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POST WORLD WAR II AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:
EXTERNAL THREATS AND
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY

By

Craig Z. Zachariasen

B.S.E., University of South Dakota at Springfield, 1973

Presented in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
1983

Approved:

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ABSTRACT

Zachariasen, Craig Z., M.A., Spring 1983 Political Science

Post World War II American Civil-Military Relations: External Threats and Public Support for the Military

Director: Forest L. Grievies

This work is an analysis of the impact external events have on public opinion and support of the American military. Specifically, the study centers on the allocation of two important national resources--money and manpower--and the public's willingness to sacrifice these in support of an efficient military organization which is used as an implement of foreign policy. This involves a study of fluctuations in defense spending and enlistee rates as indicators of the public's support for its military establishment.

In conclusion, public opinion and its influence on defense spending in reaction to an external crisis is a valid indication of public support for the nation's military and foreign policies, but fluctuation in enlistee rates is not. They are due primarily to changes in the domestic environment.

PREFACE

American civil-military relations are established on the foundation of civil control over the function and use of military forces. Achieving a compatible relationship between this civilian control and military effectiveness has long plagued American policy makers. Quite often, the issue of civil-military relations is addressed strictly in terms of "the military" with little regard to civilian influence in these relations. Americans must not forget that a nation and its military forces are not separate entities, and that the military's role in society is a result of environmental factors. One such factor which has a definite influence on society's attitude towards the military is an external threat or foreign policy crisis.

It can generally be assumed that opposition towards the military will increase or decrease in relation to the intensity of a perceived threat or crisis. Gabriel Almond in The American People and Foreign Policy states that when foreign policy questions pose a threat to the normal conduct of affairs, they share the public's attention with domestic concerns. He concludes by saying, "it is not the foreign or domestic character of the issue which determines the accessibility of public attention, but the intimacy of the impact."

How can we evaluate the intimacy of this impact? It will be the purpose of this thesis to analyze two areas of public interest which seem to reflect America's concern relating to national defense. These areas will concentrate on two of the nation's resources which are of direct importance to the American public: money and manpower. A military force cannot function without these resources, and the importance a nation places in its military is reflected in its willingness to allow these resources to be allocated to the armed forces. Thus, research for this thesis is concentrated on the defense budget and the level of public opposition toward military service.

This thesis is not an attempt at a definitive work on the subject encompassing all the elements such an effort would entail. Rather, the modest goal of this work is an effort to demonstrate a pattern between fluctuations in the areas of the public attitude pertaining to military service and the defense budget in the presence of an external threat or crisis. This thesis is an attempt to answer the following question: Do fluctuations in the areas of attitude toward military service and the defense budget provide a reliable assessment of the level of public support, or opposition, present in American society toward the military? It is my belief that fluctuation in these areas will support the hypothesis--that public support of the military does fluctuate in relation to the presence of a foreign policy

crisis. The time span will be limited to the years 1946-1980.

The first chapter presents a broad historical survey of American civil-military relations which developed the themes of civilian supremacy over the military, reliance on a citizen soldier, military influence in policy making, and the effect public opinion has had on national security policy. Chapter Two discusses the various theories and ideas concerning the role of public opinion in deciding policy issues. The theories as to the appropriate role for public opinion in policy development are many and varied, but this chapter develops the perspective that public opinion has three functions in policy development. It acts as a constraint, a stimulus, and a resource for policy makers. These functions are carried into Chapter Three which correlates fluctuations in the defense budget with the presence of an external threat or crisis and the support of the American public for a decrease or increase in defense spending. Chapter Four attempts to clarify the same idea in relation to public attitude toward military service. Chapter Five, the concluding chapter, will endeavor to assess the impact the presence of external events and public opinion have had on public support for the military based on the findings in Chapters Two and Three.

Hopefully, this thesis will provide additional support to the idea that the American military is a reflection of American society, and its efficiency is in direct relation

to the support it receives from the American people.

¹Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 71.

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CHAPTER I

CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS 1776-1980: A REVIEW

Introduction

The United States military establishment has become the largest institutional complex within the United States government. The military's operations influence all elements of society, ranging from education to medicine. In addition, its presence extends into almost every community of the United States in the form of military bases, National Guard or Reserve units, and numerous other elements of the military organization, such as ROTC and armed forces recruiters.

Americans have historically looked upon their military establishment with contrasting attitudes. In the early days of America, the citizenry saw in their geographic isolation from Europe a protection for themselves and their independence. Most Americans also believed that a standing army--by nature of its composition, discipline, and power--posed an overwhelming threat to their liberty. Experiences such as the Boston Massacre, the Quartering Act, and other incidents during colonial times made the standing army the universal symbol of despotism and corruption.¹

In another light, Americans have looked to their military institutions as instruments of defense for their liberties and as an institution that could not threaten society. As John Hancock stated:

their (the military) interest is the same as that of the state...; they do not jeopardize their lives for a master who considers them only instruments of his ambitions.²

These differing opinions as to the place in society the military occupies have caused much research, discussion, and analysis concerning what has come to be known as the American civil-military tradition. It is the purpose of this chapter to review the evolution of American civil-military relations from 1776-1980 in an attempt to identify any apparent trends or major themes in American civil-military relations regarding the military.

1. American Civil-Military Evolution 1776-1900

The Anglo-American tradition of civil-military relationships was born in the system of government used in England in the eighteenth century. A large standing army did not exist; and, therefore, the defense of England relied upon a compulsory levy of the male population to serve in the militia when the need arose.³ This system also was used in the American colonies. However, central control over the state militias was absent, just as there was no central control over home government. Each colony developed its own version of government and militia. Militiamen were not to be used outside of their colonial boundaries and must be controlled by the colonial government.⁴

During the French and Indian War, American militia units proved to be poorly trained and equipped which led to their not presenting an equal match to the French forces. Jealousies among the colonies prevented the acceptance of Benjamin Franklin's Albany Plan, which called for a "Grand Council" of colonial delegates to raise, finance, and strengthen the defense of all the colonies.⁵

During the course of the American Revolution, a dual myth developed that the militiamen were either useless or the only true victors of the war. In a balanced view, it must be clearly understood that they contributed greatly to the war effort, but that it was not their expertise in the military art which made them important--but, as historian Maurice Matloff states, it was the "ubiquity of the militia that made British victories over Continentals (Regulars) in the field so meaningless."⁶

Continental Regulars were found to be more reliable than the militia but available in far fewer numbers. Continentals were reinforced by state militias as they moved from one area of the war to another. General Washington, himself, maintained that "regular troops are alone equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defense as offense, and whenever a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous."⁷

Nationalism, a key to successful government as well as military policy, was weakened in the colonies by the fact

the Revolution was being fought against a central authority and by the various state loyalties of the colonists.⁸ Congress was made up of thirteen delegates from sovereign states and lacked the financial power necessary to direct the struggle. Congress's inability to tax led them to direct the states to supply their own line units. This caused many logistical problems and increased the internal division within the army. Despite all these problems, it is still necessary to point out that the consolidated--although, often disjointed--effort of the colonies to defeat England was the prime example of a rising feeling of nationalism in America. Also, the debate which began long before the Revolution on the positive or negative aspects of a standing army versus a volunteer militia was not settled and would continue for decades to come.

During the Revolution, American leaders attempted to develop a governmental system capable of providing for coordinated conduct of the war and also to establish policies and procedures which would lead them safely into the future. The first real national government adopted by the thirteen states in 1777--ratified in 1781--was labeled the Articles of Confederation, a simple "league of friendship."⁹ There was no central directing body, and Congress lacked the power to levy taxes, raise troops, establish courts, or compel states to observe the treaties made with other countries. The Articles were very weak and forced reliance on a consen-

sus by the individual states to conduct most political action.

Militarily, the Articles of Confederation could have led to the complete failure of the Revolutionary War. The Continental Congress did not have the authority to finance the military and could only request militia units for service with the Continentals. This did not change when the Continental Congress became the Congress of the United States. Congress was given the power to declare war but still had to requisition money and men from the states.¹⁰ Under these restrictions, it would be difficult to raise a Confederation force of any real military effectiveness. Problems, such as this, in requesting military forces from the states to protect national interests were indicative of military affairs under the Articles.

George Washington, who as Commander of the Continental Army during the revolution, had suffered under this system and was a strong proponent of a constitution which gave the central government the powers of the purse and sword. His criticism of the Articles is best presented by an excerpt in a letter he wrote to a relative:

The great business of war can never be well conducted, if it can be conducted at all, while the powers of Congress are only recommendatory. While one state yields obedience and another refuses it, while a third mutilates and adopts the measure in part only, and all vary in time and manner, it is scarcely possible that our affairs can prosper, or

that anything but disappointment can follow the best concerted plans.¹¹

The inability of the government to run the nation effectively prompted thirteen delegates from the states to meet in Philadelphia in March 1787 to revise the Articles. The central question of the convention was to attempt to establish an effective distribution of authority between the states and central government. Although the question of national defense was not the premier one, it was recognized as a matter of considerable importance. As discussion over the distribution of authority proceeded, the support the delegates gave toward either a strong or weak military was established in accordance with their views on the larger question of a strong or weak national government.¹²

The military clauses of the Constitution came to reflect a cautious compromise between the hopes of those who favored greater military strength and the fears of those who anticipated a military despotism. The Constitution firmly established the element of civilian control of the military by the division of war powers between the legislative and executive branches of government. This delineation of duties was to insure a balance of civil and military authority. Command of the military was placed with the President and the powers of financing and raising a military placed with Congress. Congress was also given the sole authority to declare war.

The states were placated in that each was guaranteed a republican form of government and was allowed to maintain their own militias. They were to be responsible for appointing officers and training all militia forces in accordance with regulations provided by Congress.¹³

With the acceptance of the Constitution in 1789, the new republic was provided with a system for the partitioning of power between the states and the nation. It also established a set of checks and balances which was to insure no abuse of power by any one branch of the government. The Constitution retained the dual military system bequeathed to the United States by its history--a citizen soldiery enrolled in state militias, plus a professional army. The formation of the Legion of the United States under General "Mad" Anthony Wayne marked the beginning of the United States Regular Army. The Militia Act of 1792 called for the enrollment of every free, white able-bodied male citizen between eighteen and forty-five in the militia of his state. This Act preserved and improved the inherited tradition of a citizen soldier which was to be the mainstay of America's defense for years to come.¹⁴

By 1794, the Regular Army numbered some four thousand men, but an American Navy was nonexistent. A national policy of defense was also lacking because America was relying on its geographic isolation to be its first line of defense.

In response to the European threat caused by the outbreak of the French Revolution and the subsequent quarrel between Great Britain and France, Americans began to consider a more substantial system of defense. Coastal fortifications were rebuilt, and six frigates were authorized for the Navy, although, only three were completed.¹⁵ The creation of a Department of Navy and the appointment of a Secretary of Navy was prompted by America's undeclared war with France in 1798. This war produced the beginnings of a formal American Navy in developing teamwork and fighting spirit.

In 1801, the Jeffersonians entered office intent upon economy in government, including the reduction of military expenditures. Jefferson saw the future of the Navy in his gunboat fleet and the future of the Army in the citizen's militia. During his tenure in office, the Army was reduced from four thousand to twenty-six hundred men.¹⁶

Jefferson's military defensive system--or lack of it--set the stage for the problems the Madison administration would face in attempting to achieve political goals without the military means to support them. At the beginning of the War of 1812, President Madison dwelt on Great Britain's need to respect American neutrality at sea. This was a ludicrous request, for America did not have the naval might to enforce it.¹⁷

Due to the lack of naval support, American action in response to England's hostility was to punish her at "some

vulnerable point until she should feel obliged to yield to the American view of international law at sea."¹⁸ This vulnerable point came to be Canada. The defeat of America's Canadian expedition caused public support for the war to diminish.

The War of 1812 was at best a military draw and a political embarrassment for Americans. Still, it contributed to the building of national unity. Men of different states fighting side by side to protect the nation and the few military successes they achieved served to give the nation a more mature and independent attitude, which served to unite and strengthen its character.¹⁹

There were those, however, who looked at the results of the war from a different perspective. The deficiencies of the Army--made up of state militias--in relation to the discipline and bravery of the Regular Army--whose composition was of professional soldiers--and the poor showing of the state militia volunteers pointed towards a need for military reform. President Madison was one who saw this need, but the weight of public sentiment made the acceptance of military reform proposals unlikely. John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War under President Monroe, recommended an "expansible army" to Congress. The staff and cadres of such an establishment would be maintained during peacetime. If hostilities should break out, the nucleus of this army--six thousand

officers and men--could be tripled by a simple expansion process using volunteers as fill-ins. Calhoun stated his reason for maintaining this type of Army as follows:

I am aware that the militia is considered, and in many respects justly, as the great national force; but, to render them effective they require the aid of regular troops. War is an art, to attain perfection in which, much time and experience, particularly for officers, are necessary.²⁰

Calhoun's plan was not accepted by Congress, but the assumption he made gained almost universal acceptance. The regular army would be small but expandable and professional. The militia would, as before, constitute the main mass. The need for a strong navy surfaced because of the British freedom to roam the seas at will during the War of 1812. As a result, America's first line of defense consisted of battleships and frigates backed up by coastal batteries. Thus, a longtime military policy of reliance on a strong standing Navy and an expandable Army began, which was to continue into the twentieth century.

The result of these formative years--1783-1815--was that the young nation proved itself capable of survival and able to organize and plan for internal development. The creation of the Constitution set the stage for the republic's future. A tenuous compromise between state sovereignty and the powers of a nationalist government also evolved. This compromise did not settle the debate but quieted it for the time being. The realization that a nation must have an Army and Navy to

defend its shores and to project its presence abroad dawned on Americans. A large standing army still was not accepted, but the need for a small Army of professionals was acknowledged.

After the War of 1812, America entered a period of national growth. Railroads began etching their way west, and America's merchant navy began to spread American trade and presence around the world. This period of nation building became marked by the widespread involvement of the military, primarily the Army, in many facets of American life. An indication of the declining interest in military affairs is the content of John Quincy Adams's second annual message. In this message, the peacetime duties of the Army have more significance placed on them than just their readiness for war. In his message, Adams states:

...to the War Department are attributed other duties...the maintenance of our relations of peace and of protection with the Indian tribes, and the internal improvements and surveys for the location of roads and canals, which during the last 3 sessions of Congress have engaged so much of their attention, and may engross so large a share of the future benefaction to our country.²¹

The reorganization of West Point in 1817 marked it as America's first school of technology. Up until 1840 and even 1850, almost all the nation's civil engineers received their preparation at West Point. They assisted in developing the nation's harbors and waterways and in surveying for the railroads. In 1834, the House Committee on Military

Affairs remarked:

The Academy...has accomplished a noble service by sending forth numbers annually competent to superintend the construction of those chains of internal improvement which are²² to be the external bonds of our National Union...

The years between 1817-1845 were known as the "Thirty Years Peace." As far as the Regular Army was concerned, this was a misnomer. With the advent of the westward movement of settlers and railroads, the Army was kept busy providing protection for these American pioneers. Three major Indian conflicts--the Seminole War of 1817, the Blackhawk War of 1832, and the Florida or Second Seminole War--were but a beginning of the major conflicts America would have with the Indians over the next eighty years.²³

The Army entered into the Mexican War highly confident in itself and its capabilities. Professionalism within the officer's corps had increased, and education in technical and tactical advancements enabled the small Regular Army to be familiar with the latest thoughts and equipment in these areas. A public, spurred on by the theory of "Manifest Destiny," lent moral support to many of the military operations in the West and Southwest.

One of the principal military features of the Mexican War was the demonstrated ability of the citizen soldier, with a basic military training, to fight respectably alongside Regulars. This was brought about by professionally

trained officers who were available to supervise volunteer training. The results of this training were summarized by then-Lieutenant Ulysses Grant:

The citizen soldiers were associated with so many disciplined men and professionally educated officers, that when they went into engagements it was with a confidence they would not have felt otherwise.²⁴ They became soldiers themselves almost at once.

Primarily, because the Army did well in the Mexican War and partly because the government was aware of the results changes in military policy might have in affecting the sectional balance of the nation, few innovations marked the history of the United States military from the Mexican War to 1861. As the sectional crisis continued, both sides exempted the Regular Army from involvement in it to prevent either side from obtaining a potential military advantage over the other.²⁵ In addition, the normal demobilization of forces at the conclusion of hostilities, which had become a trademark of the Anglo-American military tradition, had occurred unnoticed. This spread the remaining Regular forces very thin over the vast frontier it now had to police. As a major issue of domestic policy, the question of a military force organization and use would not be addressed as a major issue again until the Civil War. America's attention was now fixed on the questions of sectionalism, states rights, and slavery. All issues, the result of which would lead to a division of the nation itself.

The United States entered the Civil War with the same military system that had been bequeathed it by the makers of the Constitution. The organized militia of the states had fallen into disrepair, but many volunteer organizations had emerged to take their place. The United States Army as a regular professional force influenced the war little. Twenty-six thousand regulars on active duty at one time during the Civil War was the maximum.²⁶ The majority of the regulars were being used to take care of the Indians on the frontiers, and only minimal numbers were to be used to train the volunteers, despite the lessons learned in the Mexican American War. Both governments turned most of the recruiting burden over to the state and initially had considerable success in meeting the desired numbers. As historian Bruce Catton states, "in 1861, war had come because emotion took charge when hard decisions were to be made."²⁷ The surge of emotional zeal did not last, however, and both governments soon turned to conscription. Combined, they mobilized approximately two and a quarter million men during the course of the war.

Civil-military problems during this period of turmoil were not as evident as they were during peace. Americans have a tendency to fall in line with national policy once a war commences. So it was in the Civil War. One of the major problems Abraham Lincoln faced as President was who should be placed in charge of the military forces.

initially, it was to be aging General Winfield Scott. General Scott was soon replaced by General William McClellan. Lincoln's war aims passed through two stages--conciliation with the South and, later in the war, total defeat of the South.²⁸ In order to coordinate military strategy with national policy, Lincoln attempted to utilize generals whose military strategy ran parallel with national policy. General McClellan's conciliatory strategy corresponded with Lincoln's initial attempt to reunify the Union quickly and with limited loss of life. His principal objective was not the destruction of the Confederate Army but the capture of Richmond in hopes that this could shorten the war.²⁹ McClellan's caution, however, eventually caused him to be relieved by Lincoln during the Peninsula Campaign. McClellan was followed by a string of generals who were neither effective in coordinating military strategy with political policy nor in the actual conduct of war.

During this middle stage of the war, the problems which surfaced were not caused solely by military inefficiency. Lincoln, himself, failed to supply his generals with military objectives and policy guidance to permit the two to complement each other.³⁰ It is imperative that in a democracy the military be given direction by the civilian authorities. Without this direction, military success is unlikely, and the danger of military authority creating its own strategy and policy is increased. Russell Weigley best

explained Lincoln's dilemma in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems:

He (Lincoln) hoped to find a way to avoid that outcome in the Civil War, but he failed. The war became a social revolution. Once Lincoln acquiesced in that result, and concluded finally that only the utter destruction of the Confederate armies, war resources, and will to fight to restore the Union, he chose and supported, in Grant and Sherman, generals whose strategy fitted the new and now ruthless design of the war.³¹

With the acceptance by Lincoln of Grant as general of the armies, the end of the war was set. The surrender of Lee at Appomattox and the end of an era marked by the reunification of the nation were the results of the coordinated political policy and military strategy applied by Lincoln and Grant. In the history of military-civilian relationships, this was to be a prime example of the "yoking of military strategy and civilian policy" as stated by historian Russell Weigley.³²

With the surrender of Confederate forces, the United States Regular Army was given two primary responsibilities. The mass armies of the war were replaced by volunteer professionals, many of whom were immigrants escaping famine and oppression in Europe. These volunteers were to police the frontiers of the nation and to carry out the policy of reconstruction in the defeated Southern states. It was this latter policy of reconstruction which caused serious civil-military problems. President Johnson's reconstruction policies in the South were deemed too liberal by the

soldiers. Also, the presidential backing of the military to carry out such a sensitive policy was lacking, and Union officers became convinced that Johnson's policy strengthened former rebels and according to Harold Hyman allowed "unrepentant southern whites to harass federal soldiers and Unionists..."³³ Soon a division of allegiances among the officers formed--those who were siding with Congress and those who were with the President. Johnson's resultant impeachment was due, in large part, to his seeking to be commander-in-chief of the army units in the South, which was to be under the control of Congress. He escaped conviction by one vote, but reconstruction proceeded in the manner the soldiers had felt necessary since 1865. From this time on, the Army was to be invisible in the realm of government no longer.³⁴

During the period 1865-1899, the Army fought ten separate campaigns against the Indians to maintain peace on the frontier and to expand westward. Although the Indian wars and the French threat in Mexico kept the Army lean and hard and bequeathed it a rich tradition of professionalism, these years--1865-1891--were to be known as the "Dark Ages of the Army."³⁵ During this period, the military was used to quell civil disturbances, which never endears an Army to the society of which it is a part. In 1877, the Hayes administration used troops to restore order following several

railroad worker strikes. The Army was also used in the Pullman Strike of 1894 under President Cleveland's direction; and on 8 July 1894, army troops fired upon a mob in Hammond, Indiana, and at least one rioter was killed.³⁶

During these "Dark Ages," American society isolated the armed forces politically, intellectually, socially, and even physically. The majority of the forces were stationed on the frontiers and had limited contact with the rest of the nation until 1890. An educational system beyond West Point was established, and under the guidance of General Sherman a more equitable method of promotion and retirement policies was established. Experiments in a more effective command structure were tried but would not take hold until after the Spanish American War. Congressional budget cuts also condemned both the Army and Navy to obsolescence in equipment and tactics. The desire for economy made it almost a crime for a naval officer to utilize the engines on his ship, and the Navy returned to using canvas rather than steam propulsion.³⁷

Few periods in American history have witnessed a greater or more significant change in direction in national policy than that which occurred around the turn of the century. Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History and his thesis that national greatness was directly related to an ability to control the sea influenced many in America.

Mahan's thesis and the colonial conflicts over Samoa and the Hawaiian Islands between America and European nations starting in 1883 caused the United States Navy to modernize and become one of the most powerful in the world. This overseas involvement increased the imperialist sentiment in the United States during the last decade of the nineteenth century, which some claim caused the Spanish American War.³⁸

When the Spanish American War broke out, the actual strength of the Army was slightly over twenty-eight thousand.³⁹ In April 1898, Congress voted to double the strength of the military; and, due to the emotional surge which seems to accompany American involvement in hostilities, it had no problem getting enough volunteers. Whether the National Guard, the new name given to all state militias, could be used abroad legally was at first doubtful. This was made legal with the passing of the Volunteer Bill, which resulted in the state National Guard units being used extensively in the Caribbean.⁴⁰

The weakness of the War Department in coordinating the activities of the war prompted Secretary of War Elihu Root's reform and reorganization of that Department in 1901. Performance of the Regulars versus the volunteers again caused debate among civilian and military leaders. The volunteer units had arrived poorly equipped and trained as a whole and were of limited effectiveness in the initial

phases of the war. In 1903, the passage of the Dick Act was meant to establish federal control over the National Guard and to provide some standardization in training and equipment.⁴¹ Also, the establishment of the General Staff took place to provide for better organization and planning.

Major themes of American civil-military relations during the years 1776-1899 can be linked to all areas of national development beginning with the birth of the nation which was supported and won by military forces. Four major themes, however, need to be kept in mind. They are civilian supremacy over the military, reliance on a military based on the citizen soldier concept, the influence the military wields in policy making, and last, the impact public opinion has on national security policy.

The first theme--civilian supremacy over the military--was a result of the traditions inherited by the American colonists from their British ancestors, known today as the Anglo-American military tradition. Civilian supremacy was embodied in the Constitution of the United States and was a precaution constantly practiced by the governing authorities. Congress was given power of the purse and the ability to declare war while the President was designated as the Commander-in-Chief. As the President, he was subject to the will of the people; and by command association, the military was also subject to the will of the people.

The public's will or desire has resulted in the second theme. That is, a military establishment based upon the citizen soldier. The debate concerning the composition of America's military force has been continuous throughout America's history. Should emphasis be placed on a military composed of citizen soldiers with limited military skills--at some cost to military efficiency? Or is emphasis to be placed on a strong professional military--despite internal dangers of uncontrollable military influence? A compromise was effected in the dual pattern of defense championed by Calhoun and institutionalized into the concept of the citizen soldier as the primary means of defense, but at the same time a small Regular Army was established as the cornerstone of national defense.

This second theme led to concern over a third: the military influence in the national security process. Only in a few exceptional cases did the military establishment significantly influence national policy. Most of these cases were in relation to wartime circumstances. The establishment of occupation policies in Mexico in 1846 by General Winfield Scott provides one example. Also, during the Civil War, the compatibility of Grant's military strategy and Lincoln's national policy gave the military considerable influence in national security policy formation. The programs during Reconstruction were instituted by military

commanders in the Southern states. Last, occupation of the Philippines after the Spanish American War gave the military considerable influence over national security policy in that area. Prior to World War II, the generally accepted guidance was that military should "play a role in the formulation of national security policy only when the duress of war made the armed forces responsible for executing such policy" as stated by Amos Jordan in American National Security: Policy and Process.⁴²

Military influence has an interrelationship with the fourth theme of public opinion and its impact on national security policy. Public opinion has always been to some degree a constraint on the formulators of policy. De Tocqueville describes the effect public opinion has in a democratic government in relation to foreign policy:

Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses;...a democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design, and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot combine measures with secrecy and it will not await their consequences with patience...democracies...obey the impulse of passion rather than suggestion of prudence and...abandon a mature design for the gratification of a monetary caprice.⁴³

This relationship was not as evident during the nineteenth century as it has been during the twentieth century, but some cases are visible. The impact of public opinion was evident in the reaction of society at the beginning of

the Civil War and the Spanish American War with the initial flood of volunteers to military service. Like others, Americans are emotional people and tend to think with their hearts and pride before their mind on many occasions. Public opinion plays a significantly larger part in the security policy process as the coverage of events through different media sources increases. These media sources continue to develop and make society more aware of what is happening in their world--thus, assisting them in forming an opinion. The twentieth century will show the real impact of public opinion on national security policy formulation.

America entered the twentieth century as a leading industrial and world power with a wealth and military potential which would draw her into international political activity whether she liked it or not. Envisioning vast well-trained conscript armies and mighty fleets, professional military men offered military policies attractive to government authorities planning America's role in the international world of the twentieth century. The services streamlined their operations and developed closer and closer relations with American business and industry. The military, as has the nation, came a long way from the early days of the nineteenth century. It cannot go back even if it wanted to, and there seems to be no evidence that it desires to do so.

2. American Civil-Military Relations 1900-1980

The term "Progressive Era" was applied to the first years of the twentieth century in the United States. Economic and social problems had emerged from rapid growth of large-scale industry in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Political leaders, such as Theodore Roosevelt, attempted to solve these problems during the years prior to World War I. Writings of the "Muckrackers" and other social reformers enhanced public awareness of these difficulties, and popular support for legislative action to solve them was forthcoming. In the area of foreign policy, this period was a time of conflicting objectives for the nation. On the one side, America was predominantly rural, agricultural, and isolationist. Conversely, the decade of the 1890s had left America involved overseas and presented with problems that had heretofore been absent in America. In the end, the nation's new responsibilities and expanding commercial interests abroad made the attempt to "go back to the good old days" impossible. During this period, America became one of the most powerful and influential nations in the world.

The new mood at home and abroad also had an effect on the nation's military establishment. During the years between the Spanish American War and United States involvement in World War I, the Army and Navy underwent important

organizational reforms. As mentioned previously, the formation of the General Staff and the Dick Act of 1903 were oriented toward improving military organization, training, and coordination in both the Regular Army and the Reserves. The Navy's successful performance in the War with Spain prompted Congress and the American people to support its expansion and modernization. Expansion by America in the Pacific and the building of the Panama Canal were results of the national desire to create a navy second only to Great Britain. In the end, this expansion committed America to defending territory thousands of miles from the home base.⁴⁴

Two areas of much closer proximity to America which were to cause problems were the Caribbean and Mexico. The problems in Cuba had not been settled with the end of the war with Spain. The United States continued to intervene in Cuba to stabilize it until 1934 in reaction to America's Good Neighbor Policy. Mexico's political instability led to a period of changing revolutionary governments. A threat to peace was seen in 1911 in the continuing occurrence of border incidents between northern Mexico and southwestern United States. America's occupation of Veracruz and the pursuit of Pancho Villa by General Pershing's forces were attempts by President Wilson to help stabilize the government of Mexico. Pershing failed to capture Villa, but the practical training received by Regular Army and National

Guard troops on the frontier was invaluable. Problems with mobilization of reserves and other defects in the military establishment caused attention to be focused on the still present problem of a system for maintaining in peacetime the quantity of forces necessary to supplement the Regular Army in national emergencies.⁴⁵ This system was to prove to be valuable to America as it prepared to become involved in the war in Europe.

After the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in 1914 and the resultant war in which all of Europe participated, Americans recognized Europe as the most dangerous threat to their peace. President Wilson proclaimed American neutrality, yet Americans could not ignore the situation in Europe. Americans, by historical relationships, sided with Great Britain and the Allied Powers. American industry geared up to support Anglo-French war needs and American banks established credit and loans for the Allied nations. The sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 and the resulting public indignation towards this event prompted President Wilson to see the only way to keep America out of the war was to end it. He worked diligently to do so, but with the reopening of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany in 1917, all hopes of peace ended. The addition of the Zimmerman Telegram and the resultant discovering of a plot to involve the United States in a war with Mexico and Japan caused Wilson on 2 April

1917 to ask Congress for a Declaration of War.⁴⁶

Nationalization of railroads and industry along with conscription involved all areas of American society in the war effort. Severe problems in American civil-military relations were not apparent during World War I. Prior to the war, American military thought had concentrated on manpower problems. These were solved by the Selective Service Act of 1917, which provided 67 percent of the United States armed forces.⁴⁷ World War I uncovered, however, the neglected area of economic mobilization in an age of "total war" in the twentieth century. Management of the economic aspect of the war soon became a coordinated effort between business leaders and the military.⁴⁸

Technology in war during the twentieth century caused the creation of organizations and institutions to deal with new requirements for weapons systems or systems support. During World War I, the National Research Council was created. This agency became a central directing agency for scientific research during the war; and after the war, it reverted toward emphasis on basic science. This same organization was deprived of funds after the war but persevered and became known as the Office of Scientific Research and Development for World War II. The collaboration between science and the military was not new, but World War I marked a definite increase in the importance of one to the other.

World War I was also America's first real experience with coalition warfare. General John J. Pershing was named Commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) and was given the responsibility of insuring that America's participation in the war was organized and not abused by the Allies. Wilson's aversion to war, the great distance between Washington, D.C. and Paris, and Pershing's personality assured his status more of a proconsul than a purely military representative.⁴⁹

Pershing and the American Army performed respectably during World War I. Again, the American belief of relying on the call up of citizen soldiers to support the Regular Army was revalidated; and as hostilities ceased, Americans called for the return of their soldiers and the reestablishing of the nation's normal peacetime affairs. Between 11 November 1918 and 30 June 1919, approximately 2,800,000 officers and men received discharges, and the disintegration of the wartime army began.⁵⁰ The draft ended after World War I and small appropriations to the National Guard hindered them in maintaining a pool of trained soldiers. The Reserve Officers Training Corp at the nation's land grant colleges, however, did continue to produce a pool of reserve officers. All of this demobilization was a result of America's dream after World War I--that wars had ended forever.

The National Defense Act of 1920 bolstered Root's earlier reform in the area of planning and command. It gave the General Staff an adequate complement of officers, which was to be of great importance during the first days of World War II. It also provided the assignment of responsibility for industrial mobilization to an Assistant Secretary of War. Further coordinations between the Army and Navy led to the Army and Navy Joint Board which was to develop contingency plans for both services. By 1934, renewed interest in the military and the sounds of war emanating from Europe and Asia prompted a rebuilding program for the armed forces under the Roosevelt administration. As the year 1939 emerged, the military forces were better prepared for war than any other time during peace.

From 1921 to 1936, the American people and their elected representatives thought that America could and should avoid future wars with other major powers. By promoting international peace, avoiding commitments with old world nations, and maintaining only a small defense establishment, they believed they might achieve this goal. As history has shown, this was not to be.

Again for the second time in the twentieth century, war came to Europe. Action by Japan, Germany, and Italy foreshadowed what the years of 1939-1945 were to bring. No real changes in military policy occurred, but appropriation

for the services from Congress became more substantial. the overwhelming sentiment in America, however, remained isolationist, relying upon the oceans and America's friendly neighbors to protect it from aggression.

Events in Europe and the Far East helped to stimulate a rearmament program in the United States, which helped bring the nation out of the depression and created one of the most powerful armed forces in history. Between the appeasement of Hitler at Munich in 1938 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, America awakened to the dangers from without and began to mobilize. In 1940, the Selective Service Act was passed and aid to Britain began. Strategic planners in Washington began a coordinated effort in developing plans concerning global and coalition warfare. Again, the military and business establishments of the nation combined and coordinated their efforts toward the common goal of preparing for the war to come.

In 1940, the leaders of the nation authorized the draft of a mass army with the passing of the Selective Service Act by one vote. A workable system of conscription had been developed during World War I, and basically, the same system was now reactivated. World War I had also proven to the nation that a citizen army could be recruited swiftly and sent into battle. World War II reconfirmed this assumption, for it called for the very dimensions of military power that

America was best prepared for--a mass army composed of citizen soldiers, skilled Regular Army officers, and massive quantities of equipment produced by the nation's superior production capability.⁵¹

World War II was also the type of war which appealed to the emotions of Americans. After Pearl Harbor, America approached the war as a crusade. Russell Weigley maintains that:

In the way in which Americans regarded it, it was a kind of Indian raid writ large: the enemy fell treacherously upon the communities outer defenses, whereupon the community set aside everything else for the duration...The aggressor, repulsed and beaten, ⁵²the community could return to the ways of peace.

The support of the American public was given to the President and the armed forces as World War II developed into as popular a war as any war can be.

Common strategy of the Allies evolved to the point where political objectives were put aside and emphasis placed on military objectives. This strategy would lessen the difficulties found in conducting coalition warfare and best suited the emotional climate of America.⁵³ Within the American civil-military organization, there were few conflicts. President Roosevelt tended to give the military chiefs freedom in developing the majority of strategic plans. One exception to this was the decision to execute TORCH, the Allied invasion of North Africa. Here, President Roosevelt

overruled the judgment of his Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of War and directed them to use American forces in North Africa. Eagerness to have American ground forces engaged in large scale offensive movements was the justification for Roosevelt's decision.⁵⁴

It was during World War II that the military chiefs became very influential in determining both military and political policy. Adam Yarmolinsky maintains in The Military Establishment that the chiefs attained almost "super cabinet status."⁵⁵ From the beginning of the war to the end, military men were involved in foreign and, to a large extent, domestic policy relating to the war effort. This was to set the precedent for the continuation of the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in one form or another, through the present organization of the United States national security structure.

With the defeat of Japan and Germany in 1945, the traditional demobilization of America's forces began. While demobilization continued, civil and military officials worked toward developing a national security system capable of coping with the postwar world. A need for a central command authority emerged during the war, and as a result, the National Security Act of 1947 was passed.⁵⁶ A National Military Establishment headed by a civilian Secretary of Defense was developed. The three services were given execu-

tive department status and allowed direct access to the President. The Joint Chiefs of Staff became a statutory body and functioned as the President's principal military advisor. The creation of a National Security Council to coordinate diplomatic, military, and industrial plans and to recommend security policies to the President simplified the efficiency of the National Military Establishment. The weakness of the plan revolved around the fact that the Secretary of Defense was allowed only general supervision over the service departments and that each service department was allowed direct access to the President, thus, circumventing the normal chain of command.⁵⁷

In response to the weaknesses, an amendment passed by Congress in 1949 created an executive department out of the National Military Establishment and labeled it the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense was also given the prerequisite authority to coordinate the affairs of all three services. The National Security Act of 1947 and the amendment in 1949 served to formalize and tighten civilian control over the military and came to serve as the framework for national security planning for years to come.

At the end of World War II, the Truman administration faced a continuous decline in revenue and a decline in public awareness of happenings around the world. As a result the administration "determined not to spend more than [it took

in] in taxes."⁵⁸ In reaction to this policy, military planners again had to revert to mobilization planning rather than the maintenance of ready forces. The nation did not even have enough ready forces to support its policy of "containment of Communist expansion."⁵⁹

A strategic study by the National Security Council in April 1950, which was to be labeled NSC-68, forewarned of the growth of Soviet power. NSC-68 advocated a substantial increase in defense spending and an immediate build-up in military strength in hopes of deterring Soviet aggression without direct confrontation. This build-up, with the increased tension in Europe, the Mediterranean and Asia caused President Truman to request expenditures of funds to "...provide for an early, but orderly buildup of our military forces to a state of readiness designed to deter further acts of aggression..."⁶⁰ Until the Korean conflict, most of America's defense effort was concentrated in Europe. With the attack of North Korean forces on South Korea and later the People's Republic of China, Asia gained new dominance in security planning. The Korean conflict also caused a mobilization of reserved forces in reaction to a threat--to be replaced by a strong ready force to act as a deterrent. The concept of the citizen soldier was still in evidence with the draft, National Guard and Reserve forces, but it was no longer the foundation for the nation's defense. American

participation in wars prior to Korea had allowed a gradual build-up of forces. The postwar world with its jet aircraft, rockets, and other modern weapons etc., had changed all that. The new technology of war has required that Americans rely upon forces in being as a deterrent to aggression and a response to the limited wars of the future.

Military involvement in all areas of American society and government increased drastically since the forties. More than half of the federal budget between 1951 and 1972 went to defense expenditures.⁶¹ Industry came to rely heavily upon defense contracts, and many institutions of education came to rely on federal grants and research projects to provide income. Over seventy percent of the scientific research conducted in the United States is directly or indirectly funded by the Pentagon.⁶² Until 1972, the draft and the subsequent military service impacted on almost all American males. Today, the draft is gone, but the experience of many during their service tour has affected American society. The furor over the treatment of Vietnam era vets is but one instance of the impact the military has had through the draft.

Even though the generals and admirals have gained influential positions in the policy making process, it is still the civilian administration which makes the final decisions. With the advent of new weapons capable of quick and massive destruction and the ever present threat of the

Soviet Union, the staged build-up of an expansible military will not be effective. America has allowed, therefore, the military establishment to grow and become an effective and powerful instrument of foreign policy.

In the world today, neither the military planner who looks exclusively at the military element of policy, nor the diplomat who views diplomacy in isolation, is a positive asset to his nation's government. Henry Kissinger perhaps stated the problem best:

A separation of policy can be achieved only to the detriment of both. It causes military power to be identified with the most absolute application of power and it tempts diplomacy into an over-concern with finesse. Since the difficult problems of national policy are in the area where political, economic, psychological and military factors overlap, we should give up the fiction that there is such a thing as purely military advice.⁶³

Civil-military relations during the sixties and seventies reflected this coordination of policy and strategy. An example was Kennedy's policy of flexible response coinciding with the military's effort to rebuild their conventional forces in order to insure the capacity to respond to a Communist military challenge anywhere in the world. An exception to the coordination of policy and strategy was in Vietnam. Limited military involvement soon expanded to open military involvement and the attempt to solve political problems with military force. Vietnam has proven to be a period in which civil-military relations became uncoordinated

and resulted in the discrediting of the military and its role in American policy. Since the end of the Vietnam conflict, military influence and respectability has begun to assume more importance in the eyes of Americans due to the emergence of a renewed Soviet threat. It is the power of the public attitude towards its nation's policies which either adversely or positively affect the role of the military in American society. One hundred and forty seven years ago Alexis de Toqueville said the following in relation to public opinion in America and its effect on the military:

The general spirit of the nation's being infused into the spirit peculiar to the Army, tempers the opinions and desires engendered by military life, or represses⁶⁴ them by the mighty forces of public opinion.

Would the START talks have been initiated if American opinion had not placed emphasis on the desire for a nuclear freeze? Would American participation in El Salvador be as limited as it is today without public refusal to support such a policy? The power of the public is not to be discredited, especially when discussing civil-military relations. The impact public opinion has on policy decision is something every politician considers before voting on an issue. The military also is a reflection of society's attitudes, and it is this aspect that must never be forgotten.

Dominant themes during the twentieth century are relatively the same as those during the nineteenth century. Those themes were civilian supremacy over the military,

reliance on a citizen-soldier based defense system, military influence in policy making, and the effect public opinion has had on national security policy. Differences occur in the evolution of each from 1776 to the 1980s. The first theme of civilian dominance of the military has not changed. Today, because of the advanced technology of weapons and destructiveness with which these weapons can be deployed, it is readily apparent that strict civilian control of the military is essential. Military views on policy, however, have become an inherent part of overall defense planning. The National Security Council was established to implement the coordination necessary between America's national policy and military objectives.

The traditional reliance on the Anglo-American tradition has also been altered by increased technology in warfare. No longer is there time for the gradual buildup of American forces in response to a possible threat. Wars and conflicts of the last three decades have emerged so rapidly as to be called "flare ups." America has come to rely, therefore, on a larger military consisting of ready forces. The tradition of the citizen soldier has not completely diminished. The "One Army" concept professed by the military today puts great emphasis on the manning, equipping, and training of the nation's reserve forces who are the key to military effectiveness in case of a protracted war.

Military influence since World War II has increased significantly. The defense budget has fluctuated from 5 percent of the nation's GNP in 1950 to 13.5 percent in 1954 to approximately 5 to 7 percent in 1980.⁶⁵ It has been this area of the economy in which the impact of military influence is most often observed. The primary cause for this increase continues to be the increased size of the military accompanied by the greater sophistication, which equals greater cost, of weapons systems. In the area of foreign policy formulation, the military has taken an expanded role due to the integration of national and military policy. The future of America will lie with the ability of the nation's politicians and diplomats to coordinate policy development with military strategies. Without this coordination, the mistakes of the past are bound to be repeated--or reflected--in the policies of tomorrow.

Last, and perhaps most important, is the impact American public opinion has had on the nation's foreign policy. During the nineteenth century, public opinion's impact was limited by the awareness of the populace to what was going on in the world. The development of media technology, increased literacy of the American citizen, extended franchise, and the impact foreign events have had on American society have increased awareness and opinion formation concerning matters of foreign policy. Issues, such as the attack on Pearl Harbor, had a positively electrifying and

unifying effect on American public opinion and its subsequent support of the war effort. Post World War II domestic consensus on foreign policy remained until the United States' involvement in Vietnam increased. America's involvement in Vietnam had the opposite result of Pearl Harbor; it divided the American public and caused a lack of support for national objectives in the conflict. As Vietnam retreats in the public memory, confidence is returning to American citizens and a greater willingness to have the United States take an active role as a world power is surfacing.

This theme of public opinion and its impact on national security and foreign policy formation, specifically the support of the nation's military, is worth additional study. This thesis will attempt to research the hypothesis that American opinion toward the support of military forces is dependent upon the intensity which external events and issues have on American lives and values. Areas of particular research in this thesis will be oriented on the public's support for budget allocations relating to defense and society's attitude toward military service.

CHAPTER ONE ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER II

PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Politicians court it; statesmen appeal to it; philosophers extol or condemn it; merchants cater to it; military leaders fear it; sociologists analyze it; statisticians measure it; and constitution-makers try to make it sovereign.¹

-Harold L. Childs

In the above quote, political scientist Childs describes some of the confusion surrounding public opinion. In the formulation of foreign policy, this confusion does not decrease but tends to increase. Public support for foreign policy initiatives is a source of strength in a democracy; but as political scientist Geoffrey Chandler states, it is also looked upon as:

...a continual drag on the development of foreign policy which should be able to adapt itself freely to changing situations. Its influence has meant that American foreign policy ... has been a series of ad-hoc decisions ... rather than a steady developing policy ...²

1. Politicians, Policy Makers, and Public Opinion

Although the success of a political leader depends on his ability to identify, define, and control public opinion, there is no formula with which to decipher it. Quite often, these leaders cite the old adage that the "people speak with a single voice," and that they are reacting to this voice. However, the problem of accurately deciphering public opinion is often solved by the political leader using his own code to decipher it and then claiming his position is supported by the public will. How does he determine what the public

will is? What is the result?

Public opinion may be expressed in many ways. The most frequently monitored expressions of public opinion are found in the editorial columns of the nation's newspapers, public opinion polls, and national elections.³ Editorials do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the newspaper readers, but the opinion and beliefs of the editor and owners of the newspapers are quite evident in the style with which they support - or fail to support - policy issues. These opinions can be transferred to the readers by assimilation through reading the press coverage given an issue in the paper. Prior to the widespread use of the electronic media of television and radio, the newspapers were the most important media source of expressing and shaping public opinion. As Bernard C. Cohen states in The Press and Foreign Policy, "if we do not see a story in the newspapers, it effectively has not happened so far as we are concerned."⁴ One might conclude then that if the circulation of a newspaper remains high, the possibilities are good that the majority of the readers agree with the opinion on policy issues as presented in that paper's columns.

The second expression of public opinion that is used frequently is the public opinion poll. Many historians, political scientists, and others are skeptical as to the usefulness of polls. However, the science of polling has been refined and restructured in recent years. Polls are

used extensively by political candidates and are seen as being valuable in three areas, according to American poll-taker, Louis Harris. First, polls give candidates a schematic breakdown of his political constituency indicating such features as race, religion, and occupational patterns. Second, polls indicate what the electorate thinks of the candidate as a public figure: is the candidate familiar to the electorate, are they aware of the candidate's voting record, and what is their perception of his deficiencies? The third area is the definition of issues. The voters may express in their own words how they believe the government should act, or they can select from lists and reply to specific questions.⁵

The three areas of assistance espoused by Harris will help the politician more accurately to determine the "slant" of his constituency on many issues. None of the foregoing statements mean, however, that policy makers are inclined to agree with the results of polls. Many politicians and policy makers use it as a political gimmick. One Congressman remarked:

Polling your people with questionnaires is a greater gimmick than mailing out free flower seeds ... everyone is flattered to be asked his opinion on great issues.⁶

In the area of foreign policy, polls are most useful when large numbers of questions pertaining to a particular issue have been asked over an extended period of time, thus permit-

ting the analyst to establish hopefully accurate trends in opinion.⁷

Policy makers must be aware of these trends in public opinion in order to develop better foreign policy which does not cause public unrest. Trends in opinion may be caused by social change, technological change, productivity, and movements of the populace. These trends reflect the movement of the forces of history in society and must be considered by all policy makers.⁸ A second and perhaps more dangerous trend in opinion is the short run, hot blooded reaction to what is in the news of the moment, or as political scientist Gabriel Almond states:

... an overreaction to equilibrium in world politics ... when threats from abroad become grave and immediate Americans tend to break out of the private orbit and tremendous energies become available for foreign policy.⁹

As an example of this trend, Almond cites the emotional fervor with which America entered World Wars I and II. The interpretations and considerations given these trends by the policy maker will determine, to a large degree, how successful he is in pursuing policy initiative.

Perhaps the best expression of public opinion occurs during the national political elections. When an elected official is voted out of office, it is tantamount to a rejection of his policies, or a rejection of his support of policies not of interest to his electorate. A majority vote for a candidate usually reflects support for his action and

opinion on topics of constituent interest, or at least considerable opposition to his opponent's views on those topics. This expression of support can be misleading, however, for in America approximately one-third of the electorate does not go to the polls. Many national elections are won primarily on domestic issues, and many elections are won by such small margins that they do not show accurately the overall public mood on any given issue. As a stable basis for policymaking, public opinion leaves much to be desired. It would be an unwise official who regards it as either needless or unimportant.

2. Theories on Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

The quandry political leaders face concerning the role of public opinion in national security and foreign policy development is not theirs alone. Scholars for years have been debating the role of public opinion and have failed to come to a consensus of opinion regarding its place in the policymaking process. A concept proposed by social scientist C. Wright Mills maintains that all policy decisions should be left in the hands of a few educated and competent elites.¹⁰ This "power elite" concept holds that a few elite individuals and groups govern America without direction from the public, for they--the public--are incapable of sound judgment on policy issues.¹¹ Geoffrey Chandler's concept complements that of Mills in that Chandler believes much of

the problem is due to Americans' "international illiteracy"; that is, Americans are not educated on international events. This lack of education leads to their inability to link external events to the well being of American society. These approaches as espoused by Mills and Chandler tend to characterize public opinion as completely dysfunctional to the policy process.¹²

Arguments favorable to public involvement in national policy development are also prevalent. Charles O. Lerche, Jr., in Foreign Policy of the American People, states that when public opinion is directed towards international problems it becomes a positive, not negative, force. He maintains that public debate over major issues tends to clarify them; when policies reflect the public's view they may be more in line with national interests; and if the involvement of the public has been consistent then support for that policy will be stronger and sacrifices given more willingly in support of it.¹³

J. William Fulbright, former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is also a proponent of the importance of considering public support in the development of foreign policy. In his book, The Crippled Giant, Fulbright states:

The success of a foreign policy, as we have been discovering, depends not only on the availability of military and economic resources, but, at least, as much, upon the support given it by our people.¹⁴

Further support for an active public role in the policy process is found in Ralph B. Levering's work, The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1978. In this book, Levering discounts Mill's and Chandler's statements about the inability of the American public to make sound judgments on foreign policy. Levering believes that:

Perhaps the most hopeful development during the past sixty years has been the increased sophistication of large portions of the public in regard to foreign affairs.¹⁵

Levering gives credit for this development to the increased level of education Americans have received since the 1930s and the emergence of the electronic media of radio and television as a widespread news source.

Levering proposes the idea that the use of differing news sources or media by individuals has a significant impact in regard to opinions on foreign policy issues. The level of education an individual has attained is subsequently reflected in the news information source utilized. A study conducted in the late sixties found that forty percent of college graduates and fifty percent of those with "some college" were more dependent on periodicals for their news information.¹⁶ Individuals with a high school education or less were more dependent on the electronic media for their news while both groups relied on newspapers as supplemental sources.

Levering believes there is a danger in relying on any one source for news information. Radio, television, and the newspapers tend to provide only the basic information on an issue and do not analyze it in depth. Additionally, because of a lack of space and time, these sources provide news about foreign affairs which stress "the exceptional rather than the significant."¹⁷ Periodicals, on the other hand, present a more detailed account of the issue, but they also may be biased and present a one sided version of the issue. To ensure a sound overall understanding of the world around them, Americans must utilize all forms of news sources to provide themselves with facts to form an opinion.

As can be garnered from the foregoing discussion on public opinion, it is difficult to analyze accurately its role in policy development. Political scientist V. O. Key, Jr. states:

... the sharp definition of the role of public opinion as it affects different kinds of policies under different types of situations presents an analytical problem of extraordinary difficulty.¹⁸

The true role of public opinion in policy development lies somewhere between the dysfunctional theory and the liberal democratic theory that foreign policy is merely a reflection of public preferences and belief. It may be more diffused than concentrated on matters of foreign policy for the public is slow to mobilize on these issues. However, when the public does mobilize--as it did in the late fifties in

support of the government's hard line on Cold War issues and again in the late sixties and early seventies when public pressure contributed to the withdrawal of U.S. military forces in Indochina--it can stimulate or constrain the action of American policy makers. One might conclude that unless the public's interest is sparked by some external event, they may participate in policy development but do not lead it.

3. Functions of Public Opinion

Despite the arguments and lack of agreement concerning public opinion, there seems to be a consensus that there are three primary functions of public opinion in foreign policy development. They are:

1. Public opinion can constrain policy innovations.
2. Public opinion can stimulate policy innovations.
3. Public opinion can serve as a resource in policy innovations.¹⁹

America's overriding concern with domestic matters has made it rather difficult for policy makers to develop new and innovative foreign policies. This constraint on policy initiatives need not be evidenced by actual public refusal to support specific policies. If policy makers even think the public may react and become mobilized against policy changes, they may prevent any attempts to revise present policy for fear of electoral punishment.²⁰ Public opinion has, quite visibly, become a constraint on the use

of military forces in response to international events. Presently, it seems the public is ready to build military power rather than apply it. In November 1981, thirty-four percent of those polled favored an increase in defense spending, while forty-seven percent wanted to maintain the current level of defense spending. As to the commitment of U.S. "combat" advisors to El Salvador, however, only about twenty percent of those polled favored it.²¹ Many other examples are available in recent history; all point toward Americans constraining attitudes on the use of military force. Policy makers must take this into consideration; for even though military force is but one tool they possess, it is central to the execution of foreign and national security policy.

Policy makers attempt to manipulate public opinion to their advantage. Historically, the public has tended to support most governmental actions involving foreign policy or international events once the policy was initiated. This perceived passivity of the public has led presidents to act first and seek public support later. Evidence of this action occurred during the Vietnam War when only forty-two percent of the people polled favored President Johnson's policy in 1965 before he announced it. After he made it public, seventy-two percent of those surveyed approved it.²² A contributing factor to this increase in approval was the Gulf of Tonkin incident where North Vietnamese patrol boats

supposedly attacked U.S. destroyers. The actuality of this attack has come under investigation recently, but at the time, it was enough of an insult to the American people to stimulate their support for Johnson's increased military involvement in South Vietnam. Without this incident, President Johnson's desire to increase the American presence in Southeast Asia may have been constrained by public opinion.

Public opinion as a stimulus to policy innovation is a contradiction to proposals by some that the American public is apathetic toward foreign policy questions. True, it is the exception rather than the rule; but when the situation is seen by the American people as having an impact on them, their actions may stimulate policy innovation. Political scientists Charles Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf state that often "... with respect to an issue, shifts in public preferences preceded foreign policy change."²³ They use as an example the issue of the entry of the People's Republic of China (PRC) into the United Nations (U.N.). In 1950, a survey showed less than fifteen percent of the American public were in favor of admitting the PRC to the U.N. By 1969, more than fifty percent favored it. The decision by the U.S. to block further attempts by the PRC to be admitted to the U.N. may have been caused by this high level of public support favoring the admittance of the PRC.²⁴ Also, as stated in Chapter One, the current

"Nuclear Freeze" movement and reinitiation of arms talk at Geneva may be an outgrowth of the American peace movement. Public opinion may not cause policy change, but as political scientist Milton Rosenberg states, a mobilized public can indirectly influence policy change by altering "the image of public opinion held by persons capable of affecting policy decisions" or by changing "the image of public opinion held by the public itself."²⁵ We might simply say that public attitude can act as a stimulus toward foreign policy decisions by influencing how policy makers perceive the international environment impacts upon American society.

No matter how much one believes in the liberal democratic view that foreign policy must reflect the public's desires, it would be a mistake to believe that the public attitude is not influenced by policy makers. The leadership of a nation must be able to command public support, and American leaders are quite efficient at doing so. It is in this regard that public attitude becomes a resource to be used by decision makers in the international arena. In bargaining with other nations, a strong unified public opinion not only gives the official confidence but enables him to use the excuse that the American public would not tolerate a proposed concession which goes against the popular desires. As Kegley and Wittkopf explain, by describing themselves as victims of popular preferences, "American

statesmen may indeed gain considerable bargaining leverage."²⁶

The foregoing observations may leave one confused and frustrated as to the actual place public opinion holds in the foreign and national security policy making process. As mentioned before, the role opinion holds lies somewhere between decision makers paying no heed to the public in formulating their policies and the "democratic myth" that the public is the real ruler of the republic. The following statement by Richard R. Fagen will perhaps assist in clarifying the role of public opinion:

... the fact that this decisional process may not in reality originate in the will of the people does not diminish the significance or usefulness of symbolically casting the threshold²⁷ of national tolerance in terms of public opinion.

In other words, even though public opinion may be latent and quiescent, it is included in the calculations made by decision makers in foreign policy development.

Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk hoped that Americans would come to the realization that foreign policy was a concern to their well being. In an address to the attendants at a Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association meeting, he stressed:

... never forget: Foreign policy is about you. It is about your home; your community; your safety, your well being, your chance to live a decent life²⁸ to prepare a better world for your children.

American attitudes tend to indicate they are beginning to distinguish the importance foreign policy has in relation to the security of America and the well being of American society. A survey of public attitudes on foreign policy issues sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) late in November 1978 concludes that Americans are placing more emphasis on America's role in world affairs. Foreign policy issues have not superseded domestic issues, but more and more Americans are realizing the relationship between world events and the lives of the American public. In particular, the survey shows eighty-two percent of the public and seventy-two percent of the leaders consider United States foreign policy to have substantial impact on the value of the dollar; sixty-four percent of the public believe foreign policy impacts on food prices; and five percent on unemployment. Domestic concerns were still out front with 67 percent of the public and 85 percent of the leaders reflecting inflation as their primary concern. The only area showing a substantial increase of concern was national security with 32 percent saying too little was spent on defense. This was up from 13 percent in 1974 and 8 percent in 1969.²⁹

This growing concern for world affairs and national defense has a definite effect upon the status of America's military forces. Charles L. Cochran describes it best:

The military is identified in the public mind as the arm of the government to be used in the defense of critical national security requirements. When national security policy enjoys a consensus of national support, the prestige of the military is assured to the extent it is tied to these "high" national goals. But the opposite is also true. Whatever the extent of civilian control, when United States foreign and national policies are not supported by a clear majority of the population, the military is as tied to the major military decisions as if they had been made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with a resulting decline in prestige.³⁰

Support for the military is, therefore, linked to the support foreign policy initiatives receive from the public. Those policies, in turn, are items of interest to the public when they pose a threat to the normal conduct of domestic affairs. Support for the military can then be said to fluctuate in reaction to the presence of a perceived need for military strength in relation to an international crisis or threat.

It is in this regard that the three functions of public opinion--constraint, stimulus, and resource--are exercised frequently. If a threat is not seen as dangerous or disruptive to American society, the use and support of military forces and greater defense spending will be constrained. If there is a perceived threat present affecting the normal conduct of affairs, public opinion may act as a stimulus to increase military strength, such as the increase in defense spending after the Iranian Hostage incident and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Last, public support for a strong

military is a resource which statesmen can use to strengthen their request for more defense funding or to signal America's resolve to execute a general or specific foreign policy.

A military force cannot function without support from the public, especially in respect to the allocation of the nation's most valued resources--money and manpower. Support for the military can be identified by analyzing the willingness of society to assign these resources to the military. Chapter Three will attempt to show a trend between the allocation of money for defense and the presence of an international threat or crisis.

CHAPTER TWO ENDNOTES

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¹⁰C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 187.

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- ²⁷Ibid., p. 218.
- ²⁸James N. Rosenau, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 1.
- ²⁹John E. Rielly, "The American Mood: A Foreign Policy of Self Interest," Foreign Policy 34 (Spring 1979) : 77.
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CHAPTER III

THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND PUBLIC OPINION

It is customary in the democratic countries to deplore expenditures on armaments as conflicting with the requirements of social services. There is a tendency to forget that the most important social service a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free.¹

-British Air Marshall
Sir John Slessor

Major policy issues in the United States today, be they domestic or foreign, require support from the national economy. Requirements of such policies must be met if they are to succeed. National security requirements cannot be considered apart from the nation's economic policy, for the impact of one on the other is constant. During a major war, resources are allocated to the military services based upon need and the productive capacity of the nation's industry and economy. In peacetime, or the absence of an overriding threat, other considerations emerge as constraining factors--such as, budgetary policy, the tax structure, demand for public improvements, social programs, and the demand for consumer goods and a higher standard of living. The end result is that military requirements must be weighed against other demands on the economy, and priorities must be established.

A major instrument for balancing resources and requirements, for establishing a scale of national priorities, and for resolving and recording the plans, hopes, and decisions

of national security policy is the annual federal budget. This is the President's key tool for controlling and coordinating the executive branch of the government along with the programs and policies it develops and implements. It represents a compromise between domestic areas of national policy and those involving national security.²

The direction national security policy will take is determined by the pattern of spending built into the budgetary process. Because of this sensitivity, civilian control over the allocation of resources to the military is the lever by which officials seek to implement their understanding of the requirements of national security and exercise perhaps one of the most effective implements of civilian control over the military that exists.³ The end result is that allocation of economic resources granted the defense establishment will shape the nation's military program.

Who should determine proper military policy and the size and content of the budget to support it? Dr. Paul McCracken, Chairman of President Nixon's Council of Economic Advisors, stated:

... we have to rely on the judgment of government officials chosen by the people in the belief that they have that good judgment, and reasonably represent the people's standard of values.⁴

The American public does not have a direct effect on the development of the national budget allocation, but their desires and requirements are transmitted through elected

representatives. Whether Americans believe their military is needed and important to their well being may be reflected in the fluctuations found in the defense budget. This chapter will attempt to establish a trend between the willingness of Americans to allocate economic resources--money--to national defense and the perceived or actual presence of an external crisis.

1. Historical Perspective

The ultimate constraint on national security expenditures is most directly related to the nation's Gross National Product (GNP)--which is the dollar value of all goods and services that could be produced by the nation in a given year. Prior to 1930, defense expenditures, with the exception of the World War I period, amounted to approximately one percent of the nation's GNP. By 1944, the percentage of GNP devoted to defense had increased to 35.5 percent. In accordance with the American tradition of demobilizing after a war, defense expenditures by 1950 had decreased to 4.4 percent of the GNP.⁵ The size of the defense budget became a key issue in the new pattern of politics which came to focus on the allocation of resources between the public and private sector.

Since World II, each administration has had to satisfy "The Great Equation." This is the ever present question concerning how to "equate needed military strength with

maximum economic strength."⁶ To do this, each administration must balance the allocation of resources between domestic programs, foreign policy programs--which include defense, tax limitation and reduction programs, and an attempt to balance the budget. Quite often, this balancing placed requirements for security against the physical capacity of the nation's economy and failed to consider the needs of domestic, tax, or other budget programs. The impact of this spending on defense is one too diverse and complicated to be fully understood. Defense expenditures have tested the limits of the nation's economic and political capabilities. American military expenditures are intended to defend America's national security. They should be large enough to deter enemies but not so large as to strain the domestic order or to threaten other nations into expanding their military in order to deter us.⁷ Not only do the pressures and needs of domestic programs influence the defense budget, but also external influences and tensions cause a fluctuation in support for defense spending.

Threats based upon external crisis influence defense spending, in so far as they are perceived and responded to by the Administration and the public. Post-World War II responsibilities and occupation duties caused America to maintain a much larger than normal military establishment in peacetime. After 1949, the continuing moves of the Soviet Union around the world and the growth of anti-communism in

the United States caused the size of the American military to continue to grow. Throughout American history the size of the military and the allocation of resources in support of it has varied almost directly with the actual or perceived presence of war or the threat of it.⁸ In Samuel Huntington's The Common Defense, he described the evolution of the American defense effort from 1940-1960 in eleven periods. They are:

1. Demobilization: April 1945-June 1947. After 1945, defense expenditures declined after V. J. and V. E. Day and finally bottomed out in 1947 at an annual rate of 10.3 billion dollars.
2. Stability: July 1947-June 1948. Defense expenditures during FY 1948 varied from 10.7 billion dollars to 11.5 billion. The desire for a balanced budget and needs of the European recovery program caused strict ceilings to be placed on defense spending.
3. Spring Crisis Rearmament: July 1948-September 1949. Soviet movements in Czechoslovakia and against Berlin sparked a rising fear of war and stimulated the Congress into securing selective service legislation and additional defense appropriations. A peak in defense spending of 14 billion dollars in the summer of 1949 resulted from this resurgence

of Soviet aggression.

4. Economy Drive: October 1949-June 1950. The easing of the Berlin Crisis, the tax reduction of 1948, the role of the "Fair Deal" program in the election of 1948, and the rising expenditures of the European Economic Cooperation caused a shift towards budgetary economy.
5. Korean War Rearmament: July 1950-June 1953. A sustained three year increase in national security expenditures from 12 billion dollars in 1950 to 50.5 billion in the second quarter of 1953 resulted from the Korean Crisis.
6. Post-Korean Decline: July 1953-December 1954. As with the earlier American wars, once peace was attained national defense spending declined. An increased emphasis on nuclear weapons, cutbacks in conventional forces, and major tax reductions resulted in a budget low of 38.4 billion dollars or 11.3 percent of the GNP being spent for defense at the end of 1954.
7. Stability: January 1955-June 1956. The Post-Korean War decline in defense spending was followed by an eighteen month stabilization in defense spending of approximately 38-39 billion dollars or about 9.5 percent of the GNP. Continued emphasis was placed on cutbacks in conventional forces and the

increase for missiles and other nuclear weapons.

8. Administrative Increase: July 1956-June 1957.

During 1957, defense expenditures climbed to 44.9 billion dollars. This was not the result of planned programs but rather from the increases in prices, accelerated payments to contractors, and a more speedy than anticipated delivery of weapons.

9. Economy Drive: July 1957-December 1957. This unplanned increase (period 8) was followed almost immediately by a planned decrease. Severe cuts were made in personnel, and strict spending guidelines imposed.

10. Sputnik Expansion: January 1958-June 1959. The advent of the Soviet's Sputnik and the beginning of an American recession caused a reversal in the drive for economy. Within a fifteen month period, defense related expenditures rose from 44 billion dollars in 1958 to 46.2 billion dollars in the second quarter of 1959. Increases were initiated in missile programs and other scientific related areas.

11. Uneasy Stability: July 1959-December 1960. Concentrated efforts of the Administration tended to stabilize spending as expenditures dropped to 44.7 billion dollars in 1960. Later in 1960, the break

up of the Paris Summit talks and the U-2 incident caused spending to start climbing upward.⁹

During these periods, with the exception of periods 8 and 9, the presence of an actual or perceived external threat helped to stimulate an increase in defense spending. When there was not an apparent threat, a decline in defense allocations was evident. This pattern continued into the 1960s and 70s.

In 1960, defense expenditures amounted to 9 percent of America's GNP. Gallup polls during 1960 showed that 18 percent of those polled believed too much was being spent on defense, while 45 percent considered defense spending about right and 21 percent not enough.¹⁰ As the Kennedy administration took office, turbulence in the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America combined with the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities prompted an increase in U.S. defense expenditures. The theory of "Massive Retaliation" was inadequate to deal with the new "wars of national liberation," and the advanced nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Soviet Union made general war too costly to be considered. President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara realized the need for America's military to be able to respond to any crisis with the appropriate level of force. This flexible response doctrine initiated a rebuilding of conventional forces and a strengthening of America's nuclear

arsenal. However, all this rebuilding was accomplished at a cost. Defense spending in the first three years of the Kennedy Administration rose from 42.8 billion dollars in 1960 to 50 billion in 1963.¹¹ The occurrence of the Cuban crisis, consisting of the Bay of Pigs debacle in April 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, was a contributing factor to this increase. These two events combined to refortify in the American mind the ever present threat of Soviet incursions into the Western Hemisphere and increased America's resolve to support a strong military to protect their interests. Additionally, troubles in Southeast Asia prompted President Kennedy to increase both military and economic aid to South Vietnam in 1963. Military advisors were sent in, but the actual deployment of combat units did not occur. The final allocation for defense in 1964 showed only a slight 1.2 billion dollar increase over the 1963 allocation.¹²

In November 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated and Vice President Lyndon Johnson assumed the Presidency of the United States. Approximately a year later, North Vietnamese patrol boats purportedly attacked U.S. naval warships in the Tonkin Gulf off the coast of North Vietnam. This event led to the Southeast Asia--or Tonkin Gulf--Resolution which reemphasized that the U.S. had no ambitions in Southeast Asia but rather that the U.S. wished the populace of that area to "... be left in peace to work out

their own destinies in their own war."¹³ It also authorized the President to initiate such measures as he determined necessary to protect American forces and was likened by some as tantamount to an official declaration of war. An exchange between Senators John Sherman Cooper and J. W. Fulbright best demonstrates this attitude:

Cooper: In other words, we are now giving the President advanced authority to take whatever action he may deem necessary?

Fulbright: I think that is correct.

Cooper: Then looking ahead, if the President decided that it was necessary to use such force as could lead into war, we will give that authority by this resolution?

Fulbright: That is the way I would interpret it.¹⁴

Even with the Tonkin Gulf incident, an increase in defense spending did not occur until 1966. Defense budget allocations for 1964 and 1965, respectively, were 51.2 billion dollars and 47.4 billion dollars. By 1966, however, American involvement in Vietnam included actual combat forces, increased military and economic aid to South Vietnam, and a national commitment in Vietnam which would affect all aspects of American society for years to come.

With the escalation of the Vietnam War, federal budget considerations were oriented around the defense establishment during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Defense expenditures continued to increase through 1969. By 1969, public opinion began to express a very low sentiment in favor of increased defense spending. Vietnam was becoming a long war, and long

wars - especially those which were not popular (to begin with) - soon sour the nation against increased involvement. American support for the United States taking an active role in foreign affairs had risen 13 percent from 1947 to 1965. But from 1965 to 1975 an 18 percent drop was noted--due, most logically, to the nation's involvement in Vietnam and the impact it had on domestic policies and American society.¹⁵

Vietnam also marked a turn in the moderately "hawkish" approach America had followed in defense spending starting in the early 1950s and continuing into the late 1960s. Data obtained from Gallup Polls in 1960 indicated that 18 percent of those polled felt too much was being spent on defense; 45 percent thought it was about right; and 21 percent believed too little was being spent on defense. By 1969, 52 percent answered too much; 31 percent about right; and 8 percent too little. After 1969, a gradual shift began heading toward, but not reaching, pre-Vietnam sentiments on spending. By 1974, 47 percent of those polled maintained that the right amount was being spent on defense versus 32 percent believing too much was expended. Polls in 1978 reflected an even stronger shift towards support for defense spending with only 16 percent of those polled maintaining too much was being spent versus 45 percent believing spending for defense was about right and 32 percent believing too

little was spent.¹⁶

2. Public Response to International Crisis

It is clear that public opinion after 1973 began a trend back to supporting a more assertive role for America in foreign affairs. This trend was complemented by a determination to strengthen weakened military capabilities. This trend is well documented by the responses to thirty-eight national surveys conducted since late 1968. The results of these surveys are depicted in Table 1.¹⁷ The question asked in all surveys (the wording was sometimes varied slightly) was structured as follows:

There is much discussion as to the amount of money the government in Washington should spend for national defense and military purposes. How do you feel about this? Do you think we are spending¹⁸ too little, too much, or about the right amount?

As expressed earlier, the period from 1969 to 1973 showed a low sentiment among Americans for increased defense spending beginning to appear. From 1977 on, poll results show an even stronger increase in public sentiment favoring increased defense spending. Gradual shifts in the poll results reflect normal fluctuations in attitude towards defense, but there are some abrupt shifts which are a reaction to some external crisis or stimulant.

The variation between surveys found in the "Too Little" column are most important. Many Americans have the impres-

TABLE 1
PUBLIC PREFERENCES FOR INCREASED OR
REDUCED U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING, 1969-1981*

Defense Spending?

Survey	Date	Too Much	About Right	Too Little
AIPO 784	7/69	53%	38%	9%
AIPO 793	11/69	46	47	7
AIPO 814	9/70	49	40	11
AIPO 825	3/71	50	39	11
Harris	10/71	49	40	11
AIPO/Potomac	8/72	42	49	9
Harris	8/72	38	51	11
AIPO 864	2/73	42	50	8
AIPO 878	9/73	46	41	13
AIPO/Potomac	4/74	37	46	17
AIPO 914	9/74	44	44	12
Harris/CCFR*	12/74	44	44	12
NBC	12/75	41	34	25
AIPO 945	1/76	36	42	22
AIPO/Potomac	5/76	24	48	28
Harris	12/76	32	55	13
NBC	12/76	41	33	26
AIPO 979	7/77	23	50	27
NBC	10/78	21	51	28
AIPO/CCFR	11/78	16	52	32
NBC	12/78	22	54	24
NBC	9/79	16	46	38
AIPO 1145-G	12/79	21	45	34
NBC	12/79	9	40	51
NBC	1/80	8	29	63
CBS/New York Times	1/80	14	40	46
AIPO 1147-G	1/80	14	43	49
CBS/New York Times	3/80	5	18	76
NBC	3/80	13	32	55
AIPO 1186-G	1-2/81	15	35	50

*Source: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, as cited in Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca, "Don't Tread on Me: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the Eighties," Political Science Quarterly 96 (Fall 1981): p. 383.

Questions for CBS/New York Times January 1980 and all AIPO questions except September 1970, August 1972, April 1974, May 1976, and November 1978 are identical with questions given in test; others differ trivially. The AIPO/Potomac question asked whether "spending for defense and military purposes should be increased, kept at the present level, reduced, or ended altogether?" The percentage of people responding "too much" in the above table includes both "reduced" and "ended altogether."

sion that budgetary matters are out of their grasp and therefore rely on their elected officials to do what is correct. This passivity, or perhaps rather a lack of concern, is reflected in the "About Right" column, which is more stable than the other two. The importance of the "Too Little" column is that should the percentages increase more Americans are reflecting their willingness to sacrifice personal well being for the well being of the whole society.

In examining the events surrounding some of the abrupt increases in preferences favoring increased spending, we usually find an external crisis or event which contributed to the change in sentiment. The abrupt increase favoring spending between the polls in February 1973 and April 1974 was undoubtedly stimulated by the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973 and the ensuing Arab oil embargo. There still was not the overriding majority in favor of more defense spending, but preference percentages saying "Too Little" was being spent never again dropped to the 1964 low of 8 percent. Percentages indicating those who believed "Too Much" was being spent never again rose to the 1973 high of 46 percent.¹⁹

Other abrupt changes providing evidence that external crises influence public opinion on defense spending are quite evident throughout the remaining polls depicted in Table 1. Most prominent, perhaps, is the poll response between the NBC poll taken in August 1979 and the one taken in December

1979. The decrease in those saying "Too Much" from 16 to 9 percent and the increase of those saying "Too Little" from 38 to 51 percent was an abrupt change of opinion stimulated by the Iranian hostage crisis and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Agreement on this assumption is almost unanimous among political scientists and historians. Public reaction to Iran and Afghanistan may not have been a pivotal event in American defense spending, but it accelerated the trends of American resurgence to world power and a willingness to increase defense spending. Even American liberals polled showed support for higher defense expenditures. Americans identifying themselves as liberals in 1979 showed only 47 percent in favor of increased spending versus 67 percent in January 1980 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The liberal community was once strongly anti-war: this recent shift may be one of the most important effects of the Afghan-Iranian crisis.²⁰

Preferences in favor of increased defense spending cannot be linked solely with external events. The reversal in attitudes on defense expenditures since 1973 has been influenced by four interconnected changes. The first change which has had a definite impact on attitudes toward defense has been the decline in influence of the results of the Vietnam War. This decline is marked not only by the gradual rise in sentiments favoring increased arms spending but

also by a renewed confidence in the military and the government. Confidence in the military is interlinked with attitudes on military spending regardless of political views.²¹ The Vietnam-era generation, once associated in politics with thinking that too much is being spent on defense, is no longer distinctive and does not have the effect it once did. There is still a desire in America to avoid commitments in certain parts of the world, but the isolationist attitude evident after Vietnam has almost disappeared. Americans are now more willing to support efforts to defend U.S. interests in high priority areas of the world.²²

A second change affecting attitudes toward defense spending is changing ideology. The liberal views of the early 1970s have decreased, and there is a rise in elements of conservative ideology. The United States has seen an increase in the proportion of people favoring capital punishment and willing to identify themselves as conservatives. More and more issues of morality and military preparedness are being linked together by a growing group known as the "Moral Majority." Sentiment toward the continuation of social welfare programs has increased but so have attitudes in favor of their reduction and the placing of more stringent controls on them. All of these changes in the ideological climate are supportive of increased spending for defense and a way of expressing a growth of conservatism in America.²³

An increase in anti-Soviet and anti-communist attitudes since 1973 is the third change which has produced increased support for defense spending. Cooperation with the Soviet Union in the area of *détente* was hoped for by many Americans in the early 1970s. This cooperation was viewed by many as a one-way street with America doing the cooperating and the Soviets winning many of the negotiations. With the failure or stalemate of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks and increased Soviet activity throughout the world, hope for cooperation declined. There also has been a growing perception among Americans that U.S. military strength is weakening, and America has retreated from its dominant position in world affairs. In 1978, 56 percent of those polled perceived the U.S. falling behind the Soviet Union in military strength, and 69 percent of those favored increased military spending. In 1965, fewer than 38 percent of the poll respondents believed Soviet power would increase; this belief rose to 63 percent in 1977.²⁴


The emergence of America's attempt to reassert itself both militarily and politically in the world is the fourth change contributing to increased support for defense spending. In an attempt to document America's move towards reasserting itself in the world, Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca maintain that one reason for this change is:

Americans, in wishing to increase the share of resources devoted to military purposes, are responding to world events -²⁵ or at least to their perceptions of world events.


Russett and Deluca validate their hypothesis by examining results of polls asking Americans what they consider the "most important problem" facing the country.²⁶ They discovered that in the 1950s and 1960s foreign affairs and national security were found to be of most concern to Americans with 50-60 percent of those polled placing their greatest fears on the possibility of war and communism. Later, in the 1960s, overriding interest was reflected in the civil rights movement but was soon replaced with concern over Vietnam. The ending of the Vietnam War caused American interests to return to more domestic issues - primarily inflation - and to the economy. Beginning in late 1973, a gradual increase in the resurgence of concern over foreign affairs was observed. This increase was closely paralleled by the return of strong public sentiment in favor of increased defense spending to meet a "sense of threat" emanating from abroad. This trend in both areas is depicted in Figure 1.²⁷ As before, abrupt changes in preference for more defense spending can be said to be triggered, in part, by external stimuli. The rapid shift in spending attitudes and concern for foreign affairs can also be related to political and domestic circumstances or to events which any sensible American would take into account when forming an opinion.

FIGURE 1

Public Preferences for Increased or Reduced U.S. Defense Spending, 1969-1981*



Percentage Choosing Foreign Affairs as the Most Important Problem Facing This Country



*Source: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations as cited in Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca, "Don't Tread on Me: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the Eighties," Political Science Quarterly 96 (Fall 1981): p. 322.

3. Summary

In the international environment, military force is an instrument to be applied as the foreign environment appears to require it. The four changes addressed in this chapter have all effected the change of public sentiments toward defense spending and America's role in international affairs. Domestic politics also cannot be underrated in its influence on foreign policy. Foreign policy options and the levels of resources available for external use greatly influence America's ability to cope effectively with external threats to core values.²⁸ Support for increased defense spending is stimulated by the presence of an external threat or crisis which is perceived by the American people and government as affecting the normal course of domestic affairs. The federal budget is an indicator of the nation's priorities by the allocation of resources it assigns to domestic and international politics. The budget, in turn, is developed and approved by officials who must at least consider, if not follow, the desires and requirements placed upon them by the American public who elected them. Senator J. William Fulbright again provides perhaps the best statement linking the budget and national priorities:

Far from being a dry accounting of bookkeepers, a nation's budget is full of moral implications; it tells what a society does and does not care about; it tells what its values are.²⁹

As demonstrated throughout the chapter, the presence of an external threat contributes to fluctuations in defense spending, public support towards these expenditures, and public opinion on what is America's most important problem and priority. Here again, public opinion acts as a constraint, a stimulus, and a resource for policy makers.

CHAPTER THREE ENDNOTES

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⁹Ibid., p. 278.

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¹²Ibid.

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¹⁷Bruce Russet and Donald R. Deluca, "Don't Tread on Me: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the Eighties," Political Science Quarterly 96 (Fall 1981) : 322.

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²⁵Russet and Deluca, "Don't Tread on Me," p. 393.

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²⁸Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Patrick J. McGowan, Challenges to America: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1979), p. 25.

²⁹J. William Fulbright, The Crippled Giant, p. 245.

CHAPTER IV

PUBLIC OPINION AND MILITARY SERVICE

Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must like men, undergo the fatigue of supporting it.¹

Thomas Paine

American society has supported its nation's military through allocation of the two resources which are addressed in this thesis--money and manpower. The former is relatively easy to measure, so many dollars having the power to purchase equipment and to hire and develop the human resources needed to make the military machine run, and if need be fight. Notwithstanding, manpower is more than a matter of money. Motivation of an individual to sign on with an organization is stimulated by more than financial awards. Psychic awards, such as job satisfaction, sense of purpose, and life style are also influences acting upon an individual to join an organization. It is true that money will buy manpower and talent, but the satisfaction of the psychic needs of an individual must also be addressed.²

Manpower is no doubt the most valuable resource a nation possesses. Without sufficient human resources, a nation will be unable to carry out national economic, domestic, or foreign policy programs. Manpower produces all subsequent required resources and reinforces the projection of the nation's policies throughout the world. During World War II, the decline of Nazi Germany's manpower reserves contributed heavily to its final defeat. The drain

on manpower contributed not only to the decreased efficiency of Germany's military but also to the decreased efficiency of its industrial base.

This chapter will deal with the capability of America to obtain the required human resources needed to man its military forces and the factors influencing this. Economic, social, and external threats will be addressed attempting to establish that public attitude towards military service is an indication of overall support for the military establishment.

1. Historical Perspective

For most of its history, manpower procurement in America has been a blend of conscription and a volunteer system. The idea of a nation of volunteers has attracted favorable response down through the years, for it is seen as more in tune with America's democratic principles. Conscription infringes on individual liberties and is an abomination in a nation comprised of free men. Compulsory military service, however, has been used frequently throughout the history of the United States but with only limited popularity. It has only been seen as acceptable to a majority of the American people when its need was clearly demonstrated as in World War II. When this need was not evident, or when the application seemed inequitable, as during the Vietnam War, compulsory military service has been the center of heated debates

and the fragmentation of American society.

Compulsory military service, or conscription, has probably existed as long as there have been organized armies. Moses was instructed by the Lord to take all males twenty years old and upward and send them forth to war, and the Greek city states all practiced conscription to man their armies. Conscription in America originated in the mobilization of free men in England resulting in the establishment of the English militia system. As historian Russell Weigley states, the militia system was "transplanted to America and nourished, hereafter, it became moribund in England itself."³

The militia system was used throughout the American Revolution. When George Washington became the first President of the United States, he requested the establishment of an Army based on general conscription. Congress failed to act on this request because of the fear of large standing armies. President Madison, during the War of 1812, also requested the conscription of men for the military, but again it was disapproved. It was not until the Civil War years that the subject again would come up. It was the Confederacy which approached the issue of conscription first in 1862, followed by the North in 1863. The direct effects of the Civil War draft were limited. Only about 6 percent of the manpower used in the war were draftees.⁴

Conscription and the draft again disappeared after the Civil War and reappeared when the United States became

involved in World War I. Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1917, which established a truly national system of conscription. It was an effective system during World Wars I and II and continued to operate throughout the 1960s and early 1970s with the last man entering the Army by way of the draft on 30 June 1973.⁵

Activity against the draft itself was not overtly visible until the escalation of the war in Vietnam. After World War II, the draft ceased but was left in "standby" status. With the advent of the Korean War and the problems with mobilization for that conflict, a Universal Military Training (UMT) and Service Act was adopted in 1951 after only four days of debate. This established the Selective Service system used until 1973 but also required that the UMT Act be reviewed and extended every four years. Since 1951, the draft extension has been passed by the Congress four times-- 1955, 1959, 1963, and 1967--with only one day debate on the issue. It was not until President Nixon requested a two year extension of the draft in 1971 that political discussion over this issue increased. After three days of debate in the House and over a month of debate in the Senate, the extension was finally approved by a 293 to 99 roll call vote in the House and a 72 to 16 roll call vote in the Senate. This was the first time since 1951 that over 44 Representatives and 5 Senators voted against the extension.⁶ This turnaround in attitudes concerning the draft was sparked by

related outside events which influenced the Congressional debate. The revealing of the secret Pentagon papers on the history of the Vietnam War, the trial and conviction of Army Lieutenant William Calley for the My Lai massacre of Vietnamese civilians, the North Vietnamese offer to negotiate on mutual troop withdrawals and repatriation of prisoners, heavy lobbying pressure by coalitions supporting an end to the draft and the Vietnam War all caused the Congressmen to take a more critical look at the Vietnam War, the draft, and the possibility of an all volunteer military force.⁷ It must be remembered that these same events also affected public attitudes; and the public, in turn, will direct their desires and requirements towards their elected officials who are to act in accordance with their electorate's wants. It can safely be assumed, therefore, that the concern shown for extending the draft by the politicians was a reflection of the public unrest during the Vietnam years towards the inequities of the draft and the American involvement in Vietnam.

Public unrest against the draft started in 1965 with President Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam War. Public demonstrations against the draft grew more and more numerous as America became increasingly involved in Vietnam. With these events and the subsequent political pressures placed on the administration by the public, President Nixon appointed an advisory commission to study the possibility

of an all volunteer armed force in March 1969.⁸ Former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates Jr. was nominated to head the commission. The President charged the Gates Commission, as it was to become known, with developing "... a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving toward an all volunteer force."⁹

The Gates Commission submitted its report in February 1970 stating the following points:

1. The nation would be better served by an all volunteer force supported by a standby draft.
2. Steps should be taken promptly to move in that direction.
3. The first step is to "... remove the inequity in the pay of men serving their first term in the armed forces."
4. They believed an all volunteer force would benefit America and not endanger its national security.¹⁰

By 1972, registration for the draft ceased, and in 1973 the All Volunteer Force (AVF) was brought into being.

The rebellion against the draft may have been against the Vietnam War itself and the draft an outlet for public frustration about the war. Whatever the case, the Selective Service System was a casualty of the war in Southeast Asia, and the AVF a product.

The AVF is not the cure-all it was hoped to be; it too has its problems. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird stated the position of the AVF in his final report to Congress in January 1973. He said:

if the Department of Defense has the full support of Congress and the full support of the American people in assuring that those who serve in the military profession receive the respect, recognition, and compensation that they deserve,¹¹ we will be able to have an All-Volunteer Force.

The support referenced by Mr. Laird has been forthcoming only partially. Financially, the Defense Budget has been allowed to increase the provision for the additional funds needed to pay an AVF. Soldiers' wages have increased (in current dollars) from a total of 12.3 billion dollars in 1964 to 30.3 billion dollars in 1981, while the number of servicemen has declined.¹² These increased wages have resulted in what some maintain is a force manned by minorities, low skill and low intellectual-level individuals, drug abusers, and alcoholics. Some of these charges are true. Prior to the end of conscription in 1973, the average American soldier read at the eleventh grade level. Today the reading level of the average soldier in the AVF has dropped to the fifth grade level. Also, the AVF has a disproportionate percentage of minorities when compared to the overall society, almost 36 percent of the soldiers in the AVF are black.¹³ With these shortcomings, the AVF is truly reliant upon public support as Mr. Laird mentioned and on the uncertainty of the nation's economic situation and attitudes toward the Armed Forces.

2. Public Opinion and Military Service--Why Serve?

The attitudes of the American public from revolutionary days to the age of détente have dictated the size, purpose, and character of America's forces. It is the public's perception of the importance and relevance of a large military force to ensure national security that continues to provide the quality and texture of that force.

These attitudes, however, are influenced by many catalysts as stated earlier. Throughout the draft years from 1946-1973, many young Americans entered the Armed Forces for educational benefits obtained through the G.I. Bill, travel, a change of life style, and as a step upward on the great American mobility ladder. Others were motivated to enlist (volunteer) by the threat of the draft itself. Most of the draftees served in Army combat units for a period of two years. Enlistees could choose their branch of service--Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, or Coast Guard. Also, those who enlisted stood a much better chance of receiving training in a high technology or skill area which would assist them in a civilian career. Enlistees did have to serve for at least three years versus two for draftees.

This draft motivation was quite strong in the young men of the draft era. A Department of Defense study conducted in 1964 showed 43.2 percent of all first term enlistees surveyed stated that the draft was the primary motivation

for their enlisting in the Armed Forces. Another survey conducted in 1969 revealed 49.7 percent of those enlistees surveyed maintained the draft was the primary motivation behind their enlisting.¹⁴ Those who were not motivated by the draft had other reasons. Listed below in table two are some of these reasons:

Table 2

Reasons for enlisting in the Armed Forces other than to "beat the draft."*

	Percent Answering
1. Training and educational opportunities	22
2. A desire to become more mature and self reliant	11
3. A desire for travel and new experiences	12
4. Learn a trade valuable in civilian life	16
5. Fulfill my military obligation at a time of my choosing	49

*Source: Harold Wool, Military Specialist: Skilled Manpower for the Armed Forces (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 11.

None of the surveys available indicated a desire to serve based upon external influences such as Vietnam or the Communist threat. Also, no opinion polls or surveys were located asking civilians similar questions concerning what would motivate them to enlist.

The draft had been such a part of American life that it was automatically taken into consideration when planning

an individual's future. Fathers, brothers, teachers, etc., had almost all experienced military service because of the draft; therefore, military service was seen as a civic obligation by the young. A sense of duty to the nation and a feeling of honor and pride at having served in the Armed Forces helped to unite Americans. A large majority of American males had helped protect their freedoms, and once they looked back on their service they considered it--on the most part--a positive and meaningful period in their life. A feeling of earning the freedoms they enjoyed was a result. With the end of the draft and the stigma military service obtained during the Vietnam War, this sense of civic obligation faded away.

Today's AVF has adapted the business approach to attracting young men and women into the service. Extra funds are sought not only for weapons and wages by the Pentagon but also for publicity and advertisements. During the draft years, an expansion of military forces was accomplished by increasing the draft call up. One of the major concerns arising from the use of an all volunteer system is the military's capability to maintain adequate levels of manpower to perform its mission effectively. While the conscriptive force was concerned with the allocation of manpower, the AVF is concerned first with the attraction of personnel and then the allocation of manpower. Also, it must be remembered that the AVF, because it is not

a conscriptive force, is more susceptible to trends and concerns within society and, therefore, must be constantly concerned with its reputation and standing in society.¹⁵ Thus, advertising campaigns and multi-media blitzes have become almost as important to national security as reliable weapons.

Americans today who want not only well paying careers but also respected ones tend to steer clear of the military except as a last resort. In a 1979 survey, less than 10 percent of 17,000 high school seniors thought the military was a desirable occupation. Of college bound respondents, only 5 percent believed the military was a desirable career. Overall, about 50 percent of all seniors surveyed thought military service was not an acceptable career.¹⁶ This attitude has led to a volunteer force whose composition is seriously affected by the national unemployment rate. As long as the jobless rate stands at an exceptionally high level, the armed forces will have little difficulty attracting the quantity of volunteers needed. Unemployment assists military recruiting in two ways. First is the prospect of some probability of unemployment causing the individual to consider military service more seriously as an alternate job. Second, for those directly affected by unemployment, military service may be the only visible means for economic survival. Studies linking unemployment rates and military service

suggest that a 15 percent reduction in youth unemployment causes between a 3 to 7.5 percent decline in military recruiting.¹⁷

In the seven year history of the AVF, the Army has achieved its recruiting objective only three times. Once during the peak unemployment years of 1975 and 1976, and again in 1980 following the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.¹⁸ The 1980 increase was also due to three other factors, according to Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower. These three factors consisted of a relatively high unemployment rate particularly among the young; some recruiting innovations; and the Army's willingness to accept large numbers of high school dropouts and people who scored low on the entrance aptitude tests.¹⁹ The influences of the two external crises can only be assumed until a more extensive analysis of America's reaction to them can be completed. One might postulate that the real reaction stemmed primarily from the Iranian Crisis, and the Afghanistan Crisis acted as an additional catalyst. The seizing of American civilians without provocation may be construed by the public as a more visible insult to their national pride and violates the freedoms so valued by Americans. This insult could have acted as the influence to cause the crusading spirit of Americans to be awakened and thus resulted in the increase of enlistments in the Armed Forces. Again, this was

definitely not the only reason but may have been a contributing factor.

An additional problem facing the AVF is competition with the civilian labor market. When this market demands additional manpower, this increases the military's problems by not only affecting quantity but also quality of personnel. Increased trends toward more technologically advanced systems in both the military and civilian market place have caused increased competition for the educated youth of America. The Navy and Air Force are looked upon by most people as better sources of technical training and experience; and since the AVF came into being, they have only failed to meet their personnel objective four times for the Navy and only one time for the Air Force.²⁰ The Army and Marines have been particularly hard hit, for technical training in these services is seen as less possible than in the other two services by prospective recruits. The need for better educated soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines is important for the continued security of the nation. As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower Lawrence Korb states:

The most important military manpower questions for the 1980s are rather: are we recruiting and retaining enough high quality people to meet our national security requirements, and what steps must we take to ensure that we²¹ will be able to do so throughout the decade.

Military personnel who have not had a sound educational background will be an additional burden on the already

strained military school system used to teach low-skill level recruits high-tech jobs. Competition for these educated 17-21 year olds will become increasingly intense considering the overall decrease in young men in that age group. The projected population of 17-21 year old males in 1987 is estimated to be 9.2 million versus 10.8 million in 1978.²²

The problems of the AVF are not the type that can be cured quickly. They can be solved only partially by economic incentives to bring in more and better soldiers. Economic incentives for military service are only an attraction, for military service is quite different from other occupations because soldiers are expected to support and defend the Constitution of the United States and all it stands for unto death if need be--an act for which no economist or managerial expert has yet devised financial or career incentives. The overriding solution must come from within society, for military service in a democracy is the obligation of a citizen for it is the military which protects his rights and freedoms. When all understanding of a citizen's duty to his nation disappears, then the rights and freedoms the populace receive are taken for granted and not appreciated. Imperfections within the Armed Forces abound, but it is still their responsibility to act as a defender of America's principles, a deterrent to aggressive acts against the U.S., and an implement to assist in the execution of national policy.

In free states ... no man should take up arms, but with a view to defend his country and its laws! He puts not off the citizen when he enters the camp; Because it is because he is a citizen, and would wish to continue so, that he makes himself for awhile a soldier.²³

The American public must be constantly reminded that the freedoms they possess and value do not come without effort. A democracy must continue to be strong and to do so it needs the support of its citizens--not only financially but physically--in maintaining the freedom and prestige of the nation.

3. Summary

Public opinion towards military service has always been a crucial element influencing a nation's level of national security. In a democratic society, it is even more important, for military service is not representative of the freedoms enjoyed by non-military members of the society. The influence that economic factors, unemployment, wages, and occupational prestige has on the attitude of the public towards military service is easily understood and researched. External events or crisis influence on public opinion concerning military service is much less evident and extremely difficult to measure. Throughout the course of this research, no supporting evidence was uncovered which would indicate that external crises have a significant impact on public opinion and military service.

America's All Volunteer Force is more reliant today upon public support than the conscriptive forces ever were. Current attitudes toward military service are vitally important in the attraction and retention of qualified quality soldiers. American youth, however, have never been overly receptive to military service, even though it is an individual obligation to the community. The precept that membership in the community implies a willingness to defend it is the link between the rights of an individual and his obligation to the nation and has always been a strong point of a democracy.²⁴ Today's youth, however, are more concerned with individual success and tend to neglect the fact that prosperity for the community means prosperity for its members.

The polls and surveys uncovered during this research have been limited. What results are available show a low desire among Americans for military service. A 1977 Gallup Poll reflected that two out of every three Americans favored a law requiring all young men to devote a year to national service, either military or non-military. But when the draft age population responses were isolated only 47 percent of those between 18 and 24 years old supported national service.²⁵ This is not an entirely new attitude. Military service, as stated earlier, has never been popular with Americans. Estimates of propensities to enlist among non-

prior service males have ranged from 18 percent in the early 1970s to 33 percent in 1977.²⁶

Perhaps even more important is the absence of a continuing polling agency which monitors attitudes and opinions on military service. The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) has conducted a series of polls over the past thirty-eight years asking many questions concerning national security issues. None of the polls located asked any questions concerning military service. This lack of opinion analysis, not only by CCFR but also by Harris and Gallup, provides evidence that the issue of military service is not a public concern until it affects them directly--as demonstrated by the Gallup Poll of draft age individuals mentioned earlier.

The American public seems willing to trade high-tech weapons--resulting in increased defense spending--for manpower with which to defend the nation and project its policies worldwide. Until society comes to regard military service as a respectable occupation and necessary for the nation's well being, the All Volunteer Force will have difficulties attracting the numbers and quality needed to man a modern force capable of deterring aggression.

CHAPTER FOUR ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Traditional American approaches to the role of the United States in world affairs has been, primarily, one of leadership by example rather than cooperation in international projects. During the last forty years, however, a realization has emerged among Americans that while ideals and examples are important, they are not enough in a world where actions of all nations are interrelated.

Until the realization of this international attachment emerged, American policies for raising, developing, and employing military forces were generally established under the American civil-military tradition. This tradition called for small volunteer military forces which could be augmented in time of need by citizen soldiers recruited from state militias or--as in the twentieth century--through a system of conscription. Additionally, Americans, except in times of crisis, have looked upon the military as a national institution which was necessary but evil. Those who abide by these thoughts tend to argue that the American civil-military relationship should be one in which all decisions, except the most militarily and technically specific, should be accomplished by civilians and that military spending is a waste of funds which could be more productively used elsewhere.

Since World War II, this relationship has changed substantially. Increased need for military power in executing America's expanded role in the world order has projected the military establishment into the center ring of public scrutiny and concern. The need for increased funds and manpower has made the military more of a factor not only in foreign policy but also in domestic policy. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Patrick J. McGowan sum up the relationship between domestic and foreign policy best:

Domestic politics shape the foreign policy options that are open to society; effect the levels of resources available for external use; and influence greatly states' ability to cope effectively with external threats to core values.¹

The increased importance of the military in the normal conduct of national affairs has also placed military planners in a more prestigious position in contributing to foreign policy development. Because of the dangers and external threats in the rapidly changing world around them, Americans have allowed the military establishment to grow and become an effective and powerful instrument of foreign policy.

Just how effective and powerful the military will be is determined by the resources allocated to it by the nation. Few Americans today doubt the need for an effective military force to implement national security policies, but many ask the question "how much is enough?" The level to which Americans will go to support increased allotment of the nation's resources to the military is dependent on both the

domestic and external world environment. The primacy of domestic affairs has not changed, but there are times when the concerns of America are focused on external events. This concentration of attention on external events is most apparent when that event is seen as a threat to the normal conduct of the nation's affairs. The concern is escalated when there is a threat of violence present, which is a characteristic--directly or indirectly--of most of the confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Examples include the Berlin Crisis, the Hungarian Revolution, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the various and continuing Mid-East Conflict, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the unrest in Third World nations. It is at times like these when the public influence on policy is greatest and most visible. After all, it is the public who must sacrifice the two most important resources a nation has--manpower and money. Their willingness to do this may indicate the level of support they have for the military or the perceived need for a strong military in answer to world events.

The percentage of the federal budget allocated to defense seems to be a reliable indication of the importance placed on foreign affairs. As a result of this emphasis, the status of the nation's armed forces is also affected, for as Samuel Huntington states: "A nation can achieve little by diplomacy unless it has the strength and the will

to back up its demands with force."² It is here, in the area of budgetary distributions of the nation's wealth, that public opinion can exercise the three functions addressed in Chapter Two. Those three functions being that opinion can constrain policy, stimulate policy, and act as a resource for policy makers. Public approval for increased defense spending may stimulate policy makers to become more adventuresome in foreign policy programs while a consensus favoring less spending would affect the elected official's thoughts on foreign policy development. Public opinion may also be a resource upon which elected officials or policy makers might call in putting pressure on the President for either an increase or decrease in defense spending. In Table 1 and Figure 1, increases in public support for defense spending are evident during and after years in which an international crisis occurred involving the U.S. When there is a drop in those polled who desire more defense spending, a further analysis of attitudes surveyed show that international affairs are seen as non-threatening. This was evident in surveys taken after Vietnam, the end of the "Cold War," and the birth of *détente*. Later in the seventies, the increase in concern toward the accelerated Soviet military buildup and the occurrence of the 1976 Mid-East war, forced Americans again to see the need for rebuilding their military forces to give them the strength to once again become a dominant force in world affairs.

Americans have demonstrated their support for the nation's policy and military by favoring increased defense spending and the indication that foreign policy concerns are becoming more important to their domestic well being. One resource U.S. citizens do not seem as willing to provide for national security and the reinforcement of the nation's policies is manpower. The willingness to provide funds for new weapons and programs is seen as the furthest limit Americans are willing to go in an attempt to bolster America's position in the international arena. Since the end of the draft in 1972, the All Volunteer Army has attained its recruiting goals only three times. Only one of these years, 1980 (after the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), could be attributed in part to an increase in fervor to defend America's prestige and ideals. Primary motivators for individuals enlisting in the Army is, as mentioned in Chapter Four, due to the domestic environment. During Winter Quarter 1983 at the University of Montana, a survey was taken by Dr. Thomas Payne concerning student attitudes toward military budget decisions, including personnel and weapons. The students, mostly sophomores studying American Government, (6) reflected what I believe is, and has been, a consistent attitude among Americans concerning the support of national security policies. Of the 51 students surveyed, a total of 96 percent thought

either the Volunteer Army should be expanded (15) or maintained at present strength levels (34). Less than 21 percent of these same students were in favor of universal service for all 18-21 year olds for one year. Seventy-eight percent of the students did agree with universal service if there was a major war, and 54 percent thought the selective service registration should continue.³ This data is perhaps not scientifically valid, but I believe it demonstrates the attitude of Americans toward military service. Americans want the protection and security of a strong military during peacetime but are not willing to interrupt their individual pursuits by serving in the armed forces. During an international crisis affecting American interests, Americans will rise like the fabled Minute Man of Lexington Green to defend the ideals and principles of America. In today's world of fast changing situations and high technology warfare, being ready in a minute may not be soon enough. I do not profess to believe that all Americans should be professional soldiers. But we must bring back the sense of duty--not blind obedience--to our country that has been replaced by a sense of duty only to ourselves, complemented by a lack of concern over protecting the source of our freedoms.

Today there is no overt opposition to service in the armed forces, but there is also no visible support. When the domestic market place returns to normal and the unemploy-

ment rate decreases, the services will again experience difficulties in attaining their recruiting goals. Fewer and fewer Americans will experience military service and have an opinion--based on actual participation--on the necessity and benefit of military service. In turn, America's armed forces may become less and less of a deterrent in the foreign policy arena, and the realization of Demosthenes admonition to the Athenians may be applied to America as well:

There is one source, O Athenians [Americans] to all your defeats. It is that your citizens have ceased to be soldiers.

1. Summary

In conclusion, public opinion must be a consideration in the development of a democratic nation's foreign and domestic policies. It is extremely important in constraining policy, stimulating policy, and providing a resource for policy makers to use in policy development. Public opinion is vitally important in supporting the allocation of resources towards a nation's military, especially the resources of money and manpower. Fluctuations in support of defense spending may be traced to the occurrence of external crisis and be a valid indication of public support or opposition to the military establishment. Manpower fluctuations--under a volunteer system--will be caused more often, not by external events but by changes in the domestic

environment.

American civil-military relations are an area public opinion will often focus on because of the visibility of the military establishment. The military does not need to be "liked" or supported by everyone. Its mission, however, in respect to the nation's survival must be considered and respected by America's citizens; for without a strong and efficient military, the nation is neither influential or safe in the international environment.

Any kind of war short of jihad (a holy war), is and will be unpopular with the people. Because such wars are fought with legions, and Americans, even when they are proud of them, do not like their legions. They do not like to serve in them or even allow them to be what they must.

For legions have no ideological or spiritual home in the liberal society. The liberal society has no use for legions--as its prophets have long proclaimed.

Except that in this world there are Tigers.⁴

T. R. Fehrenbach

The American people's attitude towards, and acceptance of, the military must be based on the realized need for a force to protect their rights, values, and freedoms. As Fehrenbach says "... in this world there are Tigers," and Americans must be prepared to fend off "Tiger" attacks which attempt to deprive Americans of their freedom.

CHAPTER FIVE ENDNOTES

¹Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Patrick J. McGowan, eds., Challenges to America: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1979), p. 25.

²Samuel Huntington, "The Military Mind: Conservative Realism of the Professional Military Ethic," in War, Morality, and the Military Profession, ed., Malham M. Wakin (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), p. 32.

³Thomas Paine, Unpublished Survey, Military Budget Decision, (University of Montana, Missoula, Montana, 1983).

⁴T. R. Fehrenbach, as cited in William Hauser, America's Army in Crisis: A Study in Civil-Military Relations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. iv.

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