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

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THE IDEOGRAPH FREEDOM, THE IMPLICATED BODY, and COPING WITH TECHNOLOGY: A RHETORICAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE and THE UNABOMBER MANIFESTO

by

Blake E. Snyder

B.A., Florida Atlantic University, 1998

presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Master of Arts

The University of Montana

2000

Approved by:

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Special thanks must be given to my advisor, George Cheney, for all of your encouraging and critical comments on drafts of this thesis. You always kept me focused and "on the right track." For this I am indebted to you. I must also thank my other committee members, Sara Hayden and Albert Borgmann. I appreciate the insightful feedback you provided me in both formal and informal meetings. Finally, I must thank my wife, Marta, for putting up with me during my periods of "immersion" in this work (and for taking such extra and excellent care of our pets!).

Snyder, Blake, M.A., May 2000 Communication Studies

The Ideograph Freedom, The Implicated Body, and Coping with Technology: A Rhetorical Comparative Analysis of Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance and the Unabomber Manifesto

Director: Dr. George Cheney

Technology is a complex phenomenon, one which increasingly pervades the daily lives of individuals. As such, it requires ongoing scrutiny and critical inquiry. This thesis examines two texts which discuss the phenomenon of technology and offer recommendations for how modern individuals should cope with technology: Robert Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance and Theodore Kaczynski's Manifesto.

McGee's (1980) concept of the *ideograph* is utilized in analyzing the value of freedom as it appears in both texts. Additionally, *body-centered* criticism is conducted in an effort to elucidate the ways both authors implicate the body in their respective discussions of technology and society. Both Pirsig and Kaczynski invoke notions of freedom and the body, despite arriving at completely different recommendations for how society should cope with technology. While Pirsig asserts that individuals must first engage their bodies properly before sufficient levels of freedom can be procured, Kaczynski argues that individuals need to break *free* from modern society before a proper engagement of the body can occur (along with increased levels of freedom). A primary conclusion offered through this research is that notions of freedom and the body are pivotal to discussions of technology and modern society, particularly when such discussions emphasize ways for individuals to cope with the phenomenon.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ii

Abstract iii

Chapter One: Introduction and Rationale 1
Discussing Technology 5
One Cultural Artifact and One with Potential 7

Chapter Two: The Two Texts 12
Stylistic Similarities and Differences 18

Chapter Three: Contextual Analysis 22
The 1970s 23
The 1990s 27

Chapter Four: Theoretical Frameworks 36
The Ideograph 36
The Implicated Body 44

Chapter Five: Review and Preview 49

Chapter Six: The Ideograph <Freedom> 52
Kaczynski and <Freedom> 55
Pirsig and <Freedom> 69
Kaczynski, Pirsig, and <Freedom> 82

Chapter Seven: The Implicated Body 88
Kaczynski and The Implicated Body 89
Pirsig and the Implicated Body 101
Kaczynski, Pirsig, and the Implicated Body 117

Chapter Eight: Discussion 120
The Two Texts 120
Theory Redux 126
Technology and Society 136

Endnotes 139

Bibliography 145

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE

> Like Kaczynski, I worry about technology's encroachments upon privacy and other cherished American freedoms.....Somewhat like Kaczynski, I have mixed feelings about the mixed blessings of technology.
> (Mello, 1999, p. 20)

Theodore John Kaczynski, known by most of the general public as the "Unabomber," pleaded guilty to a number of bombings sent through the mail between the years 1978 and 1995. His plea was announced on January 22nd, 1998. The trial itself received substantial media coverage. As Mello (1999) states, "Seventy-five news organizations congregated at 'Club Ted,' a parking lot near the Sacramento courtroom." While much of the attention drawn to Kaczynski and the case was due to the fact that three people were killed and a number injured during his stint as the "Unabomber," part of what captivated the general public as well as the media was both the man's convictions and the man himself. Kaczynski *had* been a rather innocuous professor of mathematics at the prominent University of California at Berkeley before retreating to Montana and becoming a hermit. He received his degree in Mathematics from Harvard at the age of twenty. Most importantly, though, were his ideas concerning technology and modern society. They were Kaczynski's justification for why he had become a serial bomber. Kaczynski's arguments that technology has taken too much control over our lives and that a revolution against it (along with modern society) is necessary were first made public in June of 1995, when his Manifesto (1995) appeared in The Washington Post. Today, an Internet search of *unabomber manifesto* will pull between forty and fifty-thousand sites

that either briefly mention the man, the case, the Manifesto, or discuss in detail his views regarding technology and society. Some websites even provide full texts of the 52-page Manifesto[1]. This thesis will examine technology as it gets discussed with respect to modern-day society. First, it is important to discuss the role of technology in society.

"Technology" refers to a complex phenomenon which appears to be receiving more and more discussion with each new innovation that gets applied to the everyday world and the everyday lives of its inhabitants[2]. Borgmann (1984) describes technology as being the characteristic way in which we engage the world. Essentially, technology is presented as paradigmatic; it is focal to our reality. In other words, everything about our lives is either implicated *within* or has implications *for* the technological paradigm[3]. This requires further explication. For example, when we are at work, at home, on vacation, or engaged in a hobby, technology is ever-present. There do exist instances in which we are far removed from technological innovation. However, these situations are usually a response *to* technology. That is, we are making a choice to be removed from technology as best we can in order to "get away from it all." If this were the case in 1984, it is certainly no less the case as we close out the century and prepare to enter a new one. For the purposes of this research, *I will characterize technology more specifically as:* ***a)*** *a set of artifacts made by humans,* ***b)*** *an institution that includes the "engineering" and reshaping of our world, and* ***c)*** *an attitude.* Naturally, one might expect there to be rather strong views concerning technology and its implications for modern-day society.

Don Ihde (1993) identifies five main arguments taken in response to the concerns over technology with respect to an issue that has come to the forefront in the 1990's: the

environment[4]. The *first* claims that modern technologies are still developing, and will evolve into more positive and refined technologies capable of handling environmental problems. The *second* argument advocates a "scale-down" approach to technology in general. Control has become too difficult via centralization. A more decentralized and smaller scale approach is what is needed. The *third* argument Ihde refers to as a more radical group of "alternative technology positions," seeking alternative models for technologies in both understanding and context. Deep ecologists and ecofeminists fall within this group, he argues. The *fourth* and perhaps most extreme position Ihde labels the *catastrophic* position. Modern technologies are viewed to be no longer controllable, and are "run-away or autonomous." Technology gets reified to a transcendental role, according to this argument. "Only a catastrophe of some sort could reverse the situation" (p. 92), as the idea of technology being "deterministic" can be taken as a synonym. The *fifth* and final position Ihde discusses, he calls the *postmodernist* position. It argues that modernity, "which includes the basic structures of technoscience, is already coming to an end." That is, society is entering a different kind of reality, one which includes, among other things, the element of virtual reality. The economy is of special significance here. Information is now being regarded as the most precious resource, replacing the likes of coal, iron ore, plastics, etc. The postmodernist position rejects any return to past models as an outcome because the social structure of which we are a part possesses a natural tendency to move forward. This is not to say that information *has* to become our most precious resource of the future, but rather that we as a society, in moving forward, are choosing this to be so.

Ted Kaczynski can be associated rather clearly with the *catastrophic* position Ihde discusses. Kaczynski argues that technology takes the form of an over-arching "system," whereby individuals are forced to function within the confines of the system's demands and requirements. He maintains that the system limits individual autonomy, or freedom, and that the only way for the human species to re-capture the levels of autonomy that he argues were prevalent during the period of primitive man is to revolt against the technological system in such a mass, cohesive way as to extirpate all that constitutes modern-day society. For Kaczynski, this entails what can be perceived to be a catastrophe. This may be our only option, he asserts, for the path to human fulfillment has been occluded by technology and its ramifications. He argues that a catastrophe is preferred over the alternative future which, among other things, likely entails the genetic engineering of human beings.

While Kaczynski can be identified with the catastrophic position, Robert Pirsig (1974) argues that we can, in fact, reconcile technology with modern society in such a way as to obviate such catastrophes. Pirsig, in his well-known work, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, assesses the problem of technology through individual terms. He argues that if, at the level of the individual, values are shifted to involve and ensure *caring, gumption,* and *Quality* (with a capital "Q"), feelings such as alienation and frustration that seem to be becoming more and more prominent in modern-day society will essentially be alleviated. The individual can find fulfillment if a re-orientation of values occurs. For Kaczynski, true fulfillment can only be acquired through a *revolution* against technology, not a reformation within it.

The purpose of this research then is to examine the way two texts: Theodore Kaczynski's Manifesto (sometimes referred to as the "Unabomber Manifesto") and Robert Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, choose to discuss the phenomenon of technology with respect to society. It is important to stress that I am examining *representations* of the phenomenon of technology. In other words, explored here is how Pirsig and Kaczynski first *represent* the phenomenon, and then argue for how we as a society ought to *cope* with it given modern-day structure. What follows is a discussion of why these two texts are being chosen as part of the present inquiry into the phenomenon of technology.

Discussing Technology

The first and most obvious reason for selecting these texts is that they both address the phenomenon of technology. More importantly, though, is that both artifacts discuss the phenomenon as a whole, rather than examining only certain aspects of it. In other words, instead of looking at how one particular technological innovation is utilized, incorporated into society, or influential, Pirsig and Kaczynski choose to examine technology in general, and how this phenomenon as a whole is to be coped with in our society. That is, both authors treat technology as a material, social, and psychological institution. While a discussion of this magnitude has the potential to become unclear and inaccurate, being so far-reaching and ambitious, one cannot help but feel these types of discussions are more significant and meaningful with regards to how we live our lives each day (presuming the discussions are presented well). Both Pirsig and Kaczynski wrestle

with technology, and wind up with completely different "recommendations" for how we as a society ought to deal with the reality it has created for us.

Different means for reconciliation

Although Pirsig and Kaczynski both address the phenomenon of technology, they do so in different ways, as I've briefly already mentioned. Kaczynski argues that the "system," described as technological society and the constraints technology has imposed upon the individual, has taken autonomy and the fulfilling life away from the individual. For example, he argues: "...in our society the effort needed to satisfy the biological needs has been reduced to triviality. More importantly, in our society people do not satisfy their biological needs AUTONOMOUSLY but by functioning as parts of an immense social machine" (p. 8). The only way one is to procure for him/herself the kind of freedom associated with the fulfilling life as s/he sees it is by mass revolt against modern society. Kaczynski concedes that this will be catastrophic to a certain degree. Individuals will have to endure a harsh period of adjustment toward more primitive ways. However, he claims it to be better than the projected alternative, arguing that things will only get worse the longer the collective unit of society waits to revolt.

Pirsig on the other hand believes that if the individual re-orients his/her values to place a higher emphasis on caring, gumption, and Quality in one's work, hobbies... etc., then progress can be made toward a reconciliation of technology with society. Pirsig writes:

> Believe me, when the world is seen not as a duality of mind and matter but as a trinity of quality, mind, and matter, then the art of motorcycle maintenance and other arts take on a dimension of meaning they never had. The spector of technology.....becomes

not an evil but a positive, fun thing. (p. 221)

Unlike Kaczynski, who claims the problem of technology has transcended individual levels to reach more systemic ones, Pirsig assesses the problem at the individual level, arguing that it is at this level where goals must be set and progress can be made. In other words, people *can* find fulfillment, even within modern society, if they reflect on and follow their individual values.

Both Kaczynski and Pirsig agree that technology has at least reduced for the individual what is perceived to be a fulfilling lifestyle. That is, living in a technologically-developed society has left people with, at least sometimes, feelings of frustration *toward* and alienation *from* the society in which they live. Both argue that freedom, or autonomy, is limited in such a society. Yet, the two authors not only assess the problem in different terms (or on different levels), but proceed into completely different recommendations for how we as a society ought to cope with technology. Additionally, the two texts are disparate in terms of *time* (Pirsig's was published in 1974, Kaczynski's was made public in 1995), *purpose, style,* and *audience*. By analyzing both texts, I will provide a more thorough conceptualization of the phenomenon of technology. As mentioned, technology is a complex phenomenon, one with a broad scope and many viewpoints concerning the ways it should be approached. The analysis presented here examines two of these viewpoints, delineating how they are similar and different in the way each structures its argument.

One Cultural Artifact and One with Potential

Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is certainly a cultural artifact. Since its publication in 1974, it has sold more than three million copies worldwide. Consequently, it has "reached" the public at-large, far beyond the academic circle. Pirsig (1974) notes in the ten-year afterward of the text that the book was submitted to 122 publishers, and only one picked it up. Of course, one is all you need. He goes on to note that the publisher offered him a standard nominal fee, and that he probably shouldn't expect anything more. However, the end result was quite different. Soon after the book's release, critical acclaim followed. This led to numerous television and radio interviews, along with multiple lecture invitations (Pirsig, 1974). There have been many a discussion of Quality in cities other than Bozeman, Montana, no doubt[5]. Pirsig's discussion of technology and Quality is a complex one, and it is a tribute to both his writing style and the nature of the discussion itself that it has been so well received. While its acceptance in the academic circle is seen as appropriate, it is probably surprising even to Pirsig that it has been so embraced by the mainstream.

Kaczynski's Manifesto is not considered to be a cultural artifact -- at least not yet. Nor has Kaczynski acquired the type of reverence bestowed upon Pirsig. Part of the reason the Manifesto is not and may never be a cultural artifact is that *most* of the American public conjecturally desires to condemn Kaczynski's message because of the evil of the messenger. While both Pirsig and Kaczynski employ rhetorical means in attempting to persuade audiences through their texts, it is Kaczynski that also employs non-rhetorical means when he murders individuals in an effort to create a more powerful and lasting message. Thus, many may dismiss an analysis of the Manifesto simply on the claim that he

is a "nutcase." However, this claim must be attached to its proper place. While few would disagree Kaczynski was wrong in his extreme course of action and probably even crazy, the Manifesto, when taken on its own merit, presents some interesting arguments, ones which even Michael Mello (1999) is compelled to agree with (see passage at beginning of this paper). Mello is a former defense attorney and current anti-capital punishment activist. He is not the only one identifying with at least some parts of the Manifesto. The fact that there are so many web-sites out there addressing Kaczynski, the Manifesto, or both, suggests that people are at least discussing the viewpoint he presents[6]. Many of the sites do disagree with Kaczynski, citing the dubious nature of some of his predictions, but there are also many advocating the kind of action he calls for. Kaczynski has captured much attention outside of the academic circle, while echoing noted philosophy of technology scholars such as Ellul (1964) and Marcuse (1968). Ellul argues that a technological society cannot be civilized, and its end is not freedom, but the opposite of freedom. By this he means that for all the liberation technology is supposed to provide, it in fact imposes more constraints upon the individual. These constraints, taking the form of trivialities for which we are forced to hold ourselves accountable to, reduce our levels of freedom. For example, in modern-day society it is not uncommon for individuals to possess multiple forms of communication, such as electronic mail, pagers, fax machines, and cellular phones. We are expected to respond to messages that we receive through these mediums. In this regard, it is a burden for us to be held accountable for so many forms of communication. This is not to say that we do not appreciate being so accessible, and being able to access others when we need to. Rather, it is that by their

very nature we are constrained by all of these communication mediums because they force us to be responsible for them.

Marcuse gets precisely at Kaczynski's claim that humans cannot properly engage the *power process* in a technological setting (this will be further explicated in the next section) when he argues that in such a society, all basic needs (food, clothing, shelter, health) are satisfied, and only non-necessary needs become the goal. Thus, individuals only *indirectly* provide for their vital needs. This is accomplished usually through a job of some sort, where one works to earn money, and then uses this money to procure for oneself food, clothing, shelter...etc. The "procuring for oneself" these vital needs, though, is all too often accomplished through others. For example, we allow others to build our homes; we purchase clothing from department stores that was made by individuals other than ourselves; and we often buy pre-cooked or pre-prepared food from supermarkets (this does not include meals we eat at restaurants or fast-food chains). As a result of not being able to *directly* provide for our vital needs, we set goals that reflect materialistic needs, such as a bigger home, a nicer car, or a larger salary. The preceding comments appear to justify an inquiry into the Manifesto, particularly when analyzed alongside an "opposing" text, such as Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.

What must be taken up in what follows is a more in-depth discussion of the texts at hand. Additionally, the structure and style of each text will be examined. Differences and similarities will be addressed in more detail in this section. The fact that these two texts are separated by approximately twenty years is not to be overlooked. However, that Kaczynski is being discussed and Pirsig is *still* being discussed also are important points.

Both texts are worthy artifacts for analysis regarding the phenomenon of technology in society. Consequently, the following research questions are posed:

RQ1: In what ways do Kaczynski and Pirsig discuss the issue of technology with respect to society?

RQ2: How are Kaczynski and Pirsig similar and different in the ways they discuss technology with respect to society?

CHAPTER 2: THE TWO TEXTS

John and Sylvia, who are friends of the narrator's in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, readily express their displeasure with what they call "The System." Pirsig first takes notice of their frustration when John experiences trouble with his own motorcycle, a BMW-R60. He wants nothing to do with learning how to fix his motorcycle, or how to prevent mishaps. He is only concerned that it is performing properly. Pirsig knows there is something deep and worth exploring in John's frustration, but is unable to put his finger on it until one day, when he is at John and Sylvia's home, the faucet is dripping, and he remembers that is has been dripping for quite a long time. John mentions that he tried to fix it with a new faucet washer, but was unsuccessful. Some time later, Pirsig is again at their home, the faucet is still dripping (rather irritatingly, he remarks), and while he is talking to Sylvia her kids come into the kitchen. She completely snaps at the kids, but Pirsig realizes that the faucet is at least part of the reason why she is so irritated. Sylvia later mentions her irritation at a friend who thought that computer programming was "interesting." Pirsig concludes that it isn't any specific technological product they express displeasure with, "...it's all of technology they hate" (p. 14). He goes on to claim that momentary anger about something deeply hated always gets suppressed. It's the entire system which becomes the subject of their aggression. This is the reason statements such as "There's just no escape from it all" come forth from John and Sylvia (p. 14). The ideas Pirsig explores in this book are in large part inspired by John and Sylvia's situation.

Just as there are two themes to Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance -- the narrative of the protagonist (Pirsig) and his son traveling across the country on motorcycle, and the intellectual framework he develops -- so too are there two characters who eventually merge into one person[7]. One of these can simply be called narrator, the man telling the story and articulating various ideas and thoughts. The other character, *Phaedrus*, is the man the narrator used to be. Phaedrus went down a much different path than the narrator in his exploration of Quality, a path which led to insanity[8]. Throughout the book, the narrator pieces together who Phaedrus was and what led to his demise.

It all began while he was an English professor at Montana State University, specializing in rhetoric, and a colleague of his told him "I hope you are teaching Quality to your students" (p. 160). Phaedrus nodded, but began to reflect on what this term "quality" really encompasses. His path proceeded along three phases: a non-metaphysical one, a metaphysical one, and a mystical one, which was self-destructive. The first, non-metaphysical phase was one in which Quality became a working concept for him in the teaching of rhetoric. He made no attempt at a systematic definition of what he was talking about. "It was a happy, fulfilling, creative phase" (p. 168). The second, metaphysical phase came about as a result of normal intellectual criticism of his lack of a definition of what Quality entailed. In this phase he made rigid, systematic statements about the nature of Quality, all the while growing more diffident toward his family, friends, and colleagues. Phaedrus worked out a massive, hierarchical structure of thought to support it, part of which involved isolating Quality as neither a part of mind (subjective) or a part of matter (objective), but rather as a third entity independent of the two.

The third and final phase, the mystical one, would prove to be Phaedrus' downfall. Where Quality was originally seen as either a subjective or objective component of reality, derived from reality, it had now become for Phaedrus the principle component of reality. Quality had become an absolute monism. It was the source and substance of everything. This would eventually lead Phaedrus to a critique of all of Western rationality, the heart of which he argued is derived from ancient Greece. One crucial aspect to this involves the Sophistic pedagogy being swept under the rug by Platonic ideals. Toward the end of the book, the narrator articulates that Phaedrus went insane, and the reason his memory is so clouded and it is so difficult to piece it together is that Phaedrus underwent electro-shock therapy as part of the [then] procedure to eliminate his personality in favor of creating a vacuous one. The narrator chooses a different path, opting to avoid this third, mystical phase:

> Perhaps he would have gone in the direction I'm now about to go in if this second wave of crystallization, the meta-physical wave, had finally grounded out where I'll be grounding it out, that is, in the everyday world. I think metaphysics is good if it improves everyday life; otherwise forget it. But unfortunately for him it didn't ground out. It went into a third mystical wave of crystallization from which he never recovered. (p. 221)

The narrator, in attempting to reconcile Quality with technology, while at the same time attempting to avoid plummeting into the abyss which captured Phaedrus, addresses the split between the *classical* and *romantic* minds. Classical thinkers, regarding technology, want to know the intricate details of a device. Using Pirsig's example of the motorcycle, "classics" aim to know everything about the bike: how the parts work together, what goes where, and generally, how the bike manages to operate. "Romantics"

are less concerned with the components of the bike. They just appreciate it for the ride it offers the enthusiast.

Pirsig argues that to arrive at Quality, it is necessary to create a kind of marriage between the classical and romantic styles. If we take the time to both appreciate *and* understand technology, or our jobs, or hobbies, or how these utilize technologies, he would argue, we can avoid much of the alienating and frustrating sentiments that characterize John and Sylvia. Doing this requires caring on the individual's part; caring about their work, their hobbies, the technological innovations they incorporate into their lives...etc[9]. Caring is linked to the concept of gumption, in that they both involve the individual merging the concepts of "self" and "object." Gumption is more specifically defined as "initiative," or "common sense actively applied to real life." For Pirsig, gumption has similar connotations. In motorcycle maintenance, it is "the psychic gasoline that keeps the whole thing going." (p. 273). So instead of separating oneself from one's work or hobby, one ought to perceive the two as a working relationship, or partnership. By this Pirsig simply means that too often individuals feel separated from tasks they are doing or objects they engage. He argues that, essentially, these tasks and objects are human creations, and should be perceived as being more connected to individuals than they are given credit for. Once this connection is achieved (Zen Buddhist philosophy has as one of its primary tenets the aspiration for "oneness"), the individual is fully engaged with a task or object. By being fully engaged with these and appreciating them, things not only get done, but they get done *better* than if the individual did not feel connected to them.

Pirsig isolates what he calls "gumption traps," of which there are two types: *setbacks* and *hang-ups*. A set-back would involve, for example, not having the right parts before you while working on your motorcycle. A hang-up could include variables like boredom and anxiety. These "traps" can deter one from achieving gumption, and subsequently, Quality. In pursuing Quality, the individual might carefully place all parts before him/her on sheets of newspaper and carefully take notes on the sequential process of removing and adding parts to the motorcycle. Additionally, should boredom or anxiety set in, Pirsig advocates taking some time off from the maintenance process in order to clear one's head. Pirsig suggests that these sorts of steps are how one can come to grips with technology (and modern society) via Quality.

Ted Kaczynski's Manifesto is far less receptive to the phenomenon of technology than Robert Pirsig's work. The Manifesto is approximately 52 pages in length and is structured as follows. Kaczynski begins by briefly discussing the negative consequences of the Industrial Revolution. In this introduction, he sets forth the following claim:

> We do outline in a very general way the measures that those who hate the industrial system should take in order to prepare the way for a revolution against that form of society. This is not a political revolution. Its object will be to overthrow not governments but the economic and technological basis of the present society. (p. 1)

The next section addresses the "Psychology of Modern Leftism," and is a strategic move on his part, first to define what leftism is, and then to isolate his movement from it. He then moves into defining the power process and surrogate activities, and how these are at the root of social problems. He follows that with a discussion on the motives of scientists, and how this relates to a surrogate activity. Next, he discusses the nature of freedom, and

how its restriction is unavoidable in an industrial society. Technology gets deemed a more powerful social force than the aspiration for freedom. Finally, Kaczynski discusses how revolution is "easier" than reform, and how to go about strategically instigating such a revolution, stating that this will not occur overnight, but will take some time for enough people to support the position that the present system must be abolished.

Human beings possess a need for what Kaczynski calls the *power process*. The power process has four elements to it: goal, effort, attainment of goal, and autonomy. While the first three are fairly rudimentary, the fourth requires some qualification. Autonomy is related to individual effort toward goals. Individuals' efforts must be undertaken on their own initiative and must be under their own control. Autonomy can be viewed as being closely related to the notion of freedom. When individuals are not autonomous in their decision-making (at least to some degree), they often feel as though their freedom is restricted. He later goes on to tie this into what he perceives as technology's stripping of individual autonomy and freedom.

Unlike many theorists who discuss power, Kaczynski does not directly associate the concept with an assertion of influence by one individual over another in some form of social relationship. Rather, he directs his discussion of power *inward* at the level of the individual, arguing that humans have a need to be able to control their own lives, in a sense. Kaczynski argues that in modern society this ability to "have control" over one's own life is substantially limited as a result of technology. This relates to Lukes' (1974) discussion of power, wherein one dimension (Lukes develops three) entails a community or disadvantaged group that does not know its own best interests. Kaczynski suggests

that the individuals which constitute modern society do not know *their* own best interests. The result of this is an improper engagement of the power process and a reliance upon surrogate activities as a means to procure fulfillment.

Kaczynski mandates that the power process ought to only be associated with *primary* or *real goals*. These types of goals include fulfilling only those vital needs for survival, such as food, clothing, and shelter. It is important to note that in general modern society has made the attainment of these goals easy and trivial, according to Kaczynski. Thus, the power process does not get engaged in any proper and significant manner. The antithesis of the primary goal is the *surrogate activity*. Kaczynski explains: "We use the term 'surrogate activity' to designate an activity that is directed toward an artificial goal that people set up for themselves merely in order to have some goal to work toward, or let us say, merely for the sake of the 'fulfillment' that they get from pursuing the goal"(p. 7)[10]. Although it does not explicitly state it, it can be assumed that a job or a hobby would constitute a surrogate activity, as they do not satisfy any of the vital needs in a manner which engages the power process properly, according to Kaczynski.

Stylistic Similarities and Differences

With respect to style, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance and the Manifesto can be considered similar in the way they present arguments concerning technology ("concerning technology" being the key clause here). Both Pirsig and Kaczynski adopt *rational* approaches in presenting their respective views on how technology ought to be reconciled with society. Structurally, they are similar in that both

proceed by isolating *why* it is they feel technology is problematic, followed by *how* we as a society ought to solve this problem. But stylistically, both are also similar in that they present their approaches to technology and society as being rational, logical steps to make given the problem as they discuss it[11]. Consequently, rationality is understood here as the *reason-based, logical attempt at* ***understanding*** *in general and* ***progress*** *specifically. It involves the view that reason and experience rather than nonrational means are the fundamental criteria in the solution of problems.* It is also important to add that rationality is to some extent *socially constructed*, and in this respect a function of perspective and framing. Kaczynski makes the following argument: "A reform movement merely offers to solve a particular social problem. A revolutionary movement offers to solve all problems at one stroke and create a whole new world..." (p. 27), and "...the bigger the system grows, the more disastrous the consequences of its breakdown will be..." (p. 33). Pirsig offers the following assertion:

> Thus, if the problem of technological hopelessness is caused by absence of care, both by technologists and anti-technologists; and if care and Quality are external and internal aspects of the same thing, then it follows logically that what really causes technological hopelessness is absence of the presence of Quality in technology by both technologists and anti-technologists. (p. 247-8)

The fact that both Pirsig and Kaczynski present rational arguments regarding technology and society seems to be overshadowed, though, by the evident distinction between Kaczynski's more scientific style and Pirsig's more poetic approach.

While both authors present rational arguments for how to approach technology, the difference is that, for Kaczynski, this constitutes his entire text. The Manifesto is scientific and argumentative, in that each section of the text specifically addresses the ills

of technology as he sees it and how we as a society ought to respond to such ills[12]. For example, Kaczynski asserts:

> In this article we give attention to only some of the negative developments that have grown out of the industrial-technological system.....we do outline in a very general way the measures that those who hate the industrial system should take in order to prepare the way [sic] for a revolution against that form of society. (p. 1)

Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, however, has more than one theme, as mentioned. While one theme to the book is certainly rational in its discussion of technology, the other is much more *poetic* through its narrative of the father and son on a cross-country motorcycle trip. An example of the interplay between these two themes can be seen in the following passage:

> The sky over the other wall of the canyon has become overcast, and the wind in the pines around us has become cool and ominous. At least the coolness makes it easier hiking.....
>
> I was talking about the first wave of crystallization outside rhetoric that resulted from Phaedrus' refusal to define Quality. He had to answer the question, If you can't define it, what makes you think it exists? (p. 193)

It is this poetic element that seems to dominant the text, even in the way Pirsig glides back and forth between narrative and intellectual framework (and his discussion of Phaedrus within the two). This distinction will become more apparent and relevant in a later discussion of the ways in which "the body" is implicated by both in their evaluations of the technological society.

What is now needed is a contextual analysis of how technology and society is being discussed/evaluated in the American culture. I will turn my attention specifically to relevant newspaper and magazine articles and/or editorials in an attempt to situate these

two texts within their appropriate contexts.

CHAPTER 3: CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

It should come as no surprise that technology has received much attention and been the focus of numerous discussions in American society. A great deal of this attention is due to an inundating *public* response to the issues technology presents, not merely those responses emanating from the academic community. If we accept Borgmann's (1984) notion of technology being the characteristic way in which we engage the world, then this abundance of attention devoted to it as a phenomenon is both expected and logical. Because the two texts focused upon in this research are from different periods in the modern era, the objective here is to capture how technology gets discussed in the American culture of both the 1970s and 1990s. As a result of this analysis, a better understanding of the context from which these two texts originate will be achieved. By no means does this analysis claim to be exhaustive. Rather, the goal is to procure a representative sample of the ways technology was discussed during these periods. In doing so, it becomes clear that there *were* specific events occuring in society which no doubt contributed to the development of these two texts. For example, there was consumer frustration over the poor quality of many manufactured products in the 1970s. And in the 1990s, there has existed a kind of "longing" by many to escape urban America for a more rural, unpolluted lifestyle. In what follows, I will specifically turn to various newspaper and news magazine articles and editorials in an attempt to capture the social, economic, and political issues of particular relevance to technology and society. The 1970s will be discussed first, followed by the 1990s.

The 1970's

Reiterating Robert Pirsig's primary argument concerning technology and society seems both appropriate and necessary in framing the forthcoming analysis. Pirsig (1974) asserts that individuals often possess a feeling of alienation from technology and its many forms and functions. This alienation, he contends, stems from both a lack of understanding of how technology works (its many functions), and a growing frustration over the way technological innovations are produced. That is, there exists contempt for the poor quality of technological innovations or products (its many forms). The solution, Pirsig argues, lies in an effort on the part of the individual to re-assess one's own values when at work, engaged in a hobby or chore...etc. If the individual can eliminate subject-object dualisms, and pursue Quality, real progress can be made.

The climate of American society in the early and mid - 1970s can best be characterized as unstable. U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam escalated and declined, until "peace with honor," as Nixon proclaimed it, was finally obtained in January of 1973 (Goldman, 1973). Both Nixon and the American public would encounter additional adversity through the Watergate affair, the impending impeachment of the president, and his subsequent resignation in 1974.

As if a war and political scandal weren't enough to occupy the hearts and minds of Americans, food shortages coupled with a fuel and energy crisis picked up where the Vietnam War left off. As one Newsweek article ("Summer", 1973) described, shortages developed in several areas: food, paper, energy, and natural resources. These shortages altered the lifestyles of consumers:

> The spreading shortages were wrenching the way millions of Americans live and think. They now had to plan ahead. No more simply dropping into a service station when the fuel gauge was low; instead, many motorists were getting down to the stations the first thing in the morning to fill up their tanks. ("Summer", 1973, p. 70)

The solutions to the energy crisis would have a significant effect on the American lifestyle.[13] It became apparent that "Consumers inescapably will see their bills for electricity, heating, and gasoline raised ever higher -- and they could conceivably find these necessities being rationed" ("Americas Energy", 1973).

In addition to the fuel and energy crisis, less abundant food supplies on grocery store shelves had its impact on the American consumer:

> Americans had already changed their eating habits as meat prices soared and supplies grew tight....With other food items -- poultry, dairy, and flour products -- now running short, housewives might start grabbing things off supermarket shelves not because they need them at the moment, but for fear that they will not be available later on. ("Summer", 1973, p. 70)

The food shortage contributed to a penny-pinching lifestyle for the consumer. A high cost of eating is something that hit home everyday for the average American, no doubt ("High Cost", 1973). In fact, the average family food bill had risen dramatically in recent years as well as throughout the year of 1973 ("High Cost", 1973). Some were forced to seek cheaper alternatives to daily food staples. For example, something as common as a gallon of milk had to be replaced with the more inexpensive instant, nonfat dry milk (Letters, 1973a).

All of these factors contributed to what many would consider an economic "devil term": *inflation.* Inflation had actually nudged the Watergate affair aside on the front pages of newspapers and news magazines across the country ("Other", 1973). Indeed, "folks....were more concerned about high prices than high crimes in the administration" (p.

22). Many will recall the not-so-catchy theme adopted by Nixon's replacement for the presidency, Gerald Ford: *WIN*, or "Whip Inflation Now," in 1975.

These factors would translate into a more economically conscious consumer. An example of this can be seen in the push for more practical, inexpensive, and environmentally friendly automobiles that occurred in 1975. As a result of this, major auto companies in Detroit "scaled down" their automobile models, releasing a series of compact, fuel efficient, and less costly vehicles. These were a sharp contrast to what had been the norm for the American industry up until that point: big, powerful, fuel guzzling vehicles ("Detroit's Gamble", 1975). Many consumers praised the move, recognizing the economic benefits of the new line of automobiles (Forum, 1975).

While the American consumer was forced to adjust to the changing economic climate during the early and mid-1970s, other issues would surface that speak to the growing frustration being experienced. An issue pertaining to Pirsig's call for a re-assessment of individual values is what one article appropriately termed "The Job Blahs" ("Job", 1973). The discussion here is on the workplace, and how both blue-collar and white-collar workers feel alienated from their jobs, and/or find little to no fulfillment in them. As one steelworker is cited as stating, "it's a boring, repetitious job -- nasty, hot, and dirty work. I go there 'cause I have to" (p. 79). Another autoworker is quoted as saying, "Everyday, for eight hours, we fight that black devil-chain [the assembly line]" (p. 79). The article attempts to capture the national sentiment regarding this issue:

> The mood of this vast work force is obviously of tremendous importance to the country as a whole as well as to the individuals themselves. Worker attitudes affect productivity.....While people have been complaining about work since it was invented, there is a widespread feeling that there is something different

about today's discontent. (p. 79)

The article categorizes these types of modern-day workers as:

> the new problem children of the American economy: the "alienated" workers, afflicted with the blue-collar blues, the white-collar woes and the just plain on-the-job blahs. They are bored, rebellious, frustrated; sometimes they're drunk on the job or spaced out on drugs. (p. 79)

Nineteen million part-time or full-time workers were, at this time, engaged in manufacturing, "and one million of these are tied to the dull, routine tedium of an assembly line...." (p. 79). If consumers are frustrated with the quality of products produced by technological means, this seems to offer at least one reason why such a lack of quality exists. If workers don't care about the work they're doing, terms like "quality" and "the final product" don't enter into the equation. Some individuals blame the structure of society for the alienation workers feel from their jobs, highlighting the transition from school to the work force:

> If for twelve years a person is subjected to a situation where emphasis is placed on the individual, on personal freedom and accomplishment, it's no wonder that when that person faces a situation where the emphasis is on the system, boredom, disillusionment and alienation result. (Letters, 1973b, p. 4).

The lack of enthusiasm many workers felt for their jobs coupled with the poor quality of manufactured products appears to have been at the heart of much of the discontent individuals felt for technology and its byproducts. Whitman (1973) writes of the yearning for the past he experiences. It is his claim that things were simply done better before technological gadgetry stepped up to the forefront. He opens his essay by stating: " 'Nothing's like it used to be,' a friend exclaimed the other day when a plastic-handle screwdriver came apart in his hands.' " (p. 15). At the same time, however, others acknowledge that while there does exist some shabbiness in present-day craftsmanship, the

obvious benefits technology has procured should not simply be swept under the rug (Letters, 1973c).

American consumers were also concerned over the general safety of many of the products out on the market during this period. As one article reports ("Home Hazards", 1973), "Each year at least 30 million Americans are hurt and 30,000 killed because of unsafe consumer products other than autos." (p. 91). Part of the problem associated with these products is the way consumers choose to use them (such as playground equipment, bicycles, cleaning and lighting fluids...etc). However, this did not seem to quiet the overall public outcry. The Consumer Product Safety Commission was set up by Congress to evaluate many common household products and create safety standards ("Home Hazards", 1973).

The early and mid-1970s presented some interesting discussions concerning technology and its interplay with society. While the same can be said of the 1990's, the difference lies in *what* specifically that discussion is about. Worthy of mention is that the pace of life has greatly accelerated for most people in industrialized societies since the 1970s. The advent of digital electronics in general, and computer technology more specifically, has provided this more recent decade with a new set of topics open for discussion. This particular period more adamantly seeks to address the question of *where* technology is taking us (or perhaps *leading* us).

The 1990s

As with the 1970s, it is important to preface the current analysis with a brief

discussion of Ted Kaczynski's primary argument in his Manifesto (1995). Kaczynski argues that human beings in modern society do not fulfill the *power process* in any meaningful way. Instead of meeting one's vital needs for survival in an autonomous manner, the individual relies on the "system," or current-day structure of society, to procure these needs for him/her. In an attempt to make one's life fulfilling, he argues that individuals engage in surrogate activities, such as a job or hobby, but that these activities do not fulfill for the individual vital needs (food, clothing, shelter...etc) in an autonomous way. Kaczynski asserts that if the technological system is *not* brought down by a mass revolution, it will grow so powerful that it will become unstoppable, and limitations to human autonomy such as the genetic engineering of individuals will become the norm.

Elmer-Dewitt reported in 1993 that a debate had ensued over the issue of cows being treated with genetically engineered hormones in order to produce more milk for a growing society. We as consumers had relatively little say in the matter, except for those of us living in rural areas who had access to more "natural" milk (i.e., that which was produced by untreated cows). The National Institute of Health and the Food and Drug Administration assured consumers that there are no safety hazards associated with milk from cows that had been treated (Elmer-Dewitt, 1993c). Despite this, the sentiment loomed that this was just one of the products of living in a largely populated, growing society. Consumers were, for the most part, forced to adhere to production methods such as the one mentioned in order to sustain our society.

These types of production methods such as the one just mentioned were a sign of an ever-growing population. Linden reported (1993) that the world was "about to pass a

milestone: more people will live in urban areas than in the countryside" (pp. 28-29). While urban life has provided societies with many benefits, its shortcomings are a relevant topic for discussion: "A walk through the South Bronx fulfills every outsider's vision of urban decline" (p. 35). Some respond to this issue by isolating over-population as the most pressing problem, while others argue that a lack of proper planning by local governments is where the fault lies (Linden, 1993). Bonfante (1993) discusses the trend of many Americans to pack up and move from the metropolises of the east and west coasts to the Rocky Mountains of Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah and New Mexico. Deedee Corradini, mayor of Salt Lake City, was reported as saying, "Look at L.A. or San Francisco. I don't know how you can begin to solve those problems, whereas we can solve ours. Our problems are smaller." (p. 23). The appeal of the "mountain cities" wasn't simply its natural landscape. Its lure also involved the qualities of less crime, fewer inhabitants, and less stress. This appeal has no doubt created tension between some residents of mountain cities and visitors from the coasts. While some mountain residents simply ask visitors to *adjust* to the lifestyle rather than try to re-shape mountain life into city life (Letters, 1993e), others are more adamant in their hostility:

> Invasion of high-end money earners has spoiled this area for those who have lived here for generations, forcing the natives to deal with higher real-estate prices, higher taxes and ruination of the environment. You can't expect to accommodate this immigration without tapping into water, land, air, and other resources that sustain life. (Letters, 1993e, p. 8)

Just as urban development and its ramifications were receiving significant discussion, so too was the area of specific technological innovations. The early 1990s began to see highly significant developments in digital/wireless communications and the

computer industry. Elmer-Dewitt (1993b) discusses the "electronic superhighway," and how the advent of the Internet will lead to a consolidation of home-office mediums, such as the television, telephone, and fax machine. The expectation is that the individual will essentially be able to do more while doing less. While many welcome the prospects of technological innovation, others have suspicions, claiming that such innovation will lead to an invasion of privacy, this since a record of what individuals do through these mediums will be stored electronically (Letters, 1993c). Some hold that modern technology will turn us into "couch potatoes," as the evil behind such innovation is *idleness* (Letters, 1993c).

Cyber cultures began to emerge as a result of this technological innovation (Elmer-Dewitt, 1993a). Its offspring, the *cyberpunk*, receives its name from *cybernetics* ("the science of communication and control theory") and *punk* ("an antisocial rebel or hoodlum") (p. 59). Elmer-Dewitt characterizes cyberpunk culture as "a way of looking at the world that combines an infatuation with high-tech tools and a disdain for conventional ways of using them" (p. 59). Virtual reality equipment is a favorite innovation of the cyberpunk. The frightening nature of cyber culture comes through in one San Jose State University mathematician's characterization of the cyberpunk as being nothing less than the *fusion* of humans and machines (Elmer-Dewitt, 1993a). The idea of individuals becoming so involved with computers and so uninvolved with non-electronic devices casts eerie suspicions within many. For these respondents, the dehumanizing and unhealthy attributes associated with cyber culture are enough to repel them. Two more recent articles suggest that criticism of computer technology continues to profilerate. Chapman (2000) reveals that increasing numbers of computer experts are challenging corporations

which try to lock down the internet and secure it for commerce. These "anti-corporation" groups are proponents of open source software and an open internet. They oppose an internet absorbed into mass culture, and they do not wish to see corporate logos on every web-site. Joy (2000) reveals the potential for an even bleaker scenario to unfold. Cofounder and chief scientist of Sun Microsystems, Joy argues that technological advances in the computer industry and beyond (e.g., genetic engineering) may prove to actually threaten the human species. Not surprisingly, Joy references Kaczynski's Manifesto, and argues that increased levels of monitoring and perhaps even restriction are necessary to ensure that technology does not proceed so rapidly that it surpasses human capabilities to manage it effectively.

Technological development in the computer and communications industries would receive much more discussion in a special edition of The New York Times Magazine (NYTM) published in September of 1997. The edition features a slew of articles devoted to current trends in technological innovation, and how these trends will alter our lives, for better and for worse. Examples of these include Krugman's (1997) "The Paper Bag Revolution." This piece de-emphasizes all of the mega-expensive, high-tech gadgetry and instead brings to the foreground the ways in which technology makes our lives easier (e.g., the way the Internet can be used in a non-glamorous way to locate certain things such as the nearest version of a particular department store). Another piece, entitled, "Addicted to Speed," by James Gleick (1997), discusses the ways movies and televisions are getting faster with respect to the imagery they can present and the imagery that gets presented. Gleick notes in the trailer: "We love the sensation they give us, which is just as well -- we

couldn't slow them down if we wanted to" (pp. 54-55). He suggests that, while it is fine that we appreciate this innovation, it is also important to acknowledge the rapid pace at which such innovation is occurring. One final piece worth noting is Elizabeth Royte's (1997) article, "Life as We'll Know it." This article examines some of technological innovations that may surface in the near future. One example of this is the electronic book, which can hold a million volumes of say, the Library of Congress in its database. All one needs to do is scroll up or down to whatever it is one is searching for, and it is presented for them on screen.

The NYTM received a substantial amount of feedback in the form of letters. They note at the beginning of the "Letters" (1997) section:

> Our special issue on technology drew mail from scores of readers traveling at all speeds on the information superhighway. Technophiles were outnumbered, 4 to 1, by technophobes, who hold tight to rotary phones and complain that their children don't visit friends anymore, except in chat rooms (p. 20).

Though one should be careful not to overgeneralize, it does seem significant that so many responses were from "technophobes," as they are labeled; those who aren't so merrily jumping on board the information superhighway. It suggests that there appears to be a substantial amount of caution among the public regarding where all of this innovation is headed. Indeed, many echo what Kaczynski would argue about these types of innovations: that they strip the individual of even more autonomy than is necessary by "allowing" us to rely on them in our daily lives.. As such, they do more harm than good.

One response is offered here:

> Computer technology may be making people richer and life faster, but I'm not sure it's making us smarter. Is it smart to become more alienated from one another, to exchange human relationships for frenetic speed and isolation?

> Keep this up and psychiatrists will reap untold profits (Letters, 1997, p. 20).

Obviously, this individual is not prepared to risk the loss of one precious commodity for the acquisition of another: namely, sacrificing human relationships and "smarts," for greater alienation and more speed in technology. Others weren't so critical of the perceived progress, stating that these innovations were improvements, and we as a society ought to be ready to jump on the technological bandwagon (Letters, 1997). By in large, however, responses to the special edition on technology were more characteristic of a "technophobic" position. The following passages serves to illustrate this:

> I don't have to fake having a rotary phone; I have one. The best part is when people who are completely familiar with computers come over and have to ask for help using the phone. I love it. (pp. 27-28)

The "plight of the technophobes" is in response to technological development within modern-day society. Wright (1995) discusses the efforts of evolutionary psychologists to examine the mismatch between our genetic makeup as a species and the modern world. The hope is to locate the source of discontent resting within many individuals. The timing of his piece leads to a reference to the Unabomber (Kaczynski had not been identified as the mail bomber at this point), and Wright mentions that: "There's a little bit of the Unabomber in most of us. We may not share his approach to airing a grievance, but the grievance itself feels familiar" (p. 50). The argument Kaczynski sets forth and evolutionary psychologists are attempting to analyze is that modern society requires individuals to live under conditions that are drastically different from those by which the human race evolved (Wright, 1995). While some are content to reside in modern-day society, others acknowledge the depression that plagues so many as a moral

stand, "a protest against a world we do not understand." (Letters, 1995, p. 18).

In other areas of society, advances in the field of genetics signal precisely the kind of trend Kaczynski warns his readers about. Thompson (1993) reports on Cynthia Cutshall and Ashanthi Desilva, two children afflicted with Severe Combined Immunodeficiency (SCID), the result of being born with a broken gene that devastated their immune systems. The two young girls were the first to receive *human gene therapy*, a process where defective genes in the girls' white blood cells were replaced with normal genes.

Toufexis (1993) reveals the ethical dilemma that the National Institute of Health was confronted with after treating children who were short in height with a synthetic version of human growth hormone (HGH). The question was: "Should children who are healthy be given a drug made simply to change their looks?" (p. 49). Some readers of the article were appalled by the National Institute of Health's experiment on healthy children, citing moral qualms with the issue (Letters, 1993d).

Finally, Elmer-Dewitt (1993) discusses the possibility that technology may have gone too far when researchers successfully duplicated, or cloned, a human embryo. For the first time, manipulated cells came "not from plants or pigs or rabbits or cows, but from human beings." (p. 65). The issue spawned both positive and negative reactions. While some felt technology *had* in fact gone too far in interfering with nature, others believed this was an accomplishment, not a setback in medical history (Letters, 1993f). One reason for this is the potential that exists in preventing and curing diseases.

Robert Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (1974) and Theodore

Kaczynski's Manifesto (1995) were not created in a vacuum. There were real political, social, economic, and scientific events surrounding them. Technology received significant attention during both the 1970s and 1990s, and this attention focused on different ways that technology was influencing its respective time period. What must now be undertaken is a theoretical discussion of the method to be used in analyzing the ways Robert Pirsig and Theodore Kaczynski discuss technology with respect to society.

CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

The Ideograph

> Some value terms take on special meaning. When people use them to represent multiple values they become 'ideographs'. Thus, the word *frontier*, for example, becomes an ideograph. (Sillars, 1991, p. 129)

Rokeach (1968) characterizes the term *value* as "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to alternate modes of conduct or end-state of existence" (p. 160). Values should be distinguished from more specific statements, called *beliefs*. Whereas "life," "liberty," and "the pursuit of happiness" are values, "abortion is murder" is a belief (Sillars, 1994). Rokeach (1979) also notes that values can be organized in an effort to establish and reflect priorities. Where one sub-culture in American society might value individual freedom over collective welfare, another may value collective welfare over individual freedom.

Values are not things we can point to directly in the material world. As McGee (1980) notes: "No one has ever seen an 'equality' strutting up the driveway, so if 'equality' exists at all, it has meaning through its specific applications" (p. 10). Values represent categories for thought and action that we create, usually in trying to inspire others toward higher goals or to steer them away from what we think they should not be thinking or doing. Not left unnoticed here is the fact that values are *abstract*, and by nature ambiguous and malleable within the societies in which they operate.

Much like the concept of frontier, *freedom* is also a value. It is this particular concept that is *a* focus of my analysis. Both Pirsig and Kaczynski employ the concept of

freedom throughout their discussion of technology and society, though they do this in different ways. Important here is that freedom is examined with respect to technology and society, as this is how Pirsig and Kaczynski generally treat it. Therefore, a broad discussion of freedom will be cast aside for a discussion of freedom more specifically geared toward technology and society. In other words, questions such as: *How does living in modern (technological) society affect individual freedom?* will be explored with respect to both authors. In order to effectively examine the ways each incorporates freedom into their work, I will utilize Michael Calvin McGee's (1980) concept of the "ideograph."

McGee presented the ideograph to the field of Rhetorical Criticism in an attempt to create a link between rhetoric and ideology. I define ideology loosely as *the integrated assertions, theories, and [core] values of a given society. These elements operate to invoke what is right, wrong, and what ought to be within the given society.* Early in his piece, McGee presents the following assertion:

> Human beings in collectivity behave and think differently than human beings in isolation. The collectivity is said to have a "mind of its own" distinct from the individual...When one appears to "think" and "behave" collectively, therefore, one has been tricked...into accepting the brute existence of..."public mind" (p. 2)

McGee proceeds into a discussion of the distinction between *symbolists* and *materialists* (specifically, "Marxians"). He argues that symbolists generally prefer to say that this "trick" is a sort of "transcendence," a voluntary agreement to accept and engage a myth. Materialists, on the other hand, claim that the trick is essentially a lie, "a self-perpetuating system of beliefs and interpretations foisted on all members of the community by the ruling

class" (p. 2). McGee states that, fundamentally, these two groups pursue two different studies:

> The Marxian asks how the "givens" of a human environment impinge on the development of political consciousness; the symbolist asks how the human symbol-using, reality-creating potential impinges on material reality, ordering it normatively, "mythically." (p. 3)

While materialists neglect language studies and fail to adequately explain socially constructed realities, symbolists neglect the material environment and fail to adequately explain the impact of material phenomena on the construction of social reality. For McGee, ideology in general and the ideograph specifically is how gaps between the two groups can be bridged. The preceding discussion on symbolism and materialism functions to do two things: 1) ground McGee's work, isolating some of his motivation for developing the concept of the ideograph, and 2) provide an initial, broadly-based definition of the ideograph, which can be characterized as *a concentration of meaning that has material as well as symbolic implications.*

McGee suggests that ideology in practice is "a political language, preserved in rhetorical documents, with the capacity to dictate decision and control public belief and behavior" (p. 5). He continues in stating that the language which creates ideology is characterized by "slogans," a vocabulary of ideographs. An analysis of these ideographs, McGee believes, reveals the many structures of public motives. I conceptualize the term "political" in its broadest sense. That is, while an ideograph may reveal the language structure behind an attempt to control public belief, and may be political in a *broad* sense, it may *not* necessarily be directly linked to politics as we normally associate the term. In other words, while "politics" always presupposes being "political," the reverse is not the

case as I argue it. The example of *freedom* as Pirsig discusses it serves to illustrate this. He attempts to shape human behavior and belief regarding technology, society, and freedom, but does so without specific mention to any political structure. Kaczynski does this as well, for the most part, though his argument does include references to "government" and "industrial society."

Ideographs are loaded words, existing in real discourse, functioning clearly and evidently as reflections of consciousness. It is also important to observe that, while it is not the focus of the present research, ideographs can be *visual* representations of a collective consciousness or focal points of an ideology (e.g., the peace symbol, the U.S. flag, etc.). Ideographs "are not invented by observers. They come to be as a part of the real lives of the people whose motives they articulate" (p. 7). They are language imperatives which McGee claims make "pure thought" perhaps impossible, as they are bound within the culture they help to define. Having discussed McGee's concept of the ideograph, I will now turn to some of the ways ideographs have been examined in research.

Ideographic analyses have been conducted on a wide range of issues and topics. Edwards and Winkler (1997) examine visual ideographs taking the form of print cartoons and the "Iwo Jima image." Moore (1988) argues that the advantage of McGee's approach is that "it allows the critic to identify specific language usages that reflect political commitments and orientations in real discourse" (p. 81). In a later piece (1997), Moore discusses the environmental debate over tobacco and smoking, and how the cigarette becomes, through its constant portrayal, a "representational ideograph." Martin (1983)

addresses the manner in which Jimmy Carter was able to construe an image of himself as "mirroring" the 19th century definition of "the best men" in light of Richard Nixon's Watergate troubles. This definition was a compilation of an ideographic cluster which included "good moral character," "competency," and "intelligence." Carter attempted to emulate such ideographs. He did so by opposing himself against Nixon, whom he claimed was, to borrow from Burke (1950), the "antithesis" of these terms.

Lucaites and Condit (1990; 1993) are well-recognized for their work in charting the ways in which "equality" as an ideograph was invested with divergent content (integrationist or separatist). Lucaites and Condit give more weight to the potential for public influence over an ideograph's meaning, and as such perhaps shed the ideograph in more of an "optimistic light" than McGee, who stresses the "potentially coercive dimensions of ideographic usage" (see Cloud's 1998 discussion of Lucaites and Condit's work on the ideograph "equality"). McGee, as mentioned, argues that it is possible ideographs may make "pure thought" impossible because of their very nature. The added spin Lucaites and Condit place on the ideograph is a helpful one, particularly for analyses such as my own, where the issue is not necessarily one involving a particular group (political or not) asserting power or influence over another, but rather individuals writing from their own perspectives in hopes of generating discussion and stimulating change. Readers of their work are not likely in a position of subservience, but are instead merely potential agents of change and action.

Finally, Cloud (1998) examines the ideograph "family values" as it was deployed by republicans and democrats during the 1992 presidential election campaign. Dan

Quayle's speech on the alleged decline of family values in the midst of the urban riots in Los Angeles and through television series' such as Murphy Brown is said to have been one of the instigators of this ideograph's deployment. Cloud reveals that talk centering around family values served to scapegoat Black men and poor Americans for social problems (not to mention being disastrous for poor, Black men and women). That is, it was these particular groups of Americans that were not meeting their responsibilities as parents, according to this type of "talk." Any combination of being Black, female, and poor served to magnify the blame that was placed on these individuals.

While much of the research utilizing ideographic analysis as method has been centered around both *the political* in general and *politics* specifically, the present endeavor seeks to employ this method in a "non-political" arena, if you will. In this regard, it seeks to extend McGee's discussion of the ideograph by examining the ways Robert Pirsig and Ted Kaczynski employ the value concept freedom without utilizing or incorporating specific political platforms (for the most part, as discussed). It also seeks to extend McGee's work by analyzing one text that *explicitly* discusses freedom and one that does so at a more *implicit* and "definition-by-association" level. The Manifesto makes explicit, direct references to freedom (and autonomy). Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, however, makes no such references. Instead, the 360-plus page book discusses terms such as *peace-of-mind* and *control* as related to technology and society.

What I argue is that freedom *is* a concept that appears in the work of both Kaczynski and Pirsig. It does so, as mentioned, at different levels. I will primarily focus my attention *inward* at the texts, rather than *outward* at historical conceptualizations of

freedom. This will be done for two reasons. First, I am examining freedom with respect to technology. This is an important point, for to examine the concept in its complete and broad sense would not only be an overwhelming task, but would overshoot my mark for the purposes of this research. Discussion of freedom with respect to technology and society has been far less prolific than an overall discussion of freedom (e.g., with respect to political systems of thought). Second, my primary purpose is to examine how Pirsig and Kaczynski discuss freedom, and looking directly at the ways each invokes the concept requires devoting much of my attention inward at the texts. Certainly, references and comparisons will be drawn against outside conceptualizations of freedom, but emphasis will be placed on the way each discusses the term, and the comparisons between the two.

Because freedom is discussed at different levels by both authors, it is necessary to justify such an analysis. Cheney and Tompkins (1988) examine the many conceptualizations and levels of the concept *text*, and in comparing the empirical sciences highly efficient statistical means for analyzing text versus more literary or rhetorical ones, come up with a potential "rival" to empiricism. By utilizing Kenneth Burke's (1964) theory of *indexing*, the critic can forge one "route toward validity and reliability in interpretation" (p. 464).

Burke's indexing method entails a series of propositions, one of which states that "the specific associations or relationships between terms of a text are of three general types: equations, implications, and transformations" (Cheney & Tompkins, 1988). Equations deal mostly with direct linkages or lines of opposition (the example provided is "War *is* evil"). Implications involve spin-offs of a term (e.g., how "order" might stem

from "hierarchy" or "control"). Transformations reveal the "from what," "through what," and "to what" developments such as a syllogistic progression or a "yesterday-today-tomorrow" sequence (p. 466). It is at this level that inferences are more readily made and apparent. While both the Manifesto and Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance employ each of these associations with respect to freedom, the former more frequently utilizes equations and implications, whereas the latter adheres more to transformations, leaving the critic to draw inferences about *how* freedom enters into a particular mini-discussion within the text. Additionally, Cheney and Tompkins note Burke's suggestion for the critic to "note operational synonyms of a word, terms that are synonymous to it in the text under consideration" (Cheney & Tompkins, p. 467). This is particularly relevant to an analysis of freedom in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, though it also comes into play with the Manifesto (e.g., the term "autonomy"). In the former, the term freedom is virtually absent from the entire text, and I will argue that operational synonyms for it *do* exist. Moreover, I argue that Pirsig's rather tacit usage of the concept does not attenuate its significance in any way.

McGee's (1980) concept of the ideograph will be utilized in examining the value of freedom as it appears, either explicitly or implicitly, in the Manifesto and Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. Building on Cloud's (1998) and other prior research, I will denote the concept of freedom in carats (<freedom>) during the ideographic analysis section, since <freedom> is the ideograph to be examined. Keeping in mind Cheney & Tompkin's (1988) discussion of Burke (1964) will allow for a more valid and reliable interpretation of the concept as it appears in both texts. I will now address an additional

method to be utilized in my analysis -- that of *the implicated body.*

The Implicated Body

> Why is the body such an intense focus of attention in the academy today?....Is one reason so many of us are energetically studying the body precisely that we are undergoing fundamental changes in how our bodies are organized and experienced? (Martin, 1992, p. 543)

In chapter one I discussed how Pirsig and Kaczynski assess the problem of technology and society in similar and different ways, and how they develop means for coping with this problem that are radically different from one another. I also discussed how the styles and structures of the two texts were quite different, with Pirsig's being more poetic and multi-themed, and Kaczynski's being more scientific and argumentative. Both authors also implicate the *body* differently in their discussions of technology and society. *Pirsig implicates the body as a* ***means*** *for reconciling technology with society.* That is, if one can engage both the physical and mental aspects of one's own body, and strive for Quality in one's work, hobbies....etc., then real progress can be made, according to Pirsig. Emphasizing both the physical and the mental makes sense when one considers that Pirsig seeks to adopt a "Zen-like" approach to reconciling technology with society. If the individual is to achieve a sense of *oneness* with their work, hobbies...etc., this is likely to be so because a similar sense is achieved at both the physical and mental levels of the individual body. *Kaczynski on the other hand implicates the body primarily as an* end, *choosing to inform his reader of the ways the body will continue to be engaged in modern society as well as the way it ought to be engaged once a revolution against technology is*

carried out. For example, Kaczynski argues that technology strips the individual of proper *physical* engagement with the power process. Only through a more primitive lifestyle can one attain the type of fulfillment found in directly providing for one's own vital needs, such as food, clothing and shelter. Additionally, Kaczynski strongly implicates the body by arguing that at the rate technological/modern-day society is "progressing," individuals will become more and more isolated from their physical bodies by relying on ever-increasing [indirect] means for fulfilling vital needs. Additionally, he asserts that the time will come where we as individuals will progressively lose control of our own bodies, even at the very fundamental level of biological /genetic make-up. Thus, for Kaczynski, technology becomes part of and contributes to the *artificial* or *inauthentic* experience for human beings. Kaczynski instantiates this idea by citing developments in genetic engineering and [human] biological research. He argues that such developments are creating this trend.

It becomes apparent through the work of Pirsig and Kaczynski that an analysis of the ways the *body* gets discussed in their work is both critical and central to an analysis of how these two authors reconcile technology with society. For both, the arguments that get developed center around the body, sometimes dealing explicitly with its implications and other times hovering around them, though seemingly never drifting more than an arm's length from the focal point that is the body.[14] What is perhaps most appealing about examining these particular texts is the way in which the body is implicated in arriving at *completely different* means for coping with technology vis-a-vis society. As such, by conducting what I might call a "body-centered analysis," a more thorough understanding

of the ways technology gets discussed with respect to society (through Pirsig and Kaczynski, anyway) is attainable.

Emily Martin (1992; 1994) suggests that in American society today the body is being experienced in dramatically different ways from the era of "Fordist mass production." She characterizes the Fordist mass production system (perhaps most identified by the public through the image of the assembly line) as one which had as its goal *efficiency*, and utilized a production method geared to manufacturing large quantities of standardized products assembled with standardized components. Consequently, "Fordism" referred to the collective effort to create a new type of worker and a new type of man, one who could withstand the rigorous physical demands associated with this type of "mass-production" work. This particular worker would have to be in good health and good physical shape (1992).

Currently, our bodies are suited more for what Martin terms an era of "flexible accumulation." She states: "We are seeing not the end of the body, but rather the end of one kind of body and the beginning of another kind of body" (1992, p. 544). In other words, our bodies are not being utilized (and subsequently, experienced) as much for laborious purposes as they used to be, but are instead experiencing an intensification of the processes of deskilling and reskilling, particularly in the workplace. With this, the mental component of the body is drawing more and more weight than its counterpart, the physical. In this regard, individuals are being drawn further away from their physical selves, so-to-speak.

Susan Faludi (1999) creates similar discussion in her recent work, but with special

emphasis given to experiences held by males and the problems they encounter in trying to uphold socially constructed images of masculinity. For example, young men grow up with fathers who participated in the type of "Fordist" era Martin (1992) speaks of, or who participated in World War II. Today, men are too often deprived of the kinds of "opportunities," if you will, to experience such masculinity. Because of societal, organizational, and technological development (these three overlap, obviously), men are left with conflicting notions of what it means to be masculine compared with the experiences of prior generations, Faludi argues. She claims that if males (and females) can get past these entrenched notions of what it means to be masculine, both sexes can begin to make progress toward a more liberating society at the level of gender.[15] Kaczynski, for example, probably would not cite the arguments laid out by Martin and Faludi as the primary motivation for his *own* theorizing, but would certainly have to acknowledge these issues as contributors to the problems that he argues technology poses for society.[16]

While the body is central to both Pirsig's and Kaczynski's discussion of technology and society, it gets implicated in different ways. I will examine the ways both writers implicate the body in their respective works, and the *style* and *structure* of each text will prove to influence how the body is invoked. Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is multi-themed and more poetic than the Manifesto, which is more argumentative and scientifically grounded. As such, Pirsig applies a greater use of metaphor in discussing the body when he moves from one theme of the book to another. For the most part, these metaphors exist in the more poetic, narrative theme of the author's cross-country motorcycle trip with his son. They serve to emphasize the points he makes about

technology and society in the intellectual framework he develops.[17]

If one text were to more strongly invoke the notion of "the implicated body," it would probably be the Manifesto. Kaczynski's work is generally lacking in colorful metaphor and poetic style. Instead, his more argumentative and scientific approach results in a discussion of the body as it will likely be implicated in a society which continues along its present course of technological development. An additional result is a discussion of the way the body *ought* to be engaged and why Kaczynski believes a revolution against modern industrial society is necessary to arrive at this. In both cases, the body is central to Kaczynski's primary argument. In the following brief chapter I will review what has been covered thus far and provide an overview of the remaining sections of the thesis.

CHAPTER 5: REVIEW AND PREVIEW

Thus far, I have provided a rationale for why I feel it is important to examine the phenomenon of technology and its impact on society. I've also rationalized why it is that Robert Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance and Ted Kaczynski's Manifesto are worthy texts for examination in this respect. I have provided brief overviews of the two texts, along with a discussion of the stylistic and structural similarities and differences between both, and the implications of this. This led to a discussion of the contexts in which these two texts were created. Specifically, I examined American cultural climate of the 1970s and the 1990s, focusing on the beginning and middle parts of the respective decades, when these texts were produced.

I proceeded into a discussion of the theoretical components to be employed in my analysis. First to be discussed was the ideograph, introduced by Michael Calvin McGee in 1980. The concept of <freedom> will be analyzed as an ideograph through both texts, appearing either explicitly or at a more implicit level (e.g., through Pirsig). Finally, I propose to examine what I call the "implicated body" as it gets invoked by Pirsig and Kaczynski. Specifically, I will be looking at Pirsig's more metaphorical discussion of the body versus Kaczynski's more scientific, argumentative approach and the levels at which they implicate the body as they argue for how we as a society ought to cope with technology.

In the following sections of this thesis, I will analyze both artifacts, beginning with the ideographic analysis of the ways Pirsig and Kaczynski discuss the concept <freedom>

in their respective works. I will also discuss the implications this part of my analysis has for the examination of the phenomenon of technology vis-a-vis society. I will follow this with the analysis of the "implicated body" as both texts invoke it. This section will also be concluded with a discussion of its implications. Both sections will be analyzed at a "micro-level." That is, I will examine the two texts in some instances at the level of individual words (and word choice). Finally, I will conclude the Thesis by moving *outward* to a more macro-level, discussing the overall implications this research has on the issue of technology with respect to society (i.e., considering technology as a social institution).

In setting up the forthcoming analysis, it may prove helpful for my reader to keep the following diagram in mind:

Step 1	Can Lead To....	Step 2
Pirsig: subject/object merging through caring, the striving for Quality, and the "body"	---------->	<Freedom> in a technological / modern society (e.g., "control," "peace of mind," "security")
Kaczynski: <Freedom> *from* technology and modern day society	---------->	Proper engagement of/with the "body" *and* autonomy / <freedom>

For Pirsig, step one *is* feasible within modern day society, as long as the individual "re-evaluates" the mindset which advocates a clear distinction between subjects and objects, and instead opts for an elimination of this form of dualistic thinking by advocating "caring," striving for Quality, and re-engaging the body with the mind (in one's work, hobbies, etc.). Kaczynski on the other hand argues that we must break free from

technology and the current social structure in order to arrive at proper engagement of our bodies and sufficient levels of freedom. For both authors, if step one is not achieved, the consequences will be a continued lack *of* or potential decline *in* what is proposed in step two.

The preceding diagram is meant to preview and illustrate the arguments I will be presenting in the forthcoming analysis. First, that both Pirsig and Kaczynski rely heavily on notions of the body and freedom in their discussion of the phenomenon of technology. Second, that they do so in comparable and contrasting ways. And third, that the different ways they invoke these notions affects *how* they get invoked throughout each of their texts. I will now turn to an ideographic analysis of the the concept <freedom> as I argue it appears in both texts.

CHAPTER 6: THE IDEOGRAPH <FREEDOM>

Before any discussion of how Pirsig and Kaczynski invoke the concept of <freedom> in their respective works can occur, it is necessary to at least preface this by addressing the ways technology and <freedom> are thought to or expected to go together in modern society. This is done in order to provide a basis on which to evaluate the arguments set forth by Pirsig and Kaczynski, as many of their "recommendations" are responses to perceived societal needs. First, <freedom> is not conceptualized here in its more general sense, but rather with respect to technology. Thus, the types of questions people seek to answer regarding technology and <freedom> are: *What does technology mean for my individual freedom?* or *How does technology affect freedom at the societal level and/or the individual level?* It may be that in modern Western culture the line separating "freedom in a general sense" from "<freedom> with respect to technology" is becoming increasingly blurred, as technology is now so interwoven into our daily lives that any such distinction is near impossible. Regardless, we as a society all have expectations, or hopes, for what we believe technology *ought* to accomplish for our <freedom>. These expectations and hopes *may* or *may not* be met; this is an issue Pirsig and Kaczynski explore and evaluate in their works.

In attempting to characterize folk or lay wisdom on the subject of technology, it can plausibly be argued that there are certain commonalities that exist when we as a society consider what technology ought to accomplish for us (and *through* us, since we are its "pioneers"). For example, we expect technology to contribute to more jobs, larger

quantities of food and consumer goods, and adequate shelter with proper heating and cooling, to name a few core benefits. Wright (1995) echoes this sentiment in an article which also illuminates the growing viewpoint that technology may be producing an increasingly different world from the one in which we evolved. One may pose the question: *Where does <freedom> fit into this?*

First, <freedom> fits in at the level of *peace of mind.* That is, individuals who occupy a job, have enough food and possess adequate housing, for example, owe this at least in part to technological innovation. Having these needs met provides the individual with peace of mind, and leaves him/her **free** to pursue other avenues of interest that contribute to what is perceived to be a fulfilling lifestyle. Examples of these might include taking up hobbies, spending more time with one's family, and/or philanthropy, to name a few. Second, <freedom> occurs at the level of *options*. Technology contributes in providing the consumer, for example, with multiple options in the world of consumer products. Thus, the individual exhibits a more magnified **freedom of choice** in deciding which variety of apple to eat, which brand of toothpaste to use, which style of sunglasses to wear, which type of living quarters to reside in, etc. Individuals in modern American society are for the most part *not* restricted to only one "brand" of a given product.[18] The <freedom> existent in having options can even be felt in the realm of employment. Many individuals have a legitimate choice in deciding what type of job to occupy, where to occupy it and with whom to work. Again, technology, and technological development, contribute to this.

Certainly I am guilty here of simplifying matters and providing broad

generalizations. Realistically, there are many subleties at work in the interplay of technology, society, and <freedom>. For example, certain technological innovations are going to be percieved to do more or less for human <freedom> than others. It would be unfair and less than critical to assume otherwise. *Accessibility* also becomes an issue. A significant number of people do not have access to the perceived "fruits of technology." For example, the homeless in our society likely do not enjoy the kind of peace of mind that many middle-class citizens do when it comes to neccessities like food, clothing and shelter. Along with these issues one must also consider the influence of such forces as the *media* and *government* regulation/interference. How much do these institutions infringe upon (or extend) the type of individual <freedom> that owes itself in large part to technology? How free are we in a society where the development of the telecommunications industry is resulting in an increasing number of ways to monitor human behavior?[19] Two philosophers I've discussed previously, Ellul (1964) and Marcuse (1968), probe deeply into issues such as these.

The subleties and questions discussed here are certainly critical ones that require ongoing examination. Their mentioning is meant, though, to illustrate that I *am* in fact making generalizations about technology's influence on individual <freedom>. That is to say, we as members of society have rather general and uniform hopes and expectations for what technology *ought* to do for us and our <freedom>. The distinction between what the individual believes technology ought to do, and what it actually does, is an important one for my reader to keep in mind. Discussing ways that technology can contribute to peace of mind and freedom of choice, for example, likely coincides with what we as a society

believe it ought to do. The inaccessibility of technology's perceived benefits to everyone, such as the homeless, in all likelihood does not coincide with what we as a society believe it ought to do. Having said this, I will now turn to a discussion of what Pirsig and Kaczynski argue technology does for individual <freedom>, and how they feel this should or should not be altered.

Kaczynski and <Freedom>

> People do not consciously and rationally choose the form of their society. Societies develop through processes of social evolution that are not under rational human control. (Kaczynski, p. 19)

One of the central ways in which Kaczynski assesses technology is by appealing to the concept <freedom>. It is argued here that <freedom> is a primary component to Kaczynski's discussion of technology, but also that his argument is broken up into a series of "mini-arguments." This should come as no surprise since the Manifesto itself is laid out in an argumentative, scientific manner, as compared to Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, which is more poetic in style. I argue that Kaczynski's development of the <freedom> concept can be divided into five mini-arguments, which I categorize as: 1) setting the stage, 2) autonomy as necessity, 3) the imposition of change, 4) purposelessness and "the leash", and 5) potential "ends" for the human race. It is important to keep in mind that <freedom> is what drives each of these arguments (as I propose), and although Kaczynski actually uses the term *freedom*, he also incorporates the term *autonomy* into his argument.

Setting the stage

In this particular "argument," Kazcynski attempts to rationalize why it is that he advocates the taking of such extreme measures in responding to industrial-technological society. In the introduction of the Manifesto Kaczynski states, "There is no way of reforming or modifying the system so as to prevent it from depriving people of dignity and autonomy" (p. 1). He goes on to mention that his revolution is just that -- a *revolution.* It's objective will not be to overthrow the political structure of modern society specifically, but rather the economic and technological structures of society. At the outset the reader is forced to recognize Kaczynski's appeal to the notion of <freedom> when he implements the term *autonomy.* The term *freedom* appears in a later passage: "...any attempts at reform would be too timid to be effective...permanent changes in favor of freedom could be brought about only by...revolutionaries..." (p. 20).[20] Kaczynski advocates revolution over reform, but he does so by attaching <freedom> to that argument. It is implied that a revolution is necessary if the reader values <freedom>, and the *only* way we as a society will be able to procure it is by revolting against technology. Essentially, the reader is forced into a corner, with little or no alternative to the issue if s/he values <freedom>.

Kaczynski continues to paint the picture of technology suppressing freedom in an ensuing passage, and he does so a bit more emphatically: "...technological progress marches in only one direction; it can never be reversed...the system can move in only one direction, toward greater technologization. Technology repeatedly forces freedom to take a step back -- short of the overthrow of the whole technological system" (p. 25). Again the reader is forced to recognize Kaczynski's claim that technology comes at a cost --

human <freedom>. Additionally, he asserts that this force *cannot* be halted or reformed, for technology "marches in only one direction." Kaczynski's argument that there are only two options in this matter -- technology or <freedom>-- becomes clearer here.

Thus far, Kaczynski's argument in what I term "setting the stage" has consisted of broad, sweeping claims without a lot of support behind them. He attempts to reconcile this in a passage suggesting that the human race has had such a difficult time solving less abstract problems (Kaczynski's example is of environmental degradation) that it certainly would be unable to reconcile technology with <freedom>. He suggests that technology presents clear-cut material advantages, whereas freedom is an abstraction that means different things to different people. The advocacy of revolution over reform is emphasized again, but this time the argument takes a different form. It is not merely that technology as a force suppresses <freedom>, but that the human race simply would not be able to manage any kind of reconciliation of <freedom> with technology. The reasoning given behind this is that the concept of <freedom> is an abstract one that means different things to different people. Despite its "abstract" nature, Kaczynski arrives at what he believes to be a suitable definition of the term.

<Freedom> according to Kaczynski means "...the opportunity to go through the power process, with real goals [sic] not the artificial goals of surrogate activities, and without interference, manipulation or supervision from anyone, especially from any large organization" (p. 17). Additionally, it entails being in control of the vital issues of one's life, either as an individual or potentially as a member of a small group. These vital issues include the necessities of food, clothing and shelter. <Freedom> also implies being able to

defend oneself against any threats that may exist in one's environment.

Kaczynski's definition of <freedom> clearly falls in line with what he is arguing and advocating: that individuals are less than free in modern, technological society, and that they must break "free" from that society in order to acquire <freedom>. This definition helps to establish later arguments that in modern society, individual <freedom> is constantly being suppressed in order to meet the needs of the system. Because of this, Kaczynski argues, frustration and purposelessness (among other things) are rampant. The claim is also made that individuals who simply say they are free may not really be free, as notions of <freedom> in modern society are often governed more by social convention than by actual needs. The point is made to connect the reader once more to the assumption that in modern society, <freedom> is ingenuine if perceived at all, and takes a back seat to technological progress.

The first passages in the Manifesto set the stage for the remainder of Kaczynski's argument centering around <freedom>. I will now turn to the discussion of what I call "autonomy as necessity," and how <freedom> is implicated in this. This theme is derived from Kaczynski's frequent discussion and development of the concept "autonomy."

Autonomy as necessity

Kaczynski believes individuals have a natural need to go through what he calls the "power process." This process entails: 1) having a goal, 2) pursuing that goal, and 3) attaining the goal. *Autonomy* is the fourth element in the power process and is implicated at the level of *effort*, or step two. Kaczynski argues that individuals need to be able to pursue their goals on their own or as participating members of a small group. He also

suggests that it is through this process that individuals acquire confidence, self-esteem, and a sense of power. When one is unable to adequately go through the power process the consequences are (potentially) boredom, demoralization, low self-esteem, inferiority feelings, defeatism, depression.[21] *For Kaczynski, the power process is pivotal in experiencing a life that is fulfilling. Autonomy is an essential ingredient in this process, since having "adequate opportunity" to go through the power process relies in large part on its presence*. Recall that for Kaczynski, power is conceptualized inward at the level of the individual. That is, he argues that what individuals require most is *not* the need to exert power over others, but the need to have sufficient levels of autonomy in engaging the power process on their own terms and with respect to the issues of their own lives.

In a footnote to the preceding passage, Kaczynski suggests that some of the symptoms listed are similar to those shown by caged animals. Those who do not engage the power process properly are, according to Kaczynski, analagous to caged animals. The point is implied that caged animals arrive at states such as boredom and depression as a result of being confined to a cage. Here we catch a glimpse of just how important the concept of <freedom> is to Kaczynski's argument. It is argued that individuals that do *not* engage the power process experience similar symptoms to caged animals that are confined. For these caged animals, it is *all* about autonomy. They do not have any <freedom>. Autonomy is only one element, however, in the power process -- albeit a crucial element.

Kaczynski proposes that most people need at least some degree of autonomy in pursuing their goals. If this is accomplished, their need for the power process will in all

likelihood be served. If this is not accomplished, though, and the individual works under orders from above that do not allow for any autonomous decision making, then his or her need for the power process will not be served. Kaczynski notes that some individuals appear to have little or no need for autonomy, and he characterizes these individuals as being one of three ways: 1) either lacking a drive for power, 2) being satisfied to identify themselves with a large and powerful organization, or 3) as unthinking, animal types, satisfied with a purely physical sense of power. The first characterization is left uncriticized by Kaczynski, but the second is critically implicated within the third. Kaczynski's example for those satisfied with a purely physical sense of power is the "good combat soldier," yet there are few organizations larger and more powerful than military branches of the government. While it would be an unsubstantiated argument to claim that Kaczynski is critical of *all* types who lack the need for autonomy, it can certainly be argued that a critical tone is adopted by Kaczynski in discussing these individuals.

Finally, Kaczynski suggests that in modern society, individuals do not satisfy their biological needs autonomously, but by functioning as parts of an immense social machine. By "biological" needs, Kaczynski is referring to necessities such as food, water, and even clothing and shelter. Essentially, he argues that the power process ought to be directed toward these types of goals, which he calls *primary* or *real* goals. We as a society, in large part, do not satisfy these needs through our own, physical effort, but rather in an indirect manner.[22] For example, food and water are for most people procured by working a job, earning a paycheck, and purchasing these necessities from vendors or merchants, without actually providing these for oneself directly. Readers of the Manifesto might ask:

What's wrong with working as a part of society and procuring for oneself, albeit indirectly, necessities such as food and water? This is one of the questions Kaczynski addresses in what follows, and <freedom> is a primary component in his discussion.

The imposition of change

Kaczynski believes that working a job and contributing to society in exchange for being provided necessities like food, clothing, and shelter is anything but a fair exchange, particularly when one examines more critically the role modern society assumes in one's day-to-day life. There are ramifications to be accepted, ones that impact individual <freedom>. He states: "...modern man has the sense...that change is IMPOSED on him, whereas the 19th century frontiersman had the sense...that he created change himself, by his own choice. Thus a pioneer settled on a piece of land of his own choosing and made it into a farm through his own effort" (p. 10). Kaczynski is arguing that 19th century frontiersmen had much more <freedom> of choice, and as a result had more control over their lives. He uses the example of being able to "settle on a piece of land," but it is clear that his conceptualization of <freedom> extends far beyond this. <Freedom> would also be extended to satisfying one's biological needs autonomously, as was discussed earlier, and as Kaczynski suggests is not the case for modern man. *Modern man is constrained by society, forced to accept the changes that are imposed on him.* By stating that modern man has "the sense" that change is imposed on him, Kaczynski tunes into a level of *frustration* and *resentment* that he believes people in modern society are experiencing.

A specific example is laid out in the Manifesto which seeks to illustrate this point. It is the advent of motorized transportation, and Kaczynski prefaces this example by

suggesting that technological advances that appear *not* to threaten freedom often turn out to be a serious threat to it later on. He chronicles this by considering a walking person's former ability to go where s/he pleased and at his or her own pace without being restricted by traffic lights and regulations. The introduction of motor vehicles appeared to *increase* individual <freedom>, since nobody was forced to own one. If an individual *did* they could usually get from point A to B more quickly. However, Kaczynski argues that motorized transportation altered society in such a way as to actually *restrict* individual <freedom>. Once motorized vehicles grew to such a large number it became necessary to regulate their use by instituting registration methods, periodical inspections, and vehicle insurance requirements. Kaczynski suggests that at this point individuals are now being constrained by all of these regulations. It is these regulations, or changes brought about by society (i.e., the *system*), that restrict individual <freedom>. Moreover, Kaczynski notes that motorized transportation is no longer an option for most individuals. The layouts of cities have changed in such a way as to require individuals to own vehicles for transportation. Essentially, people are forced to accept a technological advance that began as legitimately optional. Change has been imposed on the modern individual, and it is human <freedom> that suffers the consequences, Kaczynski argues.

Being forced to comply with change is something felt by many in the workplace, as well. Skilled workers are frequently either put out of a job by technical advances or forced to undergo re-training. Kaczynski asserts that this can be a humiliating experience for some workers, but it is simply taken for granted that individuals must embrace technical necessity. He believes that if human needs were placed before technical

necessity the result would be economic turmoil (e.g., greater unemployment). It is at this point that Kaczynski connects the necessity for accepting change that is initiated by the system with society's conceptualization of *mental health*. He suggests that mental health is defined largely by how well an individual behaves in accord with the needs of the system, and how much or little stress results from this. Thus, individuals are expected to accept change when it is for the good of the system, and are evaluated (mentally) in part by how well they adapt to these changes and behave thereafter. Kaczynski's argument that modern individuals feel change is imposed on them is similar to notions of being on a leash and feeling a sense of purposelessness, both of which are also connected to the concept of <freedom>. It is here that I now turn.

Purposelessness and "the leash"

If being forced to accept the change that is imposed on an individual restricts that individual's <freedom>, it can be expected that this restriction of <freedom> has negative consequences. I have previously stated that Kaczysnki has already suggested a few of these consequences, namely feelings of frustration and resentment. One other consequence that receives more explicit discussion by Kaczynski is the sense of *purposelessness* that he feels is prevalent today and warrants attention. This sense of purposelessness is closely connected to a perception that individuals are restricted by the proverbial "leash" that is the system, and this leash is somewhat related to earlier discussion of modern man's feeling that change is imposed on him.[23] Kaczynski maintains that the problem of purposelessness that exists in modern society *cannot* be resolved by simply arriving at a point where society can guarantee everyone's security (e.g., by

providing for everyone). This would only bring back the problem of purposelessness. The real problem, as Kaczynski sees it, is that individuals are framing the issue improperly. Individuals are *dependent* on the system for their security instead of having it in their own hands, and this is where feelings of purposelessness come into play. When individuals come to realize that society is providing for them these feelings surface. Restricted <freedom> breeds perceived negative consequences, Kaczynski would argue. These negative consequences take the form of feelings of purposelessness. The right to bear arms receives brief attention here, as it is proposed that so many people passionately advocate it because owning a gun puts the element of personal security in one's own hands. Owning a gun essentially translates into greater <freedom>. Kaczynski's tone here is empathetic and supportive toward these individuals, as it is implied that they are taking their security into their own hands and acting out against the system.

A sense of purposelessness is again associated with this concept of "the leash" when Kaczynski asserts that many individuals are not in a position to pursue their goals autonomously. For example, workers are more often than not someone else's employee, and have to perform the necessary functions associated with their job by doing what they are told to do in the way they are told to do it. Those who are in business for themselves, and would appear to have a great amount of autonomy/<freedom>, often complain that their hands are tied by government regulations.

It is Kaczynski's belief that the reason so many individuals possess feelings of purposelessness is because they are not engaging the power process properly; and the reason the power process is not being engaged properly is because their exists a deficiency

of both real goals and autonomy in pursuing these goals:

> Our lives depend on decisions made by other people; we have no control over these decisions and usually we do not even know the people who make them...our lives depend on whether safety standards at a nuclear power plant are properly maintained...The individual's search for security is therefore frustrated, which leads to a sense of purposelessness. (p. 12)

<freedom> is heavily connected with *security* in this passage. Kaczynski implies that individuals may be able to possess a gun, but this will not amount to complete security by any means. There exist other forces at work which have the potential to infringe upon individual <freedom> at very significant levels. These forces inevitably leave the individual feeling helpless; as if, as Kaczynski claims, "we have no control" over certain issues.

In a later passage Kaczynski reasons that, while there is no law that says we must go to work everyday and follow orders given by an employer, in practice it can really be no other way. Realistically, there is room in the economy for only a small number of private business owners, and there can only be so many *bosses*. The structure of society demands that the majority of us work as someone else's employee. Again, Kaczynski draws a negative picture of the consequences of being on the leash that has at its other end modern society.

Modern society is in certain respects extremely permissive, according to the Manifesto. In matters that do not effect the functioning of the system, we as members of society possess complete autonomy. The example given is that we can believe in any religion we like, as long as it does not encourage behavior that threatens the system. We can engage in sexual behaviors with whomever we please, as long as we practice "safe

sex." In other words, Kaczynski argues, we have autonomy in all unimportant matters, but the system regulates our behavior increasingly in those matters that can be characterized as "important". A distinction between *two* sides of the issue of autonomy is established by Kaczynski. We as members of society possess autonomy in unimportant matters, and do not possess it in those matters that are deemed important by the system.

Kaczynski makes an argument about the nature of the system that is similar to an earlier one set forth about human needs being overridden by technical necessity. He suggests that the system *must* regulate human behavior in order to function efficiently. Workers must do what they are told, otherwise production would be thrown into chaos. He asserts: "A technological society cannot be broken down into small, autonomous communities, because production depends on the cooperation of very large numbers of people and machines" (p. 21). The reader of the Manifesto is informed that there is simply no other alternative for the system. Autonomy, or <freedom>, must be sacrificed to it.

In a rare literary move by Kaczynski in the Manifesto, he draws an analogy of the human race with technology to a drunk with a barrell of wine. The drunk argues that wine isn't detrimental if used in moderation, and that one little drink won't hurt. Kaczynski points out that the drunk will certainly consume too much wine, and the link between the drunk and the human race corresponds to the link between a barrel of wine and technology. It is implied that we as a race will have more difficulty getting off the leash that is modern society/the system/technology the more we endulge it. Perhaps the proposal is that we will squander our own <freedom> to the point that it becomes nonexistent. This provides a segway to Kaczynski's proposal of the potential *ends* that

await the human race, and how <freedom> is implicated.

Potential "ends" for the human race

Of the two potential ends Kaczynski proposes for technology and society, the first is what he is trying to counter and avoid. He begins this discussion (or at least, this discussion as I categorize it) by declaring that if individuals feel government interference in day-to-day life is excessive now, the future holds a much more disturbing prospect -- one that entails government regulation of the genetic constitution of their children. Kaczynski argues that this course of action will inevitably lead to the genetic engineering of human beings. Advances in this field will initially and by themselves appear to be beneficial to the human race. For example, through genetic engineering certain diseases will be able to be accounted for, treated, and perhaps even cured.[24] Such advances, though, will become part of an authority-lead (perhaps governmental) process of rapid social evolution. Essentially, the sphere of individual <freedom> will continually decrease in size.[25] Kaczynski suggests that technology would eventually, within this scenario, achieve near complete control over human behavior.

Should society adhere to the arguments advocated by Kaczynski, the industrial-technological system will meet its demise. It is argued that regardless of the type of society that exists after such a demise, individuals will certainly have to live close to nature. The absence of advanced technology mandates such a lifestyle, as there is virtually no other way *for* people to live. Individuals will, like their primitive ancestors, procure food by being peasants, herdsmen, fishermen and/or hunters. It is through this lifestyle, where *real* goals are the only goals, that individuals will properly engage the power

process. <Freedom> and feelings of purpose and fulfillment will once again predominate, Kaczynski believes. Additionally, autonomy will be better served at the local level, where local communities will be able to flourish without the fear of governmental control.[26]

Once again, Kaczynski depicts issues regarding <freedom> by suggesting only *two* potential "ends" for the human race. One involves the continued development of technology, leading to eventual control over human behavior. The other scenario requires individuals to break free from society, abolishing its industrial-technological structure, and returning to more primitive ways. Kaczynski argues it is here that the power process can be properly experienced and <freedom> can resurface to achieve sufficient levels for the individual.

I have addressed the Manifesto's utilization of the concept <freedom> in its discussion of technology. Kaczynski's argumentative and scientific approach allows for a categorization of how <freedom> is discussed. I argue that Kaczynski discusses the concept with respect to five mini-arguments or sections: 1) setting the stage, 2) autonomy as necessity, 3) the imposition of change, 4) purposelessness and "the leash," and 5) possible "ends" for the human race. Summarizing Kaczynksi's key arguments reveals that:

- Individuals have a natural need to experience the power process, and one of the key components to this process is autonomy or <freedom>.
- In modern society, sufficient levels of <freedom> are impossible to achieve (e.g., individuals feeling that change is imposed on them), and the result of this is increased feelings of frustration, purposelessness, anger, etc.
- Individuals must get off the leash that is modern society (and technology) in order arrive at <freedom>. Essentially, they must break *free* from society before a proper engagement of the body can occur. If this is not accomplished, technology may annihilate <freedom> in its pursuit of control over human behavior (e.g., through genetic engineering).

I will now turn to a discussion of the ways Robert Pirsig employs the concept <freedom> in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. This section of the overall analysis will be concluded with a discussion of the implications both texts have for the concept <freedom>, and I will highlight key similarities and differences between both authors, drawing also on modern society's conceptualization of <freedom> with respect to technology.

Pirsig and <Freedom>

> Our current modes of rationality are not moving society forward into a better world. They are taking it further and further from that better world. (Pirsig, p. 102)

Robert Pirsig's employment of the concept <freedom> is much more implicit than what appears in Kaczynski's Manifesto. The term itself is for the most part absent in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, and Pirsig does not utilize synonymous concepts such as *autonomy*. <Freedom> does play a prominant role in his discussion, though, as it is invoked through a committee of related terms, such as *peace of mind* and *power*.[27] These terms are also discussed antithetically. Pirsig reserves significant discussion for the ways individuals experience the opposite of *peace of mind*, for example. I argue that Pirsig invokes <freedom> in several ways: 1) by discussing "John" and "Sylvia," and their apparent hatred for technology; 2) by drawing upon additional *negative* experiences (some of which are his own) that can be had with technology; 3) by *positively* relating his experiences with his motorcycle; and 4) by making more general, theoretical statements about the nature of <freedom> with respect to technology (and Quality). Each of these

will be addressed seperately in what follows.

"John" and "Sylvia"

"John" and "Sylvia" are friends of the narrator (Pirsig) in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, though they hold opposing views when it comes to technology. John, like Pirsig, owns a motorcycle. Unlike Pirsig though, John does *not* feel one should have to learn the mechanics of the motorcycle. Rather, the cycles should perform properly at all times, as this is what their owners have paid for and expect. Pirsig recounts an experience John had one day when he couldn't get the cycle started. John reveals: "You know...when it doesn't start like that it just...really turns me into a *monster* inside. I just get paranoic about it" (p. 12).

It is important to recall earlier discussion of modern society's expectations for technology with respect to <freedom>. Individuals have certain expectations for what technology ought to do for their <freedom>. Among other things, technology ought to contribute significantly to increasing jobs and increasing amounts of food. This contribution by technology has implications for human <frredom>. For example, having one's necessities provided for ought to leave the individual free to pursue other avenues of interest that contribute to what is perceived to be a fulfilling lifestyle. Additionally, many individuals in modern American society experience great <freedom> of choice when it comes to choosing which brand of product to buy, what type of home to live in, and even where to work.

John's experience with his motorcycle presents a different angle to the issue of <freedom> and technology. He has this product, a BMW-R60 motorcycle, that he more

than likely *chose* over other types of motorcycles. However, when it doesn't perform as it is expected to it frustrates him and turns him "into a *monster* inside." Where technology ought to contribute to an individual's *peace of mind* by providing for necessities like food, clothing and shelter, here it contributes to the opposite, or *antithesis* of peace of mind, by leaving John in a state of *paranoia* about whether the cycle will perform properly. <Freedom> of choice is argued to be no kind of <freedom> at all if technological innovations do not function as they are expected to.[28] The <freedom> associated with peace of mind is absent for John here, and what remains is an antithesis to peace of mind (frustration, paranoia).

Pirsig recalls another experience (addressed briefly in "The Two Texts" section), in which he is at John and Sylvia's home, and he notices the kitchen sink faucet is dripping. He remembers that the faucet has been dripping as long as he can remember, and that this irritation has had an impact on John and Sylvia. One day, when Pirsig is talking to Sylvia in the kitchen, the kids come into the room and Sylvia yells at them. Pirsig deduces that in fact it is the dripping faucet that is the source of her anger, not the kids.

This experience compares well to John's experience with the cycle. The faucet is not functioning properly, and frustration is the end result.[29] Pirsig asserts in a later passage that John and Sylvia depend on technology while condemning it at the same time, and that this must contribute significantly to their contempt for it. In fact, Pirsig draws upon statements by John and Sylvia which echo this sentiment, such as "There's just no escape from it all" (p. 14). Here the perception is given that we as a society cannot break free from technology and its negative ramifications. These ramifications take the form of

experiences like the ones already mentioned and encounterd by John and Sylvia.

Eventually Pirsig arrives at a revelation that perhaps John and Sylvia really do care about technology, but in a different way than he does. Here the reader encounters one of many instances in which Pirsig addresses the *classic-romantic* split. It is argued that John and Sylvia adopt a romantic perspective, concerning themselves more with what things *are* and what things do for them than with what they *mean* and how they function. The latter entails the classic perspective, which Pirsig argues to be his own. This choice of perspective has implications for John and Sylvia where <freedom> is concerned. For example, the narrator observes that when John gets upset over something like the cycle not performing properly, it is because an intrusion on his reality has taken place. John has a "groovy way of looking at things," where appearance takes precedence over underlying form. It is argued that this is acceptable, but that this perspective can come back to haunt the individual in a number of ways. For example, Pirsig, Chris, John and Sylvia are cycling through stretches of land that are at times extremely isolated. Pirsig suggests that John, by not bringing along vital parts like spare plugs for his BMW-R60, and relying so heavily on the reputation it has for running reliably, will be in a difficult situation should he encounter mechanical trouble. *Here again the antithesis to peace of mind presents itself, as Pirsig creates the image of a* ***constrained*** *John, one who must at least acknowledge the thought of potential mechanical trouble*. Though Pirsig utilizes the experiences and convictions of John and Sylvia to invoke the concept of <freedom>, he does so in other ways as well.

Improper engagement of technology

Pirsig observes that many individuals arrive at an office or factory and perform

what is perceived to be a totally meaningless job/task for eight hours a day without question. They do so because society demands that it be so, but it is the perception that their job or task is *meaningless* that is at the heart of the problem, Pirsig argues. It is implied that these individuals are frustrated with their jobs, but perform them on a daily basis because they have to in order to receive a paycheck every week. Thus, even though technology helps to create jobs, which have the potential to lead to increased <freedom>, the jobs themselves appear to constrain <freedom> when the perception exists that they are meaningless. If individuals feel compelled to hold a job only because of the paycheck, then chances are there exist other things they would rather devote eight hours a day to. Though Pirsig does not mention it, certainly the specialization of labor that has developed and now exists contributes to the perception that one's job is meaningless. For the most part, the "Jack-of-all-trades" has vanished, and a notion of craftsmanship is recognized by few. What has commonly replaced these is a more monotonous office or factory position that leaves little room for creativity.

The issue of constraint with respect to <freedom> appears again and at a more subtle level when Pirsig is looking over a set of instructions for a rotisserie barbecue with some friends. He suggests that what is really troublesome about the instructions is that they imply there is only one way to assemble the rotisserie. It is this presumption that wipes out all creativity and constrains the individual to one method or procedure. Pirsig adds: "Technology presumes there's just one right way to do things and there never is" (p.147). Essentially, individuals engage technology, but do so (or are forced to do so) in ways that restrict <freedom>. Thus, even if the individual is unaware of it, creativity can

be limited by things like instruction manuals that force him/her to adhere to only one correct method of assembly. Pirsig proposes that this does not have to be the case. It is just that we as a society have gotten use to things like assembly instructions beginning and ending exclusively with the objects they instruct about. There exists no discussion about the realtionship between the individual and the object, and the result of this is that individuals feel far removed from things like rotisserie barbecues. By engaging technology in ways that limit the potential for creativity, one is also restricting <freedom>. *In this case, a restriction of creativity equals a restriction of <freedom>.*

Pirsig asserts that when the world is viewed not as a duality of mind and matter (or subjects and objects) but as a "trinity of Quality, mind, and matter," then motorcycle maintenance and other "arts" become much more meaningful (p. 221). He argues though that, in fact, a dualistic way of viewing subjects and objects is what exists at present, and he himself has perceived things as such in the past. Pirsig recalls experiences had with his motorcycle, ones that occurred when he had not known much about its mechanics. One involves misdiagnosing a problem he had with the cycle during a storm, and the other entails taking the cycle to a group of lousy mechanics for repairs he could not do because he lacked the necessary knowledge. During the former Pirsig presents himself as being scared and anxious, anything but experiencing a kind of peace of mind that one hopes technology can deliver. During the latter experience, Pirsig characterizes himself as feeling helpless, frustrated, and lacking control over the situation. All of these feelings can be characterized as antitheses to <freedom>. He wishes he had known more about the cycle at the time, as the mechanics took poor care of it in trying to repair it. Pirsig

maintains that this was because they simply did not care about the work they were doing.

Pirsig believes that a dualistic form of perceiving subjects and objects is sufficient as long as vital needs such as food, clothing and shelter predominate. However, because most individuals are now able to look beyond these needs, a new form of rationality is necessary. Pirsig suggests that the current form of rationality is no longer adequate, and the implication is that human <freedom> is what is being sacrificed.[30] It is no longer enough for individuals to be fed, clothed, and provided with shelter. The search for fulfillment takes on new forms, and it is precisely these new forms that is causing feelings of frustration, anxiety, helplessness, etc.

The preceding point requires explication. First, it can be assumed that for most people the kind of peace of mind that comes with having necessities like food and clothing provided has been achieved. This, I have argued, results in <freedom> by allowing the individual to pursue other avenues for fulfillment in addition to providing him/her with greater <freedom> of choice in various matters. However, because individuals can now look elsewhere for fulfillment, the potential exists for peace of mind to be sacrificed in other ways, and replaced with feelings of frustration. For example, people will be more critical of consumer goods, and when a product has defects or imperfections consumers will not only feel slighted, but frustrated by having spent the time and money to purchase the product.[31] The same holds true for a hobbyist who purchases a piece of equipment necessary for his/her hobby. Expectations exist for how the equipment *ought* to perform. Even the service industry is examined more critically. Pirsig's example of the mechanics who did a poor job of repairing his cycle illustrates the point that a lack of caring in

performing one's job has negative implications for individual <freedom>. Interestingly enough, in this particular case the implications will be felt by the mechanics as well as the customer. The mechanics do not receive the fulfillment associated with doing a job right, and the customer is likely frustrated by taking a vehicle in for service that was not performed properly. Pirsig on the other hand describes for his reader the relationship he has developed with his cycle, and the benefits this has created.

Pirsig and the cycle

Pirsig asserts that over time a motorcycle develops a kind of personality. That is, its owner picks up certain feelings about the machine that are unique to that machine, and its personality is characterized as "the intuitive sum total of everything you know and feel about it" (p. 39). He continues by adding that motorcycles begin as new strangers, and either deteriorate rapidly or turn into dependable, long-lasting friends. Pirsig's cycle is an example of the latter, as he notes that it has required fewer and fewer repairs as time has passed.

Referencing the cycle as a "long-lasting friend" emphasizes Pirsig's personal investment in the cycle. More than this, though, is that the owner considers himself or herself to be engaged in a relationship with the cycle, one which is initiated by the owner. This is actually one of Pirsig's principle reccomendations for how individuals ought to engage technology, and a direct result of this is that the individual will experience greater <freedom>. The reason the cycle has required so few repairs as it has gotten older is precisely because of the investment Pirsig has placed in the cycle and the relationship he has forged with it. It is implied that by engaging, in this case, the cycle, one will know

more about its mechanics and how to treat any potential trouble. Possessing this knowledge about the machine and its mechanics contributes to greater peace of mind and a sense of *control* over how to handle the machine and take care of it. *This peace of mind and sense of control are equatable to <freedom>, in that the individual who experiences these is free from worry and feelings of helplessness.*

This point can further be illustrated by the following passage:

> That's the reason I'm checking it now. If it is a loose rod and I try to make it to the mountains without an overhaul, it will soon get louder and louder until the rod tears itself free, slams into the spinning crankshaft and destroys the engine. (p. 85).

Pirsig is performing a check of the cycle in order to ascertain whether or not he can make it to the mountains. The reason he is able to make a judgment based on his observations is because he has taken the time to learn about the machine. The benefits of this are, again, peace of mind and a sense of control over the situation. The antitheses of these are feelings of helplessness and perhaps even paranoia. These would exist for an individual who has not taken the time to engage the motorcycle and understand its mechanics. It is assumed that for this individual, if the rod tears itself free and destroys the engine, what ensues will likely be feelings of anger and frustration, which are antithetical to <freedom>. *By applying his knowledge of the cycle and taking the time to inspect it, it is implied that Pirsig will experience a peace of mind that will leave him free to concentrate on other matters.*

In a conversation with a sculptor, Pirsig mentions that he does a lot of welding in the process of maintaining his motorcycle. The welder and Pirsig articulate similar reasons for welding. Namely, that once the skill is picked up it can offer the welder a tremendous

feeling of *power* and control over the metal. This feeling of power and control is nearly synonymous with the type of <freedom> of choice that comes with having creativity at your fingertips. Pirsig adds that one can do just about anything with metal if the skill is present. The implicit message is that acquiring skill in welding or other pursuits is a necessary step in engaging that pursuit in such a way that will lead one to experience a sense of power, control, creativity, peace of mind, etc. These ends are all connected to <freedom>.

An example of Pirsig being on the road with the cycle and experiencing peace of mind comes when he comments that "the road is smooth and clean and the engine now has a 'packed,' high rpm sound that says it's right on" (p. 26). Pirsig further explains that a storm is upon them, but the sense is given that the cycle will get him to shelter safely because it is performing well. Pirsig is able to ascertain that the sound of the engine is a good one, one which "says it's right on," but he is only able to realize this because he possesses a knowledge about the cycle and understands it. I argue that the peace of mind this brings him is also closely related to a sense of *security*. Pirsig feels secure on the cycle, despite the imminence of the storm. *Security and peace of mind essentially amount to <freedom>, as Pirsig experiences a kind of "mental liberation" from feelings of helplessness and skepticism.* Additionally, this sense of security is presented as much more stable than what John experiences on his cycle. Any security John feels must be attributed to the reputation his BMW-R60 has for performing well, and it is this reputation that he is banking on.

Pirsig reveals that he will probably never sell the motorcycle. He adds that if they

are kept tuned and overhauled they can last for what seems like an eternity. Because he has done this, the cycle will continue to perform when called upon. Peace of mind is a significant end result of this. Pirsig suggests that it is an understanding of Quality which has allowed the cycle to carry him so far without trouble.

Theorizing about <freedom>

I have argued that Pirsig invokes the concept of <freedom> by drawing upon related concepts and their antitheses. One such concept is *peace of mind.* Pirsig employs this concept literally in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance during the discussion of the rotisserie barbecue assembly instructions:

> I've a set of instructions at home which...begin, "assembly of Japanese bicycle requires great peace of mind."...Peace of mind...it's the whole thing. That which produces it is good maintenance...The ultimate test's always your own serenity. If you don't have this when you start and maintain it while you're working you're likely to build your personal problems right into the machine... (p. 146)

Here we have a direct reference to peace of mind, and Pirsig implicates it not only as an end state but as a necessary precursor to the Quality-seeking process. That is, not only will "good maintenance" produce it, but it must be present at the start of the maintenance process. I've discussed in detail the type of peace of mind that is an *end,* along with its relation to <freedom>. However, Pirsig also declares that peace of mind is necessary for an individual to *start* working. He asserts that if this isn't present at the start, one is likely build one's "personal problems right into the machine." The implicit suggestion is that frustration and anger will likely be the result, and it is here that antitheses to <freedom> emerge once again.[32]

Pirsig makes mention of "the system" in ways that are not unlike Kaczynski's

characterization of it. Essentially, he understands the system to be the structure of modern society as we know it. Pirsig proposes that a true understanding of Quality does more than just serve the system or even escape it. Rather, a true understanding "captures" the system and puts it to work for one's own use. It is argued that this will leave the individual free to fulfill his or her inner destiny. Ambiguities inherent in this particular passage leave the reader to guess at what exactly Pirsig is aiming for when he claims that individuals can put the system to work for their own use. What the reader *can* assume from this, however, is that a genuine understanding of and appreciation for Quality will lead the individual to increased <freedom>. Essentially, one will be free to fulfill one's inner destiny.

In a later passage Pirsig suggests again that discovering and understanding Quality has significant implications for <freedom> at, say, the workplace. "What's important is the relevance of such a discovery to...all the dull, dreary jobs and monotonous years that await all of us in them" (p. 229). Quality is seen as savior here, for it is argued that it has the potential to lift the perverbial fog that resides over what are perceived to be meaningless and monotonous jobs. Quality leads to liberation, and this liberation takes the form of <freedom>. *Pirsig holds that individuals who discover Quality will be set free from the dreariness and monotony that once characterized worklife*. Thus, the argument being made is that Quality can be implicated even at the level of one's own job, and <freedom> with respect to technology can be experienced without *escaping* technology. As Pirsig suggests: "The Buddha...resides quite as comfortably in the circuits of a digital computer or the gears of a cycle transmission as he does at the top of mountain or in the

petals of a flower" (p. 16). Pirsig's reference to the Buddha would eventually develop into his working concept of Quality, and the message is clear that individuals need not retreat to the wilderness to discover Quality and experience <freedom>. What is needed is a re-evaluation of the ways one perceives of these things.

I have argued that Pirsig invokes the concept of <freedom>, but that he does so much more implicitly than Kaczynski. In summarizing:

- Pirsig chooses to rely on other concepts to draw the connection between <freedom> and technology, such as *peace of mind*, *control*, *power*, *security* and *creativity*. He also incorporates the antitheses to some of these concepts, such as *frustration*, *helplessness*, *paranoia*, and *constraint*.

- Pirsig makes use of characters John and Sylvia and his own experiences with the motorcycle in drawing the connection between <freedom> and technology. Additionally, he addresses some of the ways individuals (including himself) can negatively engage technology (e.g., upholding subject-object dualisms) so as to restrict <freedom>.

- Pirsig makes what can be considered more general arguments about the nature of <freedom> and Quality. For example, peace of mind is not only an end state when Quality is pursued, but a precursor to the pursuit itself. It can translate into fulfillment and liberation for the individual, since feelings of frustration and helplessness will be absent.

In the following section, I will draw on both Kaczynski and Pirsig to compare and contrast their conceptualizations of <freedom> with contemporary American society's perceived expectations and hopes for what technology ought to accomplish for individual <freedom>. Additionally, I will address the question of how each author's argumentative style affects the way they choose to reconcile <freedom> with technology, if at all. In doing so, I will be referring back to the initial diagram illustrating the two-step argument for both Kaczynski and Pirsig.[33]

Kaczynski, Pirsig, and <Freedom>

One observation left unaddressed up to this point is that Kaczynski applies many of the same concepts Pirsig does in discussing technology and <freedom>. That is, Kaczynski also makes reference to feelings of *frustration, anger* and *security* (along with the sense of *purposelessness* that he believes many experience). The difference between Pirsig and Kaczynski is that for Pirsig these concepts (*peace of mind,* etc.) are the primary means by which he discusses <freedom> alongside technology. The result is a text which invokes <freedom> implicitly. Kaczynski however references <freedom> more explicitly by using the term itself or a more arguable synonym: *autonomy*. It is for this reason that these terms receive the bulk of the attention when analyzing the Manifesto.[34]

Kaczynski believes individuals must break free from society altogether in order to arrive at what he considers to be an adequate amount of <freedom>, or autonomy. Only when the individual no longer relies on society to provide for him necessities like food and shelter can s/he truly be *free*.[35] Pirsig on the other hand suggests that technology *is* reconcilable with modern society, and that <freedom> can be an end result if individuals discover and strive for Quality. So, while Kaczynski concentrates his development of <freedom> in step one of his argument, Pirsig chooses to situate <freedom> in step two for his. The way <freedom> is situated by Kaczynski and Pirsig in their overall arguments affects how they develop the concept.

Kaczynski reasons that technology cannot be reconciled in such a way as to ensure individual <freedom>. Its continued development will lead to greater encroachments on <freedom>, and the only way to avoid this is to revolt against the structure that is modern

industrial-technological society. The reader of the Manifesto is given, in most scenarios and arguments presented, only two options. These options include either allowing technological development to continue *or* abolishing it entirely. Kaczynski warns that reform is not an option, as any attempt at such will be too weak to have a significant and long-term impact.

Although Kaczynski does provide two options for his reader, he advocates only one. This is where we can begin to see how his argumentative style affects his employment of the concept <freedom>. *Virtually all of Kaczynski's comments regarding <freedom> are presented in such a way that the reader is never far removed from the assumption that the individuals that make up society must break free from technology in order to ensure <freedom>*. In proposing that individuals have the option to allow technological development to proceed along its current path, Kaczynski paints a picture of the future for his reader. This picture reveals that individual autonomy or <freedom> will gradually be stripped away until the result is near complete control over human behavior by technology.[36] He cites recent trends in genetic engineering as a precursor to the eventual genetic constitution of our children and gradual engineering of our species. For Kaczynski, the bottom line is that individuals are on the "leash" that is modern society (or the *system*), and it is impossible to ensure human <freedom> while we remain on this leash.[37] Furthermore, by remaining on this leash we are ensuring that our <freedom> will continually be restricted. Kaczynski's development of the concept <freedom> is therefore emphasized in step one of his argument, which proposes that individuals must break free from society in order to arrive at true fulfillment.

For Pirsig, step one is not that individuals must abolish technology and modern society, but that they must re-orient their values and come to understand and embrace Quality. By doing so, and striving for Quality (at work, in their hobbies, etc.), <freedom> (step two) can be attained. This will take the form of *peace of mind*, *security*, *creativity*, and/or a sense of *power* and *control*. Situating <freedom> in step two of his proposed process affects the way Pirsig employs the concept.

Pirsig invokes the concept of <freedom>, and what I might call its *siblings* (peace of mind, security, etc.), by closely connecting it to step one of his argument: that individuals must first understand and strive for Quality in their pursuits. That is, *virtually all of Pirsig's comments regarding <freedom> are connected to the assumption that individuals either do or do not pursue Quality.* The fact that Pirsig connects arguments about <freedom> to Quality appears to make sense, since it is Quality that he isolates as a necessary precursor to arriving at <freedom>. It should be recalled that Pirsig relies on a usage of antitheses to <freedom>, such as feelings of *frustration*, *helplessness*, *constraint*, and *lack of control*. He does so in order to distinguish between what it means to pursue Quality and what it means to pursue something in a non-Quality way. It is for this reason that I argue the assumption exists that individuals do or do not pursue Quality.

This assumption by Pirsig gives the immediate impression that he is presenting a *black- and-white*, two-option argument in much the same way that Kaczynski does so. People are either in pursuit of Quality or they are not. However, Pirsig reveals that <freedom> takes multiple forms, such as peace of mind, power and control. The bottom line for Pirsig is that a discussion of <freedom> must also entail a discussion of the Quality

experience, or lack there of. Having discussed how the argumentative styles of Kaczynski and Pirsig affect the ways they invoke the concept <freedom>, it is now necessary to turn to a comparison of the ways their arguments echo and/or differ from society's perception of the connection between <freedom> and technology.

Throughout my analysis of the ways Kaczynski and Pirsig discuss <freedom> with respect to technology, I have also been discussing how they feel technology affects our <freedom> as members of society. Despite this, it may prove helpful to step back and situate their arguments more broadly. I have argued that society has certain expectations and hopes for what technology ought to accomplish for individual <freedom>. For example, it is hoped that technology will contribute to an increasing number of jobs and larger quantites of food to sustain greater numbers of people. It is expected that <freedom> will come with the peace of mind experienced by having one's vital needs provided for. Additionally, it is expected that a greater <freedom> of choice will exist in having more options to choose from when purchasing a product.[38] Kaczynski and Pirsig look to assess the impact technology has on human <freedom>.

Kaczynski suggests that it is by providing for our vital needs that technology contributes to a sense of purposelessness that many of us experience. Technology, and modern society, has us on a leash, and being on this leash has consequences. For example, Kaczynski notes that many individuals get worked up about the right to bear arms simply because owning a gun puts an element of personal security back into their hands. Kaczynski also proposes that the leash we are on is constantly restricting our freedom, *not* broadening it. Essentially, Kaczynski believes that technology does more to constrain us

that it can ever do to liberate us. He would argue that the providing of jobs and food carries with it too many negative ramifications. Furthermore, individuals ought to re-assess why it is they wish to have these things provided *for* them in the first place, rather than providing for themselves.

Pirsig suggests that it is true that technology has provided many with the necessities of food, clothing and shelter. Because of this, though, individuals now look elsewhere for fulfillment. More attention is currently being given to the Quality of products and services. As a result of this, two things need to occur: 1) Individuals who produce and provide these products and services need to strive for Quality in doing so, and 2) Individuals who use technology need to engage it more properly, also by striving for Quality in these *pursuits*. Thus, Pirsig argues that technology can be reconciled with modern society in a way that promotes individual <freedom>. Kaczynski, however, asserts that technology cannot be reconciled with modern society in a way that will *not* continually restrict individual <freedom>.

Having analyzed the ideograph <freedom> as it appears in Kaczynski's Manifesto and Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, I will now direct my attention to a discussion of the ways both authors implicate the *body* in their texts. It is important to preface this part of the analysis by mentioning that the concept of <freedom> and this notion of the implicated body are not completely separate entities. In fact, the two are more closely interwoven than they are distinct. It is difficult to discuss one of these, as the authors present them, without also discussing the other. As a result of this, my reader may observe that some of the passages mentioned and analyzed in the former section may again

fall under a critical lens in the following one. However, the angle taken to examine these passages a second time will be different, as I will be focusing on ways Pirsig and Kaczynski implicate the body in their respective discussions of technology.

CHAPTER 7: THE IMPLICATED BODY

Both Kaczynski and Pirsig implicate the body in their discussions of technology and society. However, they do so in different ways. It can be recalled that for Pirsig, engaging the body and striving for Quality is what can lead to greater freedom in modern society. Kaczynski suggests that individuals must first procure freedom from society before any proper engagement of the body can occur. The result of getting off the "leash" that is society will be, consequently, increased levels of freedom.

It might appear that an equal amount of difficulty exists in separating freedom from what I call the *implicated body* in each author's work.[39] Upon closer examination of the texts, though, it is Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance which allows for an easier distinction between the two concepts to be drawn. The reason behind this is Pirsig's employment of multiple themes in his text. That is, by appealing to metaphors and analogies Pirsig is able to draw a connection between his cross-country motorcycle trip and his more theoretical discussion about the nature of technology with respect to modern society. This *connection* more clearly distinguishes Pirsig's discussion of the body from his discussion of freedom. Kaczynski on the other hand does not cross over from one theme to another in the Manifesto. Rather, he sticks to one theme: a theoretical discussion of technology and modern society. Because of this, the distinction between freedom and the body is more difficult to discuss. Essentially, by employing multiple themes, Pirsig also invokes the body in different ways, and it is easier for the reader to distinguish between the body and freedom than it is the single-themed Manifesto. It is

with the Manifesto that I shall begin a discussion of the implicated body.

Kaczynski and The Implicated Body

In addressing the ways Kaczynski implicates the body in his discussion of technology, I've isolated what I believe to be a series of phases that his argument proceeds through. First, I will address Kaczynski's argument that individuals improperly engage their bodies in modern society. I will then proceed into a discussion of what I believe Kaczynski assumes to be the ramifications of technology where the body is concerned. Finally, and much like the Manifesto's discussion of freedom, I will examine Kaczynski's arguments for what the future holds for the individual's body.

Improper engagement of the body

Recall Kaczynski's argument that individuals have a need for what he calls the power process, and that this process has four elements: goal, effort, attainment of goal, and autonomy. The Manifesto advocates fairly early that the individual suffers when the power process is not engaged properly by the body:

> Nonattainment [sic] of important goals results in death if the goals are physical necessities.....Consistent failure to attain goals throughout life results in defeatism, low self-esteem or depression.....Thus, in order to avoid serious psychological problems, a human being needs goals whose attainment requires effort, and he must have a reasonable rate of success in attaining his goals. (p. 7)

The "physical necessities" are indicative of food, clothing, and shelter. Their attainment requires physical effort on the part of the individual, as long as the power process is engaged *properly*. This passage sets up later discussion of the argument that in modern-day society, human beings do not have sufficient capabilities for engaging the power

process in any significant way. Kaczynski asserts that human beings, instead of having these "real" goals, fall back on surrogate activities in hopes of finding fulfillment. In fact, the equating of physical necessities to "important goals" as it appears in the first sentence of the preceding passage suggests a preference for making one's goals physical necessities. When this is not the case, psychological problems are implied to be a result.[40]

Because most individuals are not required to exert themselves physically in order to procure necessities like food, clothing and shelter, Kaczynski argues that surrogate activites are what individuals pursue as a replacement. He suggests that surrogate activities are directed toward goals that people set up for themselves simply for the sake of having a goal to work toward (and the perceived fulfillment that results from this). Thus, if an individual takes up tennis, Kaczynski would reason this to be a surrogate activity because the individual would *not* pursue this activity if his/her effort were directed toward satisfying the vital needs of food, clothing and shelter. *That is, as long as the effort directed toward satisfying vital needs requires the individual to use his or her physical and mental facilities in varied ways, then the desire to pursue surrogate activities such as tennis should remain absent.*[41]

Kaczynski observes that individuals assert a similar amount of effort in pursuing their surrogate activities that they would in pursuing real goals. A critic of Kaczynski might argue that if an individual is asserting physical effort toward a surrogate activity, and that surrogate activity provides fulfillment, then there is nothing wrong with having surrogate activities. Kaczynski would suggest that a problem *does* exist in that the power process (and consequently, the body) is not being engaged properly. Implied here is that

surrogate activities do not adequately engage the power process because they come with strings attached. These strings amount to society and its constraints. Being able to pursue and engage surrogate activities means being on the "leash" that is society, and this translates into, according to Kaczynski, restricted levels of freedom. Here we see one example of just how closely related the concepts of freedom and the body are for Kaczynski. Essentially, the body cannot engage the power process properly in pursuing a surrogate activity because freedom is so restricted in other spheres of life.[42]

The points discussed above receive additional attention in later passages:

> In modern industrial society only minimal effort is necessary to satisfy one's physical needs.....The only requirements are a moderate amount of intelligence, and most of all, simple OBEDIENCE. If one has those, society takes care of one from cradle to grave. (p. 8)

and

> Many people who pursue surrogate activities will say that they get far more fulfillment from these activities than they do from.....satisfying their biological needs, but that is because in our society the effort needed to satisfy the biological needs has been reduced to triviality. (p. 8)

In these passages, society is seen as "taking care of the individual" if the individual conforms to the system. As long as s/he chooses not to make physical necessities primary or "real" goals, the system will provide for him/her (speaking of the general population). Even further, it is implied that society, in providing for one's vital needs, is not *allowing* the individual to adequately engage the body. Because society provides this, it is implied that only minimal effort is required to attain the goals of physical necessities. As a result, no real bodily effort is put forth by the individual in a significant way. This is articulated again in the second passage. It is suggested that people believe they get more fulfillment from pursuing surrogate activities than they do from satisfying biological needs.

Here we can see similarites to previous discussion. Kaczynski suggests that individuals turn to surrogate activities for fulfillment "...because in our society the effort needed to satisfy biological needs has been reduced to triviality." Thus, an individual works a job, gets paid, and provides for oneself, but does not do so by exerting oneself physically in a direct manner. That is, an individual may have to exert oneself physically at work, say as a construction worker, but this is done in order to secure a paycheck, which is then used to procure necessities such as food, clothing and shelter. No real physical effort is applied toward directly providing these vital necessities for oneself. Providing for one's own physical necessities makes the process of *providing* much more significant, Kaczynski argues. He points out that it is in fact no surprise that society is full of surrogate activities, for individuals are searching for fulfillment. Society, in making it easy for individuals to secure physical necessities, has forced them to look elsewhere for it. If individuals were forced to exert themselves physically (and mentally) to procure these, there would be no need for surrogate activities.

Kaczynski proceeds into a classification of what he calls "human drives," of which he argues there are three types. The first type consists of drives that can be satisfied with very little effort, and in modern society vital needs like food and shelter unfortunately reside here (for many), acording to Kaczynski. The second type includes those drives which can be satisfied, but only through considerable effort on the part of the individual. The third type of human drives consists of those which cannot be satisfied regardless of the amount of effort put forth by the individual. These drives are relative to the individual. For example, certain individuals cannot become "supermodels" or "doctors" because their

physical appearances or learning capabilities do not comply with society's expectations for these occupations.

Kaczynski asserts that the "power process" is intended to satisfy the drives of the second group (e.g., the pursuit of primary/real goals), but that modern society has pushed most human drives into either the first or third groups. The result of this, Kaczynski argues, is an increasing number of individuals who experience frustration, anger, depression...etc. What largely remains for the second type of human drives, those for which Kaczynski argues the power process is intended, are surrogate activities (e.g., jobs, hobbies).

Kaczynski is imlpying here that individuals are not sufficiently satisfying those human drives which require serious effort. He reasons that surrogate activites have been inserted into this type of human drive, but that this is somehow not enough for the individual. Kaczynski suggests this to be the case in pointing to what he believes to be a significant and growing number of individuals who frequently experience feelings of frustration, anger...etc. Again there appears to be some equivocality in the way Kaczynski presents the argument, as the reader of the Manifesto is uncertain as to what sorts of things *are* being pursued in the first and third types of human drives. It can be assumed, though (and Kaczynski *does* attempt to clear this up in later passages), that for many individuals it is the physical necessities of food, clothing and shelter which are now a part of those drives which can be satisfied by exerting only a small amount of effort. Regarding those drives which cannot be satisfied even when effort is exerted, greater ambiguity exists. Perhaps Kaczynski would argue that autonomy is a central characteristic

to drives in this group, and the perceived lack of this is what makes them impossible to achieve. *For Kaczynski, the power process belongs in type two human drives, but this process must include a proper engagement of the body, and must therefore* ***not*** *include surrogate activities.* It is here that Kaczynski makes reference to primitive societies, arguing that these societies satisfied physical necessities as a part of those drives requiring considerable effort, and the result was increased levels of fulfillment (and less frustration, anger...etc.). Much of Kaczynski's discussion in what I have categorized as "improper engagement of the body" could arguably appear in the following section and vice-versa. However, it is my argument that dividing Kaczynski's discussion of the body into categories allows for a clearer articulation of his reasoning. I now turn to what I consider to be a discussion of the ramifications of technology with respect to the body.

Ramifications of technology

Kaczynski asserts that technology is a primary contributor to the deprivation that occurs regarding the individual's experience of the power process. One result includes feelings of frustration, unfulfillment, purposelessness...etc. Additionally, Kaczynski argues that the modern individual is obsessed with a notion of longevity and with maintaining physical vigor and attractiveness to an advanced age. Again, it is reasoned that this is a result of not significantly engaging the power process.

It has been observed that Kaczynski advocates a more proper experience of the power process, one which engages the body both physically and mentally in pursuing vital necessities such as food, clothing and shelter. He argues that individuals instead apply the power process to surrogate activities in the search for fulfillment, and that feelings of

frustration stem from being on the leash that is society. However, in the preceding passage Kaczynski is making a different sort of argument. This one holds that individuals are even more obsessed with their physical bodies than they would be if the power process were applied in an adequate manner. Because individuals in modern society have not engaged their bodies in pursuing real or primary goals, lack of fulfillment remains. The result of this is a greater amount of attention being devoted to maintaining one's physical image. Indeed, Kaczynski explicates this point in the following passage:

> Many modern people...are disturbed by the prospect of death...We argue that this is due to unfulfillment resulting from the fact that they have never put their physical powers to any use, have never gone through the power process using their bodies in a serious way. It is...the primitive man...whose need for the power process has been satisfied during his life who is best prepared to accept the end of that life. (p. 14)

Kaczynski makes the perceived connection clearer between the modern individual's fear of death (and growing old) and the type of unfulfillment that results from never experiencing the power process in a significant way. Essentially, it is argued that the obsession many individuals have with maintaining their bodies and physical appearance is a result of never engaging their bodies in the pursuit of real goals. Thus, not only are individuals unfulfilled, but they devote excessive amounts of attention to maintaining their bodies. Kaczynski proposes that this attention could be diverted elsewhere if the body was engaged properly, and the power process was directed toward satisfying one's vital needs.

In a later passage Kaczynski declares that even if the most cherished fruits of technology were preserved while the rest of the system were dismantled, these "fruits" would by themselves harbor evil. He uses the example of medicine, and argues that if

cures for diseases such as diabetes were discovered, those individuals with a genetic tendency toward them would then be able to survive and reproduce as well as anyone. Kaczynski asserts that natural selection against such genes will cease and these genes will likely spread throughout the population. The image conjured here is that of an infected *collective* body that is the human race. It is argued that this may already be "in the works" today, in that advances in medicine and genetics are allowing many diseases to be controlled. This is a rare use of metaphor by Kaczynski, one which appears again later. Kaczynski suggests that there will inevitably be only one solution: a program designed to genetically engineer human beings. The result will be a human species that is, essentially, a manufactured product. This point will receive greater attention in the next section, where I examine Kaczynski's discussion of the future with respect to the body.

Kaczynski is accurate in arguing that many diseases will likely be cured, or at least sufficiently controlled. However, in asserting that there will inevitably be only *one* solution, the genetic engineering of human beings, Kaczynski leaves no room for the possibility that these diseases will be eliminated altogether. Furthermore, the argument can be made that if a cure is found for a disease that *cannot* be wiped out, then it really does not matter whether an individual's genetic tendency toward that disease increases. Kaczynski might argue that these types of medical developments function to create an individual that will be much less "pure" than modern individuals. However, the appeal to what Kaczynski perceives to be an infected collective body leads him to a narrowly conceived vision of medical progress and the fate of the human race. Only one solution is envisioned, and no room is left for additional outcomes. The preceding mini-discussion

provides a segue into Kaczynski's discussion of what the future holds, and how the body is implicated.

The future

As discussed in the ideographic section, Kaczynski asserts that one of two scenarios will unfold where technology and society are concerned, and both have implications for the way we as a race will conceive of our bodies. In a continuation from a previous discussion on the potential for genetic engineering, Kaczynski connects this to what he refers to as government interference in the daily lives of its citizens:

> If you think big government interferes in your life too much NOW, just wait till [sic] the government starts regulating the genetic constitution of your children. Such regulation will inevitably follow the introduction of genetic engineering of human beings, because the consequences of unregulated genetic engineering would be disastrous. (p. 23)

Once again Kaczynski appeals to the metaphor of an infected collective body, and both technology *and* government regulation are sources of the "infection." *The implications for the body in a technological society are suggested to be so detrimental that we as a society will no longer have control over our own genetic make-up.* The system will assert its dominance over us to such an extent that the future of the body will have to be conceptualized in an entirely different way. Words like "natural" and "biological" seemingly will be replaced by "artificial" and "genetically engineered." The body, our bodies, will be altered to the system's liking to the point where while we once conceived of our internal and biological states to be our own, now even this has surrendered to the system. The certainty invoked by Kaczynski is that technology is creating a physical and social environment for the human race that is radically different from the environment

primitive man evolved through. Once again, the body and freedom are interwoven in this discussion.

In making additional references to genetic engineering and the fate of the human race, Kaczynski argues that those aspects of the body that affect mental functioning will *also* be modified by the system. He proposes that the genetic engineering of human beings is actually taking its first shape in the form of gene therapy. Kaczynski reasons that it is only natural to assume such methods will make their way into the realm of mental functioning where humans are concerned. The implicit message suggests that the human race (and the body) will not only be affected at the physical level. Our mental capacities will also fall prey to the technological development of the system.

Losing control over our own bodies at the physical as well as mental levels is not proposed to happen all at once.[43] Rather, Kaczynski argues it will take the form of a more gradual process. This process will be nearly impossible to resist, as each new "innovation" will appear by itself to be beneficial. Essentially, Kaczynski asserts that the human race will be forced to undergo a type of "social evolution." That is, we will evolve to meet the demands of the social structure. The consequences of this evolution include a surrendering of how we presently conceptualize the control we have over our bodies.

In a passage that received discussion in the ideographic section of the analysis, Kaczynski suggests that technology will eventually achieve near complete control over human behavior. He proceeds to reveal that it has been established that human behavior has a primarily *biological* basis. That is, researchers and experimenters have been able to demonstrate that sensations such as hunger, anger, and fear can be adjusted by electrically

stimulating the brain. This passage creates more of a connection between biological functions of the body (including subsequent behaviors) and the potential for technology to tap into these in an effort to achieve control. If the reader of the Manifesto experiences feelings of skepticism about the potential for the genetic engineering of the human population, it can be argued that this passage serves to remove or at least alleviate some of that skepticism. To accomplish this, the argument proposed is one which makes the potential for technological control over human behavior (and physicality) that much more imminent.

Kaczynski counters one future that envisions the human race without control over their bodies with another that envisions the human race living close to nature and engaging their bodies in a fulfilling manner. He argues that individuals, in the wake of an abolished technological structure, will be forced to live close to nature because this will be necessary for survival. In advocating what he calls "wild nature," Kaczynski includes human nature. By this he means "those aspects of the functioning of the human individual that are not subject to regulation by organized society" (p. 36). Thus, while it may be difficult for individuals to adjust to a lifestyle absent of technology, the body will finally be engaging the power process in a way that it used to (e.g., primitive man) and a way that it ought to.

In order to experience the power process through the body, individuals will procure vital necessities such as food, clothing and shelter by being peasants, herdsmen, fishermen, hunters...etc. *Survival* will be the primary goal as well as a constant motivation for the individual. Kaczynski argues that fulfillment will be the result of procuring vital necessities for oneself by engaging the body in a way that physical and mental effort are

exerted in varied ways. Surrogate activities will cease to exist, and individuals will instead experience the power process by pursuing real or primary goals. Kaczynski argues it is here that the body will be engaged in ways that produce fulfillment. *Moreover, by existing in a world removed from technology individuals will surrender recurrent feelings of frustration, purposelessness, and anger that Kaczynski argues to be so characteristic of living in modern society.*

My reader may recall Kaczynski's assumption that not only are surrogate activities characteristic of improperly experiencing the power process (by not pursuing real goals), but that the perceived levels of fulfillment individuals get from these are actually counter-balanced by being on the "leash" that is modern society. Recall that consequences of being on this leash take the form of frustration, anger, and feelings of purposelessness, among other things. Therefore, Kaczynski suggests that even if individuals believe surrogate activities provide them fulfillment, this comes at a cost. Any fulfillment that may be experienced is essentially nullified.

By living close to nature and free of technology, Kaczynski proposes that not *only* will the body be well served by experiencing the power process in the pursuit of real goals. In addition to this, individuals will discover fulfillment that comes with no strings attached. That is, feelings of frustration and anger that come with engaging the body by pursuing surrogate activities will no longer prevail. The benefits Kaczynski outlines take on multiple forms where the body is concerned.

I have addressed the Manifesto's discussion of what I call the *implicated body*. I argue that Kaczynski's discussion of the body can best be understood by categorizing it

into, namely: 1) improper engagement of the body, 2) ramifications of technology, and 3) the future. These categorizations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as I have pointed out. Some of Kaczynski's arguments could easily slide from one section to another. Despite this, I believe that by categorizing his overall argument with respect to the body in this way, a clearer articulation of that argument is allowed for. What can now be understood from the Manifesto is that:

- An improper engagement of the body leads to an improper engagment of the power process, and in modern society individuals rely upon surrogate activites for what is perceived to be fulfillment, rather than relying upon primary or real goals.
- Relying upon surrogate activities leads individuals to, ironically, continued feelings of unfulfillment due to the consequences that accompany being on the leash that is modern society (e.g., the obsession with maintaining one's physical appearance that is a result of never engaging the body in a significant manner).
- The future poses two possibilities for the human race. One is depicted essentially as an infected collective body, where advances in medicine and genetic engineering allow for near complete control over behavior to occur. The other is depicted as a race living close to nature, engaging the body physically and mentally in the pursuit of primary goals. One result of this is increased levels of fulfillment and freedom.

It has become evident that the line separating freedom and the body in the Manifesto's discussion of technology is a fairly blurred one. A significant portion of the arguments presented about the body also incorporate concepts like *control* and *autonomy*. Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance creates a distinction between freedom and the body that is a bit less blurry, and it is here that I now turn.

Pirsig and The Implicated Body

Pirsig relies on more than one theme in presenting arguments about technology and its implications for the body. For example, the theme of the cross-country motorcycle

trip, which I would call the "story" theme, functions to inform Pirsig's discussion of Quality by presenting the reader with various metaphors and analogies. This second theme, the intellectual framework Pirsig develops regarding the nature of Quality, is enriched by the way the first theme is structured, and vice-versa. The following analysis will probe Pirsig's use of one theme to inform another, and how the body is implicated in both.[44] I will then proceed into a discussion of Pirsig's reflections about the nature of Quality, where the body is concerned. Finally, I will devote a specific section to Pirsig's discussion of *gumption*, as this has significant implications for the body.

Themes, metaphor, and analogy

The language used in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance reveals interesting connections between the "body" and the main focus of Pirsig's work...the intellectual framework he sets forth. Specifically, Pirsig utilizes metaphor and/or analogy to invoke the body in one theme of the book -- that of the cross-country motorcycle trip with his son. The use of metaphor and analogy is done so in such a way as to implicate the body in his more theoretical discussion of how technology can be reconciled with modern society. An interesting observation is that while Pirsig argues that one must engage the body in one's pursuit of Quality, he also makes use of several body references and *physical* terms in connecting the story theme to this discussion of Quality. Examples of this will be illustrated through some of the upcoming passages.

During the story theme of the text Pirsig observes that things are seen on a motorcycle in a way that is completely different from being in a car. In a car the individual has a sense of being enclosed, and this sense contributes to a feeling that one is a passive

observer in which scenes occur and disappear almost in a kind of frame. The cyclist experiences no such frame, Pirsig argues, and the feeling of being completely in contact with it all is ever-present. Pirsig notes: You're *in* the scene, not just watching it anymore, and the sense of presence is overwhelming" (p. 4). This passage appears early in the text, and one may wonder how this is at all connected with the body and/or Quality.

Pirsig is advocating very early that a distinction exists between those individuals who discover and engage Quality and those who do not. The individual behind the wheel of a car is not engaging the scene, while the cyclist is. This sets up later discussion in the text which proposes that to pursue Quality, one must engage an object, craft, job...etc. in similar fashion. The individual who is on the path toward Quality will feel like s/he is experiencing an object or craft, and that this experience is never removed from immediate consciousness. *The body comes into play only implicitly here, for to pursue Quality, Pirsig argues that the body must be engaged both physically and mentally.*[45]

In another early passage, Pirsig mentions that he and his son are traveling across the country with some friends, and that secondary roads are preferred over main highways and freeways. Pirsig adds that while they strive to make good time, the emphasis ought to be placed on the term *good* rather than *time*. He argues that when this shift in emphasis is made, one's entire approach changes. For example, while twisting hilly roads are long in terms of time, they are also much more enjoyable on the cycle than stretches of flat, barren land.

Pirsig is offering illustrations about the process of riding the cycle and vacationing, but more is going on here. The argument is made that when riding, an emphasis ought to

be placed on the *good* in making good time. While certain stretches of land may seem more time consuming, they are worth it if they are enjoyable. The same will be argued about dealing with technology and pursuing Quality in the other theme to Pirsig's text, the intellectual framework he develops. The implication is that the pursuit of Quality might be a lengthy one, such as with maintaining one's motorcycle, but it is also much more enriching and enjoyable if one has an understanding for Quality. Part of what makes motorcycle maintenance a lengthy process is the amount of detail involved in caring for the cycle and the patience one must have in doing so. Again, the body is only implicitly present in this discussion, as the connection between the pursuit of Quality and proper engagement of the body is a necessary one to recall. This will receive more detailed attention shortly.

Pirsig mentions that one character, "Sylvia," was almost flown out to Montana instead of cycling out with the rest of the characters in the story. Pirsig asserts that this would have been a mistake, for arriving in the Rocky Mountains by plane would be to see them in an entirely different way than after days of hard travel on the motorcycle. It is argued that the airplane traveler would view the Rockies as "pretty scenery," while the cyclist looks upon them as "a goal, a promised land" (p. 18). Though Pirsig doesn't explicitly mention it, the assumption is given that the airplane traveler would not possess the appreciation for the Rocky Mountains that the cyclist would.

Once again, an analogy is being drawn between riding the motorcycle across country (story theme) and the pursuit of Quality (reflective theme, intellectual framework). Pirsig implies that individuals who pursue Quality in their activities have to work harder

and put in more time, but end up possessing a greater appreciation for the nature of that activity, object, job...etc. This will likely be at least in part a result of the type of *relationship* the individual forges with his or her "pursuit." Recall prior discussion that the individual that eliminates subject-object dualisms and considers himself or herself to be in a sort of relationship with that "pursuit" will feel as though an investment has been made in it, and this allows for a greater feeling of appreciation for it. While the preceding passages have served to illustrate the connection Pirsig makes between multiple themes in the text, the body has only implicitly been linked to them -- as a significant component of Quality. However, the following passages serve to illustrate not only this continued implicit notion of the body vis-a-vis Quality, but also an employment of the body in physical motion as a means to connect the story theme to Pirsig's reflective theme. *Essentially, the body appears at* ***both*** *ends of the connection Pirsig attempts to create between the two themes. Invoking the body in the story theme of the text allows Pirsig to create* ***emphasis*** *on the body in his more reflective discussion about the need for individuals to pursue Quality.*

One metaphor and subsequent analogy that Pirsig draws upon is that of the *mountain*. It is here that one can begin to see more of an employment of the body concept at both ends of the connection Pirsig is attempting to make. One of the best indicators that the metaphor of the mountain serves to implicate both the body and the pursuit of Quality in a technological society is the following passage:

> Mountains like these and travelers in the mountains and the events that happen here are found not only in Zen literature but in the tales of every major religion. The allegory of a physical mountain for a spiritual one that stands between each soul and its goal is an easy and natural

> one to make. Like those in the valley behind us, most people stand
> in sight of the spiritual mountains all their lives and never enter them. (p. 167)

The final sentence of this passage suggests that in general most people stay at the "valley" level; that is, they don't make intellectual or spiritual pursuits of any real significance. Specifically, it is implied that most people don't take the time to pursue Quality in their everyday lives. As I've discussed, striving for Quality means eliminating subject-object dualisms, and this requires more *effort* on the part of the individual. Using the example of motorcycle maintenance, it requires taking the time to learn about the machine (something most people are not willing to do). Additionally, it requires being methodical and patient in one's upkeep of the cycle. The "working relationship" between individual and cycle must be established. While traversing a mountain "physically" gets related to the kind of effort most people put into their endeavors, it is the "spiritual" mountain most need to confront if Quality is to be achieved.

In the midst of climbing the mountain, Pirsig informs that reader that a short rest is needed, and this is due to the weight of the backpacks. He adds: "There's a negative reaction to all the weight. As we go on though, it'll become more natural" (p. 174). The climber of the mountain is having to adjust to the weight of the pack much in the same way individuals who first discover and seek to pursue Quality have to adjust becoming more observant, patient, diligent, and skilled. By declaring that the weight of the pack will become more natural, it can be implied that individuals will eventually accustom themselves to the Quality process. For example, an individual like the character "John," who regards technology from a *romantic* perspective and does not care to explore the underlying form of his cycle, would feel awkward at first if he began to maintain his own

cycle and look at it from a *classic* perspective. However, eventually he would come to appreciate this process and treat it as "natural."

The mountain metaphor appears again a few pages later:

> You climb the mountain in an equilibrium between restlessness and exhaustion. Then, when you're no longer thinking ahead, each footstep isn't just a means to an end but a unique event in itself. *This* leaf has jagged edges. *This* rock looks loose.....To live only for some future goal is shallow. It's the sides of the mountain which sustain life, not the top. Here's where things grow. (p. 183)

The act of climbing a mountain and the process involved (pushing the body, asserting effort) is described, but there is more going on here. Pirsig suggests that when you no longer only have your eye on the "ends," but instead start to indulge in the "means" or process, you escape the realm of shallowness and work toward what I would call fulfillment. The "equilibrium" mentioned here can be translated over to the everyday world of the individual, wherein s/he achieves a sort of harmony with what s/he is doing. This is analogous to one's job, hobbies, or in Pirsig's case again, motorcycle maintenance. Becoming familiar with the process of motorcycle maintenance, and ***not*** just with how it rides or handles, is a "unique event in itself." It allows one to appreciate the "sides of the mountain." With respect to technology, this is viewed as liberating for the individual. No longer would one be at the mercy of how the machine chooses to function. Rather, should an individual choose to explore the underlying form of the cycle, s/he would be able to understand it better, and have more control over how s/he wants it to perform. Conceivably, technology's grip on the individual would begin to loosen. The aforementioned passage provides the reader a glimpse into how such an "equilibrium" gets applied.

The final sentence of the passage, "Here's where things grow," has an *organic* appeal to it, and this gets related to the body in a later passage in which Pirsig is no longer within the "story," but is now adding to his intellectual framework (the two seesaw back and forth throughout the text):

> In pursuit of this ghost he (Phaedrus) went on to wider meanings of Quality which drew him further and further to his end...I've no intention of going on to that end...He just passed through this territory...I intend to stay and cultivate it and see if I can get something to grow.....A real understanding of Quality doesn't just serve the System, or even beat it or even escape it. A real understanding of Quality *captures* the System, tames it, and puts it to work for one's own use... (p. 200)

Terms like *cultivate* and *captures* pose images of the body in action. To cultivate an area of discussion and to see if one can "...get something to grow" present agricultural metaphors regarding a physical body at work on a farm or in a garden. Pirsig is explaining that he wants to explore the realm of Quality with respect to everyday living -- most specifically, living in a technological world. In doing so, he presents powerful imagery of the *body* at work. Additionally, the term *captures* in almost any context allows for the image of a set of hands reaching out to grab something, then clutching it to a point where it cannot escape. *Pirsig, in trying to discuss how Quality can lead to liberation within a technological society, presents powerful imagery not of the body as* ***static****, but as* ***dynamic*** *in carrying out an action.*

One final passage within the Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance reveals in powerful fashion the manner in which the mountain serves as a metaphor for the pursuit of Quality, and with respect to the body:

> We come to a rough grade and it changes to two breaths per step. At one bank it goes to four breaths per step. Huge steps, almost vertical.....The aspen

> staves come in handy now.....the packs make you top-heavy and the sticks are good insurance against toppling over. You plant one foot, plant the staff, then SWING on it, up, and take three breaths, then plant the next foot, plant the staff and SWING up... (p. 199)

The speaker is engaged in a steep, physical climb up the mountain. It is somewhat exhausting, and he is forced to take longer breaths. By the end of the passage, he is describing the methodical nature of the climb. "You plant one foot, plant the staff, then SWING on it, up, and take three breaths, then plant the next foot..." The fact that three breaths are needed between each step suggests how methodical and patient the climber needs to be in this situation. This is analogous to Pirsig's explication of the pursuit of Quality in the everyday world. In fact, the passage is a prime example of the pursuit itself. The individual needs to be methodical and patient when engaging anything if s/he wants to be doing it properly. Things might seem slow and time-consuming, but Pirsig would argue that there is nothing wrong with this. In fact, this is what getting at the *process* of things entails. Essentially, this is necessary for the achievement of both liberation and fulfillment in modern-day society. *This* is presented as the method for coping. The preceding passage serves as a sort of mini-illustration to the reader for how to apply it.

Pirsig relies on one theme, that of the cross-country motorcycle trip story, to shed light on the more theoretical theme that is his reflections about the nature of Quality. He does so in different ways, though. In some instances the body is only subtly implied, as it can never be far removed from what it means to pursue Quality. Thus, it is here that Pirsig implicates it at only one end of the link he attempts to make between themes. Other instances exist where Pirsig implicates it at both ends of the connection drawn. In an effort to explicate the former instances better, I will turn to a discussion of what I've made

generalizations about throughout this thesis thus far: Pirsig's more theoretical comments about the significance of the body to the Quality process. This will include a later discussion of the body and gumption, which is a key component to Pirsig's development of the concept Quality.

Reflections invoking the body

Pirsig argues that engaging the body in the pursuit of Quality entails not only *physical* engagement, but *mental* engagement as well. One example he offers is the case of the auto or cycle mechanic. Pirsig asserts that untrained observers often perceive the mechanic's work largely to be made up of physical labor. However, this is only a small part of the mechanic's job. The physical labor exerted by the mechanic actually works in concert with the type of careful observation and precise thinking that constitute mental engagement. This of course carries with it the assumption that the mechanic adopts a craftsmanlike approach to work. Pirsig suggests that if one were to observe the expression of a novice workman and compare it to that of a craftsman whose work is known to be excellent, the difference would be visible. For example, the craftsman never proceeds in a straight line. Rather, decisions are made as the work unfolds. For this reason, Pirsig suggests that the craftsman will be absorbed and attentive to what s/he is doing without deliberately contriving this. Essentially, the motions of the craftsman will be in a kind of harmony with, in this case, the machine.

The larger point Pirsig attempts to drive home here is that the divorce of art from technology is unnatural. That is, individuals now see technology as being distant and removed from the artistic process. Pirsig would advocate that technology, and the

engagement of technology, is as much an artistic process as painting and songwriting. Pirsig ponders at one point how strange it is that old, obsolete buildings and the technology of fifty and a hundred years ago always appears to *look* better than its modern successors. Implied here is that what prevailed in the past was a more craftsmanlike approach to engaging technology. This approach had as its end Quality. Thus, a construction worker who was assigned to help construct a building engaged his or her body in such a way as to pursue Quality. The result would be a building, plant, or mill that stands the test of time because it is done right. Pirsig communicates this feeling when he contemplates this older technology and compares it with newer forms of technology that do not seem to exude such craftsmanship.[46]

Pirsig utilizes another metaphor, that of the *stream*, in arguing that individuals are searching for additional fulfillment in the wake of having vital necessities such as food, clothing and shelter provided for (thanks in part to technology):

> Now the stream of our common consciousness seems to be obliterating its own banks, losing its central direction and purpose...and to no particular purpose other than the wasteful fulfillment of its own internal momentum. Some channel deepening seems called for. (p. 7)

The stream is connected to the collective mindset of modern society, and it is argued that individuals are caught up in a world of unfulfillment even though something *more* is desired. Whereas for many the vital needs of food, clothing and shelter are no longer a challenge to procure, what remains are feelings of emptiness and futility that individuals appear to be experiencing. Pirsig asserts that the result of this is a lack of recognition where Quality is concerned. The "channel deepening" that seems necessary is implied to be a new approach to engaging technology. This approach has as its centerpiece the

concept of Quality, and individuals must exert themselves physically and mentally in pursuing it if they are to attain sufficient levels of fulfillment.

An incident Pirsig encounters while on the road serves to illustrate the argument that art and technology should not be separated. Pirsig has to stop into a small welder's shop to have a chain guard fixed for his cycle. He explains the problem to the welder, an older gentleman, and the welder proceeds to fix the chain guard in a more intricate and delicate manner than Pirsig admits he ever could. Pirsig is forced to ask himself: "Who appreciates work like this anymore?" (p. 321). The way in which the scene is set up and played out suggests that the welder is perceived by Pirsig to be a craftsman, one who engages his work in such as a way as to pursue Quality. The end result is a job done right, even better than Pirsig confesses he could do. In the following section, I will examine a key concept to Pirsig's reflections about Quality: gumption.

Gumption and the body

Pirsig characterizes gumption as being what happens to the individual who connects with Quality. This connection does not necessarily mean Quality is already achieved. It could simply mean that an understanding of Quality has been acquired. Pirsig observes that individuals who return from a peaceful vacation, say a long fishing trip, seem to be filled with gumption. He argues that when he repairs his motorcycle, an adequate supply of gumption is necessary at the start, for it is the "psychic gasoline" that keeps the him going.

Pirsig suggests that just as easily as the physical and mental capacities of an individual can be working together because of gumption, a lack of it can lead to

frustration, anger, and impatience. *Gumption is an essential component to the Quality process, and its presence or absence will be visible in the type of physical and mental effort exuded by the individual.* Pirsig illustrates:

> Throughout the process of fixing the machine things always come up, low-quality things, from a dusted knuckle to an accidentally ruined "irreplaceable" assembly. These drain off gumption, destroy enthusiasm and leave you so discouraged you want to forget the whole business. I call these things "gumption traps." (p. 274)

Pirsig asserts that gumption traps, if they do not leave the individual wanting to drop the entire Quality pursuit, will lead to improper bodily engagement for the individual. That is, the individual will engage his or her body physically and mentally in such a way that anything *but* Quality will be the outcome.

This point receives further development later, as gumption traps are isolated into two main types: *setbacks* and *hang-ups*. During setbacks, the individual is proposed to be thrown off the path to Quality by external conditions. Utilizing Pirsig's example of motorcycle maintenance, the individual might encounter *parts* trouble, wherein a certain part might be needed that is not already present. Thus, the individual has to search the city for a mechanic or parts store that carries the part in question. This can lead to frustration, and the implied message is that when the individual returns to his cycle to repair it, the potential exists for a lower Quality experience regarding that pursuit.[47] The body is implicated at the level of improper physical and mental engagement in repairing the cycle.

The second type of gumption trap -- hang-ups -- poses even greater implications for the body. This type of trap is more a result of the internal conditions of the individual,

and Pirsig classifies these into three types: 1) *value* traps, such as ego, anxiety, boredom and impatience; 2) *truth* traps, where the individual assumes for example that "yes' or "no" is the answer to a question, rather than acknowledging the possibility of "maybe" or even "there is no answer at this time"; and 3) *muscle* traps, such as working in bad surroundings, using bad tools, or what Pirsig calls "muscular insensitivity."

The first and third types of hang-ups have the greatest implications for the body. For example, value traps like an over-sized ego and feelings of anxiety, boredom and/or patience will in all likelihood result in an improper mental engagement of the body. This translates into poor physical performance, and the end result is a low-Quality experience for the individual. If an individual's ego gets in the way of accepting new forms of thought where the cycle is concerned, this blockage will function as a deterrent to Quality. Similarly, feelings of boredom, anxiety, impatience and even *fatigue* create blockage, and it will be more difficult for the individual to experience Quality.

In the story theme of the text, Pirsig illustrates how fatigue and impatience contribute to a low-Quality experience. Exhausted after a long day of traveling, the four characters (Pirsig, Chris, John and Sylvia) try to set up camp and prepare food. Their bodies are physically tired, and perceiving only one-half hour of remaining daylight leads to feelings of impatience where setting up camp is concerned. They try to rush through the process, but are too tired to do anything effectively. In the end they are just glad to get to sleep.[48]

Regarding muscle traps, if an individual buys ineffective or poorly constructed tools and turns up the volume of the radio while trying to repair a cycle, the end result will

once again be a lower Quality experience than what could be achieved.[49] Both concentration and performance will be what suffers. For this reason, it is imperative that an individual be comfortable with one's tools, one's knowledge of those tools, and one's surroundings. Pirsig also asserts that muscular insensitivity can be a gumption trap. This can best be characterized as a lack of ability to perform very *precise* tasks at the level of *physical* engagement. For example, in maintaining the cycle, Pirsig speaks of certain tools which he refers to as precision instruments. These tools are meant to be applied to extremely intricate components of the cycle (often very expensive components, as well). If an individual has "shaky hands," s/he will probably be forced to recognize the gumption trap Pirsig refers to as muscular insensitivity.[50]

Where muscular insensitivity largely entails a physical engagement of the body, the notion of *stuckness* appears to deal more with mental engagement. It is certain though, with stuckness and other gumption-related concepts, that *proper or improper mental engagement of the body will directly motivate proper or improper physical engagement.* Pirsig suggests:

> Stuckness shouldn't be avoided. It's the psychic predecessor of all real understanding. An egoless acceptance of stuckness is a key to an understanding of all Quality, in mechanical work as in other endeavors. (p. 257)

Pirsig places a positive spin on the idea of being stuck in one's pursuit. An implicit suggestion is that if one possesses gumption, stuckness will not prevail for long. The individual, provided s/he avoids the gumption trap of an over-sized ego, will eventually slip out of this state of stuckness and back on the path to Quality.

Pirsig explicates this discussion by detailing Chris' trouble with writing a letter to

his mother. Chris does not know where to begin, and Pirsig informs him that getting stuck is common. It usually occurs when one is trying to think of (or do) too many things at once. Rather than trying to figure out what to say and what to say *first*, Pirsig advises Chris to sort out all of the things he wants to say to his mother in the letter. This is analogous to Pirsig's discussion of the motorcycle. For example, in assembling or taking apart the cycle, Pirsig recommends keeping specific track of the order things are done. This type of organization will ensure that the individual accomplishes everything s/he wants, and that each thing gets accomplished in a specific order. Doing this not only ensures that one will sustain present levels of gumption, but that specific gumption traps will also be avoided.

Pirsig argues that individuals who possess gumption reveal a type of inner quietness and peace of mind. This peace of mind paves the way to Quality, part of acquiring it means recognizing the various levels at which it occurs. For example, physical quietness is a necessary component to peace of mind. This entails working at a level of quietness that promotes concentration and attentiveness to one's endeavor, and Pirsig argues this to be the easiest to achieve. Mental quietness occurs when one has no wondering thoughts at all. Related to this is value quietness, where one performs the acts of his pursuit without any wondering desires at all. Pirsig argues this type of quietness to be the most difficult to achieve. The implication is that if one is able to mentally engage the body in this fashion, then the type of physical application that results from this will almost certainly lead one to Quality.

I have addressed the implicated body in Pirsig's discussion of technology. Pirsig

asserts that technology *can* be reconciled with modern society as long as individuals re-assess their own values in a way that both recognizes and pursues Quality. The body is the "vehicle" through which such effort is exerted. Physical and mental engagement are necessary to arrive at Quality.

In summarizing:

- Pirsig uses the story theme in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance to inform the more reflective theme about the nature of Quality. In doing so, the body is implicated at the more subtle level of its connection to Quality.

- Additionally, there are instances in which Pirsig invokes the body in a physical way by presenting it in the story theme, but also connecting it to his more theoretical discussion about Quality. At times, the image conjured is that of a *body in motion*, either climbing a mountain or at work in a garden.

- Pirsig *reflects* on technology and its implications for the body, and one of the more focal ways this is done appears in his discussion of gumption. Gumption entails both physical and mental engagment of the body, and avoiding gumption "traps"can lead to Quality.

I will now compare and contrast the ways Pirsig and Kaczynski implicate the body in their overall discussions.

Kaczynski, Pirsig, and The Implicated Body

One can recall Kaczynski's argument that individuals must first break free from technology and modern society before an adequate engagement of the body can occur. Once this type of freedom is procured individuals will be able to engage the body as Kaczynski argues it ought to be engaged. That is, individuals will exert their bodies both physically and mentally in pursuing real goals (as opposed to surrogate activities). Essentially, the need for the power process will be served, according to Kaczynski.

Because individuals will be free from technology, the body will be engaged properly and, subsequently, increased levels of freedom and fulfillment will prevail. *Kaczynski invokes the body as an **end**, where a necessary precursor to its proper engagement is the abolition of the modern technological system.* This differs from the ways Pirsig implicates the body.

Pirsig suggests that what is *first* needed in the quest for freedom and fulfillment is a proper physical and mental engagement of the body. This *can* be achieved alongside technology and within modern society, as long as individuals re-assess their values to include an understanding and pursuit of Quality. If this is done, individuals will no longer feel frustrated by and alienated from technology. Rather, the opposite will prevail. *Pirsig argues that the body is the **means** by which individuals can procure sufficient levels of freedom, fulfillment and purpose.* This can only be accomplished, though, if individuals discover Quality and pursue it in their jobs, hobbies, and everyday tasks. Once Quality is recognized, the individual will use his or her body to physically and mentally pursue it in the aforementioned endeavors. Thus, where Kaczynski connects the body to the power process, Pirsig connects it to Quality. Pirsig and Kaczynski implicate the body at different levels of their overall argument, but discussing the body differently can also be attributed to the stylistic differences that exist between the Manifesto and Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.

Kaczynski 's argumentative and rationalistic approach to the Manifesto leaves him discussing the body merely as it *should* be engaged (and how this is not the case in modern society). That is, individuals have a need for the power process, but that need can only be

served if the individual breaks free from modern industrial-technological society. Part of the reason Kaczynski discusses the body predominantly in this manner only is that he presents an argument that is not multi-themed. Pirsig, however, incorporates multiple themes in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. The body receives attention not only in his theoretical and reflective theme, but in the story theme as well. The reader of the text is presented with multi-leveled images of the body. One potential result of this is a perception that the body is more significant to Pirsig's argument than it is to Kaczynski's. I argue that this conclusion would be misleading, for in referring back to the diagram of both authors' overall argument, it becomes evident that the body is treated as one step in the "recommendations" of both Pirsig and Kaczynski. It is just that for Pirsig the body crosses over from one theme into another.

CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION

In the following chapter I will offer conclusions about the two texts, re-addressing the methods utilized in this thesis and their implications. Included in this will be a brief return to the research questions posed in chapter one. Additionally, I will return to the level of theory, drawing especially on Borgmann's (1984) work (though others, as well) in order to provide critical, philosophical insight into the ways Pirsig and Kaczynski discuss freedom and the body alongside technology. Finally, I will broaden my lens to the more general topic of technology and society, offering conclusions about what this work can contribute to its overall discussion.

The Two Texts

At the close of chapter one, the following research questions were posed:

RQ1: In what ways do Kaczynski and Pirsig discuss the issue of technology with respect to society?

RQ2: How are Kaczynski and Pirsig similar and different in the ways they discuss technology with respect to society?

It can now be seen that Kaczynski and Pirsig present similar arguments regarding the impact technology has upon members of modern society (e.g., potential feelings of frustration, unfulfillment, insecurity, etc.). At the level of *assessment*, though, the two authors proceed in entirely different directions for how individuals ought to cope with technology. Freedom and the body are key concepts appealed to by Kaczynski and Pirsig. Where Kaczynski asserts that individuals must break free from technology and the

structure of modern society in order to properly experience the body (an subsequently, increased levels of freedom), Pirsig argues that technology *can* be reconciled with modern society if the individual first engages one's body both physically and mentally in the pursuit of Quality. The result of this will be increased feelings of freedom, which take the form of peace of mind, control, security, creativity and power, to name a few primary ones. Essentially, Kaczynski advocates a *revolution against technology*, and Pirsig advocates *reform within technology*. This reform is very much reliant upon the individual's re-assessment of his or her values to include a recognition and pursuit of Quality.

The phenomenon of technology is an expansive subject for anyone to approach. Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance and the Manifesto are examples of two texts which address the phenomenon as a whole, rather than with respect to one or more specific innovations. *Conducting a comparative analysis of two texts which address technology has allowed for a more comprehensive interpretation of the phenomenon, particularly when it is observed that similar notions (e.g., freedom and the body) are implicated in both.* Thus, both texts functioned to shed light on the phenomenon of technology in ways I had hoped they would, and observing discussions of freedom and the body allowed for an illumination of the primary means through which such discussion occurred.

McGee's (1980) concept of the ideograph was employed to examine <freedom> as it appears in the Manifesto and Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. The ideographic analysis of freedom is, as Sillars (1991) would put it, a "value analysis." Appealing to values is a popular move to make these days, it seems. Indeed, Cheney (in

press) observes that values are "all the rage in today's organizations," but the stress on values manifests itself in many different ways. The ambiguities surrounding important value terms are interpretive resources, sources of emotional allegiance, and bases for persuasion. This thesis examined the value of freedom as it appeared not in organizational mission statements or political speeches, but in discussion about the phenomenon of technology with respect to modern society. This has significant implications.

First, it is significant that *both* texts connect the concept of freedom to a discussion of technology. Kaczynski and Pirsig wind up with different recommendations for how we as a society ought to respond to the perceived restrictions of freedom that technology presents the individual, but the fact remains that both authors appeal to this concept when discussing technology. Tapping into this particular value appears to be a necessary move to make when discussing and evaluating technology as a phenomenon, either explicitly (as in the Manifesto) or more implicitly (as in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance). In the latter case, an appeal will be made to related concepts, such as security, peace of mind, power, and/or their antitheses.

It has been observed that ambiguities exist in both texts, and for the most part these ambiguities are a result of the authors' lack of clarity when presenting a particular argument. However, in appealing to freedom, a different sort of ambiguity emerges. This type of ambiguity functions almost as an *enthymeme* for the reader of these texts. An enthymeme is the building block of deductive approaches to persuasion, according to Aristotle (1954). Specifically, the enthymeme involves an argument that explicitly or implicitly draws upon value or factual premises already held by an audience. That is, the

enthymeme utilizes something the audience already holds as a fulcrum for persuasion. Kaczynski invokes the concept freedom not only by using related terms such as "autonomy," but also by frequently *implying* that individuals experience restricted levels of freedom in modern society. In this case, Kaczynski does not actually use the term "freedom" itself. Pirsig presents an even clearer example of this by *only* invoking freedom at an *implicit* level. He relies instead on notions of security, peace of mind, and control (among others), as well as their antitheses, in appealing to freedom. By creating ambiguity in appealing to freedom, ambiguity itself appears to be a strategic appeal. Readers of these texts are drawn into recognizing freedom as a crucial factor in the overall arguments concerning technology and society. If the argument is accepted, the persuasiveness of the text is enhanced, since the reader has a hand in creating the link to freedom.[51] Ambiguity in value-oriented discourse has the potential to be very powerful, particularly in cases such as this, where the value in question is a dominant, highly-recognized one which gets invoked by discussing other related (though subordinate) values (e.g., security, peace of mind, autonomy, control, etc.). Indeed, ambiguity is an inherent dimension of language, and tuning into those areas which possess it can reveal interesting findings (Burke, 1950). In fact, as Cheney (in press) observes, often the more important an idea is, the more abstract its form will be. Its very abstractness can serve as a strategic advantage in practical contexts. Consequently, a wider range of possibilities will exist for pragmatic as well as ideological implications under the umbrella of, say, "freedom," "democracy," "efficiency," etc. (Cheney, in press).

A second significant implication is that technology will in all likelihood receive

greater critical examination the more its role increases in the daily lives of individuals. It will become even more necessary to isolate particular values that come to the surface in these examinations. Will value *shifts* occur in the way technology is critically examined? Will specific values reappear or disappear altogether in future discussions of the phenomenon? These are relevant questions that value analyses in general and ideographic analyses specifically can probe when inquiring about the nature of technology.

The body was raised to a level of analysis, as I examined what I refer to as the "implicated body" in both texts. Conducting what I consider to be a "body-centered analysis" is not a common move to make. However, some brands of criticism do emphasize the "place' of the body in discourse (e.g., Foucault, 1978). More often than not the body is invoked through other methods of examining discourse. For example, I choose to examine the body and *metaphor* in addressing Pirsig's transition from one theme to another in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. I also discussed the Manifesto's employment of the "infected collective body" metaphor in arguing that genetic engineering could lead to increased numbers of genes that pose tendencies toward various diseases. Of course, the body is invoked in ways other than metaphorical ones, as more *direct* and *explicit* discussions of it are undertaken by Pirsig and Kaczynski. Because of the emphasis placed on the body by both authors, I argue that it is a worthy focus of inquiry. Thus, rather than conduct a metaphor analysis that relied partly on the body, a "body analysis" that revealed occasional usage of metaphor was carried out.

This may become more of a trend in the future, particularly for the critic who wishes to explore the phenomenon of technology. Of course, one need not look only to

technology for discussion of the body. In modern society, bodily image is promoted more and more. Everywhere we turn we are confronted with appeals to *this* diet supplement, *that* muscle-building protein shake, *this* particular piece of exercise equipment, *that* ideal bodily figure, just to name a few images. Indeed, a Foucauldian interpretation of the body would not be an inaccurate one here. Foucault (1977; 1978) asserts that society disciplines individuals to discipline their bodies in order to adhere to social expectations. Implicit in Marcuse's (1968) discussion is that, in a world where technology contributes to providing society with vital needs, and individuals are left to seek fulfillment by satisfying "non-necessary" needs, the body is engaged in a more insignificant manner. Ever-developing technology will presumably continue to reinforce this trend. Body-centered criticism may be relied upon to a greater extent in situations where critics seek to incorporate multiple forms of analyses, such as narrative, dramatistic, metaphorical, and/or value analysis, under the larger "corpus" that is the body.

Both Pirsig and Kaczynski appeal to notions of freedom and the body in their discussions of technology and society. They do this despite the fact that Pirsig argues that technology is reconcilable within modern society and Kaczynski argues that technology must be abolished. This is also the case in spite of recognizable stylistic differences between the two texts. It can therefore be argued that *notions of freedom and the body are significant concepts to the examination of technology and society.* Drawing on Borgmann's (1984) work to illuminate potential shortcomings of both texts will also reveal, in what follows, that the body and freedom are pivotal to a discussion of technology, even if one or both concepts appears implicitly.[52] The critic that examines

texts discussing technology would be well-served by investigating the forms that these concepts take in such discussion.

Perhaps even more significant than the fact that these two concepts appear in a discussion about technology is that they appear in a way that makes it difficult to distinguish them. Pirsig's employment of multiple themes seems to make the distinction between freedom and the body a bit clearer, but for the most part these concepts are as much interwoven as they are separate. This connection that exists may not be all that surprising, given the nature of the discussion. Reflecting on technology as a phenomenon almost certainly requires the scholar to examine its effects at the level of the individual. Once this is undertaken, appealing to concepts such as freedom and the body are appeals to individual concerns where technology is concerned. Questions such as: *Will technology make greater or fewer demands on my body, physically and mentally?* and *What does technology mean for my individual freedom?* are ones which demand answers. At a more theoretical level, the question: *Will technology lead me to conceptualizations of my body and the nature of freedom that are different from past conceptualizations?* seems relevant and timely.

Theory Redux

> It is the promise of technology that has both fueled and disguised the gigantic transformative endeavors that have given our time its character. (Borgmann, p. 35)

Both Pirsig and Kaczynski accurately detect that problems exist with how individuals cope with technology and modern society. Both authors suggest that levels of

freedom and fulfillment are perceived to suffer, either at the hands of the entire technological system (in Kaczynski's case) or from the way individuals engage technology (in Pirsig's case). Pirsig and Kaczynski are correct in arguing that freedom and the body are core concepts in addressing technology's impact on the individual. Both authors do good work illuminating these concepts, despite the fact that freedom and the body appear in different areas and in different ways in their overall arguments.[53] However, in proposing ways for how we as a society ought to *respond* to issues such as freedom and fulfillment where technology is implicated, both authors fall short in their analyses.

Borgmann's (1984) discussion of technology serves to illuminate the shortcomings of both Kaczynski and Pirsig. Kaczynski suggests that the body cannot be engaged properly in modern society. This is so because the power process cannot be experienced in a significant way. Individuals must revolt against and break free from the current technological structure, which Kaczynski argues to be the *source* of restricted levels of freedom, increased feelings of frustration and purposelessness, and surrogate activities. In many ways Kaczynski articulates ideas proposed by Ellul (1964) and Marcuse (1968). Recall that these philosophers both assert that freedom is frequently restricted in modern technological society (e.g., by providing us with "more" to be accountable to, such as increasing means of communication). Additionally, superficial needs are foregrounded as a result of having vital needs provided for without the exertion of serious effort. For example, individuals who do not directly provide for their own vital needs more often than not take up hobbies or direct their efforts toward the acquisition of material goods. Kaczynski would suggest that these superficial needs are pursued through *surrogate*

activities. The end result of this is a body that is not engaged properly, as well as continued restrictions placed on individual freedom.

Borgmann responds to this issue by arguing that the body *can* be engaged properly and individuals *can* experience sufficient levels of freedom and fulfillment in modern society. What is advocated is not a revolution against technology *per se*, but a shift in the way technology is perceived and embraced. Borgmann proposes that individuals ought to place the phenomenon of technology in the background of their daily lives rather than foregrounding it. That is, rather than relying on technology to such a point that it contributes to defining oneself, the individual ought to place it in such a role that it merely complements one's life.

Borgmann develops the concept of the *device paradigm* in explicating the ways individuals can fall into the trap of foregrounding technology and experiencing perceived feelings of unfulfillment. One example given is that of the central heating plant. While heat used to be something individuals had to exert serious effort to procure, today it is acquired for many by simply adjusting a thermostat. One result of this is that individuals no longer have to exert serious effort in order to secure this necessary need. Thus, the physical effort that used to be applied toward producing heat, often through a woodstove, is either channeled elsewhere or left in a static state. The device paradigm makes genuine *engagement* virtually impossible. This leads to another result of the device paradigm -- that individuals feel removed from that which provides for them. A heating plant can be perceived as an ominous, obscure entity, one which is responsible for the production of a crucial product. The experience of having such a need provided by a largely mysterious

entity can be an unsettling one for the individual. This speaks to Kaczynski's claim that individuals feel their lives are in the hands of mysterious forces or people, and that it is necessary to remove oneself from technology in order to arrive at genuine freedom and fulfillment.

Borgmann suggests that the *focal practice* is the answer in sustaining levels of freedom and fulfillment, while at the same time engaging the body properly. Focal practices allow the individual to place the phenomenon of technology in the background of daily life. When this is accomplished, things like central heating plants take on a more positive meaning in the lives of individuals. They are seen for what they are -- innovations that improve the quality of everyday life. In articulating the nature of the focal practice, Borgmann asserts:

> A focal practice, generally, is the resolute and regular dedication to a focal thing. It sponsors discipline and skill which are exercised in a unity of achievement and enjoyment, of mind and body. (p. 219)

One example of a focal practice given by Borgmann is running. For the runner, the road is a focal thing. The runner makes demands on one's skill in engaging the road. Skiing is also a focal practice, and it is the slope that is a focal thing for the skier. One might suggest that in fact technology is still foregrounded for these individuals, as they rely on technology in order to engage these focal practices and things. Borgmann responds that technological engagement is certainly present, as these activities depend on running shoes, skis, ski boots, etc. However, these technological devices do not procure but *mediate* focal engagement. The individual still must exert effort and apply skill toward these practices, and engagement in the end comes with the road, the slope, etc.[54] For

Borgmann, focal things and practices can empower society to propose and potentially enact a reform of technology, by first placing it in the background of daily life, and then opening up public discussion of it as a phenomenon. This latter point will receive greater attention later.

Kaczynski would suggest that discussion about reform within technology and finding fulfillment and freedom alongside technology neglects the imminent threat it poses to human freedom. Recall previous arguments in the Manifesto which state that technology will eventually acquire near complete control over human behavior, and that the genetic engineering of our species will become an ever-present reality in the future. Thus, not only would freedom suffer, but our bodies would also succumb to the pressures of technology.

Borgmann proposes:

> What is needed if we are to make the world truly and finally ours again is the recovery of a center and a standpoint from which one can tell what matters in the world and what merely clutters it up. A focal concern is that center of orientation. (p. 225).

Not getting caught up in all of the "clutter" is the challenge for individuals. A focal concern is one which recognizes focal things and practices, and if individuals can recognize these, it is argued that much of the clutter will inevitably fade to the background of daily life. For example, the world of commodities and consumption is a growing one, but if individuals adopt more of a focal concern, less attention will be given to a pursuit of commodities and a consumption of consumer goods. Focal things and practices take up time through their engagement. A focal concern does more than illuminate focal things and practices, though.

Recognition of a focal concern must occur through a collective affirmation. That is, by discussing issues openly and at local levels (as well as beyond), society must arrive at a shared understanding of and commitment to a "certain kind of behavior or enterprise" (p. 233). This collective affirmation will allow society to make decisions and accomplish tasks that are beyond the capacities of single individuals. It is at this level that society will be able to recognize trends that need to be either altered or reversed, such as with the kind of potential Kaczynski argues genetic engineering exhibits.

Finally, Kaczynski appears to hurt his own argument when he claims that while there is nothing to prevent us from marching out to the wilderness to live primitively, in practice there is very little wild country left. It is wild nature that Kaczynski advocates, within which he includes wild human nature. However, a tension exists in his overall proposal that individuals must break free from technology and live primitively. With so much land already developed to sustain modern society, how is it that Kaczynski can claim individuals must revert back to a primitive lifestyle, when living primitively means living in the wild if one wants to survive? Kaczynski readily admits that very little wild country remains in America, yet he acknowledges that everyone must live close to nature in the face of technological absence.[55] Kaczynski proposes that a period of harsh adjustment will be necessary, but this seems an understatement given the number of people who would be all but forced to sacrifice their lives.

Borgmann suggests that living today in a physically sustainable way requires an acceptance of technology, but that this acceptance is the sign of a new maturity. Thus, a notion of wilderness no longer receives respect through its appeal to "wildness." Rather,

the wilderness now moves us deeply in being so fragile and vulnerable, according to Borgmann. Wild nature achieves new and positive significance within the technological setting. A greater respect is what often accompanies this, and it is hoped that these feelings translate into the kind of collective decision-making that promotes the well-being of wild nature and the wilderness.

Borgmann would argue that Kaczynski's notion of the power process can in fact be served in modern society, and in such a way that engages the body and produces feelings of freedom and fulfillment. What is required on the part of the individual is a shift in perspective. Technology must no longer be foregrounded, and focal practices are ways that individuals can push technology to the background of everyday life. Thus, if an individual defines oneself as a runner, a writer, a musician and/or a painter first and foremost, then technology takes on a new meaning. This new meaning, where technology is backgrounded, is an appreciation for what it has to offer the modern individual. Robert Pirsig also argues that technology can be reconciled with modern society. However, his overall argument is open for criticism when considered alongside Borgmann's discussion of technology and society.

Pirsig declares that it is his intention to ground out a discussion of Quality in the everyday world. As Borgmann (1984) observes, though, Quality takes on such a broad meaning that it loses much of its appeal. Cheney (in press) reveals that the concept "Quality" is a vague one to begin with, one which is conceptualized by today's organizations not so much as a striving for higher standards of excellence, but merely a direct response to perceived demands. The concept is at once compelling and almost

meaningless in contemporary institutions, as no organizations will proclaim themselves to be "anti-quality." Quality has universal appeal, yet it means almost nothing. In fact, technology itself has become tied up with the abstract value of progress and a pursuit of "the good life," today more than ever. This connection has permitted technology to be deemed sacred by many.

Pirsig argues that physical and mental engagement of the body is the means by which one arrives at Quality, once an understanding of it is achieved, and it is Quality which will present the individual with increased feelings of fulfillment and freedom. However, Pirsig argues that this concept can be applied even at the level of one's own job. He advocates a return to more of a craftsmanlike approach in one's work. Borgmann correctly points out that a "Zen-like" approach to all types of jobs simply is not the answer anymore, for specialization has nudged its way into the workforce at many levels. Traditional crafts, and craftsmanship, is what has suffered. This was the case in the 1970s, and is even more the case today. Borgmann recognizes that innovations can occur only by displacing one form of tradition. Thus, technology had to displace and all but eliminate traditional crafts. The lack of care that Pirsig argues is present in things like jobs is perhaps only *partly* due to a change in values. The specialization of labor that has developed is a consideration Pirsig does not address.

Quality does appear to possess some similarities to Borgmann's discussion of the focal practice. Borgmann discusses an "excellence" that is at the heart of many pursuits, and Quality as Pirsig references it can be argued to translate to excellence. Both discussions also tie nicely into Csikszentmihalyi's (1990) concept of "flow," which can be

characterized as the immersion and enjoyment experienced by the individual who voluntarily applies effort in engaging something difficult and worthwhile. However, the concepts of Quality and the focal practice begin to diverge at the level of application. Pirsig applies Quality not only to all types of jobs, but to endeavors that Borgmann would *not* characterize as focal practices. Pirsig speaks of the need for engaging his motorcycle, and he argues that he can pursue Quality in maintaining it. This is another example of Pirsig applying the concept of Quality too broadly. In this case, technology is still in the foreground for the individual. Not only is technology *utilized* in applying what is perceived to be skill, it is the *object* that the skill is applied toward. This contrasts with the skier, who allows technology to mediate engagement, but engagement is ultimately with the slope.[56] Thus, the skier must exert himself or herself mentally and physically in order to maneuver the slope. Skill is a necessity. One could make the case that no real skill is needed by Pirsig in maintaining the cycle, only a specific knowledge about its form and function. For Pirsig, technology is implicated at the level of both focal practice and focal thing (with the cycle being the focal thing).[57] Again, technology is still in the foreground in Pirsig's case.

Another reason that a "foregrounded" technology is problematic is because it reveals very little about an individual's surrounding world. For example, Borgmann notes that one might argue that a video game is a focal practice. However, video games usually require a narrow range of skills, and they proceed in "utter indifference to the surrounding world" (p. 215). Conversely, runners and skiers engage roads and mountains, and are *in* the natural world. Video games not only geographically isolate the individual from the

world (when engaged), they also reveal very little about the world in their engagement. This contrasts with writing, which may also be done in isolation, but the difference is that it seeks to illuminate the world around the individual in some way.[58] *Essentially, Pirsig applies his concept of Quality too broadly in attempting to reconcile technology with society.*

Still, one has to wonder about the individual who engages computer programming, or video games, and actually takes the time to learn about the functioning of these things while at the same time attempting to excel at them. If this individual experiences no frustration or alienation from technology (i.e., the problem of technology is virtually non-existent with him/her), then these endeavors might function in a similar fashion to the focal practice. They may not be the *best* types of focal practices, but for these individuals they appear to serve this purpose.

Finally, Borgmann's discussion of focal things and practices appears to contribute to Burke's (1973) notion of "counter nature," and the potential technology has for allowing the individual to engage it in such a way that a false perception of effort is experienced (e.g., in driving, and the perceived feeling of power individuals can experience when they accelerate by pressing down on the gas pedal). It is easy for individuals to slip into a mindset that they are exerting effort in a given situation, when it is in fact technology which is producing the effort. By adopting a focal concern, the phenomenon of technology is placed in the background of daily life, and it becomes easier for individuals to recognize not only what technology is *doing*, but what it is doing *for them.* It is implied that the individual will now have a better understanding of this distinction.

Technology and Society

Coping with technology in a way that ensures fulfillment is a challenge for the modern individual. The phenomenon itself looms large in virtually every sphere of life nowadays. The suggestion that technology is omnipresent would not be far from the truth. Moreover, the images of technology that appear in current magazines such as Wired are glamorous and forward-looking, but also *cold*, in that innovations such as home computers are continually becoming more powerful -- at a rate sometimes appearing to be beyond human control). Technology's seemingly relentless development creates the potential for a more distant relationship with its "pioneers" and users. Commodification and consumption proliferate in an environment where technology and advertising campaigns (among other influences) create persuasive, seductive images of "the good life." These images increasingly consist of newer technologies, such as high-speed gadgets, big-screen televisions, powerful personal computers, etc. It is a genre of discourse (though visual appeals hold great persuasive power, as well) all to its own -- one which embraces commodification and seeks to expand the growing realm of consumption. However, there are ways for the individual to cope with technology that are less extreme than creating a revolution against it. Borgmann's (1984) discussion of focal things and practices presents the individual with such a method for coping with technology.

If individuals can define themselves in ways that place the phenomenon of technology in the background of daily life, concepts like the device paradigm will cease to exist. That is, individuals will no longer feel as though everything about their lives is driven by technology. Rather, technology will be assessed at the level of what it has to

offer the individual. Freedom and fulfillment will proliferate, but proper physical and mental engagement of the body may not have to occur through focal practices. In other words, it may be enough for an individual to physically engage his or her body at work, and then rely upon focal practices for mental engagement (e.g., with writing). Thus, the focal practice can produce fulfillment without allowing for significant physical engagement of the body.

Focal things and practices contribute to a focal concern, and it is this concern which allows society to address relevant issues of its time. By adopting a focal concern, and arriving at some sort of consensus or list of priorities where issues that affect all of society are concerned, discussion at a "mass" level can lead to decisions about such issues (e.g., the current trend of genetic engineering, and how work in this field should proceed). A focal concern can contribute at the level of the individual (focal things and practices) as well as the societal level (discourse about societal issues). Thus, it is one method of resolving the conflict between the extreme technological *deterministic* position and the positions which characterize technology either as an unstoppable but positive force, or as nothing more than an innocuous *tool*. The latter positions are closer to each other in relation than the deterministic position, since they characterize technology more positively. In attempting to resolve the conflict between these positions, technology is seen as a force in its own right (much like the deterministic and "positive force" positions), such as through the device paradigm, and the potential it holds for creating feelings of frustration and alienation from technology in individuals. However, it is a force which can be coped with in modern society.

Monitoring the phenomenon of technology and its impact on society must remain an ongoing process. As mentioned, *changes* as well as *shifts* in values are worthy issues to probe in researching technology. Also, examining the ways the body is implicated in discussions of technology is certainly relative to a given time period as well as culture. This point appears to justify ongoing examination of the body vis-a-vis technology. Essentially, the phenomenon of technology is one that will remain open for discussion and critique as long as it plays a role in the lives of its "pioneers." Its role may change shape, but notwithstanding a revolution against its entirety, technology will continue to be a pervasive force in modern society.

ENDNOTES

1. One such web address is the following: http://www.df.lth.se/~micke/wholemanifesto.html. The Manifesto can be recovered in full text from other web-sites as well. The page numbers of the Manifesto that get referenced are with respect to its layout from this particular Internet address (pp. 1-52). The site belongs to Mikael G. Niklasson.

2. Technology often gets traced to the ancient Greek *techne*, which Aristotle characterized as an art concerned with the matter of "making," not "doing." This "making" is driven by reason, and the link to technology exists in that technology is in effect the innovative process with a belief based in reason that such innovations will benefit the individual, community, society...etc. See Kennedy (1991) for a discussion of *techne* as he briefly takes up Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Worthy of mention is Ihde's (1993) discussion of this distinction between "making" and "doing" with respect to *techne*, and how the "doing" of technology is seen today as more important than the aesthetically determined technology Classical Greece focused upon (see specifically p.26).

3. I am speaking here of modern day society in general, and specifically American society, though other societies across the globe are certainly implicated here as well.

4. By environment I include those natural resources that directly affect the well-being of the human species. There are a growing number of people expressing concern over the natural environment in its *own* right. However, this is simply meant to emphasize the significance of the technology-environment issue by highlighting the concerns coming to the foreground with *most* people, not just environmentalists, deep ecologists, eco-feminists...etc. The issue of technology and the environment is the most pressing one involving technology that's being discussed today. Questions such as: *Will there be enough oil in 50 years?, Can we sustain an environment with decent air quality?*, and *What does the future hold for the Greenhouse Effect and the ozone layer?* implicate or are implicated by technology.

5. Pirsig used to teach English/Rhetoric at Montana State University at Bozeman -- hence the reference. Interestingly enough, Quality has become a buzzword in the 1980s and 1990s, capable of multiple meanings. It is a slogan in many American organizations today (e.g., Ford Motor Company: "Quality is job one."). This is not to say that Pirsig has started a "Quality revolution," but rather just to make an observation.

6. Brian Paul has an interesting site devoted specifically to links about the Unabomber, the Manifesto, or a discussion of the ideas presented in the Manifesto. The address is <http://users.andara.com/~bpaul/unabomber.html>. One of the links from the site is an anti-government page supporting Kaczynski and selling t-shirts which reflect this support (Mendoza, <http://www.mayhem.net.Crime/unabombshirts.html>).

7. It can be argued that there are in fact three themes to the book: the narrative of the cross-country motorcycle trip, the intellectual framework set forth by the narrator, *and* the story of Phaedrus. I choose to consider this final component as being a part of one of the previous two, simply because much of the discussion pertaining to Phaedrus is part of either the narrative or the intellectual

framework that Pirsig develops, depending on where in the book the reader finds himself or herself.

8. Pirsig gives this character the name *Phaedrus* because the term was believed to be translated as "lone wolf," and Pirsig characterizes his former self as a loner -- somewhat removed from the rest of society. Pirsig notes in the forward of the 25th anniversary of Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance that this was an error on his part, as the term *Phaedrus* is in fact more accurately translated as "brilliant" or "radiant."

9. Pirsig is specifically calling for caring in one's relationship with technology and its innovations. There is no specific reference in the book to a caring for one another as people. Instead, the emphasis is placed on the individual and the technology that s/he engages.

10. This dichotomy of *real* or fundamental activities and *surrogate* or pale substitutes for them is an important one to keep in mind.

11. Kaczynski carries this style throughout his work, whereas Pirsig utilizes a different overall style to correspond with the multiple themes present in his work. This will be discussed in what follows.

12. In fact, one of the first sections ("The Psychology of Modern Leftism") does not seem to address either specifically, but later gets reintroduced into the discussion when Kaczynski advocates that revolutionaries ought to not associate themselves with this movement, thus falling into the category of strategy, or "how" we ought to respond to the problem.

13. Few people residing in America during the winter of 1973-74 forget about the OPEC oil embargo.

14. For the most part, I am referring to the body in its physical sense. Worthy of mention again is that Pirsig implicates both the physical *and* mental aspects of the body. Progress needs to be made in both areas, he argues, and the efforts grounded in both aspects of the body serve to illustrate his commitment to a Zen Buddhist philosophy, where striving for *oneness* is the focus.

15. One can see that the work of Martin and Faludi possesses subtle connections to postmodern theorizing in general and Foucauldian theorizing specifically, by the ways the body gets discussed differently from how society normally discusses it. The difference is that Martin and Faludi outline the ways the body is being reconceptualized through the transformation/development of American society. Foucault takes a more assertive stance in arguing that the ways the body is conceptualized are flawed to begin with, examples being with respect to how human sexuality is conceptualized (1978) and how we discipline ourselves at the both the societal and individual levels (1977). Angela Trethewey (1999) provides such a Foucauldian analysis of the way women's bodies are conceptualized in the organizational/professional sector, and *how* they a) choose to discipline their bodies, and b) are expected to discipline their bodies.

16. For examples of other work which focuses on the body in analyzing a text(s), but is unrelated to or less related to a direct examination of the phenomenon of technology, see Houck (1997), Hayden (1998), Kirkmayer (1992), and Culbertson (1995).

17. This is not to say that metaphors involving the body and technology do not exist in the other theme of the book, the intellectual framework Pirsig develops. I will demonstrate that this is also the case. This is merely to make the point that such metaphors are predominantly located in the prior theme, and serve to make the connection of the body and coping with technology between both themes.

18. I use the term "product" in a broad sense, including everything from food to homes. Additionally, while I realize that many societies experience this type of freedom of choice, I also recognize that others simply do not.

19. One such example can be seen in the advent of electronic mail.

20. The terms *freedom* and *autonomy* will be defined and/or developed more by Kaczynski later.

21. Kaczynski argues that it is not enough to apply the power process in any manner, but that it must be directed toward *real goals* (as opposed to surrogate activities). This will be discussed later in this section of the analysis and in even more detail in the "Implicated Body" section.

22. This discussion of *biological* needs and *physical* effort will recieve much greater attention in the "Implicated Body" section of my analysis.

23. When I use the term *modern man* and the masculine follow-up *him* I am for the most part using Kaczynski's own words as they appear in the Manifesto.

24. Consider current advances *in* and prospects *for* cloning. Additionally, one can examine the progress of the Human Genome Project, and its potential implications.

25. Remember the "drunk with a barrell of wine" analogy?

26. Or control by large organizations, for that matter.

27. Kaczynski also uses the term *power* frequently in his discussion, but this term is attached to a process (the power process) which he argued was necessary for most individuals to experience. <Freedom>, or autonomy, is a core component of this process, as I discussed. This is why the term *power* did not receive significant attention as a *synonym* to <freedom> in discussing the Manifesto.

28. Actually, Pirsig mentions that John's frustration with the cycle in this incident is a result of his lack of knowledge in the area of general maintenance of the cycle. John had the choke in the wrong position, and eventually flooded the engine by repeatedly trying to kick-start the cycle. This leads into a later argument of Pirsig's: that striving for Quality can lead to increased <freedom>.

29. In fact, John had tried to fix the faucet by inserting a new washer. When this did not work, he gave up on the matter.

30. <Freedom> that takes the form of peace of mind, fulfillment, creativity, control/power...etc.

31. This is not to argue that there was a time when consumers were completely uncritical of these things, but merely to assert that this level of awareness is heightened in times of prosperity. People are able to devote more attention to things such as "product quality."

32. Pirsig's employment of the concept *peace of mind* will be discussed even further in the "Implicated Body" section of this analysis. Particularly, he will address the various levels at which this occurs when one is striving for Quality

33. This diagram appears in the "Review and Preview" section. It should also be noted that a return to the notion of the ideograph at a more theoretical level will occur in the "Discussion" section of the Thesis.

34. This is not to say that the concepts of *frustration*, *security*, and/or *purposelessness* have gone unaddressed in my analysis of the Manifesto. Rather, they *have* received attention, but are always connected to the more primary concepts used by Kaczynski: <freedom> and autonomy.

35. Additionally, it is at this point that a proper engagement of/with the body will be achieved, which is the focus of the "Implicated Body" section of my analysis, to be taken up next. Pirsig on the other hand argues that individuals must first engage their body (physically and mentally) by striving for Quality in order to arrive at <freedom>.

36. Kaczynski alludes to the potential for only a handful of extremely powerful individuals/organizations to assume control over the majority of the population, though it is warned that perhaps even these individuals may succumb to technological power.

37. I did utilize a section that I called "Autonomy as Necessity" to discuss Kaczynski's argument that all or most individuals have a general need for autonomy in pursuing their goals. It could be argued that this section is *not* a reflection of Kaczynski's belief that individuals must break free from society in order to ensure <freedom> (step one in his proposed process). However, this section is meant to explicate Kaczynski's general argument about Human Beings' *need* for autonomy. I would add to this that, even at a more subtle level, Kaczynski is drawing his reader to step one of his proposed process by first stating this need that individuals have. It is in later sections that he argues this need is not properly being met, due to the structure of modern society.

38. Again, product could mean toothpaste, a home, a job...etc.

39. I've previously mentioned that these two concepts are more interwoven than they are separate.

40. These psychological problems, along with their connection to freedom, have been discussed in the ideographic section of the analysis.

41. Kaczynski adds that there are some non-vital pursuits which are *not* surrogate activities, such as *sex* and *love*. In other words, individuals will feel a need for these things even if their vital needs are met.

42. Kaczynski does little to draw the connection between the body, the power process, and why surrogate activities do not suffice in this respect (keeping in mind that freedom is a significant component here). As a result, the reader is left to infer, as I am also doing here, the connection. The ambiguity that exists here appears to be problemmatic, and will be taken up later.

43. The mention of the word *control* here is suggestive of the fact that a notion of freedom is also closely implicated in this argument.

44. It is **important** to keep this point in mind, as it will be the basis for part of the upcoming analysis. *One theme of the text addresses the cross country motorcycle trip, while another theme is utilized by Pirsig to make more theoretical and reflective statements about the nature of Quality. It is in this theme that the body becomes directly implicated, as it is the vehicle through which the individual can achieve Quality* (mentally and physically). The body will also be implicated in the story theme, and this implication will receive attention.

45. More concrete examples of this will be offered later.

46. One could argue that part of what contributes to this perceived lack of craftsmanship today is increased levels of specialization at the workplace. Much of the creative freedom that existed in the jobs of forty and fifty years ago has been replaced by more specialized occupations. This issue, along with the ways individuals can counter this, will be taken up in the "Discussion" section.

47. Unless perhaps the individual has had time to simmer and rest on the issue. This will be addressed shortly

48. Ideally, Pirsig would argue that the solution to traps like fatigue and impatience is to take a little time away from this particular Quality pursuit and return to it when one is rested. In this particular instance though, it appears that the four characters did not have much choice in the matter.

49. It is interesting that the individual has to *search* for something like high-Quality tools. In Pirsig's ideal world, individuals who produce things like tool sets will *also* be striving for Quality. I should add to this that Pirsig would likely argue that even if an individual has high-quality tools to work with, it can still be the case the s/he uses the *wrong* tools when working toward Quality.

50. Certainly there exist activities/pursuits where muscular insensitivity is not so much as a factor. Pirsig is only referring to those activities where this potential trap comes into play.

51. Again, Kaczynski employs the concept freedom much more explicitly than Pirsig, so there will be greater ambiguity for the reader of Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.

52. In explicating Borgmann's (1984) work, little will be said about freedom, though this concept is implied in much the same way that Pirsig implies it.

53. This is for the most part true, since Kaczynski's discussion of freedom appears at *both* ends of his overall argument for how we as a society ought to procure it (refer back to diagram). That is, individuals must *first* break free from society in order to arrive at step two, which includes

increased levels of freedom.

54. Borgmann observes that not every focal practice entails physical effort. Take the art of writing, for example, which is for the most part strictly a mental pursuit. Additionally, many activities disguise themselves as focal practices even though they are not. Examples of these will be addressed later.

55. Additionally, the body Kaczynski implicates in his discussion of technology (and coping with technology) is strictly a *masculine* one. References to "modern man" are frequent in the Manifesto, and the type of future Kaczynski advocates is one which preferences the male experience of the power process (e.g., males engage their bodies "properly" by hunting, herding, fishing, building, etc. It is through these types of activities that fulfillment is procured, and it is males that are implied to engage these activities).

56. However, skiing can become a "high-tech" sport in its own right, as some individuals choose to rely on the newest gadgets for skiing while others are content to incorporate only the necessities, in addition to relying on older equipment.

57. One could argue that "the road" is a focal thing and riding the cycle is the focal practice, but Borgmann would argue that at the level of practice, no real skill is needed by the cycle rider. Or if so, it is only a minimal amount of skill.

58. This is the case for many traditional arts, such as music, poetry, painting, sculpting, etc.

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