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DE REBUS ANTIQUIS:
LINGUIS LITTERISQUE ET GRAECIS ET LATINIS

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THE CONCEPT OF ΔΙΚΗ
AND THE SUPPORTING ROLE OF IMAGERY IN THE *AGAMEMNON*

Greek tragedy reached its pinnacle as a literary genre in the middle of the fifth century, B.C. Man at that time was coming to a new height of understanding about the world and himself; he began to ". . . recognize . . . the savage diversities of the world."¹ The world was perceived not as a static environment, but as an evolutionary one. The changes and evolutions in the cosmos, the subject of philosophical inquiry by the Presocratic physicists, were now seen in the changes in man's engagement (philosophical and theological) with his surroundings, with himself, and with society in general. The three great Greek tragedians, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, advanced the increasing consciousness of man's self and explored his role as a responsible agent in the world. The tragic vision of each gives a different feeling about man--his place in the world and his potential future condition. Man is variously defeated and redeemed in Greek tragedy, and the degree to which either pole is approached varies among the tragedians. Aeschylus generally voiced optimism and an early humanism about man's greatness, while Sophocles and Euripides exhibited doubt and cynicism about man's nature and his ability to be an effective agent in the universe.

Aeschylus, as the first in the tradition of Greek tragedy, dealt more emphatically with the role of man in the cosmos and his interactions with the divine.² In the dramas of Aeschylus, man is coming to awareness, a necessary step in his evolution as a self-motivated force in the cosmos, for "Only when men understand the entire order of which they are a part can they understand themselves."³ Aeschylean man begins to deal in a more conscious and deliberate manner with what it is to know the

nature of gods and heroes.

The *Agamemnon* centers on a problem of human awareness: an issue is explored via the events of the play, and a solution is proffered for the problem at hand. The issue involved bears relation to contemporary thought and practice, and the discussion therefore mirrors the progress of Greek philosophical inquiry. The central issue of the *Agamemnon* is a moral one of responsibility and guilt. Justice appears as a force imposed on man by the divine element, and the drama shows man struggling within the system of Δίκη to alter that force which controls him from without. Justice is experienced both as punishment and as an ideal, but it is no longer entirely acceptable to the more rational, engaging, and responsible Greek society of that time (the play was written in 458 B.C.). The trilogy (the *Oresteia*) as a whole shows progress through time with respect to responsibility and judgment, and the *Agamemnon* itself serves to illuminate the initial stage in the development of a system of Δίκη for the mortal condition.

In his *Poetics* Aristotle undertook a timeless discourse on poetry and history, parts of which are especially relevant to our current discussion of Greek tragedy. The main differences between history and poetry are their subject matter and the consequential force of each genre. History, Aristotle asserts, treats things that *have* happened, while poetry treats things that *could* happen; history speaks of "particulars," while poetry tells of the "universals" in the world.

διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις
ἱστορίας ἐστίν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ

καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει. ἔστιν δὲ καθόλου μὲν, τῷ πόλῳ
 τὰ πῶλα ἅττα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τὸ
 εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, . . . τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον, τί
 Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔπραξεν ἢ τί ἔπαθεν.⁴

Wherefore poetry is more philosophic and more serious (noble) than history. For poetry tells rather of the universals, history speaks of the particulars. The universal is to what sort of person it happens to say or to do what certain sort of things according to likelihood (probability) or necessity. . . The particular is what Alcibiades did or what he suffered.

Greek tragedy also typically speaks of universals, but it does so through particulars. The *Agamemnon* deals with the curse on the house of Atreus, a domestic (dynastic) tradition which is merely indicative of a corollary problem on the cosmic level. The universal problem which Aeschylus engages in the *Agamemnon* is that of law and justice, on both the divine and human levels, and the resultant overview includes the cosmos as a whole and the system of law which operates therein. The discussion of Δίκη, an element of that legal system, is a particular reference to the more universal moral problem.

ΔΙΚΗ: INELUCTABLE AND JUDICIOUS FORCE

The central issue of the *Agamemnon* is one which involves the moral element of the human condition, law, and, more specifically, Justice within man's legal system. The system of law which regulates the life of man, however, is not self-imposed but is dictated and controlled by the gods. The philosophical inquiry, then, takes place on both the theological and the human levels; that is, divine law is enacted through human events. The drama focuses on the return and subsequent murder of the

lord Agamemnon, but the gods (Zeus and Artemis in particular) are essential figures in the action as well. Divine Justice is the controlling force in the universe, and the maintenance of its equilibrium is portrayed on the human level throughout the play.

Χορος	ἔστι δ' ὅπῃ νῦν 67 ἔστι. τελεῖται δ' ἔς τὸ πεπρομένον.
Chorus	Things are as they now are. Things are being fulfilled according to what was fated.

Crime and punishment (guilt and retribution) work in an automatic, ineluctable cycle over which man has no control: the guilty man will always be punished. Agamemnon is guilty and his unavoidable punishment is death; Clytaemnestra, his murderer, will receive her punishment as well, as is seen in the subsequent play of the trilogy. Thus we have an unending cycle of crime and retribution, with Justice acting to maintain its own necessary balance.

This isonomic insistence, central to the operation of *Δίκη*, seems to be derived from the speculations of the Presocratic philosophers on the balanced maintenance of the physical cosmos. In the *Agamemnon* there are frequent metaphors of balancing and weighing out things, so that the stroke-for-stroke, automatic retribution principle by which *Δίκη* operates is throughout supported by the image of scale-pans, which are never in a state of exact equilibrium but which so oscillate, very slowly in the course of time, that a rough balance is averaged out. That this principle of *ἰσονομία* seems to derive from the Presocratics is evidenced, for example, by the following quotation from Anaximander:

. . . ἀλλ' ἑτέραν τινὰ φύσιν ἀπειρον, ἐξ ἧς ἅπαντας
 γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους
 "ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶ τῶν οὐσῶν, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν
 εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεῶν. διδοῖναι γὰρ αὐτὰ
 δίκην καὶ τίσις ἀλλήλους τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ
 χρόνου τάξιν," ποιητικώτεροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ
 λέγων.⁵

[Anaximander says that the first principle is not water, etc., but]. . . some other indefinite nature, from which all the heavens and all the orders in them come to be. "And from these is the genesis for existing things, and then destruction is also into these, according to necessity. For they pay δίκη and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the assessment of time,"--he spoke of them thus in rather poetic terms.⁶

Since this speculation is already couched in metaphoric terms (ποιητικώτεροις. . . ὀνόμασιν), the extension of the notion to, or back to, the sphere of human activity was facilitated. The words imply a definitely moral character for the compensation. This is the physical universe of which Anaximander is speaking, but it has morality in its operation. This passage and others similarly expressed in metaphoric terms suggestive of morality (Heraclitus was particularly fond of speaking thus) seem to be the link between the Aeschylean concept of Zeus and Justice and the Presocratics.

Hugh Lloyd-Jones suggests, however, that the Justice of Aeschylus was obvious in authors as early as Homer and Hesiod. Zeus became the guardian of Justice in both Homer and Hesiod; Homer indeed spoke of a unified universe governed by a system of Justice under Zeus.

There [in Homer], it is true, the gods often affect the course of events on earth by direct physical action, or by giving an order to a mortal, though most often by putting an idea into a mortal's mind.

Yet above the others, and in a position wholly superior to theirs, is Zeus. In battle he is more than a match for all the rest together; though the others often try to thwart him, and even occasionally succeed, the general rule is that Zeus always prevails. What places him in a different category from all the other gods . . . is that in a general way he determines the course of events. His counsel, his plan, is fulfilled.⁷

Each event on the human scale is determined in terms of both divine and human action. Hesiod attributes to Zeus both human actions and qualities, but also others beyond the range of human capabilities.

Lloyd-Jones notes a trait of the Justice of Zeus which is particularly relevant to the *Agamemnon*: Zeus does not punish the innocent. Rather, punishment more often befalls the rich and powerful because "the great are more prone to temptations, for power and riches in themselves do not arouse the envy of the gods."⁸ Aeschylus agrees also with Homer and Hesiod that men understand the workings of Justice by regarding the past. Justice may not be clearly understood at the time it is affecting man (as it is not in the *Agamemnon*), but to be sure it comes clear in retrospect. In the context of the play, it is we (the observers) rather than the victim (Agamemnon) who profit immediately from the past.

Aeschylus also agrees with Homer and Hesiod on the point that human law is governed by divine law. Zeus is the champion of Justice, and his notions of divine justice regulate justice on the human level as well. Lloyd-Jones notes that this concept of Justice is comforting to man; indeed he suggests that "The Chorus of the *Agamemnon* expresses gratitude to Zeus for the 'grace that comes by violence'" because it entails "assurance that injustice committed by one man against another will in the

end be avenged by Zeus, either upon the criminal himself or upon his descendents."⁹

But Lloyd-Jones also points out some basic differences between Aeschylean Zeus (and Justice) and the Zeus of earlier authors:

Zeus. . . is more predominant over the other gods in Aeschylus than in any earlier poet. Certainly Zeus in Aeschylus determines the general course of events; certainly Zeus as the protector of the laws of justice has a special importance in Aeschylus.¹⁰

Aeschylus sees Zeus as not completely anthropomorphic and able to influence events without physical intervention and exertion. Zeus as the all-powerful divinity is seen by Aeschylus also with a fitting sense of humility.

The supreme god of the universe is Zeus; other gods are powerful but he determines in a general way the pattern of events. He is the champion of Dike, the order of the universe. That means first that he defends his rule against any challenge from the other gods; . . . Secondly, it means that he preserves justice among men. If they challenge Zeus' ordinances, he will punish them. But he has bestowed upon them "a grace that comes by violence." This consists in his punishment of their injustices against another man; Zeus' daughter Dike records his offense in her father's tablets, and sooner or later Zeus will be sure to punish him, either in his own person or through his descendents.¹¹

It may be that Aeschylus' concept of Δίκη was influenced both by the Homeric-Hesiodic doctrine of Zeus and Justice and by Presocratic philosophers such as Anaximander and Heraclitus. At any rate, the operation of Δίκη as we see it in the *Agamemnon* is very severe, more fitting either for an earlier and less sophisticated age of men or for the government

of the physical cosmos. Such a system of $\Delta\lambda\kappa\eta$ proves too harsh for the contemporary human world. That it is intolerably strict, in that "assessments paid in time" in the human world are paid in blood and suffering, is the statement of the play.¹² For Justice in the play sometimes seems to be a blind force bent on preserving its equilibrium without regard for rational moderation and careful, weighed consideration of its own consequences. This harsh and mechanical aspect of Justice seems to be inherited from the speculations of the Presocratics such as Anaximander and Heraclitus. The analogy of the physical cosmos and the influence of the Presocratics cannot be discounted, despite Lloyd-Jones.

The theme of Justice in the play is carried not only by the characters and events, but also by the exuberant imagery and by statements of truth (gnomic statements) uttered by the Chorus. This points up the dual role of the Chorus: they are both participant and observer in the drama. Their succinct gnomai are woven into their speeches, and the importance of these statements does not initially strike the hearer/reader because they are so casual a part of the dialogue. The gnostic statements do, however, offer an explanation about the nature of the cosmos (Justice in particular) and therefore serve to join action and conclusion. The gnostic statements later turn to action themselves: at first we hear them stated directly by the Chorus and they subsequently are enacted by the other characters and events of the drama.

The gnostic statements involve Justice generally, and more specifically their subject matter includes learning ($\mu\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$) and suffering ($\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$). These themes are repeated at various points in the play;

several examples include:

176-78: τὸν φρονεῖν βροτοὺς ὁδῶ-
σαντα, τὸν πάθει μάθος
θέντα κυρίως ἔχειν.

(Zeus) having set men on the path to being wise, having determined (laid down) as a law to have authority (as an authoritative law) learning by suffering.

180-81: καὶ παρ' ἄ-
κοντας ἦλθε σωφρονεῖν.

And understanding comes to men against their will.

249-50: Δίκαια δὲ τοῖς μὲν παθοῦ-
σιν μαθεῖν ἐπιρρέπει.

Justice weighs out understanding to those who have suffered.

532-33: Πάρις γὰρ οὔτε συντελῆς πόλις
ἐξεύχεται τὸ δρᾶμα τοῦ πάθους πλέον.

For (neither) Paris nor the city sharing in his payments boasts that the deed was greater than the suffering.

584: ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦβᾶ τοῖς γέροισιν εὐμαθεῖν.

For to learn is always a young thing for old men.

1563-64: μίμνει δὲ μίμνοντος ἐν θρόνῳ Διὸς
παθεῖν τὸν ἔρξαντα.

(The Law) remains while Zeus remains on his throne that the doer suffers.

The maxim πάθει μάθος (177) leads to the discovery of the causal principle in the universe. It unites the distant past and the impact of the

present on the immediate future. Its early renditions (176-78, 249-50) refer specifically to the sacrifice of Iphigeneia and, therefore, appropriately form a framework for the discussion of Agamemnon's crime. Anne Lebeck suggests, however, that upon this traditional meaning for the pro-verb another meaning is added:

One meaning [that just mentioned] has to do with Agamemnon, actor in the tragedy, the other with the chorus and audience, spectators of the tragedy. . . Thus in its wider sense πάθος is the experience undergone by the chorus and audience as they gain insight into the manifold causes responsible for the fate of Agamemnon, as they realize that justice is at work in human destiny, guiding all things to their conclusion.¹³

They, and we too, learn the causal connection between guilty action and punishment. This understanding comes through the dramatization of events, and is again summed up in 1564 (παθεῖν τὸν ἔργαντα). The repetition of this theme cannot help but emphasize its importance. We ourselves, as observers of the play, have come to learn and understand the nature of Justice in the world; the gnomic statements summarize it precisely lest it go unseen in the events themselves.

Divine Justice does not regard the motives or intent of an action; the same crime begets the same punishment. The motives of the guilty parties in the *Agamemnon* differ drastically, but the characters nonetheless receive the same justice. Agamemnon's guilt comes from two separate crimes; the one crime (which has two parts: Iphigeneia and Troy) was motivated by himself as an individual, while the other (the Thyestean banquet) was unavoidable as a divine curse on his house. "Wherever one is

mentioned explicitly the other is implicitly in the background."¹⁴ The latter, of course, stems from the slaughter of Thyestes' children by Agamemnon's father. Agamemnon "inherits" the curse; that is, the guilt and continuing nexus of cause and effect are passed from father to son, but Agamemnon does not *consciously* act to continue it. He is sent against Troy by Zeus, who is angered by the transgression of hospitality rites and the abduction of Helen by Paris.

Χορος οὕτω δ' Ἀτρέως παῖδας ὁ κρείσσων 60
 ἐπ' Ἀλεξάνδρῳ πέμπει ξένιος
 Ζεὺς, πολυάνορος ἄμφι γυναικὸς

Chorus Thus Zeus the mighty, protector of hospitality rites, sends the sons of Atreus against Alexandros for the sake of a woman of many husbands.

Agamemnon therefore had no personal driving force in his expedition to Troy. He put on the "yoke of necessity" (ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκας ἔδου λέπιδνον 218) and was sent by Zeus against Troy "with avenging hand" (ξὺν δορὶ. . . χερὶ--109). It *was*, however, his *own* motivations which brought about the sacking of Troy to such a great degree ("over-sack": διπλᾶ δ' ἔτευσαν Πριαμίδαυ θ' ἀμάρτια--Twice over the people of Priam have atoned for their sinful actions--537). The other action which makes Agamemnon guilty in the eyes of divine Justice is his sacrifice of his daughter Iphigeneia. The sacrifice was demanded by Artemis, who was angered at the destruction of a pregnant hare by the ominous eagle of Zeus and at the potential destruction of Troy, which the sending of the hare portended. In one respect, then, Agamemnon had no choice: it was a prerequisite to the Argive expedition against Troy, which had been ordained by Zeus.

Clytaemnestra, on the other hand, is impelled by private, passionate motives. She seeks retribution for the sacrifice of her daughter, and she is further angered by the fact that Agamemnon has brought a concubine home with him. The latter impetus incites her womanly jealousy, and she is driven as well by her own self-serving zeal for power.

Clytaemnestra is in an ironic position in the tragedy, which points up the ineluctable and unending character of the system of Justice which is operating. She acts as the agent of divine Justice in her role as Agamemnon's murderer, but she will later become the target of that Justice as well. In just the same manner Agamemnon had been the agent of Justice in the punishment of Alexander and Troy and thereby also incurred guilt. So goes the cycle: the doer must suffer, and in this case the doer is the avenger (first Agamemnon, then Clytaemnestra). The one who commits the crime is unaware at the time of its commission that he also will be the victim of a similar crime: like begets like, the sacrificer becomes the victim, the subject becomes the object.

Δίκη, it has been noted, operates on both the divine and the human levels. We see the divine will operating both *through* and *upon* the human element: through, in that Agamemnon and then Clytaemnestra are agents of Zeus; and upon, in that Agamemnon and, in the *Libation Bearers*, Clytaemnestra are the victims of divine Justice. The appearance of both divine and human characters in the context of power juxtaposes the two levels in the realm of Justice. The *Agamemnon* deals directly with the moral question of Justice (guilt and retribution) on the human level, but this has obvious implications for the theological level as well.

Aeschylus also specifically states a parallel between the two levels. We see in lines 168-175 that the divine system suffers evolution and change, as we see the human system doing in the context of the trilogy as a whole. The kingdom of Uranos was overthrown by Kronos, and that of Kronos was eventually taken over by Zeus.

Χορος	οὐδ' ὅστις πάροιθεν ἦν μέγας, παμμάχῳ θράσει βρύων, οὐδὲ λέξεταί πρὶν ὤν. 170 ὅς δ' ἔπειτ' ἔφυ, τρια- κτῆρος οὐχεται τυχών. Ζῆνα δέ τις προφρόνως ἐπινύκλια κλάζων τεύξεταί φρενῶν τὸ πᾶν.
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Chorus	But whoever formerly was great, teeming with fighting boldness, not even he [Uranos] will be spoken of as existing before. And he who then was, he [Kronos] is gone, having met with an overthrower. Someone, crying aloud the victory song for Zeus, will attain to complete understanding.
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These divine figures have obvious correspondences in the context of the *Agamemnon*, and the progression is mirrored in the house of Atreus: Uranos = Atreus, Kronos = Agamemnon, Zeus = Orestes. Agamemnon is the inheritor of Atreus' curse, as Orestes will likewise be the heir to Agamemnon. This points up the circular nature of divine will and Δίκη. Only when there is peace on the divine level can there be harmony on the human level. The *Agamemnon* deals with moral evolution among the gods, which in turn dictates moral evolution among men (that evolution is resolved in the *Eumenides*). We see the links between past and present, and between present and future. This also emphasizes the cyclical nature of the divine system of Justice: Zeus overthrew an earlier one and eventually may

himself be overthrown as the one who guides the actions of men.

In addition to the continuous nature of the evolution of law and justice, the *Agamemnon* serves also to point out the fact of its ineluctability. The guilty man will always be punished. In the drama the avenger always becomes the transgressor, usually unaware of the implications of his avenging act. Agamemnon avenges Helen and Zeus by sacking Troy, but he oversteps the limits of ὕβρις by *oversacking* Troy and by sacrificing Iphigeneia. Thus he becomes a transgressor. Clytaemnestra acts to avenge Iphigeneia and becomes transgressor. Aegisthus acts to avenge Thyestes and becomes transgressor. Orestes will act to avenge Agamemnon and will become transgressor (although the resolution of his guilt takes a different path in the *Eumenides*). The *Agamemnon* leaves us with the knowledge that Justice does not spare anyone. We learn (μάθος!) that Justice comes to all, and with that learning and understanding comes grief (πάθει μάθος).

As we see the relationship between generations unfold, the symmetry of Justice becomes apparent. The acts of crime and punishment committed in each generation of the house of Atreus are similar in kind. The crime which one commits will be visited upon him as a punishment: like for like. "Justice demands that what one suffers be the exact equivalent of what one does."¹⁵ This, however, points to the unending nature of the cycle. No finality is possible from this concept of Justice: something always remains to be paid for.

Each generation repeats the crime of the previous generation because guilt is passed from father to son. Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigeneia

Cass. I believe (am persuaded by) these pieces of evidence regarding these new-born babes bewailing their slaughters and roasted flesh eaten by their father.

The malignant crime is described even more graphically at 1217-22:

Κα. ὄρατε τούσδε, τοὺς δόμοις ἔφημένους
 νέους, ὄνειρων προσφερῆς μορφώμασιν;
 παῖδες θανόντες ὡσπερὲν πρὸς τῶν φύλων,
 χεῖρας κρεῶν πλήθοντες, οἰκείας βορᾶς, 1220
 σὺν ἐντέροις τε σπλάγχν', ἐποίκιτιστον γέμος,
 πρέπουσ' ἔχοντες, ὧν πατὴρ ἐγεύσατο.

Cass. Do you see them, the children sitting there upon the house, similar to the shapes of dreams? Children, as if killed at the hands of loved ones, their hands full of meat, their own flesh, appear holding inward parts with intestines, a pitiable load, of which their father tasted.

This is typical of Aeschylus' pattern of development, be it themes, images, causal connections, or the like: he moves via prolepsis to development (from the unknown to the known). We do not know at first the implicit importance of the situation at hand, but all comes clear in the end.

THE ROLE OF IMAGERY IN THE *AGAMEMNON*

Lebeck asserts¹⁶ that the three ingredients of the *Agamemnon* are 1) gnomic statements (*sententiae* or maxims), 2) dramatic action, and 3) imagery. The gnomic statements are general truths or principles, related to the moral theme (Justice), and as such they are the object lesson of the play. The gnomic statements are directly expressed (e.g., πάθει μάθος and παθεῖν τὸν ἔρξαντα) and are illustrated by means of the dramatic events of the play. The imagery of the play, however, is more subtle as

it supports and bears out the central issues at stake. The interrelation of the three ingredients and the especial importance of imagery are effectively described by Lebeck:

When related to each other and to the ideas which they illustrate or the dramatic action which translates them into visual terms, the images cease to be discrete and arbitrary pictures and emerge as important components of the play's significance.¹⁷

Images need not be concrete and visualized, but Aeschylus' usually are. They are analogies in life which support the notions of the play itself; they are sensory but their emphasis intellectual.¹⁸ Images are verbal pictures which elicit an intended response or experience from the hearer/reader. This is well expressed by John Hay in his succinct discussion of images and image-patterns:

. . .if a reader be competent (careful, sensitive, able to read the text in its original language, and possessed of an ample reservoir of human experience), his experience will approximate that of the poet and of other competent readers. . .¹⁹

Hay states further that a poetic image has existence at three locations: in the poet's experience, in the poem itself, and in the reader's experience. It is the second location which draws the first and third together. Aeschylus does this by "image-patterns" or "recurrent imagery," the repetition of similar images which are entwined with each other; they reinforce each other and are difficult to isolate. Hay quotes Robert Heilman's definition of (Caroline Spurgeon's term) "recurrent imagery":

. . .reiterations of families of terms, often of considerable qualitative difference, clustered about some root-idea--an idea such as sight or disease or age or sex.²⁰

The effect of this recurrent imagery in the *Agamemnon*, as we have seen above, serves to point up the issues of the play. Lebeck suggests²¹ that the recurrent images of the play are employed by means of "prolepsis and gradual development." They are introduced in an anticipatory manner; their full impact and importance is not initially apparent (indeed it is often deceptive), but their eventual unfolding and expansion clarify and reinforce the intended experience (elicited response) for the reader. This element of prolepsis allows for the frequent occurrence of tragic irony: Things are not always as they first appear and it is the recognition of this which causes a reversal for the characters involved. (Instances of this subtle recognition and reversal will be pointed out in more detail in my discussion of individual image-patterns.)

Some of the basic image patterns in the *Agamemnon* include: light and darkness; vultures and eagles; serpents and lions; entanglement: nets, yokes, robes, the hunt, and watchdogs; murdered young; wealth and hybris; male and female dominance; sacrifice and guilt. Let us examine several of these image patterns in detail to see how they appear via prolepsis and how their gradual development serves to support the central theme of Δίκη.

Nets and the Hunt

The imagery of the hunt (including nets and robes) is employed in just this manner. The images are introduced *prospectively*, and they are subsequently expanded and solidified. The kindred imagery of the hunt includes nets, robes, yokes, and watchdogs; this motif is closely

connected to other kindred imagery and is an important part in the play's development. The images are introduced first as concrete objects whose significance is not immediately obvious, but their eventual development leads also to the illumination of their import for the play.

The image of the net first appears in line 355-61: night cast a net over Troy:

Χορος	ὦ Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ καὶ Νύξ φιλία μεγάλων κόσμων κτεάτειρα, ἥτ' ἐπὶ Τροίας πύργοις ἔβαλες στεγανὸν δίκτυον ὡς μήτε μέγαν μήτ' οὖν νεαρῶν τιν' ὑπερτελέσαι μέγα δουλείας γάγγαμον αἴτης παναλώτου.	355 360
Chorus	Oh King Zeus and beloved Night, possessor of great ornaments, who threw a <u>covering net</u> (over) upon the Trojan towers, so that neither a great man nor any of the young children might overleap the great <u>net</u> of slavish, <u>all-catching</u> ruin.	

The net appears as a robe (metaphor within metaphor) in 1126-27 (ἐν πέπλοισιν. . . λαβούσα) and reappears with its full force in 1380-38 when Clytaemnestra describes the murder of Agamemnon.

Κλ.	οὕτω δ' ἔπραξα, καὶ τὰδ' οὐκ ἀρνήσομαι, ὡς μήτε φεύγειν μήτ' ἀμύνεσθαι μόρον. ἄπειρον ἀμφίβληστρον, ὡσπερ ἰχθύων, <u>περιστιχίζω</u> , πλοῦτον εἵματος κακόν.	1380
Clyt.	Thus have I done, and I shall not deny these things, so that he neither escaped nor warded off his doom. I put <u>an endless wrap-around garment</u> all around him, as for fishes, an evil wealth of robe.	

The robe as net is again mentioned in 1580-82 by Aegisthus:

Αγ.	ἰδὼν ὑφαντοῖς ἐν πέπλοις Ἑρινύων τὸν ἄνδρα τόνδε κείμενον φίλως ἐμοῦ χερὸς πατρίδας ἐκτίνοντα μηχανάς.	1580
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Aeg. I see this man lying, in a way pleasing to me, in a woven robe of the Furies, atoning in full for the wiles of his father's hand.

Agamemnon earlier overpowered Troy via a net, and he is later overpowered himself by a net (in the form of a robe). This turn of events has a subtle twist for Agamemnon: ironically, he is murdered by his own devices. It also underscores the whole principle of like for like by which *δίκη* operates.

In 1048 the Chorus addresses Cassandra, partner in death with Agamemnon, as being "caught in nets appointed by fate" (*ἀλόυσα μορσίμων ἀγρευμάτων*), and she later describes the net as "some net of death" (*ἡ δίκτυόν τί γ' Ἄιδου*--1115). She goes on to personify the net in the form of Aegisthus in 1116-17:

Κα. ἄλλ' ἄρκυς ἡ ξύνευνος, ἡ ξυναίτια φόνου.

Cass. But the sharer of the bed, the accomplice (of) in murder, is the net.

Lebeck points out²² inconsistency in the net imagery: Aeschylus employs nets associated with both fishing and hunting. Examples of nets applying to the different modes of hunting include: *δίκτυον* (358, 868, and 1115), a fishing net or hunting net; *γάγαμον* (361), a small round net, especially for oyster-catching; *ἄρκυς* (1116), a hunter's net; and, though not using a specific word for a net, Aeschylus includes the fishing motif with the phrase *ὡσπερ ἰχθύων* in 1382. Lebeck contends that

. . .these images are imprecise, their employment "catachrestic." They paint a picture drawn from fantasy, a blend of fishing and hunting which corresponds to no hunt in this world.

I would argue, however, that this inconsistency does not diminish the force of the image-patterns. The emotions aroused by the pitiless and ineluctable toils of the capturing nets, and then translated to the human analogue, are not cognizant of the particular kinds of net denoted.

In 529 the net which Agamemnon casts over Troy is likened to a yoke:

Κηρυξ τοιόνδε Τροίᾳ περιβαλὼν ζευκτῆριον

Herald Having cast a yoke such as this around Troy

The yoke appears frequently as an entwinement (ineluctable net) of necessity. The steadfast yoked team of the Atreidae embark on their expedition under the aegis of Zeus (ὄχυρόν ζεῦγος Ἀτρειδᾶν--44). In 218 Agamemnon puts on the "yoke-strap" of necessity prior to the expedition to Troy and the sacrifice of Iphigeneia (ἀνάγκας λέπαδον).

The Chorus in 1071 urges Cassandra to yield to necessity and try on her new "yoke" (εἴκοις' ἀνάγκη τῆδε καίνισον ζυγόν). Cassandra foretells the death of Agamemnon in 1214-41 and, when speaking of Aegisthus' necessary vengeance against Agamemnon for the sake of Thyestes' children, she says "it is necessary to bear the yoke of slavery" (φέρειν γὰρ χρὴ τὸ δούλιον ζυγόν--1226). Aegisthus forebodes the necessity of the yoke which will force the citizens to obey him as he seized political control which had earlier rested with Agamemnon (τὸν δὲ μὴ πειθάνορα ζεῦξω βαρείας--1639-40).

Related to the hunting imagery is the image of the dog; with respect to the murder of Agamemnon the dog appears as tracking its prey. Again there is a parallel between Troy and Agamemnon: the Greeks were

the huntsmen with hounds who tracked the dim trail of the oar-blade to Troy (κυναγοὶ κατ' ἔχνος πλατᾶν ἄφαντον--694-95), and Clytaemnestra is the dog who drives her game (Agamemnon) into the net. She appears earlier as a faithful watchdog (δομάτων κύνα--607), and in 1228 she is a hateful bitch (μυσητῆς κυνός). Note the tragic irony (reversal): Agamemnon's role shifts from hunter to hunted. Again the notion of like for like, stroke and counterstroke, is reinforced by the imagery.

The reference of the image of the net in general is easily expanded to include the whole nexus of ἄτη and δίκη in which the house of Atreus is caught (Agamemnon is only a *particular* example here). Destiny and destruction entangle man like some "hindering movement," to use Lebeck's words. She continues:

Behind the image is an idea, a concept of destiny found among many Indo-European peoples. Man's fate is a fabric spun of individual threads and allotted him at birth, his death a bond the gods bind round him.²³

This is a strong universal symbol: man's destiny is a net in which he is inexorably caught.

Hybris and Wealth

It has been mentioned that Agamemnon is compelled by forces from within himself and from without. That internal impetus stems from an inherent quality in his personality, i.e. ὕβρις, transgression of propriety that is the result of overweening pride. This concept reflects the Greek ideal of moderation; indeed it was a severe offense for a mortal to be

excessive in any respect in the world at large. Agamemnon did possess hybris and was struck down by the gods in recompense. The quality of hybris was manifested not only by Agamemnon's actions, but also materially by his wealth.

It is stated that wealth does not place a man above the divine plan for the mortal condition. Certainly it cannot purchase immunity from Δίκη:

Χορος	οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἔπαλις πλούτου πρὸς Κόρον ἀνδρὶ λακτίσαντι μέγαν Δίκας βωμὸν εἰς ἀφάνειαν.	381
Chorus	For there is no deliverance (defense) in wealth against Excess for the man who greatly kicks the altar of Jus- tice into invisibility.	
Χορος	Δίκη δὲ λάμπει μὲν ἐν δυσκάπνοις δώμασιν, τὸν δ' ἐνάισιμον τίει [βίον]. τὰ χρυσόπαστα δ' ἔδεθλα σὺν πίνῃ χερῶν παλιντρόποις ὄμμασι λιπόυσ' ὅσα προσέβα τοῦ,† δύναμιν οὐ σέβουσα πλού- του παράσημον ἄλψ. πᾶν δ' ἐπὶ τέρμα νωμᾶ.	775 780
Chorus	Δίκη shines in smokey homes and honors the righteous man. Abandoning, with averted eyes, the gold-spangled esta- blishments where hands are filthy, she approaches hallowed things, and does not respect the power of wealth, (power) falsely stamped by praise. And Δίκη steers all to fulfillment.	

Justice ignores wealth, but Agamemnon is not conscious of that truth. It is to the point that the Chorus utters this gnomic stanza as the regal procession enters the orchestra, and just before they hail the king

himself. Thus ὄψις reinforces the truth uttered by the Chorus. Agamemnon's overabundance of material goods is merely a concrete indication of his lack of respect for and true ignorance of the limits which one must necessarily exercise over himself and his life. Agamemnon's characteristic pursuit and attainment of too much leads to his undoing. In 1383 he is caught in an "evil wealth of clothing" (πλοῦτον εἴματος κακόν).

It is characteristic of Agamemnon to think and do the undarable, and be completely ignorant of the consequences of his actions. He did it in the past with respect to Troy and Iphigeneia, and he will do it in the action of the play as well.

Χορος τόθεν 220
 τὸ παντότολμον φρονεῖν μετέγνω.
 βροτοὺς θρασύνει γὰρ ἀσχρομήτις
 τάλανα παρακοπὰ πρωτοπήμων.

Chorus . . . thereafter he changed his mind to think the all-daring thing. For wretched insanity, first cause of all ill, forming base designs, makes men bold.

It is precisely this lack of moderation which leads to Agamemnon's destruction. He has dared to be conspicuous in a world which calls for mortals to maintain a low profile.

Χορος 465
 τῶν πολυκτόνων γὰρ οὐκ
 ἄσκοποι θεοί. κελαι-
 ναί δ' Ἐρινύες χρόνῳ
 τυχηρὸν ὄντ' ἀνευ δίκας
 παλιντυχεῖ τριβᾶ βίου
 τιθεῖσ' ἀμαυρόν,

Chorus For the gods are not heedless of those who slaughter much. The Black Furies in time make dim the man who is fortunate without justice, by a fortune-reversing wasting away of life.

Χορος	τὸ δ' ὑπερκόπως κλύειν εὖ βαρύ.	468
Chorus	To be spoken of excessively well is serious.	
Χορος	Ἐκ δ' ἀγαθᾶς τύχας γένει βλαστάνειν ἀκόρεστον οἰζύν.	755
Chorus	From good fortune sprouts insatiate misery for the race.	

The scene which best illustrates the notion of hybris in Agamemnon is the "carpet scene" (lines 908-958). "Trampling with the foot" or "kicking" appear often as a symbol of sacrilege throughout the play. The more particular image of trampling fineries under foot, with ruinous consequences, has been proleptically introduced as a metaphor whose referent was Paris:

Χορος	οὐκ ἔφατις θεοῦς βροτῶν ἀξιοῦσθα μέλειν 370 ὅσοις ἀτίκτων χάρις πατοῖθ'. ὁ δ' οὐκ εὐσεβής.
Chorus	Someone supposed that the gods do not deign to regard mortals by whom the grace of "things not to be touched" is trampled on. But he was impious.

In the carpet-scene, however, Agamemnon turns that symbol into action by treading on embroidered purple. Clytaemnestra bids Agamemnon to walk on the tapestries, but he refuses, saying that man ought not to walk on beautiful things which are meant for the gods. He is aware of the inherent danger in such an act:

Αγ.	ἐν ποικίλοις δὲ θνητὸν ὄντα κάλλεσιν 923 βαίνειν ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἄνευ φόβου.
-----	--

Agam. For a mortal to walk on embroidered beauties is, to my mind, in no way without fear.

This subtly reminds us that Agamemnon set his foot on Troy and kicked the altar of Justice; he now is acting out the impious act which he earlier performed by analogy. He succumbs not so much to Clytaemnestra's persuasion as to his own hybris and does indeed set his mortal foot on the celestial purple. Lebeck states the dual motivations well:

He is overcome by the almost physical force of $\pi\epsilon\lambda\theta\omega$ as quickly as a fighter may be overthrown in actual combat. Necessity and choice interact in his yielding. He acquiesces because he cannot do otherwise and, at the same time *because he wants to*. His acceptance of this climactic act, symbolic of sacrilege, is the consequence of his previous acts of impiety and in that sense is foreordained. The choice which he makes in the carpet scene is the direct result of a prior choice at Aulis. At the same time, in this last decision he appears to act as a free agent where before he was trapped in a dilemma by the gods.²⁴

It is exactly this freedom of choice which pinpoints his hybris: he is daring the undarable, and his choice is conscious. This is now a pattern in his decisions and actions, and a punishable one at that. He dared to *oversack* Troy earlier, and his hybris asserts itself again in the carpet scene. The element of hybris serves to establish a causal connection between the two events, but more importantly it embodies that mortal element which cannot be tolerated by the divine system of Justice. The man who succeeds too much, whether in thought, action, possessions, or the like, will be punished.

Light and Darkness

Another recurrent image pattern in the *Agamemnon* is that of light and darkness. These images readily suggest a stark antithesis--good (light) and evil (darkness)--and are employed by Aeschylus in a variety of motifs. The beacon light is mentioned almost immediately (λαμπάδος τὸ σύμβολον--8) as bringing good news; it is much to be hoped for since it portends the capture of Troy and the return of the Argives to their homeland. Indeed it represents a "release from toils" (ἀπαλλαγὴν πόων --1) for which the watchman so eagerly waits. The toils, of course, represent on the surface the end of the Trojan War, but subliminally they embody the curse on the house of Atreus. The beacon fire is hailed as the "fire of good news having appeared in the darkness" (εὐαγγέλου φανέντος ὀρφναίου πυρός--21) and a "healer of anxious thought" (παλῶν τε. . . τῆσδε μερίμνης--98-99). Light (the beacon light in particular) thus represents a sure sign which will ward off the darkness of night and the shadow of anxiety in the homeland and in the house. It is the light of darkness.

The Chorus, in speaking about Calchas' prophecy (and thus the past crimes and retribution of the house which influence the events of the future via Justice), asserts that "it (the things to come) will come clear along with the rays of the sun (dawn)" (τορὸν γὰρ ἦξει σύνορθρον αὐγαῖς --254). Clytaemnestra joins the Chorus in welcoming the dawn with hopeful anticipation:

κλ. εὐάγγελος μὲν, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία,
 ἕως γένουτο μητρὸς εὐφρόνης πάρα. 265
 πεύση δὲ χάρμα μείζον ἐλπίδος κλύειν.

Clyt. Just as the proverb (says), may dawn
come to be from the mother, kindly
night, with good news. You will learn
joy greater than hope to hear.

In the famous "Beacon Speech" (281-316), Clytaemnestra calls the light which bears good news from Troy "such a sure sign and symbol" (τέκμαρ τουδούτον σύμβολόν--315). We have no reason at this point to doubt that her anxiety about the beacon light and the impending return of Agamemnon is anything but genuine.

Clytaemnestra repeats her joy at the arrival of the beacon light in 587ff.

κλ. ἀνωλόλυξα μὲν πάλαι χαρᾶς ὕπο,
ὅτι ἦλθ' ὁ πρῶτος νύχιος ἄγγελος πυρός,
φράζων ἄλωσιν Ἰλίου τ' ἀνάστασιν.

Clyt. I cried aloud long ago from (under the
influence of) joy, when the first message
of fire came at night, indicating the
capture and destruction of Troy.

Clytaemnestra's words in lines 601-604 would naturally incite our emotions in sympathy for her husbandless state, if we were not cognizant of her ultimate plans:

κλ. τί γάρ 601
γυναικὶ τούτου φέγγος ἥδιον δρακίειν,
ἀπὸ στρατείας ἄνδρα σώσαντος θεοῦ
πύλας ἀνοίξαι;

Clyt. For what light is sweeter than this one
for a woman to see? (What is sweeter
than) to open the gates, when a god has
saved her husband from military service?

At this point in the drama, however, we are aware of Clytaemnestra's intentions against Agamemnon, so her joy at his return is insincere at best.

Κλ. ὅπως δ' ἄριστα τὸν ἔμὸν αἰδοῖον πόσιν 600
σπεύσω πάλιν μολόντα δέξασθαι.

Clyt. But I shall hasten--how best to receive
my revered husband when he has come
(home) again.

Her words begin to have a double meaning, with the subliminal one, of course, being that her reception of Agamemnon will be her slaughter of him. The beacon light takes on an ironic tone: the light which announces good tidings and Agamemnon's homecoming is simultaneously announcing his destruction at the hands of his wife.

Night had been an aid to Agamemnon in the capture of Troy. Night cast a net around Troy (355-61). But night later destroyed the Argives on their return trip home:

Κηρυξ ἐν νυκτὶ δυσκύμαντα δ' ὠρώρει κακά. 653

ἔπει δ' ἀνῆλθε λαμπρὸν ἡλίου φάος, 658
ὄρωμεν ἀνθῶν πέλαγος Αἰγαῖον νεκρῶις
ἀνδρῶν Ἀχαιῶν ναυτικῶις τ' ἔρειπίοις.

Herald At night evils started rising up from the
sea (ill-waved evils arose). . . . But
when the bright light of the sun returned,
we saw the Aegean sea blossoming with the
corpses of Achaean men and with pieces of
shipwreck.

The roles of light and darkness have been reversed in the play: darkness moved from helper to opponent even in the context of the Trojan War. As Troy was covered by a net of darkness, so will Agamemnon be covered by a net which the light of the beacon ushers in. The light portends not hope and release, but destruction. Clytaemnestra's persuasive powers (regarding the carpet) and her true intentions also show a reversal in the

imagery of the light. Her feigned joy and the good tidings foreseen by the torches turn out to be the opposite: a welcoming home turns into a murder, and the cycle of crime and retribution continues to evolve. The image of the light shining forth from the darkness and portending deliverance, which was introduced in the Watchman scene at the opening of the *Agamemnon*, is fraught with tragic irony.

The irony of the light-darkness imagery obtains as long as Δίκη exercises itself as a divinely imposed system of balance on man, who is a passive element in the world (as in the *Agamemnon*). The true import of the light of deliverance is seen, however, in the context of the trilogy as a whole. In the *Eumenides* man is delivered from a harsh system of Δίκη to a newly evolving one in which he becomes an active, self-motivated agent. The light of deliverance portends, as it were, a deliverance for man to a system of Δίκη more reasonable than that which we see in the *Agamemnon*. Therefore, when man has thus at last found release from the unending cycle of automatic retribution, so too the promise of release proffered by the initial beacon light of the *Agamemnon* is at last imaginatively redeemed in the triumphant torch-light procession of the *Eumenides*.

CONCLUSION

The world as seen in the *Agamemnon* is one of divine will and violence. Man is humbled by all-pervasive, divine power and is proven incapable of avoiding the principles of law and justice which regulate his environment. Even the good or wealthy man is not above the retribution of

Justice, as we have seen via the particular example of Agamemnon. He is inextricably bound up in a nexus of cause and effect, of guilt and retribution. Agamemnon "dies to take his place in the longer evolution"²⁵ of the cycle of crime and retribution which afflicts the house of Atreus.

The *Agamemnon* itself ends with a foreboding that the chain of events will continue *ad infinitum*. The dictum of πάθει μάθος, however, does hold out some hope that someone can cast out the persistent germ of ruin from the house. Cassandra forebodes that Agamemnon will be avenged by his son Orestes. This act will provide the retribution against Clytaemnestra and Aegisthus which we are led to desire, but he also will inevitably fall victim to the cycle. It is quite impossible to have a human agent who is completely free of guilt, but the purity of Orestes' motives do place him above those avengers/victims who have preceded him. This, plus the element of πάθος in the *Agamemnon*, produce an optimistic outlook, although qualified to be sure, for the future. Understanding is a positive result, even if it is always accompanied by grief and suffering.

We have seen how the events of the *Agamemnon*, supported by the images, bear out the moral lesson of the gnostic statements. The images appear as concrete objects in the drama but readily suggest more universal elements (Δίκη in this case) and their implicit consequences. The hunting imagery was seen to illustrate on a larger scale the cause and effect nexus which has been plaguing the house of Atreus. It is inevitable that the guilty man will be punished and in the *Agamemnon* the guilty man is the cause of his own retribution. The subtle irony

of the operation of Δίκη in the *Agamemnon* is the fact that the avenger is unaware that he will also become the victim of Δίκη. The hybris image points up an inherent element of Δίκη. Justice does not discriminate against mortals, and one's position or wealth does not put him above the operation of Δίκη in the world. Light and darkness pointed to the ambivalent nature of Δίκη: it is occluded by evil (chaotic via its primitive nature) and appears at times to be other than it really is. As we saw, light bringing joy turned out to be a false light, as Δίκη continued on its course of absolute, automatic retribution. The images thus serve a vital role in the *Agamemnon* to enhance the treatment of the moral issue at hand.

The conflict between divine and human Justice is settled in the third play of the trilogy. The two forces collide, and man ends up taking control of the moral system which regulates his existence. We see the old thrown out in favor of the new. It is this progress through time and eventual hope for the future that eases the burden of pain and suffering in the present. We see man taking responsibility for his actions and becoming a self-controlled agent. Automatic and inevitable retribution is replaced by a system of reasoned Justice. Man's lot improves through the conflict, and we end up with a sense of optimism. Aeschylus nods assent to the notion of human responsibility and thus to a new sense of humanism. We do indeed come away with a renewed faith in the lot of man in the world and his potential for nobility and greatness. The striving of man is not going to be without suffering, as we have seen. The Chorus is vehement and indeed is correct in its assertion

(lines 177-78) that "Wisdom comes alone through suffering." Learning by suffering necessarily does involve suffering, it is true, but man is learning nonetheless. The suffering can be tolerated more easily when we know that the learning also will come, and that by this suffering and learning man can, in time, wrest from the world a betterment of the conditions in which he lives.

NOTES

1. John H. Finley, Jr., *Pindar and Aeschylus*, Martin Classical Lectures, Vol. 14 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 183.
2. Euripides, in his explorations of the pathology of the human psyche, seems on the downward slope of fifth century humanistic optimism.
3. Richard E. Kuhns, *The House, The City, and The Judge: The Growth of Moral Awareness in the Oresteia* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1962), p. 9.
4. Aristotle, *De Arte Poetica*, ed. I Bywater (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1962, reprint [1st ed. 1897; 2nd ed. 1911]), 1451b, 5-11.
5. C. J. DeVogel, *Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Texts, Selected and Supplied with Some Notes and Explanations*, Vol. 1: *Thales to Plato* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969), p. 6 (11a: Simpl., *Phys.* 24,13 [D 12A 9, BI]).
6. This has been called "the first philosophical theodicy" by Werner Jaeger (*The Theology of Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 36 [taken from De Vogel, *Greek Philosophy*, p. 6] because ἀδικία is a disturbance of the natural order and the compensation therefore has the character of penance.
7. Hugh Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus*, Sather Classical Lectures, Vol. 41 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 82.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 99. Emphasis mine.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
12. This is more or less the dominant interpretation of the twentieth century. It sees progress wrested from time by human suffering. It sees a change, an amelioration, of Justice take place between the *Agamemnon* and the *Eumenides*. Lloyd-Jones disagrees; he emphasizes the χάρις βίαιος ("the grace that comes by violence"). Cf. *Agamemnon* 182-83:

δαιμόνων δέ τον χάρις βίαιος
 σέλμα σεμνόν ἡμένων

The grace of the gods seated on the august steering bench is violent.

This χάρις βίαιος is Zeus' insistence that crime will be punished, sooner or later, but surely, and Lloyd-Jones believes that this is still retained full force in the agreement reached between Athena and the Eumenides. "The grace that comes by violence" is necessary and formidable enough to deter men from offending the divine laws (in this case, the law against shedding kindred blood). This is what the Eumenides argue and they are not, Lloyd-Jones contends, disarmed of this.

13. Anne Lebeck, *The Oresteia: A Study in Language and Structure* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 26.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 1ff.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
18. Finley, *Pindar and Aeschylus*, p. 9.
19. John Hay, *Oedipus Tyrannus: Lane Knowledge and the Homosporic Womb* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978), pp. 38-39.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
21. Lebeck, *The Oresteia*, pp. 1ff.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77. Emphasis mine.
25. Finley, *Pindar and Aeschylus*, p. 192.

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DE CONFLAGRATIONE IN STOICORUM PHILOSOPHIA

Ut explicationem secundum rationem traderent de mundo et rebus quae in eo gererentur, id maxime philosophi Stoici agebant; qui in mundo generibusque eius explanandis notione illa, ex eis qui Socrati antecesserunt notissima, de orbe ordinato iterum atque iterum originis, exitii, et originis utebantur. Quem ad mundi orbem quo modo non solum progressio materiae ex alia in aliam speciem sed etiam notitia de rerum causa pertineant inquirere in animo habeo.

Principia Mundi

Mundum e quattuor principiis rerum, e quibus eisdem consisterent omnia quoque cetera, constare Stoici arbitrabantur, quae principia essent ignis, aer, aqua, et terra. Illis autem esse qualitates tales, suas uni cuique, ut eis alio aliter mixtis varia genera speciesque rerum ceterarum fierent. Propriam unam cuique esse potestatem vel facultatem, quam Graeci δύναμιν appellant: ignem esse calidum, aera gelidum, aquam umidam, terram siccam.¹ Vis autem ignis aerisque, quae levis sit, in caelum naturaliter surgit, sed aqua terraque, graviores illis, deorsum considunt. Principiorum igitur altissimus est ignis, in quo siderum regnum gignitur, propior autem medio mundo est aer, subter hunc aqua, et deinde terra, genus gravissimum, omnium mediam partem rerum obtinet. Illam quidem viam Heracliti, quae Graeco more ὀδὸν κάτω ἄνω dicitur et Latine fortasse ultro citro, quasi sequentes, Stoici arbitrabantur per spissationem exhalationemque stare ut fierent quattuor haec initia, quae omnia essent quaedam genera vel quasi mutationes primae naturae, id est ignis, ut dixit Diogenes Laertius in libro septimo:²

Γίνεσθαι δὲ τὸν κόσμον, ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς ἡ οὐσία
τραπήῃ δι' ἀέρος εἰς ὑγρότητα, εἶτα τὸ παχυμερὲς
αὐτοῦ συστάν ἀποτελεσθῇ γῆ.

Praeterea per partium suarum gravitatem mundus immutabilis atque aequalis est et secum cohaeret; id est, universum totum formam suam ob intentionem (τόνος) certam atque adsiduam inter partes suas singulas retinet. Intentio ad extremum, quae ex igne calido constat, numerum qualitatemque efficit, contraria autem intentio intorsum, quae ex aere gelido consistit, soliditatem, cohaerentiam et rem. Sic efficit illa duplex facultas rationis universalis, quam Graeci πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον nuncupant. Illius inopia immobilitatem efficeret, huius ut mundus dispergeretur.

Res una quaeque, ut ante dixi, pars est principii unius primi, vel ignis, ceteris generibus tribus ex igne constitit. Quae cum ita sint, ignis praestat his principiiis aliis, id quod cum sede eius supera in caelo congruit. Haec materia prima perpetuo dividitur jungitur specieque mutatur, quae vicissitudo rerum mundum constantem retineat. Reliqua autem materia omnis est rudis, informis, finitaque, quoad conformetur vel potius informetur ab illo igne principali, quem Cicero in *De Natura Deorum*³ censuit "ignem. . ." esse "artificiosum ad gignendum progredientem via." Ab hoc igitur artifice quasi igneo non solum tria principia cetera sed etiam res omnes gignuntur et permansio commutatioque earum efficiuntur. Materia autem prima est quantitate constans semper--si alia pars crescit, aliae partes minuuntur. Sed quamquam materia tota totius universi modo qualitate mutari potest, materia tamen partium et qualitate et quantitate mutatur, propter quam intra materiam mutationem res singulares sunt qualitate variae. Adhuc res omnes ob

partium suarum conformationem ex igni principali constant; exempli gratia, gelidus est aer, sed carens caloris ignis portione aliqua esse non posset; cuius caloris divini eiusdem certe accidit ut terra quoque aliquid teneat, vel herbas animantesque vivos alere non posset. Cicero⁴ vero dicit: "omnes igitur partes mundi calore fultae sustentur." Quas ob causas iam expositas sequitur ut ignis adsit in rebus omnibus et omnium semina in se contineat.

Hanc rem igneam, hoc modo omnia permanentem et diversitatem rerum dissimilitudine sua vel transformatione suae institutionis efficientem, et sic concordiam totam mundi perficientem, eandem Stoici et deum esse agnoscebant. Ut Augustinus dicit,⁵

Nam Stoici ignem, id est corpus, unum ex his quattuor elementis, quibus visibilis mundus hic constat, et viventem et sapientem et ipsius mundi fabricatorem atque omnium, quae in eo sunt, eumque omnino ignem deum esse putaverunt.

Conflagratio

Stoici etiam notioni Heracliti assentiebantur de orbe in mundo volvente, cuius summum fastigium conflagratio appellabatur. Mundus, qui in principio prisca tantum ex materia una atque eadem constabat, scilicet igne, distingui diversas in res primum coepit cum ignis ad aera, aer deinde ad aquam, aqua denique ad terram ita refrigesceret ut vicissitudo aequabilis illorum quattuor elementorum persisteret. Quae principiorum mutatio, ex alio in alium, constans et per gradus est; ad medium mundum aqua terraque considunt, ad partem contrariam aer ignisque sursum feruntur.

Cum materia rerum singularium crescere minuive possit, ut mors etiam alia alterius esse possit, summa tamen ignis, primae universi materiae, substrati constantis, semper eadem est et fluctuat nūquam.⁶ Omne hoc universum, et varium et unius generis, maxima sphaera circumdato in vacuo est.

Vicissitudine inter se elementorum aliquando inaequabili facta, principia tam immodice surgunt ut ea et omnia quae ex eis constituta sint se ad originem suam revertant (terra ad aquam, aqua ad aera, aer ad ignem) et omnia denique ignis principalis rursus fiant, id quod est illa conflagratio mundi. Quae cum ita sint, manifestum est ab igne, id est a deo, universum exoriri et in ignem redire.⁷

Conflagratione perfecta, ignis principalis exstinguitur praeter igniculum quendam in ambitu universi reliquum, qui solus semina universi redintegrandi causa continet; ad quem igniculum sementiferum ita fit ut omnia redeantur, quo usque unde profecta sint. Tum semina in eo igniculo ortus omnium, primum quattuor principiorum, deinde earum rerum quae ex illis constant, rursus gignunt, quemadmodum universum se denuo vertat vicissitudineque principiorum suorum mutetur. Haec renovatio mundi appellata est.⁸ Ergo materia prima semper aliquam formam tenet, sive semen generans, sive ignem ipsum, sive principia cetera, quae nihil aliud quam ignis in statu mutato sunt.

Tempus ab una conflagratione usque ad proximam magnus annus (notitia a Pythagoreis mutua) nominabatur, cuius exitu sol, luna, sideraque errantia dicta sunt ad eosdem locos proprios a quibus profecta essent omnia redire.⁹ Quia uno quoque in magno anno omnes res caelestes,

motus, loci, viae stellarum errantium atque inerrantium, in initia recurrunt, idcirco omnes res ceteras quoque, vitas hominum, casus, eventus, exitus, eodem modo recurrere Stoici quidam concludere. Non tamen inutiliter vel in deterius fieri hanc conversionem. Conflagrationem enim ipsam, notionemque saeculi integri et initii recentis, Stoici universo non exitio sed purgationi habebant omnes, vel eam reditui mundo fesso ducentes ad beatam integritatem temporis iam pridem praeteriti vel liberationi mundo qui sensuisset et iam esset quasi moribundus e malis praesentibus et intolerabilibus. Post conflagrationem, cuius summum fastigium igitur cupiendum avidaeque expectandum erat, deum putaverunt cessare et quae fuisset mundi modo dissoluti condicio intueri posse, atque, eodem tempore, cum solus, ut videtur, ille igniculus sementifer arderet, secum meditare et mundi renovandi melioris consilium capere.¹⁰

Animae omnium hominum conflagratione pereunt; solus tum est deus, ignis artificiosus, e quo atque a quo mundus vetus est genitus novusque gignetur. Ut dixit Cicero:

. . .ut ad extremum omnis mundus ignesceret, cum umore consumpto neque terra ali posset nec remearet aer, cuius ortus aqua omni exhausta esse non posset; ita relinqui nihil praeter ignem, a quo rursus animante ac deo renovatio mundi fieret atque idem ornatus oreretur.¹¹

In mundo recenti res non dissimillimae eis in mundo prisco erunt: homines erunt idem, casus evenient idem, sed sensus vero hominis singularis ex alio ad alium mundum non transferentur.

Ignis igitur illa prima materia est, cum antecedens tum semper tamen subiecta quasi omnibus ceteris, id quod Graeci philosophi τὸ

ὑποκείμενον appellaverunt. Illo ante tempore quam universus primus est genitus, tum etiam erat ignis principialis, animans, artificiosus (πῦρ τεχνικόν)¹² providens, deus. Deinde trium principiorum ceterorum ortus, initium mundi conformandi, gradus sunt mediis velutque interiecti, quibus gignatur mundus alaturque. Post quod ignis, artifex et deus, semper efficiet ut, vicissitudine inter se quattuor principiorum pergente, hinc atque hinc materia nunc hanc naturam nunc illam usque eo habeat, donec omni temporis spatio fatalis consumpto per sursum inaequalitatem principiorum stet quominus mutatio inter se iam esse possit atque ut conflagratio consequatur.

Ergo ignis primus, id est, ut iam saepe dixi, deus, a se motus generansque, illud est quod omnia fingat gignatque, quod mundum coniungat et formet. E quibus omnibus illud necessarie consequitur, et deus, cum non solum prima materia sit sed etiam providens artifex mundi, idem tamen sit et causa efficiens et causa materialis. Nam Stoici has esse duas causas posuerunt:

Δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς [Stoicis] ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιῶν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἀποικον οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην. τὸ δὲ ποιῶν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον, τὸν θεόν. τοῦτον γὰρ αἰετοῦ ὄντα διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα.¹³

Atque illum deum aut materiam ipsam esse aut seiungi saltem a materia non posse existimaverunt:

Stoici deum scilicet hoc esse quod silva sit vel etiam qualitatem inseparabilem deum silvae, eundemque per silvam meare, velut semen per membra genitalia.¹⁴

Deus est igitur unde omnia fiant et a quo fiant. Quae cum ita sint, conflagratione, per quam omnes res in naturam igneam relabuntur, deus cetera quasi consumit et in se omnia recipit, ut Cronos progeniem suam dicitur vorasse.

Mundus igitur, etsi orbibus assidue volventibus per gradus mutatur, est perpetuus. Quamquam fieri potest ut hic ordo eius pereat (quod conflagratio probat), mundo tamen ipsi non interire omnino licet, cum materia universa (ignis, deus) semper formam aliam aliamve teneat et per multas creationes conflagrationesque perseveret. Quem mundum Stoici rem diuturnam, infinitum tamen spatium permanentem, habent. Creatio igitur mundi non semel tantum facta est, sed iterum atque iterum, ut dicere quando initium eius certum esset vel exitium futurum non possit.

Causae et Fatum de Conflagratione

Stoica philosophia de natura rerum omnia actionibus alicuius singularis, absoluti verique, et quatenus mundus ipse patentis, explanare conabatur. Hic Deus, primus ignis, innatus omnibus et rationem omnium reddere debens, ut Stoici habebant, omnia ita agebat ut aliquid non a Deo gestum immutabilitatem mundi subrueret. Plato, qui magram auctoritatem apud Stoicos habebat, scripserat:

. . . ὡς τῷ τοῦ παντός ἐπιμελουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλου πάντ' ἐστὶ συντεταγμένα, ὧν καὶ τὸ μέρος εἰς δύναμιν ἕκαστον τὸ προσήκον πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. . . . ὡς γένεσις ἕνεκα ἐκείνου γίνεται πάντα, ὅπως ἢ ἡ τῷ τοῦ παντός βίῳ ὑπάρχουσα εὐδαίμων οὐσία, . . . καὶ πᾶς ἔντεχνος δημιουργὸς παντός μὲν ἕνεκα πάντα ἐργάζεται, πρὸς

τὸ κοινῆ ἐκτείνων βέλτιστον, μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου
καὶ οὐχ ὅλον μέρος ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται.¹⁵

Nec non Chrysippus, consentiens cum Platone Deum semper quam optime agere, nullam operam naturae perdi credebat, sed Deum omnia e consilio efficere, et propositis necessarie toti salutaribus regere. Ratione Dei recta innataque, necesse est ergo ut omnia consulto atque ad consilium certum ab illo facta sint, cuius providentiam, omnia penetrantem, utilem esse salutaremque nemo negare potest. Quidquid hominibus contingit, id cetero mundo semper prodest, cum Deus mundum congruentem in omnibus partibus eius componat, pro quibus autem finis non sit necessarie bonus, sed pro toto mundo. Deo semper res ad melius agente, conflagrationem ipsam quoque bonam esse oportet.

Benevolentia Dei etiam ad mundi auctum diuturnitatemque pertinente, si mundum alio in modo regi praestaret, nimirum Deus huic rei studuisset. Gould¹⁶ suspicatus est conflagrationem Stoicis visam esse fieri ut Deus mundum, altero quasi mundo faciendo, magis integro quam primo, ad perfectionem summam perducere posset. Id est Stoici, ut idem aliis verbis dicam, hunc mundum arbitrati sunt non solum iam esse quam optimum sed etiam meliorem factum iri, si qua melior fieri posset. (Sic beneficentia Dei discrepantiam disserendi vincit!, ut idem non videatur et optimum et emendatione egens.) Quae sententia Deum velle et satis potentem esse sumit talia bona facere qualia mundus ipse quasi velit. Deus mundum talem fecit qualis nunc est et post conflagrationem talem faciet qualem esse oportebit. Optimus autem est mundus semper. Omnia, accidentia sic ut Deus voluit, bona rectaque esse necesse est et, ut Cicero scripsit,

"nihil autem mundo melius. . ."17 Eadem quoque erat vis philosophiae de natura rerum Chrysippi. Ille enim institutum, providentiam, causamque efficientem esse in omnibus rebus gerendis vehementer confirmavit. Quin etiam censuit mundum totum, si quid sua voluntate accideret, omnino se gerere destitutum. Quibus rationibus condicionibusque de causis conflagratio scilicet non solvi potest sola. Concludamus igitur conflagrationem quoque a Deo, igne pro mundo prudenti, pro bono universi fieri.

Doctrina, quae vetus est, de uno tenore circulo in aeternum permanente fulta est perennitate rerum ab omnibus posita. Sed quo modo unum potest et idem manere et in melius mutari? Num mundus et idem in his orbibus recurrere et melior fieri potest? Quam discrepantiam nonnulli docti animadverterunt. Exempli gratia, Hicks¹⁸ rogat quo modo futura meliora quam praeterita sint si mundus novus sit simillimus praeterito. Nonne sequitur ut hic mundus recens sit idem ac proximus, ut omnia mala perpetua sint et semper Deo proroganda sint? Stoici ipsi ab hac quaestione se referre in materiam totius et partium soliti sunt, ut mundus et optimus esse posset et fortasse nescio qua emendatione egeret. Mundus, ut confitentur, mala habet, sed plerumque bonus perfectusque est. Quam totius perfectionem retineri est momenti maioris quam mala singularia singularium partium corrigi. Sic Cicero:

. . .quod certe est mundus melior quam ulla natura;
 ut enim nulla pars est corporis nostri quae non
 minoris sit quam nosmet ipsi sumus, sic mundum
 universum pluris esse necesse est quam partem
 aliquam univers;. . .19

Quae cum ita sint, fieri potest ut Deus, post conflagrationem, et totius

perfectionem retineat et mala partium corrigat. Fortasse, sed Stoici ipsi vehementius adfirmavisse nullam mutationem fieri videntur. Chrysippus adeo scribere audet,

ἀρέσκει γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ μετὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν πάλιν
πάντα ταῦτα ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γίνεσθαι κατ' ἀριθμὸν,
ὡς καὶ τὸν ἰδίως ποιὸν πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ πρόσθεν
εἰναί τε καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ κόσμῳ, ὡς ἐν
τοῖς περὶ κόσμου (Χρῦσιππος λέγει).²⁰

Conclusio

Negare igitur illas duas sententias inter se dissidere non potest: Notitio Dei qui causa efficax benevolensque sit (ut conflagratio pro bono mundi fieri debeat et mundus novus melior esse praeterito) et sententia de tenore circulo et perpetuo, sine mutatione praescripto (ut quisque mundus idem sit ac praeteritus) plane sunt inter se incongruentes. Praeterea fateamur necesse est hoc dissidium numquam esse solutum. Reliquum tamen est ut doctrina conflagrationis a Stoicis proposita esse videatur ut "aurea" velut "mediocritas"²¹ esset inter perennitatem immutabilem et volubilitatem perpetuam. Quae ratio nos interpretari cur tandem conflagratio ulla fiat adiuvat.

Stoici igitur, ratione de tenoribus circulis et perpetuis (et principiorum et omnium rerum in mundo) antiqua utentes, non magis poterant quam philosophi superiores magnam discrepantiam in partibus eius, necessarie consequentem, explicare. Zeller²² de pluribus apud se controversiis Stoicorum sic disceptat: necesse est ut rogemus cur usque mala sint et qualis etiam Deus mundum mala habentem faciat; ut dubitemus num omnia

in mundo vere de quattuor principiis facta corporeaue sint, num in eo numero etiam sit animus hominis. Si enim mala in mundo sint, fieri non potest ut sors hominum proficeret, quod homo ipse non iam suas res sua voluntate agit. Apud Zeller²³ Boethius paucas quaestiones adnotat de philosophia Stoicorum: exitium mundi caret causa; de tribus modis rerum destruendorum²⁴ nullus est idoneus mundo; Deus ipse quoque desistat esse; primus ignis inopia alimenti exstinguatur.

Stoici autem securiores erant nec umquam dubitabant quin mundus et res quae in eo gererentur a Deo qui optimus esset regerentur; sine dubio sciebant omnia sic fieri ut Deus, primus ignis, vellet, per cuius leges mundus volveretur, qui esset necessitas ipse (εἴμαρμένη apud Graecos). Cum Deus (et mundus quoque) sit absolutus perfectusque, accidit ut homines se sollicitare de rerum natura non debeant; scire potius debent omnia ab igne artificioso Deoque fatisque librari et in melius regi.

SUBNOTATIONES

1. Vide exempli gratia Ocellum in *De Omnis Natura* (Περὶ τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως) apud Philonem (C. J. DeVogel, *Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Texts with Notes and Explanation*, Vol. 3: *The Hellenistic and Roman Period* [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973], 1280b).

τυγγάνουσι δ' αὐταὶ (sc. αἱ δυνάμεις ἀντιπαθεῖς)
τό τε θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν,
τρίτον δὲ αἱ οὐσίαι ὧν αἱ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν αὐταί,
πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ καὶ γῆ.

2. DeVogel 904b.
3. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), II, xxii, 57.
4. *Ibid.*, II, ix, 25.
5. J. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, 4 vols. (Leipzig: 1905-1924), II, 423.
6. Vide Stob. *Ecl.* I, ii (DeVogel 900a):

Ζήνωνος. οὐσίαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων
πρώτην ὕλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσαν αἰδίον καὶ οὔτε
πλείω γιγνομένην οὔτε ἐλάττω. τὰ δὲ μέρη ταύτης
οὐκ αἰεὶ ταῦτὰ διαμένειν ἀλλὰ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ
συγχεῖσθαι.

7. Vide Aristoclem apud Eusebium, *Praep. Evang.* XV, p. 816d (DeVogel 905a):

Ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ κατὰ τινὰς εἰμαρμένους χρόνους
ἐκπυροῦσθαι τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον, εἴτ' αὖθις πάλιν
διακοσμεῖσθαι. τὸ μὲντοι πρῶτον πῦρ εἶναι καθα-
περεῖ τι σπέρμα, τῶν ἀπάντων ἔχον τοὺς λόγους καὶ
τὰς αἰτίας τῶν γεγονότων καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων καὶ
τῶν ἐσομένων.

8. Seneca autem ignem omnino exstingui posuit, ut solus maneret nescio qui umor in quo semen universo redintegrando conservaretur.
9. E.g., Cicero apud *De Natura Deorum*, librum secundum (x1): "quarum [stellarum] ex disparibus motionibus magnum annum mathematici nominaverunt, qui tum efficitur cum solis et lunae et quinque errantium ad eandem inter se comparationem confectis omnium spatiis est facta conversio."

10. Seneca apud *Quaestiones Naturales*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, librum tertium, XXVIII, vii: "[conflagratio" fit, cum deo visum ordiri meliora, vetera finiri." Hoc autem "ordiri meliora" atque illud "eadem semper recurrere" inter se repugnare non opus est dicere. De renovatione ad meliora facienda vide Ciceronem quoque, apud *De Natura Deorum*, librum secundum, XX, lviii:

Talis igitur mens mundi cum sit ob eamque causam vel prudentia vel providentia appellari recte possit (Graece enim πρόνοια dicitur), haec potissimum providet et is maxime est occupata, primum ut mundus quam aptissimus sit ad permanendum, deinde ut nulla re egeat, maxime autem ut in eo eximia pulchritudo sit atque omnis ornatus.

11. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II, xlvi.

12. Vide Aetium, *Plac.* I, VII, xxxiii (DeVogel 902a): "Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ νόερον θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται, πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὁδῶ βαδύζον ἐπὶ γένεσιν κόσμου. Vide quoque Ciceronem, *De Natura Deorum*, II, xxii, lvii:

Zeno igitur naturam ita definit, ut eam dicat ignem esse artificiosum ad gignendum progredientem via. Censet etiam artis maxime proprium esse creare et gignere, quodque in operibus nostrarum artium manus efficiat, id multo artificiosius naturam efficere, id est, ut dixi, ignem artificiosum, magistrum artium reliquarum.

13. Diog. VII, 134 (DeVogel 899a). Ut dixit Seneca quoque (apud Epistulam LXV, ii [DeVogel 899c]):

Dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri duo esse in rerum natura, ex quibus omnia fiant, causam et materiam. Materia iacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat. Causa autem, id est ratio, materiam format et quocumque vult versat, ex illa varia opera producit. Esse ergo debet, unde aliquid fiat, deinde a quo fiat. Hoc causa est, illud materiam.

14. Chalcid. *in Tim.* C. CXCIV (DeVogel 900b).

15. Plato, *Laws*, Vol. 2, R. G. Bury, ed., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926), 903b-d.

16. Josiah B. Gould, *The Philosophy of Chrysippus* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1970, pp. 125-26.

17. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II, viii.
18. R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, Epochs of Philosophy Series (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910), pp. 33-38.
19. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II, xii.
20. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, II, 624.
21. Quintus Flaccus Horatius, *Opera* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), Carmen II, x, 4.
22. E. Zeller, *The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, trans. by Oswald J. Reichel (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1892), pp. 165-75.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
24. *Ibid.*; κατὰ διαίρεσιν, κατὰ ἀνείρεσιν τῆς ἐπεχούσης πολύτητος, κατὰ σύγχυσιν.

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THE *CENA TRIMALCHIONIS*:
A LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE *COLLIBERTI*

As a mode of communication and social behavior, language appears in a variety of forms. The language of the same person will differ according to environment (social setting and class) and the persons with whom he is interacting. One's language can even differ over time depending on experiences, occupations, and such other influences as one might encounter in the world at large. Every language has two basic styles: formal (mainly written) and informal (mainly spoken).¹ Spoken language differs from written with respect primarily to "the greater intimacy of contact between speaker and hearer. . . . Perhaps the most important is the fact that conversation takes place in an elaborate context or situation which often makes detailed and explicit linguistic reference unnecessary and tedious."²

The divergence between the two styles is regularly "the consequence of political and social events."³ The Latin language manifested these two styles and likewise reflected the impact of political, social, and linguistic processes which steadily, over a period of many centuries, widened the gap between the spoken and written language. The formal style of Latin is exemplified by Classical Latin, the intellectual, highly polished mode of literary communication for a select group of educated Romans. This style we study via the works of authors of the first and second centuries B.C. (the Golden Age of Latin Literature). Cicero became the "canon of perfection" for Classical Latin, and it is his rigid, prescriptive style which serves as our model for formal Latin.⁴

The everyday language of the people of Rome was less formal. As the mode of communication for a larger group of people who were less refined

and less educated, its style was simpler and more flexible. The informal style existed throughout the history of the Latin language; out of this common language developed the Classical style which soared to heights of social and cultural elitism at its zenith, but which eventually descended again to mix with that element from which it had been born: the common language. As a result, there occurred a "blending" of elements from one style into the other, and so Classical Latin began to change in response to the times (social, education, and political influences). It should be emphasized here that many of the practices of colloquial Latin (phonological, morphological, lexical, etc.) derive from pre-Classical usage. Vulgar Latin, as a written, literary language, emerged during the first and second centuries A.D. and spread over the whole Latin-speaking world. It incorporated elements of the Classical style and innovations thereupon, as well as the continuing colloquial style which was in use all the while.

The *Cena Trimalchionis* of Petronius, written in the middle of the first century A.D., is one of the most famous (and one of the few) literary sources for Vulgar Latin. It shows the obvious contrasts between the Classical and common styles of the Latin language. The features of this informal language will be presented first on a rather general level. The main focus of this paper will be the language of the *Cena*, with particular attention to five individual speakers. I will analyze the language of the *colliberti* from sections 41-46,⁵ with respect to both the linguistic features they share and the ways in which they differ from other speakers (who employ the Classical language). In the meantime, I will examine some of the ways in which the Classical and informal styles

merged in Vulgar Latin.

FEATURES OF VULGAR LATIN

The Roman lower classes were uneducated and unable as a result to deal in a satisfactory manner with the stiff and highly artificial literary language of their intellectual superiors. A common language had always existed; the formal language developed out of the enduring informal language and floated in social classes above the common language in the first and second centuries B.C. It was eventually necessary, however, and indeed natural, that the language change to accommodate the general populace. This informal language differed from Classical Latin on several linguistic levels: phonology, morphology, syntax, lexicon, and style. The language became syntactically simpler (less synthetic), more flexible and inconsistent, and more colorful in response to the needs of the intellectually unsophisticated population.

Following is a general summary of the features of Vulgar Latin. These comments are intended only as a cursory survey. All examples are taken from the *colliberti* speeches in the *Cena*. Understandably, not all of these changes are exemplified in that restricted section of the *Cena*, so it is not possible to give a specific example for each change noted. More specific comments about the language of individual speakers will be presented later.

Phonology

Various changes in pronunciation took place over a period of time,

most likely for purposes of regularity and uniformity, a natural linguistic tendency, since phonological changes tend normally to appear first in colloquial and non-standard speech. The most common phonological change in Vulgar Latin was the deletion of those parts of words which were not necessary for their identification. The prime example of this sort of change is syncope, the deletion of a vowel in an unaccented syllable. This phenomenon has several illustrations in the *Cena*: *bublum* (for *bubulum*--44.12), *calda* (for *calida*--41.11) and *calfecit* (for *calefecit*--41.11). Syllables also were added to words, mostly in the form of prefixes and suffixes. This phenomenon will be discussed more fully under a later section dealing with lexical changes.

Morphology

The morphological changes which occurred during the development of Vulgar Latin were numerous. It should be noted, though, that the changes in morphology were varied: one Classical form could have a large number of Vulgar equivalents, dependent on social class or geographical area (and vice versa: numerous Classical forms developed from a single pre-Classical form). These changes in morphology tended to occur because of a lack of linguistic training and unfamiliarity with Classical forms and a resultant need to make forms simpler and more uniform. The former implies unintentional changes arising from ignorance, while the latter implies a need on the part of the less educated *plebs* for a language which was as unsophisticated as they were. The morphological changes included:

- 1) Shifts in gender, due to: omission of final *-s* or *-m*, and a

resultant gender confusion (*caelus* for *caelum*--45.3); personifying inanimate objects; neuter nouns becoming masculine (*ampitheater*--45.6); masculine nouns becoming neuter (*libra*--46.7; *theatrum*--46.8); and neuter nouns becoming feminine (especially Greek words: *stigmam*--45.9), most commonly when neuter plural collective nouns became feminine singular nouns of the first declension.

2) Shifts in declension: A word of one declension would be declined in another, changes of stem led to improper declension, or analogical case forms produced incorrect forms. First declension feminine took over neuters (especially plurals) of other declensions, especially the third declension (*schemas*--44.8); second and third declensions were confused; second and fourth declensions tended to merge (a natural change with all the *u*'s of both declensions); fifth declension tended to merge into the first or third (a natural change from fifth to third because of the propensity of morphemes containing *e*'s or *i*'s); and adjectives also were often declined incorrectly, the most common error being the use of second declension endings for adjectives of the third declension (*pauperorum* for *pauperum*--46.1).

3) Confusion in conjugation of verbs: A passive inflection was eventually made up of the perfect participle + *esse*, so the passive gradually disappeared from common speech. As the passive disappeared, in the intermediate period deponent verbs became active, and the passive was often replaced by reflexive and active constructions. Vulgar Latin therefore showed a variety of verb forms occurring at one time, with little consistency (active, passive, deponent, reflexive).

The most common changes in verbs included errors in voice (active and passive), and the introduction of the Greek middle voice (*truditur*--45.2; *delectaretur*--45.7). Sedgwick⁶ notes that Vulgar Latin was known for its "havoc with deponents." Active forms replaced deponent forms (*loquo*--46.1; *arguto*--46.1); deponent forms replaced active forms (*delector*--45.7); and errors in conjugation appeared due to improper stem selection (*vinciturus* for *vincturus*--45.11).

Syntax

Syntactic changes affected all classes of words--nouns, adjectives, verbs, etc. Some of the more common changes included the following:

1) Nouns: The case system for nouns was eventually reduced to a simple two-case system, subjective and objective. Though this appears fully developed in Vulgar Latin later than that of the *Cena*, and is manifested as well in the historical development of the Romance languages, tendencies in this direction can be seen in the *Cena*. (Examples will be given later among my specific comments about the language of the *colli-berti*.) The genitive case came to be replaced by *de* plus the ablative (the origin of the Romance *de: beaucoup de*). The accusative encroached on both the dative and the ablative: the dative was replaced by *ad* plus the accusative, and eventually the ablative was replaced by a preposition plus the accusative. Changes in noun case construction also occurred: *te persuadeam* (46.2--a direct object instead of dative with the verb) and *fui in funus* (42.2--*in* plus accusative, previously reserved for the concept of motion to or toward, took over the "ablative of place where").

2) Verbs: Analytical (periphrastic) forms developed for the past and future tenses. This was a logical reduction of the more complex organic forms of Classical Latin which included numerous morphemes and syntactic information in a single word (e.g., *habituri sumus*--45.4; *daturus est*--45.10). Future tenses were gradually replaced by *habeo* plus infinitive (evident in the future tense in French).⁷ This phenomenon of moderate use of organic forms in favor of analytical forms was a move, conscious or not, from the complex to the simple. The accusative-infinitive construction (indirect statement) was replaced by a conjunction plus the indicative. This change also occurred in the similar revision of indirect questions and the subsequent simplification of the subjunctive mood (*subolfacio quia daturus est*--45.10).

Word order shifted away from the strict and rigid practices of Classical Latin. The concepts and ideas in Classical Latin were presented and subsequently developed and tied together as the sentence unfolded (subject-direct object-indirect object-verb). Vulgar Latin, on the other hand, shifted to a more linear word order, i.e. subject-verb-object. While the Classical word order had followed prescriptive rules, amendable only for reasons of emphasis, the ordering of words in Vulgar Latin was more flexible and posed fewer syntactic problems for the unsophisticated ear.

Lexicon

The vocabulary of Vulgar Latin illustrates a preference for bigger words and more colorful language. Graphic slang replaced the colorless

words of Classical Latin, and words were borrowed from Greek to fill a void in the Classical lexicon. The sense of Vulgar words was often more extended, reflecting a change not in the lexical inventory, but in semantic range. Numerous new words were formed from their Classical antecedents, chiefly by the linguistic devices of suffixation and compounding.

Suffixation affected nouns, adjectives, and adverbs, usually with predictable semantic force, but oftentimes solely for the purpose of making longer words (e.g., adjectival suffixes *-arius*, *-osus*, and *-atus*). A very popular practice of suffixation included the formation of diminutive forms (usually with *-ulus*) from Classical nouns. These new diminutives often introduced an element of pity or ridicule, and readily provided an intimate relationship between speaker and hearer. The suffixes employed are quite numerous and therefore will not be listed here, although specific examples will be noted later in my discussion of the *colliberti* speeches.

Compounding often involved the formation of one word from two Classical words (*caldicerebrius* = *calidus* + *cerebrum*--45.5; *domusio* = *domus* + *utor*--46.7), and less frequently the hybrid forms from the mixture of a Greek and Latin word (*apocularare* = *apo* + *cularare*--62.3; *percolopabant* = *per* + *colophos*--44.5). New verbs also were produced from a preposition compounded with a verb (*appetere* = *ad* + *petere*--46.5).

Indiscriminate use of personal pronouns (often from the demonstrative *ille* and from the emphatic *ipse*) and the use of subject pronouns were especially obvious features in Vulgar Latin. The inclusion of redundant pronouns later facilitated the loss of inflectional endings, a development

visible in Romance languages.

Style

A notable stylistic variation from Classical Latin was parataxis, the coordination of clauses, as opposed to the subordination of Classical Latin. Clauses in Vulgar Latin were often placed side by side, frequently without a conjunction. This also contributed to the decrease in frequency of the subjunctive mood (noted above) and various pronominal forms (relatives, interrogatives, and the like), as well as the introduction of more personal and demonstrative pronouns. (It follows logically that lack of subordination would lead to the disappearance of the subjunctive mood.)

The informal style of Vulgar Latin showed a preference for simplicity and flexibility. As an affective language, i.e. the language of everyday life and conversation, it showed a preponderance of exclamatory expressions (*quo modo siccitas perseverat*--44.2), interrogative expressions (*quid boni faciet*--45.11), epithets and figurative expressions (*fugae merae*--45.13), ellipses (omission of words earlier supplied by the speaker), formulae and "crystallized expressions" (*ad summam*--45.12), puns, proverbs, riddles, and attempts at wit. Various emphatic devices were employed, including repetition (*modo modo*--42.3; *olim oliorum*--43.8), emphatic negatives (*neminem nihil boni facere* --42.7), pleonasm (*mulier quae mulier*--42.7), concrete ideas used in an extended sense (*subolfacio* --45.10), and similes and metaphors (*piper non homo*--44.6).

It is typical for spoken language to be more verbose. The practice of homoteleuton (adjacent words with the same ending), so avoided in

Classical Latin, was popular in Vulgar Latin, although this actually was an Old Latin practice. Alliteration also was very common. The sentences of Vulgar Latin tended to be rather loose in grammar and construction. The inconsistent syntax and style is indicative of a lack of linguistic training on the part of the speaker, as well as a lack of "elaborate context" which Palmer points to as the setting for conversation. Connections were often only implied (logical) and not explicit (grammatical), or they were totally absent (asyndeton).

THE LANGUAGE OF THE *CENA*

These two styles of Latin (Classical and Vulgar) are well illustrated by the various characters of the *Cena Trimalchionis*. Petronius has purposefully⁸ designed his characters as men of differing social levels, and indeed the linguistic tendencies of an individual speaker are indicative of his social and educational sophistication as well. As Cutt correctly states, "the absence of an individual's linguistic and literary elegance is indicative of his lack of social (and sometimes moral) refinement."⁹ As is obvious also from the personalities which Petronius has developed, there are three distinct (linguistic *and* social) classes of characters in the *Cena*:

1) The educated, who exhibit generally Classical diction and stylistic elegance. The two major characters in this group are Encolpius and Agamemnon (perhaps also Encolpius' informative table-mate in chapters 37-38). It should be noted that their linguistic refinement is corollary to their social sophistication. These characters are secure in their status

and do not show the pretention which so typifies Trimalchio and his *col-liberti*. These are the social and educational superiors of the group, but it must be emphasized that they are not the wealthiest people at the dinner. They point up an important social problem which underlies the characterization of the *Cena*: neither language nor money makes the man. The best educated are the poorest; indeed they are penniless spongers, but they seem comfortable with their social standing. The people of taste and relatively refined language in the *Cena* are paupers: they are an over-educated group for whom no suitable employment has arisen. On the other hand, those who are the wealthiest (Trimalchio, for example) are also those of sub-standard language and social-cultural insecurity.

The narrative passages of Encolpius, for example, reflect Classical forms, structures, and usages, and his language is stiffer and more restricted in a grammatical sense as a result. The speech of this group is informal but educated. It shows few (if any) errors of grammar or syntax, and the content also reveals a level of sophistication which is not evident among the other classes. Indeed their lack of pretention on a social level is mirrored in their lack of pretention on a linguistic level as well.

2) The *colliberti* of Trimalchio lack inherited culture and educational standards. They are proud of their rapidly escalating position of social and political importance and are concerned that their financial resources also increase. They are anxious to impress others with their money, and they are well impressed by the wealth of others (e.g., Trimalchio). These characters are aliens,¹⁰ most probably from Greece, since

the *Cena* is conjecturally set in Campagna in west-central Italy. The Greek origin of the *colliberti*'s names is another immediate indication of their foreign heredity and alien status. The lack of education of the *colliberti* is analogous to their lack of worldly sophistication. They are believers that money is the key to power and position. Echion, in 46.1-2, is quick to criticize and alienate Agamemnon as one who is more educated and therefore of a higher social/intellectual class. Trimalchio makes an obvious effort in 40.2 to impress Agamemnon with his Corinthian bronzeware and the value of his possessions.

These characters speak at dinner with much slang, colloquialisms, proverbs, and loosely constructed sentences. Their speech abounds with syntactic errors and is rich in examples of grammatical assimilations and confusions, as well as fuller and "more robust" words (via borrowing, suffixation, etc.). The *colliberti* are thus an excellent source for the colorful language of the people. The bulk of this paper will focus on the speech of these characters, as veritable mouthpieces for Vulgar Latin, both as an exercise in linguistic analysis of Vulgar Latin, and in an effort to study the close connection between linguistic and social levels of behavior.

3) Trimalchio himself stands somewhat as a link between the other two groups. He has enormous wealth and the social standing of the first group (the educated upper class) and the obvious desire to be counted among this elite group, but he has the linguistic skills (and life history) of the second group (the *colliberti*). It is Trimalchio's manner and personality, though, which distinguish him from the other characters. He

shows the "coarseness of speech"¹¹ of the *colliberti*, but his coarseness of personality is unparalleled by any other character in the *Cena*. While wishing to impress his guests (especially the socially elite and better educated), he flaunts his wealth in a disgustingly gaudy way and shows an obvious lack of modesty and social finesse. Trimalchio is the last to learn (indeed he never does learn) that his wealth alone cannot raise him to what he values as higher, more prestigious social levels. He lacks the education, it is true, but it is more a lack of heritage and somewhat inherent (or culturally inherited) social wherewithal which marks him for failure in his bid for upward mobility. Interestingly, his speech is similar to that of his *colliberti*; in fact the *colliberti* use specific words that will also flow from the mouth of Trimalchio (and vice versa). (I try to point out shared vocabulary and expressions among my specific comments about the speeches of the *colliberti*.) He is thus linked linguistically (and inescapably so) to the level from which he so strongly desires to separate himself.

THE *COLLIBERTI* INTER SE

Petronius has individualized his characters, but the language of each is typical of a particular social and linguistic level. There are numerous linguistic practices common to all the *colliberti* which will readily illustrate the features of Vulgar Latin. Let us take a close look at the five speakers and their linguistic techniques. They all speak in sentences that, by Classical standards, are ungrammatical and loosely constructed. Sage¹² suggests that this is because they are imperfectly

thought out by the characters themselves. Their speech abounds in proverbs, puns, riddles, fine phrases, big words, epigrams, and attempts at wit. It would be relatively safe to conjecture that these speakers are unaware of their linguistic incompetence. They, like Trimalchio, are eager to strengthen their own social status. They are impressed by Trimalchio's vast wealth, and they feel no less pride in their own new-found financial (and therefore social) position.

I shall examine carefully the five speakers (Dama, Seleucus, Phileros, Ganymede, and Echion) for both technical linguistic practices which were common to Vulgar Latin, and for implications which these might have in furthering the development of their individual personalities. Each ultimately appears as a strong, distinct personality drawn with vividness and versatility.

Dama

Dama appears only briefly, but the simplicity of both his thought and expression is obvious. The name Dama is derived from the Greek δαμάω (dominate, suppress, tame), and is an immediate indication of his Greek heritage. He therefore is not a member of the highly educated group of guests; rather, he is a *collibertus* of Trimalchio, a freedman with new wealth and both political and social power.

Dama is drunk (*plane matus sum*--41.12)¹³ and admits it with perfect candor, a trait that endears him to the reader.¹⁴ It has been suggested that Dama's condition as *matus* may also account for the brevity of his remarks and even for "his speedy disappearance from the scene."¹⁵ His

drunkenness seems to be affecting (jading, perhaps) his priorities, since his initial comments concern the relative value of the *cubiculum* and *triclinium* (41.10) and the subsequent importance of the day and its activities.

Dama's speech, despite its brevity, abounds with grammatical errors, non-Classical forms, and slang expressions. The first two characteristics could well be a result of his *matius* state, but they also are inherent to his language. The few lines spoken by Dama contain the greatest density of errors and departures from standard usage in the *Cena*; he says little, but word for word he makes more errors than the other *colliberti*.

Dama's grammatical errors are very apparent. Within the five lines of his speech he makes three gender errors.¹⁶ He makes a slip in the mood of a verb (*dum versas*--41.10)¹⁷ and illustrates the Vulgar practice of using a reflexive instead of a passive verb (*versas te*--41.10). His language also offers several examples of the phonological and morphological variations of Vulgar Latin, syncope and suffixation in particular.¹⁸

Dama's Greek heritage also shows itself in his vocabulary. He uses several words that have an obvious Greek origin,¹⁹ and it has even been suggested that the gender of a word in Greek may have caused him to use that gender as well (although incorrectly) in Latin.²⁰ This seems a less likely cause for the error than the simple regularization of forms that was affecting Latin at the time (second declension neuter nouns became masculine). The Greek language was an obvious and important influence on informal Latin. Greek words, as a new element in the Latin language, infused a sense of freshness and vividness into the stiffer, more formal language of Classical Latin. The speech of the *colliberti* thus is provided

with additional richness and vivacity from the Greek borrowings which so characterize it. (This trait will be examined in more detail in the speech of the other characters.)

Repetition of words appears as a simple indication of Dama's lack of sophistication and lexical variety (*itaque. . . itaque*--41.10). Repetition is often used for emphasis in Vulgar Latin (as it is in most other spoken languages), but it is doubtful that the occurrence here was so motivated because of Dama's drunken state and his resultant inability to think and speak clearly. Dama also illustrates the Vulgar practice of using words in different senses (more narrowly or more broadly),²¹ although this is a trait common even to modern speech. This, however, does serve to add an element of color and vigor to the speech of this simple-minded but pleasant drunk. His appearance is a welcome break in the conversation, a relief even if not comic, after Trimalchio.

Seleucus

Seleucus' name is an obvious reference to the Seleucids, a family of rulers in the remains of Alexander's empire in the Near East. This is a clear and immediate indication that Seleucus lacks the heritage and cultural links to the Roman upper class, and his status as a *collibertus* becomes more obvious as his language continually reveals elements of his character. It should be noted at this point that Petronius allows each of the *colliberti* to make a longer contribution to the conversation than his predecessors.

Seleucus speaks about a funeral, life and death, doctors, and women.

His speech is continually gloomy;²² it is forceful and opinionated, and the topics of comments are more banal than those of Dama. His remarks tend to be cynical but amusing (the value of doctors, women, and love), but his moralizing does not maintain a level of entertainment for very long. His remarks do not keep the interest of those around him, as is noted by Encolpius' remark that Seleucus was *molestus* (43.1). Petronius was therefore undoubtedly aware of the boring nature of Seleucus' speech.

Seleucus' language is almost as boring in a linguistic sense as it is in a contextual one. He frequently uses stock phrases and proverbs,²³ and his utterances come in the form of short, choppy sentences. His speech does, however, offer numerous examples of non-Classical forms and usages which were characteristic of Vulgar Latin. His usage of *cotidie* (twice in 42.2) provides a good illustration of important phonological changes which were occurring.²⁴ Several of the words used by Seleucus show the Vulgar practice of suffixation.²⁵

Seleucus uses several non-Classical verb forms, which are evidence of the introduction of the Greek middle voice,²⁶ and the same verb appears twice in different voices (*lavor*--42.2--is middle; *lavare*--42.2--is active). Inconsistency of voice was a common tendency in Vulgar Latin and appears frequently in the speech of all the *colliberti*. Seleucus makes an error in the tense of a verb (*loqui*--42.4--should be a perfect infinitive, not present, in conjunction with *me appellavit*--42.3-4), and he freely omits the verb from the apodosis of conditional sentences.²⁷ The latter practice appears to be not so much an error as merely the practice of omitting from informal speech parts of sentences which will neither

alter the meaning nor hinder the interpretation of the sentence as a whole. The sense of the sentence can still be understood when ellipses occur. Seleucus also uses an analytical verb form (*placatus est*--42.6), as opposed to the Classical organic forms, which illustrates the increasing use of that innovation in Vulgar Latin.

In Seleucus' speech there is frequent use of the demonstrative pronoun as a third person pronoun.²⁸ This could be for emphasis in some cases, but generally it illustrates a frequent and rather indiscriminate practice common to informal Latin. A subject pronoun is used in a sentence where the subject of the sentence is obvious from the verb form itself (*nos sumus*--42.4). The inclusion of subject pronouns was a popular practice in Vulgar Latin even when the speaker (or hearer) could easily distinguish the subject from the verb. This practice carried over into the Romance languages.

Seleucus uses several non-Classical case endings with nouns, in one instance using a Greek accusative ending, and later using an accusative ending where an ablative would have been expected.²⁹ One noun appears in the wrong gender (*malus fatus*--42.5). Gender errors are common among all the *colliberti* (cf. Dama's three errors in five lines of speech!) and they also are plentiful in the speech of Trimalchio. Seleucus makes an obvious error with a double negative (*neminem nihil*--42.7).³⁰ He also makes the same error twice: *tamen* (42.5 and 42.6) is not placed in a post-positive position (second word in the clause), an obvious departure from Classical style.

The lack of sophistication in Seleucus' language is apparent also

from the appearance of an analytical comparative adjective (*magis malus* --42.5); this practice carried over into Romance languages (cf. French *plus belle*). Classical Latin would have used the organic form *peior*, which includes several concepts (semantic and morphological) in a single word and would therefore have been more difficult to understand. This practice of using analytical forms instead of organic ones was common with verbs as well (cf. above, p. 7) in Vulgar Latin because of their easier intelligibility to people with a lower level of intellectual sophistication.

Despite its rather tedious content and lack of linguistic sophistication, Seleucus' speech contains a few colorful words.³¹ His use of stock phrases and proverbs was noted earlier. In the same vein he employs the Vulgar practice of using words in a narrower or wider sense than usual, including metonymy (*cor*--42.2--by metonymy this refers to the whole "person," not just the "heart") and simile (*utres*-42.4, from *uter*, *utris*, "bag": we are "bags of wind"). He uses alliteration and repetition several times,³² but it is questionable whether Seleucus is aware of the fact that he is repeating words (though certainly Petronius is aware and thus is making a point in this respect). Seleucus repeats some of the vocabulary used by the other *colliberti*, which is to be expected of course, but his language frequently echoes that of Trimalchio.³³ This, it seems to me, is a subtle means by which Petronius is linking the *colliberti* with Trimalchio, though with a rather pejorative association implied. Petronius subtly strengthens the linguistic link among the *colliberti* and Trimalchio, a connection which the former would gladly accept but

which the latter would vehemently reject, as I have noted previously (p. 13).

Phileros

Phileros quickly picks up the conversation and directs it to what he considers a more appealing topic: *vivorum*. Seleucus' comments about death seem to Phileros too sympathetic and subjective; Phileros views the dead Chrysanthus with a cool objectivity: he got what he deserved (*ille habet quod sibi debebatur. . . quid habebat quod queratur--43.1*). He is straightforward in his remarks about Chrysanthus and it is obvious that he rather admires Chrysanthus' wealth and praises his virility even in old age. His envy of Chrysanthus' wealth is understandable when we consider his status as *collibertus*: money was the center of life and means by which one attained fame and power. But his praise is not without qualification; it turns more to jealousy and envy when he attributes Chrysanthus' financial success to luck (*Plane Fortunae filius--43.7*). An element of integrity on the part of Phileros also appears in his comment about Chrysanthus' disinheritance of his own kin (43.5). *Nescio cui terrae filio* has an implicit pejorative force; Sedgwick³⁴ notes that this phrase was used proverbially to describe those of obscure birth. Phileros here is placing himself above that class of people; he is showing his snobbery and pride in his status as *collibertus*. He also comments on dissociation from one's relatives (*longe fugit, quisquis suos fugit*). It seems that Phileros heartily approves of kinship ties and family loyalty. He later turns the conversation to Chrysanthus' brother, whom he lauds for generosity.....

Phileros' speech differs dramatically from that of the other *colliberti*, not so much in a mechanical way as in its content. He uses specific words with transferred meaning and frequently speaks via graphic scenes; his speech is filled with simile and metaphor, popular sayings and proverbs. All the *colliberti* use these literary devices, to be sure, but Phileros easily stands out because they are so dominant in his speech in particular. Cutt³⁵ labels these as "features representative of the conversations of people from the lower strata of society." They are artfully woven into the conversation while Trimalchio is absent from the table and, Cutt continues,

This appears to be a deliberate technique employed by Petronius to accentuate the homogeneity of these common folk through their stock phrases and ready clichés, while he is also careful to give each one an individual flavor to distinguish him from the next.

Phileros does not state his ideas and opinions in direct and concrete terms, but instead sketches scenes which relate to his intended message. A few examples of metaphor will suffice to illustrate this pattern: *durae buccae* (43.3-4), literally "of hard cheek," means "harsh speech"; *linguosus* (43.4), literally "full of tongue," means "talkative, mouthy"; *manu plena* (43.4), literally "full hand," means "generous"; *uncta mensa* (43.4), literally "oily or greasy table," means "sumptuous or bountiful table." There are numerous other metaphors and similes in the speech.³⁶

Phileros also freely sketches vivid scenes by using very specific words: "like a honeycomb" (*tamquam favus*--43.1-2), "at least a hundred" or "a solid hundred" (*solida centum*--43.2), and "dog's tongue" (*linguam*

caninam--43.3). Although addressing a varied audience, via his specific language Phileros probably reaches a small part of the whole, but he does so on a deeper and more intimate level. By speaking in such specific terms, he can easily confuse or isolate a hearer: one does not always know exactly what is implied. This practice of using precise words and phrases is in direct contrast to Classical Latin, which tended to use broad and neutral words. The goal of Classical Latin was to reach a wide audience and communicate clearly; thus it used words that had no immediate connotations of class, pejorative force, or the like.

The speech of Phileros shows many of the same trends in non-standard forms and clear grammatical errors which were so characteristic of his two predecessors. These same errors and variations in forms and syntax will be apparent also in the two speakers (*colliberti* also) who follow Phileros, thus reinforcing the traits of informal Latin of this period. The increasing frequency of pronouns in Vulgar Latin is amply attested by Phileros' speech. He uses the demonstrative as a third person pronoun with surprising frequency.³⁷ In several cases it is possible, however, that the demonstrative does have an additional emphatic effect.³⁸ A subject pronoun is often expressed even when the subject of a sentence is very apparent from the verb itself;³⁹ it should be noted that Phileros uses both the demonstrative and intensive pronouns in this way. Some errors are made with the reflexive pronoun,⁴⁰ errors all the more understandable because the reflexive was in the process of being replaced by the passive in Vulgar Latin.⁴¹ The two errors which I have noted do not involve a mistake in case or the like, but rather Phileros uses the

reflexive when he should not, and vice versa. This supplies credence to the supposition that the reflexive was being abandoned and its resultant infrequent use led to its misuse as well. Phileros typically uses the simpler, analytical verb forms.⁴² The probably motivation for the disappearance of Classical, organic forms in favor of the analytical forms was noted above (p. 7).

Phileros' language also illustrates the Vulgar practice of word formation by compounding and suffixation. There is one occurrence of a re-compounded verb (*reconrexit*--43.4). Two prefixes have been added to the verb (*re* + *con* + *rego*), producing a nice example of double determination. There are numerous examples of suffixation, mostly adjectival suffixes being added to nouns.⁴³ The word *stips* (Classical *stipes*, "black"--43.5) appears as an example of syncope, the loss of an unstressed vowel. Waters⁴⁴ suggests more specifically that *-es* was syncope to *-s*.

Phileros makes some minor errors which only emphasize his inadequate grasp of Classical forms and syntax; it must be remembered, however, that Phileros' language is typical of the vernacular and as such is expectedly different from a formerly elite but standardized style. *Tamen* (43.6) does not appear in a post-positive position, as it would have in Classical Latin. This variation in word order was observed earlier in the speech of Seleucus (42.5, 42.6). Possibly due to Greek influence, Phileros uses a double negative (*nec improbo*--43.8). In Greek a double negative serves to emphasize the negation; in Latin, however, a double negative cancels out, so here the desired effect is lost. The Vulgar practice of reducing the genitive case to adjectives is illustrated by the phrase *linguam*

caninam comedi (43.3). Classical Latin would have employed a genitive of the noun (*canis*), instead of the adjective; this practice also is visible in Romance languages.

Popular sayings and proverbs add much color and animation to Phileros' speech.⁴⁵ This vitality perhaps compensates for the lack of serious or interesting content. He uses numerous stock phrases and slang,⁴⁶ but his speech does not have a central focus which might seem a valuable point of departure for further discussion by the other guests. Some of the stock phrases either have been or will be used by the other *colliberti* or even by Trimalchio himself. Phileros also uses repetition of words,⁴⁷ possibly for emphasis (*olim oliorum*--43.8), but just as possibly he is unaware of the pattern. Repetition is a very common practice in informal speech and probably was an inherent habit even in Vulgar Latin. With respect to repetition, Phileros employs it not only with single words, but also with individual sounds. Alliteration, although more usually a poetic device, is an effective tool in informal speech in effecting emphasis. Once again, however, it is possible that the examples of alliteration⁴⁸ are not wholly intentional on the part of Phileros (although certainly on the part of Petronius himself). One example of personification appears (*discordia*--43.4); an adjective (rather than a noun) would have been more likely in Classical Latin (*discors*). Here the use of a noun implies personification of discord, dissension, or disagreement in the form of Chrysanthus himself.

Ganymede

Ganymede considers Phileros' comments about the wealthy dead man and his brother unworthy of further attention, and even says they are irrelevant (*quod nec ad caelum nec ad terram pertinet*--44.1) in comparison to the worldly problems of the day (*quid annonae mordet*--44.1). He speaks specifically about what he needs and in so doing expresses a nostalgic but practical feeling about "the good old days" when bread was cheap and both politics and religion possessed a greater air of integrity and importance for society (when aediles were honest and men were pious). His pessimism about the contemporary state of affairs is obvious; political, religious, and moral virtues are a thing of the past. Smith⁴⁹ calls him an "upholder of old-time morality"; Ganymede's sentiments are quite banal in comparison to those of the other *colliberti*, and his melancholy dampens the light air of the conversation.

Ganymede's speech lacks the striking similes and metaphors so predominant in that of Phileros. His conservative opinions are mirrored in his conservative choice of words and phrases; his vocabulary is not as colorful as that of the other characters. He deals with commonplace subjects and likewise employs ordinary language to express his sentiments. His speech does, however, provide examples of Vulgar linguistic practices of the times and is certainly worthy of study in this respect.

Coda (44.13) illustrates the occurrence of variant pronunciation (Classical *cauda*). This shows the very common loss of diphthongs in Vulgar Latin. Bloomfield⁵⁰ labels *cauda* as "antique and difficult," "hyper-urban (over-elegant)," while he calls *coda* "intelligible" and "the

older of the two Latin forms." Two examples of syncope appear (*udi*--44.18 and *percolopabant*--44.5).⁵¹ With respect to Vulgar practices of word formation, Ganymede's speech offers numerous examples of new words formed from old ones by means of suffixation.⁵² *Schemas* (44.8) and *piper* (44.6) are examples of words borrowed from Greek; they underwent typical alterations when adopted into Latin.⁵³ *Plovebat* (44.18) is an example of epenthesis and vowel change. The word derives from *pluo*, *pluere*, which was supplanted by *plovere*. Epenthesis of [w] after a back vowel occurred to avoid hiatus; a short *u* sometimes became long, probably by the end of the fourth century or earlier, but in most areas in the Empire it became *o*, as here.

Ganymede's speech offers examples of several other changes that were developing in Vulgar Latin. He, like the other *colliberti*, indiscriminately uses the demonstrative as a third person pronoun,⁵⁴ although in certain instances the pronoun does have a definite emphatic force (*illos leones*--44.4; *illud erat vivere*--44.5). The Vulgar practice of employing a redundant subject pronoun also is well illustrated in Ganymede's speech.⁵⁵

Ganymede's syntax is rather flexible (compared to Classical standards); his sentences are loosely constructed and several non-Classical forms appear. A "floating" nominative (*aediles*--44.3) is evidence of Ganymede's loose syntax. There is no obvious grammatical function for *aediles*; it is the logical, though not the grammatical, object in the sentence. Waters⁵⁶ suggests that the use of *aediles* here (an accusative) is an example of the accusative encroaching on the dative and ablative cases.

At any rate, the sense of the sentence is clear, and the loose syntax is indicative of the loose structure but concomitant intelligibility of informal speech. Loss of formal syntax does not necessarily jeopardize the sense of the spoken word. *Si haberemus* (44.4) appears as either an unfinished present contrary to fact condition or, more probably, an independent wish. In either case, the sense is clear. This same situation occurs in 44.12 (*quotidie peius*); this is a grammatically incomplete sentence: there is no verb but the sense of the sentence is clear nonetheless. (This construction is corollary to the expression *tant pis* in French.) Omission of a verb also occurs in 44.10 (*benignus*) and 44.17 (*caelum caelum putat*), but a form of the verb "to be" easily makes sense in both cases. Ganymede also is loose in his agreement between an adjective and noun; an adjective will appear as the logical but not the grammatical modifier in a sentence. The sentence, however, is still understandable. Examples of this practice are noted specifically in my discussion of grammatical (agreement) errors in the following paragraph.

By Classical standards, Ganymede does make several grammatical errors. In several instances there are errors of agreement,⁵⁷ declensional endings,⁵⁸ the use of two nouns instead of an adjective modifying a noun,⁵⁹ and incorrect case usage.⁶⁰ The latter examples typify the indiscriminate use of the accusative and ablative cases, with the eventual abandonment of the dative and ablative cases in favor of the accusative. An adverbial accusative (*primum*--44.5) is used instead of a more likely adverbial adjective (*primus*). *Alter* is used incorrectly in 44.13; this is an illustration of the eventual replacement of *alter* by *alius* (*alius* originally

meant "another" or "anyone else," but not "the other of two"--*alter*). The Vulgar form *foras* appears (44.15) instead of the Classical *foris* (the same variation also appeared in 30.3). Ganymede makes a reasonable and common attempt to form an adjective from an adverb, producing a regularized but unusual form: *populus minutus* (44.3), meaning "common folk" (we would expect *minores*, "the little guys").

Ganymede chooses common words and phrases, and as such they appear either directly or in similar form, in the speech of some of the other characters.⁶¹ This serves as a subtle but strong linguistic link among the characters of the *Cena*, as well as attesting regular practices in Vulgar Latin. Ganymede often uses words in a different sense from their Classical usage.⁶² This has been noted as a common trait not only of Vulgar Latin but also of informal language in general. Ganymede does employ simile and metaphor to a limited extent,⁶³ but these seem to stand out little after the colorful phrases of Phileros. Proverbs also appear in his speech,⁶⁴ but they only add to the banality of his remarks. Alliteration and repetition are used effectively in several instances.⁶⁵

Echion

The tone of Echion's remarks elevates the mood of the conversation after the melancholy Ganymede. Echion freely admits that times are difficult, but he expresses a sense of optimism that "tomorrow will be a better day." He anxiously anticipates Titus' gladiatorial show (45.4) and playfully discusses an affair of Glyco's wife. He shows a sense of integrity through his remarks about the latter topic: *sibi quisque*

peccat (45.10).

Echion is preoccupied with impressing the other guests, but his self-consciousness about his lack of education is obvious at the same time. He imagines that Agamemnon is disdainful of the *colliberti* for their educational void and linguistic incompetence (46.1-2). But by his remarks he isolates himself from Agamemnon and the upper class to which he strongly aspires; he comments that Agamemnon is not "one of them" and thus directly admits of the class barrier which exists (*non es nostrae fasciae--* 46.1). He uses a genitive of description, which is used of inherent qualities, thus making the social barrier all the more solid and irremovable. His paranoia and inferiority complex are quickly swept aside (*quid ergo est--*46.2), and he places his hopes for upward mobility on his son (46.3ff.). He is anxious that his son receive the education (and thus the chance for advancement in a social sense) which he himself never had. But his concern over his son's future is tempered by a narrow vision of the value of education (*quicquid discis, tibi discis--*46.8) and by a sense of practicality (*habet haec res panem--*46.7). His language when he speaks to Agamemnon is pretentious and formal (*oro te--*45.1; *inveniemus--*46.2), perhaps an overcompensating effort to disguise his discomfort and insecurity about himself and his language.

Echion's is the longest of the *colliberti* speeches, and as such presents the most grammatical and stylistic variations (from Classical Latin). "His Latin is less 'classical' than that of the other speakers, a fact which stands out all the more clearly because of the greater length of his contribution."⁶⁶ He is not an "attractive character" because of

his materialistic values and rather sadistic views (killing birds and watching gladiatorial games).⁶⁷ Petronius nonetheless seems to be sympathetic to Echion; he clearly understands the argument that nice language does not make the man. Echion's desire (preoccupation!) to project that "nice language" and his relative optimism are hardly endearing traits. As a result, the fact that his grammar and style are so obviously non-Classical and disdainful (when compared to Classical standards) seems all the more fitting since Echion is such a disdainful person himself.

The language of Echion's speech is typical of Vulgar Latin. The words show rampant suffixation⁶⁸ and compounding,⁶⁹ and thus the words themselves are longer and more colorful. This is a characteristic of spoken language in general. Greek words were borrowed freely,⁷⁰ but often appear in a different gender in Latin. The practice of borrowing from Greek is important from a linguistic sense, but here it has social implications about Echion as well. While trying to impress the other guests by using stylish Greek words and phrases, he (unconsciously, to be sure) points out his own Greek heritage and places himself on a lower social level as a result. *Plodo* (45.13) is a good example of vowel interchange and monophthongization (cf. *plaudo*).

Echion's speech is full of pronouns, another Vulgar practice. This trend was early motivation for loss of inflectional endings as thoughts began to appear in more analytical form. Redundant personal endings on verbs would later disappear when the use of pronouns became more stable. Echion freely uses subject pronouns⁷¹ and indiscriminately uses the demonstrative pronouns, usually *ille*, as a third person pronoun.⁷² Organic

verb forms disappear as well in favor of analytical forms,⁷³ emphasizing the move to longer but more easily understood words. The reflexive pronoun (plus active verb) appeared more frequently in Vulgar Latin, for a time replacing the more common, innovative middle voice which was being adopted from Greek.⁷⁴ The reflexive pronoun is still visible in French, for example. Redundant words appear in several instances,⁷⁵ without apparent stylistic motivation.

Echion's grammatical slips are elementary and obvious, but they serve to illustrate Vulgar forms and practices. He makes inflectional errors⁷⁶ and gender errors,⁷⁷ both of which attest to the trends toward regularization and uniformity which pervaded Vulgar Latin and caused, for example, the disappearance of certain declensions or shifts of gender. Echion shows vacillation in the voice of verbs, a matter that was in flux in Vulgar Latin. He even goes so far as to use the same verb in both active and passive voices in the same line (*loquere* and *loquis*--46.1).⁷⁸

Echion makes a number of grammatical errors that point more to his lack of linguistic ability and finesse than to the linguistic trends of the times. He often tries to use a stylish form or construction but the effort falls flat on its face, with Echion unaware. E.g., the demonstrative adjective is often used in Classical Latin as a correlative reserved for speaking of only two persons or things ("the one. . .the other"). The inclusion of *tertius* with the pair (*alter. . .alter. . .tertius*--45.11) ruins Echion's attempt at the "correct" Classical form. Incorrect case usage is frequent, in some instances illustrating the encroachment of one case on another (i.e. the accusative on the dative and ablative).⁷⁹

Several conditions are used, often incorrectly or mixed.⁸⁰ Echion's syntax is frequently flexible and loose, even unclear in parts, but this is typical of spoken language and does not jeopardize the sense and clarity of the sentence.⁸¹ At times, however, Echion's desire to use sophisticated forms or phrases does meet with success.⁸²

A major change from Classical to Vulgar style involved parataxis, the coordination of clauses, instead of hypertaxis (subordination). Again, it seems possible that this practice was generated by a desire and need to simplify the language. This practice of longer, coordinated sentences is certainly natural for spoken language. Echion illustrates this trend in several instances⁸³ and it points up his simplicity in both mind and speech. It adds an important informal air to his speech, a clear difference from sophisticated, written language. He also uses repetition freely,⁸⁴ usually for emphasis and effect; it is not uncommon, however, for a speaker to repeat words or phrases simply because he has lost the train of his thought.

Echion freely uses proverbs,⁸⁵ a trait seen in the speeches of some of the other *colliberti*. His personality and the subject matter of his speech inhibit the prominence and effect which proverbs have had earlier (especially in the speech of Phileros). Several of the words used by Echion are also used by one or several of the other characters.⁸⁶ As mentioned before, this is a subtle linguistic bond among the *colliberti* and Trimalchio.

CONCLUSION

That Vulgar Latin differed in a formal way from Classical Latin is well known. But another difference, on the cultural/social level, should again be emphasized. The *Cena* provides copious examples of the formal distinctions, and Petronius also has diversified his characters in such a way that their linguistic and social incompetence or level of sophistication go hand in hand. It is obvious from their speech that the characters themselves are aware of and indeed insecure about differences in education and language.

Some of the characters readily show their social aspirations via their language. Echion, for example, is an immediate illustration of a rather uneducated *collibertus* who is anxious to impress the others at the table not only with his money, but with his social status as well. His pretentious language mirrors his pretensions on a social/cultural level. The narrator, on the other hand, is comfortable socially (even if he does lack the material affluence of the *colliberti*), and his language clearly indicates his sophistication and satisfaction with his social station. He does not put on a show to impress others, either linguistically or (implicitly) socially and culturally. His social finesse is equalled by his linguistic astuteness.

The behavior of the characters is equally indicative of their social position. Dama is "plain drunk" while the dinner is still in its early stages. This could easily be termed by some as "crude" or "obnoxious" or "distasteful" even if his language does mollify the effect (as I have already noted). Dama seems to lack a sense of propriety by being so

drunk, and this clearly lowers the image which we may form of his social consciousness.

The topics of conversation among the *colliberti* also serve as a quick indication of their (lack of) sophistication. They are indeed common folk discussing common topics (doctors, funerals, women, education, money, and the like). They do remark on more potentially "philosophical" subjects (e.g., Seleucus on life and death), but their comments never reach the heights of what one might dare to call "intellectual." At best, they are off-the-wall remarks about everyday affairs which are not generated from deep pondering and consideration of the topics at hand. While the banality of their comments may perhaps make them more realistic and endearing to us, it does nevertheless point up their social and intellectual sophistication.

The *colliberti* reveal their social/cultural uneasiness by their very demeanor. They pretend to be masters of the topics under discussion, and they puff themselves up when they venture an opinion. Seleucus ruffles his feathers while moralizing about banal topics, and Phileros is rather cool and objective in his remarks about a dead man. I suggest that this over-compensating self-confidence in speech is the outward manifestation of an inner lack of self-assurance and discomfort among the other guests. Echion easily alienates Agamemnon, while he truly does wish that he were a part of that class which he criticizes.

Petronius has written the *Cena* with skillful stylistic variations and interesting character development techniques. It is not just *how* the characters speak, but also *what* they say, which divulges personality

traits and similarities among the characters themselves. As Cutt so well states:

The author's choice of a word or phrase is always consistent with the role and status of the character involved. . . . Petronius assumes, as it were, the very character of the person he is portraying, with the result that the individual's mannerisms of thought and expression are presented with precision and ingenuity.⁸⁷

We have seen that the *colliberti* are a separate linguistic group in the *Cena*, and that their personalities also are very different. As a group, however, their linguistic homogeneity corresponds to their social/cultural homogeneity; they are lower class and use their language to try to dispel that image. The *Cena* presents an excellent sampling indeed of all levels of language and society in a most revealing and skillful manner.

NOTES

1. Language has been categorized into a variety of styles. While it is certainly reasonable that more than two styles of language can be seen, for the purposes of this paper I suggest the two (written and spoken) since the dichotomy between them is the focus of my discussion.

W. B. Sedgwick, ed., *The Cena Trimalchionis of Petronius, Together with Seneca's Apocolocyntosis and a Selection of Pompeian Inscriptions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), pp. 17-18, discusses eight stylistic divisions of language, which he then condenses into three levels of the Latin language. These include: 1) literary Latin (Cicero's *Speeches* and literary works, Caesar's *Gallic* and *Civil Wars*); 2) *sermo cottidianus*, the colloquial Latin of good society (Cicero's letters and Horace's *Satires* and *Epistles*); and 3) *sermo plebeius*, or Vulgar Latin. In the *Cena*, the language of Encolpius and his friends is the ordinary non-literary Latin of the time and would fall under the second category, while that of Trimalchio and his circle would fall under the third category, with peculiarities of its own.

2. L. R. Palmer, *The Latin Language* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1954), p. 74.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
4. Quote from Frederick M. Wheelock, *Latin: An Introductory Course Based on Ancient Authors*, 3rd ed. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1969; orig. 1956), p. xxix.
As the model for Classical style, Ciceronian Latin is the standard against which I shall measure the "correctness" of the language in the *Cena*. Language which departs from the established rules of Classical Latin (*apud* Cicero) will therefore be considered "non-standard" or "sub-standard." While "sub-standard" may have a pejorative tone, its intended force implies not a value judgment on the part of this author but merely a departure from the rules of Classical Latin. I would argue that in the context of Classical Latin, language is either "correct" ("standard") or "incorrect" ("non-" or "sub-standard"), with no middle ground for "incorrect but acceptable." The seeming subjectivity of my remarks stems rather from the judgments of numerous Latin grammarians and, to be sure, from the awareness of Petronius and the characters themselves that Classical Latin was governed by prescriptive rules.
5. Chapter and line numbers are from the Sedgwick edition. Textual variations have been noted where significant.
6. Sedgwick, p. 106.

7. E.g., French *j'aimerai* = (remnants of) *je* + *aimer* + *habeo*. The auxiliary (*habeo* most commonly) coalesced with the preceding infinitive and was reduced to a personal ending. The logic behind this might be something like the following: "I *have to* love, therefore I *shall* (will) love."
8. Thomas Cutt, ed., *Petronius: Cena Trimalchionis* (Wayne State University Classical Texts Series; Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1970), p. 29:

The deliberateness of Petronius' stylistic techniques is at times almost overwhelming. The barbarisms and vulgarities of expression that once were emended by well-meaning but unenlightened textual critics are now recognized as intentional mistakes adapted to the character and social position of the person speaking.

And p. 31:

. . . a deliberate technique employed by Petronius to accentuate the homogeneity of these common folk [the *colliberti*] through their stock phrases and ready clichés, while he is careful to give each one an individual flavor to distinguish them from the next.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
10. Palmer, pp. 152-53.
11. Cutt, p. 31.
12. Evan T. Sage, ed., *Petronius: The Satyricon* (The Century College Latin Series; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 106.
13. *Plane matus sum* (41.12): Instead of *plane* we would expect the Classical *certe*. The meaning here is "plain drunk," much like our modern idiom. *Matus* derives from the Greek *μαδάω*, giving also *madidus* ("soaked") and *madens* ("drunk"). Sedgwick, p. 101, notes that *matus* is Vulgar for *madidus*, itself slang. Smith, p. 99, states that "in glossaries it [*matus*] occurs in association with *stultus* and with *tristis*," sense which could easily be implied here.
14. Cutt, p. 27.
15. Sage, p. 163.
16. *Mundum frigus* (41.11): *frigus* is neuter, but *mundus* is masculine. Also, *frigus* is a noun, not an adjective. One would expect, in Classical Latin, an adjective modifying the noun (*frigidum*).
Balneus (41.11): the word is *balneum*, a neuter. Syncope deleted

the unstressed *i* and thus gives the Vulgar form *balneum*. This word is more commonly used in the plural. *Vinus* (41.12): for *vinum*, a neuter here made masculine.

17. *Dum versas* (41.10): *versas* is subjunctive. This could be a minor error, but for historical present Classical Latin used the indicative if the action was co-extensive, to show "time within which."
18. Examples of syncope include: *calfecit* (41.11) from *calefacio* (*caleo* + *facio*). This word is an example of compounding as well as of syncope. *Calda* (41.11), from *calida*. Examples of suffixation include: *cubiculo* (41.10), with the common Vulgar diminutive ending *-ulus*. The word comes from *cubo*, *-are*, *-ui*, *-itum*. *Vestarius* (41.11), with the *-arius* noun (and adjective) suffix. This suffix denotes connection, or in the masculine, nouns of occupation, as here.
19. E.g., *pataracina* (41.10): "bigger glasses." Sedgwick, p. 100, notes that to ask for bigger glasses was to drink *Graeco more* and not good form. In 65.8 Trimalchio, not to be outdone by Habinnas, asks for a *capaciorum scyphum* ("bigger wine cup"). *Triclinium* (41.11): from the Greek τρικλίνιον, meaning "couch." Thus the meaning has been transferred from a couch to a whole dining room. *Balneum* (41.11), from the Greek βαλανεῖον. *Staminatas* (41.12): whole "bowls-full" taken on, from the Greek σταμνάριον.
20. *Vinus* (41.12) for *vinum*, a neuter here made masculine. William E. Waters, ed., *Petronius: Cena Trimalchionis* (The Students' Series of Latin Classics; Chicago: Benjamin H. Sanborn & Co., 1917), p. 85, suggests that the speaker is Greek and the Greek word for "wine" is masculine, so this is a likely slip of the tongue.
21. E.g., *pataracina* (41.10) means "bigger glasses." *Duxi* (41.12): not "drank," but "took on." *Cerebrum* (41.12), not literally "brain." The meaning has been extended to include the whole head, which itself could be further extended to include one's whole body and state.
22. Martin S. Smith, ed., *Petronii Arbitri: Cena Trimalchionis* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 99.
23. E.g., *aqua dentes habet* (42.2): a proverb or, according to Cutt, p. 31, a contemporary pun. See 44.2, where *mordet* is used in a similar sense. Both involve metaphors. *Quid. . . si* (42.5): "What would have happened if. . ." This is a rather popular expression in Vulgar Latin, and its use by the *colliberti* will be noted again. *Antiquus amor cancer est* (42.7): apparently a proverb or a stock simile.
24. *Cotidie* (42.2, twice), from *cottidie*. Vulgar Latin was noted for a confusion of single and double consonants, especially before accent. This is from *quot(t)idie*; the unaccented *u* fell out by the mid-first

century, so unaccented vowels were in a state of hiatus. C. H. Grandgent, *An Introduction to Vulgar Latin* (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1962), p. 107, also notes that *qu* was pronounced *kw*. Before *u* and *o*, *kw* was reduced to *k* by the first and second centuries, probably earlier in local or Vulgar dialects. This produced *cottidie*.

25. Examples of suffixation include: *baliscus* (42.2), "bath attendant," with the adjective suffix *-iscus*. *Pultarium* (42.2): *Pulto* means to "knock, beat, or strike." Sage, p. 164, suggests that this is a bowl used usually for cereal, not for wine. *Abstinax* (42.5): the *-ax* suffix for adjectives was common in Vulgar Latin. The word comes from the compounding of two words, *abs* + *teneo*.
26. Middle verbs *lavor* (42.2) and *videor mihi* (42.4). The latter means "it seems to me," more likely translated in Classical Latin as *videtur mihi*, or simply *videor* without *mihi*. As Seleucus uses it, the phrase takes on the feeling of a middle voice with both the verb and pronoun in first person singular, or even a passive and reflexive.
27. E.g., *quid. . .si* (42.5): "What would have happened if. . ." The apodosis has been left out, which is a common practice in English as well; the whole condition is still easily understood. This construction is rather popular in Vulgar Latin and its use by the *col-liberti* will be noted again. Also *quid si accepisset* (42.7): "What would have happened if. . ."
28. E.g., *cum illo* (42.4), *illum* (42.5), *illum ploravit* (42.6), and *illam accepisset* (42.7).
29. Non-Classical case endings include the following: *laecasin* (42.2): *-in* is a Greek accusative ending. *In funus* (42.2): the ablative with *in* would have been employed in Classical Latin. There is no motion obvious, so the use of the accusative here is questionable, but the accusative did encroach upon the ablative and the dative in Vulgar Latin. Sedgwick, p. 101, asserts that motion *is* implied, but I disagree.
30. *Neminem nihil* (42.7): a double negative. These cancel out in Classical Latin, but they are emphatic in Greek. See 76.3: *nemini tamen nihil satis est*, where Trimalchio makes the same error. The *neminem* here has been taken by some as *nullam* (Sedgwick): "nobody should do (a woman) a good turn." *Nullam* would be a direct object, but we should expect a dative with a verb of benefitting. In this connection, see also 44.3: *aediles male eveniat*.
31. E.g., *homo bellus* (42.2): *bellus* is a more colorful word which replaced a Classical form and which also came into the Romance languages (cf. French *belle*). It is derived ultimately from *bonus*,

- which changed to *benus*, and then to *benulus* (note the diminutive suffix). The expression might mean something like "pretty boy," but here it is used in a good sense. *Ebullit* (42.3): The expression means (from "boil up") that he "boiled over his spirit," an expression which Sedgwick, p. 101, deems to be slang and hardly more dignified than our "kicked the bucket." See 62.10, where Niceros, in telling his story about the werewolf, says *paene animam ebullivi*.
32. E.g., *modo modo* (42.3), meaning "only yesterday," shows repetition for emphatic effect (as in Classical usage also). *Immo magis* (42.5): *immo* is a strengthening particle. This could easily make the expression an example of double determination, or a double comparative; as such, it is a good example of redundancy. *Magis malus* (42.5): alliteration of *m*'s. *Mulier quae mulier* (42.7): a catch phrase.
33. Words used by Trimalchio: *cor* (42.2): see 59.2 (*aeque cor non habebas*), where *cor* has more the sense of "good sense." The speaker in the second case is Trimalchio. *Vitali lecto* (42.6): see 77.7, where Trimalchio orders the *vitalia* in which he wants to be buried brought in, so he can get on with his death rehearsal. *Milvinum genus* (42.7): Trimalchio calls Fortunata a *milva* in 75.6. There is a bad connotation in both instances.
34. Sedgwick, p. 102.
35. Cutt, p. 31.
36. Metaphors include: *ab asse crevit* (43.1): he didn't increase, his wealth did. See 38.7, where the table-mate of Encolpius describes some of the other *colliberti*: *de nihilo crevit*. Trimalchio, although not employing the same words, later recounts how he too got rich from nothing (76). *Itaque crevit, quicquid crevit* (43.1): "To whatever degree he grew" = "such as he did grow." For another use of this idea of increasing one's wealth, see *crevit tamquam favus* (43.1-2). *Non homo* (43.4): *Homo* here does not have its usual generic force. It appears again and again: *phantasia, non homo* (38.15), where Encolpius' table-mate is describing Safinius; *mufrius, non magister* (58.13), where Hermeros is belittling Giton and, by association, Agamemnon; and *codex, non mulier* (74.13), where Trimalchio is criticizing Fortunata. *Malam parram pilavit* (43.4): He plucked a bad owl, a *parr* being a bird of ill-omen. Note the alliteration of *p*'s and assonance of *m*'s. With reference to *pilo* ("pluck"), cf. *compilatus* (62.12), where Niceros speaks of a man who has been swindled; and also 44.8, where Ganymede employs the word *pilabat*. Cf. also *recorrexit costas* (43.4): not literally "ribs," but "the man himself." This is a nice example of synecdoche, the use of a part for the whole. *Illius mentem sustulit* (43.4): *Mentem* here does not mean literally the "mind," but "position" or "self." *Involavit* (43.4): "flew down on or pounced on,"

literally, but here "spent." It is the graphic use of a word ordinarily used in a completely different sense (birds of prey).

Examples of simile include: *crevit tamquam favus* (43.1-2): "he (his wealth) increased like a honeycomb." *Niger tamquam corvus* (43.7-8): "He (his hair?) was black like a raven."

37. E.g., *ille habet* (43.1), *illum reliquisse* (43.2), *illius. . . vindemia* (43.4), *illius mentem sustulit* (43.4), *illi relictum est* (43.4-5), *illum pessum dederunt* (43.6), *in manu illius* (43.7), and *illum tulisse* (43.7).
38. E.g., *in manu illius* (43.7) and *illum tulisse* (43.7).
39. Redundant subject pronouns are *ille habet* (43.1) and *quanti ipse voluit* (43.4).
40. *Sibi debebatur* (43.1): We would expect *ei*, since the pronoun does not refer to the subject. Sage, p. 164, comments that this is a "doubtful use of the reflexive, but clear." *Illius. . . vindemia* (43.4): We would expect, by Classical standards, *sua*, modifying *vindemia*.
41. See pp. 5-6.
42. E.g., *paratus fuit* (43.1) and *relictum est* (43.5). *Fruitus est* (43.6): a popular lengthened form of *fruor*. The word appears in several other instances: *fruniscar* (44.16) and *fruniscaris* (75.3). The latter example is from the speech of Trimalchio to Habinnas.
43. Suffixes include: *linguosus* (43.4): *-osus*, meaning "full of." *Oracularios* (43.6): *-arius*, a common adjectival suffix. *Corneolus* (43.7): *-olus* suffix. *Pullarius* (43.8): *-arius* suffix. Sedgwick, p. 102, and others read *puellarius*, meaning "fond of girls." This might make more sense than "keeper of the sacred chickens" (*pullarius*).
44. Waters, p. 87.
45. Popular sayings include: *puto mehercules* (43.2), an exclamatory expression, common to everyday speech. *Plane* (43.7): "plain," or "really." *Corneolus* (43.7): "hard as horn" would be translated in current jargon as "hard as nails," but not "horny." Note the *-olus* adjective suffix also. *Olim oliorum* (43.8): An example of repetition and alliteration; a popular phrase. See also *nummorum nummos* (37.8). *Hoc solum. . . tulit* (43.8): "Pleasure in life was all he took with him to the grave" (Sedgwick). This, according to Sedgwick, p. 102, was a common sentiment in pagen epitaphs.
 Proverbs include: *Linguam caninam comedi* (43.3), a proverb without any apparent context. Sedgwick, pp. 101-102, suggests that eating a dog's tongue makes one truthful. *Terrae filio* (43.5),

already discussed, p. 20. Cf. also *longe fugit, quisquis suos fugit* (43.5-6) and *recte faciet, qui cito credit* (43.6).

46. E.g., *vivorum memini* (43.1): The genitive used with the verb *memini*. This seems like a rather subtle point, but it is echoed by Trimalchio in 75.8. The fact that they both correctly use the genitive may suggest that the phrase was used very frequently and the speakers were already familiar with it, rather than having to think about the correct case construction as they spoke. The construction is preserved in French and Spanish, both of which use a reflexive and *de* (*je me souviens de. . .*). *Ab asse crevit* (43.1): His wealth increased, not the actual man. See 38.7 where the table-mate of Encolpius describes some of the other *colliberti*: *de nihilo crevit*. Trimalchio recounts in 76 how he too got rich from nothing. *Crevit tamquam favus* (43.1-2): a simile. This same simile was later used by Trimalchio (76.8-9): *crescebat tamquam favus*. *Solida centum* (43.2-3): *Solida* could be a noun or an adjective. Read "real. . ." or "at least."
47. E.g., *honeste. . .honeste* (43.1): repetition for emphasis. Also *ab asse crevit. . .itaque crevit. . .quicquid crevit* (43.1); *longe fugit quisquis suos fugit* (43.5-6): a proverb. *Olim oliorum* (43.8): repetition for emphasis. Sage, p. 165, suggests that *oliorum* is an "apparent genitive." This is obvious from the inflectional ending, but the sense is not easily detected.
48. *Frater. . .fortis* (43.4). *Amicus amico* (43.4): this phrase appears in 44.7, where Ganymede is describing Safinius. In both instances, the phrase has good connotations about the character being described. *Inter initia* (43.4): alliteration of *i*'s. *Malam parram pilavit* (43.4): alliteration of *p*'s and assonance of *m*'s.
49. Smith, p. 107.
50. Leonard Bloomfield, *Language* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1933), pp. 301-302, 309. He uses the pair in a discussion of internal reconstruction and the comparative method.
51. *Udi* (44.18), from *uvidus*, thus illustrating the loss of unaccented sounds in a word. *Percolopabant* (44.5), from *percolophabant* (and later *percolapabant*), illustrates loss of aspiration and vowel interchange. The word is originally derived from *per + colaphos* (Greek κόλαφος). *Bublum* (44.12), from *bubulum*, is another example of syncope.
52. Examples of suffixation include: *maxillae* (44.4): the diminutive form of *mala* (cheek, jaw-bone). This is also an example of synecdoche, and thus we derive the meaning "fellows." *Adurebat* (44.7): from *ad + uro*. *Ad* was freely used as a prefix with verbs, often with no special semantic emphasis. *Derectum* (44.9): from *de +*

rectus; an example of compounding to form new words. *Quotidie* (44.12): from *quot* + *dies* = *cot(t)idie*. See note 23 for remarks about *cotidie*. *Retroversus* (44.13): an example of double determination: *versus* itself involves some of the notions that *retro* repeats: back again, etc. *Vitulo* (44.13): the *-ulus* suffix was a common diminutive suffix in Vulgar Latin. *Cauniarium* (44.13): *-arius* was a common adjective suffix. *Casulas* (44.16): *-ulus* diminutive suffix. Sedgwick suggests that surely the sense of the noun is singular. Echion speaks of *casulas* also (46.2). Cf. "my pants" in English. *Urceatim* (44.18): adverbial suffix *-tim*. Examples of adverbs formed with this suffix are *viritim*, *gradatim*, and *ubertim* (72.1).

53. E.g., *percolopabant* (44.5), discussed in note 51. *Piper* (44.6) is another Greek borrowing (Greek ΠÉΠΕΡΟ; modern Greek πιπέρι), which underwent a typical alteration. When Greek nouns were borrowed, their endings were adapted in various ways, e.g., *-i* in popular words was deleted or became *-a*, *-e*, *-is*, or *-i* (the case here). Grandgent, p. 145, also notes a strong tendency in popular and late Latin for neuter nouns to become masculine, so *piper* may have been **pipērem*.
54. E.g., *illos leones* (44.4), *illud erat vivere* (44.5), *illis iratus* (44.6), and *illius vox crescebat* (44.9).
55. E.g., *ego inveni* (44.4), *is ibat* (44.7), *nos habemus* (44.13), *nos haberemus* (44.14), *ego puto* (44.16), and *nos. . .sumus* (44.18).
56. Waters, p. 89.
57. *Isti maxillae* (44.4): *isti* does not agree in gender with *maxillae*. *Trium cauniarium* (44.13): *cauniarium* is in the wrong declension. *Populus est leones* (44.15): the subject is singular, the verb is singular, but the predicate nominative is plural. *Populus est vulpes* (44.15): same as above: singular subject and verb, but plural predicate nominative.
58. E.g., *schemas* (44.8): An obvious Greek borrowing, introduced by fashionable society, which affected familiarity on the part of the speaker with Greek. This word also illustrates a neuter being adopted into the first declension and becoming feminine as a result (actually it is the Vulgar *schemata*). On this confusion of gender and declension, see 45.9, where Echion does the same thing with *stigmam*. Waters, p. 93, pinpoints the process by stating that the Greek nouns in *-μα* of the third declension appear as nouns of the first declension in Latin. *Cauniarium* (44.13): *cauniarium* is in the wrong declension. *A dibus* (44.16): a declensional error: *dibus*, from *deus*. *Deus* is of the second declension, but here it has a third declension ending. Classical Latin would have had either *deis*, or its syncopated form *dis*, although the latter is usually restricted to poetic usage.

59. E.g., *oculum bublum* (44.12): The phrase here consists of two nouns instead of an adjective and the noun it modifies, as would be the more likely practice in Classical Latin.
60. *Memini Safinium* (44.6): *Memini* should be followed by the genitive, as *vivorum meminimus* indicated (43.1 and 75.8). *Pro luto* (44.11): "as good as dirt." Classical Latin would have used a genitive of price or value. Trimalchio later uses the same phrase when speaking (52.1) of his Corinthian bronzeware and the price of gold. *Asse* (44.11): Classical Latin would have used a genitive of price or value. *In die* (44.13): This phrase means *in dies*, or "daily." The accusative of duration of time would be more likely; there is no notion of "time when" involved here (which would be ablative). *Pannos meos* (44.15): The accusative is used, where the ablative would normally be used with this verb. *Ita meos fruniscar* (44.16): *Meos* has no definite noun that it is modifying, although the sense of the sentence is obvious enough. See 43.6. The accusative is encroaching on the ablative and dative cases. This verb would usually use the ablative (as an extended form of *fruor*).
61. E.g., *mordet* (44.2): See 42.2 for a similar metaphor; *aqua dentes habet*). *Buccam* (44.2): See 26.9 (*bucinator*) and 43.3-4 (*durae buccae*). Note the use of *bucca*, not *os*. When any language has two words nearly synonymous, one crowds the other out. *Serva me, servabo te* (44.3): See also 46.1: *manum manus lavat* expresses a similar sentiment, and Echion plays with alliteration and rhyme. *Ex Asia* 5): Trimalchio also returned from Asia (75.10) but he was *magnus* then. *Larvas* (44.5): See 34.8, where the skeleton (*larvam*) is described, and 62.10 where Niceros describes himself as *larva*. *Non homo* (44.7): See 43.4. This indicates the general use of the word *homo* in an extended sense; *homo* became French *on*. *Amicus amico* (44.7): Used also by Phileros in 43.4. *Tanquam unus de nobis* (44.10): Safinius is "one of us," but not Agamemnon (46.1), according to Echion. *Pro luto* (44.11): see note 60. *Crevit tanquam* (44.13): See *crevit tanquam mavis* (43.1-2) for a similar phrase. *Sibi placeret* (44.14): See 46.5 (*sibi placens*) for a similar phrase. This could be an innovative use of the old Greek middle voice. *Foras* (44.15): Classical Latin *foris*. See also 30.3 for a similar variation.
62. E.g., *non homo* (44.7): General use of the word *homo* in an extended sense; it became French *on*. *Nomina reddere* (44.10): Not literally "give back," but in an oral sense. *Mordet* (44.2): Not literally "bites," but figuratively "vexes, strains, hurts or pains."
63. E.g., *mordet* (44.2); *maxilla* (44.4); *tanquam tuba* (44.9); *tanquam unus de nobis* (44.10); *crevit tanquam coda* (44.13); *tanquam mures* (44.18).

64. E.g., *serva me, servabo te* (44.3): A proverb, and a good example of parataxis (lack of subordination of clauses). See also 46.1: *manum manus lavat*.
65. E.g., *amicus amico* (44.7) and *nemo. . .putat, nemo. . .servat, nemo . . .facit* (44.17).
66. Smith, p. 113.
67. *Ibid.*
68. Most suffixes have already been explained in earlier notes. Examples of words which have undergone suffixation in this section include: *centonarius* (45.1), *lanisticia* (45.5), *caunarium* (45.6), *essedarium* (45.7), *amasiunculos* (45.7), *sestertarius* (45.8), *filicem* (45.9), *bestiarios* (45.11), *gallinaceos* (45.11), *tertarius* (45.11), *casulas* (46.2), *discipulus* (46.3), *servulum* (46.3), *morbosus* (46.3), *mustella* (46.4), *curiosus* (46.6), *venalia* (46.8).
69. E.g., *alicubi* (45.4): from *aliquis* + *ubi*. Sedgwick notes that the earlier form was actually *ali* + *quobi* (the old locative of *quis*) = "anywhere." Cf. *aliquis* = "anybody"; *aliquando* = "anytime." But *alicubi* = "anywhere else". *Caldicerebrius* (45.5): *Cal(i)dus* + *cerebrum*. Also an example of syncope (from *calidus* to *caldus*). *Domusionem* (46.7): *Domus* + *utor*. See also Trimalchio's use of the same word (48.4). *Causidicum* (46.7): *Causa* + *dico*.
70. Greek borrowings include: *centonarius* (45.1), from *cento*, *-onis* (with *-arius* suffix). From the Greek ζήλων. *Zelotypos* (45.7): An obvious Greek borrowing, indicative of both Echion's Greek heritage and his attempt to use stylish Greek words and phrases in his attempt to impress the other guests at the table. *Mustella* (46.4): Note the *-el(l)a* diminutive ending. From the Greek μῦς (weasel), which Sedgwick suggests was the equivalent of a domestic cat. For other Greek words of the wrong gender in Latin, see note 12.
71. E.g., *tu fueris* (45.4), *ille* (45.9), *ille fecit* (45.11), *ego plodo* (45.13), *ego occidi* (46.4).
72. E.g., *illi domesticus* (45.6), *relictum est illi* (45.6), *illius pater* (45.6), *patrimonium illius* (45.6), *illa matella* (45.8), *ille* (45.9), *illam delebit* (45.10), *ille fecit* (45.11), *iste* (46.1), *quicquid illi* (46.4), *illi* (46.4), *volo illum* (46.7), *illum docere* (46.7), *illi auferre* (46.7), *illi clamo* (46.8).
73. E.g., *habituri sumus* (45.4), *daturus est* (45.6), *relictum est* (45.6), *deprehensus est* (45.7), *coactus est* (45.8), *daturus est* (45.10), *vinciturum (esse)* (45.11), *secti sunt* (45.12), *inquinatus est* (46.7).
74. E.g., *se. . .traducere* (45.8), *se extendit* (46.8). See pp. 5-6.

75. E.g., *in triduo die* (45.4-5): *Triduum* = "a space of three days," so *die* is redundant here. *Se ipsum traducere* (45.8): a case of double determination. *Unus alicuius flaturae* (45.12): *Aliquis* is an indefinite pronoun, but its sense is shaken by *unus*, a definite pronoun. *Flaturae* is a genitive; we would have expected a nominative. *Qui et ipse* (45.12): *Ipse* is redundant, emphasizing the *qui*.
76. Inflectional errors include: *medius caelus* (45.3): *Caelus* for *caelum* (neuter, not masculine). See also 39.5, where Trimalchio makes the same error. *Munus eccellente* (45.4): Should be *excellens*. The speaker is confusing adjectives of one termination. See also 38.1 (*lacte*) where improper stem selection provided an incorrect form. *Pauperorum* (46.1): An adjective in the wrong declension. The form is *pauper*, *pauperis*, a third declension adjective. Here it is declined with first-second declensional endings.
77. E.g., *ampitheater* (45.6): should be *ampitheatrum*. *Stigman* (45.9): Greek neuter in *-a* becomes feminine in Vulgar Latin. See similar forms in 69.1 (*stigman* again) and 44.8 (*schemas*). *Nervia* (45.11): The word is *nervum*, so plural would be *nerva*. *Libra rustica* (46.7): *Libros* is masculine, not neuter as here.
78. *Loquere* (45.1), *loquere* (46.1), and *loquis* (46.1). Other variations in the voice of a verb or unusual forms include: *truditur* (45.2): This could be a middle, rather than a passive. *Delectaretur* (45.7): A middle voice, most likely, but it has a direct object. This would be an example of an inappropriate use of the Greek middle voice; Echion is trying to do the stylish thing and fails. Sedgwick notes the form as a use of the deponent in place of the active. See also 64.2 where Trimalchio uses a similar adjectival form, *delectaris*.
79. E.g., *ad bestias dedit* (45.8): An indirect object would be necessary in Classical Latin with *do*. It is not very conceivable that the implied motion would change the construction and demand an accusative. *Flaturae* (45.12): A genitive, where a nominative would have been expected. *Prae litteras* (46.2): *Prae* with the accusative. See 39.12 where Trimalchio uses it in a similar way: *prae mala sua*. *Te persuadeam* (46.2): Classical usage would have employed the dative *tibi* with *persuadeo*. The accusative encroached on the dative and ablative in Vulgar Latin. There also is no indication that the sentence is a question. *In aves* (46.3): *In* plus the accusative. Motion implied by this construction is questionable. *Artificii docere* (46.7): The accusative of the thing taught is generally used with *docere*.
80. *Dici potest, si. . .haberet* (45.3): A mixed condition. The protasis is in the subjunctive (contrary to fact), but the apodosis is indicative (real). *Si fueris, dices* (45.4): A future open condition. This shows some finesse on the part of the speaker and care for fine speech. *Dederis. . .contentus est* (46.7): A strange tense sequence;

we would expect a future in the apodosis. *Si. . . didicisset, . . . abigeret* (46.8): A mixed condition; the protasis is past contrary to fact, while the apodosis is present contrary to fact. Echion is once again getting tangled in his syntax.

81. E.g., *hoc tempore* (45.3): Sedgwick, p. 104, suggests that this is an ablative absolute ("times being thus"). It could be an ablative of "time when." The two meanings are slightly different, but the sense of the sentence is not altered by either interpretation. *Habet unde* (45.6): *Unde* is usually an interrogative adverb, but here it is used almost as a noun, although indefinite. *Sempiterno* (45.7): An ablative form of a noun being used as an adverb. Classical usage would have employed *sempiternae* (true adverb in -e) or *sempiternum* (accusative used as adverb). *Qui asinum non potest, stratum caedit* (45.8-9): We must supply *caedere* with *potest*, but the sense is clear despite the omission. *Glyco dedit suas* (45.9): *Suas* has no noun. Sedgwick suggests we supply *poenas*. At any rate, the noun must be feminine. *Mihi et meis* (45.10): *Meis* has no noun, but it is easy enough to supply my "household" or something similar. The sense of the sentence is obvious despite the omission of a noun. *Plane fugae merae* (45.13): There is no verb. *Plane plus merae* could possibly be an illustration of double determination. Sedgwick suggests that *fugae* is the use of an abstract for the concrete, "runaways." *Belle erit* (46.2): *Belle* is an adverb, and is an improper form with the verb "to be." We would expect a neuter form of the adjective (*bellum*) instead. *Latinas* (46.5): *Latinas* is an adjective without a noun. We must understand *linguas*, or something similar. *Sibi placens sit* (46.5): = *sibi placet*, "self-willed, self-satisfied." We would expect *est* since the supposition is not imaginary (Sedgwick, p. 107). *Tonstreinum* (46.7): Loose appositive with *aliquid*; Echion is lax with syntax! *Praeconem* (46.7): See my comment above regarding a loose appositive. *Adversus* (46.8): It is difficult to tell whether this word is acting as an adjective or adverb. Echion's syntax is not very clear. *Litterae thesaurum est* (46.8). The subject is plural, verb singular, and predicate nominative singular. *Thesaurum* is also improperly neuter; it is a Greek borrowing and should be masculine.
82. E.g., *quid boni* (45.11): a partitive genitive. This usage implies some sort of sophistication on the part of Echion, since it is not an easy or common construction. *Quod. . . auferre. . . possit* (46.7): A relative clause of characteristic generally uses the subjunctive (as here). Echion is finally using a classy construction correctly.
83. E.g., *oro te* (45.1): Coordination, rather than Classical subordination. See also 39.3 (*rogo*) for a similar example of parataxis. *Subolfacio quia* (45.10): *Quia* introduces a noun clause, replacing indirect statement from Classical Latin. This also illustrates parataxis. See also 46.4 (*dixi quia*): *quia* plus noun clause, replacing indirect statement. Read "I tol' him dat," rather rustic.

84. *Modo sic, modo sic* (45.1): Repetition of entire phrase, for emphasis. *Gallos gallinaceos* (45.11): *Gallinaceos* is redundant, meaning "common" *gallos*. Cf. "kitty cat." *Pingit. . .impingit* (46.5): Repetition of words for emphasis and effect. *Quicquid discis, tibi discis* (46.8): Repetition for emphasis. Echion is here very concerned that his son do the thing that will be the most practical and make him richest. *Modo modo* (46.8): Repetition of a single word, for emphasis.
85. Proverbs include the following: *quot hodie non est, cras erit* (45.2); *qui asinum non potest, stratum caedit* (45.8-9); *milvo volanti poterat unguis resecaere* (45.9): cutting claws is a proverbially "sharp" practice, "like father, like son." A similar statement follows with "snakes don't beget ropes": *colubras restem non parit* (45.9). *Manus manum lavat* (46.1) is similar to *serva me, servabo te* (44.3).
86. E.g., *binos denarios* (45.10): Used later by Trimalchio in 71.9. *Ad summam* (45.12), "as a matter of fact," a crystallized expression used by all speakers in the *Cena*. *Molestus* (46.1): Used earlier by Encolpius in 43.1, describing one of the other *colliberti*. *Cicaro meo* (46.3): See also 71.11 where Trimalchio mentions *cicaronem meum* when speaking of his funeral arrangements. *Nenias* (46.4), "hobby": See 47.10 (*nenias rustici*) when Trimalchio speaks. *Ceterum* (46.5), a crystallized expression, usually an adversative.
87. Cutt, p. 29.

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