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THE SELLING OF ISRAEL: A CASE STUDY OF ZIONIST  
ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

by

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B.A., College of William and Mary, 1968

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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1972

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


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## PREFACE

At the conclusion of World War Two, the power structure of the international arena was left in a vastly different state. Germany's bid for power had failed. France, by some reckonings one of the strongest powers prior to the War, emerged from the Second World War a defeated and ruined nation. Great Britain had been bled of its national treasure and manpower in defending its island and empire against the German onslaught. Of all the world's nations, the United States emerged from the four years of conflict unquestioningly the most powerful nation in the world; our economy was the strongest and our military might the most formidable. In addition, the colonial or what later became known as the Third World, profited from the changing power relations. Seizing the opportunity which the new power changes created, the colonial world launched a host of movements for national independence, and gradually the European colonial possessions either won or were awarded their independence. In Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, young nations formed a significant new political and economic aggregation on the world political stage which in the years to come was to change the complexion of foreign affairs.

Within a few years after the War's end, the United States was challenged for global political and ideological supremacy by a revitalized Soviet Union. Faced with the awesome realities of thermonuclear war, the line between East and West became frozen on the European subcontinent, prohibiting either side from

making significant advances at the expense of the other. Thus, in the struggle between the two new superpowers, it soon became apparent that meaningful gains could be scored only in the Third World--in the hamlets of Asia, in the jungles of Africa, in the sultry capitals of Latin America and in the newly independent nations of the Middle East.

Unfortunately, in little more than two decades United States global prestige and influence in the Third World have been sorely undermined. In Latin America and Southeast Asia, anti-Americanism is on the rise. American policy toward the new African nations has only inculcated suspicions of colonial ambitions, and U.S. relations with the Arab nations of the Middle East are at their lowest point in history.

With specific reference to the Middle East, the United States and Soviet Cold War battle is rapidly approaching the confrontation stage. The Soviet Union is playing an ever more pivotal role in the Arab nations of the Middle East, and the growing Soviet naval power is highly visible in any number of North African ports, on what was once regarded as an "American lake." The increasing Soviet presence in the Middle East, writes Dr. Walter Lacqueur, is not "the result of invasion, nor of infiltration by stealth: the Soviet Union became a Middle East power by invitation."<sup>1</sup>

That such an invitation was issued is, in this author's opinion, due to American Middle Eastern policy. The massive popular and economic support which this nation has offered to the Middle Eastern nation of Israel has in many respects pushed Egypt, the keystone of the Middle East, into the awaiting arms of the Soviet

Union, and with the loss of Egypt, U.S. prestige and relations with the rest of the Arab world has declined with few exceptions. Given the immense strategic, economic and political interests which this nation has in the Middle East, one can only view the loss of the Arab nations to the Soviet Union as one of the most serious defeats of U.S. post-war foreign policy. Students of foreign policy are left to question why the United States has so seriously undermined its own national interests in its unilateral support of Israel. What forces were there in the United States that could account for the overwhelming pro-Israeli sentiment of this nation? What influences were at work in the American government and among the American people that led to an identification of Israel's interests with those of the United States? Indeed, what kind of tactics functioned to force the loss of U.S. initiatives in the Middle East? The answer to these questions and others are the focus of this thesis.

In order to answer these questions the author has chosen to study the activities of the political Zionist movement as it functions in the United States, for in the success of Zionist activity in this nation lies the seeds of American attitudes and policy toward Israel and the Middle East. Political Zionism was a 19th century Jewish national movement which developed as a reaction to the emancipation and assimilation values of the European subcontinent. Fearing the loss of Jewish identity, the Zionists formed a movement which was dedicated to founding a state on the former birth site of the Judaic religion. Implicit in the success of their aspirations was the need for the support of strategically placed Jewish communities and international recognition of the Zionist claims. As the United States was a

major power in the international arena, the American Jewish community became a crucial and indeed indispensable link between Zionist aspirations and their realization. Without the moral, material and political support of American Jewry, it is doubtful that Israel would be a Jewish state today.

As "The Selling of Israel" is primarily a study of Zionist influence in the United States, political Zionism will be treated within the context of interest group activity. Since Arthur Bentley wrote The Process of Government in 1908, political science has broken away from describing politics as the study of formal governmental institutions. In contemporary studies of politics, primary focus is attached to the functioning of extra-governmental groups under the assumption that "of the vast variety of activity involved in political situations, that of the persons within the governmental and party structures is only a manifest and small part when compared with the importance of non-governmental groups." <sup>1</sup> This assumption has brought increased interest in political science to the study of social class and ethnic ties as a basis of political activities. In the spirit of this focus of contemporary political analysis, Zionism can be viewed as a product of an interest group vying in the public arena for recognition and support of its claims.

In terms of the sequential organization of the thesis, "The Selling of Israel" falls into the following chapter categories. Chapter I describes the social, political and intellectual currents which contributed to the rise of Jewish nationalism in the 19th century; discusses the early formulation of Zionist goals and ideology; and traces the evolution of the Zionist movement in Europe through World War I. Chapter II delineates the development of Zionism in the United States

prior to World War II, showing the early antipathy of the American Jewish community to the political and sociological conclusions of the Zionist program.

Chapter III discusses the historical events and Zionist strategies which aided in the development of pro-Zionist sentiments in this nation. In Chapter IV focus is given to the Zionist's influence of American foreign policy, followed by a brief, general discussion of American foreign policy toward the Middle East. Chapter V discusses some of the contemporary issues facing American Jews in their adherence to political Zionism, with Chapter VI providing a further expansion on this theme with a study of Zionist fund-raising techniques. In addition, Chapter VI provides further insights into Zionist propaganda techniques in the realm of fund-raising and raises the question of the American people's right to know the facts about Zionist fund-raising and fund usage. Finally, Chapter VII provides some concluding remarks and briefly discusses the role of Zionism in a pax semitica, asking whether political Zionism has become counter-productive to Israel's best interests in contemporary world affairs.

With respect to the title of this work, "The Selling of Israel: A Case Study of Zionist Activity in the United States," the above chapters may be viewed as falling into three general sections. The first four chapters deal with the "selling" of the Zionist ideological precepts to the international community, to American Jewry and the American government in particular. Chapters V and VI call for some type of "consumer protection" from Zionist salesmanship in terms of elucidating the real and perceived nature of the Zionist product, with Chapter V affording a look at the actual "selling" job which occurs during Zionist fund-raising. The last



chapter deals with some of the contemporary problems raised for Israel in Zionist "over-sell." This author hopes that, in addition to whatever else may be gleaned from the following study, readers in the future may approach the functioning of Zionist activities in this nation with a more open and questioning mind.

For the initial thrust behind the author's personal interest in this paper, a debt is owed to the Senate investigations of Zionist affairs in the United States initiated by Senator J.W. Fulbright; to the original research opportunities offered to me by Senator Mark O. Hatfield; and to the immense knowledge imported to the author by Dr. W.T. Mallison of George Washington University from his own vast research of Zionism.

In the writing of the thesis, the author is grateful for the fortitude, forbearance and scholarly insights of Lauren McKinsey, formerly of the University of Montana Political Science Department, and to Dr. Frank Spencer of the University's History Department. In addition, the author recognizes a special debt of thanks to Dr. Leo B. Lott of the Political Science Department at the University of Montana for his academic guidance and generous allocation of time in the final, traumatic stages of writing. Finally, whole-hearted credit is given to Gladys McKinsey for putting this thesis into presentable form. Without the assistance and skills of the above, the following study may today still have been an unformulated idea.

PREFACE - FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Walter Lacqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: The Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 181.

<sup>2</sup> David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953), p. 172.

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## CHAPTER I

### THE GENESIS OF WORLD ZIONISM

#### The Nineteenth Century in Perspective

For the people of Europe, the latter decades of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century were marked by hitherto unparalleled material and industrial growth. These two factors, combined with the years of international peace, bore fruit in a host of revolutionizing discoveries ranging from electricity, the telephone, and the internal combustion machine; to Darwin's Origin of Species, cultural anthropology, and Wundtian, Freudian, and Pavlovian psychology; to the dramatic questioning of Newtonian physics and Euclidian geometry.<sup>1</sup> The overall impact of these discoveries of the 19th century heralded in an age which reveled in the value of science and progress.

Politically, the 19th century gave rise to an advance of the concept of popular government and the awakening of widespread nationalistic feeling. The European nationalisms, developed in resistance to the forcible internationalisms of the Napoleonic Empire, manifested themselves in the 19th century in a growing desire for nation-states.<sup>2</sup> Prior to 1860, European political organization was characterized, on the one hand, by small states comprising fragments of a nation such as Hanover, Baden, Sardinia, Tuscany, or the Two Sicilies and, on the other, by large empires ruling diverse and distant people such as the Hapsburg and

Ottoman Empires. With the advent of the nation-state system, a trend was felt throughout Europe to consolidate the numerous non-national states into large nations. Between 1859 and 1871, this dynamic nationalism produced the formation of a new German Empire, the unification of the Italian states, a dual-monarchy in Austria-Hungary, dramatic reforms in czarist Russia, the success of the northern forces in establishing central authority in the United States, the unification of the Canadian provinces, and the "occidentalization" of the Japanese Empire.<sup>3</sup>

But where the idea of the nation-state tended to bring people together, it also planted seeds which would eventually break them apart. As the ethnic groups composing the large nation-states grasped the nationalist idea, it tended to make these ethnic groups think of themselves as nations, entitled to their own sovereignty and independence. Indeed, as R.R. Palmer stated in A History of The Modern World: "For many in the 19th century, nationalism, the winning of national unity and independence and the creation of the nation-state, became a kind of secular faith," rivaled only by the age's faith in science and progress.<sup>4</sup>

In the following century this "secular faith" grew in the ethnic groups incorporated in the large nation-states, ultimately climaxing in a number of drives for national independence. These strivings for independent sovereignty, combined with the web of alliances between the world's nation-states, finally set off a series of events which spread into the First World War. At the end of the war the Russian, Austrian-Hungarian, and Turkish Empires were in dissolution. The new map of Europe registered seven new independent states: Finland, Estonia,

Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Rumania and Greece, which had achieved independence from the Ottoman Empire prior to the war, were enlarged by adjoining territories formerly part of the now dissolved nation-states. The Ottoman Empire also was laid to rest. Turkey emerged as a republic; Syria and Lebanon were given to France as mandated territories by the League of Nations; and Palestine and Iraq were awarded to Great Britain on the same basis.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, by the end of World War I, the right of national self-determination emerged as the general principle guiding the Paris settlement. Nationalism became an accepted rule of world affairs.

This chapter is directed to the genesis and early rise of the Jewish national movement, Zionism, which led to the founding of a Jewish state in the Middle East. Among the 19th century movements seeking sovereign national status, Zionism was unique, for it lacked the accoutrements of the other national movements. Zionism sought national sovereignty for a religious group which had held no common history for over two thousand years. It sought to make claims on the nationality of a group which was composed of distinct languages, varied social patterns and belonged to various countries of origin. Indeed, the Zionists were dedicated to forming a national identity among a group of dispersed people which had been linked only through religious ties and claimed a homeland which held essentially spiritual, rather than political, meaning for world Jewry. But Zionism was not a religious movement. The secular emphasis of the 19th century had weakened the hold of religion on the lives of people, and Judaism, in particular,

"was weaker than in any previous period of Jewish history."<sup>6</sup> Zionism arose as the political solution to a religious problem.

### Early Jewish Nationalism

For the Jews of Europe the rise of nationalistic feeling, later to be called Zionism after the biblical Judaic desire for a return to Zion, might be viewed as the result of several conflicting social, intellectual, and political currents at work during the historic trends of the 1800's. Faced with the "emancipation" and "assimilation" trends created by the French Revolution and perpetuated by the constitutional, representative, and democratic tendencies of 19th century European government, many Jews increasingly shed the distinctive elements of their essentially separatist religion and slowly began to assimilate into the social and political fabric of their host societies. Yet despite freedom from old legal discriminations and the richer lives offered by new opportunities in the social, economic and political processes of Europe, some Jews deplored the assimilationist trends of the 19th century.<sup>7</sup> Holding to the belief that the "separateness of the Jews and their Jewish education" were the crucial links to the preservation of Jewish identity and "love of Zion during the long centuries of exile," these Jews saw "integration" as a direct threat to the perpetuation of Judaism itself and increasingly became nationalistic in their desire to preserve the Jewish heritage and identity.<sup>8</sup>

These early Jewish nationalistic stirrings were given impetus by the development of political anti-semitism toward the end of the 19th century. Differing from any earlier, sporadic outbreak of Jew-baiting, the rise of political anti-semitism was a paradoxical off-shoot of the particular economic, political, and

social conditions of the 19th century, an age which experienced the impact of industrialization, scientific thought and democratic ideals.<sup>9</sup> The emancipation trends of the 19th century gave birth to new mobile groups moving into areas of European society heretofore barred to them. The Jews, in particular, were evident as a new group. With a general aversion to manual labor, the Jews concentrated on moving into the commercial professions providing serious competition to the incumbent bourgeoisie. The enunciation of "social darwinism" led to a paradoxical situation. Where Jews were not free to compete for the new industrial wealth of the 19th century, existing elites, covetous of their positions, reacted violently to the insurgence of Jewish competitors. As the Jews were an easily identified group, the incumbent bourgeoisie turned "social darwinism" against them, justifying their anti-semitism on the fact that Jews were unfit to compete in a Gentile world, a type of paranoia which was later given expression in Nazi Germany.<sup>10</sup>

This anti-semitic reaction to the liberal values of the 19th century expressed itself in a host of racialistic theories, actual politically inspired pogroms, and in such individual political acts as the Dreyfus Affair in France. But while such anti-semitism undermined the "emancipation" of the 19th century, it greatly enhanced the anti-assimilationist Jews in their own form of racism. A new sense of Jewish identity emerged, formed in reaction to the anti-semitic outbreaks; causing a division of opinion in the European Jewish communities between those who sympathized with Jewish nationalism and those who insisted that Judaism serve only as a religious faith and cultural foundation, not as a political ideology.



In the early formulations of Jewish nationalism or Zionism, the rift between the nationalists and the so-termed assimilationist Jews was expected. Dr. Theodor Herzl, a Jewish Viennese journalist credited with the founding of Zionism, stated in his classic statement of Zionist philosophy, Der Judenstaat: "Perhaps we (the Zionists) shall have to fight first of all against many an evil-disposed, narrow-hearted, short-sighted member of our own race."<sup>11</sup> As every action produces an equal and opposite reaction, anti-Zionism, and even a form of non-Zionism, were predictable developments among certain segments of world Jewry. Ben Halpern noted in The Idea of the Jewish State that anti-Zionism and non-Zionism were "not merely convenient ways of grouping certain individuals," but rather corresponded to positions that "were more or less ideological."<sup>12</sup> Even today the outspoken presence of anti- and non-Zionist Jews continues to be an embarrassment and discomfort to the Zionist movement. As the Zionists have rested their claims to power on their ability to speak for and represent the interests of the entire world Jewish community, non-Zionist Jews and anti-Zionist Jews have been treated ruthlessly as detriments to the overall policy aims of Zionism.

#### The Formulation of the Zionist Movement

The First World Zionist Congress was held in Basle, Switzerland in August, 1897, one year after Herzl's book Der Judenstaat gave expression and impetus to the stirrings of Jewish nationalism. The goal of this first Zionist meeting was to counteract the historical currents of the 19th century which the Zionists perceived as antithetical to the preservation of Jewish identity. As Zionist Louis Lipsky has stated:

The intellectual conceptions of emancipation, as well as the doctrines of the Marxists, were modified and developed to accord with the demands of the Jewish rebirth; for the new life was not to be built on the dogmas of alien civilizations; it was to work out its own destiny in consonance with the revelations of its own sages and prophets and poets. The trend of history had to be reversed and brought back to the field of Jewish self-emancipation."<sup>13</sup>

The revelations of Zionist "sages, prophets and poets" were readily available to the First Zionist Congress as the early Zionists set about forming the "Basle Platform," the "keystone of the world Zionist movement" in the years to come.<sup>14</sup>

The words of the anonymous author of the 137th Psalm were often taken by the Zionists to demonstrate biblical support for their "nationalist-segregationist" ideology:<sup>15</sup>

- By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea,  
we wept, when we remembered Zion.
- 2 We hanged our harps upon the willows in the midst thereof.
- 3 For there they that carried us away captive required of us a song; and they that wasted us required of us mirth, saying, sing us one of the songs of Zion.
- 4 How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land?
- 5 If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning.
- 6 If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy.<sup>16</sup>

It should be mentioned while on the subject of biblical support of Jewish nationalism that one group of ultra-orthodox Jews still fervently adhere to the biblical passages which promise that the Messiah will come to lead the Jews back to Palestine. Oddly enough, while some of these Jews live in Israel today, they do not recognize it as the Promised Land. Rather, they see their presence in Israel as preparation for the reunion of the Jews under the sovereignty of God.<sup>17</sup> For these

Jews, and many non-Zionist and assimilationist Jews, the words of the prophet Jeremiah conveyed to the Jews during the Babylonian captivity (586 B.C.) still remain their closest expression of a longing for a return to Zion. Jeremiah cautioned the Jews to "seek the peace of the city whither I have caused you to be carried away captive, and pray unto the Lord for it; for in the peace thereof ye shall have peace," comforting them at the same time with the promise that the Lord would gather them soon for a return to Zion.<sup>18</sup> The traditional Judaic greeting of "next year in Jerusalem," which issues from such biblical promises, expressed not the nationalistic sentiments of Zionism but merely reflected the biblical promise made to the Jews that one day they would be returned to Palestine. It was part of the Judaic system of religious tenets, not part of their politics—at least until the rise of Zionism.

After the formation of the Zionist organization, one anti-Zionist cryptically stated that Zionism "had now replaced the Messiah in leading the Jewish people back to Palestine."<sup>19</sup> Jacob R. Marcus, who submitted a study of the subtle psychological processes inherent in the increase of pro-Zionist Jewish opinion in the United States to The American Scholar, stated that for many Jews "tired of waiting for the Messiah," Zionism was the signal for the "advent of the Messianic Era."<sup>20</sup> Indeed, the continual mixing of Jewish religious traditions with the relatively secular Zionist political movement, assisted by Zionist propaganda strategies (see following chapters), often clouds the distinctions between the two. Such blurring of issues has proven useful in Zionist appeals to non-Zionist Jews, and the blending of religion with Jewish nationalism has provided the Zionist movement

with an emotional appeal which without religious identification it might not have gained. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that Zionism was not and is not a religious movement but a political, nationalist movement dedicated to obtaining and today preserving a national Jewish state, not a religious colony.

Beyond biblical interpretative conflicts, however, the Zionists at the First Congress were able to draw upon the writings of several more contemporary and secular sources. Ranging from the first presentation of Zionism given by Moses Hess in his 1862 book, Rome and Jerusalem, to Dr. Leo Pinsker's first fully formed articulation of Zionist doctrine in Auto-Emancipation (1881), the Zionists were presented with two fundamental tenets upon which to base the ideology of their movement. The writings of Hess and Pinsker asserted that 1) Jews constituted a distinctive identity as a people or a nation in a historic, cultural and psychic sense; and 2) that anti-semitism would always remain an inescapable fact of life as long as the Jews were forced to function as an "abnormal nation or ghost nation."<sup>21</sup> To clarify and expand on these original assumptions made by the earliest Jewish nationalists, the First Zionist Congress was led by the Zionist's own philosopher-in-residence, Theodor Herzl, whose celebrated book Der Judenstaat, served as a "bible" for early Zionist activity.

From the writings of these early Zionist ideologues and under the leadership of Herzl, the Zionists' program and thesis for statehood reflected the fundamental conceptions of the movement. These ideological positions are just as characteristic of contemporary Zionism as they were of Herzlian Zionism:

- A. The Jews together as a group constitute a distinctive ethnic nationality.

As Theodor Herzl stated:

It might further be said that we ought not to create new distinctions between people; we ought not to raise fresh barriers, we should rather make the old disappear; but men who think in this way are amiable visionaries . . . universal brotherhood is not even a beautiful dream. Antagonism is essential to man's greatest effort.<sup>22</sup>

- B. Due to the presence of ineradicable anti-semitism and the threatening aspects of emancipation and assimilation, the existence of Jewish identity and Judaism is challenged.
- C. Therefore, a "Jewish Problem" exists whose rational solution lies only in granting a state to the Jews.

As Herzl said:

The whole plan is in essence perfectly simple, as it must necessarily be if it is to come within the comprehension of all.

Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation; the rest we shall manage for ourselves.<sup>23</sup>

- D. In order to achieve this rational solution, the aim of Zionism is to "create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law." (See the following Basle platform.)
- E. In order to secure this goal, Jewish immigration must be obtained to Palestine, world Jewry must be organized behind the Zionist goals, Jewish nationalism must be promoted in order to confront assimilationist tendencies, and, finally, steps must be taken to gather the consent and support of governments behind the Zionist objectives.

The first step towards the achievement of these goals was to gain governmental recognition of the Zionist claims, and the first Basle Platform set forth the working Zionist program:

Zionism seeks to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law. The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end:

1. The promotion by appropriate means of the settlement in Palestine of Jewish agriculturalists, artisans and manufacturers.
2. The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, both local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.
3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and national consciousness.
4. Preparatory steps toward obtaining the consent of governments, where necessary, in order to reach the goal of Zionism.<sup>24</sup>

As Herzl stated in his opening address to the Congress: "We are here to lay the foundation stone of the house which is to shelter the Jewish nation."<sup>25</sup>

The phrases and objectives set forth by the Zionists at the First Zionist Congress were necessarily subject to a variety of interpretations and gave rise to various Zionist parties built upon the semantic interpretation and meaning of such phrases as "the Jewish people," "a home in Palestine," and such questions as what the position of religion was to be in Zionist philosophy and how, where, and in what priority should care be taken of Jewish needs.

In simplified terms, the Zionists split along a fundamental line of "cultural" or "spiritual" Zionism versus "political" Zionism. The cultural Zionists, who claimed as their spiritual founder the writer Achad Ha'am, supported a home in Palestine for the Jews, not as a political state, but as a haven where both Jews and Arabs could find human dignity and individual rights.<sup>26</sup> The spiritual or cultural Zionists emphasized the need for Jewish philanthropy to aid less fortunate coreligionists and stressed the need to preserve Judaic culture and heritage. The

emphasis of the political Zionists, on the other hand, was on achieving the attributes of nationhood: "territory, language, culture, and sovereignty."<sup>27</sup>

The distinctions between these two fundamental forms of Zionism again reflected the confusions which naturally arose over the religious and political nature of the movement. The political Zionists were dedicated solely to obtaining a Jewish home in Palestine for all Jews, as stated in the Basle Platform. Their goals were political and their methods were political. Inasmuch as their accepted leader, Theodor Herzl, called specifically for a state rather than a home, it has often been asserted that the terminology of Der Judenstaat was consciously and deliberately changed in order to appease and gain the support of those Jews who had solely a sentimental, cultural or spiritual attachment to Palestine but rejected the concepts of a universal Jewish nationality and a Jewish state.<sup>28</sup> To what extent semantical ambiguity aided the political Zionists in enhancing their appeal among those who opposed their political concepts is, of course, not known, but as further examples shall show, this technique of broadening appeal among non-Zionist or cultural Zionist Jews has been successfully employed in the Zionist political program.

The central concern of this paper is with the activities and ideology of the political Zionists as opposed to any other forms of Zionism. In succinct form, the definition of Zionism offered by the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs, which during the second World War was the coordinating agency for all American Zionist groups, makes the distinction desired for political Zionism, with the added consideration that the term "home" is synonymous with "state":

Nothing more was ever expected of the Zionists than the promotion of this object (a nationale home for the Jewish people). All special interpretation of Zionism, all accompanying philosophies are, as it were, private additions to the official policy. This should be made clear as an answer to various criticisms of the Zionist movement which are in reality aimed not at the movement itself, but at the views held by one Zionist group or another.<sup>29</sup>

### Early Zionist Negotiations

The First Zionist Congress (1897), presided over by Herzl, formed the World Zionist Organization (W.Z.O.) whose members comprised "all Jews who accept the Zionist programme (Basle Platform) and pay the shekel."<sup>30</sup> The W.Z.O. was to serve as "the appropriate international organization" envisioned by the Zionists' Basle Platform for carrying out the objectives of the political Zionists. As the first elected president of the W.Z.O., Dr. Herzl first began steps to achieve the practical implementation of a Jewish home through negotiations with Germany. Claiming to represent the national interests of the "Jewish people," despite the fact that W.Z.O. membership was less than 100,000, Herzl approached Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1898 with a plan for establishing a Jewish land development company in Palestine under German protection.<sup>31</sup> The Kaiser's rejection of the plan brought Herzl into direct negotiations with the Sultan of Turkey with whom he was similarly unsuccessful.

Finally, in 1901, Herzl established his "Jewish Chartered Company" in London under the name "Jewish National Fund" with the express purpose of acquiring "the soil of Palestine as national and inalienable property for the Jewish people."<sup>32</sup> After two years of unsuccessful negotiations with the British government, the British, in response to the emotional impact of the Russian pogrom in Kishinev,



finally offered the W.Z.O. portions of Uganda to colonize.<sup>33</sup> Herzl cautiously supported a Zionist commission to investigate the offer at the 1903 Sixth Zionist Congress, stating: "I do not believe that for the sake of a beautiful dream or a legitimate flag we ought to withhold relief from the unfortunate."<sup>34</sup> This statement set off a storm in the Zionist movement.

The Uganda offer marked the first time that the Zionist program was faced with a choice between philanthropy and immediate humanitarian relief against political anti-semitism and pursuit of the political aim of obtaining a Jewish national home in Palestine. In their writings neither Hess, Pinsker, nor Herzl specifically mentioned the exact location desired for a national home for the Jews. After the 1897 Zionist Congress, Palestine was affixed on as the proper location, and negotiations with governments had centered on the Palestine area. Nevertheless, three factors contributed to the Zionist's wavering from their support of the Palestinian home. The first factor centered on the fact that the Uganda offer represented the first political triumph for the W.Z.O. After six years of fruitless negotiations, a world power had finally recognized them as the legal representatives of world Jewry, thus lending the movement badly needed credibility and legitimacy. The second factor focussed, of course, on the sufferings of the Russian Jews and the now substantial ability of the Zionists to aid them and, indeed, to give them a refuge due to the Uganda offer. Finally, the third factor which caused support for the Uganda offer centered on the divisions over interpretation and objectives among Zionists. In explaining this division of opinion, Chaim Weizmann, an important early member of the British Zionist organization and

ultimately the first president of Israel, said of Herzl: "To him, and to many with him--perhaps the majority of the Jews assembled in Basle--Zionism meant an immediate solution of the problems besetting their sorely tried people . . . . The conception was at once crude, naive, and generous."<sup>35</sup>

The emotionalism raised by the arguments of the more philanthropically oriented Jews (the cultural or spiritual Zionists) and the hard-line of the political Zionists ultimately led Herzl to drop his proposal for investigating the Uganda offer. The triumph of the hard-line political Zionists at the 1903 W.Z.O. Congress left little doubt in the minds of the Jewish delegates there which direction Zionism would follow in the future. Other instances since the Uganda offer have again raised the question of humanitarian versus political acts, and each case has similarly been resolved in favor of the goals of political Zionism. But while political Zionism has dominated Zionist affairs since 1903, the W.Z.O. has still pressed its claims and built its popularity on humanitarian labels. As with the identification of Judaism with Zionism, Zionists have found it to their advantage to represent their claims to a national home for Jews on the basis of philanthropy and humanitarianism. Without such identifications in both the minds of the Jewish community and the international arena, it is doubtful that the Zionists would have achieved such success in the ultimate realization of their political aims.

After Herzl's defeat at the Congress his health failed rapidly and his final months were spent in trying to justify his position on the Uganda offer with his espousal of political Zionism. His last letter to the American Zionist organization (April 28, 1904) reflects the confusion he still felt over the place of humanitarianism and politics in Zionism:

East Africa offers us no solution of the Jewish problem. The Jewish question remains, but this plan would save for the house of Israel the poorest among the masses, who are now borne down by national and economic conditions and who would otherwise be lost to us. There is no political question so complicated as ours. But we have accepted no charity, and our policy is not the policy of philanthropy. A nation does not accept philanthropy--and our policy is a national one.<sup>36</sup>

Herzl died the following year at the age of 44 and the 1905 Seventh Zionist Congress, now dominated by pragmatically oriented political Zionists, definitely rejected the Uganda offer. Several segments of the W.Z.O. withdrew support from the Zionist organization because they were unable to adhere to the rigid political ideology of the new leadership. The leader of one of these, Israel Zangwill, a cultural Zionist, founded the Jewish Territorial Organization which for years unsuccessfully sought another area in which large numbers of Jews could be established in a home.<sup>37</sup> Following the Seventh Zionist Congress, Palestine became the sole acceptable goal for political Zionism. And for these Zionists, government recognition of this claim was imperative.

#### The Balfour Declaration

Since the 1500's the Ottoman Turks had built a vast empire stretching from the Middle East into Eastern Europe. In the 19th century the stirrings of European nationalisms awakened numerous national movements within the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, giving rise to the independence of some of the nationalist groups which comprised it. Indeed, prior to World War I, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Rumania achieved their sovereignty from the Ottoman Turks. During the latter part of the 19th century, vague stirrings of an Arabic national movement were also found. For nearly four hundred years the Ottoman domination of the

Arab World had extended without a break from Algeria to the Persian Gulf and from Aleppo to the Indian Ocean. Then in the 19th century, France and Great Britain occupied many of the Ottoman areas, drastically lessening Ottoman hold on the Middle East area.<sup>38</sup> At the beginning of the 20th century Abdul Hamid, last of the absolute Turkish sultans, began a "reign of repression" in a desperate attempt to retain control over his remaining holdings. His ruthless practices only served to fan the fires of Arab nationalism. With the outbreak of World War I, the Turks might have enlisted the religious emotions of the Arabs in their fight against Christian nations, they instead increased their harsh tactics of repressing any signs of dissent or nationalism. The Arabs rose up in revolt against their Turkish masters.<sup>39</sup>

As in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the social and political conditions of the Ottoman Empire brought the Allies opportunity to play upon the competing nationalisms in order to gain war advantage. In British usage of the conflicting nationalisms of the Arabs and the Zionists, both Arab and Zionist nationalists were deceived into thinking that they would achieve their national aspirations in return for support of the Allied war effort. This period of World War I, a period of "broken promises," did much to sow the seeds of the present impasse in the Middle East.

In the beginning years of the war, the Allies, unknown to the Arabs, concluded a series of secret treaties over the division of the Ottoman Empire, the most important of which was the Sykes-Picot Treaty of May 16, 1916, in which France and Britain divided the Middle East into their own spheres of influence. In 1917, however, the Bolsheviks published the secret treaties denouncing Russian concessions

in them, and the Arabs were optimistic that given certain statements by Lloyd George and President Wilson's Fourteen Points, their territorial integrity would be upheld and the secret treaties denounced at the peace talks at Versailles.

The Arabs had reason for further optimism in the "Hussein-McMahon Correspondence." When World War I began, Turkey declared a "Holy War" against Britain and France. During the years of 1915-1916, Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner for Egypt, completed negotiations with Hussein, Sharif of Mecca, for the support of the Arabs in the Middle East theater against the Turks and the Germans. As a result of the Hussein-McMahon letters, the Arabs agreed to assist the Allies in return for recognition and support of their independence from the Ottoman Turks in the areas specified in the letters, including Palestine.<sup>40</sup> When the famous Balfour Declaration was mailed in the form of a private letter to the Anglo-Jewish leader, Baron Lionel Rothschild, the Arabs had already declared themselves on the side of the Allies and were fighting alongside Britain in the belief that victory would bring them freedom and independence in the Middle East.

The direct origination of the Balfour Declaration is often attributed to Chaim Weizmann. Weizmann, having moved to England in 1904 because of the probability of British support of political Zionism, spent much of his time in the ensuing years before World War I negotiating with the British for a public law recognition of the Zionist national claims.<sup>41</sup> As Dr. W. T. Mallison, professor of international law at George Washington University wrote, the Zionists at this time had "three central objectives:" "The first objective was that the Zionist national home enterprise . . . be established as of legal right. The second objective was that all

Jews (the comprehensive claimed entity of "the Jewish people") be recognized in law as constituting a single nationality grouping. The third objective was that a juridical connection be recognized in law between 'the National Home' and 'the Jewish people'.<sup>42</sup> In the final draft of the Balfour Declaration, agreed to by the parties involved in negotiations, all three of these objectives were met. On November 2, 1917, Lord Balfour, the British Foreign Minister, issued the following statement:

Dear Lord Rothschild:

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:

'His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

Yours, Arthur James Balfour<sup>43</sup>

This letter to Baron Rothschild was nevertheless regarded by Dr. Weizmann as "a painful recession" because of the addition of safeguard clauses to the official Zionist draft proposal (see below) transmitted to Lord Balfour on July 18, 1917:

1. His Majesty's Government accepts the principle that Palestine should be reconstituted as the National Home of the Jewish people.
2. His Majesty's Government will use its best endeavors to secure the achievement of this object and will discuss the necessary methods and means with the Zionist Organization.<sup>44</sup>

But despite Zionist annoyance over the addition of the "non-Jewish community" phrase and the protection of "non-Zionist Jews," the Zionists decided to accept

the Balfour Declaration for fear that the British might become annoyed at Zionist intransigence. Indeed, as Weizmann stated:

(E)masculated as it was, (it) represented a tremendous event in exilic Jewish history--and that it was a bitter pill to swallow for the Jewish assimilationists as the recession from the original, more forthright formula was for us."<sup>45</sup>

That Weizmann made this statement stands as refutation of the Zionist Organization's claims to represent the national strivings of all of world Jewry. Where the Zionist Executive of the World Zionist Organization armed with the Balfour Declaration headed off for Palestine to begin to begin to set up the framework for a Jewish state in Palestine, it must be noted that the claimed representativeness of their action did not picture the reality of the situation.

While many Jews interpreted the Balfour Declaration as guaranteeing a cultural center for Jews, the Zionists employed the wording of the Balfour Declaration to begin a drive for statehood in Palestine. As one Zionist legal writer, Dr. Ernst Frankenstein, stated: in the minds of political Zionists "the National Home was to be a National Home for the Jewish people, not merely for the Jews of Palestine."<sup>46</sup> The political Zionists totally rejected interpretations of the "national home" concept as meaning anything other than a state. As Frankenstein noted:

(t)he Jewish National Home may be defined as a scheme intended to give the Jewish people the opportunity to become, through immigrations and settlement, a majority of the inhabitants of Palestine, and to make Palestine a Jewish state again."<sup>47</sup>

Thus while the Zionists did not at the time possess the political power to dictate the exact wording they desired, they did develop a method of interpreting the Declaration which was consistent with their goals.

On the British side, one can only wonder about the motivations behind the Balfour Declaration. Why, for instance, did the British describe the existing Arab community in Palestine as the "non-Jewish communities when 1) they had already promised to secure the sovereignty of the Arabs in the Hussein-McMahon letters and 2) the population of Palestine in 1917 was about 91% Arab and 9% Jew? Why was the particular word "home" employed in both the Balfour and Zionist drafts? Why did the British feel it necessary to negotiate with the Zionists at all? One can only attempt conjectural answers at these questions.

The Balfour Declaration was issued after four participants had negotiated its wording. The first group were the Zionists representing the goals of political Zionism. This group was led by Chaim Weizmann, president of the English Zionist Federation, and a man of immense importance in British political circles due to his discovery of an acetone process which greatly aided the British war effort. Perhaps the issue of the Balfour Declaration was designed to meet the Zionist appeals of this important Englishman. The second group was composed of anti-Zionist English Jews, which, although without organization, were invited to represent this other Jewish viewpoint. The negotiating history of the Balfour Declaration is replete with anti-Zionist objections to the use of such phrases as "Jewish race," a "reconstituted" Jewish national home, etc. Perhaps the word "home" was sufficiently vague to be acceptable by all the participants. Whatever the motivations behind the word "home," one authoritative historian of the Balfour Declaration has asserted that there was no disposition among any of the participants to "probe deeply into . . . meaning--still less . . . any agreed



interpretation,"<sup>48</sup> following the old political maxim: the more left unexplained the better. The third group, the Palestinian Arabs, did not participate as active negotiators, but Arab interests were taken into consideration. The fourth and final participant was the British government. Each of these participants had its own interests in the Balfour Declaration. The Zionists, of course, wished to obtain government recognition of their national claims on Palestine. The anti-Zionists and non-Zionists desired careful wording of the declaration in order to preserve their independence vis-a-vis the World Zionist Organization. The Arab interests were treated passively, hence perhaps the off-handed mention of non-Jewish communities. And finally Britain had its own strategic and political interests in Palestine which it hoped to safeguard in the post-war settlement.<sup>49</sup> With all of these interests competing together, there is little wonder that the interpretation of the Balfour Declaration has been the subject of numerous studies, none of which seemingly agrees with another. Nevertheless, with the Arabs believing in British support of their independence and the various Jewish groups allowed to interpret the Balfour Declaration as they wished, the British were able to draw support from both sides for her war effort. Whatever Britain's true reasons for negotiating the Declaration, whether as a response to Zionist pressures, the exigencies of war, or as a means of establishing a further link to the Palestine area, the importance of the Balfour Declaration to the Zionist movement was immeasurable. Aside from the more ancient doctrine recorded in Genesis, the Zionists at last possessed a governmental statement which they could interpret as supporting their claims on world Jewry and on Palestine.

### The League of Nation's Palestinian Mandate

The Balfour Declaration was accorded international recognition when it was incorporated into the preamble of the League of Nation's mandate agreement assigning Palestine to Britain as a mandated territory. The Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 had opposed turning Palestine into a Jewish state because 90% of the Palestinian population was not Jewish and because Palestine was the recognized Holy Land for Christians and Muslims as well as Jews. Thus the newly created League of Nations established a mandate system (tutelage for independence) for the countries of the Middle East, awarding Great Britain mandatory responsibility for Palestine and Iraq, with the Syrian mandate assigned to France (Lebanon was created out of Syria in 1920 by France).<sup>50</sup>

In past international altercations the victor had taken what territory he had wanted by assuming the governmental functions of the area and backing up his authority with a garrison army. The limitations of such a system of spoils extended only to the degree of the victory and the ability of the victor to maintain his position within the conquered territory. Indeed, the Sykes-Picot treaty between France and Great Britain was formulated as a means to follow this ancient custom. The entry of the United States into the war, however, and the accompanying interjection of Wilsonian political philosophy into the Allied camp dramatically put an end to the historic system of spoils. The mandate system, in fact, was a direct outgrowth of the United States' entry into the international arena.<sup>51</sup> President Wilson abhorring "private international understandings of any kind" declared that "(p)eople and provinces are not to be bartered about as if they were chattels and

pawns in the game."<sup>52</sup> This philosophy was accepted by the Allies and the basic elements of the mandate system were incorporated in Article 22 of the League of Nations covenant:

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this covenant.<sup>53</sup>

It was understood that the mandate terms of the covenant were to be "exercised for the benefit of the people inhabiting the respective territories," which in the case of Palestine would have meant primarily the Palestinian Arabs which were in the vast majority.<sup>54</sup> But from the beginning the goals of the Palestinian mandate were unclear.

The Palestinian mandate went into force on September 29, 1922. The second paragraph of its preamble incorporated the Balfour Declaration, thereby giving a semblance of international agreement and support to the Zionist Jewish aspirations. The incorporation of the Balfour Declaration into the mandate was also ironic since it referred only to the Palestinian Arabs as the "non-Jewish communities." Although the United States was not a partner to the League of Nations provisions, the Anglo-American Convention of 1924 (to clarify the rights of the United States government and its nationals concerning Palestine) made the United States a partner to the Declaration. Article Two of that Convention provided that

the United States and its nationals shall have and enjoy all the rights and benefits secured under the terms of the mandate to members of the League of Nations and their nationals notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not a member of the League of Nations.<sup>55</sup>

Thus, while the Anglo-American Convention provided a safeguard against infringement of U.S. citizens' nationality status on the basis of religious identification, it also made them a party to the recognition of Zionist-Jewish claims to Palestine. The Zionist Organization was slowly building the foundations upon which later recognition of a Jewish state would be accomplished.

The Zionist legal interpretations of the Palestine mandate completely ignored the safeguard clauses provided in the mandate and in such agreements as the Anglo-American Convention, especially the protection of the "rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." One of the fundamental goals of political Zionism was to establish the "Jewish people" nationality entity and to confer membership in it on all world Jewry. Indeed, as Herzl stated in Der Judenstaat, this goal was to be accomplished even if it meant having to fight against the Jews who were not disposed to Zionism.

The language of the Palestine mandate was interpreted as conforming to these claims. Dr. Chaim Weizmann hailed the mandate in the following words:

The value of the Mandate, apart from being a great success of Zionism, consists in the recognition of the Jewish people.<sup>56</sup>

Another Zionist writer, Dr. J. Stoyanovsky, went even further in trying to extend the nationality claims of the mandate.

There can hardly be any question now whether Jews constitute a distinct national entity in the eyes of international law. This seems to have been laid down, on the one hand, by the various treaties containing what is known as minority clauses, and on the other, by the mandate for Palestine providing for the establishment in that country of a national home for the Jewish people. If, therefore, the question of the national character of the latter may remain open--as in fact it does--for purposes of ethnographical or sociological

research, it seems to have been definitely settled from the point of view of international law. The status of Jews no longer constitutes a mere political issue within certain States, or a diplomatic issue between States, on the ground of humanitarian protection afforded to them by such Powers as Great Britain, France and the United States; Jews as such have now become subjects of rights and duties provided for by international law.<sup>57</sup>

The nature of these interpretations naturally ran counter to the safeguard clauses of the Balfour Declaration. The Zionists continued to extend this Orwellian "more than equal" status upon world Jewry, forcing a type of dual nationality on Jews. Aided by British acquiescence in the use of the term "Jewish people" rather than "Zionist Jews" in the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations' use of the same terminology without further clarification as to its meaning, the Zionists were gradually able to build up an identification of Jews with a particular Jewish nationality simply through the lack of any other claims.<sup>58</sup>

The confusion which arises over Zionist claims to speak for a Jewish people nationality entity extends directly from the wording of the Balfour Declaration. During the Balfour negotiations there was no question of the right of the Zionist participants to represent the Zionist membership of the World Zionist Congress. But why did the British extend a term such as "the Jewish people" to the Zionists' constituency, especially when the British were so careful to provide a disclaimer for non-Zionist Jews? In this document and later in the League of Nations mandate, why was not the genuine constituency of the Zionists termed "Zionist Jews" rather than "the Jewish people?" The only apparent explanation for the use of these words in the Balfour Declaration is found in the multi-purpose use of the Balfour Declaration. While the Zionists desired British assistance in securing a Palestinian

national home for them, the British wanted the support of the European Jews for their war aims. The Zionists offered the British such support from their "claimed international constituency of Jews" in return for British support of the Zionists' national aspirations at the end of the war.<sup>59</sup> What appeared to be a British humanitarian gesture was in fact motivated by political self-interest. The politics of the Balfour Declaration was described in Leonard Stein's study of the Declaration:

(T)he war years were not a time for sentimental gestures. The British Government's business was to win the War and to safeguard British interests in the post war settlement. Fully realising that these must in the end be decisive tests, Weizmann was never under the illusion that the Zionists could rely on an appeal of ad misericordiam. Zionist aspirations must be shown to accord with British strategic and political interests.<sup>60</sup>

In short, the Balfour Declaration was a trade between Zionists and the British. The losers in this political propaganda game were the Arabs and non-Zionist and anti-Zionist Jews.

One final aspect of the Palestine mandate which is of interest is the formal recognition in "Article Four" of the mandate of the World Zionist Organization as the public body representing Jewish interests in Palestine. After the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, the Zionist Executive headed by Chaim Weizmann settled in Palestine to promote political Zionist aspirations in that area. The League of Nations mandate gave formal recognition and political credibility to the activities of this body. "Article Four" of the mandate reads:

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the administration of Palestine (the British) in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the (author's emphasis) Jewish National Home . . . . The Zionist Organization (W.Z.O.) shall

be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the (author's emphasis) Jewish National Home.<sup>61</sup>

The terminology used in formulating "Article Four" demonstrates some subtle changes from the Balfour wording. Where the Balfour Declaration provided for "a national home for the Jewish people," Article Four stressed the establishment of "the Jewish National Home." Where the World Zionist Organization was not given specific representation of "the Jewish people," the W.Z.O. was now recognized, however, as "the Jewish agency." In short, "Article Four" was a rewording of the original Zionist draft proposal (see page 17) for the Balfour Declaration which had been rejected by the British only a few years before. The force of this change is even greater if one incorporates the section of the mandate preamble which provides for the "Jewish people" to "reconstitute" their national home in that country."<sup>62</sup> With the provisions of "Article Four," the Zionists had essentially achieved all of their original goals, including the wording desired.

"The appropriate Jewish agency" concept appears to have been a concession that the W.Z.O. was only acting provisionally on behalf of "the Jewish people" and would be duly reconstituted to include a more representative cross-section of Jews, i.e., non-Zionist Jews and anti-Zionist Jews.<sup>63</sup> Thus, paradoxically, the W.Z.O. was given international recognition as the representative body of world Jewry before it even attempted to broaden its representation. The concept of an "enlarged Jewish Agency" was amenable to the Zionists' plans and program. Not only would an enlargement of the Jewish Agency constituency lend credibility and strength to the Zionists' aspirations but also it would bring new monies into the struggling Zionist coffers.

### Early Zionism and the American Jewish Community

In thinking of enlarging the Jewish Agency, the Zionist leaders particularly "had in mind the leaders of the American Jewish community."<sup>64</sup> In many respects the American Jewish community was viewed as a large untapped resource for Zionist action. As Chaim Weizmann describes it:

Their philanthropies were manifold and generous, and Palestine might occasionally be included among them as a peripheral interest. They had done and were doing magnificent relief work for European Jewry during and after the First World War, but for one who believed that the Jewish Homeland offered the only substantial and abiding answer to the Jewish problem, their faith in the ultimate restabilization of European Jewry was a tragedy. It was heartbreaking to see them pour millions into a bottomless pit, when some of the money could have been directed to the Jewish Homeland and used for the permanent settlement of those very Jews who in Europe never had a real chance. They accused us Zionists of being doctrinaires, of being more interested in creating a Jewish homeland than in saving Jewish lives. Actually the shoe was on the other foot. They were too often the doctrinaires who gladly supported any worthy cause as long as it did not involve them in what they called Jewish nationalism.<sup>65</sup>

This statement brings into focus some of the fundamental differences between American Jewry and the European Zionists. On the whole, American Jewry in the 19th century and during the beginning decades of the 20th century were either non-Zionists or anti-Zionists (see Chapter II). What Zionists did step forward in American society were cultural Zionists such as Louis D. Brandeis who became an early leader of the American Zionist movement. They were philanthropically oriented and dedicated to bringing the stabilization to their coreligionists in Europe that they had found in this nation. Where European Jewish nationalism was a reaction to the forces of "emancipation," "assimilation" and "anti-semitism," American Jewry, already assimilated, were unable to conceptually identify with



the political Zionists' program. Many of the European political Zionists, on the other hand, did not want the "rich, assimilationist Jews of America . . . emasculat(ing)" their political goals "in the direction of philanthropy."<sup>66</sup> With the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, however, many Jews in the United States felt that the political goals of the W.Z.O. had been accomplished and that now the agency was merely a philanthropic body for aiding world Jewry and building up the Jewish community in Palestine.<sup>67</sup> When the enlarged Jewish Agency was signed into effect on August 14, 1929, many American Jewish groups sent delegates to participate in the Agency's activities. The feeling of a great portion of American Jewry at this time was expressed by Justice Louis Marshall:

You probably know that I am not a Zionist. I am, however, greatly concerned in the rehabilitation of Palestine, and I regard it to be the duty of every Jew to aid in that cause. Political Zionism is a thing of the past. There is nobody now in authority in the Zionist Organization who has the slightest idea of doing anything more than to build up the Holy Land and to give those who desire a home there the opportunity which they cherish.<sup>68</sup>

Marshall's statement demonstrates several grave misinterpretations. He first of all assumed that political Zionism was content with merely achieving the Balfour Declaration. Later, when it became evident to some segments of American Jewry that political Zionism was far from a "thing of the past" but rather a potent nationalistic movement, these groups gradually withdrew from the Jewish Agency until the Agency became again what it was originally: "another name for the (World) Zionist Organization."<sup>69</sup> Another mistaken impression expressed by Marshall was the linkage of the Zionist Organization with building up the "Holy Land." Such statements connecting religion to Zionism are helpful to Zionist

propagandists, but they hardly assist in clearly distinguishing the political from the religious. Finally, the overall impact of the Marshall statement tended to develop the confusion which still exists today between philanthropic desires to assist Jews and the monetary requirements of state-building.

Upon such thinking as expressed by Justice Marshall, the Zionists in the United States have built an effective domination of American public opinion. De-emphasizing Jewish nationalism which was antithetical to American Jewish sentiment and emphasizing the humanitarian, philanthropic and religious labels which draw such general support from Americans, political Zionism has been able to gain an immense following in this nation in its new guise. Confusing as it sounds, political Zionism has had to adopt an outer covering of cultural Zionism in order to sell its product to American Jewry and indeed to the American public and government at large. The next chapter delineates the changing fortunes of political Zionism in pre-World War II America and the conflicts which political Zionism wrought on the early American Zionist movement. Combined with Chapter III, Chapter II depicts the subtle transformations which political Zionism underwent in order to make their appeals to the American Jewish community. But while the rhetoric of the political Zionists changed to fit the practical needs of the movement, the actual goals and program of political Zionism have never changed. This distinction should be kept in mind throughout the reading of this thesis.

## CHAPTER I - FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> R.R. Palmer, A History of the Modern World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), pp. 596-603.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 401.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., pp. 508-509.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 509.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., pp. 660-668, 698-699; William L. Langer (ed.), An Encyclopedia of World History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962) *passim*.

<sup>6</sup> Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Palmer, op. cit., p. 606.

<sup>8</sup> S. Landman, "History of Zionism," Zionist Pamphlets, edited by H. Sacher, Leon Simon, and S. Landman (London: "The Zionist," 1916), Series III, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup> Peter G. J. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), pp. vii-ix, 3-17.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp. 3-17; Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 72-73.

<sup>11</sup> Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of The Jewish Question (D'Avigdor and Israel Cohen transl., 1943). p. 108 as quoted by W.T. Mallison, Jr., "The Zionist-Israel Juridical Claims to Constitute 'The Jewish People' nationality Entity and to Confer Membership in It: Appraisal in Public International Law," The George Washington Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 5, June 1964, p. 994.

<sup>12</sup> Ben Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 132.

<sup>13</sup> Louis Lipsky, A Gallery of Zionist Profiles (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1956), p. xxii.

<sup>14</sup> Leonard Stein (ed.), The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), Appendix, p. xxxi.

<sup>15</sup> Alfred M. Lilienthal, What Price Israel (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1958), p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> The Holy Bible, King James Version (New York: The World Publishing Company), p. 518.

<sup>17</sup> Samuel Halperin, The Political World of American Zionism (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961), p. 68.

<sup>18</sup> The Holy Bible, op. cit., p. 620.

<sup>19</sup> Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>20</sup> Jacob R. Marcus, as quoted in Halperin, op. cit., p. 22.

<sup>21</sup> Halpern, op. cit., p. 15; Safran, op. cit., p. 15.

<sup>22</sup> Herzl, op. cit., pp. 107-108, as quoted in Mallison, The George Washington Law Review, p. 1071.

<sup>23</sup> ibid., p. 39, as quoted in Mallison, The George Washington Law Review, p. 994.

<sup>24</sup> Halperin, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>25</sup> Mallison, The George Washington Law Review, op. cit., p. 998.

<sup>26</sup> ibid.; passim; Lilienthal, op. cit., passim; Halperin, op. cit. passim.

- <sup>27</sup> Halperin, ibid., p. 68.
- <sup>28</sup> Mallison, The George Washington Law Review, op. cit., p. 999.
- <sup>29</sup> Halperin, op. cit., p. 7.
- <sup>30</sup> Moses Lasky, Between Truth and Repose (American Council for Judaism, 1956), p. 1, quoting the World Zionist Organization Constitution, Article 2.
- <sup>31</sup> Halperin, op. cit., p. 132-154.
- <sup>32</sup> Frank C. Sahran, Palestine Dilemma: Arab Rights Versus Zionist Aspirations (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1948), p. 106.
- <sup>33</sup> Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error: the Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 84.
- <sup>34</sup> Halpern, op. cit., p. 154.
- <sup>35</sup> Weizmann, op. cit., p. 84.
- <sup>36</sup> Jacob A. Rubin, Partners in State Building (New York: Diplomatic Press Inc., 1969), p. 24.
- <sup>37</sup> Weizmann, op. cit., p. 84.
- <sup>38</sup> Phillip Knightley and Colin Simpson, The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), pp. 60-61; Palmer, op. cit., p. 509.
- <sup>39</sup> Knightley and Simpson, ibid.
- <sup>40</sup> Ralph H. Magnus, (ed.), Documents on the Middle East: American Interests in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969), pp. 12-26.
- <sup>41</sup> Weizmann, op. cit., p. 93.

<sup>42</sup> Mallison, The George Washington Law Review, op. cit., p. 1012.

<sup>43</sup> Magnus, op. cit., p. 27.

<sup>44</sup> Mallison, The George Washington Law Review, op. cit., p. 1012.

<sup>45</sup> Weizmann, op. cit., p. 207.

<sup>46</sup> Mallison, The George Washington Law Review, op. cit., p. 1006, as quoted from M. Feinberg and J. Stoyanovsky (eds.), The Jewish Yearbook of International Law, 1948, p. 27.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 1007, as quoted from the Jewish Yearbook of International Law, 1948, p. 41.

<sup>48</sup> Mallison, ibid., p. 1006.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., pp. 1011-1016.

<sup>50</sup> Population figures obtained from the Middle East Division, of the Legislative Research Section of the Library of Congress; Palmer, op. cit., p. 698.

<sup>51</sup> Sahran, op. cit., p. 96; Magnus, op. cit., p. 27.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>53</sup> League of Nations Covenant, Article 2, as quoted in Mallison, op. cit., p. 1030.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Mallison, op. cit., p. 1034.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 1032, as quoted from a speech given by Weizmann in Carlsbad, Germany, August 25, 1922.

<sup>57</sup> J. Stoyanovsky, The Mandate for Palestine: A Contribution to the Theory and Practice of International Mandates (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1928), p. 55.

<sup>58</sup> Since the issuance of the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations mandate, there has been a general trend to use the phrase "the Jewish people" to refer to the constituency of the W.Z.O. This has naturally confused the distinctions between Zionist and non-Zionist Jews, implicating all Jewry in the nationality claims of the Zionists.

<sup>59</sup> See explanation in Mallison, op. cit., p. 1003, footnote 86.

<sup>60</sup> Mallison, op. cit., p. 1012.

<sup>61</sup> Weizmann, op. cit., p. 304.

<sup>62</sup> Mallison, op. cit., p. 1031.

<sup>63</sup> Halpern, op. cit., p. 179; Weizmann, op. cit., p. 304.

<sup>64</sup> Weizmann, ibid.

<sup>65</sup> ibid.

<sup>66</sup> ibid., p. 306.

<sup>67</sup> ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Halpern, op. cit., p. 198.

<sup>69</sup> ibid., p. 195.

## CHAPTER II

### THE EARLY RECEPTION OF ZIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Once the goals and purposes of the political Zionist movement were formulated, the Zionists naturally turned to developing the strategy by which they hoped to realize their nationalist aspirations. In order to function effectively as an interest group, the Zionists were faced with two tactical problems: 1) the need to gain international acceptance and support of their group's interests and 2) the need to gain significant Jewish backing behind their nationalist program in order to give credibility and legitimacy to their claims to speak on behalf of world Jewry. In the preceding chapter, early Zionist strategies were discussed with reference to obtaining international recognition of the World Zionist Organization as a representative Jewish organization and international support of the Jewish-Zionist claims to a Jewish state in Palestine. As Great Britain was the major world power involved in the Palestine area prior to World War I, it was quite natural that Zionism focused its early attention and pressures on the British government. However, after World War I the Zionists, armed with the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations mandate, turned to their second tactical problem: the need to organize significant Jewish support behind their nationalist movement.

In seeking to involve the larger public of world Jewry in the Zionist movement, it was perhaps inevitable that the Zionists directed the greatest portion of their activity to the American Jewish community. The United States, even prior



to World War I, was rapidly gaining recognition as a world power. Realizing that American governmental support would ultimately be necessary for the realization of Jewish statehood, the Zionists required influence among American Jewry in order to gain effective access to the machinery of American politics. But beyond the potential political influence which American Jewry could afford the Zionist movement, the sheer numerical and economic strength of American Jewry made them an attractive target for the much needed monetary and ideological support which Zionism demanded. In essence, the United States was a large untapped resource which, if effectively cultivated, could lend Zionism the prestige, power and money that were prerequisites for Zionist success. Without the support of American Jewry, it is doubtful that Zionism would have been able to continue to flourish. But in attempting to sell American Jewry on Zionism, the Zionists faced formidable obstacles.

#### The Character of Early American Jewry

Sporadic support for a Jewish return to Palestine was found among American Jewry even prior to the 1897 World Zionist Congress. Indeed, a small delegation of American Jews attended the first formal meeting of the Zionist movement and returned to the United States to form an American Zionist organization.<sup>1</sup>

But despite the early vigor of Zionism in Europe, Zionism never became a strong force among American Jewry of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The explanation for this lack of early interest in Zionism is found in the dominant character and make-up of the American Jewish community of that time. Most of the American Jewish population of the late 19th century had escaped the onslaught of

anti-semitism in Europe and consequently lacked some of the feelings of identity and homogeneity which the later immigrants from the ghettos of Europe had formed in reaction to these historical currents. For the early Jewish immigrants of the United States the call of Zion was a distant dream compared to the immediate rigors of "making it" in their newly adopted American nation. This different cultural orientation of American Jewry caused most American Jews to view Zionism when it appeared here as

. . . a disturber of their peace of mind . . . an offense to their Americanism . . . an obstacle to Jewish adjustment in a democratic environment; it revived memories they wished to forget. The orthodox at the time were steeped in their traditions and rejected innovations; they believed in the Messiah and the Redemption of Zion, but God had to utter the word. The Jewish labor movement accepted the materialistic conception of history that came from the mind of Karl Marx; they had already written off Jewish nationality as one of the sacrifices the Jews would have to make for the world revolution; and they regarded Zionists as benighted reactionaries.<sup>2</sup>

What was it then that transformed the embryonic American Zionist movement from a small, decentralized peripheral group in American Jewish society to a cohesive and politically powerful group? A partial answer to this question lies in the constitution of the various groups of Jewish immigrants which came to this country.

Jews immigrated to this country in essentially three waves: 1) Sephardic Jewish immigration during colonial times and up to 1815; 2) German-Polish Jewish immigration from 1815 to 1880; and 3) East European Jewish immigration from 1880 on.<sup>3</sup>

The first wave of Jewish immigration consisting of Sephardic Jews (that is, Jews of Spanish and Portuguese origin) arrived from the Netherlands, England, and the European colonies of Central and South America. Although this first group of

Jewish immigrants was small in number, probably no more than several thousand, they soon became an influential part of American society. The political freedoms that the Sephardim had enjoyed in their previous national homes tended to produce a large number of middle-class merchants, and as they arrived in the United States, they were easily assimilated and accepted into the overwhelmingly Protestant population.

Since the Sephardic Jews had undergone western acculturation and had experienced some of the forces of the Enlightenment, they tended to be more secular in their religion and outlook than the later waves of Jewish immigrants to the United States. Although they held to their orthodox beliefs in Judaism, they were lax in their practice and participated fully in the social and political life of their adopted America. Because of these assimilationist tendencies among the Sephardim, the Zionists were unable to attract much popularity for Jewish nationalism among the early American Jewish immigrants. Nevertheless, the Sephardic Jews did hold on to their messianic hope for a restoration to the "Land of Promise," a hope which Zionists were eventually able to exploit in support of their cause (see Chapter III). As the outbreak of World War II brought the return to Palestine out of the realm of religious illusion and into reality for the descendants of these early Jewish immigrants, the rising expectations of the Sephardic Jews made them natural targets for Zionist influence.<sup>4</sup>

The second wave of Jewish immigration brought the Jewish population of the United States to over several hundred thousand. Having arrived from the various German states where economic and legal barriers still confronted Jewry,

these Jews tended to be relatively impoverished when they arrived, usually becoming peddlers and small shopkeepers in the Midwest, West and South. Nevertheless, the exposure to the doctrines of the Enlightenment while in Europe had developed a tendency in this group to lean toward a Reform movement of the more orthodox practices of the Judaic religion. More Jewish in their culture than the Sephardim, the German Jews nevertheless sought to shed the specific Jewish traits and religious practices that had separated them from society in the Old World. Like the Sephardim, they easily assimilated into American life and soon prospered into a solid middle-class base.<sup>5</sup>

Where the Sephardic Jews were uninterested in Zionism, this second wave of immigrants proved to be anti-Zionist, seeing Zionism as a tool for creating dual loyalties and blocking their attempts to assimilate into American society. But while this group of Jews was anxious to assimilate and be accepted as a part of society, their ties to their coreligionists still in Europe were strong. During both World Wars, these German Jews contributed generously to assist the war victims of the German states. The Zionists were eventually able to play upon these philanthropic ties in order to gain support for their nationalist movement.

The third and final wave of Jewish immigration came from Eastern Europe. Forced in many areas of Eastern Europe to live in compact masses, beset by the economic disasters of Europe and in some instances fleeing actual persecution, these Jews came to the United States "seeking refuge and a new life." But the social chasm between this group of Jewish immigrants and the earlier immigrants was wide. The Eastern European Jews possessed deep feelings of homogeneity and

a strong set of Jewish values and tradition. Greeted with the assimilationism of early Jewish immigrants and with the differing religious practices of the Americanized Jews, the last wave of Jewish immigrants tended to hold themselves apart from the rest of American Jewish society, becoming more militant and clannish in self-imposed American Jewish ghettos. They fought assimilation and preserved strong emotional attachments to their Jewish heritage. Poor to begin with, the rise in their socio-economic status in the United States has been termed "the greatest collective Horatio Alger story in American immigration history."<sup>6</sup> Given the wealth of the Eastern European Jews and given their strong anti-assimilationist tendencies combined with their overwhelming number (over 2 1/3 million prior to World War I), these Jews soon became the dominant force in American Jewish life. As American Jews of this heritage have come to gain leadership positions in Jewish organizations, their ideology has pervaded contemporary American Jewish life. And with the rise of Eastern European Jewry in the United States came the rise of Zionism.<sup>7</sup>

The effects of the waves of Jewish immigration was reflected in early Jewish organizational life. During the 1820's and 1830's the orthodox Sephardim dominated American Jewry because of their dominant numbers, but because of their Americanization, the Sephardim attempted no formal organization which would unite American Jewry.

During the 1840's a ritual murder accusation against some Jews in Damascus briefly aroused and united American Jews, causing one writer to date the development of a national American Jewish communal attitude from that decade.<sup>8</sup>

Efforts to weld American Jewry into one organization failed repeatedly, however, until another event occurred in Italy, which gave rise to "an embryonic nation-wide organization."<sup>9</sup> Reacting to a conflict between papal authorities and the Jewish parents of Edgar Montara over the possession and upbringing of the boy, American Jews "100,000 strong organized themselves into the Board of Delegates of American Israelites," a non-Zionist fund-raising and defense organization composed of many types of Jews.<sup>10</sup> The Board of Delegates never became well established, and eventually as the second wave of German Jews began to dominate American Jewry, the Board was absorbed into the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, a reform organization composed mostly of the new immigrants.<sup>11</sup>

In 1885 the first meeting of the entire American Jewish reform movement (organized into the Union of American Hebrew Congregations) took place in Pittsburgh and delineated eight principles of American Jewish belief, the most meaningful to this paper being number five:

The modern age heralds the approach of Israel's Messianic hope for the establishment of the kingdom of truth, justice and peace among all men. We consider ourselves no longer a nation but a religious community, and expect neither a return to Palestine, nor the restoration of sacrificial worship under the sons of Aaron, nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning the Jewish state.<sup>12</sup>

The statement of the Pittsburgh Conference of 1885 was remarkable in its prescience of the rise of Zionism in Europe and in its explicit rejection by early American Jewry of the Zionist precepts. Until Eastern European Jewish immigrants gained power in the American Jewish community just before World War I, the Pittsburgh statement set the tone for American Jewish attitudes toward Zionism. Representing, as it did, the thinking of both the Sephardic community and the

German Jews, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations and its accompanying Pittsburgh Platform has been described as "the closest approach American Jewry has ever made to a national representative body."<sup>13</sup>

Nevertheless, as the vast influxes of East European ghetto Jews arrived on the American Jewish scene, the Union was unable to appeal to the deep divisions among the segments of American Jewry. The Sephardic Jews abandoned the Union and founded in 1886 a seat for conservative Judaism in the Jewish Theological Seminary, today a Zionist-oriented group.<sup>14</sup> Other disaffected Jews, primarily German in background, established the American Jewish Committee in 1906, which in its early days formed a strong bastion along with reform Judaism against Zionist influences.<sup>15</sup> And the increasing numbers of nationalist minded Eastern European Jews finally broke away from the rest of the Jewish organizations, and in 1918 created the Zionist-oriented American Jewish Congress "to secure minority rights for the Jews of Eastern Europe and to effect some form of Jewish autonomy."<sup>16</sup> With the creation of the American Jewish Congress, "the hegemony of the earliest Judaist settlers, the Sephardic-German Jews, had ended," and the rise of American Zionism had begun.<sup>17</sup> The outbreak of World War I led to "a temporary truce between the competing groups within American Jewry," but the harmony among American Jewry was short-lived as the diverse ideologies of the groups conflicted over the proper means of aiding the Jewish victims of the war.<sup>18</sup> By World War I the predominant number of Jews in the American Jewish community were by inclination and heritage favorable targets for Zionist influence.

### Early Successes of Zionism in the American Jewish Community

By 1918 the Zionist Organization of America (Z.O.A.) a re-formed version of an earlier Federation of American Zionists, counted 150,000 paid Zionist members in its ranks as compared with the 15,000 registered Zionists in 1914.<sup>19</sup> Between the Z.O.A. and the American Jewish Congress, an organizational backbone was provided for American Zionism. Sharing leadership and membership (Rabbi Stephen Wise was president of Z.O.A. from 1936-1938 and head of the Congress from 1928-1949), the Z.O.A. and the American Jewish Congress became "virtually indistinguishable" after a constitutional reorganization of the American Jewish Congress in 1922 specifically pledged the Congress to a Zionist program.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, by 1918 American Zionism was strong enough to elect "a delegation to represent American Jewry at the Peace Conference."<sup>21</sup> Although it is quite debatable whether the Zionists at that point could rightfully speak for all American Jewry, much less even the East European Jewish immigrants, there was little doubt that the delegation was to present American Jewry as favorably disposed to the Zionists' aspirations:

They were to co-operate with representatives of other Jewish organizations, specifically with the W.Z.O., to the end that the Peace Conference might recognize the aspirations and historic claims of the Jewish people in regard to Palestine and might declare that in accordance with the British Government's Declaration, there shall be established such political, administrative, and economic conditions in Palestine as would assure, under the trusteeship of Great Britain, acting on behalf of such a League of Nations as might be formed, the development of Palestine into a Jewish commonwealth.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to the rise of Eastern European Jewry among the American Jewish community and the organizational bases founded for the nascent American American Zionist movement, two other factors contributed to the growth of



American Zionism. One factor was, of course, the Balfour Declaration (see Chapter 1). As Samuel Halperin wrote in his book on American Zionism, the Balfour Declaration made Zionism "respectable."<sup>23</sup> No longer was the nationalistic Zionist movement only the utterings of a minority of rabid European Jews. A world power had now recognized Jewish nationalism as a valid movement and given some credence and hope that in the not too distant future a Jewish national home would be established in Palestine. In the face of such a respectable document, it was difficult for Jews of any persuasion to cast aspersions on Zionist doctrine.

But perhaps more than anything else, Zionism was aided in the United States by the emergence of influential Americans into positions of leadership in the American Zionist organizations. Such talented and respected Jewish Americans as Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, U.S. Circuit Court Justice Julian Mack, Harvard law professor Felix Frankfurter and others joined the American Zionist movement, causing one Zionist writer to claim that "over-night, Zionism became fashionable."<sup>24</sup> In addition to respectability, however, these influential Americans afforded the American Zionist movement with "the best political connections of any Zionist party in the world."<sup>25</sup> The personal connections of Brandeis, Frankfurter and Rabbi Stephen Wise with the Wilson Administration have been held directly responsible for American support of the Balfour Declaration.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, by 1918 Rabbi Wise had received a personal letter from President Wilson supporting the essence of the Balfour Declaration long before formal governmental support was given either by the U.S. Congress or the Anglo-American Convention of 1924.

These early successes of American Zionism, nevertheless, cannot be viewed as "a conquering of public opinion" by political Zionism. American Zionism had evolved its own brand of Zionism replete with the political Zionist jargon of Jewish duty to aid in the up-building of Palestine but noticeably absent of strong statements of Jewish nationalism. Internal factionalism between political Zionists and the American Zionist leadership, specifically Brandeis and Mack, eventually led the Brandeis-Mack faction to break away from the American Zionist movement (see below).

A probe into the Brandeis defection of 1921 provides insight into two points. As an interest group, early American Zionism had relied on the charismatic leadership of respected American Jews to broaden its appeal. When Brandeis resigned as president of the Provisional Executive Committee for Zionist Affairs, Zionism lost much of its appeal, with membership falling between 1921 and 1929 to a low of 18,031.<sup>27</sup> As one author described American Zionism after the loss of the Brandeis leadership: "Zionism became just another philanthropy among numerous philanthropies."<sup>28</sup> Since the American Zionist movement of 1921 relied so heavily on respectable leadership for popular support, the Brandeis split with Zionism demonstrates the tenuous hold and appeal that political Zionism had on American Jewry in the post-World War I years.

A second point illustrated by the Brandeis denunciation of Zionism centers on the dispute between cultural Zionism and political Zionism. Brandeis, a cultural Zionist (i.e., philanthropic and humanitarian links to world Jewry and Palestine rather than any nationalistic aspirations) could not support in toto the

programs of the World Zionist Organization. In the confrontation between the W.Z.O. and the American Zionist leadership, American Zionism emerged wholly aligned with political Zionism in organization, ideology and program. Cultural Zionism became either absorbed in the goals of political Zionism, for many American Jews failed to perceive the very real distinctions between the two as Brandeis did, or cultural Zionists were removed, as in the case of the Brandeis group which could not bring itself to support the political-nationalist program of the world Zionist leadership in Europe.

#### The Brandeis Split of 1921

Chaim Weizmann, leader of the World Zionist Organization, made his first trip to the United States in 1921, arriving in New York on April 2nd. The expressed purpose of Weizmann's trip was to bring the American Zionists under the guiding hand of the W.Z.O. Weizmann had become increasingly concerned with the independent development that Zionism was taking in the United States. Recognizing that a primary tenet of successful interest group activity stressed the importance of unified control over the group's activities, Weizmann hoped that his trip to the United States would stem the recalcitrant American Zionists. Weizmann's ostensible purpose was to found an American Keren Hayesod (Palestine Foundation Fund, or United Israel Appeal) and to promote American interest in the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.<sup>29</sup>

Weizmann knew that his visit to the United States was not going to be eagerly met by the American Zionist leadership, and his suspicions were confirmed even before he left the boat in New York harbor. Judge Julian Mack brought a

letter to Weizmann aboard ship delineating the conditions under which the American Zionist leadership was prepared to support his mission in the United States. The letter spelled out the deep divisions which had grown up between the American Zionist organization and the W.Z.O. since wording of the Balfour Declaration. Where the W.Z.O. viewed the Balfour Declaration as but the beginning of their work of setting up a Jewish state in Palestine, the American Brandeis leadership saw it as the end--an accomplishment of governmental recognition of the right for a Jewish cultural and religious center in Palestine.<sup>30</sup>

The different interpretations of the Declaration again reflected the cultural Zionist tendencies of the American Zionist leadership: the greater emphasis on religion and the de-emphasis of Jewish nationalism. In this autobiography Weizmann expounded on the different positions of the W.Z.O. and Z.O.A. He related that Brandeis wanted "world Zionism to consist of strong local federations, so that the old unity which had been the background of the authority of our Congresses should be replaced merely by co-ordination."<sup>31</sup> Weizmann viewed this proposal of the Brandeis group as a denial of "the organic unity of world Jewry" and a "denial of Jewish nationalism," which, of course, it consciously was, given the uneasiness with which American Jewry viewed these concepts.

For Weizmann, on the other hand, "Zionism was the precipitation into organized form of the survival forces of the Jewish people." He was incensed at the Brandeis attempt to make of "Zionism merely a sociological plan" rather than "the folk renaissance that it was." In keeping with Brandeis' rejection of Jewish nationalism, Weizmann also was incensed at the Brandeis emphasis on "private

investment" and "individual project" methods for up-building Palestine. For Weizmann, large unattached contributions to the W.Z.O. were the only feasible way to set up the Jewish national home in Palestine.<sup>32</sup> The Brandeis group was bitterly opposed to proclaiming the Keren Hayesod as an affiliate of the Z.O.A. without being assured that the W.Z.O. would guarantee the independence of their organization and the distribution of collected monies. For Weizmann (and the distinguished delegation of European Zionists that he had brought together for this showdown with the American Zionist leadership), the Brandeis terms were unacceptable.<sup>33</sup> "In the end," Weizmann later stated,

(We) were compelled to break off relations with the Brandeis group, and I had to issue a statement to the American Jewish public that, by virtue of the decision of the last Zionist Conference, and of the authority vested in me as President of the World Zionist Organization, I declared the Keren Hayesod to be established in the United States.<sup>34</sup>

The audacity of Weizmann's announcement of an American Keren Hayesod is beyond question. One British diplomat in Washington declared that Weizmann had placed himself "in the position of President Wilson when he appealed to the Italian people over the heads of their duly constituted Government."<sup>35</sup> And not only did the European delegation from the W.Z.O. "officially" establish an American Keren Hayesod over the heads of the elected American Zionist leaders, they also assumed the job of "organizing and popularizing the fund."<sup>36\*</sup>

At the 24th Convention of the Z.O.A., the Brandeis group resigned in disgust, leaving the Z.O.A. virtually under the control of the European political Zionists. Since 1921, the American Zionist movement has been an inextricable

\* The Keren Hayesod is still functioning today under the new name of United Israel Appeal.

part of the international Zionist movement with organizational ties and obligations which extend far beyond the borders of the United States. Brandeis' hopes for an independent American Zionist organization had failed.<sup>37</sup>

### Conclusion

As this chapter has depicted, the bulk of the American Jewish community prior to World War I were either anti- or non-Zionist Jews, an assimilated population of Jewry whose ties to Palestine and world Jewry were basically religious and philanthropic. After World War I, the predominant number of American Jewry were comprised of Eastern European Jews whose ghetto experiences in Europe tended to make them favorably disposed to Zionist nationalism. Combined with the Balfour Declaration, the League of Nations mandate, and the 1921 undermining of the cultural Zionist leadership of American Zionism by the personal intervention of the W.Z.O., the political Zionist leadership in Europe had achieved the set of conditions which were required for political Zionism to become a viable force in American life. Their next strategic move was to capitalize on these conditions. In order to do this they needed to build an emotional appeal to political Zionism which would unify the material, moral, and political assistance of American Jewry around a sense of duty to aiding the cause of Israel. Despite the influx of Eastern European Jews, American Jewry was still composed of many diverse elements. The loss of Brandeis leadership and the lack of any real issues after the League of Nations mandate had made Zionism less attractive to American Jewry. By 1929, 18,031 paid Z.O.A. members were able to muster only \$2 million in contributions to Palestine. By 1948, however, almost 250,000 Z.O.A.

members remitted \$100 million to Palestine.<sup>38</sup> The forces behind this vast increase of Zionist popularity is both the story of world events and specific Zionist interest group activity. It is also the story which accounts for the general identification of American Jewry and political Zionist aspirations today.

## CHAPTER II - FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Samuel Halperin, The Political World of American Zionism (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961), p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Louis Lipsky, A Gallery of Zionist Profiles (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1956), p. 156.

<sup>3</sup> Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 183-184.

<sup>4</sup> Marshall Sklare (ed.), The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group (Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 4-44; and Gordon, ibid.

<sup>5</sup> ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Gordon, ibid., p. 185.

<sup>7</sup> Klare, op. cit., pp. 4-44; and Gordon, ibid., pp. 184-186.

<sup>8</sup> Oscar I. Janowsky, (ed.), The American Jew: A Reappraisal (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1964).

<sup>9</sup> ibid.

<sup>10</sup> ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Robert St. John, Jews, Justice and Judaism (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969), I. 127.

<sup>12</sup> ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Janowsky, op. cit., p. 18.

<sup>14</sup> St. John, op. cit., p. 202.



<sup>15</sup> Halperin, op. cit., p. 114.

<sup>16</sup> Janowsky, op. cit., p. 19.

<sup>17</sup> Alfred M. Lilienthal, What Price Israel (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), p. 17.

<sup>18</sup> Janowsky, op. cit., p. 19; and Halperin, op. cit., p. 196.

<sup>19</sup> Halperin, ibid., p. 12.

<sup>20</sup> ibid., pp. 150-153.

<sup>21</sup> Arthur Hertzberg (ed.), The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1959), p. 595.

<sup>22</sup> ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Halperin, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>24</sup> Jacob A. Rubin, Partners in State Building: American Jewry and Israel (New York: Diplomatic Press Inc., 1969), p. 48.

<sup>25</sup> Halperin, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>26</sup> ibid.

<sup>27</sup> ibid., p. 15.

<sup>28</sup> ibid., p. 12.

<sup>29</sup> Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949).

<sup>30</sup> ibid., p. 266.

<sup>31</sup> ibid., p. 267.

<sup>32</sup> ibid.

<sup>33</sup> ibid., p. 268.

<sup>34</sup> ibid., p. 269.

<sup>35</sup> ibid., p. 270.

<sup>36</sup> ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Halperin, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>38</sup> ibid., p. 15.

## CHAPTER III

### FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE RISE OF ZIONIST POPULARITY IN THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY

In terms of interest group activity, the political Zionists viewed the American Jewish population as a potential group from which to recruit additional membership support for the Zionist organizations. But beyond the need for increasing Zionist membership, political Zionism was more concerned with forming an American Jewish constituency in order to build an effective base of popular support.

Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan call such interest group constituencies "solidary groups," groups in which "egos are emotionally bound together in relation to (political) demands in the name of identified groups." In order for there to be a solidary group,

. . . the persons in the aggregate must take account of the perspectives of others, identify with others, be interested in their interests. This is not merely a number of egos making the same demands, for instance, but the demand is made in behalf of a self, including several egos."<sup>1</sup>

In the terms of William Gamson, "Interest groups are formal organizations which represent the demands of such solidary groups in the political system."<sup>2</sup> Solidary groups are therefore not interest groups in themselves but a group of individuals "who think in terms of the effect of political decisions on the aggregate and feel

that they are in some way personally affected by what happens to the aggregate."<sup>3</sup>

In this chapter several factors will be discussed which enabled political Zionism to build a feeling of solidarity among American Jewry. It should be remembered that solidary groups are emotionally linked to an interest group cause which does not necessarily signify that they have wholly adopted all of the interest group's tenets. Solidary groups are carefully cultivated constituencies for interest groups, but in the case of Zionism, for instance, this does not mean that all American Jews became Zionists. In the long run the existence of an emotionally tied solidary group means that an interest group can count on the loyal cooperation of a group of people "without having to specify in advance what cooperation will involve."<sup>4</sup> The emotional ties to an interest group form a basis of political trust in which the good of the group, rather than specific individual wants or desires, is seen bound up with the success of the interest group. This political trust becomes a kind of "diffuse support" which an interest group can rely on to further their cause.

In religious and ethnic matters the importance of building a solidary group is readily seen. Without building and maintaining a feeling of solidarity among a religious or ethnic group and without creating a base from which to influence this constituency, a religious or ethnic oriented interest group could not get very far in achieving its aims. For the Zionists, in particular, it was imperative that American Jewry be made to identify with the Jewish national home. Between 1929 and 1945 the Zionists were able to achieve effectively this goal.

### The Historical Factors

Leonard W. Doob in Public Opinion and Propaganda has stated that "public opinion remains latent until an issue arises for the group; an issue arises when there is conflict, anxiety and frustration."<sup>5</sup> Between 1929 and 1945 a series of events occurred which greatly assisted the promulgation of Zionism among American Jewry by generating a bond of emotional solidarity between the diverse elements of the American Jewish community. Successful Zionist capitalization upon these emotions helped to forge the bond between Zionism and American Jewry which is evident today. As one Jewish writer stated, this historical period produced events "which apparently aroused Jewish predispositions which could then be exploited by Zionist activity and propaganda."<sup>6</sup> Indeed, an adequate understanding of Zionist successes in this country cannot be discussed without some knowledge of the social context within which the Zionists were able to work.

The first event which notably aided the Zionist cause was the 1929 Arab riots against the continued immigration of Jews into Palestine. The emotion engendered by the news of the anti-Jewish riots brought on a reaction of "marked solidarity" among American Jewry for their fellow coreligionists in Palestine. Within a few months over \$2 million in emergency funds were collected to aid the riot victims, representing contributions from all segments of American Jewry. The Zionists were quick to capitalize upon this emotional unity of the American Jewish community. They held protest rallies and meetings, calling for an end to Jewish persecution in Palestine and affirming that such persecutions would continue until the Jews had their own national home in Palestine.<sup>7</sup> These meetings afforded

Zionists with the opportunity to cultivate non-Zionist support behind Zionist condemnation of the riots, thus projecting a front of Jewish unity on the Palestine question. Surrounding the Arab riots with a sense of "emergency," the Zionists were also able to persuade the Brandeis-Mack faction to return to the Zionist movement, a development which lent new cohesion and credibility to the political activities of the Zionists while at the same time providing charismatic appeal to capitalize on the emotions of American Jewry.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to the Arab riots, the arrival of the depression in the United States wrought great changes in the appeal of Zionism to American Jewry. The first effect of the depressed economy was to force a type of psychological solidarity on the American Jewish community. Economic disaster in their new home and lives brought about a temporary loss of faith in the American "Land of Promise," and American Jews began to view Palestine as a bright spot of hope in their depression-darkened world. Palestine was yet to be built; the entire future of Eretz Israel was waiting for discovery. Compared with the dismal outlook of the American Depression, Palestine provided a psychological uplift to the American Jewish community. The Zionists, as the recognized proponents of a return to Palestine, naturally profited from this revitalized interest in a Palestinian homeland. Indeed, Zionist leader Louis Lipsky spelled out the Zionist call:

When other hopes have lost their meaning . . . . when all else in Jewish life lies in confusion, the flag of ZION shall be held high as the symbol of national life reawakened . . . . . All other movements have lost their significance, and its devotees have lost their faith. If you will come now and tell the story of achievement in Palestine, thousands of Jews will espouse the cause . . . . . It is a moment of unusual opportunity. What could not be built up so speedily in times of prosperity may be built up now . . . .<sup>9</sup>

The second effect of the depression on American Jewry, however, was to act as a counterforce to the Jewish sentiments aroused in favor of Zionism. As Samuel Halperin described it, the economic difficulties of the depression adversely affected the Zionist movement in "quantitative terms,"<sup>10</sup> Where the Zionists recognized the great opportunities incumbent in Jewish depression sentiment for rallying American Jewry around Zionism, they were unable to function actively due to the very economic adversities which had given rise to these opportunities. During the depression years Zionist membership fell to a mere 9999 dues-paying members--hardly enough people to organize all of American Jewry. Fund-raising campaigns were dismal failures because of tight money. As the Zionist press of this period stated, the development of Zionist goals would have to wait for "more auspicious times to appear."<sup>11</sup>

World War II brought the Zionists their "more auspicious times." Where pre-World War II Zionist activity both abroad and in the United States had focused on selected targets such as the British government, the League of Nations, the American Zionist organizations and indirect appeals to the various segments of American Jewry, World War II served to catapult Zionist demands into a sympathetic and guilt-ridden public arena. Playing upon the sporadic attacks of anti-semitic American groups which had developed concomitant with Hitler's rise to power, Zionism developed its theme of the ineradicable presence of anti-semitism to enhance the feelings of insecurity and anxiety among American Jewry. The ruthless Nazi purges of Eastern European Jews added additional fire to the Zionist demands for statehood. In short, World War II provided all the elements which

Zionist propaganda could use in order to give proof to the validity of their goals.

Although historically the Zionists had expressed antipathy to philanthropism, the emotions of the war years generated public sentiment which reacted most favorably to humanitarian and philanthropic calls. Thus, the Zionist propaganda machines wrapped Jewish statehood in a flood of emotional, humanitarian labels. Portraying the critical events of the war years as direct threats to the interests of all Jews, including American Jewry, the Zionists were thus able to present their program to both American Jewry and the United States government as "the most logical (and most humanitarian) answer to the problems confronting the Jewish people."<sup>12</sup>

Some Jews, of course, reacted violently to the Zionists' political use of the tragedies of World War II. Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher of the New York Times, declared in 1946 that the "particular 'racial' absurdities of the Nazis" have not been banished with victory but "have given rise to other ridiculous 'racial' myths." Sulzberger further added:

I cannot rid myself of the feeling that the unfortunate Jews of Europe's D.P. camps are helpless hostages for whom statehood has been made the only acceptable ransom.

I acknowledge that those who view Jews as a race instead of a faith, and a faith only, as I do, have reasons for national aspirations which I do not share. I acknowledge that those to whom a Jewish state has been a life-long goal can be expected to pursue it even when the costs are high, but it seems to me that the costs of statehood today in terms of human suffering are greater than people can be asked to bear.

Although two years later the New York Times wholeheartedly supported the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, Sulzberger's statement was perhaps indicative of American Jewish opinion toward Palestine. Where the political Zionists were



calling for nothing less than a Jewish state in Palestine, Jews such as Sulzberger merely wanted Palestine opened as a haven for the Jewish D.P.s. But the distinctions between the two disparate goals were too subtle for most of American Jewry. Viewing Zionism as the salvation for Jewish war victims, American Jews swarmed to the Zionist movement, increasing Z.O.A. membership by some 2,900% between 1932 and 1948.<sup>14</sup> As one observer remarked: "History was on the side of the Zionist program."<sup>15</sup>

Historical events alone, however, cannot be held responsible for American Jewish support of Israel. Group action was required on the part of the American Zionist organizations to marshal and direct the aroused sentiments of the war years behind the Zionist aspirations. In directing their efforts behind organizing and defining the emotions of American Jewry, the Zionists were illustrating a primary principle of interest group behavior. Interest group activity is not a static process in which formal, set actions reproduce themselves in timeless monotony, producing a certain desired success. Rather, interest groups are governed by a host of interacting variables which combine to determine the favorable circumstances for interest group influence.<sup>16</sup> The events of the depression and war years might be viewed as necessary conditions for the rise of Zionist popularity but they can by no means be judged the sufficient conditions. Zionist planners had to capitalize effectively on the various emotions emanating from American society in order to insure that such emotions would develop into and remain a favorable basis for Zionist activity. As an intense study of Zionist strategies and tactics is beyond the scope of this paper, a few specific examples have been chosen to illustrate the usefulness of the

"propaganda factor" in Zionist activity. Chapter VI will provide further elucidation on the same theme.

### The Propaganda Factors

The unification of American Jewry behind a protest of the 1929 Arab riots in Palestine was paralleled by the creation of the Zionists' first organ of propaganda. In the fall of 1929 the American Zionist Organization created a Committee on Public Information to capitalize on the new feeling of solidarity among American Jewry. For several years the Committee functioned vigorously in such areas as

. . . interviewing government officials and foreign ambassadors, staging mass protest rallies, securing testimonials from President Hoover and other leading Americans and by establishing a Washington office for 'follow-up' purposes.

But the monetary limitations of the depression eventually made propaganda activities beyond the scope of the Z.O.A.'s budget.<sup>17</sup>

During the 1930's the Committee was sporadically revived. Rather than formulating a propaganda machine which would effectively and permanently underlie Zionist activity, however, the Zionists tended to utilize propaganda in a peace-meal manner, merely as a reaction to the various Jewish "emergencies" as they arose. A fragmented propaganda approach such as this did succeed in creating some identification between the defense and protection of Jewish rights and lives and the American Zionist movement, but it did little to turn this identification into an effective basis for Zionist activity.

World War II brought an end to the haphazard actions of Zionist propaganda. In 1939 the World Zionist Organization formed an American Emergency Committee for

Zionist Affairs (A.E.C.Z.A.) in New York City which was to act as the authority in Zionist affairs should the World Zionist headquarters in Jerusalem become embroiled in the impending hostilities. Although the A.E.C.Z.A. never had to assume this role, it did assume authority over the uncoordinated activities of American Zionism. The A.E.C.Z.A. organized as a public relations instrument to unite all the major Zionist groups for political action and to establish a daily network of propaganda to sell the American Jewish community on the Zionist program.<sup>18</sup> But the A.E.C.Z.A. itself lacked the necessary leadership which would enable it to effectively carry off its plans for American Jewry. The International Jewish Press Service described the problems of the A.E.C.Z.A. as follows:

. . . recurrent factional and personal differences . . . vacillation in policy and action; absence of centralized administrative direction; failure to adopt a definite program of activities and budgets wholly inadequate to the immensity of the task.<sup>19</sup>

American Zionism desperately needed to develop an effective and efficient organizational structure or lose the initiatives afforded by the war years.

In order to put an end to the Zionists' organizational confusion, Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization, again personally intervened in American Zionist affairs. At his urging a Rabbi Hillel Silver was given the leadership of a reorganized organization called the American Zionist Emergency Council. Under Silver's leadership, American Zionism developed into the grass-roots organization that it is today run from the top by a central Zionist executive, with funds and programs ruled by the "trickle down effect."

Silver's leadership proved a great boon to Zionist popularity. The many grass-roots Zionist groups established around the United States were immensely effective in building and maintaining "a broad secure base of public sentiment" not only among the Jewish community but in the larger public sector. Formerly, Zionist tacticians had employed direct organizational approaches to American Jewry and to American government leaders. The new, more personalized community organizations were predicated on a recognition that it is "the final approval of public opinion which in the final analysis determines the attitude and action of governments in democratic societies."<sup>20</sup> The hundreds of local Zionist emergency committees also made it possible for the Zionists to reach the anti- and non-Zionist Jewish population at the grass-roots level.

But above all, Rabbi Silver's leadership provided American Zionism with its first real opportunity to unite all American Jewry. Silver was the first American Zionist leader to transform the face of Zionist propaganda in order to capitalize effectively upon the numerous interests and dispositions of the American Jewish community.<sup>21</sup> If an American Jew would buy the up-building of a cultural center in Palestine, then that was what Zionism had to sell. If a reform Jew could tolerate philanthropic aid to European Jewry, then that was the Zionists' program. Indeed, from 1943 on Zionism has become a movement which holds all things for all people. Had Silver not broadened the appeal of Zionism, it is doubtful that the American Zionist movement would have ever gained the general support of American Jewry. As political Zionism had but the goal of obtaining a Jewish state in Palestine, there were many ways that their product could be packaged and sold. Zionism

became a religious movement extolling good Judaism as support of Zionism. Zionism became a philanthropic and humanitarian organization for the protection of world Jewry. Zionist became the organization dedicated to protecting Jewish culture. What Zionism projected least in Zionist propaganda was its nationalistic side which made claims to the national identity of all Jews. In this sweeping attempt to gain broad support from American Jewry, the majority of the American Jewish population found it easy to identify in part with the aspirations of Zionism. In doing so, the Zionists had succeeded in developing a psychological identification of the diverse segments of American Jewry with the Zionist movement, helping to form the American Jewish community into a solidary group for Zionist interests.

### The Organizational Factors

Thus far, this study of Zionist attempts at gaining an American Jewish constituency has concentrated on the historical events and propaganda tools which generated a sense of Jewish solidarity with the Zionist movement. Another factor which greatly enhanced the Zionists' ability to form a solidary group out of American Jewry, however, had to do with Zionist treatment of the existing Jewish organizational structure. The Zionists were not the only Jewish group vying for Jewish support. In order to defuse effectively their competition, therefore, the Zionists needed to gain not only the support of the Jewish community behind their aspirations but also the support of the variety of Jewish organizations.

Concomitant with the rise to power of Rabbi Hillel Silver in the American Zionist Emergency Council, American Zionists re-thought their strategies for gaining American Jewish support. Where newly formed grass-roots organizations would

reach the masses of American Jews, the Zionists also began to form a series of alliances with other Jewish organizations in order to reach the American Jewish leadership. As interest group theoretician David Truman observed:

... groups often find it essential to make alliances in order to assert their claims effectively. Alliances are a means of enlarging a public, and the facilities of allied organizations are channels through which a friendly group's propaganda may flow . . . such channels have for the membership of the allied group a prestige and influence greater than that of any "outside" group. Access to these channels, therefore, reduces the hazards facing an outside group.<sup>22</sup>

The Zionists recognized the need to dominate organizationally American Jewry. Once in control of Jewish organization, the Zionists would have: 1) defused all competition; 2) gained a means to unifying all segments of American Jewry; 3) gained credibility in their claims to speak for and represent American Jewry; 4) won some control over American Jewish thinking by controlling the socialization processes they experienced in their organizations; and 5) established a network of familiar organizations through which to channel their Zionist propaganda and program. All these elements were necessary for what Zionist Louis Lipsky termed the "prescription for a conversion of American Jewry."<sup>23</sup>

But the question was how to accomplish the "take-over."

As early as 1898 Theodor Herzl had realized the power that the utilization of democratic techniques could have on the practical political goals of political Zionism. He stated that:

(a)most everywhere the masses are with us. It is they who constitute as well as support the communities. Consequently their wishes must be carried out . . . . That there should be agitations in Jewish communities against Zion has become unbearable. The situation is absurd, impossible. We must end it. An election campaign must be begun

wherever the heads of the communities are not yet with us. Men with convictions similar to ours, worthy and capable of filling these distinguished positions, must be nominated and elected in the name of the national idea. The prestige of the Jewish community, the means at its disposal, the people whom it supports, must not be used to oppose the will of our people. Therefore I think I voice the sentiments of all of you, fellow delegates, in proposing to make the conquest of the Jewish communities one of our immediate aims.

... We must not content ourselves with knowing to what extent the Zionist idea has laid hold of Jewry. The facts must be demonstrated. The ballot is the only suitable, wholly unexceptionable means to this end.<sup>24</sup>

Herzl's advocacy of democratic techniques was especially necessary in the United States where groups were expected to compete democratically for the resources of society. The American Jewish Conference of 1943 illustrates an effective example of the "democratic take-over" of Jewish organizational structure by American Zionists.

#### "The American Jewish Conference of 1943"

After the outbreak of World War II, it has been mentioned that American Jews became increasingly interested in the land of Palestine as a means of aiding the Jewish victims of the war. Capitalizing on this interest, American Zionists decided to bring all the major Jewish organizations together to discuss the status of Palestine, fully realizing that the emotions of the time were favorable for the presentation of their program. The first step in this strategy was to attempt to bring all the factionalized Zionist parties together in order to coordinate activities and build strength behind the attempt to enlist Jewish organizations behind the Zionist program.

The four major Zionist groups in the United States met in New York's Biltmore Hotel on May 11, 1942 to discuss the future direction of their activities.

Spurred on by some of world Zionism's most charismatic leaders, the Zionist parties unified behind an authoritative statement of Zionist policy supported by the World Zionist Organization. . . . Termed the Biltmore Program, this statement called for all American Zionists to mobilize the entire American Jewish population behind a political program directed at establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. . . . It proposed that the Mandate over Palestine be terminated and that Palestine be recognized as the sovereign state of the Jews. . . . It further called for the creation of a national Jewish army in Palestine for the protection of the Jews and, finally, that the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem "be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with the authority for the upbuilding of the country, including the development of its occupied and uncultivated lands."<sup>25</sup> The Jewish Agency in Jerusalem denounced the Balfour Declaration upon the issuance of the Biltmore Program and adopted the new statement as official Zionist policy.<sup>26</sup>

The Biltmore Program made explicit the Zionists' desires for a state in Palestine and not just a homeland. . . . It mentioned specifically the word "state" rather than all the previous vague terminology of "a national homeland for the Jewish people," "the Jewish National Home," "a Jewish commonwealth," etc. . . . It called for an army and greater freedom of action for the Jewish Agency (the same as the World Zionist Organization). . . . The Biltmore Program effectively demonstrated American Zionism flexing its muscles. . . . Feeling confident in the ultimate success of their aspirations, given the enormous assistance which Nazi atrocities had afforded them, the American Zionists were now prepared to sell subscriptions to Zionism as a Jewish obligation. . . . In both the American Jewish community and



the broader American public at large, the Zionists felt that they could list demands now and not requests. With the Biltmore Program, American Zionists finally formulated and publically claimed the ultimate aim of their movement. Where in the past American Zionists had concentrated on the practical task of "building the Jewish National Home," they now felt confident in openly pursuing the creation of the Jewish state in Palestine.<sup>27</sup>

American Zionists began to implement the provisions of the Biltmore Program immediately. In 1943 the Zionists persuaded the president of B'nai B'rith to call a preliminary conference of national Jewish membership organizations. B'nai B'rith, one of the most respected non-partisan Jewish charitable organizations in the United States, was the perfect "front" host for the conference. The Zionists were assured that B'nai B'rith would host the conference due to the Zionist proclivities of the organization's president, and the universal appeal of B'nai B'rith to all segments of American Jewry also assured a favorable turnout for the conference. The Conference was held. Only two groups refused invitations: the American Jewish Committee (see Chapter II) and the Jewish Labor Committee, "the official voice of the Jewish worker" and dominated by Marxist inclined Jews. The preliminary conference decided to convene an American Jewish Assembly to arrive at a "common program of action in connection with Post-war problems." The terms of participation in the Assembly were fixed by a Zionist-led Executive Planning Committee to assure entrance to all organizations regardless of size.<sup>28</sup>

The American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Labor Committee finally agreed to send delegates after the Executive Committee agreed to change the name

to "American Jewish Conference" to meet objections that the word "Assembly" implied "a separate political enclave . . . through which sections of America's population would rule themselves, deal with the national government or negotiate with other governments in the interest of their group." The Executive Committee also had to concede the right "of any participating organization to dissent from, and so dissenting, not be bound by, the conclusions of the Conference."<sup>29</sup> After a series of skirmishes over objections to "representation" standards to the Conference, the Zionists settled down to organize local community elections in order to assure that a maximum of Zionist-oriented delegates would be elected to the Conference. The result of the Zionist election organization was that Zionists comprised 63% of the delegates to the Conference.<sup>30</sup>

Needless to say, the Conference passed a common resolution on Palestine echoing practically verbatim the provisions of the Biltmore Program. Although there was some serious question over whether the Zionists had rigged the entire Conference or whether they had legitimately won the day through democratic procedures, the American Jewish Conference provided American Zionism with legitimization of their claims to "representativeness" and "majority rule," and allowed them to claim successfully the approval of organized Jewish opinion for Zionist objectives. Of all the groups at the Conference, only the American Jewish Committee withdrew its support of the Conference statement. Nonetheless, for the practical purposes of the Zionists, Jewish organizational unity had been achieved.

### Conclusion

Chapters II and III have demonstrated a number of hypotheses about interest group behavior. In Chapter II the early difficulties which Zionism faced in gaining support for its program centered on the nature and predispositions of the Jewish public it was trying to influence. Before Zionists could effectively make demands on the American Government, this Jewish public had to be won and the dissenting elements neutralized. The Zionists were aided considerably in their attempts to gain American Jewish support by the vast influxes of East European Jews which shared in part Zionist inclinations. But the favorable predispositions of this group alone were not enough to unify American Jewry behind Zionism. The quality of Zionist leadership, the propaganda techniques of the Zionist information organs, the ability of the Zionists to demonstrate Jewish organizational support and effectively defuse organizational competition for Jewish support, and specific world conditions must all be taken into account in an explanation of Zionist fortunes in the United States.

In addition, early Zionist activity in the United States also demonstrated David Truman's hypothesis that the success of an interest group often hinges on "the extent to which its objectives and methods are congruent with the prevailing values" of the constituency and "political world" within which it works.<sup>31</sup> American Zionism was limited in both numbers and resources primarily at those times when the prevailing world conditions were not favorable to the promulgation of their ideology (the depression years were an exception to this principle). Without issues, the Zionist movement withered. With issues, it flourished and grew.

Between 1929 and 1945 the Zionists were presented with a set of events which drastically improved their ability to influence American Jewry. By the end of World War II, the Zionists had ironed out their own internal organizational and leadership problems; by 1942 the Zionists had developed a specific program of activity; and by 1943 and the American Jewish Conference, no organized Jewish group (save a few rare exceptions) were willing to speak out against Zionism and become a "wrecker of Jewish unity and welfare." In short, American Zionism had developed into a force sans equal in the American Jewish community.

Another point illustrated by Zionist activity centers on the dramatic changes which new Zionist propaganda techniques brought to the movement's ability to influence American Jewry. Rabbi Silver's leadership effectively demonstrated that the ability of an interest group to make successful appeals is often in direct proportion to the relative scope of those appeals. Where the early calls for support of Jewish nationalism fell on deaf ears, broadened, and, one may say, localized themes of political Zionism attracted wide following.

Finally, the history of American Zionism in the Jewish community demonstrates the achievement of the ultimate goal of an ethnic group interest such as Zionism: "the greater the success achieved by an interest group, the more difficult it becomes to identify it as a discrete unit."<sup>32</sup> As the Zionist program became accepted by a wider portion of the American Jewish public, it became virtually impossible to distinguish Zionist Jews from non-Zionist Jews. The height of Zionist success had been reached at the end of World War II: American Jewry had become a solidary group for the Zionist program. In doing so, American Jewry

became a network of unorganized allies for Zionist claims. In essence, American Jewry became identified with Zionism and vice versa. In describing the phenomenon, Samuel Halperin has stated that some authors have tried to argue that political Zionism in the United States sold out to "the lure of philanthropy" and that Jewish philanthropy took on the "minimal political program" of Zionism.<sup>33</sup> Perhaps there is truth in both of these statements. In order to sell political Zionism to the larger Jewish public, political Zionists were forced to appeal to the strong philanthropic tendencies among American Jewry. And for the American Jews who had long supported the security and well-being of European and Palestinian Jewry, political Zionism became the sole effective organization within which to express their philanthropy.

### CHAPTER III - FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 34-36.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

<sup>5</sup> Leonard W. Doob, Public Opinion and Propaganda (New York: Henry Holt, 1948), p. 57.

<sup>6</sup> Samuel Halperin, The Political World of American Zionism (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961), p. 16.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Speech by Louis Lipsy as quoted in Halperin, Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>13</sup> The New York Times, October 27, 1946, p. 21.

<sup>14</sup> Halperin, op. cit., p. 327.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>16</sup>Harry Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics (California: Stanford University Press, 1960), *passim*.

<sup>17</sup>Halperin, op. cit., pp. 266-267.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., pp. 253-280.

<sup>19</sup>As reported in Halperin, ibid., pp. 269-270.

<sup>20</sup>Statement by Rabbi Hillel Silver as quoted in Halperin, ibid., p. 271.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 270-278.

<sup>22</sup>David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 251-252.

<sup>23</sup>Louis Lipsky, A Gallery of Zionist Profiles (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1956), p. 55.

<sup>24</sup>Federation of American Zionists, The Congress Addresses of Theodor Herzl (New York: Zionist Press, 1917), pp. 11-12.

<sup>25</sup>Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (ed.), The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 94; and Halperin, op. cit., p. 222.

<sup>26</sup>William Yale, The Near East (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958), p. 406.

<sup>27</sup>Halperin, op. cit., p. 222.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., pp. 219-251.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 226.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., pp. 219-251.

<sup>31</sup>Truman, op. cit., p. 248.

<sup>32</sup>Halperin, op. cit., p. 315.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 316.

## CHAPTER IV

### ZIONISM AND THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: EVOLUTION OF A MID-EAST POLICY

In terms of the political process there are usually two primary actors involved in the function of decision-making. The "authorities" who make the binding decisions in a political system and the "potential partisans" or those who are affected by the outcome of a given decision in some "significant" way. William Gamson in Power and Discontent has described the functions of these two actors in the following way. Groups affected by the decisions of authorities attempt to influence the authorities in the direction of support of their claims. The authorities, on the other hand, attempt to exercise a type of social control over the actions of potential partisans which "can potentially disrupt the orderly function of the system."<sup>1</sup> Political power in this perspective becomes an instrument by which both authorities and potential partisans try to affect alternative selection in decision-making. The relation between authorities and potential partisans is therefore essentially conflictual with the resolution of this conflict dependent on the interaction of such properties as the potential and actual amount of resources held by a group; the relative insulation of authorities from pressure; the ability of authorities to use sanctions, persuasion and cooptation to quell partisan activity; and the ability of the partisans to provide constraints, inducements and persuasion to influence the decisional outcome.<sup>2</sup>



In this chapter an attempt shall be made to demonstrate that the relationship between American Zionism (as potential partisans) and the American government (as an authority) runs directly counter to this usual format for decision-making activity. A case shall be made to support the hypothesis that the American government has abrogated, whether as a conscious or unconscious policy, a great deal of its Middle East policy formulations to the American Zionist group, and some of the reasons for this abrogation of power will be offered. Selected examples in history have been chosen to illustrate these points.

Politically, U.S. policy toward the Middle East remained essentially neutral prior to American entry into World War I. American foreign policy prior to April 2, 1917 barred "entangling alliances, participation in extra-continental affairs and the meddling of other powers in American matters."<sup>3</sup> Given this tradition of isolationism, Zionist attempts to involve the American government in Jewish nationalism were sporadic and notably unsuccessful. Between 1897 and 1917 political Zionism focused its attention primarily upon influencing more amenable world powers and to gaining a foothold in the American Jewish community (see Chapters I and III). The Herzl Year Book even labeled Zionist aspirations during this period as virtually "extraneous to American foreign policy."<sup>4</sup>

American entry into World War I greatly increased the Zionist interests in the Mid-East policy of the U.S. government. However, the Zionists soon discovered that President Wilson had more global concerns than Jewish national claims to Palestine. Indeed, Wilson's first hope was to bring peace to the world, and his hopes centered strongly on Turkey. Throughout the war effort, American

attempts to wean Turkey away from the Central Powers made it impolitic for the American government to express any support for Zionist nationalism.

Despite the unfavorable circumstances found during the war years, however, the Zionists were still able to exert effectively some influence on the direction of American foreign policy by circumventing direct activity with the government. The so-called Morgenthau Mission of 1917 is illustrative of the Zionist tactics during the years when the American government was "off-limits."

#### The Morgenthau Mission of 1917

Two weeks after the American declaration of war against Germany, Turkey severed diplomatic relations with the United States, but the two nations made no official declarations of war against one another. President Wilson, in the hope of breaking Turkey away from the Central Powers, embarked on a set of secret diplomatic actions aimed at accomplishing this goal. Colonel House, Wilson's aide, was instructed to sound out the British reaction to a separate treaty with Turkey. After careful negotiations, House reported back to the White House that Mr. Balfour had agreed that ". . . if Turkey . . . were willing to break away from Germany . . . certain concessions should be made to them . . ." <sup>5</sup>

With what amounted to British approval, Wilson set out to test whether his theories on Turkey were feasible. <sup>6</sup> Henry Morgenthau, a former ambassador to Turkey, was chosen to head the delicate mission. In order to disguise the secret nature of the mission, it was decided that it should be presented as a humanitarian effort to investigate the needs of the Jewish communities in Palestine. <sup>7</sup>

The Zionists naturally saw the Morgenthau Mission as antithetical to their hopes, fearing that Palestine might be traded for Turkey's break from Germany.<sup>8</sup> Justice Louis D. Brandeis learned of the mission and carefully pressured Secretary of State Lansing to include Felix Frankfurter, then assistant to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, in the Morgenthau Mission. The treasurer of the Federation of American Zionists (predecessor to the Zionist Organization of America), E.W. Lewin-Epstein, was also included.<sup>9</sup> The argument which induced Lansing to include these men centered on the fact that these two well-known and respected Zionists would provide more credibility to the "humanitarian mission."<sup>10</sup> Whether Justice Brandeis knew the true nature of the mission is unclear, but his actions seem to point to the fact that he had his suspicions. As the Herzl Year Book study of that year stated:

Professor Frankfurter's inclusion in the Morgenthau Mission was not mere whimsy by Brandeis. His motivations were clear, for he knew that Frankfurter would stymie any rash action by Morgenthau which might endanger or run counter to Zionist plans for Palestine.<sup>11</sup>

After attaching two Zionists to act as "watchdogs" on Morgenthau, Brandeis then cabled Chaim Weizmann in England in June of 1917. He only told Weizmann that "an American commission was traveling to the East and that (he) should try to make contact with it somewhere."<sup>12</sup> There were no other details in the Brandeis communication.

From the British Foreign Office Weizmann learned that "attempts were being made to detach Turkey from the Central Powers." Weizmann also discovered that British and French representatives were going to meet with Morgenthau in Europe before he proceeded on to Turkey. After discussions with Balfour,

Weizmann was sent to Gibraltar as the British representative, an ironic choice given Balfour's earlier statement of support for the mission. There, in Weizmann's own words, "it was no job at all to persuade Mr. Morgenthau to drop the project," despite the fact that the French representative, Colonel Weyl, had brought French support of the mission to the meeting.<sup>13</sup> One can only surmise from this meeting that Weizmann was a man of immense persuasive talents. Whatever his personal effect on Morgenthau, between Weizmann, Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Lewin-Epstein, the Morgenthau Mission never got past Gibraltar. The Zionists had helped to scuttle the mission and with it whatever hopes there were for a separate peace with Turkey.

#### Zionism During the Inter-War Period

At the conclusion of World War I, the United States became involved in the Middle East in terms of the peace settlement and the Balfour Declaration. With the British primarily responsible for Palestine and no doubt because of his close personal relationship with Wise, Wilson saw no difficulties in sending a private letter in 1918 to the American Jewish leader Rabbi Stephen Wise supporting the Jewish homeland concept. On June 11, 1918 the Zionist Organization of America, armed with a large constituency of American Jews and the politically respected leadership of Justice Brandeis, sent a letter to all members of Congress requesting their views on the Balfour Declaration for publication in a Z.O.A. book. The letter responses listed an overwhelming number of vague but affirmative responses.<sup>14</sup> Four years later, on September 21, 1922, a joint resolution

of Congress was passed, giving formal U.S. approval to the entire Balfour Declaration.

### "The King-Crane Commission"

That these early formulations of U.S. Middle East policy were based on anything but informed knowledge is aptly demonstrated by the fact that the only official American study of the Palestine question between 1919 and 1946 called for a different response to Jewish nationalism in the spirit of America's national interests in the Middle East. The findings of the commission are also significant in their indication of the high esteem enjoyed by this country in the Arab world a half-century ago.

After lengthy interviews with a large number of Palestinian and Syrian people, the King-Crane Commission turned in the recommendation that the unity of Syria (meaning Syria, Lebanon and Palestine) be preserved and that if a mandate was necessary, the overwhelming preference of the population of these areas was for the United States to assume a single mandate over the entire area. The report stated:

They declared their choice was due to knowledge of America's record; the unselfish aims with which she had come into the war; the faith in her felt by the multitude of Syrians who had been in America; the spirit revealed in American educational institutions in Syria, especially the college in Beirut, with its well-known and constant encouragement of Syrian national sentiment; their belief that America had no territorial or colonial ambitions, and would willingly withdraw when the Syrian State was well-established as her treatment of both Cuba and the Philippines seemed to illustrate; her genuinely democratic spirit; and her ample resources.<sup>15</sup>

In addition, the commission devoted a long paragraph to their assessment of Zionism in the Middle East.

We recommend, in the fifth place, serious modification of the extreme Zionist Program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State.

(1) The Commissioners began their study of Zionism with minds predisposed in its favor, but the actual facts in Palestine, coupled with the force of the general principles proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the Syrians have driven them to the recommendation here made.

(2) The Commission was abundantly supplied with literature on the Zionist program by the Zionist Commission to Palestine; heard in conferences much concerning the Zionist colonies and their claims; and personally saw something of what had been accomplished. They found much to approve in the aspirations and plans of the Zionists, and had warm appreciation for the devotion of many of the colonists, and for their success, by modern methods, in overcoming great natural obstacles.

(3) The Commission recognized also that definite encouragement had been given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr. Balfour's often quoted statement, in its approval by other representatives of the Allies. If, however, the strict terms of the Balfour Statement are adhered to--favoring "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine"--it can hardly be doubted that the extreme Zionist Program must be greatly modified. For a "national home for the Jewish people" is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the "civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conference with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase.

In his address of July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the following principle as one of the four great "ends for which the associated peoples of the world were fighting": "The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior

influence of mastery." If that principle is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine--nearly nine-tenths of the whole--are emphatically against the entire Zionist program. The tables show that there was no one thing upon which the population of Palestine was more agreed than upon this. To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted, and of the peoples' rights, though it kept within the forms of law.

It is to be noted also that the feeling against the Zionist program is not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally by the people throughout Syria, as our conferences clearly showed. More than 72 per cent--1350 in all--of all the petitions in the whole of Syria were directed against the Zionist program. Only two requests--those for a united Syria and for independence--had a larger support. This general feeling was only voiced by the "General Syrian Congress" in the seventh, eighth and tenth resolutions of their statement (paras. 7, 8, 10, Doc. 25) . . . .

The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist program could be carried out except by force of arms. The officers generally thought a force of not less than fifty thousand soldiers would be required even to initiate the program. That of itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist program, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria. Decisions, requiring armies to carry out, are sometimes necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of a serious injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, that they have a "right" to Palestine, based on an occupation of two thousand years ago, can hardly be seriously considered.

There is a further consideration that cannot justly be ignored, if the world is to look forward to Palestine becoming a definitely Jewish state, however gradually that may take place. That consideration grows out of the fact that Palestine is "the Holy Land" for Jews, Christians and Moslems alike. Millions of Christians and Moslems all over the world are quite as much concerned as the Jews with conditions in Palestine, especially with those conditions which touch upon religious feeling and rights. The relations in these matters in Palestine are most delicate and difficult. With the best possible intentions, it may be doubted whether the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or Moslems proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of the Holy Land as a whole. The reason is this: the places which are most sacred to Christians--those having to do with Jesus--and which are also sacred to Moslems,

are not only not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply impossible, under those circumstances, for Moslems and Christians to feel satisfied to have these places in Jewish hands, or under the custody of Jews. There are still other places about which Moslems must have the same feeling. In fact, from this point of view, The Moslems, just because the sacred places of all three religions are sacred to them, have made very naturally much more satisfactory custodians of the holy places than the Jews could be. It must be believed that the precise meaning in this respect, of the complete Jewish occupation of Palestine has not been fully sensed by those who urge the extreme Zionist program. For it would intensify, with a certainty like fate, the anti-Jewish feeling both in Palestine and in all other portions of the world which look to Palestine as "the Holy Land."

In view of these considerations, and with a deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners feel bound to recommend that only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up.

There would then be no reason why Palestine could not be included in a united Syrian State, just as other portions of the country, the holy places being cared for by an International and Inter-religious Commission, somewhat as at present, under the oversight and approval of the Mandatory and the League of Nations. The Jews, of course, would have representation upon this Commission.<sup>16</sup>

In view of the strongly worded recommendations and warnings of the King-Crane Commission, it remains an irony of American foreign policy that this sole presidential commission study of the Middle East and, indeed, the first direct political involvement of the United States in the Mid-East, should have carried so little weight in policy determinations in the years ahead. One can only surmise that stronger factors were at work which overshadowed the clear statement of recommended policy of the King-Crane Commission.

After the death of President Wilson, the United States returned to its policy of isolationism, and Zionist political activity again fell to low ebb. The center of Zionist political activity during these remained in Europe, with the focal



point of Zionist influence attempts centered on Great Britain where the mandatory power for Palestine was held. The Zionists continued, however, to direct their attentions to gathering an effective base of support within the American Jewish community. After World War I, American Jewry became an important source of Zionist support in terms of material contributions to the up-building of Palestine (see Chapter III). In addition, as Samuel Halperin observed, a "favorable Jewish opinion toward Zionist objectives was a necessary precondition of any effective Zionist demand on the American government."<sup>17</sup> In recognition of this, the Zionists directed increased effort on the American Jewish population.

#### Zionism During and After World War II

As related in Chapter III, the beginning of World War II brought on a miraculous growth of Zionist activity in this country. In 1939 the establishment of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs in New York marked the transfer of world Zionist leadership from war-torn Europe to the safer shores of the United States.

By 1941 the newly formed A.Z.E.C. under Rabbi Silver's leadership extended its activities to include the organization of non-Jewish Americans who supported Zionism (see Chapter III). An American Palestine Committee was formed with then Senator Robert Wagner as chairman. The purpose of this committee was "to serve as a vehicle for the expression of sympathy and good-will of Christian America for the movement to establish the Jewish National Home in Palestine." The wording of this purpose is interesting in the fact that the Zionists were still employing the National Home concept rather than a clear statement of

Jewish statehood and continued to employ emphasis on the humanitarianism involved in the support of the Zionist program. As the atrocities of the war immensely aided the Zionists in popularizing their cause, membership in the Committee rose to 15,000 by 1945, including sixty-seven U.S. Senators, 143 Congressmen, twenty-two governors, editors, writers, civic leaders, clergymen, publishers, distinguished jurists and educators.<sup>18</sup>

The formation of the Committee caused some problem in the Allied war camp. The British particularly urged the U.S. government to try to disband the Committee since it caused them serious difficulties in their negotiations with Arab countries which viewed the Committee as committing the United States to a pro-Zionist, anti-Arab position.<sup>19</sup> Despite diplomatic appeals, however, the Zionists had gained sufficient strength behind their cause to make it impolitic for the American government to try to control their activities. The British appeals were answered negatively, and the Zionists were left unencumbered to carry on in their selling of Israel.

By the years 1944-45 Zionist membership had risen to nearly a half-million people, a stunning tribute to the Zionists' effective organization and capitalization on American reaction to the atrocities of the war (see Chapter III). Both the Democratic and Republican election platforms supported the Zionist program. The particular wording of the platforms also demonstrated the effectiveness of the Zionists' campaigns against the British White Paper which, in an attempt to lessen the friction in Palestine, restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine.<sup>20</sup> The GOP Platform adopted on June 27, 1944 read:

In order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jewish men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration and land ownership so that in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of a Republic Congress in 1922, Palestine may be constituted as a free and democratic commonwealth.<sup>21</sup>

The Democratic Platform adopted one month later echoed the GOP stand:

We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization and such policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.<sup>22</sup>

The fact that the two major parties of American politics felt it necessary to make such a direct appeal to Zionist sentiment is indicative of the political strength which Zionism had achieved during the war.

In the United States Congress the Zionists achieved similar success. By 1944 seventy-seven Senators from forty-eight states and 318 Representatives from forty-eight states had expressed support in favor of "the Jewish National Home in Palestine."<sup>23</sup> Hundreds of pages of pro-Zionist material, including many direct appeals from the World Zionist Organization, had appeared in Senate and House hearings. And nearly every Congressman up for election had made campaign pledges supporting the Jewish National Home in order to appeal to local Jewish populations.<sup>24</sup> By the end of the war, the Zionists had gained many friends in the U.S. Congress and were effectively aided by their own network of in-Congress lobbyists for the Zionist cause.

During the war years, direct presidential influence was made impossible because of American involvement in the war. As interest group activity is often determined by the effective channels of access opened to the group, it was natural

that the Zionists employed this time to gain support with Congress and the nation's political parties. After the war, however, attempts to influence directly the White House were possible and were greatly assisted by President Harry S. Truman's personal reaction to the war atrocities.

As the stories of Hitler's purges filtered out of Europe, President Truman, no less than the American public, was deeply and emotionally affected by the tragic plight of the Eastern European Jews. Truman's sincere sympathy for the plight of the Jews tended to make him ignore his State Department's suggestions to go slow on the Palestine problem "with a view to the long range interests of the country."<sup>25</sup> In speaking of the State Department's position on Palestine, Truman expressed his personal feelings on the problem:

I was skeptical, as I read over the whole report up to date, about some of the views and attitudes answered by the "striped-pants boys" in the State Department. It seemed to me they didn't care enough about what happened to the thousands of persons who were involved. It was my feeling that it would be impossible for us to watch out for the long-range interests of our country while at the same time helping these unfortunate victims of persecution find a home.<sup>26</sup>

Truman's genuine sympathy for the Jews was used by the Zionists to solicit the President's support for a Jewish state (rather than just the haven or refuge that Truman's statement above seems to indicate) in Palestine. Zionist lobbyists bombarded the White House with pressure. Truman stated in his Memoirs that "I do not think I have ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance."<sup>27</sup> He continued to state, "The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders--actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats--disturbed and annoyed me."<sup>28</sup> Truman's feelings of responsibility for the Jews, however, overrode his annoyance.

In the fall of 1947 Truman supported the Zionists' demands for a U.N. Partition of Palestine against the advice of the State Department and Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal. Indeed, throughout the whole U.N. debates in Palestine and the eventual recognition of Israel, Truman totally ignored the advice of his foreign policy advisors, much to the chagrin of both.

Secretary of Defense James Forrestal was particularly disturbed about the abrogation of foreign policy to pressure politics. The entry of November 26, 1947 in his diary summed up his feelings on the Palestine problem:

I said to (Senator J. Howard) McGrath that I thought the Palestine question was one of the most important in our American foreign policy and that if we were talking about lifting foreign affairs out of domestic politics, there was nothing more important to lift out than Palestine with all of its domestic ramifications. I said the Palestine-Jewish question was similar to the Eire-Irish question of forty years ago and that neither should be permitted to have any substantial influence on American policy.<sup>29</sup>

Forrestal's diary also indicates the degree to which the Palestine question had become a political football. When he approached GOP leader Senator Vandenberg in an attempt to enlist Republican support for a non-partisan policy on Palestine, Vandenberg informed him that "there was a feeling among GOPs that the Democratic party had used the Palestine question politically and the GOPs felt they were entitled to make similar use of the issue."<sup>30</sup> In addition to the political reaction to the Jewish vote, Forrestal was also blocked in his attempt to lift Palestine out of partisan politics because of the immense contributions which Zionist funds had made to the Democratic party. Forrestal's fellow Democrats only reacted to his advice with an expression of fear over the loss of such monies and the negative reaction that a non-partisan policy might have on the Jewish vote.<sup>31</sup>

In the absence of any type of effective control over their activities by the United States government, the Zionist organization virtually lobbied the Partition Plan for Palestine into existence.<sup>32</sup> Indeed, one might say that the Zionists were even assisted by the tacit consent of the American government. For instance, on the eve of the vote in the United Nations when the necessary two-thirds majority needed for passage of the Partition by the General Assembly was in doubt, the American Zionist organization chose six target nations which had opposed partition: Haiti, Philippines, Liberia, Nationalist China, Greece and Ethiopia, and subjected their governments to an intense telephone call campaign.<sup>33</sup> The key to the success of the Zionists' campaigns was the usage of prominent American figures in their lobby. As Kermit Roosevelt stated in "The Partition of Palestine: A Lesson in Pressure Politics":

An ex-Governor, a prominent Democrat with White House connections, personally telephoned Haiti urging that its delegation be instructed to change its vote . . . . A well-known economist, also close to the White House and acting in a liaison capacity for the Zionist organization, exerted his powers of persuasion on the Liberian delegation.<sup>34</sup>

Kermit Roosevelt's article also describes the types of pressures that the "prominent Americans" leveled at these nation's governments, including the threat of economic sanctions in Liberia's case should that nation not see fit to comply with Zionist desires. The result of such tactics, combined with the constant barrage of lobbying that the Zionists aimed directly at the U.N. itself, resulted in a final approval of the Partition Plan on November 29, 1947. Haiti, the Philippines, Liberia, and Ethiopia changed their votes and supported the U.N. recommendation for a partition of Palestine. China abstained, and only Greece voted against the

final plan. Lessing J. Rosenwald, President of the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism, could only describe the November vote as "a sordid story of pressuring and high-handed methods of lining up votes."<sup>35</sup>

Following the Partition Plan vote, however, President Truman began to vacillate from his earlier support of Zionist demands. Reacting to a 1948 report by the National Security Council warning of the danger that the continued turmoil between Arabs and Jews in Palestine could have on U.S. security, U.N. Ambassador Warren Austin was instructed to call for suspension of all partition efforts in support of a U.N. trusteeship over Palestine.<sup>36</sup> On May 14, 1948, the day that the British Mandate over Palestine terminated, Clark Clifford, the President's consul, met with Truman and outlined the serious political implications for the Democrats as a result of the shift to trusteeship. Clifford mentioned that a party revolt was in the offing and that Truman might be defeated in the November elections.<sup>37</sup> On May 15, 1948, during a U.N. vote on the U.S. trusteeship proposal, Truman extended de facto recognition to the newly proclaimed state of Israel, much to the amazement and anger of many U.N. delegates, including the completely uninformed Ambassador Austin.<sup>38</sup> Secretary of State Marshall was informed only hours before the Truman statement was released. In short, the decision to recognize Israel was made in a vacuum devoid of the advice of any of the government's Middle East experts. Truman's personal feelings toward the Zionists, combined with pressure politics and political considerations, motivated United States' recognition of Israel. The recognition of Israel was not so much based on American foreign policy as on a lack of it.

### American Policy in the Middle East

For all practical purposes the United States still lacks a coherent and defined foreign policy toward the Middle East. The vacillations which President Truman exhibited during the steps which ultimately led to American recognition of Israel still characterizes the day-to-day functioning of U.S. Mid-East policy. In great measure, this "no policy" foreign policy has resulted from the absence of any assessment of the Middle East in terms of the realities and possibilities it holds for the United States. Without a definition of American interests in the Middle East in specific terms of defense needs, the importance of Arab oil to western nations, the domestic and moral requirements of aiding Israel and the long-term implications of the loss of American prestige in the Arab nations, American Mid-East policy will continue to zigzag its way through a myriad of conflicting views, opposing pressures, deep emotions and the general lack of any defined goals in the Middle Eastern area.

In terms of stated policy toward the Middle East, U.S. emphasis has been placed on two factors: containment of communism (through the Truman Doctrine, CENTO, and the Eisenhower Doctrine) and an impartial stance in support of the peace and security of all states in the Middle East. In practice, however, these two facets of American Mid-East policy can hardly be viewed as a coherent foreign policy. The schizophrenic nature of U.S. relations with the Arab states and the widespread feeling among the Arabs that the United States has chosen Israel for favored treatment led to a break in diplomatic relations between Washington and the U.A.R., Iraq, Syria, Algeria, and Yemen.<sup>39</sup> While espousing a communist



containment policy, the United States actions have helped instead to create a vacuum in the Middle East which was ripe for the Soviets to fill. Such continued U.S. actions have led to an increasing radicalization of the Arab states, have placed pro-West nations such as Jordan in an awkward position in the Arab community, and have tended to produce further political polarization through identification of Israel with the United States and the Arabs with the Soviet Union.

Propaganda emanating from Israeli and domestic Zionist sources have played up Soviet presence in the Arab world in order to strengthen U.S. commitments and identifications with Israel. For instance, a statement by the American Jewish Committee (once a rabid anti-Zionist organization--Chapters II and II) last year referred to the presence of the Soviet military personnel in Egypt as "obviously designed to test the intentions of the free world and particularly that [sic] of the United States." The statement further read: "The balance of power in the area has already been disturbed and a serious challenge to the national will of the United States has been raised." Further, "the United States must make it unmistakably clear to the Soviet Union that it intends to defend its (emphasis added) vital interests in the Middle East against encroachment by the Soviet Union." The statement then calls for "affirmative action . . . to avoid the danger of a confrontation through Soviet misinterpretation of our past restraint as a sign of weakness."<sup>40</sup> Such statements pitting the United States against the Soviet Union in the Middle East area are dangerous at minimum. Echoing the Vietnam rhetoric of the 1960s:

Their vital interests are suddenly identified as our vital interests; their security becomes a matter of our 'national will'; their regional conflict

is identified with our global crusade against communism--all without benefit of factual analysis."<sup>41</sup>

One can only hope that American foreign policy-makers have gained some enlightenment from U.S. involvement in Vietnam in order to avoid a similar mistake in the Middle East. Indeed, as members of the United Nations, the Soviet Union and the United States could greatly assist in alleviating the Middle East turmoil by playing the role of peace mediators. By acting as co-belligerents for their respective Middle East client states, by slowly but inextricably committing their prestige to the issues, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. can only serve to convert a local conflict into a potential world conflict.

The other facet of U.S. "no policy" foreign policy toward the Middle East emphasizes an evenhanded and impartial treatment of Israel, the northern tier and the Arab states. Indeed, all of the public statements which have emanated from the Executive branch in Washington have stressed U.S. impartiality toward the Middle East turmoil (save the U.N. Partition Plan and the recognition of Israel which, however, the Soviet Union also supported).<sup>42</sup> Beginning with the 1950 Tripartite Declaration of the U.S., Britain and France, the United States has tried to maintain a public affirmation of neutrality. In addition to this 1950 protection of the armistice lines of the first Palestinian war, the United States has never recognized Israel's legal right to Jerusalem (nor Jordan's) because of U.S. adherence to the provisions of the 1947 U.N. Partition Plan which calls for an internationalization of the city. The United States was also one of the main architects of the 1967 U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 which has been claimed by this government as the "bedrock of our policy."<sup>43</sup> This U.N. Resolution provides for the withdrawal

from territory occupied in the June 1967 war; provides for the recognition of the right for existence of all states in the area; guarantees the free passage of all international waterways; calls for repatriation and compensation for Arab refugees; and recognizes the rights of all states to live in peace and security within recognized and guaranteed borders.<sup>44</sup>

These public statements of impartiality, however, have been difficult for the United States to keep in practice. Part of the reason behind this difficulty is the sentimental and cultural attachments to Israel which were a necessary but not sufficient outgrowth of political Zionist activities in this nation (see Chapter III). Support of Israel has become a rather automatic cause among informed Americans and public officials anxious to please their constituencies. Such public sympathy has naturally tended to undermine the well-intentioned impartiality of American policy statements. Indeed, Congress exhibits a definite bias toward the Zionist program for Israel. When it comes to congressional enactment of the foreign aid bill each year, the amount of aid to Israel is left open-ended; when it comes to the sale of military equipment to Israel, all but a few Senators and a large majority of Representatives take the floor to support such aid usually in the emotional terminology of Zionism. Part of the reason for this congressional response to Zionism is based on sympathy. Another reason for this response is that politicians seemed convinced that any other response would court disaster. Since World War II American politicians have based their reaction to the support of Jewish statehood on the "Jewish vote" and on Jewish political contributions.

With regard to the "Jewish vote," figures have shown that American Jews have voted primarily for Democratic candidates since Franklin Delano Roosevelt's years in the presidency. This strong democratic attachment of American Jewry tends to disprove the reality of any monolithic bloc of Jewish voters that can be traded at will.<sup>45</sup>

In spite of this, however, many a political statement has been issued and many a political stand has been taken in response to the alleged power of the "Jewish vote." The potential effects of the "Jewish vote" have been sufficient to cause this response. Jews are primarily concentrated in New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois and California--states with large electoral votes.<sup>46</sup> Since the electoral college facilitates the ability of groups to swing a bloc vote in a closely contested state to one candidate or another, there is always the potential threat that the "Jewish vote" could be a major factor in national politics.<sup>47</sup> The existence of this potential threat has been sufficient to make both political parties bend over backwards in their wooing of Jewish voters. In fact, President Nixon's support for Israel in the 1968 campaign was so enthusiastic that even the New York Times questioned its wisdom.<sup>48</sup> And, as this nation now approaches the 1972 presidential election, the Washington Post recently echoed 1968 election history in reporting that "President Nixon has forbidden the slightest pressure on Israel . . . while he is courting Jewish voters in the presidential campaign."<sup>49</sup> Nixon's election policy completely collides with the new Mid-East policy that the State Department is trying to urge now that the Russian advisors and reconnaissance planes have departed Egypt.<sup>50</sup> Thus, while perhaps the diplomatic time is ripe to restore better relations with Egypt,

the perceived exigencies of domestic electioneering is allowed to forestall a bid for settlement of the Middle East crisis. Such blatant wooing of the Jewish vote has given rise to the fact that since 1944 American Zionists have never had occasion or cause to challenge a presidential candidate on his Middle East policy.

Jewish political contributions also partially account for presidential and congressional bias toward Israel. Jewish contributions, especially to the Democratic party, have formed a substantial proportion of party campaign funds in this nation. Jewish Americans have been immensely generous to politicians espousing pro-Israeli sentiments. Indeed, when doubts surround a candidate's positions, Jewish contributions are often employed to bring the candidate back into line. Just recently, a nationally syndicated column reported that Jewish contributors to presidential hopeful George S. McGovern had complained that McGovern's staff members were not sufficiently pro-Israel in the development of the Senator's position regarding U.S. Mid-East policy.<sup>51</sup> Indeed, many liberal "dove" lawmakers, particularly in the Senate, find themselves after years of fierce opposition to the Vietnam war, in an awkward situation when pressured by their Jewish backers to be "hawks" on the Middle East. This dilemma has been particularly agonizing in the case of Senator George McGovern, and he has frequently commented (both publically and privately) on the lack of consistency between his policies and those of others vis-a-vis the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Other leading Democrats, particularly Edward Kennedy, Birch Bayh and Eugene McCarthy, have apparently felt no inconsistency in their opposition to the Vietnam war and voracious calls for U.S. support of Israel. Indeed, many legislators feel no necessity in even

preserving a facade of evenhandedness toward the Middle East. Many Congressmen, including both Republicans and Democrats, have expended tireless efforts in raising funds for the state of Israel through the sale of Israeli Bonds and Zionist-oriented fund-raising dinners. Included among this group are both "hawks" and "doves" on Vietnam: Senator Stuart Symington, Senator Robert Dole, Senator Jacob Javits, Senator Henry Jackson, Senator John Tower, and Senator Barry Goldwater serve as but a few examples.

Thus, natural sympathies, the "Jewish vote" and Jewish political contributions have all combined with Zionist lobbying and propaganda efforts to make U.S. presidents and congressional representatives substantial backers of Zionist demands. At times this pro-Israeli sentiment in one branch of government has made it extremely difficult for the United States to develop a coherent policy toward Israel and the Middle East. For instance, President Nixon's off-election year attempts to develop an evenhanded policy toward the Middle East in both theory and practice have been continually undermined by Congressional politics. In March of 1971, Israel's Foreign Minister made a direct hard-sell appeal in a briefing session with almost one-half of the U.S. Senate. This direct attempt to undercut President Nixon's policies forced Secretary of State William P. Rogers to ask for equal time the following week.<sup>52</sup> As long as politics and emotions rule a major portion of America's policy-makers, there will be little hope for a rational foreign policy toward the Middle East.

In short, domestic influence on America's policy-makers has continually belied the very sincere hope of the U.S. government to act as a force of peace in

the Middle East. The problem which remains for U.S. politicians is how to steer their way through the domestic influences on American policy toward the Middle East, giving play to the very real ties that this nation has with Israel, while at the same time taking into account the other strategic, cultural, historical, economic and political interests which the United States has in the Middle East. Above all, it must be made clear in American Mid-East policy that Israel is not our only interest in the Middle East. While well-financed Zionist campaigns have developed an effective identification of interests between this nation and Israel, it is vitally important that such an identification not be allowed to cloud the multitude of other interests which are at stake in the Middle East. While domestic affairs and foreign relations have always been intimately associated, there is danger when domestic pressure is allowed totally to shape and mold policy. In foreign policy, in particular, it is necessary to analyze and evaluate the sources and reasons for domestic pressure, for all too often public opinion has resulted from a calculated fanning of mass emotions by an organized interest group. In the case of Zionist influence of American foreign policy, an additional question is raised: the question of whether such influence actually emanates from domestic American sources or whether the influence is the result of a calculated program produced and directed by foreign interests. In the next two chapters some of the contemporary claims, problems, and determinants of Zionist influence of American opinion and policy shall be discussed. In doing so, it should be kept in mind that Zionism has been a necessary but not a sufficient condition for United States support of Israel and American pro-Israeli sentiments. Many other factors have influenced the

contemporary American attitude toward Israel. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that without Zionist activities in this nation, American foreign policy toward the Middle East would be totally different.



#### CHAPTER IV - FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> William Gamson, Power and Discontent (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 21-37.

<sup>2</sup> ibid., *passim*.

<sup>3</sup> Herzl Year Book: Essays in Zionist History and Thought, Vol. 5, "Studies in the History of Zionism in America, 1894-1919," edited by Raphael Patai (New York: Herzl Press, 1963), pp. 314-315.

<sup>4</sup> ibid., p. 315.

<sup>5</sup> ibid., p. 253.

<sup>6</sup> ibid.

<sup>7</sup> ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Jacob A. Rubin, Partners in State Building (New York: Diplomatic Press, Inc., 1969), p. 54.

<sup>9</sup> ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Patai, op. cit., p. 43.

<sup>11</sup> ibid., p. 261.

<sup>12</sup> Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 195.

<sup>13</sup> ibid., p. 198.

<sup>14</sup> Zionist Organization of America (ed.), The American War Congress and Zionism (New York: Z.O.A. PRESS, 1919), *passim*.

<sup>15</sup> American-Enterprise Institute, United States Interests in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Oct. 1968), p. 3.

<sup>16</sup> Ralph H. Magnus, Documents on the Middle East: United States Interests in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969), pp. 32-34.

<sup>17</sup> Samuel Halperin, The Political World of American Zionism (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961), p. 298.

<sup>18</sup> Joseph B. Schechtman, The United States and the Jewish State Movement: The Crucial Decade 1939-49 (New York: Herzl Press, 1966), p. 65.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 66.

<sup>20</sup> Alfred M. Lilienthal, The Other Side of the Coin (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1965), p. 275.

<sup>21</sup> Cyrus Adler and Aaron M. Margalith, With Firmness in the Right: American Diplomatic Action Affecting Jews, 1840-1945 (New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1946), p. 398.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 397.

<sup>23</sup> Frank C. Sahrn, Palestine Dilemma: Arab Rights Versus Zionist Aspirations (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1948), p. 173.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., pp. 172-173.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> From Truman's Memoirs as quoted in Lilienthal, Ibid., p. 278.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 279.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Walter Millis, (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 218.

<sup>30</sup> ibid., p. 347.

<sup>31</sup> ibid., p. 360.

<sup>32</sup> Harry B. Ellis, Challenge in the Middle East (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 90.

<sup>33</sup> ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Kermit Roosevelt, "The Partition of Palestine: A Lesson in Pressure Politics," Middle East Journal, January 1948, p. 15.

<sup>35</sup> New York Times, May 15, 1948, p. 4.

<sup>36</sup> Alfred M. Lilienthal, What Price Israel (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), pp. 74-75.

<sup>37</sup> ibid., p. 82.

<sup>38</sup> New York Times, May 15, 1948, p. 1.

<sup>39</sup> American Enterprise Institute, op. cit., pp. 21-31.

<sup>40</sup> Statement on the Middle East by the American Jewish Committee, May 17, 1970, as quoted in "Old Myths and New Realities--The Middle East," speech given by Senator J.W. Fulbright, August 23, 1970. Mimeographed copy.

<sup>41</sup> Fulbright, ibid., p. 23.

<sup>42</sup> American Enterprise Institute, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

<sup>43</sup> Secretary of State William Rogers, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 27, 1969, as quoted in Fulbright, op. cit., p. 30.

<sup>44</sup> Magnus, op. cit., pp. 205-206.

<sup>45</sup> Morris Fine and Milton Himmelfarb, (eds.), American Jewish Year Book, Vol. 70, (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1969), p. 99.

<sup>46</sup> "The Mideast: Election Year Role in U.S. Politics," Congressional Quarterly, February 5, 1972, p. 242.

<sup>47</sup> The Washington Post, August 30, 1972, p. B21.

<sup>48</sup> The New York Times, September 10, 1968.

<sup>49</sup> The Washington Post, op. cit.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> See The Washington Post, February 20, 1972, p. A1 and The New York Times, March 12, 1972. Also, The Washington Post, July and August, 1972, passim.

<sup>52</sup> The Washington Post, April 12, 1971.

## CHAPTER V

### AMERICAN JEWRY AND ZIONIST ISRAEL

The discussion of American Jewry as a Zionist solidary group in Chapter III stressed the point that the growth of emotional ties to Zionism did not necessarily indicate a corresponding attachment to Zionism as a political force. In early Zionist attempts to gain American Jewish support, loose usage of religious, philanthropic and political phraseology were of great value to the Zionists in their effort to win a variety of Jewish ideological attachments to the Zionist cause. The vast majority of the new adherents were not nationalistically motivated.<sup>1</sup> Religious Jews could support the Zionists' claims to a Jewish state as the fulfillment of an ancient biblical heritage. More secular Jews could view Eretz Israel as a haven of security for persecuted Jewry and the foundation for the preservation of Jewish culture. Indeed, as author Alan R. Taylor stated:

The reason for Zionism's ultimate ascendancy in contemporary (American) Jewish circles is that it has been able to blur the distinctions between secularism and religiosity, through charismatic and romantic appeals and to interpret the circumstances of the inter-war period as a substantiation of its premises.<sup>2</sup>

When Israel was actually created, however, this "ecumenical" character of Zionism created a complex dilemma. Where prior to the formation of Israel, Zionists could make claims on world Jewry in their representation of the "Jewish people," the actual political reality of the Jewish state drastically curtailed the meaning of their claims. The "Jewish people" as a nationality entity were now

those Jews living in Israel, not the world Jewish group at large. In the case of the American Jewish community, 99% of American Jewry, primarily linked to the Jewish state through Zionist-developed spiritual and emotional bonds, felt neither compunction about retaining their American citizenship nor political obligation to their membership in the "Jewish people" to immigrate to Israel. Indeed, in some respects, given the character of the Zionist movement as it developed and the ultimate realization of its claims, Zionism created the seeds for its own negation in the Jewish state. In order to remain a viable force in Jewish life, the Zionists were, in short, faced with the problems of how to make political claims on people who were primarily attached to them through non-national identity and how to retain Zionist claims on the larger "Jewish people" beyond the borders of Israel.

In this chapter two methods which Israel's Zionists have employed to widen American-Jewish political bonds to Israel will be discussed. One method involves Israeli law; the other concerns the organizational ties which Zionist Israel has established over American Jewry. Despite the Zionists' possession of Israel, these two examples will, hopefully, demonstrate the type of corporate control which Israeli Zionism tries to retain over the lives of American Jewry.

#### Israeli Law: The In-gathering of Exiles

On March 8, 1949, an initial statement of Israeli foreign policy was made by Zionist Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. Among the five-point enunciation of Israeli foreign policy principles was the "assurance of the right of exit from every country to Jews who wish to return to make their home in their historic

homeland."<sup>3</sup> Ben-Gurion's statement enunciated a simple Zionist assumption: Israel had now been created as the Jewish state, and therefore Jews living outside of her borders were Exiles. His stand echoed the "In-gathering of the Exiles" program set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, since the creation of Israel in 1948, the Zionist concept of aliyah (in-gathering) or return of Diaspora (dispersed) Jews to the Jewish state has become a basic imperative of Israeli foreign policy.

The "in-gathering of exiled Jews" was codified in public law with the adoption of the Law of the Return by the Knesset on July 5, 1950 and with the Nationality Law of 1952. The provisions of these documents give "every Jew the right (and in some Zionists' minds the obligation) to come to Israel for permanent settlement and to acquire Israeli citizenship automatically."<sup>5</sup> These laws apply to all Jews; regardless of whether the Jew has renounced his original citizenship.

The uniqueness of this claim on a group's citizenship is beyond doubt. Israel is one of the few modern states where religious affiliation is viewed as a sufficient base for nationality. But beyond the question of the composition of the nationality concept, the legal problems these laws raise are also troublesome. Jews living in Israel must explicitly disclaim Israeli citizenship or automatically become Israeli citizens, giving rise to problems of dual citizenship in the latter instance.

The U.S. State Department has supported the force of Israeli claims on all Jews who visit her shores by inserting a special citizenship clause in the travel regulations for Jewish Americans traveling to the Middle East. But other nations

have not looked so favorably on Zionist Israel's claims to the nationality of their Jews. For instance, in 1958 Italian law (*Ravenna v. Ministero Interno*) held that "spontaneous" acquisition of Israeli nationality had no meaning in Italian law, thus preventing Italian Jews from losing their Italian nationality. The Italian courts felt that it was unnatural for a Jew of another nationality to have to "make an express declaration" that he did not want to acquire Israeli nationality.<sup>6</sup>

At the very least, Israel's nationality laws are odd among the laws of the modern community of nations. How can Zionist Israel legally make claims on the nationality of American Jewish citizens in such a way that they have to deny their political allegiance to Israel? Why can Zionists still make political claims on world Jewry when the vast majority of Jews are free to participate in the Jewish national experiment in Israel should they so desire? In short, why is Zionist Israel able to make claims on a group when individuals of that group should have the right to establish their own citizenships?

In addition to these questions, the Israeli nationality laws constitute a form of discrimination which the American government always professes to abhor, and at times even takes sanctions against, as in the case of Rhodesia. While an American Jew living in Israel must renounce his Israeli citizenship in order to reject dual-citizenship, an Arab cannot become a citizen without first proving that he had been a citizen of Palestine before the formation of Israel and had lived continuously in the state since its establishment or had re-entered Israel through legal channels. If, as in many cases, Arabs could not prove these facts, then they could only become naturalized citizens by meeting six rigorous requirements,



including a residency period, knowledge of Hebrew, and renunciation of any prior nationality.<sup>7</sup> And yet our government and many other governments feel no unease in acknowledging the validity of the nationality laws, thereby giving tacit support to Israel's own brand of anti-semitism in the Middle East.<sup>8</sup>

American Jewry, through its philanthropic contributions to the United Israel Appeal and the Israeli Bond drives, has lent its support to the "in-gathering" policy of the Israeli government. Reacting generously to such appeals as "Save Moroccan Jewry," "Save Yemen Jewry," "Save Soviet Jewry," American Jewry has financed Israeli attempts to "redeem (my emphasis) the Jews in Arab and European countries" and by doing so often adversely affect American relations with the nations being propagandized.<sup>9</sup> Yet where American Jewry has been willing to fund the in-gathering of other "exiled" Jews, they do not regard themselves as being in the "exile" category. Out of a world population of 14 million Jews, only 2-1/2 million live in Israel and of the latter number, American immigration accounts for 25,000 or 1/100th of Israeli Jewish population.<sup>10</sup> The United States today possesses the largest Diaspora population in the world, a fact which is not likely to change in the near future. The refusal of American Jewry to follow up their support of political Zionism with actual physical immigration has brought constant attacks from Israel's leaders, from Ben-Gurion to Golda Meir. In 1951 Ben Gurion stated that U.S. Zionist leaders:

went bankrupt since the establishment of the Jewish state. There were not five leaders who got up to go to Israel after the state was established. I don't maintain they would have been followed by masses, but they would have proved that Zionism was not void of meaning at least in the eyes of its leaders.<sup>11</sup>

Aliyah is, of course, more than just an ideological drive with Israeli Zionists. Ben-Gurion stated at the first Knesset meetings that "it is for mass immigration that the State of Israel was established; it is by virtue of this alone that it will stand."<sup>12</sup> Israel needs manpower, and it has become a source of embarrassment that they have to propagandize Jews to come to Israel, especially after the years of selling the world the proposition that all Jews desired to return to Palestine. The United States' Diaspora stands as the most blatant disclaimer of this tenet, and American Jews have been constantly upbraided by Israeli leaders as being ignorant "of being what a Jew means," of being "godless" and a host of less desirable things.<sup>13</sup> American Jews for their part have treated Israel as a new addition to their religion and an extremely worthy recipient of their philanthropy, but they have not acknowledged any claims of aliyah on them. Nevertheless, the emphasis on "the unity of Jewish people and the centrality of the State of Israel to its life" continues to emanate from Zionist councils and with it Zionist claims on American Jewish nationality.

Organizational Ties on American Jewry - Part A:  
The 1952 Status Law and the World Zionist Organization

Another difficulty faced by American Jewry in its contemporary ties to Zionism lies in the inextricable bond which the American Zionist establishment maintains with the state of Israel. With the creation of Israel, the World Zionist Organization (also called the Jewish Agency since the League of Nations mandate; see Chapter I), has been incorporated into the Israel government structure as a quasi-governmental body charged with specific governmental tasks. As the World

Zionist Organization (W.Z.O.) functions as the world executive for Zionist affairs, the members affiliated with it, including all of the American Zionist organizations, are also bound by the W.Z.O. relation with the government of Israel.<sup>14</sup> This relationship between American domestic groups and the Israeli government has naturally raised some question about the non-governmental status of our domestic Zionist organizations. This section shall superficially explore the nature of the tie between Zionists and Israel and take note of some of the problems which such a relationship incurs for American-Jewish contribution to Israel. Chapter VI provides a more in-depth study of these entangling relationships. Hereafter, all mention of the World Zionist Organization (W.Z.O.) or of the Jewish Agency will be in reference to the same entity--an entity tied by public law to the government of Israel.

The incorporation of the World Zionist Organization, the authoritative organ of the Jewish nationalist movement, into the government structure of Israel was accomplished by two documents. The first document was the "Status Law" of Israel enacted by the Israeli Knesset on November 24, 1952. It provided that

the State of Israel recognizes the World Zionist Organization as the authorized agency for the settlement and development of (Israel), for the absorption of immigrants from the Diaspora . . . and for the coordination of the activities in Israel of Jewish institutions and associations operating in these spheres.

In addition, the 152 "Status Law" provided that

details of the status of the World Zionist Organization . . . and the form of its cooperation with the Government shall be determined by a Covenant to be made in Israel between the Government and the (World Zionist Organization).<sup>16</sup>

Twenty months later the Israeli government and the W.Z.O. entered into the covenant as provided. The 1954 Covenant between the W.Z.O. and Israeli government spelled out the duties of the W.Z.O.; provided for a Coordination Board composed of members of the Israeli government, including Israel's Prime Minister and members of the W.Z.O.; made provisions for regular meetings of the Coordination Board "for the purpose of coordinating the Government and the (W.Z.O.) in all spheres to which the Covenant applies;" and gave a tax-exempt status to the W.Z.O.'s funds and donations.<sup>17</sup> In short, between the "Status Law" and the Covenant a public relationship was established between the W.Z.O. and the Israeli government and set in Israel's public law. Indeed, when the first Export-Import Bank loan was obtained by Israel in 1949, \$25 million of that loan was already earmarked for the programs of the W.Z.O.<sup>18</sup>

The quasi-governmental status of the Jewish Agency (same as the W.Z.O.), however, has been constantly denied by both Israeli officials and Zionists in the United States. In hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1963, an American Zionist leader, Gottlieb Hammer, stated that "since 1948, when the State of Israel was established, the (Jewish Agency) has performed no political functions," admitting, however, that prior to that date the Jewish Agency "served as the representative of Jewish authority in Palestine vis-a-vis Britain and later in the presentation of the Jewish case before the United Nations."<sup>19</sup> Later in the hearings, Mr. Hammer further described the Jewish Agency as follows:

The Jerusalem Agency is a body which, as I have described, is responsible for the bringing of immigrants and for their initial care and settlement.

In this regard they obviously have to consult and cooperate with the host government, in this case the Government of Israel. They coordinate their activities, they coordinate their policies in all questions affecting the immigration and resettlement of refugee immigrants.

I think I should make it clear that they are not part of the Government, they are not a governmental agency, nor are they an agency of the Government. The (Jewish Agency) is an international body created by Zionist groups throughout the world who meet once every four years in a congress or convention at which time they elect or designate individuals to serve as the "Executive of the Jewish Agency."<sup>20</sup>

Nevertheless, Zionist assertion of the nonpolitical status of the Jewish Agency appears to be but a play on semantics. Until June of 1967, the Israeli government provided over one-half of the Jewish Agency's budget with the other half coming primarily from the United States in terms of American contributions to Zionist fund-raisers. Since the Israeli government finances the Jewish Agency, it would appear that the Jewish Agency's relation to the Israel government is more than the mere "consultive" relationship that Mr. Hammer describes in the above testimony. Although the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war drastically curtailed government funding of the Jewish Agency, the Israeli government still provides over one-third of the Jewish Agency budget with overseas donations supplying the rest.

The uses to which the Jewish Agency's budget are put fall into the following categories: education, housing, welfare, medical services, university grants, geriatric care, as well as immigration programs, agricultural settlements, the acquisition of land, "the establishment and expansion of development enterprises," the "encouragement of private capital investments," and so on.<sup>21</sup> These activities go far beyond the immigration and settlement program that Mr. Hammer described as the Jewish Agency's responsibility and can hardly be depicted as

non-governmental functions. Thus, the actual functions of the Jewish Agency in Israel would seem to confirm its governmental status.

In addition, Israeli governmental leaders have always been closely tied to the Jewish Agency. For instance, Moshe Sharett and David Ben-Gurion, who held the Israeli government positions of Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, respectively, held equivalent positions in the Jewish Agency as Director of the Political Department and Chairman of the Executive, respectively.<sup>22</sup> The fact that Israel's Prime Minister always sits on the Jewish Agency-Government of Israel Coordination Board would seem to add further evidence to the governmental character of the Jewish Agency.<sup>23</sup> Finally, research reveals that the Jewish Agency is today also "an instrument for the distribution of money to the Zionist parties" of Israel. One non-Zionist member of the Israeli Knesset described this function of the Jewish Agency as follows:

Unlike the government and Parliament of Israel, over which strict public control is exercised, no real control exists over the Jewish Agency, whose governing bodies are not elected by any normal democratic process. It is a federation of party secretariats, pure and simple, a system for the division of the spoils. Several million dollars are parceled out directly among the Zionist parties, ostensibly as compensation for relinquishing their rights to organize their own fund-raising in the United States. But this represents only a fraction of the real division; by financing youth organizations, educational activities, propaganda agencies, and other institutions belonging to the Zionist parties, the Jewish Agency goes a long way toward sustaining the huge apparatus every Zionist party maintains in Israel and abroad. Thus, parties controlling the Jewish organization can manipulate vast amounts of money independent of ordinary democratic processes and controls.<sup>24</sup>

In the opinion of the author, all of these facts support the argument that the Jewish Agency is a quasi-governmental, if not an actual governmental agency, of the State of Israel. Given American financial support of the Jewish Agency,

the question then becomes one of American support of a subordinate institution of a foreign government. Since Zionist fund-raising techniques in this nation (see Chapter VI) focus on the philanthropic, humanitarian and religious nature of Jewish contributions to Israel, it would seem imperative to clarify the distinctions between the advertising of the Zionist product in this nation and the actual nature of the product, i.e., that the Jewish Agency is specifically a political entity, not a charitable institution.

The bulk of Jewish funds raised in the United States are earmarked for Zionist usage. The United Jewish Appeal, the major Jewish fund-raiser in the United States, is composed of two organizations: the United Israel Appeal (formerly the Keren Hayesod--see Chapter II) and the Joint Distribution Committee, a non-Zionist fund-raising organization formed in 1914 to meet the needs of Jewish war victims. Today the United Israel Appeal, a Zionist controlled organization, receives between 60% and 70% of United Jewish Appeal contributions.<sup>25</sup> The major portion of United Israel Appeal funds are then given to the Jewish Agency. Indeed, between 1948 and 1968 the U.I.A. provided over \$1.1 billion to the Jewish Agency. Thus, when American citizens respond to the philanthropic call of the United Jewish Appeal, they contribute monies to an organization which distributes the bulk of such donations to the United Israel Appeal; in its turn the U.I.A. supplies the major portion of the Jewish Agency's budget--a budget which is employed for use by the Israeli government. Such a confusing network of funding channels substantially obfuscates the specific uses to which well-meaning American contributions are put. In essence, American Jewry is responding to a

charitable call to assist Israel while Zionist Israel is leveling a kind of tax on the Diaspora.

The United States government assists in perpetuating the confusion over the funding of the Jewish Agency by granting a tax-exempt status on Jewish contributions to the United Jewish Appeal as charitable contributions. The funds of the Jewish Agency are also exempt from payment of taxes in Israel but for directly opposite reasons. In the Covenant between the Jewish Agency and the Government of Israel, tax exemptions extend to contributions from the United Israel Appeal (the Zionist member of the United Jewish Appeal) because of its membership in the World Zionist Organization. As the W.Z.O. (or Jewish Agency) is a quasi-governmental body under Israeli law, the conclusion is that the United Israel Appeal is also an extension of the government of Israel and, therefore, qualifies for tax-exempt status. This situation means that the same funds are tax-exempt in Israel because they are regarded as revenues of a governmental agency, and in the United States because they are regarded as charitable contributions.<sup>26</sup>

In no other instance does the United States government follow this peculiar practice of tax-exempting American contributions to a foreign government or one of its agencies. The practice becomes even more peculiar in light of the fact that the U.S. government requires the American office of the Jewish Agency to register in this nation as a foreign agent.

In 1944 the Jewish Agency established an American office in New York City which was incorporated under the laws of that state. Inasmuch as the American office of the Jewish Agency (hereafter referred to as the Jewish Agency/



American Section) was to act as the Jewish Agency's principal in this nation for channelling funds from the United Israel Appeal to the Jewish Agency, the Department of Justice required that it register under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which the organization did.

The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (amended in 1938 and 1964; hereafter F.A.R.A.) provides that all foreign agents must submit full disclosure to the Department of Justice of their propaganda and other activities conducted on behalf of foreign interests in the United States,

so that the government and the people of the United States may be informed of the identity of such persons and may appraise their statements and actions in light of their associations and activities.<sup>27</sup>

The specific purpose of this bill was to enable American citizens to have "a clear understanding of the foreign governmental and political forces at work" within the United States in order to be able to appraise their interests in "the formulation and implementation of United States national policy."<sup>28</sup>

In 1960, a new ruling by the Internal Revenue Service required that the Jewish Agency/American Section drop its role as a conduit of funds to Israel. In order for the Jewish contributions to remain tax-exempt in this nation the I.R.S. required that an American-based corporation determine the use of the funds, rather than have them directly channelled to Israel. The appropriate changes were made, but as the Jewish Agency/American Section still remained a foreign agent for Israel, it continued to register with the Justice Department.

Lax enforcement of the F.A.R.A., however, has made it extremely difficult to distinguish between "American political activities and foreign ones."<sup>29</sup> In

the case of the Jewish Agency/American Section, the Department of Justice has been peculiarly unconcerned with clarifying either the nature of the American Section's activities in this nation or the nature of its relationship to the government of Israel. For instance, when the Department of Justice in 1969 finally required the Jewish Agency/American Section to file a copy of the Covenant between the Jewish Agency and the Israeli government, it also permitted the American Section to file two exhibits simply stating that the Jewish Agency was not "an instrument or a subdivision of the State or Government of Israel."<sup>30</sup> The Justice Department requested no substantiation of this Zionist claim, although it would appear vital in the interests of the "public's right to know" to clarify whether the Jewish Agency/American Section is functioning in this nation as a direct arm of the state of Israel.

Although additional mention of the activities of the Jewish Agency/American Section will be made in the following chapter, this portion of the paper has attempted to clarify some of the problems which arise because of the close ties of the state of Israel with the Jewish Agency and with its American principal, the Jewish Agency/American Section. The government of this nation has been lax spelling out the exact nature of these ties in order to protect American citizens from foreign interests operating in the United States. Whether this governmental laxity has been due to ignorance, unconcern or deliberate action, it is not this author's privilege to know, But it would seem to be in the best interests of this nation, interests recognized in the original formulation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, to have a clear view of the character of Israeli Zionist activities and claims on American citizenry.

Organizational Ties on American Jewry - Part B:  
Saul Joffes vs. B'nai B'rith

Political Zionism has constantly fought assimilation as dangerous to the loss of Jewish identity. One of the basic Zionist strategies in maintaining Jewish group identity has been to infiltrate Jewish organizational structure in the United States in order to be able to guide more closely the direction and ideology of American Jewish activities in this country. Early instances of Zionist concern with organizational structure were mentioned in Chapter III, with particular emphasis on the American Jewish Conference of 1943. Since the 1943 Conference, Zionist strategy has continued to focus on gaining leadership positions in Jewish organizations in order to obtain control over such organizations' policies and activities. But while these attempts at maintaining Jewish identity have helped the Jewish ethnic group to develop a spirit of shared interests and culture, they have raised problems for many non-Zionist Jews. Where does the non-Zionist Jew turn if he wishes to partake in Jewish activities that are not within the structural and ideological precepts of political Zionism? Although political Zionism has helped to preserve a minority's status in a democracy, it has perhaps infringed on individual Jews' status.

It has been said of B'nai B'rith, founded in 1843, that "no Jewish institution except the synagog, is a more universal feature of American Jewish life."<sup>31</sup>

B'nai B'rith (B.B.) is today the nation's largest Jewish service organization dedicated to the defense of Jewish rights at home and abroad; to the improvement of Jewish welfare; and to the preservation of social community among American Jews.<sup>32</sup> Its constitution states that its purpose is to unite

persons of the Jewish faith in the work of promoting their highest interest and those of humanity . . . of inculcating the purest principles of philanthropy, honor and patriotism . . . alleviating the wants of the poor and needy . . . coming to the rescue of victims of persecution . . . (and) protecting and assisting the aged, the widow and orphan on the broadest principles of humanity.<sup>33</sup>

In short, B.B. was an organization in which the majority of American Jews could identify. It made no claims on loyalties, was domestically oriented and dedicated to Jewish philanthropy for other Jews. It was an organization which for years bridged the gap between Zionists and non-Zionists and that between cultural Zionists and political Zionists. Indeed, it will be remembered that it was the prestige of B.B.'s hosting of the 1943 American Jewish Conference that brought the diverse elements of American Jewry together (see Chapter III).

Although since 1865 B.B. has contributed funds to Jews in Palestine, the vast proportion of B.B.'s budget has been devoted to domestic needs. Today, with revenues from 500,000 dues-paying members, B.B. contributes funds to such activities as the Anti-Defamation League, B'nai B'rith Youth Organization, Hillel Foundations, B'nai B'rith Vocational service, Adult Jewish Education Program and Community, and Veterans Affairs Program.<sup>34</sup> Nevertheless, a little noticed court case in Washington, D.C. may provide new insights into the functioning and program of B'nai B'rith.

Until 1967 Saul E. Jofes was director general of the B.B. International Council's office of international affairs. After World War II, Jofes helped to shape B.B.'s policy to aid European Jews and to assist them to rebuild their lives in Europe, a policy which ran directly counter to Zionist goals for the post-war years (see Chapter IV). After twenty-two years of service to B'nai B'rith, Saul Jofes

has been fired for what Rabbi Kaufman, B.B.'s executive vice-president, terms "incompetence," "incapacity," and "malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance."<sup>35</sup> Joftes maintains that he was fired for his criticism of B'nai B'rith's increasingly political Zionist position.

As instances of Zionist "take-over" of B'nai B'rith, Joftes has leveled a number of allegations at B'nai B'rith. Included in the documents which Joftes has filed with the Washington, D.C. courts are the following allegations: 1) Joftes maintains that B.B. "employed" one Mrs. Avis Shulman at the request of the Israeli consulate in New York City although Mrs. Shulman's salary was provided through the consulate. Mrs. Shulman was to receive a "desk" and an innocuous title from B.B. in order to cover the real nature of her job for the Israeli consulate. Specifically, Mrs. Shulman conducted briefings for American Jews going to Russia and channeled information to the consulate on who was going to Russia and what Russians were coming to the United States. Joftes contends that B'nai B'rith acted as a "front" organization for Mrs. Shulman in direct violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. 2) Joftes has filed messages from B.B. President Dr. William A. Wexler to him warning Joftes against interfering with Zionist programs for aliyah in his overseas assistance to Jews. 3) Joftes has further maintained that B.B.'s leadership consists totally of Zionists, stating that the past and present president and vice-president of B.B. belong to such organizations as the Zionist Organization of America, the Jewish Agency, and other active Zionist organizations. 4) The former B.B. officer also contends that B.B.'s membership in the Conference of Jewish Organizations, which includes the World Zionist Conference and the Jewish

Agency/American Section and B.B.'s membership in the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations which receives substantial financial aid from the Israeli Zionist foreign agent in this nation, the Jewish Agency/American Section, have inextricably bound B'nai B'rith to the Zionist establishment. 5) Jofte also points out in his documentation to the court that since 1969 B'nai B'rith has solidly endorsed the Zionists' program of aliyah although prior to that time B.B. had focused its activities on aiding Jews in the national homes in which they resided. 6) Jofte has filed, in addition, a memo he received from Rabbi Kaufman stating that "B.B. is now playing a greater role in the fate and future of Diaspora Jewry, assuming tasks which the State of Israel cannot legitimately undertake because it is a sovereign state and cannot intrude on the affairs of other nations." 7) Jofte argues that statements from B'nai B'rith's Board of Governors "stimulate the thinking of the vast B'nai B'rith membership toward consideration of regular and extended visits or total life in Israel." 8) Finally, Jofte has concluded his case against B'nai B'rith with documentation of B'nai B'rith support of pro-Israeli propaganda both in terms of money and the organization's prestige. <sup>36</sup>

Jofte's lawsuits against B'nai B'rith seek to establish the relationship between Israel and this domestic charitable organization and to chart the legal implications that such a relationship might have under the terms of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. B'nai B'rith officials have refused to discuss the details of the Jofte litigation and have merely issued public denials of any relationship between B.B. and Israel. Until the litigation is settled, this example of Zionist "take-over" of a Jewish organization in the United States must be offered with

disclaimers. As research provided only two news stories on the case of Saul Joffes vs. B'nai B'rith, the above information represents at best a sketchy picture of the "truth." Nevertheless, the case does offer a little insight into the plight of non-Zionist Jews in this country.

There is a danger present when any minority opinion is not allowed expression through the channels which are normally representative of the group to which that minority opinion belongs. Such dangers of oligarchically controlled interest groups, stifling adequate expression of minority opinion and denying access to the group's decision-making process, were brought out in Henry Kariel's book The Decline of American Pluralism. In Kariel's view,

the voluntary organizations or associations which the early theorists of pluralism relied on to sustain the individual against a unified, omnipotent government have themselves become oligarchically governed hierarchies.<sup>37</sup>

As such, Kariel depicts the contemporary American "social organism" as composed of a fragmented, decentralized governmental system relying on semi-autonomous private groups for its power; large-scale multi-interested oligarchical associations formed in response to contemporary complexities and the absence of governmental guidelines, policies and standards; and the undifferentiated mass of the American people, sold by their decentralized government into the hands of "nonpublic forms of coercion." The result of this "social organism" Kariel maintains is that American public policy is made in the private arena of unrepresentative giant interest groups which are under no compelling impulse to claim public responsibility for such policy. Kariel says that the governmental policy of laissez-faire, once so reflective of democratic values, has produced a form of "syndicalist anarchy" in

which the few have been allowed to dominate the many; in which "voluntary" group associations have become a necessity rather than a matter of choice; in which the evolving inequities of pluralism were institutionalized and formalized; and in which the well-being and protection of the individual, the classical tenet of democracy, has become nothing more than a manipulated and regulated cog in the machines of highly organized, heterogeneous, oligarchically defined private power blocs.<sup>38</sup> Probably somewhere between an idealistic defense of the pluralist position and Kariel's nightmarish picture of private oligarchical control of American policy lies the truth of the decision-making structure of our nation. Nevertheless, in light of the power which Zionism has gained among American Jewry and the American public at large, it bears reflecting whether Zionism has been allowed to corner too much of the market on Jewish and Middle East interests.

This chapter has raised some questions about the relationship of American Jewry to contemporary Zionism and brought to light a not-yet-proven instance of Zionist "take-over" of a non-Zionist charitable Jewish organization. The next chapter shall deal with the political propaganda programs conducted by Zionists in this country in terms of gaining funds to finance Israel. Chapter VI raises the question of whether Zionist fundraising is philanthropic or political. The examples of this chapter and the next are not presented to discredit the very real support of the American Jewish community for Israel. Rather, they are offered to stimulate inquiry into the type of Zionism which has been presented and bought by American Jewry and the actual practices and goals of contemporary political Zionism. Since Zionism first began to develop in this nation, it has taken on a chameleon approach



to gaining public support. Today, given the complexities of international policy and the desperate need to lessen the political tensions of the world, perhaps it would do well for American Jews and, indeed, the American public and government to see Zionism without its protective clothing. Political Zionism under any other guise is still political Zionism, despite America's uncanny ability to see only what they want.

## CHAPTER V - FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> This assumption is based on the fact that American immigration to Israel between 1948 and 1968 totaled only 25,000 persons. It is assumed that if American Jewry had been motivated in their support of political Zionism by nationalistic tendencies then they would have followed through on these tendencies by immigrating to the Jewish state.

<sup>2</sup> Alan R. Taylor, "Israel and the Modern Jewish Identity Crisis," Mid East: A Middle East-North African Review, Vol. XI, No. 3, June 1970, p. 20.

<sup>3</sup> Israel and the United Nations, National Studies on International Organizations Series (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1956), p. 32.

<sup>4</sup> W.T. Mallison, "The Zionist-Israel Juridical Claims to Constitute 'the Jewish People' Nationality Entity and to Confer Membership in It: Appraisal in Public International Law," The George Washington Law Review, Volume 32, No. 5, June 1964, p. 1037.

<sup>5</sup> Alfred M. Lilienthal, The Other Side of the Coin (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1965), p. 32.

<sup>6</sup> Mallison, op. cit., p. 1041.

<sup>7</sup> Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 212; also, Alfred M. Lilienthal, What Price Israel (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), p. 204.

<sup>8</sup> For a more in-depth discussion of Israeli anti-semitism, see Lilienthal, The Other Side of the Coin, pp. 212-243.

<sup>9</sup> Lilienthal, The Other Side of the Coin, op. cit., p. 47.

<sup>10</sup> The National Observer, May 18 1970, reprint, quoting an Israeli Embassy estimate.

<sup>11</sup> New York Times, December 13, 1951, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup> Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 48.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 29-30.

<sup>14</sup> Moses Lasky, Between Truth and Repose (American Council for Judaism, 1956), *passim*.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> As quoted in Mallison, op. cit., p. 1040.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., pp. 1040-42.

<sup>18</sup> Hearings on Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Part 9, 1963, p. 1217.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 1216.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 1227.

<sup>21</sup> Moses Lasky, op. cit., p. 63; and Lawrence Mosher, "Zionist Role in U.S. Raises New Concern," The National Observer, op. cit., May 18, 1970, reprint.

<sup>22</sup> Israel and the United Nations, op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>23</sup> Mosher, op. cit.

<sup>24</sup> Uri Avnery, Israel Without Zionists: A Plea for Peace in the Middle East (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 176

<sup>25</sup> Morris Fine and Milton Himmelfarb, (eds.), American Jewish Year Book, Vol. 70, (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1969), pp. 136-36.

<sup>26</sup> W.T. Mallison, Statement for the Record to the Near East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "United States Law and International Law Which Is Applicable to the Middle East Conflict," August 21, 1970, mimeograph copy, pp. 14-15.

<sup>27</sup> The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 as Amended and the Rules and Regulations Prescribed by the Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 7.

<sup>28</sup> W.T. Mallison, Statement for the Record, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>31</sup> Samuel Halperin, The Political World of Zionism (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961), p. 145.

<sup>32</sup> B'nai B'rith, This Is B'nai B'rith: A Story of Service (Washington, D.C.: B'nai B'rith), passim.

<sup>33</sup> Quoted in The Washington Post, February 7, 1971, p. C 3.

<sup>34</sup> B'nai B'rith, op. cit., passim. Also note The Washington Post, Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> The Washington Post, Ibid., p. C 3.

<sup>36</sup> As gained through a reading of The Washington Post, Ibid., and Mosher, The National Observer, op. cit.

<sup>37</sup> Henry S. Kariel, The Decline of American Pluralism (Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 153.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., passim.

## CHAPTER VI

### ZIONIST FUND-RAISING: POLITICS OR PHILANTHROPY

Samuel Halperin described the Jewish community in the United States as composed of "competing social and religious ideologies and mutually hostile socio-economic groups."<sup>1</sup> As an organized interest group, political Zionism has faced the task of trying to mobilize these diverse elements of the American Jewish community behind the Zionist program. Chapter II described some of the predispositions which were found among American Jewry, and which Zionists were eventually able to play upon in order to gain influence among American Jews. Chapter III delineated some of the factors which American Zionists employed, including the capitalization on historical events, the development of an effective "propaganda machine" under the 1943 leadership of Rabbi Hillel Silver and the infiltration of Jewish organizational structure in order to attempt to influence American Jewry toward a favorable reception of political Zionism.

Before 1943, the Zionists' approach to American Jewry was in piecemeal fashion. The Zionists' haphazard propaganda machine merely reacted to the prevailing tides of Jewish emotions, effectively producing Jewish sympathy toward Zionism, but not effectively capitalizing upon these sympathies in order to build an American Jewish solidary group to back the Zionists' aspirations. After the formation of the American Zionist Emergency Committee in 1943, however, Zionist

propaganda developed into a cohesive machine (see Chapter III). Zionist propaganda widened its themes and techniques in order to gain appeal among a wider cross-section of American Jewry. In order to play upon the favorable emotional conflict provided by World War II, Zionism developed its propaganda appeals into a "multi-faceted and all-inclusive" appeal in which most of American Jewry could identify.

Utilizing the emotional and spiritual ties which American Jewry had to Palestine, the most effective Zionist appeal centered on philanthropy. In the final analysis, political Zionism had to dilute its political program to gain the most from the philanthropy of American Jewry. Indeed, one Jewish survey of the Zionist press between 1930 and 1941 argued that the term "Jewish State . . . as the ultimate goal of the Zionist movement, had almost entirely disappeared from common parlance."<sup>2</sup> Philanthropic and religious appeals to the existing predispositions among the American Jewish community replaced Zionist attempts to build an effective feeling of Jewish nationalism among the assimilated and entrenched elements of American Jewry. Given the emotional and religious bases upon which Zionism could focus its efforts, propaganda ("the deliberate use of symbols by representatives of a group in a controversial situation to bring about beliefs, attitudes, and action in accord with the purpose of that group") has been notably successful in the case of American Zionism.<sup>3</sup> Since 1946, the United States government has maintained one of its highest per capita aid programs to Israel, providing over \$877,700,000 in economic and military aid to Israel between 1946-1962. This figure represents a per capita contribution to each man, woman and child in Israel of \$39.70.<sup>4</sup> In

addition, from 1948 to 1968, American contributors to Jewish fund-raisers have provided an additional \$1.1 billion in direct philanthropic contributions to Israel, and American citizens purchasing Israeli Bonds have flooded Israeli coffers with \$1,077,000 more.<sup>5</sup>

The philanthropic tie which Zionists have built between the people of the United States and Israel has made Israel remarkably dependent on the continued good-will of the United States. During the fiscal year 1954-1955, philanthropic funds from the United States accounted for more than 20% of Israel's foreign currency, a situation of incredible dependency of one nation on the people of another.<sup>6</sup> Since 1959, foreign currency reserves have somewhat increased, easing slightly this dependency on American good-will, but the fact remains that Israel relies to a large extent on continued American financial support. Indeed, in 1971 alone \$520 million in bond sales and United Jewish Appeal contributions were sent to Israel in a year in which Israel's total national budget was just under \$3 billion.<sup>7</sup>

In view of the fact that Zionist Israel is dependent to such a degree on private American contributions, large amounts of money and effort have been expended by Zionist organizations in order to insure that American Jewry retains its philanthropic generosity to Israel. Ironically, the funds used to propagandize American contributors to Israel are provided by the contributors themselves. Americans contribute to Israel through the United Jewish Appeal; the United Jewish Appeal turns the majority of its collections over to its affiliate, the Zionist United Israel Appeal; the United Israel Appeal in its turn sends the funds to the

Jewish Agency in Israel. Finally, the Jewish Agency returns some of the funds to the United States through its foreign agent in this country, the Jewish Agency/American Section, which then disseminates the funds for propaganda and support of Zionist activities in the United States.<sup>8</sup> This entangled web of philanthropic funds to Israel and American Zionist propaganda in the United States raises some serious questions about the nature of Zionist fund-raising in this nation. This chapter shall briefly discuss some of these questions and problems.

#### American Control Over the Use of Funds Sent to Israel

Since 1960, the Internal Revenue Service has ruled that contributions to domestic American agencies could not be tax exempt or tax deductible if the organization merely served as a conduit of funds to a foreign agent or nation (see Chapter V). Prior to 1960, the U.S. registered foreign agent of the Jewish Agency in Israel directly channelled American contributions to Israel. After 1960, the Jewish Agency/American Section dropped this task, and an American corporation, the Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc., was established to provide American control over funds sent to Israel. Since 1966, a merged entity composed of the United Israel Appeal and the Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc., has taken over the task of providing such American control over the contributions sent to Israel. Such control, however, might be more real on paper than it is in fact.

The Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc., the United Israel Appeal (the Zionist organization which receives most of the Jewish contributions in this nation), the Jewish Agency/American Section (the Zionist foreign agent) and the American Zionist Council (a tax exempt, tax deductible American organization which is



composed of U.S. Zionist groups) all occupy the same building in New York City, making for what one Zionist admitted was "a great deal of contact" between foreign interests and American control.<sup>9</sup> In addition to the physical proximity of the groups, the Zionist fund-raising structure is replete with leaders from the Jewish Agency/American Section, the foreign agent of Israel which is not supposed to exercise any control over how American Zionists earmark the use of Jewish contributions for Israel. For instance, one registered agent of the Jewish Agency/American Section is also a vice chairman of the United Israel Appeal, the organization which is responsible for American, rather than Israeli, control over funds earmarked for Israel. The other agent is a United Israel Appeal director.<sup>10</sup> The nature of this collective leadership principle makes it difficult to ascertain exactly where American control begins and foreign agent control ends, since both interests are incorporated into the leadership structure of the American corporation responsible for establishing American control over how tax-exempt American contributions are spent in Israel. Thus, one question surrounding Zionist fund-raising is whether American contributors really do have control over the expenditure of their contributions, and if not, why are these contributions tax exempt and tax deductible?

#### The Jewish Agency and U.S. Zionist Activities

Another question of Zionist fund-raising techniques centers on the large involvement of the Jewish Agency, established in Chapter V as a governmental body of Israel, in Zionist activities in the United States. With the Jewish Agency financing propaganda activities in the United States through its registered foreign

agent, the Jewish Agency/American Section, and using American contributions to do it, some problems arise between this practice and the spirit of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (hereafter F.A.R.A.).

As long as the Jewish Agency/American Section lists its expenditures for propaganda and labels its propaganda on behalf of its foreign agent, the practice of foreign subsidization of propaganda in this nation is legal.<sup>11</sup> However, the Jewish Agency/American Section has employed some practices in this nation which cast doubt on whether the American Section has adequately been meeting the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. For instance, in 1962, the American Section made direct grants (totalling \$25,000) to a Hebrew Culture Foundation that was founded to make grants to American colleges and universities for the establishment of chairs in Middle Eastern Studies.<sup>12</sup> Among the recipients of such grants were Columbia, Harvard, Indiana, Pennsylvania Johns Hopkins and Wisconsin. Senate hearings in 1963 brought out the fact that often the schools were not made aware of the fact that the grants were, in essence, coming from a registered foreign agent through the front organization of the Hebrew Culture Foundation. In addition, the Jewish Agency/American Section did not report in its registration with the Department of Justice many of these grants to the Foundation, viewing the contributions as scholastic and therefore exempt from the Foreign Agents Registration Act. The Registration Act itself does not provide for such exemptions. Thus, important centers of Middle Eastern studies, producing many of this nation's foreign experts on the Middle East, are financed in part and unknowingly by a registered foreign agent of Israel with tax-exempt funds. Such

practices raise the question of the fine line between educational support and attempts at indoctrination.<sup>13</sup>

Another example of Jewish Agency propagandizing of the American people which is not registered under the F.A.R.A. deals with the labelling of political propaganda. The F.A.R.A. provides that all political propaganda disseminated by a foreign agent should be labelled in such a way as to disclose the origins of the information. The Jewish Agency/American Section, however, has devised a method by which to circumvent this labelling provision. For instance, the Jewish Agency/American Section often contributes large sums of money to the American Zionist Council which, in turn, uses the money to support various American Zionist publications. In this manner the Jewish Agency/American Section merely lists its unitemized donations to the American Zionist Council with the Department of Justice, and the publications, in turn, do not have to label their material as propaganda of a foreign agent since it received its funds from an American based group, the American Zionist Council.<sup>14</sup> Such practices are of doubtful legality but, again, lax enforcement of the F.A.R.A. provides for the continuance of such activities. In this author's mind, such practices are detrimental to the public's right to know the sources and biases of the propaganda and information that it receives. The Jewish Agency/American Section's use of conduits for its funds is widespread and by no means limited to support of Zionist publications. Financing of Zionist lobbyists, research groups, and so on, are accomplished through conduits, thus releasing the American Section from registering these activities with the Department of Justice.<sup>15</sup>

A final point of interest in this brief look at Jewish Agency involvement in American activities is the question of whether other organizations are speaking on behalf of American or government of Israel interests. For example, during 1970, the Supplemental Registration Statements of the Jewish Agency/American Section revealed that the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations received \$5,667 from the Jewish Agency. Such subsidies of American groups by a foreign agent would seem to make it incumbent on the Presidents Conference, in this case, to show evidence that it too is not speaking for the government of Israel. Unless such clarification is made, the disclosure and identification purposes of the F.A.R.A. are subverted. A similar instance involves the Synagogue Council for America. The Synagogue Council consists of representatives of the three branches of Judaism in this country--reform, conservative, and orthodox--and "consists of representatives both of the lay bodies of those three branches and the rabbinical bodies of those three branches."<sup>16</sup> The Synagogue Council receives a subsidy from the Jewish Agency/American Section in order to "prepare and distribute educational and cultural material in connection with the upbringing of Israel, particularly with regard to the historic and spiritual relationship of Jewish communities outside of Israel to the Holy Land." The Council is also involved in testimony in support of foreign aid legislation and in educating Americans in the "moral principles" underlying such foreign aid.<sup>18</sup> These activities are clearly forces of propaganda and as they are financed by the Jewish Agency/American Section, it would seem reasonable to expect the Synagogue Council to register as a foreign agent so that the American public might better know the relation of that organization to Israel.

Finally, in another example, it seems strange that the American Zionist Council (an umbrella organization of all U.S. Zionist groups) should be listed as a tax-exempt, tax-deductible organization when it receives over 80% of its budget from the Jewish Agency/American section.<sup>19</sup> The American Zionist Council sponsors youth programs, media advertising, supports Zionist communications projects (radio, TV, and periodicals), funds a speaker's bureau, finances a research bureau which functions as a form of Zionist censorship (see footnote), and sponsors American trips to Israel.<sup>20</sup> These activities funded as they are by a foreign agent would certainly seem to classify the American Zionist Council as a foreign agent itself.

All of these examples of the raising and use of Zionist funds in the United States have established the fact that Zionist activities in this nation are often funded by foreign vested interests. Although the 1963 Senate investigations into the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals resulted in a closing down of some of the conduits, extensive propaganda continues entangled in a web of foreign and domestic Zionist organizations, to the detriment of public accounting of the activities of the Zionist groups. As part of the Zionist funds raised in this country filter back from the Jewish Agency in order to create favorable American sentiment toward Israel or to directly influence U.S. Mid-East policy, it would seem imperative that greater control be exercised over the practices of Zionist groups. The American people must be able to distinguish the origins and funding of their information on the Middle East. In short, the American public has the right to be able to distinguish between genuine domestic

interest and support in foreign policy and an artificially manipulated interest inspired by a foreign government acting through paid U.S. citizens. In the area of Mid-East foreign policy, as perhaps in no other area, extreme caution and sensitive diplomacy will be required to lessen the deep conflicts. As this nation is continually propagandized, it becomes increasingly difficult for voices of moderation to emerge in support of U.S. hopes for peace in the Middle East.

### Israeli Bond Sales in the United States

In addition to direct philanthropic contributions by the American public to Israel, one additional Zionist method of raising funds bears mentioning: the sale of Israeli bonds. Many countries facing economic difficulties attempt to alleviate their plight through a foreign loan from another government or through the Export-Import Bank. In some instances, countries may sell securities to the citizens of another country as an investment opportunity. Israel has used all three of these methods during the last two decades.

In the marketing of securities in America, Israel has hardly followed normal practices.<sup>21</sup> Rather than playing up the investment opportunity angle of foreign securities, she has exclusively sold her bonds through a nationalistic appeal to the "special responsibility of the Jewish people" in the United States.<sup>22</sup> Even the bond prospectus filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington, D.C., begins with a Zionist version of Jewish history, the Jewish homeland and the intrinsic ties of all Jews to Israel.<sup>23</sup>

Israel Bond drives focus their propaganda on the Jewish responsibility that American Jews have to Israel. The 1951 Bond Drive, for instance, was opened with a statement by former Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., to the effect that it was of the "utmost patriotism as Americans and as Jews to see to it that this Israel Government Bond issue is a success."<sup>24</sup> The constant equation in Zionist propaganda between adherence to Judaism, patriotism as Americans, and financial support of Israel has brought great success to the sale of Israeli bonds. Synagogues, B'nai B'rith lodges, national and local public officials, have all lent their support, either as bond salesmen, or in drumming up potential buyers. Today, the United States is the major buyer of Israeli bonds worth millions a year.<sup>25</sup>

While the sale of the bonds in this nation is a perfectly legitimate way of gathering funds for Israel, it does raise some questions about an extension of Zionist propoganda and indoctrination into American life. When, for instance, has the private financing of a foreign government become a patriotic duty for Americans?<sup>25</sup> How healthy is it when it becomes social suicide for an ethnic minority in one country not to support the financing of another? How conducive is it to national policy-making in this nation to have such a strong identification between one nation and another, such that appeals can be made for funds on the basis of nationalistic feeling for the other country?

In short, it would seem to be in the best interests of this nation to evaluate rationally whether Zionist fund-raising in this country is all politics or all philanthropy. If it is, as it appears to be, mostly the former, then the American people should be informed; a number of Zionist organizations should be made to register

under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act; solid information should be obtained on the gathering and use of the hundreds of millions of dollars of American contributions to Israel; and the impact of such propagandistic fund-raising on American policy toward the Middle East should be evaluated. Benign neglect may be the answer to some aspects of American domestic policy, but when domestic politics become deeply embroiled and perhaps even shape U.S. foreign policy, such neglect is not only unwarranted but also dangerous to domestic and international harmony.



## CHAPTER V - FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Samuel Halperin, The Political World of American Zionism (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961), p. 200.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 210.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 253.

<sup>4</sup> Alfred M. Lilienthal, The Other Side of the Coin (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1965), p. 409.

<sup>5</sup> Morris Fine and Milton Himmelfarb, (ed.), American Jewish Year Book 1967, Vol. 70, (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1969), p. 129.

<sup>6</sup> Oscar I. Janowsky, (ed.), The American Jew: A Reappraisal (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1964), p. 297.

<sup>7</sup> The Washington Post, February 20, 1972, p. A 1.

<sup>8</sup> Lawrence Moser, "Zionist Role in U.S. Raises New Concern," The National Observer, May 18, 1970, reprint.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> See "Exemptions" in The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended and the rules and regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 22-25.

<sup>12</sup> "Activities and Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States," Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 88th Congress, First Session, Part 12, February 1963 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 1758.

<sup>13</sup> ibid., passim.

<sup>14</sup> See the Foreign Agents Registration Act, op. cit., and Senate Hearings, ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Senate Hearings, ibid.

<sup>16</sup> ibid., p. 1765.

<sup>17</sup> ibid.

<sup>18</sup> ibid., p. 1766.

<sup>19</sup> ibid., p. 1349.

<sup>20</sup> ibid., p. 1345. With respect to the "Research" Bureau, the function of that Bureau, according to the testimony of Zionists before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is to "analyze books and articles which deal with Israel and the Middle East. When the book is favorable, it is recommended. When it is unfavorable, it is analyzed and distortions are pointed up by providing the factual data required, so that our local Councils will be prepared to react to the impact which these books made on communities."

<sup>21</sup> Alfred M. Lilienthal, What Price Israel (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), p. 184.

<sup>22</sup> ibid., pp. 184-185.

<sup>23</sup> ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Fine and Himmelfarb, op. cit., pp. 131, 158.

<sup>25</sup> Lilienthal, What Price Israel, op. cit., p. 185.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSION: ZIONISM AND "PAX SEMITICA"

The first meeting of the World Zionist Organization called for nothing less than a form of classic revolution in the sense of an actual recasting of the existing social, political and economic order of world Jewry. Armed with the vague contours of a political doctrine calling for a "reconstitution" of the Jewish state in territory in which Jews had not enjoyed independent status since 586 B.C., the Zionists turned all their energies loose on selling their revolution to not only world Jewry--which was to form the backbone of their revolution--but also to the Gentile world which had to be made to accept the need and desirability of the Zionists' revolutionary solution to the "Jewish Problem."

In the first few decades of the Zionist revolution, the Zionist blueprint for Jewish nationalism was basically unsuccessful. In classic terms of revolution, the Zionists lacked the "objective conditions" on which to base an emotional appeal for a liberation of the "Jewish people." Although 19th and early 20th century Europe did provide some strength to the Zionist mission through periodic outbreaks of anti-semitism and political oppression of Jews, the liberal emancipation values of Europe, by and large, predominated, and European Jews were enjoying new freedoms and status. The First World War provided the Zionists with some opportunity to gain headway in obtaining international recognition of their claims, but in a very real sense, Zionism was still a small guerrilla movement in terms of the large scope and goals envisioned for the revolution.

World War II drastically changed the fortunes of the struggling Zionist movement. In essence, Nazism provided the Zionists with the "objective conditions" on which to base the Zionist revolution, and the machines of the waiting Zionist organizational network geared to meet this paradoxical boon to Jewish nationalism. The rise of the Zionist propaganda machine and the sophistication of Zionist political techniques acquired from years of studying their successes and failures worked to provide the Zionist revolution with the final element required for success: the commitment of the people or, in other words, the "subjective conditions" indispensable for successful revolutionary activity. The Jewish state was proclaimed; and a new language, governmental structure, culture, identity, and environment were provided for world Jewry. The Zionist revolution was accomplished. Nevertheless, Zionism as an ideology of militant Jewish nationalism continues despite the attainment of its goal. Today Zionism continues as the ideological foundation of Israel through the fervent efforts of an international network of Zionist organizations centered primarily in Israel and the United States.

The foregoing thesis on Zionist interest group activity has attempted to describe some of the elements of the Zionist revolution, with particular emphasis on the role which Zionism played in the United States. Without United States backing of the Zionist movement, it is doubtful that the Zionist revolution would have succeeded. Zionist recognition of the importance of American Jewry and the American government to their goals produced a high level of Zionist interest group activity in this nation. The paper has described some of the problems which the Zionist interest group faced in the United States and the world events, methods,

and ideological approaches which Zionism used in order to overcome obstacles to their successful influence of U.S. attitudes and policy toward the Zionist program. Finally, Chapter IV through Chapter VI focussed on some of the contemporary questions raised by the dominant influence of the Zionist movement in the United States both in terms of American foreign policy toward the Middle East and the relations between American Jewry and Israel.

Because of the large role played by the United States government and American Jewry in the ultimate formation of Israel and because of continued governmental and private support of Israel, the United States today has become intricately involved in the belligerencies of the Middle East. American ties to Israel have helped to foster a situation of bipolarity in the Middle East, with the United States and Israel pitted against the Soviet Union and the Arab nations. The United States has recognized the disastrous consequences to which such polarization may lead but has been unable to charter effectively a different course in its involvement in the Middle East. Government leaders in this nation, fearful of U.S. involvement in the Mid-East, have attempted to assume a position of neutrality and persuade both the Arabs and Israelis to lessen the political tensions between them, but both the Israelis and Arabs have exhibited aggressive refusal of such peace overtures. Israel has naturally developed a security paranoia constantly fed by belligerent Arab statements. The Arab nations, on the other hand, fear Zionist expansionism. Indeed, as early as 1953 John Foster Dulles stated:

Today the Arab peoples are afraid that the United States will back the new state in aggressive expansion. They are more fearful of Zionism than of communism, and they fear lest the United States become a backer of expansionist Zionism.<sup>1</sup>

The problems of the Middle East are deeply emotional and complex, but as yet the political tensions of that area of the world have not reached a point of no return. In light of the catastrophic consequences for both Arabs and Israelis should the Middle East turmoil escalate into all-out war and, in light of the specific focus of this thesis, it seems worthwhile to conclude with a brief exploration of the role which Zionism, as an aggressive Jewish nationalist movement, plays in the conflict in the Middle East.

### "Zionism and Pax Semitica"

In 1954 then Assistant Secretary of State for the United States, Henry A.

Byroade, issued some advice to the State of Israel:

To the Israelis I say that you should come to truly look upon yourselves as a Middle Eastern State and see your future in that context rather than as a headquarters or nucleus, so to speak, of a worldwide group of peoples of a particular religious faith who must have special rights in and obligations to the Israeli state. You should drop the attitude of the conqueror and the conviction that force and a policy of retaliatory killings is the only policy that your neighbors will understand. You should make your deeds correspond to your frequent utterance of the desire for peace.<sup>2</sup>

Since the Zionist movement gained penultimate success in the formation of the Jewish state in Palestine, they have fervently worked to keep Israel an "exclusivist state for the 'Jewish people'."<sup>3</sup> Israeli public law today discriminates against both Christians and Moslems in the Law of Return and the Nationality Law of 1952 (see Chapter V). This discrimination has been carried over into the public life of Israel. Prior to the June 1967 war, the Arab minority in Israel, while constituting nearly 12% of the population, held only 2% of the posts in government administration, with not one single Arab among the top-ranking officials, judges, or cabinet

ministers. Indeed, among the 120 members of the Israeli Knesset, only seven were Arabs.<sup>4</sup> Former Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, a Zionist discussed the reasons behind such discrimination with Senator Mark O. Hatfield during his 1970 trip to the Middle East. Eshkol told Hatfield that Jews had been a minority wherever they have lived throughout history, and that they would not be a minority again. He told Hatfield that non-Jews could not be allowed to live in large numbers in Israel, let alone participate in the government.<sup>5</sup> Eshkol's view was recently echoed in a Washington Post article quoting Moshe Dayan, Israel's Defense Minister. Dayan stated: "We must avoid having too large an Arab minority in Israel. I definitely consider another million Arabs too large a minority to be accepted by present-day Israel with its present population."<sup>6</sup>

This continued separatist ideology of Zionism has served to only further increase the tensions between the Arabs and Jews in the Middle East. Indeed, some writers have even gone so far as to suggest that the first indispensable step toward peace in the Middle East is understanding that is a conflict between "Zionist nationalism and the Palestine people over Palestine."<sup>7</sup> While such an analysis is no doubt simplistic, it does serve to remind students of the Middle East that "Israel is first and foremost the creation of Zionism," and as long as Zionism continues to predominate in Israel, the Israeli nation will continue to be characterized by the militant segregationist philosophy of that movement.<sup>8</sup>

This is not to say that a de-Zionization of Israel will bring an immediate pax semitica to all the semitic peoples of the Middle East. The history of the conflicts between the Arabs and Israelis since 1948 has brought practical matters of

territorial boundaries, security guarantees and the plight of the Palestinian refugees which must be solved to the satisfaction of both sides of the Middle East dispute before peace will ever come to that troubled area of the world. But the de-Zionization of Israel would open the way for Israel to become a modern nation of the Middle East and perhaps help to pave the way for accommodation of Israeli and Arab differences. Nationalist philosophy is no longer applicable to Jewish needs or reality. The goal of Zionism was to found a national home for Jews in Palestine. That goal has been accomplished, and "by its very success, Zionism has become obsolete; by attaining its goals, Zionism provided for its own negation."<sup>9</sup>

Today Israel needs a new ideological superstructure more appropriate to its position as a recognized member of the world community of nations. Israel is a Hebrew state; it is not merely a Jewish religious community nor should it be merely a state of Zionist ideologies or act as if it were a western state merely in the Middle East by geographical fluke. Indeed, one non-Zionist Israeli has stated that "of all the legacies bequeathed by Zionism to Israel, the most dangerous perhaps is its orientation toward Western Jewry and the West in general," which has led to a neglect of Israeli-Arab affairs.<sup>10</sup> Israeli policy-makers must realize that a great gap exists between the true reality of an Israeli nationalism and the historically obsolete Zionist philosophy. As long as Zionist thinking is allowed to dictate Israel's actions, this small Middle Eastern nation will continue to be guided by an artificial ideology which no longer conforms to the realities of the mid-twentieth century, nor to the realities of Israeli statehood. As Michael Ionides pointed



out: "Despite its glorious achievements, miraculous successes and undeniable feats of self-sacrifice, Zionism now tragically finds itself in a cul-de-sac, created by its own inherent characteristics."<sup>11</sup> Peace with her neighbors shall never come to Israel as long as she remains trapped by the out-moded tenets of the 19th century thought of political Zionism. "No one can walk backward into the future."<sup>12</sup>

Israel has a long way to come before it is de-Zionized. Of the eleven parliamentary groups elected in 1965, all but five deputies were Zionists.<sup>13</sup> But the election of 1965 was significant in one respect: for the first time, an anti-Zionist political party (outside of the Israeli Communist Party) won the test of election. Called the New Force or Ha'olam Hageh Movement, this non-Zionist party elected one deputy, Uri Avnery, and received 1.2% of the vote "evenly dispersed throughout the country, but with a much higher percentage in the army, some frontier settlements and the Israeli Arabs."<sup>14</sup> The New Force may indicate that "deep structural changes" may be occurring in Israel, for the party is totally anti-theoretical to Zionist philosophy. For instance, the New Force has advocated a return of the Arab refugees; has urged cooperation with Arab nationalism; and called for the abolishment of the pervasive Zionist organization. In addition, the party has stated that Israel should cease to declare itself a Jewish state and become a pluralist one, offering full equality to Israeli Arabs and a complete separation of synagogue and state.<sup>15</sup> The emergence of an anti-Zionist political party in Israel is paralleled by other indications of anti-Zionism, such as the Hebrew University group which recently questioned the Israeli government's sincerity in seeking peace with the Arabs; the reorganization which the Jewish Agency is

undergoing in order to direct monies more toward social than political causes in Israel; to a recent poll among Jews abroad which indicated that only one in six thought himself a Zionist; and a rise of Israeli criticism of their government's annexation plans for the Arab-inhabited regions occupied by Israel.<sup>16</sup> Even the head of the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency, Dr. Nahum Goldmann who, as a loyal Zionist, "is committed to the objective of maintaining Israel as a Jewish state by preventing the return of the Palestinians to their homes," has called for a neutralization of Israel on a basis similar to Switzerland, thus removing Zionism from militarism and politics.<sup>17</sup> The rise of anti-Zionism among Jews around the world has brought to the surface distinctions which the Zionists sought to cloud as they pursued their national objectives: that is, the distinctions between Zionism and Judaism and between Judaism and Zionism and a Hebrew or Israeli nation. In the clarification of these distinctions lies the hope for a peaceful future for Israel in the Middle East. The de-Zionization of Israel is not a sufficient condition for peace in the Middle East. But as long as Israeli government officials tenaciously hold to an antiquated ideology of Zionism, peace remains an elusive goal for both the Israelis and their Arab neighbors. Zionism is fundamentally incompatible with a lasting peace in the Middle East.

## CHAPTER VII - FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> From Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' speech "Six Major Policy Issues," June 1, 1953, as reprinted in Documents on the Middle East, Ralph H. Magnus, ed. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, July 1969), p. 79.

<sup>2</sup> Statement by Henry A. Byroade, Department of State Bulletin, 628, 632 (1954).

<sup>3</sup> Statement by Dr. W.T. Mallison, Jr., for the Record to the Near East Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, August 21, 1970, mimeographed copy, p. 34.

<sup>4</sup> Uri Avnery, Israel Without Zionists: A Plea for Peace in the Middle East (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 162.

<sup>5</sup> As related to the author by Senator Mark O. Hatfield. Also stated by Senator Hatfield in The Congressional Record, Vol. 116, No. 99, June 16, 1970, p. 59037.

<sup>6</sup> As quoted by The Washington Post, April 10, 1972.

<sup>7</sup> Mallison, op. cit., p. 28.

<sup>8</sup> Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 2.

<sup>9</sup> Avnery, op. cit., p. 156.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 164.

<sup>11</sup> Michael Ionides, Divide and Lose (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1960), p. 352.

<sup>12</sup> Joseph Hergesheimer, as quoted in The Wit of the Jews, edited by Lore and Maurice Cowan (Nashville, Tennessee: Aurora Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 44.

<sup>13</sup>Avnery, op. cit., p. 167.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 178-179.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 179.

<sup>16</sup>See articles in The Washington Post, January 29, January 31, April 10, and August 30, 1972.

<sup>17</sup>Mallison, op. cit., p. 4.

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