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THE SOLIDARITY OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
in the
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
on the
SPANISH QUESTION

by

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B.A., Montana State University, 1950

Presented in partial fulfillment of the
requirement for the degree of
Master of Arts.

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1951

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-Preface-

This thesis is an attempt to determine the solidarity of the Inter-American system during the consideration of the Spanish question in the United Nations General Assembly. The claim has been made repeatedly that the United States exercises a dominating control of the Inter-American system. It is hoped that this study has presented evidence that the United States has not dominated the views and activities of the other twenty republics of the Western Hemisphere on the Spanish question. These aspects of the Spanish question are still contemporary, and therefore it is necessary first of all to determine what has happened. To the historian, with information that will be available later, is left the task of determining why these developments occurred.

It is the writer's wish to acknowledge the generous assistance of Dr. Robert Turner, whose supervision and advice were invaluable in writing this thesis. Gratitude is also extended to Alvaro Teixeira Soares, Alternate Representative of Brazil to the United Nations, for providing the materials that made it possible to write Chapter VII of this thesis.

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Chapter I
Introduction

I

The Inter-American system is the oldest existing regional arrangement in the world. It includes the twenty-one republics of the Western Hemisphere: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Canada is the only independent nation in the Western Hemisphere not included in the Inter-American system; as a dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations, Canada does not belong and has never belonged to the Inter-American system. All colonial possessions of European Powers are also excluded.

The Inter-American regional system has its basis not only in the geographical relationship of the nations in the New World, but also in the fact that in the 18th and 19th centuries the Inter-American states developed almost together from a colonial status to become sovereign states. A great part of eastern South America lies in close proximity to the Eastern Hemisphere, and distances are shorter between these parts of South America and Europe than between the United States and these parts of South America.

However, the distance factor was early overcome by the American nations because of a mutual interest in maintaining their freedom from Europe.

The cultural, religious, social, linguistic, and historical ties between the Roman Catholic Hispanic American countries and the predominately Protestant Anglo-Saxon United States are few indeed. Ties of culture, blood, language, religion and history bind most of Hispanic America to Spain. Brazil is related to its mother country of Portugal in language, religion, race, history, and culture. Haiti has a predominantly Negro population with a French language and culture. Native Indian blood is more prominent in Hispanic America than in the United States where almost all traces of the aboriginal have been eliminated in the national racial complexion. Non-Whites are a minority in the United States, while White creoles are often a minority rather than a majority in Hispanic America. (The exceptions are Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay.) As a result of a large immigration in the 19th century, the population of the United States became mostly European. Hispanic America also received European immigration at that time but in lesser numbers.

II

The Inter-American system was founded on the fact that the United States emerged in the 19th century as a bulwark against European imperialism. The Monroe Doctrine in 1823 declared that the United States was opposed to further European or Asiatic colonization in the Western Hemisphere, and since that time the Doctrine has been a continuous policy of the United States. However, the Monroe Doctrine was not a self-denial policy of the United States; it in no way limited United States freedom of action in the Western Hemisphere. Acquisitions of huge areas of Mexican territory, for example, were the results of United States aggression and expansion. Hispanic Americans have often assailed the Monroe Doctrine for reserving the Western Hemisphere as a colonial preserve for United States exploitation.

The Inter-American system as an international regional organization dates from the first Inter-American Conference held at Washington, D. C. in 1889 and 1890, the first of several such Inter-American Conferences to be held under auspices of the Pan-American Union.¹ The United States at that time was becoming a great economic

¹Arthur P. Whitaker, "Development of American Regionalism -- The Organization of American States," International Conciliation, No. 469, March 1951, pp. 125-127, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, New York.

and military power, needing closer contacts with Hispanic America to promote its military, economic, and political ascendancy. A form of United States hemispheric hegemony in the form of Dollar Diplomacy and the Roosevelt Corollary was the first result of the new Pan-American program.

Hispanic American indignation at United States interventionist policies resulted in the beginnings of a liquidation of United States imperialism after World War I. Charles Evans Hughes, as Secretary of State, attempted to negotiate treaties for the peaceful settlement of Inter-American disputes and the codification of Inter-American international law. Nevertheless, at the Inter-American Conference at Havana in 1928, Hughes announced that the United States intended to retain its "right" of intervention in the Hemisphere. Later, however, Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of State during the Hoover administration, took steps to remove United States Marines from Nicaragua and Haiti while at the same time laying down a policy of de facto recognition of Inter-American relations.

Growing Hispanic American opposition to United States imperialism and European efforts to revive a cultural union of Spain with the New World (Hispanidad, Hispanismo, and Pan Latinism) partially led to the "Good Neighbor" policy inaugurated during the early days of the New Deal. The

Good Neighbor Policy, promulgated by Cordell Hull, repudiated United States supervision of the internal affairs of small Hispanic American States, and at the Montevideo Conference in 1933, he announced that the United States wished to be a good neighbor. As an offering of good faith, the United States delegation made no effort to dominate the Conference, thus ushering in a new era of Inter-American relations.²

III

The Inter-American system was recognized as a regional organization by the League of Nations Covenant in an effort to make the Covenant acceptable to the United States Congress.³ Article 21 of the Covenant provided:

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing and the maintenance of the peace.

After the failure of the League and at the conclusion of World War II, another attempt was made to set up a workable international organization. The Dumbarton Oaks Con-

²Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943, Ch. XII, XV, pp. 202-225, 256-275. Also, Laurence Duggan, The Americas, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1949, pp. 55-67.

³David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 276-277.

versations (1944), the first steps toward creating an international organization for the post-World War II world, resulted in several proposals in which regionalism was paid special deference as a factor in international peace and security. This was a recognition of the Inter-American system and of United States interest in its perpetuation. Of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, Section C (Regional Arrangements) of Chapter VIII (Maintenance of International Peace and Security) provided:

1. Nothing in the Charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Organization. The Security Council should encourage settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies, either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.
2. The Security Council should, where appropriate, utilize such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, but no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.
3. The Security Council should at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.⁴

⁴United Nations, Yearbook, 1946-47, p. 8.

All nations signing the United Nations Declarations or at war with the Axis were invited to the United Nations Conference on International Organization held at San Francisco in 1945. At first this invitation included every Inter-American state except Argentina, but later Argentina was invited after its declaration of war against Germany and Japan. At the San Francisco Conference, the Hispanic American states showed their interest in promoting, within the framework of the United Nations, regional arrangements to settle Inter-American (local) disputes and to provide for regional co-operation.⁵ The United States delegation, too, worked for the recognition of regional arrangements and organizations on the ground that they would strengthen the United Nations organization.⁶

⁵For resolutions on regionalism introduced by the states of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, and Venezuela, see: UNCIO, Documents, United Nations Information Organization, New York, 1945, Vol. XII, pp. 767-784.

⁶United States, Department of State, Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference, by the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, the Secretary of State, Publication 2349, Conference Series 71, p. 101.

The United Nations Charter gives recognition to regional arrangements such as the Inter-American system. Article 51 of Chapter VII provides:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.⁷

Article 51 authorizes individual or collective self-defense against aggression, pending Security authorization, whereas, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would have compelled nations (or regional arrangements) to wait until they had received Security Council authorization for such action.

Articles 52, 53, and 54 provide for regional co-operation and settlement of disputes, all within regional arrangements, and are typical of the proposals made by the Inter-American states at the San Francisco Conference.

Article 52 provides:

⁷United Nations, Yearbook, 1946-47, p. 51.

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.⁸

Article 53 provides:

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

⁸Ibid., p. 837.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.⁹

Article 54 provides:

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.¹⁰

These articles provide for regional co-operation and the settlement of disputes by regional arrangements.¹¹

⁹Ibid., p. 837.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 837.

¹¹The Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace held at Mexico City, Mexico, in February and March, 1945, further buttressed the Inter-American system with a joint defense treaty (Act of Chapultepec) in case of aggression against any one of them. Argentina alone of the Inter-American states did not participate, but later adhered to this pact, declared war against the Axis, and participated in the San Francisco Conference. The Inter-American (treaty) system was further strengthened by an Inter-American Conference held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1947, resulting in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) which provided for collective self-defense in the event of an attack or threat to the security of any Inter-American state. The Rio Treaty was the first regional agreement for collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. See: Duggan, op. cit., pp. 228-229.

In 1948, a Conference of Inter-American states held at Bogota, Colombia, set up the present form of the Inter-American system by chartering the Organization of American states. The Charter states that the Organization of American States (OAS) is a regional agency within the United Nations, and that the purpose of the organization is to fulfill its regional obligations under the United Nations. The Inter-American system under the Organization of American States now has a better administration than under the older Pan-American Union, the basic structure of the Inter-American system before 1948.¹²

The Charter of the Organization of American States stipulates that membership does not impair obligations to the United Nations. However, the Organization of American States is not subordinate to the United Nations, but it would be incorrect to term the two organizations as co-equals since their relationship is more reciprocal in nature. Nevertheless, the Organization of American States is not dependent upon the United Nations, and it would continue to exist if the United Nations disintegrated. The Inter-American system, as exemplified in the Organization of American States, is older by far than the United

¹²Whitaker, op. cit., pp. 135-144.

Nations.¹³ The value of regional arrangements like the Organization of American States in strengthening the United Nations remains to be seen.

This study is to determine the extent of Inter-American solidarity and co-operation during the consideration of a specific problem of interest to all the members of the Organization of American States in the United Nations General Assembly. (Each of the twenty-one Inter-American republics is a member of the General Assembly where equality of states is the principal characteristic.) The question of relations of United Nations members with the Franco government in Spain has been one of great concern not only to the Hispanic American countries but also to the United States in the post-World War II world.

The Spanish question was recognized as a United Nations problem at the San Francisco Conference (1945) and at the Potsdam Conference (1945). The San Francisco Conference declared governments set up by Axis armed forces ineligible for United Nations membership.¹⁴ That declaration was directly aimed at the Franco regime which had

¹³Ibid., pp. 135-140, 146-147.

¹⁴United Nations, op. cit., p. 67.

gained power in Spain by means of a revolution and with the support of Germany and Italy. The three great powers (United Kingdom, United States, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) at Potsdam declared that they would not support a request from the Franco government for admission to United Nations membership because of the association of that government with the Axis Powers.¹⁵ These conferences, while excluding Spain from United Nations membership, nevertheless left for settlement the specific problem of relations between Spain and United Nations members.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 67.

Chapter II

The Panama Resolution

I

The Panama resolution was the first to be introduced in the General Assembly concerning the relations of member nations with Franco Spain. It originated in the seventh meeting of the General Assembly's Sixth Committee held in London on January 29, 1946.¹ That committee, concerned with legal questions, met to consider a proposal by the Secretariat for the registration of treaties and international agreements. Hernan Porras, the Panamanian member, asked the committee if it were intended that Franco Spain should be invited to send treaties and international agreements for registration with, and publication by, the Secretariat. He argued that it was the United Nations' avowed intention to have nothing whatever to do with a Fascist state. In view of Porras' argument, the Sixth Committee decided to refer the Secretariat's proposal to the rapporteur for redrafting, and the Panamanian repre-

¹United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, First Part, First Session, Sixth Committee, Document A/C.1/19, p. 17.

representative was requested to submit his argument as a written proposal to the Sixth Committee.

At the Sixth Committee's eighth meeting on February 4, 1946, Porras clarified his earlier contention by saying that his only interest was to insure that member nations had no dealings with the Franco government, but he added that he had no objections to the publication of treaties concluded by member nations with Spain.² The Sixth Committee resolved the publication question by recommending that the secretary-general should accept all treaties sent to him by non-member nations, but that non-members should not be invited to submit treaties. There was no objection to the adoption of this recommendation, but Porras' suggestion that United Nations members specifically have no dealings with the Franco regime was not included.

The General Committee, which determines the General Assembly's agenda, held its thirteenth meeting on February 8, 1946. At this meeting the Panama delegation proposed the inclusion on the Assembly agenda of a resolution concerning member states' relations with Franco Spain.

²Ibid., Document A/C.16/26, p. 20.

John Foster Dulles (United States) suggested that the General Committee recommend Assembly examination of the resolution, and he was seconded by Andrei A. Gromyko (Soviet Union). After some consideration the General Committee placed the draft of the Panama resolution on the General Assembly agenda.³ The Panama resolution, as submitted, read:

1. The General Assembly recalls that the San Francisco Conference adopted a resolution according to which paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Chapter II of the United Nations Charter "cannot apply to States whose regimes have been installed with the help of armed forces of countries which have fought against the United Nations so long as these regimes are in power."⁴

2. The General Assembly recalls that at the Potsdam Conference the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that they would not support a request for admission to the United Nations of the present Spanish Government "which having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor states, does not possess the necessary qualifications to justify its admission."

³Ibid., General Committee, Document A/BUR/25, p. 20.

⁴Chapter II, Article 4, paragraph 2 reads: "The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council." See United Nations, Yearbook, 1947-48, "Charter of the United Nations," p. 988.

3. The General Assembly, in endorsing these two statements, recommends that the Members of the United Nations should take into account the letter and spirit of these statements in the conduct of their future relations with Spain.⁵

At the General Assembly's twenty-sixth meeting on February 9, 1948, the General Committee formally submitted the Panama resolution. During the discussion, Eric Colban (Norway) introduced an amendment to substitute for the words in paragraph 3, "take into account" the words, "act in accordance with." This change, though strengthening the Panama resolution, did not substantially alter its intent. After considerable discussion, the Assembly president called for a vote on the Norwegian amendment, and it was carried forty-five to three by a show of hands. The amended Panama resolution was then put to a roll-call vote on the Panamanian delegate's motion and was adopted forty-six votes to two with three delegations absent and registering no votes.

II

In the Assembly discussion of the Panama resolution only four Inter-American delegations participated. These

⁵United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, First Part, First Session, Plenary Meetings, Document A/40, Annex 9, p. 584.

four delegations (Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela) took an active part in the discussion and were extremely vocal in supporting the Panama resolution. They insisted that the Franco government had come to power through Axis intervention and consequently, they argued, that the Franco government should not be recognized by the United Nations as representing the Spanish people. They proposed, as exemplified by the Panama resolution, that United Nations members should conduct their relations with the Franco government in the letter and spirit of the statements made at Potsdam and San Francisco.

These four Inter-American delegations did not urge United Nations intervention in Spain against the Franco government.⁶ Rather, their intention was to secure a declaration to serve as a guide for the future conduct of relations between the members of the United Nations and the Franco government. They argued that the resolution was in accord with the purposes and hopes of the world's free peoples. The resolution, as amended by the

⁶As an example, Roberto Cordova (Mexico) said that his country was honor-bound to support the Spanish Republican government, but he made it clear that Mexico did not advocate interference in Spain's domestic affairs. See, Ibid., pp. 355-357.

Norwegian delegate, was supported by these delegations, and they requested its unanimous approval by Assembly acclamation. Roberto MacEachen (Uruguay) succinctly summed up the attitudes of the four Hispanic American supporters of the resolution. MacEachen said:

If we are not to be in flagrant opposition with the origins and the purposes of our Organization and with the hopes of free peoples throughout the world, this resolution should be carried with the wholehearted and unanimous support of our Assembly.⁷

They seemed earnest in their support of the resolution, which if fully observed, would have a pronounced effect upon the relations of France Spain with the rest of the world.

If there were any opposition to the Panama resolution among the Assembly's Inter American members, it was not voiced in the discussion. Not one Hispanic American state vocally opposed the Panama resolution or championed the France government.

III

The General Assembly adopted the Panama resolution by a roll-call vote of forty-six to two.⁸ Eighteen Inter-

⁷Ibid., p. 357.

⁸Ibid., p. 361.

American states voted for the resolution:

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Two voted against the resolution:

El Salvador and Nicaragua.

One delegation was absent and registered no vote:

Honduras.

The unanimous acclamation requested by the delegations of Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela was not realized, ironically enough because of the negative votes of two Hispanic American states. Indeed, the only votes cast against the Panama resolution in the entire General Assembly were those of El Salvador and Nicaragua. (And one of the three absent was Honduras.) Nevertheless, the passage of the Panama resolution by an overwhelming vote certainly amounted to a condemnation of the Franco regime, and it is significant that this resolution should have originated with one, and been supported by eighteen, of the twenty-one nations of the Inter-American system. Moreover, the approval of the resolution by a large majority of the Inter-American nations revealed considerable agreement among them as to their general attitude toward the Franco government.

The approved Panama resolution recommended a standard of conduct to which United Nations members should conform in their relations with Franco Spain, and it was prefaced by a general restatement of the resolutions (concerning Franco Spain) made at the San Francisco and Potsdam Conferences. Although Spain was not mentioned specifically at San Francisco, the conference held there had declared Axis-formed governments ineligible for United Nations membership. Later, at Potsdam, the three big powers (United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom) had declared that a request from the Franco government for United Nations membership would not receive their support. The reasons given were that the Franco government had been founded with Axis support and that it had associated with aggressor states during World War II. The Panama resolution asked that United Nations members act in accordance with the statements made at Potsdam and San Francisco, statements that now became United Nations policy.

It was clear, however, that the Panama resolution did not provide for United Nations armed intervention to overthrow the Franco government, regardless of the latter's background and associations during the war. The resolution neither suggested nor threatened armed action against Spain. Even though the Panama resolution severely criti-

cized the nature of the Franco government, it did not provide for collective or individual severance of relations by United Nations members with Spain, nor did it determine the exact extent to which United Nations members should have relations with the Franco government. The resolution morally condemned Franco Spain, excluded it from United Nations membership, and recommended that United Nations members act in accordance with the Potsdam and San Francisco declarations. It did nothing beyond that.

There was not much activity by the United States either on behalf of or against the Panama resolution. The United States did not use its position of leadership among the Inter-American delegations to influence their voting on the Panama resolution. The resolution was definitely authored and sponsored by small nations of the Inter-American system, and even though the United States delegation supported the resolution in the General Committee, it was silent during the deliberations of the General Assembly. In this instance, at least, the United States followed rather than led the Hispanic American states.

The delegations of Nicaragua and El Salvador, while voting against the resolution, did not speak against it. Their negative votes, the only negative votes cast in the entire Assembly, indicated perhaps that they did not want

to condemn, as did the Panama resolution, the Franco government. But, because of their silence, their votes against the Panama resolution cannot be construed as conclusive evidence of their support either of the Franco government or of that type of government. (However, from their later actions on the Spanish question, it can be assumed at this time that they were less hostile toward the Franco government than were the delegations from Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela.)

There was thus a three-way cleavage among the Inter-American states in the General Assembly's discussion and voting on the Panama resolution. Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela, besides sponsoring the resolution, openly supported it in the General Assembly, asked for a general acclamation favoring the resolution, and voted for it. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, Peru, and the United States, although silent in the Assembly discussion, voted for the resolution. Nicaragua and El Salvador, though never speaking against the resolution, cast the only negative votes in the General Assembly. The delegate of Honduras was absent. This preponderant support by such a large majority indicated a large degree of Inter-American solidarity on the Spanish question in 1943.

Figure No.1

United Nations General Assembly
 Title of Resolution Panama Paragraph (entire text)
 U. N. Action Adopted 46 to 2, 3 absent Date February 9, 1946

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina	X			
Bolivia	X			
Brazil	X			
Chile	X			
Colombia	X			
Costa Rica	X			
Cuba	X			
Dominican Republic	X			
Ecuador	X			
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti	X			
Honduras				X
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua		X		
Panama	X			
Paraguay	X			
Peru	X			
United States	X			
Uruguay	X			
Venezuela	X			
Totals	18	2		1

Voting with the U. S. 17 Not voting with the U. S. 3

Chapter III

The Belgian Resolution

I

The General Assembly, after adopting the Panama resolution recommending that United Nations members consider the Axis background of the Franco government in the conduct of their relations with Spain, resumed consideration of United Nations members' relations with Spain. The General Assembly in the latter part of 1946 considered several proposals on conduct of relations of members with the Franco government, and the First Committee of the General Assembly considered ten resolutions and amendments in its attempt to make a satisfactory report to the General Assembly.

Two resolutions were proposed by the Polish delegation, one by the United States and one by Colombia. The Byelorussian and Norwegian delegations each proposed amendments to the Polish resolution. (The two resolutions submitted by Poland were considered as a single resolution.) Five Hispanic American delegations (Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela) submitted a joint amendment to the United States resolution. The delegations of Belgium, Yugoslavia, and The Netherlands each submitted amendments to the United States resolution. A sub-committee of the First Committee arrived at a resolution from those that had been submitted,

in an effort to find one acceptable to a majority of the members.

On October 19, 1948, Trygve Lie (Norway), the secretary-general of the United Nations, notified the president of the General Assembly that the Security Council was then "seized of" the Spanish question.¹ At the forty-sixth meeting of the General Assembly (October 31, 1948), a proposal by the delegations of Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia, and Venezuela, to consider the relations of the member states with Spain, was placed on the agenda. The proposal was referred to the First Committee for consideration prior to any Assembly discussion.²

On November 4, 1948, the secretary-general informed the president of the Assembly that the Security Council was no longer considering the Spanish question and that the Council had directed him to place all records and documents of the case at the Assembly's disposal.³ The Assembly president notified the Assembly of the November 4th communication from the secretary-general at the forty-seventh meeting

¹United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Second Part, First Session, Annex 31, Document A/124, p. 1479.

²Ibid., p. 925.

³Ibid., Annex 31a, Document A/177, p. 1480.

on November 9, 1946. He noted that the Assembly had not been asked to pass a resolution; the message was merely a notification.⁴

The First Committee, presided over by Dmitro Manuil-sky (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), began consideration of the Spanish question at its thirty-fifth meeting on December 2, 1946. The discussion was opened by Oscar Lange (Poland) who denounced the Franco regime as an Axis-installed government now providing a haven for those who had been defeated in the war. Lange introduced two resolutions that already had been submitted in a letter to the General Assembly president on November 1, 1946. The first recommended:

...That each Member of the United Nations terminate, forthwith, diplomatic relations with the Franco regime.⁵

The second resolution recommended:

...That the Franco Government be barred from membership and participation in any of the organs and agencies established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations.⁶

(The two Polish proposals were combined and considered as a single resolution.)

⁴Ibid., p. 943.

⁵United Nations, General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records, Second Part, First Session, Annex 11a, pp. 352-353.

⁶Ibid., Annex 11b, p. 353.

Kuzma Kiselev (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) had submitted a resolution implementing the Polish resolution in a letter to the secretary-general on November 4. This amendment recommended:

...That each Member of the United Nations terminate diplomatic and economic relations with Franco Spain, such action to include the suspension of communications by rail, sea, air, post and telegraph.⁷

Tom Connally (United States) submitted a resolution in a letter to the secretary-general on December 2, and introduced the resolution in the First Committee meeting on that day. The resolution recommended:

...That the Franco Government of Spain be debarred from membership in international agencies set up at the initiative of the United Nations, and from participation in conference or other activities which may be arranged by the United Nations or by these agencies, until a new and acceptable government is formed in Spain.

...General Franco should surrender the powers of government to a provisional government broadly representative of the Spanish people, committed to respect freedom of speech, religion, and assembly and to the prompt holding of an election in which the Spanish people, free from force and intimidation, and regardless of party, may express their will.⁸

At this meeting the delegations of Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela moved to amend the United

⁷Ibid., Annex 11c, Document A/C.1/35 and Corr. 1, p.354.

⁸Ibid., Annex 11d, Document A/C.1/100, pp. 354-355.

States resolution by replacing the last two paragraphs with:

And inasmuch as the United Nations, by the action they took in San Francisco, in Potsdam, in London, and more recently in Lake Success, have in fact, collectively refused to maintain relations with the Franco regime, does hereby recommend that the Members of the United Nations take, individually, the same attitude they have taken collectively and refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with the present Spanish regime.

The Assembly further recommends that the States Members of the Organization report to the Secretary-General and to the next Assembly what action they have taken in accordance with this recommendation.⁹

Alfonso Lopez (Colombia) then moved to amend the Polish resolution by substituting what was actually a draft resolution with principles similar to the United States resolution but with a different approach. It contained a three-part recommendation:

1. To express its (United Nations) wish that the Government and people of Spain should seek and find the method of bringing into being, by peaceful means, within the shortest possible time and in accordance with the principles and purposes and the Charter of the United Nations, the new social and political conditions necessary to enable Spain to be admitted as a Member of the Organization;
2. To recommend to the Latin-American Republics that they should offer to the Government of Spain their good offices, should the latter think them useful in order to achieve the purposes of this resolution;
3. To defer until the next meeting of the next General Assembly the discussion and adoption of

⁹Ibid., Annex 111, Document A/C.1/108, p. 358.

the resolution proposed by the delegation of Poland as well as the amendment proposed by the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR.¹⁰

Terje Wold (Norway) introduced a resolution at the thirty-sixth meeting held on December 3, 1946; his resolution, too, was an amendment to the Polish resolution. The Norwegian amendment would add to the Polish resolution:

The General Assembly instructs the Secretary-General to inform Member States of this recommendation and to request them to notify him before midnight of 15-16 January 1947, if they are prepared to break off relations with the Franco regime or shall, in fact, not maintain diplomatic relations with the Franco regime as of that date, the Secretary-General shall request those States which agree to break off diplomatic relations to do so as of 1 February 1947.

If less than two-thirds of the Member States shall have notified the Secretary-General that they are willing to break off diplomatic relations with the Franco regime or shall, in fact, not maintain diplomatic relations with the Franco regime as of 16 January 1947, the Secretary-General shall inform the Member States that they are free, within the terms of this resolution, to break or not to break off or to establish such relations with the Franco regime.¹¹

The thirty-seventh meeting of the First Committee convened on the afternoon of December 3. M. W. Loridan (Belgium) discussed the various resolutions already before the

¹⁰Ibid., Annex 11e, Document A/C.1/102, pp. 355-356.

¹¹Ibid., Annex 11f, Document A/C.1/104, p. 357.

Committee and disagreed with all of them: the Polish proposal, because it would unnecessarily divide the organization at a time when unanimity was necessary; the Byelorussian proposal, because of the economic sanctions; and the Colombian proposal, because it simply adjourned the whole problem. The United States resolution was more acceptable, but he offered an amendment to it, which would add this paragraph:

Recommends that if, within a reasonable time, the political conditions enumerated above are not realized, the Security Council consider the adequate measures to be taken in order to remedy the situation, and recommends that all Members of the United Nations immediately recall from Madrid, by way of warning, their ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary, accredited there.¹²

Loridan said that his government really favored stronger action, but his amendment was offered to obtain some positive and concrete majority action.

At this meeting, the Yugoslav delegate, Ales Bebler, introduced an amendment to the United States resolution to replace the words in the next to the last paragraph, "General Franco should surrender the powers of government to a provisional government," with the words:

That there should be formed in Spain a provisional government.

¹²Ibid., Annex 11h, Document A/C.1/107, pp. 357-358.

A paragraph would be added to the resolution stating:

Recommends to all the Member States of the United Nations to sever diplomatic relations with the government of General Franco.¹³

On December 4, J. H. van Roijen (The Netherlands) submitted an amendment to the United States resolution in a letter to the secretary-general. His amendment read:

Recognizing that it is for the Spanish people to settle the form of their government;

Places on record its profound conviction that in the interest of Spain and of world co-operation the people of Spain should give proof to the world that they have a government which derives its authority from the consent of the governed and is pledged to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, as referred to in Article 1 of the Charter; and that to achieve that end General Franco should surrender the powers of government to a provisional government broadly representative of the Spanish people, committed to respect freedom of speech, religion and assembly and to the prompt holding of an election in which the Spanish people, free from force and intimidation and regardless of party, may express their will.¹⁴

Of the motions before the First Committee, the two submitted by Poland with the Byelorussian amendment were the most forceful, a combination of motions that would completely isolate Spain from the rest of the world by a severance not only of diplomatic relations but also of rail, sea,

¹³Ibid., Annex 11j, Document A/C.1/105, p. 358.

¹⁴Ibid., Annex 11L, Document A/C.1/116, pp. 362-363.

postal, and telegraphic communications. The Norwegian amendment to the Polish resolution would make a minimum consent of two-thirds of the Assembly membership necessary for severance to be binding upon those willing to sever relations with the Franco government. Failing of two-thirds assent, the resolution would not be binding on those that had agreed to its provisions.

The United States resolution would continue to bar Spain from United Nations membership, and it requested the Franco government to relinquish its authority. The Colombian amendment was similar in that it also contemplated an orderly change of regimes in Spain. The Colombian suggestion that Hispanic American nations offer their good offices in such a change indicated that that delegation felt that Franco should not be forced to relinquish his authority. The joint amendment to the United States resolution proposed by Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela recommended that United Nations members refuse to have diplomatic relations with the Franco government. This did not go as far as the Byelorussian amendment to the Polish resolution which would have placed Spain in a virtual international quarantine.

The Netherlands' amendment to the United States resolution embodied a similar recommendation to that which it

was amending. It also provided for Franco's relinquishing his authority in favor of a more democratic regime. But the Belgian amendment to the United States resolution was unique, in that it would refer the problem to the Security Council, if conditions in Spain did not improve satisfactorily. It also recommended that United Nations members warn Franco by withdrawing all their ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary accredited to his government.

At the First Committee's thirty-eighth meeting (December 4), Guillermo Belt y Ramirez (Cuba) proposed the setting-up of a sub-committee to make a unanimously acceptable resolution reflecting the debate and the various proposals offered. Belt suggested that the members of this sub-committee be from the delegations of:

Belgium, China, Colombia, Cuba, France, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States.¹⁵

At the thirty-ninth meeting (afternoon of December 4), the First Committee set up such a sub-committee and charged it with the almost impossible task of producing a compromise resolution satisfactory to the entire General Assembly. The sub-committee membership included representatives of delegations that had authored resolutions and amendments, as well as of delegations having permanent membership in the

¹⁵Ibid., Annex 11g, Document A/C.1/106, p. 357.

Security Council. The delegations represented on this sub-committee were:

Belgium, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, France, Guatemala, Mexico, The Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Poland, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.¹⁶

This sub-committee of the First Committee was formally named the Fourth Sub-Committee and held five meetings under the chairmanship of Ricardo J. Alfaro (Panama). It reported out a resolution more harmoniously than might have been expected under the circumstances, since almost every facet of opinion was represented in the Sub-Committee. The specific recommendations included in the Sub-Committee report were:

...That the Franco Government of Spain be debarred from membership in international agencies established or brought into relationship with the United Nations, and from participation conference or other activities which may be arranged by the United Nations or by these agencies, until a new and acceptable government is formed in Spain...

...The Members of the United Nations take, individually the same attitude they have taken collectively and refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with the present Spanish regime, and...

...The States Members of the United Nations report to the Secretary-General and to the next Assembly what action they have taken in accordance with this recommendation.¹⁷

¹⁶Ibid., Annex 11k, Document A/C.1/128, pp. 358-362.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 358-362.

In addition, the Fourth Sub-Committee included in its report, a resolution proposed by the French member. This resolution provided that:

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the majority of the Spanish people are in a situation of hardship because they are seriously deprived of food necessary to their existence,

Recognizing that the Franco regime exports considerable quantities of foodstuffs which are essential for the feeding of the impoverished Spanish people,

Recognizing that the Franco regime uses foreign exchange obtained from such exports to reinforce the political organization that has been repeatedly condemned by the United Nations.

Recommends that the Members of the United Nations should forthwith put an end to all imports from Spain of foodstuffs and their produces until the United Nations is assured that these products are no longer an immediate necessity for the food requirements of the Spanish people.¹⁸

The Fourth Sub-Committee report recommended, as did the United States resolution, that the United Nations continue to bar Franco Spain from participation in any of the activities of that organization. It departed from the United States resolution in recommending that the members refuse to maintain relations with the Franco government, a recommendation taken from the joint resolution of Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. The report included

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 358-362.

the French proposal that United Nations members cease importing foodstuffs from Spain.

The First Committee discussed the Fourth Sub-Committee report at its forty-third meeting (December 9, 1946) under the chairmanship of Paul Henri Spaak (Belgium), who was presiding in the absence of Manuisky (Ukraine). At this meeting the Colombian proposal was re-submitted and rejected. The United States resolution, with the amendment submitted by The Netherlands (which Connally accepted) was also rejected. The entire Fourth Sub-Committee report (including the French motion to end the importing of foodstuffs from Spain by United Nations members and the joint amendment of Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Venexuela advocating that United Nations members refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with Spain) was rejected. After the rejection of these resolutions and amendments, Loridan (Belgium) submitted his proposal to recall the ministers and ambassadors from Madrid as a compromise measure. It was adopted by the First Committee as its report to the General Assembly.

II

Widespread differences of opinion among the Inter-American delegations came into the open during the First Committee's discussion of the Spanish question. These

differences divided the delegations into three generally defined groups, each group varying in membership, however, from issue to issue. One group included those who were definitely anti-Franco, who favored a severance of relations with the Franco government, and who denied repeatedly that severance of relations (individually or collectively by the United Nations members) constituted a violation of Spanish sovereignty or intervention in Spanish domestic affairs. This group usually included Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

A second group included those who argued that any United Nations-imposed restriction on Spain, (be it collective severance of relations or imposition of some form of sanctions) was intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation. Although many of these nations expressed dislike for Franco's government, they nevertheless insisted that it would be an injustice to Spain and a bad precedent to interfere in Spain -- even to the extent of severing relations with Spain at the behest of the United Nations. The members of this group usually included Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and the United States.

The third group consisted of that minority of states who maintained that the Franco government was Spain's legal government and that it governed with the Spanish people's

consent. This group denied that Franco had been established by an outside power, that Franco had held his power with Axis aid, or that Franco during World War II had aided the Axis Powers more than he had the Allies. In some instances this group tried to make it appear that anti-Franco sentiment was solely communist-inspired. El Salvador and Argentina comprised the membership of this group.

Six Hispanic American delegations (Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela) spearheaded the anti-Franco group of Western Hemispheric delegations and even of the rest of the world. This first group noted that the United Nations had never expressed any kind words for Franco at San Francisco, London, or New York; nevertheless, no concrete action had ever been taken against Franco. They attributed a lack of universal enthusiasm for the United Nations to the organization's inability to take active measures to assist democratic forces in Spain.¹⁹ These nations warned that it was wrong to recognize the fascist nature of Franco's government and at the same time to take no action against him under the guise and misconception of

¹⁹United Nations, General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records, Second Part, First Session, pp. 229-230, pp. 252-253. This position is pointedly expressed by Pedro Zuloaga (Venezuela) and Hugo Miranda (Chile) in their speeches found in the above listed pages.

preserving the principle of non-intervention. They argued that the principle of non-intervention did not apply to the Spanish case, since the action contemplated made no provision for unilateral action by one power. It was argued that the very essence of the United Nations was collective action, and that collective severance of relations could hardly be termed intervention.

They deplored the inconsistency in the organization's refusing to have anything to do with Franco yet hesitating to do anything likely to effect a change in the Spanish government. These delegations rejected the premise that the Spanish question was essentially a domestic issue and that measures taken against Franco would humiliate the Spanish people and thereby aid and enhance Franco's control. It was insisted that the Spanish people would welcome aid from their well-wishers. They hoped that the Spanish people could regain their lost freedom, but they were certain that the United Nations had to help them to make that recovery.²⁰ No nation of this group even suggested a renewal of the Spanish Civil War, but all ex-

²⁰Ibid., pp. 240-241, p. 254. Ricardo J. Alfaro (Panama) and Luis Padilla Nervo (Mexico) made speeches expressing the view that aid from the United Nations to the people of Spain would be both necessary and welcome to overthrow the Franco regime.

pressed the desirability of helping Spain to overthrow the Franco regime.

This group claimed that Franco Spain was a menace to international peace and security, warranting United Nations action. They insisted that Franco was contemptuous of the United Nations, as the Axis Powers had earlier been of the League of Nations. They felt that declarations and appeasement helped Franco retain his control, and that effective measures requiring United Nations action were necessary to depose Franco. This group favored a collective severance of relations by the United Nations as the most effective method to end Franco's control of Spain.²¹

The delegations of Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and the United States were the outstanding supporters on non-intervention and opponents of severance of relations in the First Committee's discussion and proceedings. This second group opposed the

²¹Ibid., pp. 268-269, Mr. Granados (Guatemala) cited an article in the New York Times, December 4, 1948, as exemplifying Franco's contempt of the United Nations. The article was a protest from the Franco government against the resolution introduced by the United States in the First Committee. The article denied all the accusations made by the United States and other delegations in the United Nations and insisted that the resolution would fail if adopted. The article was generally contemptuous of the United Nations and the United States.

severance of relations with the Franco government on the grounds that such action would constitute intervention in Spain's internal affairs.

However, these delegations generally deplored the type of regime that Franco maintained and expressed a general hope that Spain might soon adopt a democratic government. They felt that the Spanish people should be asked by the United Nations to determine their own form of government, so as to make them eligible for United Nations membership.²²

This group advanced two proposals. One by the United States advocated that Franco surrender his authority to a provisional government while an election was held to establish a democratic government for Spain. The other proposal, by Colombia, looked for a change in the Spanish government, a change facilitated by the use of Hispanic American good offices to establish a democratic government in Spain.²³

This group held that since the Security Council had declared Spain to be only a potential danger to peace, measures adopted on account of the Spanish government's

²²Ibid., pp. 232-236, the speeches of Ricardo Fournier (Costa Rica), Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa (Nicaragua), and Cesar R. Acosta (Paraguay) on these pages present a good summary of the arguments of the non-interventionist group.

²³Ibid., pp. 354-355.

origin and nature would amount to intervention and would violate the Charter. They generally agreed that Spain should continue to be barred from United Nations membership and participation in its activities, but they would not sanction direct action against that government. They contended that restrictions imposed by the whole organization would amount to an unwarranted interference in purely domestic affairs and insisted that chaos and strife could be the only possible result of such action, which would not help the Spanish people to regain their lost freedoms. Fomenting internal disorders was considered an imposition on the Spanish people which would only strengthen the Franco regime by making Spaniards resent such action.²⁴

This group, particularly the Hispanic American states, expressed affection and admiration for the Spanish people as well as a desire to protect the doctrine of non-intervention. It was insisted that the doctrine of non-intervention was a cornerstone of the Pan-American structure, as well as a principle of the Charter, and that non-intervention and self-determination were incompatible with the collective severance of relations with Franco Spain.²⁵

²⁴Ibid., pp. 239-240, 242.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 249-251.

A third group stoutly maintained that the United Nations should take no action against the Franco regime, and by their speeches and voting records, they established themselves as being pro-Franco. This minority group contained only two members: Argentina and El Salvador. The delegations of both these states supported the doctrine of non-intervention and opposed the severance of relations on that ground. Their speeches indicated that they would not support any action against the Franco government. The Argentine member of the First Committee suggested that the Assembly drop the Spanish question entirely and consider other matters more important to the peace of the world.²⁶ Both delegations insisted that the Spanish question was not within United Nations jurisdiction. The Salvadorean delegate averred that the present Spanish government was not an Axis creature, having been established before the World War II in a civil war that was essentially Spanish in nature.²⁷

This group insisted that the Spanish question was

²⁶Ibid., p. 246.

²⁷Ibid., p. 230, pp. 253-254, 269-270. These pages contain the many remarks of Hector D. Castro (El Salvador) on the Spanish question during the First Committee discussion.

entirely domestic in character and that Spain's quarrel with Russia put Franco at a disadvantage by preventing his case from being fairly heard. Collective severance of relations was termed a collective intervention violating the Charter and contradicting Hemispheric non-intervention principles.

The arguments of these pro-Franco nations had indeed been weakened by their allegation that the Spanish government was not an Axis creature. There was some justification supporting the opinion that international law did not condone interference in the internal affairs of a regime, as some of the more anti-interventionist nations had suggested. The non-interventionist nations had some merit in their arguments against collective severance on that point, but the pro-Franco group tried to excuse the Franco government from accounting for its connections with the Axis Powers during the war. It had been all too obvious from evidence presented by the Security Council, and from arguments offered by members in the Assembly, that Franco had had ties with the Axis.

The delegations of Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic Haiti, and Honduras did not participate in the debate on the Spanish question, so the position of this fourth group was not yet determined. The examination of these delegation's views here depends entirely upon an examination of their

voting on the Sub-Committee report.

The principle of non-intervention was not the real issue in the Spanish question. The proposed action hinged on United Nations acceptance of collective severance of relations as a measure in dealing with the Franco government. Six nations, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela favored severance of relations on the understanding that it was collective action by the United Nations and not unilateral intervention by a strong power or group of powers in a weaker nation's affairs. These six delegations all supported the doctrine of non-intervention, but they did not consider that severance of relations constituted intervention.

The other Inter-American states that announced a dislike for the Franco regime supported non-intervention. They associated collective severance of relations with intervention and did not choose to support such action against the Franco government. The pro-Franco states used the argument of non-intervention in an attempt to forestall any action detrimental to the Franco regime.

III

The First Committee speeches revealed the diversity of opinion and policy among the Inter-American delegations.

The various proposals considered brought out a number of views and demonstrated a lack of Inter-American unity on the Spanish question. An examination of the First Committee voting is even more indicative of the lack of solidarity.

At the First Committee's forty-third meeting (December 9, 1948), Jorge Soto del Corral (Colombia) resubmitted his delegation's proposal calling for an orderly change of government in Spain facilitated by the use of Hispanic American good offices. The chairman submitted it to a paragraph by paragraph vote, and the first paragraph was rejected in a roll-call vote twenty-five to eight with sixteen abstentions.²⁸ Six Inter-American delegations voted for the first paragraph:

Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru.

Nine voted against it:

Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Four abstained:

Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, and United States.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 293.

Of the Hispanic American delegations voting affirmatively on the first paragraph, five had already expressed themselves as being anti-interventionist. These were now joined by the Dominican Republic which had not participated in the discussion and which had voted in favor of the Panama resolution in February, 1948. Cuba, having fluctuated between the United States and the Colombian proposals in the discussion, now voted for the Colombian proposal.

The five Hispanic American delegations that introduced the joint resolution recommending severance of relations with Spain voted against the Colombian proposal. They were joined by Uruguay who had expressed similar views and Costa Rica who had supported the non-interventionists' arguments. El Salvador, so anti-interventionist as to be pro-Franco, voted against the resolution. Here was an odd combination of avowedly anti-Franco nations being supported by the most pro-Franco nation in the United Nations.

Both the United States and Nicaragua, having already expressed non-interventionist leanings, abstained, as did Bolivia and Brazil. As yet, Bolivia and Brazil had neither expressed an opinion nor voted on the Spanish question; their attitudes were officially undeterminable. The United States, supporting its own resolution, could hardly vote for the Colombian resolution; an abstention or negative

vote were the only alternatives. Argentina and Haiti neither voted nor abstained on the Colombian proposal; Argentina had indicated its opposition to taking any action on the Spanish question, and Haiti had yet to express an opinion.

The Colombian proposal's second paragraph, suggesting use of Hispanic American good offices, met a similar fate, being rejected twenty-six to five with eighteen abstentions.²⁹

Four Inter-American delegations voted for this paragraph:

Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Ecuador.

Ten voted against it:

Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Five abstained:

Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru, and United States.

In the voting on the Colombian resolution's first paragraph, both Peru and Paraguay had voted affirmatively, but on the second paragraph Peru abstained, and Paraguay voted negatively. The other Inter-American delegations voted consistently on these two parts of the Colombian proposal. After these two defeats, the Colombian delegate withdrew his resolution, reserving a right to resubmit it to the General Assembly.

²⁹Ibid., p. 296.

The United States delegate, having incorporated The Netherlands' amendment with the United States resolution, now resubmitted it to the Committee and insisted that it be voted on before consideration of the Sub-Committee resolution. (The amended United States resolution would continue to bar Franco Spain from the United Nations and called upon Franco to surrender his powers to a provisional government which in turn would make way for a democratic government.) A vote was taken, and the resolution was rejected by a roll-call vote twenty-two to twenty-two with six abstentions.³⁰ Eight Inter-American delegations voted for this resolution:

Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and United States.

Eleven voted against it:

Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.

One abstained:

Paraguay.

One registered no vote:

Argentina.

In the voting on the United States resolution, Argentina was the only Inter-American delegation not to register a vote

³⁰Ibid., p. 300.

of any kind, and Paraguay, avowedly non-interventionist, abstained from voting. Of the eight Inter-American delegations voting for the resolution, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Honduras had not previously presented their views. Their affirmative votes demonstrated support for the United States, at least on this proposal. Cuba and the Dominican Republic already had voted for the Colombian proposal, and their affirmative vote on the United States proposal reaffirmed their non-interventionist stand. The United States voted for its own proposal but failed to marshal the Inter-American support so crucially needed where the vote was a tie. Indeed, the United States could have pushed its proposal through the First Committee if it had had a greater degree of Inter-American support.

Colombia did not abstain from voting on the United States resolution, (as the United States had done in the vote on the Colombian proposal) but cast a negative vote. Non-interventionist Ecuador and Peru again followed Colombia. Costa Rica and El Salvador voted against the United States resolution, as they had against the Colombian proposal. The five nations (Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela) that had proposed their own joint resolution voted with the non-interventionists and El Salvador. The

vote on the United States resolution again revealed the three-way split in the Inter-American system, and it can be said that this division was responsible for defeating the United States resolution.

The Fourth Sub-Committee resolution embodied the joint proposal of Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela which called for a collective United Nations severance of relations with Franco Spain. This motion was defeated by a roll-call vote twenty to twenty with ten abstentions.³¹ Seven Inter-American delegations voted for this motion:

Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Eleven voted against it:

Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and United States.

One abstained:

Brazil.

Two registered no vote:

Argentina and Haiti.

Of seven Inter-American delegations voting for this proposal, Uruguay and Bolivia were the only two that were

³¹Ibid., p. 301.

not co-authors of the motion. Although Bolivia had remained silent in the discussion, it had voted affirmatively for both the United States resolution and for the joint resolution as embodied in the Sub-Committee report. Evidently, Bolivia favored stronger action against Franco than did the non-interventionists. Brazil had abstained on the Colombian resolution, had voted for the United States proposal, and now abstained on the Sub-Committee resolution, as that delegation had done on the Colombian proposal. Haiti had voted for the United States proposal, but, as yet, Argentina had not registered a vote of any kind.

Eleven Inter-American delegations, including the United States and El Salvador, voted against the Sub-Committee resolution. United States "leadership" and Colombian "co-operation" were undoubtedly instrumental in defeating this proposal; if one more Inter-American delegation had voted for the resolution, it would have been carried. The vote on the Sub-Committee resolution, a resolution favoring stronger action against Spain than the non-interventionists liked, found all the non-interventionists voting together. This had not been true in the voting on the United States and Colombian resolutions where the United States and Colombia had opposed each other. Now, however, their combined voting support defeated the Sub-Committee report.

With the rejection of the Colombian, United States and Sub-Committee resolutions, the First Committee chairman was at a loss for a compromise measure. He suggested the submission of the United States proposal to a second vote, but Bebler (Yugoslavia) suggested that the Belgian motion be submitted as the logical compromise.³² Loridan (Belgium) then requested a vote on his proposal to withdraw the ambassadors and ministers of United Nations members from Madrid, a proposal that was an amendment to the rejected United States resolution.³³ Loridan, therefore, requested that his amendment be added to the Sub-Committee report, excluding the paragraph that called for the collective severance of relations by United Nations members with Spain. The Belgian proposal was voted on, paragraph by paragraph, and the first paragraph, which recommended that the Security Council take action on the Spanish case if political conditions were not bettered within a reasonable time, was adopted by a roll-call vote twenty-six to eight with sixteen abstentions.³⁴

³²Ibid., p. 301.

³³Ibid., p. 301.

³⁴Ibid., p. 302.

Ten Inter-American delegations voted for the first paragraph:

Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Five voted against it:

Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, and United States.

Four abstained:

Cuba, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay.

Two registered no vote:

Argentina and Haiti.

Of the ten Inter-American delegations that voted for the first paragraph, five had proposed the resolution advising severance of relations with Spain. Colombia and Peru had now moved away from the non-interventionists. Bolivia and Brazil voted for this paragraph, a significant development since both had been silent during the debate and had not yet definitely established their positions. Uruguay kept its adopted place with those favoring strong action against Franco.

The United States and three other non-interventionists (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Ecuador) voted negatively, as did pro-Franco El Salvador. The four abstentions (Cuba, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay) were also non-interventionists. The non-interventionists were thus

divided in their votes: Colombia and Peru voted for the paragraph; Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and the United States voted against the paragraph; Cuba, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay abstained. Again, Argentina and Haiti did not register either a vote or an abstention.

The second paragraph,³⁵ recommending United Nations members withdraw ambassadors and ministers from Madrid, was adopted twenty-seven votes to seven with sixteen abstentions.³⁶ Eight Inter-American delegations voted for the second paragraph:

Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Six voted against it:

Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, and Peru.

Five abstained:

Cuba, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and United States.

Two registered no vote:

Argentina and Haiti.

³⁵Loridan agreed to delete the words, "by way of warning" from paragraph 2. This was requested by Sir Hartley Shawcross of the United Kingdom, who would vote for the paragraph, but his government refused to be a party to warning the Spanish people.

³⁶Ibid., p. 302.

Colombia and Peru did not vote for the second paragraph, as they had for the first paragraph, but joined the non-interventionists and voted negatively. The United States did not vote against this paragraph, as against the first paragraph, but abstained with the four original abstaining delegations of the voting on the first paragraph. The five abstaining delegations were also non-interventionists. Apparently, this paragraph was more unpopular with the Inter-American delegations than was the first.

The last paragraph was adopted by acclamation, since there was no comment.³⁷ The chairman then put the entire proposal to a vote. The First Committee adopted the entire resolution by a roll-call vote twenty-three to four with twenty abstentions.³⁸ Six Inter-American delegations voted for the resolution:

Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela.

³⁷ Before a vote was taken on the full text, the chairman called upon Castro (El Salvador) to make a statement, a privilege that Castro had been promised earlier. Castro said that this question was under the express jurisdiction of the Security Council, and therefore, the resolution was contrary to the Charter. His government would not conform to a resolution recommending the severance of relations. De Lavalley (Peru) also spoke, disagreeing with the recommendation and reserving his vote governing international agencies that might be affected by this resolution.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 303.

The only votes cast against the resolution were those of four Inter-American delegations:

Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and El Salvador.

Six abstained:

Cuba, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and United States.

Five registered no vote:

Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti, and Uruguay.

The entire Belgian resolution got less Inter-American support than did either of its first two paragraphs. Brazil and the five co-authors of the proposal to sever relations with Franco Spain were the only Inter-American delegations voting for the complete resolution, as contrasted with ten voting for the first paragraph and eight for the second.

The only First Committee members to vote against the Belgian resolution were four Inter-American delegations (Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and El Salvador). It was expected that El Salvador would vote against this, or any other, resolution proposing action against Franco Spain. However, it was a different matter for Colombia to vote with the minority, since that delegation had proposed that the Spanish people change their government through the use of Hispanic American good offices. Al-

though the Colombian good offices proposal was not as forceful as the recommendation contained in the Belgian resolution, Colombia had voted for the first paragraph, and it seemed likely that it might support the entire Belgian resolution. Costa Rica so far had voted against every proposal and was consistent in its present negative vote. The Dominican Republic, having voted for the Colombian and the United States resolutions, now abruptly followed Colombia's lead.

The six abstaining votes included the United States, and it would seem that the United States had influenced more of the Inter-American states than had Colombia. On the other hand, it may be assumed that the abstaining states would have voted against rather than for the resolution, since they were all non-interventionists.

Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti, and Uruguay did not register a vote on the complete Belgian resolution. Uruguay, though not voting on the resolution, made known to the First Committee that it wished to be included in the group voting for the resolution since it had voted for all the paragraphs of the resolution. Ecuador, a consistent non-interventionist, probably would have abstained or cast a negative vote. Haiti and Bolivia might well have favored the resolution, since Bolivia had seemed to favor stronger action and Haiti had voted for the United States proposal. However, the

abstention of the United States might have influenced Haiti to adopt a similar course. Argentina ignored the Belgian resolution, both in part and as a whole, and kept to its view that the Spanish question was not within the jurisdiction of the General Assembly.

After the acceptance of the Belgian resolution, the First Committee turned to a discussion of the French proposal that member states aid the Spanish people by cutting off all imports of foodstuffs from Spain. The discussion was brief, and Connally (United States) was the only Inter-American delegate to make any comment. He refused to support any form of economic sanctions, and he argued that trade was necessary to the well-being of the Spanish people. The motion was defeated by thirty-two votes. Such an overwhelming rejection of the French proposal indicated that the First Committee was unwilling to take any action stronger than recommending the withdrawal of their ministers from Madrid.

The First Committee report demonstrated wide Inter-American differences of opinion on the Spanish question. El Salvador stood alone in its support of Franco, but the principle of non-intervention was well supported. Argentina's opposition was demonstrated in that it neither voted nor abstained on any of the proposals. The Argen-

tine delegation seemed to be willing to let the Salvadorean delegate battle indefinitely against the action contemplated on the Spanish question without giving him even verbal support. Argentina apparently felt that its position would be supported best by this form of passive resistance; this type of opposition was not apt to draw much animosity from other members. Haiti voted only for the United States proposal, which constituted its only activity in the entire proceedings and demonstrated its lack of interest in taking action against France.

The United States had considerable support for its proposal within the nations of the Hemisphere. However, the Belgian proposal, as accepted by the committee, more nearly resembled the joint proposal of Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. The adoption of the Belgian resolution demonstrated an absence of Hemispheric unity.

Figure No. 2

United Nations **General Assembly, First Committee**
 Title of Resolution **Colombian** Paragraph **One**
 U. N. Action **Rejected 23 to 8, 5 abstain** Date **December 9, 1946**

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain.	Vote Unregistered
Argentina				X
Bolivia			X	
Brazil			X	
Chile		X		
Colombia	X			
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba	X			
Dominican Republic	X			
Ecuador	X			
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala		X		
Haiti				X
Honduras		X		
Mexico		X		
Nicaragua			X	
Panama		X		
Paraguay	X			
Peru	X			
United States			X	
Uruguay		X		
Venezuela		X		
Totals	6	9	4	2

Voting with the U. S. 3 Not voting with the U. S. 17

Figure No. 3

United Nations **General Assembly, First Committee**

Title of Resolution **Colombian**

Paragraph **Two**

U. N. Action **Rejected 26 to 5, 18 abstain**

Date **December 9, 1946**

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina				X
Bolivia			X	
Brazil			X	
Chile		X		
Colombia	X			
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba	X			
Dominican Republic	X			
Ecuador	X			
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala		X		
Haiti				X
Honduras		X		
Mexico		X		
Nicaragua			X	
Panama		X		
Paraguay		X		
Peru			X	
United States			X	
Uruguay		X		
Venezuela		X		
Totals	4	10	5	2

Voting with the U. S. 4 Not voting with the U. S. 16

Figure No. 4

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee
 Title of Resolution United States Paragraph (entire text)
 U. N. Action Rejected 22 to 22, 6 abstain Date December 9, 1946

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina				X
Bolivia	X			
Brazil	X			
Chile		X		
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba	X			
Dominican Republic	X			
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala		X		
Haiti	X			
Honduras	X			
Mexico		X		
Nicaragua	X			
Panama		X		
Paraguay			X	
Peru		X		
United States	X			
Uruguay		X		
Venezuela		X		
Totals	8	11	1	1

Voting with the U. S. 7 Not voting with the U. S. 13

Figure No. 5

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee

Title of Resolution Sub-Committee Paragraph Ten

U. N. Action Rejected 20 to 20, 10 abstain Date December 9, 1946

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina				X
Bolivia	X			
Brazil			X	
Chile	X			
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba		X		
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti				X
Honduras		X		
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua		X		
Panama	X			
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay	X			
Venezuela	X			
Totals	7	11	1	2

Voting with the U. S. 10 Not voting with the U. S. 10

Figure No. 6

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee
 Title of Resolution Belgian Paragraph One
 U. N. Action Adopted 26 to 8, 16 abstain Date December 9, 1946

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina				X
Bolivia	X			
Brazil	X			
Chile	X			
Colombia	X			
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba			X	
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti				X
Honduras			X	
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua			X	
Panama	X			
Paraguay			X	
Peru	X			
United States		X		
Uruguay	X			
Venezuela	X			
Totals	10	5	4	2

Voting with the U. S. 4 Not voting with the U. S. 16

Figure No. 7

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee

Title of Resolution Belgian Paragraph Two

U. N. Action Adopted 27 to 7, 16 abstain Date December 9, 1946

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina				X
Bolivia	X			
Brazil	X			
Chile	X			
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba			X	
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti				X
Honduras			X	
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua			X	
Panama	X			
Paraguay			X	
Peru		X		
United States			X	
Uruguay	X			
Venezuela	X			
Totals	8	6	5	2

Voting with the U. S. 4 Not voting with the U. S. 16

Figure No. 8

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee
 Title of Resolution Belgian Paragraph (entire text)
 U. N. Action Adopted 23 to 4, 20 abstain Date December 9, 1946

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina				X
Bolivia				X
Brazil	X			
Chile	X			
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba			X	
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador				X
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti				X
Honduras			X	
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua			X	
Panama	X			
Paraguay			X	
Peru			X	
United States			X	
Uruguay				X
Venezuela	X			
Totals	6	4	6	5

Voting with the U. S. 5 Not voting with the U. S. 15

Chapter IV

The December 1946 Resolution

I

The First Committee report on the Spanish question contained the Belgian proposal recommending withdrawal of the ambassadors and ministers of United Nations members from Madrid. The report was placed on the General Assembly agenda at its fifty-seventh meeting on December 13, 1946. The Assembly at the same time had been scheduled to elect a sixth member of the Economic and Social Council, but the chairman, V. K. Wellington Koo (China), decided to postpone the election because of insufficient attendance. This change of agenda caused some difficulty, since the Venezuelan delegation was scheduled to speak first on the Spanish question, and that delegation's chairman was absent. Pedro Zuloaga, the Venezuelan representative present, proposed consideration of other business until other members might arrive who intended to participate in the discussion on the Spanish question.¹

The chairman assured the members that all would be afforded an opportunity to speak on the Spanish question.

¹United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Second Part, First Session, pp. 1159-1160.

However, the discussion immediately involved the determination of the agenda. After the vice-chairman of the First Committee, Joseph Bech (Luxembourg), read the First Committee's report calling upon United Nations members to withdraw their ambassadors and ministers from Madrid, Lange (Poland) suggested the study of some other business until the attendance was greater. The chairman informed the Polish delegate that there were now forty-two delegations in attendance, more than the required two-thirds for a quorum, and the Assembly had to proceed with the discussion unless there was a motion to adjourn.²

Carlos Eduardo Stolk (Venezuela) consequently proposed adjournment until the afternoon, and Felix Nieto del Rio (Chile) supported him. After further deliberation, Belt (Cuba) and Castro (El Salvador) requested a vote on Stolk's proposal without further delay. The president called for a vote on adjournment, which was defeated.³ Stolk then requested a rearrangement of the schedule so that his delegation might speak in the afternoon; his request was granted.

The discussion of the Spanish question was carried

²Ibid., p. 1162.

³Ibid., p. 1166.

over from the fifty-seventh meeting to the fifty-eighth meeting (afternoon of December 12), presided over by Paul Henri Spaak (Belgium). Spaak suggested that the number of speakers on the First Committee resolution with unlimited time be limited to two for and two against the resolution and that other representatives be allowed to make only three or four minute speeches to explain their vote.⁴

Castro (El Salvador) objected to the president's proposal, which he insisted would prevent him from speaking against a resolution that had been proposed by Spaak's delegation. He had been scheduled to speak after the Cuban and Costa Rican delegates, both of whom were to speak against the First Committee resolution, and he automatically would be prevented from making a major address. The Salvadorean representative claimed that Spaak already had limited the First Committee's debate on this proposal and that he now was doing the same in the Assembly. Castro insisted that his protest be entered in the records, and he threatened to walk out of the meeting.⁵

Spaak refused to comment on the withdrawal threat, and insisted that he had no desire to prevent Castro from speak-

⁴Ibid., p. 1177.

⁵Ibid., p. 1178.

ing at length on the Spanish question. He then asked if either the Cuban or Costa Rican speaker would agree to speak for only three or four minutes to allow the Salvadorean delegate to make a major address.⁶

Belt (Cuba) conceded the point and suggested that each speaker be permitted only one minute, since the Spanish question had been discussed fully by the First Committee. Long speeches could be circulated in writing, which he for one agreed to read and study.⁷ The chairman then proposed that the Costa Rican and Salvadorean delegates should speak against the resolution and those of Venezuela and Czechoslovakia should speak for it. All four speeches were to be without time limit. The Czechoslovakian delegate yielded his privilege to Leon Jouhaux, the French delegate, who vigorously supported the resolution.⁸

Numerous speeches were made on the Spanish question, and the discussion was carried over into the fifty-ninth meeting (evening of December 12). At that time the First Committee report was submitted to a vote of the Assembly. A. G. Bottomley (United Kingdom) requested a separate vote

⁶Ibid., p. 1179.

⁷Ibid., p. 1179.

⁸Ibid., pp. 1190-1195.

on the paragraph recommending that the Security Council consider measures to be taken against Franco Spain if that government, within a reasonable length of time, were not replaced by one more democratic in form. This paragraph was adopted by a show of hands. The entire resolution was submitted to a roll-call vote, resulting in its adoption thirty-four to six with thirteen abstentions.⁹

II

In the First Committee's work on the Spanish question (1946), the Hispanic American states of Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela had favored a resolution recommending that United Nations members sever relations with the Franco government. After the defeat of their proposal, they had supported the Belgian resolution calling for member nations to withdraw their ministers from Madrid, which the Assembly considered and adopted on December 12, 1946.

These delegations, favoring a severance of relations with Spain and voting for the Belgian resolution in the First Committee, were the most energetic in supporting the resolution in the Assembly discussion. They again rejected

⁹Ibid., pp. 1221-1222.

the non-interventionists' arguments that severance of relations constituted intervention and insisted that the United Nations should make an effective contribution within the Charter to aid the Spanish people.¹⁰ They deplored the fact that some nations had publicly condemned the Franco regime (Potsdam, San Francisco, and London) but were giving that regime their political and legal protection. They also rejected the possibility that Spain could regain democracy or overthrow Franco without at least moral aid and support from the outside.

The suggestion that a plebiscite could be held under Franco's auspices to stimulate the growth of democracy in Spain was rejected.¹¹ They deemed it necessary to isolate Spain in order to prevent its fascist government from infecting other governments and to enable Spaniards to overthrow Franco. Collective repudiation and isolation was not intervention, as in the case of unilateral intervention by a single power in a weaker power. To invoke the principle of non-intervention against this type of action was a contradiction of the principle of United Nations collective action in the interests of international peace

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 1166-1169, 1204-1206, 1210-1212, 1214-1216, 1219-1220.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 1179-1182.

and security.

This group further insisted that the resolution was mild enough and legal according to the Charter.¹² They rejected the argument that not all United Nations members had democratic governments and to take action against a non-member for that reason was a contradiction. Indeed, they insisted that the proposed action was considered because the Franco government, in addition to being anti-democratic and dictatorial, was an Axis creature.

These states, in Assembly discussion now were joined by three non-interventionists (non-severance) states (Nicaragua, Paraguay, and United States). Bolivia had registered no vote on the complete Belgian resolution in the First Committee's voting, but it had voted for each of its two paragraphs. Bolivia, like Nicaragua, Paraguay, and the United States, vocally supported the Belgian resolution in the General Assembly. The delegates of Nicaragua, Paraguay, and the United States supported the resolution in the interests of unanimity, as well as in the hope that it might succeed in establishing a more democratic government in Spain. They recognized that the resolution contemplated a peaceful change in the Spanish government, and that the

¹²Ibid., pp. 1179-1182.

principle of non-intervention therefore was not being sacrificed.¹³

Bolivia, Nicaragua, and the United States said that although they had favored the United States proposal in the First Committee, they now would support the Belgian resolution as an act in accordance with the principles of the Charter.¹⁴ This reversal of attitudes by three non-interventionists was indeed encouraging to Inter-American cooperation.

Among the Inter-American delegations speaking against the Belgian resolution in the Assembly were the pro-France representatives of El Salvador and Argentina and the non-interventionist representatives of Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru. The representatives of Cuba and Colombia, who had associated themselves with the non-interventionists in the First Committee's discussion and voting announced their intention not to support the Belgian resolution.¹⁵ However,

¹³Ibid., pp. 1200-1202, 1203-1204.

¹⁴Adlai E. Stevenson (United States) commented on the paragraph recommending that the Council be asked to consider adequate measures, if a more favorable government were not established in Spain. His delegation doubted that the Charter authorized the Council to act in that capacity and would abstain in voting on that paragraph, if the paragraphs were submitted separately. See, Ibid., pp. 1217-1218.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 1169-1176, 1179.

they (Colombia and Cuba) did not actively oppose or denounce the Belgian resolution as did the non-interventionist delegations (Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru). These latter representatives insisted that they opposed the resolution, because (in their opinion) collective withdrawal of ministers from Madrid constituted intervention, and they would not support any resolution embodying intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign government. They did not intend to support any form of intervention against any kind of government.

These non-interventionist states differed from the pro-Franco states (Argentina and El Salvador) in that they were well aware of the nature of the Franco government, which they did not intend to praise. However, they expressed the view that inasmuch as the Security Council had determined that Franco Spain did not constitute an actual threat to world peace, the United Nations should not forsake the principle of the equality of states and intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. Since the forms of democracy varied throughout the world, the criteria of democracy also varied, and therefore, an attempt to impose democracy on a single state would constitute intervention. The democratic system should be allowed to arise spontaneously within a state rather than be

imposed from the outside. By the same token, an attempt to force a state by collective severance of relations was intervention incompatible with the United Nations Charter.¹⁶ Moreover, intervention was contrary to the principles of the Inter-American system.¹⁷

The Cuban delegate said that he would neither vote for nor against the Belgian resolution, since the resolution called for the recall of ministers and ambassadors from Madrid, and Cuba had never had an ambassador accredited to the Franco government.¹⁸ However, he did not wish to oppose the resolution, because he felt that its rejection would aid France. The Colombian delegate said that the Franco regime should be replaced, but he believed in the desirability of inducing France to introduce reforms by United Nations request in preference to coercion.¹⁹

The pro-Franco delegates from El Salvador and Argentina agreed with the non-interventionist delegations of Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru that the Franco government was not a threat to international peace and that any action

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 1171, 1183-1185.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 1216.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 1179.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 1175.

taken against that government would constitute intervention in violation of the Charter. They also insisted that the resolution violated the principles of the Inter-American system. They maintained that there was no foreign influence in Spain (in 1948) and that there was no threat against international peace by the Franco government.²⁰

The Salvadorean delegate announced that he would not only vote against the Belgian resolution but that if the resolution should be passed by the Assembly, his government would reserve the right to re-examine the resolution in light of the Charter and national interests.²¹ Both the Argentine and Salvadorean delegates insisted that the Spanish problem was beyond United Nations jurisdiction. The Argentine delegate said that the proposed action was no more justified against the Franco government than similar action would be against communist or capitalist governments.²² The United Nations should refrain from concerning itself with internal political problems and concern itself solely with international social conditions.

²⁰Ibid., p. 1189.

²¹Ibid., p. 1190.

²²Ibid., p. 1207.

The Belgian resolution was well supported by the Inter-American delegations in spite of the non-interventionist and pro-Franco opposition. The nations that had opposed the Belgian resolution in the First Committee on non-interventionist grounds (Nicaragua, Paraguay, and the United States) now joined the supporters of the resolution (Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela) in the Assembly action. Cuba and Colombia had opposed the Belgian resolution in the First Committee also, but they did not actively oppose it in the Assembly discussion. These delegations generally agreed that a recall of ministers and ambassadors from Madrid did not constitute intervention in Spain's internal affairs.

Inter-American opposition to the Belgian resolution in the Assembly debate was led by Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru who opposed on non-interventionist grounds. The opposition further was supported by Argentina and El Salvador who evidenced obvious admiration for the Franco regime. This made a total of five Inter-American delegations opposed to the Belgian resolution in the Assembly debate.

The delegations of Brazil, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Honduras were the only Inter-American delegations not to take part in the Assembly discussion. Determination of their opinions depended on their votes on the Belgian reso-

lution.

III

The General Assembly adopted the Belgian resolution in a roll-call vote of thirty-four to six with thirteen abstentions.²³ All Inter-American delegations voted on this resolution, but their votes were widely divided. Twelve Inter-American delegations voted for the resolution:

Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Six voted against the resolution:

Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Peru.

Three abstained:

Colombia, Cuba, and Honduras.

The six Inter-American delegations voting against the resolution cast the only negative votes in the General Assembly. It is significant that the only nations willing to go on record as definitely opposing action against Franco were six Hispanic American republics. Argentina ended its record of non-participation by voting against this resolution. The other five delegations had been consistent supporters of non-intervention, and their negative votes were anticipated.

²³Ibid., pp. 1221-1222.

The Dominican Republic had been silent in the debates on the Spanish question but had consistently voted against taking action against Franco in the First Committee except in the voting on the United States and Colombian resolutions. Peru and Costa Rica went on record as being against Franco's form of government, and Peru still favored barring that government from the United Nations. But neither delegation supported the Belgian resolution because of their non-interventionist policies.

The reasons for the negative votes of Argentina and El Salvador were very different from those of Peru and Costa Rica, and even Ecuador. The statements of the representative from El Salvador, when coupled with his voting, indicated that he was consistently pro-Franco. The Argentine representative's disinterest in the First Committee work, his failure to vote, and his abortive speeches in that Committee, indicated reluctance to take action against the Franco regime. This "reluctance" was merely a thinly disguised favoring of the Franco regime.

The three nations abstaining (Colombia, Cuba, and Honduras) were non-interventionists. Honduras had voted for the United States proposal and for the second paragraph of the Colombian proposal in the First Committee. It had never vocally expressed itself but had voted consistently with the

non-interventionist group. Cuba had avowed that it would not support the Belgian resolution but was outspoken in its disapproval of the Franco regime and did not maintain ambassadorial relations with France Spain. During the Assembly discussion, the Cuban delegate had expressed an intent to abstain, which he did, because he did not want to prejudice action against France, nor did he wish to forsake the principle of non-intervention.

Colombia might have been expected to support the First Committee's report to the Assembly. Its delegation had offered a resolution, which if followed to its ultimate conclusion, would have involved action stronger than that provided for in the Belgian resolution. Its rejection might have found Colombia disposed to support some other form of action, but the Colombian delegate had not supported the Belgian resolution in the interests of non-intervention during the Committee work, and he did not now abandon that position.

The United States had been opposed to any "interventionist" proposals in the committee discussion, and it again questioned the legality of the Belgian resolution in the Assembly. However, the United States supported the Belgian proposal in the Assembly which it had never done in the committee work. The United States voted without reserve for

the Belgian resolution in the General Assembly, while being an avowed non-interventionist in the committee proceedings.

Paraguay and Nicaragua had both been non-interventionists in the First Committee, but they followed the lead of the United States and voted for the Belgian resolution. Haiti voted for this resolution after having taken little part in the development of a resolution in the First Committee. Bolivia and Brazil also had taken little part in the committee work, but they voted with the United States and the five delegations proposing a resolution stronger than the compromise resolution of Belgium.

For the prestige of the Inter-American system, it is indeed fortunate that twelve Inter-American delegations did support the Belgian resolution. But the fact that the only negative votes on this important question were from the Western Hemisphere does illustrate a lack of solidarity in the Inter-American system.

The work of the General Assembly on the Spanish question during December 1946 resulted in a resolution which if carried to its fullest extent might have served to remedy the undesirable political and social conditions in Spain. The Assembly work presented an opportunity to examine the workings of the Inter-American system on a question that was not essentially Inter-American but which was of primary

interest to the nations of the Western Hemisphere. The Hispanic American nations by virtue of their ties with Spain had special interest in the question. The United States had an interest in helping the infant United Nations face up to the task of solving this complex problem.

The United States did not exercise any obvious control or influence over any large number of the Inter-American delegations in the First Committee work, and the General Assembly voting demonstrated that the United States followed rather than led the five states that had earlier proposed a stronger resolution favoring a severance of relations with Spain. The final resolution adopted by the General Assembly was more nearly like the joint resolution of Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela than those proposed by Colombia or the United States. The voting on the First Committee report indeed demonstrated not only the wide divergence of Inter-American opinions but also that each nation voted according to its own dictates.

Figure No. 9

United Nations **General Assembly**Title of Resolution **Belgian**Paragraph **(entire text)**U. N. Action **Adopted 34 to 6, 13 abstain**Date **December 12, 1946**

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia	X			
Brazil	X			
Chile	X			
Colombia			X	
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba			X	
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti	X			
Honduras			X	
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua	X			
Panama	X			
Paraguay	X			
Peru		X		
United States	X			
Uruguay	X			
Venezuela	X			
Totals	12	6	3	

Voting with the U. S. 11 Not voting with the U. S. 9

Chapter V

The Failure to Reaffirm the December 1946 Resolution

I

The General Assembly resolution of December 12, 1946, recommended that United Nations members withdraw their ambassadors and ministers from Madrid and that the members report at the General Assembly's next session what action they had taken in accordance with the recommendation. At the session following the December 1946 resolution, the secretary-general of the Assembly reported on the action taken by members.¹ He reported that three states (El Salvador, The Netherlands, United Kingdom) had recalled ambassadors or ministers, nineteen states had no accredited ambassadors or ministers in Spain, and thirty had no relations of any kind with Franco Spain. Liberia said that it would adhere to the resolution, the Dominican Republic said that proper consideration would be given to the resolution, and Argentina acknowledged the notification of the resolution from the secretary-general. (Argentina appointed a new ambassador to Madrid in 1947.)

After the report of the members' actions on the Decem-

¹United Nations, Yearbook 1946-47, p. 130.

ber 1946 resolution, the Spanish question was placed on the Assembly agenda of the second United Nations session. At the ninety-first meeting of the Assembly (September 23, 1947), the Spanish question was referred to the First Committee for consideration and report. The First Committee began discussion of the Spanish question at its one-hundred and third meeting (Lake Success, New York, November 10, 1947), and the discussion lasted into the one-hundred and fourth meeting (November 11, 1947). At the latter meeting, Lange (Poland) made a denunciatory speech about the Franco government and introduced a resolution which would reaffirm the resolution of December 12, 1946. The Polish resolution, dated November 11, 1947, stated:

The General Assembly.

Reaffirming again its resolution 39 (I) of 12 December 1946 concerning relations of Member States of the United Nations with Spain,

Recommends to the Security Council that it consider, within a month, the Spanish question and that it take adequate measures, in conformity with Article 41 of the Charter, in order to remedy the present situation according to the resolution of 12 December 1946.²

The delegation of Yugoslavia introduced an amendment to the Polish proposal, which would make that proposal somewhat

²United Nations, General Assembly, First Committee, Second Session, Official Records, Document A/C.1/259, Annex 20a, p. 626.

stronger. The Yugoslav amendment recommended that the Security Council impose economic sanctions on Spain. That amendment stated:

Add in paragraph 2 after the words "in conformity with Article 41 of the Charter" the following words:

"particularly measures of an economic nature."³

At the one-hundred and fifth meeting (November 11, 1947), Loridan (Belgium) introduced a resolution, submitted jointly by the delegations of Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg. That resolution, submitted in a compromise spirit stated:

The General Assembly

Takes note of the part of the Secretary-General's annual report dealing with the relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain, and notes the measures taken by virtue of resolution 39 (I) regarding such relations adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1946;

Regrets that the recommendations inviting all Members of the United Nations to recall their ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary from Madrid immediately has not been fully applied;

Expresses its confidence that the Security Council will exercise its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security as soon as the Spanish question shall require the adoption of such measures.⁴

³Ibid., Document A/C.1/263, Annex 20e, p. 628.

⁴Ibid., Document A/C.1/261, Annex 20c, p. 627.

M. C. Setalvad (India) favored reaffirming the December 1946 resolution, and to that end, he introduced an amendment to the joint resolution of Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The amendment was to modify the last sentence of the joint resolution, so as not to weaken the 1946 resolution. The amendment stated:

Delete last paragraph; substitute the following:

Expresses its confidence that the Security Council will as recommended in resolution 39 (I) dated 12 December 1946 consider the adequate measures to be taken to remedy the situation.⁵

Padilla Nervo (Mexico) also introduced a joint resolution, submitted by the delegations of Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay. He noted that the resolution of December 1946 had not been fully complied with, and in the interests of promoting co-operation and unity, he did not intend to introduce a stronger resolution. This resolution stated:

Whereas the Secretary-General in his annual report has informed the General Assembly of the steps taken by the States Members of the Organization in pursuance of its recommendations of 12 December 1946;

Reaffirms its resolution 39 (I) adopted on 12 December 1946 concerning relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain, and

⁵Ibid., Document A/C.1/262, Annex 20d, p. 627.

Expresses its confidence that the Security Council will exercise its responsibilities under the Charter should it consider that the situation in regard to Spain so requires.⁶

Belt y Ramires (Cuba) for his delegation, and for the Panamanian and Guatemalan delegations, submitted a proposal for the creation of a sub-committee to draft a generally acceptable text. That sub-committee, with a suggested membership of all authors of proposals and amendments on the Spanish question, would include the representatives of Belgium, Cuba, Guatemala, India, Luxembourg, Mexico, The Netherlands, Panama, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.⁷ The proposal for a sub-committee was put to a vote and adopted by the First Committee.

The sub-committee drew up a resolution, which was reported to the First Committee at its one-hundred and seventh meeting on the following day (November 12, 1947). Setalvad (India), the sub-committee chairman, presented the report, which was essentially the same resolution submitted jointly by the delegations of Cuba, Guatemala, Panama, Uruguay, and Mexico. The sub-committee resolution stated:

⁶Ibid., Document A/C.1/260/Rev. 1, Annex 20b, pp. 626-627.

⁷Ibid., Document A/C.1/264, Annex 20f, p. 628.

Whereas the Secretary-General in his annual report has informed the General Assembly of the steps taken by the States Members of the Organization in pursuance of its recommendations of 12 December 1946;

The General Assembly

Reaffirms its resolution 39 (I) adopted on 12 December 1946 concerning relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain, and

Expresses its confidence that the Security Council will exercise its responsibilities under the Charter as soon as it considers that the situation in regard to Spain so requires.⁸

This resolution was put to a roll-call vote by paragraphs, resulting in adoption of its three paragraphs. The First Committee then adopted the entire sub-committee resolution, and the chairman announced that the rapporteur would report the resolution to the General Assembly.⁹

Henrik de Kauffman (Denmark), the First Committee rapporteur, read the Committee report to the General Assembly at its one-hundred and eighteenth meeting (November 17, 1947). After some spirited discussion on the report and the Spanish question in general, the Assembly president, Oswaldo Aranha (Brazil), called for a roll-call vote on each paragraph, as requested by S. E. Duran-Ballen (Ecuador).¹⁰ The first paragraph was adopted, and the

⁸Ibid., Document A/C.1/265, Annex 20g, p. 628.

⁹Ibid., p. 431.

¹⁰United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Second Session, Vol. II, p. 1095.

president then advised the Assembly that the second paragraph required a two-thirds majority for adoption. The second paragraph was rejected, failing to obtain a requisite two-thirds majority. (It received only twenty-nine votes to sixteen with eight abstentions.)¹¹ The third paragraph was adopted, and the president then called for a vote on the First Committee resolution, without the second paragraph which had failed to get the necessary two-thirds majority. The resolution was adopted without the second paragraph (which reaffirmed the 1946 resolution recommending that United Nations members withdraw their ministers from Madrid.)

By rejecting the second paragraph of the First Committee resolution, the Assembly simply did not reaffirm the December 1946 resolution, so it may be presumed that that resolution was dead. According to the third paragraph, the Assembly had left the disposal of the Spanish question to the Security Council.

II

In November 1947, the main issue confronting the General Assembly in its consideration of the Spanish question was whether or not to reaffirm the resolution of December 12, 1946. That resolution's success was difficult to

¹¹Ibid., pp. 1095-1096.

measure, because it recommended that United Nations members withdraw their missions from Madrid, and many members did not maintain relations with the Franco government. The resolution was intended as a step in the direction of changing the Spanish government, but it had accomplished little and had no real effectiveness during 1947.

The Polish resolution, the joint resolution of Cuba, Guatemala, Panama, Uruguay, and Mexico, and the Indian amendment to the joint resolution of Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg all would have reaffirmed the December 1946 resolution.

In the discussion of this question both in the General Assembly and in the First Committee, the Inter-American delegations were widely divided in opinion. Chile, Guatemala, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela had supported the December 1946 resolution, and they supported the reaffirmation of that resolution in the First Committee and Assembly discussion.¹² Cuba had not supported the December 1946 resolution when it was adopted by the Assembly, but at that time had abstained from voting. However, Cuba now joined Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay in proposing a resolution to reaffirm the December 1946 resolution. Ecuador had voted

¹²Ibid., p. 1081.

against the resolution, but had accepted its decision. The Ecuadorean delegate announced that he would support reaffirming the resolution, as did the Cuban delegate, in the interests of consistency and logic.¹³ Both Cuba and Ecuador had been in the group that had insisted that collective severance of relations with the Franco regime constituted intervention in Spain's internal affairs.

Eight Inter-American delegations (Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela) supported the reaffirming of the December 1946 resolution, and they were among the strongest supporters of reaffirmation in the General Assembly.¹⁴ Since the resolution had been passed by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly, it should be reaffirmed to realize the full benefits intended by the resolution, and the Security Council should carry out the resolution in conformity with the Charter. (This was expressed in the joint resolution of Cuba, Guatemala, Panama, Uruguay, and Mexico submitted to the First Committee and also in the sub-committee resolution submitted to the First Committee.)

These delegations resented Franco's mistreatment of the Spanish people: they pointed to the laws of succession

¹³First Committee, Ibid., pp. 419, 426-427.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 404-405, 411-412, 417, 428.

imposed by a faked plebiscite (1946), new anti-labor laws, and generally increased persecution of Spaniards in a deteriorated political situation.¹⁵ The argument that collective action in severing relations constituted intervention was again rejected, and they urged reaffirmation of the December 1946 resolution as the United Nations' best method of taking action against the Franco regime.

The delegations of Brazil and Nicaragua thought that the Assembly could go no farther than the December 1946 resolution in taking action against the Franco regime.¹⁶ They would support some form of action allowed by the Charter, but they did not openly advocate reaffirmation of the December 1946 resolution.

The United States returned to its place with the non-interventionists in not supporting the reaffirmation of the December 1946 resolution. The United States joined Costa Rica and Peru in opposing the reaffirmation of that resolution on non-interventionist grounds.¹⁷ These three delegations (Costa Rica, Peru, United States) felt that the Franco regime was not aggressive, that the previous resolu-

¹⁵Ibid., p. 417.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 416-417.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 412.

tion had been to no avail, and that no form of sanctions should be imposed on the Spanish people. They insisted that sanctions would cause the Spanish people undue suffering and violence and that the December 1946 resolution had only tended to unify the Spanish people behind Franco.

The pro-Franco states (El Salvador and Argentina) were extremely vocal in their opposition to reaffirming the December 1946 resolution. Roberto Despradel (Dominican Republic) voiced opposition to the December 1946 resolution in the same tones as had the pro-Franco states of Argentina and El Salvador.¹⁸ Both El Salvador and the Dominican Republic had voted against the resolution when it had been adopted on December 12, 1946, but both had withdrawn their ministers from Madrid in "compliance" with that resolution. They both regretted and disliked this "intervention" interfering with Spanish sovereignty. The delegates of Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador insisted that the resolution in question was contrary to the Charter and constituted intervention, which they zealously opposed.¹⁹ They implied that the opposition to the Franco regime was a direct result of leftist agitation in the world.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 429.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 417-418, 424-426, P. 429.

Bolivia, Colombia, Haiti, Honduras, and Paraguay did not participate in the discussion over the reaffirmation of the December 1946 resolution in either the General Assembly or in the First Committee. However, Bolivia, Haiti, and Paraguay had voted for the resolution when it had been adopted, and Colombia and Honduras had both abstained. An examination of those five states' votes would be necessary to determine their attitudes on reaffirming the resolution.

The General Assembly work on reaffirming the December 1946 resolution demonstrated the cleavage and lack of solidarity within the Inter-American system. The group favoring action included those that had favored it in 1946, but with the addition of Cuba and Ecuador. The latter two states formerly had opposed recalling ministers from Madrid as constituting intervention in Spanish domestic affairs, but they now joined the group favoring a severance of relations with Spain for a laudable reason -- to support a previous resolution of the General Assembly.

The United States had voted for the resolution in 1946. Now, (1947) the United States again joined the non-interventionists. The anti-severance, non-interventionist states of Costa Rica and Peru had opposed the resolution when it had been adopted, and still opposed it (1947). Brazil and Nicaragua had voted for the resolution, but

they seemed only lukewarm toward reaffirmation. The Dominican Republic had voted against the resolution and now expressed opinions of the Franco regime resembling those expressed by the avowed pro-Franco delegations, Argentina and El Salvador.

III

On November 12, 1947, the sub-committee resolution was presented to the First Committee for approval, and it was adopted in a paragraph vote. The first paragraph acknowledged the secretary-general's report on steps taken by United Nations members on recommendations of the December 1946 resolution. The First Committee adopted that paragraph thirty-eight votes to six with eleven abstentions.²⁰ Fourteen Inter-American delegations voted for the first paragraph:

Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Six voted against it:

Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Peru.

One abstained:

Colombia.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 429-430.

The first paragraph was generously supported by the Inter-American states, but it did not propose anything, nor did it raise any issues. However, the second paragraph, which reaffirmed the December 1946 resolution, was more controversial and got less support. It was adopted by the First Committee thirty votes to fourteen with eleven abstentions.²¹ Ten Inter-American delegates voted for the second paragraph:

Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Eight voted against it:

Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Paraguay, Peru, and United States.

Three abstained from voting:

Colombia, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

The third paragraph of the sub-committee report was adopted thirty-seven votes to six with twelve abstentions.²² This paragraph expressed the General Assembly's confidence that the Security Council would take measures against Franco Spain whenever the Spanish situation might require such action. In effect, the third paragraph left the solution of the Spanish problem to the Security Council. Thirteen Inter-

²¹Ibid., p. 430.

²²Ibid., p. 430.

American delegations voted for the third paragraph:

Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Six voted against it:

Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Peru.

Two abstained from voting:

Bolivia and Colombia.

The entire sub-committee resolution was put to a vote after adoption of the separate paragraphs, and it was adopted twenty-nine votes to six with twenty abstentions.²³ Nine Inter-American states voted for the entire sub-committee resolution:

Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Six voted against it:

Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Peru.

Six abstained:

Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, and United States.

Nine Inter-American states (Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela) voted for the entire sub-committee resolution, and they had consistently voted for each of its three paragraphs. With the

²³Ibid., pp. 430-431.

exception of Haiti, all of those states had vocally supported reaffirming the December 1946 resolution in the First Committee. Haiti had voted for that resolution when it had been adopted by the General Assembly, but Cuba had abstained and Ecuador had voted against it. Both Cuba and Ecuador left the non-interventionist group to support the reaffirmation of the resolution. Bolivia voted for the first paragraph, and for the second paragraph, reaffirming the December 1946 resolution, but chose to abstain on the third paragraph which left the solution of the problem to the disposal of the Security Council. Bolivia also abstained in the voting on the entire sub-committee resolution. Haiti had not voiced any opinion in the discussion of the sub-committee report in the First Committee, but its vote for all three paragraphs of the resolution reaffirming the December 1946 resolution definitely placed it with those favoring a severance of relations with Franco Spain.

The non-interventionist delegations (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Peru) in addition to the pro-Franco non-interventionists (Argentina and El Salvador) opposed each paragraph of the resolution, and voted against the entire resolution. Their votes were the only ones cast against the first and third paragraphs of the sub-committee resolution. The United States and Brazil voted for the

first and third paragraphs, but abstained in the voting on the entire resolution. This voting indicated that the non-interventionists and pro-Franco states were not willing to reaffirm the resolution.

The sub-committee resolution's third paragraph recommended that the Security Council take action on the Spanish question whenever it deemed such to be necessary. This paragraph received the support of three more Inter-American votes than did the paragraph calling for reaffirming the December 1946 resolution. Bolivia voted for the second paragraph but abstained on the third paragraph. Honduras voted for the first and third paragraphs of the resolution but abstained on the second paragraph. Nicaragua and the United States voted for the first paragraph but against the second paragraph.

The entire resolution received fewer votes than any of the paragraphs, including the votes of only eight Inter-American delegations (Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela). Haiti had been silent in the First Committee discussion but had voted for each of the three paragraphs and for the entire resolution. The other seven Inter-American delegations had supported reaffirmation in the First Committee.

Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the United States voted for the first and third paragraphs, but they abstained in the vote on the entire resolution. Bolivia made a unique performance, voting for the first and second paragraphs, abstaining on the third paragraph, and abstaining on the entire resolution. Colombia did not oppose the reaffirmation of the resolution in the First Committee but abstained on each paragraph and on the complete resolution.

With the adoption of the resolution reaffirming the December 1946 resolution, the First Committee reported it to the General Assembly. The General Assembly considered the First Committee report on November 17, 1947. The voting in the General Assembly was similar to that of the First Committee. The first and third paragraphs of the resolution were passed by the General Assembly, but the second paragraph (reaffirming the December 1946 resolution) required a two-thirds majority, which it failed to receive.

The first paragraph, acknowledging action taken by United Nations members on the December 1946 resolution was adopted thirty-seven votes to five with eleven abstentions.²⁴ Thirteen Inter-American delegations voted for

²⁴General Assembly, Ibid., p. 1095.

the first paragraph:

Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, United
States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Five voted against it:

Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, and Peru.

Two abstained from voting:

Colombia and Ecuador.

One registered no vote:

Paraguay.

The only states in the General Assembly that voted against the first and third paragraphs were Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Peru. They had voted the same way in the First Committee, and Paraguay had voted with this non-interventionist group. However, in the Assembly, Paraguay registered no vote on any of the paragraphs.

The second paragraph (reaffirming the December 1946 resolution) required a two-thirds majority, and it failed to get that much support in the General Assembly, so it was rejected twenty-nine votes for the paragraph, against sixteen with eight abstentions.²⁵ Nine Inter-American delegations voted for the second paragraph:

²⁵Ibid., pp. 1095-1096.

Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Nine voted against it:

Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, and United States.

Two abstained:

Colombia and Ecuador.

One registered no vote:

Paraguay.

The nine Inter-American delegations that voted against the second paragraph were non-interventionists who had consistently opposed the severance of relations with Franco Spain. The defeat of this paragraph actually cut out the heart of the First Committee resolution.

The third paragraph, leaving the problem of United Nations members' relations with Spain to the Security Council, was adopted thirty-six votes to five with twelve abstentions.²⁶ Twelve Inter-American delegations voted for this paragraph:

Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

²⁶Ibid., p. 1096

Five voted against it:

Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
and Peru.

Three abstained from voting:

Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador.

One registered no vote:

Paraguay.

The only votes against the third paragraph were five non-interventionist Inter-American delegations. The voting was much the same as on the first paragraph, except that Bolivia voted for the first and second paragraphs and abstained on the third. Ecuador had supported the affirmation of the December 1946 resolution in the First Committee discussion and voting but abstained on all three paragraphs in the Assembly voting.

The First Committee resolution, minus the paragraph reaffirming the December 1946 resolution calling for collective withdrawal of ministers from Madrid, was adopted by the General Assembly in an unlisted vote. The resolution as adopted by the General Assembly acknowledged the action of United Nations members concerning the December 1946 resolution and left the solution of the Spanish problem in the hands of the Security Council.

The familiar three-way split was apparent in the voting of the Inter-American states on reaffirming the December 1946 resolution. The states that favored stronger action against the Franco regime supported the resolution in its entirety, while the non-interventionists and the pro-Franco states voted together against the second paragraph, and thereby defeated reaffirmation. However, the non-interventionists voted with the pro-severance delegations in supporting the first and third paragraphs of the resolution. The Inter-American delegations, by their voting and statements, were as divided on reaffirming the December 1946 resolution as they had been when that resolution had been adopted.

Figure No. 10

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee

Title of Resolution Sub-Committee Paragraph One

U. N. Action Adopted 38 to 6, 11 abstain Date November 12, 1947

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia	X			
Brazil	X			
Chile	X			
Colombia			X	
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba	X			
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador	X			
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti	X			
Honduras	X			
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua	X			
Panama	X			
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States	X			
Uruguay	X			
Venezuela	X			
Totals	14	6	1	

Voting with the U. S. 13 Not voting with the U. S. 7

Figure No. 11

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee
 Title of Resolution Sub-Committee Paragraph Two
 U. N. Action Adopted 30 to 14, 11 abstain Date November 12, 1947

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia	X			
Brazil		X		
Chile	X			
Colombia			X	
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba	X			
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador	X			
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti	X			
Honduras			X	
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua			X	
Panama	X			
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay	X			
Venezuela	X			
Totals	10	8	3	

Voting with the U. S. 9 Not voting with the U. S. 11

Figure No. 12

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee

Title of Resolution Sub-Committee Paragraph Three

U. N. Action Adopted 37 to 6, 12 abstain Date November 12, 1947

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia			X	
Brazil	X			
Chile	X			
Colombia			X	
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba	X			
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador	X			
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti	X			
Honduras	X			
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua	X			
Panama	X			
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States	X			
Uruguay	X			
Venezuela	X			
Totals	13	6	2	

Voting with the U. S. 12 Not voting with the U. S. 8

Figure No. 13

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee
 Title of Resolution Sub-Committee Paragraph (entire text)
 U. N. Action Adopted 29 to 6, 20 abstain Date November 12, 1947

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia			X	
Brazil			X	
Chile	X			
Colombia			X	
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba	X			
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador	X			
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti	X			
Honduras			X	
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua			X	
Panama	X			
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States			X	
Uruguay	X			
Venezuela	X			
Totals	9	6	6	

Voting with the U. S. 5 Not voting with the U. S. 15

Figure No. 14

United Nations General Assembly

Title of Resolution First Committee Paragraph OneU. N. Action Adopted 37 to 5, 11 abstain Date November 17, 1947

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia	X			
Brazil	X			
Chile	X			
Colombia			X	
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba	X			
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador			X	
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti	X			
Honduras	X			
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua	X			
Panama	X			
Paraguay				X
Peru		X		
United States	X			
Uruguay	X			
Venezuela	X			
Totals	13	5	2	1

Voting with the U. S. 12 Not voting with the U. S. 8

Figure No. 15

United Nations **General Assembly**Title of Resolution **First Committee** Paragraph **Two**U. N. Action **Rejected 29 to 16, 8 abstain** Date **November 17, 1947****(Failed to receive two-thirds majority)**

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia	X			
Brazil		X		
Chile	X			
Colombia			X	
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba	X			
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador			X	
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti	X			
Honduras		X		
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua		X		
Panama	X			
Paraguay				X
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay	X			
Venezuela	X			
Totals	9	9	2	1

Voting with the U. S. 8 Not voting with the U. S. 12

Figure No. 16

United Nations General Assembly
 Title of Resolution First Committee Paragraph Three
 U. N. Action Adopted 36 to 5, 12 abstain Date November 17, 1947

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia			X	
Brazil	X			
Chile	X			
Colombia			X	
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba	X			
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador			X	
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti	X			
Honduras	X			
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua	X			
Panama	X			
Paraguay				X
Peru		X		
United States	X			
Uruguay	X			
Venezuela	X			
Totals	12	5	3	1

Voting with the U. S. 11 Not voting with the U. S. 9

Chapter VI

The Attempt to Revoke the December 1946 Resolution

I

Juliusz Katz-Suchy (Poland) placed the question of United Nations members' relations with Franco Spain on the General Assembly agenda at its one-hundred and forty-second meeting on September 24, 1948. It was then decided to refer the Spanish question to the First Committee, charging it to consider the implementation of the December 1946 resolution (recommending that United Nations members withdraw their ministers from Madrid) and the implementation of the resolution of November 1947 (leaving settlement of the Spanish question to the Security Council's discretion).¹ In the latter resolution, the Assembly had not reaffirmed the December 1946 resolution.

The First Committee began consideration of the Spanish question at its two-hundred and fifty-sixth meeting on May 4, 1949. At that meeting, Joao Carlos Muniz (Brazil) submitted a resolution on behalf of the delegations of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. That resolution stated:

¹United Nations, Yearbook, 1948-49, p. 311.

The General Assembly,

Considering that, during its second session in 1947, a proposal intended to confirm the resolution of 12 December 1946 on the political regime in power in Spain failed to obtain the approval of two-thirds of the votes cast;

Considering that certain Governments have interpreted the negative vote of 1947 as virtually revoking the clause in the previous resolution which recommended the withdrawal of heads of mission with the rank of ambassador or minister plenipotentiary accredited to the Spanish Government;

Considering that, in view of the doubt regarding the validity of this interpretation, other Governments have continued to refrain from accrediting heads of mission to Madrid, thereby creating inequality to their disadvantage;

Considering that such confusion may diminish the prestige of the United Nations, which all Members of the Organization have a particular interest in preserving;

Considering that in any event the 1946 resolution did not prescribe the breaking of political and commercial relations with the Spanish Government which have been the subject of bilateral agreements between the Governments of several Member States and the Madrid Government;

Considering that, in the negotiation of such agreements, Governments which have complied with the recommendation of 12 December 1946 are placed in a position of inequality which works to the disadvantage of economically weaker Governments;

Decides, without prejudice to the declarations contained in the resolution of 12 December 1946, to leave Member States full freedom of action as regards their diplomatic relations with Spain.²

²United Nations, General Assembly, Third Session, Second Part, Annexes 1948, Document A/852, pp. 58-61.

The First Committee resumed the discussion of the Spanish question at its two-hundred and fifty-eighth meeting on May 5, 1949. At that meeting, Katz-Suchy (Poland) introduced a lengthy resolution that stated that the Franco government had been established by the Axis Powers, had aided the Axis Powers during the war, and still maintained an anti-democratic and dictatorial regime. The Polish resolution also noted that several United Nations members had violated the resolutions of December 1948 and November 1947.³ The Polish resolution made several recommendations including:

9. Calls upon the Members of the United Nations to comply with the letter and the spirit of the above enumerated pronouncements, declarations and resolutions;

10. Recommends that all Members of the United Nations should as a first step forthwith cease to export to Spain arms and ammunition as well as all warlike and strategic material;

11. Recommends that all the Members of the United Nations should refrain from entering into any agreements or treaties with Franco Spain both formally and de facto;

³Katz-Suchy vigorously attacked the United States for allegedly seeking economic concessions and for setting up military bases in Spain. He attacked both the United States and the United Kingdom in the First Committee and in the General Assembly for aiding the Franco government in return for military and economic advantages in Spain. See First Committee, Ibid., pp. 172-174; also General Assembly, Ibid., pp. 458-464.

12. Reaffirms that upon the establishment of a democratic government in Spain in accordance with the above enumerated pronouncements, declarations and resolutions, the United Nations will look forward to welcoming Spain to membership in the United Nations and its specialized agencies and affiliated organizations;

13. Expresses confidence that the Security Council will have the situation in Spain under its continuous observation and will fulfill its responsibilities in regard to this situation in accordance with the principles of the Charter.⁴

The discussion of the Spanish problem was carried into the two-hundred and fifty-ninth and two-hundred and sixtieth meetings of the First Committee on May 6, 1949 and into the two-hundred and sixty-first and second meetings on May 7, 1949. At the latter meeting, the joint resolution (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru) was put to a vote. The first and second paragraphs were voted on separately and adopted. The operative (last) paragraph was put to a separate vote and adopted. The resolution as a whole then was voted on and adopted.⁵

A paragraph vote was requested on the Polish resolution, resulting in the rejection of every paragraph. The chairman refused to put the entire Polish resolution to a vote, as requested by the Polish member, and the committee

⁴Ibid., Annexes 1948, Document A/860, pp. 84-85. Consult appendix for full text of the Polish resolution.

⁵First Committee, Ibid., pp. 238-240.

upheld the refusal.⁶

The joint resolution was therefore adopted as the First Committee's report on the Spanish question and was taken to the General Assembly.

At the two-hundred and eighth meeting of the Assembly held on May 11, 1949, the First Committee rapporteur read the report revoking the recommendation contained in the December 1946 resolution. There was no discussion at the time, because the First Committee was considering another problem, and the delegations of Guatemala and the Soviet Union requested that the First Committee and the General Assembly not meet concurrently so as to permit First Committee members to participate in the Assembly debate on the Spanish question.⁷

The consideration of the Spanish question was resumed at the two-hundred and thirteenth meeting of the General Assembly on May 13, 1949, and it continued into the two-hundred and fourteenth meeting. The joint resolution was put to a vote, but it was not adopted because it failed to get a required two-thirds majority.⁸ The Polish resolution was put to a paragraph vote, and all the paragraphs were

⁶Ibid., pp. 240-246.

⁷General Assembly, Ibid., p. 356.

⁸Ibid., p. 501.

rejected, as was the entire resolution when it was put to a vote.⁹

The failure of the Assembly to adopt either of these resolutions left the question of United Nations members' relations with Franco Spain to be regulated by the resolution of November 17, 1947. This latter resolution not only had left the problem of the Franco regime to the Security Council, but it also had failed to reaffirm the December 1946 resolution recommending that United Nations members withdraw their ministers from Spain. The joint resolution which the Assembly now failed to adopt would have revoked the December 1946 resolution. A peculiar legal question now faced the United Nations. On the one hand, the Assembly's failure to reaffirm the resolution calling for the withdrawal of ministers from Madrid (1947) was considered by some members to be a revocation of the December 1946 resolution. On the other hand, the joint resolution revoking the recommendation of the 1946 resolution was rejected by the General Assembly in 1949. Consequently, the Spanish question now was suspended between the resolutions of December 1946 and November 1947.

⁹Ibid., pp. 501-504.

II

Inter-American participation in the discussions by the First Committee and the General Assembly on the joint resolution (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru) and the Polish resolution in May 1949 was energetic and spirited. Fourteen of the twenty-one Inter-American delegations participated, and their opinions divided them into two general groups. One group included those supporting the joint resolution revoking the clause in the 1946 resolution that recommended United Nations members not accredit ambassadors and ministers to Madrid. Inter-American delegations speaking on behalf of the joint resolution, besides the author delegations (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru), were Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and El Salvador. These states in turn divided into two groups: those making statements approving the Franco regime (Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador), and those wanting to maintain relations with Franco for matters of expediency (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru).

Another group of Inter-American delegations included those not supporting the joint resolution. This group included Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, the United States, and Uruguay. These states in turn divided into two groups: those strongly opposed to the joint resolution (Guatemala,

Mexico, and Uruguay), and those more lukewarm in their opposition (Cuba, Panama, and the United States).

Seven Inter-American delegations (Chile, Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela) did not participate in the discussions in the First Committee or the General Assembly, so their positions were not immediately determinable. However, Chile, Venezuela, and Haiti in the past usually had voted in favor of taking action against the Franco regime, while Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay had generally voted with the non-interventionists.

The delegates of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru argued, both in the First Committee and in the Assembly, that the existence of the Franco government was an established fact. In spite of the nature of that government, it should be recognized that the Spanish people alone were capable of passing judgment on their government. A nation's government was its own business, and the United Nations should respect a nation's sovereignty. These states argued that the December 1946 resolution, in addition to not being well supported, had lowered United Nations prestige by alienating popular support, and that international harmony would be more beneficial to the Spanish people than to the Spanish government. It was alleged that the Decem-

ber 1946 resolution economically punished those nations that followed it scrupulously and rewarded those nations that ignored it. And, finally, the Franco regime obviously did not constitute a threat to peace in 1949, and no United Nations action was warranted.¹⁰

Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador adhered to these arguments, adding, however, that the world-wide hostility toward the Franco government was purely communist-inspired.¹¹ El Salvador and Argentina could not conceal their admiration for the Franco regime and were even hesitant about supporting the joint resolution, because it proposed that United Nations members individually do whatever they wished about relations with the Franco regime -- without prejudice to the resolutions of 1946 or 1947.¹²

Among the Inter-American states that strongly opposed the joint resolution, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, and Uruguay were the most outspoken. They argued that the issue was not one of taking action against the Spanish people but rather against the Spanish government, and these were not

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 456-458, 464-470, 480-491.

¹¹Ibid., p. 481.

¹²Ibid., pp. 477-479, 481-483.

one and the same.¹³ The December 1946 resolution had been taken against a fascistic and Axis-sponsored Franco government that still existed, and the admittance of that government to international relations would only serve to enhance its prestige at the expense of the reputation of the United Nations. The doctrine of non-intervention could not be invoked, because the December 1946 resolution did not constitute intervention, and the failure to adopt one paragraph of the November 1947 resolution did not annul automatically the December 1946 resolution. These states rejected the assertion that the 1946 resolution had brought economic and other disadvantages to some nations, as being an invalid, futile, and completely selfish argument.¹⁴ They insisted upon the necessity of positive action to aid the Spanish people, not only to help them achieve a democratic government, but for the strength of the United Nations as well.

The United States and Panama also opposed the joint resolution. They saw no reason to modify the 1946 resolution, although they also opposed the Polish resolution. The Panamanian delegate insisted that his government had

¹³Ibid., pp. 483-485.

¹⁴First Committee, Ibid., pp. 206-210.

never deviated from its position on Spain; he disliked Franco's government and felt that the United Nations should have nothing to do with it. The United States delegate also said his country's position had not changed. He believed in giving the Spanish people an opportunity to settle their own affairs, and he hoped that a free government eventually could be set up in Spain. His delegation insisted that sanctions against Spain would not aid democratic progress in that country.¹⁵

The delegations of Chile, Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela did not participate in the First Committee or the General Assembly discussion. The determination of their position on the question of United Nations relations with Spain depended upon their voting on the two resolutions.

¹⁵Atherton (United States) said that his government approved of Spain's participation in United Nations technical and specialized agencies. He felt that it was a benefit to the Spanish people and not a political problem to have Spain participate in such agencies. This was in direct opposition to the Polish resolution. General Assembly, Ibid., p. 494.

III

The joint resolution of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, recommending that United Nations members take whatever action they might choose about sending ministers and ambassadors to Madrid, was submitted to paragraph by paragraph vote of the First Committee on May 7, 1949. The first paragraph (acknowledging that the December 1948 resolution had failed to obtain sufficient votes to be reaffirmed) was adopted by a vote of twenty-five to twelve with nineteen abstentions.¹⁶ Twelve Inter-American delegations voted for the first paragraph:

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.

Three voted against it:

Guatemala, Mexico, and Uruguay.

Four abstained:

Chile, Costa Rica, Haiti, and United States.

Two registered no vote:

Cuba and Panama.

The First Committee adopted the second paragraph (noting that several governments had recognized that the failure to reaffirm the December 1948 resolution was a virtual

¹⁶First Committee, Ibid., pp. 238-239.

revocation of it) by a vote of twenty-one to fifteen with eleven abstentions.¹⁷ Ten Inter-American delegations voted for that paragraph:

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru.

Five voted against it:

Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay.

Five abstained:

Chile, Colombia, Haiti, United States, and Venezuela.

One registered no vote:

Cuba.

With the adoption of the first two paragraphs, the seventh paragraph, which was the operative paragraph, was put to a vote. The First Committee adopted that paragraph (allowing the members of the United Nations to take any action they might choose in regard to relations with Spain, without prejudice to the December 1946 resolution) by a vote of twenty-five to sixteen with sixteen abstentions.¹⁸ Twelve Inter-American delegations voted for the seventh paragraph:

¹⁷Ibid., p. 239.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 239.

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.

Five voted against it:

Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay.

Three abstained:

Chile, Haiti, and United States.

One registered no vote:

Cuba.

The entire resolution was put to a vote and adopted by a vote of twenty-five to sixteen with sixteen abstentions.¹⁹ Twelve Inter-American delegations voted for the entire resolution:

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.

Five voted against it:

Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay.

Three abstained:

Chile, Haiti, and United States.

One registered no vote:

Cuba.

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Peru supported the resolution in the First

¹⁹Ibid., p. 240.

Committee's discussion and voted for each submitted paragraph and for the entire resolution. Colombia abstained from voting on the second paragraph but voted for the other two paragraphs as well as for the entire resolution. Contrary to expectation, the Colombian delegation abstained from voting on a paragraph that it had jointly sponsored.

Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay voted for the separate paragraphs and for the entire resolution. Those delegations, while being silent in the discussion, had generally supported in previous voting the non-interventionist policy of opposing strong action against the Franco regime. Their support of the resolution was consistent with their general policies on the Spanish question. Venezuela in the past usually had voted with those favoring strong action against Franco, but it now voted for the entire resolution and for every paragraph except the second.

Guatemala, Mexico, and Uruguay had strongly supported action against the Franco regime in December 1946, and these states in the First Committee action, voted against the paragraphs and the entire joint resolution. Panama also had opposed maintenance of relations with the Franco government, and now it voted against the second and last paragraphs and the entire joint resolution but registered

no vote on the first paragraph. Costa Rica abstained on the first paragraph, voted against the second and last paragraphs, and voted against the entire resolution. Although Costa Rica usually had supported the non-interventionists, it now was not prepared to revoke the December 1946 resolution.

Chile, like Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay, had always supported the severance of relations with the Franco government, but Chile took no part in the discussion on the proposal to revoke the 1946 resolution. Chile abstained on the separate paragraphs and the entire resolution and apparently was not prepared to help kill the December 1946 resolution. Haiti and the United States originally had voted for the December 1946 resolution and had generally supported the carrying out of that resolution. Haiti also had voted to reaffirm the 1946 resolution in 1947. Now, both states abstained in the First Committee's vote to revoke the December 1946 resolution. Cuba had not voted for the December 1946 resolution but had voted to reaffirm it in 1947. Cuba did not register a vote in 1949.

The Polish resolution alleged that several United Nations members had disregarded the December 1946 resolution, had strengthened their political ties with the Franco government, and had materially aided that government. The

Polish resolution called for United Nations members to refrain from sending strategic war materials to Spain and to refrain from having any form of relations with that government. The Polish proposal was submitted to a paragraph vote on each of its thirteen paragraphs, and the First Committee overwhelmingly rejected each paragraph.

The Inter-American delegations did not give much support to the Polish proposal.²⁰ Twelve Inter-American delegations (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and United States) voted against every paragraph of the Polish resolution.²¹ These delegations had all voted for the joint resolution with the exception of the United States which had abstained. Costa Rica, Chile, and Venezuela voted against some paragraphs of the Polish resolution. Uruguay abstained in the entire voting on the Polish resolution in the First Committee, and Panama and Cuba did not register any votes.

With the exception of Mexico, Guatemala, and Haiti, the Inter-American states did not support the Polish resolution, and this was a clear demonstration that a large

²⁰Consult the appendix for the text of the Polish resolution.

²¹First Committee, Ibid., pp. 240-244.

majority of Inter-American states favored, in the First Committee, the joint resolution to the Polish resolution. There was little indication of anything resembling complete solidarity in Inter-American support of the joint resolution, however, but a majority of the Inter-American states, resembling the majority that opposed the Polish resolution, voted for the joint resolution.

On May 16, 1949, the joint resolution was put to a vote in the General Assembly. The joint resolution required a two-thirds majority to be adopted by the General Assembly, and failing to get the required support, consequently was not adopted. The vote was twenty-six to fifteen for the resolution with sixteen abstentions.²² Twelve Inter-American delegations voted for the resolution:

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.

Four voted against it:

Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay.

Three abstained:

Chile, Haiti, and United States.

Two registered no vote:

Costa Rica and Cuba.

²²General Assembly, Ibid., p. 501.

Inter-American voting in the General Assembly on the joint resolution was almost identical to the voting on the same resolution in the First Committee. The only exception was that Costa Rica registered no vote in the Assembly, whereas it had voted against the resolution in the First Committee.

After the failure of the joint resolution in the General Assembly, the Polish resolution that had been so overwhelmingly rejected in the First Committee was submitted to the General Assembly. The first seven paragraphs of that resolution were each rejected overwhelmingly, even more so than in the First Committee voting. Paragraphs eight through thirteen were rejected by a show of hands, and the entire resolution was also rejected.²³ Guatemala was the only Inter-American delegation to vote for any of the paragraphs of the Polish resolution. Mexico had voted for parts of the Polish resolution in the First Committee but now registered no vote. (Costa Rica and Cuba also registered no votes.) The other Inter-American delegations voted against the Polish resolution in much the same way that they had voted against it in the First Committee.

²³Ibid., pp. 501-504.

The General Assembly's failure to abrogate the December 1946 resolution left that resolution in the same peculiar situation that it had been in when the Assembly had failed to reaffirm it in 1947. In the 1949 voting, the December 1946 resolution was neither reaffirmed nor abrogated; it was left suspended almost in mid-air.

The Inter-American states were widely divided on the Spanish question, and the opinions and voting records of their delegations in the United Nations presented little evidence of solidarity. A preponderant majority of the Inter-American states voted against the Polish resolution, however, and this was significant since the Polish delegation had attacked the United States for allegedly aiding the Franco regime in an attempt to gain military and economic ascendancy in Spain. The voting would indicate a good measure of Inter-American support for the United States against the Polish attack. However, the same majority that voted against the Polish resolution, also voted for the joint resolution of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru on which the United States abstained.

The proposal to nullify the December 1946 resolution got a majority of twelve of twenty-one Inter-American delegations, but the total vote was widely divergent, and the results did not indicate any large measure of

solidarity. The nations of the Inter-American system obviously voted according to their own dictates and not at the suggestion of any one nation.

Figure No. 17

United Nations General Assembly, First CommitteeTitle of Resolution Joint Latin-American Paragraph OneU. N. Action Adopted 25 to 12, 19 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina	X			
Bolivia	X			
Brazil	X			
Chile			X	
Colombia	X			
Costa Rica			X	
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic	X			
Ecuador	X			
El Salvador	X			
Guatemala		X		
Haiti			X	
Honduras	X			
Mexico		X		
Nicaragua	X			
Panama				X
Paraguay	X			
Peru	X			
United States			X	
Uruguay		X		
Venezuela	X			
Totals	12	3	4	2

Voting with the U. S. 3 Not voting with the U. S. 17

Figure No. 18

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee
 Title of Resolution Joint Latin-American Paragraph Two
 U. N. Action Adopted 21 to 15, 11 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina	X			
Bolivia	X			
Brazil	X			
Chile			X	
Colombia			X	
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic	X			
Ecuador	X			
El Salvador	X			
Guatemala		X		
Haiti			X	
Honduras	X			
Mexico		X		
Nicaragua	X			
Panama		X		
Paraguay	X			
Peru	X			
United States			X	
Uruguay		X		
Venezuela			X	
Totals	10	5	5	1

Voting with the U. S. 4 Not voting with the U. S. 16

Figure No. 19

United Nations ~~General Assembly, First Committee~~
 Title of Resolution Joint Latin-American Paragraph (operative)
 U. N. Action Adopted 25 to 16, 16 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina	X			
Bolivia	X			
Brazil	X			
Chile			X	
Colombia	X			
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic	X			
Ecuador	X			
El Salvador	X			
Guatemala		X		
Haiti			X	
Honduras	X			
Mexico		X		
Nicaragua	X			
Panama		X		
Paraguay	X			
Peru	X			
United States			X	
Uruguay		X		
Venezuela	X			
Totals	12	5	3	1

Voting with the U. S. 2 Not voting with the U. S. 18

Figure No. 20

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee
 Title of Resolution Joint Latin-American Paragraph (entire text)
 U. N. Action Adopted 25 to 16, 16 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina	X			
Bolivia	X			
Brazil	X			
Chile			X	
Colombia	X			
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic	X			
Ecuador	X			
El Salvador	X			
Guatemala		X		
Haiti			X	
Honduras	X			
Mexico		X		
Nicaragua	X			
Panama		X		
Paraguay	X			
Peru	X			
United States			X	
Uruguay		X		
Venezuela	X			
Totals	12	5	3	1

Voting with the U. S. 2 Not voting with the U. S. 18

Figure No. 21

United Nations **General Assembly, First Committee**

Title of Resolution Polish Paragraph One

U. N. Action Rejected 27 to 9, 20 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile			X	
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica			X	
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti			X	
Honduras		X		
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua		X		
Panama				X
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela			X	
Totals	2	12	5	2

Voting with the U. S. 11 Not voting with the U. S. 9

Figure No. 22

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee
 Title of Resolution Polish Paragraph Two
 U. N. Action Rejected 31 to 9, 16 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile			X	
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica			X	
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti			X	
Honduras		X		
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua		X		
Panama				X
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela		X		
Totals	2	13	4	2

Voting with the U. S. 12 Not voting with the U. S. 8

Figure No. 23

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee
 Title of Resolution Polish Paragraph Three
 U. N. Action Rejected 32 to 10, 14 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile			X	
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica			X	
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti			X	
Honduras		X		
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua		X		
Panama				X
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela		X		
Totals	2	13	4	2

Voting with the U. S. 12 Not voting with the U. S. 8

Figure No. 24

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee

Title of Resolution Polish

Paragraph Four

U. N. Action Rejected 31 to 9, 16 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile			X	
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica			X	
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti			X	
Honduras		X		
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua		X		
Panama				X
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela			X	
Totals	2	12	5	2

Voting with the U. S. 11 Not voting with the U. S. 9

Figure No. 25

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee
 Title of Resolution Polish Paragraph Five
 U. N. Action Rejected 34 to 8, 14 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile			X	
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica			X	
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti			X	
Honduras		X		
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua		X		
Panama				X
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela		X		
Totals	2	13	4	2

Voting with the U. S. 12 Not voting with the U. S. 8

Figure No. 26

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee

Title of Resolution Polish

Paragraph Six

U. N. Action Rejected 28 to 9, 19 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile			X	
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica			X	
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala			X	
Haiti	X			
Honduras		X		
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua		X		
Panama				X
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela			X	
Totals	2	12	5	2

Voting with the U. S. 11 Not voting with the U. S. 9

Figure No.27

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee
 Title of Resolution Polish Paragraph Seven
 U. N. Action Rejected 46 to 6, 4 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile		X		
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala		X		
Haiti			X	
Honduras		X		
Mexico		X		
Nicaragua		X		
Panama				X
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela		X		
Totals		17	2	2

Voting with the U. S. 16 Not voting with the U. S. 4

Figure No. 28

United Nations General Assembly, First CommitteeTitle of Resolution Polish Paragraph EightU. N. Action Rejected 39 to 6, 11 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile		X		
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala			X	
Haiti			X	
Honduras		X		
Mexico			X	
Nicaragua		X		
Panama				X
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela			X	
Totals		14	5	2

Voting with the U. S. 13 Not voting with the U. S. 7

Figure No. 29

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee

Title of Resolution Polish

Paragraph Nine

U. N. Action Rejected 35 to 10, 10 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile		X		
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica			X	
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala			X	
Haiti	X			
Honduras		X		
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua		X		
Panama				X
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela		X		
Totals	2	14	3	2

Voting with the U. S. 13 Not voting with the U. S. 7

Figure No. 30

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee
 Title of Resolution Polish Paragraph Ten
 U. N. Action Rejected 39 to 6, 11 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile		X		
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica			X	
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala			X	
Haiti			X	
Honduras		X		
Mexico		X		
Nicaragua		X		
Panama				X
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela		X		
Totals		15	4	2

Voting with the U. S. 14 Not voting with the U. S. 6

Figure No. 31

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee
 Title of Resolution Polish Paragraph Eleven
 U. N. Action Rejected 43 to 7, 6 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile		X		
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala			X	
Haiti			X	
Honduras		X		
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua		X		
Panama				X
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela		X		
Totals	1	15	3	2

Voting with the U. S. 14 Not voting with the U. S. 6

Figure No. 32

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee
 Title of Resolution Polish Paragraph Twelve
 U. N. Action Rejected 34 to 11, 11 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile			X	
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica			X	
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti	X			
Honduras		X		
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua		X		
Panama				X
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela		X		
Totals	3	13	3	2

Voting with the U. S. 12 Not voting with the U. S. 8

Figure No. 33

United Nations General Assembly, First Committee

Title of Resolution Polish Paragraph ThirteenU. N. Action Rejected 36 to 9, 11 abstain Date May 7, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile		X		
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica		X		
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti	X			
Honduras		X		
Mexico	X			
Nicaragua		X		
Panama				X
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela		X		
Totals	3	15	1	2

Voting with the U. S. 14 Not voting with the U. S. 6

Figure No. 34

United Nations General Assembly

Title of Resolution Joint Latin-American Paragraph (entire text)

U. N. Action Rejected 15 to 26, 16 abstain Date May 16, 1949

(Failed to receive two-thirds majority)

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina	X			
Bolivia	X			
Brazil	X			
Chile			X	
Colombia	X			
Costa Rica				X
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic	X			
Ecuador	X			
El Salvador	X			
Guatemala		X		
Haiti			X	
Honduras	X			
Mexico		X		
Nicaragua	X			
Panama		X		
Paraguay	X			
Peru	X			
United States			X	
Uruguay		X		
Venezuela	X			
Totals	12	4	3	2

Voting with the U. S. 2 Not voting with the U. S. 18

Figure No. 35

United Nations General Assembly
 Title of Resolution Polish Paragraph One
 U. N. Action Rejected 23 to 8, 20 abstain Date May 16, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile			X	
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica				X
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti			X	
Honduras		X		
Mexico				X
Nicaragua		X		
Panama		X		
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela		X		
Totals	1	14	3	3

Voting with the U. S. 13 Not voting with the U. S. 7

Figure No. 36

United Nations General Assembly

Title of Resolution Polish

Paragraph Two

U. N. Action Rejected 30 to 8, 18 abstain

Date May 16, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile			X	
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica				X
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti			X	
Honduras		X		
Mexico				X
Nicaragua		X		
Panama			X	
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela		X		
Totals	1	13	4	3

Voting with the U. S. 12

Not voting with the U. S. 8

Figure No. 37

United Nations General AssemblyTitle of Resolution PolishParagraph ThreeU. N. Action Rejected 33 to 10, 13 abstain Date May 16, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile			X	
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica				X
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti			X	
Honduras		X		
Mexico				X
Nicaragua		X		
Panama			X	
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela		X		
Totals	1	13	4	3

Voting with the U. S. 12 Not voting with the U. S. 8

Figure No. 38

United Nations **General Assembly**

Title of Resolution **Polish**

Paragraph **Four**

U. N. Action **Rejected 35 to 8, 13 abstain**

Date **May 16, 1949**

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile		X		
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica				X
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti			X	
Honduras		X		
Mexico				X
Nicaragua		X		
Panama			X	
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela		X		
Totals	1	14	3	3

Voting with the U. S. 13 Not voting with the U. S. 7

Figure No. 39

United Nations General Assembly

Title of Resolution Polish

Paragraph Five

U. N. Action Rejected 35 to 7, 13 abstain

Date May 16, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile			X	
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica				X
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala	X			
Haiti			X	
Honduras		X		
Mexico				X
Nicaragua		X		
Panama			X	
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela		X		
Totals	1	13	4	3

Voting with the U. S. 12 Not voting with the U. S. 8

Figure No. 40

United Nations General AssemblyTitle of Resolution PolishParagraph SixU. N. Action Rejected 33 to 7, 16 abstain Date May 16, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile			X	
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica				X
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador			X	
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala			X	
Haiti			X	
Honduras		X		
Mexico				X
Nicaragua		X		
Panama			X	
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela		X		
Totals		12	6	3

Voting with the U. S. 12 Not voting with the U. S. 9

Figure No.41

United Nations General Assembly

Title of Resolution Polish Paragraph Seven

U. N. Action Rejected 36 to 6, 11 abstain Date May 16, 1949

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina		X		
Bolivia		X		
Brazil		X		
Chile		X		
Colombia		X		
Costa Rica				X
Cuba				X
Dominican Republic		X		
Ecuador		X		
El Salvador		X		
Guatemala		X		
Haiti			X	
Honduras		X		
Mexico				X
Nicaragua		X		
Panama		X		
Paraguay		X		
Peru		X		
United States		X		
Uruguay			X	
Venezuela		X		
Totals		15	2	3

Voting with the U. S. 15 Not voting with the U. S. 5

Chapter VII

The End of the December 1946 Resolution

I

When the joint resolution of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly in 1949, the Spanish question was left in abeyance. The December 1946 recommendation that United Nations members not accredit heads of missions to Madrid was still officially on the record, subject only to the modifications of the November 1947 resolution. The almost dormant question of United Nations relations with Spain was now left to the Security Council for settlement. And no Security Council action would be forthcoming on the Spanish question, so long as the Franco government did not constitute an actual threat to world peace. In 1949, it was more than unlikely that Franco's dictatorial, corrupt, and weak government would embark on a campaign of aggression.

In August 1950, the delegations of the Dominican Republic and Peru, in separate communications, requested that the secretary-general place the problem of members' relations with Spain on the agenda of the Assembly's fifth

session.¹ Upon recommendation of the General Committee, the General Assembly at its two-hundred and eighty-fifth meeting (September 26, 1950) referred the question of the relations of United Nations members and specialized agencies with Spain to the Ad Hoc Political Committee for consideration and report.²

The Ad Hoc Political Committee considered the Spanish question at its twenty-fifth and through its thirtieth meetings. At the twenty-fifth meeting (October 27, 1950) a joint resolution was introduced by Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Peru. That resolution stated:

The General Assembly.

Considering that:

The General Assembly during the second part of its first session in 1946 adopted several recommendations concerning Spain, one of which provided that Spain be debarred from membership in international agencies established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations, and another that Member States withdraw their Ambassadors and Ministers from Madrid,

The establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of Ambassadors and Ministers with a Government does not imply any judgment upon the domestic policy of that Government,

¹United Nations, General Assembly, Fifth Session, Official Records, Document A/1473, p. 1.

²Ibid., p. 1.

The Specialized agencies of the United Nations are technical and largely non-political in character and have been established in order to benefit the peoples of all nations, and that, therefore, they should be free to decide for themselves whether the participation of Spain in their activities is desirable,

Resolves:

1. To revoke the recommendation for the withdrawal of Ambassadors and Ministers from Madrid, contained in General Assembly resolution 39 (I) of 12 December 1946;
2. To revoke the recommendation intended to debar Spain from membership in international agencies established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations, which recommendation is a part of the same resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 concerning relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain.³

At the twenty-eighth meeting of the Ad Hoc Political Committee (October 30, 1950), The Netherlands delegation introduced an amendment to the joint resolution which the sponsors of the joint resolution accepted and which added after the word, "desirable" in paragraph 3, the words, "in the interest of their work."⁴ This amendment removed any political connotations in favor of the practical necessity of accepting Spain's participation in specialized agencies.

³Ibid., Document A/1473, p. 4.

⁴Ibid., Document A/AC.38/L.26.

At the thirtieth meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee (October 31, 1950), the amended joint resolution, revoking the December 1946 resolution and opening the way for admitting Spain to participation in United Nations specialised agencies, was adopted by the Committee in a roll-call vote, thirty-seven to ten with twelve abstentions.⁵ The General Assembly (operating under a rule that matters brought to it by the Ad Hoc Political Committee would not be discussed in Assembly meetings) adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on November 4, 1950 by thirty-eight votes to ten with twelve abstentions.⁶

The General Assembly's revocation of the December 1946 resolution (recommending that United Nations members not send ministers or ambassadors to Madrid) left General Assembly policy on the Spanish question based on the Panama resolution (February 1946) and the November 1947 resolution. The Panama resolution recommended that United Nations members take into account the origin and nature of the Franco government in their dealings with that government, and the November 1947 resolution left the Spanish question to the

⁵Ibid., pp. 2-3.

⁶New York Times, November 5, 1950, pp. 1, 26.

Security Council for settlement whenever that body might find that action was warranted against the Franco government. The issue of Franco Spain for all practical purposes now was dropped upon the adoption of the joint resolution. It should be noted that the joint resolution did not provide for Spain's admittance to United Nation membership; the most that it did in that matter was to open the way for Spanish participation in the technical agencies of the United Nations.

II

The voting on the joint resolution revoking the December 1946 resolution was almost identical in the Ad Hoc Committee and the General Assembly. The passage of this resolution may not be termed as United Nations approval of the Franco regime, and no state represented in the committee claimed that the Franco government had undergone the change, or any part of the change, necessary for admitting Spain to United Nations membership. It was a matter of political practicality and technical expediency, and those states that had previously announced their dislike of the nature of the Franco government did not change their opinions.⁷

⁷Ibid., Document A/1473, p. 2.

The twenty-one Inter-American delegations voted on the joint resolution the same in the General Assembly as in the Ad Hoc Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee adopted the joint resolution in a roll-call vote thirty-seven to ten with twelve abstentions; the General Assembly adopted the same resolution thirty-eight to ten with twelve abstentions.⁸ Seventeen Inter-American states voted for the resolution:

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, and Venezuela.

Three voted against it:

Guatemala, Mexico, and Uruguay.

One abstained:

Cuba.

Three Inter-American states (Guatemala, Mexico, and Uruguay) had been consistent supporters of the December 1946 resolution. They had been supported at various times by other Inter-American states, but by 1950 they alone wanted to isolate Franco Spain. Cuba vocally had opposed the December 1946 resolution when it was adopted as constituting unwarranted interference in Spain's domestic affairs. But Cuba had never voted against the December

⁸Ibid., p. 3, and New York Times, op. cit., p. 1.

1946 resolution, had supported its reaffirmation, and opposed its abrogation in 1949. Cuba, alone of the Inter-American states, abstained in the vote to revoke that resolution which probably indicated opposition to its revocation.

The non-interventionists, including the United States, had not supported the 1946 resolution to any extent in the Assembly. These non-interventionists included Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru. Argentina, Dominican Republic, and El Salvador had always opposed taking any form of action against Franco Spain, and they had appeared to use non-intervention as a cloak to cover their pro-Franco tendencies. Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Haiti, Panama, and Venezuela usually had supported some form of action against the Franco regime, and they professed to detest that regime. Ecuador and Nicaragua had supported the December 1946 resolution in the face of revocation, or when reaffirmation was suggested. However, all these states apparently had decided to close the issue in 1950 and to prepare for co-operation and closer relations with the Franco government.

It is essential to bear in mind that this revocation, at least for the moment, did not indicate United Nations approval of the Franco government nor that the Inter-

American states, which had expressed their dislike of the Franco regime, had changed their views. Even with the revocation of the 1946 resolution, there had been few serious suggestions that Spain be admitted to United Nations membership or be accepted as an equal in the General Assembly.

It is significant to note that seventeen out of twenty-one Inter-American republics voted for the revocation of the December 1946 resolution. This was the greatest degree of solidarity in voting since the vote in February 1946 on the Panama resolution (recommending that United Nations members take into account the nature and origin of the Franco government in their dealings with it), the first instance of Assembly consideration of the Spanish problem.

III

The General Assembly's action on the Spanish question (1946-1950) involved the consideration of five major resolutions. These included: the Panama resolution (February 9, 1946) in which the Assembly recommended that United Nations members take into account the nature and origin of the Franco government in their dealings with it; the Belgian resolution (December 12, 1946) in which the Assembly recommended that United Nations members not accredit minis-

ters to the Franco government; the resolution passed on November 17, 1947 which failed to reaffirm the December 1946 resolution and left the Spanish question to the Security Council; the resolution jointly proposed by Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru and rejected by the Assembly on May 7, 1949, which would have abrogated the December 1946 resolution; and the resolution jointly proposed by Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, The Philippines, and Peru (November 4, 1950) which revoked the December 1946 resolution and which the General Assembly adopted. Various other resolutions were submitted and considered, but these five were the resolutions that decided the Assembly's course on the Spanish question.

The Inter-American system showed a large measure of unanimity in the votes on the first and the last of these five resolutions. There was much less solidarity and unanimity on the three intervening resolutions and even less unanimity on the incidental resolutions.

The voting record and the opinions expressed in the Assembly work on the Spanish question divided the Inter-American states into three groups. There were those that disapproved of the Franco government and expressed that

disapproval by favoring a severance of relations and strong action against Spain. This group usually included Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Haiti was less vocal in its disapproval of the Spanish regime, but its voting record placed it in the group opposed to the Franco government. Cuba often expressed dislike of the Franco regime but abstained in several votes in an attempt to support the principle of non-intervention.

Another group included those that disapproved of the Franco government but did not support even the mild action recommended by the Assembly on the grounds that non-intervention should be maintained as a United Nations principle at all costs. The non-interventionists included Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and the United States. Bolivia and Brazil alternated between voting with these non-interventionists and those favoring stronger action against the Franco regime. Cuba, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Nicaragua modified their position on non-intervention by supporting, at various times, action against the Franco government. The United States supported the Panama resolution and the December 1946 resolution, but it usually voted with the non-interventionists.

A third group, also non-interventionist, was made up of those few states that indicated outright approval of the Franco regime. These states, Argentina, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic, by their participation in the debate and their voting records, indicated that the Franco government was to their liking and that they would welcome relations with such a government.

There was little solidarity demonstrated by the Inter-American system during the General Assembly consideration of the Spanish question from 1946 to 1950. It was quite evident that the Inter-American states voted as individuals, and that neither the United States, nor any other state, exercised control or domination over these states. The United States influence was no greater than that of any other state in the Inter-American system. However, on behalf of solidarity it must be acknowledged that the Inter-American states voted in a large majority on the first issue (Panama resolution) and voted in a similar majority in what was apparently the General Assembly's last consideration (Ad Hoc Committee resolution) of the Spanish question. But, little solidarity was in evidence in the intervening consideration by the Assembly, and it

was obvious that the Inter-American delegations enjoyed a complete freedom of action in the General Assembly.

Figure No. 42

United Nations **General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee**
 Title of Resolution **Joint** Paragraph **(entire text)**
 U. N. Action **Adopted 37 to 10, 12 abstain** Date **October 31, 1950**

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina	X			
Bolivia	X			
Brazil	X			
Chile	X			
Colombia	X			
Costa Rica	X			
Cuba			X	
Dominican Republic	X			
Ecuador	X			
El Salvador	X			
Guatemala		X		
Haiti	X			
Honduras	X			
Mexico		X		
Nicaragua	X			
Panama	X			
Paraguay	X			
Peru	X			
United States	X			
Uruguay		X		
Venezuela	X			
Totals	17	3	1	

Voting with the U. S. 16 Not voting with the U. S. 4

Figure No. 43

United Nations General Assembly
 Title of Resolution Ad Hoc Committee Paragraph (entire text)
 U. N. Action Adopted 38 to 10, 12 abstain Date November 4, 1950

Delegation	Yes	No	Abstain	Vote Unregistered
Argentina	X			
Bolivia	X			
Brazil	X			
Chile	X			
Colombia	X			
Costa Rica	X			
Cuba			X	
Dominican Republic	X			
Ecuador	X			
El Salvador	X			
Guatemala		X		
Haiti	X			
Honduras	X			
Mexico		X		
Nicaragua	X			
Panama	X			
Paraguay	X			
Peru	X			
United States	X			
Uruguay		X		
Venezuela	X			
Totals	17	3	1	

Voting with the U. S. 13 Not voting with the U. S. 4

INDEX of PERSONS

Alfaro, Ricardo J. (Panama) (1883-)

Alfaro, an international jurist of great repute, has been secretary-general of the American Institute of International Law since 1938, and is a former member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (Hague). He has had a long and illustrious career as jurist and diplomat. He became assistant secretary for Foreign Affairs (1905), and served as premier (1918-1922). He was minister to the United States (1922-1930 and 1933-1936), vice president (1928-1930) and president (1931-1932). He became minister of Foreign Affairs (1945), and served as the Panamanian representative at the San Francisco Conference (1945) and the General Assembly (1946).

Aranha, Oswaldo (Brazil) (1894-)

Aranha served as ambassador to the United States (1934-1937) and as minister for Foreign Relations (1938-1944). He was chairman of the Brazilian delegation to the Inter-American Foreign Ministers Conference in Rio de Janeiro (1942). He was the representative in the Security Council (1947), and was president of the General Assembly's first special session (1947).

Atherton, Ray (United States) (1883-)

Atherton has been in United States Foreign Service since 1914. He was minister to Bulgaria (1937), Denmark (1939), and Canada (1943). He became the first United States ambassador accredited to Canada (1943). He was an alternate representative to the General Assembly in Paris (1948).

Bautista de Lavallo, Juan (Peru)

Bautista de Lavallo, a Peruvian jurist, was elected to the Board of Directors of the Inter-American Bar Association (1941-1943), and to the Peruvian Supreme Court (1945). He was a representative at the General Assembly in New York (1946-1947).

Bebler, Ales (Yugoslavia)

Bebler was an officer in the Spanish Republican Army during the Spanish Civil War and in the Tito Resistance Forces in Yugoslavia during World War II. He is the under secretary of Foreign Affairs and was a representative at the General Assembly's second session (New York, 1947).

Belt y Ramirez, Guillermo (Cuba) (1905-)

Belt y Ramirez was secretary of the Council of State (1934), mayor of Havana (1935), and became ambassador to the United States (1944). He is a member of the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union. He was a delegate to the Inter-American Conference at Chapultepec (Mexico City, 1945), and was chairman of the Cuban delegation to the San Francisco Conference (1945) and to the General Assembly (1946-1947).

Bottomley, Arthur G. (United Kingdom) (1907-)

Bottomley was Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Dominions (1946-1947), and was a member of the parliamentary mission to India (1946) and of the special government mission to Burma (1947). He was a delegate to the General Assembly in New York (1946-1947).

Castro, Hector David (El Salvador) (1894-)

Castro has a long record as a diplomat, serving as secretary of the Salvadorean legation in Washington (1920-1923) and as charge d'affairs (1923-1927). He served as under-secretary of Foreign Affairs (1927-1928) and as minister of Foreign Affairs (1931-1934). He was appointed minister to the United States and became ambassador in 1943. He is a member of the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union, and is a representative on the Inter-American Commission of Jurists. He was chairman of his country's delegation at San Francisco (1945), and was a representative at the General Assembly (1946-1947).

Colban, Eric (Norway) (1876-)

Colban was a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1916-1918) and of the Minority and Disarmament sections of the League of Nations (1919-1927). He was a representative in the League Council and Assembly (1930-1936). He was ambassador to the United Kingdom (1934-1936), and minister to France and Belgium (1930-1931). He was a representative in the General Assembly (1946).

Connally, Tom (United States) (1877-)

Connally has been a United States Senator from Texas since 1929 and was formerly chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He was a representative at the San Francisco Conference (1945) and in the General Assembly (1946).

Cordova, Roberto (Mexico)

Cordova is a former member of the Mexican-American Claims Commission, and was legal counsellor at the Mexican embassy in Washington. He was formerly ambassador to Costa Rica and was a representative in the General Assembly and Security Council (1946).

Dulles, John Foster (United States) (1888-)

Dulles was a member of the United States delegation at San Francisco (1945) and also at the Council of Foreign Ministers in London (1945) and Moscow (1947). He is chairman of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He was an alternate representative at the General Assembly's first session (1946) and a representative at the second session (1947).

Duran-Ballen, Clemente (Ecuador) (1904-)

Duran-Ballen is the Ecuadorian Consul-General in New York. He was his country's representative in the General Assembly's second session (1947).

Garcia Granados, Jorge (Guatemala) (1900-)

Garcia Granados is a member of the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union, and has been ambassador to the United States since 1945. He was an alternate representative at the General Assembly (New York, 1946).

Gromyko, Andrei A. (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (1909-)

Gromyko is the Soviet deputy minister of Foreign Affairs. He was ambassador to the United States and minister to Cuba (1943-1946), chairman of the Soviet delegation at Dumbarton Oaks (1944), and acting chairman of the Soviet delegation at the San Francisco Conference (1945). He was the Soviet representative in the General Assembly (1946).

Hughes, Charles Evans (United States) (1862-1948)

Hughes was a United States Supreme Court justice, and was appointed chief justice by President Hoover (1930). (He was defeated for the presidency by Woodrow Wilson in 1916.) He served as secretary of state in the Harding and Coolidge cabinets, was a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and International Justice, and was chairman of the United States delegation at the Sixth Pan-American Conference (Havana, 1928).

Hull, Cordell (United States) (1871-)

Hull was elected Senator from Tennessee (1931), resigning later (1933) in order to become secretary of state, serving until his retirement (1944). He was chairman of the United States delegation at the Inter-American Conference at Montevideo (1933), the Inter-American Peace Conference in Buenos Aires (1936), the Inter-American Conference at Lima (1938) and the Foreign Ministers Conference in Havana (1940). He was a delegate to the San Francisco Conference (1945).

Jouhaux, Leon (France) (1879-)

Jouhaux was a former representative to the League of Nations, and has been a member of the Governing Board of the International Labor Organization since 1920. He is president of the Economic Council of France and was a representative at the General Assembly's second session (1947).

Katz-Suchy, Julius (Poland) (1912-)

Katz-Suchy worked in an English factory during World War II, and became the Polish press attache in London (1945). He is counsellor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and was the secretary general to the permanent Polish delegation to the United Nations (1946).

Kauffman, Henrik de (Denmark) (1888-)

De Kauffman was secretary of the New York consulate (1913-1915) and later minister to Italy, China, Japan, Siam and Norway. He became minister to the United States (1939) and was promoted to ambassador (1947). He was chairman of the Danish delegations to the San Francisco Conference (1945) and to the General Assembly's second session (1947).

Kiselev, Kuzma Venedictovich (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (1903-)

Kiselev, a physician, is a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union and of Byelorussia. He is also Byelorussian Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs. He was the chairman of the Byelorussian delegation to the San Francisco Conference (1945) and also to the General Assembly (1946).

Koo, V. K. Wellington (China) (1888-)

Koo was the Chinese minister of Foreign Affairs (1922, 1924, 1931), prime minister (1927), and a representative to the League of Nations Assembly and Council (1932-1939). He was ambassador to France (1936-1941), to the United Kingdom (1941-1946) and finally to the United States (1946). He was chairman of the Chinese delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations (1944), representative in the General Assembly (1946) and in the Security Council (1947).

Lange, Oscar (Poland) (1904-)

Lange was formerly a lecturer at the Universities of Michigan and California, and a professor of economics at the University of Chicago (1938-1945). He was ambassador to the United States (1945-1947), Polish representative in the Security Council, and in the General Assembly (1946).

Lie, Trygve Halvdan (Norway) (1896-)

Lie was the Norwegian minister of Justice (1935-1939), Commerce (1939-1940), Shipping and Supply (1940), and Foreign Affairs (1941-1946). He was chairman of his country's delegation to the San Francisco Conference (1945) and also in the General Assembly (1946). He became the first secretary-general of the United Nations (February 1, 1946).

Lopez, Alfonso (Colombia) (1886-)

Lopez, educated in British and United States universities, was minister to the United Kingdom (1931) and was president of Colombia (1934-1938, 1942-1945). He was chairman of the Colombian delegations at the Montevideo Conference (1933) and at the General Assembly (1946-1947). He was later a representative in the Security Council (1947).

Loridan, M. W. (Belgium)

Loridan is chief of cabinet in the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was an alternate representative to the General Assembly at the first session (New York, 1946).

MacEachen, Roberto Eduardo (Uruguay) (1899-)

MacEachen was minister to Cuba (1940-1943), the United Kingdom (1943-1944), and became ambassador to the United Kingdom in 1944. He was chairman of the Uruguayan delegation to the General Assembly in London (1946).

Manuilsky, Dmitro Zakharvich (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (1883-)

Manuilsky became commissar for Foreign Affairs in 1944. He was chairman of the Ukrainian delegation to the San Francisco Conference (1945), and to the General Assembly (1946). He was later chairman of the General Assembly's First Committee.

Muniz, Joao Carlos (Brazil) (1893-)

Muniz was minister to Cuba (1941-1942) and ambassador to Ecuador (1942-1945). He is a member of the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union and was a representative to the General Assembly in New York (1946-1947).

Nieto del Rio, Felix (Chile) (1888-)

Nieto del Rio was secretary at the embassies in Washington and Brussels (1917-1926), and secretary to the Chilean delegation to the League of Nations. He was appointed special minister to Peru (1929) and became under secretary of Foreign Affairs (1930). He was an ambassador to the Chaco Peace Conference (1935-1937) and to Brazil (1936-1939). He was formerly a representative on the Inter-American Juridical Commission, and is now a member of the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union. He was a representative at the San Francisco Conference (1945) and was chairman of his country's delegation in the General Assembly (1946).

Padilla Nervo, Luis (Mexico) (1898-)

Padilla Nervo has been in Mexican diplomatic service since 1920. He was minister to the United States (1932-1934) and subsequently to El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Uruguay, Paraguay, The Netherlands, Denmark, and Cuba. He was a delegate to the League of Nations (1938) and a representative in the General Assembly (1946-1947) and Security Council (1946).

Picon Lares, Roberto (Venezuela)

Picon Lares is the Venezuelan minister of Foreign Relations, and was the chairman of his country's delegation at the General Assembly's first session (London, 1946).

Porras, Demetrio A. (Panama) (1897-)

Porras is the Panamanian minister to Great Britain and France. He is a former minister of state, and was the Panamanian representative at the General Assembly in London (1946).

Setalvad, M. C. (India) (1884-)

Setalvad was the Indian representative at the General Assembly's second session (1947). He was an alternate representative at the Security Council on consideration of the India-Pakistan question in 1948.

Shawcross, Sir Hartley (United Kingdom) (1902-)

Shawcross has been a labor member of Parliament since 1945. He was chief United Kingdom prosecutor for investigation of charges against war criminals at Nurnburg (1945), and was a representative at the General Assembly's first and second sessions (1946-1947).

Soto del Corral, Dr. Jorge (Colombia)

Dr. Soto del Corral was formerly minister of Foreign Affairs. He was the representative at the General Assembly's first session (New York, 1946).

Spaak, Paul-Henri (Belgium) (1899-)

Spaak has been a socialist deputy from Brussels since 1932, foreign minister almost continuously since 1936, and premier (1938-1939). He was chairman of the Belgian delegations at the General Assembly's first and second sessions (1946-1947), and was Assembly president at the first session. He was chairman of the Belgian delegations at the San Francisco Conference (1945) and at the Yalta Conference (1943).

Stettinius, Edward R., Jr. (United States) (1900-)

Stettinius, an American businessman associated with the General Motors and United States Steel corporations, was Lease-Lend administrator and special assistant to President Roosevelt (1941-1943), under secretary of state (1943-1944), and secretary of state (1944-1945). He was chairman at the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations (1944), and was chairman of the United States delegation at the San Francisco Conference (1945).

Stevenson, Adlai E. (United States) (1900-)

Stevenson was assistant to the secretary of the navy (1941-1944) and chief of the War Department Mission to Europe (1944). He became assistant to the secretary of state in 1945. He was an advisor to the United States delegations at San Francisco (1945) and at the General Assembly in London (1946), and he was a United States representative in the General Assembly (1946-1947). He has served as governor of the state of Illinois since 1948.

Stimson, Henry L. (United States) (1867-)

Stimson was secretary of war (1911-1913), the president's (Coolidge) special representative to Nicaragua (1927), and governor-general of the Philippines (1927-1929). He served as secretary of state (1929-1933) and again as secretary of war (1940-1945).

Stolk, Carlos Eduardo (Venezuela) (1912-)

Stolk is an international jurist and has been a representative on the Inter-American Neutrality Commission since 1942. He was a representative in the General Assembly in London (1946) and was chairman of his country's delegation in New York (1946).

van Roijen, J. H. (The Netherlands) (1905-)

Van Roijen began his diplomatic career in the legation in Washington (1930-1932). He later became head of the political division of The Netherlands Foreign Office (1939), minister of State and Foreign Affairs (1945-1946), and was appointed ambassador to Canada (1946). He was the representative to the General Assembly (1946) and chairman of The Netherlands delegation (1947).

Wold, Terje (Norway) (1899-)

Wold is a lawyer and a Supreme Court judge. He is chairman of the Norwegian Foreign Relations Commission, and was a representative in the General Assembly (1946).

Zuloaga, Pedro (Venezuela) (1898-)

Zuloaga is a graduate of the Harvard Law School and has held various government posts since 1937. He was a member of his country's delegation at the San Francisco Conference (1945), and was a representative in the General Assembly (1946).

APPENDIX I

Poland: Draft Resolution Calling For The Severance Of
Diplomatic Relations with Franco Spain.

November 1, 1946

The General Assembly recalls that on 9 February 1946, without a dissenting vote, it condemned the Franco regime in Spain, reaffirmed its exclusion from membership in the United Nations in accordance with the decisions of San Francisco and Potsdam, and called upon the Member States to take this into account "in conducting their future relations with Spain."

In May and June, 1946, the Security Council conducted an investigation of the possible further action to be taken by the United Nations. The Sub-Committee charged with the investigation found unanimously:

"(a) In origin, nature, structure and general conduct, the Franco regime is a Fascist regime patterned on, and established largely as a result of aid received from Hitler's Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Fascist Italy.

"(b) During the long struggle of the United Nations against Hitler and Mussolini, Franco, despite continued Allied protests, gave very substantial aid to the enemy Powers. First, for example, from 1941 to 1945 the Blue Infantry Division, the Spanish Legion of Volunteers and the Salvador Air Squadron fought against Soviet Russia on the Eastern Front. Second, in the summer of 1940 Spain seized Tangier in breach of international statute, and as a result of Spain's maintaining a large army in Spanish Morocco large numbers of Allied troops were immobilized in North Africa.

"(c) Incontrovertible documentary evidence establishes that Franco was a guilty party, with Hitler and Mussolini, in the conspiracy to wage war against those countries which eventually in the course of the world war became banded together as the United Nations. It was part of the conspiracy that Franco's

Poland: Draft Resolution (continued)

"full belligerency should be postponed until a time to be mutually agreed upon."

The Sub-Committee also found that "the Spanish situation is one which has already led to international friction" and concluded that the existence and activities of the Franco regime constitute a situation "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." Since that time the situation in Spain has deteriorated and continues, increasingly, to disturb and endanger international relations.

Therefore, the General Assembly recommends that each Member of the United Nations terminate, forthwith, diplomatic relations with the Franco regime.

The General Assembly expresses its deep sympathy to the Spanish people. The General Assembly hopes and expects that in consequence of this action the people of Spain will regain the freedom of which they were deprived with the aid and contrivance of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The General Assembly is convinced that the day will come when it will be able to welcome a free Spain into the community of the United Nations.

United Nations, General Assembly, Document A/C.1/24.

APPENDIX II

Poland: Draft Resolution Concerning The Exclusion Of The Franco Government From Organs And Agencies Established By Or Connected With The United Nations.

November 1, 1946

Whereas the admission or participation of the Franco Government in Spain in organs and agencies established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations would contravene the purpose and intent of the resolution of 9 February, 1946, excluding this government from membership in the United Nations;

The General Assembly recommends that the Franco Government be barred from membership and participation in any of the organs and agencies mentioned.

United Nations, General Assembly, Document A/C.1/25.

APPENDIX III

The United States: Draft Resolution On The Spanish Question.

December 2, 1946

The peoples of the United Nations, at San Francisco, Potsdam and London condemned the Franco regime in Spain and decided that, as long as that regime remains, Spain may not be admitted to the United Nations.

The peoples of the United Nations assure the Spanish people of their enduring sympathy and of the cordial welcome awaiting them when circumstances enable them to be admitted to the United Nations.

Therefore the General Assembly,

Convinced that the Franco Fascist Government of Spain, which was imposed by force upon the Spanish people with the aid of the Axis powers and which gave material assistance to the Axis powers in the war, does not represent the Spanish people, and by its continued control of Spain is making impossible the participation of the Spanish people with the peoples of the United Nations in international affairs;

Recommends that the Franco Government of Spain be debarred from membership in international agencies set up at the initiative of the United Nations, and from participation in conference or other activities which may be arranged by the United Nations or by these agencies, until a new and acceptable government is formed in Spain.

The General Assembly further,

Desiring to secure the participation of all peace-loving peoples, including people of Spain, in the community of nations,

Recognizing that it is for the Spanish people to settle the form of their government;

United States: Draft Resolution (continued)

Places on record its profound conviction that in the interest of Spain and of world co-operation the people of Spain should give proof to the world that they have a government which derives its authority from the consent of the governed; and that to achieve that end General Franco should surrender the powers of government to a provisional government broadly representative of the Spanish people, committed to respect freedom of speech, religion, and assembly and to the prompt holding of an election in which the Spanish people, free from force and intimidation and regardless of party, may express their will; and

Invites the Spanish people to establish the eligibility of Spain for admission to the United Nations.

United Nations, General Assembly, Document A/C.1/100.

APPENDIX IV

Colombia: Amendment To The Polish Draft Resolution On
Franco Spain

(undated)

Whereas The General Assembly, at the first part of its first session held at London, adopted on 9 February 1946 the following resolution:

"1. The General Assembly recalls that the San Francisco Conference adopted a resolution according to which paragraph 2 of Article 4 of Chapter II of the United Nations Charter 'cannot apply to States whose regimes have been installed with the help of armed forces of countries which have fought against the United Nations so long as these regimes are in power.'

"2. The General Assembly recalls that at the Potsdam Conference the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Soviet Union stated that they would not support a request for admission to the United Nations of the present Spanish Government 'which having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, does not possess the necessary qualifications to justify its admission.'

"3. The General Assembly, in endorsing these two statements, recommends that the Members of the United Nations should act in accordance with the letter and the spirit of these statements in the conduct of their future relations with Spain."

Whereas a great many of the Members of the United Nations do not maintain diplomatic relations with Spain and various others are prepared to suspend such relations; and

Colombia: Amendment (continued)

Whereas it has been proposed to this General Assembly that it should recommend to all Members of the United Nations which have not yet done so that they should sever their diplomatic and economic relations with the Franco regime in Spain forthwith; and

Whereas it is a fact that the political and social conditions which gave rise to and justify the declarations made at San Francisco, Potsdam and London are still prevailing in Spain; and

Whereas, however, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations lays down that membership in the United Nations is open, not only to original members of the Organization, but also to all those which accept the obligations contained in the Charter, and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations; and

Whereas, in accordance with Article 55 of the Charter, the United Nations shall promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction of race, sex, language or religion,

Therefore the General Assembly resolves:

1. To express its wish that the Government and people of Spain should seek and find the method of bringing into being, by peaceful means, within the shortest possible time and in accordance with the principles and purposes and the Charter of the United Nations, the new social and political conditions necessary to enable Spain to be admitted as a Member of the Organization;

2. To recommend to the Latin-American Republics that they should offer to the Government of Spain their good offices, should the latter think them useful in order to achieve the purposes of this resolution;

Colombia: Amendment (continued)

3. To defer until the meeting of the next General Assembly the discussion and adoption of the resolution proposed by the delegation of Poland as well as the amendment proposed by the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR.

United Nations, General Assembly, Document A/C.1/102.

APPENDIX V

Fourth Sub-Committee: Draft Resolution

The peoples of the United Nations, at San Francisco, Potsdam and London condemned the Franco regime in Spain and decided that as long as that regime remains, Spain may not be admitted to the United Nations.

The General Assembly in its resolution of 9 February 1946 recommended that the Members of the United Nations should act in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the declarations of San Francisco and Potsdam.

The peoples of the United Nations assure the Spanish people of their enduring sympathy and of the cordial welcome awaiting them when circumstances enable them to be admitted to the United Nations.

The General Assembly recalls that in May and June 1946, the Security Council conducted an investigation of the possible further action to be taken by the United Nations.

The Sub-Committee charged with the investigation found unanimously:

"(a) In origin, nature, structure and general conduct, the Franco regime is a Fascist regime patterned on, and established largely as a result of aid received from Hitler's Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Fascist Italy.

"(b) During the long struggle of the United Nations against Hitler and Mussolini, Franco, despite continued Allied protests, gave very substantial aid to the enemy Powers. First, for example, from 1941 to 1945 the Blue Infantry Division, the Spanish Legion of Volunteers and the Salvador Air Squadron fought against Soviet Russia on the Eastern front. Second, in the summer of 1940 Spain seized Tangier in breach of international statute, and as a result of Spain maintaining an army in Spanish Morocco large numbers of Allied troops were immobilized in North Africa.

Fourth Sub-Committee: Draft Resolution (continued)

"(c) Incontrovertible documentary evidence establishes that Franco was a guilty party, with Hitler and Mussolini, in the conspiracy to wage war against those countries which eventually in the course of the world war became banded together as the United Nations. It was part of the conspiracy that Franco's full belligerency should be postponed until a time to be mutually agreed upon."

The General Assembly,

Convinced that the Franco Fascist Government of Spain which was imposed by force upon the Spanish people with the aid of the Axis powers and which gave material assistance to the Axis Powers in the war, does not represent the Spanish people, and by its continued control of Spain is making impossible the participation of the Spanish people with the peoples of the United Nations in international affairs;

Recommends that the Franco Government of Spain be debarred from membership in international agencies established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations, and from participation in conference or other activities which may be arranged by the United Nations or by these agencies, until a new and acceptable government is formed in Spain.

The General Assembly

Further, desiring to secure the participation of all peace-loving peoples, including the people of Spain, in the community of nations, and

Inasmuch as the United Nations, by the action they took in San Francisco, in Potsdam, in London, and more recently in Lake Success, have in fact collectively refused to maintain diplomatic relations with the present Spanish regime, and

Fourth Sub-Committee: Draft Resolution (continued)

Further recommends that the States Members of the United Nations report to the Secretary-General and to the next Assembly what action they have taken in accordance with this recommendation.

United Nations, General Assembly, Document A/C.1/128.

APPENDIX VI

Poland: Draft Resolution

May 11, 1949

The General Assembly

1. Recalling the solemn pronouncements of the peoples of the United Nations in San Francisco, the pronouncements made at the Potsdam and London Conferences as well as the declarations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America in March 1946, condemning the Franco regime in Spain, and the resolutions of the General Assembly of 12 December 1946 (39 (I)) and 17 November 1947 (114 (II));

2. Considering that the Sub-Committee of the Security Council investigating the Spanish situation found, and the General Assembly reaffirmed, that the Franco regime was a fascist regime patterned on and established largely as a result of aid received from Hitler's Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Fascist Italy, and that during the long struggle of the United Nations against Hitler and Mussolini, Franco despite continued Allied protest, gave substantial aid to the enemy Powers, and that Franco was a guilty party together with Hitler and Mussolini in the conspiracy to wage war against the United Nations;

3. Convinced that the Franco Fascist Government which was imposed by force on the Spanish people with the aid of the Axis Powers does not represent the Spanish people;

4. Recalling the long sufferings of the Spanish people under the tyranny of the Franco fascist regime and their deprivation of all human and basic freedoms;

5. Taking into consideration that the situation in Spain has become worse since the date of the adoption of the resolution of the General Assembly of 17 November 1947, and that the fascist regime of Franco has continued its policy of persecution of democratic

Poland: Draft Resolution (continued)

elements in Spain as exemplified by the execution and imprisonment without court proceedings or investigation of many tens of thousands of democrats including thousands of Spanish women, that during the same period the fascist Government has imprisoned many hundreds of democratic leaders of Spain;

6. Recalling the unflinching sympathy of all the democratic nations for the Spanish people in their sufferings and in their struggle for freedom, as well as the duty of the United Nations to aid the Spanish people;

7. Noting that the Government of the United States, the United Kingdom and several other countries in violation of the resolutions of the General Assembly of 12 December 1946 and 17 November 1947, have continued to strengthen their political and economic relations with Franco Spain, thereby preventing the establishment of a democratic regime in Spain;

8. Considering that the failure of the Members of the United Nations to implement the above enumerated pronouncements, declarations and resolutions would constitute a flagrant violation of the high principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, undermine international confidence, and would convince the Spanish people that they are being abandoned by the United Nations,

9. Calls upon the Members of the United Nations to comply with the letter and spirit of the above enumerated pronouncements, declarations and resolutions;

10. Recommends that all Members of the United Nations should as a first step forthwith cease to export to Spain arms and ammunition as well as all warlike and strategic material;

11. Recommends that all the Members of the United Nations should refrain from entering into any agreements or treaties with Franco Spain both formally and de facto;

Poland: Draft Resolution (continued)

12. Reaffirms that upon the establishment of a democratic government in Spain in accordance with the above enumerated pronouncements, declarations and resolutions, the United Nations will look forward to welcoming Spain to membership in the United Nations and its specialized agencies and affiliated organizations;

13. Expresses confidence that the Security Council will have the situation in Spain under its continuous observation and will fulfill its responsibilities in regard to this situation in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

United Nations, General Assembly, Document A/860.

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_____, _____, Sixth Committee, Official Records, First Session, First Part, January 11 - February 8, 1946, Church House, Westminster, London.

_____, _____, Official Records, Plenary Meetings, First Session, Second Part, October 23 - December 16, 1946, Flushing Meadow, New York.

_____, _____, First Committee, Summary Record of Meetings, First Session, Second Part, November 2 - December 13, 1946, Lake Success, New York.

_____, _____, Official Records, Plenary Meetings, Second Session, September 16 - November 29, 1947, Vol. II, Lake Success, New York.

_____, _____, First Committee, Summary Record of Meetings, Second Session, September 16 - November 19, 1947, Lake Success, New York.

_____, _____, Official Records, Plenary Meetings, Third Session, First Part, September 21 - December 12, 1948, Paris, France.

_____, _____, First Committee, Summary Record of Meetings, Third Session, Second Part, April 5 - May 13, 1949, Lake Success, New York.

_____, _____, Official Records, Plenary Meetings, Third Session, Second Part, April 5 - May 18, 1949, Lake Success, New York.

Political Committee, Report of Ad Hoc
Document A/1473, Fifth Session,
November 2, 1950, Lake Success, New York.

Included in these United Nations documents are the General Assembly records of its consideration of the Spanish question from its beginnings (1946) to its eventual settlement (1950). The records are mostly complete, providing practically all of the information necessary for this research. Where portions of the information were lacking, it was possible to supplement the United Nations records with contemporary reports. The documents contain some verbatim records, and some edited records of the General Assembly. The edited portions are adequate, and compare favorably with the verbatim records. Without these valuable records the research needed for this thesis could not have been accomplished.

United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission III, Security Council, Documents, United Nations Information Organization, Vol. XII, New York, 1945.

This document, one of the series from the UNCIO at San Francisco (1945), contains records of proposals advanced on regionalism in drawing up the United Nations Charter. This volume was especially valuable because it presented regional proposals advanced by the Inter-American delegations at the San Francisco Conference. Use of these documents gives an opportunity to compare the Dumbarton Oaks proposals on regional arrangements with the proposals advanced at San Francisco, and with those finally arrived at and included in the final draft of the Charter.

United States, Department of State, Publication 2349, Conference Series 71, Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference, by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, the Secretary of State.

This United States state department document contains the United States delegation's views on regionalism and its place in the United Nations organization, then being formed (San Francisco). The document is the report of the United States secretary of state on the adaptability of regionalist arrangements in the proposed international organization. The document is valuable in that it is an attempt to present and explain the United States view on regionalism.

SECONDARY SOURCES

New York Times, December 4, 1946.

_____, October 28, 1950.

_____, November 5, 1950.

These editions of the New York Times contain some information on General Assembly action that at present is unavailable in official form. The first edition cited is a report of the Franco government's commentary on the resolution proposed by the United States in 1946; the second and third editions contain information on the Ad Hoc Political Committee resolution passed by the Assembly on November 4, 1950. The Times made a good coverage of the Spanish question in the United Nations, and provides a good source for incidental information that the United Nations records do not contain, and provides information that has not yet been compiled by the United Nations.

Bemis, Samuel F., The Latin American Policy of the United States, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943.

Duggan, Laurence, The Americas, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1949.

Miller, David Hunter, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. I, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928.

United Nations, Yearbook, 1946-47, United Nations Department of Public Information, Lake Success, New York.

Whitaker, Arthur P., "Development of American Regionalism -- The Organization of American States," International Conciliation, No. 469, March 1951, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, New York.

Bemis' book is a good history of United States foreign policy on Latin America, giving a clear picture of hemispheric diplomatic relations since their beginnings. It is certainly adequate in presenting all sides of Inter-American foreign relations. Duggan's book is a good study of the present-day Inter-American system, especially since the inauguration of the "Good Neighbor Policy." Duggan's work is short, but informative and adequate. Miller's work only pertains to this thesis in that it effectively explains that United States interest in regionalism was one factor in the writing of the League of Nations Covenant. The United Nations Yearbook is a valuable source of ready information on most phases of United Nations activity; it does not contain all the information from the records and documents, but provides a starting point in the search for information. Whitaker's article is an excellent presentation of the various aspects of the present-day Inter-American system. It provides an excellent analysis of the relationship of the Organization of American States to the United Nations.