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AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD

THE PHILIPPINES

1898-1934

By

Frank J. Busch

Presented in partial fulfillment of the
requirement for the degree of Master of Arts.

Montana State University

1947

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE PHILIPPINES ENTER ON THE AMERICAN SCENE	1
II. AMERICA DECIDES TO ACQUIRE THE ISLANDS.	7
III. IMPERIALISM AND THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1900 . . .	23
IV. IMPERIALISM LOSES ITS LUSTER.	38
V. FIRST MATERIALIZATION OF INDEPENDENCE	53
VI. AMERICA ADOPTS A FIRM ATTITUDE.	74
VII. ECONOMIC PRESSURE BRINGS ABOUT INDEPENDENCE	88
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	108

CHAPTER ONE

THE PHILIPPINES ENTER ON THE AMERICAN SCENE

When the surprising news of Dewey's victory over the Spanish fleet at Manila on May 1, 1898 arrived in America, it awakened a new interest in geography. Many American citizens had never before heard of the Philippine Islands. This was natural in days of slower ways of communication and news dissemination. The surprise on the part of the public over American action so far from home was understandable in the light of the official notice and publicity which had been given exclusively to Cuba.

If the American people had been surprised by the beginning of actual hostilities in an entirely unexpected part of the globe, such was not the case on the part of the State Department or the representatives of that department in the various ports of the Far East. As early as November 3, 1897, the United States Consul at Hongkong, Mr. Rousseville Wildman, had been called upon by individuals who represented themselves as being officials of the government of the republic of the Philippines. The latter had proposed that the United States should under-write the said republic with arms and ammunition to be paid for at a later date. Wildman was informed by the State Department that it recognized no such

government and not to encourage any further overtures from the same.¹ The United States naturally could not recognize this so-called government which geographically was part of a nation with which it was at peace. The American government could not, however, have been in ignorance of the conditions which prevailed in the Islands, for no other reason than the character of the official communications from the United State's Consul in Manila, who was apparently an advocate of American interference and imperialism. His dispatches were full of assertions against Spanish rule. In referring to the unsettled conditions of the Islands he said, "War exists, battles are of almost daily occurrence, ambulances bring in many wounded, and hospitals are full. Prisoners are brought here and shot without trial, and Manila is under martial law."² In a special dispatch to the State Department, dated March 19, 1898, he confessed that he was acting as a spy for the American Navy.

I have daily communication by cable and letter with Commodore Dewey, but we pass letters by British and other shipmasters and by private parties, because cables and letters are tampered with.³

¹ A Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain with accompanying papers, Senate Document No. 62, Pt. 2, (55th Congress, 3rd Session), Serial 3732, p. 334.

² Ibid., pp. 319-320

³ Ibid., p. 320

In a later dispatch he said, "All information as to defenses of Manila has been sent to Commodore George Dewey at Hongkong."⁴ In a still later dispatch he said, ". . . every odd hour of day and many of evenings have been given to inspection of forts, arsenals, and battle-ships in order to fully inform Commodore Dewey at Hongkong."⁵

It may be assumed that such actions as these are legitimate for an American Consul, however, this particular individual was not averse to permitting his personal emotions to become part of his reports. He inferred cruelties which he said were too horrible to report officially. Mr. Williams even evolved a solution to the problem of Philippine separatist tendencies and Spanish misrule. He believed that the United States should take the Islands from Spain and make an American colony of them. He informed the home government that if it should take such a step it would meet with the greatest enthusiasm from the native population.

In spite of the obvious interest shown by the Navy Department in the Islands, the latest information which was available in the Department was dated 1876.⁶

⁴ Ibid., p. 322

⁵ Ibid., p. 324

⁶ George W. Dewey, Autobiography, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), p. 175.

In the instructions which Commodore Dewey had received under the signature of Assistant Secretary Roosevelt it was intimated that "offensive operations" were to be carried out after the destruction of the Spanish squadron. In view of this, it was only natural that any help from the natives would have been welcomed by the American commander. Consequently, when the Commodore received a message from the United State's Consul General at Singapore, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, that it would be possible to secure the services of the exiled Filipino leader Emilio Aguinaldo, who was at that time in Singapore, he replied as follows: "Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible." Dewey, being a naval officer, no doubt had in mind that part of his instruction which read: "and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands."⁷ He had no supporting troops with which to undertake any such operation, and this was a providential means of obtaining them. Only twelve days after the battle of Manila Bay, Aguinaldo was allowed, through the American Consul, to draw upon funds which he had deposited abroad. This money was to be used for the purchase of arms. If America seemed gener-

⁷ Ibid., p. 179.

ous in providing the rebel chief with transportation to his homeland, it was only for selfish reasons.

The State Department was anxious to maintain a free hand in the Islands. On June 16, 1898, Secretary of State, Day, addressed the Consul in Singapore saying,

To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to gratify.⁸

The Secretary went on to say that he expected the attitude of the Philippine people to be that of a conquered province, regardless of what their disposition had been toward Spain. On this same date, Consul Williams (Manila) had written the State Department that he was continuing to maintain friendly relations with Aguinaldo "for future advantage". In the same message, evidently afraid that the insurgents would be too successful too soon, he said, "We fear the city may fall too soon." Mr. Williams' home office still did not commit itself toward the Philippines. For, on August 4, 1898, it wrote him the following: "Your course, while maintaining amicable relations with the insurgents, in abstaining from any participation in the adoption of their so-

⁸ A Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain with accompanying pages, Senate Document No. 62, Pt. 2, (55th Congress, 3rd Session), Serial 3732, P. 354.

called provisional government, is approved.⁹

As will be shown later in this paper, President McKinley was in doubt in his own mind as to what disposition to make of the Islands. His state of mind was no doubt reflected by the various agencies of the government, in that no definite policy of either a positive or negative nature was adopted toward the insurgent leaders. Had this been done, much trouble would probably have been avoided at a later date. However, opportunism is a weapon of small nations; its use by America in this instance was probably the turning point from a second to first class power.

⁹ Ibid., p. 330.

CHAPTER TWO

AMERICA DECIDES TO ACQUIRE THE ISLANDS

In July, 1898, Spain, realizing that further fighting was useless, sued for peace and a protocol of peace was signed August 12, 1898. The wording of this document (in its reference to the Philippines) was vague and uncertain. One has but to contrast the positive wording of the protocol as it relates to Cuba to the almost hesitant mention of the Philippines to realize that no definite solution had crystallized in the mind of the victor (at least the minds of the responsible authorities). Article three of the protocol of peace, said,

The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.¹⁰

No mention was made in the protocol that the United States wanted the whole of the Philippine Islands. Only the city and harbor of Manila were mentioned, and this in a more or less tentative way. As the Spanish Commissioners to the peace conference ably pointed out, it was the duty of the victorious power to stipulate the extreme demands which it

¹⁰ A Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain with accompanying pages, Senate Document No. 62, Pt. 2, (55th Congress, 3rd Session), Serial 3732, p. 277.

desired to make; otherwise, it placed the defeated power in an unfavorable position as far as the subsequent negotiations were concerned. This was brushed aside by the American Commissioners. The language of the protocol as regards Cuba was quite plain. It simply said, "Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba." Why was such a clear statement not made about the Philippine Islands where the Spanish flag still flew over the capital at Manila; and the forces of the two countries were engaged in active war? According to the American peace commissioners in Paris, it was because "It was the purpose of the President in everything written and spoken to leave to the negotiators of the treaty the most ample freedom with reference to the Philippines. . . ."¹¹ In fact, there really would have been no problem for the peace commission to solve had the American Government known what it wanted at the time the protocol of peace was signed. In witness to this statement, we again have the word of the American peace commissioners.

The President did say that the Philippine question was the only one left open for negotiation and settlement in the treaty. It is undoubtedly true that it was not then fully settled in his own mind as to what disposition should be made of the Philippines.¹²

¹¹ A Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain with accompanying papers, Senate Document No. 62, Pt. 2, (55th Congress, 3rd Session), Serial 3732, p. 132.

¹² Loc. cit.

The startling thing about this remark is that it was made to the Spanish Mission. Such an admission of indecision to the enemy gives grounds for the belief that McKinley was waiting for an opportunity to sound the public will. Whether this is the case or not, it is probable that the President was perfectly frank and honest when he said to our delegates,

It is none the less true, however, that, without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we can not disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human action. Avowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we can not be unmindful that, without any desire or design on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written this high command and pledge of civilization.

Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines, is the commercial opportunity ^{is} which American statesmanship can not be indifferent.

From the foregoing quotations it is quite plain that the President, far from being the master of circumstances, was the victim of them.

What circumstances had forced or, at least, permitted the President to make a complete, if gradual, about face? What had influenced the change from his earlier position

13. "Instruction to the Peace Commissioners, Sept. 16, 1896", Foreign Relations of the United States, 1896, p. 907.

"I speak not of forcible annexation, for that can not be thought of. That by our code of morality would be criminal aggression."¹⁴ to his later position of: "While we are conducting war and until its conclusion we must keep what we get; when the war is over we must keep what we want."¹⁵ There were two possible elements which would bring about such a change of attitude. (1) Official sentiment and pressure in Washington for a more energetic expansionist policy and (2) a growing public desire (energized by war spirit) for Uncle Sam to reach out and obtain any territory which might fall to his lot. That official opinion was in some respects inclined toward a policy of retention of the Islands is indicated by the message sent by Secretary Long to Admiral Dewey in late May, 1898, to the effect that he should avoid "political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the Islands that would impair liability to maintain their course in the future."¹⁶

America had been captivated by Dewey's victory in Manila; so much so, that, from the beginning events in the

¹⁴ Congressional Record, (59th Congress, 2nd Session), p. 4.

¹⁵ Charles S. O'Leary, The Life of William McKinley, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915) 2, 188.

¹⁶ Dewey, Op. Cit., (Appendix E), p. 211.

Far East competed for attention with the war in Cuba. This had been an entirely unexpected development of the war and one for which the people were little prepared. Their minds were, therefore, fertile ground for the seeds of expansion which were to be sowed upon them.

It had been over thirty years since the end of the Civil War and America had been occupied with its problems at home. She had not lifted her eyes from the work of self-development for any appreciable time until conditions in Cuba had forced her to do so. The job at home was very nearly done and now there appeared a golden opportunity for more expansion and commercial profit. But most of all, the idea of America taking its place among the colonial empires of the world as an adult power appealed to the emotions of the people. This development of an expansionist attitude was merely an outgrowth of that same spirit which had created "Dewey Clubs" a few months before. In September, 1898, The Literary Digest published the results of a newspaper plebiscite which it had taken of three-hundred newspapers covering the entire area of the United States and reflecting as many diverse opinions and views as possible. This poll showed that the newspapers of the land were predominantly in favor of taking the Philippines from Spain. The only difference

of opinion seemed to be on the disposition to be made of them. Even in the southern newspapers, there was a definite desire for the United States to obtain and keep the Islands.¹⁷ To say, however, that all the newspapers and periodicals were imperialistic would be an error, for even before the end of the war, in August, there were those who were raising their voices in opposition. Notable among these was E. L. Godkin of The Nation. William Jennings Bryan and former president, Grover Cleveland, added their voices to the opposition. Mr. Godkin, as early as May, 1898, objected to the way in which the American people were becoming jingoistic and to the fact that so many Americans seemed to wonder how we had gotten along so long without a colonial empire. William Jennings Bryan was opposed to a policy of expansion; although he supported the war to free Cuba, he did not wish the United States to be subjected to accusations of hypocrisy.

If a contest undertaken for the sake of humanity degenerates into a war of conquest we shall find it difficult to meet the charge of having added hypocrisy to greed. Is our national character so weak that we can not withstand the temptation to appropriate the first piece of land that comes within our reach?

. . . shall we contemplate a scheme for the colonization of the Orient merely because our fleet won a remarkable victory in the harbor of Manila?¹⁸

¹⁷ The Literary Digest, 17:507-8, September 10, 1898.

¹⁸ The Literary Digest, 17:2, July 2, 1898.

Former President Cleveland opposed a policy of expansion because he felt that America would be departing from the traditions and policies of its past. Notable among the publications which opposed imperialism were the journals which represented the cane sugar producers of the South, particularly Louisiana. The United States imported great amounts of sugar. Therefore, the acquisition of potential cane-producing colonies, which would compete with the home producer, was frowned upon.

That there was a predominant expansionist feeling throughout America seems to be pretty well agreed upon by all the writers of the day. Even those who were violently opposed to the policy of the administration had to admit the extent of this sentiment. However, the opposition had begun and it continued to increase in strength. Another predominant figure among the opposition was that of Andrew Carnegie, the great steel manufacturer. It was his contention that the forces of expansion based their beliefs upon a three-fold foundation, i. e., first, the desirability of profit to be obtained from commercial expansion; second, the increased war power which a colonial empire would supposedly bring to the United States; the third, and, according to Mr. Carnegie, the most dangerous, was that of a moral obligation to take over the Philippines and show them

the light of civilization. Mr. Carnegie, no doubt, pleased President McKinley in this latter category. He was opposed to America's extending itself away from the continent, because he thought that by so doing the nation would be weakened. He contended that to embark upon a career of expansion, the United States would have to maintain a large Army and Navy; that, by acquiring these possessions so far from home, the United States would be forced to enter into binding alliances with some other power (Great Britain), and, as a result, America might be drawn into a war with one of her friends. He said,

Two questions are submitted to the decision of the American people: First--Shall we remain as we are, solid, compact, impregnable, republican, American; or, Second--Shall we creep under the protection, and become, . . . "the cat's paw", of Britain, in order that we may grasp the phantom of Imperialism?¹⁹

Carnegie was particularly vexed at those who believed that America had a moral obligation and duty to assume in the Philippines. Even so, by the very existence of his argument, he admits the great strength of this belief.

The average American, especially in the West, really believes that his country can govern these tropical people, and benefit them by so doing; he considers it a duty not to evade a task which, as he sees it, Provi-

¹⁹ Andrew Carnegie, "Americanism Versus Imperialism", North American Review, 168:10, January, 1899.

idence has clearly imposed upon his country. ⁸⁰

After much debate, the Commissioners of the United States and Spain finally reached agreement and a treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898. This treaty stipulated that "Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, . . ." This was the clause which some people believed to be the coming to full cycle of American independence. It was contended by some that America was now beginning, belatedly, a career of imperialism. Some rejoiced in the thought, and some were saddened by it. Arguments flowed pro and con, some were based on constitutional grounds, some on religious and other ideological grounds. President McKinley in explaining his decision upon the Philippine question said,

The truth is I didn't want the Philippines, and when they came to us, as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do with them.

I sought counsel from all sides--Democrats as well as Republicans--but got little help. I thought first we would take only Manila; then Iuzon; then other islands, perhaps, also. I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way-- I don't know how it was, but it came: (1) That we could not give them back to Spain--that would be cowardly and

⁸⁰ Andrew Carnegie, "Americanism Versus Imperialism--II" North American Review, 168:363, March, 1898.

dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany--our commercial rivals in the Orient--that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves--they were unfit for self-government--and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed, and went to sleep, and slept soundly, . . .²¹

In this revelation, President McKinley states the four possible solutions of the problem: i.e., (1) to return the Islands to Spain, (2) give them to some other European country to rule, (3) leave them to themselves, and (4) take them ourselves.

The administration had committed itself to a policy of acquisition. It was now necessary to make into law the treaty which had been signed by its representatives in Paris. To do this the favorable vote of two-thirds of the Senate was necessary. In order that one might understand the different points of view it would be well to study the remarks and debates which took place on the floor of the Senate in the months of December, 1898, January and February, 1899. This was the period during which the treaty was under consideration. After the treaty had been ratified the argu-

²¹ Olcott; Op. Cit., 2, pp. 110-111

ments were still not quieted. This fact should be borne in mind, for its ratification did not necessarily mean the end of the argument. The treaty was not submitted to the Senate until January 4. However, opposition to it and debate upon it had been present for some time. On December 6, 1898, four days before the conclusion of the negotiations in Paris, Senator Vest of Missouri introduced a resolution (S.R. 191) which was to be much discussed on the floor for the next two months. Had the sentiment expressed in this resolution prevailed, ratification would have been impossible. This was not the only resolution of similar nature to appear, but it was quite representative and worthy of quotation.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That under the Constitution of the United States no power is given to the Federal Government to acquire territory to be held and governed permanently as colonies.

The colonial system of European nations can not be established under our present Constitution, but all territory acquired by the Government, except such small amount as may be necessary for coaling stations, correction of boundaries, and similar government purposes, must be acquired and governed with the purpose of ultimately organizing such territory into States suitable for admission into the Union.²²

In attempting to uphold his point of view, Senator Vest referred to the Declaration of Independence and its

²² Congressional Record, (55th Congress, 3rd Session), p. 93.

guiding thought that all government derives its right to govern from the consent of the governed. He contended that it was unconstitutional for the Federal Government to acquire territory in any way except by the admission of new states. To support his position, the Senator quoted from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *Dred Scott versus Sanford*, as follows:

There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure, nor to enlarge its territorial limits in any way except by the admission of new States.²³

One of the specters which Senator Vest held up to the Senate was the possibility that the Filipinos would become American citizens by virtue of the annexation. Again, he based this belief on what he felt to be Constitutional grounds.

. . . I assert that the fundamental idea of our American institutions is citizenship to all within the jurisdiction of the Government, except to the Indian tribes.²⁴

In rebuttal to Vest, Senator Platt of Connecticut, representing the imperialistic view, maintained that ". . . expansion has been the law of our national growth." This

23 Loc. cit.

24 Ibid., p. 94

was no doubt a reference to America's expansion in the past. Platt contended that America was a nation. As a nation, it had all the prerogatives pertaining thereto, and that this included the right to acquire territory. The Dred Scott case was referred to as the only case on record where the United States was denied the right to acquire territory. It was the contention of the expansionists throughout the entire argument that the Dred Scott decision had been reversed by the Civil War.

Senator Teller of Colorado, who before the war had been the author of the altruistic resolution which bears his name, still adhered to the policy embodied in that resolution. He had, however, enlarged his views in the intervening months, and was one of those who believed that Providence had given the nod to Uncle Sam. He called our occupation of the Philippines "this great work of humanity", and further represented the self-righteous attitude of a large percentage of Americans by saying "We can confer no favor upon those people like taking them under our flag."²⁵

As was to be expected, the majority of Senatorial opposition to the treaty came from the Democrats. 1898 was a

²⁵ Congressional Record, (55th Congress, 3rd Session), p. 841.

mid-term election year. State conventions were held and various party platforms adopted. In a survey of these conventions The Literary Digest discovered that no Republican convention had adopted an attitude hostile to annexation, and only seven Democratic conventions adopted negative planks. The majority of opposition came from the South as the mid-West, West and East were strongly in favor of annexation. The attitude of California was well stated by Senator Perkins of that state:

I am against the policy of acquiring the Philippine Islands. I believe it is unwise and a menace to republican institutions. But nine-tenths of the people of my state, whom I have the honor to represent in part only, so far as public expression can be given, have decided otherwise.²⁶

The most ardent supporter of the treaty in the Senate was Senator Henry Cabott Lodge of Massachusetts. It was he who insisted upon its secret discussion. As the chief proponent of the treaty was a Senator from Massachusetts so, also, was one of its main opponents. Of the two Republicans who eventually voted against the treaty, one was Senator Hear of Massachusetts, whom Karl Schristgiesser, biographer of Lodge, characterized as having an "abiding passion for decency and human rights."²⁷ Senator Hear was

²⁶ Congressional Record, (55th Congress, 3rd Session), p. 841.

²⁷ Karl Schristgiesser, The Gentleman from Massachusetts, p. 181.

anti-expansionist because he thought that such a policy was not good constitutional doctrine, contrary to our ideals of a small Army and Navy, and because he thought it would settle a large public debt on the taxpayer. He was an able speaker and master of debate. In him, Senator Lodge had his ablest opponent. His speeches were quoted extensively. One of his sharpest remarks and one which displayed his "Little America" attitude was this: "I do not agree, . . . that America is to begin the twentieth century where Spain began the sixteenth."²⁸

The debate on imperialism is not to be confused with the secret discussion of the actual treaty. It was carried on on what Lodge called "high and altruistic grounds". The "Little America" press complained about this in somewhat the following manner:

Does it not seem as if it were time for somebody who is interested in this expansion business, to do something besides discuss the powers of the Supreme Court, of Congress, and of the President, and the vigor of the Constitution, and the behavior of Jefferson? To this there seems to be no end.²⁹

²⁸ Congressional Record, (55th Congress, 3rd Session), p. 501.

²⁹ E. L. Godkin, The Nation, "The Next Step", February 2, 1899, 68:81.

From January 4th to February 6th the treaty was debated in Executive (Secret) session. Its passage was in doubt to the last. At the very end, the factor of luck played into the hands of Lodge and his cohorts. Two days before the Senate was to vote there occurred the initial clash between American troops and Philippine insurgents. Up to this time, the administration forces had lacked two votes of the required number. This out-break of arms was enough to swing a few of the doubtful into line and the treaty was ratified with but one vote to spare. Another unexpected turn of events was the unsolicited support of William Jennings Bryan who came to Washington to influence his followers. After this unexpected support from Bryan, Senator Hear agreed that it was impossible to defeat the treaty.³⁰

With the ratification, the first phase of American policy towards the Islands was at an end. By the efforts of expansionist politicians and the support of a large percentage of the press and the public, the United States was committed, at least temporarily, to enter into the internal politics of the Islands. The issue at home, however, was still not dead. And those who believed in a "Big America" had still not achieved complete success.

³⁰ G. F. Hear, Autobiography of Seventy Years, (two volumes, New York: 1905), 2:322.

CHAPTER THREE

IMPERIALISM AND THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1900

During the period when the ratification of the treaty was under discussion, two events occurred which, on their first appearance, cast shadows before them. First, the attitude of William Jennings Bryan was a surprise, and second, the open warfare between Philippine insurgents and American troops was an unexpected political development, occurring just two days before the final vote on the treaty. These two factors were to be of mutual interest and aid.

Bryan had been one of the first statesmen to stand against expansion. During the six months period of his military career he had not expressed himself. However, in December, 1898, he committed himself as still being against imperialism but as favoring the treaty because it would end the war and then the American Congress could deal with the Philippines in its own way. He meant by this that Congress could pass a joint resolution containing a statement of the intentions and policy of the United States. By this method Bryan hoped to end the war and relieve the Democratic party of any responsibility for its continuation. He said,

. . . the Democrats would have had to have borne the responsibility for the continuation of war. . . and it was difficult for Democrats to defend an act that would

continuing the state of war and postpone the making of the treaty.³¹

After the treaty was ratified, Bryan supported the Bacon resolution, which, in fact, would have promised independence to the Philippines as it had been promised to Cuba. Bryan had realized that the policy of free silver was not the strong argument that it had been two years before and he believed that the McKinley administration had given him a new cause to bring to the people in the election of 1900. Whether rightly or wrongly, Bryan believed that the American people were opposed to expansion. That there must have been a very strong feeling against the acquiring of colonial possessions appears obvious. Otherwise, one of the two great parties would not have used it as a rallying sentiment in its attempt to gain mastery of the nation. The anti-imperialist forces opposed imperialism "... because they thought an imperialist policy ran counter to the political doctrines of the Declaration of Independence, Washington's Farewell Address, and Lincoln's Gettysburg Address--"³²

³¹ William Jennings Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan, (Toronto, Chicago, Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Co., 1925), p. 121.

³² Fred H. Harrington, "The Anti-imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-1900." Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 22:211.

Had the Filipinos submitted willingly to American domination it is doubtful if there would have been the strong anti-imperialistic feeling that there was in the United States. This, however, the Filipinos did not do and so gave the anti-administration forces strong points of argument. Until the outbreak of the insurrection, the anti-imperialists had been inclined to depreciate the Islands and their value to America. However, the insurrection with the gradual

unfolding story of the relationship that had existed between Aguinaldo and certain United States officials, led virtually the entire anti-expansion group to advocate independence for the Islands, and to support the cause of the insurgents against the McKinley administration.

The anti-expansionists made use of the atrocity stories which began to filter back home in an effort to prove that imperialism under a republic was no different than that imposed by any other nation.

The question of imperialism cut across party lines and brought together people whose basic beliefs were poles apart. For a time, it appeared that Carnegie, Hear, Bryan, and Cleveland would join forces in the campaign. The anti-imperialists could be classified into three groups: the reformers, the political groups, and the intellectuals.

Not all of any one group could be said to be on either side of the issue, however.

A good example of the kaleidoscopic aspect of those who were opposed to expansion was given by the membership of the anti-imperialists leagues which had as vice presidents

Grover Cleveland, George F. Edmunds, John Sherman, Henry Codman Potter, H. S. Ingre, Samuel Gompers, John G. Carlisle, Andrew Carnegie, Charles Francis Adams, Carl Schurz, Beverdy Johnson, Samuel Bowles, Edward Atkinson, James C. Carter, John C. Bullitt, Patrick A. Collins, Herbert Myrick, Theodore L. Gaylor.³⁴

In the spring of 1900, the administration was committed to holding the Philippines. On the other side, there was a great group of individuals (no one knows how large) which was making itself heard to a very great degree.

In their campaign platform of 1900, the Republicans maintained that "to ten millions of the human race there was given 'a new birth of freedom', and to the American people a new and noble responsibility."³⁵ By way of acknowledging this responsibility President McKinley offered his solution.

"It is our purpose to establish in the Philippines a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the in-

³⁴ Irving Winslow, "The Anti-Imperialist League", The Independent, (May 18, 1896), 51:1347.

³⁵ Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency From 1897 to 1916, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916), p. 47.

habitants and to prepare them for self-government and to give them self-government when they are ready for it and as rapidly as they are ready for it."³⁶

These words would indicate a sound solution if such a course had been possible and if it were a sincere statement. President McKinley made this statement in his letter accepting his renomination. That some such thought was in the minds of the officials close to the President is indicated by the statement of Elihu Root four years later when he said, "I look for the time when the Philippines shall assume substantially the same relation to us as Cuba now holds."³⁷

"Mr. Bryan's interviews with Democratic Senators in the Marble Chamber undoubtedly weakened the party opposition to the treaty."³⁸ By so doing, he had allowed the administration to carry out its policy and he had thus been successful in placing the responsibility upon the administration and the Republican party and in forcing them into a position of defending their past actions. They were forced to admit this in their platform of that year.

Our authority could not be less than our responsibility, and wherever sovereign rights were extended it became the high duty of the Government to maintain its authority, to put down armed insurrection and to confer

³⁶ The Literary Digest, September 15, 1900, 21:306.

³⁷ The Literary Digest, February 13, 1904, 28:208.

³⁸ Winslow, Op. Cit., P. 1348-49.

the blessings of liberty and civilization upon all the rescued peoples.³⁹

The Democratic convention put itself on record in a positive manner by saying

We declare again that all governments instituted among men derive their just powers from the consent of the governed; that any government not based upon the consent of the governed is a tyranny; and that to impose upon any people a government of force is to substitute the methods of imperialism for those of a republic. We hold that the Constitution follows the flag and denounced the doctrine that an Executive or Congress, deriving their existence and their powers from the Constitution, can exercise lawful authority beyond it, or in violation of it. We assert that no nation can long endure half republic and half empire, and we warn the American people that imperialism abroad will lead quickly and inevitably to despotism at home.

.....
 We condemn and denounce the Philippine policy of the present administration.

.....
 The importance of other questions now pending before the American people is in nowise diminished and the Democratic party takes no backward step from its position on them; but the burning issue of imperialism, growing out of the Spanish War, involves the very existence of the Republic and the destruction of our free institutions. We regard it as the paramount issue of the campaign.⁴⁰

In answering the call of the cause, the party (and incidentally of his own political ambition) Bryan had the following to say about the "paramount issue of the campaign".

"If elected, I shall convene Congress in extraordinary session as soon as I am inaugurated, and recommend

³⁹ Stanwood, Op. cit., p. 51.

⁴⁰ Stanwood, Op. cit., pp. 58-59.

An immediate declaration of the Nation's purpose, first to establish a stable form of government in the Philippine Islands, just as we are now establishing a stable form of government in the island of Cuba; second to give independence to the Filipinos, just as we have promised to give independence to the Cubans; third to protect the Filipinos from outside interference while they work out their destiny, just as we have protected the republics of Central and South America, and are, by the Monroe Doctrine, pledged to protect Cuba.⁴¹

With this statement the anti-imperialist press was in hearty accord. The Springfield Republican (one of the leading papers which opposed expansion) said, "the issue is reduced to the lowest terms to which it can be brought in a presidential contest. This personal pledge is a masterly stroke. . ."⁴² and The Detroit News, another paper of similar leanings, contrasted the position of the two candidates thusly,

"Mr. Bryan is more fortunate than Mr. McKinley in two respects at least. Mr. Bryan has a Philippine policy, and he is not afraid to enunciate it. Whether it is better or worse than Mr. McKinley's policy we have no means of knowing, for Mr. McKinley has never permitted the public to know what his Philippine policy is. Vague references to duty and destiny and to the humiliation of hauling down the flag can not be construed as a policy."⁴³

The expansionist forces were quick to condemn Bryan's stand both from the viewpoint of his past action in helping to secure the ratification of the treaty and from their own

⁴¹ The Literary Digest, August 18, 1900, 21:184

⁴² Loc. cit.

⁴³ Loc. cit.

viewpoint of expansion. Even some of the anti-expansion papers took him to task; e.g., The New York Evening Post said,

"Therefore, Mr. Bryan's glib statement that he favored ratification in order to put an end to the war is fallacious in the extreme. Probably it was an after-thought. Seventeen months have passed since the treaty was signed. Yet we have not been without a war at any time since--a war growing out of the treaty itself--and we have lost twenty-two hundred soldiers by death and as many more by wounds since Mr. Bryan wanted to give the volunteers a chance to come home."⁴⁴

At this point, relative to the above, it is well to stop and study the remarks of two men, Elihu Root and Theodore Roosevelt. Their remarks illustrate one very effective method of attack which the Republicans used against Bryan. They were appealing to the national emotion. They contended that by making an issue of imperialism, the Democrats were encouraging the Philippine insurgents and thus prolonging the war. Root said,

". . . the men who are reviling and belittling America here and the men who are shooting from ambush there are allies in the same cause, and both are enemies to the interests and credit of our country."⁴⁵

Secretary Root spoke in the closing days of the campaign in an attempt to justify the policies of the War Department and the Administration. The other was made by Theodore

⁴⁴ The Literary Digest, July 28, 1900, 21:96.

⁴⁵ The Literary Digest, November 3, 1900, 21:514.

Roosevelt in St. Paul, Minnesota. It was a particularly violent outburst and caused a furor in the Democratic Press. It was not particularly well thought out and tended to depreciate Roosevelt's prestige. The vice-presidential nominee said,

Study the Kansas City platform and you can not help realizing that their policy is a policy of infamy. They stand for lawlessness and disorder, for dishonesty, for license and disaster at home, and cowardly shrinking from duty abroad.⁴⁶

An indication that a break was beginning to appear in the anti-expansionist ranks is indicated by Senator Hoar's remarks in which he accused Bryan of insincerity in his acceptance speech, in that he knew that Congress would not pass such a measure as he advocated. The senator further said,

"No, the anti-imperialism of Mr. Bryan and that of his party is but a mask--it is a mask to cover the things they have had most at heart from the beginning, it is a mask, to cover their purpose to establish the free coinage of silver, a mask to cover their purpose to bring in free trade, a mask to cover their purpose to overthrow the banking system, a mask to cover an attack upon the Supreme Court, and a purpose to reorganize it if they can get the opportunity."⁴⁷

In Hoar's remarks concerning Bryan's stand on silver he was not striking too far from the truth, and Bryan made no attempt to hide his feelings on the subject. At various

⁴⁶ The Literary Digest, September 8, 1900, 21:273

⁴⁷ The Literary Digest, August 18, 1900, 21:184

times he said, "Today the dollar comes first and the man afterwards, if at all,..."⁴⁸ and "The position of the democratic party on the money question is known. It has undergone no change."⁴⁹

The Republicans and others, even Bryan, himself, were not too sure that imperialism was the main issue of the campaign. At the beginning of the campaign The Literary Digest made an effort to ascertain the importance of the silver issue by studying the various newspapers of the country and came up with this conclusion:

The newspapers seem unable to agree on the issue on which they will fight out the 1900 campaign...One finds the Western Republicans agreeing with the Eastern and Southern Democrats that silver is not an issue, while the Western Democrats and the Eastern Republicans contend stoutly that it is the paramount one.⁵⁰

Bryan had refused to run on any ticket which did not contain a declaration for bimetallism, consequently, one had been inserted in the platform. Those who had looked askance at Bryan in 1896 but who were anti-imperialists now, were frightened away by this in the belief that as long as William Jennings Bryan believed in free silver he could not have

⁴⁸ The Ansonia Standard, October 11, 1900, p. 1.

⁴⁹ Ibid., September 9, 1900, p. 1.

⁵⁰ The Literary Digest, August 11, 1900, 21:153

any ideals which would take precedence over it, in spite of what his party or he, himself, might say. While he admitted that silver was not the strong talking point he had believed it to be in '96, he still would have refused the candidacy had the party not reiterated its belief. This silver issue tended to cause the anti-imperialistic elements to shy away from their leader and, in many cases, they found themselves apologizing for him. The New York Sun, though a Republican paper, well illustrated this fear when it said,

"For four years he has been going up and down, talking of free silver. It has been and is his paramount issue. He has taken up anti-imperialism and anti-trusts, but they are the mere garnish of his first, great and only issue, silver. . . ."

"Yet the Democratic Platform makers would have us believe that this paramount issue of Mr. Bryan's, which he has advocated with such passionate enthusiasm and damnable iteration, is not paramount!"⁵¹

The views of the two candidates were quite ably expressed by themselves in the early days of the campaign. In speaking of the Democratic platform, Bryan said, "It deserves support because it stands for the Declaration of Independence in dealing with the Philippines. . . ."⁵² In a particularly sharp condemnation of the administration Bryan reduced the situation to lowest terms thusly, "The Republican

⁵¹ The Literary Digest, August 11, 1900, 21:193.

⁵² The Anacosta Standard, July 11, 1900, p. 1.

party, which was not willing that a black man should be sold for one thousand dollars, now claims that a Filipino can be bought for two dollars and fifty cents."⁵³ In defending his policy, President McKinley said,

A just war has been waged for humanity, and with it have come new problems and responsibilities...There must be no scuttle policy. We will fulfill in the Philippines the obligations imposed by the triumph of arms and by the Treaty of Peace...The obstructionists are here, not elsewhere.⁵⁴

The Democratic vice-presidential nominee, Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson, put into words the solution proposed by the Bryan forces.

Authoritative declaration should be made at once to the people of the Philippine Islands that it is not our purpose to conquer or to subjugate them. Under existing conditions, they should be protected against the cupidity and aggression of foreign nations. All this, upon our part, to the end that the Filipinos may have the full enjoyment of liberty and stable government fashioned by their own hands.⁵⁵

The issue was now drawn and the question was: How accurately had the Democrats and the anti-expansionists gaged the temper of the American people? The question might also have been: How serious and honest were the Democrats in their contentions? There were other factors than the anti-

⁵³ Ibid., August 17, 1900, p. 2.

⁵⁴ Ibid., July 13, 1900, p. 1.

⁵⁵ Adlai E. Stevenson, "The Issue of the Campaign," The North American Review, October 1900, p. 438.

imperialist sentiment which entered into the campaign and greatly influenced the outcome of the election. The McKinley administration had seen an increase of prosperity; it had brought the country through a successful war in which not too much sacrifice was involved; and, as a result of the war, the national feelings of the people were very high. Against the glory of a new empire, increased international prestige for the nation, prosperity and talk of never taking down the flag, the Democrats had only offers of abstract idealism which the people at large were not too eager or desirous of grasping. Also, they were advocating the election of a man in whom many people had little faith and over whom many of their own numbers were not too positive. The nationalistic feeling of a new nation had not yet started its decline from a war peak and, as a result, Bryan was defeated.

Bryan did not make nearly as good a showing in the 1900 election as he had in 1896. It was apparent that either the Americans were not interested in the policies which he advocated or they were too well pleased with those of McKinley to dispense with them. Of the two possibilities, the latter seems to be the more plausible. At any rate, the Democratic party must have been convinced of this, for though they continued to place a free Philippine plank in their subsequent campaign platforms, they never again made it the main

issue of a campaign.

"Bryan's defeat in 1900 marks the end of anti-imperialism as an important factor in American politics."⁵⁶

The reasons for the Democratic failure were four-fold.

(1) Bryan was too unacceptable to many and as a consequence, though they agreed with him on the Philippine issue, they withheld their support from him. Notable among these were Carnegie and Cleveland. Hoar adhered to his party and refused to support Bryan. He distrusted him and remarked, "In my opinion, if he had been elected, he would have accepted the result, have put the blame for it on his predecessor in office, and matters would have gone on very much as they have under Republican control."⁵⁷

(2) The strong position held by the administration and the expansionists was one very difficult to assault. The national ego tended to support expansion, and fortunately for them, an event of world-wide importance was taking place which the Republicans were able to use to their own advantage. The Boxer uprising in China and the relief expedition which was sent there by the western powers and Japan claimed a large percentage of the front pages of the newspapers. This emphasized the importance of having troops near at hand

⁵⁶ Harrington, op. cit., p. 228.

⁵⁷ Hoar, op. cit., p. 323.

(Manila) to be free and close to China that we might partake of the spoils which apparently were about ready for the taking. This cooperation with the other powers tended to still further the nationalistic sentiment. "The very imperialism which partisan prejudice claims has inspired our holding the Philippines now enables us to pursue an anti-imperialistic policy in China."⁵⁸ (3) The Democrats were urging a negative policy as contrasted to positive action by the opposition. They were attempting "...to urge the pride of renunciation as against the pride of glory and possession."⁵⁹ (4) The great leaders of the anti-expansion movement, Hear, Cleveland, Reed and others showed no tendency to lead a great protest movement. This indicates that the issue of anti-imperialism was not strong enough to overcome more basic prejudices and beliefs. If the question which caused so many different factions to cling to this one belief was not strong enough to cause them to forsake old gods, then it must have been that the issue was not strong enough in eyes of the people.

⁵⁸ Barrett, "The Philippines; Our approach to Asia.", Harpers Weekly, 44:702.

⁵⁹ Harrington, Op. Cit., p. 230.

CHAPTER FOUR

IMPERIALISM LOSES ITS LUSTER

The statement that ". . . our being in the Philippines is not the act of any class or party but represents the will of the American people"⁶⁰ would appear on the surface to be borne out by the results of the 1900 election. As has been pointed out earlier, there were other interpretations which could be inferred from the results, but the latter seems to be the one which was believed in and adhered to by the victor.

The McKinley administration was not blind, however, to the fact that it appeared to be trampling on human liberties.

While unshaken in their belief that they were acting in a manner which under the existing circumstances, was both wise and just, they knew that this justice and wisdom could only be proved by the use they made of their victory.

Ever since the United States had taken the Islands there had been three different points of view in America. These were the anti-imperialist, the expansionist or out-and-out imperialist, and then there were those who believed in a middle course. This latter group included President McKin-

⁶⁰ D. R. Williams, The United States and the Philip-
pines, p. 68.

⁶¹ Archibald Cary Coolidge, The United States as a
World Power, The MacMillan Co., (New York 1908) p. 158.

ley and Judge Taft whom the President had sent to the Islands as the first civil governor. The viewpoint of this latter group was best illustrated by the policy of Taft, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." Even this latter group, however, did not envisage a complete independence or severance from the United States.

Advocates of Philippine Independence, whether Americans or Filipinos, usually do not propose the severance of all political connections between the United States and its Asiatic colony, but they talk vaguely of some sort of "protectorate".⁶²

In 1912, when it was proposed that America give immediate self-government to the Islands, President Taft illustrated the conservative mature attitude of the "Philippines for the Filipinos" group thus,

"It takes a long time and much experience to ingrain political habits of steadiness and efficiency. Popular government ultimately must rest upon common habits of thought and upon a reasonably developed public opinion."⁶³

This viewpoint, it would seem, represented a sensible approach to the problem. This approach took into consideration the politically immature nature of the Islanders. After all, it had been but a few years since Spanish imperial rule had been expelled from the Islands. The after-effects of this rule were two-fold. The great majority of the Philippine

⁶² Ibid., p. 167.

⁶³ Congressional Record, (62nd Congress, 3rd Session), P. 208.

people were uneducated and did not even speak a common tongue. There would, therefore, be a considerable difference between political independence and political freedom. The second factor, which was actually the mother of the first, was the element of Caciquism. This was the chief obstacle to social and political progress in the Philippine Islands. It could be compared to "Boss" rule in the United States, except that its political, economic and social aspects were far more expansive and all-inclusive. Such a system had given the people as a whole no preparation for independence. It had been the young men of this Cacique or ruling class who had been the leaders of the revolutionary government. It was this political immaturity which had resulted in chaotic conditions in Spanish America after Spanish rule was overthrown and it was probably in the light of this experience that even those who believed in the "Philippines for the Filipinos" did not think that immediate independence was wise. William Howard Taft, one of the strongest friends of the Filipinos, said,

". . . I am in favor of teaching the people how to govern themselves, and I can not assume that such a lesson, so difficult to learn, can be taught to a people 90 per cent of whom are possibly ignorant today, without any political experience whatever, in five years. . . or in twenty years."⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Grayson L. Kirk, Philippine Independence, (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1936), p. 38.

In 1900, the Philippines had already begun to lose their lure and were being relegated to the back pages of the American newspapers. The Boxer uprising, the Boer War, and later the Panama Canal, Russo-Japanese War, and other world events were beginning to attract the attention and interest of the American people. Had it not been for the activities of the insurgents and the attention placed upon imperialism by the campaign of 1900, it is doubtful if the public attention would have been focused upon them for as long as it was. When the insurrection had broken out, it had aroused

. . . a fresh explosion of patriotism in the United States. American blood had been shed, and whatever might be decided about the ultimate fate of the islands, there could be no talk of negotiation until all armed opposition had been crushed out. This patriotic fervor began to cool, however, when the war degenerated into a fatiguing, inglorious and guerrilla contest, . . . 65

The stories which began to appear about American cruelty and particularly about the "water cure" began to disgust the people and they were rapidly losing interest in the whole affair. This loss of interest was destined to come to a halt, however.

In 1901, the Filipino insurgent leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, was captured by a small force of volunteers under the command of an American Brigadier General of volunteers, Frederick Funston. (The American government immediate-

65 Coolidge, Op. Cit., p. 155.

ly rewarded him with a permanent Brigadier Generalship in the regular army.) This dramatic incident once more awakened the interest of the American people in the Philippines.

Shortly after his capture, Aguinaldo swore allegiance to the United States and made several remarks which drew considerable reports from the American press. Aguinaldo signified that he considered the insurrection to be at an end.

The time has come, however, in which they find their advance along this path to be impeded by an irresistible force, while it restrains them, yet enlightens their minds and opens to them another course, presenting them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully embraced by the majority of my fellow countrymen, who have already united around the glorious sovereign banner of the United States.⁶⁶

The American newspapers could now look at the leader in a different light (for he was a captive).

The address of Aguinaldo to the Filipino people, . . . seems to have worked a striking change of opinion among his former friends and former foes. The anti-expansionist papers, that a short time ago were printing eulogies of his character, now consider him a weak and faithless fellow, while the Administration papers have suddenly acquired a sort of admiration for the man upon whom he recently they were heaping ridicule and contumely.⁶⁷

This paper dwells upon the subject of Aguinaldo's capture and "desertion" because this event in early 1901 is the beginning of a short revival of interest in the Is-

66 The Literary Digest, April 27, 1901, 22: 503-4

67 Ibid., p. 503.

lands. These further quotations give an example of how the American press reacted to Aguinaldo's apparent betrayal of the cause. "The trap set for Aguinaldo . . . has brought practically all the American press, anti-expansionist as well as expansionist, to the conclusion, as expressed by Admiral Dewey, that this 'means the end of organized resistance'."⁶⁸ The New York World, which had long been expansionist in nature, thought that "grandiloquent but abject address of the captive Filipino leader goes far to confirm the low opinion of his character hitherto expressed by his enemies."⁶⁹ While the Philadelphia Record castigated the insurgent leader thus, "few professional traders in patriotism have more successfully marketed their wares."

The imperialists were elated by this new stroke of war.

Some of the expansionist papers observe that if Aguinaldo is satisfied, the anti-expansionist papers in America ought to be satisfied too; but they are not. On the contrary, they seem to feel that the elimination of the armed resistance to our authority makes possible a calmer discussion of the merits of the case than was possible while the flag was being assailed.⁷⁰

The Springfield Republican lamented the loss of a hero of the cause but did not surrender its ideals. It said

⁶⁸ The Literary Digest, April 6, 1901, 22:401.

⁶⁹ The Literary Digest, April 27, 1901, 22:503.

⁷⁰ The Literary Digest, April 13, 1901, 22:433.

that Aguinaldo's statements "gives us a character certainly not of the stuff of which the heroes of the Western world have usually been made, or of which we find evidences in the Mabinis of this Malay people."⁷¹ As a result of Aguinaldo's capture, many insurgent bands began to surrender. "Armed bands are surrendering every day, and the War Department, it is reported, expects everything to be quiet in the Islands in three months."⁷² This prediction of peace in the Islands was premature, however. The up-surge of interest toward the Philippines was not to be derived from the actions of the natives but rather of certain Americans in the Islands.

There were still bodies of Filipinos at large who either still believed in the cause or were fearful of surrendering. Two centers of resistance, Samar and Batangas, were to achieve considerable prominence in the American newspapers for the next few months. General Nelson A. Miles, who at that time was the Commanding General of the Army, was in not too good graces with the administration. In early 1902, General Miles had asked permission to go to the Philippines to attempt to bring about an end to the hostilities which he said had "been conducted with marked severity". This was taken to be a reference to the stories of atrocities

⁷¹ The Literary Digest, April 27, 1901, 22:503.

⁷² The Literary Digest, April 13, 1901, 22:433.

which was becoming more and more numerous.

One of these reports, which was of particular importance and which really jolted the public into a realization that the means which the United States had adopted to bring enlightenment to the savage and of bringing about "benevolent assimilation" were not too christian in aspect, was the report concerning the actions of General Smith and Major Waller on the Island of Samar. Major Waller was in command of a detachment of marines which was acting under orders of Brigadier General Smith in the reduction of guerrilla activities on the Island. In the evidence presented at a court-martial which attempted to convict Waller for his acts of atrocity, several startling facts appeared. The following quotation from the Boston Transcript of April 8, 1902, makes these facts self-evident.

"Manila, April 8.--Major Littleton W. T. Waller of the Marine Corps, at today's session of the court-martial by which he is being tried on the charge of executing natives of Samar without trial, testified in rebuttal of the evidence given yesterday by General Jacob H. Smith, who commanded the American troops in the Island of Samar. The major said General Smith instructed him to kill and burn; said that the more he killed and burned the better pleased he would be; that it was no time to take prisoners, and that he was to make Samar a howling wilderness. Major Waller asked General Smith to define the age limit for killing, and he replied: 'Everything over ten.'"⁷³

73

B. O. Flower, "Some Dead Sea Fruit of our War of Subjugation". The Arena, June, 1902, 27:651.

The news of such occurrences with apparent official sanction and committed under orders tended to authenticate what heretofore had been only rumor. Naturally, no group could associate itself with approval of such a situation. The anti-imperialist papers were, of course, much more stirred up over this incident than were the others. The Baltimore Herald commented that the accusation of these crimes was "probably the most terrible charges made against an American soldier during a generation."⁷⁴ The Boston Advertiser took an editorial shot at the economic interests with these words:

"Congress is not willing to let the islands go, because there is still an idea that men on the inside can make millions in the next ten or twenty years. . . . So, if the islands must be kept and the natives will not submit peaceably, what else can be done but to kill them off as soon as possible? For what else are men like Major Waller sent there?"⁷⁵

There were those expansionist journals which tried to tone down the nature of events and wait for further developments. The Philadelphia Press, if not trying to excuse such actions, at least tried to explain them away by saying:

"War is a brutalizing trade. No one doubts it. War with a weak and treacherous race is the worst of all in its effects. Operations in such a war after an act of signal treachery puts officers and men under the strain of grave temptation."⁷⁶

⁷⁴ The Literary Digest, April 19, 1902, 24:531.

⁷⁵ loc. Cit.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 532.

By and large, the American press denounced such actions. "Journals of every political stripe and geographical location seemed to unite in condemning the author of these orders."⁷⁷ The New York Tribune remarked, "Herod was more merciful. He killed only the children, leaving the parents to live. Under General Smith's order the parents were to be killed, leaving the children to die."⁷⁸

As a result of all this publicity General Smith became known in the American press as "Hell-Rearing Jake". He explained his actions thus,

The inhabitants were masters of the situation, and the little control by the volunteers and later few stations of the army on the coast amounted to nothing, as they had been treated by both officers and men with such kindness as would be proper to civilized moral people. . .

It did not take long before it was quite patent to any observer that only the "fire-and-sword" policy could succeed in bringing these people to understand that they must come under the absolute and complete control of the United States.⁷⁹

In addition to the atrocities blamed on General Smith, there were rumors that General Bell in Batangas province was employing equally severe measures in his dealings with the natives. These reports of violence lead some to assert that America was adopting measures similar to those which had been so roundly condemned when employed by Spaniards in Cuba.

⁷⁸ Loc. cit.

⁷⁹ The Literary Digest, May 10, 1902, 24:630

The New York Journal, although a democratic paper, had earlier represented a smug holier-than-thou attitude which very frequently, both then and now, is characteristic of Americans in general when comparing themselves to foreign systems and institutions, by boasting that, "There is a most gratifying contrast between the attitude of our authorities toward the war they are waging against the Filipinos and that of the British toward their somewhat similar war in South Africa."⁸⁰ Two years later, the New York Evening Post put the lie to this statement by proposing drastic punishment for Americans who were guilty of war atrocities. "General Kitchener has had some of his murderous officers shot for less atrocious acts. We can not afford to be behind the British in inflicting stern justice upon our assassins who masquerade as soldiers."⁸¹ In commenting on the stories of atrocities, the Chicago News observed that, "It is nearly time for Spain to interfere in the interests of Humanity."⁸² The general nature of the situation brought forth this summation, "That it is time for somebody to interfere seems to be the well nigh unanimous opinion of the daily papers, both expansionist and 'anti';"⁸³

⁸⁰ The Literary Digest, December 15, 1900, 121:726.

⁸¹ Ibid., April 19, 1902, 24:531,532.

⁸² Ibid., April 26, 1902, 24:561.

⁸³ Ibid., April 26, 1902, 24:561.

The anti-expansionist papers in general thought ". . . that the reports of the treatment of the natives by our soldiers are convincing proof that our army should be withdrawn;"⁸⁴ while the expansionist papers tended to maintain that ". . . the conduct of a small number of soldiers has no bearing on the question of a national policy."⁸⁵ The New York World thought that "Wyler 'would find himself a congenial guest' at many a mess dinner party in the Philippines."⁸⁶

This whole affair was more or less cleared up when Roosevelt had the Secretary of War make an investigation. The President, at least, made a pretense of investigating the atrocities. He still was not backing down from his previous imperialistic ideals and said as much.

The Republic has put up its flag in those Islands, and the flag will stay there, where wrong has been done by anyone the wrong doer shall be punished, but we shall not halt in our great work because some man has happened to do wrong.⁸⁷

He punished the wrong doer, General "Hell-Roaring Jake" Smith, or at least he was made the scape goat. In re-

⁸⁴ Ibid., April 26, 1902, 24:561

⁸⁵ Loc. cit.

⁸⁶ The Literary Digest, May 9, 1903, 26:676.

⁸⁷ Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time Shown in His Own Letters, 2 vols., Charles Scribner's Sons, (New York, 1920) p. 192.

ferring to his "kill all over ten", "howling wilderness" order, President Roosevelt condemned him thus, ". . . his worse than injudicious procedure has destroyed his further usefulness in the active service of the Army."⁸⁸ General Smith was punished by enforced retirement. This was rather late action and the tardiness of it was not lost on those who opposed the administration. Although they approved of the action, they condemned its lateness, e.g.,

We are glad to see that the horror and indignation of the nation have stirred up our tardy Administration, and that President Roosevelt has ordered investigations and court-martials; though we could wish that he had acted before the aroused conscience of the people practically forced action.⁸⁹

President Roosevelt was still an out-and-out imperialist, a statement which his own words verified. ". . . I fail to understand how any man, confident of his country's greatness and glad that his country should challenge with proud confidence our mighty future, can be anything but an expansionist."⁹⁰ In spite of this statement he was apparently convinced that some policy of at least partial independence was going to have to be adopted. In his memorial day speech of 1902, he gave the first inkling that he favored

⁸⁸ Ibid.,

⁸⁹ Flower, Op. cit., p. 653.

⁹⁰ The Literary Digest, May 23, 1903, 26:741.

any form of eventual independence for the Filipinos by saying,

"We believe that we can rapidly teach the people of the Philippine Islands not only how to enjoy but how to make good use of their freedom; and with their growing knowledge, their growth in self-government shall keep steady pace. When they have thus shown their capacity for real freedom by their power of self-government, then, and not till then, will it be possible to decide whether they are to exist independantly of us or be knit to us by ties of common friendship and interest."⁹¹

Until this time those newspapers which were considered pro-administration had not admitted that America should ever grant independence to the Islands.

Such a possibility, that the Filipinos may sometime "exist independently of us," has not heretofore been openly considered by the journals that support the Republican Philippine policy, and their indorsement of it is a new position. Whether it is the beginning of a general movement toward treating the Philippines as Cuba has been treated or is only a passing phase of popular thought, it is too early to say."⁹²

This period in 1902 was evidently the point at which the Republicans realized that some sort of eventual independence was inevitable or at least the foregoing quotations would tend to so indicate. The beginning of a trend seemed to appear in 1902.

A number of influential Republican journals have been strong and consistent advocates of ultimate Philippine independence ever since the discussion began. . . . But it is something new for the Cleveland Leader (Rep.) to say that "what the United States has done for Cuba

⁹¹ The Literary Digest, June 14, 1902, 24:791.

⁹² Loc. cit.

may be done some day for the Philippines," and for the Brooklyn Times (Rep.) to remark that "in time the United States will produce in the Philippines the same miracle which was wrought yesterday in Cuba." The Kansas City Journal (Rep.) admits that "perhaps independence may be granted some day," and the Chicago Tribune believes that if the Filipinos "are a progressive race, . . . the future will see them independent if they desire independence."⁹³

Although there was a beginning of a change in attitude at this time, it was not, however, an overwhelming one. "Nor have the rank and file of the Republican press experienced the change of thought indicated in the above quotations."⁹⁴

93 Loc. cit.

94 Ibid., p. 792.

CHAPTER FIVE

FIRST MATERIALIZATION OF INDEPENDENCE

The beginning of American government in the Philippines was ushered in by a national catastrophe which took the form of severe drought and rinderpest which killed off a large percent of the livestock of the Islands. The American Congress voted a relief of three million dollars to combat the effects of the disaster. Thus even nature did not smile on America's colonial dreams.

In 1902 President Roosevelt sent a delegation to Rome to deal with the Pope concerning the lands which belonged to the various Spanish catholic religious orders which were remnant of Spanish domination in the Islands. These lands were a source of great agitation among the Filipinos and it was largely due to pressure from the natives that the United States' government made the attempt to buy them. The inviolable possession of this land had been guaranteed in the treaty with Spain and so they could not be expropriated or alienated in any way unless the church was agreeable. This commission was composed of four men, Governor Taft, Judge Smith, Major Porter and the Roman Catholic Bishop of South Dakota, Bishop O'Gorman. The sending of this mission aroused some comment in American protestant papers, but all in all, there was no great opposition although some thought that it

was a proposal to subsidize the Catholic church. "Having been assured by Secretary Root that Governor Taft's visit to the Pope would be 'purely a business matter' and nothing more, the daily press seem to be heartily in favor of the errand.⁹⁵ The transaction which was completed in December, 1903, had three-fold results: (1) The majority of the land was alienated from the church; (2) Questionable land titles were settled; (3) There was brought about a complete separation of church and state.

The basic concept of America's occupation of the Islands went through a gradual development or transformation from the "Benevolent assimilation" of President McKinley, who ". . . had never spoken of independence even as a remote possibility, and until his untimely death he held steadfastly, at least in his official utterances, to the principle of "benevolent assimilation!"⁹⁶

It will be remembered that Theodore Roosevelt had given an inkling that some sort of eventual self-government was possible when he said that they might be able "to exist independently of us". That they might be able to so exist was given a good start when, in 1902, Congress passed the Philippine Organic Act which was the beginning of self-rule

⁹⁵ The Literary Digest, June 21, 1902, 24:626.

⁹⁶ Kirk, Ibid., p. 36.

for the Philippine Islands. Sections of it which pertain to the granting of some political freedom are here quoted:

Sec. 6. That whenever the existing insurrection in the Philippine Islands shall have ceased and a condition of general and complete peace shall have been established therein and the fact shall be certified to the President by the Philippine Commission, the President, upon being satisfied thereof, shall order a census of the Philippine Islands to be taken . . .

Sec. 7. That two years after the completion and publication of the census, in case such condition of general and complete peace with recognition of the authority of the United States shall have continued in the territory of said Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes and such facts shall have been certified to the President by the Philippine Commission, the President upon being satisfied thereof shall direct said Commission to call, and the Commission shall call, a general election for the choice of delegates to a popular assembly of the people of said territory in the Philippine Islands, which shall be known as the Philippine assembly. After said assembly shall have commenced and organized, all the legislative power heretofore conferred on the Philippine Commission in all that part of said Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes shall be vested in a legislature consisting of two houses--The Philippine Commission and the Philippine assembly . . .

Sec. 8. That at the same time with the first meeting of the Philippine legislature, and biennially thereafter, there shall be chosen by said legislature, each house voting separately,⁹⁷ two resident commissioners to the United States, . . .

Although it was to be five years before the Filipinos were to benefit from these provisions it was at least a beginning.

⁹⁷ The Statutes at Large of the United States of America, 32:693-694.

Imperialism, even though it was to be brought to the fore again, was no longer the potent rallying cry it had been. The first step had been taken toward granting civil and political freedom, and the Republican party, in its 1904 platform, could pause to take stock of its accomplishments.

In the Philippines we have suppressed insurrection, established order, and given to life and property a security never known there before. We have organized civil government, made it effective and strong in administration, and have conferred upon the people of these islands the largest civil liberty they have ever enjoyed. By our possession of the Philippines we were enabled to take prompt and effective action in the relief of the legations at Peking, and a decisive part in preventing the partition and preserving the integrity of China.⁹⁸

By this time, through the words of President Roosevelt and by the action of the Republican Congress in their first step toward giving home rule to the Islands, the Republican party was fairly well committed to a policy of eventual and evolving self-government, differing from the definite policy of the Democrats who espoused a policy of eventual independence for the Philippines. The difference in meaning between these two words fairly well exemplifies the different attitudes of the two parties. Regardless of the attitudes of the two major political parties, it would be safe to say that a large percentage of the American people cared very little about this subject and if they did think about it,

⁹⁸ Stanwood, op. cit., p. 105-106.

they considered it of little importance. As one proponent of Philippine Independence put it:

With passage of the Philippine Organic Act the interest of the American people in the future of the Philippines grew less and less. Whatever fear they might have had as to the establishment of a truly imperialistic policy in the islands was smoothed away by loud protestations of benevolent intentions repeatedly made by Republican leaders. These Republican leaders . . . plainly intimated that the Philippines were ultimately to be given their independence.

The question of Philippine freedom as it existed between the two great American parties was relatively an academic one in which the different beliefs to which the two parties adhered merely differed in degree but not in their ultimate purpose. The Democratic party was, of course, duty-bound to give the islands as much freedom as possible, as quickly as possible. The campaign of 1900 had made such a policy mandatory for succeeding Democratic politicians. The Democratic national convention placed official sanction upon this policy in their 1904 convention. Being the party out of office, they could, of course, take a critical attitude. Their platform of that year indicated that the policy of the United States should be changed and that "we insist that we ought to do for the Filipinos what we have already done for the Cubans, and it is our duty to make that promise

⁹⁹ Karimo H. Kalso, The Case for the Filipinos, The Century Company, (New York, 1916), p. 147.

now, . . .¹⁰⁰ The Democratic presidential candidate of that year, Alton B. Parker, echoed the sentiment of the national convention in this fashion:

" . . . I am in hearty accord with that plank in the Democratic platform which advocates treating the Filipines precisely as we did the Cubans; and I also favor making the promise to them now to take such action as soon as it can prudently be done."¹⁰¹

Expressing somewhat the same view, William Jennings Bryan supported the candidate and his policy in a rather left-handed manner, thusly:

"If you ask me why I, a silver Democrat, can support Judge Parker, a gold Democrat, I will answer that I am more interested in constitutional government and human liberty than I ever was in gold or silver."¹⁰²

In addition to those who were always speaking out for political rights for the Filipines, there were those who also bethought themselves of some of the economic inequities of the situation. In 1902, after the famous Fourteen Diamond Rings case had temporarily brought about the free entry of Philippine goods into America, Congress passed a tariff law which permitted the entry of Philippine goods at seventy-five per cent of the normal duty. This tariff law was opposed by the Democrats as being too high. There were others who believed that the tariff on Philippine goods should be lowered

¹⁰⁰ Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency, 1897-1916, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston and New York, 1916, p. 120.

¹⁰¹ The Literary Digest, September 3, 1904, 29:275.

¹⁰² The Literary Digest, October 22, 1904, 29:518.

or completely abolished.

Secretary Taft, in all his addresses and public remarks, referred to the tariff as the greatest cause of friction. He assured the natives that he desired changes would be made, . . .¹⁰³

Even though there was no great pressure brought to bear against free trade with the Philippines, it was to be some years before it was to become a reality.

None of the daily newspapers seems to object to the tariff concessions urged by the President and Secretary Taft in behalf of the Filipinos and embodied in a bill favorably reported on by the House Committee on Ways and Means. In fact, outside the sugar and tobacco interests, and the American Protective Tariff League, there are very few who do not want to see the tariff reduced on those products from the Philippines, or abolished altogether.¹⁰⁴

As has been noted earlier the lack of free trade plus the doubtful nature of American politics, inasmuch as it affected the Philippine Islands, and the policy which the administration followed of frowning on economic exploitation of the Filipinos, had discouraged the investment of American capital in the Islands. As far as imperialistic economic exploitation was concerned, it was not present to any large degree in the relationship which existed between America and her new ward.

. . . trade developed between the two countries very slowly. American capital available for investment was either drawn into the newly developing domestic channels, such

103 The Literary Digest, August 26, 1905, 31:264.

104 The Literary Digest, January 6, 1906, 32:7.

as the automotive industry, or it seemed to prefer lucrative investment in Cuba, Hawaii, or Puerto Rico. So small was the American investment in the Philippines that, by 1910, it was still quite insignificant. There was still too much uncertainty over the future status of the Islands and there was too much irritation over the government's announced policy of administering the Philippines for the welfare of the Filipinos . . . acquisition had been merely an impulsive manifestation of an essentially "unripe" imperialism.¹⁰⁵

American economic interest in the Islands had so faded away that in 1908 Theodore Roosevelt felt called upon to say that "My only regret is that more capital has not gone there." He remarked "Our real problem is to convert indifference to the Philippines into active interest, . . . I am not in the least afraid of hostility to what we have done in the islands, but I sometimes am afraid of indifference;"¹⁰⁶

Believing that the conditions of the 1902 "Organic Act" had been complied with and that the time had come to give the Filipinos some concrete aspects of liberty, Theodore Roosevelt designated July 30, 1907, as the election day. This move met with the general approval of the American press. ". . . the press generally regard this step as all that could now be expected and as redeeming the pledges of the Administration in this direction."¹⁰⁷

105 Kirk, Ibid., p. 35.

106 Theodore Roosevelt, "The American Attitude toward the Philippines", The Outlook, 90:451.

107 The Literary Digest, April 20, 1907, 34:619.

In the election which followed the Filipinos displayed considerable apathy toward this first manifestation of self-government. Various American papers attached different interpretations to this attitude.

Some of our papers have been trying to explain the apathy of the Filipinos regarding the election of delegates to their first Assembly by declaring that the natives do not really want self-government. This view is not accepted by the Baltimore American, which suggests that "probably the truth is that the Filipinos expect nothing in the way of actual self-government from the new Assembly, and therefore do not deem it worth their while to go through the idle form of voting."¹⁰⁸

The Springfield Republican, which had been one of the foremost advocates of independence, hoped that the Filipinos would take advantage of their new opportunity in a more serious manner.

"The Filipinos, it is to be hoped, will not allow such feelings to have permanent sway over them, since progress can certainly be made along the lines laid down in the legislative Assembly soon to be instituted. Their work in that body will be observed and the American people will surely be glad to note evidences of a native capacity to make liberal institutions workable in the archipelago."¹⁰⁹

Since the days of Governor Taft and even before that, in the days when the Army was still in control, it had been the policy of the American Government to attempt to raise the islands from the level of a nineteenth century Spanish

¹⁰⁸ The Literary Digest, August 10, 1907, 35:184.

¹⁰⁹ Loc. Cit.

colony to an approximation of twentieth century culture. One of the very first Acts of the Army had been to open schools and build roads. This policy had been followed by succeeding Civil Administrations. There were two political parties in the Philippines, the Progressista and the Nationalista. "The Progressistas advocate good roads, re-adjustment of the tariff, wider public education, and the enforcement of sanitary laws." The Nationalistas had a platform which . . . "resembles that of the Immediatistas, in demanding immediate independence and reduction of the salaries of American officers."¹¹⁰

It was therefore a blow to those Americans who were proud of the schools, roads, and other civic improvements which were the attributes of American rule in the Islands when, in the election, the Nationalista party gained a considerable majority as opposed to the Progressista party.

The New York World commented upon the "sheer ingratitude" of the Filipinos and asked:

"What better proof can there be that the Filipinos by blood and the color of their skins are a base and treacherous race, unfit for free institutions and incapable of self-government? What destiny can providence possibly contemplate for such a people except the denial of popular rights and the perpetuation of foreign rule?"¹¹¹

110 Loc. cit.

111 Loc. cit.

The Seattle Post-Intelligence inferred that the results of the election were indicative that the Filipinos were not capable of honest self-government and not yet free from the Cacique ideas on politics.

With independence, the Government would not only be in the hands of this oligarchy, but it would be for it, without regard to the interests of the people. . . . In view of the showing made, discussion of the possibilities of future independence for the Philippines should properly be postponed until the new generation has come on the field.¹¹²

President Theodore Roosevelt, while agreeing with this last sentiment, nevertheless did feel that some sort of self-determination should be left the Islanders. In 1908, he stated the following view on the subject:

"I trust that within a generation the time will arrive when the Filipinos can decide for themselves whether it is well for them to become independent or to continue under the protection of a strong and disinterested power, able to guarantee to the Islands order at home and protection from foreign invasion."¹¹³

Whatever original thoughts the Republicans might have had about "benevolent assimilation" they had been considerably changed by 1908. Their platform of that year was not one of boasting of how the possession of the Islands had aided us in imperialistic expansion, but rather it was one of boasting of what America in its generosity

112 Loc. cit.

113 Kirk, op. cit., p. 37.

had done for the Filipinos themselves.

In the Philippines insurrection has been suppressed, law is established, and life and property are made secure. Education and practical experience are there advancing the capacity of the people for government, and the policies of McKinley and Roosevelt are leading the inhabitants step by step to an ever increasing measure of home rule.¹¹⁴

In their 1908 platform, the Democratic party was still repeating time-worn phrases whenever it spoke of America and the Philippines.

We condemn the experiment in imperialism as an inexcusable blunder which has involved us in enormous expense, brought us weakness instead of strength, and laid our nation open to the charge of abandoning a fundamental doctrine of self-government.¹¹⁵

Taft came to the Presidency with a wealth of first hand information concerning the Islands. . . . Consequently, he had a more intimate acquaintanceship with Philippine problems than any other man in public life at the time.¹¹⁶

When Taft succeeded Roosevelt, he was able to achieve one of his main ideals, that of securing a freer trade relationship between the Islands and America.

The next landmark in the history of Philippine tariff legislation is the American tariff act of August 5, 1909, which granted free entrance to goods from the Philippines, with the exception of rice, and with the limitation that the free importation of sugar should be restricted to 300,000 gross tons per annum, and of tobacco to 300,000 pounds of wrapper tobacco, 1,000,000 pounds of filler

114 Stanwood, Ibid., p. 178.

115 Ibid., p. 178.

116 Kirk, Loc. cit.

tobacco, and 150,000,000 cigars; any amounts beyond these limits were to be subject to the ordinary duty.¹¹⁷

In the presidency of Taft can be seen the contrast of views of the two major political parties. The Democrats were more or less obliged to maintain the spirit of their 1900 campaign. Toward the end of Taft's term, a bill (the Jones Bill) was initiated in the House of Representatives. This bill proposed to give to the Filipinos a definite promise of independence; it passed the House and there might have been some chance of it passing the Senate, but the Republicans objected to the wording of the preamble.

. . . A compromise was offered by certain Republican senators whereby the word "independence" in the preamble would have been eliminated and "self-government" substituted. Had this offer been accepted the bill would have passed the Senate unanimously.¹¹⁸

The last part of this quotation might be questioned, but the first part, at least, illustrated the attitude held by many Republicans that the United States had a "sacred duty" to perform in the Islands. In their belief, independence entailed obligations such as defence and honest local government which mere self-government did not entail. President Taft summed up his attitude on our duty thusly:

¹¹⁷ United States Tariff Commission, Colonial Tariff Policies, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1922. p. 597.

¹¹⁸ Kalaw, op. cit., p. 217.

The Islands are already enjoying popular government, wide spread prosperity, and peace and harmony which never before existed thruout their history. The continuance of our national policy must of necessity make that prosperity greater and greater, and gradually fit the people for self-government. Nothing can prevent this result but the ill-advised policy proposed by the Democratic party of holding before the Philippine people a prospect of independence in the immediate future.

* * * * *
 We are seeking to create a national spirit--not, as under all previous systems, to suppress it. It is utter folly to suppose that in ten or eleven years all of this could be fully accomplished. Our work is very far from completed. Our duty to the Filipinos is far from done.¹¹⁹

In 1912, the Republican platform had nothing boastful to say about their Philippine policy but rather it was now taking an entirely altruistic tone.

"The Philippine policy of the republican party has been and is inspired by the belief that our duty toward the Filipino people is a national obligation which should remain entirely free from partisan politics."¹²⁰

The Democratic platform of that year indicated with oft-repeated phrases the course which it desired its candidate to follow as regards the Philippines.

We reaffirm the position thrice announced by the democracy in national convention assembled against a policy of imperialism and colonial exploitation in the Philippines, or elsewhere. We condemn the experiment in imperialism as an inexcusable blunder which has involved us in enormous expense, brought us weakness instead of strength, and laid our nation open to the charge of abandonment of the fundamental doctrine of self-gov-

¹¹⁹ William Howard Taft, "Our Duty to the Philippines", The Independent, 76:115-116.

¹²⁰ The Democratic Text-Book, 1912, Democratic National Committee, New York and Chicago, p. 31.

ernment. We favor an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government can be established, . . .¹²¹

Wilson, keeping true to the Democratic platform, indicated that he did not intend to diverge either from his ideals of self-determination or from the avowed and oft-stated purpose of his own party.

There are two great things to do. One is to set up the rule of justice and of right in such matters as . . . the political life of the people of the Philippines, for whom we hold governmental power in trust for their service, not our own.¹²²

In this same speech, he also indicated that America should rid herself of its imperialistic semblance of Europeanism.

In dealing with the Philippines, we should not allow ourselves to stand upon any mere point of pride, in order to keep our countenance in the family of nations, as if it were necessary for us to make the same blunders of selfishness that other nations have made. We are not the owners of the Philippine Islands. We hold them in trust for the people who live in them. They are theirs, for the uses of their life. We are not even their partners. It is our duty, as trustees, to make whatever arrangement of government will be most serviceable to their freedom and development. Here, again, we are to set up the rule of justice and of right.¹²³

The American People thus knew the policy of the Demo-

121 Ibid., p. 30.

122 Ibid., p. 1.

123 Ibid., p. 274.

eratic party first vehemently expressed in 1900 and repeated from time to time, and also of the candidate whom that party had chosen. However, if the question could be raised in 1900 that the "paramount issue" was not of primary merit, it certainly could not be said twelve years later that the American people had finally decided to revoke imperialism. "It is true that the voters gave little attention to this matter and can not be said to have given a mandate upon it." In fact, after the Democrats came to power in 1913, public opinion was still very indifferent to the whole question of Philippine Independence.

If the attitude of the American public toward President Wilson's insular administrative reforms showed how uncertain was public opinion on the Philippine question, the discussion of the Jones bill showed even more plainly how great is the indifference toward the whole Philippine question in America.¹²⁴

The election of Woodrow Wilson and the victory of the Democratic party in 1912, although it brought about more of a semblance of autonomy for the Filipinos, actually it brought no great departure from the course which events had taken under the Republicans. It represented a speeding-up process but it was far from being a complete about-face.

The Wilson policy as now declared differs in only one respect. . . . President Wilson declares that 'every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate inde-

¹²⁴ Kalaw, op. cit., p. 209.

pendence of the Islands.' President Roosevelt and President Taft believed that every step should be taken with a view to the preparation of the Filipinos for self-government, leaving the question of independence or continued association with the United States to be determined by the circumstance which shall exist when that preparation is complete.¹²⁵

While he supported Philippine Independence as a matter of policy, Wilson was for no drastic measure and he so indicated to Congress.

We must hold steadily in view their ultimate independence, and we must move toward the time of that independence as steadily as the way can be cleared, and the foundations thoughtfully and permanently laid.¹²⁶

Before he assumed office, President-elect Wilson gave an inkling of what the Democratic version of the "national obligation" was when he commented that "the Philippines are at present our frontier but I hope we presently are to deprive ourselves of that frontier."¹²⁷ Wilson adhered to his theories that nationalities should have the greatest amount of self-determination by appointing a fifth Filipino member to the Philippine commission. This gave the Filipinos a majority of five to four in the upper house of their legislature. In his first State of the Union message to Congress, Wilson explained this action.

¹²⁵ "Our Duty to the Philippines" (an editorial), The Independent, October 16, 1913, 76:105.

¹²⁶ Congressional Record, (63rd Congress, 2nd Session) p.45.

¹²⁷ Kirk, op. cit., p. 44.

Acting under the authority conferred upon the President by Congress, I have already accorded the people of the islands a majority in both houses of their legislative body by appointing five instead of four native citizens to the membership of the commission. I believe in this way we shall make proof of their capacity in counsel and their sense of responsibility in the exercise of political power, and that the success of this step will be sure to clear our view for the steps which are to follow.¹²⁸

"The steps which are to follow" were to be those implementing the Democrats' old promise that a definite statement of American intentions toward the Philippines should be made. This, of course, implied some sort of a promise of independence.

The Wilson policy bore fruit in the Jones Law which, it will be remembered had been defeated during Taft's administration. This bill can be best described by quoting various excerpts.

. . . it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established there; . . .

Sec. 12. That general legislative powers in the Philippines, except as herein otherwise provided, shall be vested in a legislature which shall consist of two houses, one the senate and the other the house of representatives, . . .

Sec. 13. That the members of the senate of the Philippines, except as herein provided, shall be elected for

¹²⁸ Congressional Record, (63rd Congress, 2nd Session), pp. 75-76.

terms of six and three years, as hereinafter provided, by qualified electors of the Philippines.

Sec. 14. That the members of the house of representatives shall, except as herein provided, be elected triennially by the qualified electors of the Philippines.¹²⁹

This law accomplished a double purpose: (1) It made the Philippine legislature a Philippine institution, with the representatives of the Philippine people, (with minor exceptions) elected by the Philippine electors; (2) It accomplished what had been attempted by the Democrats during the discussion over the peace treaty with Spain, that is, it gave the Filipinos a definite promise that it was our intention to some day retire and leave them to their own destiny. This legislation came very near to granting the Philippines more freedom than they had dared to hope for. In the proposed Clarke Amendment to the bill it was provided that American sovereignty would be withdrawn in not less than two nor more than four years; it also withdrew any guarantee of future protection. This amendment ironically passed the Senate (48-41) by virtue of the casting vote of the Democratic vice-president. The irony being that the Bacon Resolution which would have accomplished the same thing as the Jones Bill was defeated in the Senate in 1899 by the casting vote of the Republican vice president, Hobart. This Clarke

¹²⁹ The Statutes at Large of the United States of America, 39:1:545, 548, 549.

Amendment was defeated in the House, however, by a combination of Republican and Catholic-Democratic votes. The outcome of the Jones Bill and the fate of the Clarke Amendment is told clearly by the following:

In this form the bill was sent to the House, where the Clark Amendment encountered vigorous opposition not only from the Republicans but from many Democrats. Especially pronounced was the antagonism of the Democrats of the Catholic faith, and despite the frantic efforts of Commissioner Quezon, the Republican, Catholic-Democrat coalition killed the Clarke Amendment by a vote of 193-151, after which the House then approved the original bill, preamble and all (213-165). The Senate ultimately acquiesced, and the Jones Bill was approved by President Wilson on August 29, 1916.¹³⁰

The Independent had foreseen this action by the Catholic Church and had also foreseen its reason.

It appears likely that the influence of the Catholic hierarchy, if there is to be any will be exerted in favor of not hauling down the United States flag in the Philippine Islands, and thus leaving the inhabitants of the Islands to their own devices. The Catholic Church is nowhere less hampered or better protected than it is under the equal government of the United States.¹³¹

The New York Evening Post said of the new Democratic policy, "This much-abused Jones Bill is but a logical sequel to the Administration's action of 1913 in giving the Filipinos a majority in both houses of the insular Assembly."¹³²

¹³⁰ Kirk, op. cit., p. 46-47.

¹³¹ "Shall We Drop the Philippines?", The Independent, November 21, 1912, 73:1203.

¹³² The Literary Digest, September 18, 1915, 51:580.

The Democratic national convention of 1916 gave its approval of the Jones Law.

We heartily indorse the provisions of the bill, recently passed by the House of Representatives, further promoting self-government in the Philippine Islands as being in fulfillment of the policy declared by the Democratic Party in its last National platform, and we reiterate our indorsement of the purpose of ultimate independence for the Philippine Islands, expressed in the preamble of that measure.¹³³

The Wilson policies were not confined to the relationships which existed between America and the Philippines; they extended throughout the islands themselves. Wilson appointed Francis B. Harrison Governor General of the Philippines. The Philippine Resident General to the United States' Congress, Manuel Quezon, was well pleased with this appointment. Harrison, whom Henry Cabot Lodge accused of purposely making himself a figurehead was an out-and-out exponent of Philippine independence. Through the administrative reforms which he instigated, the Filipino politicians had a more or less free hand in the running of the Philippine government. This rather sudden change of policy naturally made possible a considerable amount of graft. This tendency was further increased by two other factors, namely the war with its demand for Philippine products had greatly augmented the national income, and secondly, in an effort to correct the lamented

¹³³ The Democratic Text-Book, 1916, Democratic National Committee (New York and Chicago), p. 21.

lack of foreign capital the politicians conceived the idea of the Philippine government itself entering into business. This it did, and apparently patronage was prevalent in the expenditure of money on railroads, sugar mills, cement plants and other enterprises. The following quotation, although written by a man who had a personal interest to further in the Islands, explains the economic situation in the light which those who opposed a policy of American scuttle adopted.

The Philippines prospered during the war, peak prices being obtained for sugar, hemp, copra, coconut oil, and other staple export products. In consequence, the Insular revenues, which totaled less than \$21,000,000 in 1913 increased to more than \$43,000,000 in 1920, thus furnishing a substantial surplus. As a convenient means of diverting these funds into political channels and with it a corresponding increase in the power and patronage of Messrs. Quezon and Osmena . . . the old plan of "government-owned" enterprises was adopted.¹³⁴

These policies were to be the source of considerable criticism.

Shortly after the end of the war, the Filipinos sent a delegation to Washington for the purpose of capitalizing on the current popularity of the term "Self-Determination". The Democratic administration, however, was now faced with a Republican Congress, and any such action would not be favorably received. In spite of this, however, President Wilson

¹³⁴ Daniel R. Williams, "General Wood and the Filipinos," The World's Work, February, 1924, 47:367.

addressed Congress in December, 1920, in the following manner :

Allow me to call your attention to the fact that the people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government since the last action of the Congress in their behalf, and have thus fulfilled the condition set by Congress as precedent to a consideration of granting independence to the Islands. I respectfully submit that this condition precedent having been fulfilled, it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of these Islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet.¹³⁵

The Congress took no action on this recommendation and American-Philippine relations were on the verge of a "time of troubles".

¹³⁵ Congressional Record, (66th Congress, 3rd Session), p. 28.

CHAPTER SIX

AMERICA ADOPTS A FIRM ATTITUDE

In 1920, in keeping with their traditional policy, the Democrats again asserted in their national platform a plank favoring Philippine Independence. "We favor the granting of independence without unnecessary delay to the 10,500,000 inhabitants of the Philippine Islands."¹³⁵ The Republican platform of that year was conspicuous by a complete absence of any mention of the subject.

If the Republican party had ignored the Philippine question, the same could not be said for President Harding.

President Harding, who as a member of the Senate Committee on Insular Affairs had become reasonably conversant with the problem, was known to be unsympathetic to any proposal involving American withdrawal in the near future.¹³⁶

It will be remembered that President Wilson had recommended at the end of his term in office that the Philippines were ready for independence. Such a statement could not be entirely ignored by the succeeding president and, since he was in no frame of mind to comply with the

¹³⁵ "Text of the Democratic Platform," Current History Magazine, August 1920, 12:836.

¹³⁶ Kirk, op. cit., P. 49

recommendation, he sent an investigating commission to the Islands to report on conditions there. This commission was headed by General Leonard Wood and former Governor W. Cameron Forbes. General Wood will be remembered as a personal friend of President Theodore Roosevelt and had had former experience in the Philippines subjugating the Moros. After spending four months in the Islands, this commission came to the conclusion that the recommendation which had been made by President Wilson was founded on unsound ground.

We find that the Government is not reasonably free from those underlying causes which result in the destruction of government.

* * * * *
 We find that the people are not organized economically nor from the standpoint of national defense to maintain an independent government.

* * * * *
 We feel that with all their many excellent qualities, the experience of the past eight years, during which they have had practical autonomy, has not been such as to justify the people of the United States relinquishing supervision of the Government of the Philippine Islands, withdrawing their army and navy, and leaving the islands a prey to any powerful nation coveting their rich soil and potential commercial advantages.

In conclusion we are convinced that it would be a betrayal of the Philippine people, a misfortune to the American people, a distinct step backward in the path of progress, and a discreditable neglect of our national duty were we to withdraw from the islands and terminate our relationship there without giving the Filipinos the best chance possible to have an orderly and permanently stable government.¹³⁷

¹³⁷ Congressional Digest, April 1924, 3:238,250.

With this recommendation before him, President Harding appointed Wood Governor General of the Islands with the unpleasant task of restoring American executive authority.

From eight years of Democratic politics in which Filipino politicians ran their own show with the passive assistance of the Governor General, of whom the New York Tribune said, "Mr. Harrison's chief ambition seemed to be to bring to an end the line of American Governors-General, to haul down the flag from his palace and take it back with him to San Francisco."¹³⁸ it is a very long ideological step to a man whom the New York World could describe in this manner, "Long experience in the tropics had given him a soldier's attitude toward dark-skinned races, and his record eloquently testifies to his impatience of any authority but his own."¹³⁹ It is not hard to understand why Filipino politicians were so desperately active. Now the United States was changing its policy and the prediction of William Howard Taft concerning the chaos which would be resultant of any promise of independence had

¹³⁸ The Literary Digest, August 4, 1923, 78:14.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 15.

come true.

"...such a promise will greatly mislead the Filipino people and greatly complicate the situation in the Philippine Islands with respect to the success of the present government there and its orderly continuance. No promise can be made to the Filipinos except that we will grant them independence when they are fit for complete self-government."¹⁴⁰

America had not followed this advice; a definite promise of independence had been made. When for sound reasons, the United States had to hold off fulfilling this promise, conditions became strained.

At home, the Filipinos referred to American rule as "Wood's Cavalry Cabinet". Protesting against the change of policy which Wood brought about in attempting to restore some sort of executive authority and curtail some of the excesses of the Filipinos, the Philippine legislature sent another delegation to the United States seeking independence. Unfortunately for the Philippine cause, this was a period when their ability to operate a democratic government appeared negative and their stock in America was at a low ebb. The Wood-Forbes investigation and the subsequent administration of Governor General Wood had resulted in bad publicity in the United States. For example, the New York Tribune, doubting that the Filipinos were capable of basic sound government said, "What government would be

¹⁴⁰ The Literary Digest, September 3, 1904, 29:276

under independence has been painfully forecast. In domestic affairs there would be a relapse to factional dissensions and intermittent revolution--to spoliation and poverty."¹⁴¹ And the Washington Star commented that "the setting up of an independent government in the Philippines would be a risky experiment, to say the least."¹⁴² Against a background of political corruption, well publicized in the United States, the Philippines sent this latest delegation seeking independence. It is not surprising that President Harding politely turned them aside in this manner:

"with ever mindfulness of your aspirations, with shared pride in your achievements, with gratitude for your loyalty, with reiterated assurance that we mean to hold no people under the flag who do not rejoice in that relationship, I must say to you that the time is not yet ripe for independence."¹⁴³

The press of the country in general supported Harding's "the time is not yet ripe" attitude.

"Will it ever be ripe? The press in general either avoids facing the question, or mildly acquiesces. . . ."¹⁴⁴

There were a few papers which supported independence, but these were a small minority and had very little influ-

141 The Literary Digest, July 2, 1921, 70:15.

142 Loc. cit.

143 The Literary Digest, July 22, 1922, 74:13.

144 Loc. cit.

ence, for the people at large were still not disturbing themselves over the issue. The New York Tribune rather truthfully exemplified the attitude of a large part of the press in this fashion:

The movement for independence is largely the work of a small political class which aspires to make an experiment in nationalism for which the people of the islands as a whole are not prepared.¹⁴⁵

Again in 1924, the Filipinos sent a delegation to America to complain about General Wood and to ask again for independence. Speaking to the president and congress, this delegation, headed by Manuel Roxas, referred back to a statement of the late President Harding who had said, "No backward step is contemplated, no diminution of your domestic control is to be sought."¹⁴⁶ Against the background of this statement, the delegation asserted that such was no longer the character of American rule in the Islands and that "Governor General Wood has set at naught all understandings the Filipino people have had with the American government, . . . He has most decidedly taken a backward step. . . "¹⁴⁷ After naming a long list of the high crimes of which Wood was allegedly guilty, the delegation con-

145 Ibid., pp. 13-14.

146 "The Philippine Independence Mission Asks Immediate Action", Congressional Digest, April 1924, 3:230.

147 Loc. Cit.

cluded, "The time for Philippine independence has come." President Coolidge's reply was not as polite as the one which Harding had made to a similar plea. Among other things, he said,

I am convinced that Governor General Wood has at no time been other than a hard-working, painstaking, and conscientious administrator.

* * * * *
Frankly, it is not felt that that time has come. It is felt that in the present state of world relationship the American Government owes an obligation to continue extending a protecting arm to the people of these Islands.¹⁴⁸

In their 1924 convention the Republican party supported Coolidge's policies. Their platform was most positive in its mention of the Philippine problem. This was no doubt due to the light which had been thrown upon the subject by the Wood-Forbes investigation as well as the considerable publicity which the subject had attracted. Among other things, their platform of that year had this to say on the subject:

If the time comes when it is evident to Congress that independence would be better for the people of the Philippines with respect to both their domestic concerns and their status in the world, and the Filipino people then desire complete independence, the American Government will gladly accord it. The results of a careful study of the conditions in the Philippine Islands convinces us that the time for such action has

148

Ibid., p. 231.

not yet arrived.¹⁴⁹

In 1924, as usual, the Democrats stood for independence, and the Republican text-book of that year condemned such an attitude.

The Democratic party had never recovered from the fanatical "anti-imperialism" doctrine which Mr. Bryan advanced in 1900 in his endeavor to have the people forget his disastrous advocacy of free silver.¹⁵⁰

Although the Republican party could condemn the past acts of the Democrats, they could not escape the consequences of those acts. Regardless of the support which the Republican administration gave to Governor General Wood, it became more and more obvious that an intolerable impasse existed between Wood and the Filipino politicians. This led President Coolidge to send a new investigator to the Islands, Mr. Carmi A. Thompson. Thompson's report said basically the same things as the Wood-Forbes report. It is interesting to note that this period, (roughly 1926) was one during which there was a greatly expanding demand for rubber products. The British and the Dutch, but more particularly the British, held a practical monopoly on the production of raw rubber. There were those in America who hoped that by the exploitation of the Philippines America could break

¹⁴⁹ Republican Campaign Text-Book, 1924, Issued by the Republican National Committee., p. 88.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 390.

this monopoly. It is not difficult to reach a conclusion upon what channels Colonel Thompson's mind was inclined to dwell when one reads this excerpt from his speech to the Philippine legislature.

"I hope you gentlemen in your wisdom will find a way to open primarily for the benefit of your people the public lands in the rubber section. . . You require capital, but before the invitation to capital you should pass such laws as will preserve the rights of the people as well as safeguard the rights of those who are willing to support progress financially."¹⁵¹

Later, in his investigation, Colonel Thompson commented on what was apparently a preoccupation with him by saying, ". . . a rubber industry could be developed in the Philippines which would make the United States independent of any foreign rubber control."¹⁵²

If nothing else, the sending of Thompson to the Islands made the fact obvious that a permanent solution had not yet been found.

The Philippine legislature answered the Thompson report, and incidentally those who claimed that independence was desired only by the politicians, by authorizing a national plebiscite on the question. They, of course, felt that the national emotions would cause a vast vote in the

¹⁵¹ The Literary Digest, September 11, 1926, 90:5.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 6.

affirmative. This bill was vetoed by Wood, however, and the veto was supported by President Coolidge, who felt that

"A plebiscite on the question of immediate independence would tend to divert the attention of the people toward the pursuit of mere political power rather than to the consideration of the essential steps necessary for the maintenance of a stable, prosperous, well-governed community."¹⁵³

This veto the Springfield Republican, remembered as the implacable foe of imperialism in Bryan's day, commented upon as a "Fatherly veto". Thus had American opinion changed.

In addition to the Republican administration's attitude toward independence, there were also certain Democrats who at this time held similar views. In general, those who opposed casting the Islands free, seemed to be so convinced from a viewpoint of the best interests of the Filipinos. Robert Lansing, Wilson's Secretary of State, seemed to believe that it was to the best interests of the Filipino people to remain under American control for reasons which the following statement indicates:

In the past, Oligarchies have not been conducive to the general welfare of the people, the majority of whom do not possess the intellectual development necessary to conduct a popular government, and there is no evidence that the Philippines would prove to be an exception to

¹⁵³ Kirk, op. cit., p. 53.

the rule.¹⁵⁴

Senator Thomas J. Walsh, another prominent Democrat, voiced the double fear that the Filipinos were not prepared either emotionally or economically for independence.

I felt when I visited the Philippines four years ago that the desire for independence among the Filipinos was largely, if not wholly, sentimental, and nothing has happened to change that view. . .

Only a few Filipinos have reflected, I conceive, on the economic consequences of separation from the United States. . . ¹⁵⁵

The attitude of those opposing independence is illustrated by the following excerpt of a cablegram sent by Governor General Wood to the War Department. It also illustrates the attitude of the administration.

"I sympathize deeply with the desire of the Filipino people for independence, but know they are not yet prepared to assume its responsibility, either from the standpoint of instructed public opinion, preparedness for defense, a common language or economic resources."¹⁵⁶

The consensus of American opinion seemed to be that the Filipino politicians were blind to the forces of economics which bound the Islands' economy to America, and interest in the question died away almost completely.

¹⁵⁴ Vincent Villamin, "'Hold the Philippines!'" Signs of a Revolution in the Democratic Ranks." The American Review of Reviews, August, 1927, 76:154.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 156.

¹⁵⁶ "Highlights in the Political History of the Philippines, 1521-1931", The Congressional Digest, May 1931, 10:136.

" . . . even in Congress, interest in independence as an immediate problem died away almost completely."¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷ Kirk, op. cit., p. 52.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ECONOMIC PRESSURE BRINGS ABOUT INDEPENDENCE

Since those first days of national jubilation when Dewey had been the shining hero and the glamour of expansion had appealed, momentarily, to the imagination of the American people, there had never been a recurrence of popular interest of any magnitude in the Philippine Islands. True, there had been moments when this group or that group had been either indignant or joyous over some particular aspect of our policies. But there had never been a moment when any aspect of the Philippine question had shown signs of becoming the "paramount issue".

In the distant future of early 1942, the American people were again to turn their eyes to the west in a manner comparable to 1898, but this time it was not an interest in the Islands themselves which aroused the people but rather it was an alarmed national interest. For the purpose of this discussion it is therefore seen that between these two great surges of American interests in the Islands there lies a plain which, however, has many undulations and disturbances. One of these smaller crests originated as a result of the pressure exerted for independence from the Islands. Time after time, it appeared that this movement would become predominant, but each time it appeared that the underlying

forces supporting it were not strong enough to carry to a successful end. There were at work, however, forces which were to do so.

From the very beginning there had been opposition from certain southern sugar-producing states to America's policy in the Islands. Fearing that cheap labor and lands plus ideal climatic conditions would ruin the southern raiser of sugar cane, pressure began to originate in these localities, the residents of which imagined that the "yellow peril" of cheap imported sugar was upon them. This attitude is illustrated by a letter which was written to and printed in the American Economist of New Orleans.

" . . . within a very few years the competition of cheaper lands, cheaper labor, and a low freight rate by which Filipino raw sugar cane can be laid down in New York for a total of one cent per pound will result in the extermination of the cane and beet-sugar industry in the United States."¹⁵⁸

It will be remembered that President Taft, both as president and as a member of the cabinet, had advocated that the tariff rate on Philippine products should be lowered. The fear of competition caused the producers of American grown sugar to abhor such a policy as this quotation from The Louisiana Sugar Manufacturer would indicate:

"The admission of Philippine sugars into the United States, free of duty or at 25 per cent. of the Dingley

rates, . . . sounds the death knell of our domestic sugar industries, both cane and beet."¹⁵⁹

This was how the growers of sugar felt in 1906, seven years after our occupation began. The danger, however, was not immediate and since no one else seemed to pay much attention to this voice in the wilderness a system of free trade with the Philippines was inaugurated. American agriculture, as a whole was not aroused.

Neither in connection with the establishment of partial free trade in 1909 nor with full free trade in 1913 did the farm interests make any attempt to defeat the legislation.¹⁶⁰

Due to a variety of circumstances, Philippine economic competition slipped up on the American producer. The treaty with Spain specifically said that

The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States.¹⁶¹

As long as this situation existed, the old Spanish tariff laws prevailed, but for a twenty-five per cent reduction in 1902 on imports from the Islands. This period had more or less caused American producers to revert to

¹⁵⁹ Loc. cit.

¹⁶⁰ Kirk, Ibid., p. 73

¹⁶¹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, (Government Printing Office), p. 833.

complacency over the Island trade. It is of some interest to note that the main objection to the reduction of trade barriers came not, at first, from American agricultural interests but from American labor. The following quotation from the Cigar Makers International Union of America illustrates the attitude with which they viewed certain aspects of Philippine trade.

Owing to climate and the bounties of nature the Filipino lives very cheaply. Clothing is of the cheapest kind; he has no expensive rent to pay, no fuel to purchase, while he has self-sustaining food growing in abundance. We, on the other hand, must buy food and fuel, pay high rent, buy more expensive clothing, and, with the always increasing cost of living, we find the effort to sustain home, family, and life always equal to our income. We earnestly protest against our struggle for existence. We protest against the proposed changes in extending the amount of free importation of cigars from the Philippine Islands.¹⁶²

American sugar interest as yet had developed no antipathy of any great magnitude toward the Philippine sugar industry. Sugar growers in the United States were more concerned with the threat that Cuban grown sugar would present if sugar were allowed to come in free. In fact, in 1913, American and Philippine sugar growers found themselves thinking similar thoughts as it appeared that Cuban sugar might be allowed to enter the country free of duty. American cane and beet growers were afraid that free Cuban

¹⁶² Congressional Record, (63rd Congress, 1st Session), p. 1331.

sugar and eastern refiners would be their undoing. A lobbyist for domestic sugar stated it in this way,

If sugar is placed on the free list, either now or three years hence, as proposed, it will give the eastern cane refiners, who import and now pay duty on their raw material, the absolute power to depress prices below the cost of the production of sugar beets as well as Louisiana cane.

. . . At the present time the eastern refiners are utilizing less than half the productive capacity of their plants, and it will be a simple matter for them to deal a death blow to the domestic production of sugar, as they will have the assurance of an absolute monopoly as soon as the domestic industry is annihilated.¹⁶³

Since the free entry of Cuban sugar would have meant ruin for the Philippine sugar industry, Filipinos found themselves in full accord with this sentiment.¹⁶⁴

While all Philippine products had received encouragement from the tremendous demand which war had created, the product which had shown the most alarming gains were coconut products such as oil and copra. In 1910, the United States imported from the Islands 9,914,000 pounds of coconut products; in 1918, this figure had risen to 326,774,000, an increase in eight years of about 3300 per cent. When prices of dairy products and cottonseed oil (the competitors of coconut oil) began to drop, it was only natural that the

¹⁶³ Congressional Record, (63rd Congress, 1st Session), p. 1541.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 1537.

producers of these products should begin asking for trade restrictions on these products. This move was seconded by the domestic producers of cordage. Sufficient pressure had not yet arisen, however, and Congress did not take too seriously these cries for help. "No one in either house was seriously perturbed over the danger of Philippine import competition, . . . "165 In fact, the Fordney-McCumber tariff of 1922 tended to favor Philippine producers more than ever, since tariffs were raised on all other foreign producers it amounted to a subsidy for the Filipinos who had free entry into our market.

Like all great periods in history, the American economic depression had cast its shadow before it in the guise of a prolonged agricultural depression. With the passing of time, it appeared that the American farmer was not emerging from the postwar slump as successfully or rapidly as the commercial and industrial interests had. This was recognized by Secretary of Commerce, Hoover, in 1924, when he said,

"The farmer has not yet emerged from it. The past year has been one of high prosperity to the commercial and industrial side of our community. It has been one of great difficulty to the farmer, particularly in some of our Western states."166

165 Kirk, op. cit., p. 76.

166 Republican Campaign Text-Book, 1928, p. 250.

The farm groups had attempted in 1929 to secure a tariff on Philippine imports. Failing in this, they realized that their only recourse was to support Philippine independence. The plight of the American farmer showed no signs of alleviation. What prewar hostility there had been toward Philippine imports had not been predominately from the agricultural region of the country; because there had not existed any immediate good cause for such opposition.

Hostility on the part of American agriculture toward the unlimited entry of duty-free Philippine imports is entirely a postwar development and almost entirely a product of the depression.¹⁶⁷

As the forces of American agriculture rallied toward an independence measure for the Islands, the various organizations representing the dairy interests, cane and sugar interests, cottonseed oil interests, organized labor and also the American investors in Cuban and Puerto Rican sugar estates, since the latter stood to gain if import duties were to be imposed on Philippine products, transferred the pressure of their members to their representatives in Congress. Organizations which maintained lobbies in Washington were ". . . the National Dairy Union, the National Grange, the National Co-operative Milk Producers' Federation, the Southern Tariff Association, and various producers of cottonseed oil. . . "¹⁶⁸ Another notable organization in this field

¹⁶⁷ Kirk, op. cit., p. 73.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 79.

was the Farm Bureau Federation. A representative of the National Farmers' Union was frank in his economic justification for his organization's support of independence.

Until independence is granted the present situation compels the farmers in the United States to meet the unfair competition of Philippine products in our domestic markets. We insist that independence be granted the Philippine Islands at the earliest possible moment so that the American market can be preserved for American farmers.¹⁶⁹

This same individual speaking before a congressional committee presented the argument of the cottonseed oil people.

The oriental oils, there is no doubt about it, fix the prices of the cottonseed oil in this country. A study of prices from year to year will show anyone that that is true and that the prices of cottonseed oil follow the prices of the coconut and other oils that come not only from the Philippine Islands but from other countries.

. . . the Farmers' Union says to you gentlemen of this committee and to the American Congress:

Give these folks their freedom and in turn the farmers of America their freedom.¹⁷⁰

Marshaled beside the American farmer in this campaign were the forces of organized American labor. Labor feared the import of cheaply made Philippine goods as exemplified by the previously mentioned case of the cigar

¹⁶⁹ Statement of John A. Simpson, President of the National Farmers' Union, Hearings on H.R. 7233, A Bill to Provide for the Independence of the Philippine Islands, before House Committee on Insular Affairs, (77th Congress, 1st Session), p. 185-86.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 186.

makers. Mr. W. C. Hushing, representing the American Federation of Labor, before a House Investigating Committee, presented the history of labor's attitude toward the question of Philippine independence.

We have favored the independence of the Philippine Islands since they came under the jurisdiction of the United States.

We can not understand how a country of our historical background and with our ideals can hold any nation or country in subjugation, and they are a subject people. . . . for many years, we have advocated their independence. About 15 years after they came under our jurisdiction, we began to receive complaints which bolstered that stand for another reason. That was the competition that we received in certain lines from their low paid labor. . . .¹⁷¹

At this point the representative of labor brought up a relatively new argument which was being increasingly used by those forces favoring independence, that of Philippine immigration.

We believe that they should be given their independence and be barred from this country the same as any other race that can not become citizens; . . . not on the same basis as the peoples of the Western Hemisphere might be barred, but on the same ground and under the same laws that any barred race is kept out of this country.¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ Statement of W. C. Hushing, National Legislation Representative of the American Federation of Labor, Hearings on H.R. 7233, A Bill to Provide for the Independence of the Philippine Islands, before House Committee on Insular Affairs, (77th Congress, 1st Session), p. 233.

¹⁷²

Loc. cit.

In addition to the comments of the various lobbyists, it is equally interesting to read some of the comments of the senators and representatives who, regardless of their particular party, were beginning belatedly to swing into line, mostly as a matter of pure politics. While discussing the 1929 tariff, Senator Heflin of Alabama, said,

Mr. President, I am in favor of the independence of the Philippine Islands. I would vote today to free the Philippine Islands. They are hanging like a milestone about the necks of the cotton producers and the peanut, bean, and corn producers of the United States. Let us give them their independence and get rid of the Philippine Islands now.

I am particularly interested in preventing the coming in of their cheap and inferior vegetable oils in competition with our cottonseed oil, peanut oil, bean and corn oil.

Mr. President, let us vote on the question now and go on record as being in favor of freeing the Philippine people, giving them their independence, and hereafter when this cheap inferior stuff comes in to swamp our American farmers we can put a tariff on it, protect their interests, and preserve the home market for our American home people.¹⁷³

Senator Vandenburg, evidently having in mind his Michigan sugar growing constituents, had his bit to say on this Philippine competition.

I entirely agree that the greatest single exposure, which American sugar, as well as many other farm commodities, confronts is exposure on the West from free trade

173
Congressional Record, (71st Congress, 1st Session),
 p. 4395.

in Philippine sugar.¹⁷⁴

Representative Cross of Texas described the Filipinos as being, "Withal, a people as ultra in physical type, mental concepts, and racial customs, from the people of these United States, as can be found between the poles." He then proceeded to the real basis of his belief, "I assert that if we would befriend the primary industry of this country, agriculture, . . . then we should grant to the Filipinos their unqualified independence without delay."¹⁷⁵

The American depression and its accompanying characteristics appeared as a mountain to the American people. But, to the Philippine politician, seeking independence and realizing his own impotency it gave new hope, and he was not long in emulating the biblical example "I will lift mine eyes unto the mountain from whence cometh my help." He was not long in raising his eyes to this new benefactor and taking full advantage of it.

Well aware of the new forces which had appeared on the scene, the Filipinos renewed their propaganda campaign in this country and sent a new mission to agitate and to co-operate with the farm group. The Filipinos were not unaware

¹⁷⁴ Congressional Record, (71st Congress, 2nd Session) pp. 1307-1308, Vol. 72.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 8797.

of the strange and unusual character of their bedfellows. This was apparent in the conversation which took place before a House Committee between Camilo Osios, Resident Commissioner from the Philippine Islands, and Fred Cummings, President of the National Beet Growers association. Mr. Cummings made the remark "I saw more Filipinos here this morning than I ever saw at any time in my life. . . but if the people here are a fair sample of the people of the Philippine Islands, I can not understand why any man should be uneasy about them taking care of themselves after they get their freedom." To this, Mr. Osios remarked, "I smile again, because of this advocacy in favor of our independence."¹⁷⁶ Earlier Juan Sumulong, minority floor leader of the Philippine Senate, had recognized the unique nature of the pressure which was being exerted in his cause,

. . . the agitation in this country against Philippine products such as sugar, coconut oil, tobacco, and even cordage, is retarding and will continue to retard the economic development of the islands. . . because the tariff privileges which their products now enjoy may be removed at the least expected moment. . . .

We have no quarrel with the American producers who exert every effort to eliminate the alleged competition

¹⁷⁶ Statement of Fred Cummings, President of the National Beet Growers Association, Hearings on H.R. 7233, A Bill to Provide for the Independence of the Philippine Islands, before House Committee on Insular Affairs, (77th Congress, 1st Session), p. 164.

of Philippine products.¹⁷⁷

Philippine politicians, although they professed to believe that there were ways of reorienting their national economy, never denied that the Philippine economy was bound to the American market. This dependence was never denied by Manuel Quezon,

. . . who admits that the economic independence of the islands depends upon the free trade they enjoy with America; not what America sends into the islands free, but what the islands send into America free.¹⁷⁸

The rationalizations of the Filipino politicians is illustrated by this statement of Manuel Roxas.

In case we would lose the free entry of our products into the United States. . . two of our most important staple products would be affected, namely, sugar and tobacco.

If the products of the Philippines must suffer with the disruption of free-trade relations, I think it will simply mean momentarily. We would be able to readjust our system. . . There is no reason why Java and Cuba can raise sugar and afford duty thereon and the Philippine Islands can not.¹⁷⁹

177 Statement of Hon. Juan Sumulong, Minority floor leader, Philippine Senate, Hearings on H.R. 5182, A Bill to Provide for the Independence of the Philippine Islands, before House Committee on Insular Affairs, (71st Congress, 2nd Session), p. 37.

178 Walter Robb, "Wood's Philippines After One Year's Work," The Outlook, January 31, 1923, 133:219.

179 Manuel Roxas, "Could Philippines Survive Economically Today If Independent?", Congressional Digest, April, 1924, 3:237.

It was this attitude of apparent dodging of economic facts which had been and was still frowned upon by the Republican administration.

As it stood after 1930, the farm, Cuban sugar, Hawaiian sugar and American Labor interests were aligned with the Philippine lobbyists. The attitude of the administration, however, as presented by the Secretary of War, the Hon. Patrick J. Hurley, was not so inclined:

. . . I would like to familiarize the committee in the beginning with some conclusions that I have reached. . .

The political chaos in the Orient today is such that, in my opinion, this is no time to deal with Philippine independence. . . .

Until the Filipino people shall have made greater progress toward economic independence, political independence would merely invite chaos and revolution. . . .

The political and social institutions of the Filipino people are not yet developed to a point where the stability of an independent government would be reasonably assured.

The most essential steps toward economic independence for the Philippine islands are the establishment of stable trade relations, and greater diversification of Philippine agriculture and industry.¹⁸⁰

This was the opinion of the administration; it was well supported by the American Press. According to a survey of the

¹⁸⁰ Statement of Hon. Patrick J. Hurley, Secretary of War, Hearings on S. 3377, (Hawes-Cutting Bill), before Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, (72nd Congress, 1st Session), p. 7.

editorial policies of various papers, it appeared that in the year ending February 20, 1932,

The total number of newspapers which have gone on record during the past year as specifically against immediate independence, as discovered by this survey, is 246. The total number which have gone on record during the same year as against retention of the islands, the survey indicates, is only 26. Many newspapers, of course, have expressed no opinion on the issues.¹⁸¹

Following are a few quotations referred to in the above which reflect various attitudes and approaches to the problem. The New York Times of February 12, 1932 said:

"There is no abandonment of the hope ultimately to set up a self-governing Filipino republic, but the strong and prevailing conviction at present was well set forth by Secretary Hurley. . . ."

One newspaper, the Atlanta Georgian, denying that Philippine independence would help the farmer, said,

"The total exclusion of Philippine sugar from this country, . . . would not affect the situation in the least, so far as the American sugar producer is concerned. It would only mean the admission of more Cuban sugar, as American sugar interests in Cuba well know."

Another paper from the north-central region, the Fort Wayne Journal Gazette gave tongue to the new fear of Japanese

181 Ten Eyck Associates, "Philippine Independence--- A Survey of the Present State of American Public Opinion on the Subject, as expressed in editorial comment throughout the U.S. during the past 12 months," Hearings on S. 3377, (Hawes-Cutting Bill), before Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, (72nd Congress, 1st Session), p. 77.

aggression and implied that America for self-protection should give the Islands their independence.

"If America has any notion, as some urge should be the fact, of washing hands of the bloody affair between China and Japan and permitting the entire situation in the Far East to develop and work out as it may. . . the sooner we clear out of the Philippines the better. Otherwise, we can not clear out."

The Decatur Herald (October 31, 1931) came close to the truth when it said,

"If the Filipino gets independence within the next decade, it will not be because Americans still burn with the political idealism of Jefferson, but because the arrangement looks like smart business."

The Dayton Herald voiced the old Republican sentiment of the "sacred obligation" by saying,

"The future of the islands is safer in American hands than in those of insular politicians. This trust can not be relinquished with honor until national development in the islands has reached such a point that their political and economic safety is assured."

The Chicago News commented:

"Not devotion to high principle but selfish material considerations have caused a notable accession of strength to the Philippine independence movement."¹⁸²

This report summarized:

An inevitable conclusion: The American people do not believe in either the wisdom or the justice of granting Philippine independence at the present time.

. . . The mass of comment leads, as the reader has seen, to the inevitable conclusion that, as a whole, the Amer-

182

Ibid., pp. 64-70.

ican people to-day are in full agreement with those who feel that the Philippines should not now be given political independence, and, more specifically, should not be given political independence until their economic independence is assured. . . . Eventual independence, yes, but not immediate independence; this is the spirit that is obviously moving the American people, . . .¹⁸³

Thus, there were three main forces opposed to the granting of independence: (1) the administration, (2) the press, (3) the exporters of American goods to the Islands. The latter group was of no great weight in the fight.

After much delay and compromising, a Philippine Independence Bill, the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill, was finally sent to President Hoover in December, 1932. The President quickly vetoed the bill and such was the pressure behind it that the Congress just as quickly passed it over his veto. The following quotation describes the general provisions of this bill.

The general process under the new law by which independence was to be achieved was comparatively simple. The legislature was authorized to provide for the election of delegates to a constitutional convention which was to begin its work within a year. This constitution was to be submitted within two years to the President of the United States for his approval.¹⁹ If the constitution met with the President's approval, it was then to be submitted within four months to the people for ratification or rejection. If ratified by a popular majority, the governor general was then to order an election for the officers of the new government. On the fourth of July following the end of the tenth year of this Commonwealth government, the President of the United States was to be required to "withdraw and

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 74.

surrender all right of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control, or sovereignty," and he would at that time request foreign governments to recognize the new state.¹⁸⁴

The law further provided that the quotas of goods which could be shipped without duty into the United States should be reduced.

The Philippine Legislature found these conditions unacceptable and declined the offer.

President Roosevelt was known to be favorable to an independence measure and on March 24, 1934, he approved the bill which Congress presented him, the Tiddings-McDuffy Bill. The Filipinos, realizing that they would probably not be able to obtain any further concessions, accepted.

Certain pertinent provisions of the bill are here quoted:

Section I. The Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide for the election of delegates to a constitutional convention, which shall meet in the hall of the house of representatives in the capital of the Philippine Islands, at such time as the Philippine Legislature may fix, but not later than October 1, 1934, to formulate and draft a constitution for the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands, subject to the conditions and qualifications prescribed in this Act. . . .

Sec. 3. Upon the drafting and approval of the constitution by the constitutional convention in the Philippine Islands, the constitution shall be submitted within two years after the enactment of this Act to the President of the United States, who shall determine whether or

¹⁸⁴ Kirk, op. cit., p. 121.

not it conforms with the provisions of this Act.

Sec. 4. After the President of the United States has certified that the constitution conforms with the provisions of this Act, it shall be submitted to the people of the Philippine Islands for their ratification or rejection at an election to be held within four months after the date of such certification, on a date to be fixed by the Philippine Legislature, at which election the qualified voters of the Philippine Islands shall have an opportunity to vote directly for or against the proposed constitution and ordinances appended thereto.

This law further provided certain economic provisions and trade restrictions.

There shall be levied, collected, and paid on all refined sugars in excess of fifty thousand long tons, and on unrefined sugars in excess of eight hundred thousand long tons, coming into the United States from the Philippine Islands in any calendar year, the same rates of duty which are required by the laws of the United States to be levied, collected, and paid upon like articles imported from foreign countries.

Sec. 10. (a) On the 4th day of July immediately following the expiration of a period of ten years from the date of the inauguration of the new government under the constitution provided for in this Act the President of the United States shall by proclamation withdraw and surrender all right of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control, or sovereignty then existing and exercised by the United States in and over the territory and people of the Philippine Islands, including all military and other reservations of the Government of the United States in the Philippines (except such naval reservations and fueling stations as are reserved under section 5), and, on behalf of the United States, shall recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands as a separate and self-governing nation and acknowledge the authority and control over the same of the government instituted by the people thereof, under the constitution then in force.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁵ United States Statutes at Large, (73rd Congress) Pt. 1, pp. 456, 458, 459, 463.

Under these conditions independence had been offered to and accepted by the Filipinos. Thus, the first legal step had been taken toward complete independence. However, this was not the end of American interest in the Islands and the wisdom of our action is still open to debate.

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