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Article

# SECURITISATION AS DEPOLITICISATION: DEPOLITICISATION AS PACIFICATION

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**Abstract**

This article considers the development of the liberal state's approach to national security in the era of the 'war on terror'. The analysis focuses on state security strategies, considering how the state positions the politics of security historically through its representation of the current security 'environment'. Drawing upon a critical analysis of the various layers of official strategy produced by the UK, US and Australia in this era, the article considers in the first instance the process of depoliticisation that defines the official understanding of security threats. The effects of depoliticising the issues and individuals deemed to constitute a threat to national security are subsequently considered through the theory of pacification plotting the links between securitization, depoliticisation and pacification. In doing so the analysis demonstrates how the framing of national security is pivotal to the official representation of 'extremism' and to the subsequent policing of protest and political activity. The article therefore suggests that the liberal state's politics of security are defined by a pacification process that seeks to produce citizen-subjects who are unable and unwilling to resist the current social order.

**Keywords**
Securitisation, depoliticisation, pacification, national security, extremism

In the context of the so-called 'war on terror' much of what has passed for critical work in the social sciences has failed to understand the behaviour of the liberal state. This failure stems from the absence of a critique of security at the core of analyses of state violence. The attempt to provide a critique of the liberal state whilst accepting the illusion

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of security – in many cases demanding that the state do security better or differently – has rendered much critical scholarship at best ineffective and at worst counter-productive, merely reinforcing the seemingly unquestionable status of security in contemporary political discourse. Fundamentally, the failure to reject the logic of security has compounded an analytic and political blockage that prevents critical work understanding the violence of the liberal state and thus precludes such work from contributing to a truly alternative politics that has to be *against* security and devoid of reformist appeals to the liberal state.

The analysis in this article seeks to contribute to the process of finding a way out of this dead end. Ultimately, the project here is to contribute to the further development of an anti-security politics (Neocleous and Rigakos 2011) and the analysis seeks in Heidi Rimke's terms to address, challenge and move beyond the hegemony of security (Rimke 2011, 194). It aims to do this by arguing that we need to understand the politics of security through the liberal state's order-building, and the violence involved therein, both in the context of the 'war on terror' and beyond. More specifically, the analysis seeks to consider how national security as a - if not *the* - central state concern has been formulated in the post-9/11 period, suggesting that this gives us a vital insight into the liberal state's role in the development of security politics. Through a focus on national security and counter-terrorism strategies produced by the UK, US and Australian governments the analysis is concerned with how these states conceive security in the current epoch but, moreover, how they define the current situation within which security strategy is developed and employed. This requires situating the politics of security historically.

The emphasis here is to establish a further understanding of how the official presentation of national security serves to legitimate the current security regime and the wider status quo. To do this the analysis considers two components of liberal security politics. In the first instance the analysis treats the process of securitization as a process of depoliticisation. Focusing upon what is essentially a process of *marketing* security politics through strategy documents the analysis seeks to demonstrate the legitimising effects that result from stripping security threats – and security in general – of any political dynamic in the official presentation. Secondly, the process of depoliticisation is considered as pacification. There exists a pivotal relationship between depoliticisation and pacification, and a focus on official security strategies reveals much about the behavior of the liberal state and its role in fabricating order.

## Securitisation as Depoliticisation: National Security at the End of History

While the defense of the nation is clearly not a new concern of the state the emphasis on the term 'national security' as a specific concern of state policy is a feature of the latter part of the twentieth century (Neocleous 2006). The production of specific

'national security strategy' documents began in the US under Regan and has continued through to the current era with each President providing their own revised version. It is however only in the post 9/11 period that UK and Australia governments appear to have adopted this US model and developed their own national security strategy documents. This article seeks to consider the content of these documents and examine the points of convergence between more recent strategy documents produced by US, UK and Australian governments.[2]

From their inception these security strategy documents have had as their central role the provision of an official vision of the current national and global security environment. These public documents published directly by heads of government give little direct detail about state policy and legislation and arguably serve instead to *market* the state's vision of security, to 'sell' to the public the state's account of the threats faced and the responses required. Their content and the importance afforded to the publication of these documents by new administrations[3] demonstrate the importance to the state of maintaining an idealised image of security (see also McMichael, this volume) and the strategy documents produced by the US, UK and Australia have from their inception played a vital role in presenting a very specific, state sanctioned vision of the world. While much of what these documents set out is not new, a consideration of official security discourse as articulated through layers of security strategies makes it possible to understand how the politics of security is historically located and positioned in relation to (and as an integral part of) the broader politics of the liberal state.

In what follows, I draw on a number of the national security strategy documents published in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia since 2002 and a number of official statements on national security from the same period to create an 'ideal-typical' narrative of securitization in the post 9/11 period. Although there may be some cross-national differences, overall, the story is a remarkably similar one, emphasizing the 'end of history' and the dawn of a new era of security in the face of

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[2] The general concern of the state in these documents – national security – is clearly not itself novel but the publication of a distinct publicly available strategy document of this nature, and under this title, published by the White House in the US since 1987, the Cabinet Office in the UK since 2008, and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in Australia since 2008 is. The concern of this article lies with the content and specific function of these documents considering if and how the adoption of this US model by the UK and Australia is indicative of a shared framing of the issue of national security.

[3] Changes in government or changes in leader in each of the three countries in focus has brought about a new, revised or updated version of the national security strategy. In the US there have been 15 versions of National Security Strategy with each President from Regan through to Obama publishing their own documents and revising and updating at regular intervals (see www. http://nssarchive.us). In the UK the first national security strategy was published in 2008 and has been revised twice firstly in 2009 and then again by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010. In Australia the first National Security Statement to Parliament was published in 2008 and the first comprehensive national security strategy document was produced in 2013.

unfamiliar and unprecedented terrorist threats. In the first instance each of these documents make clear to the reader that the contemporary threats to national security and the state response to them have to be understood in line with how the world has changed in the twenty-first century.[4] The twentieth century ended, albeit eleven years early, with a "decisive victory for the forces of freedom" that left "a single sustainable model for national success" defined by "freedom, democracy, and free enterprise" (Bush 2002, iv). The struggles of the twentieth century have been overcome with the "forces of freedom' unanimously victorious. The defining opposition of this period, that between "two power blocs" driven by ideology (and located either side of a freedom/tyranny binary), has been replaced by "more complex and unpredictable sets of relationships" leaving a "transformed international landscape" (UK Cabinet Office 2008, 3). Essentially, this "transformed landscape' is one on which there remains no defining opposition between nation states, "power blocs" or ideologies. There is now in the post-1989 context no "sustained global challenge to the liberal, market-oriented vision of a free society" (UK Cabinet Office 2009, 5). We have reached the end of history (Fukyama 1992); the age of political oppositions is over.

The "victorious forces of freedom" have therefore carte-blanche to define this new era in their own image and, as a result, this is an age of freedom, democracy and human rights starkly distinguished from a previous era blighted by war, barbarism and inhumanity. The "militant visions of class, nation and race which promised utopia and delivered misery have been defeated and discredited" (Bush 2002, 1) and in its place we have a vision of the world defined by human rights. The vision of freedom presented here is central to the liberal state's role in maintaining bourgeois order. Free-market capitalism is presented post-1989 as the victorious economic model and in turn as an inevitable defining feature of the current era. In an apparent drive to consolidate 'capitalist realism' (Fisher 2009), there is, we are told, now no possibility, but also no desire, for an alternative model.

The market economy, in its current form, is taken as both as the defining feature of the current global situation and as the end point for the development and consolidation of the new post-political era. Free trade is understood to be "real freedom"

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[4] While this emphasis on the end of the twentieth century is true to each of the documents produced since 2001, the notion of a changed and changing world has been central to the official narrative in national security strategy documents since their beginning: the first US document drafted under Regan in 1987 set out the issue of national security against the backdrop of a 'complex and changing world' (Regan 1987, 2) and for George Bush the fall of the Berlin Wall and 'crisis of communism' meant that the national security challenges facing the US in 1990 had to be understood in an 'environment that is today dramatically changing' (Bush 1990, 4). Each consecutive President from Clinton to George W Bush to Obama has stressed the need for the public to understand the challenges the state and the nation as a whole face in terms of security threats arise from the ways in which the world has changed and is changing at the time of their writing (Clinton 1994, 1997, 2001; Bush 2002, 2006; Obama 2010).

(Bush 2002, 18) and the capitalist economy is presented in this formulation as the overcoming of the political. The question of capital is thus depoliticised – the age of politics in which economic models and political ideologies were opposed has given way to an "age of freedom" defined by free-trade and the free-market. As history is here divided in two eras on either side of 1989, global capitalism (or moreover the economic sphere in general) is withdrawn from consideration; the end of history marks the end of questioning the role and form of the economy. This framing is central to the logic of national security.

It is from this starting point that the UK, US and Australian security strategies need to be understood. Such strategies are "grounded entirely in human rights" (HM Government 2009, 55). Terrorism threatens these rights and thus constitutes the primary threat to security – defined by the US as the "common foe" (Executive Office of the President 2003, 2) – for the international community. This 'community' is here defined by its commitment to human rights as those who reject their validity are "isolated" or, more accurately, excluded. The terrorists' unwillingness (or inability) to justify their actions inside the language of human rights posits them as relics of the previous age of politics; they are in George W Bush's words the "heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century…..following the path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism" (Executive Office of the President 2003, 5). Given that in the state's vision this 'age of ideology' is over, the terrorist's commitment to politically motivated violence and ideology is seen to distort political action.

Legitimate forms of political action are those defined exclusively by (the values of) liberal democracy. What this means is that in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, all counterhegemonic movements were redefined as structurally 'on the same side' as these terrorist acts. Hence, for instance, the 'anti-globalization' movement, which in fact posits an alternative, sometimes non-capitalist form of globalization, was assimilated to Al-Qaeda, as if there were no meaningful differences between these two movements (Coburn 2011). The goal of the liberal state here is to bring about a consensus around one vision of politics and political action defined through human rights; a vision of political action that is ultimately incapable of challenging the current status quo.

The presentation of the current threat(s) to security involves at its core the construction of an enemy that defines the 'war on terror' distinguished from 'us' not in terms of a political opposition but through its inability or unwillingness to share the vision of the world set out by the liberal state. The ability to locate the threat of contemporary terrorism historically – as a new form of threat to state integrity – has a fundamental effect on the content of counter-terrorism strategy and the provision of a historical narrative has become a more prominent feature in the most recent strategy documents. For example, one of the key revisions to the UK counter-terrorism strategy in 2009 was the addition of a historical account of the emergence of the contemporary

terrorist threat to the UK, explaining what led to its emergence and considering how it may continue to evolve in the future. The space afforded to this type of historical account is a result of the fact that the provision an official history of terrorism is crucial to the state's attempt to legitimise its counter-terrorism strategy.

The historical account provided in UK strategy affirms the official diagnosis of the threat as driven, in Gordon Brown's terms, *solely* by a "violent extremist ideology" (Brown in HM Government 2009, 4) identified by a shared attachment to Islam and only tied together in the contemporary era by the Al Qaída 'organisation'. This account serves, by way of an introduction, to further homogenise and as a result depoliticise the whole range of movements and causes that are lumped together under the banner of international terrorism (Cole 2003). The fact that the only common link is supposedly provided by Al Qaída and their 'extremist ideology' further dismisses the idea of coherent grievances deriving from common causal factors. The history of Western imperialism in the Middle East is perhaps unsurprisingly not part of the official history of the evolution of the contemporary terrorist threat. For example, the role of UK foreign policy in inciting the terrorist threat is restricted to "perceptions" of such policies held by those with a distorted and inaccurate view of global events.[5] The official historical analysis is set in opposition to the "fabricated narrative of contemporary politics and recent history" (HM Government 2010, 10) and the "subculture of misinformation and conspiracy" that are said to be at the root of an extremist ideology (Executive Office of the President United States 2006, 10).

This account is reinforced by the continued emphasis on the distinctive nature of the contemporary terrorist movement. The previous threat is presented as having been manageable through conventional methods and distinct in both motivations and strategy from the modern threat. The distinction between 'old' and 'new' terrorism is based on the partial acknowledgement of the political goal and resulting political status of previous threats that is now conclusively absent in discussions of the modern threat. This distinction is based on a revisionist account of state responses to previous terrorism that allows the current strategy to attribute to it a political cause. This is arguably most pronounced in UK security and counter-terrorism strategy in which the official history provided marks a fundamental departure from the official line on the IRA in the 1970s and 1980s defined as it was predominantly through a process of criminalization (see O'Dowd et al 1980). This revised understanding of past terrorist movements allows the UK government to point toward a relationship between the devolution of powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly and the decline of terrorist groups in this context.

[5] Tackling these "unfounded' views of British imperialism is a central component of British counter-terrorism strategy and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office under the New Labour government sent senior diplomats on "roadshows" to "terror hotspots" in the UK and abroad to talk to young Muslims about the "reality" of foreign policy. See Butt (2009).

Importantly, it also allows them to depoliticise and dismiss outright all dissident Republican groups that continue to oppose the post-Good Friday Agreement situation in Northern Ireland.

Accordingly, in this official account there existed a political and to some extent 'legitimate' terrorism that was confronted (and ultimately defeated) in previous decades, whereas there is now a 'new' terrorism driven exclusively by a violent extremist ideology underpinned by a religious fundamentalism. The 'culturalisation' of contemporary international terrorism in security strategy is both explicit and comprehensive. The religious ideology that supposedly underpins all contemporary terrorist activity is understood as apolitical because it stands outside of what constitutes politics in the liberal framework. The contemporary terrorist is thus in the liberal mind a *fanatic* summoning what Alberto Toscano has described as a "spurious form of political simplification, an ersatz intelligibility that leaves us none the wiser about religious politics and global conflicts" (2010, 101). The official representation of security aims precisely to reinforce this obfuscation.

The UK National Security Strategy 2009 sought to challenge the "climate of intolerance and distrust in which violence as a tool of political discourse becomes acceptable" (UK Cabinet Office 2009, 78). This understanding of the relationship between intolerance and violence is central to official security discourse as 'intolerance' has become a "code-word……for fundamentalism identified with the non-West, with barbarism and with anti-Western violence" (Brown 2008, 16). The "climate of intolerance" is in this sense associated with the Islamic terrorist who focuses their intolerance toward the West. The terrorist's intolerance is understood to be entirely irrational, driven by culture and religion and indicative of the void between the opposing forces in the 'war on terror'. Through this interpretation the distinction between these opposing sides cannot be overcome, but neither can it be contested politically: it is reduced to cultural difference, the response to which can only be tolerance.

The opposition between the tolerant and the intolerant that frames security strategy (with particular emphasis in relation to counter-terrorism) involves, according to Wendy Brown, a fusion of the 19$^{th}$ century opposition between the civilized and the primitive and the Cold War opposition between freedom and tyranny, given that tolerance is aligned in contemporary liberal discourse with civilisation and freedom and intolerance equated with fundamentalism and barbarism (Brown 2008, 6). In this sense, civilisation remains the reserve of the ostensibly apolitical liberal. Political conflict is effaced; the irreducible confrontation is instead between those with the capacity for tolerance (the civilized) and those without (the barbaric).

If we understand that "the governmentality of tolerance as it circulates through civilisational discourse has as part of its work the containment of the (organicist, non-Western, non-liberal) Other" (Brown 2008, 166), then the role of tolerance in security strategy becomes clearer; it serves to delineate the defining oppositions that apparently

colour the current security environment. That the opposing forces are non-Western and non-liberal is to be taken as given against the back drop of a culturalised framing of terrorism. However, the notion of an organicist Other defined through the notion of tolerance has wider implications. Here, we must understand that tolerance in liberal discourse can only be generated by autonomous individuals and thus those who are intolerant are defined by their rejection of (liberal) individualism. The rule by culture and/or religion that defines the intolerant, and in this case definitively marks the contemporary international terrorist, illustrates their opposition to and devaluation of the autonomous individual. The liberal individual is itself naturalised, posited as a universal norm that only the non-liberal fundamentalist would seek to challenge.

The utility of the alignment of tolerance in security strategy with human rights is here illustrated more clearly when one considers how the discourse of tolerance reinforces the idea that, in Alain Badiou's terms, any "collective will to the Good is dismissed as an Evil" (2001, 13). Any collective identity is presented as the sole reserve of the non-liberal intolerant other. In a circular fashion their intolerance is a product of their collective identity and their intolerance compounds their rejection of liberal individualism. It is ultimately this devaluation of the autonomous individual that defines the intolerant as so opposed to the liberal model that it is to be understood as *intolerable*.

Framing security strategy through tolerance serves in this sense to defend the boundary between the free and the fundamentalist and render it insurmountable. The backdrop to security strategy – the opposition not *between* cultures or civilisations but between secular liberalism and the religious fundamentalist – is comprehensively depoliticized, thereby removing any formal consideration of a political response to terrorism from the security agenda. By framing the terrorist as intolerant and equating intolerance with fundamentalism and anti-Western violence, the terrorist is depicted as *intolerable*. This construction justifies the use of the most extreme violence to oppose a threat that is both incapable of being tolerated and unable to be confronted politically.

## Depoliticisation as Pacification: Pacifying the Internal Threat

Since its beginning, the 'war on terror' has relied on this thinly veiled construction of the external threat to legitimate interventionist strategies and provide a legitimising gloss to the broader politics of security. Yet in recent years there has been an intensification of the domestic components of this 'war' as it has been increasingly directed at populations within those nations at the forefront of the 'war on terror'. This component has been couched in the language of counter-radicalisation and counter-extremism and for the countries in focus here it has been to a large extent developed along the lines of the UK model. The concern here has been with the identification of an internal enemy supposedly revealed through the domestic terrorist attacks orchestrated

by those with citizenship in the target nation. The London bombings of July 7, 2005 have been presented as the prime example of this internal threat (see Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2010) and the official approach to radicalisation and extremism has developed significantly since 2005. The distinction between the domestic and foreign component of the 'war on terror' is ultimately a false one (Neocleous and Rigakos 2011) but a focus on the development of domestic counter-radicalisation and counter-extremism strategies demonstrates usefully the further diffusion of the logic of security throughout state institutions and civil society.

UK and Australian counter-terrorism strategies share an emphasis on radicalisation and violent extremism understood to be the most important strategic factors in the encouragement of terrorism and thus a predominant focus in current strategy.[6] UK strategy presents and discusses the causes of radicalisation in some detail as the backdrop to a counter-radicalisation strategy that forms a significant component of counter-terrorism work (HM Government 2009, 2010). The UK approach to (counter-)radicalisation has been cited as a model toward which the Australian government has sought to develop their approach[7] and more recently the US have cited both UK and Australian counter-radicalisation programs as "possible templates" for the development of a US strategy to counter violent extremism.[8]

The analysis of radicalisation provided in strategy documents involves a continued rebuttal of "perceptions" of Western foreign policy that are understood to define the radicalised individual who is, as a result, "vulnerable" to the lure of terrorist movements (see HM Government 2009; Benjamin 2010). Beyond those grievances that underpin the radicalised subject there exists "a range of social and psychological factors" (Benjamin 2010, 42) that lead to radicalisation. This explanation focuses on the "vulnerability" of individuals and points to "a crisis in identity and, specifically, to a feeling of not belonging" (HM Government 2009, 42). The emphasis on the "psychological frailties" of these "vulnerable" individuals aligns them as Judith Butler has suggested with the mentally ill positioned as they both are "outside of reason" (2004, 72). Opposition to Western imperialism is framed as a result of the individual social and psychological issues attributed to Muslims demonstrating a continued concern with the

[6] The US were slower to take up the idea of a specific counter-radicalisation strategy or strategy to counter violent extremism but under the Obama administration efforts have been made to establish such a program with domestic and international projects. See, (Benjamin, 2010).

[7] As indicated by First Assistant Secretary to head the Office of National Security in Australia, Angus Campbell in 2007 (see Campbell, 2007).

[8] In 2010 the US Department of State had on detail a senior member from the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Counterterrorism Research Group from whom there was hope to gain "greater understanding of the UK's experience with countering violent extremism as well as how the U.S. government can create effective, locally-targeted programs and enhance its efforts to counter extremist narratives." (Benjamin, 2010, 4).

"Arab and Muslim 'mind'" that Toscano notes has been a "long-term concern of the Atlantic discourse on Islam" (2010, 162).

The program of counter-radicalisation work that sits in UK strategy in the *Prevent* component of UK counter-terrorism strategy is diffused into all aspects of government[9], widening the state's policing of 'suspect' populations. All local authorities in the UK have the accommodation of Prevent built into their "performance framework" as the facilitation of this program has been installed as an integral part of governance and an internal measure of its success (HM Government 2011, 36). Diffusing counter-terrorism work throughout government and public services is possible as a result of the fact that those orchestrating the 'war on terror' have sought to break "old orthodoxies that once confined out counterterrorism efforts primarily to the criminal justice domain" (Executive Office of the President 2006, 1). However, presenting the fight against terrorism as not simply the work of the police (although of course central to policing) has allowed such policing measures to expand beyond the criminal justice domain and infiltrate all aspects of government. The logic of security is all pervasive defining the work of a whole range of disparate institutions and services whose role in the fabrication of order is transformed through this new (or intensified) policing function.

This policing function is imposed in the UK upon schools, colleges and universities as well as children's services, health services, social workers and community groups who are all expected to facilitate the monitoring and reporting of extremist ideas (HM Government 2010). This project of countering extremism is a state project in the true sense; it unites a multitude of state institutions and also demonstrates the difficultly of marking clearly a state – civil society distinction in the case of security politics. The development of this element of security strategy demonstrates Neocleous' argument (2011) that security *is* pacification. The state's desire to police dissenting subjects is made clear here with no age group or place of sanctuary off limits, but more importantly counter-radicalisation strategy reveals the productive dimension to the pacification process. What effectively plays out as the policing of school age children, of community groups, of those under the watch of social services, is driven by the desire pacify any flickers of resistance, no matter how embryonic, and produce the docile citizen-subjects necessary for the maintenance of bourgeois order.

The official presentation of extremist ideology and the flexibility[10] of its definition provided by in official strategy have the ability to denounce all substantive political criticism of the current security agenda – as well as criticism of the current political and economic status quo – as extremist. The rejection of "shared values" is sufficient to be

[9] The diffusion of counter-terrorism measures across government was presented in the US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003 as a means to 'maintain momentum' and 'keep the global war on terrorism in the forefront' (Executive Office of the President 2003, 19).

[10] "The terms 'moderate' and 'extremist' are at times defined in practice by the degree to which Muslims support or oppose central government or local authority policies." (Kundnani 2009, 35).

labeled as an extremist; indeed, a personal opinion that illustrates an “uncompromising rejection of the principle of the rule of law and the authority of any elected Government in this country” (HM Government 2010, 9) is sufficient to be an indicator of (vulnerability to) extremism. A rejection of the legitimacy of liberal democracy or indeed a strident political critique of its failings is easily classified as extremist[11] marking the individual out as a sign of *disorder* and thus the target for police action.

The problem posed by the radicalised individual is made clearer in Australian strategy. Here the problem of radicalisation is that it discourages “full participation in Australia’s social and economic life” (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2010, iv) illustrating that the opposition to liberalism posed by radicalisation cuts to the heart of the liberal production of the subject. Radicalisation prevents the subject from fulfilling their *productive* potential – that is, their potential as *productive* subjects – and clearly must be opposed. The concern with the marginalisation of the radicalised Other is genuine but not driven by a concern with the participation of the individual in social and political life. Pacification understood as a police project (Rigakos 2011) becomes vital here to counter the real threat posed by the radical and the aim of counter-radicalisation needs to be understood in line with the police dream of pacified workers (Neocleous this volume). In this sense radicalisation does pose a threat to liberal order, to capital, and counter-radicalisation becomes more pertinent once liberal states realise that they have a problem with an ‘internal enemy’. The possibility of unproductive subjects outside the West is troubling, but the idea of internal forces who seek to reject the validity of the current domestic order requires decisive action. This is a point noted explicitly in Australian strategy but implicated throughout the approach in the UK and US.

The official response then seeks to return the radical to mainstream (liberal) politics by undermining extremist ideas and essentially by enforcing a convergence on liberal shared values. The process of *de*radicalisation is therefore a process of fashioning the docile subject who fulfills their productive potential and shares these values accepting the legitimacy of what Badiou (2008) has termed “capitalo-parliamentarism”. The ‘return’ from radicalisation is facilitated by “mainstream” or “moderate” voices that support the state in the central “battle for ideas” that defines counter-radicalisation. These voices are selected on the basis that they essentially do not question – or are willing and able to extenuate – the culturalisation of terrorism and extremism. In the UK the role of the organisations who promote these voices is integral to counter-terrorism. State funded organisations like *The Quilliam Foundation* (QF) seek to “challenge extremism” and

[11] Of the key factors that contribute to radicalisation, the Australian Counter Terrorism White Paper makes explicit that these include “the identification with, and adoption of, particular ideologies and belief systems that are hostile to liberal democratic norms and values” (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010, 66). The US Institute of Peace (established and funded by Congress) has defined “cognitive radicalization” (radicalisation that falls short of violent expression) by the refutation of “the legitimacy of the existing social order” (Vidino, 2010, 4).

"advance liberal democratic values' (2013) serving only to legitimise the dominant, official understanding of the causes and necessary responses to terrorism. In this account the causes remain confined to the Muslim community (domestically and internationally) and QF advocates that the response to extremism should at its core involve "a more self-critical approach (to) be adopted by Muslims" in which "Westophobic ideological influences and social insularity needs to be challenged within Muslim communities by Muslims themselves" (2013). The broader solution to the problem of Islamic extremism advocated by these moderate voices is epitomised by the co-director of QF, Ed Hussain, who has suggested a need for the creation of "an apolitical Western Islam" (in Kundnani 2009, 36). The extensive funding channeled to QF and similar organisations is highly unsurprising given that they play a central role in the pacification of Muslim communities assisting in the project to produce the 'ideal' Muslim citizen-subject free of a commitment to a political Islam – understood in this sense as the "communism of the twenty-first [century]" (Toscano 2010, 239) – and willing to submit itself to the current order.

The idea that counter-terrorism be defined by a battle for ideas is of course not new. The development of a counter-radicalisation strategy along the lines set out above has become a major point of convergence for contemporary counter-terrorism strategy through which the UK, Australian and US government have been involved in a mutually beneficial, multi-directional exchange of policy ideas. The discourse now contains discussion of a "struggle over narratives" (Benjamin 2010, 2) between the West and the terrorists that maintains the opposition between 'their' ideology and 'our' values. A battle between narratives is but the most recent framing of an opposition that is essentially depoliticised and the central construction of the Islamic terrorist through the idea of the fanatic demonstrates its continued application as a "remarkably resilient and adaptable weapon in a wide array of political and philosophical confrontations" (Toscano 2010, 249). The inauguration of a counter-radicalisation strategy complete with legal sanctions enhances the process of marginalising radical ideas and continues the project of policing the 'suspect' populations who harbor them that defines the 'war on terror'. From the more recent 'realisation' of an internal threat (ostensibly from 2005 onwards) this process of pacifying internal populations has been made more explicitly a central component of the 'war on terror'.

This has been achieved in part by a widening of the security agenda. Post-1989 'national security' has become simply the banner under which the state continues its essential task of self-preservation and the preservation of the current order. The liberal state in the current era presents itself – and its security strategy – as a *reactive* force in a changing security environment. The development of national security strategies in the UK, Australia and the US is based ostensibly on the state's response to a fundamentally changed and continually evolving set of threats to national security. The liberal state's relationship to security is thus constructed in terms of a necessary and proportional

response, playing no direct active role in the prioritisation (and fetishisation) of security. However, the presentation of the contemporary security environment in these strategy documents reveals much about the state's role in defining security as well as the effects of such a (re)definition.

The "clear security threat" that defined the Cold War era has been replaced by a "diverse but interconnected set of threats and risks" (UK Cabinet Office 2008, 3). Understanding the "diversity" of the new threats illustrates that the need for new strategy is premised on a major reconceptualisation of what constitutes (a threat to) national security. The novelty of the current era lies in the fact that the state now has to confront both "traditional" and "non-traditional" security threats (Rudd 2008) that combine to create an increasingly "complex and unpredictable" security landscape (HM Government 2009, 10). The distinction between these two strands of the threat lies in the fact that traditional threats are those that threaten the "interests and integrity of the sovereign state" while non-traditional threats instead target "citizens and respective ways of life" (Brown and Rudd 2009). Terrorism is defined as a traditional threat whilst the non-traditional strand encompasses diverse phenomena such as threats to the environment, global poverty, trans-national crime, energy security, pandemics and natural disasters. The contemporary threat is distinguished by its dual stranded composition but the seemingly diverse threats are presented as linked, enabling a "coherent" (Rudd 2008, 3) and overarching strategy. This formulation, presenting the threat as both diverse and interconnected, forms the basis of joint agreements between UK and Australian governments (Brown and Rudd 2009) and provides the backdrop to more recent US national security strategy (Obama 2010). The connections between the diverse threats legitimate the continued revision and expansion of security strategy into "uncharted territory" necessitating new measures previously uncalled for.

Beyond justifying the continual development of security policy and the increasing prominence afforded to security in official discourse, the implications of this broadened conception are more insidious. Fusing counter-terrorism with the fight against climate change for example allows the state to co-opt popular support for state action and thus bolsters support for the wider security agenda. Arguably, this is done by building on the depoliticised approach to climate change that defines state strategy in both the UK and Australia.[12] Climate change is understood in official discourse to be an unintended consequence of human action definitively disconnected from the capitalist mode of

[12] The UK government has attempted to construct climate change as an issue for the UN Security Council a move that constructs climate change as predominantly, if not exclusively, a security issue. The issue of climate change in this approach becomes one of "climate security" or "energy security" and the response is monopolised by the (permanent) member states of the Security Council. Referring climate change to the Security Council as opposed to the Economic and Social Council of the UN is a clear indication of the securitisation of the issue as well as its withdrawal from any discussion of the political and economic framework in which it has emerged as a global problem (see Hulme 2009).

production. The response to it does not require a questioning of the current order let alone its transformation; instead it stands to open up new opportunities for investment and entrepreneurialism (Cameron 2010). The liberal-capitalist order is not at the root cause of the crisis of the environmental or global poverty and conversely is presented as its only possible savior. This approach arguably defines the liberal response to climate change more generally to the extent that is has been argued that the hegemonic approach to climate change is not simply a symptom of depoliticisation but that this approach "ultimately reinforces processes of depoliticisation and the socio-political status quo" (Swyngedouw 2010, 214).

The liberal state's response to climate change is defined by an ideology of market environmentalism within which a "carbon capitalism" seeks to "extend property rights to the atmosphere" (Hulme 2009, 300-303) – through the commodification (and subsequent fetishisation) of $CO_2$ – and solve the problem by trading these rights regulated only by an "invisible green hand". By securitising climate change this inherently conservative approach is rendered closed to critique. In relation to campaigns around climate change that are aligned with alternative politics, securitisation of the issue undermines the possibility of a proper political act and enforces subservience to the state. As Neocleous has noted, "'securitising' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state" (Neocleous 2008, 186). The aim here through 'securitising' climate change is to pacify climate change activism to produce environmental campaigners who see the response to climate change simply as an investment opportunity.

The current hegemonic approach to climate change expresses some of the classic tenets of populism that reveals much about the utility (and ease) of the fusion of climate change and traditional security threats for a conservative project. In the first instance climate change is constructed as a humanitarian issue positing no political subject but instead baring down on the 'people' as universal victims of a global threat. The presentation of climate change as a humanitarian issue is at the core of the rise of ecology understood through "the rights of Nature" that has been condemned as "a giant operation in the depoliticisation of subjects" rendering ecology the "contemporary form of the opium of the people" (Badiou 2008, 139). In addition, the detachment of the current political and economic order from the problem of climate change is secured by externalising ecological problems and their solutions (Swyngedouw 2010, 222); the solution is incontrovertibly to be found *within* the current system.

If we understand that through security "authority inscribes itself deeply into human experience", (Neocleous 2008, 4), then the securitisation of these issues has major implications for the pacification of populations. It serves to neutralise political action that in the case of climate change has for decades sought to confront these issues outside of state structures. It serves to bring these issues into the state, place them under state control and as a result those with a desire for action must surrender themselves to the

state. Depoliticisation here *is* pacification. Securitisation in this sense serves to exclude in the first instance all but the state from the process of defining the problem and its solution. Those who wish to contribute must conform to the state's position and ultimately must tailor their understanding of climate change or global poverty to fit with the current logic of security. The ideal climate change campaigner imagined and *produced* by this approach sees 'green' investments and recycling their rubbish as the limits to their activism. Framing political activism in these terms reveals the onward march of the liberal state's "production of political docility in the name of security" (Neocleous 2011, 49).

On this basis, those who seek to politicise (or repoliticise) issues are in the current era marginalised, labeled as extremists and in many cases criminalised. In this context, the concept of "domestic extremism" has been developed and incorporated into counter-extremism policing. In the UK there have been since 2010 three national police units responsible for combating domestic extremism run by the "terrorism and allied matters" committee of the Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO] (Lewis et al 2009). Domestic extremism refers to those involved in "'single-issue' protests, such as animal rights, environmentalism, anti-globalisation or anti-GM crops" (Association of Chief Police Officers 2011), and who conduct themselves outside of the acceptable forms of political expression are constructed as extremists. Reinforcing the foreignness of the Muslim Other this formulation also allows for an expansion of the strategy to facilitate the policing of all "individuals or groups whose activities go outside the normal democratic process and engage in crime and disorder" (Association of Chief Police Officers 2011). The causal relationship presented here between abandoning the democratic process and engaging in criminal activity obscures the real process by which the narrow parameters set to the "democratic process" allow alternative politics to be criminalised. Once issues become incorporated into the security agenda they are comprehensively closed off from any kind of alternative, critical analysis; in this sense politics – defined by an inherent antagonism – *is* extreme. Those who seek to question the status quo and by definition politicise these issues through a rejection of the impotent channels of liberal political expression available will be met by the full force of the state's violence.

The caveat attached to extremism strategy that "legitimate peaceful protest is to be respected" is itself restricted to those actions that take place in a "peaceful and safe manner and does not cause unnecessary disruption to a community" (Association of Chief Police Officers 2011). Both the terms "disruption" and "community" are here left open to (the state's) interpretation as we have seen in the policing of the Occupy movement (Giroux 2013) and climate change protesters (Monbiot 2009) through use of counter-terrorism powers (to name but two examples). Major corporations and financial markets themselves *are* the community who must not be disrupted by any form of protest that has the audacity to question their authority. Yet the policing of protest in the name of

security is a pacification process *par excellence* in which the crushing of resistance (and indeed all dissent) is only one part. The drive is to produce the 'responsible', 'peaceful', and ultimately disciplined political subject whose approach to political activism, to politics itself, is non-disruptive.

Much of the even the critical literature on protest policing has been concerned recently with the development in policing *tactics* and the effect on mobilisations and protest events. The focus on the police use of "strategic incapacitation" (Gillham 2013) for example reveals much about the immediate relationship between police and protestors but not about the broader function of police power in this context. The use of what Gilmore describes as an "increasingly authoritarian style of protest policing" (2010, 21) is not simply useful to hinder each individual protest event but to reinforce the idea, to existing and moreover to prospective protestors, that protest itself is extremist. It has then the effect of "forcing compliance" within protest movements and inducing public fear of protestors (Fernandez 2008, 77). The use of the term "eco-terrorism" used to refer to "any environmental action more radical than writing letters to your MP" (Monbiot 2009) is indicative of the equation of political action with terrorism and more clearly reflects the state's drive to produce a political subject who is unable and unwilling to threaten the current order.

Policing protest is a, if not *the*, central function of policing and the development of counter-extremism strategies in this vein formalise further the police's role in the fabrication of social order. The applicability of counter-terrorism powers to contexts seemingly beyond their remit is not simply a fortuitous coincidence; as Toscano has noted, "antiterrorism has become a full-fledged method of government, a willfully vague expedient in the arsenal of the modern state" (2009). The pacification process that defines counter-radicalisation and counter-extremism strategies is at the heart of contemporary security politics and demonstrates more clearly that the "'war on terror' is a war of pacification" (Neocleous 2011, 48). We must not be lured into thinking this project is new and that new policing techniques are evidence of a radical shift in the role of police. The policing of dissent, of disruptive, unproductive subjects is vital to the pacification process that has always defined the role of police in the interests of capital and state (Neocleous 2000; Rigakos 2011).

Considering security strategy through pacification (and via depoliticisation) provides a critical understanding of the behaviour of the liberal state in the 'war on terror'. We avoid here a discussion of the effects of counter-radicalisation and counter extremism strategies in terms of unintended consequences or 'mission-creep'. The policing of Muslim populations and the policing of protest movements are part of the broader process of reproducing social order; a process that is underpinned by the production of subjectivities in which individuals are rendered docile to the point that the official idealized image of security is accepted wholesale. An anti-security politics rejects

the current depoliticised framing of security, and seeks instead a *re*politicisation resisting the political docility that results from the depoliticisation of politics itself in this context. This repoliticisation involves then the production of our own subjectivity outside 'security' one that is able and willing to confront the politics of security. This involves both exposing the ideological function of the idealized image of security presented in official security discourse, and refusing to be drawn into the police project monitoring 'suspect' populations. The refusal of political docility enables us in the first instance to understand the 'war on terror' as part of the fabrication of a social order in which global accumulation is secured. An alternative politics must begin here.

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