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
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University of
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The Effects of Self-Monitoring, Relevance Strategies,
and Normative Information on Attitude-Behavior Consistency

By

Stephen C. Peck

B. A., California State University, Long Beach, 1986

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Master of Arts


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The Effects of Self-Monitoring, Relevance Strategies,
and Normative Information on Attitude-Behavior Consistency (126 pp.)

Director: Authur L. Beaman *ALB*

This paper focused on the relationship between attitudes and behavior. A brief discussion of the attitude concept was followed by a description of a dominant framework used in the study of attitude-behavior relations, the theory of reasoned action. How intentions are viewed to mediate attitude-behavior consistency received special consideration. Next, the relationship between personality variables and attitude-behavior consistency was briefly reviewed followed by a relatively detailed discussion of the role that a particular personality variable, self-monitoring, plays in moderating the attitude-behavior relationship. Research was reviewed which suggested that (1) increasing the perceived relevance of individuals' attitudes relative to some pending behavior and (2) conveying normative information relative to individuals' attitudes would each have an effect on the degree of attitude-behavior consistency manifested by these individuals. Further, research was reviewed which suggested that this effect would be moderated by the personality type of the subject as defined by the self-monitoring scale.

One hundred fifty two female and male subjects were assessed with the self-monitoring scale. Using the median split procedure, subjects were then assigned to one of the four experimental conditions defined by the presence or absence of (1) a relevance strategy and (2) normative information. Attitudes, intentions, normative beliefs, behavioral beliefs and motivations to comply with significant referents were assessed before and after the experimental manipulations. Voting and volunteering time to work on the given issue constituted the dependent variable. It was predicted that (1) regardless of the presence or absence of normative information, for those subjects exposed to the relevance strategy attitude-intention and intention-behavior correlations would be equally strong for both high and low self-monitors and (2) regardless of whether or not subjects were exposed to the relevance strategy intention-behavior correlations would be stronger for low than for high self-monitors in normative information conditions compared to conditions with no normative information. The results of the Pearson product-moment correlations provided no support for either of the two hypotheses. Several possible reasons for this lack of support and some possible strategies for clarifying the moderating roles of relevance strategies and normative information on the attitude-behavior relationship were discussed.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The nature of the relationship between *attitudes* and *behaviors* has been the subject of investigation for over a half a century (Schroeder, Johnson, & Jensen, 1985). In recent years, knowledge of this relationship has expanded considerably; our conceptual and empirical models have allowed increasingly more accurate predictions and meaningful explanations of behaviors based on knowledge of attitudes (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). With these increasingly sophisticated ideas and techniques, however, has come an increasingly differentiated array of perspectives on the nature of attitudes and their role in moderating behaviors (Chaiken & Stangor, 1987). This report will begin with a discussion of the concept of attitude and will be followed by a brief overview of the relationship this concept has to the prediction and explanation of behavior. Next, a dominant theory of the relationship between attitudes and behaviors -- the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) -- will be described in some detail. Then, a brief introduction to the relationship between attitudes and personality variables will be given, followed by a somewhat thorough discussion of the role a particular personality variable, *self-monitoring* (Snyder, 1974), plays in moderating the

attitude-behavior relationship. Following this general review, a research project will be presented. This presentation will include (1) a brief introduction (recapitulating the major points from the previous review), (2) a section explaining the rationale for the proposed study along with a formal statement of the predictions, (3) a description of the methods and design used in conducting the study, (4) a description of the results of the data analysis, and (5) a discussion of these results.

The Attitude Concept

Aside from the generally accepted notion that, "the term 'attitude' was introduced in social psychology as an explanatory device in an attempt to understand human behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 336), the attitude concept has not enjoyed a great deal of acceptance as a theoretically valid construct (Neale & Liebert, 1980, pp. 254-265). An excellent illustration of this confusion is provided by the following observations: (1) In a two year period, from 1968 to 1970, over 500 different operations were used to assess "attitudes", and (2) of a sample of studies that used more than one measure of "attitude", 70% found different results depending on which measure one considered (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1972). A recent review of the literature (Chaiken & Stangor, 1987) reflected the

perpetuation of this confusion by pointing out a multitude of differing conceptualizations of the attitude concept. Clearly, there continues to be a lack of consensus about what is meant by the term attitude and how attitudes should be measured. Consequently, this leaves a great deal of responsibility for researchers to clarify matters of definition and assessment at the outset of their reports.

There have been three basic approaches to conceptualizing attitudes (Chaiken & Stangor, 1987). The first, the tripartite model, views attitudes as being composed of an affective, behavioral, and cognitive component. A second view, the two-component model, considers only the affective and cognitive components while a third view, the unitary position, holds that attitudes are best conceptualized only in terms of the affective component. The cognitive component is defined by the beliefs about the attitude object and the relations this object has with other objects and attributes (Bagozzi & Burnkrant, 1979). The affective component refers to the degree of emotional attraction to an attitude object (Bagozzi & Burnkrant, 1979), or the evaluative dimension of an individual's concept of the given object and associated attributes (Fishbein & Raven, 1962). After reviewing a variety of these models -- with the purpose of deciding

which one best fits the data -- Chaiken and Stangor concluded that "a definitive judgment on the three- (or two-) versus one-dimensional issue seems premature given that the results of structural analyses sometimes vary with the sophistication of researchers' LISREL¹ programs (and their abilities to generate plausible models)" (p. 578). Consequently, the selection of a definition and method of assessment became a relatively arbitrary process.

According to Fishbein and Raven (1962), the term *attitude* "can be seen as the evaluative dimension of a concept" (p. 35) and can be operationalized in terms of the extent to which a subject refers to an object of evaluation as "good" or "bad". Even though this position would, according to Chaiken and Stangor (1987), be classified as unitary (affective), it is interesting to note that the concept of goodness/badness by itself does not constitute an attitude. Attitudes are held with respect to psychological, social and/or physical referents (Kerlinger, 1973). Fishbein and Raven point out that in order for something to become the object of evaluation, it first must exist (to some degree) in the mind of the evaluator. They

1. LISREL refers to a set of statistical procedures designed to assess the causal relations among variables.

use the term *belief* to describe both the probability that some concept (e.g., object, attribute) exists for someone as well as the probability that two (or more) concepts are related to one another. To the extent that goodness/badness is viewed as a concept, the probability that this concept is associated with any given object can be described in terms of belief. At the same time, whenever we associate the concept of goodness/badness with some object we say that we hold an attitude toward that object. Hence, it is evident that any concept we refer to as an attitude has a probability dimension and an evaluative dimension. Extending this logic, for the purposes of this project, attitudes are viewed as evaluative beliefs. This view is consistent with Fishbein and Raven's work and was expressed nicely when they wrote: "an individual's attitude toward any object is a function of his [sic] beliefs about the object (i.e. the probability that the object is associated with other objects, concepts, values, or goals) and the evaluative aspect of those beliefs (i.e. the attitude toward the 'related objects')" (p. 233).

Attitude-Behavior Consistency

Early research on the relationship between attitudes

and behaviors was characterized by the assumption that the former played an integral role in the production of the latter (Fazio & Zanna, 1981; Meyers, 1983). It has become customary to speak about the nature of this relationship in terms of the amount of *consistency* that is observed between measures of attitudes and measures of behaviors. After decades of research, the validity of the consistency assumption was seriously challenged; an extensive review of the literature indicated that the presumed consistency was not reliably observed (Wicker, 1969, 1971). Further, it became increasingly evident that the direction of influence between attitudes and behaviors could operate both ways (Bem, 1967; Festinger, 1957). As a result, interest in the relationships between attitudes and behaviors waned; "a shift in the field found attitude research beginning to take second place to more cognitive-oriented approaches to social processes" (Schroeder, et al., 1985, p. 43). This period of disillusionment, however, was short-lived. Critical analysis of the attitude-behavior relationship revealed both conceptual and methodological inadequacies in past research that rendered any final conclusions about the nature of this relationship premature (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1972).

Conceptual inadequacies were reflected primarily by a

lack of agreement among researchers about how attitudes were to be defined, while methodological inadequacies were reflected primarily by a lack of agreement about how attitudes and behaviors were to be measured. Although progress was slow with regard to resolving the conceptual difficulties associated with the definition of attitude, researchers interested in the relationships between attitudes and behaviors were gradually able to clear up a great deal of the methodological confusion. For example, Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) were able to show that much of the confusion surrounding the attitude-behavior relationship was the result of a lack of correspondence between the type of attitudes measured (typically quite general) and the types of behaviors measured (typically quite specific). These investigators demonstrated that consistently significant relations between attitudes and behaviors can be obtained to the extent that there is correspondence between measures of attitude and measures of behavior in terms of their *action, target, context* and *time* elements. This principle will be discussed in greater detail in a later section.

As a consequence of such advances, in the last 20 years research on the attitude-behavior relationship has once again begun to flourish. Moving past the question of

whether or not there *is* a relationship between attitudes and behaviors, recent investigations have spent a good deal of time focusing on *when* a relationship can be expected to occur and, most recently, *how* such a relationship occurs (Zanna & Fazio, 1982). Although the distinction between *when* questions and *how* questions may not always be clear, Zanna and Fazio maintain that this distinction is useful in conceptualizing the activities and progress of investigators working with a wide variety of psychological phenomena.

The question of *when* attitudes are systematically related to behaviors is directed at discovering the types of variables that moderate the attitude-behavior relationship and can be thought of in this way: "under what conditions do what kinds of attitudes held by what kinds of individuals predict what kinds of behavior?" (Fazio & Zanna, 1981, p. 165). The question of *how* attitudes are related to behaviors is directed at discovering "how attitudes 'guide' or 'influence' behavior" (Zanna & Fazio, 1982, p. 283); that is, given that a moderating variable has been identified, the boundary conditions of its effects on the attitude-behavior relation must be specified. For example, given that perceived relevance has been shown to moderate the attitude-behavior relationship (Snyder &

Kendzierski, 1982), research needs to address the factors that govern the presence or absence of this perception, the psychological processes that are involved with linking this perception to action, etc. An important research question from this latter point of view is: How does attitude strength (e.g., operationalized in terms of the amount of previous experience with the attitude object, reaction time, etc.) affect the behavioral expression of this attitude (e.g., in terms of the degree of attitude-behavior consistency)?

What has resulted is an increasingly complex view of the relationships between attitudes and behaviors. In a review of the literature, Chaiken and Stangor (1987) discuss two major orientations to the study of attitude-behavior relations. The first of these is described as a *combinatorial* approach; it focuses on "the ways that cognitions about a behavior are combined to create attitudes and/or intentions toward that behavior" (p. 583). According to Chaiken and Stangor, the combinatorial approach is best illustrated by Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) *theory of reasoned action* which will be discussed in detail below.

The second major approach to the study of attitude-behavior relations is described as a *process*

model; it focuses on the "underlying cognitive processes that influence the attitude-behavior relationship" (p. 584). Specifically, Fazio et al.'s (Fazio, 1986; Fazio, Chen, McDonel, & Sherman, 1982; Fazio, Powell, & Herr, 1983; Fazio & Williams, 1986; Fazio & Zanna, 1977) work focuses on (1) the *strength* of object-evaluation associations, (2) what these associations mean in terms of attitude *accessibility* -- i.e., "the likelihood or readiness with which a construct will be retrieved from memory" (Zanna & Fazio, 1982, p. 291) -- and (3) how attitude accessibility affects the links between attitudes and behaviors.

While both of these orientations are fairly complex, the process model tends to be simpler to the extent that it typically includes only two basic measures of attitude for predicting behavior: a measure of attitude extremity (as indicated on a Likert-type scale), and a measure of attitude strength (as indicated by the time it takes to react to an attitudinal query). The reasoned action model, while typically employing a single measure of attitude (e.g., using a semantic differential type scaling procedure), also includes a number of other measures designed to aid in the prediction and explanation of behavior (e.g., beliefs, subjective norms, and

intentions). Further, as will be discussed shortly, the reasoned action model was largely designed to account for *all* of the systematic variance thought to be involved with the production of behavior.

Finally, it should be noted that Fazio's process model -- which defines the attitude concept very similarly to the Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) model -- has been shown to predict behavior at a level seemingly on par with the more complex reasoned action model (e.g., Fazio & Williams, 1986). However, due to the different operational definitions employed by the different models, as well as the different domains of behavior tapped, it is currently impossible to assess (1) which of the two approaches actually predicts more of the variance in behavior and (2) which better explains the underlying basis for that behavior. Future studies that integrate and/or simultaneously test these two models would seem to be vital for clarifying these very important theoretical issues.

In summary, theory and research on the attitude-behavior relationship was largely abandoned following reviews of the literature which revealed very little support for the assumption that behaviors could be predicted on the basis of attitudes. Eventually, methodological advances in attitude measurement allowed

researchers to see that there was, in fact, a great deal of consistency between attitudes and behaviors. As a result, theory and research on the attitude-behavior relationship moved beyond the "is" question to the questions of "when" and "how" this relationship could be expected to occur. Current research on these questions has resulted in increasingly complex views of the relationship between attitudes and behaviors. Two currently dominant orientations to the study of attitude-behavior relationships, the combinatorial approach and the process model, embody these views. The following review and study will focus on theory and reasearch in the combinatorial vein.

Chapter 2: The Theory of Reasoned Action

Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) theory of reasoned action is predicated on the assumptions that (1) people are generally rational and make systematic use of the information available to them in the course of their behavior, and that (2) most socially relevant behavior is under volitional control, hence, ultimately determined by an individual's conscious intentions. The concept of *behavioral intention*, then, represents a key component of the reasoned action model and it plays a central role in the present study.

If the ultimate goal of the theory of reasoned action was simply to predict behavior, the model could feasibly be reduced to just the intention component. As Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) point out:

The notion that intentions predict behavior does not provide much information about the reasons for the behavior. It is not very illuminating to discover that people usually do what they intend to do. Since our goal is to *understand* human behavior, not merely predict it, the second step in our analysis requires that we identify the determinants of intentions" (pp. 5-6).

To outline the model to be discussed below: Intentions are viewed as being determined by the other two key components of the reasoned action model, *attitudes* and *subjective norms*. Attitudes are considered to represent

personal factors, while subjective norms are considered to reflect social influences. The attitude and subjective norm components are in turn determined by underlying beliefs. Addressing the question of *why* people behave the way they do requires, in the final analysis, consideration of an individual's attitudes and subjective norms as well as the beliefs of which they are composed. Consequently, discussion of the various elements of the model will include the consideration of their underlying elements, beliefs.

The attitude component. It is important to note that references to attitudes in the theory of reasoned action are always references to *attitudes towards behavior* (as opposed to the more traditional conceptualization of attitudes towards objects, people or institutions). This very important principle stems from Ajzen & Fishbein's (1977) argument that poor attitude-behavior correlations found abundantly in the literature were primarily a function of a lack of correspondence between predictors and criterion with respect to the dimensions of *action, target, context, and time*. By formulating attitudinal measures in terms corresponding in specificity to the criterion behavior along each of these dimensions, the degree of attitude-behavior consistency is consistently higher than

otherwise.

Beliefs underlying attitudes towards behaviors are referred to as *behavioral beliefs* and are conceptualized in terms of beliefs about the consequences of behavior. For any given act, a number of salient consequences are presumed to exist, some of which may be positive, some of which may be negative, and each of which is held with more or less confidence. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) point out that people probably have a large number of beliefs with respect to engaging in any given behavior, yet they maintain that individuals are typically only capable of attending to a small number of these at any given time. Hence, they believe that there is some set of *salient* beliefs that are responsible for an individual's attitudes at any given time.

Obtaining salient beliefs about some behavior can be accomplished by having subjects list the ones that come immediately to mind; the assumption being that those that come to mind the easiest are the salient ones. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) admit that it is essentially impossible to determine precisely which beliefs are salient and which are not; that is, it is difficult to know when the list begins to reveal non-salient beliefs. They recommend using the first five to nine beliefs as a rule of thumb. An

additional concern when assessing salient beliefs is ensuring that these beliefs correspond to the remaining elements of the model (attitudes and subjective norms) in terms of the dimensions of target, action, context and time.

As mentioned, correspondence among the elements of the model is vital at every stage. If accurate prediction and understanding of behavior is the ultimate goal, assessment of relevant variables must be systematically consistent with respect to the level of specificity across each of the previously identified dimensions. So, for example, if the go assess someone's attitudes towards obtaining a car, belief statements would need to be assessed on the basis of the type of car (target), whether the car would be bought, leased, rented, etc (action), whether it would be obtained from a used car lot, dealer, private owner, etc. (context), and whether it would be obtained within a day, week, month, etc. (time). By assessing every component of the model at the same level of specificity, we can be sure that what we are measuring has some relation to the behavior of interest. For example, if a car manufacturer wished to predict the likelihood of consumers purchasing their brand of car, assessment of general attitudes toward buying a car would probably not yield the best prediction

or comprehension of the consumers' behavior. The bottom line is this: when attempting to predict and explain behavior x , assess beliefs toward doing x , attitudes toward doing x , and intentions to do x , not some variation on x .

After a set of salient beliefs has been generated -- expressed in terms of outcomes -- each belief is evaluated in terms of the extent to which the outcome is considered positive or negative (e.g., on a scale from +3 to -3). Next, each belief's relative strength must be considered. Obtaining a measure of belief strength is tantamount to measuring the strength of the association between the behavior and projected consequence in question. This approach is based on the operational definition of belief provided by Fishbein and Raven (1962). These investigators defined a belief as "the probability dimension of a concept" (p. 35) and operationalized it in terms of the probability that the object of belief (e.g., ESP) is associated with some attribute (e.g., existence). Measurement of the strength of a behavioral belief, then, entails obtaining a subjective probability estimate of the extent to which a given behavior is expected to be associated with some consequence, or outcome (e.g., on a scale from -3 to +3).

After obtaining outcome evaluations and subjective

probability estimates for each of the specified behavioral beliefs, an individual's attitude can be predicted by multiplying each outcome evaluation by its respective belief strength and then summing these products. The obtained value is a measure of the individual's attitude; that is, the extent to which the behavior in question is viewed as positive or negative.

In practice, the prediction of a large group of subjects' attitudes toward some behavior based on the evaluation of behavioral beliefs described above runs into some problems. Aside from the fact that it requires an inordinate amount of time to consider each subjects' belief statements individually, meticulously selecting only those that correspond appropriately to the behavioral criterion, "the elicitation procedure usually produces sets of beliefs that differ from respondent to respondent in terms of content and number. This makes it difficult to compare the beliefs of different individuals and to submit their responses to quantitative analyses" (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, p. 68). In light of these problems, the use of *modal salient beliefs* is recommended.

Modal salient beliefs are obtained by having a representative sample of people from the population of interest list their salient beliefs with respect to some

behavior; "the beliefs most frequently elicited by this sample constitute the modal set for the population in question" (p. 68). From the entire list generated, the researcher typically must make a number of judgment calls in the process of selecting precisely which beliefs to use and in what grammatical form they will appear. Ajzen and Fishbein discuss a variety of possible approaches to selecting the number of modal salient beliefs to be used; i.e., using the first n most frequently expressed beliefs, using all beliefs expressed by at least n percent of the sample, or using as many beliefs necessary to account for n percent of the number of beliefs generated. Combining conceptually similar belief statements into single grammatical expressions proceeds primarily on common sense, although a few general considerations were discussed; for example, where two belief statements of similar semantic properties exist as a part of the modal set, selecting them for use as independent belief statements or in some combined form as a single belief statement can be guided by knowledge of whether a particular subject included both in their list of salient beliefs. If this is the case, both could be used in the modal set, as would have been the case if only behavioral beliefs were being considered.

After the modal set has been decided on, a

questionnaire can be developed. As discussed above, the belief statements should be expressed so that they correspond to the attitude toward the behavior in question. Use of a bipolar evaluative scale, with a mid-point of zero, allows the respondent to indicate if a particular modal belief statement is believed to be unrelated to the specified outcome. The bipolar scale also has the additional advantage of reflecting disagreement with belief statements reflecting negative outcomes (e.g., radiation causes cancer). For example, a negative evaluation of -3 (meaning the outcome, cancer, is viewed as extremely negative) multiplied by a likelihood estimate of -2 (meaning the outcome is not expected to be associated with the object, radiation) would yield a net positive effect of +6 to the attitude in question (e.g., I would consider voting in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years to be...).

To understand *why* different people behaved differently, the following procedure can be employed: After observing the actual behavior of a group of subjects, comparisons can be made between those who performed the behavior and those who did not. By looking at the relative effects of each belief statement on the attitude in

question, patterns tend to emerge that reveal the basis for the differential behaviors. By comparing the values of each variable across the two groups, it may be found that subjects' differential behavior can be attributed to differences on merely one of 10 belief statements, thereby revealing the *reasons* for the differential behavior. For example, it could be that in the group that voted for the nuclear power plant, likelihood estimates of whether radiation would actually be associated with cancer averaged -2.4, whereas the estimates of those who voted against the plant averaged +2.8. As Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) point out repeatedly, "in the final analysis, then, a person's behavior is explained by reference to his (sic) beliefs" (p. 79).

The subjective norm component. Whereas *behavioral* beliefs are at the basis of the *attitude* component of Ajzen and Fishbein's model, *normative* beliefs are at the basis of the *subjective norm* component. In general, subjective norm refers to the belief that most significant others think the person should (or should not) perform the behavior in question. It is this part of the theory of reasoned action that attempts to account for social influences; that is, perception of, and compliance with, the expectations of important others. The defining feature of a normative

belief, then, is that it is a belief held by an individual about another person's belief about what this individual should do in a particular situation. Identifying a set of salient normative beliefs provides the basis for a measure of an overall subjective norm.

Normative beliefs can be elicited in the same way behavioral beliefs are elicited. In this case, however, a list of salient referents -- that is, significant others -- is generated that has relevance for the behavior in question. As before, these belief statements need to correspond to the behavior in question to ensure that the identified referents will represent those of actual relevance. For example, eliciting salient referents that have relevance for whether to vote for or against the construction of a new building could depend on the type of building (e.g., nuclear power plant versus toy factory), where it would be constructed (e.g., Missoula county versus Mozambique), how it would be constructed and operated (e.g., by specially trained technicians from out-of-state versus hundreds of people from the Missoula area), and when it would be constructed (e.g., within the next year versus sometime between 30 and 40 years from now).

As was the case for dealing with behavioral beliefs, for practical purposes, the acquisition of *social normative*

beliefs is usually preferred. After obtaining a set of modal normative beliefs, subjects can respond on a Likert-type scale to whether they believe that each of these referents think they should (+3) or should not (-3) engage in the given behavior. This is accomplished by their responses to a set of scales corresponding to each of the identified referents. Note that the normative belief scale is analogous to the outcome evaluation scale described for obtaining behavioral beliefs.

Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) take the position that knowing a person's beliefs about what salient referents think they ought to do is not sufficient to predict or understand their overall subjective norm. Subjective norm can be understood only by assessing subjects' motivation to comply with each of the salient referents. Acknowledging that this component is the least understood (by them) in their theory, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) conclude that "on both theoretical and empirical grounds it appears that motivation to comply is best conceived as the person's general tendency to accept the directives of a given reference group or individual" (p. 306). They go on to suggest that individual differences on this variable may be related to personality characteristics such as need for approval or affiliation, self-esteem, or authoritarianism,

but add that "previous work on personality variables of this kind in various areas of social psychology leads us to be rather pessimistic about the utility of this approach" (p. 306). The issue of what role personality might play in the theory of reasoned action will be returned to in greater detail at a later point.

Interestingly, Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) recommend using a unipolar scale to assess motivation; that is, a scale ranging from 0 (not at all motivated to comply) to 3 (strongly motivated to comply). This recommendation is based on the assumption that people will not be motivated to do the opposite of what significant others think they should do. Given the possibility that this assumption is faulty, along with the relative ease with which a bipolar scale could be substituted, it seems more logical to use the latter. In any case, it should be noted that the motivation to comply scale is analogous to the belief strength scale described in reference to behavioral beliefs. As such, the derivation of the subjective norm component of the model follows the same procedure as the derivation of the attitude component; that is, for each referent the scale value for the normative belief is multiplied by the scale value of the corresponding motivation to comply. These products are then summed to

arrive at a single value for subjective norm.

The intention component. After obtaining measures for both the attitude and subjective norm components of the model, according to the theory of reasoned action, prediction of the intention component should be relatively straightforward. There is, however, one other variable to consider; that is, the relative influence of the attitude versus the subjective norm component on the intention component. Application of the reasoned action model in a variety of domains and at a variety of levels of specificity with regard to the behavior in question has revealed that attitudes and subjective norms do not equally contribute to intention formation. In fact, according to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), the relative influence of these two components is "expected to vary with the kind of behavior that is being predicted, with the conditions under which the behavior is to be performed, and with the person who is to perform the behavior (p. 303). So, for example, in cases where social pressure is at a minimum, *attitudes* might be expected to contribute most significantly to intention. In cases where social pressure is at a maximum, *subjective norms* might be expected to contribute most significantly. Even though common sense might dictate some expectations with regard to the relative influence of these

two components in a given situation, there has yet to have been a technique developed for accurately assessing these influences prior to noting their actual relationship to intention. In the absence of accurate information about the true weights of these components, then, estimates of these weights are derived empirically by means of regression analysis. Hence, in terms of the regression model: the criterion is intention, the predictors are attitude and subjective norm, and the standardized regression coefficients are the estimates of the weights.

Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) strongly emphasize their position that intention formation can not be affected by variables external to the reasoned action model; that is, intentions are formed only via the influence of the attitude component, the subjective norm component, or the weights of either of these two components. Further, an external variable (e.g., self-esteem) may affect one of the components of the model without affecting intention if the weight for that component renders its relative contribution to intention insignificant. For example, if the regression coefficient for the attitude component is very large and the coefficient for the subjective norm component is very small, changes in the subjective norm component attributable to an external variable will tend to

contribute very little to the overall prediction of intention. In short, intention is affected only indirectly by any variable other than attitude and subjective norm (or their relative weights) as they are defined by the theory of reasoned action.

Much of Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) discussion regarding this principle revolves around the issue of the extent to which attitudes towards *objects* predict intentions. By reference to a number of prior studies, Fishbein and Ajzen demonstrate the lack of a necessary relationship between attitudes towards objects and intentions. For example, an individual may have a strong, positive attitude toward sports cars but may not intend to purchase one. Where a significant relationship is found between attitudes towards objects and intentions, Fishbein and Ajzen show the integral role the elements of the reasoned action model play in this outcome. Further, over half of Ajzen and Fishbein's (1980) book is devoted to reinterpreting the nature of attitude-behavior relationships in a wide variety of behavioral domains. In their words: "where an external variable is consistently found to be related to the behavior under investigation, we...show that its effects are mediated by the predictors in our theory" (p. 97).

As was the case with respect to behavioral beliefs, normative beliefs, attitudes, and subjective norms, accurate prediction of intention, hence behavior, assumes that the attitudinal and subjective norm components correspond to the intention being predicted along the dimensions of target, action, context and time. Direct measures of intention are obtained in terms of subjective probability estimates about the extent to which some behavior is intended to be performed. According to the theory of reasoned action, such measures of intention should be predicted with considerable accuracy on the basis of direct measures of the attitude and subjective norm components.

Note that *prediction* of intention is not dependent on assessment of underlying beliefs, whereas detailed *explanation* of intention is dependent on such assessment. For example, attitude and subjective norm scores could be derived on the basis of extremely different patterns of underlying beliefs. To illustrate, a strong belief in the negative consequences of radiation could account for most of the variance in one individual's negative attitude toward nuclear power plants while a strong belief in the negative consequences of institutionalized control over electrical resources could account for the majority of variance in the

negative attitude of another individual.

As previously mentioned, intentions are held to be the immediate determinants of volitional behavior. Hence, given accurate assessment of intentions, with complete correspondence between measures of intention and behavioral criteria, the major factor thought to affect whether or not the behavior occurs is the *stability* of the intention over time. Although Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) allow for the possibility that intention may decay simply as a function of time, strictly speaking, the instability of intentions is the result of new information entering the system. This point is central to the present study: As new information enters the system, the salient set of beliefs may change which could change attitudes and/or subjective norms, which would alter the equation that predicted the original intention. Given the normal course of daily events, the longer the time between intention assessment and the behavioral criterion, the more information that could potentially alter the equation. Hence, predicting behavior from intention generally becomes less accurate as a function of the time between the two assessments.

Based on this reasoning, controlling the flow of information -- as in a controlled lab study -- should have predictable effects on intention. For example, providing

one group with new information that is relevant to a particular intention and providing a second group with no new information that is relevant to a particular intention should result in greater shifts in the extremity of intentions for the former group. Further, it should be possible to determine which types of information are most likely to alter intentions by selectively exposing different subjects to different types of information. For example, it could be that processing information that is relevant to the beliefs underlying a given attitude has the effect of altering this attitude (or the weight given to this attitude). Likewise, it could be that exposing a subject to information that indicates that a salient referent opposes one's attitudes might alter this subject's subjective norms (or the weight given to the subjective norm). If the reasoned action model is valid, then the effects of virtually any type of situational information should be evident at several places in the model.

One possible strategy for dealing with the lack of predictability due to the instability of intentions is to assess what Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) refer to as *conditional* intentions. Conditional intentions can be used to assess the effects of extraneous events which are likely to affect the stability of the relevant intention and which

are likely to occur prior to the predicted behavior. Theoretically, asking subjects to indicate the subjective probability of engaging in behavior x given the occurrence of event y should result in improved prediction.

To study the nature of intention stability itself, however, requires tight control over the information available to subjects for processing. This means that every aspect of the reasoned action model must be assessed within the context of a single experimental scenario. The importance of this principle for the present study will be taken up in greater detail in a later section.

To summarize, Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) theory of reasoned action provides a model for the prediction and explanation of behavior. The components of the model are amenable to empirical assessment. In addition, each element of the model is both conceptually and empirically distinct while standing in definite relationship to the other elements. Such a well organized system allows for maximum versatility in approaching a wide variety of psychological and behavioral phenomena. The present study will illustrate this versatility by using the reasoned action model as a framework for further articulating the very complex and often subtle interactions among person variables, situation

variables, and behavior.

Chapter 3: Personality and Attitude-Behavior

Consistency

While study of the relationships between attitudes and behavior and between personality traits and behavior have both flourished, the relationship between personality and attitudes has received very little attention by psychologists. In one of the few attempts to address the nature of the relationship between traits and attitudes, Sherman and Fazio (1983) provided an overview of the historic, methodological, and conceptual parallels between these two predictors of behavior. Perhaps due to the lack of integration between these two areas, it is rare to find trait-behavior research that includes measures of attitude and rare to find attitude-behavior research that includes measures of traits. Where studies of attitude-behavior relations that include personality variables are found, very few have reported any meaningful effects attributable to those variables (McArthur, Kiesler, & Cook, 1969, self-image as a "doer"; Rholes & Bailey, 1983, level of moral reasoning; Snyder & Swann, 1976, self-monitoring). Further, of the personality variables shown to moderate the attitude-behavior relationship: (a) none can be considered traditional trait dimensions of personality and (b) only self-monitoring has received much attention. The overall

picture, then, reveals two very complex areas of psychological inquiry, neither of which has been very well integrated with the other.

As an illustration of the potential for integrating attitude and personality perspectives, there exists a growing body of research which is helping to clarify the role that self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) plays in moderating the attitude-behavior relationship (Ajzen, Timko, & White, 1982; Baize & Tetlock, 1985; Snyder & Swann, 1976; Zanna, Olsen, & Fazio, 1980). This chapter explores the nature of the self-monitoring construct and the relationship of this construct to the attitude-behavior consistency issue. Beginning with a brief look at Snyder's original attraction to the notion of self-monitoring, the following pages will describe the conceptual and empirical development of this increasingly popular personality variable. Following this introduction, research will be reviewed that has found self-monitoring to moderate the attitude-behavior relationship. Finally, research will be reviewed indicating that taking into account various aspects of the self-monitoring scale's factor structure results in a more informative and useful interpretation of the role this construct plays in moderating the attitude-behavior link.

The self-monitoring construct. Snyder's initial interest in the concept of self-monitoring was a function of his curiosity about, first, the nature of reality and illusion, and second, "the gaps and contradictions between the selves we allow other people to see and the more private self only we personally are allowed to know" (Snyder, 1987, p. 1). Attempts to gain insight into the illusions and realities of *self*, to comprehend the relationship between public appearance and private reality, led Snyder into the relatively uncharted regions of interaction between personality and social psychology. Based on a variety of casual observations, including a variety of literary expositions as well as on general social interactions among his contemporaries, Snyder became increasingly intrigued by people's ability to project a variety of public selves to the social world. Upon close scrutiny of the processes underlying this ability, Snyder (1974) began to conceptualize this phenomenon in terms of self-presentational styles, or modes of expressive behavior. Four basic features of self-monitoring were identified: (a) concern for appropriate self-presentation, (b) sensitivity to social cues of appropriateness, (c) ability to translate these cues into implications for appropriate behavioral expression, and (d) the ability to

actualize these implications behaviorally. The concept of *monitoring*, then, refers to people's tendency to observe and control their self-presentation and expressive behavior in terms of the four features described above. *High self-monitors* "control the images of self they project in social interaction to a great extent. *Low self-monitors*, in contrast, value congruence between who they are and what they do" (Snyder, 1987, p. 5).

The concept of *appropriate* self-presentation is central to differentiating between high and low self-monitoring individuals. According to Snyder (1974), people who do not concern themselves with whether or not their behavioral expressions are deemed appropriate by those in their social milieu -- that is, low self-monitors -- will not attempt to alter their self-presentation as a function of situational cues. Rather, low self-monitors will confidently express themselves in the way that most accurately reflects their innermost beliefs, attitudes, and values. According to Snyder (1987), it is as if low self-monitoring individuals base their social behavior on the question, "*Who am I and how can I be me in this situation?*". On the other hand, individuals who *do* concern themselves with whether or not their behavioral expressions are deemed appropriate by those in their social milieu --

that is, high self-monitors -- *will* attempt to alter their self-presentation on the basis of situational cues. High self-monitors, then, will respond to situational cues by projecting the self-image that they believe most appropriately fits the situation. According to Snyder (1987), it is as if high self-monitoring individuals base their social behavior on the question, "*Who does this situation want me to be and how can I be that person?*"

Predicting the types of selves most likely to be projected by a high self-monitor requires knowledge of their standards of appropriateness. Although Snyder (1974, 1987) does not deal with the concept of appropriateness in any depth, he does offer a variety of suggestions with regard to the general goals likely to be strived for by the high self-monitor; for example, (a) accurate communication of one's "true emotional state by means of an intensified expressive presentation" (p. 527), (b) accurate communication of an arbitrary emotional state which is not congruent with the actor's actual emotional state, and (c) concealment of a variety of emotional states for a variety of reasons. By using the skills of selective self-presentation and behavioral expression, then, the high self-monitor is able to achieve a variety of subjectively appropriate social states of being; that is, they are able

to assess the social milieu, decide upon which public appearance is most appropriate, and then project the desired image. Low self-monitors, on the other hand, do not attend to situational cues of appropriateness nor do they have the skills and/or motivation to present themselves in a manner appropriate to the situation.

To succinctly summarize the ideas discussed above, and to provide an idea of the type of thinking and implications that follow from these basic ideas, deferment to the words of Snyder (1987) is in order:

According to self-monitoring theory, a person in a social setting actively attempts to construct a pattern of behavior appropriate to that context, drawing on two primary sources of information: information about situational and interpersonal specifications of behavioral appropriateness, and information about inner feelings, attitudes, dispositions, and other personal attributes. People differ in the extent to which they rely on either source of information. Those who guide their behavior on the basis of situational considerations (that is, high self-monitors) ought to be very responsive to social and interpersonal cues to behavioral appropriateness. They ought to show considerable situation-to-situation specificity in their social behavior but correspondence between their behavior and underlying personal attributes may be minimal. By contrast, the behavior of people who act according to information from relevant inner sources (that is, low self-monitors) ought to possess substantial consistency across situations and over time and the correspondence between behavior and underlying personal attributes ought to be substantial (pp. 33-34).

The self-monitoring scale. To come up with a

measurement device that tapped into the dimensions of self-presentation and behavioral expression described above, Snyder (1974) began with 41 true-false self-descriptive statements. These statements were designed to differentiate people on the basis of the presence or absence of the four essential features of the high-self monitoring individual discussed above; that is, motivation to attend to and sensitivity to accurately perceive cues to appropriate self-presentation, as well as ability to formulate and carry out actions that are appropriate to the given situation. Further, the questions were designed to assess the extent to which individuals actually employ these modus operandi in the course of their social interactions. Due to the nature of the content domains of interest, some items necessarily reflect information about several domains simultaneously; for example, the item, "I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them," primarily yields information about the ability to control expressive behavior, but necessarily implies attentiveness to cues of appropriateness.

Each of the 41 items was scored in the direction of high self-monitoring, balanced with respect to whether agreement indicated high or low self-monitoring, and then

administered to 192 subjects. After subjecting the data to item analysis, 25 items were selected on the basis of their ability to maximize the internal validity of the scale. The results were cross-validated on an independent sample (Snyder, 1974).

The validity of the self-monitoring construct. At first glance, the self-monitoring concept would seem to be very similar to a variety of other personality concepts; for example, need for approval, Machiavellianism, and extraversion. Snyder (1974; 1987) addresses each of these concepts and demonstrates dissimilarity on both conceptual and empirical grounds. For example, high need for approval is not always accompanied by the ability to act in ways to obtain such approval. Conceptual differences aside, the bottom line is that none of the personality variables assessed by Snyder or other researchers over the years has been found to be significantly related to self-monitoring from a statistical point of view. A notable exception is Lippa's (1978) finding of "slight statistical associations between extraversion and self-monitoring" (Snyder, 1987, p. 27). Snyder argued that these findings were probably the result of overlapping tendencies of extraverts and high self-monitors. He distinguished between these two personality types by noting that extraverts would tend to

act consistently extraverted across situations, whereas high self-monitors would tend to adjust their behavior to play different roles in different social situations.

Finally, it should be noted that a rather rambunctious debate has surfaced with regard to the validity of the self-monitoring construct. The critics (Briggs & Cheek, 1986, 1988) claim, among other things, that the apparent usefulness of the self-monitoring scale in the many published reports is most reasonably attributable to the individual associations between one of the three reliably obtained sub-scales and whatever behavioral criterion is being used. In other words, each sub-scale has an independent relationship to the behavioral criteria in question and different effects attributed to the self-monitoring construct are better interpreted as the effects due to one of these sub-scales.

In defense of the self-monitoring construct, Snyder and Gangestad (1986) provide a detailed argument for the validity of conceptualizing self-monitoring as a unitary construct. The thrust of their argument centers on the issue of how to interpret the factor structure of the scale. According to their analyses, there exists a general factor, on which 24 of the 25 items composing the original self-monitoring scale load positively. It is this general,

unrotated factor, as opposed to the three rotated factors discussed by their critics, that is held by Snyder and Gangestad to be responsible for the unique self-presentational expressions of high and low self-monitoring individuals. According to self-monitoring theory, then, the general factor is indicative of a single, underlying, causal entity, or latent variable, which can be meaningfully interpreted in terms of self-monitoring processes.

Whether or not the self-monitoring construct is ultimately accepted as valid or rejected by researchers in the behavioral sciences remains to be seen. At this point, however, the personality measure derived from it continues to be a viable tool for the researcher interested in investigating the moderating role of individual differences in social behavior. To increase the utility of this tool for assessing self-monitoring, Gangestad and Snyder (1985) have created a revised edition of the self-monitoring scale. The purpose of creating this modified scale was to assess more reliably the proposed underlying unitary construct, to reduce the amount of variance in the scale associated with other factors, and to thereby provide a purer measure of the self-monitoring construct. This was functionally accomplished by deleting eight items whose

correlations with the first unrotated factor were less than +.15.

Relevant Research

As mentioned above, many studies have demonstrated a moderating role of self-monitoring on attitude-behavior consistency: low self-monitors are significantly more likely to act in accord with their attitudes than are high self-monitors. Most explanations of this effect have centered on the simple notion that low self-monitors -- being more attentive to inner states and valuing congruence between those inner states and their self-presentation and behavioral expressions -- according to self-monitoring theory, *should* demonstrate substantial attitude-behavior consistency. High self-monitors, on the other hand, being less attentive to inner states than to situational cues to appropriateness, are expected to act in accord with those cues thereby minimizing the role of attitudes. In short, the results of studies reporting a moderating effect of self-monitoring on the attitude-behavior relationship are entirely consistent with Snyder's theory.

Self-monitoring and the "believing means doing" orientation. Examining the moderating effects of self-monitoring on attitude-behavior consistency led Snyder (1982) to characterize the low self-monitor as one who

generally adopts a "believing means doing" orientation to social interaction. By believing means doing, Snyder means that low self-monitors "explicitly define their attitudes as relevant and appropriate guides to action" (p. 114); that is, "this orientation effectively provides individuals with an 'action structure' (cf. Snyder, 1977) or a 'plan' (cf. Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) or a 'script' (cf. Schank & Abelson, 1977) for linking their attitudes and their behavior" (Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982, p. 181). The action structure is essentially a set of "instructional rules" that induces individuals to relate situational information to their repertoire of attitudes, to abstract relevant attitudes, and then to formulate and carry out the implications of those attitudes. Low self-monitoring individuals, then, are characterized by the active pursuit of behaving in ways that are congruent with, and expressive of, their attitudes.

High self-monitoring individuals, on the other hand, are characterized by their tendency to monitor social situations for cues to appropriate behavior and then to orchestrate their self presentation so that it conforms to these standards. In contrast to low self-monitors, high self-monitors tend not to define their personal attitudes as relevant guides to behavior; that is, they tend not to

adopt a believing means doing orientation to behavior. Snyder (1982; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982), however, has argued that high self-monitoring individuals can be induced to adopt a believing means doing orientation to behavior. By inducing subjects to reflect on the implications their behavioral decisions have for furthering their attitudinal viewpoints, Snyder has apparently caused high self-monitors to define attitudes as relevant guides to behavior. This conclusion was drawn on the basis of the increased attitude-behavior correlations that have been observed for high self-monitors who were exposed to attitude relevant information relative to high self-monitors who were not exposed to attitude relevant information.

Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) first showed that simply making information cognitively *available* to subjects resulted in increased attitude-behavior consistency for low self-monitors while not affecting high self-monitors. To render attitudes available, Snyder and Kendzierski instructed subjects to take a few minutes and reflect on their general attitudes toward the specified issue. This manipulation occurred before the subjects were exposed to any details of the court case they would be judging. The obtained results follow from the proposed differential believing means doing orientations; that is, low

self-monitors, in line with their set of instructional rules, are expected to use any available attitudinal information for the purpose of selecting an appropriate response. High self-monitors, on the other hand, lacking such instructional rules, are not expected to make use of the available attitudinal when selecting an appropriate response.

In a second experimental condition, Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) showed that by providing subjects with information that was relevant to linking their attitudes to behavior -- that is, by providing information that specified the implications certain attitudes had for behavior -- attitude-behavior correlations were as strong for high self-monitoring individuals as they were for low self-monitoring individuals. The relevance manipulations reported by Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) successfully enhanced correspondence between the attitudes and behavior of both low and high self-monitors in two different experimental conditions. It was argued that to the extent that relevance strategies include the defining features of *importance* (inducing subjects to cognize that their behavior in a given situation has important implications for furthering their attitudinal viewpoints, or that their attitudes have important implications for their behavior)

and *connectedness* (that because of this important link, "one's attitudes ought to be connected meaningfully to one's behavioral decisions" [p. 180]) these strategies will effectively induce individuals to adopt a believing means doing orientation, hence act in accord with their attitudes. Attitude-behavior consistency, then, was argued by Snyder to be a function of the extent to which individuals adopt a believing means doing orientation in a given situation. In line with Snyder's (1987) view of self-monitoring as a discretely distributed class variable, low self-monitors have such an orientation built in to their personality, high self-monitors do not.

Self-monitoring and the theory of reasoned action. Although Snyder's (1982) theory about the effects of exposing individuals to information that induces them to define their attitudes as relevant guides to behavior may seem relatively straightforward and consistent with self-monitoring theory, Ajzen, Timko, and White (1982) have provided an alternative interpretation of the relationship between self-monitoring and attitude-behavior consistency that is based on the theory of reasoned action. According to Ajzen et al., differing perceptions of an attitude's relevance to behavior by high and low self-monitors does not explain the observed differences in attitude-behavior

consistency. In line with the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) these investigators maintain that differences in behavior are better explained by differences in the stability of intentions. High self-monitoring individuals, being more susceptible to situational influences, are assumed to have less stable attitudes, hence intentions. As evidence for their position, Ajzen et al.'s data indicated that attitude-intention correlations were basically the same for both high and low self monitoring individuals -- presumably confirming the perception of relevance -- but that intention-behavior correlations were higher for low than for high self-monitors.

Ajzen et al.'s (1982) conclusions are based on the following logic: First, they assumed that attitudes could be placed on a continuum from "so general and removed from the behavior that not even low self-monitors could regard them as relevant" (p. 427) to "so obviously relevant to the behavior that it penetrates the awareness of even high self-monitors" (p. 427). Based on this assumption, it was concluded that only attitudes of *intermediate relevance* should be expected to moderate the effects of self-monitoring on attitude-behavior consistency; that is, attitudes should differentially affect high versus low

self-monitors only when those attitudes are of intermediate relevance. Ajzen et al. went on to assess attitudes whose relevance to behavior was assumed to be obvious to both high and low self-monitors. In support of this assumption they reported statistically equivalent correlations between attitudes and intentions for high and low self-monitors. Further, assessment of these two measures was reported to have occurred two weeks apart, ruling out the possibility that the obtained correlation was due to an extraneous relevance manipulation at the time of intention assessment. Given, the obvious relevance of subjects' attitudes for behavior, Snyder would presumably have predicted equivalence in behavioral consistency for low and high self-monitors. However, Ajzen et al.'s data revealed that high self-monitors were less likely to act in accord with their attitudes than were low self-monitors; in other words, high self-monitors can apparently be well aware of the relevance their attitudes have for behavior while simply choosing to act in ways that are inconsistent with those attitudes. Consequently, Ajzen et al. (1982) concluded that "there was thus no evidence to support Snyder's (in press) [1982] suggestion that self-monitoring moderates the perceived relevance of attitudes as guides to action" (p. 433).

The implications of the Ajzen et al. (1982) study for Snyder's theory are not entirely clear. To begin with, the Ajzen et al. study does not explicitly address itself to the notion of the "believing means doing" orientation which is central to Snyder's position. Snyder (1982; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982) has argued that providing high self-monitors with attitude relevant information induces them to adopt a "believing means doing" orientation. To the extent that attitude relevant information results in that orientation, behavior is expected to correspond to attitudes. Snyder did not, however, address the issue of how long such an orientation would persist in an individual. Further, it is important to note that the relevance manipulations used by Snyder and Kendzierski occurred only moments before assessment of the behavioral criterion. The relationship between the perceived relevance manipulation and the behavioral criterion in the Ajzen et al. (1982) study is less clear.

According to Ajzen et al. (1982), people will perceive the relevance of their attitudes for behavior (a) when those attitudes are "obviously relevant" and (b) when they are asked to respond to attitude statements that reflect attitudes toward behaviors. These investigators argued that the equivalent attitude-intention correlations

for high and low self-monitors were indicative of equal levels of perceived relevance, while higher intention-behavior correlations for low self-monitors were indicative that perceived relevance was not the essential factor in linking attitudes to behavior. Depending on which source of perceived relevance is focused on, the behavioral criterion can be viewed as (a) occurring simultaneously with perceived relevance (in the case where the attitude's relevance is obvious) or (b) occurring one week after the perceived relevance manipulation (in the case where relevance was manipulated via assessment of subjects' attitudes toward their behaviors). In either case, if perceived relevance was, in fact, a given for these subjects, then Ajzen et al.'s results contradict Snyder's theory.

Accepting, for the moment, that the high self-monitoring subjects in Ajzen et al.'s study actually did perceive the relevance of their attitudes for behavior (as was ostensibly borne out by the reported attitude-intention correlations), a number of questions arise: for example, did the high self-monitoring subjects perceive the relevance of their attitudes to behavior (a) based on the presence of a "believing means doing" orientation, or (b) because the attitudes in question were

already firmly linked to the behavior in question; that is, due to their obvious relevance? If these are interpreted to have equivalent meanings, the question becomes: How would Snyder explain the lack of correspondence between intention and behavior? If there is a difference between these two points of view, then how are they to be empirically differentiated?

Whether or not there is a difference between perceiving the relevance of an attitude for action and adopting a "believing means doing" orientation, a useful line of inquiry would begin by asking: What factors govern the probability that high self-monitoring individuals will perceive the relevance of their attitudes for behavior (or be in a "believing means doing" state of mind) at one moment and be distracted from this realization at the next? In other words, was the lack of correspondence between intentions and behavior by high self-monitoring subjects in Ajzen et al.'s study due to (a) the absence of a "believing means doing" orientation, or (b) the instability of intentions. Further, there is the question of whether intention stability and perseverance of a "believing means doing" state of mind are simply two different conceptual frameworks, or points of view, describing the same phenomena? If this is the case, it

should be possible to design a study whose data would support both points of view. In the absence of a method to conduct such a critical test of these two differing interpretations of the moderating role of self-monitoring on attitude-behavior relations, the present study will limit its focus to examining the combined influences of a relevance strategy and the presentation of various types of normative information that could potentially affect intention stability.

In any case, several other observations relating to the Ajzen et al. (1982) study deserve mention. First, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) have argued that attitudes and subjective norms combine to form intentions. The amount of influence of each of these variables is assessed by reference to their respective regression coefficients when intentions are the criteria. Although not significant, Ajzen et al. reported that the weights of the subjective norm components played a greater role in determining intentions for high self-monitors than for low self-monitors. This is consistent with Snyder's (1974; 1987) theory that high self-monitors are more influenced by situational cues -- in this case, the beliefs and expectations of important others -- than are low self-monitors. A second interesting result was that the

correlations between attitudes and intentions were consistently higher, yet not significantly so, for high self-monitors than for low self-monitors. Ajzen et al. took this as further evidence that there is no reason to believe that low self-monitoring individual's are any more in touch with the relevance of their attitudes to behavior than are high self-monitoring individual's.

The moderating role of self-monitoring sub-scales in the attitude-behavior relationship. Although there may be confusion with respect to precisely what processes are involved, it seems safe to conclude that the personality variable, self-monitoring, is a reliable moderator of the attitude-behavior relationship. On the basis of a number of factor analytic studies, however, there is increasing sentiment among a variety of researchers that it is unwise to treat the self-monitoring construct as if it represented a unitary, underlying dimension of behavior (Baize & Tetlock, 1985; Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980). Due to the alleged multidimensional nature of the self-monitoring construct, Baize and Tetlock suggested that when examining the moderating effects of this construct on the attitude-behavior relationship researchers should take into account these multiple dimensions. To illustrate their point, Baize and Tetlock reanalyzed Ajzen et al.'s (1982)

data by examining the moderating effects of three relatively stable sub-scales of the self-monitoring scale: Acting, Other-directedness, and Extraversion (Briggs et al., 1980).

The results of Baize and Tetlock's analysis clearly supported their contention that the underlying dimensions of the self-monitoring construct would have important implications for the attitude-behavior relationship. For example, the relationship between attitudes and behavior was moderated almost exclusively by the Other-directedness sub-scale with those scoring highly being the least likely to be consistent. The other two sub-scales revealed the opposite tendency; that is, high scores on Acting and Extraversion were associated with greater attitude-behavior consistency. On the basis of this information, Baize and Tetlock concluded that 56% of the self-monitoring scale does not contribute to the prediction of behavior from attitudes.

Although consideration of the sub-scales did not reveal any interesting information with respect to the relationship between attitudes and intentions, the Acting sub-scale was shown to moderate the relationship between subjective norms and intentions. Subjects scoring high on Acting showed greater consistency between their perceptions

of the expectations of significant others and their intentions than those who scoring low.

With regard to the intention-behavior relationship, Acting was again found to play a significant role. Subjects scoring high on the Acting sub-scale were more likely to translate their intentions into behavior than were subjects scoring low. Scores on the Other-directedness sub-scale showed a non-significant trend in the opposite direction; that is, subjects scoring high in Other-directedness were least likely to act in accord with their intentions.

The Baize and Tetlock (1985) study included discussion of a number of interesting implications of these results for understanding the role self-monitoring plays in moderating the relationship between attitudes and behavior. First, they emphasized the importance of viewing self-monitoring as a multidimensional construct. Because individual differences along the dimensions underlying self-monitoring result in differential effects on the attitude-behavior relationship, Baize and Tetlock cautioned investigators using the self-monitoring scale to avoid assuming that only unitary influences are operative.

In response to the specific results discussed above, Baize and Tetlock made several important observations.

First, they pointed out that their results regarding the moderating role of Other-directedness were consistent with previous findings; that is, high scorers tend to be shy, publicly self-conscious, and lacking in self-esteem (Briggs et al., 1980). Hence, highly Other-directed people are "likely to bend to social pressures of the moment, thus producing a less consistent attitude-behavior relationship" (Baize & Tetlock, p.39). On the other hand, high scorers on the Acting and Extraversion sub-scales are characterized as being independent and self-confident in social interactions. In fact, Baize, Fleisher & Santee (1982) have shown them to "exhibit creative dissent and nonconformity in the face of an apparently unanimous majority" (Baize & Tetlock, p. 39) which would account for their ability to act in accord with their intentions in the face of situational cues to the contrary.

Chapter 4: Problem for Research

Research on the relationship between attitudes and behaviors seems to grow more complex all the time. After initial assumptions of correspondence (Allport, 1935) were questioned (Wicker, 1969), closer analysis (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977) revealed that particular attitudes could reliably predict particular behaviors. As suggested by Zanna and Fazio (1982), we seem to have moved well beyond the generation of "Is" questions (e.g.: Is there a relationship between attitudes and behavior?) and are rapidly making the transition out of the generation of "When" questions (e.g.: When are attitudes related to behavior?) and into a generation of "How" questions (e.g.: How do attitudes affect behavior?). The present study, dealing simultaneously with both "When" and "How" questions, is considered to be on the cusp of this transition.

Despite the fact that we seem to be moving into a third generation of research on the relationship between attitudes and behavior, conceptualizations of the attitude concept and the relation between this concept and behavior continue to differ widely among investigators (Chaiken & Stangor, 1987). Whether attitudes are best viewed as unitary or multidimensional in nature and what implications

these various views have for predicting and explaining behavior remain the subject of considerable debate. Given the lack of an integrated framework for studying attitude-behavior relations, then, it seems especially important for investigators to make explicit their particular theoretical orientations so that confusion and misinterpretation is kept to a minimum. In line with this view, a brief sketch of the theoretical orientation underlying the present study is in order.

First, consistent with past research relevant to the present study, attitudes are referred to solely as evaluative concepts (Ajzen, Timko, & White, 1982; Fishbein & Raven, 1962; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982). As suggested by research that demonstrates that behavior can sometimes be better predicted and explained by taking into account variables other than just attitudes (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Schlegel & DiTecco, 1982), a model that incorporates these suggestions is employed; that is, the *reasoned action* model (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). This model includes measures of beliefs and motivations in addition to attitudes. Further, assessment of the personality variable, self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974), is also included. Consequently, this study is more accurately conceptualized as addressing the cognition-behavior

relationship than the attitude-behavior relationship. The term cognition, as used within this context, refers to the general realm of thoughts, ideas, and/or mind. Accordingly, personality variables are considered cognitive to the extent that they are represented in the mind (Harvey, 1986; Kerlinger, 1973; Rokeach, 1961). Likewise, social stimuli are presumably processed by, hence represented in, the mind prior to subsequent behavioral responses (Lazarus, 1984).

Personality and the attitude-behavior issue.

According to the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), "extraneous variables" such as personality and situational variables can not affect behavior directly. Intentions are the immediate antecedents of behavior, hence any external variable can only affect behavior by somehow first affecting the relevant intentions. Intentions, however, are only affected by the influences of attitudes and subjective norms which are ultimately determined by underlying beliefs and motivations. Consequently, the only way for personality and/or situational variables to affect behavior is via their influence on the beliefs and motivations which ultimately form the basis for behavior. Because of the well-developed structure of the theory of

reasoned action, testing Ajzen and Fishbein's extraneous variable hypothesis is relatively easy. One value of the reasoned action model, then, is that it provides a context within which to test a variety of predictions about the role person and situation variables play in the manifestation of behavior. Further, to the extent that relationships between personality and attitudes and their mutual effects on behavior have been neglected (Sherman & Fazio, 1983), the reasoned action model provides an invaluable framework for integrating these two very important domains of inquiry.

Regarding the general state of knowledge about the role personality variables play in moderating the attitude-behavior relationship, with relatively few exceptions (e.g., McArthur, Kiesler, & Cook, 1969; Rholes & Bailey, 1983; Snyder & Swann, 1976, Wicklund, 1982) personality variables have not been found to significantly affect the relationship between attitudes and behaviors. Nevertheless, there have been a relatively large number of reports showing moderating effects of at least one personality variable, self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974), on attitude-behavior consistency (Ajzen, et al., 1982; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982; Snyder & Swann, 1976; Snyder & Tanke, 1976; Zanna, Olson, & Fazio, 1980).

Self-monitoring, perceived relevance, and the "believing means doing" orientation. With regard to the question of how self-monitoring moderates the attitude-behavior relationship, Snyder (1982) has proposed that high and low self-monitoring individuals have fundamentally different orientations to social situations. Low self-monitors are characterized by a "believing means doing" orientation, while high-self monitors are characterized by the lack of such an orientation. Theoretically, the "believing means doing" orientation of low self-monitoring individuals increases the probability that they will make use of available information for linking attitudes to behavior; that is, (a) it typically makes them aware that their attitudes have relevance for action in a given situation and (b) it provides them with clear guidelines for acting in congruence with these attitudes. High self-monitors, on the other hand, lacking the believing means doing orientation, tend not to make use of available information for linking attitudes to behavior; that is, (a) they tend not to perceive the relevance of their attitudes for behavior, hence (b) they typically have no attitude-generated guidelines for behavior.

To illustrate this principle, Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) began by demonstrating that making attitudinal

information cognitively *available* to both high and low self-monitoring individuals was effective as a method for increasing attitude-behavior consistency for low but not for high self-monitors. To render attitudes available, Snyder and Kendzierski instructed subjects to take a few minutes and reflect on their general attitudes toward the specified issue. This manipulation occurred before the subjects were exposed to any details of the court case they would be judging. The obtained results were predicted on the basis of the proposition that a believing means doing orientation would result in low self-monitoring individuals translating the attitudes that they had become aware of into the prescribed actions. High self-monitors, lacking this orientation, were presumed not to make use of the available attitudinal information when selecting a behavioral response.

Next, Snyder and Kendzierski induced high self-monitoring individuals to act in accord with their attitudes by providing them with information that highlighted the *relevance* these attitudes had for behavior. In one study, for example, subjects read a short paragraph that prompted them to consider the implications their behavioral decision -- deciding which party should win an affirmative action lawsuit -- would have for similar

cases in the future as well as affirmative action programs in general. In a second study, subjects simply heard two confederates have the following interaction: First confederate: "I don't know if I should volunteer or if I shouldn't volunteer. What do you think?" Second confederate: "Well, I guess that whether you do or whether you don't is really a question of how worthwhile you think experiments are." In general, Snyder and Kendzierski provided subjects with information which induced them to cognize the *importance* their behavior had for furthering their attitudinal viewpoints. With this cognizance presumably came the *connection* that because attitudes were relevant to behavior, they should be acted upon. In other words, by creating believing means doing orientations in high self-monitors it was possible for these high self-monitors to link their attitudes to their behavior. This effect was obtained within the context of two attitudinal domains, using two separate relevance strategies and two very different methods of assessing the behavioral criterion. Snyder and Kendzierski proposed that "relevance strategies will effectively enhance correspondence between attitude and behavior to the extent that they successfully induce individuals to adopt a 'believing means doing' orientation to choosing their

actions" (p. 181).

Self-monitoring and the theory of reasoned action. In response to this analysis, Ajzen, et al. (1982) argued that the perception of relevance had nothing to do with the moderating effects of self-monitoring on the attitude-behavior relationship. Further, based on Snyder's (1982) discussion of the believing means doing orientation, Ajzen, et al. reasoned that even if perceived relevance did play a role in moderating the attitude-behavior relationship, this role would be limited to certain types of attitudes. Specifically, Ajzen, et al. first assumed that attitudes could be placed on a continuum from "so general and removed from the behavior that not even low self-monitors could regard them as relevant" (p. 427) to "so obviously relevant to the behavior that [they] penetrate the awareness of even high self-monitors" (p. 427). Based on this assumption, it was concluded that only attitudes of *intermediate relevance* should be expected to moderate the effects of self-monitoring on attitude-behavior consistency; that is, attitudes should differentially affect high versus low self-monitors only when those attitudes are of intermediate relevance.

In support of this argument, Ajzen, et al. (1982) conducted a study in which the behavioral relevance of both

low and high self-monitoring subjects' attitudes was assumed to be obvious but where attitude-behavior consistency was shown to be greater for the former subjects than for the latter. During the first of three contacts with 140 subjects, several personality variables (including self-monitoring) and general attitudes toward voting in an upcoming presidential election and smoking marijuana were assessed. Two weeks later, subjects completed the following measures associated with the theory of reasoned action: intentions, attitudes and subjective norms. The election occurred one week after the second contact, and subjects' behaviors were assessed via telephone interviews about two weeks after this election. The results indicated that attitude-intention correlations were statistically equivalent for both low and high self-monitors but that intention-behavior correlations were significantly higher for the former relative to the latter subjects.

The fact that attitude-intention correlations were equivalent was taken as support for the assumption that the attitudes in question were obviously relevant to both low and high self-monitoring individuals. This result was interpreted as supporting the view that low and high self-monitors do not differ in the extent to which they perceive the relevance of their attitudes as guides to

behavior. The differential intention-behavior correlations were attributed to the instability of the high self-monitors' intentions. This instability interpretation was viewed as consistent with Snyder's (1974) original conception of the high self-monitor as more likely to guide self-presentation on the basis of situational cues to appropriateness while the low self-monitor would be more apt to regulate self-expression on the basis of inner states. Recall that, according to the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), intentions will change to the extent that an individual is exposed to information that affects the attitudes and/or subjective norms (or their relative weights) that underlie these intentions. According to Ajzen, et al. (1982), then, high self-monitors' intentions are unstable because these individuals have a tendency to rely on situational cues to appropriateness as guides to behavior; because these cues tend to vary with the social situation, intentions are also expected to vary.

Theoretical incooperability. There is one major difference between the Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) study and the Ajzen et al. (1982) study that renders a decision on which interpretation most accurately describes the moderating role of self-monitoring on the attitude-behavior

relationship premature. Basically, each study addressed the concept of perceived relevance in different ways; both conceptually and empirically. These differing approaches can be viewed as the result of differences in theoretical orientation. Because the two studies were designed from such different theoretical perspectives, their ranges and focuses of convenience were very different. In other words, what was important to one of the theories was primarily superfluous to the other. As a result of these differing points of view, there was a fundamental incomparability between the two designs. For example, the Snyder and Kendzierski study was specifically designed to assess the believing means doing phenomenon; that is, systematic variation in the believing means doing orientation was introduced and the consequences assessed. The Ajzen et al. study, on the other hand, functionally preempted any possibility of assessing the effects of this phenomenon by designing the experimental situation such that there would be no systematic variation along this dimension; that is, Ajzen et al. assumed that all of their subjects were under the influence of the believing means doing orientation as the result of the obvious behavioral relevance of the attitudes in question. This assumption was then supported by reference to statistically equivalent

attitude-intention correlations between high and low self-monitors.

Assuming that the equivalent attitude-intention correlations were indicative of equally high levels of perceived relevance -- that is, the presence of believing means doing orientations -- on the parts of the high self-monitors, it is still not clear how the events that occurred between the assessment of attitudes and intentions differed from the events that occurred between the assessment of intentions and behavior in a way that could account for the differential levels of intention stability. In other words, why would intentions remain stable for two weeks and then suddenly become unstable? According to the Ajzen et al. (1982) report, perceived relevance persevered from the time of initial attitude assessment for at least the two weeks until intentions were assessed (as evidenced by the attitude-intention correlations). The implication is that subjects formed intentions to act that were congruent with the perceived relevance of their attitudes for behavior. This intention, then, remained stable for the next two weeks until it was directly assessed during the second experimental session (as evidenced by the attitude-intention correlations). However, as evidenced by differential responses to the

behavioral criterion by high and low self-monitors one week later, intentions obviously did not remain stable for an additional week.

Ajzen et al. (1982) argued that this instability was due to the greater susceptibility to situational pressures for high self-monitors than for low self-monitors. This interpretation, however, does not explain how the situational pressures differed across the duration of the study; that is, it does not explain why high self-monitors' intentions remained stable across the first two weeks and became unstable at the end of the third week. According to the theory of reasoned action, intention is the immediate determinant of behavior. If behavior occurs that is not congruent with a previously measured intention, then it logically follows that this previously measured intention must have changed or been replaced by some other intention. If these new intentions had been measured immediately prior to the behavioral criterion, attitude-intention correlations for high self-monitoring subjects would presumably have been much lower than for low self-monitoring subjects. These low correlations would, according to the Ajzen et al. analysis, indicate the absence of perceived relevance. Because these intentions were never assessed, we have no way of ruling out the

possibility that high self-monitoring subjects were no longer in believing means doing states of mind at the time of the behavioral criterion.

Further, if the attitudes in question were not of the obviously relevant type -- that is, if they were of the intermediately relevant type -- according to both self-monitoring theory and Ajzen et al.s (1982) analysis, we would expect that high self-monitors would be characterized by an absence of the believing means doing orientation and, consequently, a lack of consistency between attitudes and behaviors. Hence, even though Ajzen et al. controlled for the effects of perceived relevance via randomization, because they did not assess this variable at the time of the behavioral criterion, their conclusion that perceived relevance does not moderate attitude-behavior relations seems premature.

Another manifestation of incomparability between how Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) dealt with the concept of a believing means doing orientation and how Ajzen et al. (1982) dealt with this concept involved the differing temporal relations that existed between the relevance manipulations and the behavioral criteria. In both studies reported by Snyder and Kendzierski, relevance was manipulated only moments before their subjects were to

perform the criterion behavior. Contrarily, Ajzen et al. on the one hand assumed that relevance was obvious and on the other hand allowed at least one week between the manipulation of relevance (via attitude assessment) and the behavioral criterion. Recall that in addition to assuming that the attitudes assessed in their study were obviously relevant to behavior, Ajzen et al. argued that simply assessing attitudes towards behavior would result in their relevance becoming obvious. This, again, obscures the role that a believing means doing orientation might play in moderating the attitude-behavior relationship. For example, if one were to assume that the given attitudes were *not* obviously relevant to behavior, this would render the initially equivalent attitude-intention correlations between low and high self-monitoring subjects uninterpretable from the reasoned action perspective. In fact, it would suggest that the obtained correlations may have been the result of the inducement of a believing means doing orientation during the second contact with subjects when they were being assessed on their attitudes towards the behaviors under study. The presence of believing means doing orientations during this second contact would account for the equivalent attitude-intention correlations but would raise the question of how to interpret these

attitude-intention correlations. Likewise, given the inducement of a believing means doing orientation during the second contact, Ajzen et al.'s implicit assumption that this orientation would persevere for at least one week after assessing attitudes towards behavior seems dubious. In fact, Snyder (1982; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982) never addressed the issue of how long such an orientation would affect the high self-monitoring individual.

To summarize, in order for Ajzen et al. (1982) to conclude that perceived relevance was not an important contributor to the intention-behavior link, they must have assumed that the behavioral relevance of the attitudes in question was obvious to both low and high self-monitors at the time the behavioral criterion was assessed. In fact, intentions were not assessed at this time. Had these investigators measured intentions immediately prior to assessment of the behavioral criterion they ostensibly would have found the same high attitude-intention correlations for high self-monitors that were obtained the week before thus supporting their theory. However, the following critical point should be noted: according to the reasoned action model, in order for behavior to occur that does not reflect the previously measured intention, a new intention must have been formed. Hence, also according to

the reasoned action model, attitude-intention correlations assessed using intention measures taken just prior to the behavioral criterion should be relatively low for attitude-behavior inconsistent high self-monitors thereby arguing, according to Ajzen et al.'s criterion (attitude-intention correlations), against the presence of perceived relevance.

Proposal for clarifying the role self-monitoring plays in moderating the attitude-behavior relationship. In an attempt to clarify the apparently conflicting interpretations offered by Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) and Ajzen et al. (1982) regarding how self-monitoring moderates the attitude-behavior relationship, the present study was designed to test the theoretical propositions inherent in these two interpretations by creating an experimental context conducive to integrating the two theoretical frameworks. In other words, the design employed in the present study was structured to examine more carefully the role that perceived relevance, or a believing means doing orientation, plays in moderating cognition-behavior relations as represented by the reasoned action model.

Unlike the Ajzen et al. (1982) study, in the present study perceived relevance was directly manipulated and

potential sources of extraneous influences on intention stability were assessed. Unlike the the Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) study, following the relevant information manipulation subjects were exposed to information that potentially could distract them from the presumed believing means doing orientation. The primary research question, then, was: Does the believing means doing orientation, as induced by the presentation of a relevance strategy, persevere in the face of potentially distracting information? Or, in other words: Is a relevance strategy sufficient to prevent the destabilization of intentions in the face of competing normative information?

In an attempt to answer this question, two types of situational information expected to differentially affect high and low self-monitors were manipulated: information relevant to linking attitudes to behavior and information regarding social norms. Specifically, in an effort to maximize the systematic variance in high self-monitors' intention stability the following manipulations were introduced. First, half of the subjects were exposed to a relevance strategy and half were not. This manipulation was designed to increase intention stability for subjects who received the relevance strategy relative to subjects

who did not receive the relevance strategy. Second, 2/3 of the subjects in each of the aforementioned conditions were exposed to some type of normative information containing cues to situationally appropriate self-presentation while 1/3 received no information. This manipulation was designed to decrease intention stability for subjects who received normative information relative to subjects who did not receive normative information. Of the subjects who received normative information, one half received information that was positive with respect to the behavioral criteria while the other half received information that was negative with respect to the behavioral criteria. Hence, this design included two manipulated variables: attitude relevant information and normative information. The relevant information variable had two levels (presence versus absence) and the normative information variable had three levels (no information versus pro-nuclear power plant information versus anti-nuclear power plant information).

Regarding the attitude-relevant information variable: as discussed above, providing high self-monitors with information that induces them to cognize the relevance their behavior has for furthering their attitudinal viewpoints typically results in levels of attitude-behavior

correlations which are significantly higher than for high self-monitors who did not receive such information and at a level commensurate with low self-monitors who may or may not have received such information. In the present study, a relevance strategy similar to the ones employed by Snyder & Kendzierski (1982) will be used to induce half of the high self-monitoring individuals to adopt a believing means doing orientation. The remaining high self-monitoring subjects will not be exposed to the relevance strategy.

Regarding the normative information variable: According to the theory of reasoned action, intentions are expected to vary as a function of time. Specifically, intentions are expected to change as a function of encounters with "unforeseen extraneous events." The range of events studied by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) do not implicate any boundary conditions for what can be classified as unexpectedly extraneous information, nor do these investigators provide an explicit definition of these conditions. However, given the evidence from research on self-monitoring theory that high self-monitoring individuals are particularly sensitive to situational cues to appropriateness, and given that such appropriateness can be viewed as normative information (Myers, 1983), the type of unforeseen extraneous

information to be focused on in the present study can be generally classified as normative information. Recall that the subjective norm element of the reasoned action model is composed largely of normative beliefs. To the extent that the set of salient normative beliefs of any given individual becomes altered we would expect a corresponding alteration in the overall subjective norm component. Because changes in the subjective norm component have the potential to alter the intention component, normative information can be viewed as a threat to intention stability. In short, information that a subject encounters after the initial intention assessment that was not taken into account during initial intention formation could potentially alter the saliency of a given belief which would in turn increase the probability of a change in attitude or subjective norm (or their relative weights) which would increase the probability of a shift in intention.

In general, the greater the time between intention assessment and behavior assessment, the less accurate the prediction of behavior from intention. In other words, the more unforeseen information related to intention formation that is encountered, the less accurate the prediction. Based on this reasoning, it would seem logical to assume

that by keeping the amount of unforeseen information at a minimum for a first group while maximizing this information for a second group that stronger intention-behavior correlations would result for the former group relative to the latter. Following this logic, each subject will be presented with one of two scenarios that vary in the type of information they contain. In the first case, unforeseen information will be minimized by eliminating as much normative information as possible. In the second case, negative information will be maximized to the extent that subjects will be exposed to (1) the opinions of potentially salient referents (environmentalists) who have *negative* attitudes about the given issue, and (2) the approval and support of these attitudes by other potentially salient referents (community leaders). The situational cues to appropriate behavior intrinsic to this latter condition are expected to have effects similar to the unforeseen extraneous information that may have influenced the outcome in Ajzen et al.'s (1982) study. As such, this information is expected to decrease intention stability, hence reduce the strength of intention-behavior correlations.

To further articulate the primary question addressed by the present study, then: Will the relevance strategy be sufficient to increase high self-monitor's

attitude-behavior consistency despite the manipulation of normative information? Or, more generally, which theoretical orientation can more accurately predict the outcome of exposing high self-monitors to both attitude relevant information as well as information designed to increase the salience of normative pressures? Snyder's (1982; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982) theory predicts that linking attitudes to behavior via presentation of relevant information results in high self-monitoring individuals adopting a believing means doing orientation. This orientation, in turn, is expected to result in greater consistency between attitudes and behavior than would be found in those conditions where attitude relevant information was absent. Or, conceptualized differently, given the inducement of a believing means doing orientation, high self-monitors would be expected to act in accord with their attitudes with the same consistency as low self-monitors. Presumably, this effect would be reflected both in similar attitude-intention and intention-behavior correlations for high and low self-monitors. Ajzen et al.'s (1982) theory, on the other hand, would predict the opposite results for the intention-behavior relationship; specifically, for high self-monitoring subjects, normative pressures are expected

to alter their intentions and subsequently cause them to act in accord with those pressures despite any perceived relevance of their attitudes for behavior.

Predictions. Based on the experimental design sketched above, the following hypotheses were tested:

1. To the extent that Snyder and Kendzierski's (1982) perceived relevance interpretation of the moderating role self-monitoring on the attitude-behavior relation is correct: Regardless of the presence or absence of normative information, for those subjects exposed to the relevance strategy, thus adopting a believing means doing orientation, attitude-intention and intention-behavior correlations will be equally strong for both high and low self-monitors.

2. To the extent that Ajzen et al.'s (1982) intention instability interpretation of the moderating role of self-monitoring on the attitude-behavior relation is correct: Regardless of whether or not subjects are exposed to the relevance strategy, intention-behavior correlations should be stronger for low than for high self-monitors in normative information conditions compared to conditions with no normative information.

Chapter 5: Methods

Design and Overview

The basic design was a 2 (high vs. low self-monitoring) X 2 (relevant vs. no relevant information) X 2 (anti-nuclear vs. no normative information). For experimental groups, the manipulated variables were *relevance strategy* and *normative information*; both were between subjects variables. Self-monitoring (high versus low) was a personality variable.

Both self-monitoring and a general measure of attitudes toward nuclear power were assessed during an allegedly unrelated experiment which occurred between one and five weeks prior to the main experiment. The difference in times between the two sessions across subjects resulted from waiting for subjects to voluntarily sign-up during the quarter. At the time of the main experiment, all of the remaining measures and manipulations were administered. After a brief introduction to the issue to be considered, subjects in all conditions responded to all of the elements of the reasoned action model which were presented in the following order: intentions, attitudes, behavioral beliefs, outcome evaluations, general subjective norms, normative beliefs, and motivations to comply. Next,

all subjects were exposed either to a relevance strategy or to no relevance strategy. Following this manipulation, all subjects were exposed to either anti-nuclear normative information or to no normative information. At this point, intentions were again assessed for all subjects. Immediately following this intention assessment, subjects responded to two items that comprised the dependent variables. Finally, subjects were assessed on the remaining elements of the reasoned action model; that is, attitudes, behavioral beliefs, outcome evaluations, general subjective norms, normative beliefs, and motivations to comply.

Subjects

Subjects were 58 female and 51 male introductory psychology students participating for course credit and 19 female and 16 male student volunteers enrolled in an undergraduate sociology course at the University of Montana. Ages ranged from 18 to 46 with a mean of 20. Random assignment to experimental conditions was achieved by first using a median split procedure to classify subjects as either high or low self-monitors. Subjects from these two classes were then randomly assigned to each of the experimental conditions until there were 18 high

self-monitors and 18 low self-monitors in each condition. The data from 9 subjects were not included in the analysis for the following reasons: Eight cases were discarded due to missing data and one case was discarded because the subject was observed skipping over the pages containing the experimental manipulations.

Measures

General attitudes toward nuclear power and the presence of nuclear power reactors were assessed as part of a larger attitude and personality survey. The following four critical statements were rated on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree): (1) The US government should fund the development of nuclear energy resources, (2) nuclear power plants are a substantial health hazard, (3) the costs of nuclear power outweigh the benefits, (4) the use and exploration of nuclear energy results in a strong nation. Scores on these four items were reversed where necessary and summed to yield a single measure of attitude. Actual scores ranged from 4 to 38 with a mean of 19.23, a standard deviation of 7.27, and an internal consistency (as measured by Cronbach's alpha) of .61. Based on a median split, Snyder's (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale was used to identify subjects

as high (scores above 9.5) and low (scores below 9.5) self-monitoring individuals; the internal consistency of this scale (as measured by Cronbach's alpha) was .63.

On two occasions during the course of the main experiment, all of the elements germane to Ajzen and Fishbein's (1980) reasoned action model were assessed (as summarized below) according to their suggested guidelines (pp. 261-274). First, subjects' intentions, attitudes and subjective norms with regard to voting in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula County within the next two years were assessed (items 1, 2, and 33 respectively in Appendix A). For intentions, respondents indicated on 7-point scales (ranging from extremely likely to extremely unlikely) the likelihood that they intended to vote in favor of the issue. For attitudes, subjects indicated on three 7-point bi-polar items the extent to which they thought voting in favor of the issue was good vs. bad, wise vs. foolish, and harmful vs. beneficial. For subjective norms, subjects indicated on 7-point scales (ranging from extremely likely to extremely unlikely) the likelihood that important others thought they should vote in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years.

To assess underlying beliefs about the issue, the 14

most frequently mentioned modal behavioral beliefs that had been drawn from a previous experiment were rated by subjects on 7-point likelihood scales (items 18-32 in Appendix A). Outcome evaluations for each of the belief statements, ranging from extremely good to extremely bad, were also obtained by subjects' responses on 7-point scales (items 3-17 in Appendix A). Likewise, modal normative beliefs about the nuclear power plant issue were previously obtained and used to create the subjective norm scale. Subjects indicated on 7-point likelihood scales the extent to which they believed that each modal referent thought they should vote in favor of the nuclear power issue (items 34-45 in Appendix A). Finally, motivations to comply with these perceived expectations were assessed by subjects responding on 7-point likelihood scales to the statement: "Generally speaking, I am (motivated/unmotivated) to do what (a given salient referent) think(s) I should do" (items 46-57 in Appendix A).

Procedure

All relevant instructions and materials were contained in each subjects' protocols. The protocols were organized as follows: Each experimental group was exposed to the following introduction:

 Welcome to the public forum on nuclear

development. We, the County Commissioners, have requested the cooperation of the Psychology Department in gathering information about how people feel about constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next 2 years. The state has requested that we seriously consider such a proposal. Rather than relying solely on random public opinion, we believe that a more formal scientific fact finding approach is called for. For this reason, we will ask you many specific questions.

As university students, you represent a vital source of information for our knowledge base. The most important way you can aid us in providing feedback to the state is to answer the questions below as accurately and honestly as you possibly can. Inaccurate information can obviously be a large problem and can effectively make the time we have spent on this project a waste. So, if you are not in the mood to take this seriously, please indicate this by marking the appropriate phrase: __ Yes, I will provide honest feedback; __ No, I will not provide honest feedback. In either case, you will be given full credit. This procedure allows us to draw the most meaningful conclusions; it is worth it to us to avoid the problem. Thank you for your cooperation.

Please keep in mind that all of the information obtained in this research will be anonymous; your identity will in no way be associated with any information you give us.

At this point, all subjects in each experimental condition completed the reasoned action measures (see appendix A). Next, all experimental protocols contained the following review:

Considering whether or not to support the construction of a nuclear power plant is a very complex activity. Obviously, only a brief review of the issue is possible here. The Department of Energy is the branch of the U.S. government that is responsible for dealing with issues related to basic energy requirements for American society. Because our current energy requirements are being satisfied primarily by relying on fossil fuels,

and because these fuels are a non-renewable resource, the Department of Energy encourages state governments to pursue alternative energy sources. The bottom line is this: Fossil fuel resources (e.g., coal, natural gas, oil, etc.) will eventually be exhausted. It makes no sense to wait until all of our current resources have been depleted. Therefore, as a nation, we must seek out alternative sources of energy (e.g., nuclear, solar, hydro, etc.).

Nuclear energy has been part of the lives a millions of Americans for many years. Most of us do not realize the extent to which the electricity we use is provided by nuclear power plants. Nevertheless, as with most issues of concern in our society, there are many people who agree with the use of nuclear power and many people who do not agree with the use of nuclear power. The impact nuclear power plants have had on the local economies, the surrounding environments, and the communities in general has varied greatly from location to location. And although a great deal of information has been collected that documents many dimensions of such impact, there is virtually no way to predict what the impact will be for any given location. Consequently, feedback from the community on their perceptions of the issue is vital. It is our hope that the information we gather from this project will allow us to better understand this very important issue.

Following the above information, subjects in the relevant information conditions were provided with the following statement:

Now that you have had a chance to become familiar with the nuclear power plant issue, take a few moments to reflect on the implications your decision will have for the people of Missoula county as well as people all over Montana. In deciding whether or not to support the construction of such a facility, keep in mind that the feedback we (the County Commissioners) receive from this study will be included in our report to the Missoula community as well as the state legislature. Further, because our final report will be on record in the state capitol,

your decision on this issue could affect how other communities handle the same issue when and if it comes up for them. That is, this report could set precedents to be followed by any number of other communities.

Subjects in all conditions then read the following:

We feel that constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula has both good points and bad points. On the positive side, such a project would probably do a lot to stimulate our depressed economy. Jobs would become available, people and businesses would be attracted to the area and this would result in an overall increase in cash flow. Further, the cost of running our homes would probably go down. On the negative side, such a project can be dangerous and could ultimately render Missoula county uninhabitable. Even if an accident could be avoided, the problem of what to do with the toxic waste would remain.

For the anti-nuclear normative information conditions, the final sentence of the last paragraph of the review read: Consequently, given all of the available information, we are in agreement with the environmentalists that a nuclear power plant would be a poor and inappropriate addition to our community. For the no normative information conditions, the final sentence of the last paragraph of this review read: Given the complexity and importance of this issue, we believe that it is vital to assess how the community feels about nuclear development. Directly following these experimental manipulations, intentions were assessed for all subjects.

The Behavioral Criteria

Immediately following intention assessment, two dependent variables were assessed: First, each subject was instructed to communicate their final decision on whether or not to support the construction of the plant by marking the appropriate box on an official ballot (item 1, appendix B). Next, subjects were asked to indicate the amount of time they would be willing to spend assisting the County Commissioners with their project (item 2, appendix B).

After completing the dependent measures, subjects read the following instructions prior to responding to the remaining measures of the reasoned action model (items 2-57 in appendix A): "It is not unusual for people to vary with respect to their thoughts on various issues. For the questions you are about to respond to, please do not concern yourself with whether or not you are being consistent with your earlier responses." Finally, subjects were fully debriefed and urged to remain silent about the nature of the study until all of the data had been collected.

Chapter 6: Results

To test for the pattern of correlations predicted on the basis of Snyder and Kendzierski's (1982) study, attitude-intention, intention-behavior, and attitude-behavior Pearson product-moment correlations were obtained for both high and low self-monitoring subjects in relevance and no-relevance strategy conditions. This analysis was performed after (1) collapsing over the normative information variable, (2) using the second intention measure which was obtained immediately prior to assessment of the behavioral criterion, and (3) using the general attitude measure which was obtained several weeks prior to the main experiment. The correlations are presented in Table 1.

Insert Table 1 about here

The first hypothesis predicted equivalent attitude-intention, intention-behavior, and attitude-behavior correlations for high and low self-monitors in relevance strategy conditions and significantly higher correlations for low self-monitors than high low self-monitors in no relevance strategy conditions. Using

Fisher's procedure (Marascuilo & Serlin, 1988), correlations for high self-monitors were compared to correlations for low self-monitors to determine whether they differed significantly. The region of rejection for a one-tailed test of equality between two correlation coefficients ($p = .05$) begins at $z = 1.65$.

The difference between attitude-intention correlations for high self-monitoring subjects ($r = .55$) and low self-monitoring subjects ($r = .43$) was not significant, $z(r_1 - r_2) = .66$, $p = .254$. The difference between

intention-behavior correlations for high ($r = .81$) and low ($r = .73$) self-monitoring subjects was not significant, $z(r_1 - r_2) = .83$, $p = .203$; and the difference between

attitude-behavior correlations for high ($r = .52$) and low ($r = .21$) self-monitoring subjects was not significant, $z(r_1 - r_2) = 1.52$, $p = .064$.

Although these results would seem to support the hypothesis that exposing high self-monitors to relevance strategies induces them to behave in a manner consistent with their attitudes, it should be noted that subjects in conditions that were not exposed to relevance strategies showed a similar non-significant pattern of correlations (see Table 1). Specifically, the test statistics were $z(r_1 -$

$r_2 = .63$, $p = .235$ for attitude-intention correlations,
 $r_1 = 1.44$, $p = .075$ for intention-behavior correlations, and
 $r_2 = .96$, $p = .168$ for attitude-behavior correlations.

 Insert Table 2 about here

To test for the pattern of correlations predicted on the basis of Ajzen et al.s (1982) study, intention-behavior correlations were obtained for high and low self-monitoring subjects in both negative and no normative information conditions after collapsing over the relevance strategy variable. It was predicted that intention-behavior correlations would be equivalent for high and low self-monitors in no normative information conditions while being significantly different for high and low self-monitors in negative normative information conditions. Using the same decision rule and procedure identified above it was found that the intention-behavior correlations for high ($r = .81$) and low ($r = .70$) self-monitors in the no normative information conditions, $z(r_1 - r_2) = 1.09$, $p = .144$, did not differ significantly.

Likewise, the difference between intention-behavior

correlations for high ($r = .72$) and low ($r = .55$) self-monitors in the negative normative information conditions, $z(r_1 - r_2) = 1.21$, $p = .113$, was not significant.

Finally, examining the differences between the two cells which should have displayed the highest level of divergence in attitude-behavior correlations -- the low self-monitoring, relevance strategy, no normative information cell ($r[18] = .37$) versus the high self-monitoring, no relevance strategy, negative normative information cell ($r[18] = .39$) -- revealed again a nonsignificant difference, $z(r_1 - r_2) = .06$, $p = .476$.

Chapter 7: Discussion

The results provided no support for either of the two hypotheses. Regarding the hypothesis that providing subjects with attitude-relevant information would increase attitude-intention, intention-behavior, and attitude-behavior correlations, the results indicated that the relevance strategy had no appreciable effect on the correlations in question. This conclusion was based on the following observations. First, although not significantly so, all three of the identified correlations in the no relevance strategy conditions were higher for the high self-monitoring subjects than for the low self-monitoring subjects. This result was precisely the opposite of what was expected on the basis of past research and self-monitoring theory (Snyder, 1987). Whereas high self-monitors have typically shown a strong tendency to behave in ways that were inconsistent with their attitudes, the results of the present study revealed a strong tendency for high self-monitors to behave in ways that were consistent with their attitudes. Because of this failure to replicate the previously reported tendency for low self-monitors to display higher attitude-behavior correlations than high self-monitors, it was impossible to conclude that the obtained equivalent correlations in the

relevant information conditions for high and low self-monitors were the result of the relevance strategy. Further, the same trend of higher correlations for high self-monitors than for low self-monitors was evident in the relevant information conditions.

Regarding the hypothesis that the presentation of normative information would result in decreased intention-behavior correlations for high self-monitors relative to low self-monitors, the results clearly demonstrated that the normative information did not have the predicted effect. As was the case for the first hypothesis, the pattern of obtained correlations illustrated a pattern that was completely opposite to what was predicted based on Ajzen, et al.'s (1982) study. Not only did the presence of normative information fail to attenuate the intention-behavior correlations of the high self-monitors, but again the correlations of high self-monitors were higher, although not significantly so, than those for low self-monitors.

There are a variety of factors that could potentially have contributed to these unexpected results. From a purely statistical point of view, the number of subjects in each of the reported comparisons was small enough to render the obtained correlation coefficients considerably

unreliable. When dealing with small sample sizes (e.g., under 50 observations per comparison) a single *deviant* observation (e.g., one beyond 2.5 standard deviations from the mean of the sample) can have a relatively large distorting effect on the obtained correlation coefficient. Removing the six identified outliers and computing correlations without them showed that in this case there was virtually no effect on the results. Hence, the potential problem from outliers does not account for the unexpected results.

Another factor that may have contributed to the nonsignificant results, from a design standpoint, was the power of the test of significance. At a .05 alpha level, assuming an effect size of .3 and when the number of observations are unequal and around 35 per comparison, is approximately .55 which is very low. That means the current design had only about a 50% chance to detect true differences of this magnitude. In terms of the standard normal distribution, the coefficients being tested would have to be over two standard deviations apart in order to be considered significant (Marascuilo & Serlin, 1988). For example, when comparing the .55 base-rate attitude-behavior correlation ($Z = .618$) of the high self-monitors in no relevance strategy conditions to the attitude-behavior

correlation of the high self-monitors in the relevance strategy conditions, the latter would have to be at least .77 ($Z = 1.02$) to be considered significantly different from the former. However, given the pattern of correlations obtained in the present analysis, even larger sample sizes probably would not have yielded significant results.

A factor that may have had a more direct effect on the obtained results was the distribution of self-monitoring scores. Because the distribution of self-monitoring scores was approximately normal and all of the subjects were used in the analysis, a large proportion of the subjects were not very well differentiated on this variable. It is common in research of this type to select for analysis some subset of subjects whose scores fall at the extremes of the self-monitoring distribution (e.g., the upper and lower quartiles) in order to maximize the potential variability of their behavior. Unfortunately, due to the paucity of available subjects for the present research, the option of using only a subset of the given sample was not feasible.

Even though the distribution of self-monitoring scores was not the most conducive to the present analysis, it seems unlikely that this could fully account for the obtained results. It seems more probable that the observed

patterns of correlations associated with the first hypothesis were the result of other factors. This hypothesis essentially predicted a three versus one pattern of correlations among the four cells of the comparison. Both high and low self-monitors in the relevance strategy conditions and low self-monitors in the no relevance strategy conditions were expected to show elevated correlations relative to high self-monitors in no relevance strategy conditions. This latter group represented those subjects that past research has shown to be reliably inconsistent in terms of the relationship between their attitudes and behaviors. Yet in the present study, although not significantly so, these subjects revealed the highest correlations of any group in the design. As discussed above, these high base-rate correlations for high self-monitors in no relevance strategy conditions severely limited any opportunity to find statistically significance differences for high self-monitors between the relevance and no relevance strategy conditions.

The question to be addressed here is: Why were the correlations of high self-monitoring subjects who were not exposed to the relevance manipulation equivalent to the correlations of all the low self-monitors and the high self-monitors who were exposed to the relevance

manipulation? There are two plausible explanations for this pattern of correlations that are immediately obvious. The first relates to the nature of the content domain under investigation. It could be, as suggested by Ajzen et al. (1982), that the attitudes being assessed were so obviously relevant to the behaviors being assessed that they easily penetrated the awareness of the high self-monitoring subjects. If this were the case, then we would expect on the basis of the Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) study that high self-monitors would act in accord with their attitudes. Ajzen et al. mirrored this conclusion when arguing that if Snyder and Kendzierski's analysis is correct, "the moderating effect of self-monitoring is limited to attitudes of intermediate relevance to the behavior (p. 427).

The second plausible explanation for the observed pattern of correlations associated with the first hypothesis is rooted in the content of the experimental protocols. Subjects were required to respond to a large variety of statements pertaining to the attitudinal issue under investigation, and these statements could have artificially boosted the perceived relevance of subjects' attitudes for their behavior. With regard to this possibility, it should be noted that the mere exposure to

information related to an attitudinal issue technically does not qualify as an attitude relevance strategy according to Snyder and Kendzierski (1982). Situations in which subjects are merely exposed to attitude related information would be classified as attitude available situations and would be expected to have only small effects on high self-monitors' attitude-behavior consistency. Attitude relevant situations require that subjects be induced to contemplate the behavioral implications of their attitudes and are expected to have large effects on high self-monitors' attitude-behavior consistency. Nevertheless, the current study involved a much higher degree of attitudinal availability than that of the Snyder and Kendzierski study. This extreme level of availability caused by the large amount of attitude-related information in the experimental protocols may have been sufficient to substantially elevate high self-monitoring subjects' attitude-behavior consistency. Consequently, a definite conclusion with regard to the source of the obtained pattern of correlations seems premature.

Finally, what may on the surface seem to be a third plausible explanation for the failure to find the expected pattern of correlations with respect the first hypothesis -- that is, a weak relevance manipulation -- is on closer

examination not a sufficient explanation at all. It is true that subjects exposed to the relevance manipulation were no more likely than subjects who were not exposed to the relevance manipulation to have elevated attitude-behavior correlations. However, the fact that high self-monitors in the no relevant information conditions had such high base-rate correlations indicates that the correlations in the relevant information conditions, as discussed above, would had to have been extraordinarily high for the differences to have reached conventional levels of statistical significance. Such strong correlations are rarely obtained when using a general measure of attitude as in this case. Hence, the relevance manipulation may have been weak, but if so this weakness alone is not sufficient to account for the obtained pattern of correlations.

The second hypothesis tested the effects of normative information on the relationship between intentions and behaviors. According to the Ajzen et al. (1982) study, increases in the amount of normative information experienced by high self-monitoring subjects should have been associated with decreases in intention-behavior consistency. The results revealed no such effect. With regard to this unexpected pattern of correlations, there

are at least three related contributory factors that can help account for these results. The first involves subjects' positions on the attitudinal issue. The overall distribution of scores on subjects' attitude towards the behavioral criterion was positively skewed; that is, subjects' attitudes tended to be polarized towards the negative end of the scale. Because the majority of subjects had such strong attitudes against the construction of a nuclear power plant in Missoula county, this may have rendered their attitudinal positions less amenable to change. Obviously, this was a poor choice of content domain within the context of the present study.

Given this relatively extreme polarization, a second factor contributing to the obtained results may have been the restricted range of possibilities for shifts in subjects' attitudes. The normative information manipulation was designed to induce subjects to vote against the proposed nuclear power plant. However, since most of the subjects were already against the idea (64%), there was not a lot of room for their attitudes to shift along the likert-type dimension in response to the negative normative information. Clearly, the presentation of positive normative information would have been more appropriate.

Finally, it is plausible that the normative information manipulation was simply too weak to be effective. It constituted only one sentence embedded in a rather lengthy set of experimental materials. Subjects may have been fatigued or uninterested enough not to attend closely to much of the relevant text. As indicated earlier, at least one subject was observed skipping over the two pages of text that contained the experimental manipulations. If one subject chose not to attend to much of the text, it is probable that others acted similarly. Hence, it may be that there was not a sufficient amount of salience associated with the normative manipulation to render it effective.

The implications of this study for the theoretical propositions it was based on must be largely inconclusive. The failure to replicate even the simplest effect of differing attitude-behavior correlations between high and low self-monitoring individuals renders any substantive conclusions dubious. Further, the fact that high self-monitoring subjects who were *not* exposed to the relevance strategy and *were* exposed to negative normative information demonstrated attitude-behavior consistency that was essentially identical to low self-monitoring subjects who *were* exposed to the relevance strategy and were *not*

exposed to normative information leaves serious doubts about any conclusions based on the present study. These two groups should have differed more than any other two groups in the present design according to both self-monitoring theory and the theory of reasoned action.

Several strategies could be employed in an attempt to clarify the potentially moderating roles of relevance strategies and normative information on the attitude-behavior relationship. First, a greater number of subjects could be involved. It is clear that the small number of subjects involved with the present study may have severely limited the ability for any effects of self-monitoring on the attitude-behavior relationship to manifest themselves. Second, the amount and type of information relevant to the attitudinal issue could be better controlled; specifically, it either could be varied systematically or simply kept to a minimum. Third, the experimental manipulations could be made more salient. Rather than embedding these manipulations in the middle of 20 pages of response items, a more impactful procedure would involve active intervention on the part of the experimenter. For example, subjects could be given a series of questionnaires to complete that could be followed by a brief talk by the experimenter regarding the

importance of their upcoming behavioral decision. This talk could also include normative information by means of the experimenter (perhaps posing as a jobless member of the community) conveying personal opinions with regard to the attitudinal issue. Subjects could then be given additional questionnaires to complete. This procedure would better ensure that the experimental manipulations were experienced by the subjects in a manner commensurate with the requirements of the design.

With regards to future research, exploration of the relationship between attitudinal issues and the moderating effects of self-monitoring on attitude-behavior consistency may prove rewarding. As suggested by Ajzen et al.'s (1982) level of perceived relevance argument, it may be that low self-monitors behave more consistently with their attitudes than high self-monitors only with respect to certain attitudinal domains. Exploring alternative means of inducing and assessing perceived relevance may also result in fruitful progress in our attempts to understand the relationship between what Snyder (1982) has referred to as the believing means doing orientation and what Ajzen et al. (1982) has identified as intention stability. More focused attention on how these two concepts are related to each other should further clarify the moderating role of

self-monitoring on the attitude-behavior relationship.

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likely_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____unlikely
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

2. My voting in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years is:

good_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____bad
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

wise_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____foolish
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

harmful_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____beneficial
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

3. Attracting businesses to Missoula is:

good_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____bad
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

4. Protest, conflict, and general social upheaval is:

good_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____bad
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

5. More pollution is:

good_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____bad
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

6. Costing the people of Montana a lot of money is:

good_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____bad
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

7. Being a primary target during a nuclear war is:

good_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____bad
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

8. Providing less expensive sources of energy is:

good_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____bad
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

9. Attracting people to Missoula County is:

good _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____bad
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

10. Nuclear accidents which endanger people's health are:

good _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____bad
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

11. Radiation leakage is:

good _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____bad
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

12. The toxic waste disposal problem is:

good _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____bad
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

13. Nuclear accidents which seriously damage the environment are:

good _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____bad
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

14. A serious nuclear accident is:

good _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____bad
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

15. The dangerousness of nuclear power is:

good _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____bad
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

16. Strengthening the local economy is:

good _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____bad
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

17. Providing job opportunities for the unemployed is:

good _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____bad
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

18. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years would attract businesses to Missoula:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

19. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years would result in protest, conflict and general social upheaval:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

20. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years would result in more pollution:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

21. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years would cost the people of Montana a lot of money:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

22. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years would make Missoula a primary target during a nuclear war:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

23. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years would provide a less expensive source of energy (e.g., electricity
 :

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

24. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years would attract people to Missoula:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

25. A nuclear accident in Missoula County within the next two years would be a health hazzard:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

26. If a nuclear power plant were constructed in Missoula county within the next two years, radiation leakage would be a major problem:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

27. Toxic waste disposal would be a major problem for a nuclear power plant in Missoula county:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

28. A nuclear accident in Missoula county would seriously damage the environment:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

29. If a nuclear power plant were constructed in Missoula county within the next two years, the chance of a serious accident occurring would be great:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

30. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years would be dangerous:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

31. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years would strengthen the local economy:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

32. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years would provide job opportunities for the unemployed:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

33. Most people who are important to me think I should vote in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in

Missoula county within the next two years:

likely_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

34. My friends think I should vote in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years:

likely_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

35. The scientific community thinks I should vote in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years:

likely_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

36. Pro-nuclear groups think I should vote in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years:

likely_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

37. Missoulians think I should vote in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years:

likely_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

38. Most members of my family think I should vote in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years:

likely_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

39. The people who construct and maintain the proposed nuclear power plant think I should vote in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years:

likely_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

40. Granolas think I should vote in favor of constructing

a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

41. Anti-nuclear groups think I should vote in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

42. The government/politicians think I should vote in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

43. The business community thinks I should vote in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

44. The unemployed think I should vote in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

45. Environmentalists think I should vote in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years:

likely____:____:____:____:____:____:____unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

46. Generally speaking, I am

motivated____:____:____:____:____:____:____unmotivated
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

to do what my friends want me to do.

47. Generally speaking, I am

motivated____:____:____:____:____:____:____unmotivated
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

to do what the scientific community wants me to do.

48. Generally speaking, I am

motivated____:____:____:____:____:____:____unmotivated
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

to do what pro-nuclear groups want me to do.

49. Generally speaking, I am

motivated____:____:____:____:____:____:____unmotivated
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

to do what Missoulians want me to do.

50. Generally speaking, I am

motivated____:____:____:____:____:____:____unmotivated
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

to do what my family wants me to do.

51. Generally speaking, I am

motivated____:____:____:____:____:____:____unmotivated
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

to do what the people who construct and maintain the
 proposed nuclear power plant want me to do.

52. Generally speaking, I am

motivated____:____:____:____:____:____:____unmotivated
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

to do what granolas want me to do.

53. Generally speaking, I am

motivated____:____:____:____:____:____:____unmotivated
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

to do what anti-nuclear groups want me to do.

54. Generally speaking, I am

motivated ___:___:___:___:___:___:___unmotivated
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

to do what the government/politicians want me to do.

55. Generally speaking, I am

motivated ___:___:___:___:___:___:___unmotivated
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

to do what the business community wants me to do.

56. Generally speaking, I am

motivated ___:___:___:___:___:___:___unmotivated
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

to do what the unemployed want me to do.

57. Generally speaking, I am

motivated ___:___:___:___:___:___:___unmotivated
 extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely

to do what environmentalists want me to do.

Appendix B

Official Ballot

1.

----- Yes, I support the construction of a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years.

----- No, I do not support the construction of a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next two years.

2. How much time would you be willing to spend assisting the County Commissioners with this project?

- not at all.
- up to 1 hour.
- up to 2 hours.
- up to 4 hours.
- up to 6 hours.
- more than 6 hours.

Table 1

Correlations, z-Statistics, Probability Levels, and Cell Sizes for High and Low Self-Monitors in Relevance versus No Relevance Strategy Conditions

Self-Monitoring			
Condition	Low	High	
Relevance Strategy			
Attitude-Intention	.43	.55	$z = .66, p = .25$
Intention-Behavior	.73	.81	$z = .83, p = .20$
Attitude-Behavior	.21	.52	$z = 1.52, p = .06$
<i>n</i>	37	39	
No Relevance Strategy			
Attitude-Intention	.64	.72	$z = .63, p = .24$
Intention-Behavior	.51	.72	$z = 1.44, p = .08$
Attitude-Behavior	.37	.55	$z = .96, p = .17$
<i>n</i>	35	41	

Table 2

Correlations, z-Statistics, Probability Levels, and Cell Sizes for High and Low Self-Monitors in Normative versus No Normative Information Conditions

Self-Monitoring			
Condition	Low	High	
Normative Information			
Intention-Behavior	.55	.72	$z = 1.21, p = .11$
<i>n</i>	36	40	
No Normative Information			
Intention-Behavior	.70	.81	$z = 1.09, p = .14$
<i>n</i>	36	40	
