

Eastern Michigan University
DigitalCommons@EMU

Master's Theses and Doctoral Dissertations

Master's Theses, and Doctoral Dissertations, and
Graduate Capstone Projects

2018

The United States and irregular warfare 1899-2011

Justin Wike

Follow this and additional works at: <https://commons.emich.edu/theses>



Part of the [Military History Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Wike, Justin, "The United States and irregular warfare 1899-2011" (2018). *Master's Theses and Doctoral Dissertations*. 948.
<https://commons.emich.edu/theses/948>

This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Master's Theses, and Doctoral Dissertations, and Graduate Capstone Projects at DigitalCommons@EMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses and Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@EMU. For more information, please contact lib-ir@emich.edu.

The United States and Irregular Warfare 1899-2011

by

Justin Wike

Thesis

Submitted to the department of History and Philosophy

Eastern Michigan University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

For the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

In

History

Thesis Committee

Steven J. Ramold Ph.D. Chair

Jesse Kauffman Ph.D.

Richard Nation Ph.D.

2018

Ypsilanti, Michigan

Acknowledgments

This thesis would not have been possible without the help of numerous individuals. I would firstly like to thank my thesis committee for their help during this process. I would especially like to thank Professor Ramold for all of the time and effort he has put into proofreading and editing the many different drafts of this thesis. I would also like to thank the staff at the National Archives in Washington DC for their assistance while I researched there. Without the generous donations from Judge Opperman to the Opperman History Research Fund I would not have been able to perform research at the National Archives. Because of this Judge Opperman has my profound thanks. Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family for their support and encouragement throughout this process.

Abstract

After the United States fought irregular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the amount of scholarship on the topic of counterinsurgency and guerilla warfare grew at a fast pace. Much of this scholarship has focused on a single conflict, or on several recent conflicts. This thesis took a different approach and looked at United States involvement in these irregular conflicts from the Philippine-American War onward through the lens of paternalism and the military strategies and tactics employed by the United States. The Philippine-American War was the first war the United States waged to maintain its overseas empire. This war would set precedents for many of the future conflicts fought by the United States. The paternalism that was present in this conflict would be present in many of the future irregular conflicts the United States was engaged in. Many of the strategies and tactics pioneered or implemented in this conflict were used in these conflicts as well. The United States' use of indigenous populations as an auxiliary or primary military force was started in the Philippines and continued in later conflicts. The concentration of the civilian populace and the positioning of numerous small outposts among the population were strategies from this conflict that would appear in future conflicts.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments..... .ii
Abstract..... .iii
Introduction..... .1
Chapter 1: War in the New Empire.....13
Chapter 2: Irregular War After Empire..... 37
Conclusion 67
Bibliography 73

Introduction

Before the Spanish-American War, the United States had concentrated its expansionist efforts on the North American continent by moving westward from the original colonies. Following the Spanish-American War, the United States became a global empire with territories in the Caribbean and Pacific. These territories included Puerto Rico in the Caribbean and the Philippines and Guam in the Pacific. While not comparable to that of the British, French, or other European powers, the United States was now an empire participating in the European tradition of colonialism that had dominated much of the world for centuries. The United States' decision to acquire the Philippines was not made before the Spanish-American War. Indeed, after the cessation of hostilities, the decision as to whether the Philippines were to become a territory or an independent nation was very much undecided in Washington. This indecision led to uncertainty in the actions undertaken by the military forces on the ground in the Philippines. The commanders on the ground were unsure as to how they should act and treat the Filipino revolutionaries.

The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the Philippines by Commodore George Dewey and his Asiatic Squadron was ancillary to the primary objective of the United States during the Spanish-American War, namely to liberate Cuba. Even though plans were in place to attack the Spanish throughout their empire, the success of the attacks came as a surprise to many in the United States. These actions in the Philippines played a minor role compared to the conflict on Cuba during the war.¹ The primary motivation for the United States to wage the Spanish-American War was the conflict in Cuba between the Spanish and the

¹ David J. Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007). Kindle Edition , 35.

revolutionaries on the island. Because the main objective for the United States was in the Caribbean theater, the actions in other parts of the world were of lower importance to those in charge compared to the campaign to liberate Cuba. With the focus in the Caribbean, the forces arrayed on the islands in the Philippines were minimal. This shortage made it difficult to adequately secure the territory and later fight the forces of the Filipino Revolution under Emilio Aguinaldo.

Many of the actions undertaken by the United States government during and after the Spanish-American War went against what many considered the goals of the United States. Many believed that the United States could have annexed Cuba and eventually granted it independence.² However, this was not the case, as the United States annexed the Hawaiian Islands and many of the former possessions of the Spanish Empire but decided against annexing Cuba. The United States kept small concessions in Cuba, such as Guantanamo Bay, and reserved the right to intervene in the affairs of Cuba if it deemed it necessary. The passage of the Teller Amendment, which specifically forbade the United States from annexing Cuba, discouraged the hopes and ideas of many by denying the United States the ability to annex Cuba after the island had been pacified.³

This thesis will focus on the war that the Army wanted to fight and the war that its soldiers fought in relation to future conflicts. Rather than focusing on purely military aspects of the Philippine-American War, this paper will instead spend some of its space focusing on the motivations behind the orders and actions taken by the Army command in the Philippines and what the end goal of these actions were. Throughout the orders issued by the

² Christine Skiwot, *Purposes of Paradise: U.S. Tourism and Empire in Cuba and Hawai'i*. (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010.), 5.

³ Skiwot, *Purposes of Paradise*, 51-52.

commanders, it is apparent that the main goal of the United States in the Philippines was to “civilize” the islands and show the natives that the Americans were “representatives of a high civilization.”⁴ The United States government and its military forces saw themselves as bringing their “higher civilization” to these backwards islands and bringing the native inhabitants up to this level of higher civilization. The United States’ actions in the Philippines were paternalistic in nature, more so than the imperialism exercised by many European nations. For example, the British colonized India through the auspices of the British East India Company and used the continent to increase the riches of the metropole at the expense of the inhabitants of India.⁵ A notorious example of this type of colonization is that of the Belgian Congo, where the colony existed solely for the benefit of the king and the native inhabitants were infamously mistreated and abused in order to enrich the crown.⁶ This is not to say that the United States had not engaged in some behaviors that could be classified as a form of informal empire prior to the Philippine-American War. The United States had begun its imperial ventures by setting the standards for the unequal treaties that many foreign nations enacted with China during the nineteenth century guaranteeing the right to extraterritoriality for its citizens in China. This treaty would become the standard by which the other colonial powers measured their success in dealing with the Chinese and the negotiation of the unequal treaties.⁷

⁴ General Orders no. 3, 9 August 1898, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps. Records of United States Army Overseas Operations and Commands, 1898-1942 Record Group (RG) 395 e.765, National Archives Building, Washington DC (NAB).

⁵ Nick Robins, *The Corporation that Changed the World: How the East India Company Shaped the Modern Multinational*. 2nd edition. (London, Pluto Press, 2012), xii.

⁶ Jenny Folsom. “Antwerp’s Appetite for African Hands.” *Contexts: Understanding People in Their Social Worlds*. Vol.15 no. 4 (65-67), 65.

⁷ Teermu Ruskola, “Canton is Not Boston: The Invention of American Imperial Sovereignty.” *American Quarterly*, vol. 57, no. 38, 60.

Even though the United States was not interested in pursuing colonization for the betterment of itself, the United States still colonized the Philippines against the wishes of many Filipinos and many people in the United States.⁸ Many of the official actions undertaken by the United States seemed to follow Rudyard Kipling's *The White Man's Burden* line, "Fill full the mouth of Famine and bid the sickness cease."⁹ The United States undertook a massive campaign to eradicate smallpox and improve the health of many areas of the Philippines, and it also constructed a considerable amount of infrastructure on the islands and made education an important piece of the occupation strategy. Many local commanders even worked to prevent starvation among the natives under their supervision. Many of the strategies and tactics employed by the United States during the conflict harken back to one of the widely held cornerstones of a successful counterinsurgency campaign, control of the populace. By using benevolent means, the United States attempted to draw people to its side of the conflict. To use a term that is often misunderstood and misused, the United States was trying to win the "hearts and minds" of the people. This term does not mean that the people would be won over by using only benevolent and nonintrusive means. Instead, the people would either have their hearts won over by the benevolent rule of the United States or they would see that it was in their best interests to support the United States even if their hearts were with the guerillas.

The prevalence of insurgencies and guerrilla conflicts in the modern day has sparked a great deal of interest in the guerilla wars and insurgencies of the past. While an attempt can certainly be made to gather knowledge from the past to better deal with problems of today,

⁸ Adam Cooke, "An Unpardonable Bit of Folly and Impertinence": Charles Francis Adams Jr., American Anti-Imperialists, and the Philippines." *The New England Quarterly*. Vol.83 no. 2. (313-338), 317.

⁹ *Rudyard Kipling: Complete Verse, Definitive Edition*. (Anchor Books/Doubleday, New York, 1940). "The White Man's Burden" 322.

the range of time between the present and the conflict covered in this thesis present some issues with attempting this approach. For one, the century or more that separates this conflict from today's conflicts are two entirely distinct time periods. These different time periods had different circumstances on the international stage and different acceptable norms of behavior. Another issue is that the nature of past irregular conflicts is the underlying factors and reasons for the conflicts. Filipino insurgents waged wars of independence against the United States and before that Spain. Trying to put these past conflicts into the perspective of either the Maoist or Islamist insurgencies of the recent past or present is problematic because the influence of Mao's guerilla warfare was not present, and the modern Islamist terrorism and insurgencies were not widely applicable. Also, the technology and knowledge of the twenty-first century has changed how wars are fought and how they are perceived. The conflicts that the Philippine-American War most closely resembled may be the wars of colonial independence that were waged against Spain in Latin America and some of the later wars of independence waged against the other colonial powers.

The conduct of the United States during the Philippine-American War was markedly different from that of the wars the earlier American Wars. Beginning with the American Revolution, the United States waged wars of extermination against the Native Americans, especially those that fought with the enemies of the United States.¹⁰ In the case of the Seminole Wars, the United States waged the wars to remove the native inhabitants to settle the land. The First Seminole War also resulted in the Spanish ceding Florida to the United States.¹¹ The United States also sent numerous Natives Americans on the Trail of Tears in

¹⁰ Holger Hoock, *Scars of Independence: America's Violent Birth*. (New York, Crown Publishing, 2017), 284.

¹¹ David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. *Old Hickory's War: Andrew Jackson and the Quest for Empire*. (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2003).

order to remove them from desirable land and caused the deaths of many.¹² These wars were not characterized by a desire of the United States to civilize and then colonize a people, but rather they were primarily waged to take the indigenous population's land and use it for the gains of the United States. During the American Civil War, the United States dealt with guerillas throughout the conflict, but the conduct towards the guerillas and the civilian population was harsh. Reprisals were common, and much of the landscape was devastated by the marauding armies and the guerillas.¹³ Similar to the Indian Wars, the United States waged a brutal war against its enemies. The difference was that the people were civilized, and the United States dealt with adversaries already familiar with and practicing those values. Unlike the Philippine-American War, the United States waged a conventional conflict alongside the guerilla conflict. While these guerilla operations would be a major issue for United States, they were not the focus of the war. The guerillas forced the United States to utilize large numbers of troops to protect against guerillas and devote other resources and planning to deal with them, but they were not the primary focus of the United States.¹⁴ Rather the United States was focused on defeating the Confederate field armies and capturing the key cities of the Confederacy.

In the case of the Philippine-American War, the United States took a different approach to warfare. After the United States captured Manila, the soldiers in the city undertook the task of cleaning Manila and bringing about the resumption of civil services.¹⁵

¹² Sean Michael O'Brien, *In Bitterness and Tears: Andrew Jackson's Destruction of the Creeks and Seminoles*. (Westport, CT, Praeger, 2003), 234.

¹³ Daniel E. Sutherland, *A Savage Conflict: the Decisive Role of Guerillas in the American Civil War*. (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2006), 133-34.

¹⁴ Robert R Mackey, *The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865*. (Norman, OK, University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 165.

¹⁵ Brian McAllister Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific 1902-1940*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). Kindle Edition, 10.

After, the Filipino insurrection reverted to a guerilla war, the United States did not make reprisals and other punitive measures the primary means of dealing with a recalcitrant populace. Instead, the United States used benevolent measures as a primary strategy and punitive measures in a secondary manner. The use of these measures ushered in the use of similar tactics by the United States military when it dealt with other unconventional military conflicts. The next century of irregular warfare waged by the United States resembled the Philippine-American War in many aspects, especially the paternalism and the primary strategies used in these conflicts. This conflict marked a turn to a more paternalistic approach by the United States in future conflicts.

When studying the wars and conflicts fought by the United States following the Philippine-American War in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the similarities and changes from previous centuries are obvious. During the Banana Wars, a series of interventions by the United States in Latin America from the 1900s through the 1930s, the United States used many similar tactics, such as the recruitment and use of local military units to combat guerillas. During the Vietnam War, the United States attempted to separate the populace from the insurgents and, in a limited manner, made use of small outposts to control the populace, just like the Philippine-American War. During the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in the twenty-first century, the United States would use many of the same strategies, principally the use of numerous small outposts and working with the local population to combat the insurgent forces. Throughout all of these conflicts, the United States also built infrastructure improvements. Another strategy that was common was the separation of the populace from the insurgent forces.

When it comes to the Spanish-American War and the Philippine-American War, there is a solid base of literature. David J Silbey's *A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902* explores the reasons why the United States declared war on Spain and how the United States waged war in the Philippines.¹⁶ Silbey wrote about both the United States and Filipino sides and goes into detail about what each side was doing and the impact these actions had on the conflict. Another work that focuses solely on the conflict is Brian McAllister Linn's *The Philippine War: 1899-1902*. This work is written to explore the conflict in its entirety from the Spanish-American War through the Philippine-American War and the numerous different locations where the conflict took place. Other works that deal with the efforts of the United States in the Philippines are Edward M. Coffman's *The Regulars: The American Army 1898-1941*.¹⁷ In this work, Coffman wrote about how the United States military waged war in the Philippines and then transitioned itself into a modern army from the frontier force it had been. The Army had mostly consisted of numerous small frontier outposts scattered across the frontier.¹⁸ Another work of a similar nature is Brian McAllister Linn's *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific 1902-1940*.¹⁹ Linn explored the role of the United States military in the Philippines and the other possessions of the United States in the Pacific Ocean. Linn goes into detail about how the military was changing and attempting to deal with the problems of protecting an overseas of empire. Linn also went into depth about the different campaigns waged in the Philippines and how the

¹⁶ Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire*.

¹⁷ Edward M. Coffman, *The Regulars: The American Army 1898-1941*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), Kindle Edition.

¹⁸ Francis Paul Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846*. (New York, Macmillan 1969), 354.

¹⁹ Linn, *Guardians of Empire*.

United States military and the Philippine colonial government dealt with the irregular forces arrayed against it.

One of the key themes that appeared in all of these works is the importance of political events and the influence these had on counterinsurgency operations. For example, Silbey argued that the election of 1900 had a profound impact on the Filipino Insurrection. After William Jennings Bryant lost the election, the insurrection lost a great deal of momentum. Because of this, many who were fighting gave up, turned themselves in, or started working for the United States against the Filipino guerrillas and Emilio Aguinaldo.²⁰ Silbey and the others also mentioned the importance of small unit commanders taking the initiative and being the ones who waged most of the war. These small units, platoons and companies, were the key to defeating the insurgency because they were the ones who had interactions with the populace on a daily basis and were also responsible for protecting the populace and fighting the guerillas.²¹ No matter the orders these individuals received from above, it was the actions of these small units and the men that constituted them that won the war for the United States. If these men had chosen to wage a more violent war with little regard for the civilian populace, it is very likely that the war would have turned out differently and the war would have been remembered far differently than it is now, if it is even remembered at all.

Another group of works that deal with the counter-guerrilla activities of the United States are works such as Max Boot's *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of*

²⁰ Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire*, 161-162.

²¹ *Ibid*, 181-183.

American Power.²² In this work, Boot looked at many of the so-called small wars that the United States has fought, including the United States' efforts in the Philippines during the Philippine-American War. Another work of a similar nature is *Heart and Minds: A Peoples History of Counterinsurgency*²³ edited by Hannah Gurman. Like Boot's work, this book contains a variety of topics relating to several wars. A final work that shares similarities with the two-forementioned works is James R. Arnold's *Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq*.²⁴ Like the others, Arnold writes about multiple conflicts in his book in order to showcase the similarities and differences between them. One of the main differences between all of these works is the scope and reason behind their works. In the case of Boot, he wishes to show small wars have shaped the United States and its rise to power while Gurman and the authors in her edited volume attempted to show how counterinsurgency operations have affected the civilian population. Lastly, Arnold shows similarities between counterinsurgency operations and demonstrate how different counterinsurgency operations were waged in an attempt to show how effective different tactics and strategies were in combating guerillas and insurgents. While these works deal with the Spanish-American War and the Philippine-American War among other topics, only Arnold deals exclusively with the topic of counterinsurgency warfare, and he focuses on several different conflicts. Unlike the works of Linn and Coffman, this project will not focus on societal changes within the military or other topics. While these are certainly important, they fall outside of the scope of this research project but do offer tantalizing ideas for future

²² Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace and the Rise of American Power*. (New York: Basic Books, 2002), Kindle Edition.

²³ *Hearts and Minds: A People's History of counterinsurgency*. Edited by Hannah Gurman. (New York: The New Press. 2013).

²⁴ James R. Arnold, *Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq*. (New York: Bloomsbury Press. 2009).

research on this topic. What differentiates this thesis from the work of these prior studies is that it takes the experiences of the United States during the Philippine-American War and extrapolates this to other conflicts through the lens of paternalism and the way the United States waged these conflicts.

Many of the primary sources used in this work come from the National Archives in Washington DC. The material located there is voluminous and is an excellent source for those who wish to see the official records of the military forces that occupied the Philippines. The records used include the Records of the U.S. Army Overseas Operations and Commands contained in Record Group (RG) 395. These records include the correspondence and orders issued from the commander in the Philippines down to the individual outposts maintained by the United States. These documents offer a glimpse into the mindset of the officers and command of the Army stationed in the Philippines. The orders and correspondence show how the commanders wanted the war to be waged. The records also contain reports of operations and capture the way the war was fought by those at the junior levels of the military. These orders also give insight into the concerns of commanders and how events in the Philippines and the rest of the world influenced the decisions of the commanders in the Philippines. With the use of these documents, it is possible to see how the United States wanted to wage the war in the Philippines and, in many cases how the war was waged. These official records also mentioned the behaviors of the troops stationed in the Philippines. These include the exemplary behavior of the soldiers as well as the reprehensible behavior of others. These incidents demonstrate the differences between the war that the commanders wanted to wage and the war as it was fought by the individual soldiers stationed in their outposts throughout the Philippines. The utilization of these reports will help show how the

orders from superiors were followed and how the United States punished those who disobeyed them.

The first chapter of this paper will give the reader a general overview of the Philippine-American War. This chapter will serve as an introduction to the conflict and will introduce the many different strategies and tactics employed by the United States. The second chapter will analyze how many of the different strategies and tactics used in the Philippine-American War were also used in other conflicts waged by the United States. These conflicts include the Banana Wars, the Vietnam War, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These chapters will look at specific examples that show similarities in how the United States waged the Philippine-American War and these future conflicts.

With the recent past showing that the United States has continued to become involved in irregular conflicts, it is important to understand that the conflicts of the past may not hold the answers to these recent conflicts. However, these conflicts show us that the United States has continued to act in a similar manner as in the past. Even though the specifics of each conflict have changed, the overarching structures for the United States involvement have remained similar.

Chapter One: War in the New Empire

When the United States declared war on Spain in 1898, the concentration of almost every American was on Cuba. The primary motivator for the United States declaration of war against Spain was the conflict on Cuba raging between the Spanish and rebels on the island. Thus, when Commodore Dewey attacked and sank the Spanish fleet stationed in the Philippines, there was not a firm idea of what to do following the victory. Consequently, the forces the United States sent to the Philippines were small and lacked direction from Washington on how to proceed, and they were constantly on the periphery of the conflict for those in the United States and Washington.

When the first troops from the United States arrived, they joined the rebels surrounding Manila. After the Americans were in position around Manila, there was a lack of clear direction from President William McKinley.²⁵ As the siege continued, the troops stationed in the Philippines lacked decisive direction from Washington. Instead, commanders received orders that lacked specifics on how they were to interact with Filipino rebels and with the continued Spanish presence on the islands. When General Wesley Merritt, the first commander of the expedition to the Philippines, finished meeting with President McKinley, he was unsure as to what exactly the president wanted him to do in the Philippines.²⁶ Events took a turn when the army stationed in the Philippines assaulted Manila without the prior knowledge or assistance from the Filipino rebels. The assault was prearranged between the United States and Spanish forces. The Spanish forces put up a token resistance to save face and then abandoned their positions and gave the city to the United States while at the same

²⁵ John Morgan Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1899-1902*. (Westport, Conn. Greenwood Press Inc. 1973), 4.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 5.

time the United States tried to prevent the Filipinos from gaining entry to the city.²⁷ The Americans and Spanish wanted to prevent the Filipino rebels from gaining access to Manila because they feared the rebels would sack the city and mistreat the populace.

The assault on the city went off as planned. An artillery bombardment from the ships located in the harbor, and the field guns heralded the beginning of the Battle of Manila. The bombardment was followed by the advance of the United States forces towards the Spanish lines. As arranged, the Spanish forces put up a token resistance and then retreated to the city and surrendered to the United States.²⁸ While the assault was planned with the intent to keep the Filipino Rebels out of Manila, many took part in the attack and took control over many areas of the city and the suburbs.²⁹ With the capture of Manila, the United States was now in possession of the capital of the Philippines, but little else. The United States went from the besieger to the besieged over the course of a single day.

While the situation had changed for the United States forces stationed on the island, there was still a lack of direction from Washington. With the capture of Manila, the already tenuous relationship between the United States and the Filipino rebels became worse. Because Washington could not decide if the Philippines were to be annexed or given their independence, the commanders had no direction on how to deal with the rebels. They did not know if the army was only supposed to occupy Manila or attempt to capture the whole archipelago and subdue Aguinaldo's forces.³⁰ The Filipino rebels were decidedly perturbed at

²⁷ Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 23-24.

²⁸ Brian McAllister Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific 1902-1940*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). Kindle Edition,, 10.

²⁹ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 25.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 26.

the United States' attempt to keep them out of Manila. This attempt contributed to the souring of relations between the United States and the Filipino rebels.³¹ With the United States' soldiers stationed inside the city and the Filipino rebels surrounding them the situation developed into a stalemate with both forces waiting in the calm before the storm. Throughout this time of waiting, tensions between both sides were high and there were numerous instances where events threatened to break out into open conflict.³²

After the United States occupied Manila, they found the city in disarray. Trash was lying in the streets, schools were closed, and the populace was on the verge of an epidemic. To combat these problems, the United States implemented the cleanup of the trash, opened the schools, and began inoculating the populace against smallpox.³³ While these actions were certainly benevolent, they also served to keep the soldiers stationed in the city healthy and prevented the outbreak of civil unrest that the army could ill-afford to deal with at the time. The United States also undertook the trial and sentencing of criminals in the city. In one case, an "Anoto Lorente, did unlawfully and feloniously assault one Suprema Luxon, ...against her will did ravish and carnally know the said Suprema Luxon."³⁴ For this crime the court sentenced Lorente to ten years of hard labor.³⁵ Another civilian was tried during this time for "circulating seditious newspaper articles in violation of the laws of war."³⁶ The man, Antonio Hidalgo, was found guilty of all but one of the six charges leveled against him. For his

³¹ Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 26.

³² *Ibid*, 26-27.

³³ Anthony James Joes. "Counterinsurgency in the Philippines 1899-1954" in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. Edited by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian. (New York, Osprey Publishing, 2008), 44.

³⁴ General Order no.35 November 30, 1898. Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps. vol 2. RG 395, e.765 National Archives, Washington DC.

³⁵ *Ibid*.

³⁶ General Orders no.38, December 17, 1898.. Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps. vol 2. RG 395, e. 765 NAB.

crimes, Hidalgo was assessed a “fine of five hundred dollars in United States gold coin,”³⁷ and the sentence was later commuted to two hundred and fifty dollars by General Elwell Otis.³⁸ The United States restored much of the civil functions of the city of Manila and undertook the day to day activities of running a city and imparting law and order. By doing so, the United States showed the populace that the United States was not the same as the Spanish who had ruled the Philippines but rather a more benevolent and paternalistic force.

Throughout the remainder of 1898, the United States and Filipino forces remained in a stalemate. Neither side was willing to upset the precarious status quo that had emerged after the Spanish capitulation of the city. Throughout the stalemate, the United States continued to reinforce its presence in the Philippines with troops arriving from the West Coast of the United States. These troops consisted of regular army units made up of professional soldiers who were generally well equipped and disciplined. The other units were made up of state volunteers made up of prewar state militia and volunteers who had joined after the United States declared war. For example, “when Company B, 13th Minnesota, mustered 112 officers and men into service on 7 March all but 12 of the enlisted men were new volunteers.”³⁹ Unlike the regulars, the volunteers were not very well equipped. Instead, they were armed with outdated firearms and equipment, while many of the regulars were armed with the more modern Krag-Jorgensen bolt action rifle.⁴⁰ While certainly an eclectic mix of men and arms, the United States forces were generally well disciplined and motivated, with many of the men and officers in these units having served in the American Civil War and the many

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 12.

⁴⁰ David J. Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 72-74.

campaigns against the Native Americans in the Western United States.⁴¹ For example Arthur MacArthur had served in the American Civil War and reached the rank of Colonel.

While the mix of United States units may have looked inadequate, especially considering the lack of manpower and outdated equipment, the Filipino rebels were hardly in a better position themselves. Whereas the United States had a strong centralized military and political apparatus, the rebels lacked this strong consolidation of authority. Even though Emilio Aguinaldo was the titular head of the rebellion, he lacked power like those of United States military officers and the President of the United States. Aguinaldo constantly had to settle infighting among his subordinates and deal with their unwillingness to follow his and other officers' orders.⁴² Not only was there a serious lack of discipline among Aguinaldo's followers, his forces were even less well equipped than the United States' military. Unlike the United States soldiers, the rebels had a motley assortment of arms that they had captured from the Spanish and acquired through other means.⁴³ They did not have enough firearms to equip all their forces. The rebels also lacked sufficient artillery, which the United States did not.⁴⁴ The one advantage the rebels had was in numbers. However, without the proper armaments for all their forces, the advantage in numbers that the rebels possessed was of little value against the far better equipped and disciplined United States Army.

Even though the rebels did not possess an advantage in material, or the quality of their forces one advantage, they possessed was that they knew the terrain. The rebels were also emplaced in defensive positions that the United States soldiers would have to attack to

⁴¹ Edward M. Coffman, *The Regulars: The American Army 1898-1941*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), Kindle Edition, 6-7.

⁴² Linn, *The Philippine War*, 34-35.

⁴³ Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire*, 41.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 73.

break the siege and bring the fight to the rebels. The rebels also began infiltrating Manila to prepare for the battle over the city that was inevitable.⁴⁵ By infiltrating Manila, the rebels placed their forces in a position where they could strike a blow against the rear of the United States Army manning the lines around Manila. For many armies this would have proven to be a huge advantage, but not for the rebels. Some of the units in the United States Army had been detailed as a provost guard inside Manila to provide policing and to counteract such a move by the Filipinos.⁴⁶ Aguinaldo's forces also lacked coordination so that when the battle for Manila finally came, they were unorganized and made little impact on the battle.

The mounting tension between both sides broke out into a battle on the night of February 4, 1899, when sporadic firing along the lines turned into a full-fledged battle after American sentries fired on a small group of Filipinos that had approached their post.⁴⁷ The spontaneous nature of the battle meant that coordination among both sides was haphazard and lacking.⁴⁸ The surprising nature of the battle benefitted the United States because the rebels that had secreted themselves into the city were caught just as unaware as the Americans. Because of this, the rebels' actions were disorganized, and the provost guard within the city reacted quickly and decisively ending most of the threat posed by the rebels in the American rear.⁴⁹

The United States forces were able to overrun the rebel positions and break the siege of Manila. Many of the attacking units had so much success that they were in danger of

⁴⁵ Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire*, 64.

⁴⁶ General Orders No. 20, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, Philippine Islands, RG 365 E. 765 NAB.

⁴⁷ Mark Moyar, *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency From the Civil War to Iraq*. (New Haven CT. Yale University Press, 2009). 66.

⁴⁸ Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 76-77.

⁴⁹ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 47.

advancing too far and losing the support of other units.⁵⁰ These units also risked attack by rebel forces on their flanks and then being cut off from neighboring forces. However, the rebels were uncoordinated and incompetent when it came to taking advantage of these American mistakes.⁵¹ The United States forces were able to overrun the Filipino rebel positions with relatively light casualties, suffering sixty killed to the Filipino's three thousand.⁵² This can be attributed to the discipline of the United States forces, and the lack of skill among the Filipino rebels, who were quite frequently reported as shooting above the heads of the approaching volunteers and regulars.⁵³ Following the aftermath of the battle, the situation had changed dramatically for the United States and the Filipino rebels. Whereas the United States had been contained in Manila in a stalemate with the Filipino Rebels, now the momentum had shifted to the United States.

What followed the Battle of Manila were a series of engagements where the United States advanced against the Filipino rebels. In almost every encounter, the United States forces would advance against entrenched Filipino rebels and then defeat Aguinaldo's soldiers. Despite the numerical superiority and with the advantage of defending fortified positions, the Filipino rebels were unable to defeat, or hold, the United States forces arrayed against them.⁵⁴ Not only were the Filipinos incapable of defeating the United States, but with each defeat the rebels were becoming increasingly demoralized and fissures were starting to appear in their ranks.⁵⁵ The Filipinos were also losing large amounts of supplies and

⁵⁰ Ibid, 50.

⁵¹ Ibid, 50.

⁵² Anthony James Joes. "Counterinsurgency in the Philippines 1898-1954" in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. Edited by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian. (New York, Osprey Publishing, 2008). 21.

⁵³ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 49.

⁵⁴ James R. Arnold, *Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq*. (New York: Bloomsbury Press. 2009), 19.

⁵⁵ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 136.

equipment to the United States with every loss; these could not be replaced.⁵⁶ In successive battles, the rebels lost a great deal of their modern arms and the ammunition. In many instances, the rebels abandoned positions without bothering to take their supplies with them.⁵⁷

After the breakout from Manila, the United States had managed to separate the Filipino forces between the north and those who were to the south of the city. These Filipino rebels were a constant problem for the United States because they threatened the southern flank of the United States forces in Manila and prevented more forces from being dispatched to fight Aguinaldo in the north, so the United States undertook operations against the rebels in the south. Because the majority of the available forces being deployed to combat Aguinaldo in the North,⁵⁸ many of the operations conducted by the United States to the south of Manila consisted of limited advances against the Filipinos. After the advances, the United States fell back to its original defensive positions closer to Manila and abandoned the gains made because the United States lacked sufficient manpower to continue an offensive to the south of Manila in addition to the main offensive to the north of Manila⁵⁹

The Filipino rebels were constantly wracked by internal problems and infighting. While Emilio Aguinaldo was the titular head of the rebellion, his authority was far from absolute. Because of this, he had extreme difficulty combating the United States. His generals and officers were often unwilling to listen to his orders and refused to obey many of them.⁶⁰ Not only were his generals and officers insubordinate, his men were also

⁵⁶ Ibid, 158.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 151.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 95.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 94-95.

⁶⁰ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 101.

undisciplined. There were many reported incidents where Filipino soldiers abandoned their positions when the United States forces closed in on them and began to have any success during an attack.⁶¹ Because of these difficulties, Aguinaldo's forces became demoralized and were losing territory to the United States with each battle. To add insult to injury, the United States captured Aguinaldo's capital of Malolos as he retreated into the interior of the island of Luzon.⁶² Aguinaldo's rebellion was also beset by political intrigue and mistrust among the officers. This mistrust led Aguinaldo to undertake many decisions that in hindsight proved to be ill-advised. One of these decisions was the execution of General Antonio Luna. He was arguably one of Aguinaldo's most capable officers, but Aguinaldo mistrusted and feared Luna to such a degree that it is believed Aguinaldo had him murdered by his personal bodyguard.⁶³

Even though Aguinaldo was the leader of the Filipino rebellion, he lacked authority over any rebel forces that were not under his direct control on the island of Luzon. Even though many of the rebels on neighboring islands were pledged to him, they would make their own decisions despite the orders they received from Aguinaldo.⁶⁴ In an attempt to control these groups, Aguinaldo sent advisors to train and keep the disparate rebel groups under his control. However, because of the difficulty in communication, Aguinaldo had difficulty sending orders and then ensuring that they were followed. This communications problem was exacerbated in later years when Aguinaldo could only communicate by using messengers after the conflict had turned into a guerilla war.⁶⁵ Also, because Aguinaldo

⁶¹ Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire*, 76.

⁶² Linn, *The Philippine War*, 99.

⁶³ *Ibid*, 136.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 71.

⁶⁵ Arnold, *A Jungle of Snakes*, 21.

focused on fighting the United States forces that were arrayed against him in Manila and Luzon, he did not have the time nor manpower to see that his orders were followed on the other islands.

After suffering numerous defeats at the hands of the United States throughout the campaigning season of 1899, Aguinaldo was faced with the realization that he could not win a war against the United States in a conventional manner. Instead, Aguinaldo believed he had to wage a guerilla campaign that would draw out the conflict and hopefully result in a victory for the rebellion by tiring out the United States and turning the United States populace against the war.⁶⁶ With this decision, Aguinaldo gave up any direct control he had over the rebellion. What little authority he had was gone, and now he would have to rule on the run from the United States and through unreliable communications.

The communications and command problems that beset Aguinaldo were in large part due to the terrain on the Islands of the Philippines. There were very few roads, and those that existed were often little more than paths through the countryside and jungle.⁶⁷ While the terrain hampered Aguinaldo, it also hampered the United States forces that worked to defeat the rebellion. The maps the United States used did not accurately portray the terrain that the military would encounter, and it was often far more difficult to traverse than the commanders were led to believe.⁶⁸ Each advance by the United States required the buildup of supplies before the operation could commence, and these supplies had to be transported over the almost nonexistent roads or the main railway system.⁶⁹ In addition to being slowed by the

⁶⁶ Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 99.

⁶⁷ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 95.

⁶⁸ Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire*, 117.

⁶⁹ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 92.

terrain, the army suffered many casualties due to sickness and exhaustion. For example, “when MacArthur’s 2nd Division finished one twenty-day campaign... 2,600 of its 4,800 soldiers were on sick report.”⁷⁰ The advances taken by the army took far longer than expected and resulted in many casualties from disease and exhaustion. These hardships caused missed opportunities that might have led to Aguinaldo’s capture, or dealt serious blows to the rebels.⁷¹ Shortly after Aguinaldo launched the guerilla campaign, the United States attempted to capture him as he retreated towards the mountainous interior of Luzon. The plan involved multiple forces that would attempt to encircle Aguinaldo and his army to prevent his escape into the mountains.⁷² However, when the forces marched out, they encountered difficult terrain that prevented them from encircling Aguinaldo, and while they were pursuing Aguinaldo and his men, they ran into a rear guard that slowed down the pursuit enough so that Aguinaldo escaped into the mountains.⁷³

The lack of infrastructure in the Philippines prompted the United States to undertake the construction of roads and telegraph lines throughout the islands to increase their mobility, and to improve communications.⁷⁴ Nearly every major outpost was connected by telegraph and received numerous reports ranging from the mundane to important.⁷⁵ Because of the importance of these telegraph lines to the United States military, they were a constant target of the Filipino rebels. The cutting and destruction of telegraph wires by the rebels were such

⁷⁰ Ibid, 90.

⁷¹ Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire*, 56.

⁷² Linn, *The Philippine War*, 139.

⁷³ Ibid, 156.

⁷⁴ Anthony James Joes. “Counterinsurgency in the Philippines 1898-1954” in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. Edited by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian. (New York, Osprey Publishing, 2008), 41.

⁷⁵ Telegram, September 5, 1901 Capbayog Samar, RG 395 e. 3507. NAB.

a problem that those who were caught undertaking such an endeavor were severely punished for doing so including execution.⁷⁶

Even though the United States was focused almost entirely on the island of Luzon, this did not mean that the other islands in the Philippines had been neglected. Soon after the United States had sizeable forces in the Philippines, soldiers were sent to the other major islands. These islands included Negros and Panay along with other islands in the Visayas.⁷⁷ These forces encountered similar problems to the United States forces stationed in Manila in that they lacked the numbers necessary to defeat their Filipino adversaries and were instead confined to little more than the major population areas they controlled. Because of this, they were only able to haphazardly implement the plans McKinley and the United States' government had for the islands.⁷⁸ Merritt dispatched the first of these troops to take control of the major port of Iloilo City on the island of Iloilo. They arrived to find that the port had already fallen to the Filipino rebels.⁷⁹ Because of the lack of clear direction from the executive branch of the United States government, the forces stayed on their ships because the rebels had refused to surrender the city to the United States without direction from Aguinaldo's government.⁸⁰ After hostilities began between the rebels and the United States forces in Manila in February 1899, the expeditionary forces undertook a landing against the rebels in the port. As the United States forces conducted their amphibious assault on the port, the city erupted into flames.⁸¹ There is some debate as to who set fire to the port. The United States claimed that it was the rebels, whereas the rebels claimed that it was the invading

⁷⁶ Arnold, *Jungle of Snakes*, 43.

⁷⁷ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 72-73.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 76.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 38.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 39.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, 67.

United States forces that did so. The most likely explanation is that the fire was caused by both parties in their efforts to either capture or defend the city during the battle.⁸²

In other islands throughout the Philippines, the United States sent soldiers to take control of these areas and enforce the authority of the United States over the native inhabitants. Each of these locations varied in their reactions to the United States. On Negros, the United States met with approval from many of the locals who formed a government that helped the United States rule the island and was seen by many as an example of how the United States could rule the Philippines.⁸³ On other islands, the United States encountered a great deal of resistance to their arrival and rule, such as on Iloilo.⁸⁴ While these islands were not the focus of the United States, they were nonetheless important to the overall goal of defeating the rebels in the Philippines.

The most famous of these was the final operation to capture Aguinaldo.⁸⁵ This mission was undertaken by a small group of United States military officers who relied on the native scouts to deceive Aguinaldo into believing that the officers had been captured and that the Filipino scouts were reinforcements sent to Aguinaldo by one of his officers.⁸⁶ The detachment landed on a remote part of the coast and then marched through the jungle to Aguinaldo's hideout. Once the detachment reached Aguinaldo, an honor guard of Aguinaldo's men awaited the detachment expecting them to be the prisoners and reinforcements that were promised. When the United States officers were led into Aguinaldo's headquarters, the officers sprung the trap and arrested Aguinaldo and took him

⁸² Ibid, 68.

⁸³ Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 35.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 90-91.

⁸⁵ Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 233.

⁸⁶ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 275.

through the jungle to be picked up by the Navy.⁸⁷ With the capture of Aguinaldo, the United States scored a major psychological victory over the insurgents, and many insurgents surrendered after hearing the news. Others surrendered after learning that Aguinaldo had pledged allegiance to the United States and had asked for his men to surrender to the United States. The capture of Aguinaldo also coincided with a general breakdown of the insurgency against the United States.⁸⁸ While certainly not the primary reason for the collapse of the insurgency, the capture of Aguinaldo was nevertheless an important victory for the United States. By keeping Aguinaldo alive the United States was able to get many insurgents to surrender because Aguinaldo told them to do so. Instead of executing Aguinaldo the United States showed the Filipinos that they were more benevolent than the Spanish, by sparing Aguinaldo and showing that the United States was willing to work with native people instead of attempting to fight them and rule them in a totalitarian manner.

After the United States had forced Aguinaldo to change from a conventional conflict to a guerilla conflict, it took time for the United States forces to adapt to this new conflict. The first efforts by the United States were haphazard and lacked a cohesion. Soon the United States developed a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy that ultimately wore down and defeated the rebels. One of the key features of this strategy was the use of numerous small outposts placed throughout the islands to exert authority and control over the populace. This strategy also served to protect those loyal to the United States from retaliation by the insurgents. As the conflict continued the number of outposts grew consistently until there were hundreds of them scattered throughout the Philippines.⁸⁹ One of these outposts was

⁸⁷ Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire*, 177.

⁸⁸ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 275.

⁸⁹ Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 299.

created when “2nd Lieutenant F. Pratt, 1st Infantry,” was ordered “with [a] detachment 50 men Co, ‘L’ 1st Infantry, fifteen native police, thirty caragadores [porters], and five prisoners, to proceed to Coradosa on the Mondiaogon River and establish a base there.”⁹⁰ Each of these outposts were only manned by a small number of soldiers who were, for all intents and purposes, operating independently of most authority. These outposts were not only responsible for projecting the military power and authority of the United States, they were also tasked with more mundane administrative tasks. These included running the local governments, undertaking infrastructure projects, operating the customs and tax apparatuses, and instructing at the local schools.⁹¹ In the Visayas, the outpost commanders were directed that “a book of ‘Individual Histories’ shall be kept, in which shall be entered in a systematic manner the names of such persons, their family relations, their political connections, vocation, and financial standing.”⁹² By keeping records of individuals, the military had a more accurate picture of the populace they were dealing with, and this information would allow them to better fight the insurgents by having information available on who belonged in the towns and villages, as well as who to question if an individual was suspected of being an insurgent.

As the expedition in the preceding paragraph mentioned, 2nd Lieutenant Pratt went out with a contingent of native police. The United States would use large numbers of the indigenous populace to augment their own forces in the form of scouts raised to support the United States military stationed throughout the islands. These forces served to increase the

⁹⁰ General Order no. 4, Catarman, Samar, January 21st 1902. Special Orders Catarman RG 395, e 3445. NAB.

⁹¹ Brigadier General Grant, Telegram May 12, 1902. Telegrams Sent and Received, Mauo Samar, RG 395, NAB.

⁹² Headquarters Department of the Visayas, Confidential Memorandum December 27, 1900, RG 395, e. 5454, NAB.

limited forces sent to the Philippines. Even though the United States raised large numbers of indigenous soldiers, they were never the main fighting force during the Philippine-American War. These scouts were also invaluable because they knew the culture of the civilian populace and had connections among the populace that could be used to gather intelligence.⁹³ While they were never the main fighting force, the Filipino Scouts were often used by the United States on the islands. Many patrols like the one Lieutenant Pratt led were made up of a combination of Filipino Scouts and soldiers. For example, one patrol consisted of “a detachment consisting of...15 enlisted men of Company ‘L’ 1st Infty 20 Ilocano Scouts...under command of Captain N.L. Jackson 1st Inftyt.”⁹⁴ The communications sent to many outposts detailed the number of men that were to embark on patrols and expeditions. The patrol dispatched above commanded by Captain Jackson completed its mission along with detachments from other units. The results of the operation were chronicled in Captain Jackson’s report. One detachment of native scouts was responsible for “thirteen natives killed, 1 wounded, three men and three women captured, 36 houses destroyed, 400 cabanas rice, 46 carabaos killed.”⁹⁵ The expedition that Captain Jackson personally led “captured 7 bolomen three of whom were vigilancias of Lukban’s for the Catarman, Bobon and Carainan District.”⁹⁶ The Native Scouts performed well on this expedition, and the expedition was successful in destroying many stores of the insurgents as well as killing and capturing many others.

⁹³ Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire*, 165.

⁹⁴ Special Orders number 14. Mauo, Samar, P.I. March 14: 1904. RG 395, e. 4478.NAB.

⁹⁵ Letter Catbolgan, Samar, P.I. November 30th, 1901. Letters Sent Jan.-Oct. 1902 Catarman, Samar. RG395 e. 3443. NAB.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

Besides using the scouts on many missions, the United States routinely increased the number of scouts. Many commanders wanted more Scouts, but there was a lack of action on this from the command in Manila. It took much prodding before General Arthur MacArthur increased the number of scouts that had been begun under his predecessor Elwell Otis.⁹⁷ After this, the size of the scouts were steadily increased. In one letter, the quartermaster at Calbayog was authorized to employ “fifteen (15) native scouts at \$15.max, and one (1) Chief of scouts at \$30.00 max...he [the general issuing the orders] may authorize an increase of the number allowed to thirty (30).”⁹⁸ As explained above, the increase in the size of the indigenous scouts was an integral to the United States’ strategy and served to increase the capabilities of the limited forces stationed in the Philippines.

As well as managing the mundane day to day activities, the outposts frequently sent men out on patrols to protect the populace. One of these patrols guarded a group of locals that gathered hemp.⁹⁹ This patrol highlighted the importance that was placed on protecting the local populace and providing economic security to the populace. If the civilian population was able to support themselves economically, they would be less likely to challenge the United States. If the civilians were protected from the insurgents, then the civilians would be more willing to assist the United States without fear of reprisal from the insurgents. Other patrols were sent to capture specific insurgents whose location had become known.¹⁰⁰ By capturing the leaders, the insurgents lost their commanders and any men that were with the leader, depriving the insurgents of men and reducing the effectiveness of the insurgents.

⁹⁷ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 215-216.

⁹⁸ Letter to Quartermaster Calbayog, Samar, P.I. August 21 1901.. Letters Sent May-Nov. 1901. RG 395 e. 2550. NAB.

⁹⁹ Letter Commanding Officer. Calbayog, Samar, P.I. August 21 1901. Letters Sent May-Nov. 1901. RG 395 e. 2550. NAB.

¹⁰⁰ General Orders no. 4, January 21, 1902. Special Orders, Cartarman. RG 395 e. 3445. NAB.

Other patrols were sent out simply to project the presence of the United States and undertake actions against the insurgents that were operating in the area.¹⁰¹ By sending out these patrols, the United States showed the people and the insurgents that they could move around the area at will. If the insurgents decided to engage the patrol, they would have to pit their limited strength against that of the well-armed patrols. If the attack failed, the insurgents lost many of their men to the patrol and weakened themselves as well as showing the populace that they were incapable of defeating the Americans.

The men in charge of the outposts were also responsible for ensuring the proper health of the local inhabitants. Commanders in charge of these outposts requested supplies and food to be shipped to the towns and ports to keep them supplied. One officer requested that “a small steamer loaded with two thousand sacks of rice and a reasonable quantity of salt, at the port of Manila for Catbalogan. The stores of rice are almost exhausted at this place.”¹⁰² When permission was granted for these provisions to be shipped the commanders were often ordered to sell the rice at a reasonable price to ensure profit for the firms undertaking the shipping of the rice. One commander was ordered to keep the rice “stored [so] that you can supervise and regulate its sale. It will be sold at a price fixed by you, allowing a reasonable profit to the agents, and only to such persons and in such quantities as you may designate.”¹⁰³ The commanders of these outposts were tasked with regulatory affairs that would have normally been under the purview of civilian officials. By setting the price of the rice, the outpost commander would prevent the price from being extremely high,

¹⁰¹ General Orders no. 10 Catarman Samar. March 10, 1902. Letters Sent Jan.-July 1902 Mauo, Samar. RG 395 e. 4478. NAB.

¹⁰² Telegram Calbayog August 1, 1901. Telegrams Sent May-June, August-November 1901; Telegrams received July-Nov. 1901. RG 395 e 2551/2552. NAB.

¹⁰³ Borongan, Samar. Letter October 23, 1901. Letters Sent May-Nov. 1901. RG 395 e. 2550. NAB.

while still protecting those who were undertaking the risk of shipping the rice. By performing this action, the men in charge were able to ensure the people could afford to feed themselves and promote the economy on a small local scale. To keep tight control over the movement of supplies and food, the ships that the food was being transported on were required to be named.¹⁰⁴ Reports were also requested of the progress of these ships to ensure they were not transporting any items that would assist the Filipino rebels.¹⁰⁵ By controlling to whom the rice was sold, the commanders could prevent insurgents or known insurgent sympathizers from gathering rice to send to the insurgents.

In addition to policing and looking after the civilian population, the United States also policed its own men. A sergeant was investigated on the Island of Samar for misconduct in his dealings with a merchant. In this instance, a Sergeant Martin detained a merchant at his post for attempting to trade at a closed port. This merchant “was induced to sell his cargo, which he asserts cost Seven Hundred Pesos at Manila, to Sergeant Martin, or to his so-called “wife”, a Filipina girl, for Four Hundred Pesos rather than lose all.” Sergeant Martin or his wife then proceeded to sell the part of the cargo. A 2nd lieutenant intervened and confiscated the cargo, the proceeds from Sergeant Martin’s sales and the money paid to the merchant. Sergeant Martin was detained and the second lieutenant was able to determine that the merchant’s story about being moved off course by the wind and currents was plausible, and therefore, it was determined that the merchant was not trying to break the blockade around the Island of Samar. This episode showed that the United States was not only interested in bringing justice and law and order to the Philippines and the inhabitants of the Island but also

¹⁰⁴ Telegram Calbayog August 12, 1901. Telegrams Sent May-June, August-November 1901; Telegrams received July-Nov. 1901. RG 395 e 2551/2552. NAB.

¹⁰⁵ Telegram Calbayog August 2, 1901.. Telegrams Sent May-June, August-November 1901; Telegrams received July-Nov. 1901. RG 395 e 2551/2552. NAB.

in holding its own soldiers to the same or higher standards. In addition to holding its soldiers to a higher standard the United States also treated the inhabitants with respect and fairness in legal proceedings¹⁰⁶

While the aforementioned strategy and policies were benevolent in nature, the United States also undertook many strategies and actions that were less benevolent, even malevolent in some respects. One of the actions undertaken by the United States was the institution of the policy of concentration. This policy came about in the areas that were most resilient to efforts of the United State to pacify them. This strategy involved forcibly removing the populace from their homes and concentrating them into areas where they could be controlled and separated from the insurgents.¹⁰⁷ This strategy was ultimately effective, but it inflicted a great deal of hardship on the civilian populace that was forced into the concentration areas. This strategy succeeded because it deprived the insurgents of support from the populace and the supplies they needed. While the civilian populace was relocated into areas that were under the direct supervision of the United States, there were some problems with concentration. One of the major issues with the concentration of the populace was disease, especially cholera.¹⁰⁸ While the United States soldiers were under strict orders to boil all their water, food, cookware, and utensils, which was effective in combating the disease, the civilians were far less fortunate.¹⁰⁹ Many civilians died because of the use of concentration as

¹⁰⁶ Letter Mauo, Samar, June 14, 1902. Letters Sent Mauo Samar January 1902 – July 1902 RG 395 e. 4478. NAB.

¹⁰⁷ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 262-263.

¹⁰⁸ Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire*, 197.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 199.

a strategy, and this caused the policy to receive a great deal of negative press and a negative reputation.¹¹⁰

While the populace was under the direct control of the United States military, this allowed the United States to patrol the uninhabited areas and hunt the insurgents. Any male that was outside of the concentration camps was to be arrested and shot if they resisted. The patrols also destroyed any caches of supplies that they encountered.¹¹¹ This strategy deprived the insurgents of supplies by preventing the populace from giving the insurgents supplies and destroying any supplies that were found outside the concentration areas. By denying the insurgents food and supplies, concentration forced the insurgents to spend more time and resources looking for these necessities and less time fighting the United States. Without food, the insurgents were unable to sustain themselves and offer an effective resistance to the United States beginning the end of insurgent activity in these areas.¹¹²

Another tactic employed by many United States soldiers was the use of the water cure and other torture techniques on insurgents and suspected insurgents. The water cure involved forcing water into an individual's stomach until he "became distended. The interrogators forced the water out by kicking the victim. Then they filled him with water again."¹¹³ The use of the water cure and other torture techniques placed a black mark on the United States efforts to pacify the Philippines. While the use of such techniques has certainly been over-exaggerated due to the sensational nature of the tactics employed, they were nevertheless

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 58.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 57.

¹¹² Linn, *The Philippine War*, 262-263.

¹¹³ William Weir. *Guerilla Warfare: Irregular Warfare in the Twentieth Century*. (Mechanicsburg, PA, Stackpole Books, 2008), 22.

employed and rarely were the perpetrators of such actions punished.¹¹⁴ The use of such tactics by some of the soldiers eventually served to sensationalize the conflict and distract the public and many people from other aspects of the Philippine-American War.¹¹⁵

The success of the United States was far from certain as the conflict dragged on. One of the most infamous episodes of the conflict was the ambush of the United States forces at the coastal town of Balangiga. The populace was seemingly docile and welcoming of the United States presence there, and the mayor had invited the Army there for protection.¹¹⁶ Unbeknownst to the United States soldiers stationed there, this turned into a ploy to get the soldiers to let their guard down for an eventual attack against them. This attack was retaliation for several instances of misconduct including theft and a rape.¹¹⁷ Prior to the attack, the townspeople had concealed weapons and insurgents to prepare for the attack. On the morning of September 28, 1901, while the men of Company C of the 9th U.S. Infantry were getting breakfast, the townspeople and the insurgents attacked. Because the men were getting breakfast, most of them were unarmed there was only a light guard stationed to protect the men.¹¹⁸ What resulted was a complete defeat of the United States forces. As the rebels attacked the United States soldiers, they used the bolo knife with grisly consequences. As the attack unfolded, surviving soldiers retreated towards the ocean and then fled in boats towards the nearest United States outpost.¹¹⁹ When news of the attack reached the United States forces in the Philippines, a great deal of worry ensued. Telegrams were sent to outposts informing them of what had transpired at Balangiga and warning them to be

¹¹⁴ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 224.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, ix.

¹¹⁶ Arnold, *Jungle of Snakes*, 52.

¹¹⁷ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 312.

¹¹⁸ Telegram Calbayog Samar. September 29, 1902., Messages sent Maou Samar, RG 395. NAB.

¹¹⁹ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 311.

prepared for possible attacks against their outposts.¹²⁰ The resultant retribution by the United States was swift and destructive. The United States troops destroyed the town so that, “with the exception of the stone walls of the church and a few large upright poles of some of the houses, there is today not a vestage [sic] of the town of Balangiga left.”¹²¹

Balangiga was one of the few episodes of the Philippine-American War when the United States used punitive measures to wage the conflict. The United States did not make a policy of taking punitive measure against the civilian populace. Rather, the United States forces in the Philippines were more concerned with treating the populace fairly, instituting civil services, and showing the populace that the soldiers were “representatives of a high civilization.”¹²² An exception to this was when General Joseph Smith wanted his men to turn Samar into a “howling wilderness” in order to pacify the island and punish the inhabitants for their continued intransigence.¹²³

Despite the defeat at Balangiga, the United States suffered relatively few major setbacks during its campaign in the Philippines. By the end of the conflict, the overwhelming majority of the resistance to the United States had ceased. Despite the ending of the conflict against Aguinaldo and his rebels, the United States had to continue to deal with other insurrections and uprisings in the Philippines. On the island of Samar, the United States had to contend with a religious cult known as the Pulahanes, who lived in the mountains and launched attacks against the United States and the coastal towns of the Island.¹²⁴ The United

¹²⁰ Telegram Calbayong, September 30, 1901. Messages sent Mauo Samar. RG 395. NAB.

¹²¹ Linn *The Philippine War*, 312.

¹²² General Orders no. 3, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps. RG 365 e.765. NAB.

¹²³ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 313.

¹²⁴ Linn, *Guardians of Empire*, 31.

States was eventually able to subdue the Pulahanes by employing many of the same tactics and strategies that they had employed against Aguinaldo and his rebels.¹²⁵

After the United States had defeated the numerous rebellions that had taken place in the Philippines, the process of governing the islands and settling in for a term as the colonial rulers of the islands began. The United States constructed numerous military bases to protect the newly acquired possession.¹²⁶ The United States granted the Philippines their independence in 1946.¹²⁷ The efforts of the soldiers that fought in the Philippine-American War paved the way for a half century of rule by the United States. This rule could be described as far more benevolent than that of the European powers that had colonized the rest of the world long before the United States had acquired an overseas empire. While the colonial rule of the United States could be called benevolent, especially when compared to that of other colonial powers, it is still important to remember that the United States ruled over a group of people without that peoples' permission and had done so through conquest and the use of military power and arms to do so.

¹²⁵ Ibid, 32.

¹²⁶ Ibid, 83.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 235.

Chapter 2: Irregular War After Empire

After the Philippine-American War, the United States became involved in the Banana Wars, where similar tactics and strategies were used. The Banana Wars were military interventions undertaken to support regimes that the United States wanted to keep in power or remove regimes that were working in a manner contrary to the interests of the United States. This series of conflicts lasted from the late nineteenth century through the 1930s. These conflicts were predominantly characterized by small-scale interventions by the United States using primarily Marines and Navy personnel. Like the Philippine-American War, the United States was often fighting against guerillas operating from the countryside. To combat these irregular forces, the United States used small units, like in the Philippines, to root out the guerilla forces. Infrastructure improvements were also an important strategy used to project the United States' power into the interior of these countries. The paternalism of the United States was also present in these conflicts through the actions of these interventions, such as the running of portions of the governments. There was also changes to the laws of these countries, such as the rewriting of the electoral code of Nicaragua. United States interventions in Latin America were a common occurrence during the latter years of the nineteenth century and prior to the Great Depression in the twentieth century. Interventions occurred in Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and many of the other nations in Latin America.¹²⁸ These interventions are commonly viewed as benefitting the interests of big business in the United States to the detriment of the local inhabitants and governments.

¹²⁸ Walter Lafeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*. (New York, W.W. Norton and Company, 1983), 8.

One of the primary concerns for the United States' interventions in Latin America was to prevent other world powers from constructing a canal through Central America that would connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.¹²⁹ The construction of a canal would drastically shorten the trip between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans and make it much safer for ships to do so. Without a canal ships would have to sail around Cape Horn. This trip took a great deal of time to complete and was dangerous. If another nation had a canal, then the other nation would invite foreign intervention into the Americas by foreign powers, a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States also had commercial interests in controlling a canal, as another canal would drive revenue away from the canal constructed by the United States.¹³⁰

One of the strategies used by the United States was the use and recruitment of local military forces to assist in defeating the guerillas. The most prevalent use of this was in Haiti and Nicaragua during the twentieth century. In Haiti, the United States trained local inhabitants into a local *Gendarmerie*, a national police and military force who were then used to augment the United States as well as perform civic duties.¹³¹ Just like in the Philippines, American officers trained and led the Haitians. However, these units would be used by the United States as part of their main force and were immensely important to the goals of the United States on Haiti. While the Filipino scouts during the Philippine-American War were used to supplement the United States military stationed in the Philippines, they never played

¹²⁹ Major Bruce Gudmundsson, "The First Banana War: US Marine in Nicaragua 1909-12." In *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. Edited by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian. (New York, Osprey Publishing, 2008), 61.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, 61.

¹³¹ Lester D. Langley. *The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire, 1900-1934*. (Louisville KY, University of Kentucky Press, 1983), 8.

the primary role as they did in Haiti or Nicaragua, where they provided a great deal of the manpower.¹³²

The Haitian Gendarmerie projected United States power throughout Haiti. The Gendarmerie undertook the important task of policing rural areas through numerous small outposts in the interior of Haiti.¹³³ The United States only deployed a small number of Marines to keep order and protect its interests on the island. Unlike the Philippines, where the United States deployed tens of thousands of men, only a single Marine brigade was deployed to the nation.¹³⁴ Because the United States was interested in protecting its interests in the region and preventing other foreign powers from gaining control and influence in Haiti, the United States deployed a small number of troops. Unlike the Philippines, the United States did not annex Haiti. Instead, the United States was interested in making the government stable to protect its interests and keep out foreign powers.¹³⁵ The United States' actions in Haiti were very much paternalistic, just as they were in the Philippines. The United States ran the financial system, dabbled in the politics of the nation, created a United States run military force, and advised the Haitians on how to run their government.¹³⁶ For example the United States ran the customs houses throughout Haiti beginning in September 1915.¹³⁷ This paternalistic attitude stemmed in part from the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt

¹³² Lafeber, *Inevitable Revolutions*, 66.

¹³³ Ivan Musicant. *The Banana War: A History of United States Military Intervention from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama*. (New York, Macmillan, 1990), 206.

¹³⁴ Langley, *Banana Wars*, 136.

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, 124.

¹³⁶ Jennifer Bauduy. "The 1915 U.S. Invasion of Haiti: Examining a Treaty of Occupation." *Social Education* 79 (2015): 244.

¹³⁷ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Address of the President to Congress December 7, 1915, ed. Joseph V. Fuller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), Document 610.

Corollary, but the strategies and tactics came from the Philippine-American War that the United States recently fought.

Just as the United States had contracted infrastructure in the Philippines the same was done in Haiti under, the auspices of the *Corvée*, a system that required the inhabitants to perform work for the government or pay a tax to be exempt from the work. During the work, the government was obligated to provide food and housing to the workers. However, most people could not afford to pay taxes, so the United States gained access to a large pool of labor. Through the use of the *Corvée*, the United States was able to construct a road network throughout Haiti that allowed the use of wheeled transport that had recently been unusable on the overgrown and dilapidated Colonial French roads.¹³⁸

Like many of the conflicts that the United States would wage in Latin America, the United States intervened only after the indigenous government had fallen, was in danger of doing so, or the United States desired a change in government. In Nicaragua, the United States undertook two major interventions, in 1912 and 1927. The United States occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934., There were also interventions in countries for numerous reasons. The pattern exhibited by the United States was one of self-interest and paternalism. When the indigenous people showed themselves incapable of ruling themselves, the United States intervened and restored order and government to the population. The supervision of elections in Nicaragua by the United States highlighted this paternalism. The United States did not trust the local government to run the elections, so they supervised the elections. The 1928 and 1932 elections were supervised by Marines. In addition to supervising the elections, the

¹³⁸ Musicant, *The Banana Wars*, 208-209.

Nicaraguan election code was rewritten.¹³⁹ Rather than let the people of these nations decide their own fate, the United States intervened and steered the countries in a direction that was beneficial to the United States. Just like in the Philippines, when the United States decided to colonize the islands because the people were deemed incapable of ruling themselves, the United States acted similarly during its interventions in Latin America. While the United States actions were paternalistic, the reason for this paternalism was rooted in self-interest to prevent intervention by European powers and keep friendly regimes in power.

In Nicaragua, the United States used indigenous forces to augment the forces that were deployed. Here the United States used the same strategy as in the Philippines and Haiti. United States officers led and trained local soldiers and used them to augment and their own forces.¹⁴⁰ These local units were used to great effect by the United States because they allowed the United States to cover more territory than their limited ground forces could on their own. In Nicaragua, these native forces often bore the brunt of the guerilla forces arrayed against the United States and the Nicaraguan government.¹⁴¹ Just like Haiti, the United States only utilized a small force to provide stability and protect its interests in Nicaragua. Once again, because the United States only employed a small number of forces, they had to rely on the native populace to augment their forces. Rather than use the local military forces that had existed before they arrived, the United States created its own military and police forces to replace the original indigenous forces and augment the United States forces deployed there. The creation of a new local military under United States supervision was done for several reasons. One reason was that creating a new military and police force allowed the United

¹³⁹ Langley, *Banana Wars*, 203.

¹⁴⁰ Lafeber, *Inevitable Revolutions*, 66.

¹⁴¹ Langley, *Banana Wars*, 195.

Sates to build up the new force in a manner befitting a democratic government. This meant that the military was not supposed to take part in politics and serve the state instead of an individual. Another reason was that the previous military was incompetent and corrupt, so a new force removed this major problem.

While the United States had used native and local peoples to help fight its conflicts prior to the Philippine-American War; these local soldiers were often used haphazardly and without the large scale official use like that in the Philippines and later conflicts. The Philippine-American War was the first conflict waged by the United States wherein large numbers of the local populace were recruited to fight for the United States for an extended period. The United States had used Indian scouts during the wars waged in the Western United States against other native tribes. However, these forces served to augment the United States Army, never to supplant them as was the case in the conflicts following the Philippines.¹⁴² During the Philippine-American War, the United States recruited large numbers of Filipinos to augment its forces in the Philippines. This practice was repeated elsewhere when the United States was waging war in a foreign country. This was the strategy used by the United States in Nicaragua, Haiti, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These forces turned into permanent establishments that existed for decades. The Philippine Constabulary persisted for decades after the official conclusion of the Philippine-American War.¹⁴³ The Constabulary operated in a manner like that of the Filipino Scouts. The Constabulary was responsible for maintaining peace on the islands and working with the United States to defeat any uprisings and deal with any unrest.¹⁴⁴ The Filipino Scouts and the Philippine

¹⁴² Thomas W. Dunlay. *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army, 1860-90* (Lincoln, University of Nebraska, 1982), 13.

¹⁴³ Linn, *Guardians of Empire*, 157.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 19.

Constabulary were also led by officers from the United States. This practice was repeated by the United States in Nicaragua and Haiti.¹⁴⁵

The use of local troops highlighted the major shift in the way the United States waged irregular conflicts. The use of local troops was meant to ‘help’ that native populace and the country the United States was in to become more westernized and have similar ideals to that of the United States, especially by imparting the ideal of an apolitical military and police force.¹⁴⁶ By teaching these westernized values and western military ideals into the native forces, the United States had adopted a paternal attitude that was more nuanced than the one they had adopted with the Indians in the United States and with Filipinos. Whereas those policies were blatantly paternalistic, the new paternalism in use by the United States was less blatant, and more nuanced. Instead of trying to convert the savage into a westerner, or something other than a savage, the United States was taking people that were already civilized, but acting as a guiding force, or father figure to these peoples to help them.

Instead of directly subjugating the people of the countries the United States had invaded, the United States was working towards bringing the people up and giving them good government. Rather than taking territory, the United States was imparting its values and mores on less powerful nations and showing them the benefit of the United States’ brand of capitalism and democracy. This paternalism would characterize the actions undertaken by the United States throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

When the United States intervened in Nicaragua in the twentieth century, it did so to restore stability when the country was undergoing rebellions and instability. When the United

¹⁴⁵ Langley, *Banana Wars*, 210-211.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 158.

States intervened in Haiti, it did so for the same reasons as Nicaragua. By intervening in this manner, the United States was able to take advantage of the chaos to force its policies on these nations. After intervening, the United States worked towards establishing democratic elections in Nicaragua. These elections were based on the American ideal of how an election and country should have been run.¹⁴⁷ These elections were supervised by the United States and were an attempt by the United States to remake Nicaragua in its own image and hopefully prevent another situation that would require intervention by the Marines and Navy.¹⁴⁸ While the attempt in Nicaragua was ultimately unsuccessful, it showcased the paternalistic efforts of the United States. Soon after the United States left, the local military it had trained took power for itself and ruled the country. The United States had attempted to remake Nicaragua, its government, and its military into a smaller version of itself and had not succeeded.¹⁴⁹

While in later conflicts, the United States relied on indigenous forces to help do the fighting, they would very rarely be led by United States officers. In Vietnam and later wars, the United States would use advisors to help train indigenous forces. These advisors would fill some of the same roles as the officers who led local forces in the past. However, these officers would very rarely be able to give orders to the local forces they were advising.¹⁵⁰ The use of advisors was prominent during the Vietnam War, where the United States deployed large numbers of its soldiers as advisors with the South Vietnamese military to

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 201-202.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, 207.

¹⁴⁹ Lefeber, *Inevitable Revolutions*, 68.

¹⁵⁰ Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*. (New York, Random House, 1988), 86-87.

train, advise, and eventually try to create a competent military based on that of the United States and other western nations.

The same tactics and strategies used in the Philippine-American War and the Banana Wars would be employed by the United States during the Vietnam War. While the United States did not create and utilize the indigenous military force for its own use, the United States still trained and equipped the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the other South Vietnamese military forces.¹⁵¹ The South Vietnamese also received a great deal of aid from the United States in the form of economic and humanitarian aid in addition to military aid.¹⁵² The United States began its intervention in South Vietnam by sending military advisors to assist the ARVN in their battle against the Viet Cong guerillas and the North Vietnamese. Rather than attempt to create an army that was suited to waging a war against an insurgent foe, the United States helped equip and create an army that was based on the United States military and optimized for fighting a conventional war.¹⁵³ The United States wanted the ARVN and other South Vietnamese forces to fight in a manner similar to that of the United States. The senior advisors repeatedly requested that all ARVN units spread throughout the countryside be gathered together so they could be trained as a division instead of providing security throughout the country.¹⁵⁴

One of the advisors the United States sent to Vietnam was John Paul Vann, a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army. His experiences are portrayed in the book *A Bright Shining Lie*. Vann was one of the advisors sent by the United States to train and advise

¹⁵¹ Sheehan, *A Bright Shinning Lie*, 99-100.

¹⁵² Ronald H. Spector. *Advice and Support: The Early Years of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1941-1960*. (New York, The Free Press, 1985), 306.

¹⁵³ Ibid, 296-298.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 295.

the ARVN on how to wage their conflict. Vann and the other advisors could do little more than advise their ARVN counterparts because the decisions were ultimately left up to the ARVN officers. The United States did not believe that the ARVN was able to effectively wage a campaign against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese; thus, they had to send advisors to give the ARVN a fighting chance. While the ARVN were certainly performing poorly against the Viet Cong, the United States' efforts to assist them were insufficient to help the ARVN. This was due to the United States advising the ARVN and organizing their military to fight a conventional conflict. The United States also equipped the ARVN to fight a conventional conflict. The United States gave the ARVN armored personnel carriers, tanks, planes, and helicopters to equip their military. During the battle of Ap Bac, the ARVN used American provided M113 armored personnel carriers against the Viet Cong. There were the same vehicles as what the US Army was using for its conventional forces.¹⁵⁵ All of these conventional weapons were given to the ARVN to fight an enemy that could blend into the civilian populace. The Viet Cong were best fought in a manner that was different from the way the United States was equipping and advising the ARVN on how to wage the conflict.¹⁵⁶ Unlike in the Philippines, Nicaragua, and Haiti, the United States did not directly control the ARVN. Thus, the United States advisors were incapable of creating an effective force like they had in the Philippines, Nicaragua, or Haiti.

When Ngo Dinh Diem, the president of South Vietnam, was obviously unfit to lead South Vietnam and was doing more harm than good, the United States gave the opposition elements of the South Vietnamese government approval to launch a coup. This coup deposed

¹⁵⁵ Sheehan, *A Bright Shinning Lie*, 227.

¹⁵⁶ John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 120-121.

and murdered the president, along with other senior members of his government.¹⁵⁷ If the rulers of South Vietnam would not acquiesce to the wishes of the United States, then the United States would have them removed and replaced with someone who would conform. After Diem was deposed, South Vietnam suffered from constant coups and changes in government that would undermine the stability of the country and the ability of the country to fight the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese.¹⁵⁸

The construction of roads throughout Vietnam was a priority of both the United States and South Vietnamese government. By building roads, the government would be able to extend its control throughout the interior of the nation and combat the communist guerillas it was facing.¹⁵⁹ During the Banana Wars the United States had constructed roads and laid telegraph lines, just as it had done in the Philippines. By increasing the mobility of their militaries, the United States and its allies planned to extend the reach of their government into the interior of the countries. By increasing government control, the guerillas could more effectively be combated and maybe even defeated.

One of the strategies employed by the United States in Philippine-American War that would be replicated during the Vietnam Conflict would be the use small numbers of soldiers spread throughout the villages in the countryside. The United States Marine Corps used this strategy to great effect soon after they arrived in Vietnam in 1965.¹⁶⁰ These units were comprised of a small number of Marines and local militia forces who would work together to defend a village from the Viet Cong. The actions of one of these units was chronicled in Bing

¹⁵⁷ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife*, 137.

¹⁵⁸ Gregory A. Daddis, "Out of Balance: Evaluating American Strategy in Vietnam, 1968-1972." *War and Society*. Vol 32 no. 3 (252-270), 253.

¹⁵⁹ Spector, *Advice and Support*, 307-308.

¹⁶⁰ Bing West, *The Village* (New York, Pocket Books, 2000), 9-10.

West's *The Village*. The Marines would work with the local Popular Forces militia units to provide security to the villagers and keep the Viet Cong at bay. One of the ways the Marines accomplished this task was by patrolling with the Popular Forces militia they were stationed with.¹⁶¹ Just like in the Philippines, the Marines worked to take care of the villages they were protecting. They would often work to provide the villages with supplies that were needed for numerous projects. In one instance, West and his men secured supplies to help construct a school for the village.¹⁶² While in the Philippines the officers who were in the villages assumed almost complete control over the governance and day-to-day functioning of their outposts, in Vietnam the Marines were there to protect the village more so than govern the village.

The Marines that were stationed in the village worked with the local militia forces to provide security to the village. The Marine's work with the local militia forces hearkened back to the Philippine-American War and Banana War when the United States had used indigenous forces to augment their own forces. The Popular Forces militia that the Marines worked with were trained and commanded by the Marines in a manner like other indigenous forces in past conflicts. The Marines and the militia would patrol the village and the surrounding area together to deter the Viet Cong and provide security to the village. With the combination of local forces and the Marines, the United States was able to use a small number of troops to secure the villages and work with the local populace. By using the local militia forces, the United States was able to gain local knowledge from the militia as well as use them to better understand the local culture, customs, and populace. Unlike the

¹⁶¹ West, *The Village*, 17-18.

¹⁶²Ibid, 263-264.

Americans, the local militia were from the village, knew the people in the village, and were able to help the Marines in their mission of pacifying the village and its surrounding area.¹⁶³

The use of small forces spread thinly throughout the numerous villages and hamlets was not without its risks. Such small units risked being overrun and defeated by superior enemy forces. This threat proved itself to the Combined Actions Platoons. One of these attacks against the Combined Action Platoons was chronicled in West's book. In this attack, the Viet Cong mustered a large force to attack the Marines and their Popular Forces militia in the village they were defending. When the Viet Cong launched their attack, they were able to take the Marines and militia by surprise and inflict heavy casualties on the defenders.¹⁶⁴ A later attack was thwarted when the Marines received intelligence of an impending attack. Because of this warning, the Marines and militia disrupted the Viet Cong plans by preparing a defense that ruined the element of surprise for the Viet Cong and forced them to call off the attack.¹⁶⁵ This foiled attack was stopped because the Marines had established a good relationship with the villagers, who in turn supplied the Marines with intelligence prior to the attack. This information allowed the Marines to use their considerable resources to gather intelligence on the planned Viet Cong attack.¹⁶⁶ Just like in the Philippines and other conflicts, by living among the people and gaining their trust the forces on the ground were able to fight an effective battle against the insurgent forces.

¹⁶³ Jack Shulimson and Major Charles M. Johnson *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965* (Washington D.C. History and Museum Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1978). <http://ehistory.osu.edu/books/1965>, 135-137.

¹⁶⁴ West, *The Village*, 157.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 235-236.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 230.

Another strategy the South Vietnamese employed was the use of concentration. The civilian population in many areas was relocated to fortified hamlets, to separate them from the Viet Cong.¹⁶⁷ However, this strategy was not successful because the strategy was implemented in a haphazard and rapid manner that made it extremely difficult for the strategy to succeed. The populace that was being relocated was moved in a rapid manner. The civilians were moved so rapidly that the government could not adequately prepare, fortify, and provide for the populace that had been moved to these concentration areas. On top of this, corruption was rampant among the Vietnamese that were responsible for the Strategic Hamlet Program¹⁶⁸ Many of the fortified areas were anything but fortified. The barbed wire was described as having numerous holes in it, and the local forces that were meant to protect the inhabitants were incapable of doing so. Because of this, the Viet Cong were able to influence, terrorize, and recruit the civilian populace that was already angry at the government for forcing them out of their homes.¹⁶⁹

While this strategy had proved successful for the United States during the Philippine-American War. During the Vietnam War the strategy was ineffective. Rather than separating the populace from the insurgents, the concentration of the populace in one area gave the Viet Cong easy access to the populace. This ease of access to the populace allowed the Viet Cong to actively recruit and terrorize the populace. This was because the fortified hamlets were insufficiently secured and corruptly run, making the people there easily accessible to the insurgents and more willing to aid and join the insurgents.¹⁷⁰ The strategy of concentration during the Vietnam War had originally come from the British and their experience in

¹⁶⁷ Sheehan, *A Bright Shinning Lie*, 309.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 310.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 311.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 311.

Malaya. In Malaya, the British had been hugely successful in implementing the strategy of relocation and concentration.¹⁷¹ The United States seemed to have forgotten this strategy after the Philippine-American War and only reintroduced it during the Vietnam War after receiving the idea from the British ,who had successfully implemented the strategy in Malaya.¹⁷²

In a strategy like the mass vaccinations in the Philippines, the United States employed inoculation in Vietnam. Many Vietnamese were vaccinated against various diseases, such as plague.¹⁷³ In other cases the United States used vaccine as a tool to prevent outbreaks among refugees. The United States also vaccinated refugees against diseases such as Cholera at the Refugee Center at Nui Sam Mountain.¹⁷⁴ These vaccinations were undertaken under the auspices of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United States military under Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAPS). The goal of the MEDCAPS was to train the Vietnamese to take over their own medical care and to win over the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ Karl Hack, “Malaya-Between Two Terrors “People’s History” and the Malayan Emergency.” In *Hearts and Minds: A People’s History of Counterinsurgency*. edited by Hannah Gurman (New York, The New Press, 2013), 22-23.

¹⁷² Arnold. *Jungle of Snakes*, 188-189.

¹⁷³ Photograph 342-AF-106667USAF; Captain Vydareny, Vaccinates a Vietnamese Woman Against Plague ; 1/23/1970; Black and White Photographs of U.S. Air Force and Predecessors' Activities, Facilities, and Personnel, Domestic and Foreign, 1930 - 1975; Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and Organizations, Record Group 342; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. [Online Version, <https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/vaccinations>, June 17, 2018].

¹⁷⁴ Photograph 306-MVP-10(2); It Doesn't Hurt, But it Tickles. A U.S. Navy Hospital Corpsman, Member of a USAID Military Health Team, Inoculates a Flood Refugee Against Cholera at the Refugee Center on Nui Sam Mountain, Chau Doc Province; 1966; Miscellaneous Vietnam Photographs, 1958 - 1974; Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Record Group 306; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. [Online Version, <https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/navy-hospital-corpsman-inoculates-refugee>, June 17, 2018].

¹⁷⁵ Elray Jenkins, *Medical Civic Action Programs (Medcaps) and Medical Readiness Training Exercises (Medretes) as Instruments of Foreign Policy*. (US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks PA, 1988), 8-9.

The United States also distributed rice and other foodstuffs to the Vietnamese people. Often these were supplies that were captured from the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army. The United States used the distribution of rice as a major propaganda tool in the war. The rice was distributed to many civilians throughout Vietnam. Three-hundred tons of rice were distributed to refugees in the city of Quang Tri after Operation Maine Crag was completed by the Third Marine Division.¹⁷⁶ By distributing captured rice rather than destroying it, the United States was using another approach to win over the Vietnamese people. The capture of rice from the Viet Cong was also used as a propaganda tool to show the successes of the United States and its Vietnamese allies.¹⁷⁷ By showing the capture of rice from the Viet Cong, the United States and the South Vietnamese were showing their capability to engage and defeat or at the very least disrupt the operations of the Viet Cong.

While the United States employed some strategies and tactics that were like those employed during the Philippines, they were often half-heartedly employed in Vietnam, or not employed for very long. The strategy of concentration was employed in a rapid, ill-conceived, and corrupt manner in a way that guaranteed the strategy would fail. In the case of the Combined Action Platoons, the strategy proved successful, but it was not implemented across a large enough area soon enough to be effective. The United States Army focused primarily on conventional combat because the commander in Vietnam, General William

¹⁷⁶ Photograph ; 314 - ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) - 1969 - 1969; 1969; 127-GVB-314-A800442; Divider/Subject - 314 - ARVN - 1969; Black and White Photographs of Marine Corps Activities in Vietnam, 1962 - 1975; Records of the U.S. Marine Corps, Record Group 127; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. [Online Version, <https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/soldiers-distributing-rice-vietnamese>, June 17, 2018].

¹⁷⁷ Photograph 127-GVB-311-A188025; 311 - ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) - 1966 - October 23, 1966; 10/23/1966; Divider/Subject - 311 - ARVN - 1966, 1962 - 1975; Black and White Photographs of Marine Corps Activities in Vietnam, 1962 - 1975; Records of the U.S. Marine Corps, Record Group 127; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. [Online Version, <https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/marines-assist-vietnamese-unloading-rice>, June 17, 2018].

Westmorland, believed that the answer to winning was “firepower.”¹⁷⁸ Another general said that the answer was “more bombs, more shells, more napalm.”¹⁷⁹ The use of local forces though was somewhat successful, especially in the case of the Combined Action Platoons and the use of the Popular Forces militia units. Overall, the United States strategy was one of attrition.¹⁸⁰ While other conflicts had been waged in this manner, this was not the way the United States should have waged the Vietnam War, but it was how the United States fought for most of the war. It could be argued that the focus on the conventional war was what was responsible for the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War.

After the Philippine-American War, the United States had several opportunities to implement the strategies and tactics that had worked in defeating Emilio Aguinaldo’s Filipino revolutionaries. In the case of the Banana Wars, the United States relied heavily on local forces that were trained and led by United States military officers. In the Banana Wars this strategy was overwhelmingly effective if the United States was leading the local forces. However, when the United States left these local forces often turned despotic and corrupt.¹⁸¹ In the case of Vietnam, the use of local forces was more problematic. In the case of the Combined Action Platoons, the use of local forces was successful. When it came to the ARVN though, there was far less success. Instead of having the ARVN led by United States officers, they were led by Vietnamese officers who did not always heed the advice of their American advisors. Unlike the other interventions by the United States, the ARVN did not

¹⁷⁸ Arnold, *Jungle of Snakes*, 218.

¹⁷⁹ David H. Ucko. *The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars*. (Washington D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2009), 43.

¹⁸⁰ Michael Lind, *Vietnam The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous Military Conflict*. (New York, Touchstone, 1999), 78.

¹⁸¹ Lafeber, *Inevitable Revolutions*, 69.

turn despotic; instead, the ARVN was defeated by the North Vietnamese Army and South Vietnam was conquered and united with North Vietnam under communist rule.

The overarching theme that connected these actions by the United States was the paternalistic nature of the United States actions. The United States intervened in these countries to protect the interests of the United States. The raising of local forces, the interventions, and the advising were all put into effect because the United States did not trust the native inhabitants to “correctly” rule their own country or fight their own conflicts. While the United States had less control over the conflict in Vietnam, the control that it did have was not implemented correctly nor in a manner that would guarantee the success of the United States in Vietnam.

The wars the United States waged in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown how the United States has exhibited a paternalistic attitude in its relations with other nations. These conflicts have also underscored how the United States has continued to use many of the same tactics and strategies from the time of the Philippine-American War to these more recent conflicts. Many of the successful and unsuccessful strategies used by the United States in the Philippine-American War and later conflicts would be used in these more recent conflicts. In both nations, the United States invaded, toppled the existing government, and then installed a democratic government in the likeness of the United States. The United States did this while ignoring the cultural and political differences between these countries and the United States.

The United States began the Iraq War by waging a conventional conflict that would pit the vastly superior United States military against the Iraqi Army. Just like in the Philippine-American War, the United States military had little difficulty defeating the conventional Iraqi forces arrayed against them. When the Iraq War transitioned into an

irregular conflict, the United States would have to implement many of the same strategies that had been implemented in the Philippine-American War and other unconventional conflicts waged over the past century. These included training indigenous forces and working with them to defeat the insurgents. The forces at the disposal of the United States also operated numerous small outposts throughout the country similar to the Philippine-American War, Banana Wars, and the Vietnam War. Lastly, the United States used an innovative approach to separate and control the populace. For example, a wall was constructed around Sadr City, a slum of Baghdad, to control the flow of people, materiel, and goods through the city and the ability of insurgent groups to operate.¹⁸² The United States also used walls in other areas of Baghdad, such as markets, to control the flow of people and protect them from vehicle borne attacks.¹⁸³

Unlike the Iraq War, the War in Afghanistan against the Taliban was waged in a more unconventional manner from the beginning. Part of the reason for this was that the United States feared a reaction in the country like what happened when the Soviet Union invaded previously. Rather than sending in large numbers of conventional forces, the United States sent in numerous teams of elite soldiers to wage an unconventional conflict, including Special Forces,¹⁸⁴ CIA operatives, and other special operations units sent to work with the Northern Alliance and other indigenous forces to topple the Taliban regime.¹⁸⁵ The use of these special operations units was a textbook example of how Special Forces were supposed to operate. In Northern Afghanistan, Special Forces deployed to assist the Northern Alliance

¹⁸² Peter R. Mansoor. *Surge: My Journey with General Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War*. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2013), 245.

¹⁸³ *Ibid*, 74.

¹⁸⁴ (More commonly known as Green Berets)

¹⁸⁵ Seth G. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2008). Chapter One, Kindle edition.

by calling in airstrikes against the Taliban and providing other support.¹⁸⁶ These airstrikes were the deciding factor in many battles. In the south, the Special Forces met Hamid Karzai, the future leader of Afghanistan. The Special Forces worked with Karzai and his supporters to capture the city of Kandahar.¹⁸⁷ Once again, airstrikes proved to be a major instrument in the fight against the Taliban. The Special Forces team was able to gather a large number of tribesmen to support their drive towards Kandahar and topple the Taliban.¹⁸⁸

After the fall of the Taliban from power, the United States and its NATO allies set about creating a strong central government in Afghanistan. While attempting to create this government, the United States was ignoring the culture and political structures of the native populace. By ignoring these structures, the United States and its allies allowed tribal animosity to flourish, and this caused many tribes and groups to support the Taliban, who had turned into an irregular combatant force.¹⁸⁹ Mirroring the future situation in Iraq, the United States soon found itself engaged in an irregular conflict. In order to combat these insurgents, the United States began training indigenous forces to supplement the limited forces deployed. The United States would also utilize numerous small outposts to extend control over the countryside. These outposts were positioned in many areas, such as the remote Korengal Valley.¹⁹⁰

In Iraq, the United States attempted to implement a democratic government that was based on the representative democracy utilized by the United States and many other Western

¹⁸⁶ Center of Military History. *Operation Enduring Freedom: October 2001-March 2002*. (Washington DC, US Army Center of Military History, 2004), 10.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁸⁸ Eric Blehm, *The Only Thing worth Dying For: How Eleven Green Berets Fought for a New Afghanistan*. (New York, Harper Perennial, 2010).

¹⁸⁹ Antonio Giustozzi. *Koran, Kalshnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*. (New York, Columbia University Press, 2008), 55.

¹⁹⁰ Sebastian Junger, *WAR*, (New York, Hachette Book Group, 2010).

democracies. The problem with this approach, besides its obvious hubris, was that it ignored the ethnic and religious divisions that would drive rifts throughout Iraq in the coming years of the conflict. Iraq was divided among three major religious sects and ethnic groups, the Shia, Sunni, and the Kurds.¹⁹¹ Each of these Islamic religious sects had a long and violent history under the rule of Saddam Hussein. The minority Sunni were in power for decades under the rule of Hussein, and he used his power to marginalize the majority Shia in Iraq.¹⁹² Hussein also waged a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Kurds who lived in the north of Iraq using conventional military forces and chemical weapons.¹⁹³ When the United States attempted to create a democratic government in Iraq, these religious divisions were ignored. By ignoring these divisions, the United States paved the way for a civil war in Iraq that would rage out of control until after the United States implemented the Surge in 2007.¹⁹⁴ The Surge was an increase of 20,000 men to Iraq, primarily in Baghdad, to quell the rampant insurgency and civil war in the country.

The United States maintained a mindset that was focused on conventional warfare during the first years of the conflict in Iraq, even though the United States was engaged in a conflict against an insurgent foe waging an unconventional conflict. The United States was largely treating the conflict as a conventional war that could be solved using conventional tactics and strategies. The United States kept its troops stationed in large bases in the cities

¹⁹¹ Paul R. Williams and Matthew T. Simpson. Rethinking the Political Future: An Alternative to the Ethno-Sectarian Division of Iraq *Symposium: Rethinking the Future: The Next Five Years in Iraq. International Law Review Vol. 24 no. 1 2008*, 196.

¹⁹² Patrick Cockburn, *Muqtada Al-Sadr: And the Battle for the Future of Iraq*. (New York, Scribner, 2008), 32.

¹⁹³ Joost R. Hilterman "Outsiders as Enablers: Consequences and Lessons from International Silence on Iraq's Use of Chemical Weapons During the Iran-Iraq War." In *Iran, Iraq and the Legacies of War*, ed. by Lawrence G Potter and Gary Sick, Chapter 7. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 151.

¹⁹⁴ Ucko, *The New Counterinsurgency Era*, 125.

and then eventually on even larger base outside of the cities.¹⁹⁵ The United States sent patrols into the cities from the large bases, and then the patrols would abandon the city at night leaving it in the hands of the insurgents.¹⁹⁶ This strategy did not allow the United States to control the population or protect those who would have helped them against the insurgents by providing information to the United States and its allies.

During this time of a conventional mindset, the United States trained a new Iraqi Army after the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi Army that had existed under Saddam Hussein.¹⁹⁷ This new army was trained and created along the lines of the United States Army. Unlike the ARVN, the army that the United States created focused primarily on internal security operations. Like Vietnam, these units would not be led by United States personnel. Instead, the Iraqi Security Forces would only be advised by the United States. These Iraqi Security Forces units were mentored by teams from the United States military.¹⁹⁸ Many of these Iraqi units were also stationed with units from the United States to create a more effective partnership and mentoring process to prepare the Iraqis for the eventual departure of the United States.¹⁹⁹

One of the tactics employed by the United States after the conventional strategies had failed was the use of smaller numbers of soldiers deployed in small outposts throughout major population centers. This strategy was employed in numerous cities across Iraq with mixed results. One of the most successful iterations of this strategy was in in the city of

¹⁹⁵ Peter R. Mansoor. *Baghdad at Sunrise: A brigade Commander's War in Iraq* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2008)., 297.

¹⁹⁶ Mansoor. *Baghdad at Sunrise*, 297.

¹⁹⁷ L. Paul Bremer, Coalition Provisional Authority order 2, May 23, 2003.

¹⁹⁸ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. (New York, The Penguin Press, 2006), 339.

¹⁹⁹ Timothy S. Williams, Kurtis P. Wheeler. *Al-Anbar Awakening Vol.1 American Perspectives. U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq 2004-2009*. (Quantico, VA, Marine Corps University, 2009), 190.

Ramadi, where Colonel Sean MacFarland deployed his units in numerous outposts throughout the city “one neighborhood at a time rather than seizing numerous combat outposts in one fell swoop.”²⁰⁰ MacFarland worked in a gradual and efficient manner to regain control of the city from insurgents that had taken control of the city away from the Iraqi government.²⁰¹ MacFarland was an important figure because he was one of the most effective individuals to combat the insurgency. As MacFarland’s troops were being deployed throughout the city, the tribal elders in the area began to trust the United States forces or see the United States as a better alternative to the insurgents. These tribal elders banded together and worked with the United States to form an alliance against the insurgents in Ramadi and the surrounding areas. This movement became known as the Anbar Awakening.²⁰² With the forces stationed in small outposts throughout the city and the cooperation of the tribal elders and their tribes, the United States was able to deal a major blow to the insurgency in Ramadi. These actions also increased the size and confidence of the Iraqi Army and police units stationed in the city.²⁰³

One of the major goals of the Surge in 2007 was to create a massive influx of troops into the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. Surge was the term used to describe this massive influx of soldiers and Marines. Before the Surge, a civil war raged between the various political and religious sects throughout the city with Shia and Sunni killing each other. Some police commandos even acted as Shia death squads.²⁰⁴ In order to accomplish the goal of defeating the insurgency and ending the sectarian violence, the United States deployed 20,000

²⁰⁰ Ibid, 178.

²⁰¹ Ibid, 180.

²⁰² Fred Kaplan, *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War*. (New York, Simon and Schuster, 2013), 248.

²⁰³ Ibid, 246-248.

²⁰⁴ Cockburn, *Muqtada Al-Sadr*, 175.

additional troops to provide security in the capital.²⁰⁵ The Surge also extended the tours of many other units already deployed past the normal twelve-month rotation.²⁰⁶ One of the centerpieces of this new strategy was the same as that employed by MacFarland in Ramadi. The United States deployed its additional forces in small outposts to provide security to the population of Baghdad. Some of the soldiers employed in this strategy were sent to the Baghdad slum of Sadr City, a predominately Shia area that had been an epicenter of the insurgent movement against the coalition forces and the Iraqi government. One of the primary reasons for this was the presence of Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army, a personal militia that answered to Sadr and ran many neighborhoods in Sadr City. This group had been responsible for much of the violence in Baghdad prior to the Surge but would not be as active during the Surge to avoid being dismantled by the new forces sent as a part of the Surge.²⁰⁷

One of the infantry battalions deployed to Sadr City was at the heart of the battle for this slum of Baghdad. This battalion, the 2-16 Infantry, was deployed in a large compound in Sadr City as part of the Surge and would take part in the attempt to pacify Sadr City. The battalion then began to set up small outposts near their main base to regain control of Sadr City from the insurgents that had reigned over the slum before the Surge. By deploying some of their forces in small outposts inside the city, the battalion's goal was to protect the populace and deny the insurgents access to the populace.²⁰⁸ This Army unit also worked with the indigenous security forces as the United States had done in numerous conflicts before and during the war in Iraq.²⁰⁹ The battalion was not stationed in Sadr City long enough to see the

²⁰⁵ Kaplan, *The Insurgents*, 243.

²⁰⁶ Mansoor, *Surge*, 107.

²⁰⁷ Cockburn, *Muqtada al-Sadr*, 178-179.

²⁰⁸ David Finkel, *The Good Soldiers*, (New York, Sarah Crichton Books, 2009), 45.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 32.

effects of their efforts, but while there the battalion did not meet with much success. To the men of the battalion and their commander, the situation they were leaving behind for their replacements was the same, or worse than, when they had arrived over a year earlier.²¹⁰

One of the early successful attempts to restore stability and governance in Iraq was in Mosul shortly after the capitulation of the Hussein regime. After the fall of Baghdad, General David Petraeus had a brigade of his 101st Airborne Division board helicopters and fly to the city of Mosul in a massive air assault.²¹¹ Once the division arrived, Petraeus began the process of governing the city. As his predecessors had done in Manila during the Philippine-American War, Petraeus resumed many of the civil services and attempted to restore the city to a state comparable to prior to the invasion. Petraeus resumed the collection of garbage, classes at the university in Mosul, opened and guarded infrastructure, and instituted local government.²¹² For example, Petraeus had his soldiers posted at gas stations in order to ensure the orderly flow of traffic and provide protection to these areas.²¹³ Petraeus also had his men spread throughout the city in order to provide security to the population and make the presence of his soldiers felt. The situation in Mosul was relatively peaceful compared to the rest of Iraq during this time-period. Whereas other cities and regions in the country were overwhelmed with violence, the levels of violence in Mosul were low and people were able to live their lives in a far better situation when compared to the rest of Iraq.²¹⁴ While Petraeus was using his forces in a counterinsurgency strategy, many other commanders were having their units work in a conventional manner throughout Iraq that fueled the insurgency.²¹⁵

²¹⁰ Ibid, 241.

²¹¹ Kaplan, *The Insurgents*, 71.

²¹² Ibid, 73.

²¹³ Ibid, 73.

²¹⁴ Ibid, 75.

²¹⁵ Ricks, *Fiasco*, 232.

Petraeus used his soldiers in a manner like commanders during the Philippine-American War and was seeing positive results because of it.

Another commander who was using similar tactics was Colonel Peter R. Mansoor in Baghdad. Mansoor deployed his limited forces of the 1st brigade of the 1st Armored Division in the best manner he could. Mansoor attempted to create relationships with the locals to create the trust that was necessary for him to combat the insurgent and criminal elements that had appeared after the fall of Saddam and the Baathist regime.²¹⁶ Mansoor also wanted to keep his forces stationed inside Baghdad to provide the security that was necessary for the coalition to defeat the growing insurgency.²¹⁷ The inclusion of indigenous forces was a major program undertaken by Mansoor and the United States shortly after the invasion. The United States employed many Iraqis to help guard key infrastructure and locations that the United States was too undermanned to guard with its own forces.²¹⁸ The Army also employed numerous individuals from the surrounding neighborhoods as cooks and cleaning staff.²¹⁹ This provided an economic boost to the local populace and helped the United States gain the trust, or at least cooperation of some of the local populace.

After the Vietnam War, the United States did not attempt to forcibly relocate entire populations of people to defeat an insurgency. Instead, the United States implemented a different strategy based off the same idea. Rather than relocate a large group of people into one area to cut them off from the insurgents, a strategy which was infeasible in Baghdad, the United States adopted a novel approach to this strategy. The strategy the United States

²¹⁶ Mansoor, *Baghdad at Sunrise*, 88.

²¹⁷ *Ibid*, 297.

²¹⁸ *Ibid*, 37.

²¹⁹ *Ibid*, 23.

undertook was to build a walled off area of Baghdad to control the movement of insurgents through the city. The strategy was simple. The United States would construct a concrete barrier surrounding a portion of Sadr City where a large portion of the insurgent activity was occurring.²²⁰ The premise was the same as earlier relocation efforts but undertaken in a different manner. The construction of a wall would separate the insurgents from the civilian population. The wall would also control the flow of people and materiel to different sectors of Baghdad. By doing this, the insurgents would be hampered in their attempts to undermine the Iraqi government and terrorize the civilian population. This strategy also kept the insurgents confined in a smaller area that would allow the United States military to concentrate its manpower on this area.

The implementation of a strong central government in Afghanistan was another instance like the implementation of a central government in Iraq. The United States ignored or was ignorant of the ethnic and cultural problems this would bring. The plan was undertaken without due consideration to the different cultures, ethnic groups, and tribes in Afghanistan. The implementation of a strong government in Afghanistan was particularly fraught with peril because many of the tribes that inhabited the mountainous regions of Afghanistan were reluctant at best, outright hostile at worst, to a strong central government in Afghanistan. Prior to the overthrow of the Afghan government by the communist party in Afghanistan in 1979, the country had been relatively peaceful. After the overthrow by the communist and during the Soviet-Afghan War the country suffered years of warfare.²²¹ After

²²⁰ Mansoor, *Surge*, 245.

²²¹ The Russian General Staff, *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*. (Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2002). Translated by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress. 18.

the Soviet-Afghan War, the country was wracked by constant civil war and conflict between different political and ethnic groups.

The United States undertook a training mission in Afghanistan similar to that in Iraq and the earlier attempt in Vietnam. The United States attempted to create a modern military to assist the coalition mission in Afghanistan. This new military force was trained by the United States and its coalition partners. The different nations of the coalition undertook different roles in the advising mission. The British trained the noncommissioned officers of the Afghan Army, the French trained the general staff, and other nations helped train the army in other areas.²²² In order to equip the Afghan Army, the United States and its coalition allies equipped the force with the leftover Soviet equipment that was in plentiful supply in Afghanistan and donated equipment from Eastern European nations.²²³ The advising of these units met with varying degrees of success. In some cases, the units the United States partnered with proved themselves capable soldiers and more than qualified to fight the insurgents arrayed against them. In other cases, the opposite was true.

During Operation Medusa, an operation to retake the Panjwayi Valley from the Taliban, a United States Special Forces team was partnered with a battalion of Afghan commandos in 2006.²²⁴ The Special Forces team worked closely with this unit and used them to great effect during the battles that were to come. During the battle for the valley, a Canadian task force was ordered to take an insurgent held area.²²⁵ When the Canadians

²²² Center for Military History. *Operation Enduring Freedom: March 2002-April 2005*. (Washington DC, U.S. Army Center for Military History, 2013), 29-30.

²²³ Ibid, 30.

²²⁴ Rusty Bradley and Kevin Maurer. *Lions of Kandahar: The Story of a fight Against All Odds* (New York, Bantam, 2015), 29.

²²⁵ Ibid, 2.

encountered stiff resistance from the insurgents, the Special Forces team and their Afghan counterparts moved to assist the Canadians in their attack. They did this by moving to take an area of elevated terrain to call in airstrikes and control the surrounding area.²²⁶ On their way to assist the Canadians by taking control of this hill, the Special Forces were ambushed by the insurgents. During this battle, the Special Forces and their Afghan counterparts were forced to retreat and resupply.²²⁷ However, the Special Forces and their Afghan commandos worked together to attack the insurgents again and support the Canadian offensive against the Taliban in the area by capturing and holding the hill.²²⁸ The partnering of United States and indigenous forces is like the Philippines when the United States soldiers worked closely with local scouts and police against the insurgent forces with a great deal of success.

Another instance where the United States partnered its forces to work with Afghan forces was in the north of the country. Here a platoon of infantry from the 10th Mountain Division was tasked with supporting a group of Afghan Border Police. When the platoon went to meet the Afghan police, they discovered the atrocious state that the unit was in. The Afghan Border Police unit completely lacked discipline, and their commander was corrupt, selling his unit's weapons on the black market where they would end up in the hands of the insurgents.²²⁹ The compound the Afghans were stationed in was filthy, with human excrement scattered on the ground, and the entire unit being completely unfit for combat or any sort of professional police work.²³⁰ It came as no surprise to the platoon that when the

²²⁶ Ibid, 152.

²²⁷ Ibid, 176.

²²⁸ Bradley, *Lions of Kandahar*, 190.

²²⁹ Sean Parnell, and John R. Bruning. *Outlaw Platoon: Heroes, Renegades, Infidels, and the Brotherhood of War in Afghanistan*. (New York, Harper Collins, 2013), 42.

²³⁰ Ibid, 32.

insurgents launched an attack against the outpost it was overrun ,and the Afghan Border Police were defeated soundly by the insurgents.²³¹

When the United States found itself fighting an unconventional war during the twenty-first century, it used the same tactics it had employed more than a century earlier in the Philippine-American War. The United States took a paternalistic approach in the countries they had invaded. These nations were also reconstituted based on the idea that American ideal of liberty and democracy were the best forms of government. The United States also created a military force that was created to be similar its own and not necessarily what was best suited to combat the irregular warfare the United States would be dealing with. Another strategy that carried across the century was the use of small units spread throughout the cities and towns of the country. A final strategy employed was that of separating the civilian populace from the insurgents and controlling the movement of the people and goods.

²³¹ Ibid, 349.

Conclusion

The way the United States waged war over the century from the Philippine-American War to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan maintained many similarities. The United States waged its irregular conflicts in a manner that was similar throughout these conflicts. The primary motivator in these conflicts was the idea of the United States acting as a benevolent force and adopting a paternalistic attitude in its dealings with the indigenous inhabitants of the nations involved in these conflicts. The United States used indigenous forces in each of these conflicts that were trained and led or advised by the United States. These indigenous forces played a significant role in each of these conflicts, although the way they were used differed greatly. In the case of the Philippines, these indigenous forces were never the main fighting force. Rather, they served to augment the United States forces that were deployed to the islands to pacify the new colony of the United States. In Nicaragua and Haiti, the local forces there served a pivotal role in allowing the United States to not send large numbers of troops to the conflicts and even draw down the number of troops in these countries by replacing them with local forces.²³² In Vietnam, the United States helped train and advise the ARVN and the other South Vietnamese security forces. The United States wanted these forces to be modeled after their own military because the United States was more concerned about a conventional conflict with an invasion from the North Vietnamese, much like what had happened with the Korean War.²³³ The United States followed a similar strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan by creating a new indigenous military trained and advised by the United

²³² Walter Lafeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*. (New York, W.W. Norton and Company, 1983), 65-66.

²³³ Ronald H. Spector. *Advice and Support: The Early Years of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1941-1960*. (New York, The Free Press, 1985), 300.

States. The plan was that these new militaries would be able to effectively take over security duties from the United States and its allies.

Another key characteristic of the way the United States waged irregular warfare was through the use of small outposts placed throughout the territory they wanted to control. In the Philippines, the United States used this strategy to great effect by having its soldiers stationed in many of the towns and by having the men in charge of these outposts perform many of the functions of a civic government. In the case of Nicaragua, the United States Marines did the same. One Marine detachment was attacked by Sandino and only saved by the use of airplanes to drop bombs and strafe the guerillas.²³⁴ With the use of Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam, the United States continued the use of the strategy of small units being placed in numerous outposts. While certainly not without risks, this strategy was far more effective than the grandiose search and destroy missions employed by much of the military. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States once again used this strategy. In Iraq, this strategy came to the fore during the Surge. The Surge was successful in ending the civil war that had erupted in Baghdad and brought stability to the Iraqi capital.²³⁵ In other cities throughout Iraq, such as Ramadi, the strategy was used with great success and worked in conjunction with the Anbar Awakening to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq. With Major Jim Gant in Afghanistan, his small team was able to effectively work with the native populace and gain their loyalty and acceptance, which allowed him to effectively combat the Taliban and other insurgent forces in Afghanistan.

²³⁴ Ivan Musicant. *The Banana War: A History of United States Military Intervention from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama*. (New York, Macmillan, 1990), 195.

²³⁵ Fred Kaplan, *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War*. (New York, Simon and Schuster, 2013), 267-268.

With each of these conflicts, the United States brought along the vestiges of life on a base in the United States. On the island of Samar at Tarangman, a post exchange was present and had an athletic field and a pool table. In Vietnam, the bases the United States built had many of the comforts of home, such as ice cream and other creature comforts. The trend continued with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The major bases had fast food and post exchanges as well as other establishments that would have been more at home in a town, city, or base in the United States.

Even though the United States used the same strategies throughout all these conflicts, the overarching mindset in each of these conflicts was the idea of the United States as a benevolent and paternalistic actor. With the Philippines, the natives were considered “uncivilized” and incapable of ruling themselves. The United States also did not want another foreign power to annex the Islands after the United States and Filipino Revolutionaries had defeated the Spanish in the Philippines.²³⁶ In the case of the Banana Wars, the United States intervened in Haiti and Nicaragua to instill stability and protect its interests in the two countries. In the case of both countries, the United States worked towards instituting a more democratic government and instilling the populace with some of the tenants of an American democracy. A new electoral code was drafted for Nicaragua by the United States to fulfill the goal of instituting good government.²³⁷ The customs service of Haiti was taken over by the United States so the Haitians could repay their debt, which they had not been able to do on their own.²³⁸ When it came to Vietnam, the United States once

²³⁶ John Morgan Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1899-1902*. (Westport, Conn. Greenwood Press Inc. 1973), 24.

²³⁷ Lester D. Langley. *The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire, 1900-1934*. (Louisville KY, University of Kentucky Press, 1983), 203.

²³⁸ Musicant, *The Banana Wars*, 182.

again attempted to instill in the country a democratic spirit. With Iraq, the United States assumed that once Saddam Hussein had been defeated the people would willingly embrace democracy and silently acquiesce to the new regime. Because of this belief, the United States had almost no planning in place for Iraq after the Iraqi Army was defeated and the United States had control over the country.²³⁹ The United States also had a similar mindset in Afghanistan. The United States attempted to impart a western democracy in the country and assumed that they would meet with little to no resistance to the imposition of western ideas and values on a largely tribal society. This was far from the case, and many in Afghanistan were against the idea of a strong western style government in the country.

The United States acted in a similar manner in all these conflicts. When it came to irregular warfare, the United States adopted the same strategies to combat the insurgent or guerilla enemy they were facing. In the case of the larger conflicts, the United States began the conflicts in a conventional manner to fight a conventional enemy. When the conflict transitioned to irregular warfare, the United States had difficulty adapting to the new conflict. This problem was most prevalent in Iraq when the military refused to change its strategy to face a new irregular threat. Instead, the military kept its troops stationed in large bases on the periphery of the cities instead of spreading its forces throughout the cities to control the population. In Vietnam, the United States followed the same strategy.

Overall, the United States' efforts over the past century in irregular conflict can be characterized by the use of the same, or similar, strategies that have proven effective. The only problem with the implementation of these strategies is that there has often been a long

²³⁹ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. (New York, The Penguin Press, 2006), 78.

period where the United States had not implemented these strategies until later in the conflicts. The main reason for the United States actions had been the misguided idea that the United States is superior and is helping, or liberating, the inhabitants of these countries. This attitude has led to a paternalistic and benevolent attitude that has caused the United States to become involved in many conflicts with misguided beliefs about the countries they were invading, assisting, or “liberating.” This paternalistic attitude has led to a lack of planning for the aftermath of these conflicts and a complete lack of understanding of the populace of these countries. In addition to this lack of understanding of the populace, the United States also lacked the knowledge to effectively work with the native inhabitants to create a government and other institutions that would be able to effectively rule in these countries.

For future research, a different approach would be to include the opinions of the indigenous populations in the countries that the United States had invaded or assisted. Another approach would be to investigate the attitudes of the civilian populace in the United States and see how that compared to the attitudes exhibited by the military and civilian leadership in the United States. Did the civilian populace share largely similar ideals as the military and leadership? Did this change as the conflict progressed? Another way to investigate these conflicts would be to research the way these conflicts are viewed by the populations of these countries after the conflicts have ended as well as during these conflicts. Future research could look at a longer period of time and examine how the United States waged warfare from the colonial times to the most recent conflicts. Another way to examine these conflicts would be to compare how the United States and other nations have waged these conflicts and then compare the similarities and differences. Along with comparing the way different countries waged these conflicts, another useful approach would be to research

the different reasons that each country had for becoming involved in these conflicts. A final idea for future research would make use of David Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*.²⁴⁰ Galula's work is held in high regard by many who have practiced counterinsurgency warfare. This high regard for Galula's work makes it important to research why it is held in such high regard and to see if Galula made accurate observations about counterinsurgency warfare.

The United States intervened in numerous small conflicts from the Philippine-American War to the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States had acted in a paternalistic nature that has existed to the present day and throughout the intervening conflicts. This attitude has led to a sense of superiority in the United States actions in these countries, and this attitude has led to numerous difficulties and a lack of planning. This superiority makes it seem as if the United States was more willing to become involved in more conflicts in order to exercise this paternalism because it views itself as being the only nation or the nation best able to deal with these conflicts.

²⁴⁰ David Galula. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. (Westport, CT. Praeger Security International, 2006).

Bibliography

Primary Sources

- The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan.* Translated by Lester W. Grau. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996.
- Black and White Photographs of U.S. Air Force and Predecessors' Activities, Facilities, and Personnel, Domestic and Foreign, 1930 - 1975; Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and Organizations, Record Group 342; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. [Online Version, <https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/vaccinations>, June 17, 2018]
- Black and White Photographs of Marine Corps Activities in Vietnam, 1962 - 1975; Records of the U.S. Marine Corps, Record Group 127; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. [Online Version, <https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/soldiers-distributing-rice-vietnamese>, June 17, 2018]
- Blehm, Eric. *The Only Thing worth Dying For: How Eleven Green Berets Fought for a New Afghanistan.* New York: Harper Perennial, 2010.
- Bremer, L. Paul, Coalition Provisional Authority order 2, May 23, 2003
- Bradley, Rusty and Kevin Maurer. *Lions of Kandahar: The Story of a fight Against All Odds* New York: Bantam, 2015.
- Finkel, David. *The Good Soldiers.* New York: Sarah Crichton Books, 2009.
- Jalali, Ali Ahmed and Lester W. Grau. *The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War.* Quantico, VA: The United States Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division, 2010.
- Mansoor, Peter R. *Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.
- Mansoor, Peter R. *Surge: My Journey with General Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.
- Miscellaneous Vietnam Photographs, 1958 - 1974; Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Record Group 306; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. [Online Version, <https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/navy-hospital-corpsman-inoculates-refugee>, June 17, 2018]
- Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States With The Address Of The President To Congress December 7, 1915. Washington Government Printing Office 1924.
- Bruning. *Outlaw Platoon: Heroes, Renegades, Infidels, and the Brotherhood of War in Afghanistan.* New York: Harper Collins, 2013.
- Records of United States Army Overseas Operations and Commands, 1898-1942, Record Group 395, National Archives Building, Washington DC.

The Russian General Staff. *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*. Translated by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress. Lawrence KS: University of Kansas Press, 2002.

West, Bing. *The Village*. New York: Pocket Books, 2000.

Williams, Timothy S., Kurtis P. Wheeler. *Al-Anbar Awakening Vol.1 American Perspectives. U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq 2004-2009*. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 2009.

Secondary Sources

Arnold, James R. *Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq*. New York: Bloomsbury Press. 2009

Bauduy, Jennifer. "The 1915 U.S. Invasion of Haiti: Examining a Treaty of Occupation." *Social Education* 79 (2015): 244-249

Boot, Max, *The Savage Wars of Peace and the Rise of American Power*. New York: Basic Books, 2002. Kindle Edition

Center of Military History. *Operation Enduring Freedom: October 2001-March 2002*. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2004.

Center for Military History. *Operation Enduring Freedom: March 2002-April 2005*. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 2013.

Cockburn, Patrick, *Muqtada Al-Sadr: And the Battle for the Future of Iraq*. New York: Scribner, 2008.

Coffman, Edward M. *The Regulars: The American Army 1898-1941*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004. Kindle Edition

Cooke, Adam, "'An Unpardonable Bit of Folly and Impertinence': Charles Francis Adams Jr., American Anti-Imperialists, and the Philippines." *The New England Quarterly*. 83: 313-338.

Daddis Gregory A, "Out of Balance: Evaluating American Strategy in Vietnam, 1968-1972." *War and Society*. 32: 252-270

Dunlay, Thomas W. *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army, 1860-90*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1982.

Folsomm Jenny. "Antwerp's Appetite for African Hands." *Contexts: Understanding People in Their Social Worlds*. 15: 65-67

Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006.

Gates, John Morgan. *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1899-1902*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Inc. 1973.

Giustozzi, Antonio. *Koran, Kalshnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

- Gudmudsson, Bruce. "The First Banana War: US Marine in Nicaragua 1909-12." In *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. Edited by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian. New York: Osprey Publishing, 2008.
- Hack, Karl. "Malaya-Between Two Terrors "People's History" and the Malayan Emergency." In *Hearts and Minds: A People's History of Counterinsurgency*. edited by Hannah Gurman New York: The New Press, 2013.
- Hearts and Minds: A People's History of Counterinsurgency*. Edited by Hannah Gurman. New York: The New Press. 2013.
- Heidler, David S. and Jeanne T. Heidler. *Old Hickory's War: Andrew Jackson and the Quest for Empire*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003.
- Hilterman, Joost R. "Outsiders as Enablers: Consequences and Lessons from International Silence on Iraq's Use of Chemical Weapons During the Iran-Iraq War." In *Iran, Iraq and the Legacies of War*, ed. by Lawrence G Potter and Gary Sick, Chapter 7. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Hook, Holger, *Scars of Independence: America's Violent Birth*. New York, Crown Publishing, 2017
- Jenkins, Elray, *Medical Civic Action Programs (Medcaps) and Medical Readiness Training Exercises (Medretes) as Instruments of Foreign Policy*..US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks PA, 1988.
- Joes, Anthony James. "Counterinsurgency in the Philippines 1899-1954" in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. Edited by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian. New York: Osprey Publishing, 2008.
- Jones, Seth G., *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008. Kindle edition.
- Junger, Sebastian. *WAR*. New York: Hachette Book Group, 2010.
- Kaplan, Fred. *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013.
- Kipling, Rudyard. "The White Man's Burden" *Rudyard Kipling: Complete Verse, Definitive Edition*. New York: Anchor Books/Doubleday, 1940.
- Lafeber, Walter. *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1983.
- Langley Lester D. *The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire, 1900-1934*. Louisville KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1983.
- Lind, Michael, *Vietnam The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict*. New York: Touchstone, 1999.
- Mackey, Robert R. *The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004.
- McAllister Linn, Brian. *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific 1902-1940*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. Kindle Edition

- McAllister *Philippine War* Linn, Brian. *The, 1899-1902*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000.
- Moyar, Mark. *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency From the Civil War to Iraq*. New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2009
- Musicant, Ivan. *The Banana Wars: A History of United States Military Intervention from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama*. New York: Macmillan, 1990.
- Nagl, John A. *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005.
- O'Brien, Sean Michael. *In Bitterness and Tears: Andrew Jackson's Destruction of the Creeks and Seminoles*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.
- Prucha, Francis Paul. *The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846*. New York: Macmillan 1969.
- Ricks, Thomas E. *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2006.
- Robins, Nick. *The Corporation that Changed the World: How the East India Company Shaped the Modern Multinational*. 2nd edition. London: Pluto Press, 2012.
- Ruskola, Teemu, "Canton is Not Boston: The Invention of American imperial Sovereignty." *American Quarterly*. 57
- Sheehan, Neil. *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*. New York: Random House, 1988.
- Shulimson, Jack and Major Charles M. Johnson. *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965*. Washington, DC: History and Museum Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1978. <http://ehistory.osu.edu/books/1965>
- Silbey, David J. *A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902*. New York: Hill and Wang, 2007. Kindle Edition
- Skiwot, Christine. *Purposes of Paradise: U.S. Tourism and Empire in Cuba and Hawai'i*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010.
- Spector, Ronald H. *Advice and Support: The Early Years of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1941-1960*. New York: The Free Press, 1985.
- Sutherland, Daniel E. *A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerillas in the American Civil War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006.
- Ucko, David H. *The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009.
- Williams Paul R. and Matthew T. Simpson. "Rethinking the Political Future: An Alternative to the Ethno-Sectarian Division of Iraq." *Symposium: Rethinking the Future: The Next Five Years in Iraq. International Law Review*. 24 (2008).