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A DIFFERENT MODERNIZATION EXPERIENCE: TURKISH MODERNIZATION AND THE ARMY

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ABSTRACT:

This study will concern itself with Turkish political development from the early nineteenth century up to the present time: Firstly, the term modernization will be explained and the historical roots of Turkish modernization will be examined. Then, it will be concerned with the development of Turkish democracy. Also, the late Ottoman Period will be looked at very briefly, because Turkish modernization began in the Ottoman Empire.

The central institution in the process of Turkish modernization was the army. After the abolition of the Janissary in 1826, the military became one of the most Westernized elements in the Empire. Liberal ideas first spread among the military officers and military colleges became the centre of secret political organizations in the mid-nineteenth century. Turkish military elites have always had the aim of representing the new values, behavior patterns and life styles since the late Ottoman era.

Key Words:

Atatürk, Turkish Revolution, Modernization, Turkish Modernization, Turkish Army, Turkish Military Elites.

1. INTRODUCTION

The army has been one of the most important institutions in Turkish society and the military elites have been one of the most considerable and powerful elite groups in the Turkish power structure. Army and military elites have achieved significant duties either in the defense of the country or the modernization and development of society. As a natural result of this, very strong and good relations were established between the Turkish army and the Turkish people. Turkish military elites and the Turkish army as an institution have always had a very esteemed and honorable place in the eyes of the Turkish people. The Turkish people have always nominated the army as the most reliable and trustworthy institution of the society. As noted by several researchers (such as Kasim Cindemir, *Hurriyet Newspaper*, 5 July 1999; *US News and World Reports*, July 1999; Janowitz, 1971; in several articles of Emin Colasan), the situation is still the same in the 1990s.

The central institution in the process of Turkish modernization was the army. The first modernization efforts began in the military sphere during the Ottoman era. The modernization of the army was understood as the creation of a European style army in terms of education, technology and structure. As a natural result of these efforts, Western values and norms first entered Turkish society via the army. As stressed by Sen (1996: 187), the major target of the Ottoman political elites during those modernization efforts was to strengthen the power of the ruling elites. Nevertheless, contrary to their aims, these efforts culminated in the end of the Ottoman ruling elites and the beginning of the Kemalist Revolution.

The Turkish military elites have played a significant role in security-defense and strategic policy making. They are very well experienced in the “management of violence”. However, they are

not only sensitive and influential on foreign affairs and military issues, but also general domestic and international economic and social issues. Their economic and civilian functions are an indivisible part of their military functions. Nevertheless, they exclude themselves from domestic partisan politics. As stated by Rustow (1959: 549), “the exclusion of officers on active duty from any formal role in politics which was laid down in the early years of the Kemalist movement has been maintained to the present.”.

Traditionally, Turkish military elites have been ascribed important non-military functions and accomplished several important missions as the agent of social and political change in the development of Turkey. As a result of these and their mutual acceptance by the Turkish people, they have exercised much of their political influence without violent combat or extensive bloodshed (Janowitz 1971: 31). A number of facts which are observed in 1990s’ Turkey are proof of this. Especially in the late 1990s, Turkish military elites played significant roles in Turkish politics without any violent combat or using classical intervention techniques. They used very elegant and modern pressure-group methods when exercising their political power. They established very effective co-operation among the major elite groups, such as business, media, scientific, trade union elites. Their solidarity and co-operation brought an end to the highly corrupt “Refah-yol” coalition government.

Another important point to state is that, it was impossible to get detailed data about the military establishment and military elites for reasons of confidentiality, secrecy and security. Generally the available research and research materials on military establishments and military elites is rather limited.

Particularly, Turkey has a strategic location in the world, both politically and geographically. Also, the Turkish army has very important internal and external matters which have to be dealt with. The Turkish army has been engaged in a war against the PKK separatist terrorists for more

than a decade. Also, the increasing Islamist danger and terror is another important issue. For these reasons, it is easy to understand the sensitivity of the army and the state on military issues.

2. MODERNIZATION AND MODERNIZATION PROCESS OF TURKISH SOCIETY

Modernization is a social process that comprises the whole of society including its economy, belief system, culture and politics. It consists of industrialization, rationalization, secularization and bureaucratization. As Jary noted (Jary & Jary, 1991:405), modernization began in Europe in the ages of the Renaissance and Reformation. Europeans experienced modernization as a process of discovery and invention rather than of response and adaptation. The main interest of this section will be political modernization rather than the general meaning of modernization.

Political modernization, as defined by Jary, is the process usually seen as crucially affected by economic modernization, in which traditional or colonial forms of political organization and state forms, including modern political parties are involved (Jary & Jary, 1991: 477).

Modernization in general, and political modernization in particular, are open-ended processes. In Huntington's words (Huntington, 1968:328), political development is never complete, and no political system ever solves the problems of confronting it. According to Huntington, a politically modern society has rationalized authority, differentiated structure and mass participation. Every modernizing society confronts these major political problems which may be called the growth of authority and public service, the search for national identity and unity, and the demand for political equality and participation (Rustow, in Karpat, 1973:113). Atatürk followed this order in his modernization of Turkey; authority, identity, equality.

The following sections will concern themselves with the political modernization of Turkish society. In particular, the historical roots of Turkish modernization will be examined. The late Ottoman Period (under the name of the pre Republic era) will be looked at, because the origins of Turkish modernization can be found in the late Ottoman Empire.

The modernization process in Turkey began in the Ottoman Empire at the time of Selim III and Mahmut II. Nevertheless, this process reached its real and certain meaning with the Atatürk reforms. The face of Turkey was turned completely to the west by Atatürk. Turkish modernization was shaped by the Kemalist Revolution. Atatürk defined the form and the way which should be followed by the Turkish people to become a more civilized and westernized society.

Following very brief information about the Pre-Republic era the Turkish Independence Movement and the Atatürk Revolution will be examined. Secondly, Atatürk's reforms will be set out. After a very brief overview of the single party period, the multi-party period will be investigated.

3. PRE REPUBLIC ERA (OTTOMAN PERIOD):

The Turkish historian Halil İnalcık divides the Ottoman Empire into 6 periods: Formative 1300-1402, consolidation and reorganization 1402-1481, attempt at world-wide empire 1481-1671, crisis and development struggle 1581-1699, defeat and acceptance of European superiority 1699-1826, abolition of Janissaries to Abdulhamid's overthrow 1826-1906 (Karpaz, 1973:28-28)

Turkish efforts at modernization first began in the military area with Selim III and Mahmut II. Sultan Selim, who lost his throne and his life in the fight against traditional forces of resistance, established a body of new troops, entirely trained in the European style. Later, Mahmut II (1803-1839) used the new army to destroy the anti-reformist Janissaries (Yeniceri). At the beginning of the

nineteenth century Sultan Mahmut replaced the degenerate Janissaries with a reorganized and modernized army model that was the "Assakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye" (the victorious Mohammedan Soldiers).

Social and political reforms followed the military reforms. Sultan Mahmut decided with Alemdar Mustafa Pasa to co-operate with the Ayan (Council of Notables) by the "Sened-i Ittifak" (Deed of Agreement). With this document, the absolutist authority of the Sultan began to diminish.

As Onulduran discussed (Onulduran, 1974: 30), following the abolition of the Janissaries, reforms were introduced which intended to modernize the political structure and the economic and financial systems of the Empire. As Rustow noted, military reforms expanded into cultural transformation and defensive modernization turned into an integral modernization (Karpas, 1973).

Sultan Mahmut made great efforts to create a new bureaucracy in the governmental machinery staffed by people who had Europeanized minds and a European style of education. As a result of the pressure of the new elite, Tanzimat (reorganization) Rescript (Gulhane Hatti Humayunu -the Imperial Edict of Gulhane) was proclaimed in the reign of Sultan Abdulmecid. The Edict was engineered by Mustafa Resit Pasa who was a civil servant, a diplomat and the Ottoman foreign minister. With this document, as Onulduran stressed, all citizens -Moslem or non Moslem- would be treated equally before the law and criminal and civil trials would be conducted in public. To prepare the new legislation, the existing Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (Meclis-i Vala-yi Ahkam-i Adliye) was to be increased in number, and the members of the Council would be charged with codifying the general principles of the Rescript into concrete law (Onulduran, 1974: 31). The Supreme Council of judicial Ordinances was an advisory body where discussion on the laws took place (like a quasi- parliament). Another rescript was declared in 1856 which was the Islahat (Reform) Edict. This Edict emphasised the equality of all religious groups and forbade religious and racial discrimination in the empire.

The military, medical and administrative academies, modeled on their Western counterparts, were established in the subsequent years of the Islahat Edict. The European style educational system of the Tanzimat produced a new social elite that adopted European tastes in dress and in its social life, literature and thought. These new ruling elites were significantly different from the classic Ottoman ruling elites. They are known as the "Young Turks".

Following the Tanzimat period, the first attempt at transition into a constitutional monarchy took place on the 23rd of December, 1876. This period is known as the First Constitutional period (I. Mesrutiyet). The first Constitution was modeled on the 1831 Belgian Constitution, with Mithat Pasa as its chief author. It defined the sovereign right of the Sultan on the one hand and the basic rights of the individuals on the other hand. However, this was to be ended by the absolutist monarch Abdulhamid II in 1878. He suspended the 1876 Constitution and dissolved the parliament until 1908.

Hamidian repression brought its antithesis. Several secret revolutionary organizations against Abdulhamid rose up in the empire. By far, the most effective one was "the Society (Committee) of Union and Progress" (Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) which was organized by the Young Turks. This society was particularly effective amongst young army officers.

The first reaction against Hamidian despotism occurred in Monaster, orchestrated by Besneli Niyazi on July, 1908. Abdulhamid was not successful in suppressing the uprising and he was compelled to sign the declaration of the Second Constitutional Period (II. Mesrutiyet) in 1908. The second Constitutional Government was established on July 23, 1908, and was the beginning of a new phase in the political development of Turkey. This period (1908-1918) covered four assemblies.

As Turhan noted (1991), these periods are of prime importance for Turkish political life; when many new social groups -such as civil and military officers, civil bureaucrats and professionals- first began to emerge among the political elites.

4. TURKISH INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

As Rustow noted (Karpas, 1973:109), the Anatolian resistance (Turkish Independence) movement was a civilian organization with a military apex: all decision given by the TGNA (Turkish Grand National Assembly-Buyuk Millet Meclisi) since 1920. As stressed by Lewis (1961: 390), the first parliament of young Turkey was a colorful and mixed body, including some 125 civil servants, 13 municipal officials, 53 soldiers (10 of them pasha), 53 men of religion (including 14 muftis), and 5 tribal chiefs. It also comprised 40 merchants, 32 farmers, 20 lawyers, 1 journalist, 2 engineers and 1 artisan.

The occupation of Izmir by the Greeks in May, 1919 was the last blow that transformed the resistance movement into a true struggle for independence. A few days after this, Mustafa Kemal went to central Anatolia from Istanbul. At that time all Turkey was occupied apart from a small part. There were no regular armed forces and no powerful weapons. After the Erzurum Congress which took place between July 23- August 7, 1919, the "Declaration of Independence" (Misak-i Milli) was proclaimed. According to this declaration, "the people and territory of Turkey should form an indivisible and complete whole, mandates and foreign dominance were unacceptable, and the National Will of the people was to be the only valid power". This resulted in the establishment of the National Sovereignty Principle as the basis of the new state. Then, the second congress gathered in Sivas between 4-11 September.

Mustafa Kemal organized small groups of people who fought for independence, and set up a regular armed force in a very short time. He started a big counter attack. Under commander-in-chief Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish army defeated the invading armies. As a result of this victory the Lausanne Treaty was signed on July 24, 1923. With the signing of Lausanne, the humiliating Treaty of Sèvres was abrogated and Turkey's independence, integrity and sovereignty were recognized by the world powers.

Mustafa Kemal had successfully completed the first step of the Kemalist Revolution; defending Turkish sovereignty (1919-1922). Now came the time for the realization of the second but the most important step of his revolution -creating a totally new state, a new society and a new country. His real objective was to create a truly modern, democratic, secular (laic), republican and independent Turkey based on the sovereignty of the people. From 1923 to 1938, the main activities of Mustafa Kemal consisted of placing the state and Turkish society on the road to Westernization.

5. THE TURKISH REVOLUTION

As a product of the Turkish Revolution, the new secular nation state of Turkey was established by Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia between 1919 and 1923 (Dunn, 1972: 192). Now the time came for the proclamation of the Republic and the promulgation of the new constitution.

In a country where the Ottoman Sultans had ruled for centuries, as Allah's Shadow on earth, Mustafa Kemal had the courage and vision to do away with centuries of tradition and corruption by announcing that: "The Turkish State is a Republic", on October 29, 1923. To achieve this first of all he separated the Caliphate (religious leadership of all Moslems) and Sultanate (political leadership), then abolished the Sultanate, and secondly the Caliphate. Later, he replaced the Sheriat, which is the

Law of Koran, with a modern civil code adopted from the Swiss civil code, and a penal code modeled on the Italian Penal Code. This new legal system was based on Roman Law (1925-6).

Another far-reaching cultural reform was the reform of the alphabet: he abolished the use of Arabic script and adopted Latin characters in 1928. After that, Ataturk gave to Turkish women complete equality in society. They acquired the right to vote and to be elected to parliament before the women of many European Countries.

Reform was carried out in every area of social life. The first political party of the Republic, the Republican People's Party, was established. As Frey emphasized (Frey, 1965:40-42), the statement that Islam was the religion of the state was deleted from the constitution. Religious tribunals were done away with, the fez was outlawed, and the religious dervish order was proscribed. The wearing of religious garb outside of religious buildings was forbidden. The Western calendar and time standards were adopted. A national system of education was established, a national railway network was built, and the expansion of secular higher education began. On account of these exceptional services, Turkish people gave to Mustafa Kemal the name "Ataturk" a venerable name, which means the father of all Turks.

Ataturk's Revolution accomplished the basic modernization of the educated elite and brought it into active political participation. As Frey said, now the possibly more difficult task of modernizing the ill-educated masses of society and involving them in the political process was undertaken.

As Dankwart Rustow said, Ataturk achieved the transformation of an empire into a nation, of a transitional society into a western cultural image. Mustafa Kemal combined the three roles of victorious battlefield commander, state founder and chief sponsor of large-scale educational establishments (Rustow, in Karpat, 1973:10).

Ataturk was a man of action, a man of ideas and a pragmatic far-seeing statesman. The driving force of his life was science, particularly the positive sciences. He built up a socio-political system, called Kemalism/Ataturkism.

6. SINGLE PARTY PERIOD: (1923-1946)

There is a wrong but popular idea that Communism and Fascism constitute the only two possible type of single party. As Duverger argues, such an idea does not correspond with reality. There are some single parties that are not really totalitarian either in ideas or organization. The best example of this is provided by the People's Republican Party which operated in Turkey from 1923 to 1946 as a single party (Duverger, 1964:276). It had a democratic ideology, in which all the power was given to the Great National Assembly by the Turkish Constitution.

The Turkish single-party system did not give any official recognition to the monopoly of power and did not make any attempt to justify it by the existence of a classless society. In Duverger's words, it was always embarrassed and almost ashamed of the monopoly (Duverger, 1964:277). Mustafa Kemal several times attempted to end it.

No parallels can be drawn with Hitler's Germany, nor the Italy of Mussolini. Factions developed freely inside the party without destroying it. The Grand National Assembly has had an opposition since the establishment of the first National Assembly (23 April 1920), such as "Second Group". But the first opposition political party was founded officially on November 17, 1924 by the two former commanders, Kazim Karabekir and Ali Fuat Cebesoy: it was the Progressive Republican Party (Trakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkası). It was abolished by cabinet decree on June 5, 1925 because

its members were neither republican nor progressive. Their linkage with the Shaikh Said Rebellion, which was a fanatical religious and anti-revolutionist revolt, brought about their end.

The second stage in the transformation to a multiparty system took place in 1930. The Liberal Republican Party was established by Fethi Okyar, at Ataturk's suggestion. In a short time, fanatics joined the Liberal Party and started to campaign against the secular state. As a result of this, the Liberal Party was abrogated by its president Fethi Okyar on December 17, 1930. Nevertheless, the opposition continued with their activity in the Parliament up to 1946 under the name of the Independent Group.

The last experiment in the transition to a multi-party system took place in 1945, with the establishment of the Democratic Party and their peaceful triumph in the 1950 elections. Turkey passed from a single-party system to pluralism, as Duverger said (1964: 280) with neither checks nor disturbance.

7. MULTI-PARTY PERIOD: (FROM 1946 UP TO DATE)

Although many political parties were established between 1945 and 1950, only the Democratic Party was ultimately successful. As mentioned by Tezic (1975: 253), the first party was the National Development Party, a religious conservative party. It was established by Nuri Demirbas, Huseyin Avni Ulas and Cevat Rifat Atilhan on July 18, 1945, but they did not manage to play the game of democracy according to its rules.

7.1. 1946-1960 PERIOD:

The Democratic Party was established by Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Fuat Koprulu and Refik Koraltan who were the members of RPP (Republican People's Party), on January 7, 1946. It grew rapidly in a very short time, with the election of 61 deputies in the 1946 elections. The eighth Assembly (1946) was the first real multi-party Assembly, but the first completely free and openly contested election in Turkey was not achieved until 1950. The period of 1946-50 could be labeled the "Transitional Period" to a multi-party system.

The Democratic Party won the election of 1950 with 53.35 % of the popular vote and 83.57 % of the Grand National Assembly seats and established the government while RPP gained 39.78 % of the votes and 14.40 % of the seats. Furthermore, the populist politics, good weather conditions, inflationary economic policies and foreign capital brought social and economic welfare for the people in the following years. As the result of all these factors the Democrats won 503 seats, whereas the Republican had only 31 in spite of 34.78% of the popular vote in the 1954 general elections.

This honeymoon did not continue very long. In the late 1950s, like the social and economic indicators of Turkish society, the vote for the Democratic Party began to decline. However, the Democratic Party still won the 1957 election with 47.3 % of the vote while RPP achieved 40.6 %. Adnan Menderes' despotic and neurotic behaviour and politics led to his downfall and his party's end as a result of the 27th May 1960 overthrow. According to Ozbudun (Kircak, 1993:95), the deviation from democracy, privileges given to his own supporters and a deviation from Kemalist principles, were an invitation to young patriots and Kemalist soldiers.

7.2. 1960-1971 PERIOD:

Turkish people began their daily life on 27 of May,1960 with a radio announcement that they had never heard before. It was an extraordinarily beginning to the day and the announcement ushered in a highly different period in the social-political life of Turkey. The announcement that was heard on the Turkish state radio at 7:00 am on 27 May 1960 was: "*Honorable fellow countrymen!... The Turkish armed forces have taken over the administration of the country. Our armed forces have taken this initiative for the purpose of extricating the parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they have fallen ...!*" (Ahmad, 1993:126).

The Armed forces restored their traditional respected status in the societal hierarchy. The Junta or the National Unity Committee (NUC) prepared a new constitution for the professors Commission. This Constitution was very civilized and radical.

Under the 1961 Constitution, as Ahmad noted (Ahmad, 1993: 136), Turkey enjoyed a greater degree of freedom than ever before. People had more civil rights, the universities had greater autonomy, and students were given freedom to organize their own associations. Workers were given the right to strike. Turkey had been thoroughly politicized in the 1960s and ideological politics were permitted. The ultra-nationalist and neo-fascist National Action Party (NAP) and the Socialist Workers Party (WPT) had been founded in those years. The Socialist Workers Party would get 16 seats in the Parliament of the 1960s. It was the first and last great success of the Turkish Socialists in Turkish modern history. The Islamist movement also became quite powerful.

Two new political parties were formed in 1961 as the inheritors of the Democratic Party: the New Turkey Party (NTP) and the Justice Party (JP), to compete in the first election under the new election law. The two biggest parties were RPP and JP in all the elections during this period. The 1960s could be labeled the period of coalition governments.

However, as a result of high inflation, high political tension, rising unemployment, and rapid social and political change, Turkey dissolved into chaos. As Ahmad emphasized (1993:147), the Islamist movement had become more aggressive and its party, the National Order Party, openly rejected Ataturk and Kemalism. On account of this, the generals presented a memorandum to the President and the chairmen of the two chambers in 12 March 1971. The Generals demanded the formation of a strong, credible government capable of implementing the reforms envisaged by the constitution.

7.3. 1971-1980 PERIOD

Following Demirel's resignation, the ex-leftist new rightist Nihat Erim formed the government. According to Erim and the Military High Command, the liberal constitution of 1961 was a luxury for Turkey. They started a campaign against civil rights and liberties. This modification covered every institution of the state, such as the unions, the universities, the press, radio and television, the Council of State, the Constitutional Court, the Court of Appeal, the Assembly and the Senate. The philosophy and activities of the 12 March regime was totally different from the 27 May regime. It could be labeled the antithesis of the 27 May spirit.

Ecevit's populist and "peace and unity" policies were not enough to bring about a cease fire. Political terrorism had become a regular feature of Turkish social life. As Ahmad argued (Ahmad, 1993: 163), there were fundamental differences between the terrorism of the left in the early 1970s and the terrorism of right and left in the mid/late 1970s: in the first period, the action was against imperialism, western influences and capitalism whereas in the second period, the aim was to create chaos and demoralization. In addition, rising unemployment, increasing inflation and declining wages encouraged the conflagration.

Ecevit's RPP (Republican Populist Party) won 41.4 % of the popular votes and 213 seats as compared with 36.9 % for Demirel's JP in the 1977 election. Ecevit established a minority government but he could not get a vote of confidence. This was the beginning of one of the darkest periods in Turkey's modern history which would eventually culminate in the 12 September 1980 Coup D`etat.

7.4. 1980-1998 PERIOD

The junta set up the National Security Council (NSC) under the chief of Staff Kenan Evren. The other members of the National Security Council were the chiefs of the armed forces comprising army, navy, air force and gendarmerie. They ruled Turkey until November 1983.

In the first place, the military junta suspended the constitution and dissolved parliament, then they closed down the political parties, detained their leaders and suspended the professional associations and confederation of trade unions. They attempted to change all areas of social life except foreign policy and the economic stabilization programme which had been in place since 24 January 1980. As Ahmad commented (Ahmad, 1993:185), arrests and trials were the principal features of daily life.

As a result of external and internal repression, the Junta decided to hold general elections in November 1983. Evren and the Junta openly supported the retired general Turgut Sunalp's Nationalist Democratic Party (NDP). They did not permit free competition in the elections; they always vetoed the powerful rival of their preferred candidate. However, the Junta could not prevent the victory of Ozal's Motherland Party, because Ozal had the support of patrons and America. In

Ahmad's words "Turkey had selected a salesman and not a statesman" in the 1983 general elections (Ahmad, 1993: 209).

Ozal had a colorful political identity like his party, the Motherland Party which was a transitional period political party. They claimed that they were conservative like the Justice Party, Islamist like the Nationalist Salvation Party (NSP), nationalist like the Nationalist Action Party, even social democrat. Is it possible to be everything at the same time for either an individual or a political party? Certainly, according to the saying "everything means nothing!"

As a parallel to the former Islamic candidate Ozal's rise in politics, the Islamist movement began to increase in Turkey. The Junta and later the Twin union of Evrem-Ozal appropriated the "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" as the ideology of the state. As Guvenc (1991) and Kircak (1993) emphasized the Islamist element was more overpowering than the Turkish element in this unsystematic philosophy. It was the power of the Islamists who wanted to abolish the secular Republic and create an Islamic state based upon the Sheriat.

The Junta encouraged and supported the Islamists because they saw Islam as the antidote to all forms of left-wing politics (Ahmad, 1993: 214). But, there was the other, maybe the more important side of the coin, that they were clearly breaking down the barriers that were in the way of the Sheriat. Moreover, they were doing it in the name of Ataturk and on behalf of Ataturkism.

The period of Motherland governments would continue until the 1991 general elections. These brought into power the coalition government of Demirel's True Path Party (TPP) and Inonu's Social Democratic Populist Party (SPP).

One of the most effective Turkish columnists Emin Colasan describes very accurately the social situation in Turkey in the 1980s and also in the 1990s: "The Motherland Party (1980s) has destroyed all the values we held sacred. Ten years ago we as a nation used to consider swindling,

theft, bribery and corruption as dishonorable. Now, they are normal things; Yalcin, whom we would have criticized and disgraced a few years ago, has become everyone's darling today. Where will it all end, dear sir!?" (Ahmad, 1993: 209). I also agree with Ahmad (1993: 208) that, the 1980s created a society of "the haves, the have nots, and the have lots" in Turkey.

8. ARMY AND POLITICS IN TURKEY

Democratization of outlook and behavior of elites (not only military elites) is among the major problems of most societies, including Western ones. Nevertheless, the Turkish military elites have operated as a political umpire, rather than as a ruling oligarchy. Janowitz's (1971: 105) findings clearly support this argument.

Janowitz (1971: 104-105) and Ozturk (1993: 58-60) argue that, from the beginning of his national leadership, Ataturk had a sharp sense of the limits of the military in politics. He seemed to look forward to some form of party rule over which the military would be arbiter. Ataturk did not give permission to those army officers who wished to be active in partisan politics: to remain in active service they had to leave the armed forces either to retire or resign from their commissions. Hence, the military could preserve its unity and cohesion. The Turkish military have continued to follow this highly effective tradition since Ataturk's time. As noted by Janowitz (1971: 105), most of the new nations followed the model of Ataturk in military-political relations.

Perlmutter (1981: 30) identifies the Turkish army of 1919-1923 (under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) as the "anti-traditionalist reformer army". Contrary to some ideas of some scholars who examined the Turkish army, Perlmutter (1981: 32) argues that the Kemalist army has served "as a watchdog to prevent the civilian regime from returning to corrupt practices. By

civilianizing his regime under the auspices of the army, Ataturk also legitimized the army's role in politics as the defender and protector of the constitution and of republican and honest civilian rule by legitimizing the army as its sole protector”.

Unlike most countries, the Kemalist Turkish military elites have acted as the guardian of the civilian authority, political stability and the constitution. As stressed by Perlmutter (1981: 25), the military elites and army are dedicated to protecting and preserving constitutional government. After social-political corruption has been eliminated and political stability restored, the Turkish military has always returned to the barracks in a short time.

As Perlmutter (1981: 253) states, the balance of civil-military relations in modern times is dependent on the stability and/or instability of the political order. Although, mistakes by the political elites have damaged to some degree civilian supremacy, it is still possible to observe civilian supremacy in civil-military relations in modern Turkey. Nonetheless, as in most of other countries, potentially the military elites maintain a large influence in the major social and political matters of Turkish society. However, the influence of the Turkish military elites on social-political affairs are not much more than any other contemporary western countries. As noted by Lerner and Robinson (1960: 22-23), despite obvious problems, Turkey's performance in the maintenance of civilian supremacy is “... relatively good-perhaps even absolutely good”.

Sometimes, the hidden tensions between the military elites and political elites have become controversial. Turkish military elites have intervened not only when Turkish democracy was in danger but also when large problems have occurred in economic development, social justice and mass-education. One of the most common reasons for military interventions in Turkey has been the increasing violence of terrorist actions. As stressed by Dodd (1983: 29), “the military can not be criticized for intervening. They had repeatedly called upon the two major parties to form a coalition in order to combat effectively the mounting wave of violence. ... The military are not to be blamed

if they came to believe that the politicians could not, as well as would not, do anything effective about the situation”. The military as the powerful arm of the Ataturkist elite have merely done what had to be done.

As noted by Dodd (1983: 23), on all three occasions (1960, 1971 and 1980 take-overs) the military intervened to set up a “Roman dictatorship” intended to last only for a limited period until some modified form of liberal democratic system might be made to work once again. According to Dodd (1983: 80), in all take-overs, the Turkish military has been intent on recreating a democratic form of government. Moreover, power has been transferred peacefully after only a brief period of military rule (in 1971, the military did not rule directly).

Also, as argued by Janowitz (1971: 29), the take over of power by the military has generally followed the collapse of efforts to create democratic institutions in developing countries. The situation in Turkey fits this argument. A high degree of corruption in major social, economic and political establishments, socio-political and economic crisis which were mostly caused by elected political elites, created an invitation to intervene by the patriotic, Kemalist military elites. They intervened in social and political life to prevent the rising corruption and increasing problems. It is possible to argue that incapable and greedy political elites caused the military interventions.

In brief, the most common reasons for Turkish military interventions are deviation from the laic-democratic Kemalist Principles, rising corruption among the ruling elites, increasing socio-economic problems in the country, rising terror, disorder and violence, and the failure of the political elites to solve these major problems can be identified as the most important reasons for military take-overs in Turkey.

9. A GENERAL EVALUATION OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TURKEY AND CONCLUSION

Counter-balancing power is very important for democratic regimes including the Turkish political system. Power must be countervailed by alternative bases of power, because uncontrolled or over-centralized power encourages the rise of authoritarian and oppressive regimes. It may cause political corruption or electoral dictatorship. On the other hand, over diffused power structures also carry serious dangers for democratic life because, it is impossible to talk about elite unity if power has been over-decentralized. Another important condition for elite unity is relative elite autonomy.

Sometimes, elite unity has great importance in order to solve serious social and economic problems and to achieve urgent socio-political goals. Recent events in Turkey provide a good example of this: the Turkish general election of 1995 held a very important place within Turkish political history. Political power was over-diffused amongst several political parties in this election. Five major political parties gained more than 10 % of the popular vote and passed the “general vote impediment”. The Islamist Welfare Party-Refah Partisi (WP-RP) (with about 20 % of the general vote) whose “ultimate aim” is to replace democracy with a totalitarian theocratic regime based on Sheriat (the Holy Islamic Rule) was one of the five parties.

Fundamentalist Islamists used highly systematic and Machiavellian tactics and gained government power. Following this success, they concentrated their pressure on the opposition and other elite groups to defeat the autonomy of the other elites and centralized power in their own hands. At the same time they began to implement their “ultimate aim”. However they could not annihilate the autonomy of elites and become all-powerful because, large majority of the Turkish population were/are against the Sheriat.

A democratic and peaceful civil movement which had no parallel in Turkish history began against the activities of the government. There was a widespread participation in this civil movement from all sections of Turkish society including elites, sub-elites and the general public. All the democratic contemporary action groups, labor union elites, business and business union elites, media elites, scientific elites, opposition political elites, military elites and others united and co-operated to save the democratic laic system in Turkey. And finally, the National Security Council-Milli Guvenlik Konseyi (MGK) issued a proclamation which invited the government to halt anti-laic and anti-democratic activities, and to follow the constitution and laws of the country.

This example demonstrates that not only the separation of powers within the state but also the separation of powers outside the state have value for the health and wealth of democracy. As Schumpeter stressed, electors cannot control the power of elected politicians. Elected politicians can only be controlled by powerful and autonomous elites.

This example also highlights the fact that the balance of elite unity is very important for democracy. As Aron emphasized, elite unity means freedom, on the other hand the complete disintegration of elites means the end of the state. Elite unity and relative elite autonomy do not contradict one another. Only independent groups can realize consensus, co-operation and unity as regards common values, beliefs and objectives. We agree with Etzioni (1993: 110) that “without elite co-operation, there can be no democracy, but without elite autonomy there can be no democracy either”.

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