

Article

THE PACIFICATION OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS: A TIME SERIES ANALYSIS

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Abstract

In this paper we operationalize and empirically test six core tenets of pacification theory derived from Marxian political economy using time series data for the USA from 1972-2009. Our analysis confirms that rising inequality is statistically significantly correlated to increased public and private policing over time and that increased public and private policing is also statistically significantly correlated to increased industrial exploitation as measured through “surplus-value”. While unionization correlates to strikes and lock-outs which suggests that unions have an important mobilizing role for the industrial reserve army, unionization also inversely correlates to total policing employment. As union membership decreases, policing employment increases, which gives credence to the notion that unions may also act as policing agents for capital. We conclude that when these findings are coupled with our previous international research of 45 countries for the snapshot year of 2004 (Rigakos and Ergul 2011) that produced almost identical results, there appears to be significant empirical support for pacification theory. The relationships we have discovered recur both across time and international contexts despite the fact that variations in legal norms and institutional histories of policing are varied and complex.

Keywords

Pacification, policing, inequality, unions, United States

It is now accepted wisdom that the widening gap between rich and poor in the United States is a matter of significant public policy concern (Thompson, 2012). The ‘gap’ issue has been embraced by liberal thinkers as one of equity (Huffington, 2011), by venture capitalists as one of sufficient consumption and the spectre of economic stagnation (Buffet, 2012), and by security experts as one of national stability. Witnessing

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falling real wages alongside soaring profits, of course, comes as no surprise to critical political economists (e.g. Wolff, 2011) who have long held that if capitalism were deregulated, left to its own devices, and allowed to operate unfettered, it would produce gross disparities in relative wealth and income. In Marx and Engel's (1850) terms "[s]ociety as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other — Bourgeoisie and Proletariat". In the United States, resultant political discussions about the decline of the 'middle class' have turned to a more progressive income tax system as a solution (Buffet, 2012) that might act as a leveler for inequality and a method by which worker insecurity may be alleviated. Yet, worker insecurity is of significant benefit to capitalists both domestically and internationally (e.g. Klein, 2008). After all, worker uncertainty and exploitation is considered 'productive' for the economy as it significantly tempers demands and drives down real wages. Capitalism ushers in "everlasting uncertainty and agitation" (Marx and Engels, 1850). In this way, we might say that an *insecure* workforce is one important step toward a *pacified* workforce. It is therefore the nature of capitalism to engage in warfare (both open and subterranean) against its workers in order to produce a consistent, beneficial insecurity: a state of anxiety that can only ostensibly be satiated by consumption. In fact, during the economic bubble of the late 1990s and just ahead of the Great Recession, U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan argued that "growing worker insecurity" played a pivotal role in workers' having stopped asking for wage increases which was by extension beneficial for US capital (Uchitelle, 1997). Of course, this insecurity took place during a period that witnessed a massive rise in corporate profits, a decline in real income (Wolff, 2011) and consistent increases in public and private policing (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011).

In this paper, we build upon our previous international research (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011) that investigated the relationships between four resilient and seemingly unrelated trends: (1) the consistent erosion of union-membership; (2) an increase in income polarization and inequality; (3) a dramatic resurgence in popular protest; and (4) a steady rise in public and private policing employment. We analyze the relationship between these variables in the context of a theory of pacification which argues that the role of "policing", broadly defined, has both historically and contemporaneously been designed to "make workers productive" (Rigakos, 2011) by "fabricating a social order" (Neocleous, 2000) that seeks to protect private property relations in support of bourgeois interests. In this sense, we treat total policing employment in the United States as an empirical barometer of bourgeois insecurity conditioned by two elements of Marxian political economy: (1) relative deprivation (income inequality) and (2) the rise of an industrial reserve army, or manufacturing unemployment through successive deindustrialization. We also examine how both worker exploitation (as measured by surplus value) and labour militancy (as measured by strikes and lockouts per 100,000 population) interact with declining union membership. Our goal, in the simplest terms,

is to empirically test the central tenets of pacification theory through a statistical examination of macroeconomic trends in the United States from 1972 to 2009.

This paper is organized into five sections. The first section introduces the reader to the basic theoretical tenets of pacification and policing. For us, the most important aspect of this review is to glean from the perspective a number of assertions that may be operationalized in a manner that will allow us to statistically test their veracity against our available U.S. time-series data. The general relationships measured in this paper all revolve around policing employment as a contemporary barometer of bourgeois insecurity, yet it is important to note that this is only one aspect of the broad project of police and its relationship to capital. The next section on methodology outlines our approach. More specifically, we lay out the various sources for the variables we examine including our calculations for creating second-order variables, such as surplus value and cumulative deindustrialization. The following three sections, entitled “inequality”, “surplus-value” and “de-unionization and deindustrialization” explain and contextualize the results of our analysis.

Policing as Pacification

Pacification is the continuum of police violence upon which the fabrication of capitalist order is planned, enforced and resisted. The Oxford English Dictionary defines pacification as a state or sovereign action that attempts ‘to put an end to strife or discontent’ and ‘to reduce to peaceful submission’ a rebellious population. Neocleous (2011: 38) argues that the Dictionary’s reference to the *Edicts of Pacification* of 1563, 1570 and the *Edict of Nantes* in 1598 as the first instances of the usage of the word ‘pacification’ are important because “they are the point of departure for the period in which the insecurity of bourgeois order had to be secured.” It is at this point that a politics of security, a need to fabricate an order necessary for the functioning of the bourgeois state becomes central to the development of liberal philosophy both domestically and imperially (Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011). Pacification was to be achieved through a science of police that aimed to proactively shape a new social order.

This police science (Polizeiwissenschaft) has a rich analytic history, going back to the 17th century, that is tied to the development of a technical need to order populations and to fabricate conditions conducive to capitalist accumulation. Much of what we now come to understand as policing is based on Enlightenment thought concerning the best organization of populations for the “welfare of all” and the maximization of wealth either for an absolutist monarchy or, later, as part of the market dynamics of a liberal state. These organizing principles of police and capital have historically revolved around an intentional class-based ordering, including the proper establishment of work-houses, the best method of keeping accounts of persons and goods as well as their movements, the formation of a pauper police, and the systematic categorization of worthy and unworthy

poor. These innovations in police thinking played a prominent and pronounced role in the establishment of the 19th century constabulary that the English-speaking world, including the United States, has inherited. The “new police” of London were a bourgeois innovation that were made necessary by an unregulated migration of “masterless men” and other “vagabonds” to the emerging industrial heartlands of England. The police were set up to methodically inculcate a wage-labour system that made wealth accumulation more predictable. The great police thinker Patrick Colquhoun sought to set up a system of enforcement as a method to regulate the compensation of labour conducive to capital accumulation. At the heart of 19th century imperial England, Colquhoun set about creating an experimental police that would replace “chips and perquisites” of all types among dock workers and that would enforce a dress code and system of inspection that would “eliminate pilfering” altogether. Colquhoun’s methods were centred on the enforcement of wage labour and his success was catalogued empirically. As Rigakos (2011: 70-1) notes, Colquhoun “clearly realized that social control... was geared to the benefit of a particular class of property holders” and that this was “consistent with his emphasis on managing the various classes of persons who he said threatened commercial interests.” Thus, the main target and concern of police has, from its inception, been the working class and the poor. “That is, its mobilizing work was the mobilization of work” (Neocleous, 2000: 20).

Colquhoun, however, was also an imperialist. A former Virginia colonist and Loyalist, he even raised an army out of Scotland to assist in putting down the American rebellion. Like other police intellectuals, Colquhoun focused on both imperial planning by means of fabricating a wage-labour system and putting an end to domestic instability (see Rigakos et al., 2009). He was, in the strictest sense, both a theorist and practitioner of pacification. In the American context, labour unrest and its policing also has a very long history. Like the British context, there were experiments with private policing, such as the Coal and Iron Police, who worked directly for industrial interests and were often brutal in their methods of strike-breaking and unscrupulously infiltrating and undermining worker associations (Friedman, 1907). As American railroad baron and financier Jay Gould once put it: “I can hire one half the working class to kill the other half.” When private security companies such as the notorious Pinkerton Detective Agency (Morn, 1982) proved too controversial and local guardsmen proved too unpredictable by galvanizing further resistance (Hogg, 1944), states across the union began to move to state-level law enforcement in an effort to create a more centralized, less locally dependent, and ‘professional’ service (Couch, 1981). In the same way it was clear to workers and political agitators in nineteenth century London, it was not lost on American labour activists of the day that the legislative move towards the use of state “troopers” and “rangers” was a direct threat to their ability to mobilize. At every step, pacification anticipates resistance.

It is within this historical backdrop, both domestic and international, that the interconnected role of police and capital can be viewed as part of a large-scale project of pacification. Thus, there are at least six tenets that may be distilled from current thinking about pacification that are useful to our study:

1) **Public-private.** Given their institutional interchangeability yet identical targets of enforcement, to rigidly distinguish between public versus private forms of policing is to further reify a false binary that obfuscates far more than it reveals. Put another way: “The public sphere does the work of the private sphere, civil society the work of the state. The question is therefore not ‘public versus private’ or ‘civil society versus the state’, but the unity of bourgeois violence and the means by which pacification is legitimized in the name of security” (Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011: 15-16). In the context of both pacification and a Marxian political economy (see Rigakos and Ergul 2011: 338-340) it makes no sense to operationalize public and private policing separately² and so, in this paper, we *operationalize public and private policing employment into one variable*.

2) **Inequality.** The more capitalism *naturally* matures the more unequal the distribution of wealth. Adam Smith admitted as much but defended the emergent class distinctions that sprang from early capitalism by unapologetically arguing that the “accommodations” of “an industrious and frugal peasant” always “exceed[ed] that of many an African king, the absolute master of the lives and liberties of ten thousand naked savages” (Smith 1937: 18). He held that *absolute* poverty is reduced wherever capitalism flourished. Marx, however, (1977: 33) pointed out that poverty was *relative* rather than absolute arguing that since our gains and possessions “are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature.” Despite the fact that “living conditions may have improved for the lowest rungs of society, they improved much more significantly for the bourgeoisie whose source of wealth was directly tied to the exploitation of workers” (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: 341). If policing is aimed at the fabrication of an order that seeks to promote capital accumulation and the valorization of private property then the larger the threat to that order the greater the aggregate need to secure it. Rising inequality is a threat to the capitalist order because it amplifies relative deprivation. For us, this means that, over time, unfettered capitalist systems become more and more unequal and as they do so this inequality, if not

² In his historical examination of private detective industrial policing in the US from 1850-1940, Weiss (1978: 63) argues that “the public/private distinction can be seen as bogus” even though “this arrangement has had decided benefits in upholding the interests of capital”. Similarly, in his analysis of the Coal and Iron Police, Couch (1981: 90) asserts that the move to state policing was as a result of the need to “guarantee stability of class and property relations” when the company cops proved too controversial. In the end, public and private police have historically been used interchangeably in the American pacification of the working class.

addressed by other means, must necessarily occur alongside more and more policing. *Inequality will positively correlate to total policing.*

3) **Surplus value.** Long before the Thames River police and in the preceding pre-capitalist economic epochs some form of coercion has always been required to realize a surplus (Rigakos et al., 2009). The historical and institutional goal of police science, both in terms of planning and enforcement, is to produce an environment conducive to the promotion of capital accumulation, to make workers productive. This is accomplished by facilitating the practice of exploitation necessary for the functioning of the capitalist system. Exploitation, in Marxist terms, is unpaid labour time or surplus value: the amount of time that a worker works without getting paid and for which the capitalist realizes a surplus (Marx, 1972). A system of police is vital to the extraction of surplus value because it is based on the use and threat of coercive force. *Surplus value will positively correlate to total policing.*

4) **(De-)Unionization.** There is ambivalence among Marxian thinkers about the relative role of unions with respect to the revolutionary goals of the proletariat. Gramsci (1968: 34) argued that unions “cannot be the instrument[s] for a radical renovation of society”. Luxemburg (1971:68) lamented that unions suffered from a “bureaucratism and a certain narrowness of outlook” because their goal was to ameliorate and resolve class conflict as much as possible. Trotsky (1974: 43) chastized “the reformist bureaucracy and the labour aristocracy who pick the crumbs from its banquet table” and derisively dubbed this emerging labour aristocracy the “lieutenants of capital” (Trotsky 1969: 54). By 1872, Marx (1987: 90-93) complained in his speech to the General Council of the International Workers’ Association that “[t]rade unions are praised too much; they must in the future be treated as affiliated societies and used as centers of attack in the struggle of labour against capital.” Despite these critiques Marxian scholars still held out hope for a radicalized union movement that would assist a revolutionary socialism. In our own previous work we have argued that “[i]n sum, the general position toward trade unions by Marxists is that unions alone cannot be the vehicles for the radical transformation of the social relations of production” because by “their very nature trade unions do not seek to unleash the war between the bourgeois and the proletarian classes but rather act to keep the peace: to behave, as Trotsky put it, as policing agents for capital” (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: 334). If we are to believe that unions are indeed agents of capital, then they also acquire a police function in society and so we should see that more union membership per capita will result in lower police employment numbers, and the inverse should also be true. *Unionization will inversely correlate to total policing.*

5) **The industrial reserve army.** It is fair to say that there has been no greater preoccupation among the police scientists of the Enlightenment than with that of the idle, the indigent and the poor. To a large extent, planning for control over and policing of vagabonds and masterless men, the creation of policy to discern between the deserving and undeserving poor, and motivating people classified in these categories to become productive have guided much thinking about the proper use and deployment of police (Neocleous, 2000). Marx also had much to say about this reserve army of workers for they act as both a pressure release on the demands of workers by lowering expectations – lest they be replaced by the unemployed – and also appear as a threat to the system itself by acting as a ready reservoir of agitated revolutionaries. Marxian historians have offered significant insights into how the emergent bourgeois state made it a central organizing mission to pacify this body of transient workers through forced migration, immigration policy and the use of public and private police to crush revolutionary agitation (see Couch, 1981; Weiss, 1978). Both in the formative logics of bourgeois systems of police and within the radical philosophy of revolutionary politics, the industrial reserve army plays a pivotal role. Much of the revolutionary fervor of the nineteenth century around the unemployed and this persists today. Strikes and lockouts may act as catalysts for revolutionary actions (Priestland, 2009) and union agitation becomes paramount; yet, with ever-decreasing union membership it is likely that strikes and lock-outs will also become less frequent. Following from the above we can hypothesize: *Unionization will positively correlate to strikes and lock-outs and cumulative deindustrialization will positively correlate to total policing.*

We have now laid out six tenets of Marxian political economy, generally, and pacification more precisely. We have operationalized these tenets in a hypothetico-deductive manner for the purpose of statistical testing. We must admit, however, that in setting up these hypotheses we have been significantly aided by our previous international research (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011) that investigated identical relationships across 45 countries for the comparative “snapshot” year 2004. In that study we sought to develop a “nascent theory” with the “exploratory” aim of producing an empirically-grounded Marxian political economy of policing. This study, therefore, builds directly on that international study in that we are far more confident of the veracity and explanatory power of Marxian political economy and believe that pacification theory effectively captures what we were already seeking to map analytically: the material, macroeconomic connections between police and capital. We are also taking two important analytic steps by choosing to conduct a time-series study of the United States. First, pacification theory demands that we take stock of what is happening in the heart of Empire (i.e., Hardt and Negri, 2001) – the domestic is the imperial according to pacification (Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011: 17). Second, while discovering significant relationship between police and

capital transnationally is indeed significant, it would further solidify our claims if similar relationships were observed over time in a single national context.

Methodology

We have already gone some way in the preceding section toward mapping out how we intend to operationalize concepts gleaned from Marxian political economy and pacification by translating these notions into empirically testable hypotheses. Here, we detail the source data used in the analysis. Our variables are as follows: (1) total policing employment per 100,000 population which is the sum of (a) public police employment per 100,000 population and (b) private security employment per 100,000 population; (2) inequality; (3) surplus value; (4) union membership; (5) cumulative deindustrialization (which is the cumulative annual difference of manufacturing job losses subtracted from manufacturing job gains); and (6) strikes and lock-outs.

Our data-set generally reflects a time-series analysis of the United States from 1972-2009. Prior to 1972, there is no reliable annual statistical information on public police or private security employment in the United States other than national census data. Similar gaps are present with data on manufacturing job losses and gains.³ While the variables used in this study equate to those in our previously published international study (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011), the sources have changed, as has the construction of one key indicator: the industrial reserve army. Our decision to employ a longitudinal analysis in this article has led us to replace our manufacturing unemployment variable with a new “cumulative deindustrialization” measure. The reason for such an alteration derives from the statistical restrictions that the use of manufacturing unemployment data generates in a longitudinal analysis. The Current Population Survey produces “unemployment by industry” data by asking for the identification of the last job that the persons participating the survey held. This poses a problem for our longitudinal analysis because people who were laid-off from manufacturing sector employment could be hired and again laid-off from jobs in another sector prior to the survey. Considering that displacement is a major issue for manufacturing sector employees (Brauner, 2008), manufacturing unemployment as a variable loses its reliability over time. Therefore, in our analysis, we have created a measure of *cumulative deindustrialization*: which, as mentioned, is the net change in deindustrialization calculated by subtracting the annual “job destruction” or job losses from “job creation” or job gains. It is a cumulative measure because we add the number of each year’s net change to the following year.

³ It should be noted that there are isolated data points where earlier statistics are available for certain variables. Whenever available, we make use of these data-points though they are sometimes not shown graphically.

Our data are gleaned from the following pre-existing data sources: Public police and private security data are added to make up our measure of **total policing**. They are derived from: (1) a combination of census and FBI *Law Enforcement Employment Bulletins* and (2) Occupational Employment Statistics by the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS). For **inequality**, we used the Gini coefficient from the Income Inequality database, Earnings and Poverty Reports. The Gini coefficient is currently the most widely used measure of income inequality. It is the ratio of the area under a line of equality where one axis is the cumulative share of income and the other axis is the cumulative share of people from the lowest to the highest. It produces a range from zero to one which is often multiplied by 100 (we also use this convention in our Graphs). The higher the Gini coefficient, the higher the rate of income inequality.⁴ The data required for the calculation of **surplus value** consists of the number of employed production workers, manufacturing value added, and annual earnings of manufacturing workers (production workers). This is the most widely accepted measure by Marxian scholars.⁵ We also adopt this calculation.

$$SV = \frac{(\text{gross value added} - \text{total manufacturing workers' earnings})}{\text{total manufacturing workers' earnings}}$$

This data is retrieved mainly from: (1) Current Employment Statistics on Employment, Hours and Earnings, produced by BLS; (2) Gross Domestic Products Accounts by Industry, created by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; and (3) Annual Survey of Manufacturers and American Fact Finder, prepared by the U.S. Census Bureau. Data regarding **union-membership** is retrieved from three major sources: (1) “Union Membership Trends” (Mayer, 2004); and (2) News Releases prepared by the BLS; and (3) “Union Membership, Coverage, Density, and Employment by State and Sector, 1983-2011” (Hirsh and Macpherson, 2012). The data for “job destruction” and “job creation” as well as job losses and job gains which we add as a measure of **cumulative deindustrialization** is retrieved from Business Dynamics Statistics released by the U.S. Census Bureau, and Business Employment Dynamics Statistics produced by the BLS. National level data concerning **strikes and lockouts** is obtained from Economic News Releases produced by BLS.


⁴ For more detail on the calculation of Gini coefficient see Gini (1921).

⁵ While there have been diligent attempts to more closely approximate the rate of surplus value using existing economic measures (Amsden, 1981; Cuneo, 1978, 1982, 1984; Lynch, 1987; Lynch, 1988; Moseley, 1985; Varley, 1938; Weisskopf, 1985; Wolff, 1975, 1979) we have chosen the simplest and most widely applicable measure adopted by Marxian scholars (Cueno, 1978; Lynch, 1988; Lynch, Groves and Lizotte, 1994).

This is a simple correlational study. While the nature of our general tenets sometimes hint at causality, our time-series data are insufficient to conduct multivariate tests. Causality in a time-series can also be asserted by time-shifting backwards the presumed independent variable. The strength of the associations we have discovered, however, would make this shifting rather artificial. That is to say, where powerful and statistically significant relationships already exist, one or two-year shifts makes no difference in the result. Causality may also be conveyed epistemically by demonstrating that an expected association is predicted by the theory. In this case, as a direct function of the theoretical assertions being tested, from time to time we take liberties in this direction but it should always be remembered that our statistical tests are nonetheless correlational and not causal.

Inequality

Graph 1: Total Policing and Income Inequality



Since the late 1960s U.S. income disparity has become the widest among all major industrialized nations (Brandolini and Smeeding, 2006; Smeeding, 2005; Morris and Western, 1999)⁶. The Gini co-efficient rose from 38.6 in 1968 to 46.8 in 2009 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010) to 46.9 in 2010 (Levine, 2012). While this is the measure of inequality we use in this article, it is important to note that other measures have produced similar results.

Income disparity is also explained by a comparison of the ratio of the median income level (50th percentile) to that of 10th percentile income level (the ratio of 50-10) as well as the ratio of the 90th percentile to the 50th percentile (the ratio of 90-50). On the basis of this comparison, it is suggested that growth in overall income inequality is a result of those near the bottom of the distribution falling further behind the typical household income while those near the top are far ahead of the typical household income.⁷ Thus, according to Levine (2012:5), increased inequality in the upper half of the distribution might be accountable for most of the overall increase in inequality between 1961 and 2002. Such pattern in which the benefits of economic growth are being accrued by largely those near the top of the income distribution has continued throughout 2007 (Diaz-Gimenez, Rios-Rull and Glover, 2011). According to Census Bureau data, the bottom fifth quintile's share of income has changed little – at less than 4% – for the last few decades. On the contrary, the income share of the top fifth quintile increased significantly. While the bottom 20%'s share of income was 4.2% in 1968, it fell to 3.3% in 2010. In contrast, the top 20%'s share of income increased from 42.6% in 1968 to 50.2% in 2010. More importantly, the share of the top 5% rose from 16.3% in 1968 to an astonishing 21.3% in 2010. To put it more clearly, the top 5%'s income “accounted for more than four times the share it would have had in a perfectly equal distribution” (Levine, 2012). Moreover, the income share of the middle three quintiles (second to fourth) declined from 53.2% to 46.5% (Levine, 2012) while the income share of the top 1% increased drastically from 8.35% in 1968 to 12.98% in 1990 to 17.42 in 2010 (Alverado, et. al., 2012).

The inevitable question in this context is: What has been driving the increase in income inequality in the United States? The two explanations most commonly offered for

⁶ Income inequality has increased throughout the world over the past three decades both within and between countries (Milanović and Kaya, 2007; Wade, 2004). Income inequality within countries was stable or declining from the early 1960s to the early 1980s, but it has increased sharply and steadily across the globe since (Galbraith, 2002; Galbraith, 2007; Wade, 2004). In advanced industrialized countries, the average income of the richest 10% is almost nine times that of the poorest 10%, a ratio of 9 to 1. The Gini co-efficient was 0.29 in OECD countries in the mid-1980s; however, it rose by almost 10% to 0.316 in the late 2000s (OECD, 2011). For more detail on the rising income inequality in the world see Berger, et al. (2010); Brandolini and Smeeding (2006); Smeeding (2002). However, neoliberal theorists refute the idea of the rising inequality in the world since 1980s. For more detail see Dollar (2005); Dollar and Kraay (2002); Nielsen (2007); Wolf (2000).

⁷ For an analysis of individual income inequality trends in the US see Bryan and Martinez (2008).

the trend toward greater income inequality in the U.S. are: globalization and technological advancement (Levine, 2012). In the contemporary world, globalization is promoted through a neoliberal form of capitalism in which the goals of the economy are set as growth and development and these goals become possible mainly through openness to trade and investment. However, trade liberalization and financial globalization result in income inequality across the globe (Jaumotte, Lall and Papageorgiou, 2008). In the context of the U.S., the improvement of the conditions of free trade and flows of goods, services, and capital have placed less skilled U.S. workers in more vulnerable position by putting them in direct competition with less skilled workers abroad. Shifting the production of goods and services overseas has reduced demand for workers in the United States, and in turn put downward pressure on their wages (Levine, 2011; Levine, 2012).

The argument that is commonly found most convincing, among economists, in explaining rising inequality, across the globe and in the U.S., is technological change. Technological development, it is argued, has led to “the comparatively rapid growth in the wage premium paid to more highly skilled (productive) workers since 1979” (Levine, 2012: 8). In other words, technological changes have resulted in turning information technology employees into low-skilled workers while raising the demand for high-skilled employees and thus increased their wages (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003; Jaumotte, Lall and Papageorgiou, 2008). Here, the relationship between technological advancement and education is utilized in order to explain rising inequality.

Of course, these two explanations, i.e., globalization and technological development, cannot be separated from one another. For, as Marx and Engels (1992: 6) argue, “[t]he bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society.” That is to say, the spaces of capital in which it operates, the social relations within which these operations take place, and “with them the whole relations of society” have to be continuously re-constructed, re-created, and re-structured as a response to the untameable desires of capital. Therefore, neither technological changes nor the processes of globalization can be divorced from capital and its needs.

A less popular explanation for the increasing wage inequality in the U.S. draws attention to the relationship between the decline of unionization and the increase in wage inequality and argues that “unions help to institutionalize norms of equity, reducing the dispersion of nonunion wages in highly unionized regions and industries” (Western and Rosenfeld, 2011: 1).⁸ While the union effect on inequality is alternately considered modest (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008), indirect – through technological change (Acemoglu, 2002), or secondary – to the effects of other institutions, such as minimum

⁸ It should be noted that the U.S. and the UK are the countries with the largest decline in unionization rate, and they are also the countries that have experienced the largest increase in income inequality in the last three decades among the industrialized nations (Card, Lemieux and Riddell, 2004).


wages (Card and DiNardo, 2002), or minute and primarily affecting men (Card, Lemieux and Riddell, 2004), the decline of unionization explains as much of the increase in inequality as the growing stratification of wages in relation to education (Bruce and Rosenfeld, 2011). Considering the vitality of the effect of relative deprivation on the immiseration of multitudes in the Marxian theoretical framework, it is necessary for our analysis to examine the relation of income inequality, unionization and radicalization to state and corporate insecurities and their manifestation in the increasing numbers of public and private police. The growth of private security in the U.S. has been well-documented (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1971; Cunningham, Strauchs and van Meter, 1990) as has the role of private security agents in both domestic and foreign pacification (Rigakos, 2011). These activities, of course, have a long lineage (Couch, 1978) but today encompass increasingly concentrated (Rigakos, 2000; 2005) multinational security companies, parapolice (Rigakos, 2002) and private mercenary armies (Scahill, 2008) charged with overseas imperial projects.

Our time-series analysis of the U.S. from 1972 to 2009 demonstrates that there is an almost perfect positive correlation between total policing and inequality ($r^2 = .940$, $n=36$, $p < .001$, see Graph 1). The strength of the association is quite astonishing. In our international study we found that inequality was also statistically significantly positively correlated to total policing ($r^2 = .344$, $n=43$, $p < .05$) (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: 356) although this association was not nearly as strong as in the U.S. Our analysis demonstrates that increasing inequality in the U.S. has risen in almost synchronous lockstep with a rising body of public and private policing agents in the last four decades.

Surplus-Value


Surplus value is both the aggregate effect and the driving engine of capitalism. In Marxian terms, capitalism does not exist without surplus value. Surplus value is the unpaid labour-time a capitalist must steal from a worker in order to create profit or margin. As a basic maxim of capitalism one must drive down labour costs to increase surplus, to maximize profits. As inequality rises in the U.S. alongside declining unionization (as we shall see in the next section) it makes perfect sense to presume that this will facilitate the further economic exploitation of manufacturing workers. Job losses breed insecurity which fuels wage concessions. The more pacified the labour force, the more 'productive' it is in the eyes of capital. But this widespread unease, immiseration and exploitation, as we have already mentioned, produces unease on the part of the bourgeoisie which necessitates more policing.

Graph 2: Total Policing and Rate of Surplus Value



Our analysis of the U.S. shows a very strong positive correlation ($r^2 = .855$, $n = 39$, $p < .001$, see Graph 2) between the rate of exploitation (the rate of surplus value) and policing. We did not observe a similarly significant relationship in our international study (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011) though the direction was also positive. This difference between the U.S. and the rest of the world may also be explained by intervening variables such as the relatively more well-developed social safety net in OECD countries, especially in Europe (Åslund, 2007) that may ameliorate the need for more policing in cases of higher exploitation through alternative state initiatives.

Graph 3: Total Policing, Unionization and Strikes and Lock-outs




De-unionization and de-industrialization

The industrial reserve army plays an important role in Marxian political economy – it acts as a calibrating body that drives down wages in times of economic downturn through heightened competition for work. But these dispossessed industrial workers can also threaten the system of exploitation if organized – a proto-revolutionary force ready to seize the means of production. Marx was contradictory in his assessment of the industrial versus the service sector. While he (Marx, 1976: 1044) was quick to distance himself from Smith whom he accused of “fetishizing” the production of vendible commodities as supremely productive, he also later dismissed the service sector, leaving it entirely out of

his account and returning to manufacturing as “productive labour” *par excellence* (see Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: 331). The industrial army, therefore, plays a key role in the sense that it makes goods, is most productive and ripe for revolutionary action. Understanding and measuring the industrial reserve army, that mass of workers made redundant by the rising organic composition of capital, and the *rate of exploitation* they indirectly help foster are thus central Marxian concerns. The most important mechanism used by workers to offset this exploitative relationship is collective bargaining.

Graph 4: Total Policing and Cumulative Deindustrialization



The origin of the labour movement in the U.S. can be traced back to the trade societies, or guilds, of the 18th century (Commons, et al., 1966). However, it was not until the early 19th century that American workers felt compelled to organize against their employers in order to protect themselves from falling wages in the face of rising prices, and to reduce work hours from twelve to ten (Zieger and Gall, 2002). Although these trade societies mounted an effective resistance against new capitalism they were, in effect, restricted “craft” unions. In the second half of the 19th century, however, the penetration

of the factory system, which led to the reduction of wages, the intensification of work, longer work hours, and strict discipline, generated the rise of a permanent factory proletariat. During the Civil War the strength of the labour movement increased. The number of trade unions rose from 79 to 270 between 1863 and 1864, and the estimated number of organized labour was over 200,000. These developments culminated in the establishment of the American Federation of Labour (AFL) in 1886 (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984).

The industrial expansion experienced in the U.S. between the Civil War and the end of the 19th century increased prosperity and improved standards of living for workers. However, as Marxian political economy predicts, capitalist growth never occurs without recurring depressions whose effects are mostly felt by the working class. Dulles and Dubofsky (1984) thus argue that the depressions of the 19th century increased workers' persistence to form and sustain unions. However, the response to the efforts of workers to obtain recognition for their unions was very hostile, resulting in warfare between the workers and employers. Throughout this period, workers received no support from either federal or state governments, or from the courts. Conversely, factory owners were endowed with the power to use police and military troops as well as private security – including the notorious Pinkerton Detective Agency (Morn, 1982; Hogg, 1944) against the labour unrest.⁹ In this context, most of the unions turned towards the protection of the AFL whose union practices were both restrictive to the affiliated unions and skilled-workers, and exclusive toward the semi-skilled, unskilled, migrant, female, and black workers.

The 20th century came with promises of reform and peace in industrial relations¹⁰ but in the face of the growing power of unions, capitalists altered their attitude of searching for peace in industrial relations and adopted destructive strategies and means – such as encouraging the use of “yellow dog” contracts, playing into ethnic-religious fractions within labour movement, exchanging blacklists of workers accused of having radical views, hiring detectives, special deputies and spies, and calling for court injunctions – through which they set organized labour back in almost all areas.¹¹ The anti-unionism accompanied with the domination of the AFL within the organized labour

⁹ In the U.S., the 19th century was the century of violent encounters between workers and police forces – both public and private. To name a few: Tompkins Square Riot (1874), Haymarket Square Riot (1876), Great Railway Strike (1877), Rolling Mills Workers Strike (Bay View Tragedy) (1886), Sugar Cane Workers Strike (1887), Homestead Strike (1892). For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky (1984); Couch (1981); Weiss (1978).

¹⁰ The period from 1901 to 1917 is called the “progressive era” in the U.S. (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 177).

¹¹ One of the most important allies of the employers during this period was the courts which generally made non-membership in a union a condition of employment, sustained the employers in their counterattacks to union boycotts with the claim that boycotts were a restraint on trade. Accordingly, the membership of the AFL declined in 1905 and remained the same for the next five years. For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky (1984: 185-190).

made it almost impossible to organize or sustain a union of any significance in the most important industries, such as steel, automobiles, tobacco, machinery and electrical manufactures, public utilities, and meat- packing. This meant that more than 90% of the labour force in the U.S. was still unorganized.¹²

The entrance of the U.S. in WWI created the conditions for organized labour to be officially recognized as an important player within the national economy. The *Clayton Act* (1914) exempted unions from prosecution under the anti-trust laws in recognizing the right to organize and to bargain collectively. President Wilson also established a National War Labour Board (NWLB) in 1918 to serve as a final court of appeal to settle all industrial disputes if they could not be solved through other means. These developments resulted in a gradual rise of wages and an increase in union membership to over a million from 1916 to 1919 (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 219). However, when wartime restraints were removed and the NWLB was disbanded, the contest between the workers and employers started anew. The year of 1919 witnessed an industrial strife on a scale greater than the country had ever experienced.¹³ The labour movement, which came out of the war organized and confident that with the government's support it would be able to extend its rights, lost ground in the face of the capitalist counterattack since the governmental intervention and injunction laws were on the side of capital once again.¹⁴

The emergence of New Deal policies in the 1930s represented a change in the approach of the U.S. government to industrial relations. Following the principles set in

¹² But, the beginning of the 20th century witnessed the emergence and growth of new unions, such as The United Mine Workers (UMW), the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU), and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA), whose fundamental goal was to eliminate the distinction between skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers, and to overcome the obstacles created by ethnic-religious fractions and gender issues within the union movement. These efforts had fundamental effects on the U.S. labour movement, the most important of which is the formation of the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) in 1935 as an alternative to the AFL. For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky (1984); Zieger and Gall, 2002).

¹³ There were more than 3,500 strikes that were joined by over 4,000,000 workers in 1919 (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 221).

¹⁴ From 1920 to 1923, the union membership fell from over 5,000,000 to 3,500,000. For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 220-232). Expanding production and prosperity between 1922 and 1929 meant increasing wages for workers and an increase in their purchasing power. Therefore, during 1920s, trade unions adopted a strategy of complying with the promises of economic expansion while capitalists started to see unions as a "regulatory mechanism" within industrial relations. The "regulatory unionism" was also called "the new unionism", "trade-union capitalism", "business unionism", "job conscious unionism", or "class collaboration" in the U.S. This new unionism meant the restriction of union goals to narrowly defined immediate material issues, and the instrumentalization of unions by the capitalists as a means of policing the working class (Gordon, 1994). The number of strikes in 1928 was 604, which was the fewest on record in the U.S. labour movement history since 1884. In 1929, there were only 900 work stoppages involving just 1.2% of the labour force (Zieger and Gall, 2002: 45).

the *Norris-La Guardian Act* (NRA) (1932)¹⁵, the *National Industrial Recovery Act* (NIRA) (1933) took a definite step toward implementing the right to organize and collective bargaining. The NIRA and the NRA did not go far enough to protect workers and so, a new act, the *Wagner Act*, or the *National Labour Relations Act*, was passed in 1935. This *Act* recognized and imposed “the right of wage earners to organize without making any such corresponding concessions to management as had been incorporated in the NIRA. It was prepared to strengthen the bargaining position of the workers” (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 266). With this *Act*, it was finally recognized that labour could gain equal terms of bargaining power at the table with capital, only with the support of the government. The importance of this *Act* resides therefore not only in the affirmation of the right of workers to organize, but also in the banning of all employer attempts against the realization of this right. The significance of the 1930s for the labour movement can then be summarized as the establishment of the legal foundations for organized labour in industrial relations.¹⁶

At the beginning of 1940, the U.S. economy started to recover from the depression as a result of orders placed by the Western European countries for the ongoing war. Such orders led to a rise in production, a decrease in unemployment, and an increase in wages. The booming industry and growing union power prepared the stage for one of the most tumultuous years in the U.S. labour history. The number of labour disputes in 1941 reached a higher total than any other year, except 1937. There were 4,288 strikes bringing together more than two million workers. In a pattern that would replicate itself time and time again, anti-unionist propaganda from capitalists framed these strikes as having paralyzing effects on national defense and therefore being un-democratic and un-American.¹⁷ As a result, the National War Labour Board was established in 1942 (Dulles

¹⁵ The *Norris-La Guardian Act* is the embodiment of laws that aimed at profound changes in the role of federal government and federal institutions in the regulation of labour disputes. This *Act* consisted of banning of “yellow dog” contracts, barring the federal courts from issuing injunctions against nonviolent labour disputes, and creating a right of organization and collective bargaining for the industrial workers (Winter, 1960). Section 7 (a) of the Act states the recognition of the right to association and collective bargaining. The New Deal reformulated Section 7 (a) of this Act more carefully in the *Wagner Act* (1935) and the *Fair Labour Standards Act* (1938). For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky (1984: 265-268).

¹⁶ With the New Deal policies, the role of labour in politics had become more crucial than ever. Both the AFL and the CIO played a significant role in the re-election of Roosevelt in 1936. However, the close relationship between the President of the CIO, John L. Lewis, and Roosevelt cooled as a result of the U.S. foreign policy and the loosening of New Deal reforms. For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky (1984, 307-311).

¹⁷ Following the coal strike of 1941, anti-labour laws of different severity were passed in many states, and thirty bills were introduced in the Congress to curb union power (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 317).

and Dubofsky, 1984: 223-230; Zieger and Gall, 2002: 130-136) and organized labour was asked to surrender its right to strike (No-Strike Pledge) as a wartime necessity.¹⁸

After WWII, stable trade unions in mass production became essential for the smooth functioning of the economy.¹⁹ Increasing productivity and the U.S. economic domination facilitated rising capital accumulation, which made capitalists more agreeable to contracts with unions that guaranteed rising living standards. However, this did not mean that the corporate community's distaste for the increasing power of organized labour ceased to exist. The *Taft-Hartley Act of 1947* was the fruition of this opposition.²⁰ The *Act* directly aimed at the unions through banning closed shops, complicating the voting procedure for forming a union shop, and more importantly, leaving the door open for more severe anti-union legislations to be passed by the states.²¹ In the 1950s and 1960s, trade unions reached a peak point both in their social and political impact and in their overall membership. Private sector union density reached its peak at 36% in 1953 and 1954 while many public employees joined trade unions during the same time (Hirsch, 2010). The union membership rate for all wage and salary workers was at its highest (34.8%) in 1954 (Mayer, 2004). However, it was not long before this process was systematically reversed. The U.S. has been experiencing a steady decline in trade union membership rates over the last forty years, reaching a seventy-year-low in 2010. This decline is seen largely as a private sector phenomenon (Lipset and Katchanovski, 2001;

¹⁸ Exceptions to this surrender occurred during the war. The most important one of which was the coal strike led by the United Mine Workers in 1943. The victory of the UMW in this strike resulted in the passing of the *Smith-Connally Act* (1943), whose goal was to limit economic and political power of organized labour. For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky (1984: 325-329); Zieger and Gall (2002: 134).

¹⁹ During this time, the struggles between the workers and employers were not as violent as previous times. The union officials functioned as "managers of discontent" and work stoppages were merely designed for the improvement of existing contractual relations (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 334-341; Zieger and Gall, 2002: 134-148).

²⁰ This *Act* guaranteed safeguards for the rights of the management. For example, employers were ensured full freedom of expression regarding union organization; they were also authorized to call for elections to determine the appropriate bargaining units in wage negotiations. Moreover, it was declared that any attempt of unions to coerce employers to collective bargaining was declared an *unfair* labour practice (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 345; Zieger and Gall, 2002: 153).

²¹ Section 14 (b) of the *Act* made the adoption of the "right-to-work" laws possible in various states. These laws made it "illegal for a group of unionized workers to negotiate a contract that requires each employee who enjoys the benefits of the contract terms to pay his or her share of costs for negotiating and policing the contract" (Gould and Shierholz, 2011: 1). Therefore, these laws did not only restrict the financial viability of unions but also decreased their ability to negotiate favorable contracts and benefits. Twelve states passed the so-called "right-to-work" laws within couple of years. Today, these laws are in place in twenty-two states in the United States, especially in the South and Southwest. Gould and Shierholz (2011) argue that in RTW states, wages are 3.2% lower, while the rate of employer sponsored health insurance is 2.6% lower and the rate of employer-sponsored pension is 4.8% lower than those in non-RTW states. For discussion of the effects of RTW laws on union density, organizational activities and industrial development see Moore and Newman (1998); Moore and Newman (1985).

Farber and Western, 2001; Hirsch, 2010; Hirsch and Hirsch, 2006). According to Hirsch, the decline in private sector union density²² has been gradual, but unremitting. Union density in the private sector was 24.5% in 1973, 16.5% in 1983, 11.1% in 1993, reaching its lowest point at 6.9% in 2010.²³ While private sector union density was in decline, public sector union density had increased rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s.²⁴ Even though the size of the public sector has grown since the 1970s, union density has remained relatively constant, rising from 32.8% to 36.7% in 1983, and falling to 35.9% in 2010 (Hirsch, 2010: 2-3). Union membership rate of all wage and salary workers was 30.9% in 1960, 22.3% in 1980, 12.9% in 2000 (Mayer, 2004) and 11.9% in 2010 (U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2011).²⁵

These changes must be viewed within the overarching context of the intensification of production in the wake of a paradigm shift away from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism at the beginning of the 1980s. The macro-management of the economy and social protections as well as the regulation of the population by the government have been replaced by deregulation, decentralization and extensive privatization. As a result, the hospitable New Deal policies have been replaced with the enactment of discouraging, if not hostile, labour legislations, the decentralization of collective bargaining, labour market deregulation, and the flexibilization of production in capital-labour relations (Katz, 1993; Palley, 2005). The steady increase in the rates of deunionization in the U.S. has been coupled with a precipitous decline in manufacturing employment. Marxist interpretations identify the manufacturing sector as the source of productive labour *par excellence* and the prime vehicle for both capitalist growth and its demise.²⁶ That is to say, manufacturing employment and unemployment speak directly to core Marxist maxims dealing with the rate of exploitation, value creation, and the composition of the industrial reserve army. Therefore, from the perspective of Marxist political economy, the process of deindustrialization and its implications on the workers is quite significant for an analysis whose attempt is to reveal the relationship between deunionization, policing and capital.

²² Union density demonstrates “the number of union members as a percentage of the number of people who could be potentially be union members” (Wallerstein and Western, 2000: 357).

²³ While union density fell in the private sector, nonunion wage and salary employment in the private sector increased from 47 million in 1973 to 103 million in 2010 (Hirsch, 2010: 2).

²⁴ The increase in public sector union density is related to the enactment of public sector labour laws within the states and at the federal level. For more detail see (Freeman, 1986; Freeman and Valletta, 1988).

²⁵ Along with the decline of union membership, and hence organized labour, has come the decline in the number of strikes and lockouts. The number of major strikes and lockouts lasting one shift and involving 1,000 or more workers was 424 in 1950, 222 in 1960, 381 in 1970, 187 in 1980, 44 in 1990, 39 in 2000 and 11 in 2010 (Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2012).

²⁶ Marx has been widely criticized by contemporary scholars for his contradictory assertions about mental versus manual labour, productive versus unproductive labour. For more detail see Becker (1977); Carchedi (1977); Mandel (1975).

The U.S. has also been experiencing a steady decline in the manufacturing sector's share of overall employment since its all-time peak in 1979 (Baker, 2011).²⁷ The job losses in the manufacturing sector have been even more substantial since 2000. Following the 2001 recession, employment in manufacturing fell by 17%, and by the end of 2007 "had edged down further" (Brauner, 2008) and has continued to fall subsequently.²⁸ This steep decline has been explained with reference to two interrelated factors: (1) rapid development in productivity, and (2) increased competition in the world market (Brauner, 2008; Fisher, 2004). Along with productivity growth and increase in global competitiveness, Brauner (2008) relates the decline in manufacturing employment to the imbalance between job losses and job gains. On the one hand, the rates of job losses had spiked during the 2001 recession and by the end of 2003 had fallen below the levels witnessed in the late 1990s and has remained low since then. On the other hand, the rate of job creation, which had began its decline in the late 1990s, has also continued its descend. Moreover, since the 1980s manufacturing workers have become an important part of the population of "displaced workers".²⁹ They have been more likely than other sector workers to be displaced, and those who had lost their jobs have been more likely than other sector employees to have remained jobless and have experienced significant losses in their earnings even when they have been reemployed (Brauner, 2008).

The development of American industrial production is the history of worker resistance and pacification. Various eras have seen progress and regression by unions and workers. In each of these historical formations, in the lead-up to, during and after the two World Wars, police force and legal authority have played a decisive role. It is within this historical backdrop of pacification that we analyze the relationship between total policing, the unionization rate and strikes and lock-outs in the U.S. from 1972-2009.³⁰

²⁷ The decline in the manufacturing sector employment is not unique to the U.S. On the contrary, all advanced industrial countries have been experiencing a steady decline in their manufacturing employment rates. For more detail see Bernard (2009); Commission of the European Communities (2009); Pilat, et al. (2006); van der Zee and Brandes (2007).

²⁸ The manufacturing sector lost 15% of its workforce during the period between December 2007 and June 2009 (Baker, 2011). It is argued that although there has been a continuous decline in the manufacturing employment in the U.S. for almost over a half-a-century, manufacturing production and value-added continued to grow as a result of high productivity (Pilat, et al., 2006). Despite this high productivity rate, the share of the manufacturing sector in the total economic activity and value-added have continued to decline in Western economies due to increased economic integration, demographic effects, productivity growth and the fluctuations in exchange rates (Alderson, 1997; Brauner, 2008; Pilat, et al., 2006).

²⁹ Displaced workers are defined as "people who had 3 or more years of tenure on a job they had lost or left because of plant or company changes or moves, insufficient work, or the abolishment of their positions or shifts" (Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2012). For more detail on "displaced workers" see Current Population Survey (2012).

³⁰ Data for unionization and strikes and lockouts goes back further than total policing employment and this is represented in Graph 3.

Graph 3 indicates that both unionization ($r^2 = .932$, $n=39$, $p<.001$) and strikes and lock-outs ($r^2 = .818$, $n=39$, $p<.001$) are statistically significantly inversely correlated to total policing. That is, as unionization has declined so have strikes and lock-outs while the number of total police per 100,000 population have increased. In fact, while total policing employment has climbed by 64.8% from 1972 to 2009, strikes and lock-outs have declined by 99.2% and the overall unionization rate has dropped by 55.4%. A pacification approach to unions would hold that these organizations play a surrogate policing role. Certainly, our international study reinforces these statistically significant findings (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: Table 2) – as unionization decreases, policing increases. Similarly, as unionization decreases so does the frequency of strikes and lock-outs decrease both internationally (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: Table 1) and in the USA ($r^2 = .923$, $n=50$, $p<.001$, not shown).

Not surprisingly, as both unionization and strikes and lock-outs have decreased consistently since the early seventies so has deindustrialization increased. That is, as cumulative job losses in the industrial sector mount, so does unionization wither ($r^2 = -.823$, $n=32$, $p<.001$, not shown) and strikes and lock-outs decrease ($r^2 = -.691$, $n=32$, $p<.001$, not shown). As might be expected, this upward trend in industrial job losses has coincided with rising total policing employment numbers ($r^2 = .705$, $n=32$, $p<.001$). Graph 4 illustrates this trend line since 1972. Again, as in our study of the relationship between the industrial reserve army and total policing internationally ($r^2 = .462$, $n=34$, $p<.01$, see Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: Table 1) more industrial unemployment coincides with more policing.

Conclusions

At the outset of this paper we produced five testable hypotheses that were gleaned from our reading of Marxian political economy, studies of pacification, and our own previous international research. Our aim was to examine the explanatory power of these approaches for assessing the relationship between policing, inequality, exploitation, unionization, strikes and lock-outs, and deindustrialization in the USA over the last four decades. This empirical assessment used existing macroeconomic statistics that were operationalized to suit our analysis and to conform to the core concepts being tested. The analysis confirmed the following five hypotheses:

Inequality will positively correlate to total policing;

Surplus value will positively correlate to total policing;

Unionization will inversely correlate to total policing;

Unionization will positively correlate to strikes and lock-outs; and

Cumulative deindustrialization will positively correlate to total policing.

When coupled with our previous international research of 45 countries for the snapshot year of 2004 (Rigakos and Ergul 2011) that produced almost identical results, these findings are simply remarkable. The associations we have discovered are powerful and recurring both over time and across international borders where variations in legal contexts and institutional histories of policing are many and complex. The empirical verification of these basic tenets of a Marxian political economy of policing are significant for both the study of pacification as well as policing and security research more broadly.

Although aimed at the level of a larger political economy, the effect of increased policing, decreased unionization, and more inequality has profound institutional effects that structurally condition our everyday social relations. As Althusser (1972: 174) once mused: if a police officer simply says: "Hey, you there!" in public, the individual who turns around "by this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion... becomes a *subject*". The multiplication of these institutionally mediated (interpellated) effects have significant implications on how we see the world, the power of ideology, and the rise to prominence of *security as hegemony* (Rigakos 2011; Rigakos and Manolov, 2013: 16-19). Thus, these empirical results may usefully inform a general social theory and resistance that increasingly identifies "policing" – broadly defined – as a core element of the global pacification of labour and the enforcement of capitalist relations (Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011).

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