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THE STRUCTURE OF CHINESE
COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY: A CONTENT ANALYSIS

By

Kathleen D. Brasel

B.A., Colorado State University, 1973

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Master of Arts

UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA

1980

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Abstract

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Anthropology

The Structure of Chinese Communist Ideology: A Content Analysis.
(99 pp.)

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The question of what are the basic cultural premises underlying Chinese Communist socio-political thought is examined. It is postulated that some Western liberal concepts have combined with elements of traditional Chinese thought, resulting in a new conceptual structure which provides the basic cultural assumptions of Chinese Marxism. How this conceptual formulation is expressed in Chinese Communist propaganda is the focus of this study.

The premise is tested through two methodologies: structural analysis and content analysis. The structural analysis explores the theories of Louis Dumont concerning the differing natures of modern and traditional social thought, and the theories of Victor Turner concerning anti-structure as the basis of millenarian and revolutionary socio-political movements. The content analysis extrapolates basic cultural traits derived from Turner's theory of anti-structure and determines how extensively these traits are expressed in the sample of propaganda.

The evidence derived from the content analysis clearly supports Turner's hypothesis concerning revolutionary movements and their attempt to maintain the transitional state of anti-structure. The question of why and how Chinese ideology has attempted to formalize anti-structure is dealt with in terms of a new structural model derived from Dumont's structural theories. This new model demonstrates the merging of Western modern cultural premises and traditional Chinese cultural assumptions.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Statement of Research Problem

Chinese Communist propaganda, like all propaganda, utilizes a variety of types of messages to influence public thought and opinion. It is the purpose of this study to investigate two sources of influence in contemporary Chinese mass media: 1) Confucian or traditional concepts and 2) elements of Western liberal thought assimilated by Chinese culture. How these two very divergent conceptual sets coalesce into a single cohesive philosophy, Chinese Marxism, will be explored in terms of major themes repeatedly expressed in the mass media of the People's Republic of China.

The assumptions underlying this research rest in the nature of anthropological thought. Much of anthropological literature deals explicitly or implicitly with defining similarities and differences, change and stasis, and what varies and what is constant in culture. Paradoxically, how we conceptualize and define what is culture is modified by how we decide what constitutes change and what are selected as variables. Researchers' assumptions about what is culture and what is change are a result of training in anthropology and are highly pertinent to any study; therefore, assumptions

underlying this study are as follows:

1. culture is a mental abstraction that exists both in the minds of the observer and the participant;
2. culture is also an external reality that forms a systematic whole, the way by which humans interact with their environment and each other;
3. the astounding variation that often exists within a culture is in large part attributable to a lack of complete integration of the whole;
4. this lack of integration is a result of the on-going flux and change that all existential phenomena undergo;
5. cultural change is orderly, drawing from what was and combining with new elements, evolving into a new state;
6. certain structural elements of culture show resistance to change and provide continuity in periods of transition;
7. assimilated cultural elements that originate from outside the culture are adapted to and modified by pre-existing requirements.

The point of all this, and the essential goal of this research, is to begin to demonstrate that the "cultural revolution," on the scale the Chinese claim, cannot exist and is not possible, that the "common distinction between modern

and pre-modern China implies the existence of a cultural gulf that does not in fact exist" (Munro, 1977, p. viii).

This research will explore how elements of traditional Chinese premises and Western conceptual schemes combine to form contemporary Chinese ideology, and how this is expressed in Chinese Communist propaganda for the purpose of demonstrating the nature of cultural evolution in China.

The problem simply stated, then, is this: What are the cultural messages communicated in Chinese propaganda and what are their socio-ideological origins?

Statement of Hypotheses

The hypotheses to be tested are:

1. contemporary Chinese Marxism as expressed in the mass media can be, in large part, analyzed into elements of traditional Chinese and Western liberal conceptual schemes;
2. the combination of the above mentioned ideologies has produced a structural hybrid that shares characteristics of both conceptual schemes but is unlike either;
3. Chinese Communist ideology is an expression of anti-structure as described by Victor Turner's concept of *communitas*.

Statement of Methodology

The methodology of structural analysis is used to test the first two hypotheses. To this end use is made of Louis Dumont's Homo Hierarchicus (1970) in which he suggests that the combination of traditional or hierarchical and egalitarian or modern social structural elements produce a totalitarian social structure. The transformation of the Chinese socio-political conceptual scheme through the use of Dumont's structural concepts and the methodology of structural analysis will be explored.

To test the last hypothesis, the methodology used in content analysis will be employed. This methodology will be modified according to requirements of the problem and limitations of the researcher.

The selection of the propaganda sample is critical to obtaining a representative data base. The sampling of communications used here is received by a massive public, originated by a huge propaganda bureaucracy; therefore, this sample is limited in many ways:

1. limited personal funds for expenditure to purchase necessary literature;
2. limited access to propaganda sources;
3. language limitations restricting access to only translated materials; and,
4. limitations of time for one investigator to analyze and encode data.

There are other problem-oriented restrictions on the

sample selection. Almost every officially spoken or written word in the People's Republic of China is produced by the Department of Propaganda. For the purpose of this research I am interested only in those "folk-oriented" media that are assumed to contain the social values, roles, and goals that are of primary interest to the Communist Party for the purposes of "cultural engineering" and mass thought reform.

To deal most effectively with the stated limitations in the sample selection, I have decided to examine the material listed below:

Propaganda Sample

Magazines:

Peking Review - one year's subscription (1978)

"Weekly journal of political affairs. Contains important editorials, speeches, and government documents. Also features reportage and analytical articles on domestic and internal issues" (Books New China, p. 42).

This magazine gives an excellent general political overview of various internal and external policies and trends in the P.R.C.

Chinese Literature - three years' back issues (1975, 1976, 1977)

A monthly magazine on literature and art. Regular features include stories, short novels, poems, plays, literary critiques, and reproductions of art work.

This magazine will provide insight into the general state of mass-consumed folk literature. Also it will provide access into many expressive forms that are broadcast daily on radio. No knowledge of circulation.

Philosophical pamphlets - 10: eg., "Confucius - 'Sage' of the Reactionary Classes"

General literature - 8 novels: eg., Bright Red Star

Reportage - 1

Short stories - 7 books of collections

Poetry - 2 books of collections

Revolutionary operas - 2 operatic scripts

Songs - 1 collection of revolutionary songs

Political pamphlets - 27: eg., "Strive to Learn from Each Other and Don't Stick to the Beaten Path and Be Complacent"

Children's literature:

Picture story books - (for very young children)
8 collections

Story books - 4 collections

Adult picture books - 12 collections

The examination of this sample of material will be a content analysis for the purpose of describing influences on propaganda within the documentary universe, so as to make inferences as to the cultural antecedents of the literature. The unit of analysis to be used for the purpose of coding

will be the sentence. The categories to be employed are categories that have been generated by Victor Turner's theory of anti-structure as it is expressed in *communitas*. According to Turner, *communitas* engenders in the participants a state called "liminality." The liminal person bears a striking resemblance to the idealized "true Communist" as he is portrayed in the propaganda.

The coding categories are characteristics of the liminal person as defined by Turner, and they are as follows:

Ideological Purity (Traits of liminality) = I

- I1 = anonymity - unconcern for status
- I2 = humility
- I3 = selflessness
- I4 = acceptance of pain and suffering
- I5 = simplicity
- I6 = heteronomy - obedience

Moral Knowledge (Perfect moral understanding) = K

- Kx = distinguishing good and bad
- Kx1 = good from bad people
- Kx2 = good from bad thoughts
- Kx3 = good from bad action
- Kx4 = good from bad situation

- Ky = distinguishing true from false
- Ky1 = people
- Ky2 = thoughts
- Ky3 = actions
- Ky4 = situations

Power (Personal and unlimited) = P

- Px = internal, physical and psychological
- Px1 = over pain
- Px2 = to assimilate knowledge and skills
- Px3 = to change

- Py = external, social and environmental
- Py1 = over adversary
- Py2 = over difficulties
- Py3 = to influence others
- Py4 = over environment

Review of the Literature

Most of the work that has been done concerning Chinese Communist propaganda has been of a general nature. Such works as To Change a Nation (1969) by Fu-Wu Hou, Mass Persuasion in Communist China (1957) by Frederick T. C. Yu, Responsibility in Mass Communication (1957) by William Schram, and The Communist Program for Literature and Art (1955) by Chung Chao, all deal with Chinese propaganda as a genre and are concerned with the general methods, aims, and political philosophies that generate this form of mass media. Other works available, such as H. E. Chen's work, Thought Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals (1960) and Robert Lifton's Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism (1961 and 1963), deal with the social, political, philosophical, and/or moral issues concerning thought reform and cultural manipulation.

The third major type of source on Chinese Communist propaganda is concerned with an analysis of specific issues or situations affecting mass media in China, such as Persuasive Communication During the Cultural Revolution (1970) by Frederick T. C. Yu, "Hu Feng's Conflict with the Communist Literary Authorities" (1957) by Merle Goldman, and "Who Was the Principle Enemy? - Shifts in Official Chinese Perceptions of the Two Superpowers - 1968-69" (1977) by L. D. Dillon.

Only one source could be found that was an actual first-hand analysis of Chinese propaganda: "An Analysis of a Representative Sample of Plays Written and Used for Propagandistic Purposes by the Chinese Communists" (1960), Ph.D. Dissertation by Raymond J. Lammer.

Little work has been done in this area. American sociologists have been studying American advertising in television, radio, newspapers, and the expression of social values in comic books, novels, movies, etc., for some time and there are undoubtedly many parallels to be drawn between the enculturation of American consumers and Chinese Communist propaganda. Hopefully this study will contribute in some small way to an understanding of culture change as it occurs on the conscious and unconscious level, and as it is modified and affected by the feedback system involving the people and their would-be "cultural engineers."

CHAPTER TWO

Dumont's Structural Hypothesis

It must be clearly established at the outset that the subject matter of this research is the thoughts, premises, and basic assumptions that influence and form parameters of social behavior. As such, the classical distinctions developed in Anthropology for the purposes of analysis between political, religious, economic, or social thought systems will not be delineated. It is the premise of the research that there are certain primary and pervasive assumptions that people make concerning "human nature" and social reality that underly and color all areas of thought. The comparative method is essential to throw into relief these primary cultural assumptions.

Louis Dumont in Homo Hierarchicus (1970) suggests that there are two basic and structurally opposite conceptual systems extant in the human social universe:

It is immediately obvious that there are two mutually opposed configurations of this kind: one is characteristic of traditional societies and the other of modern society. In the first, as in Plato's Republic, the stress is placed on the society as a whole, as collective Man; the ideal derives from the organization of society with respect to its ends (and not with respect to individual happiness); it is above all a matter of order, or hierarchy; each particular man in

his place must contribute to the global order, and justice consists in ensuring that the proportions between social functions are adapted to the whole.

In modern society, on the contrary, the Human Being is regarded as the indivisible, "elementary" man, both a biological being and a thinking subject. Each particular man in a sense incarnates the whole of mankind. He is the measure of all things (in a full and novel sense). The kingdom of ends coincides with each man's legitimate ends, and so the values are turned upside down. What is still called "society" is the means, the life of each man is the end. Ontologically, the society no longer exists, it is no more than an irreducible datum, which must in no way thwart the demands of liberty and equality (Dumont, 1970, pp. 9,10).

In Dumont's terminology, traditional social systems are Homo hierarchicus, and modern social systems are Homo aequalis. The basic and mutually exclusive premises of these two systems are 1) holism (collective Man) versus individual (elementary Man), and 2) hierarchy versus equality. Each of these major and all-encompassing concepts will be examined for the purposes of establishing the conceptual universe in which traditional Chinese thinking and modern Chinese Marxism will be compared.

Following Dumont's example, it will be instructive to first describe and define the crucial assumptions of Homo aequalis. It is the nature of study that that with which we are most culturally familiar is least clearly understood and objectively defined. Homo aequalis has developed a concept of the individual which is pivotal to all of his cultural idea systems:

Our two cardinal ideals are called equality and liberty.

They assume as their common principle, and as a valorized representation, the idea of the human individual: humanity is made up of men, and each man is conceived as presenting, in spite of and above his particularity, the essence of humanity. . . This individual is quasi-sacred, absolute; there is nothing over and above his legitimate demands; his rights are limited only by the identical rights of other individuals (Dumont, 1970, p. 4).

This assumption is a given in Western society and its correlate is a view of society and social life in which there is an ongoing competition between the individual and his membership in the human group:

There is often claimed to be antagonism between "the individual" and "the society" which tends to appear as a non-human residuum: the tyranny of numbers, an inevitable material evil running counter to the sole psychological and moral reality which is contained in the individual (Dumont, 1970, pp. 4,5).

To further clarify the uniqueness of this concept, it is useful to reiterate Dumont's distinction between the recognition of "empirical agents" or persons who act and interact, and the "individual":

. . . much indecision and difficulty arises from failing to distinguish in the individual:

- a) The empirical agent, present in every society, in virtue of which he is the main raw material for any sociology.
- b) The rational being and normative subject of institutions; this is peculiar to us, as shown by the values of equality and liberty: it is an idea that we have, the idea of an ideal (Dumont, 1970, p. 9).

The differences between these two concepts are critical to this research. The "empirical agent" is recognized by all human societies at all times. He is the "raw material" from

which cultures are built; he differentiates himself from others and is differentiated by others. He is often the instrument of social change, sometimes as a charismatic leader, but most often through the cumulative effects of millions of minute personal choices made by him in the course of a lifetime, and, in conjunction with other "empirical agents," the sum of which form societies. But the "individual" as the modern mind conceives him is qualitatively different. The "individual" is recognized as, by definition, having prior significance to society by virtue of his "legitimate demands" embodied in rights. This representation emphasizes the particularity and uniqueness of each person and a belief that the "individual consciousness springs ready armed from the affirmation of self" (Dumont, 1970, p. 6). For the purposes of clarity, the term "individual" will be used in this study only to refer to this second complex of assumptions, and the terms "empirical agent" or "person" will be used in the sense of that which all peoples and culture perceive when distinguishing "I" from "others":

. . .the majority of the world's cultures do not share the individualism of the modern West and have no need to explain what appears to them evident: that the self is not the individual self alone, but includes, according to circumstances, those with whom the self is conceived as solidary (Pitt-Rivers, 1973, p. 90).

Standing in opposition to individualistic thinking is what Dumont calls "holism," the premise upon which traditional

cultural systems are based. Holistic thinking takes as self-evident the idea that the social whole is the only significant reality and that "each man. . .(is not) a particular incarnation of abstract humanity, but. . .a more or less autonomous point of emergence of a particular collective humanity; of a society" (Dumont, 1970, p. 5). The person is an expression and part of a social collective. "It is the difference Rousseau describes between natural man; 'by himself a complete and isolated whole', and social man; 'a piece of a greater whole from which that individual receives his life and being'" (Dumont, 1970, p. 11). The person in this view does not have a socially significant separate reality of existence, and a person whose entire identity is somehow self-generated is simply inconceivable. Coexistent with social holism is the assumed purposes of society; the maintenance of society itself is the end, the purpose of traditional society. A person's position in the social system must be adapted to and contributive to, the preservation of the whole.

This leads clearly into the second major element described by Dumont as constituting a pivotal difference between modern and traditional man, that is, the primary organizational principles of hierarchy and equality. Once again, let us begin with egalitarianism as the most culturally familiar principle:

The ideal of liberty and equality follows immediately from the conception of man as an individual. In effect, if the whole of humanity is deemed present in each man, then each man should be free and all men are equal. This is the foundation of the two great ideals of the modern age. By contrast, as soon as a collective end is adopted by several men, their liberty is limited and their equality brought into question (Dumont, 1970, p. 11).

The concept of "equality" entails a variety of possible expressions; there are many different ways in which people can be conceived of as equal. Egalitarianism will be used in the sense that all individuals have equivalent value to society for each represents in his person the "essence of humanity." Differences entailed in the particularity and uniqueness of individuals are not differences of value or worth, and the social order must be designed in a manner that will ensure that individual's equal worth is recognized and preserved. Concomittant to equal worth of individuals is the idea of "independence" and the necessity of independent action to permit the individual to claim his life as his own; this is how Dumont uses the terms "liberty" and "freedom." The idea of "independence" is derived from the assumption that "man's dominant traits exist independently of any social context" (Munro, 1977, p. 2), and that "as individuals, people possess a realm (that of consciousness, beliefs, or thought) that normally does not affect other and that should remain immune from tampering by external agents. . ." (Munro, 1977, p. 3). This idea of independence protected by:

privacy as a value is closely related to the individuals

being left alone by other people to the extent that he can lead a life in a style and with satisfactions that give realization to the inner forces. . .The factual assumption is that people are capable of self-direction (Munro, 1977, p. 5).

At the level of ideals, then, modern society is made up of independent, self-directed, equal individuals, isolated incarnations of humanity. The purpose of the social order is to protect and serve the rights and demands of these social monads. What attaches individuals to society is what I will call "voluntary universalism"; what is commonly called "fraternite" or "brotherhood." Individuals are tied to society by a concern for ensuring to all equal value, protection from interference by the social order in the pursuit of their "legitimate demands." It is voluntary in that it is a spontaneous result of valuing equally each individual; it is universalistic in that it is by definition a bond to all of mankind and not to any particular individual:

Individualism is a mature and calm feeling, which disposes each member of the community to sever himself from the mass of his fellow creatures; and to draw apart with his family and friends; so that after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves society at large to itself. . .In democratic ages. . .when the duties of each individual to the race are much more clear, devoted service to any one man becomes more rare; the bond of human affection is extended, but it is relaxed (Toqueville in Dumont, 1970, p. 17).

Hierarchy is the structural opposite of egalitarianism. Hierarchy in its most elementary form is an obvious fact of reality, recognized at many times in the history of human

thought. To get at the essence of hierarchy it will be useful to demonstrate its expression in the writings of widely divergent systems of thought:

When the people of the world all know beauty as beauty,
 There arises the recognition of ugliness.
 When they all know the good as good,
 There arises the recognition of evil (Chan, 1963, p. 101).

Here is expressed the primal functions of mental activity--to differentiate, to categorize, to evaluate. In terms of these functions affecting, guiding, and determining social existence, Dumont offers a differently expressed interpretation of the same concept:

. . . man does not only think, he acts. He has not only ideas, but values. To adopt a value is to introduce hierarchy, and a certain concensus of values, a certain hierarchy of ideas, things and people, is indispensable to social life (Dumont, 1970, p. 20).

As to how these differentiating and evaluative functions are manifested in traditional societies, Toqueville expresses it most concisely:

Among aristocratic nations, as families remain for centuries in the same condition, often on the same spot, all generations become as it were contemporary. A man almost always knows his fore-fathers and respects them: he thinks he already sees his remote descendants, and he loves them (Toqueville in Dumont, 1970, p. 17).

Here is expressed the essence of traditional kinship ties, in which the person is defined by his positional relationship to his ancestors and descendants; generational hierarchy. The hierarchical principle of organization extends beyond kin ties and permeates, in one form or another, the entire range of social interaction in traditional societies:

As in aristocratic communities all the citizens occupy fixed positions, one above the other, the result is that each of them always sees a man above himself whose patronage is necessary to him, and below himself another man whose cooperation he may claim (Toqueville in Dumont, 1970, p. 17).

As can be seen, it is impossible to discuss hierarchy in social relationships without reference to types of interactions and the interdependence of empirical agents. A person "respects" his ancestors and "loves" his descendants. This involves certain obligatory and expected rights and duties and patterns of exchange. A person depends on his superiors "patronage" and his subordinates' "cooperation" for his very existence. This presupposes an enmeshment of each person within a web of mutually dependent, interlocking social relationships, and the definition of each person is in terms of his position in that web; he has no significant reality outside of it. Because of this immediate and personal dependence on positional social identity, the empirical agent tends to fail to distinguish clearly personal goals from social goals, or what is commonly referred to as public versus private interests. Because the "individual" does not exist as a significant social reality, there is no private interest that supercedes the need of the social whole; a person's private interest is most often, by definition, coincidental with social goals:

Men living in aristocratic ages are therefore almost always closely attached to something placed out of their own sphere, and they are often disposed to forget

themselves. . .He willingly imposes duties on himself towards the former and the latter (ancestors and descendants); and he will frequently sacrifice his personal gratification to those who went before and to those who will come after him (Toqueville in Dumont, 1970, p. 18).

At the ideal level, then, hierarchical societies are made up of interdependent, socially-defined empirical agents, whose personal interests are not distinguishable from social interests. People are tied to society by a complex of linked obligations which define and maintain them as members of the social whole. These are ties that are neither voluntary (in that they are not self-generated and spontaneous) nor universal (in that they extend to persons or groups within the social whole, but rarely beyond to "society," "nation," or "mankind"). "It is true that in those ages the notion of human fellowship is faint, and that men seldom think of sacrificing themselves for mankind; but they often sacrifice themselves for other men" (Toqueville in Dumont, 1970, p. 18).

CHAPTER THREE

Structural Elements of Modern Chinese Thought

Having examined and defined the major assumptions upon which traditional and modern social realities are based, it is necessary to refine and tune these principles to a particular social reality: traditional Chinese social thought. Modern Chinese-Marxist thought cannot be wholly or clearly perceived without reference to its cultural antecedents. Cultural change does not occur in a vacuum, and contemporary Chinese ideology is both a reaction to, and a sharing of, elements of traditional cultural assumptions. To understand this requires insight into what was rejected and what was continued in Chinese thought.

The most elementary and all-pervading aspect of ancient Chinese thought is clearly social holism:

The harmonious cooperation of all beings arose, not from the orders of a superior authority external to themselves, but from the fact that they were all parts in a hierarchy of wholes forming a cosmic pattern, and what they obeyed were the internal dictates of their own nature (Needham, 1951, p. 5).

This quote by Needham synthesizes a complex of assumptions that are pivotal to Chinese social thought and will each be examined in turn. For now, the crucial element is the primacy of the social whole to its parts. Traditional

Chinese thought is best described as organistic, i.e., the actions of persons originate within a social context and ramify throughout the social whole:

. . .in Chinese eyes the social group was always the more important, if not the only reality. The social group having its natural basis in the family was a perfect and intelligible whole, while the individual was simply part of it without standing or particular value of his own. . .In the vigilance over group rights a "democratic" feature may be seen, although it must be realized that the Chinese variety of autonomy hardly favored individual freedom. Every individual had to adjust himself to the group regardless of his talents and desires. The individual, considered far less important than the group, from childhood was educated to submissiveness. The system itself discouraged initiative, originality, and qualities of creative leadership; it favored gratitude, courtesy, and cooperation in small groups (Callis, 1959, p. 47).

It must be made clear at this point that traditional thought did not deny individuals their rights, nor was the individual considered "less important." What was subordinated to social goals was the empirical agent, for the individual whose rights are prior to social goals did not exist as a socially recognized reality.

To further clarify this point, it will be useful to examine the issue of how public and private realms were defined and differentiated by traditional Chinese. The most important realm of privacy recognized and associated with "individualism" is in the kingdom of private thoughts and opinions; consequently, "the right of freedom of conscience has been first among the set of rights" (Munro, 1977, p. 161). valued in modern minds. This is based on the

assumption that thoughts and actions are separable, and therefore thoughts do not affect others and "should remain immune from tampering by external agents" (Munro, 1977, p. 161). This is in profound opposition to traditional Chinese assumptions which did not differentiate thought from action:

There is no factual knowledge that does not contain a potential association with an evaluation. . . Because they assume the probability of association between "knowing" and "promptings to act" educated Chinese have been sensitive to the behavioral implications of a principle or theory. They assume that if people learn a principle, they will also be inclined to behave in a certain way. . . there are degrees of knowledge. . . the deeper the knowledge, the greater the possibility that the promptings to act will manifest themselves in public conduct (Munro, 1977, pp. 25, 35).

If people's thoughts will eventually generate action which will be manifest as public conduct, the consciousness itself is not a private phenomenon but rightfully subject to interference by "external agents." Since action and interaction can conceivably effect not only the immediate parties, but reverberate throughout society, then the control of actions of persons is justifiable and necessary.

The nature of social control exists on many levels and involves what Nadel calls "triadization" in which parameters on interaction are maintained by a "third party" or "external agent":

. . . what happens here is that the dyadic relationship of persons in correlative roles comes to involve the interests and reactions of "third parties". . . There

are more indirect and subtle instances of triadization, when the enactment of the dyadic relationship falls in a moral sense within the purview of others--of potential critics, witnesses, a public of some kind. . .(it) becomes the concern of actors in other roles. It determines their behavior towards each other and hence, their relationships, even if the other "actors" are simply the rest of society. Conversely, the contingent reactions of the "third party" also becomes the concern of the persons in the reciprocal relationship, guiding or influencing their mutual behavior (Nadel, 1957, p. 86).

Given a social reality in which the distinction between what is public and what is private is not made or is unclear, then most of people's interactions come "in a moral sense within the purview of others," and are thus subject, on a conscious and explicit level, to third party control. For the vast majority of ancient Chinese, the peasantry, third party social control was through the family and, ideally, in the form of moral exemplars of virtuous Confucian scholars and moral persuasion of virtuous rulers:

Man's psyche is held to be sensitive to moral influence. Hence, self-cultivation means coming under the moral force of its sage-like models, and government at its best is likewise government by moral suasion. . .rigid enforcement of the laws. . .can never be so meaningful to the people as the good example set by their rulers . . .(Mote, 1971, p. 48).

A seeming exception to this rule of triadization in the control of human behavior is in the Confucian emphasis on "self-cultivation" as the origin of correct thoughts and therefore correct action:

To achieve the perfect society, you must begin with the individual. . .Chinese ethical philosophy in all periods stresses the necessity to engage in self-examination and self-correction (Mote, 1971, p. 48).

It appears as though there are elements of individualistic thinking expressed here that are in opposition to what should be a generally holistic system. But it is a matter of carefully defining terms within their cultural context. "Self-cultivation" is not in any way parallel or analogous to "an individual consciousness (that) springs ready-armed from the affirmation of self" (Dumont, 1970, p. 6). To interpret in this manner is an example of that more subtle and insidious form of ethnocentrism in which we presume that other cultures make the same sort of primary assumptions about reality that we make.

The concept of self-cultivation comes out of two key Chinese ideals: "li" and "jen." To obey "the internal dictates of their own nature" (Needham, 1951, p. 52) was to have "jen," or human-heartedness. It is not the affirmation of individual particularity, but rather the recognition of a commonly shared human tendency. However, what made this cultivation of the self operational for the "virtuous" man was the necessity that the "superior man must be watchful over himself when he is alone" (Legge, The Great Learning, p. 9). The possibility of social reaction and the proper social milieu will support and reinforce the virtuous in their self-cultivation when they are interacting properly with others, and this is what Nadel refers to in the idea of triadization in which society

is the third party (Nadel, 1957). "Watching oneself when alone" takes that triadization into the realm of consciousness, and the person plays all three roles: he is first himself; second, he is interacting with his nature (li); and last, he is also the third party policing and influencing self-interaction. He is representing society to himself, and his actions and reactions must at all times be guided and influenced by what most contributes to the proper social order. Not even when alone with one's own thoughts must the requirements of harmonious social existence be neglected or forgotten. It is what Westerners would call an invasion of the last and most sacred bastion of individualism: freedom of thought.

This interpretation of the nature of self-cultivation is useful to explain the origin of proper social action and interaction on the part of the virtuous. Why self-cultivation is such a key element in Confucian doctrine has to do with the fact that thoughts effect action, and the action of any one person ramifies throughout all of society:

The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom, first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their states they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost of their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things.

Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their state being rightly governed, the whole kingdom was made tranquil and happy (Legge, The Great Learning, pp. 2, 3).

In this cyclical description of how to achieve a well-ordered society the critical element again seems to be the actions of individuals. But it is in "things being investigated" where lies the key for it is assumed that there exists in external reality a proper order that is apparent upon investigation. That there is, always has been, and always will be a social consensus of values and expected behavior is the primary assumption expressed here:

When the sovereign behaves to his aged, as the aged should be behaved to, the people become filial; when the sovereign behaves to his elders as the elders should be behaved to, the people learn brotherly submission; when the sovereign treats compassionately the young and helpless, the people do the same. Thus the ruler has a principle with which, as with a measuring square, he may regulate his conduct (Legge, The Great Learning, p. 16).

Independent individuals do not, then, originate social behavior; it is not from their unique consciousness or private interests that proper conduct springs. The social order is pre-existent in the internal tendencies of human nature (li) and the rules of behavior exist independently of the empirical agent of behavior.

It is generally agreed upon by most scholars of trad-

itional Chinese social and political thought that holistic or organistic primary assumptions provide the foundation for traditional thinking. We see an equally unanimous agreement on the subject of hierarchy as the central principle of organization. To go back to the quote by Needham, the basic premise is that they "were all parts in a hierarchy of wholes." There were many, sometimes overlapping, sometimes isolated, hierarchic structures within traditional Chinese social structure; hierarchy was an all-pervasive, unquestioned organizational principle. What makes this characteristic (shared by a "traditional" cultures if we accept Dumont's structural theory) of special interest to this study is the way in which it is modified in its traditional Chinese context.

It is important to add a note of caution here, that we do not lapse into the ethnocentric habit of perceiving hierarchy as simply "inequality of status":

Even sociologists and philosophers seem to speak of "hierarchy". . . in the sense of the residual or inevitable inequalities of aptitude, function, or of the chain of command which is presupposed by an artificial organization of multiple activities, briefly "power" hierarchy. However, that is not hierarchy proper, nor the deepest root of what is so called (Dumont, 1970, p. 19).

Hierarchy is "positional" or social identity, structurally opposed to the self-determined identity of egalitarian modern social structures. However, the Chinese seem to have shared certain aspects of egalitarian thinking, aspects in fact

which were compatible with what was basically a holistic and hierarchic society:

They know that poor and rich change places quickly in the vicissitudes of life and in the destiny of nations. They recognize social status as a fact, but they do not bow to it submissively. An egalitarian trait runs unmistakably through Chinese behavior (Callis, 1959, p. 36).

This subject is painstakingly explored by Munro (1977). Munro recognizes the predominantly hierarchical nature of Chinese thought: "Individuals derive the major features of their identities from the groups to which they belong . . . Thus a person identifies himself in part relationally in terms of position within a group that stands in a certain relation to another group" (Munro, 1977, pp. 16, 17). However, certain aspects of egalitarianism, independence and competition, were not unknown when the relation of groups was that of different family groups:

Chinese families were as jealous of their "rights" as were nations and individuals in the West of theirs . . . So strong was this spirit of independence on the part of China's families and other familistic units that historically it proved to be a real obstacle to the growth of a national consciousness. . . Chinese familism, as did Western nationalism, developed into a grandiose form of selfishness (Callis, 1959, pp. 4, 5).

This spirit of selfish competition and impulse to family self-sufficiency and independence, though an "obstacle to the growth of national consciousness" was never allowed overt, explicit social expression:

Though they may be intently looking out for themselves, social aggressiveness in its open form is taboo among (the Chinese) (Callis, 1959, p. 36).

In Traditional China there was no legitimized interplay among privately based power groups, and people had to be taught that it was improper and dangerous to assert self-interest in making any claims upon the political system. . . everyone--official and citizen alike--acknowledged that private interests had no legitimate claims on government (Pye, 1968, pp. 17, 18).

The nature of egalitarian strains in ancient Chinese thinking, then, were on the implicit, unexpressed level of pragmatic interaction of family groups. This could be described in terms of a tension arising between social ideals of cooperative non-aggression and the social realities of aggressive competition. Also the economic vicissitudes of the rise and fall of families, seen through the eyes of a long-memoried people, teaches a kind of cyclical "equality" of opportunity. Through membership in a time-transcendent generational social group, all will have eventual access to economic resources. This indirect equality of opportunity and implicit unexpressed equality of status attained through the competitive self-interest of families provides an incipient tendency for egalitarianism in an otherwise hierarchic society.

Allowing for this subtle egalitarian inconsistency in an otherwise hierarchic society, it is apparent that traditional Chinese assumptions about human nature and social existence fit rather nicely into Dumont's structural scheme of Homo hierarchicus. In what context and by what structural scheme can we understand modern Chinese Communism? It

is a modern social reality that does not fit into Dumont's Homo aequalis mold. Dumont classifies modern communist states in general as totalitarian. His speculation about their antecedents is much akin to a racial bigot's attitudes towards miscegenation:

. . .the traditional hierarchical tolerance gives way to a modern mentality and this is a totalitarian mentality: Hierarchical structure is replaced by a single rigid substance. The fact is extremely significant: egalitarianism, leaving the limited zone in which it is well tolerated, causes a profound modification and causes the threat of religious totalitarianism (Dumont, 1970, p. 231).

In Dumont's later writings, From Mandeville to Marx (1977), we see a more complete understanding of the complexity of totalitarianism:

A major difficulty in the effort to grasp totalitarianism comes from the spontaneous tendency to consider it a form of holism. The word itself refers us at first sight to the social "totality", and the regime in its contrast to democracy, is first thought of as a "reaction", a return to the past. These are vulgar notions, which serious studies reject. They acknowledge that totalitarianism is no holism, that it is quite different from the traditional naive conception of the society as a whole. Yet, as the totalitarian regime constrains its subject most radically, it appears to oppose individualism in the current meaning of the term, so the analyst is faced with a contradiction. To solve it, one should remember that the phenomenon is internal to the modern world, that the totalitarian ideology is constrained within modern ideology. The hypothesis is that totalitarianism results from the attempt to a society where individualism is deeply rooted and predominant, to subordinate it to the primacy of the society as a whole (Dumont, 1977, p. 12).

The key element in this passage is the hypothesis that "totalitarianism results. . .in a society where individualism is deeply rooted and predominant. . ." To apply

this hypothesis universally would be to suggest that Communist China, which according to Dumont's classification must be a totalitarian state, has evolved out of a society in which "individualism" is a "predominant" primary assumption. This is as "vulgar" a notion, which in light of all that is understood about Chinese thinking is absurd. It seems fair to suggest that Dumont has fallen victim to a confusion of terms and their precise definitions. This is ironic in that it was Dumont who was so careful in his earlier work to differentiate carefully between the concept of the individual and the empirical agent. We need only to pick up any source on Chinese political thought or social thought to see this error recur:

Being "good" means for a Communist the utter subordination of individual interest to that of the party, and ultimately that of mankind. Since the good individual is utterly selfless, he fears nothing and will happily sacrifice even his life for his principles, i.e. for the best interests of the Party. . . . whereas in the Confucian ideal the cultivation of goodness was man's highest activity and the ultimate expression of his dignity, in Communist practice, on the contrary, this cultivation has value just and in so far as it completes the subjection of the individual to the tasks the state requires of him (emphasis mine; Nivison, 1964, pp. 60, 73).

We can note in this passage how, almost intuitively, the author drops the use of the term "individual" when referring to traditional Confucian thought, but uses the term freely without examination when discussing Communist ideals. The term implies all that Western liberal thought has con-

ceived about social interaction; it is the centerpiece of Western thinking. When it is used indiscriminately to describe the social patterns of societies that do not share those primary assumptions, confusion results.

The above comments by Nivison illustrate the misunderstanding as described by Pitt-Rivers:

A system of thought that takes the individual as its starting point and assumes that he is motivated by self-interest, faces a difficulty in confronting the examples of behavior that is not so motivated and this difficulty has given rise in modern literature to theories of altruism, moral, religious, and psychological . . . the majority of the world's cultures do not share the individualism of the modern West and have no need to explain what appears to them evident: that the self is not the individual self alone, but includes, according to circumstances, those with whom the self is conceived as solidary (Pitt-Rivers, 1973, p. 90).

Nivison conceives of "selflessness" in communistic ideals as a repression of individualism for altruistic goals. Like Dumont, he would insist that the concept of the individual exists but is struggled against and subordinated to the interests of society. This is indeed a contradiction, but not one that is "internal to" Chinese political thought. It is rather a conflict that arises when attempting to understand non-Western politics in terms of Western liberal assumptions:

The Chinese Communists never bothered much about equal rights, no matter what the Soviet Constitution said. The concept is simply alien to the Chinese. In its classical formulation, it is almost unintelligible to those who have an organistic conception of society. How can people exist and have rights prior to joining society by consent (a society that then has an obligation to protect those rights that existed before it)? People are not conceivable apart from society

in the organistic view. To make such a claim for such rights is likely to subject one to the charge of "selfishness" (Munro, 1977, p. 162).

The origins of Chinese Communism in the May 4th movement will shed some further light on this dilemma. We can see that from the very beginning the concept of the individual was unacceptable, perhaps even incomprehensible, to early Chinese-Marxists:

In emphasizing the importance of the conscious will of the individual, Li (Li Ta-chao) stopped short of advocating individualism. His conception of individual consciousness demanded the participation of the individual in the common work of rebuilding the nation. He took "free-will" to mean not freedom of individual action but the duty and ability of self-conscious men to change the conditions under which they live. In some respects Li's conception of "free-will" parallels the use of the term "democracy" in present-day Chinese Communist ideology, in which "democracy" does not mean individual freedom but the obligation of individual participation (Meisner, 1967, p. 24).

Further, we can see that it was not the radical leftists and Marxists that deviated most from traditional holistic assumptions; indeed, it was those who began to accept and understand Western liberal ideals of the individual that were most at odds with their social and cultural origins:

The failure of the liberal alternative to authoritarianism may perhaps be better understood as the result of a fundamental incompatibility between liberal values and Chinese realities. Liberalism failed in China because it could not succeed: it was a transplant rejected by the recipient organism. Despite the fact that both sides (radicals and liberals) used the same language, it seems clear in retrospect that their understanding of it often differed, and especially that the term "politics" meant quite different things to each. The radicals, I suggest, used the term essentially in

its traditional Chinese sense; (that government creates culture-cultural values and the norms of social behavior reflect the quality of the political environment) the liberals, in a sense that was new to the Chinese mind. . . held that culture generates government. . . Government is the creation of a system of social values, which in turn are (or should be) ultimately derived from judgements of practical utility in individual living experiences. Hence the liberals' consistent emphasis on intellectual responsibility, skeptical independence, the capacity for criticism.

But for the Confucians, the line between them (government and culture) was not clearly drawn, and this in turn led to a blurring of the distinction between community and individual--between what is "public" and what is "private". For the liberals the distinction is sharper. . . the scope of government is considerably restricted; and cultural values are regarded as being, in essence, the values generated by individuals as a result of individual experience and intellectual judgement--that is, cultural values are essentially private (Schwartz, 1972, p. 97).

It would appear that holistic principles are still basic tenets of Chinese socio-political thought but, as Dumont points out, what exists in contemporary China "is quite different from the traditional naive conception of the society as a whole" (Dumont, 1977, p. 12):

. . . neither the traditional nor the present monolith has favored individually oriented values or patterns of behavior. Both have sought conformity and uniformity throughout the state and culture. But the saving grace of the old system was that in operation it left a good deal in the realm of the permissive and the private. This, indeed, was one of its unacknowledged strengths--a kind of safety valve for the harmless release of individualistic impulses. The new order in seeking absolute uniformity and conformity, excludes any such outlet (Wright, 1972, p. 8).

The question at this point might be why is such an "outlet" or "safety valve" not permitted in contemporary China? Several answers are possible here. It is part of

Chinese Communist ideology that a person's total consciousness is "class consciousness," prescribed by the social group to which he belongs:

Although there is a continuity with the dominant Confucian legacy in the belief that a person's identity derives in part from the group to which he belongs, the claims that feelings, goals, interests, skills and knowledge are social products, induced in the group is a new one. . . that contemporary position drops the idea of innate affection for others as part of what a person is (Munro, 1977, p. 17).

The empirical agent here is totally a social product. This seems to be the logical extreme of holistic thinking, and it implies the obligation of the group and ultimately the state to see to it that the person is properly nurtured and reared. We see the recurrence of the ancient theme of government as parent to the people.

In Confucian political thought, the idea of a paternalistic government was prevalent and explicit:

If a ruler can truly practice these five things, then the people in the neighboring kingdom will look up to him as a parent. From the first birth of mankind till now, never has any led children to attack their parent and succeeded in his design (Legge, The Works of Mencius, p. 178).

In this government-parent relationship, the rules of filial piety traditionally applied to kin relationships are shifted to a political relationship and a certain anomaly is introduced:

By Shun (emperor) completely fulfilling everything by which a parent could be served, Koo-sow (his father) was brought to find delight in what was good. When

Koo-sow was brought to find that delight, the whole empire was transformed. When Koo-sow was brought to find that delight, all fathers and sons in the empire, were established in their respective duties. This is called great filial piety (Legge, The Works of Mencius, p. 178).

When it is believed the "whole empire is transformed" because of the interaction of the emperor with his father, the political effects of a kin relationship come to supercede the familial affects. When "great filial piety" is defined as that which has a profound effect on all the people of the state, once again we see a political purpose developing out of a kin role. In this particular passage, political concerns take priority over the kin relationship, and the traditional value of filial piety takes on a broader meaning.

This anomaly is expressed in other ways, and in this next passage we see the roles of elder brother and father take on a non-familial meaning and become roles played by anyone who is morally or intellectually superior:

Those who keep the mean, train up those who do not, and those who have abilities, train up those who have not, and hence men rejoice in having fathers and elder brothers who are possessed of virtue and talent (Legge, The Works of Mencius, p. 183).

The government-parent analogy explored here and the mixing of relationships has profound implications for the development of contemporary political thought. One can easily skim through The Four Books and read every passage on filial piety as an analogy for correct political behavior and derive

from this an understanding of what the Communists in China today propound as the ideal people-government relationship. Indeed, as shown above, this exercise would not be a violation of Confucian principles, for they also shift easily from a familial to a political mode of expression, and analogies between the two modes are prevalent throughout Confucian writings.

This extension of kinship relationships into the political sphere is an example of Pitt-Rivers' theory of "consubstantiality," and the "extension of self" is precisely what the Chinese Communists are attempting on an almost cosmic level:

. . .this principle of the likeness of those connected biologically provides always the most impelling manifestations of what I should like to call consubstantiality, the prime nexus between individuals for the extension of the self. . .The initial tie of kinship can be modified by acts of individual will. . .The ties of amity can be formalized even without any demonstration of consubstantiality, but by a mystical analogy with parenthood (Pitt-Rivers, 1973, pp. 92, 93).

Also, the distinctions between the moral and jural modes, as described by Pitt-Rivers, are not made and, as seen above, the political and kinship roles are at times indistinguishable. The moral and jural modes are antithetical:

Moral values are seated in the sentiments and conscience of the individual and they cannot be induced by coercion, for free will is their very essence; jural values are derived from institutions which govern relations between individuals. Where all are in agreement there is no need for sanctions (without which law is said not to be able to exist). Hence

jural sanctions fulfill the function of transposing moral conflicts into the jural domain where they find their resolution at the level of action; they cease to be moral once sentiments become subjected to jural concepts of right and obligation, and the moral autonomy of the individual to the judgements of society (Pitt-Rivers, 1973, pp. 92, 93).

In a social system in which "free will" translates as the "obligation of individual participation" (Meisner, 1967, p. 24) and the "moral autonomy of the individual" is an alien concept, the moral-jural dichotomy loses its clarity and there is an attempt to elicit moral bonds through jural sanctions. In Communist China the moral bond that is the idealized goal for everyone to share in is a form of general reciprocity:

. . .moral reciprocity is unspecific as to equivalence, time and even in the extreme case the person from whom it is due, while jural reciprocity is the opposite. . . When we reach undifferentiated exchange even the person who should furnish the reciprocity is unspecified. Trust is no longer a question of confidence in a specific known individual but in the rest of humanity. . . It depends on nothing more than the collective acceptance of the same values. . .With this we find the conception of dispossession of self for its own sake, the renunciation of the world, the annihilation of personal ambition, the end of all jural engagements (Pitt-Rivers, 1973, p. 100).

The "collective acceptance of the same values" on which this generalized reciprocity depends is jurally sanctioned by the state. Herein lies the contradiction noted by Dumont that is inherent in "totalitarian" Chinese Communism and the lack of an outlet for personal freedom and "individualistic impulses."

Another critical issue is the phenomenon of "undifferentiated exchange" (Pitt-Rivers, 1973, p. 100). Dumont discusses how, despite the structural opposition of hierarchic Indian society to egalitarian Western society, there was, in Hindu thought a release, an outlet from hierarchy in the form of "world renunciation." Upon contact with Western notions of brotherhood and social altruism, there was a point of permeability, a way by which Western liberal concepts could articulate with traditional hierarchic society:

. . .the presence of the individual-outside-the-world and his millenarian action was truly decisive for the permeability of Indian society to individualistic ways of thought. Let us recall the effect of the renouncer on the worldly mentality (introduction of the religion of choice and love, relativization of group religion, subjective morality). The general mentality was thereby penetrated with elements contrary to those which result from hierarchy from long before the Western (or even Mughul) impact. The Westerner, in so far as he was concerned with quite other things than power in the most obvious sense of the word, appeared not only as a heathen prince, but also as a sort of sonnyasi of an unusual type, for his preoccupation with truth, his unselfishness as expressed in even a modest ideal like "scholarship" or again his humanitarian concern or his concern with social progress and with moral discipline in general evoke for the Hindu masses, and even more used in the nineteenth century to evoke, characteristics unique to the renouncers (Dumont, 1970, pp. 235, 236).

There is a strong similarity here with the enthusiastic acceptance of the same Western concepts by Chinese Communism. "Devotion to mankind" and "universal brotherhood" are concepts that in China were relatively alien prior to Western contact. Though such concepts are found in the

writings of Mo Tzu (Wang, 1967), they were never accepted by more than a handful of Chinese scholars. Nevertheless, this "undifferentiated exchange," what I shall refer to as universalism, is the basis of the selflessness of the Chinese Communist ideal.

CHAPTER FOUR

Turner's Structural Hypothesis

As we have seen, the Chinese have maintained a kind of social holism, failing to comprehend and assimilate the Western thought complex of individualism with all that it implies. In ways that will be explored shortly, the Chinese have managed to separate out hierarchy from holism, and replace it with a profound commitment to absolute egalitarianism. The empirical agents, parts of the social whole and secondary to it, are bonded together in a solidarity based on a borrowed Western concept of universalism. However, this universalism is not voluntary, as in the West, springing from a natural and spontaneous love of humanity. For, in the West, that inclination to brotherhood is motivated by a desire to protect the human rights of each individual, thereby insuring one's own rights. Chinese universalism is obligatory--one should be committed to the whole, to mankind, for the effects of one's actions and thoughts will ramify throughout society, and because one's own personal interests are not in any way distinguishable from social or public interests.

How, then, can this particular constellation of pri-

mary assumptions which provides the conceptual foundation for a major social system be best understood and explained? It is a society born out of violent revolution; its central credo, Maoism, has as its main tenet "continuing revolution." In that light, the structurally-oriented speculations of Dumont fail us, for revolution is "anti-structural" by nature. Chinese socio-political thought will not be contained within this structural model, and so might be more fruitfully approached in terms of Victor Turner's theory of anti-structure.

The Chinese revolution originated in reaction to and rejection of traditional cultural premises. It was further nurtured by its exploration and ultimate rejection of Western liberal premises. Even its romance with Marxism and Leninism was strained, and much of basic Marxism was rejected as unresponsive to and/or inappropriate for Chinese socio-economic reality. The spirit of reaction and rejection which characterized the May 4th movement likewise was soon rejected by the Chinese:

The reaction came as the mixture of dogmatism, adherence to arbitrary truths, uncritical acceptance of generalizations, and irresponsible use of terminology, the hallmarks of Chinese Communism and trends of Chinese thinking that Hu Shih fought to reverse (Grieder, 1970, p. 125).

This automatic reversion to ancient habits of thought brings to mind Turner's hypothesis concerning root paradigms:

But where processes are unconditioned, undetermined,

or unchanneled by explicit customs and rules, my hypothesis would be that the main actors are nevertheless guided by subjective paradigms--which may derive from beyond the mainstream of socio-cultural process with its ensocializing devices. . . Root paradigms are the cultural transliterations of genetic codes. . . it should not be forgotten that a primary process will not take place in a social vacuum but in a pre-structural social field full of the complex residues of previous primary and secondary processes (Turner, 1974, p. 67).

Turner's central concept of *communitas* is best defined as the social state entered into by those who become liminal through the ritual process of rites of passage. Rites of passage transform individuals from one social status to another. While they remain in the interphrase between social roles, they become liminal and enter into *communitas*. *Communitas* is a form of social interaction, the precise opposite of structured social interaction, and therefore is anti-structure. Turner postulates millerian movements share many aspects of the anti-structure of liminality:

Mostly such movements occur during phases of history that are in many respects "homologous" to the liminal periods of important rituals in stable and repetitive societies, when major groups or social categories in those societies are passing from one cultural state to another. They are essentially phenomena of transition (Turner, 1969, p. 12).

Turner suggests three types of *communitas*: "existential or spontaneous *communitas*. . . a total confrontation of human identities, . . . ideological *communitas*--utopian models or blue prints of societies. . ." (Turner, 1974, p. 169), and normative *communitas*. It is the construct of normative

communitas which most closely parallels the revolutionary experience in China:

. . . normative communitas, where under the influence of time, the need to mobilize and organize resources to keep the members of a group alive and thriving, and the necessity for social control among these members in pursuance of these and other collective goals, the original existential communitas is organized into a perduring social system--this is never quite the same as a structured group whose original raison d'etre was utilitarian for normative communitas began with a nonutilitarian experience of brotherhood and fellowship in the form of which the resulting group tried to preserve in and by its religious and ethical codes and legal and political statutes and regulations (Turner, 1974, p. 169).

The absolute merging of public and private interests of Chinese Communism seems to be elucidated by Turner: ". . . In this kind of thinking, too, the health and integrality of the individual is indissoluble from the peace and harmony of the community; solitude and society cease to be antithetical" (Turner, 1974, p. 203). The totalitarian tendencies which attempt to control all personal movement and expression is clarified in terms of the attempt to "structuralize anti-structure":

The historical fate of communitas seems to have been to pass from openness to closure, from "free" communitas to the solidarity given by bounded structure, from optation to obligation, from W. H. Auden's "needless risk" to the "endless safety". . . this theologizing of experience is to reduce what is essentially a process to a state or even the concept of a state, in other words, to structuralize anti-structure. . . if communitas is maximized it becomes in a short while its own dark shadow, totalitarianism, from the need to suppress and repress in its members all tendencies to develop structural independences and interdependences. Thus to keep out structure, structure has to be con-

stantly maintained and reinforced (Turner, 1974, pp. 202, 203, 268).

Further investigation reveals many parallels between the state of liminality as described by Turner and the idealized concept of the "true Communist." A primary condition of liminality is the dissolution of all structure-oriented differences between people:

The second model (society as an homogeneous undifferentiated whole) of *communitas*, often appears culturally in the guise of an Edenic paradisiacal, utopian, or millennial state of affairs, to the attainment of which religious or political action, personal or collective, should be directed. Society is pictured as a *communitas* of free and equal comrades--of total persons. . . On the one hand, one finds a structural and ultimately bureaucratic *übermensch* who would like to array the whole world of lesser men in terms of hierarchy and regimentation. . . and on the other the puritanical levelers who would abolish all idiosyncratic differences between man and man. . . and set up an ethical tyranny that would allow scant scope for compassion and forgiveness (Turner, 1974, pp. 237, 268).

This passage is a reflection of the absolute egalitarianism so fervently sought after in contemporary China. The use of Chairman Mao's Red Book as a Bible-instruction book-for-life can be understood in terms of the instruction of the initiate into *communitas*:

. . . the liminal situation of *communitas* is heavily invested with a structure of a kind. But this is not a social structure in the Radcliffe-Brownian sense but one of symbols and ideas, an instructional structure. It is not too difficult to detect here a Levi-Straussian structure, a way of inscribing in the mentalities of neophytes generative rules, codes, and media whereby they can manipulate the symbols of speech and culture to confer some degree of intelligibility on an exper-

ience that perpetually outstrips the possibility of linguistic (and other cultural) expression (Turner, 1974, p. 240).

The almost miraculous transformation that is expected to occur when the initiate is exposed to Communist doctrines through Mao's Red Book, and the unlimited "malleability of man" (Munro, 1977, chap. 3) as the underlying assumption permitting this profound change, is an inherent aspect of liminality which in its classical formulation is, after all, an interphase of rites of passage. "What they seek is a transformative experience that goes to the root of each person's being and finds in that root something profoundly communal and shared" (Turner, 1969, p. 138). The need for class struggle, which is the attempt to continually level all classes by resisting tendencies of any group or person to assume structural power or authority, is eloquently described by Turner in terms of the impulse to establish Buber's "I-Thou" relationship and extend it throughout society:

Only men who are capable of saying Thou to one another can truly say We with one another. . . . It is enough to prevent the We arising, or being preserved, if a single man is accepted, who is greedy of power and uses others as a means to his own, or who craves of importance and makes a show of himself (Turner, 1969, p. 137).

Liminality and Its Attributes: Power and Knowledge

The similarities between Turner's description of *comunitas* and how it is originated and established and the Chinese Communist experience as it is idealized in the

political philosophy and literature are more than coincidental. Testing this hypothesis, we first discover the essential characteristics of the liminal person, and then see if we find the same attributes expressed by the "true Communist" as he exists in idealized form.

Turner (1969, p. 106) lists a number of traits characteristic of liminality juxtaposed to their opposites as they occur in structured society. The opposite of liminality is status and so that is the primary dyad:

<u>LIMINALITY</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
<u>TRANSITION</u>	<u>STATE</u>
TOTALITY	PARTIALITY
HOMOGENEITY	HETEROGENEITY
COMMUNITAS	STRUCTURE
EQUALITY	INEQUALITY

These first five conditions seem to describe the generalized principles upon which the transitional phase of liminality stands in opposition to structure. The rest of the list consists of particular traits of the liminal person (see Table One, p. 48 below).

I have synthesized this list of 21 traits into a compilation of six major attributes of liminality, grouping the traits according to similarity in kind:

Liminality

- Trait 1 - anonymity - total unconcern with any external sign of rank or status, political, economic, military, social, sexual, age, kinship.
- Trait 2 - humility - egalitarian, respectful demeanor, modesty.
- Trait 3 - selflessness - total unconcern for personal interests: property, kinship health, desires--replaced by total concern for social interests and goals.

FIGURE 1

<u>LIMINALITY</u>		<u>STATUS</u>
anonymity	(T-1)	systems of nomenclature
absence of property	(T-1)	property
absence of status	(T-1)	status
nakedness or uniform clothing	(T-5)	distinction of clothing
sexual continence	(T-5)	sexuality
minimization of sex distinctions	(T-1)	Maximization of sex distinctions
absence of rank	(T-1)	distinction of rank
humility	(T-2)	just pride of position
disregard for personal appearance	(T-5)	care for personal appearance
no distinctions of wealth	(T-1)	distinctions of wealth
unselfishness	(T-3)	selfishness
total obedience	(T-6)	obedience only to superior
sacredness		secularity
sacred instruction		technical instruction
silence		speech
suspension of kinship rights and obligations	(T-3)	kinship rights and obligations
continuous reference to mystical powers		intermittent reference to mystical powers
foolishness		sagacity
simplicity	(T-5)	complexity
acceptance of pain and suffering	(T-4)	avoidance of pain and suffering
<u>heteronomy</u>	<u>(T-6)</u>	<u>degree of autonomy</u>

Trait 4 - acceptance of pain and suffering.

Trait 5 - simplicity - aesceticism in life style, deferment of gratification, unconcern for emotional, physical comforts and sensual pleasures.

Trait 6 - heteronomy - obedience; discipline.

In this way, all but the traits concerning mystical powers or reference to such powers and the traits of silence and foolishness are grouped and accounted for. Those traits excluded pertain to a religiously oriented liminality. As we are dealing with a strictly secular process, socio-political revolution, and since it would be inappropriate within the context of this paper to address the question of Communism as a sacred or religious ideology, I will set aside these five traits for future investigations.

Power

There are two other major aspects of liminality described by Turner. The first one is a type of power. This power, inherent in liminality, evolves from the challenge and rejection of the innumerable codified and uncoded restrictions on thought and action inherent in structure:

One may well ask why it is that liminal situations and roles are almost everywhere attributed with magico-religious properties, or why these should so often be regarded as dangerous, inauspicious, or polluting to persons, objects, events, and relationships that have not been ritually incorporated into the liminal context. . . from the perspective viewpoint of those concerned with the maintenance of "structure" all sustained manifestations of communitas must appear as dangerous and anarchical, and have to be hedged around with prescription, prohibitions, and conditions. And,

as Mary Douglas (1966) has recently argued, that which cannot be clearly classified in terms of traditional criteria of classification, or falls between classificatory boundaries, is almost everywhere regarded as "polluting" and "dangerous" (Turner, 1969, pp. 108, 109).

This power arises out of a paradox (powerdox?), that is, the power of those who lack the classic sources of power--status. It is because of the lack of any status that liminal people achieve a kind of power that grows out of having "nothing left to lose":

These autochthonous people have religious power, the "power of the weak: as against the jural-political power of the strong, and represent the undivided land itself as against the political system with its internal segmentation and hierarchies of authority. . . the liminality of the strong is weakness, of the weak, strength (Turner, 1969, pp. 200, 234).

The power of liminality is potentially dangerous to structured society, and so is typically surrounded by protective parameters imposed by society. But, for those who share in the liminal experience, their power seems to be unlimited and uncontainable: "Spontaneous communitas has something magical about it. Subjectively there is in it the feeling of endless power" (Turner, 1969, p. 139).

Turner has described liminal power as subjective and endless, and so we will take this description as our definition of liminal power. Next, it will be helpful to break-up this attribute into its possible expressions:

- A. Internal power
 - 1. physical - over pain and suffering
 - 2. psychological
 - a. to assimilate new knowledge and skills
 - b. to change own behavior

- B. External power - power over social and environmental realities
1. power over adversary
 2. power over social, environmental difficulties
 3. power to influence: persuade others
 4. power to influence: modify physical environment

Each component can be assumed to be a potential of the liminal person.

Knowledge

The second major aspect of liminality dealt with by Turner is what will be termed knowledge. Turner, as mentioned earlier, discusses how the neophyte must be instructed in "generative rules, codes, and media whereby they can manipulate the symbols of speech and culture. . ." (Turner, 1974, p. 240). But it is not enough for the neophyte to simply absorb instructions: he must be able to know and recognize reality in whatever aspect it is manifested, and understand how to deal with difficulties in accord with the new understanding he has gained from instruction. "Accepted schemata and paradigms must be broken if initiates are to cope with novelty and danger. They have to learn how to generate viable schemata under environmental challenge" (Turner, 1974, p. 256). The initiate is transformed by this new knowledge. As it is knowledge of the self, his entire nature is totally changed by the instructional experience:

The wisdom (mana) that is imparted in sacred liminality is not just an aggregation of words and sentences; it has ontological value, it refashions the very being of the neophyte (Turner, 1969, p. 103).

A further aspect of liminal knowledge is that it is a

spontaneously generated, perfectly moral understanding precluded by structured social interaction:

All these mythic types are structurally inferior or "marginal" yet represent what Henri Bergson would have called "open" as against "closed morality", the latter being essentially the normative system of bounded, structured, particularistic groups. . . In closed or structured societies, it is the marginal or "inferior" person or "outsider" who often comes to symbolize what David Hume has called "the sentiment for humanity", which in turn relates to the model we have termed "communitas" (Turner, 1969, p. 110).

The antithesis to this moral knowledge is the countless choices extant in structured existence in which the participant must carefully choose a path guided by layers of rules and norms, expectations and obligations, rights and duties, that make up any given social system. "Life in structure is filled with objective difficulties: decisions have to be made, inclinations sacrificed to the wishes and needs of the group" (Turner, 1969, p. 139). Liminal knowledge, unbounded by structured commitments, like the compass needle, unerringly points in the "right" direction.

This knowledge which imparts recognition and understanding of reality and how to cope with it is related to the power of liminality. Turner (1974, p. 258) mentions this relationship, "It is not merely that new knowledge is imparted, but new power is absorbed." ". . . (S)peech is not merely communication but also power and wisdom" (Turner, 1969, p. 103). But he fails to follow up on the thought. It seems possible that some of the power of liminality

originates in the perfect understanding imparted by moral knowledge.

As with the attribute of power, the trait of moral knowledge can be broken down into its various potentialities. Moral knowledge will first be defined as spontaneous, perfect moral understanding:

- A. Ability to distinguish "good from bad"
 - 1. people
 - 2. thoughts--ideas
 - 3. actions
 - 4. situations

- B. Ability to distinguish "true from false"
 - 1. knowing a person's true identity
 - 2. recognizing deceptive and sincere thoughts
 - 3. recognizing deceptive and sincere actions
 - 4. recognizing deceptive and true situations

Having listed the attributes of the liminal person and broken down the traits of power and moral knowledge into the ways they can be expressed in any given situation, it remains to be seen whether these are characteristics descriptive of the "true Communist" as he is portrayed in Chinese Communist propaganda. A casual examination of Chinese propaganda suggested to me that traits compiled from Turner's list were the same traits exonerated as virtues of "true Communists"; moreover, it seemed as if correctness in Communist ideology was indicated by the expression of these traits.

CHAPTER FIVE

Content Analysis

From the sample of Chinese propaganda I obtained I selected 25 sources that would be the data base for this research. This selection was based on two principles. First I narrowed the universe of appropriate literature on the basis of those sources in which character traits and social values were delineated and developed. This ruled out the use of some of the very elementary picture books for the young, as much of the material required inferential processes in interpretation (the values were expressed in an implicit, not explicit, manner). It also ruled out such magazines as the Peking Review, the content of which was strictly economic and political, both national and international. Second, I confined my investigation to stories, plays, and novels which explicitly expressed basic values and developed characters and plots. Within this sample, I randomly selected 25 sources: six revolutionary operas, four novels, two picture books, three collections of short stories, and seven volumes of Chinese Literature (two from 1975 and 1977, three from 1976; see Appendix C). My selection was based on a representative sample of each literary

form and the limits of time for one investigator to encode. On one occasion, I rejected one of my selections as unsuitable for coding. It was volume 9 of Chinese Literature, 1975. The stories were very intricate, the characters complex, the values vague and unclear. I am unsure as to why or how this one item was so very different from the rest of my sample. It may represent anything from a poor translation, to a new direction or an alternate class in Chinese propaganda. I was unable to clearly categorize it according to my codes for reasons unclear at this time. For the rest, the coding was almost mechanical in nature.

My categories were developed from the three basic principles derived from Turner's theory of the nature of liminality: liminal traits (aspects of ideological purity), moral knowledge, and power (see Appendix A). Examples of each of the coding categories are given in Appendix B. My unit of codification was, for the most part, the sentence. Often, however, a single sentence contained more than one category. I itemized the categories accordingly.

I had originally planned to code simply for the traits of the "true Communist," indicating presence or absence of traits. It became clear at once that a more comprehensive picture could be developed if I coded for all of the characters. In order to do this, I categorized the characters into three types: type A, type B, and type C. Type A

characters included those who were members of the Communist Party or had embraced Communism (Maoist-Leninist-Marxist thought), that is, those who should show a high frequency of positive traits, traits of liminality. Type B characters included all those who fit into the groups characterized by ideological impurity (class enemies, Kuomintang, Japanese, etc.), those who should prove to show negative characteristics or traits of structure. Type C characters included a rather ambiguous group of people, caught, as it were, between A and B types. Not being ideologically pure, they are vulnerable to negative influences from type B's, but not having rejected Communist ideology, they have the potential for becoming type A's. In fact, in almost every plot, C characters come to accept or are educated to Communism as a means of resolving the conflict. Most of the literature makes it clear to the reader from the beginning who is the protagonist and who is the antagonist in the plot. It is also common for a story to feature all type A characters in which the antagonist is a type A whose ideology is slipping.

To verify the validity and clarity of my codification I employed one naive coder. I first coded five sources: a collection of short stories, one revolutionary opera, two Chinese Literature volumes, one novel and a picture book (see Appendix C). There were 554 separate items to be

coded within this sample. The naive coder was Kirk Dielman, who has a Master of Science degree in History. His background is in American History with no academic exposure to Chinese culture or political thought. His only information for the coding was the categories delineated in Appendix A (no examples given) and the propaganda itself. In the margins of the literature I marked the items to be coded and kept a separate list of my own coding. The results of this test of validity were 78% agreement on each major category, that is, agreement on whether a trait should be categorized as ideological purity, moral knowledge, or personal power (and their opposites). Within each sub-category, whether a trait is Kx1 (knowledge of good and bad people) or Kx2 (knowledge of good or bad thoughts), there was greater variance: 18.9%. The disagreement of whether a trait was coded positive or negative was 3.1%. It is the 3.1% of non-agreement of codes that is the significant variance, which, if it was greater would affect the results of the content analysis. However, this is a less than 5% margin of error which is acceptable. The total number of coded items in the sample is 3,816; the sub-sample tested by the naive coder represents 14.5% of the total coded items.

I recorded each character type separately. The results are summarized in Table 1, below. Each category and their positive and negative expressions is summarized for each of

TABLE 1: Summary of Traits for Each Character Type

NUMBER OF ITEMS	PER CENT OF TOTAL	CHARACTER TYPE	IDEOLOGICAL PURITY		MORAL KNOWLEDGE		POWER	
			I	-I	K	-K	P	-P
2230	58	Type A	87%	13%	90%	10%	93%	7%
705	18	Type B	1.2%	98.8%	21%	79%	10%	90%
882	23	Type C	38%	62%	49%	51%	63%	37%

TOTAL ITEMS = 3,816 = 100%

the character types. Of the total number of items coded, the majority (58%) were expressed by type A characters. This is understandable since type A's are the Communist heroes who serve as moral models and are the focal point of the propaganda. Type B characters (antagonists) and type C's express a comparable number of total traits: 18% and 23% respectively. Within each category, the numbers represent the total percentage each character expressed of positive and negative traits for that particular category. For example, for A characters, 87% of all ideological traits (liminality) expressed by these characters were positive, and 13% were negative; for B characters 1.2% of all ideological traits were positive, 98.8% were negative, etc.

As we can see from Table 1, there is a clear pattern. Type A characters show a high frequency of positive traits or liminal traits for each category: I=98.8%, K=90%, P=93%; type B characters show a high frequency of negative traits or structural traits for each category: -I=98.8%, -K=79%, -P=90%. Type C characters also demonstrate this pattern in a different manner. For each category, type C characters' traits are split much more evenly. The figures demonstrate the co-variability of these traits; they show no instance of high frequency of positive traits in one category with low frequency of positive traits in another category for a single character type. The reverse is also true: in no case is there a high frequency of negative traits in one category with a low frequency of negative traits in another category for a single character type. For type C characters, ambivalence in one category is concomittant with ambivalence in all categories. In more expressive words, if a character is ideologically pure, he will most certainly have a high degree of moral knowledge and personal power (the three elements can be switched--if a character demonstrates moral knowledge he will have power and be ideologically pure). Conversely, if a character is ideologically impure he has a good chance of having little moral knowledge or personal power. Type C's seem to have an equal chance of going either way, having an even split between the positive and negative

TABLE 2: Traits of Character Type A

<u>Positive Traits</u>						
<u>IDEOLOGICAL PURITY</u>		<u>MORAL KNOWLEDGE</u>		<u>POWER</u>		
I	2.0%	K	4.0%		P	15.0%
I1	6.0%	Kx1	5.0%	49%	Px1	16.0%
I2	16.0%	Kx2	8.0%		Px2	4.0%
I3	50.0%	Kx3	31.0%		Px3	5.0%
I4	***	Kx4	1.0%			
I5	6.0%					
I6	7.0%	Ky1	10.0%		Py1	8.0%
		Ky2	4.0%	41%	Py2	30.0%
		Ky3	1.0%		Py3	11.0%
		Ky4	26.0%		Py4	4.0%
	<u>87.0%</u>			<u>90.0%</u>		<u>93.0%</u>
<u>Negative Traits</u>						
-I	.3%	-K	.1%		-P	1.2%
-I1	6.0%	-Kx1	.6%		-Px1	.3%
-I2	2.0%	-Kx2	1.5%	6.5%	-Px2	.4%
-I3	2.0%	-Kx3	4.0%		-Px3	.6%
-I4	***	-Kx4	.3%			
-I5	1.0%					
-I6	2.0%	-Ky1	1.0%		-Py1	.3%
		-Ky2	.3%	3.5%	-Py2	3.1%
		-Ky3	.1%		-Py3	.3%
		-Ky4	2.1%		-Py4	.5%
	<u>13.0%</u>			<u>10.0%</u>		<u>7.0%</u>

(totals approximate)

aspects of moral knowledge, a majority of ideologically impure or structured traits, and a majority of traits of liminal power. Type C characters still have a much higher proportionate frequency of positive traits than B characters and a much lower proportionate frequency of negative traits. The highest proportionate frequency of positive traits for B characters is in the moral knowledge category (21%).

To understand the meaning of this statistic, I refer the reader to Tables 2, 3, and 4. These tables break down each major category for each character type and give the proportionate percentage of each sub-category.

It will be helpful to look at the three character types and compare the traits which are most frequently expressed for each. Type A characters who are most often protagonists in this literature show a very high frequency for three particular traits, one from each major category. In Table 2 the trait for selflessness (I3) has the highest frequency of the traits expressed by A characters (50%). Selflessness is most often expressed in terms of putting social goals and interests ahead of personal interests or goals. It is also frequently expressed as commitment to the good of all. It is the one ideological trait that is the key to attaining ideological purity.

This is further supported in the frequency of the trait for the other characters. Type B's (Table 3, below) show a high frequency for the negative aspect of this trait (-I3 = 31%), which is the second most frequently expressed trait for this character type (also most frequently expressed numerically--see Table 5). Type C characters show a perfect reverse of this: the most frequently expressed trait is I3, 31%, and it is also the most numerically frequent trait for this character type (see Tables 3 and 5). The numbers in-

dicade a pivotal significance for this trait in terms of a causal relationship with the other major categories.

The second most frequent trait for A characters is the ability to distinguish good from bad action ($Kx3 = 31\%$). Knowing what to do and doing it successfully is the hallmark of the "true Communist." The knowing (as distinct from the doing, which is ability ergo power) is essential. Any hesitation or caution in knowing what to do is a sure sign of either an underdeveloped or deteriorating ideology. This trait is also the second most numerically frequent for all traits expressed by A characters (see Table 5 below). In comparing the frequency of this trait with the other characters, it is clear that both B characters ($-Kx3 = 11\%$) and C characters ($Kx3 = 18\%$) show a significant frequency for this trait, though for neither is it second in frequency.

The third most frequent trait for type A characters is the power to overcome difficulties ($Py2 = 30\%$). It is also the third most numerically frequent trait for type A's. This power is concomittant to knowing what to do, i.e., successfully doing it no matter what. It is much more than enduring hardships or finding ways around obstacles, for it is a kind of transcendant inner power that gives the person the ability to behave as if hardships and obstacles were not a part of significant reality. In fact, as soon as one begins to credit difficulties with importance it is an indica-

tion of lack of power over the situation, not knowing automatically what to do about it, and ergo, ideological impurity. We see a comparable level of significance for this trait for the other character types: it is the third most frequent for both B characters (-Py2 = 28%) and C characters (Py2 = 38%).

The fourth most frequent trait expressed by A characters is knowing what the true situation is (Ky4 = 26%). This sub-category, in a way, is the culmination of all the other knowledge sub-categories. It includes the ability to size up people, their thoughts, intentions, and actions, and spontaneously know what is going on. Any given situation is affected by a myriad of objective and subjective variables, including the history of all the factors. The "true Communist" can, at a glance, perceive and understand any given situation and the significant factors underlying it. There is some ambiguity in the statistics for this trait. B characters show a rather high frequency for the positive aspect of this trait (Ky4 = 9%), but the negative aspect of this trait has the highest frequency for all traits expressed by this character (-Ky4 = 36%). It is the type of situation that is significant here. B characters, as protagonists, must be given some abilities or they will not fulfill their role as adversaries. The writers of this literature opt to allow class enemies some strategic understanding in

TABLE 3: Traits of Character Type B

<u>Positive Traits</u>						
<u>IDEOLOGICAL PURITY</u>		<u>MORAL KNOWLEDGE</u>		<u>POWER</u>		
I	0.0%	K	0.0%	P	1.4%	
I1	0.0%	Kx1	1.1%	Px1	1.0%	3.0%
I2	.3%	Kx2	0.0%	Px2	0.0%	
I3	1.2%	Kx3	2.3%	Px3	.5%	
I4	***	Kx4	0.0%			
I5	0.0%					
I6	0.0%	Ky1	8.0%	Py1	2.9%	
	1.0%	Ky2	1.0%	Py2	2.9%	7.2%
		Ky3	0.0%	Py3	1.4%	
		Ky4	9.0%	Py4	0.0%	
			21.4%			10.0%
<u>Negative Traits</u>						
-I	2.7%	-K	.6%	-P	26.0%	
-I1	24.0%	-Kx1	2.8%	-Px1	5.8%	
-I2	19.0%	-Kx2	0.0%	-Px2	1.0%	42.0%
-I3	31.0%	-Kx3	11.3%	-Px3	9.2%	
-I4	***	-Kx4	0.0%			
-I5	14.0%					
-I6	8.0%	-Ky1	25.0%	-Py1	16.5%	
	99.0%	-Ky2	2.8%	-Py2	28.0%	47.8%
		-Ky3	0.0%	-Py3	1.9%	
		-Ky4	36.0%	-Py4	1.4%	
			78.5%			90.0%

(totals approximate)

military conflicts and some espionage ability to infiltrate and undermine the Communist society (usually by manipulating the ideological weakness of C characters). But when it comes to confrontation, either military or ideological, the knowlegeability of B characters runs out and they lose by failing to understand or miscalculating the underlying factors of the situation. According to these statistics, this is their major weakness.

In a comparison of the most frequently expressed traits for all character types, ideally type B's would demonstrate a mirror reflection of type A characters, expressing negative aspects of the same traits with the same frequencies. This is very nearly the case. For A characters the four most frequently expressed traits are:

Selflessness - I3 = 50%
 Power over difficulties - Py2 = 30%
 Knowing right action - Kx3 = 31%
 Knowing true situations - Ky4 = 26%

The four most frequently expressed traits for B characters are:

Not knowing true situation - -Ky4 = 36%
 Selfishness - -I3 = 31%
 No power over difficulties - -Py2 = 28%
 Concern with status - -I1 = 24%

The two character types share three of the four traits in terms of highest frequency, the notable exception is that concern for status (-I1) is substituted for not knowing the right action (-Kx3), although this trait does have a significant frequency (11%) for B characters. One could assume that since the most frequent trait for this character type is a general failure to understand situations (-Ky4), that not knowing what action to take or the proper action to take (-Kx3) would be a less frequently stated inevitability.

The other notable deviance for B characters for the pattern set by A types is the high frequency of the trait of concern for status (-I1). This statistic is best understood in light of the pattern of traits exhibited by C characters. The four most frequently expressed traits for C

characters are:

Selflessness - I3 = 31.6%
 Concern with status - -I1 = 19.8%
 Power over difficulties - Py2 = 18.2%
 Knowing right action - Kx3 = 18.1%

TABLE 4: Traits of Character Type C

<u>Positive Traits</u>					
<u>IDEOLOGICAL PURITY</u>		<u>MORAL KNOWLEDGE</u>		<u>POWER</u>	
I	.7%	K	3.0%	P	10.7%
I1	1.0%	Kx1	2.3%	Px1	7.2%
I2	2.8%	Kx2	7.7%	Px2	2.4%
I3	31.6%	Kx3	18.1%	Px3	13.4%
I4	***	Kx4	0.0%		
I5	.7%				
I6	1.0%	Ky1	6.5%	Py1	5.1%
	<u>38.0%</u>	Ky2	1.2%	Py2	18.2%
		Ky3	1.5%	Py3	2.7%
		Ky4	8.1%	Py4	3.6%
			<u>49.0%</u>		<u>63.0%</u>
<u>Negative Traits</u>					
-I	1.0%	-K	1.5%	-P	10.4%
-I1	19.8%	-Kx1	1.9%	-Px1	2.4%
-I2	10.4%	-Kx2	8.1%	-Px2	.9%
-I3	17.4%	-Kx3	12.7%	-Px3	3.0%
-I4	***	-Kx4	0.0%		
-I5	8.6%				
-I6	4.9%	-Ky1	10.8%	-Py1	1.5%
	<u>62.0%</u>	-Ky2	3.1%	-Py2	14.6%
		-Ky3	0.0%	-Py3	1.2%
		-Ky4	12.7%	-Py4	2.7%
			<u>51.0%</u>		<u>37.0%</u>

(totals approximate)

For C types the second most frequent trait is concern with status (-I1). It is difficult to assign a value to this statistic. If we look at the frequencies for this trait for

A types, we see that it has an ambivalent expression, neither the positive (I1 = 6%) nor the negative (-I1 = 6%) aspects of this trait are frequently expressed, though they are equal in frequency. It is my impression that this trait is only significant to the propaganda when it is frequently expressed in its negative form. Its positive form is demonstrated by A characters by the absence of concern for social position. It is difficult to count the number of absences of a trait; one can most easily count the presence of a concern for status.

C characters demonstrate a significant capacity for the essential ideological trait--selflessness--and the essential power over difficulties. It appears that whatever weaknesses are expressed by this character type result from their concern with status. In fact, this is the very avenue by which B characters seduce C characters. Through their concern with their social position and their other most frequent negative ideological trait (-I3 = 17.4%)--their selfish interests--C characters manifest their ideological impurity in their inability to size up a situation (-Ky4 = 12.7%), their frequent inability to perceive correct actions (-Kx3 = 12.7%), and their frequent succumbing to difficulties (-Py2 = 14.6%).

There is one last significant trait for C types, that is a healthy frequency for the ability to change their own

TABLE 5: Trait Totals by Character Type

A Characters					
I = 12	-I = 2	K = 30	-K = 1	P = 114	-P = 9
I1= 42	-I1= 40	Kx1= 36	-Kx1= 5	Px1= 122	-Px1= 2
I2= 111	-I2= 17	Kx2= 62	-Kx2= 12	Px2= 29	-Px2= 3
I3= 256	-I3= 16	Kx3= 243	-Kx3= 31	Px3= 35	-Px3= 4
		Kx4= 11	-Kx4= 2		
I5= 40	-I5= 5	Ky1= 75	-Ky1= 8	Py1= 61	-Py1= 2
<u>I6= 47</u>	<u>-I6= 12</u>	Ky2= 33	-Ky2= 2	Py2= 223	-Py2= 23
		Ky3= 10	-Ky3= 1	Py3= 82	-Py3= 2
		<u>Ky4= 205</u>	<u>-Ky4= 17</u>	<u>Py4= 31</u>	<u>-Py4= 4</u>
T = 608	T = 92	Kx = 352	-Kx = 50	Px = 186	-Px = 9
	T = 700	Ky = 323	-Ky = 28	Py = 397	-Py = 31
		<u>T = 705</u>	<u>T = 79</u>	<u>T = 697</u>	<u>T = 49</u>
Grand Total = 2,230		T=784		T=746	

B Characters					
I = 0	-I = 9	K = 0	-K = 1	P = 3	-P = 54
I1= 0	-I1= 76	Kx1= 0	-Kx1= 5	Px1= 2	-Px1= 12
I2= 1	-I2= 61	Kx2= 0	-Kx2= 0	Px2= 0	-Px2= 2
I3= 4	-I3= 99	Kx3= 4	-Kx3= 20	Px3= 1	-Px3= 19
		Kx4= 0	-Kx4= 0		
I5= 0	-I5= 45	Ky1= 14	-Ky1= 44	Py1= 6	-Py1= 34
<u>I6= 1</u>	<u>-I6= 26</u>	Ky2= 2	-Ky2= 5	Py2= 6	-Py2= 57
		Ky3= 0	-Ky3= 0	Py3= 3	-Py3= 4
		<u>Ky4= 16</u>	<u>-Ky4= 64</u>	<u>Py4= 0</u>	<u>-Py4= 3</u>
T = 6	T = 316	Kx = 6	-Kx = 25	Px = 3	-Px = 33
	T = 322	Ky = 32	-Ky = 113	Py = 15	-Py = 98
		<u>T = 38</u>	<u>T = 139</u>	<u>T = 21</u>	<u>T = 185</u>
Grand Total = 705		T=177		T=206	

C Characters					
I = 2	-I = 3	K = 8	-K = 4	P = 36	-P = 35
I1= 3	-I1= 57	Kx1= 6	-Kx1= 5	Px1= 24	-Px1= 8
I2= 8	-I2= 30	Kx2= 20	-Kx2= 21	Px2= 8	-Px2= 3
I3= 91	-I3= 50	Kx3= 47	-Kx3= 33	Px3= 45	-Px3= 10
		Kx4= 0	-Kx4= 17		
I5= 2	-I5= 25	Ky1= 17	-Ky1= 28	Py1= 17	-Py1= 5
<u>I6= 3</u>	<u>-I6= 14</u>	Ky2= 5	-Ky2= 8	Py2= 61	-Py2= 49
		Ky3= 4	-Ky3= 0	Py3= 9	-Py3= 4
		<u>Ky4= 21</u>	<u>-Ky4= 33</u>	<u>Py4= 12</u>	<u>-Py4= 9</u>
T = 109	T = 179	Kx = 72	-Kx = 59	Px = 77	-Px = 21
	T = 288	Ky = 47	-Ky = 69	Py = 99	-Py = 67
		<u>T = 127</u>	<u>T = 132</u>	<u>T = 212</u>	<u>T = 123</u>
Grand Total = 882		T=259		T=335	

behavior (Px3 = 13.4%). If we compare C characters' frequency for this trait with the other character types, we see C types outstripping both B and A characters in this ability:

A Characters - Px3 = 5%
 B Characters - Px3 = .5%
 C Characters - Px3 = 13.4%

This frequency is born out numerically in Table 5, above:

A Characters - Px3 = 35
 B Characters - Px3 = 1
 C Characters - Px3 = 45

TABLE 6: Linked Categories

I and P = 142	-I and -P = 17	T = 159 = 63%
I and K = 22	-I and -K = 10	T = 32 = 13%
K and P = 38	-K and -P = 5	T = 43 = 17%

It is this facet of C characters that allows them to demonstrate a similar frequency for the same positive traits as A characters. For 3 of 4 positive traits, we see that A characters and C characters share the same pattern:

A	B
I3 = 50%	I3 = 31%
Kx3 = 31%	Kx3 = 18.1%
Py2 = 30%	Py2 = 18.1%

The ability to change one's thoughts, feelings and behavior is what allows C characters, not only the regular expression of positive traits, but the potential for becoming "true

Communists." Many stories centered around just such a character change. In no instance did a C character change into a B character.

A general frequency for traits is given in Table 5, above. These are the numerical sums of all traits expressed in the sample. The four most frequently expressed traits are all positive: I3 = 451, Kx3 = 294, Py2 = 290, Ky4 = 242, and they are the same traits expressed most frequently by A characters. The three most frequent negative traits are: -I1 = 173, -I3 = 165, -Py2 = 129. These are the traits (except for -Ky4) most frequently expressed by B characters.

This chart can also provide insight into the viability of my sub-categories and categories. For sub-category I and its alter -I, there are only a total of 28 items. This is a result of vagueness about the way to implement this category. Characters were frequently described as belonging to either the "true Communist" or the "class enemy" mold, but I used these references to define my character types rather than as expressions of ideological purity or impurity. Consequently, these expressions simply did not get coded as I or -I. Regardless, we see that general expression of a major category is most frequently found in power, P, and its negative aspect, -P. Characters were most often described, not in terms of their ideological correctness (I) nor moral knowledge (K), but in terms of their overall power, whether

it was power of feeling, muscle or integrity. Their power, or lack of it was a tangible force that could be known and felt on immediate contact by anyone, and that could effect any aspect of reality.

The other notable aspect of this summarizing chart is that two sub-categories, knowing good from bad situations (Kx4) and knowing a true from a false action (Ky3) and their opposites have so few expressions as to be negligible in significance. It is probable that these sub-categories are really indistinguishable in the literature from the frequently expressed Ky4 and Kx3, and so should probably be combined with them.

There is one last set of data recorded from this sample that should be discussed. I recorded any clear expressions that link major categories. There were countless expressions linking sub-categories, but these were not recorded, or were recorded separately, since the task of keeping track of all the possible relationships between some twenty variables was beyond reasonable expectations to record. However, there were a significant number of expressed relationships between ideology and power, ideology and knowledge, and knowledge and power (see Table 6, above). There were also expressions of the relationship between negative aspects of these categories, though these were far less numerous. The most frequently expressed connection was between ideology

and power: between 4 and 5 times more frequent than the others. The great majority of expressions was between ideology and power (63%).

Ideology is repeatedly referred to as the source of power, as in being "armed with Mao Tsetung thought." Ideological purity is the spontaneous and inevitable result of contact with and acceptance of Communist doctrine. As these traits of ideological purity are derived from Turner's concept of liminality, we see that Communist thought transforms structure-oriented persons into liminal persons:

"In people's communes we're all of one heart. Our energy has no limit" ("Song of the Dragon River", p. 36).

"Revolutionary Wisdom is bound to win" (Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy, p. 19).

"With collective wisdom we'll defeat the enemy" (Ibid., p. 20).

"The Party gives me wisdom and courage" (Ibid., p. 22).

The next most numerous linked categories are knowledge and power. As mentioned earlier, it is possible that the power of liminality comes out of moral knowledge in which the initiates into *communitas* are instructed. When one spontaneously knows what is right and wrong, true and false, without doubt or hesitation, the ability to act successfully, ideally, should be an inevitability. This leads to the circular reasoning of ancient Chinese thought, i.e., if an act should end in failure, it is proof the agent had doubts and

was hesitant, ergo his ideological purity is called into question. We see the identical phenomenon in the perception of the emperor's Mandate of Heaven. If the roads and canals, crops, military engagements, etc., begin to fail, it is evidence of the loss of the Mandate. It is the "root paradigm" that dictates that failure indicates weakness which is a clear indication of ideological decline or decay.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion

The evidence revealed by the content analysis makes it clear that the liminal traits (listed by Turner that stand in direct opposition to traits of structure) are what define and describe the "true Communist" as he is idealized in the propaganda. The abilities and powers that are originated in *communitas*, moral knowledge and liminal power in all of their possible manifestations, characterize those who are or would be "true Communists." By contrast, the enemies of Communist society are, by definition, enemies of *communitas*; non-liminal, therefore participants in structure.

The evidence suggests, then, that the Chinese Communist experience of "continuing revolution" is indeed an experience of *communitas*. But, as Turner suggests, it is an attempt to structuralize anti-structure, to enforce and maintain what is by nature a transition, an interphase. Two questions remain to be answered to conclude this study. The first question demands that we explore what elements of the two structural models earlier discussed have the Chinese Communists reacted to and rejected, what have they maintained, and why has this been done? The second question deals with

the problem of why and how have they attempted to create a social system out of what is, inherently a transitional state?

It will be helpful to design a structural model akin to that of Dumont's (1970, p. 233) for the purpose of delineating those structural elements which this study has emphasized:

<u>Homo Major</u> (holism)		<u>Homo Minor</u> (individualism)
Hierarchy	Primary Assumption	Equality
Interdependence	Organizational Principles	Independence
Partiality		Universalism
Obligation		Voluntary
I have shown that the Chinese Communists' system fits neither of these models and yet expresses elements of both. I would describe the Communist system by the model below:		
Primary Assumption of traditional structure	Holism	
	Equality	Organizational principle of Western thought
Organizational implication of holism	Interdependence Universalism	Organizational implication of equality
Organizational implication of holism	Obligation	

Here we have our structural hybrid. We have seen that the individualism of the West was rejected as incomprehensible

by the Chinese Communists and reacted against by recourse to the organistic or holistic understanding of traditional Chinese society. The correlation of the holistic premise, hierarchy, was separated out, in reaction to the profound hierarchy of traditional society, unbound and replaced by egalitarianism, a concept for which there was precedence in China. But this was not the selective equality of the West, in which individual particularism was recognized and valued; this is the absolute egalitarianism of a culture that has always sought and demanded uniformity. The element of interdependence as an inevitability of the holistic premise also has been modified as it must articulate with the equality principle. It is not the interdependence of empirical agents who define themselves **positionally** in a hierarchy as in organic solidarity; it is the interdependence of empirical agents who are parts of a greater whole, who have no position relative to each other, but are equal and interchangeable as in mechanical solidarity. The principle of **universalism** is also a result of the principle of equality: one is committed to ever-widening circles of society not because of the Western need to protect individual rights and freedoms, but because of the traditional **impetus** to further social ends and goals which are not distinguishable in any case from personal interests. This universalism is modified by the obligation of traditional thinking, but it is not the ascribed obligation of hierarchy, it is a spon-

taneous result of the all-pervading holistic principle-- it is not voluntary; it is necessary.

As to why these particular elements have come together to describe Chinese Communism, the answer lies in the nature of cultural evolution. Once the individualistic principle was rejected at the very beginning by budding Chinese Communists, they were forced into falling back on the only other paradigm extant in their world: holism. However, contrary to Dumont, holism does not imply hierarchy; it only implies that the social whole be the only recognizable reality of which the empirical agent is a mere part. It implies that the individual does not exist as a significant reality. Having fallen back on this root paradigm, it remained imperative for the Communists to destroy the companion paradigm of hierarchy. Marxism and revolution demanded equality--the equality of *communitas* which is absolute. These two principles, holism combined with equality, make inevitable the rest of the organizational principles, interdependence and obligation, and the means of solidarity, universalism.

As to the second question, why structuralize anti-structure, the answer lies in two very different directions. The Chinese have fallen back on deep and primal answers for the impulse to totality. Two very different systems of thought of ancient China, Taoism and Legalism, share some

essential elements of anti-structure. This is well summarized by the legalist Han Fei Tzu (translated by Watson, 1967, p. 10):

Taoist sage

absolute understanding
above distinctions of
right and wrong
quietude

withdrawal from world

Legalist ruler

absolute power
law unto himself

no personal inter-
vention

withdrawal-mystery

It has been generally believed by those who study Chinese thought that Taoism was used by legalist thinkers, but that actual connections between the two forms of thought were non-existent:

Han Fei, incongruous as it may seem (and certainly is), hints that he felt the all-powerful ruler of the totally efficient state fulfilled some Taoist principle of "doing nothing, yet accomplishing everything"; but even such tenuous links to outraged philosophy are difficult to establish (Mote, 1971, p. 121).

Recent discoveries of four essays of Lao Tzu that have been lost have revealed some very legalistic notions mixed in with the writings of a Taoist sage:

A discovery of major importance occurred with the excavation of the Ma Wang Tui tombs near Chang-sha in Hunan province, China, in 1972. A number of silk manuscripts were found in tomb number three among which were four previously lost essays appended to the beginning of the Lao-Tzu.

Those who are correct in their conduct and moral in their relations with others are not plagued by the union of opposites and have thus achieved a state of quietude. The author points out that the Tao can be lost or it can be responded to. Affairs must be measured, not by the paired emotions of the sensible opposites which are always changing, but by an unvarying standard of predetermined values--the fa or model behaviors which issue from the Tao itself. These un-

varying standards which measure and determine the real significance of the constantly changing opposites are expressed as those naturally occurring relationships which find their own name and form in events and which stand apart from values determined out of pure self-interest. An interesting example of a model for human emulation is the pronouncement in the text to discard the private and establish the public, quite in line with the currently accepted models for a good citizen and a good scholar (Ching-fa, 1974, p. 1).

Two elements expressed here are critical to this study, the idea that there is an absolute standard of good and bad that is unchanging and that self-interest must and will be "set-aside" in favor of these standards. This is quite out of line with the Taoist being "above distinctions of right and wrong" and "withdrawal from the world," and more of an expression of the Legalist notion of enforcing, through powerful sanctions, what is an ultimate good for the people regardless of their desires.

This tendency is further reinforced by a peculiar adoption of elements of Western rational thinking as described by Max Weber and interpreted by Julian Freund in The Sociology of Max Weber (1968, p. 140):

How is it that Europe has produced this unique culture with its virtually universal significance and value? Weber believed the cause to lie in the influence of its rationality. . .it must be added that the notion of rationality is far from being univocal. . .the distinction between rational and irrational is usually made on the basis of certain values which are preferred to others, whereas in fact any idea of value is based on a subjective and irrational factor. That is equally true of Western culture in so far as it does not call into question the validity of the values in which it believes. . .It remains, however, that the rationality of the Western culture presents a number of absol-

utely distinctive traits, characteristic only of itself . . . Only in the West has science developed in the sense of a body of knowledge possessing universal validity. . . The distinctive and fundamental feature of the rationality of Western civilization is that it is not confined to a particular or privileged sector of human activity, but permeates the whole of life. It exerts a permanent action, developing and transcending itself ceaselessly.

The Chinese Communists have drawn from this Western rationality, ascribing to their ideology the same "universal validity." This was and is possible for them because of their sensitivity to the value of facts and their unique perspective that maintains that knowledge is inseparable from action, theory inseparable from practice. Western rationality originates with the premise that there are empirical data, facts, that are objective and autonomous from mental evaluation, and is thus limited:

The most far-reaching rationalization is incapable of surmounting the conflicts arising out of the multiplicity of evaluation and possible goals, since it is impossible once and for all to identify truth, justice, goodness, beauty, freedom, equality, and usefulness (Freund, 1968, p. 147).

The Chinese, however, have always "merged fact and value," so that they are indistinguishable. They have created a parallel to Western rational thought by building a rationality out of facts that carry values, i.e., consciously subjective perception of objective facts. They have assigned universal validity to this rationality, a universality that also "permeates the whole of life. . .and. . .exerts a permanent action developing and transcending itself ceaselessly."

Communist ideology is as effective in repairing a tractor as in class struggle.

In much the same way that Western scientists "discover" principles of the objective world, so do the Chinese Communists discover and reveal the principles of their socio-economic reality. Their propaganda is produced and distributed in the original catholic meaning of its root, i.e., to propagate the truth. They are not limited by a "multiplicity of evaluation" and so have gone on to "identify truth, justice, goodness, beauty, freedom, and usefulness." Out of this comes the need to maintain anti-structure, for belief in the ability to define absolutes (moral knowledge) and the power to act on and perpetuate that belief and to seem, therefore, to be master of reality as a result of that conviction, all come from the social absoluteness of *comunitas*.

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Appendix A

Categories

- I Ideological purity: signified by having accepted Maoist-Marxist-Leninist thought or Communism (these political ideologies were treated as synonymous) indicated by virtue of membership in these groups:
- a. Communist Party
 - b. Red Army, Eight Route Army, PLA
 - c. Poor or middle peasant who has accepted Communism or become a Communist
- I Ideological impurity: one who actively rejects Maoist-Marxist-Leninist thought of Communism and accepts Imperialism, Capitalism, revisionism, left or right deviationism (these are often treated as synonymous) indicated by virtue of membership in these groups:
- a. Upper or middle peasant (this group has the potential for either I or -I)
 - b. Class enemies and their descendants: landlords, merchants, gentry, scholars, any servants of class enemies
 - c. Kuomintang and their "puppets"
 - d. Warlords and bandits (this group has potential for either I or -I)
 - e. Japanese and their "puppets"
 - f. Americans or any foreigners of Western industrial countries.

Traits of Category I:

- I1 anonymity: unconcern with any external sign of rank or status: political, military, social, sexual, age
- I1 concern with external signs of rank or status
- I2 humility: egalitarian, respectful demeanor, modesty
- I2 authoritarian, arrogance, highhandedness, vanity
- I3 selflessness: total unconcern for personal interests, property, kinship, health, desires; concomittant concern for social interests.
- I3 personal interests take precedence over all else
- I4 acceptance of pain and suffering (this category was voided as it overlaps with Px1 below)

- I5 simplicity: aesceticism in life-style, deferrment of gratification, unconcern for emotional, physical comforts and sensual pleasures: creature comforts, clothing, food, shelter.
- I5 desire for comforts and sense gratification
- I6 heteronomy--obedience: disciplined , decisions always made in line with Party policy
- I6 autonomy--self-directed: undisciplined, superiors' orders ignored or disobeyed.
- K Moral knowledge: characterized by being:
- a. effortless and spontaneous
 - b. clarity in thinking
 - c. no uncertainty or hesitation in decision
 - d. prophetic: anticipates "will of the masses"; anticipates future situations
 - e. perfect understanding--no error in judgement
- K Moral uncertainty: characterized by:
- a. hesitation in thought and decision
 - b. confused thinking
 - c. incomplete understanding or misunderstanding
 - d. inability to anticipate "will of the masses" and/or future situations

Traits of Category K:

- Kx ability to distinguish good and bad (which is synonymous with right and wrong, correct and incorrect)
- Kx inability to distinguish good and bad
- Kx1 able to distinguish good from bad people
- Kx1 unable to distinguish good from bad people
- Kx2 able to distinguish good from bad thoughts
- Kx2 unable to distinguish good from bad thoughts
- Kx3 ability to distinguish good from bad action
- Kx3 inability to distinguish good from bad action
- Kx4 ability to distinguish good from bad situation
- Kx4 inability to distinguish good from bad situation

Ky ability to distinguish true from false

-Ky inability to distinguish true from false

Ky1 knowing a person's true identity

-Ky1 not knowing a person's true identity

Ky2 recognizing deceptive or false from true thoughts

-Ky2 not recognizing deceptive or false from true thoughts

Ky3 recognizing deceptive or false from true actions

-Ky3 not recognizing deceptive or false from true actions

Ky4 recognizing deceptive or false from true situations

-Ky4 not recognizing deceptive or false from true situations

P Power: personal and unlimited

Characterized by:

a. self-assurance and confidence

b. certainty in action

c. determination and perseverance

d. eagerness and enthusiasm in undertaking
and facing difficulties

e. social power and influence

-P Power: limited

Characterized by:

a. lacking self-confidence

b. hesitation and uncertainty in action

c. lack of commitment, ambivalence

d. fear and caution in facing difficulties

e. socially impotent

Traits of Category P:

Px internal power, physical and psychological

-Px lack of internal power

Px1 power over pain and suffering or discomfort

-Px1 powerless in the face of pain or suffering

Px2 power to assimilate new knowledge and skills easily

-Px2 unable to assimilate new knowledge and skills easily

Px3 power to modify or change own behavior

-Px3 unable to change own behavior

Py external power, social and environmental

-Py lack of external power

Py1 power to overcome adversary

-Py1 powerless to overcome adversary

Py2 power to overcome and surmount obstacles and difficulties

-Py2 powerless to overcome and surmount obstacles and difficulties

Py3 power to persuade, influence, change others

-Py3 powerless to persuade, influence, change others

Py4 power over environment

-Py4 powerless over environment

Appendix B

Examples of Categories
Found in the Propaganda

NOTE: The following examples are all taken from Island Militia Women by Li Ju-ching (1975).

Ideological purity (I): "Every man, woman, and child on our island understands Chairman Mao's great strategic concept of people's war" (p. 7).

Ideological impurity (-I): "Your first step is to get down to the root cause, the ideological roots of your error" (p. 285).

Anonymity (I1): "I then noticed that he was still in uniform but without a badge on his cap nor tabs on his tunic" (p. 59).

Concern for status (-I1): "You're the very venerable steward of the esteemed Yufeng Fishing Firm. It doesn't befit a man in your position to beat her" (p. 22).

Humility (I2): "'Countrymen, we're sorry to trouble you like this,' one of the Liberation soldiers said, smiling" (p. 45).

Authoritarian (-I2): "'Miserable beggars!' they cursed. 'They haven't a damn thing worth taking!'" (p. 44).

Selflessness (I3): "(rather than) risk the lives of everyone on board and save his son, (he) sacrificed his only son for the safety of the crew" (p. 44).

Selfishness (-I3): "They had not boarded the junk with the others. . .The brigands had realized that it was impossible to escape by sea and had stayed behind, abandoning the junk to effect their own escape" (p. 281).

Acceptance of pain (I4): (category voided--see Px1).

Simplicity (I5): "He wore a uniform several sizes too big for him and had a wide leather belt drawn tightly round his waist so that he looked for all the world like a human gourd" (p. 45).

Non-simplicity (-I5): "In summer she would deck herself out in white silk, heavily powdered and rouged. . ." (p. 65).

Obedience (I6): "I can't decide on my own, I must consult the district Party committee about it" (p. 80).

Undisciplined (-I6): "Some bandits were wounded. Some were panic-stricken and leapt into the sea. The officer in command was killed and there was disorder on board" (p. 272).

Moral knowledge (K): "She was clear-headed now and could see right through Liu's lies" (p. 272).

Moral uncertainty (-K): "I kept turning this question over and over in my mind and the more I thought the more I felt befogged. Dimly, I sensed something wrong, but exactly what I could not tell" (p. 246).

Knowing good/bad people (Kx1): "He's a bad egg, and an enemy, and will never be at one with us" (p. 83).

Not knowing good/bad people (-Kx1): "If you can't distinguish enemies from friends, Hai-hsia, what use is a gun to you? Who are you going to shoot?" (p. 83).

Knowing good/bad thoughts (Kx2): "You're wrong there. We want to learn something about politics, not learning words merely for the sake of learning them" (p. 94).

Not knowing good/bad thoughts (-Kx2): "You're learning to read and write so what does it matter what it's about?" (p. 94).

Knowing good/bad actions (Kx3): "Suddenly I remembered those caverns. We couldn't flush the enemy out of them from above, so I immediately ordered squads two and three to get them out from their sampans" (p. 212).

Not knowing good/bad actions (-Kx3): "I didn't know what to do next as I'd never been faced with such a situation" (p. 211).

Knowing good/bad situation (Kx4): "Losing the pennant is a good thing as it enables us to see our weakness in training and in thinking" (p. 158).

Not knowing good/bad situations (-Kx4): "I've been with the revolution for years and to think that I've been acting as a shelter for these enemies through being wooly-headed and lowering my guard" (p. 284).

Knowing a person's true identity (Ky1): "The encounter with the one-legged Liu Ah-tai left me feeling more confident that he was an enemy, although there was no tangible evidence, yet" (p. 257).

Not knowing a person's true identity (-Ky1): "Black Wind realized that he had miscalculated. . .He had been sure she would side with him" (p. 272).

Knowing false/true thoughts (Ky2): "I thought I could see foul tricks and cunning schemes hidden in every fold of his shining wrinkled face" (p. 67).

Not knowing false/true thoughts (-Ky2): "I could feel he wanted to probe my thoughts. He was probable thinking he could take good care of himself and easily cope with a simple girl like me" (class enemy underestimating Communist hero, p.253).

Knowing false/true action (Ky3): "His words moved some people to pity but they left me cold. Every time I heard him 'um' and 'uh', it made my flesh creep" (p. 55).

Not knowing false/true action (-Ky3): "The very moment she exposed herself there was a burst of automatic fire from the cave. . .She had feigned injury in order to get the enemy to expose himself" (enemy falls for feint, p. 282).

Knowing false/true situations (Ky4): "His like will never be reconciled to their defeat. Every minute, every second they are up to some mischief" (p. 84).

Not knowing false/true situations (-Ky4): "That matter about a bowl of rice was his doing. I was mystified. How could there be class struggle in half a bowl of rice?" (p. 83).

Power (P): "But she steadied herself and stood there erect and straight, straighter then before as if some new force had found its way into her and filled her with courage" (p. 33).

No power (-P): "Poor people are afraid of taking posts and things like that, because they think they can't run public affairs" (p. 69).

Power over pain (Px1): "I could do two turns of guard duty when others did one, and although I ached all over I was happy at heart" (p. 115).

No power over pain (-Px1): "Tsai-chu came up to me at about mid-morning and asked to be let off duty. She said her shoulder was bruised and bleeding. . . 'I try and work like the others but I just can't do it'" (p. 139).

Power to assimilate new knowledge/skills (Px2): "In my dream I suddenly heard someone say 'Here's a gun for you!' It was Secretary Fang, 'But I don't know how to use it,' I protested. 'You do know,' he replied. I took the gun and pulled the trigger. There was a terrific 'bang' and all the bad eggs (class enemies) vanished" (p. 78).

No power to assimilate new knowledge/skills (-Px2): "An old saw has it that without book learning you're not cultured and therefore cannot reason things out. And being unable to reason things out, how can you conduct public affairs?" (p. 64).

Power to change own behavior (Px3): ". . .now that you have pointed it out to me I see the whole thing differently. I admit I did put medals first and I did feel glum about our failure at first, but I feel different now" (p. 159).

No power to change own behavior (-Px3): "His sort never throw away their butcher knives and become buddhas" (p. 56).

Power to overcome adversary (Py1): "I did not raise my voice but there was no mistaking the steady firmness of my voice. He collapsed before me, dropping his arms as if he had been shot, as if a knife had severed his ligaments" (p. 264).

No power to overcome adversary (-Py1): "Like a wounded beast the enemy howled and turned tail. . ." (p. 227).

Power to overcome difficulties (Py2): "Even if I do lose my arm I can still use the other to hold a gun, can't I" (p. 178).

No power to overcome difficulties (-Py2): "You know very well what my capabilities are. I can only carry fifty kilograms but you are trying to make me carry a hundred. How can I manage it?" (p. 223).

Power to change others (Py3): "Secretary Fang drove his points home to me and made me see things in a new light" (p. 124).

No power to change others (-Py3): "She was such a vile deceitful woman that it would be strange for anyone to take any notice of what she said" (p. 65).

Power over environment (Py4): "Shui-ying unhesitatingly leaps into the water. The others follow suit, forming a human wall which slows the rushing waters" (from "Song of the Dragon River", p. 22).

No power over environment (-Py4): "At the gap in the dam men. . .are driving stakes but the current sweeps them away" (from "Azalea Mountain", by Wang Sho-yuan, et al., 1973 script, 1976 ed., p. 50).

Appendix C

Sample of literature coded by naive coder:

1. Going to School, Kuan Huan, 1975 (children's story book).
2. The Young Skipper and Other Stories, 1973 (short story book).
 - "Old Sentry"
 - "Old Hsin's Day of Retirement"
 - "Red Navigation Route"
3. "Fighting on the Plain", 1976 (revolutionary opera).
4. Tunnel Warfare, 1972 (picture-story book).
5. Chinese Literature, v. 9, Dec. 17, 1976.
 - "Investigation of a Chair"
 - "The Undaunted"
 - "The Golden Keys"
 - "Scaling the Heights"
 - "The Northern Wilderness Is My Home"

Total number of items coded = 554.

Differences of coding within major categories = 132 = 22%.

Differences of coding that would affect interpretation of data = 17 = 3.1%.

Appendix D

Sample of literature for content analysis. All published by Foreign Language Press, Peking, P.R.C.

Novels

Going to School by Kuan Huan, 1975.

Bright Red Star by Li Hsin-tien, 1974.

The Making of a Peasant Doctor by Yang Hshao, 1976.

Island Militia Women by Li Ju-ching, 1975.

Short story collections

City Cousin and Other Stories, 1976.

"The Call" by Chu Yu-tung.

"City Cousin" by Sha Ping-teh.

"Look Far Fly Far" by Shanghai docker's spare-time writing group.

"Spring Comes to a Fishing Village" by Hung Shan.

"A Shoulder Pole" by Yueh Chang-kuei.

"When the Persimmons Ripened" by Ko Niu.

"Home Leave" by Hsueh Chiang.

"The Ferry at Billows Harbor" by Fanf Nan.

The Young Skipper and Other Stories, 1973.

"The Young Skipper" by Chang Tao-yu and Chang Cheng-yu.

"Old Sentry" by Chiu Hsueh-pao.

"Old Hsin's Day of Retirement" by Yao Ke-ming.

"Red Navigation Route" by Chao Tzu.

Yenan Seeds and Other Stories, 1976.

"Yenan Seeds" by Hua Tung.

"Not Just One of the Audience" by Tuan Jui-hsia.

"Leading the Way" by Chu Min-shen.

"In the Shipyard" by Shih Min.

"Many Swallows Make a Summer" by Li Cheng-yi.

"Trial Voyage" by Wang Chin-fu, Chu Chi-chang, and Yu Peng-nien.

Revolutionary Operas

- "Fighting on the Plain" by Chang Yung-mei and other members of the China Peking Opera Troupe, July, 1973.
- "Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy" revised collectively by the "Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy" Group of the Peking Opera Troupe of Shanghai, July, 1970.
- "Song of the Dragon River" revised by the "Song of the Dragon River" Group of Shanghai, January, 1972.
- "On the Docks" revised by the "On the Docks" Group of the Peking Opera Troupe of Shanghai, January, 1972.
- "Shachiapang" revised collectively by the Peking Opera Troupe of Peking, May, 1970.
- "Azalea Mountain" written by Wang Shu-yuan and Others, September, 1973.

Picture Books

- Tunnel Warfare, adapted by Che Mei and Pi Lei, 1972.
- Monkey Subdues the White-Bone Demon, adapted by Wang Hsing-pei, 1973.

Chinese Literature, no. 7, 1975

- "A Change of Heart" by Fang Nan, pp. 3-20.
- "New Blood for the Party" by Hua Shan, pp. 21-42.
- "Advancing through the Rapids" by Chou Keng, pp. 43-56.
- "Our Train Races Forward" by Chen Chi-kuang, pp. 57-66.

Chinese Literature, no. 8, 1975

- "A Young Hero" (excerpt from a novel) by Shih Wen-chu, pp. 3-49.
- "The Adjutant" by Wang Chin-nien, pp. 50-63.
- "The One-Legged Raftsman" by Yeh Wei-lin, pp. 64-72.

Chinese Literature, no. 1, 1976 (Reminiscences of the Long March)

- "Crossing the Golden Sand River" by Hsiao Ying-tang, pp. 6-18.
- "Red Army Men Dear to the Yi People" Aermuhsia, pp. 19-27.

- "Forced Crossing of the Tatu River" by Yand Teh-chih, pp. 28-36.
 "Nine Company Cooks During the Long March" by Hsieh Fang-tzu, pp. 37-42.
 "Snow in June" by Tien Kuo-hao, pp. 43-45.
 "On the Tangling Mountains" by Wu Hsien-en, pp. 46-51.
 "Political Commissar Wang of Our Squad" by Chao Lien-cheng, pp. 52-58.
 "Our Supply Station on the Grassland" by Yang Yi-shan, pp. 59-61.
 "The Battle of Chihlochen" by Hsu Hai-tung, pp. 63-68.
 "Our Three Front Armies Join Forces" by Ho Po-ling, Liu Jen-sung, and Chu Chia-sheng, pp. 69-78.

Chinese Literature, no. 2, 1976.

- "Sunny-Side Pine" pp. 3-27.
 "Honest Chung and His Family" pp. 28-45.
 "The Chief Supervisor" by Li Yen-hsiang, pp. 52-69.
 "Men Can Conquer Heaven" by Chang Szu-kung, pp. 70-86.

Chinese Literature, no.9, 1976

- "Investigation of a Chair" (opera) by Ah Chien, pp. 3-16.
 "The Undaunted" by Chen Chung-shih, pp. 17-54.
 "The Golden Keys" by Yu Chun-ying and Shen Chin-hsiang, pp. 67-75.
 "Scaling the Heights" by Nachialun, pp. 76-83.
 "The Northern Wilderness Is My Home" by Hsing Tung-chi, pp. 83-97.

Chinese Literature, no. 4, 1977

- "High in the Yimeng Mountains" by Nieh Li-ke and Liang Nien, pp. 3-18.
 "Sister Autumn" by Chao Pao-chi, pp. 19-37.
 "Heroes Split Mount Chailung" by Sung Shu-wen and Sung Kuei-sheng, pp. 36-52.
 "Callused Hands" by Tsing Ting-chao, pp. 53-58.
 "A Pine Twig from Tachai" by Chang Kang-kang, pp. 59-66.

Chinese Literature, no. 12, 1977

- "Erh-pao and the Chen Family" by Shu Ping, pp. 3-18.
 "Two Comrades" by Miao Lin, pp. 19-28.
 "The Leather Girth" by Wang Yuan-chien, pp. 29-35.
 "Honey of the Grassland" by Wen Hsiao-yu and Wang Chen-cheng, pp. 48-54.