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AMTRAK MULTIPLE PASSENGER TRAIN ROUTES

CROSSING MONTANA: ARE THEY NEEDED?

By

Angelo R. Zigrino

B.S., University of Tennessee, 1961


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
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
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"Who needs the railroads? You do. We all do."¹

Truer words were never spoken. Yet, during the past decade railroad passenger service has almost completely disappeared. Rail travel has shown a steady, year-by-year decline since the wartime peak in 1944. By 1954, this massive attrition of passengers resulted in a \$58 million deficit. Since the end of World War II, passenger service losses have averaged more than \$525 million a year.² The decade of the 70's will be a critical period for America's passenger railroads and for the nation's transportation system in general. This period is an opportunity for rebuilding, modernizing, and expanding our passenger rail network.

The task of restoring an efficient intercity rail passenger service after so many years of attrition, neglect and deterioration will be difficult. "The Congress has now recognized the imperatives of modern train service by providing greatly increased federal assistance for mass transit

¹Popular television commercial by the chief spokesman for the American Association of Railroads, Wally Schirra.

²Association of American Railroads, The Case of the Vanishing Passenger Train (Washington, D.C.: Association of American Railroads), p. 5. (Hereinafter referred to as Vanishing Passenger Train.)

and by establishing the National Railroad Passenger Corporation to operate intercity service."³

Purpose of the Study

The primary objective of this study is to determine if a need exists for the current passenger route structure in Montana devised under Amtrak guidance. This paper attempts to analyze the importance of the passenger routes in existence at this time and the criteria used in the selection of these routes. The criteria consisted of six points used by the National Rail Passenger Corporation in determining the nationwide rail passenger route network. The finding will serve as a guide for decisions regarding the future passenger route structure in Montana.

Analysis of the Problem

Prior to the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 which created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) the route structure of Montana consisted of three main routes: (1) Butte to Salt Lake City Route operated by the Union Pacific Railroad Company, (2) Hi-Line Route operating in Northern Montana, previously operated by Great Northern, now part of the Burlington Northern, and (3) Northern Pacific Route across southern Montana, also part of Burlington Northern.⁴

³Association of American Railroads, Yearbook of Railroad Facts (Washington, D.C.: Economics and Finance Department, Association of American Railroads, 1971), p. 18.

⁴The incorporators adopted the short name "Amtrak." The previous nickname, "Railpax", was felt not as graphically suitable to the service offered. Amtrak is a word formed from the elements of three other words, "American", "travel", and "track."

With the decision of the Burlington Northern to join the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, the operation of the railroad was put in the hands of the Department of Transportation. On March 22, 1971, the Amtrak passenger train plan announced that it would by-pass the populous centers of Montana and leave them with no valid rail transportation. The plan, announced for Montana by the National Railroad Corporation, would have one train a day heading east and west between Williston, North Dakota and Glacier National Park on the Hi-Line Route. Montanans joined with their congressional delegation and other civic organizations and labor groups in urging the Department of Transportation and Amtrak to give full and continued consideration to multiple east-west passenger routes crossing Montana and to maintain a north-south connection to Idaho, Utah, Nevada and California.

Finally, on June 3, one month after the official beginning of Amtrak, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield announced partial return of rail passenger service to Montana's more populous southern line. Rail service would be three days a week on the southern route--abandoned when the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) took over rail passenger service nationwide. The new southern route began June 15, 1971, on an experimental period that will end on September 5, 1972.

Need for the Study

It is clearly evident that a need exists to remedy the present dilemma of multiple passenger train service in Montana. This study analyzes the dilemma created by both the north and south passenger train routes in Montana by looking at the various criteria relevant to the establishment of multiple routes. These include the criteria of ridership, population, competition, existing railroad facilities, profitability and need. The study presents quantitative data on passenger boardings and detrainings, profitability, need and available transportation facilities in hopes of preventing an inadequate surface transportation system from being thrust on the people of Montana.

Research Limitations

This study is limited to multiple transcontinental routes crossing Montana. It is not concerned with the Butte to Salt Lake City Route.

Organization of the Paper

Several sources of data are used in the development of this paper. The body of the paper is arranged chronologically into two periods: the time before the enactment of the Rail Passenger Service Act (October 30, 1970) and the period following this enactment. Included in the appendices will be reference material concerning the history of Amtrak's pre-incorporation period and materials reflecting activities since Amtrak began train operations.

The next two chapters are a general review of the passenger train losses. A brief history of rail passenger service in Montana is presented in the next chapter. Chapter III is a general review of the history, decline, need, and purpose of intercity rail passenger service nationally.

Chapter IV is included to provide information on the development of the National Rail Transportation Act of 1970 which created Amtrak. Some of the problems encountered in the Basic System route selections are presented in Chapter IV. The basic criteria used to arrive at route selection decisions are discussed in Chapter V.

The conclusion begins with a general review of the need for both the northern and southern routes in Montana based on the findings presented. In addition, recommendations for further research will be included.

The questionnaire and its results are located in Appendix A. Reference to the results of the questionnaire are made throughout the paper for substantiation of material included.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF THE PASSENGER TRAIN IN MONTANA

Good transportation has been a vital necessity for Montana throughout its history. A whole series of transportation advances--improved roads, steamboats, canals, railroads, automobiles and then the airplane--appeared in succession. One of the most important was the railroad, particularly in the West. The railroad offered the best opportunity for spanning long distances of the West and of bringing prosperity. The three major transcontinental lines in Montana were instrumental to the development of Montana. With the decline of the passenger train, one finds a reduction of sentimentality and is able to look at the contribution of the railroads more objectively. A brief review of the passenger train in Montana prior to Amtrak will attest to its importance.

Because of Montana's size and its remoteness, transportation has always been important and difficult. There is little doubt that Montana residents are penalized economically by transportation problems resulting from the state's geographic location and the sparse population in relation to land area.¹ The state's population which was 694,345 in

¹University of Montana Bureau of Business and Economics Research. Montana Economic Study Project No. P-31, Montana Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Missoula, Montana, pt. 2 Vol 3, 1970, p. 6.1.

the 1970 census, is projected to grow to only 860,000 by 1990.²

Before the railroads came, travel was by foot, by horse, by stage coach, and by boat. Beginning in the 1880's the railroads brought people and economic activity to the state, and they provided outlets for Montana's mineral and farm products. Railroad promoters oversold the state's agricultural prospects and helped create the serious rural problems which have plagued the state to this day.³

The first railroad in Montana was the Utah and Northern, north from Salt Lake City to Dillon in 1880 and as far as Silver Bow in 1881; it is now part of the Union Pacific line. Service from Butte to Salt Lake City along this line was discontinued by the establishment of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation. This service was not included in the Basic System due to existing and projected ridership, lack of population deemed necessary to support rail service, and lack of profitability. Revenue and cost estimates have indicated that service could not be operated without incurring a substantial loss.

In 1883, the Northern Pacific, first transcontinental railroad in Montana, was completed. The Northern Pacific's first train crossed the Yellowstone River into

²"1990 Population of 860,000 Predicted for State," Great Falls Tribune, December 2, 1971, p. 1.

³Montana Economic Study Project No. P-31, p. 6.5.

Billings August 22, 1882.⁴ This was only seven years after the battle of the Little Big Horn, at which Custer was massacred. The renowned North Coast Limited began its steaming through the Yellowstone Valley in 1900. It is the oldest name train in the west and was not discontinued.

The Great Northern came in 1893 and the Milwaukee in 1909. The Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy entered Montana from Wyoming and connected with Billings; it recently was combined with the Great Northern, the Northern Pacific and the Spokane, Portland and Seattle Railway to form the Burlington Northern. This merger was accomplished on March 2, 1970, nine years after the initial application. Other smaller railroads such as the Butte, Anaconda and Pacific Railway, the Montana Western, and Yellowstone Park Railways haul mine and wood products.

Fifteen years ago, passenger service was available on three transcontinental railroads through Montana--a state of 148,000 square miles and 700 miles across.⁵ The Great Northern and Northern Pacific came into being because of Government land grants. "The Milwaukee, the Third Transcontinental Line, was built privately. There were no land grants. But over the years it has gradually cut off its

⁴U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Mansfield speaking on the Rail Passenger Service Act, "To Postpone Implementation of Proposed 'Amtrak' Rail System," 92nd Cong., 1st sess., April 29, 1971, Congressional Record, S5957.

⁵Ibid., p. S5956.

passenger service so that it now has only freight service running through Montana."⁶ Since it was built privately, there was no opposition to its discontinuance. Since 1955, the only transcontinental service has been on the old Northern Pacific and Great Northern lines.

Nationally, great changes in the transportation industry have been recommended. Many of these changes apply to urban areas and would attempt to shift passenger traffic from private automobiles to common carriers (trains, buses, planes, and water carriers). Amtrak hopes to accomplish a return of passengers back to the railroads by providing efficient, modern passenger rail service. The decline of rail passenger service is prevalent throughout the United States. Between 1958 and 1969, 1,060 different passenger trains were discontinued.⁷ Since 1968, railroads were able to discontinue trains without the approval of the states in which the trains operated. To fully appraise the situation, a look at the railroad passenger crisis throughout the United States is necessary.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Robert Fellmeth, The Interstate Commerce Omission, with an Introduction by Ralph Nader (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1970), p. 286.

CHAPTER III

RAILROAD PASSENGER CRISIS

Passenger Service Losses Nationally

America's intercity passenger trains are rapidly vanishing from the rails. If this trend continues, they would become a relic like the stagecoach--a victim of transportation progress.

Their passing will be mourned by many. But they can hardly be expected to survive forever the efforts of changing times and changing travel habits.¹

In spite of severe passenger deficits each year, our railroads manage to operate at a slight profit. However, their average rate of return on net investment is one of the lowest among the nation's major industries. In 1969, passenger losses were more than \$464 million and the overall rate of return was a meager 2.36 percent.² Preliminary results from 1970 have indicated that the decline in revenues narrowly exceeded the reduction in expenses, causing the total deficit to rise to over \$475 million. The "solely related" deficit increased from \$31 million as recently as

¹Vanishing Passenger Train, p. 3.

²Association of American Railroads, Yearbook of Railroad Facts (Washington, D.C.: Economics and Finance Department, Association of American Railroads, 1971), p. 18.

1966 to \$250 million in 1970.³ The passenger deficit, coupled with a sharp increase in the operating expenses, forced the railroads to cut back heavily on expenditures for badly needed capital improvements.

A history of Class I railroad passenger service operations for the past twenty years has indicated a progressive deterioration in net income⁴ (see Table 1). Passenger revenues progressively decreased in each of the twenty years during the period 1951 to 1970, inclusive, except for the years 1952, 1956 and 1959, which showed slight increases from the previous year. The passenger revenues decreased from \$1,449,047,959 in 1951 to \$585,705,941. This was a decrease of 60 percent, which amounted to \$863.3 million. Passenger miles progressively decreased each year over the twenty-year period by a total of 23.8 billion miles or 69 percent. This decrease was from 34,613,546,000 miles in 1951 to 10,770,395,127 miles in 1970. The higher percentage decrease in passenger miles over passenger revenues is attributable to increases granted during the interim and further emphasized the trend of decreasing volume of passenger traffic. Passenger mile revenue increased 8 percent to 3.90 cents in 1970. Between 1951 and 1970, it increased from 2.60 cents per mile to a high of 3.90 cents. Losses increased per passenger mile, from 1951 to 1970, from 1.97

³Ibid., p. 19.

⁴Class I railroads are those having annual operating revenues of \$3,000,000 or more per year.

cents to 4.43 cents per mile. Operating expenses decreased \$997.5 million during the period, or 51 percent, which is a lesser percentage decrease than that for revenue.

The annual deficit for rail passenger operations as a whole was over \$400 million per year for the past 20 years, reaching a high of \$723 million in 1957. Passenger operations for the years 1951 through 1970 resulted in over \$10.7 billion in losses.⁵ These statistics were computed according to the ICC's fully allocated cost formula, which does not measure the amount that would be saved were passenger service discontinued. Under ICC accounting rules railroad operating revenues and expenses are separated between freight and passenger services to develop a net railroad operating income for each service. Expenses regarded as solely related to one service or the other are assigned directly; common expenses are apportioned statistically. The true avoidable loss of passenger service has never been computed on a nationwide scale. Available evidence indicates that the avoidable loss of rail passenger service on a nationwide basis is much less than stated deficits. In the ICC "Passenger Train Deficit" hearings, the railroads themselves estimated that in 1955 the national avoidable cost was only two-thirds of the formula for that year.⁶

⁵The Interstate Commerce Commission, Report to the President and the Congress, Amtrak--State of Rail Passenger Service--Effectiveness of the Act (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), Appendix I, p. 52. (Hereinafter referred to as Effectiveness of the Act.)

⁶National Association of Railroad Passengers, Report to Members, The Southern Pacific and Railroad Passenger Service (Washington, D.C.: NARP, 1967), p. 26. (Hereinafter referred to as Railroad Passenger Service.)

The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) has made clear that the results produced by the "fully allocated cost formula" have no relation to the amount that would be saved upon discontinuance of passenger service. At the end of the "separation rules" as they appear in the Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR 121) the following is stated:

Note B: The total distribution to freight service or passenger service derived under the foregoing rules for separation consists of the solely related or directly assignable amounts plus an apportionment of the common on a service or use basis. Inasmuch as the amounts assigned and/or apportioned to the freight and passenger services, respectively, are based on the performance of both services, the operating expenses, taxes, equipment and joint facility rents assigned and/or apportioned to either service may not represent the amounts that could be eliminated if either service were discontinued.⁷
(Emphasis supplied)

⁷Ibid., p. 22.

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF CLASS I RAILROAD
PASSENGER OPERATIONS FOR YEARS 1951 THROUGH 1970

<u>Year</u>	<u>Revenue</u>	<u>Operating</u>	<u>Equipment Rentals and Other-Net</u>	<u>Loss</u>	<u>Passenger Miles</u>
1970	\$ 585,705,941	\$ 946,909,671	\$ 115,546,260	\$ 476,749,990	10,770,395,127
1969	638,186,823	983,426,461	118,566,253	463,805,891	12,159,009,215
1968	685,783,999	1,047,508,636	124,307,637	486,032,274	13,110,288,110
1967	877,710,670	1,224,637,159	138,124,406	485,050,895	15,192,698,803
1966	1,017,552,384	1,285,093,407	132,104,011	399,645,034	17,085,345,006
1965	1,042,082,853	1,324,195,531	138,534,623	420,647,301	17,378,425,112
1964	1,085,424,384	1,357,198,074	138,421,049	410,194,739	18,244,618,476
1963	1,106,759,808	1,365,183,825	140,451,056	398,875,073	18,493,768,963
1962	1,148,882,944	1,394,454,031	148,706,399	394,277,486	19,902,200,651
1961	1,152,748,851	1,404,562,936	156,393,870	408,207,955	20,283,142,617
1960	1,176,334,674	1,489,536,046	171,968,876	485,170,248	21,257,968,747
1959	1,202,914,137	1,570,995,017	175,738,943	543,819,823	22,047,005,198
1958	1,202,031,394	1,641,121,378	171,334,452	610,424,436	23,268,841,225
1957	1,238,124,475	1,788,029,536	173,765,211	723,670,272	25,884,493,476
1956	1,282,390,509	1,803,809,104	175,519,203	696,937,798	28,184,927,601
1955	1,266,827,979	1,743,096,627	160,423,926	636,692,574	28,525,743,984
1954	1,312,007,662	1,812,655,680	168,884,550	669,532,568	29,286,008,403
1953	1,416,214,008	1,953,674,004	167,077,860	704,537,856	31,655,134,000
1952	1,496,689,325	1,969,977,489	169,102,283	642,390,447	34,009,986,000
1951	<u>1,449,047,959</u>	<u>1,944,425,886</u>	<u>185,443,785</u>	<u>680,821,712</u>	34,613,546,000
TOTAL	<u>\$22,383,420,779</u>	<u>\$30,050,490,498</u>	<u>\$3,070,414,653</u>	<u>\$10,737,484,372</u>	

Source: Service--Effectiveness of the Act (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), Appendix P, p. 1.

Arguments For And Against
Passenger Rail Service

Arguments Against Rail Service

Over a ten year period after World War II, the railroads invested more than a billion dollars in new passenger equipment, providing for the world's finest passenger trains and service. But patronage declined sharply and steadily and the deficits rose as jet airlines took to the air and new Interstate highways made travel by private automobile even more popular (see Figure 1). Revenue passengers carried by the railroads in 1944 accounted for 75.7 percent of the national total while buses accounted for 20.9 percent and airlines carried 1.7 percent (see Table 2).

In 1960, the trend was completely reversed with airlines accounting for 43.8 percent of the total passenger miles while railroads were down to 27.8 percent, and buses had 24.9 percent. During this same period, automobile mileage increased from 181 million to 706 million passenger miles.⁸ The railroads tried to adjust to changing conditions by reducing train frequency and tailoring service to meet economy minded passengers.

To a large extent, the claim that the trains were abandoned by the traveling public was true. Many trains, especially those traveling long runs, were vigorously promoted. However, there were just not enough people utilizing

⁸Yearbook of Railroad Facts, p. 34.

the service because of the popularity of other modes. Where services were trimmed because of low demand the railroads were accused of driving passengers away. Where service was upgraded critics accused the railroads of intentionally pumping up losses.

In 1959, the ICC issued a report, entitled "The Railroad Passenger Train Deficit", which stated unequivocally that railroads have "consistently endeavored to improve their standards of service" and "generally have not discontinued trains without serious efforts--sometimes prolonged--to make them pay and only after sympathetic consideration of public convenience."⁹

Loss of business travel--once the backbone of rail passenger service--was a staggering blow. Where businessmen once constituted the majority of travelers on passenger trains, today they are a rare breed. Business travelers account for more than 60 percent of all airline passengers.¹⁰ "Times have changed. It's that simple. The number of passengers on the average intercity train in this country is now less than 100--not even a full load for most jets."¹¹ If the railroads were still running as many trains as they ran ten years ago, losses in recent years probably would have exceeded a billion

⁹Vanishing Passenger Train, p. 9.

¹⁰Association of American Railroads, 20 Questions & 19 Answers (Washington, D.C.: Public Relations Department (A.A.R.), 1971), p. 4.

¹¹Ibid.

dollars per year. In 1970, there were 11,000 passenger-train cars in operation on Class I railroads. This was a tremendous decrease from the high of 61,728 passenger-train cars in service in 1929.¹²



Rail travel has shown a steady, year-by-year decline since the war-time peak of 1944, when the railroads carried 910,295,000 revenue passengers and registered 95.5 billion passenger miles to account for 75.7 percent of the national total.¹³ Long haul passenger trains have seldom paid their own way in recent years. These trains were expensive to operate due to increased expenses largely attributed to out-dated work rules.

By 1970, the number of rail passengers was down to 283,923,000. Passenger miles were down from 95.5 billion to 10.8 billion to account for 7.2 percent of the national total. Passenger revenue was down from \$1.8 billion to \$586 million, and expenses increased to \$946 million. On the basis of hard, cold facts, railroad officials found it difficult to buy the idea that the expenditure of millions of dollars for new equipment would bring people flocking back to the rails.

¹²Yearbook of Railroad Facts, p. 53.


¹³Ibid., p. 28.

RAILROADS FOUGHT LOSING BATTLE AGAINST PUBLIC SHIFT TO AUTOMOBILE AND AIR TRAVEL



RATIO OF AUTOS-TO-PEOPLE FAVORS RAIL TRAVEL IN OTHER COUNTRIES

In Japan




35 people per car

In Europe



14 people per car

In the United States



2.5 people per car

Fig. 1.--Public Shift in Transportation

Source: Association of American Railroads, American Railroads Building, Washington, D.C. 20036.

TABLE 2

VOLUME OF U.S. INTERCITY PASSENGER TRAFFIC

Millions of Passenger-Miles and Percentage
of Total (except automobiles)

Year	Rail-roads ^a	Percent	Buses	Percent	Air carriers
1929	33,965	77.1	6,800	15.4	--
1939	23,669	67.7	9,100	26.0	683
1944	97,705	75.7	26,920	20.9	2,178
1950	32,841	46.3	26,436	37.7	10,072
1960	21,574	27.8	19,327	24.9	33,958
1969	12,300	8.1	24,900	16.4	111,000
1970 ^b	11,000	7.2	25,000	16.2	114,000

Source: Association of American Railroads, Yearbook of Railroad Facts, 1971 Edition.

^aRailroads of all classes, including electric.

^bPreliminary (partially estimated by A.A.R.).

TABLE 2--Continued

Percent	Inland water-ways	Percent	Total (except autos)	Private auto-mobiles	Total (including autos)
--	3,300	7.5	44,065	175,000	219,065
2.0	1,486	4.3	34,938	275,000	309,938
1.7	2,187	1.7	128,990	181,000	309,990
14.3	1,190	1.7	70,179	438,293	508,472
43.8	2,688	3.5	77,547	706,079	783,626
73.0	3,800	2.5	152,000	977,000	1,129,000
74.0	4,000	2.6	154,000	1,026,000	1,180,000

Arguments for Rail Service

On the other side of the coin, many feel the decade of the 70's will be a critical period for the passenger trains. They feel that a need still exists for the passenger train due to the over-burdened highway and airway systems. "The passenger train is an ideal mode of transportation for commuters, for intercity travelers in densely populated "corridors", and for cross country vacationers."¹⁴ The Congress has now recognized the imperatives of modern train service by establishing the National Railroad Passenger Corporation to operate intercity travel.¹⁵

An important factor turning people to other modes was the deterioration of rail service to the point that in many areas it became inadequate, unattractive, or non-existent. Much of this deterioration came about because of the tremendous decrease of patronage. It is felt that given good equipment and service and proper promotion, trains not only can regain lost patronage but will attract many people who today never think of train travel.

Much of the decline of passenger business since World War II was closely related to actions taken by railroad management, some of which were:

- a) increase in scheduled running time

¹⁴National Association of Railroad Passengers, *Why, in the 1970's Do We Need Rail Passenger Service, Here Are The Reasons* (Washington, D.C.: NARP), p. 1. (Hereinafter referred to as *Here Are the Reasons*.)

¹⁵Ibid., p. 1.

- b) poor on-time performance
- c) failure to offer incentive fare plans
- d) run down, dirty equipment and stations
- e) inadequate, unattractive, and expensive food service
- f) little or no promotion or advertising
- g) refusal to honor credit cards
- h) inadequate reservation and information service.¹⁶

To some extent, the railroads can blame themselves for their own predicament. Discouraging passenger service through the numerous methods mentioned above has added to the passenger crisis. "In fact, the railroads, policy of purposefully downgrading their facilities has made the passenger train unpalatable."¹⁷ Another important reason for the decline in passenger service was the decline in the number of trains operating.

Focusing on the role of railroad management in the decline of passenger service, Rhode Island Senator Claiborne Pell comments:

U.S. railroads more often than not seem to have deliberately run passenger services on a non-competitive, unprofitable basis...As a result, rail passenger service, organizationally speaking, is treated as the stepchild of the freight service. The Doyle Report found that only three or four railroads in this country had vice presidents assigned to passenger service, and most of them gave it no separate, high level

¹⁶ Railroad Passenger Service, pp. 10-11.

¹⁷ Fellmeth, The Interstate Commerce Omission, p. 294.

attention. Bookkeeping and operations have been hopelessly intertwined with freight service in so many cases, so that there is no clear executive responsibility for making a profit on passenger service and no clear line of authority for making the decisions necessary in order to trim costs and exploit public demand where it still exists.¹⁸

Need For and Purpose of Intercity
Rail Passenger Service

Many would allege that there is no need or purpose for intercity passenger service. Business travel has been captured by the airlines, they say, and the train is no match for the convenience and flexibility of the automobile for short distances. "The train has 'out-lived its usefulness' and no longer 'serves a purpose'."¹⁹ The fact that so many have switched from trains to other modes in recent years simply means that they must be persuaded to use trains again. As stated by a Canadian National official:

Rail passenger transportation is subject to the same laws of supply and demand as any other business. If the product is unattractive, poorly presented and overpriced, people will be reluctant to buy it, and there will be no apparent demand for railway service.²⁰

Because travel occupies such an important place in our society, and because railroads offer a means of travel that has distinct advantages over other modes, the long-distance train service is essential. Railroads have numerous

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Railroad Passenger Service, p. 3.

²⁰Ibid., p. 5.

advantages in comparison to automobiles and airlines. These include: safety, dependability, economy, relaxation and availability. The need for intercity rail service is still substantial if adequate service can be provided.²¹ Intercity service has the greatest potential in short to medium distant runs (up to 500 miles) in high density "corridors" such as Boston to New York.²²

In summary, the nation's Class I railroads sustained a substantial loss aggregating over \$10.7 billion in passenger service operations over this twenty-year period. The technological obsolescence of railroad passenger service in many parts of the country in recent years, coupled with the governmental requirement that service be maintained whether the public wished to patronize it or not cost the railroads both money and a tremendous amount of good will.²³

As spelled out in the congressional findings and declaration of purpose:

The Congress finds that modern, efficient, intercity railroad passenger service is a necessary part of a balanced transportation system; that the public convenience and necessity require the continuance and improvement of such service to provide fast and comfortable transportation between crowded urban areas and in other areas of the country; that rail passenger service can help to end the congestion on our highways and the overcrowding of airways and airports; that the traveler in America should to the maximum

²¹Appendix A, Questions 4 and 18.

²²Ibid.

²³Stephen Ailes, "The Future of America's Railroads," Michigan Business Review, March, 1972, p. 3.

extent feasible have freedom to choose the mode of travel most convenient to his needs; that to achieve these goals requires the designation of a basic national rail passenger system and the establishment of a rail passenger corporation for the purpose of providing modern, efficient, intercity rail passenger service.²⁴

Whatever the reason for the decline of intercity rail passenger service--and it seems clear that both the railroads and traveling public have been responsible for a great deal of the decline--strong federal action was taken in hopes of preserving our railroad passenger service. The birth of Amtrak is a step toward this salvation. It must lay the groundwork for reinvigoration of the passenger train system or this vital mode of transportation may be lost forever.

²⁴Annual Report of National Railroad Passenger Corporation: Covering the Period October 30, 1970 - October 29, 1971, Submitted by Roger Lewis, President, National Railroad Passenger Corporation in Accordance with PL 91-518 (Washington, D.C.: 1971), Appendix A, p. 1. (Hereinafter referred to as Annual Report.)

CHAPTER IV

BIRTH OF AMTRAK

The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, signed by President Nixon on October 30, 1970, has created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation called "Amtrak", and has assigned it the responsibility for the operation of intercity passenger trains, effective May 1, 1971, between points designated by the Secretary of Transportation, John Volpe, in his announcement of a basic national system of rail passenger service. The objective of the Act is to provide our country with a vigorous, modern efficient, intercity rail passenger service and to establish the proper place for this mode of transportation within a balanced transportation system.¹

This profit-oriented quasi-government corporation was established by Congress in approving the rail-passenger plan on October 14, 1970. Its working capital came, in part, from railroad companies that agreed to turn over to the corporation their passenger service. Of the 26 carriers performing rail passenger service on October 30, 1970, only

¹Letter from Roger Lewis, President of Amtrak to the President of the United States, discussion of First Annual Report, October 29, 1971.

five declined to join Amtrak.² Those railroads that did not join must continue operating all present passenger service until at least July 1, 1971, when they have the option to join. If they refuse the option again, they must operate the same service until January 1, 1975, when they may ask permission to abandon it. In 1971 the Corporation took over most of the intercity passenger service from the railroads. Prior to October 30, 1970, 25 carriers operated 547 passenger trains in the United States.³ On May 1, 1971, the rail system was less than half its previous size with only 223 passenger trains in operation (Appendix C). In return for being relieved of the burden of running passenger trains, the railroads paid to the corporation the equivalent of one year's financial loss. An estimated 197 million dollars in cash or equipment was given to the corporation by the joining railroads⁴ (Appendix D). This one-time railroad entry fee is payable over a three year period. Other capital will be raised by the sale of public stock. Congress provided a grant of \$40 million and authorized it to borrow up to \$100 million to improve roadbeds and buy new road equipment. Another \$200 million in loans guaranteed by the Government was provided for railroad companies that operate passenger trains under contract for the Corporation.⁵ The Corporation

²Effectiveness of the Act, p. 10.

³Ibid., p. 7.

⁴Ibid., p. 17.

⁵"Where You Can Go By Train If They Change The Rail Map," U.S. News and World Report, December 14, 1970, p. 56.

then contracted with the railroads for the use of tracks and facilities for the operation of trains. By reconstructing present service patterns and by unification of operating and marketing functions, the Corporation hopes to increase revenues and decrease expenses to the point that it can make a profit.

Organization of the corporation and the selection of routes to be serviced were necessary before Amtrak could begin operation. During this crucial period, route selection presented the main obstacle to a viable passenger service system. Final designation must be based on limited funds which must be channeled into a number of limited routes which show promise of success. In addition, negotiation had to be successfully concluded with the 21 railroads that were to participate in Amtrak as stockholders or members.

The Legislative Charter

The task facing Amtrak was to create, under the terms of the law, an organization, recruit management, make the determinations on the actual routes to be served, and the services to be offered in detail when operations began on May 1.⁶ It was left for Amtrak officials to fill in the details of the basic system such as: frequency of trains, intermediate stops to be served, quality of equipment, and major connection points. In addition, Amtrak had to make all the necessary preparations to take over, operate and

⁶Annual Report, p. 1.

revitalize intercity passenger trains on a national basis. To fully appreciate the scope of this task, it is necessary to examine the congressional mandate that it provide a truly national system in the public interest. Stated briefly, the mandate calls for:

1. providing modern, efficient, intercity rail passenger service.
2. employing innovative operation and marketing concepts to fully develop the potential of modern rail service in meeting intercity transportation needs, and
3. operation as a profit corporation.⁷

Thus, Amtrak was faced with the challenge of beginning the revitalization of intercity rail passenger service and devising a corporate structure to run it in a manner that had been unachievable by the railroads themselves. The most demanding requirement was to put rail passenger service on a profitable basis.⁸

The Basic System

On November 30, 1970, the Secretary of Transportation released his preliminary report designating a basic national rail passenger system, in accordance with the existing terms of PL 91-518. The preliminary report presents proposals based on studies of rail passenger service made by the Government. This left the way open for the Secretary to weigh

⁷Ibid., p. 2.

⁸Ibid.

criticisms and incorporate possible changes in the final report. Interested parties were given until December 30, 1971 to submit their comments and suggestions, after which the Secretary must submit his final, non-reviewable report by January 30, 1971. The Corporation must commence operation between the points specified by the Secretary on or before May 1, 1971 and must continue operation through at least June 1973. It may operate additional trains between these points, and trains between other points, at any time if consistent with "prudent management".

On January 28, 1971, the Secretary issued the final report on the basic system. The basic system was to consist of twenty-one city pairs between which intercity passenger trains were to be operated.⁹ This new network significantly expands the original sixteen intercity routes but eliminates half of the passenger trains. The report spells out one hundred alternate routings by which end points might be connected. "It was left to Amtrak officials to fill in the details of the basic system and the frequency of trains and the intermediate stops to be served."¹⁰

Route Selection

Amtrak officials went to their task of route selections with great deliberation. Each alternate route set

⁹"Administration Expands Rail Passenger Network"
Great Falls Tribune, January 29, 1971, p. 1.

¹⁰Annual Report, p. 6.

forth in the Secretary's Final Report was studied individually and all available data relating to each route was tabulated. The Final Report provided alternate routes over which service may be provided to help to facilitate the clear identification of route options. Intermediate points between which intercity passenger trains might run in Montana included four Fargo/Spokane segments: (1) Williston, North Dakota, Glacier Park; (2) Billings, Great Falls, Glacier Park; (3) Billings, Helena, Missoula; and (4) Billings, Butte, Missoula (See Figure 2). At the outset, exacting criteria was established to help them arrive at intelligent and equitable route selection decisions. Amtrak adopted five basic criteria in route selection. These were:


Market Opportunity: Population along routes and airline passenger traffic between major cities enroute.

Cost Economics: The level and proportion of losses that were being experienced on existing routes and by the individual trains operating over these routes.

Ridership: Current and past ridership along routes and on specific trains. This measure was used carefully because of the realizations that poor service in the past could have driven away potential passengers who under better conditions could have been customers.

Physical Characteristics: The existing conditions of track and roadway, particularly as it effected speed, safety, and the future capital demands; also natural beauty and scenic attractions along the routes.

CHICAGO - SEATTLE



Note: The alternative routes shown, over which service may be provided, have been divided into segments at certain points in order to facilitate the clear identification of route options. The Corporation may provide intercity rail passenger service over those routes identified or any combination thereof. The listing of any point, other than Chicago-Seattle is not intended to suggest that the Corporation is required to provide service to that point.

Source: Annual Report of National Railroad Passenger Corporation: Covering The Period October 30, 1970 - October 29, 1971, Appendix C.

Fig. 2.--Designated points and identified route options.

Alternative Transportation Modes: Adequacy of other means of travel for the public along each route.¹¹

In the judgement of Amtrak officials, the application of these basic criteria provided the most rational approach to making the difficult choices between route alternatives.¹² While each of the five basic criteria was considered, no single one was overriding. The Basic System designated in the Secretary's Preliminary Report was subjected to an intensive reappraisal in view of the many suggestions provided by various agencies. In the Final Report, the criteria was applied conscientiously and as uniformly as possible against each of the specified routes.

During and after the route selection there were many pressures brought to bear in advocacy of one route over another. In all cases material submitted or gathered in meetings with delegations from the affected areas was given full consideration and factual information was compared with the data that had already been assembled to insure against error.¹³

This data can be presumed to have been supplied by the railroads that had been hauling passengers. Once selected routes were announced there could be no deviation from the final decision without jeopardizing Amtrak's ability to meet its operation deadline.¹⁴

Concurrently, the argument was raised in some quarters that if the deadline were too close to permit reconsiderations

¹¹ Ibid., p. 7.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

then the deadline should be extended. On April 29, 1971, Senators Mansfield and Metcalf from Montana introduced a resolution to postpone implementation of proposed "Amtrak" rail system for a period of six months.¹⁵ In addition, many organizations such as the National Association of Railroad Passengers, (NARP), the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and various state regulatory bodies proposed a six month delay to enable Amtrak to build its own operating staff and organization, refurnish its cars and to give states the time to put up required funds if they wish to request additional service. However, contracts with 20 major railroads joining Amtrak were binding.

Corporation officials believed that any postponement of the May 1 deadline would result in utter confusion and chaos--and with the likelihood that one postponement would logically only lead to others to the extent that route selection, which was essential to the concept of the Act, could well become politically impossible. It should be noted that formal efforts in the Congress and in the courts to delay the May 1 beginning of Amtrak train operations did not succeed.¹⁶

On March 22, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation announced its selection of routes over which its 184 passenger trains would begin operation, together with a summary of the reasons for the selection of each route compared to the other alternatives not selected.

¹⁵U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Metcalf (for himself and Senator Mansfield) introduced a bill to amend the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., March 25, 1971, Congressional Record, p. S3899

¹⁶Annual Report, p. 7.

In enacting the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Congress intended to bring about a new vigorous approach to railroad passenger service as a replacement for the deteriorating and stagnant passenger service provided by the majority of railroads. One can see Amtrak establishing the exacting criteria used to help them arrive at equitable route selection decisions. What part the basic criteria played in the current route structure of Montana will be determined by a thorough examination of each of the criteria.

CHAPTER V

CURRENT ROUTE STRUCTURE IN MONTANA

Prior to the start of Amtrak, passenger service in Montana was available on the Northern Pacific and Great Northern lines. Four pairs of transcontinental trains were operated on a daily basis between Seattle and St. Paul (see Figure 3). Under the Amtrak plan, the only passenger service on the Basic System would be on the Great Northern line, across the Northern edge of Montana. Two-thirds of the state was without rail passenger service until temporary service on an alternate day basis was instituted.

In general, the route segments selected either covered the largest population or generated the greatest ridership. This selection of routes was made after a detailed appraisal of the conditions prevailing between twenty-one pairs of cities. These route selections were the best possible decisions considering the enormous problems of money, track conditions, inadequate equipment, and lack of apparent potential for future passenger growth.




Fig. 3.--Route structure prior to Amtrak

The key decision in the selection of Montana's route structure was whether to operate the northern route (through Glacier Park) or the southern route (through Billings, and Missoula). The northern route was believed to contribute much higher ridership than the southern route (although the southern route served almost twice the population) it is shorter and more than one hour faster, less expensive to maintain, and the intermediate cities have little other public transportation available to them, while the southern route is serviced by an interstate highway and good air service. The northern route serves Glacier Park directly while the southern route provides easy access to Yellowstone Park.¹


In the Basic Plan of intercity rail passenger service submitted by the Department of Transportation, there were four possible routes over which service could be provided. In the final analysis, only two were considered feasible, the northern and southern routes (see Figure 4). The following route segments were rejected: (1) Bismarck, North Dakota, Billings, Great Falls, Glacier Park, (2) Bismarck, Billings, Helena, Missoula.

The route segment between Billings and Shelby (where the line connects with the northern route) running through Great Falls was not chosen principally because the track condition and signaling system are not as good as the other alternatives, and the combination of longer track and lower maximum speeds would add eight hours to long-haul trips. Moreover there is no present passenger service on the segment.

¹Annual Report, Appendix C, p. 54.

INTERCITY RAILROAD PASSENGER ROUTES

National Railroad Passenger Corporation



Source: Annual Report of National Railroad Passenger Corporation: Covering the Period October 30, 1970 - October 29, 1971, Appendix D, p. 15.

Fig. 4.

The route segment between Missoula and Spokane (via the Milwaukee Road) was not chosen principally because although this segment is 29 miles shorter than the alternatives it would require about one hour for switching in the Missoula freight yard, resulting in 30 minutes longer running time, and no present service exists on the segment.²

The current route structure in Montana consists of the Hi-Line route operating in Northern Montana. Daily service is provided both eastbound and westbound. Rail passenger service on Montana's more populous southern line is on a three day a week basis. This is the current route structure in Montana. This service is depicted in Figure 5. The intermediate points selected for inclusion in the Basic System were selected by applying the criteria set forth in the following section.

Selection Criteria

The decisions on route selection and the eliminating of uneconomic and duplicating service were based on the following six basic criteria:


1. Current train ridership and number of trains per week.
2. Current operating costs on each route.
3. Adequacy of other travel modes.
4. Total population of cities along the route.
5. The physical characteristics of track and equipment.
6. The need for service.

²Ibid., p. 55.

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INTERCITY RAILROAD PASSENGER ROUTES

National Railroad Passenger Corporation



Source: Annual Report of National Railroad Passenger Corporation: Covering the Period October 30, 1970 - October 29, 1971, Appendix H, p. 15.

Fig. 5.

It is recognized that if rail passenger service was to be revived and modernized it must be drastically restructured and reorganized. To do the best possible job of eliminating uneconomic and duplicating passenger service was no easy task. Strong pressure was brought from many groups and individuals to continue operating certain passenger runs. In the final route selections, these exacting criteria, mentioned above, were to serve as guidelines to help Amtrak officials arrive at intelligent and equitable route selection decisions. A thorough examination of the basic criteria will help to determine if the need exists for both the northern and southern routes. These include the criteria of ridership, population, competition, existing railroad facilities, profitability and need.

Ridership

One of the most important criteria used in the determination of basic route selection was ridership. It is described as the existing and past ridership along both the routes and on specific trains. This measurement was used carefully because of the realization that poor service in the past could have driven away potential customers.

Information on passenger boardings and detrainings for various points in Montana on the former Great Northern (northern route) and Northern Pacific (southern route) from 1969 are contained in Tables 3 through 8. All trains were operated eastbound and westbound on a daily basis.

Ridership on the Great Northern

On the Western Star, Train No. 27 operating westbound between St. Paul and Seattle, there was a total of 13,933 passengers detraining with a total of 12,728 passengers entraining throughout Montana during 1969 (see Table 3). On Train No. 28 operating eastbound between Seattle and St. Paul, there was a total of 16,009 passengers entraining and 15,331 passengers detraining (see Table 4).

The best train, the "Empire Builder", suffered substantial losses in 1969 yet on Train No. 31, running between St. Paul and Seattle, there was a total of 19,936 passengers detraining during 1969 with 22,031 passengers entraining (see Table 5). Train No. 32, the "Empire Builder" running eastbound, had a total of 18,807 passengers detraining and a total of 17,944 passengers entraining during 1969 (see Table 6). On the northern route, total passenger detrainings in 1969 were 68,007 with 68,722 entrainings at various points in Montana. This was a total of 136,729 passengers entraining and detraining on the Hi-Line route during 1969.

Ridership on Northern Pacific

Along the southern route, formerly the Northern Pacific, one finds the dense population centers of Montana. On Train No. 25, North Coast Limited, westbound between St. Paul and Seattle, there was a total of 33,177 passengers detraining while a total of 32,722 passengers entrained. The North Coast Limited, Train No. 26, eastbound from Seattle to St. Paul, had a total of 31,238 passengers detraining and 31,749 entraining (see Table 7).

Train No. 29, the Mainstreeter, westbound from St. Paul to Seattle, had 13,880 passengers detraining and 15,859 passengers entraining. Train No. 30, the Mainstreeter, eastbound from Seattle to St. Paul, had a total of 17,765 passengers detraining and 16,302 passengers entraining. This was a total of 96,060 passengers detraining and 96,632 entraining for a total of 192,692 passengers on the southern route, approximately 56,000 more than the northern route (see Table 8).

Interesting enough is the fact that the Northern Pacific twice tried to discontinue the Mainstreeter with no success. This will be discussed in detail in the next section. Intentional downgrading was attributable to the decrease in patronage along this route segment. In 1969, the number of passengers on and off at Missoula was 36,798, an average of a little over 100 per day. Billings had 38,720 passengers entraining and detraining, Butte had 19,872 and Bozeman had 12,253. Comparative figures for the State of Montana, north route versus south route for passenger sales, show the south sales almost double over the north sales.³

³U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Mansfield speaking on Amtrak, "Amtrak", 92nd Congress, 1st sess., April 29, 1971, Congressional Record, p. S5951.

TABLE 4

PASSENGER BOARDINGS AND DETRAININGS FOR 1969

TRAIN NO. 28

Item	Station	Passengers Boarding	Passengers Detraining																										
			Spokane	Everett	Shelburne-Monitor	Wenatchee	Quincy	Edwards	Spokane	Spokane-Nillyard (P)	Sumner Ferry	Troy	Libby	Bozford	Eureka	Porter-Glady (P)	Whitfish-Col. Falls	Cornucopia	Malheur	Clatsop Park (P)	Bronson	Carl Bock	Shelby	Maup	Chinook	Minidoka (P)-Porter	Glacier	Wolf Point	Poplar-Culbertson
1	Total Detraining	99,173	316	172	2	1	98	377	301	1,113	55	27	122	810	171	57	22	34	910	770	253	12	29	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	Seattle	19,107	216	411																									
3	Edwards	1767																											
4	Everett	3,508																											
5	Shelburne-Monitor	13																											
6	Wenatchee	787																											
7	Quincy	65																											
8	Edwards	212																											
9	From Portland	2,064																											
10	Spokane	5,687																											
11	Spokane-Nillyard (P)	757																											
12	Sumner Ferry	277																											
13	Troy	351																											
14	Libby	1,007																											
15	Bozford (P)	67																											
16	Eureka	715																											
17	Porter-Glady (P)	161																											
18	Whitfish-Col. Falls	3,713																											
19	Cornucopia	16																											
20	Malheur (P)	367																											
21	Clatsop	31																											
22	Clatsop Park (P)	725																											
23	Bronson	577																											
24	Carl Bock	563																											
25	Shelby	886																											
26	Maup	5767																											
27	Chinook	228																											
28	Minidoka (P)-Porter	675																											
29	Glacier	678																											
30	Wolf Point	587																											
31	Poplar-Culbertson	677																											

Source: Information on passenger boardings and detrainings for former Great Northern and Northern Pacific passenger trains is furnished by Burlington Northern.

TABLE 5

PASSENGER BOARDINGS AND DETRAININGS FOR 1969

TRAIN NO. 31

No.	Station	Passengers Entraining	Passengers Detraining																			
			Minneapolis	Willmar	Brockenside	Fargo	Minnsford	New Rockford	Winnit	Williston	Wolf Point	Glasgow	Malta	Nevre	Chester	Shelby	Cut Bank	Glacier Park (1)	Dolton	Whitefish	Libby	Troy
1	Total Detraining	102103	355	2011	2322	2103	261	2650	1153	1445	1256	1719	597	4442	3101	2335	2627	2669	2572	1371	1221	244
2	On Board	19826	240	557	353	710	25	268	1359	478	177	222	102	613	13	282	58	1618	1140	668	81	38
3	St. Paul	14462	115	241	290	583	69	327	1669	153	241	231	114	682	53	119	55	531	450	641	117	27
4	Minneapolis	22248		1813	1546	1265	141	119	4322	2798	567	532	132	769	31	144	75	305	153	572	74	21
5	Willmar	2084		34	265	7	51	140	86	32	12	8	84	10	19	8	39	19	76	12	2	
6	Brockenside	1307			180	11	69	254	133	33	6	7	43	2	11	15	7	2	32	6	2	
7	Fargo	8303				121	645	1119	1441	129	118	36	272	21	49	32	12	3	123	27	6	
8	Minnsford	167					1	34	38	2	1	4	12		5	2			14	1		
9	New Rockford	1615							166	46	7	8	6	39	7	10	7	3	26	6	1	
10	Winnit	4014							523	52	89	35	200	17	50	8	7	5	104	64		
11	Williston	2699								36	77	22	392	20	59	33	9	4	144	47	11	
12	Wolf Point C	1886									71	14	417	22	60	41	4		176	28	6	
13	Glasgow C	1618										119	184	11	55	47	2		145	51	10	
14	Malta C	836										257	10	21	36	1	6		87	19	5	
15	Nevre	3235											96	310	214	41	51		685	46	16	
16	Chester C	450												24	31	7	5		123	36	3	
17	Shelby	2266													267	16	17		415	69	16	
18	Cut Bank C	1646														14	5		211	30	9	
19	Glacier Park (1)	975															33		25	2		
20	Dolton (1)	318																	7	13		
21	Whitefish	6996																		176	44	
22	Libby C	2275																			27	
23	Troy	396																				

Source: Information on passenger boardings and detrainings for former Great Northern and Northern Pacific passenger trains is furnished by Burlington Northern.

TABLE 6

PASSENGER BOARDINGS AND DETRAININGS FOR 1969

TRAIN NO. 32

LINE	Station	Passengers Entaining	Passengers Detraining																
			Edmonds	Everett	Wenatchee	Ephrata	Spokane	Troy	Libby	Whitefish	Belton	Glacier Park	Cut Bank	Shelby	Chester	Havre	Malta	Glasgow	Wolf Point
1	Total Detraining	118713	58	161	2187	2222	2117	303	1436	7337	541	637	925	2511	418	2452	558	1786	2270
2	Seattle	29307	58	141	5227	1320	5585	25	225	2092	215	322	213	501	50	515	115	247	314
3	Edmonds	4912		20	1375	282	1496	2	21	294	4	11	32	113	7	53	33	31	60
4	Everett	8706			1522	447	2412	17	36	431	120	19	63	187	12	124	16	56	44
5	Wenatchee	3935				213	2423	17	40	187	3	8	1	48	8	9	2	7	27
6	Ephrata	1315					728	3	31	60	2	8	8	30	2	35	10	15	43
7	From Portland	9830						20	244	1181	60	81	118	358	58	582	44	165	55
8	Spokane	12117						219	534	3011	87	122	374	619	100	652	129	194	349
9	Troy	202							5	25			6	19	4	8	2	6	6
10	Libby	755								63	5	3	10	101	12	67	17	18	43
11	Whitefish	3632									35	22	85	244	118	250	49	177	273
12	Belton	1001										31	2	19	1	15	2	1	2
13	Glacier Park	2008											13	19		16	2	4	3
14	Cut Bank	858												223	26	92	13	122	42
15	Shelby	1164													20	156	23	83	67
16	Chester	356														158	8	9	21
17	Havre	4467															88	620	562
18	Malta	527																9	14
19	Glasgow	1559																	81
20	Wolf Point	1557																	

Source: Information on passenger boardings and detrainings for former Great Northern and Northern Pacific passenger trains is furnished by Burlington Northern.

TABLE 7

TRAIN NO. 25 AND NO. 26

North Coast Limited					
Train No. 26 - Eastbound			Train No. 25 - Westbound		
Station	Origin Total	Destination Total	Station	Origin Total	Destination Total
Paradise	201	348	Glendive	2,915	1,770
Missoula	5,406	4,671	Terry	---	---
Garrison	60	1,500	Miles City	2,338	1,456
Deer Lodge	340	452	Forsyth	596	281
Butte	4,598	4,234	Billings	7,690	7,484
Logan	463	60	Livingston	2,586	3,744
Bozeman	4,269	1,970	Bozeman	2,311	3,973
Livingston	2,553	2,497	Logan	67	551
Billings	9,378	7,947	Butte	6,334	4,578
Forsyth	388	595	Deer Lodge	526	353
Miles City	1,754	2,851	Garrison	2,120	95
Terry	---	---	Paradise	4,738	7,838
Glendive	2,339	4,112	Missoula	498	553
Total	31,749	31,237	Total	14,216	13,428

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Source: Table drawn from statistics provided by Burlington Northern, 1969.

TABLE 8

TRAIN NO. 29 AND NO. 30

Mainstreeter					
Train No. 29 - Westbound			Train No. 30 - Eastbound		
Station	Origin Total	Destination Total	Station	Origin Total	Destination Total
Wibaux	118	98	Noxon	378	132
Glendive	2,171	1,002	Thompson Falls	530	478
Terry	67	25	Paradise	488	423
Miles City	1,303	576	Perma	8	21
Forsyth	218	111	Ravalli	234	254
Hysham	11	5	Missoula	5,173	2,496
Custer	13	18	Drummond	98	96
Billings	2,984	2,511	Garrison	217	1,798
Laurel	155	139	Avon	10	10
Austin	5	---	Elliston	40	19
Columbus	61	50	Helena	2,040	2,582
Big Timber	73	51	Townsend	76	168
Livingston	355	323	Toston	5	13
Bozeman	736	1,612	Deer Lodge	1	10

Belgrade	16	4	Butte	21	4
Manhattan	13	15	Logan	211	42
Logan	36	205	Manhattan	---	---
Butte	31	6	Belgrade	2	3
Deer Lodge	9	---	Bozeman	1,928	1,257
Toston	4	6	Livingston	721	569
Townsend	101	---	Big Timber	75	156
Helena	2,177	1,377	Columbus	34	110
Elliston	4	15	Austin	---	---
Avon	21	4	Laurel	149	277
Garrison	833	34	Billings	2,761	3,460
Drummond	107	20	Custer	9	14
Missoula	2,748	1,941	Hysham	4	23
Ravalli	228	46	Forsyth	87	262
Perma	27	---	Miles City	446	1,321
Paradise	394	69	Terry	14	100
Thompson Falls	491	53	Glendive	493	1,447
Noxon	122	141	Wibaux	47	93
Total	15,832	10,457	Total	16,300	17,138

Source: Table drawn from statistics provided by Burlington Northern, 1969.

Train Discontinuance Attempts

Before Amtrak began service on the Basic System, all four pairs of daily transcontinental trains were well patronized. Only one, the Mainstreeter, has ever come before the Commission for discontinuance proceeding. And that was denied.⁴ In analyzing the trains which the carrier itself regarded as the most likely prospect for discontinuance, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) found in 1968 that 251,827 passengers used the Mainstreeter annually, and that unlike the general trend--usage was actually increasing. Pointing to these increases (which, even according to railroad figures showed an average of 345 passengers per trip) the Commission concluded: "We consider it clear beyond dispute that the public has not abandoned the Mainstreeter."⁵ In 1969, the Northern Pacific Railroad again unsuccessfully sought to discontinue the Mainstreeter. The decrease in patronage since the first discontinuance proceeding was attributable to intentional downgrading by the railroad. Many of these trains have been poorly patronized, not because of a lack of interest but, because the railroads have downgraded equipment and service, eliminated sleeping cars, offered poor schedules and shunted passenger trains on to sidings to let freights fly by while passengers wait.⁶ This

⁴Effectiveness of the Act, Appendix I, p. 34.

⁵Ibid., p. 35.

⁶"Railpax Plan In Montana - No. 3," Congressional Record, p. S4730.

intentional downgrading of service played a substantial part in the loss of patronage along the southern route. As the ICC concluded "...there are good reasons for this decrease in patronage...reasons brought about by railroad management in contemplation of discontinuance." Despite all of this, the Mainstreeter trains still carried "approximately 200,000 revenue passengers" in 1968.⁷

Such extensive use is in addition to the North Coast Limited, which except for the Butte cut-off parallels the Mainstreeter route between St. Paul and Seattle. Significantly, the North Coast Limited has never even been the subject of a discontinuance proceeding. These circumstances seem to provide ample basis for continued passenger service in the basic national system.

The use of trains over the former Great Northern route is equally impressive, considered along with the fact that the carrier has never sought to discontinue its two pairs of transcontinental trains operated over this route. Figures drawn from ICC records developed in passenger train cases over the past twelve years substantiate this. In 1969, approximately 400,000 people used the Empire Builder and its connections between Chicago and Seattle/Portland.⁸ The Empire Builder is a luxury express train providing the fastest surface transportation between Chicago and Seattle.

⁷Effectiveness of the Act, Appendix I, p. 35.

⁸Ibid., p. 36.

During the same period approximately 200,000 people used the Western Star, which runs between St. Paul and Seattle.⁹ "And these figures do not account for passengers formerly traveling trains discontinued in the cited case, but retained on the Western Star or Empire Builder."¹⁰

In the judgment of the ICC, there is clearly a need for some transcontinental service on both the former Great Northern and Northern Pacific Corridors, whether on an alternate day or some other basis. The Commission found that the establishment of St. Paul and Seattle as end points was essential to the preservation of transcontinental rail passenger service and should be maintained in the basic system.

Summary

As previously mentioned, selection of various route segments was dependent to a large degree on the ridership generated. However, one sees total combined passengers de-training and entraining were 136,729 for the northern route versus 192,682 for the southern route. The higher ridership of the northern route is merely an illusion, unless it was based on ridership per population density.

To highlight this controversy over ridership, the Honorable Mike Mansfield, U.S. Senator, Democrat-Montana, in a letter to Secretary of Transportation, John Volpe, on April 13, 1971 stated:

⁹Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 36.

You indicate that, 'the decision not to continue east-west service across southern Montana was made because ridership is less on this line than on the northern route through Havre.' I find this somewhat difficult to believe, in view of the fact that the southern route serves Montana's larger cities--Missoula, Butte, Helena, Bozeman, Billings, Miles City, and Glendive. The northern route serves an area which is in need but Havre and Kalispell, via Whitefish, are the only two cities served which are in the top ten cities of the state. I would appreciate having statistical information on passenger boardings and detrainings on the southern route as compared to the northern route. I would also like to remind you that in recent years the Northern Pacific Railroad has made an effort to discourage passenger service on the southern route and this would have an effect on the statistics.¹¹

In reviewing the ridership criteria, it is found that throughout Montana the southern route had a definite advantage. In the past, ridership on both routes was quite impressive, even despite intentional downgrading of service on the southern route.

Population

End points to which service is required should generally have Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) populations of one million or more. The route options between these points should touch a large number of intermediate population centers. Each "point" on the Basic System, specified as one which the corporation is required to serve, is intended to include an entire SMSA. The SMSA

¹¹U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Mansfield discussing the Railpax plan and its many misgivings, "Railpax Plan In Montana - No. 2," 92nd Congress, 1st sess., April 14, 1971, Congressional Record, p. S4734.

population of the end points of the Chicago to Seattle route segment were Chicago with a population of 6,920,000 and Seattle with a population of 1,335,000.

Amtrak Frowns on South

Routes were selected which held a reasonable prospect of economic viability in terms of overall cost--benefit relationships. One of the factors to be evaluated included the potential demand for service measured by both the population and the total travel volume. On March 22, 1971, the officials of the National Passenger Railroad Corporation announced that the Amtrak plan for Montana would bypass the dense population centers. On the other hand, the Hi-Line communities were selected for inclusion in the Basic System. This fact caused an uproar among community and business leaders in the state's largest communities--Miles City, Billings, Bozeman, Butte, Great Falls, Helena, and Missoula--which were left without passenger trains until resumption of partial service on a temporary basis in June.¹² Senator Mike Mansfield recognizing that Montana's largest cities would be without service stated:

In the case of my own state of Montana, the fourth largest state in the union, there will be but one route across the northern tier. This is an area which deserves rail service and needs it. But the Railpax plan completely ignores the remaining two-thirds of Montana and approximately 80 percent of the population.¹³

¹²"Distracting Amtrak on Track Saturday, Like It or Not," Great Falls Tribune, April 28, 1971, p. 13.

¹³"Railpax Plan in Montana - No. 3," Congressional Record, p. S4730.

Population Comparison

The people of Montana were stunned when they learned that the Corporation recommended that over two-thirds of Montana would have to give up rail passenger service. The present population of major cities left out of the basic route is 171,000 with the major Hi-Line cities on the Great Northern Route selected having a total population of 27,000.¹⁴ For many years Montana has supported eight trains a day, four eastbound and four westbound, one-half on the Hi-Line and the other on the heavily populated southern route.

The southern route serves twenty counties with a combined population of 313,471, while the ten Hi-Line counties have only 127,811 residents.¹⁵ The ten year growth in population of the major cities in southern Montana is more than the total population of the Hi-Line route served by Amtrak.¹⁶

The million-or-more SMSA population requirement applied in the case of long haul service between Chicago and Seattle seems to have only been used in the selection of end points. Little indication seems to exist to indicate that the intermediate population centers within the State of Montana were considered. Perhaps the importance of population

¹⁴"Nine Southern Route Cities Join in Effort to Block Railpax," Great Falls Tribune, March 31, 1971, p. 4. (Hereinafter referred to as Block Railpax.)

¹⁵"Hi-Line Residents, Butte Legislature Disagree on Railpax Route," Great Falls Tribune, December 27, 1970, p. 1. (Hereinafter referred to as Hi-Line Residents.)

¹⁶"Block Railpax," Great Falls Tribune, p. 4.

in the selection of Montana's route segment can best be summed up by the statement of a Hi-Line spokesman. He commented,

northern and southern Montana residents are using the wrong approach in comparing their area's population, as "the whole state is a drop in the bucket" in population when considered in the nationwide system.¹⁷

Yet, routes over which service has become fragmented or even non-existent have more market potential, either because of greater population density, shorter distances, and/or better scenic attractions, than routes where through service is now provided.¹⁸

Summary

The population criteria was a determining factor in the selection of many of the intermediate points of the Basic System. Population along the southern route through Montana is substantially greater than through the northern route; however, the southern route was by-passed. Considering the overwhelming population advantage located in the area of southern Montana, a significant number of passengers should be generated to warrant and support at least one pair of trains to serve southern Montana. The trains serve a number of populous intermediate points; and the passenger patronage

¹⁷"Hi-Line Residents," Great Falls Tribune, p. 1.

¹⁸National Association of Railroad Passengers, Modern Trains For A More Mobile America (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Railroad Passengers, 1970), p. 6. (Hereinafter referred to as Modern Trains.)

of these points indicates substantial reliance upon the previous trains. The fact is that Montana is too huge and too sparsely populated to be served by a single rail passenger route.

Alternate Mode Competition

The use of this criteria was to determine the adequacy of other means of travel for the public along each route. Rail transportation must be able to compete effectively with other modes of transportation in terms of cost, speed, or comfort or be discontinued. Routes must be selected which hold a reasonable prospect of economic viability in terms of overall cost-benefit relationships.

If trains are to attract people now traveling by air, they must be fast enough to nullify the speed advantage of the airplane over intermediate distances. For long haul carriage they must provide unique characteristics and advantages to offset airport-to-airport speed. If they are to compete effectively with the automobile, service must be frequent enough to offset the flexibility advantage of highway travel between any given points, or the apparent adequacy of other modes, should militate against the continuance of service.¹⁹ "What may appear to be adequate service by other modes has quite possibly been obtained at the expense of the environment, or will do great harm in the future if it is to remain adequate in terms of travel demand."²⁰

¹⁹Ibid., p. 5.

²⁰Ibid.

Absence of Alternative Modes

The application of the competition criteria seems to have played its biggest part in the selection of the intermediate points served throughout the State of Montana. The northern route, formerly the Great Northern, through Montana was chosen to be part of the basic system despite the population and ridership advantage along the southern route through the state, largely because of the absence of alternate modes of transportation along the northern route.²¹ These Hi-Line communities are almost exclusively dependent upon rail passenger service as the only existing public transportation available.

The Montana Railroad Commission pointed out that many hundreds of Montana communities are without air service, bus service, or other public transportation and that in these instances, rail passenger service is not merely an important service but is basically an "essential service without which these communities could possibly cease to exist."²²

Epitomizing the plight of Hi-Line residents is the city of Malta, virtually isolated as far as public transportation is concerned. "There is no plane service to Malta and the buses are more interested in freight than passengers."²³

²¹Annual Report, p. 17

²²"MRC Pushes Hi-Line Rail Route," Great Falls Tribune, January 8, 1971, p. 1.

²³"Malta Gets Amtrak Flag Stop," Great Falls Tribune, October 29, 1971, p. 11.

To make connection for rail passenger service residents had to go to either Havre or Glasgow and there was always the possibility of an overnight stay if connections were missed. In November, the city finally won assurance of "flag stop" designation by the Empire Builder during the winter months.²⁴ Likewise, Havre has no bus or air service. Glasgow's mayor, James Christensen, indicated the Hi-Line rail service is "a must--we are stranded." He said that air service at Glasgow is poor and bus service is "out of the question."²⁵ Senator Mansfield commented:

In defense of rail passenger service, I believe it is the most reliable of all public conveyance. Air travel is often controlled by weather. Highways in a state like Montana become impassable because of freezing rain and blowing snow. The only reliable service under these conditions is passenger train service.²⁶

The decision of the Corporation to abandon service over the southern route in favor of the northern route was due mainly to the feeling that the remainder of Montana had adequate alternatives of public transportation. Granted, southern Montana has more public transportation but these facilities are far from adequate. Air service does not include many of the smaller cities and at some points, the airlines are attempting to reduce service further.²⁷ Bus lines

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵"Hi-Line Residents," p. 1.

²⁶"Amtrak," Congressional Record, p. S5947.

²⁷U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Mansfield addressing problems of route selections, "Railpax Plan In Montana - II," 92nd Congress, 1st sess., March 25, 1971, Congressional Record, p. S3889.

offer about fifty percent less public transportation than they did a few years ago.²⁸ This situation was best described by Senator Mansfield before Congress on March 25, 1971, when he commented,

Alternate methods of public transportation has apparently been the major factor in their decision. A state like Montana does have other quantities. A number of these communities affected do not have airline service and in the case of cities like Missoula and Butte, cannot depend on scheduled airlines because of fluctuating and often times, difficult weather conditions. These same areas are mountainous and during the winter there are days when it is impossible to travel by highway, for those, the one possible method of transportation, would be the railroads. After May 1, the people of western Montana will not have this option.²⁹

Airline Transportation

A brief examination of public transportation in Montana accents the need for rail passenger service. Airlines provide service to fourteen of the larger cities, and, although the service provided is limited and frequently inconvenient, the increase in its use has been almost phenomenal. "Between 1950 and 1968, the number of enplaned passengers increased from 73,076 to 444,371, a jump of 508 percent."³⁰ Despite this increase, Montana's share of enplanements in the United States decreased during this period from 0.43 to 0.31. "Approximately 69 percent of boarding occurred in Billings and Great Falls; if Missoula and Butte are added, the proportion rises to 86 percent."³¹ The smaller communities

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., p. S3888.

³⁰ Montana Economic Study Project No. P-31, p. 6.11.

³¹ Ibid.

of the state are virtually without adequate feeder air service. The automobile has affected the airlines, mainly by reducing the traffic on short feeder routes. Previously subsidized by profits on long routes, these shorter routes have lost traffic and are being discontinued.

Bus Transportation

Like railroad and air passenger service, bus transportation is limited in the state. Bus service is less frequent and service has been discontinued to a number of towns and cities. The quitting of passenger bus service by railroads as the Amtrak rail passenger service went into operation compounded the limited transportation problem. The bus passenger service was halted by the railroads on the ground it was licensed as a substitute for rail service. Amtrak law does not mention rail substitute service. Often travel by air or highway is hazardous or impossible due to Montana's difficult weather conditions. An alternate means of transportation is essential. Rail has proven to be the most reliable. Trains are accurately described as the only all-weather mode of transportation.

Private Transportation

The greater use of automobiles and private planes in Montana can be primarily attributed to the inadequacy of public transportation. The per capita expenditure for automobile operation in Montana averaged \$426 per person compared to the national figure of \$364.³² "In addition, Montana

³²Ibid., p. 6.12.

residents own almost four times as many private planes in relation to the population as do other Americans--two per 1,000 persons, compared to 0.6 per 1,000 in the United States."³³ Per capita expenditures for highways in Montana came also well above the national average; in 1967 they amounted to \$136 compared to a national per capita expenditure of \$70.³⁴ With the possible elimination of 80 percent of rail passenger service throughout Montana, these statistics will increase. With the decline in intercity rail passenger service, the private automobile will remain the only means of transportation. "Pretty soon it will be almost impossible to even get out of Montana from some points by public conveyance."³⁵

Railroad Dependability

A comment on the dependability of the railroad which has served the southern route for eight decades was eloquently made by W. L. Rasmussen, a ticket clerk for the Burlington-Northern Railroad in Missoula.

I remember:

The times Johnson-Bell Field was socked in with fog, for days at a time. No air service in or out of Missoula.

The passenger trains ran without any problems.

The times the interstate highway has been black ice east and west out of Missoula. The highway department put out warnings of danger for auto travel, and to stay off.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵"Railpax Plan In Montana - No. 3," Congressional Record, p. S4730.

The passenger trains ran without any problems.

The lady whose mother was dying and had to get to Seattle as soon as possible. She said the airline did not land; they had refunded her air ticket.

She got on the passenger train okay...³⁶

Summary

Amtrak recognized the need of the northern route due to the relative absence of alternate modes of public transportation along this route. This factor weighed significantly in its selection as part of the Basic System. As previously mentioned rail service is an essential service without which these communities could not exist. These people definitely need a good passenger train to compensate for their lack of first-rate public transportation. But southern Montana needs a good passenger train too.

The limited rail passenger structure could force Montanans into using less dependable forms of transportation. Much of the public transportation throughout Montana is inadequate or non-existent.

Train service is most likely to compete effectively with other transportation modes where it is competitive with bus transportation in terms of speed and comfort, and less costly than air transportation. Train service throughout Montana is essential. "Examination of bus and airline schedules on these traffic patterns proves the old saw, 'you can't get there from here.'"³⁷ The feasibility of long-haul service

³⁶ "Amtrak," Congressional Record, p. S5951.

³⁷ Ibid., p. S5948.

over the long run depends upon factors such as existing travel patterns and existing levels of air and bus transportation. In Montana, the lack of public transportation attests to the need for passenger train service.

Existing Railroad Facilities

The exacting criteria used to arrive at route selection included that of physical characteristics. The existing condition of track and roadway, particularly as it affected speed, safety, and future capital demands, is one of the main problems facing Amtrak. In the selection of intermediate points along the Chicago-Seattle segment, the existing facility criteria seems to be insignificant. If track and other facilities are not sufficient quality to permit continuing passenger service without major and immediate improvements, that particular route segment was eliminated.

Physical Facilities

Both routes through Montana are in the same physical condition and are maintained for the Burlington Northern's freight operations. The northern route is 646 miles in length. By comparison, the southern route is 755 miles long and one hour longer.³⁸ The northern route through Montana is the shortest and the least costly to maintain. Among the defenses for the Hi-Line route is that it will cut one hour

³⁸"Railroad Commission Seeks Present Service," Great Falls Tribune, March 27, 1971, p. 13.

off the trip between Chicago and Seattle (41 hours versus 42).³⁹ It had been hoped as minimal service, alternate day service on both routes would be provided. This was not unreasonable since the trackage on both lines must be maintained to handle freight service.

Speed of Service

Roadbeds have to be improved and made feasible for high speed trains. To gain public acceptance and evolve into a permanent, profit making organization, Amtrak's trains must have average origin-to-destination speed comparable with other modes. "While Amtrak can sell the virtues of rail convenience, comfort, and dependability, it must match or outdistance the automobile and bus in miles covered per hour of travel."⁴⁰ Amtrak is restricted to operate its trains at speeds required to be competitive. Hopefully, the railroads will cooperate in raising train speeds by maintaining and improving roadbeds and signaling systems. For the nation as a whole, the pre-Amtrak average speed of 48.8 miles per hour has increased by one-tenth of a mile per hour. The Chicago-Seattle run consisting of 4,478 round-trip miles has an average speed of 47.8 miles per hour.⁴¹

³⁹"Railpax Plan in Montana - No. 3," Congressional Record, p. S4731.

⁴⁰Edwin P. Patton, "Speed: Amtrak's Performance Indication and Sales Weapon." Passenger Train Journal, Vol. 4 No. 2 (Summer 1971), p. 13.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 16.

Another important gauge in measuring Amtrak's track condition was their on-time performance. Burlington Northern had a 61.1 percent on-time performance since May.⁴² Trains more than six minutes late are considered late, Burlington Northern's late trains were running an average of 76 minutes late.

Prior Track Maintenance

In the current confusion surrounding Amtrak, few have given the problem of track condition the attention it deserves. Nothing else Amtrak does to improve equipment, facilities, or employee attitudes will matter if its trains cannot travel safely, quickly and dependably between two points.

Deferred maintenance became standard operating procedure for many roads. Main lines deteriorated to where they looked like branch lines; branch lines disappeared under a sea of weeds and rust. By now, on many roads, the policy of deferring maintenance to train expenses has proved to yield only a short term gain.⁴³

In the long run, expensive things happen, like flaming derailments and sharply deteriorated service, driving passengers away. To compound that situation, many railroads simultaneously removed second tracks or sophisticated signaling systems in the name of economy and rationalization as passenger service declined.

⁴²"Amtrak On-Time Performance Between Basic System End Points," News from National Association of Railroad Passengers, Vol. 5, No. 11, (December, 1971), p. 1.

⁴³"Without Good Track, Where Is Amtrak?" Passenger Train Journal, Vol. 4, No. 3, (Fall, 1971), p. 4. (Hereinafter referred to as Without Good Track.)

This short term policy proved disasterous in the long run. In essence, railroads no longer have the capacity to run more than a handful of passenger trains on many inter-city routes at slower speeds. Many route options were discarded in the preliminary Amtrak system as track and other facilities were not of sufficient quality to permit continuance. This was the case in the rejection of the route segment between Billings and Shelby.

Track maintenance across the former Burlington-Northern routes in Montana has been adequate in the past. Modernization of the yard at Missoula was recently accomplished. In 1969, capital expenditures totaled \$82.6 million.⁴⁴ The projected track program for 1970 included 185.4 miles of new rail relay, 72.9 miles of secondhand rail relay, and major ballasting and new cross ties. What percentage of these improvements were made on passenger lines is unknown as Montana has 4,925 total miles of existing lines of which 1,401 miles are included in the Amtrak system.⁴⁵

Track Maintenance Under Amtrak

The area of track maintenance is one in which the Amtrak contract seems to be seriously deficient. Amtrak has no right to insist upon revision of what may be arbitrary

⁴⁴ Burlington Northern, Inc., Annual Report for the Year Ended, p. 5. (In 1970 the total expenditures were \$99,260,000, with \$75,627,000 allocated for new equipment and \$23,633,000 for road improvements.)

⁴⁵ Yearbook of Railroad Facts, p. 47.

railroad restrictions on speed and other matters relating to use of track. Amtrak must pay for necessary upgrading of tracks even though the existing state of maintenance is below accepted standard for freight operation.

The rail lines were to be maintained by railroads at not less than the level of utility existing on the date of the beginning of such use. Any additional maintenance of improvements will be at the sole expense of Amtrak. Amtrak has the right at its expense to require railroads to improve their lines provided that any such improvements will not unduly interfere with railroad freight operations. For the period from inception through June 30 1971, a total of \$1,035,000 was spent on maintenance of way and structures throughout the entire system.⁴⁶ Maintenance of way expenses through Fiscal Year 1973 are estimated at 22.9 million dollars.⁴⁷

Summary

Although the existing condition of railroad facilities, especially trackage, will play an important part in the future existence of Amtrak there is little indication that it was instrumental in the selection of the northern route over the southern route. However, until Amtrak can offer reasonable speed, on-time performance, and a reasonable level of comfort, it might be difficult to attract more than hard-core patrons.

⁴⁶ Annual Report, p. 33.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Profitability

The cost economics, the level and proportion of losses that were being experienced on existing routes and by individual trains operating over these routes, played an important part in route determination. Operating cost and revenues of each route and of the total system should be such that:

- a. no single service requirement will impose an undue burden on the Corporation as compared with each of the other points served, and
- b. the financial resources of the Corporation are sufficient to operate the total system.⁴⁸

Profitability Conflict

In the final analysis, routes were selected which had reasonable prospects of becoming financial self-supporting in the near future. Routes were excluded that would have a disproportionately adverse effect on the Corporation's finances in relationship to the benefits received. There is an apparent conflict between the "for profit" corporation concept and the Congressional mandate that it provide a truly national passenger system.

It is recognized that the Rail Passenger Service Act requires the establishment of a "for profit" Corporation, and that Corporation would be required to commence its operations with limited capital resources. Each service element considered for inclusion in the Basic System was weighed against candidates on the basis of financial implications.

⁴⁸Annual Report, p. I-3.

The challenge of turning around a badly deteriorated element of the transportation system was to hinge on a reduction of deficits. This was to be accomplished by the reduction of the number of trains to be operated and the number of routes in existence while retaining as much of the prior ridership as possible.

It was deemed essential that no route place undue financial burden on the Corporation. The Corporation must be solvent, and its ability to improve upon present levels of service must not be impaired as it must win new ridership from competing modes of transportation. "It is not believed that this application of profitability criterion is either unreasonable or beyond the importance assigned to it by Congress."⁴⁹

The ultimate success or failure of this venture should be judged on whether or not it provides modern, attractive passenger service on an acceptable cost-benefit basis, rather than on whether or not it earns a corporate profit. As mentioned, the prospect of Amtrak becoming a profitable operation is far in the future. Nevertheless, given determined management, proper organization, and adequate government financial support for capital improvements, especially for deferred maintenance, it is possible for Amtrak to eventually earn a profit. Hence retention of the "for profit" structure, for whatever it may contribute toward encouraging

⁴⁹Ibid., p. A-4.

a business-like, efficient, economical operation is beneficial.⁵⁰

Non-Profitable Routes

Amtrak must grapple with the realistic problem of providing adequate passenger train service over the numerous routes outside the "basic system" which simply do not have the potential of being self-sustaining, especially in the two year period Amtrak is required to run the basic system. Nevertheless, over many of these routes there may be a genuine need for train service. This need for service will be examined in the next section.

Montana, with its limited service provided in the basic system and the addition of the southern route on a temporary basis, does not have the potential for sufficient traffic volume for profitable operations in the immediate future. However, service by other modes of transportation has deteriorated greatly in recent years, and during the winter months is particularly undependable.

There may be great public need for a particular passenger train even if passenger revenue do not make the train possible. Rail service should not be discontinued, even though alternate forms of transportation are available, because in some areas of the country the railroad is the only means of transportation between rural communities. Although the railroads and the ICC continue to talk about declining demand

⁵⁰Hearings before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, Committee on Commerce/Statement of Anthony Haswell, Chairman, National Association of Railroad Passengers), 92nd Congress, 1st sess., April 28, 1971, p. 3.

for rail passenger service between cities, there are surveys to indicate that the demand is there, if only decent service is offered to the public.⁵¹

Operating Results Prior to Amtrak

Prior to the start of Amtrak, Burlington Northern (BN) and its predecessors, Great Northern, Northern Pacific and Burlington, operated high quality passenger service in Montana for many years. Yet in 1969, the Mainstreeter lost \$3.75 million on the basis of total solely related costs only.⁵² Total solely related passenger losses were \$38.2 million that year for BN components, and this figure would have been much higher in 1970. Solely related costs include fuel for passenger locomotives, wages for employees in passenger service, and maintenance of passenger equipment. No non-passenger costs are involved.

In that same year, the Empire Builder lost \$4 million, the Western Star lost \$2.75 million, and the North Coast Limited lost \$2.5 million.⁵³ These losses occurred despite long continued efforts by BN and its predecessors to provide good service and to operate good equipment on all runs.

1971 Operating Results By Train

A review of passenger bills received by Amtrak for the first three months of operations, plus estimates submitted by railroads for the remaining months of the year, indicate Amtrak

⁵¹Fellmeth, The Interstate Commerce Omission, p. 291.

⁵²Letter from John Willard, Regional Manager for Burlington Northern, Billings, Montana, September 29, 1971.

⁵³Ibid.

will incur substantial losses from passenger operations from all participating carriers.⁵⁴ (See Appendix E for details.)

Burlington Northern, in the period from May 1, 1971, through December 31, 1971, estimates revenues of \$8.8 million while expenses will run some \$16.2 million for a net loss of \$7.4 million. This is a ratio of expenses to revenues of 184 percent.⁵⁵

The breakdown requirement which allocates revenues and expenses by train does not present a fair statement of net income by train, since station expenses, certain station revenues and maintenance of way expenses are not allocated to trains. However, to provide some indication of profitability, revenues and expenses were allocated on a proportional basis for bills received in May and June.⁵⁶

Following is a summary of train net income and losses by point served for the month of May and June for Burlington Northern route segments in Montana (see Table 9). The Chicago, Twin Cities-Seattle loss for May, 1971, was \$785,803. On Train No. 31 serving these points, there was a revenue of \$193,166 while expenses were \$584,056 for a net loss of \$390,890. On Train No. 32, eastbound, revenues were \$177,859 with expenses of \$572,772 for a total loss of \$394,913. Trains No. 25 and 26 were not part of the Basic System and began temporary operation in June 1971.

⁵⁴Effectiveness of the Act, p. 29.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 30.

TABLE 9

BURLINGTON NORTHERN BILLINGS PER TRAIN

Train No.	Points Served	MAY		Profit or (Loss)
		Revenues	Expenses	
1	Chicago-San Francisco-Oakland	\$ 90,702	\$ 210,495	\$ (119,793)
2	" " "	85,017	214,933	(129,916)
101	" " "	26,070	79,366	(53,296)
102	" " "	32,094	73,984	(41,890)
31	Chicago-Twin Cities-Seattle	193,166	584,056	(390,890)
32	" " "	177,859	572,772	(394,913)
195	Seattle-Portland	6,013	28,576	(22,563)
196	" " "	6,116	30,246	(24,130)
198	" " "	4,369	27,345	(22,976)
199	" " "	5,746	27,142	(21,396)
11	Seattle-San Francisco-Oakland-San Diego	4,386	13,829	(9,443)
12	" " "	4,619	13,001	(8,382)
25	Chicago-Twin Cities-Seattle	-	-	-
26	" " "	-	-	-
	Puget Sound Special	-	-	-
		\$636,157	\$1,875,745	\$(1,239,588)

Train No.	Points Served	JUNE		Profit or (Loss)
		Revenues	Expenses	
1	Chicago-San Francisco-Oakland	\$ 185,039	\$ 226,342	\$ (41,303)
2	" " "	144,933	223,983	(79,050)
101	" " "	71,427	81,434	(10,007)
102	" " "	62,069	78,244	(16,175)
31	Chicago-Twin Cities-Seattle	427,078	622,506	(195,428)
32	" " "	416,944	600,174	(183,230)
195	Seattle-Portland	6,404	32,564	(26,160)
196	" "	7,384	32,647	(25,263)
198	" "	12,934	29,960	(17,026)
199	" "	11,979	29,501	(17,522)
11	Seattle-San Francisco-Oakland-San Diego	9,565	14,117	(4,552)
12	" "	10,090	14,006	(3,916)
25	Chicago-Twin Cities-Seattle	42,778	86,910	(44,132)
26	" " "	37,907	75,475	(37,568)
	Puget Sound Special	3,548	1,902	(1,646)
		\$1,450,079	\$2,149,765	\$ (699,686)

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Source: The Interstate Commerce Commission, Report to the President and the Congress, Amtrak - State of Rail Passenger Service - Effectiveness of the Act, Appendix M, p. 2.

In June on Train No. 31, the Empire Builder, revenues were \$427,078 with expenses of \$622,506 for a loss of \$195,428. On Train No. 32 revenues were \$416,944 while expenses were \$600,174 for a loss of \$183,230. On the southern route Train No. 25 had revenues of \$42,778 with expenses of \$86,910 for a loss of \$44,132. Train No. 26 had revenues of \$37,907 with expenses of \$75,475 for a loss of \$37,568. On an estimated summary of railroad billing for 1971 (nine months) Burlington Northern will have revenues of \$8,791,236 with expenses of \$16,182,110 for a net loss of \$7,390,874. Trains operated over long distances incurred the greatest losses and Burlington Northern generally utilized less than 50 percent of capacity routes.

Amtrak's Chicago-Seattle Corridor which traverses Montana is producing only two-thirds of the revenue needed to meet expenses, according to the National Association of Railroad Passengers (see Appendix G). This run, which goes over Burlington Northern tracks, rates seventh among twenty-four in this respect.

Frequency of Operation

Operation of a daily train over both the northern and southern routes might be an excessive burden on the corporation. Eventually this route should be able to support daily service. Three days weekly service does not satisfy the requirement for daily service.⁵⁷

⁵⁷Appendix A, Question 13.

As a minimum, service should be provided to serve communities on both the Great Northern and Northern Pacific, on alternate day basis, providing reasonable service between Chicago and Seattle. This plan was voiced by Senators Mansfield and Metcalf of Montana, the ICC, the National Railroad Passenger Association and others. The alternate plan would provide at least partial service to people in five major cities of Montana. Cost of this service has been estimated at \$800,000 per year. Mr. Anthony Haswell, Chairman of National Association of Railroad Passenger (NARP) commented:

I am told that the additional cost to Amtrak of providing alternate day service between Fargo and Spokane on both the Great Northern and Northern Pacific is only \$800,000 per year. This seems a bargain price for continued service on the Northern Pacific route, which has considerably more population than the Great Northern route now slated for daily service.⁵⁸

Summary

The degree to which profitability was considered in selecting routes for the basic system is seen. It is conceded that this application of the profitability criterion is not unreasonable or beyond the importance assigned to it by Congress. There is little doubt that much of the existing rail passenger profitability service in Montana prior to Amtrak was uneconomical and not required as part of a total transportation system. However, there may be a great

⁵⁸Hearing before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, p. 9.

public need for a particular passenger train even if passenger revenues do not make the train profitable.

The Need for Service

The criteria of need was not included as one of the five basic criteria used to arrive at route selection decisions. However, it was an important factor in the final route selection of the northern route in Montana. Need is defined as a condition in which there is a deficiency of some thing, in the case of Montana this deficiency is a lack of passenger train service.

Public Convenience and Necessity

In this section, need will be primarily discussed with relationship to public convenience and necessity. The main question is whether or not there are passenger trains that should be kept running in the public interest though they continue to lose money.⁵⁹ The public policy obligation must be viewed in its entirety and not merely as an obligation, under the guise of "public convenience and necessity", to a diminishing number of rail passengers. Amtrak has an obligation to the public to provide useful passenger service. The factors that must be evaluated in each case are whether the value or need to the public is sufficient to justify the imposition of the loss incurred in providing it, with relation to the overall financial condition of Amtrak. Under the Transportation Act of 1920, the ICC was given power over

⁵⁹Twenty Questions and 19 Answers, p. 3.

rail abandonments as follows:

No carrier by railroad subject to the chapter shall abandon all or any portion, or operation thereof, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity permit such an abandonment.⁶⁰

In essence, continued operation is required by public convenience and necessity unless it will unduly burden the interstate commerce.⁶¹ Control over abandonment was for the purpose of protecting the communities which were dependent upon particular railroads. "Public convenience and necessity requires a balancing of interests between the carrier's losses from the line as a burden on its interstate rail systems with the local public need for continued service."⁶² The public interest does not just mean those who use the service but the entire public. Inconvenience to users is insufficient ground to order continued service; proof of public need does not mean convenience of a few persons who wish to continue riding trains as distinguished from the general public necessity that would require continued train service.⁶³ In reality, there is no definable method for weighing losses against public need and the public convenience

⁶⁰ Michael Conant, Railroads Mergers and Abandonments, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 119.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 124.

⁶² Ibid., p. 119.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 141.

and necessity policy is also vague. Yet it is the only applicable standard available to measure the needs of Montana for rail passenger service.

Prior to Amtrak's initiation of rail passenger service, discontinuance of trains were made under Section 13(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act unless the ICC finds that the service is required by "public convenience and necessity." "What this section ignored is that fact that there may be a great public need for a particular train even if passenger revenues do not make the train profitable."⁶⁴ If Amtrak is to provide adequate service to the public, there are likely to be some operations or service that are not profitable by themselves.

Summary

The first sentence of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 declares that the nation must not only be served by a modern efficient, intercity railroad passenger service but that the "public convenience and necessity require the continuance and improvement of such service."⁶⁵ In designating the Basic System, many routes were discontinued, restructured, and reorganized. In the process, little attention seems to have been given to public convenience and necessity. Where unsubstantial use and little public support for the passenger train is shown, no public necessity will be shown even though

⁶⁴Fellmeth, The Interstate Commerce Omission, p. 286.

⁶⁵Annual Report, Appendix A, p. 1.

some of the towns have no other common-carrier passenger service. However, the facts presented in this paper indicate that there is a definite and substantial public need for the service.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Since the basic criteria were covered in detail in Chapter V, a thorough re-examination of each route alternative is unnecessary. However, factors not included previously will be added to substantiate data when necessary.

A comparison of the two alternative routes shows that the physical characteristics of both routes are nearly equal, with comparable running time and signal systems, but that the northern route has a slight mileage advantage. The population along the southern route is more than 50 percent greater than that for the northern route; however, past ridership is relatively greater throughout the northern transcontinental route. However, when comparing both routes throughout Montana only, the southern route has a substantial advantage. The northern route through Montana was chosen as part of the basic system despite the population advantage along the southern route, largely because of the absence of alternate modes of transportation along the northern route. Southern Montana has more public transportation but these facilities are far from adequate.

Many trains had to be discontinued in an attempt to revive and modernize rail passenger service. One of these

routes was the southern route through Montana. As route selection throughout Montana was difficult the southern route provided a logical area to initiate experimental service. Evidence that a substantial volume of travel on existing trains, population and the inadequacy of service by other modes were significant factors to consider in efforts to maintain previous service along this route.

Given a reasonably high level of demand between any given points, the public is entitled to a choice of modes including trains. In the past, service along the southern route has been excellent. In 1969, 354,615 passengers were generated along this route. The remaining pair, the Empire Builder and the North Coast Limited, should attract additional riders from the discontinued trains. If a substantial number of passengers from the discontinued Mainstreeter and Western Star are transferred to the remaining pair, they should greatly increase ridership and lower the losses incurred by all four transcontinental trains in 1969.

Certainly, with time and effort, a market could no doubt be developed on a route which would support at least a limited service. In the event alternate day service is adopted, additional procedures should be incorporated during the summer months. Daily service is necessary on both routes to handle the summer influx of passengers to both Glacier National Park and Yellowstone National Park. Increased train service during this period is essential. Southern Montana

was a well traveled line, with great traffic potential. An aggressive Amtrak promotion and improvement campaign would likely increase ridership more quickly in this potential area; however, it cannot be accomplished by the deadline of September 15, 1972. Far too much stress has been placed on early profit, which will not materialize in the near future. The present time period is too short to enable an adequate test to be made. If no improvement on passenger service can be shown there is little hope of generating traffic to compete with other modes. But it will take time and capital to reverse decades of neglect and mismanagement. With good scheduling, good operation and fast service, this passenger train will be retained and profits made.¹

One of the factors used in determining service potential included feasibility and costs of providing the necessary quality of rail service between given points so as to attract an adequate volume of travel. Both of these criteria support the retention of service. In the past, the majority of train discontinuances were granted because of substantial losses and no reasonable prospect for future profitability. Under Amtrak if decent service can be provided there will eventually be profits. Testimony clearly shows that the downgrading of service, difficulty of obtaining information on tickets, and lack of promotion could not help but contribute to a loss of passengers using the service of the railroad.

¹Appendix A, Question 18.

Continued service on the southern route is essential and should be maintained despite losses. It would be disastrous to kill off this promising route before a true market test can be carried out. A vast and important area of Montana will be deprived of much needed rail service. Two years before Amtrak can start discontinuing its trains is far too little time to develop profitability. If passenger revenues and carrier costs alone were determinative, there would be a serious question as to whether a basic system of any kind could be sustained.

Alternate modes of public transportation were a major factor in route selection throughout Montana. Despite various advantages of the southern route, the lack of alternate modes along the northern route was a key factor in its selection. The southern route was said to be served by an interstate highway and good air service. However, the reduction of bus service and the limited air transportation make public transportation inadequate or non-existent in many areas. In these cases rail has proven to be a reliable means of transportation. The use made by the public of the service sought to be discontinued and the lack of other means of transportation attest to the need of rail passenger service. Taking into consideration the economic impact on the communities, the number of passengers still utilizing the trains, and the lack of adequate alternative

transportation, the need for continuance of the trains is shown to be required.²

Support for the goal of making trains worth traveling again has been expressed as a national need from the highest levels of government. A start has been made toward achieving intercity rail passenger services that will be an essential part of a balanced national transportation system. This route clearly belongs in a truly national system. To prevent Amtrak from embarking on a mass passenger train discontinuance, these remaining routes must be given time to develop patronage. Otherwise all that will have been accomplished is to have given the railroads a vehicle for massive discontinuation which avoids the traditional process of filing for applications for discontinuance with the ICC.

The plan has been variously appraised as being any number of things ranging from a "bright promise for a glorious rebirth" to "a clever continuance for an ignominious demise."³ Whatever the future may produce, the plan and the system should be utilized, at the very least, as a real test of whether good passenger train service can attract and sustain sufficient ridership to compete with other modes of travel on a self-sustaining basis. To make the trains worth

²During the period August 24, 1971 through November 28, 1972, check-point ridership points were used to provide the preliminary data base by which to determine levels of usage. The check-point along the southern route, Billings, had a total of 4,022 passengers.

³Effectiveness of the Act, Appendix I, p. 10.

riding again, much improvement needs to be made. Until this first step is made substantial operating losses should be anticipated for many years. The plan is a beginning from which a renewed interest in patronage throughout Montana can be achieved. "Who needs the railroads? You do. We all do."⁴ In the future intercity rail passenger service in Montana can be a highly efficient alternate mode of transportation serving both the busy population corridors in southern Montana and a burgeoning leisure market to areas such as Yellowstone and Glacier National Parks. To accomplish efficient transportation, the southern route must be maintained.

Recommendations for Further Research

This study has identified some areas that could provide the basis for further investigation. The first of these is that a major study as to the public needs for surface transportation is urgently needed. The study should not be limited to the need for passenger trains alone, but should investigate the need for ground transportation in general. While it is being conducted, there ought to be a moratorium on any passenger train discontinuances by Amtrak, so that when the report is released a viable system may still be in operation. Amtrak lacks the resources to make an adequate evaluation of intercity rail passenger service, let

⁴Popular television commercial by the chief spokesman for the American Association of Railroads, Wally Schirra.

alone a major surface transportation study. Authorization to conduct such a study and report, as well as the financing, should come from Congress.

A survey of Amtrak's financial structure could be carried out immediately as substantial additional funds are needed for present and future operations. Substantial operating losses can be expected for many years. Amtrak is substantially under-financed and improvements cannot be accomplished within the framework of the existing corporate financial structure. Insufficient funding was a major defect in the program from the beginning.

Finally, a study could be undertaken to determine if increased service on existing routes or additional experimental routes should be established. The proposed basic system does not include a north-south service between Salt Lake City and Butte or north-south connections between Great Falls and the transcontinental routes. In view of the desperate financial conditions of state and local governments, the requirement that they come up with two-thirds of the losses needs to be re-evaluated.

APPENDIX A

THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND RESULTS

APPENDIX A

The Questionnaire

Prior to constructing the questionnaire used in this study, various literature was researched to determine the significant factors to include in a survey of railroad usage and trends for the future.

A preliminary set of questions was formulated, using accepted format designed to insure maximum response from the sample population. The resulting set of questions was then pre-tested on 50 Montana residents selected at random. The survey used a table of random digits and arbitrarily chose one five-digit group of random digits to determine an essentially random starting point for selecting the 285 names.

Where difficulty was found in understanding the question or directions, changes were made to improve clarity. Minor changes were made in two questions while a third question was added to expand the data base.

The final set of questions was then screened for relevance and the questionnaire checked for minimum length for a more favorable response and cost savings. A cover letter was designed to give those surveyed a quick overview of the intent and hopefully motivate the recipient to return the questionnaire. The final form of the questionnaire and the cover letter has been attached at the end of Appendix A.

In April, 1972, the final questionnaires were mailed to a random sample of Montana residents throughout the state. The initial random sample was obtained from the 1970 and 1971 telephone directories of various cities throughout the state. Some random list was obtained primarily through telephone directories. It is possible that obtaining names through the telephone directory could have biased the results somewhat. To attempt to correct this situation, 50 questionnaires were sent to the University of Montana at Missoula and 25 surveys were obtained from the May 1969 voter registration list. It would appear that the method used would not bias the results to any significant degree. A total of 285 names were selected and sent questionnaires.

A total of two questionnaires were returned because the people had either moved or died. It was determined that 283 people received the questionnaires. There were 190 fully completed questionnaires, six partially answered or modified returns. A total of 196 questionnaires were returned with timely and usable replies for a valid return rate of sixty-nine percent.

PRESENTATION OF THE SURVEY DATA

Analysis of the Answers to Each Question

The following is an analysis of the results of the survey. The fully completed questionnaires will be discussed question by question. Each question will be stated, the results of each question will be listed, and a brief analysis of the results will be given.

Question 1: What age group are you in?

18-30	64	33%
31-50	59	30%
51-64	44	22%
64 and over	28	14%
unanswered	$\frac{1}{196}$	$\frac{1\%}{100\%}$

These results indicate that a population of each age group was surveyed. The most respondents--64 (33% of 196)--were in the 18-30 age group. The 65 and over group had fourteen percent of all respondents, included were 11 percent retirees. Only 22 percent of all respondents were persons in the 51-64 age group. These data will later test the hypothesis that only aged persons whose alternative uses of time are negligible, are likely to use rail service. Additional data taken in a 1969 federal survey indicated one-third of train riders were between twenty-one and thirty-five, another third between thirty-six and fifty.

Question 2: What is the range that best represents your income level?

Under \$3,000	31	16%
\$3,000-\$4,999	21	10%
\$5,000-\$7,499	25	13%
\$7,500-\$9,999	29	15%
\$10,000-\$14,999	50	26%
\$15,000-\$24,999	31	16%
Over \$25,000	5	2%
Unanswered	<u>4</u>	<u>2%</u>
	196	100%

These results indicate that a population of each income group was included to make a determination of the statement that the higher a man's income becomes the more likely he is to convert from rail to air. The \$10,000 to \$14,999 income group includes the largest number of 26 percent. A larger sample and further testing would add more credibility to the implication that train service is not limited to the lower income groups. The over \$25,000 income group has the lowest number of respondents.

Question 3: What is your occupation?

Professional or Managerial	61	31%
Clerical or Sales	13	6%
Craftsman or Laborer	21	10%
Student	37	19%
Other	16	9%
Military	3	2%
Government	6	3%
Farmer	14	7%
Retired	22	11%
Housewife	<u>6</u>	<u>3%</u>
	199	100%

The results of this survey indicate that the largest percent of respondents were professional or managerial people with 31 percent, this is followed by 19 percent of respondents in the student group. The largest category of train users were business or managerial personnel with 35 percent. The next largest group was students with 16 percent closely followed by retirees with 14 percent.

Question 4: Have you ridden on a train in Montana during the past five years?

Yes	91	46%
No	<u>105</u>	<u>54%</u>
	196	100%

These results indicate the percent of respondents who have recently traveled by train in Montana. National data indicate that one percent of intercity travel was by train, yet 46 percent of respondents indicated they utilized passenger train service. Breakdown of ridership indicates 29 percent of train riders are in the 31-50 age groups. This compares favorably with national data. Twenty-five percent are in the 18-30 age group. These statistics dispel past ridership data which stated only the aged and the poor will ride the trains. The \$15,000-\$24,999 group had the largest number of train riders, 23 percent. These data compare favorably with recent surveys which indicated one-third of train riders were between twenty-one and thirty-five, another third between thirty-six and fifty.

Question 5: Frequency of trips during five year period, if Question 4 is answered yes.

1	21	23%
2-5	48	53%
6-9	15	16%
10 or more	<u>7</u>	<u>8%</u>
	91	100%

These results indicate that a substantial number of respondents utilize the trains on a recurring basis. Fifty-three percent of train riders answering the questionnaire rode the trains between 2 and 5 times. Seventy-seven percent of train users used the trains on a recurring basis.

Question 6: Reasons for selection of railroad over other modes of transportation.

Cost	45	17%
Comfort	31	11%
Safety	30	11%
Speed	9	3%
Convenience	19	7%
Relaxation	42	15%
Roominess	11	4%
Dependability	53	20%
Sightseeing	19	7%
Other	<u>13</u>	<u>5%</u>
	272	100%

National data indicated that train advantages such as safety, speed, dependability, economy and relaxation are the most prevalent factors in rail selection. The survey results verify this data in the case of economy and relaxation. This question was open ended to allow respondents to

list more than one selection if desired. Many respondents who did not utilize train service made selections indicating these were reasons why they might use train service.

Question 7: In what capacity do you travel most often?

Business	64	31%
Pleasure	86	42%
Personal	53	26%
Other	<u>3</u>	<u>3%</u>
	206	100%

The results indicate that most people travel for reasons of pleasure, 42 percent; followed by business with 31 percent. Businessmen in this survey, as a whole, preferred air travel, however, train ridership for business reasons was much higher than indicated in national data. Among train users, 37 percent indicated they traveled most often for business reasons.

Question 8: If you had to make a trip for any reason for a certain distance indicate your selected mode.

	<u>0-99</u>		<u>100-499</u>		<u>500-999</u>		<u>over 1,000</u>	
Automobile	158	94%	131	72%	58	32%	26	15%
Plane	1	1%	18	10%	79	44%	131	74%
Train	6	4%	27	15%	41	23%	19	11%
Bus	<u>3</u>	<u>1%</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>3%</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1%</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0%</u>
	168	100%	181	100%	181	100%	176	100%

The results of the questionnaire compare favorably with the results of national data. This question indicates that the automobile is by far the most popular mode of transportation, especially in the short distances (0-499 miles).

Ninety-four percent of the respondents indicated they preferred the automobile, the train was the next with four percent. The rather strange share for buses does not make complete sense. Buses have their largest market share at 200 to 500 miles. The automobile was the most popular mode primarily due to its convenience and flexibility upon arrival at destination. The train was most popular in 500-999 mile distance with 23 percent. At the 100-499 mile distance the railroad had 15 percent. Airplanes had 44 percent in the 500-999 mile range and increased its leadership to 74 percent over 1,000 miles of distance. Surprisingly the railroad had 11 percent in the over 1,000 mile distance.

Question 9: What mode of transportation do you prefer? Why?

Car	103	49%
Train	30	14%
Bus	0	0%
Airplane	<u>79</u>	<u>37%</u>
	212	100%

The results indicate that forty-nine percent prefer the automobile. The automobiles convenience and flexibility upon arrival at destination make it immensely popular. This was listed as the primary reason for selection of the automobile. Thirty-seven percent preferred the airplane, mainly because of speed. The automobile's predominance is primarily in the short distances (0-499 miles). Some respondents indicated their preference for more than one mode.

Question 10: Do you feel there is a need for passenger train service in Montana?

Yes	174	89%
No	20	10%
Unanswered	<u>2</u>	<u>1%</u>
	196	100%

This question indicated that Montana residents overwhelmingly feel there is a need for passenger train service in Montana. Eighty-nine percent of all respondents indicated there is a need for rail passenger service. Ninety-six percent of train users indicated there was a need for passenger train service.

Question 11: Do you know what Amtrak is?

Yes	180	92%
No	13	7%
Unanswered	<u>3</u>	<u>1%</u>
	196	100%

This question indicates that 92 percent of the respondents know what Amtrak is. These results were expected as publicity was heavy before and after route selections.

Question 12: Do you know where the southern and northern routes run throughout Montana?

Yes	151	77%
No	37	19%
Unanswered	<u>8</u>	<u>4%</u>
	196	100%

The results of this question indicate that twenty-three percent of the respondents were unfamiliar with the

route structure throughout Montana. Most of the respondents indicated they were familiar with the routes situated where they resided so these results were tabulated as positive answers.

Question 13: Do you feel the present transcontinental route structure in Montana is adequate, if not explain why?

Yes	101	51%
No	69	35%
Unanswered	<u>26</u>	<u>14%</u>
	196	100%

The results indicate that 35 percent of respondents felt that route structure was inadequate. This question had the highest unanswered percent, (14%). The reasons for this were the unfamiliarity of routes, indicated in Question 12, and the high number of respondents who were familiar only with the route that served their area. The respondents who felt route structure was inadequate indicated the alternate day service on the southern route and the lack of north-south service as the primary reasons for their response.

Question 14: Do you feel that daily rail service on the northern (Hi-Line) route and 3 day-a-week service on the southern line is adequate?

Yes	97	49%
No	79	40%
Unanswered	<u>20</u>	<u>11%</u>
	196	100%

The results of this question indicate that 40 percent of the respondents believe that frequency of service is adequate. The question is a restatement of Question 13 but is more to the point. Respondents who believe service is not frequent enough increased by five percent. Primary reason given for inadequacy of service was the lack of daily service.

Question 15: Do you know where you can board Amtrak trains?

Yes	140	71%
No	52	27%
Unanswered	<u>4</u>	<u>2%</u>
	196	100%

The results indicate that 27 percent of the respondents do not know where to board Amtrak trains. Among train users 19 percent indicated they did not know where to board trains. Promotional activity on the part of Amtrak can do much to alleviate this problem.

Question 16: Do you feel that there are passenger trains that should be kept running in the public interest even though they lose money?

Yes	113	57%
No	72	38%
Unanswered	<u>11</u>	<u>5%</u>
	196	100%

Fifty-seven percent of the respondents indicated they were in favor of keeping the trains running despite losses. Sixty-nine percent of train users were in favor

of retention of service even though the trains lose money. A total of 72 respondents, 38 percent felt that trains should pay their own way.

Question 17: Amtrak may initiate service outside the basic system or expand the system if the state or regional authority requests the extension and is willing to pay two-thirds of the losses.

Do you think the State of Montana should pay two-thirds of losses in order to keep on temporary southern routes or initiate additional service?

Yes	44	22%
No	136	69%
Unanswered	<u>16</u>	<u>9%</u>
	196	100%

The results of this question indicate the Montana residents would not support the maintenance of the present service or future extension if the State had to pay two-thirds of the losses. Sixty-nine percent of the respondents were against supporting the system on this basis. Among train users 66 percent were against the state providing two-thirds of the losses to maintain service. In view of the desperate financial condition of state and local governments, this requirement is wholly unrealistic. Perhaps states would be willing to contribute a reasonable portion of any losses associated with such services.

Question 18: If Amtrak were to provide modern, efficient, intercity rail service, would you ride the trains?

Yes	144	73%
No	36	18%
Unanswered	<u>16</u>	<u>9%</u>
	196	100%

The results of this question indicate that the demand is there--if only decent service is offered to the public. For example, the survey of Montana residents showed that 73 percent of the respondents believe that frequent, reliable, clear, fast, and modern service throughout Montana would produce greater patronage. Eighty-three percent of train users said they would continue to use the train if decent service is provided.

Dear Sir:

I am a student at the University of Montana's Graduate School of Business. The attached questionnaire is part of my research study which is a partial requirement for a Master's degree in Business Administration at the University of Montana.

The study will attempt to determine if a need exists for the current passenger train route structure in Montana. Would you please complete the accompanying questionnaire and return it to me as soon as possible in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope. I must stress that because of financial constraints the sample size is small and each returned questionnaire is extremely important to the project. As I have no way to connect you with your answers, your identity will remain anonymous.

Thank you very much for your help and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Angelo R. Zigrino

ARZ:bks

Attachments: 2

Enclosure

SURVEY QUESTIONS

1. What age group are you in?

18-30

51-64

31-50

65 and over

2. What is the range that best represents your income level?

Under \$3,000

\$10,000 - \$14,999

\$3,000 - \$4,999

\$15,000 - \$24,999

\$5,000 - \$7,499

Over \$25,000

\$7,500 - \$9,999

3. What is your occupation?

Professional or Managerial

Military

Clerical or Sales

Government

Craftsman or Laborer

Farmer

Student

Retired

Other

Housewife

4. Have you ridden on a train in Montana during the past five years?

Yes

No

5. Frequency of trips during five year period, if Question 4 is answered yes.

1

6 - 9

2 - 5

10 or more

6. Reasons for selection of railroad over other modes of transportation.

Cost

Safety

Relaxation

Speed

Sightseeing

Convenience

Comfort

Dependability

Roominess

Other

7. In what capacity do you travel most often?

_____ Business _____ Personal

_____ Pleasure _____ Other

Please indicate if Other _____

8. If you had to make a trip for any reason for a certain distance indicate your selected mode of travel.

	<u>0-99</u> <u>miles</u>	<u>100-499</u> <u>miles</u>	<u>500-999</u> <u>miles</u>	<u>over</u> <u>miles</u>
Automobile	_____	_____	_____	_____
Plane	_____	_____	_____	_____
Train	_____	_____	_____	_____
Bus	_____	_____	_____	_____

9. What mode of transportation do you prefer? Why?

_____ Car _____ Bus

_____ Train _____ Airplane

10. Do you feel there is a need for passenger train service in Montana?

_____ Yes _____ No

11. Do you know what Amtrak is?

_____ Yes _____ No

12. Do you know where the southern and northern routes run throughout Montana?

_____ Yes _____ No

13. Do you feel the present transcontinental route structure in Montana is adequate, if not explain why.

_____ Yes _____ No

Why: _____

APPENDIX B

TRAIN DISCONTINUANCES

APPENDIX B

Train Discontinuances

<u>Carrier</u>	<u>Passenger Trains Operated</u>	
	<u>April 30, 1971</u>	<u>May 1, 1971</u>
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad	48	10
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad	18	2
Burlington Northern, Inc.	46	14
Canadian Pacific (CP-Rail)	2	2*
Central of Georgia Railroad	4	0
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway	18	4
Chicago and North Western Railway	13	0
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad	17	8
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad	4	4*
Delaware and Hudson Railway	4	0
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad	4	4*
Georgia Railroad	2	2*
Grand Trunk Western Railroad	6	0
Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad	6	4
Illinois Central Railroad	18	6
Louisville and Nashville Railroad	20	2
Missouri Pacific Railroad	6	2
Norfolk and Western Railway	8	0
Northwestern Pacific Railroad	2	0
Penn Central Transportation Company	201	141
Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad	14	8
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad	32	12
Southern Railway	8	8*
Southern Pacific Transportation Company	14	8
Union Pacific Railroad	32	2
TOTAL	<u>547</u>	<u>243</u>

*Non-Amtrak

Source: The Interstate Commerce Commission, Report to the President and the Congress, Amtrak - State of Rail Passenger Service--Effectiveness of the Act (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 9.

APPENDIX C

BUY-IN FEES FROM PARTICIPATING RAILROADS

APPENDIX C

AMTRAK

Buy in Fees From Participating Railroads 50% of

<u>Railroad</u>	<u>Total Buy in Fee</u>	<u>Monthly Payment Due (a)</u>	<u>Payments Received May 1 to September 30, 1971</u>
1. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry.	\$21,053,773	\$584,830	\$3,508,980
2. Burlington Northern, Inc.	33,447,191	929,090	4,645,450
3. Central of Georgia Railway	1,194,026	33,170	165,850
4. The Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R.R.	5,943,074	165,090	825,450
5. Delaware and Hudson Railway Co.	325,064	9,030	9,030 (b)
6. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio R.R. Co.	2,243,750	62,330	311,650
7. Illinois Central R.R. Co.	8,666,420	240,730	1,203,650
8. Louisville and Nashville Railway Co.	5,975,176	165,980	829,900
9. Missouri - Pacific Railway Co.	2,492,477	69,240	346,200
10. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co.	5,825,348	161,820	809,100
11. Northern Pacific Railway Co.	31,896	890	4,450
12. Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac R.R. Co.	1,689,674	46,940	234,700
13. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co.	16,091,306	446,980	2,234,900
14. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.	9,259,225	257,200	1,286,000
15. Union Pacific R.R. Co.	18,770,738	521,410	3,128,460
16. Chicago and North Western R.R. Co.	126,638	3,520	17,600
17. Baltimore and Ohio Railway Co.	4,840,061	134,450	672,250
18. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co.	4,652,651	129,240	646,200
19. Grand Trunk Western Railway Co.	2,084,564	57,900	289,500
20. Penn Central Transportation Co.	<u>52,382,109</u>	<u>1,455,060</u>	<u>7,275,300</u>
Total	<u>\$197,095,161</u>	<u>\$5,474,900</u>	<u>\$28,444,620</u>

NOTES:

(a) Monthly payments shown are rounded to the nearest \$10.00.

(b) Contract price is under discussion, the railroad, after making one payment, has now decided that no payments are due on the basis of using alternate per centum of avoidable losses as provided in Section 401 of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970.

Source: The Interstate Commerce Commission, Report to the President and the Congress, Amtrak - State of Rail Passenger Service--Effectiveness of the Act (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), Appendix E.

Railroad's 1969 Fully Distributed Rail Passenger Loss

Oct. 1 to December 31, 1971	Payments To Be Received		
	Year 1972	Year 1973	First Four Months 1974
\$1,169,660	\$7,017,960	\$7,017,960	\$2,339,213
2,787,270	11,149,080	11,149,080	3,716,311
99,510	398,040	398,040	132,586
495,270	1,981,080	1,981,080	660,194
63,194 (b)	108,360 (b)	108,360 (b)	36,120 (b)
186,990	747,960	747,960	249,190
722,190	2,888,760	2,888,760	963,060
497,940	1,991,760	1,991,760	663,816
207,720	830,880	830,880	276,797
485,460	1,941,840	1,941,840	647,108
2,670	10,680	10,680	3,416
140,820	563,280	563,280	187,594
1,340,940	5,363,760	5,363,760	1,787,946
771,600	3,086,400	3,086,400	1,028,825
1,042,820	6,256,920	6,256,920	2,085,618
10,560	42,240	42,240	13,998
403,350	1,613,400	1,613,400	537,661
387,720	1,550,880	1,550,880	516,971
173,700	694,800	694,800	231,764
<u>4,365,180</u>	<u>17,460,720</u>	<u>17,460,720</u>	<u>5,820,189</u>
<u>\$15,354,564</u>	<u>\$65,698,800</u>	<u>\$65,698,800</u>	<u>\$21,898,377</u>

APPENDIX D

OPERATING RESULTS BY RAILROADS

APPENDIX D

Operating Results by Railroads

<u>Carrier</u>	<u>From May 1, 1971 through December 31, 1971</u>			Ratio of Expenses to Revenues
	<u>Revenues</u>	<u>Expenses</u>	<u>Net Loss</u>	
The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe	\$13.4	\$ 23.7	\$10.3	180%
Burlington Northern	8.8	16.2	7.4	184%
Baltimore & Ohio, Chesapeake & Ohio	.6	3.1	2.5	517%
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific	1.9	3.9	2.0	205%
Gulf, Mobile & Ohio	.8	3.3	2.5	413%
Illinois Central	4.1	7.7	3.6	188%
Louisville & Nashville	.6	1.3	.7	216%
Missouri Pacific	.1	1.1	1.0	1100%
Penn Central Transp.	48.9	76.1	27.2	155%
Richmond, Fredericks- burg & Potomac	1.7	2.4	.7	141%
Seaboard Coast Line	9.9	26.0	16.1	263%
Southern Pacific	5.3	9.9	4.6	187%
Union Pacific	<u>.5</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>.7</u>	<u>240%</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$96.6</u>	<u>\$175.9</u>	<u>\$79.3</u>	<u>182%</u>

Source: The Interstate Commerce Commission, Report to the President and the Congress, Amtrak - State of Rail Passenger Service--Effectiveness of the Act (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 29.

APPENDIX E

SUMMARY OF RAILROAD BILLINGS YEAR 1971

APPENDIX E

AMTRAK
Summary of Railroad Billings Year 1971

	May	June	July	August
The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe				
Revenues	\$1,191,036	\$2,058,940	\$2,579,800	\$2,582,200
Expenses	<u>3,092,625</u>	<u>3,324,524</u>	<u>3,286,600</u>	<u>3,070,300</u>
Net Bill	<u>\$1,901,589</u>	<u>\$1,265,584</u>	<u>\$ 706,800*</u>	<u>\$ 488,100*</u>
Burlington Northern				
Revenues	\$ 636,157	\$1,450,079	\$1,681,750	\$1,744,650
Expenses	<u>1,875,745</u>	<u>2,149,765</u>	<u>2,123,200</u>	<u>2,068,300</u>
Net Bill	<u>\$1,239,588</u>	<u>\$ 699,686</u>	<u>\$ 441,450*</u>	<u>\$ 323,650*</u>
Baltimore & Ohio & Chesapeake & Ohio				
Revenues	\$ 56,092	\$ 72,514	\$ 89,200	\$ 89,200
Expenses	<u>327,807</u>	<u>367,202</u>	<u>405,900</u>	<u>402,300</u>
Net Bill	<u>\$271,715</u>	<u>\$294,688</u>	<u>\$316,700*</u>	<u>\$313,100*</u>
The Chicago Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific				
Revenues	\$163,719	\$279,491	\$382,410	\$291,800
Expenses	<u>530,996</u>	<u>504,577</u>	<u>547,153</u>	<u>488,000</u>
Net Bill	<u>\$367,277</u>	<u>\$225,086</u>	<u>\$164,743</u>	<u>\$196,200*</u>
Gulf, Mobile & Ohio				
Revenues	\$107,398	\$128,144	\$116,300	\$119,300
Expenses	<u>363,653</u>	<u>384,602</u>	<u>431,000</u>	<u>422,650</u>
Net Bill	<u>\$256,255</u>	<u>\$256,458</u>	<u>\$314,700*</u>	<u>\$303,350*</u>
Illinois Central				
Revenues	\$416,892	\$ 448,998	\$ 644,286	\$527,533
Expenses	<u>853,237</u>	<u>1,090,175</u>	<u>1,005,857</u>	<u>965,659</u>
Net Bill	<u>\$436,345</u>	<u>\$ 641,177</u>	<u>\$ 361,571</u>	<u>\$438,126*</u>
Louisville & Nashville				
Revenues	\$ 49,216	\$ 74,659	\$ 93,400	\$123,829
Expenses	<u>149,812</u>	<u>150,977</u>	<u>158,554</u>	<u>171,497</u>
Net Bill	<u>\$100,596</u>	<u>\$ 76,318</u>	<u>\$ 65,154</u>	<u>\$ 47,668*</u>

* Estimated billings supplied by the railroads.

Source: The Interstate Commerce Commission, Report to the President and the Congress, Amtrak - State of Rail Passenger Service--Effectiveness of the Act (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), Appendix L.

AMTRAK
Summary of Railroad Billings Year 1971

September	October	November	December	Total
\$1,355,200 2,798,100 <u>\$1,442,900*</u>	\$1,148,000 2,703,300 <u>\$1,555,300*</u>	\$ 940,300 2,634,600 <u>\$1,694,300*</u>	\$1,533,500 2,832,600 <u>\$1,299,100*</u>	\$13,388,976 23,742,649 <u>\$10,353,673</u>
\$ 873,050 1,979,300 <u>\$1,106,250*</u>	\$ 677,950 2,004,000 <u>\$1,326,050*</u>	\$ 697,350 1,960,800 <u>\$1,263,450*</u>	\$1,030,250 2,021,000 <u>\$ 990,750*</u>	\$ 8,791,236 16,182,110 <u>\$ 7,390,874</u>
\$ 71,500 385,400 <u>\$313,900*</u>	\$ 68,800 398,300 <u>\$329,500*</u>	\$ 71,500 395,400 <u>\$323,900*</u>	\$ 79,000 415,600 <u>\$336,600*</u>	\$ 597,806 3,097,909 <u>\$2,500,103</u>
\$189,600 444,300 <u>\$254,700*</u>	\$187,900 458,200 <u>\$270,300*</u>	\$199,300 448,600 <u>\$249,300*</u>	\$217,200 458,900 <u>\$241,700*</u>	\$1,911,420 3,880,726 <u>\$1,969,306</u>
\$ 84,500 413,750 <u>\$329,250*</u>	\$ 85,000 436,550 <u>\$351,550*</u>	\$104,100 429,250 <u>\$325,150*</u>	\$100,700 439,050 <u>\$338,350*</u>	\$ 845,442 3,320,505 <u>\$2,475,063</u>
\$ 502,065 934,500 <u>\$432,435*</u>	\$504,012 965,659 <u>\$461,647*</u>	\$507,858 934,499 <u>\$426,641*</u>	\$523,109 965,659 <u>\$442,550*</u>	\$4,074,753 7,715,245 <u>\$3,640,492</u>
\$ 63,865 166,610 <u>\$102,745*</u>	\$ 58,943 174,282 <u>\$ 15,339*</u>	\$ 61,538 170,735 <u>\$109,197*</u>	\$ 89,222 175,282 <u>\$ 86,060*</u>	\$ 614,672 1,317,749 <u>\$ 703,077</u>

APPENDIX F

FINANCIAL RESULTS OF PRINCIPAL AMTRAK ROUTES

FINANCIAL RESULTS OF PRINCIPAL AMTRAK ROUTES

May and June 1971-Consolidated

Arranged in order of profitability

	Railroad(s)	Miles	Daily Trains	Revenues (000)	Expenses (000)	Revenue Percent of Expense
New York-Washington	PC	227	27	\$4,411	\$3,348	131
Boston-Washington	PC	456	6	1,418	1,436	99
New York-Philadelphia	PC	91	23	1,311	1,472	89
New Orleans-Los Angeles	SP	2,033	1	665	875	76
Chicago-Los Angeles	ATSF	2,222	2	2,395	3,181	75
Chicago-Denver	BN	1,034	2	505	700	72
Chicago-Seattle	MILW-BN	2,289	2	1,571	2,383	66
New York-Florida	PC-RF&P-SCL	1,426	6	3,226	5,284	61
Los Angeles-Portland	SP	1,189	1	224	383	58
Chicago-Oakland	BN-UP-SP	2,420	1	598	1,026	58
Chicago-New Orleans	IC	921	2	697	1,285	54

Chicago-Houston	ATSF	1,368	2	743	1,414	53
New York-Boston	PC	229	10	502	1,007	50
Chicago-New York	PC	907	2	878	1,775	49
Chicago-St Louis	GM&O	284	4	229	642	36
New York-Albany-Buffalo	PC	435	15	586	2,074	29
Chicago-Detroit	PC	283	4	106	369	29
New York-Springfield	PC	134	18	80	291	27
Seattle-Portland	BN	186	5	90	361	25
Chicago-Milwaukee	MILW	85	6	80	366	22
Newport News-Cincinnati	C&O	655	2	128	581	22
Chicago-Florida	PC-L&N-SCL	1,500	2	391	1,862	21
New York-St Louis	PC	1,050	2	210	1,074	20
San Diego-Los Angeles	ATSF	128	5	92	649	14

Does not include "corridors" (under 500 miles) in which less than 3 daily trains were operated

Source: Statistics provided by National Association of Railroad Passengers, (Washington, D.C., 1972).

APPENDIX G

PRIVATE RAIL EXPENDITURES VS. PUBLIC
OUTLAYS FOR OTHER MODES

PRIVATE RAIL EXPENDITURES VS. PUBLIC OUTLAYS FOR OTHER MODES

(in millions)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Pvt. Expenditures By Railroads On Roadways</u>	<u>Government Total for Domestic Transport</u>	<u>Government Expenditures for Airways</u>	<u>Government Expenditures for Airports</u>	<u>Cash Subsidies to Domestic Airlines</u>	<u>Expenditures for Highways</u>	<u>Government Expenditures for Waterways</u>
Prior to '47	\$25,617	62,475	335	3,305	119	56,147	2,570
1947	1,361	4,176	88	83	17	3,126	214
1952	1,778	6,010	119	110	25	5,390	365
1957	1,704	10,276	209	273	34	9,333	427
1962	1,263	13,975	574	428	80	12,302	591
1967	1,536	18,658	870	541	64	16,466	717
1969	<u>2,000*</u>	<u>20,471</u>	<u>1,643</u>	<u>568</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>18,070</u>	<u>741</u>
Totals All Years	\$58,655	318,988	9,311	10,471	1,215	284,324	13,667**

* Estimated

**An additional \$35 billion was spent by the government on various types of marine/maritime facilities not included above.

NOTES: Railroad expenditures above include: \$11,904,053,000 for roadway construction
 40,087,238,000 for roadway maintenance
 6,663,300,000 for taxes on roadway and track properties only.

Railroad expenditures do not include the cost of building or maintaining stations, shops, engine houses, office buildings, etc., or the taxes paid on these facilities.

Government expenditures in most instances include federal, state and local.

Source: Information provided by Association of American Railroads, (Washington, D.C.: Public Relations Department, 1971).

APPENDIX H

RAILROAD PASSENGER STATISTICS

RAILROAD PASSENGER STATISTICS

(Class I Railroads)

1943-1968

(in thousands)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Passengers Carried</u>	<u>Passenger Revenue</u>
1943	881,965	\$1,652,868
1944	910,295	1,790,305
1948	642,781	964,303
1953	456,817	841,962
1958	380,340	675,296
1963	309,623	588,104
1968	295,423	444,334

Revenue Passenger Miles

(in millions)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Intercity</u>	<u>Commutation</u>	<u>Total</u>
1943	82,582	5,261	87,820
1944	90,231	5,344	95,549
1948	35,329	5,855	41,179
1953	26,905	4,757	31,655
1958	18,474	4,776	23,296
1963	14,396	4,101	18,494
1968	8,737	4,383	13,110

Source: Information provided by Association of American Railroads, (Washington, D.C.: Public Relations Department, 1971).

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