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PROCEDURES FOR DEMOCRATIC PLANNING
ISSUES AND PROPOSALS

By

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B.A., Grinnell College, 1967


Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Master of Public Administration


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INTRODUCTION

There will have to be a public planning authority. This, in turn, will have to be under the closest legislative supervision. For here will be encountered the most difficult of all the problems of the public cognizance. That will be to have planning that reflects not the planning but the public purpose. The creation of the planning machinery, which the present structure of the economy makes imperative, is the next major task in economic design.

----- John Kenneth Galbraith¹

The creation of a public planning authority should not be considered solely a matter of economic design. It should also be a matter of political design if such an authority is to conform to values and operational standards of a political nature. This paper attempts to consider certain political aspects of the design of a public planning authority, and it belongs generally to the literature exploring how planning can be conducted in a democratic manner. The paper considers, however, only the limited topic of the design of political procedures and organizational structures for democratic planning.

At various points in the analysis it is acknowledged that the political procedures for planning are intertwined with certain social and economic conditions. However, these substantive conditions necessary for

democratic planning will not be thoroughly examined here. In many ways these questions are critical to the prospects for democratic planning, but they are simply too large and complex to be explored adequately in this paper. These matters are handled largely by assumption, but not on the basis that the assumptions made are better than alternative formulations. Instead, the assumptions are made simply to set aside the debate about these issues to allow the limited analysis of this paper to be made.

In general, it is assumed that the social and economic conditions appropriate to democratic planning can be achieved through procedures of a democratic nature--that a democratic politics can be a means to a democratic society. Moreover, it is assumed that individuals in society have or can develop, through appropriate social arrangements, the capacity for reason and the cooperative social orientation necessary to understand, identify, and agree through democratic procedures on the issues of public policy that are involved in planning. Serious objections can be raised to these assumptions by those persons who take a more pessimistic view of human nature or by those who are pessimistic about the prospects for the reform of society through democratic means. A larger study of the prospects for democratic planning would enter the debate over these assumptions and the

complex issues underlying them. At best, this paper can only be a prelude to such a larger study.

Why is the design of political procedures and organizations for democratic planning an appropriate topic for a public administration study? The design of procedures for a democratic planning authority would appear to involve questions somewhat different from the literature that focuses on how public agencies can be efficient and effective and how conflicting needs of employees and organizations can be handled. These latter topics are important, but they do not distinguish public administration from other management disciplines. What can distinguish public administration from these other disciplines is a focus on the relationship between the public and administrative structures and processes. Such a focus involves questions of the accountability and responsiveness of administrative processes to public preferences and needs and of the values that are served or reinforced by administration. These questions highlight the link between public administration, political science, and philosophy. These are also the types of questions involved in developing a proposal for a democratic planning authority. Developing such a proposal is a task for public administration as a branch of the study of politics.

A major objective of this paper is to suggest

changes in the national governmental process appropriate to democratic planning. Approaching this topic requires a discussion of the nature of both planning and democracy. The discussion of planning becomes an important subtopic for the paper, and the view of planning that is presented differs substantially from that held by many professional planners. Characteristic of the latter view is the definition, offered by Andreas Faludi, of planning as "the application of scientific method--however crude--to policy-making."² In contrast to the technical or scientific view of planning, this paper develops a view of planning as a form of politics.

The view of planning as a political activity was originally prompted by personal experiences in South Dakota as a planner and a political party official.³ Although this view emerged from a variety of experiences, it became especially evident through observing the similarities between the development of a party legislative program in 1969 and the preparation of a state comprehensive plan in the mid-seventies. In the scope of their content, both the program and the plan addressed what were assumed by the persons involved in each effort to be a reasonably complete agenda of important public issues in South Dakota. In terms of their policy purpose, each attempted to offer a coherent and internally-consistent perspective on the various issues addressed.

Both were affected by electoral purposes. The legislative program was consciously designed to aid in the election of a Democratic administration, and the plan was influenced by the desire to maintain that administration in office. Different kinds of knowledge--value judgments, insights from experience, and expert analyses--were applied in both efforts by the citizens, experts, and public officials who directly participated in them. These observations do not support the idea of planning as solely the application of scientific methods to public policy.

The idea and implications of planning as a form of politics are developed in the first two chapters of this paper. The first chapter begins with a definition of planning as the deliberate coordination of interrelated activities and explores the circumstances that create a need for planning. These circumstances involve related sets of problems or decisions in which satisfactory results are not achieved through a process of voluntary exchange or separate government interventions intended to respond to cases of market failure. Such problems are a symptom of an interdependent world in which cumulative and interrelated effects of public and private activities are ignored or not fully taken account of by existing institutions.

From an analysis of the nature of the circumstances

that require planning, general characteristics of planning are identified. In particular, it is argued that to coordinate or plan interrelated activities requires general policies that state desired results and outline strategies for accomplishing those results. To be effective the general policies must be applied on an interactive basis to the decisions that are made concerning the specific matters being planned. Those two elements, general policies and their interactive application to decisions in specific areas, are the major features of what is considered in this paper to be general planning. Importantly, the development and application of general policies involves different kinds of decisions and information. Among these decisions are those concerning the values to be advanced or realized by the planning effort. The general implications of this and other characteristics of planning for democratic control are also explored.

A major idea developed in the first chapter is that the need for general planning is as much a consequence of the selective and piecemeal character of public intervention into the private sector as it is a consequence of the absence of a public response to instances of market failure. The piecemeal interventions by the state in society are termed "partial planning" because they attempt to coordinate activities in a limited

policy sphere and fail to account for major relationships with activities in other policy spheres. The pattern of partial planning at the national level in the United States is described in the second chapter and related to the fragmented character of the political process in this country. Policy-making is parceled out, in the normal course of events, among separate networks of alliances between interest groups and public officials. How this pattern of politics is reflected in planning is examined both through a general survey of national planning practice and the consideration of major cases of planning legislation. The pattern of partial planning, it is argued, tends to produce certain systematic failures of public policy and to reinforce the control of policy in separate areas by groups of minorities.

The second chapter also suggests what some of the requirements would be for establishing a general planning process at the national level. These requirements are developed on the basis of a review of state and local, areawide efforts to implement general planning. The analysis of state and areawide efforts underscores the need for both elements of general planning--the development of general policies and their application on an interactive basis to specific areas of decisions--to be present if the planning effort is to be effective. How a general planning process can be made manageable

and not become bogged down in an effort to plan everything in detail is also analyzed using an example from state planning. The manageability of a general planning effort is shown to rest on the ability of those doing the planning to focus the effort through judgments about the values to be emphasized in the planning and the key relationships among activities that bear on the realization of those values. These are judgments that cut across the concerns that may be dominant in any particular policy area. Making and applying these judgments requires a general planning authority with sufficient power to counteract the power of the alliances that generally control policy in specific areas.

How the power necessary for general planning to be effective can be mobilized and exercised in a democratic manner is the major concern of this paper. Addressing this concern requires the application of a perspective concerning the nature of democracy. This paper presents one view of democracy based on a model developed by Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall. This model gives attention to procedural and institutional elements of democracy, but also acknowledges the need for social conditions that encourage citizen participation in the formation of public policy. The procedural and institutional elements of democracy are of major concern here because of the topic of this paper. However, at

various points the importance of the knowledge, understanding, and participation of citizens for both effective and democratic planning is emphasized in the analysis. The suggestions for further study concern questions of the social conditions necessary for effective citizen participation in planning. In terms of establishing a framework for this further study, it is important to use a model of democracy that acknowledges substantive as well as procedural elements of democracy.

The major elements of the Ranney and Kendall model of concern for the immediate analysis include:

1. the emphasis on majority rule;
2. the need for a representative assembly to establish public policy when the citizens cannot do it directly; and
3. the need for effective mechanisms of popular consultation that allow for citizen participation in proposing, discussing, and evaluating public policy.

These major elements are combined with the previously determined requirements for a general planning process to suggest a general strategy or approach for democratic planning. In this approach, the power to be mobilized for applying general policies to specific areas would be the power of majorities acting through the political process. Congress would be charged with the responsibility to develop general policies and to maintain a process of applying those policies to specific legislative and executive decisions. The political parties would be

developed as the major vehicles for citizen participation in the general planning process, and the role of parties would be adjusted to strengthen their ties to the formation of public policy. It is proposed that through the parties citizens could directly participate in the consideration of policies that would cut across the boundaries of particular spheres of policy currently dominated by interest groups.

The various elements of this approach to general planning are outlined and linked together in the fourth chapter. In addition, examples of ways this approach could be implemented are presented. These examples are not intended to be detailed proposals, but instead are suggestions for further consideration.

The principal argument of this paper can be summarized as a case that planning, to be both effective and consistent with democratic procedures, should be organized as a political-legislative process instead of as a technical-administrative process. The view that planning is a technical-administrative process is clearly dominant in American governmental practice, and making a case for a different approach requires the analysis of the paper to focus on basic, general questions that cover broad sets of issues. These questions involve such matters as the nature of planning, the pattern of American politics, and the nature of democracy. When

details and particular cases are cited, they are used to illustrate or support general points. In the process of considering general questions, many detailed issues are set aside and left for further consideration. Thus, for this reason alone, the paper should be viewed more as an effort to initiate than conclude debate on the topic it considers.

The paper can also be considered only a partial initiative, because by the nature of the assumptions already presented the questions of the social conditions necessary for democratic planning have also been set aside for this analysis. The nature of some of these questions is addressed at the conclusion of the paper in the suggestions for further study. The importance of these questions that have been set aside should not be underestimated, but nor should the questions that are addressed here.

FOOTNOTES

1. John Kenneth Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 319.
2. Andreas Faludi, "What Is Planning Theory?" in A Reader in Planning Theory, ed. Andreas Faludi (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1973), p. 1.
3. These observations were made while this writer served as Executive Director of the South Dakota Democratic Party, 1969-71, and as Commissioner of the South Dakota State Planning Bureau, 1973-77. I was responsible for the administration of both of the projects discussed here.

CHAPTER I

PLANNING

Planning is the deliberate coordination of interrelated activities. Public planning, the focus of this paper, involves the coordination of activities that are undertaken or influenced by the state. Planning arises because there are circumstances that produce unsatisfactory results when activities are not deliberately coordinated, i.e. left to a process of voluntary action or exchange. As Sir Henry Bunbury stated,

. . . when once the belief is abandoned that if every individual and particular interest is free to pursue its own interests, the advantage of all will be most fully realised, planning in some form or another becomes essential.¹

Planning occurs, according to Mannheim, ". . . when man and society advance from the deliberate invention of single objects to the deliberate regulation and intelligent mastery of the relationships between these objects."² Planning is not simply an intellectual or analytical activity that produces plans. It is a conscious effort to adjust or control activities in their relationship to each other.

It is not difficult to identify the results of

the failure to coordinate interrelated activities effectively. The simultaneous occurrence of inflation and unemployment, the prospective depletion of finite energy resources, environmental decay, lagging national productivity, rising health care costs with little improvement in health, and the specter of an end to economic growth producing distributional conflicts between rich and poor are the types of problems which give rise to predictions or proposals for more extensive planning. Underlying these problems is a network of interrelationships among organizations, technological processes, and the human and natural environments.

In both these problems and the interrelationships underlying them, the invisible hand reconciling private interest and public purpose is only too visibly absent--and absent in a double sense. First, no automatic mechanism exists or is likely to exist to manage satisfactorily most of the relationships behind the problems. Secondly, many of the activities that are interrelated are planned to a partial degree either by corporate or other private organizations or by that network of bureau-legislative committee-interest group structures that Norton Long has aptly described as "an almost feudal alignment."³ The problems arising from incomplete coordination in a highly interdependent world raise the prospect of planning on a more extensive scale.

More extensive public planning, to the degree that the matters subject to such planning are existing public policies and programs, does not necessarily mean more extensive state restriction of individual freedom of choice. This point follows from the view that general planning may be aimed as much at solving problems that result from the partial character of existing planning as it is at solving problems that result from insufficient intervention by the state in society.

The notion of partial planning (to be elaborated in the next chapter on planning in the United States) means simply that decisions are made and implemented in certain policy areas, e.g. the abatement of pollution, with insufficient consideration of their impact on other areas of policy, e.g. the control of inflation. The state has typically intervened in society on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis without substantial attention to the cumulative and interrelated effects of the interventions. When the cumulative and interrelated effects of public policy in separate areas are negative, the correction of the situation lies in the direction of greater planning, i.e. coordinating the actions in the separate policy spheres with each other. The more extensive efforts to plan public policy may entail greater or lesser restrictions on individual freedom of choice depending on the nature of the decisions made and implemented in the planning process.

In an interdependent world, even the proposals for escape from that world require planning. The character and extent of current state intervention into society is such that to reduce in a major way the extent of intervention requires the deliberate coordination of policies in that direction. Likewise, the utopian vision of unraveling the interdependent structures of society and returning to self-sufficient and independent communities--a vision of creating a world in which large scale public planning is no longer necessary--requires the implementation of a coordinated set of public policies. In this case, the policies to be implemented would include substantial state intervention in society on matters related to the technology and organization of economic production.

The judgment that planning is a consequence instead of a determinant cause of the extension of state intervention in society was suggested by Gunnar Myrdal in his review of the rise of planning in various Western societies. Although written nearly twenty years ago, the circumstances that Myrdal described as fostering increased planning serve as a reasonable generalization about the characteristics and status of public policy in the United States in the 1970's:

As a matter of plain historical fact, state intervention in Western countries has not been the outcome of a conscious decision to plan, but has

generally preceded planning

What happened was that, as measures of state intervention in a particular field grew in volume and in complexity, attempts to coordinate them more rationally had from time to time to be thrown into this development--'putting the yeast in the oven after the bread,' as the peasant's expressive metaphor runs. Such attempts at coordination were forced upon the state: when it turned out to have been an illusion that the need for a particular intervention was only temporary; when the acts of intervention proved to have disturbing effects, often far outside the field where they were applied, effects which had not been taken into account at the time the measures had been decided upon; when their lack of compatibility with each other and with other aims and policies of the national community stood out as irrational and damaging; and when they created serious administrative difficulties.⁴

Myrdal also argued that planning, when it has been undertaken in Western countries, has been adopted on a limited and piecemeal basis. His findings are consistent with the perspective of this paper that planning is practiced in the United States on a partial basis in separate policy spheres.

Myrdal's description of the circumstances that occasion planning highlights the fact that underlying any planning effort is a desire by the advocates of planning to achieve results different from those that occur in the absence of planning. As Carl Friedrich has stated, ". . . all planning presupposes a basic decision as to what is to be the results of the plan."⁵ Moreover, by the definition of planning adopted in this paper, those results are to be achieved through affecting various interrelated activities. Consequently, planning involves

the adoption of general policies that declare the results desired and the strategies for accomplishing these results that take account of the relationships among activities in different subject areas. These general policies involve the statement of the terms on which the activities to be planned are to be coordinated.

The development of the general policies of planning involves knowledge and decisions of more than a technical character. Planning involves knowledge, debate, and decisions concerning public values. Friedrich stated the point as follows:

The clamour for planning, misunderstood as technicalization of value-related decisions and policies, is ill-conceived. Planning only makes sense, to repeat it once more, within the context of rational decision-making based upon prevailing, in other words communal values and beliefs. (emphasis in original)⁶

In addition, if planning involves the coordination of interrelated activities, knowledge and decisions concerning such interrelationships are required. Making planning decisions of this type involves the use of what Karl Mannheim termed "substantial rationality," which he defined as "an act of thought which reveals intelligent insight into the inter-relations of events in a given situation" and the "capacity for independent judgment." Mannheim distinguished substantial rationality from what he termed "functional rationality," essentially technical or expert knowledge necessary to relate means to given ends efficiently.⁷

The development of this taxonomy of knowledge and decisions should not create the impression that these different kinds of knowledge are clearly separable within planning. The questions arising in the actual practice of planning typically involve an interrelated set of decisions to be made concerning values, interrelationships among activities, and techniques of relating means to ends. The integration of these types of knowledge is evident throughout the process of planning, but especially so at the stage of developing any general policies to guide the remainder of the process.

General policies are not sufficient by themselves to insure the coordination of the activities being planned. An interactive process is required between the general policies and the decisions within the different spheres of activity. The features of such an interactive process have been described by Russell Ackoff:

Sets of decisions that require planning have the following important characteristics:

- a. They are too large to handle all at once. Therefore planning must be divided into stages or phases that are performed either sequentially by one decision-making body, or simultaneously by different bodies, or by some combination of sequential and simultaneous efforts. Planning must be staged or, put another way, it must itself be planned.
- b. The set of necessary decisions cannot be subdivided into independent subsets. Hence a planning problem cannot be broken down into independent subplanning problems. The subplanning problems must be interrelated. This means that decisions made early in the planning process must be taken into account when making decisions later on in the process and the earlier decisions must be reviewed in light of

the decisions made subsequent to them. (emphasis in original)⁸

Through an interactive process general policies are not only applied to specific areas of activity, but the general policies themselves may also be adjusted on the basis of the interaction with the specific.

An additional characteristic of the circumstances that require or would benefit from planning is that they involve activities that are interrelated over a long period of time because decisions, once made, are difficult if not impossible to reverse. Examples of decisions with irreversible consequences include going to war or depleting a non-renewable resource. Decisions that are difficult to reverse often involve commitments to public or private capital investments. Other difficult-to-reverse decisions involve the creation or maintenance of a substantial relationship of power in society. Examples include the establishment of the Social Security system or the granting of the authority for a profession to regulate its own membership.

The description offered here of planning and the circumstances that occasion it has certain definite implications for the relationship between planning and politics. One obvious implication is that planning is not a purely technical activity, but is a form or aspect of politics. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of an activity so directly involved in the formation and

coordination of public policy as being other than a political activity. Norton Long has stated the case simply and bluntly: "Plans are policies and policies, in a democracy at any rate, spell politics."⁹

From a democratic perspective, the normative implication of planning as a political activity is that planning in both its design and operation should be responsive and accountable to the public through the political process. This implication is obvious, but working it out in practice is not. Political questions--questions of values, of the appropriateness of both the purposes and methods of public policies--are involved throughout the continuous and interactive process of planning. Both general policies of planning and policies in specific areas evolve and are reformulated as they are made to interact with each other in planning. If planning is to be accountable to the public, the larger political process of society must be linked to the planning process in a manner that provides for effective public control at whatever stage policy is formed. Importantly, the political process should insure that public control exercised at one stage of planning is not lost at another.

A special demand is made on the public by decisions that are difficult or impossible to reverse. To achieve public accountability in these cases, the public needs to be able to provide guidance for these decision prior

to their being made. In addition, given the importance of technical questions to planning and the fact that those technical questions are intertwined with questions of values and beliefs, the general standard of accountability requires that the technical knowledge of experts be translated into terms that can be dealt with by the public and that other arrangements exist as are necessary to make the expert clearly subordinate to the public.

The implications of failing to make the expert accountable to the public can be understood by examining arguments that have been made for leaving planning to the planners. In 1968, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development sponsored an international symposium on planning conducted by and for planners. The introductory contribution to the symposium was a paper by Salvador de Madariaga on the subject "Planning for Freedom." Madariaga addressed the question of who is to plan the planners as follows:

It would appear therefore that planning should be preceded by a certain amount of planning of planning. To echo a classical piece of advice: planner, plan yourself. We should plan our plans. We should carefully survey the reality before us to size up its measurable and so to speak mechanical sector, that part of it which would eventually admit of statistical-mechanical solutions; and this done, limit the rigid part of our planning to that sector; then organise the rest so as to marshall, guide and coordinate the free, spontaneous creativeness of institutions and individuals, allowing for their qualities, differences, experience, traditions, hopes and even, when not uncooperative, prejudices; thus aiming as best we can at a happy alliance of

the craving of thought for definiteness and the no less craving of life for the indefinite and the unexpected: the wall and the rose on the wall. (emphasis in original)¹⁰

In Madariaga's world, individuals would be allowed a "free, spontaneous creativeness," but only as marshalled, guided and coordinated by the planner. The individual need fear only if his prejudices are "uncooperative." At least we can take pleasure from a pretty image: we would be like the "rose on the wall," planted where the planner wanted us. Fortunately, Madariaga's stating this view does not make it so. But it does lend credence to the position that planning should not be left to planning experts.

These, in summary, are the major points of this section:

1. Public planning is an aspect of politics that involves the deliberate coordination of interrelated activities undertaken or influenced by the state.
2. Public planning is largely a consequence of prior intervention of the state in society--interventions that were not substantially coordinated with each other.
3. More extensive public planning may involve greater or lesser restrictions on individual freedom of choice depending on the nature of the decision made and implemented in the planning process.
4. Planning, as defined in this paper, involves the following activities or processes:
 - a. the adoption of general policies that declare the results desired from planning and the strategies for accomplishing the results that take account of the relationship among activities in different subject areas;
 - b. the use of knowledge and the making of decisions concerning values, interrelationships

among activities, and techniques of applying means to chosen ends; and

c. the conduct of a continuous and interactive process of adopting general policies, applying those general policies to specific areas, and reformulating general policies based on their application.

5. The activities that require planning frequently involve circumstances of interrelationships over time where decisions made today are difficult to reverse and have substantial future consequences.

6. Normative implications, from a general democratic perspective, of planning as an aspect of politics include the following:

a. The larger political process of society should be linked to the planning process in a manner that provides for effective public control at whatever stage policy is formed.

b. In cases of decisions that are difficult or impossible to reverse, the public should be able to provide guidance for these decisions prior to their being made.

c. The intertwining of technical knowledge, insight into interrelationships, and value judgments in planning decisions creates the need for translating technical knowledge into terms that can be understood by the public and for any other arrangements that clearly subordinate planning experts to the public.

d. The planning of planning is a matter that should be determined by the public in the political process and not left to the planners.

FOOTNOTES

1. Sir Henry Bunbury, "Governmental Planning," in Ideas and Issues in Public Administration, ed. by Dwight Waldo (New York: McGraw, 1953), pp. 392-3. Abridged from "Governmental Planning Machinery," Public Administration, October, 1938, pp. 381-398.
2. Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1940), p. 152.
3. Norton E. Long, The Polity, edited with an introduction by Charles Press (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1962), p. 103.
4. Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), pp. 19-20.
5. Carl Friedrich, "Political Decision-Making, Public Policy, and Planning," in The Dimensions of Public Administration, Second Edition, ed. by Joseph A. Uveges, Jr. (Boston: Holbrook Press, 1975), p. 116.
6. Ibid., p. 118.
7. Mannheim, Man and Society, pp. 52, 58, & 59.
8. Russell Ackoff, A Concept of Corporate Planning (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Wiley-Interscience, 1970), p. 3.
9. Long, Polity, p. 193.
10. Salvador de Madariaga, "Introduction--Planning for Freedom," in Perspectives on Planning: Proceedings of the OECD Working Symposium on Long-Range Forecasting and Planning (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1969), pp. 42-43.

CHAPTER II

PLANNING AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES

If planning is a form of politics, it would seem to follow that, as Robert Lekachman predicts, "planning will reflect the distribution of power and influence" in society.¹ Indeed, the conduct of planning is enmeshed within those networks of alliances among specialized agencies, interest groups, professional guilds, and legislative committees described by numerous observers of American politics. Theodore Lowi describes these networks of alliances as "interest group liberalism," and Daniel Ogden refers to them as "power clusters."²

Lowi offers a thoroughgoing indictment of interest group liberalism, and among his charges is that

Liberal governments cannot plan. Planning requires the authoritative use of authority. Planning requires law, choice, priorities, moralities. Liberalism replaces planning with bargaining. Yet at bottom, power is unacceptable without planning.

Application of pluralist principles in the construction of liberal government has made it possible for government to expand its efforts but not to assemble them. (emphasis added)³

The interpretation in this paper is not that planning is not done, but that it is done in a fragmented manner that results, in Harold Seidman's terms, in "treating

separately things which are inseparable."⁴ Clusters of power for different subject areas dominate planning or policy formation for their areas and resist, thus far successfully, efforts to make that planning accountable to a general planning process that is open and responsive to the general public. Planning, in Lowi's sense of assembling government action in a manner that overcomes the fragmentation of policy-making into separate spheres, is not done at the national level. This type of planning would attempt to integrate inter-related activities of the state; it is the type of planning that this paper advocates be established and conducted through democratic procedures.

The pattern of the conduct of partial planning at the federal level can be understood by reviewing the different types of planning conducted in the United States. For this review a taxonomy is used that classifies planning in terms of a vertical scale of the scope of planning and a horizontal scale of the elements on which the planning is based. The scope of planning refers to the range of public activities covered by the planning effort. Four levels of planning that vary in scope from broad to narrow are identified on the vertical scale: general, functional, program, and project planning. The horizontal scale involves two elements of planning that vary in opposite directions: goals and means.

Actual planning occurs at various locations in between the extremes because goals and means are not completely independent of each other, i.e. certain goals imply certain means appropriate to them and vice versa. End-point cases are likely to be more a matter of hypothetical speculation actual fact.

At the first level, the category of general planning corresponds to the concept of planning developed in the previous chapter. The discussion proceeds here in largely conceptual terms because general planning is not undertaken at the national level in the United States today. It is attempted, however, by several state governments, and the practice of general planning emerging in state governments tends to follow the conceptual terms used to define this category.

The scope of general planning is the set of inter-related activities of the state. General planning involves both the adoption of general policies to coordinate inter-related public activities and the maintenance of a process of applying the general policies to specific areas. For general planning to be effective, the general policies of planning would specify overall results and strategies for accomplishing those results in terms sufficiently broad to cover the interrelated activities, but sufficiently specific to provide effective guidance to those activities. Effective general planning does not require

a kind of total, blueprint planning of the details of interrelated activities, but it does require the development of general policies that are capable of being applied to specific cases. In addition, general planning both as a concept and as it has developed in state governments involves the consideration in relation to each other of the relevant goals and means associated with the activities being planned. Thus, general planning rests in the center of the scale between goals-based and means-based planning.

All fifty states have created some type of policy planning agency. In a majority of these states, the agency is authorized to conduct both types of the major activities included in general planning: the development of general policies and the maintenance of a mechanism for applying general policies to specific subject areas. As of 1977, thirty-four state governments had legislation authorizing the policy planning agency to prepare a general or comprehensive plan to serve as a tool for coordinating state government activities and planning in separate policy areas.⁵ Moreover, the authority to maintain a mechanism for applying general policies to specific subject areas is even more widespread, with every state policy planning agency charged with some major role in coordinating and reviewing the planning activities of other state agencies.⁶

Frequently, the mechanism for applying general policies to specific areas consists of the state planning agency serving as the "state clearinghouse" under the procedures established by the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-95. Among other provisions of Circular A-95, state governors are given an opportunity to review and comment on federally-assisted state plans and, for certain programs, federal grant requests that originate from within their states.⁷ State clearinghouses perform the central staff functions for these procedures and advise governors on policy issues that arise in the process. The purpose of the gubernatorial review of federally-assisted state plans is, according to the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "to permit the governor to relate development strategies among the Federally supported state programs to each other and to any overall strategies developed through the state comprehensive planning process."⁸ From this perspective, the A-95 process is intended to be one mechanism for the implementation of general planning.

State legislation has also often provided a method for applying general policies to specific policy areas. Typical of state laws providing for a state planning coordination function is the following Utah statute:

The state planning co-ordinator shall:
. . . Receive and review plans of the various
state agencies and local subdivisions of government

relating to public improvements and programs.

Where conflicts occur between the plans and proposals of state agencies, the state planning co-ordinator shall prepare specific recommendations for the resolution of such conflicts and submit his recommendations to the governor who shall make the decision resolving the conflict.⁹

Despite the existence of legal mechanisms for a majority of state governments to each develop general policies and to apply them to specific policy areas, general planning is largely frustrated at the state level. Chief among the reasons that general planning is not more successful at the state level is the fragmentation of policy-making at the federal level--a fragmentation that is too difficult for a state or locality to overcome. Exploring the implications of this fragmentation for planning is a major concern of the remainder of this chapter.

The second level of planning in the taxonomy is functional planning. The scope of functional planning is a set of activities that are related either because 1) they are related to a goal or goals in a subject area, or 2) they are related by using a common set of resources, or 3) they are related both ways. At the level of functional planning, the distinction between goals-based and means-based planning becomes relevant.

Goals-based functional planning emphasizes a goal or goals that are specified within a fixed range if not at a point and attempts to determine the means for accomplishing the goals. There are not many examples of

goals-based functional planning in the United States. The major one at the federal level is the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, which amends the Employment Act of 1946.

Means-based functional planning takes as fixed (or to be varied within a fixed range) a set of resources or a method and considers the allocation of the resources or the employment of the method in the light of alternative competing goals. Examples of this type of planning are numerous. They include such activities as multiple-use forest planning, a river basin development plan, and land use plans. Budget formulation, strictly speaking, falls into this category although it has some characteristics of general planning because of the range of activities it affects. A specific case of means-based functional planning, the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, will be discussed later in this chapter.

An example of functional planning that involves an effort to specify both goals and means in relation to each other (as opposed to specifying one and allowing the other to vary to an uncertain degree) is provided by the Federal Clean Water Act of 1977 and the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. These acts include the specification of goals--fishable and swimmable waters by 1983 and, ultimately, the zero-discharge of

wastes into waterways. These laws also specify in definite and detailed ways the nature and limits of the legal authority and funding to be utilized in pursuing these goals. Formulation of policy in these terms is an example of the kind of functional planning that would be the appropriate extension of general planning if general planning were practiced at the federal level.

The third level of planning--program planning--involves a subset of activities within an area covered by functional planning. Goals-based program planning involves a specific, defined objective or set of objectives plus resources and methods that can be varied within a fixed range. Examples of this type of planning are a transportation plan, an agricultural income support policy, or a recreational plan. Means-based program planning involves fixed resources, methods that can be varied within limits and choices among multiple, but defined objectives. A timber management plan or a capital improvements plan would fall into this category.

The same distinctions between goals-based and means-based planning exist at the specific activity or project level, and so will not be recounted again. An example of a goals-based activity or project plan is a campground plan. A means-based project plan is, for example, a water project plan.

Either goals-based or means-based planning at the program or project levels may descend from means-based functional planning. Whether it is means or goals-based at these levels depends on how successfully the groups doing the planning have captured both fixed resources and the discretion to choose among the goals to be served by those resources. When planning occurs in a means-based form at this level of planning, it is an indication of the success of a specific group or set of groups in capturing the policy formation processes for the activities being planned. When means-based planning of a very specific character, such as planning for a water project, occurs without guidance from an overall planning or policy process, the fragmentation of policy-making becomes apparent. Planning for such a project assumes the characteristics of higher levels of planning because it, in fact, assumes the roles of those higher levels. In these cases, general policy as it applies to the particular activity being planned is clearly controlled by specific groups.

The same conclusion can be extended to the functional level. The prevalence of means-based functional planning is a result of groups capturing legal, fiscal, and other resources to use for purposes they determine. The dominance of planning of this type is a symptom of the fragmentation of governmental authority in the United States.

It should not be surprising that specific groups that control general public policy as it applies to a particular set of activities will resist the transfer of the making of that general policy to a larger political process. It was this type of resistance that contributed to the demise of the National Resources Planning Board, an embryonic general planning mechanism spawned by the New Deal. Although the Board engaged in innovative studies of national policies, it never became a vehicle for effectively integrating the formation and guidance of national policy. However, because of the Board's potential for becoming a general planning mechanism, it represented a potential threat to the independence of both established and newly arising power clusters in specialized areas. Importantly, the Corps of Engineers played an instrumental role in securing the abolition of the Board during World War II.¹⁰

Problems associated with the absence of a general planning mechanism emerge from looking at specific cases of functional planning. The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act is significant because it represents an effort by Congress to specify macroeconomic goals. The act is flawed, however, by an incomplete consideration of the relationship between the goals and the means of accomplishing them. Congress did not determine in the act how the goals should be accomplished; it asked the President

to determine the means. Avoiding the question of means, Congress could specify ambitious goals--3 percent unemployment and 3 percent inflation in five years--without confronting the question of how realistic the goals were. The recent record of stagflation raises serious doubts about the feasibility of achieving these goals through the use of current macroeconomic policy instruments.

The Health Planning and Resource Development Act represents an example of how means-based planning occurs when a specific set of groups capture the authority to make general policy as it applies to a particular subject area. Congress did not specify definite goals in the law, but made only general statements about the quality, character, and cost of health care. The law does, however, elaborately detail the process by which special groups will be able to exercise authority and expend public funds.

This law authorizes local health systems agencies, predominantly of a private, non-profit character, to perform certain key health manpower and facilities planning functions. Although 51 percent consumer representation is required on the boards of such agencies, provider groups are organized and employ professional staffs to provide expert information to their also presumed expert, professional representatives on the local boards. Consumers typically have no similar access to expert resources. Most importantly, the lines of accountability between the

health systems agencies and the general public are weak. This law guarantees to certain groups the authority to make specific kinds of health policy. It does not guarantee to the public any particular health care benefits, nor does it offer any ready method for the public to correct the activities of a health systems agency if the public desired some correction.

The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act suggests that goals-based planning involves promises to deliver benefits without any corresponding promise to undertake the proper means and to incur the proper costs necessary to achieve those benefits. In contrast, the Health Planning and Resource Development Act suggest that means-based planning involves promises to undertake certain means and incur certain costs without a corresponding promise to deliver benefits of any particular kind. Both laws suggest the need for planning that relates means and ends to each other.

There is the further need to relate planning in one functional area to that in other areas. The economic, health care, and water pollution control laws discussed above each proceed without being effectively related to each other. The quality of the environment impacts health care planning and policy. Both are related to economic policy in a number of ways, including levels of investments required and impacts on price levels and

productivity. These matters are not addressed directly in the absence of a general planning process.

The general planning process advocated in this paper has been described to this point as consisting of two interrelated parts: 1) the development of general policies that state desired results and strategies for achieving those results for the activities being planned, and 2) a process of applying the general policies to activities in specific areas through the review of the plans for those activities. It should be added that the typical expectation would be that when a general policy and a specific plan were in conflict, the specific plan would be modified. However, the opposite can also be the case. A specific plan could lead to the reevaluation and change of a general policy.

Although general planning is not practiced at a national level in the United States, efforts by some state and local governments and areawide planning organizations (usually regional councils of local governments) can help to underscore the points already made about what is necessary for an effective general planning process. An analysis of some efforts at general planning is offered here on the basis of knowledge acquired by personal experience and observation.¹¹

It has been argued in this paper that general planning, to be effective, requires the development of

general policies. Such is evident because general planning attempts to achieve certain results through the deliberate coordination of activities, and general policies are the expression of the results desired and the strategies for accomplishing them. A further understanding of the role of general policies in the coordination of activities can be achieved through a discussion of alternative methods used by states and areawide planning organizations for handling A-95 review procedures.

Although not complete in its review of governmental activities, the A-95 review process is, in its intended form, an example of a method of applying general policies to specific governmental activities. The process is supposed to focus on a comparison between comprehensive state or areawide plans and proposals for public activities embodied in grant requests or specific plans. The final step of the process, assuming no policy conflicts, is supposed to be a certification that a given proposal is "not inconsistent" with the plans and policies of the jurisdiction doing the reviewing. Environmental and minority group impacts are also to be given consideration, along with any conflicts between the proposal and other projects or activities in the same area.

Before proceeding to consider the different ways that the A-95 process is implemented, some terminological

clarification is in order. The term "comprehensive" was used in the paragraph above because that is the term used in Circular A-95 and in most state laws dealing with state planning. There is no precise definition of a comprehensive plan; it can mean different things depending on whether one is considering the purpose and function of the plan or the method by which it is prepared. Judging from federal and state legal usage and the common understanding of these matters among state planners, comprehensive planning, at the level of purpose and function, is reasonably the same as general planning: both are aimed at coordinating an interrelated set of activities. For that reason and to be consistent with the taxonomy used in this paper, the term "general" plan will be substituted for "comprehensive" plan in discussing how A-95 procedures are actually conducted in certain jurisdictions. The interchangeability of these terms should be understood to occur only at the level of purpose and function.

Later in this chapter, comprehensive planning and general planning will be distinguished from each other at the level of method. The method of comprehensive planning attempts to analyze and plan everything that a governmental jurisdiction or agency can influence. It involves inventorying data and projecting trends that relate to the full range of governmental activities,

ranking goals for those activities, considering as many options for action as possible, and describing chosen options in blueprint detail. The method of general planning focuses the planning effort on a set of priority issues. The initial stage of this method involves the making of judgments about the most important problems to address and the key factors and relationships that affect those problems. The collection of information, choice of goals, and analysis of options focuses on these problems, and recommendations are stated in terms of general guidelines for future action as well as necessary immediate actions. A comprehensive plan developed through a comprehensive method would be an extreme case of a general plan.

In actually conducting the A-95 process, some states and even more areawide planning organizations do not focus on a comparison between the item being reviewed and general plans and policies for the simple fact that those entities have not actually developed overall plans. In these cases, the review of proposals through the A-95 process focuses instead on identifying conflicts between proposals and the activities of other agencies, as perceived by those agencies. The method of identifying conflicts typically consists of distributing the proposal to other public agencies to secure their comments on it. This method is also employed as an additional procedure in the jurisdictions that do conduct a comparison of the

relationship between a proposal and a general plan or set of policies. In the jurisdictions where such a comparison is not undertaken, the "self-determination of conflict" process, as it was termed in an American Institute of Planners study of functional planning coordination, is the principal or exclusive method of fulfilling A-95 requirements.¹²

The different procedures used to implement OMB Circular A-95 have a tendency to produce different policy results. Relying on the comments that public agencies raise in conjunction with proposals of another agency tends to focus attention on issues of a technical nature instead of issues of purposes, priorities, and methods. This pattern occurs for several reasons including:

1. A tendency of agencies to observe a "norm of limited comments" that institutionalizes an understanding of a log-rolling nature: "If you won't comment harshly on our proposals, we won't comment harshly on yours next time;"
2. The roles and responsibilities of public agencies are sufficiently well defined and separated that few really fundamental conflicts occur among agencies at the same governmental level; and
3. As a consequence of the factor just mentioned, public agencies do not necessarily perceive or have a strong interest in or concern for problems that tend to cut across agency lines and that are the cumulative and indirect consequences of the actions of specific agencies properly carrying out their responsibilities.

The analysis of these factors will help to illustrate that the A-95 process, when conducted solely on a self-determination of conflict basis, leads to the systematic

exclusion from consideration of certain kinds of public problems.

Agencies tend to observe the norm of limited comments because typically there is little that they have to gain from making negative comments on another agency's proposal, and potentially a great deal that they have to lose. Because the areas of responsibility of agencies are in most cases reasonably well defined, direct conflicts between a funding proposal of one agency with another agency at the same level of government are rare. The conflicts that do occur tend to be marginal in the sense that the proposal of one agency does not directly threaten the performance of activities in the major areas of responsibility of other agencies.

In any conflicts that do arise, the final step (after initial consultations to resolve the conflict) open to an agency objecting to a proposal is to have its objections transmitted to the federal agency considering the funding proposal. Expressing such objections to federal funding sources carries with it the threat that funding for the proposal will be delayed or denied. Other consequences, such as the transfer of the proposed grant from one agency to another, are extremely rare and are generally precluded by the terms and conditions of the categorical grant-in-aid system. Categories of aid generally are focused on specific purposes and carry

with them eligibility requirements for the receipt of aid, including the important single state agency requirement.¹³ These eligibility requirements mark the boundaries of agency territory within the grant-in-aid system.

The possibility of the loss of federal funds (and their consequent transfer to another state) appears to be a negative result grossly out of proportion to what is typically involved in an interagency conflict over a funding proposal. In addition, an agency that does choose to pursue an objection too vigorously is viewed as violating the grant territory of another agency and is likely to invite similar treatment when its own proposals for federal funding are reviewed. There are few state agencies that do not participate in some aspect of the grant-in-aid system, and protecting one's own grant request or plan of activities is generally more important than influencing the proposals of another agency.

The shared understanding that most interagency issues are less important than success at securing federal funds, the mutual respect for each other's grant territory, and the threat of having one's own funding proposal reviewed critically if too much protest is made over another's proposal help to insure that interagency comments in the A-95 process are polite and routine. But the inadequacy of interagency comments as a basis of coordination cannot really be explained in terms of these

aspects of political culture and psychology. Even if these factors were entirely removed, interagency comments would still be inherently aimed at primarily marginal issues. The problems that give rise to efforts at coordination are of the nature of externalities--cumulative and interrelated effects of each agency properly doing its own job. These external effects are not the province of any particular agency and cannot be adequately perceived from the perspective of those who are responsible for only part of a total problem and who help to create the problem by doing their assigned tasks well.

This point can be understood better through the use of an example. In the past two decades a number of federal and state programs have been jointly undertaken that place requirements for public services and investments that are relatively more costly on a per unit of service or per capita basis for small, rural communities than for larger, urban communities. These programs have involved such matters as upgrading rural ambulance and other emergency medical services, renovating water and sewer systems, upgrading methods of solid waste disposal, requiring additional training and education for local police, and maintaining or upgrading standards for local roads. The cumulative effect of these programs on the budgets of rural communities (and, hence, on the budgets of the residents of those communities) was often

devastating and tended to reduce the economic viability of many of these communities.¹⁴

The cumulative effect of the mostly federal social and environmental programs on the economics of small, rural communities was often not the concern of any particular state agency. Thus, in an A-95 review process that relied solely on interagency comments, the overall problem of those communities being able to finance the required services would not be identified. For instance, if a state plan for sewer and waste treatment facilities was under review, the state agency responsible for preparing the state emergency medical service plan would probably indicate some support for the sewer and waste treatment facility plan because of its generally positive effect on public health. State law enforcement training officials would likely have no comment or would not have been sent the plan in the first place. State highway officials would also have no comment, except to note any infrequent cases where the timing of the construction of a sewer line would need to be coordinated with the timing of the reconstruction or resurfacing of a highway through a community. The latter is precisely the kind of technical problem that tends to be identified in the self-determination of conflict mode of the A-95 process. But none of these agencies would be likely to identify the cumulative fiscal impact of the sewer and waste treatment

plan and other plans on the budgets of rural communities.

A process of reviewing individual activities in the absence of any general policy perspective to guide that review will not result in effective coordination to solve problems that are the cumulative result of a number of individual activities. Those problems are not even likely to be identified, let alone addressed through a coherent set of policies. Without a coherent set of policies to serve as standards to judge individual activities, almost all of the items being reviewed will be judged to be satisfactory.

Melvin Mogulof, a researcher who studied the conduct of the A-95 review process by regional councils of government in 1970 and 1971, came to a similar conclusion. Noting that most councils did not have regional plans or policies against which they could review individual grant applications, he concluded that

The grossest and most overwhelming failure of the A-95 process is its great difficulty in distinguishing between good and bad applications from a regional point of view. On a de facto basis almost everything is good--because the system finds that almost nothing is bad.¹⁵

The review of individual activities is essentially meaningless unless there is some basis for distinguishing the important from the unimportant, the good from the bad, and the consistent from the inconsistent. That basis can be provided by general policies that express results

that are desired and overall strategies for accomplishing them.

General policies without a process of reviewing and applying those policies to individual activities is also meaningless in terms of trying to coordinate those activities in the achievement of desired results. The stereotype of planning as an activity in which planners produce plans that sit on the shelf has a certain factual basis. Planners are frequently dismayed that decision-makers ignore their plans. What planners often fail to consider is that their plans may be ignored for good reasons.

It was noted earlier that at least thirty-four of the state governments have the necessary authorizing legislation for the development of general plans. The language of such legislation, following the jargon of the planning profession, refers to "comprehensive" plans instead of general plans. The idea that general plans should be comprehensive has been an obstacle to both the preparation and application of such plans. If reviewing activities without the guidance of general policies results in the erroneous conclusion that there are few important relationships among different public activities, the attempt to be comprehensive makes the erroneous assumption that everything is related in an important way to everything else. Hence, the comprehensive approach

proceeds on the basis that everything should at least be studied for planning if not actually planned.

In practice, the comprehensive approach involves the collection of large quantities of data relating to matters that might be affected by the planning. The inventory of data may proceed to a projection of trends based on the assumption of the past continuing into the future. Next to the inventory of data and projection of trends is juxtaposed a priority ranking of goals ("supplied by decision-makers") and from that juxtaposition a blueprint of as detailed a set of recommendations as possible is produced. The hallmark of the comprehensive method is the use of expert resources, and its spirit and impulse is to study everything.

The effort to study everything, to be comprehensive, typically yields one of two results. It either paralyzes the planning effort and stops a plan from being prepared, or it culminates in a voluminous document full of too much data and technical analysis--often already out of date at its time of publication--and very little of anything that can be used as an effective guide in coordinating different activities of government. The political process typically deals with a "comprehensive" plan by greeting its completion ceremoniously and then proceeding to ignore it in practice.¹⁶

Some states have avoided the problems of

comprehensive planning by developing a method that is appropriate to implementing the concept of general planning discussed in this paper.¹⁷ Instead of beginning with the collection and analysis of large quantities of data, the method of general planning begins with judgments concerning the major problems or circumstances to be given attention and the general character of the results that are desired. Combined with these judgments of values are judgments concerning the key relationships that affect the problems or circumstances being examined. These judgments involve the exercise of the kind of substantial rationality as suggested by Mannheim and discussed in the previous chapter. These judgments of value and insight are then employed to guide the technical analysis necessary to complete the planning process. Technical analysis may reveal conditions and circumstances that require a change in the initial judgments made, but the guidance of the process by judgments of what is important to study and plan continues throughout. Out of this process statements of results and strategies of accomplishing them are produced that can be used to evaluate individual cases of government activity.

This method has been most successfully applied in Massachusetts where conflicting goals for economic growth, community preservation, and environmental protection are reconciled, on a policy level, through

a growth policy that focuses on the revitalization of existing urban centers.¹⁸ In developing the recommendations for revitalizing urban centers, there has been an obvious focus on what are judged to be the key governmental activities that affect the results that are desired--these activities principally being certain public investment and development regulation decisions. The general policy has been applied through the review of individual activities in the A-95 process and other internal review processes of Massachusetts state government. The growth policy was first stated in 1975 and updated in 1977; it is stated in understandable terms that correspond to the categories of desired results and strategies for accomplishing the results. The policy has not been a "plan on the shelf." Its implementation has been sufficient to lead the authors of the American Institute of Planners study to conclude that the policy had been "a significant factor in the administration of state programs."¹⁹

An important characteristic of the Massachusetts growth policy is that it has been stated in terms that can be understood and debated by the public and that can be readily changed as circumstances and preferences change. The problem of overly technical comprehensive plans that become outdated as soon as they are published is avoided in this approach because policies are developed

and stated in terms that make them relevant over time, but also subject to change through the political process.

For example, the Massachusetts growth policy report includes eight general policy recommendations to serve as guides for governmental activities and thirty-six "action recommendations" involving measures to implement the general policies. Among the general policy recommendations is the following one concerning the location of growth:

It is the policy of the Commonwealth that growth should be channeled primarily into developed rather than outlying areas, especially into city and town centers, and discouraged in critical environmental areas, consistent with individual communities' willingness and ability to accommodate growth.²⁰

This policy is supplemented by an explanatory statement that defines such phrases as "critical environmental areas" and "ability to accommodate growth" and that explains the idea of centers on both a regional and local basis. This statement concerning the location of growth is a reasonably clear policy that could be used to direct a number of actions over time, but that could also be changed relatively easily. The policy is specific enough to be applied to particular cases, but general enough to be applied to a variety of cases.

Additional meaning is given to this general policy by several "action recommendations" in the report that are relevant to it.²¹ These recommendations

deal with matters such as the location of public investments, prohibiting geographic discrimination against older neighborhoods in lending decisions, encouraging center revitalization programs, sharing industrial property taxes, and several other topics. These action recommendations help to clarify the intent of the general policy as well as provide a means for its implementation. They are also subject to modification as circumstances change. Importantly, the action recommendations illustrate the fact that the general policy is to be implemented primarily through governmental activities that are subject to the authority of state government.

This last point is an important one, because state government efforts at general planning are often frustrated by the fact that the important governmental activities that relate to a problem are often subject to federal instead of state control. The problem cited earlier of the fiscal difficulties of small, rural communities was created primarily by federal laws and regulations. General planning at the state and local level simply cannot adequately address problems created by the fragmented character of federal policies. Those problems require a general planning mechanism at the federal level. Creating and maintaining such a mechanism requires the mobilization of political power to overcome and bring to account the clusters of power that control

policy in separate areas. How to mobilize and exercise that power through democratic procedures is the major concern of this paper. Addressing that concern requires some understanding of what is meant here by the term "democratic procedures."

FOOTNOTES

1. Robert Lekachman, "The Inevitability of Planning," in Planning, Politics, and the Public Interest, ed. Walter Goldstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 157-158.
2. Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism, Second Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1979). See especially his description of the networks of politics connected with the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, pp. 67-91. Daniel Ogden describes essentially the same network of relationships under the term "power clusters" in "How National Policy is Made," Colorado State University, February, 1971 (mimeographed).
3. Lowi, End of Liberalism, p. 67
4. Harold Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization, Second Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 64.
5. The Research Group, Inc., The Legal Basis for State Policy Planning, State Planning Series 4 (Washington: Council of State Planning Agencies, 1977), p. 22.
6. Ibid., p. 19.
7. U.S., Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Improving Federal Grants Management, A-53 (February, 1977), p. 217.
8. Ibid., p. 230
9. Utah, Code Annotated, 63-28-4.
10. This characterization of the history of the National Resources Planning Board is taken from Otis Graham, Toward a Planned Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 53-58.

11. The remainder of this chapter relies heavily on observations from this writer's personal experience in planning and politics. In addition to the experience cited in note 3 to the Introduction, support for the observations made here was also drawn from serving as a consultant to the Governor's Balanced Growth Project, Montana, 1978-79; and as a member of the Missoula, Montana, County Planning Board, 1979.
12. U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Coordinating State Functional Planning Programs: Strategies for Balancing Conflicting Objectives, by the American Institute of Planners: Research Office, August, 1977, p. 31.
13. The "single state agency" requirement appears in most federal categorical grant-in-aid laws and specifies that a governor must designate a single agency within the state as eligible for the receipt of funds under the program. Such designations create monopolies for the receipt of federal aid funds and help make designated state agencies clients of the federal agencies. The single state agency requirement, along with other features of the grant-in-aid laws and the "federal" structure of allied interest groups, creates what the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations termed "vertical functional autocracies." Vertical functional autocracies are the intergovernmental extension of the power clusters at the national level. See U.S., Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Tenth Annual Report, January 31, 1969, p. 8. The single state agency requirement may be waived by a federal agency under the terms of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, but such waivers are rarely granted. Federal agencies generally benefit from the client relationship of state agencies and are disinclined to approve such waivers.
14. Examples occurred with some frequency in the 1970's of rural South Dakota communities whose local budget share of improvements that they were required to make exceeded the total size of previous budgets of those communities. In some cases, local improvement costs exceeded the total assessed valuation of the community. In the extreme case of Sinai, S.D., the local share of the cost of a required sewer system exceeded

the estimated total market value of all the homes in the community.

15. Melvin B. Mogulof, "Regional Planning, Clearance, and Evaluation: A Look at the A-95 Process," American Institute of Planners Journal 37 (November, 1971): 420.
16. The personal judgment made here is consistent with the similar conclusions made in a study prepared for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development by the Council of State Governments. The study reported that

" . . . few states have been even partially successful in putting together what could be reasonably be regarded as a comprehensive . . . plan. The size of the effort tends to take so much time that the plan is out of date by the time it is published."

The study strongly endorsed, however, the need for overall state policy guidelines to evaluate specific activities, and it viewed favorably the trend toward realistic efforts to produce such guidelines:

"There is a trend toward the production of a stripped down version of the comprehensive plan that is selective in the issues that it deals with, concentrating on the most important policy and program alternatives."

This trend toward a "stripped down" version of a comprehensive plan is discussed in this chapter as efforts by states to develop and adopt the method of general planning.

See U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, State Planning: Intergovernmental Policy Coordination, by the Council of State Governments, August, 1976, p. 121.

17. Among the states attempting to develop and adapt this method of planning was South Dakota. This writer was involved in using this approach to produce a plan that was completed in December, 1977. The experience with implementation of this plan is not as extensive as the Massachusetts case, which began somewhat earlier with a state legislative committee report in 1973 and

an executive growth policy statement in 1975. The Massachusetts case is considered in this chapter.

18. This summary of the Massachusetts growth policy effort is drawn from U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Coordinating State Functional Planning Programs, pp. 71-115, and from a review of two major reports generated in the effort: Massachusetts, Office of State Planning, Towards a Growth Policy for Massachusetts, October, 1975, and Massachusetts, Office of State Planning, City and Town Centers: A Program for Growth, September, 1977.
19. U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Coordinating State Functional Planning Programs, p. 112.
20. Massachusetts, City and Town Centers, p. 60.
21. Ibid., pp. 63-85.

CHAPTER III

DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES

At the conclusion of Chapter I, normative implications of planning were derived from a general perspective that democracy is a condition in which public policy is responsive and accountable to the public. This chapter attempts to clarify the procedural requirements for the accountability of policy to the public. No argument will be made here that these procedural requirements for democracy comprise a full and adequate model of democracy. That there are both procedural and substantive conditions for democracy is readily acknowledged. However, only the procedural requirements are being considered in detail in this paper. Stated differently, this paper explores conditions that create an opportunity for democratic planning, but it does not explore the conditions that guarantee democratic planning.

The substantive requirements for democracy and for democratic planning in particular involve extremely important and complex issues that ought to be the subject of further study through a relaxation of the assumptions declared in the introduction. Among the kinds of issues

that should be addressed in further study are the social and economic inequalities that tend to undermine political equality within the political process.

Important also to democratic planning are the questions, belonging to the general field of the sociology of knowledge, concerning the social conditions that contribute to the acquisition of knowledge appropriate to participation in a democratic planning process. Mannheim emphasized these issues in his argument that functional rationalization--the increased specialization of the workplace--tends to reduce the degree to which citizens are able to develop the ability to exercise the substantial rationality necessary for planning.¹ The idea of opportunities for participation in society as a means for developing the citizenship capabilities of individuals is, as surveyed in a useful work by Carole Pateman, a theme of both some traditional and contemporary theories of democracy and for which there is some support from empirical research.² In addition, John Friedmann, a leading American planning theorist, has made citizen participation a central feature in his model of a learning society capable of effective planning.³ The importance of these issues for further study should not, however, overshadow the importance of the procedural questions considered here. Democracy cannot exist without democratic procedures.

Procedural elements of democracy are adapted here

from a model of democracy developed by Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall.⁴ Their model of democracy emphasizes procedures, but also acknowledges in a general manner the social conditions necessary for democracy. Their model has been chosen as a base from which to work, because unlike some models, this one stresses the need for involving citizens in the development of public policy instead of merely in the choice of leaders from among competing candidates. Because of the continuous character of policy formation in planning and because many key decisions in planning have a practically irreversible character, periodic elections of the planners is by itself an inadequate guarantee of public control of planning. The nature of planning issues makes public awareness and understanding of these issues an important requirement for public control of planning. Ranney and Kendall's model is appropriate to the task of designing democratic planning procedures because it recognizes the need for citizens to have opportunities to participate in and understand public policies.

The summary elements of the Ranney and Kendall model, in their own terms, are as follows:

1. Popular sovereignty. The whole power of government resides in the whole people--that is, in all the members of the community, and not in any special ruling class or in any single individual.
2. Political equality. Each member of the community has the same formal right as all the other members to

participate in the community's total decision-making process.

3. Popular consultation. a. The community's laws are made by a representative assembly.
- b. The electoral arrangements for selecting members of the representative assembly are such that the assembly will be as subordinate to the people as the latter wish it to be.
- c. Failing b., the members of the assembly make decisions as the whole people would make them if the latter were present and voting.
- d. The assembly supervises, holds accountable, and has full control over all other public officials.
- e. There are arrangements for communicating to the people full factual knowledge and understanding of all public problems they wish to do something about.
- f. The citizens participate in the development of proposals for public policy as well as give or withhold consent to such proposals.

4. Majority rule. a. No decision as to public policy or procedure is deemed valid if opposed by more than half of the members of the community.
- b. A majority of the representative assembly has the same power over the assembly's decisions as a majority of the town meeting has over the latter's decisions.
- c. Majorities forbear from tyranny and minorities from irredentism and civil war because of a sense of obligation to do so on the part of all the members of the community (and of their elected representatives) based on the feeling of each that he needs to keep all the others loyal to the community if he is to realize his own values.
- d. Decisions are made after a process of creative discussion in which all the members of the community are trying to find out what is best for the community.
- e. Voting and majority rule are regarded merely as makeshifts for getting action when action is needed in a hurry and there is not sufficient time for a full "sense of the community" to emerge from the discussion on the issue in hand. (emphasis in original)⁵

With the exceptions and modifications noted below, this model will be considered here as describing essential and desirable conditions with which procedures for

democratic planning ought to be consistent. The choice of this model is based both on the judgment, discussed above, concerning its appropriateness to the design of democratic planning procedures and on the view that the model is very complete in its coverage of the procedural elements of democracy. The proposals made for planning procedures are, of course contingent on this choice of model. If a different model were chosen, different procedures might be recommended. Further, it should be understood that the planning procedures to be proposed later in this paper are designed simply to be consistent with this model of democracy and not to guarantee the implementation of the model in all its aspects.

In first presenting the concept of popular sovereignty, Ranney and Kendall state the position, taken from James Bryce, that popular sovereignty applies to the "ruling power of the State."⁶ Ranney and Kendall, without justifying their position, have automatically assumed that the government is identical to the state and does not include other social institutions, such as corporations or labor unions, that might have power to affect the interests of the public in a broad and substantial manner. Robert Dahl has argued the view that corporations can be considered as part of the state as follows:

If we abandon the absurdities in extending Locke on private property to ownership or control of the modern business corporation, then the rights

of owners must be seen as secondary in relation to the primary rights that are necessary for self-government.

and further that:

. . . any large economic enterprise is in principle a public enterprise. It exists not by private right but only to meet social goals. Questions about these social goals, and the comparative advantages and disadvantages of different forms are properly in the public domain, matters for public discussion, choice, and decision, to be determined collectively by processes that satisfy the criteria of procedural democracy.⁷

From Dahl's point of view, corporations are so much a "public" entity that it is not simply a matter of subjecting individual corporate actions or sets of actions to public control. He suggests that even the forms of the corporations are properly a matter for public control. To broaden so thoroughly the degree of corporate affairs that are assumed to be in the public domain is to assume that corporations, at least large ones, are part of the state that should be subject to popular sovereignty.

Sheldon Wolin argues, however, that it is a mistake to assume that the corporation is a

. . . political entity and hence susceptible to political kinds of questions. My point, however, is that an approach of this kind leads to confusions because the concept of political responsibility is out of place in this context. Political responsibility has traditionally connoted a form of responsibility owed to a general constituency. . . .⁸

Interpreting Wolin's point to mean that politics ought to be about matters that have a general effect on the community, is it not possible for powerful social

institutions such as corporations to have such a general effect? For example, power by corporations (and unions) to administer prices for certain widely needed products might be interpreted as giving the public an interest not only in the specific acts of price administration, but also in the source of the power to administer prices. Other matters within the domain of the corporation might be similarly interpreted as causing the public to become a "general constituency" of the corporation: technological choices, employment practices, investment policies, and pollution effects are such examples. The point is that whether or not a social institution, such as a corporation, ought to be considered a part of the state is an empirical matter to be decided in particular cases as a matter of public policy by the same means as other public policy is determined.

For the above reason, Ranney and Kendall's assumption that no institutions besides government might be considered a part of the state is not accepted here. Instead, popular sovereignty will be considered here to apply to the whole power of the state and not only to the whole power of government, with the determination of what social institutions belong to the state left to public policy adopted through a democratic process.

It should be understood that Ranney and Kendall's reference to the community's "total decision-making process"

in their standard of political equality refers to political decision-making processes and not to such matters as decision-making in the workplace that might be emphasized by theorists of participatory democracy. In a study of the substantive conditions of democracy, the Ranney-Kendall definition of community decision-making process would probably need to be modified, but does not need to be here in a study of political procedures. Moreover; their intent in their application of political equality to the total political decision-making of society is to broaden the concept of equality beyond one person, one vote in elections to include an equal opportunity to participate in developing and choosing among policy proposals.⁹ They carry out their interpretation of the applicability of the concept of political equality in standards (listed above as 3.e. and 3.f.) which relate to public knowledge about and participation in public policy-making.

Ranney and Kendall's standards for political equality and popular consultation would seem to require a single representative assembly elected on a one person, one vote basis and exercising full control over administrative officials--in short, a parliamentary system. This impression is reinforced by their statement that

. . . to the extent that the full powers of the people in any nation-state are not concentrated in a single elected representative assembly, and

to the extent that the electoral arrangements do not maximize correspondence between the will of the representative assembly and the wishes of the electorate, we can call that nation's government undemocratic. (emphasis in original)¹⁰

They adjust their criteria for the representative assembly, however, to include the notion that an assembly is democratic if it makes decisions as the whole public would if the public were meeting. On this basis they later conclude that the U.S. Congress, even with separate houses, incomplete control of the executive, and a non-majoritarian Senate, is reasonably democratic because it can respond to the will of more than temporary majorities distributed somewhat evenly across the nation.¹¹ This movement away from a precise standard of a democratic representative assembly to a somewhat flexible and subjective standard is only one example of efforts by Ranney and Kendall to fit their concept of democracy to the United States and thereby to justify the nation as being reasonably democratic.

The qualification that Congress is democratic according to majoritarian standards if majority opinion is relatively evenly distributed across the nation is a significant qualification because of the importance of some of the issues on which majority opinion has been or is distributed unevenly. The difficulty of enacting civil rights legislation in recent decades and the continued support in the Senate for the funding of programs

benefiting rural areas are but two examples of how overrepresentation of certain interests in the Senate has had, at various times, non-majoritarian consequences. Nonetheless, this paper will develop the proposal for democratic planning assuming the existing constitutional structure of the executive and legislative branches, but not because there is agreement with Ranney and Kendall's judgment concerning the consistency of that structure with their model of democracy. The proposals will be designed to operate in the context of the existing separation of powers structure because the proposals can be readily simplified and adapted to a parliamentary model which is inherently more conducive to procedures for policy coordination. In addition, large questions of substantive conditions necessary for and supportive of democratic planning have already been set aside on the basis that this is principally a procedural study. To set aside the major procedural difficulties of the separation of powers system by assuming a parliamentary system for the design of the proposals would simply limit too much the relevance of the proposals to the American context.

Under the general standards of majority rule, Ranney and Kendall specify a condition (listed as 4.c.) involving majority and minority forbearance from actions destructive of the political community and a condition (4.d.)

specifying a "community welfare" motive on the part of the citizenry. These are requirements of the model for the character of social relationships in a democracy. Ranney and Kendall write that ". . . the members of the community must feel at least that minimum of mutual need that makes for forbearance . . ." and that ". . . the character and relatedness of the citizens must be of such a nature as to guarantee cooperative and mutually instructive discussion."¹² These types of substantive conditions for democracy will not be used for the design of planning procedures because of the limits on the scope of this paper. Although Ranney and Kendall describe these conditions, they do not suggest how they arise or what role public policy might play in creating or encouraging these conditions. Thus, the further study of these matters would need to go beyond the conceptual framework provided by Ranney and Kendall.

After these comments, exceptions, and modifications, what remains of the model that is important to procedures for democratic planning? The idea of majority rule exercised through a representative assembly is a central feature of the model. The assembly is to make the society's laws and control other public officials. The legislative body is to be linked to the public not only through elections, but also through mechanisms of consultation that allow the public to propose, discuss,

and acquire knowledge and understanding about matters of public policy. Each person is to have an equal right to participate in public decision-making. Underlying these elements is the idea that the whole power of the state is to rest ultimately with the people, with the extent of the state being determined itself by democratic processes.

As applied to planning, the standard of majority rule exercised through a representative assembly means that the planning process should be based in the legislative branch. The legislature would be responsible for adopting and supervising the implementation of the key policies of the process in a manner that satisfies the characteristics of planning developed in the previous chapter. Because the legislature is to control other public officials, the responsibility for intervening on behalf of the public in any key step of the process of planning would rest with the legislature.

The principal mechanism of consultation that will be proposed for linking the public to planning decisions made in the legislature will be political parties. The subject matter of planning involves the consideration of topics that cut across the boundaries of different spheres of public policy and the concerns of particular interest groups. Parties offer an arena in which citizens can consider, propose, and organize on behalf of general policies that might be used to

coordinate activities in different policy areas. In addition, arrangements can be made to incorporate expert knowledge into party discussions in an understandable manner that enables citizens to use it in combination with other knowledge appropriate to the development of policies for planning. The standard of political equality would apply to the activities of parties, and their compatibility with that standard is considered further in the next chapter.

The range and scope of the planning process-- and implicitly the determination of the extent of the institutions to be considered as a part of the state-- would itself be a matter of public policy. To make planning subject to democratic procedures is to make it an integral part of political processes and subject to political judgments.

This chapter has presented and discussed one version of democracy. Its general implications for the conduct of planning in a democratic manner have been introduced. The next chapter explores these implications in greater detail.

FOOTNOTES

1. Mannheim, Man and Society, pp. 58-59.
2. Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
3. John Friedmann, Retracking America: A Theory of Transactive Planning (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, Doubleday, 1973), ch. 8.
4. Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, Democracy and the American Party System (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1956), chs. 2 & 3.
5. Ibid., pp. 54-55.
6. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
7. Robert Dahl, "On Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy in the United States," Dissent, Summer, 1978, p. 321.
8. Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1960), pp. 432-433.
9. Ranney and Kendall, Democracy, pp. 27-28.
10. Ibid., p. 45.
11. Ibid., p. 522.
12. Ibid., pp. 51 & 54.

CHAPTER IV

PROCEDURES FOR DEMOCRATIC PLANNING

The purpose of this chapter is to propose a strategy for the conduct of planning that is consistent with both the standards of effective planning and the standards of democracy that have been previously developed. As has already been presented the institutions that are proposed to perform key planning functions are the Congress and political parties. The justification for centering the process around these institutions will be given further consideration before considering the elements of of the proposed strategy for democratic planning.

The overall role of Congress would be to establish the planning framework and within that framework to adopt both general and broad functional policies for planning, to oversee the implementation of those policies, and to intervene in executive planning processes when it appeared that those processes were not conforming to the policies adopted by law. Congress possesses the legal authority necessary for these tasks, although it may not have exercised that authority in the manner proposed. Moreover, the standards of democracy assumed in this paper clearly

require that public policy be established by the legislative instead of the executive branch.

An executive-based system also does not allow for the open discussion and consideration of alternative proposals inherent in the legislative process. An example of the absence of open discussion in executive policy formation is provided each year by the relative secrecy surrounding the development of the Presidential budget and was vividly illustrated in July, 1979, by the seclusion of President Carter in Camp David, Maryland, for a comprehensive energy, economic, and political policy review. Certainly, members of Congress also meet privately, but the decisions of the entire Congress are generally made in open proceedings with open debate and the benefit of prior public hearings. The decisions of Presidents are generally made through private consultations supported by the practice of executive privilege.

Political parties would be developed as major institutions for citizen participation in planning. As such, the standard of political equality--that each citizen has the same formal right to participate in decision-making--is especially relevant in judging the appropriateness of parties for this role. The structure of parties is regulated as a matter of law, and they are generally required to be open to those who wish to participate. In this respect, parties contrast with

interest groups that often have explicit restrictions on membership.

The desire to win elections also provides parties with a practical incentive to be effectively open to the participation of those who wish to be members. That at times there are other factors that result in parties failing to be as effectively open as they could or should be will not be denied, but as a general rule parties have been a force for political equalization by mobilizing the power of individual citizens. As Walter Dean Burnham has argued,

political parties, with all their well-known human structural shortcomings, are the only devices thus far invented by the wit of Western man that can, with some effectiveness, generate countervailing collective power on behalf of the many individually powerless against the relatively few who are individually or organizationally powerful.¹

Parties are not perfect, but they are legally open to participation and have practical incentives to be so in fact. Public policies can also be adopted to strengthen parties as vehicles for citizen participation, and some suggestions in this paper would likely to have that effect.

Parties also engage, when preparing platforms, in precisely the kind of discussions that are involved in developing proposals for the general policies of planning. The general policies of planning are based on a comparison of policies and activities in specific areas and the

development of terms on which they can be adjusted to each other. Parties in adopting platforms compare the claims of different groups (i.e. the policies and activities in different policy areas) and state the policy terms on which the interests under consideration might be aggregated or adjusted to each other. The idea of party platforms as proposals for national plans was proposed by Paul T. David on the basis of his studies of the increasingly detailed nature of party platforms adopted between 1944 and 1968 and the relatively high rate with which platform pledges were fulfilled (72 percent rate of fulfillment).² This evidence suggests that platforms can be both comprehensive policy documents and reasonably effective guides to action.

The same view of parties as capable of undertaking public discussions that lead to general policy proposals to integrate the activities of government was advanced by a special committee of the American Political Science Association in 1950:

One of the most pressing requirements of contemporary politics is for the party in power to furnish a general kind of direction over the government as a whole. The crux of public affairs lies in the necessity for more effective formulation of general policies and programs and for better integration of all of the far-flung activities of modern government.

Only large-scale and representative political organizations possess the qualifications needed for these tasks It is in terms of party programs that political leaders can attempt to consolidate public attitudes toward the work plans of government.³

More recently, in an analysis of how reform movements have weakened political parties, Everett Carl Ladd has argued the well-understood point that parties in the past provided a means for overcoming conflicts between the executive and legislative branches by being a common bond for office holders in both branches and that "By removing party from governance, we have aided the already strong centrifugal forces working against coherence in public policy."⁴ It is because parties are capable, if they are allowed to by the institutional framework of government, of being open mechanisms for encouraging the integration of public policy that their strengthening is proposed.

A strategy for democratic planning is proposed below. The elements of this strategy are based on judgments concerning how to reconcile the standards for effective planning with the standards for procedural democracy. The strategy is divided into elements that apply to Congress, to the executive branch, and to political parties. The elements of the strategy are stated in terms of guidelines, and they can be implemented in different ways. Examples of measures that could be used for implementation are given after the discussion of the strategy.

Congress should establish the planning process as a matter of law. Within that process, Congress should adopt general policies and oversee their implementation

through both specific legislation and executive programs. The process should be continuous and interactive; general policies should be updated in response to changing circumstances and to the experience of viewing those policies in relation to specific decisions. In all of its major legislation, Congress should state its policies as clearly and definitely as possible. Consistent with the recommendations for strengthening the linkage of parties, the role of both party caucuses and party leadership should be strengthened within Congress.

Planning should be required of executive agencies that is consistent with policies established in law. The role of the President as a "faithful executor of the law" should be strengthened by requiring his certification of agency compliance with the policies stated in law. Provisions should exist for Congress to intervene if it judged agency action to be out of compliance with policies it had enacted.

Parties should be linked to the planning process in several ways. They should have the ability to develop and analyze policy independent of the government, provided that they meet standards of openness and minimum levels of membership. Arrangements should exist whereby the membership can have access to expert knowledge pertaining to the issues of concern to them. Parties should have a formal role in advising on public policy and monitoring

its implementation. The role of parties in the election of officials and the appointment of policy-level administrators should be generally strengthened.

A variety of steps could be taken to implement this strategy, and one set of such steps is presented here. These measures are presented for debate and further consideration and to aid in understanding the implications of the proposed strategy. It should be understood, however, that it is the strategy that is being proposed and that the specific steps are possible ways that it could be implemented.

The general policies of a planning process could be embodied in a five-year, annually updated plan enacted by Congress. The plan could be prepared with recommendations from the parties required in advance. The actual presentation of a proposed plan could be the responsibility of the majority party leadership in each house, with the consultation of the party caucus.

The role of this plan would be that of a guide for both the work of Congress and of the executive branch. With its first budget resolution, Congress could also report a program resolution intended to implement the plan and instructing congressional committees on the schedule and nature of major legislation to be reviewed or developed. All legislation, including appropriations, would include clear policy direction to executive agencies

concerning both the goals and means of the programs that they administer.

Each executive program could be required to have an annual plan, prepared with public input organized in conjunction with the political parties. The President could be required to transmit to Congress a certification that the agency plan was consistent with the policies enacted in law. Implementation of the annual plan could be delayed by Congress if it felt the plan did not follow legislative guidelines, and the plan could be amended by law during such a delay.

Parties could not only make proposals to Congress on the general plan and major legislation, but could also monitor legislative and executive processes through panels that would sit simultaneously with any committee or official conducting programmatic or policy hearings. Such panels could perform a variety of discussion and communication purposes within the political and planning processes. Among other functions, the panels could alert Congress to executive programs being developed that were perhaps not consistent with the general plan.

Parties meeting minimal membership requirements in the nation could be provided with public funds for their planning-related activities and could have the official right to participate in planning processes as indicated. The funds could be used not only to finance

the expenses of party members in planning-related work, but also to employ expert staff. So that expert policy staff could be available to work at the direction of parties at all levels, sufficient funding could be provided for staff down to the county level of party organizations. Setting expert against expert in the competitive party process is one method of subordinating experts to the public in the planning process.

The role of parties in the election of officials could be strengthened by eliminating tax deductions for campaign purposes for organizations other than parties. Similarly, public campaign funds could be limited to party organizations. With respect to administrative policy officials, their appointments could require, in addition to other qualifications, an openly-adopted favorable recommendation from the party of the appointing official.

The above steps, again, are intended only as examples of how the overall strategy for democratic planning procedures could be implemented. More important is the strategy itself. It emphasizes the need for general policies to guide and integrate the work of government. Those policies would be implemented through an interactive process that allows for public intervention and control at key stages. Provision would be made for the interchange of knowledge among experts, citizens,

and political leaders. The process would be focused on decisions made by Congress with participation by political parties. Parties would provide for open discussion and consultation on planning policies and would be the vehicle for mobilizing majority opinion on behalf of the policies.

FOOTNOTES

1. Walter Dean Burnham, "The End of American Party Politics," in American Government: Readings and Cases, Sixth Edition, ed. Peter Woll (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1978), p. 258.
2. Paul T. David, "Party Platforms as National Plans," Public Administration Review 31 (May/June, 1971): 303-315.
3. Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," American Political Science Review, Supplement, 44 (September, 1950): 16.
4. Everett Carl Ladd, Jr., "Reform Is Wrecking the U.S. Party System," Fortune, November, 1977, p. 188.

CONCLUSION

Planning in the United States is done in only a partial way, because planning is fragmented into separate functional, program, or project pieces. The alliances of groups and public authorities that now control the separate and partial pieces of planning each constitute a minority that can, in the normal course of events, veto policies or the application of policies in their areas of concern. The qualification of "the normal course of events" is important, because the veto power of each alliance is not absolute. The veto power of an alliance may be overcome at times when it engages in a direct clash of interests with another alliance of superior power.

The veto power of all the alliances is normally not threatened on an across the board basis in the United States, except in times of crisis--of depression, of war, and of occasional public unrest over the general course of events. It is at such times that a general policy agenda--an agenda of fundamental issues--emerges, and basic decisions are made that alter the rules and assumptions by which the alliances may again resume

control of policy in separate areas in the normal course of events.

Politics as normally conducted in the United States does not fully conform to the standards of majority rule in the Ranney and Kendall model. The determination of policy in normal times is parceled out among the minority alliances and is not subject to majority control. Nor is there evidence that in the era of the positive state, when public policy has a substantial impact on nearly every aspect of society, that the method of separate interventions presided over by separate clusters of power works well. The practice of treating separately things that are inseparable appears to be creating stresses that may produce the next crisis in American society.

The stresses result from the failure of a broad range of public efforts to produced desired results in dealing with social, economic, and environmental circumstances that would seem to require public intervention. Efforts have been undertaken to maintain the stability of the economic order through economic growth, price stability, and full employment; to cope with the pressures created by the economy on the environment and resource supplies; and to alleviate the adverse human effects of the inequalities inherent in the prevailing system of economic incentives. Although launched in response to

external effects produced by a private market system, the separate and selective public interventions have produced their own external effects. These effects are as systematically ignored by the public authorities that create them as market externalities are ignored by private economic authorities. Policies pursued in separate areas either contradict each other or cumulatively produce unexpected negative consequences. New grounds must be found for reconciling policy in different areas. How to discover those grounds of reconciliation has been the concern of this paper.

As noted the American political system, at least since the advent of the positive state in response to corporate capitalism, has usually attempted to reconcile policy in different areas during times of crisis. The pattern of response has typically been the rallying of public support for a President or President-to-be. The President, in turn, has attempted to marshal the support to unclog the governmental machinery and secure adoption and implementation of measures to deal with the crisis at hand. This has been the American crisis style of planning.

This style of planning meets the criteria of democracy suggested in this paper in only a minimal way. Majority sentiment is mobilized around a leader and, perhaps, a broad set of policy ideas for a certain period of time. But it is difficult to see how this crisis style of

planning allows for popular consultation and participation in the continuing development of policy measures. The gap between what Presidents secure a mandate for as candidates and what they have actually done (some of which is expected because of changing circumstances and knowledge) is too great to suggest that participating in the election of a President is an adequate and effective way for the public to participate in shaping public policy. The making of policy through Presidential plebiscite also eclipses the legislative branch that is to make the laws, control officials, and conduct the open debate that is to inform and interact with a larger public debate of the issues at hand. The American crisis style of planning cannot meet standards of democracy that go beyond the election of officials by a majority.

The rallying of support behind a President and program in times of crisis has tended to accentuate the control of policy by minority alliances in normal times. It was Wilson's New Freedom that helped usher in the Federal Reserve System, intended as a reform to break the power of central banks, but which now seems to insulate monetary policy and the distribution of capital so effectively from majority control. Roosevelt's New Deal helped to create many of the separate programs around which power is now clustered and set, in Lowi's interpretation, the basic course toward the triumph of interest

group liberalism in the 1960's. The reformers in these and other cases may not have intended these results for the character of the political system, and the results may have been partially shaped by the compromises that had to be made with opponents of reform. Nonetheless, the overall pattern has been the acquisition of power by Presidents in times of crisis leading to the exercise of that power in normal times by minority alliances.

The crisis style of planning is not only bad democracy; it is also bad planning. General planning is conducted only on an episodic basis after problems have become severe enough to jolt government into action. A continuing and direct consideration of general policy and its relationship to activities in different areas is not undertaken. At other times, interrelated decisions--decisions with general consequences--are made on a separate basis and produce the external effects to which reference has already been made. Remedying the planning deficiencies of the crisis style solely within the executive branch would lead society further away from instead of toward democratic planning. Effective executive-controlled planning would involve, even more so than at present, the domination of the making and implementation of policy by the President, administrative officials, and experts working alliances with and on behalf of the interests of their sources of power within the organized segments of

society. This approach to planning leads to a world in which persons become roses planted on the planner's wall and where all can get by reasonably well provided that their prejudices are not uncooperative.

Instead of attempting to improve planning as an executive-led process, this paper has proposed the development of planning centered in the legislative branch and the political parties. Congress has sufficient potential authority to preside over a planning process if it chooses to exercise that authority through the making of policy in law. To exercise that authority for planning would require that Congress be capable of the kind of coherent action in formulating policy that it seems to display so rarely. Strengthening the political parties both inside and outside Congress would increase the ability of Congress to undertake coherent action. Strengthened parties also create the mechanism for popular consultation and democratic participation in the making of public policy.

Harlan Cleveland, in an article entitled "How Do You Get Everybody in on the Act and Still Get Some Action?" has stated the argument that there is a necessary contradiction between increased participation and the need for action in particular cases.¹ But all of the examples given by Cleveland to make this case are examples of executive decision-making. An opposite result can occur

in the case of political parties. The more people that are involved in a party, the more likely it is that the party will be able to organize a majority to secure the political power necessary to carry out a program of action.

There is no greater testimony on behalf of the case that parties can organize democratic participation for action than the history of political reform movements in the United States. Every purely political, as opposed to economic and social, reform movement in this nation's history--the adoption of the Constitution, the Pendleton Act, the open primary laws and non-partisan municipal government trend of the Progressive Era, and the ostensibly "participatory" internal party reform effort of the late 1960's--have been movements led by middle class and/or upper class elements of society. Each of these movements of reform had the effect of weakening the potential or existing structure of political parties as vehicles through which lower social and economic classes could organize and exercise political power. What should be surprising about parties in America is not that they are so weak, but that in the face of conscious public policy efforts to prevent or weaken parties they exist at all.

Organizing planning as a partisan and legislative activity will redefine the conventional notion of what planning is. Instead of being a comprehensive effort by expert planners to organize date, rank goals in priority,

and generate blueprint recommendations, planning will be guided more explicitly by judgments of value and judgments of insight into the character of relationships in society. Expertise will not be discarded in the effort, but will be guided by judgments that are the province of citizens organized in the political process. This redefinition of planning to focus on the development of general policies through the political process will not only help to make planning democratic, but also effective.

The recommendations of this paper would only make democratic planning more nearly a possibility. To make it a reality would require that citizens participate effectively in the political process that has been outlined. Investigating questions of whether the public could and would participate effectively in such a process is the next step in the study of democratic planning as begun in this paper. Would citizens actually choose to participate in the type of process proposed? Could they participate with an effective understanding of the complex, collective issues involved in such a process? Would decentralized political participation organized through parties in fact be effective in overcoming concentrations of economic and social power that distort the outcomes of the political process? If answers to any of these questions are negative, what in addition to or

in place of what has been proposed here would be necessary to achieve democratic planning? These are among the questions that should form the continuing agenda of study and debate concerning democratic planning.

FOOTNOTE

1. Harlan Cleveland, "How Do You Get Everybody in on the Act and Still Get Some Action?" Public Management, June, 1975, pp. 3-6.

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