

ABOUT DYNAMICS OF THE GEOPOLITICAL POSITION OF THE NORTH-EAST OF RUSSIA IN THE 17-TH-21-ST CENTURIES

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Abstract

Purpose: In the article, the changes in the geopolitical situation on the North-East for four preceding, partial centuries are considered.

Methodology: Up to the inclusion in the structure of Russia, this extensive region (2.3 million km²) with the considerable natural-resources potential has actually existed out of the world geopolitical processes, basically, because of the extremeness of the natural climatic conditions, remoteness from the centers of world civilization and limited technical and technological capabilities in those times.

Result: The different stages in the state of the geopolitical position of the region in prior centuries are identified and their repeatedly and multidirectional varying characteristics during the period in question are reported. It is also emphasized that the measures attempted by Russia for strengthening of the geopolitical position on the North-East gave rise abroad to the negative response consonant with the current ones practically at all considered stages. The current stage is considered as a period of the drastically varying external geopolitical conditions and increased technical capabilities when the geopolitical significance of the North-East for Russia increases by a factor of many times.

Applications: This research can be used for universities, teachers, and students.

Novelty/Originality: In this research, the model of About Dynamics of the Geopolitical Position of the North-East of Russia in the 17-th-21-st Centuries is presented in a comprehensive and complete manner.

Keywords: *Geopolitical, natural-resources, North-East of Russia.*

INTRODUCTION

A concept of the “North-East of Russia” is not often encountered in the scientific literature. However, in a number of works, the arguments in favor of its identification as the separated region with well-defined characteristics of the natural, resource and ethnocultural environments, distribution, and specialization of productive forces are advanced. The opinion set forth in a number of scientific papers ([Baklanov, & Romanov, 2009](#)) allows us to determine the North-East as a territory located to the east of the Verkhoyansky and Yudomsky ridges, washed by the East Siberian and Chuckchi seas in the north, by the Bering Strait and Bering Sea in the east, by the Pacific in the south-east and by the Sea of Okhotsk in south-west. Its primary characteristics include the clearly expressed continental isolation, broad aquatic “façade” in the confluence of two oceans, extreme conditions of the human life and activities. These natural realities left a personal stamp on all other characteristics of the region, including its geopolitical position, in the state of which several stages could be identified.

At the present time, their consideration appears to be urgent because, in recent times, under the conditions of significantly increased military-technical and, by and large, technical-technological capabilities and quick escalation of tensions around Russia, the geopolitical importance of the North-East has essentially increased. Under current conditions, this remote marginal land of Russia became one of the most important geopolitical frontiers.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

As the data for the study, the experimental data on the domestic and international geopolitical processes in the 17-th – 21-st centuries, written statements and directives of a number of the government leaders, selected statistical data and public documents have served. The following methods were used: chronological, comparative, statistical sampling and territorial analysis.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A long time, the North-East, is the marginal part of Oikumena, was out of the world geopolitical processes (; [Glotov, & Glotova, 2007](#)). The extreme natural conditions (for example, here the “cold pole” of the northern hemisphere is situated) render the region unfavorable for life of people and thus geopolitically unattractive for the external civilizations being at distances of many thousand km from it. As a result, the North-East remained terra incognita for years even for the countries of East Asia. At the same time, here own internal territorial-political problems continued: the difficulties in procurement of means of subsistence have provoked the local military conflicts between aboriginals.

Positioning of the North-East in the system of the world geopolitical relationships began with its inclusion in the structure of Russia.

Stage I (pioneer) covers the period from the first half to the end of the 17-th century. Its imperatives included the discovery of new lands and the primary measures for their inclusion in the structure of the country. It presented the logic continuation of the territorial expansion of the Russia east of the Urals, which developed permanently in the eastern direction from the end of the 16-th century and was mainly determined by the bio-resource factor: in the 17-th century, the furs provided more than 20% of the earnings of the treasury from the foreign trade and the export of walrus tusks was not less important. Therefore, the expansion into the high latitudes made sense of the national policy.

Having found the Lensky Ostrog (Yakutsk) in 1632, Russia solidified in the Lena River basin. The North-East fenced off from it by the mountains appeared for the Russians to be “the Lands behind the mountains” where, on hearsay, the beast was in abundance. The basic landmarks of their discoveries are as follows: in 1634, I. Rebrov and I. Perfilyev reached the valleys of the Olenek and Yana rivers; in 1639, I. Moskvitin came to the Sea of Okhotsk through Dzhugdzhur; in 1848, F.Popov and S.Dezhnev went around Chukotka by sea; in 1650, S.Motora and M.Stadukhin proceeded from the upper reach to the lower reach of the Anadyr River; in 1651, M. Stadukhin, coming to the Penzhinskaya Guba, obtained the reliable information on Kamchatka.

The North-East at large has answered expectations providing a large amount of furs. The sea hunting industry has also turned to an advantage. So, in 1664, S. Dezhnev has delivered to Moscow 289 poods of walrus tusks ([Krasheninnikov, 1949](#)). But the discovery of territories did not mean their actual annexation: the whole stage has passed under the sign of the violent conflicts with aboriginals.

Generally, this situation is ordinary: in the Age of Discovery, there were no instances of the conflict-free contacts between the discoverers of new lands and their population. And it is known that the aboriginals were of value for the Russians as more effective hunters. From here, the fixation on their voluntary acceptance of Russian citizenship has originated. In addition, the discoverers of hitherto unknown lands have acted in the North-East using the weak forces and in isolation from the main bases which has dictated for them a restraint of behavior against the local residents although all of this was not exclusive of exertion of aggressiveness at the personal level ([Magidovich, & Magidovich, 1957](#)).

On the other hand, the residents of the North-East had the advanced combat traditions and their methods of conduct of war were behindhand in humanism. The source of major concern was related to the tribute payment claim previously unknown to them. Finally, a defeat of the discoverers has promised the valuable spoils which stimulated the unprovoked assaults on them. But along with this, the number of adherents of peaceful dialog, acceptance of Russian citizenship and those who went to the service of the Russian has increased.

The Evens have ended the resistance by 1678, while the Yakagirs by 1684. As a result, the territory to the Anadyr River head and the Sea of Okhotsk coast from the Ulya River to the Penzhinskaya Guba came under the control of Russia. In Kamchatka and Chukotka, the situation continued to be stringent.

Stage II: from the end of the 17-th century to the end of the 18-th century. The geopolitical position of the region conformed to the **phase of integration in the system of international relations**. The discovered by the Europeans at the end of the 15-th century sea route to Asia around Africa had the great length which determined the search for the shorter alternative routes. In particular, it was expected that, in this regard, the route via the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean through the hypothetic North-East Passage was promising. The expeditions of H. Willoughby and R. Chancellor (1553) and V. Barents (1594-1596), despite their tragic end, showed the high interest of the Europeans on its search ([Villalobos Antúnez, 2013](#)). This has troubled the Russian party so much that Mikhail Romanov issued in 1619 a decree prohibiting the foreign shipping along the seaside of Siberia: “... the German people should not go to Mangazeya”.

The further changes were related to the width of geopolitical views of Peter the Great who saw in the North-East the new prospects for Russia differing from traditional “commercial” ones. In the first instance, because the strait between Asia and America was nevertheless found, Peter the Great raised a question of studying the possibility to lay the direct route from Arkhangelsk to China and India. The second moment consisted of the sounding of the prospects of engagement in the territorial division of North America.

The first and second Kamchatka expeditions (1724-1729, 1733-1741) carried out under the command of V.I. Bering and A.I. Chirikov implemented their tasks, including the geopolitical ones. The closeness of the Russian North-East to the part of the North America unoccupied by other nations was established and the navigability of the strait between the Arctic and Pacific oceans was determined. These discoveries specified the prospect of changes in the existing system of the international sea routes and world alignment of forces in favor of Russia. Consequently, information on them drew a great resonance abroad ([Shvedov, Romanov, Ushakov, & Churzina, 2018](#)).

The Spaniards proceeded with the working-out of plans of the California defense “... against the cruelty of the Russians”. The Dutch Consulate in Japan was tasked to form among its authorities the anti-Russian attitude. The leak of information on the discoveries on the North-East from Saint-Petersburg was provided by the residents of France and Great Britain. And since the leitmotiv of the policy in these countries consisted of the drive for the world hegemony, their reaction was most sharp. In 1750, the Parisian Academy of Sciences has presented the report to the Crown Louis the Fifteenth on necessity of the acquisition of the North-East Passage. Somewhat earlier, the British Prime Minister R. Walpole has declared about impropriety of reinforcement of the Russians in the Pacific. All of this pointed to the concerns of the world powers over

perspective of creation by Russia of the trade transit line in the Arctic in contrast with the routes of the South Seas where the “gravity center” of the French and English activity. [Grainger, J. D. \(2008\)](#)

Thus, owing to the Russian geographic discoveries of the mid-18-th-century, the North-East turned out to be in the “crosshairs” of the international interests. At that, this circumstance regained the conflictive character, due to Europeans’ attitude. This fact was detrimental to Russia because it could not then concentrate in the region the essential force potential and solve fundamentally the problem of integration of aboriginals into its structure.

In order to establish strong control over Kamchatka, the Cossack V.V. Atlasov’s brigade was sent there in 1697. However, they did not succeed because of bad discipline, up to killing by the Cossacks of their command officer in 1711. The situation was complicated so much that it was discussed by the Senate in 1727. It was decided “... to dispatch the military men for repression of the aforesaid defectors” – military detachments of A.F. Shestakov and D.I. Pavlutsky to the North-East. They have liquidated the revolt and led the main bodies of Kamchatka aboriginals to end resistance by 1731 following which the attention was focused on the most combative residents of the North-East - the Chukchi. [Clowes, E. W. \(2011\)](#)

Raids and occupancy of the lands of neighbors became for long a part of their everyday routine. In addition, the Russian party has received complaints from “friendly indigenous dwellers” about aggression of the Chukchi. But campaign against them has not answered: the detachments of Shestakov and Pavlutsky were crushed (1729 and 1747). As a result, Russia refused the solution by force of the “question of Chukotka” evacuating in 1765 its defensive base in it – Anadyr Ostrog. [Clowes, E. W. \(2011\)](#)

Therefore, the geopolitical position of the North-East was subjected to drastic changes at this stage. From the “land at the world’s end”, it has changed into the center of attraction of the world powers. At that, Russia, initiating this change, has faced a complicated problem. In the light of a new take on the North-East, employment of it offered prospect of acquisition of high dividends in the entire system of international relations. But this territory was maximally remote from the historic center of the country and possessed the severe natural-climatic conditions. From here, the question arises: can Russia, if necessary, defend here its positions; if it had the forth to successfully promote its own interests contrary to countermeasures of serious opponents in other lines, then it fell short to overcome the opposition of the weaker opponent in the North-East. [Grainger, J. D. \(2008\)](#)

Stage III: from the end of the 18-th century to the 1920s of the 20-th century, the stage of the suppressed interest has come for the North-East. Summing up the results of the Great North Expedition of 1733-1743 toward the end of the 18-th century has basically promoted a decline in its importance in the system of geopolitical values. It has highlighted the physical impossibility of the pass-through of the sailing ships from Arkhangelsk to Kamchatka. In addition, other unfavorable moments became apparent.

Natural inaccessibility of the North-East by land, conditioned by the existing technical and technological capabilities, has essentially eliminated its relations with the “Big Land”. There was the only Yakutsk-Aldan route, the journey by which to its branching to Anadyr and Kamchatka took two months. Due to high mortality, 3-4 thousand horses were needed every year for its service, which determined the expensiveness of carried cargoes. The creation of the sea lines of communications also turned out to be difficult. In due time, Bering paid his attention to the failed choice of Okhotsk as the basic seaport which, due to frequent shipwrecks, was named a “new Scylla”. Finally, towards the end of the 18-th century, the foundation of the commercial hunting was undermined ([Khrushchev, 2001](#); [Deudney, 2000](#)): the numbers of fur-producing animals reduced essentially and the rookeries of walruses in the Sea of Okhotsk and sealing grounds on the Komandorskie Islands were destroyed

Against this background, the acquisitions of Russia in North America where the fur trapping and sea-hunting industry provided the double recoupment of expenses for them looked more preferable. Having created in 1799, the Russian-American company has laid the unfrozen port Novo-Arkhangelsk in the Bay of the Sith. All of this induced the Russian party to implement the increased focus on Alaska in the prejudice of the needs and interests of the North-East.

Such an approach has resulted in developing the negative phenomena in its geopolitical state. The systemic actions for the promotion of the North-East security were not taken “as useless”. The examples of other characters were singular. So, in 1797, the infantry regiment was sent to Kamchatka, later, it was “forgotten” and degraded gradually as the combat unit. A half a century later, in 1849, N.N. Muravyov visited the Peninsula and instructed to transfer the warship flotilla from Okhotsk to Petropavlovsk to construct the seacoast defenses in it. However, after he gave up his gubernatorial powers, these initiatives were not continued. The maritime frontier patrolling in the North-East was started only in 1876 and was carried out only by two ships that could not physically control the extensive aquatic area of the North-East.

As before, the country was not the absolute sovereign of the region. The treaty of 1778 has reserved for the Chukchi and unclear status of “not exactly conquered”. And although in 1888 the Anadyr district authority was established, its role was symbolic, without the rights of intervention to the internal affairs of the Chukchi.

In addition, it should be noted that such a state of affairs was in general agreement with the international appraisal of the geopolitical position of the North-East.

The functional unsuitability of the Northern Sea Route closed the issue of its competition with the communications of the South Seas. This excluded the North-East from the prime interests of the European countries. However, it was sometimes considered by them as a weak point in the territorial defense of Russia upon which the overpowering attack could be made.

In 1789, the North-East was attacked by the Swedish corsair “Mercury” and, in 1854, by the Anglo-French squadron. In both cases, the invasions were repelled by the armed civilian population. But in this case, one should take into account that the opponents were exhausted by a longtime and difficult passage across two oceans and lack of knowledge about the local natural-climatic conditions ([Grainger, 2008](#); [Borisov, 2018](#)).

Therefore, the efforts to use the North-East as a “corridor of invasion” of Russia in the age of the sailing fleet fell short of expectations. A movement of great armed forces turned out to be the costly operation, while the actions with the use of small commands were a priori no success. The opinion was formed on this region as the inaccessible and unattractive, the struggle for possession of which is meaningless. As a result, the geopolitical “value” of the North-East fell to zero. The obvious example of this is events around Wrangel Island. In 1849, it found by the Russian discoverers three decades earlier was “rediscovered” by the British expedition of G.Kellet. But official London did not see fit to insist on recognition of it as its possession.

This stereotype turned out to be so stable that Japan, the territory of which on the Kuril Islands was separated from Kamchatka by the strait only 15 km wide, has appraised the North-East as the third-rate object for the attack in the 1904-1905 war. For this reason, a small group, with which the local rebel militias, was sent there. This is largely responsible for the situation when the intervention of Japan against Soviet Russia (1920-1922), covering the lands from Transbaikalia to Primorye, left out the North-East.

The civil war (1918-1922) starkly illustrated the low estimate of the geopolitical position of the North-East. The leaders of the internal Russian conflict parties had no idea of the state of affairs in the region. The negotiations conducted by them with the American businessmen about the concessions within its bounds were of informal nature. Furthermore, these initiatives were developed in no form.

The local authorities on the North-East ceded power periodically and, mainly, without shots to their political opponents. Naturally, the White Guard descent to Okhotsk and gunfight between the “Red Guards” and “White Guards” near the Chukot settlement Apuka (1922-1923) presented the dramatic episodes. But their scale could not be compared with the events on the “Big Land”. Kamchatka has capitulated peacefully.

Stage IV. From the 1920s to the 29-th century, the major changes have taken place in the position of the North-East. They can be determined as the stage of the geopolitical Renaissance, which lasts until now. Its essence lies in the fact that the region became the center of attention concentration for a number of the states again. This is caused by the following reasons:

- increase of demands for mineral raw materials, the extraction of which shifts to the earlier hard accessible territories and to the oceanic aquatic area as well as the development of technologies allowing this shift;
- the newly specified real possibility of transforming the Northern Sea Route into the route of international trade transit;
- breakthrough in the field of armament allowing to create the military infrastructure and to conduct military operations on the territories formerly hardly suitable or entirely unsuitable for this.

The manifestation of the symptoms of depletion of the mineral resources base in the European countries in the early 20-th century made them, among other matters, turn to the Arctic, the resources potential of which was not investigated. Owing to the successes in development of air force and icebreaker building, the “Arctic race” has begun and all of the industrialized countries came in it. The Soviet Union was not immune to it.

The high-priority task of the USSR was related to the strengthening of its sovereign rights in the Arctic Circle. In 1924, Wrangel Island was declared a part of the USSR territory. In the meantime, the clannish councils integrated into the Soviet administrative system were established in Chukotka, which abolished its semi-independent status. Initiated by a number of the countries (Canada, Norway, Denmark), the Soviet Union took part in the sectoral division of Arctic and declared that the space from the North pole to the extreme points of the national frontier with coordinates of 32°04'45" E and 168°49'30" W was its possession. These measures turned out to be well-timed in the light of the geopolitical changes concerning the North-East.

S.V. Obruchev’s expedition in 1926 has detected rich deposits of gold, tin, tungsten, and mercury on its territory. Several of them (for example, the Iultinskoye tin-tungsten one) turned out to be the largest deposit in the world. For their development, the association “Dalstroi” was established in 1931 and its subsequent passing to the control of NKVD has highlighted the strategic importance of the discovered mineral raw materials. In the region the gold mines and enrichment plants were established. Over three thousand km of the road network was laid and the “capital of Kolyma Krai”, the settlement (from 1939, town) of Magadan was erected.

As a result, the North-East has turned into one of the world's ore mining centers. In addition, the icebreaker “Sibiryakov” passed per navigation on the Northern Sea Route in 1932, which gave birth to the regular motion along it. For its servicing,

the ports of Provideniya and Pevek were constructed and the port of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski (prior to 1924, Petropavlovsk) was reconstructed.

These works were carried out mainly by the Gulag prisoners, the number of which in the region has increased during 1932-1941 from ten thousand to 150 thousand people. This made a certain internal problem: the majority of prisoners in the North-East served the sentences in accordance with the political articles, which created the potential basis for the anti-Soviet revolt in the region. But the possibility of its realization could not be compared with the arising direct threat on the part of abroad.

The first half of the 19-th century was noted by the aggression of the external political agenda of Japan pointed at the extensive territorial expansion, including that at the expense of the Soviet Union. A plan of offensive war against the USSR was drawn up in 1928 and found real contours after the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. According to its specified version, the North-East was occupied by one infantry division with support of the fleet for one month. For the USSR, in the light of this perspective, the urgent creation of the powerful defense potential within its bounds was the only way to retain the region.

From 1932, in the North-East, the erection of the Petropavlovsk, Uelen and Dezhnyov fortified sectors has started. By 1941, the 16-th Army was deployed in Kamchatka; apart from the security contingent of prison camps, the 22-nd rifle regiment of NKVD was deployed in Kolyma. In Okhotsk, 70 neighborhoods watch groups have received military training.

During the Great Patriotic War, the geopolitical position of the North-East has acquired a new vitally important aspect. It became the direct and major canal of delivery of the military assistance of allies to the USSR. From 1941 to 1946, the port of Petropavlovsk has received by the sea 8.2 million t of cargoes (47.1% of all weight volume of lend-lease) from USA (11). The Alaska-Siberia air route came into operation from 1942, and, along it, 7,908 American warplanes (42.8% of total number of their deliveries to the Red Army) arrived by air from Fairbanks to the USSR using the intermediate flight stops at aerodromes constructed in Chukotka and Kolyma Taking into account the unfriendly position of Japan and its diversions on the sea route between the USSR and the USA, the concentration of the Soviet sea naval forces in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski has started from 1944 using the capabilities of the Northern Sea Route.

At that, the North-East has remained one of the most important suppliers of strategic materials. In the course of 1941-1944, it produced 241 t of gold, 36 t of silver, 12 thousand t of tin as well as a considerable amount of tungsten and mercury.

The force potential concentrated in the region by the end of the Second World War allowed realizing from its territory the operation to defeat the Japanese troops in August 1945.

One can only assume what changes would be suffered by the geopolitical position of the region upon completion of the Second World War on retention of the constructive relations between the USSR and its former allies. However, in 1946, the long-simmering systemic conflict between them resulted at the beginning of the “Cold war” – balancing on the edge of the armed conflict. Now, the North-East, in view of its geographical position, turned out to be opposed directly to such a powerful potential enemy as the USA Army equipped with weapons of mass annihilation.

In Alaska, eight operating military bases, including the air force ones in Anchorage and Fairbanks were retained after the war's end and two brigades of the 15-th infantry division as well as the stations of the radar (later, satellite) tracking were deployed. In the Fort Greely, the base of silo-based missiles was created in 1949. From 1947, the American combat aircrafts carried out the reconnaissance flights over the USSR territory (North-East).

This situation did not remain without response. The Soviet Union could not allow a turning of its North-East into the potential “corridor of invasion” in the event of war. In addition, the mining industry of the region got the “second wind” after the short postwar decline: new significant reserves of gold, tin, tungsten, molybdenum, and uranium were discovered in Chukotka from 1951 to 1959. Possible loss of control over them as a result of the external aggression might be inadmissible.

In defense of the region, the troop units composing the 14-th (in Chukotka) and 17-th (In Kamchatka) armies were redeployed here in 1947 from East Europe. But their infantry and tank forces were considered to be an insufficient barrier against the technically superior potential enemy. Therefore, the defense potential of the North-East was renewed by 1955 in accordance with demand of time.

The armies of the primary postwar deployment gave the way to the formations of the strategic air force in Pevek and Anadyr, missile-armed units of different purposes in the settlement of Gudym and I Magadan mountain pass. The bays of Krasheninnikov and Bechevinskaya in Kamchatka became the sites of deployment of the powerful naval grouping. The ground forces were presented by the 99-th motor rifle division and the naval infantry brigade.

A modernization of the defense potential has denoted the qualitatively new dimension in the geopolitical opposition of the North-East. The modern weapons arranged in it could reach Hawaii, North Dakota, Nevada, and California. The Soviet submarines had the opportunity to raid the whole aquatic area of the Pacific Ocean.

Consequently, the forces that were concentrated in the North-, attached the powerful army-political component to the territorial presence of the USSR in the Pacific and allowed to affect directly the outcomes of the Korean (1950-1953) and

Vietnamese (1964-1975) wars. The existing state of affairs was expressed by the terminology of the Armed Forces of the United States identifying the North-East as “another Fallujah.

Stage V. In essence, the capitulatory position of the highest-level leaders just before the breakup of the Soviet Union and in the early days of the sovereign Russian state became the catastrophe for the geopolitical position of Russia in the North-East. The regional force potential, serving as one of the forward defense lines of the country and an efficient tool of inhibition of aggression against it and guarantee of its influence in the Pacific basin, was voluntarily and fast liquidated. Only the weakened naval base in the Bay of Krasheninnikov was retained. In parallel, under various pretexts, the destruction of the mining industry in the North-East began, which resulted in its full-scale crash.

As a result, by the early 21st century, the region sank itself into the severe social and economic depression and was practically defenseless. By means of it, the USA in 1989 insisted on the agreement to transfer them 31.4 thou. km² of the exclusive economic zone of Russia and 46.3 thou. km² of the continental shelf in the Bering Sea. This concession generated the unofficial claims to the Herald and the Wrangel Islands in American society. But the aforesaid tendency turned out to be short-term.

Stage VI. From the beginning of the 21-st century, Russia proceeded actively with the restoration of its geopolitical positions in the international arena in their advanced version. This process affected directly the North-East.

Having become one of the initiators of the building of the multipolar world order, Russia turned into the object of pushback from the principal architect of the Anglo-Saxon globalization-the USA, reviving de facto the state of the “Cold war”. Under such conditions, the significance of the North-East grew again, which has resulted in adoption in 2009 of the government document “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in Arctic for the period until 2020 and the further perspective”. According to its provisions, the restoration of the naval bases in the Bay of Krasheninnikov, “North Clover on Kotelny Island, creation of the multipurpose air force formation in the Bay of Elizov, deployment of the network of the air-defense capabilities in the region, radar and satellite tracking, recreation of the Naval Infantry Brigade and others took place.

Aside from the military component, the North-East is among the most important sites of concentration in Russia of reserves of nonferrous and noble metals and its explored mineral resources potential has increased by the discovery of hydrocarbons on the shelf of the Okhotsk and Chukchi Seas.

The importance of the geopolitical position of the North-East has resulted in that it became the “initial point” of the biggest extending of the sovereign rights of Russia over the last one and half centuries. In 2014, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf satisfied its request for recognition of the Sea of Okhotsk the internal one and passing completely under the Russian international-legal supremacy with all expected advantages of the economic and defense regards.

This is the largest single aquarium annexation of Russia. And its capabilities here are far from exhausted. As the formerly declared division of the Arctic into sectors has no grounds in international law, in 2001, Russia has submitted the entry for possession of the part of the continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean, including along the underwater Mendeleev Ridge extending 860 km from the Wrangel Island to the North Pole. Its rejection by the UN Commission is of the temporary nature and it, likely, will be satisfied in the future.

These actions are focused on the extension of the living space of the country at the expense of the World Ocean surface. A circle of preferences obtained from this is wide and is only supplemented by new components. So, the global climatic changes allowed from 2010 to pilot the ships on the Northern Sea Route without icebreaker assistance. In other words, the ideas of the 16-th century of the short transoceanic route through the North-East Passage materialize at the present time.

In this regard, it must be noted that these great movements related to the extension of the territorial waters of Russia are now possible, due to the fact that Russia possesses the initial continental base for their legal reasoning and practical realization – its North-East region.

CONCLUSION

Many of the concepts used in geopolitics are in need of the specification. The idea of the geopolitical position is no exception in this regard. At large, it was determined as the “geographical position of the country or its region with regard to other countries taking into account similarities and differences of their ... geopolitical potentials, presence or absence of the mutual geopolitical interests and problems. It must be added to this that the geopolitical position was a variable category. The estimate of its importance can vary in time depending on the particular factors and possibility to realize them by one or another society. This is confirmed by an analysis of the dynamics of geopolitical position of the Russian North-East. This region went through the stages of the almost full loss of its importance and transitions to the state of one of the most important “nerve centers” of the international relations; at that, these transitions have discovered every time new, earlier unthinkable aspects in its geopolitical position.

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