

University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana

Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1983

Diversity of assimilation: Case studies of the early reservation years 1867-1901

Ira E. Lax

The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd>

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation

Lax, Ira E., "Diversity of assimilation: Case studies of the early reservation years 1867-1901" (1983).

Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5390.

<https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5390>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT IN WHICH COPYRIGHT SUBSISTS. ANY FURTHER REPRINTING OF ITS CONTENTS MUST BE APPROVED BY THE AUTHOR.

MANSFIELD LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
DATE: 1 1983

THE DIVERSITY OF ASSIMILATION
CASE STUDIES OF THE EARLY RESERVATION YEARS,
1867 - 1901

by

Ira E. Lax

B.A., Oakland University, 1969

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
1983

Approved by:



Chairman, Board of Examiners



Dean, Graduate School

Date

8-1-83

UMI Number: EP40854

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI EP40854

Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.

Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code



ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346

9-2-83

Lax, Ira E., M.A., August 1983

History

The Diversity of Assimilation: Case Studies of the Early Reservation Years, 1867-1901

Director: Dr. H. Duane Hampton H.D.H.


The responses of the Kiowas, Comanches, Southern Cheyennes, Southern Arapahoes, Santee and Yanktonais Sioux to the post-Civil War U.S. assimilation policy demonstrate the persistence of native traditions. The experiences of these five tribes are compared as they formed new relationships with government agents and other Indians, faced encroaching non-Indian populations, and adjusted to farming, ranching, and other novel economic activities on the semi-arid Great Plains. Although the native economic and political institutions were destroyed during the wars of the 1870s, the tribal remnants were able to maintain and to perpetuate their social and religious traditions.

The assimilation policy sought to transform nomadic hunters and warriors into Christianized yeoman farmers. Ulysses S. Grant's Peace Policy aligned the government with the Christian denominations to establish schools, missions, and programs leading to the allotment of Indian land in severalty. Eastern reformers and westerners hungry for more land hoped that acculturation would lead the Indians to drop their tribal relations within twenty-five years. With the nuclear Indian family working an individual farm, surplus reservation land could then be opened to White settlement.

The principal sources used were the Annual Reports of The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the Annual Reports of the Board of Indian Commissioners, and the published microfilm edition of the James McLaughlin papers. Although the Indians' own words are missing from these reports, their presence is not. The assimilation policy the agent was attempting to implement is clearly stated, as are his frustrations with the various forms of traditional Indian culture which persist despite his efforts to prohibit them. Complaints of one tribe or band visiting another, Indian ceremonies, give-aways, polygamy, camp living, and traditional styles of dress and hair length are scattered throughout the agency reports. While this study ends at 1901, thirty years were to pass before Indian self-determination was taken seriously in the making of federal Indian policy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS


MAPS	iv
INTRODUCTION	1
Chapter	
I. CONQUEST BY KINDNESS	4
Kiowas and Comanches	14
Cheyennes and Arapahoes	21
Santee and Yanktonais Sioux	30
Chapter	
II. THESE ARE NEARLY ALL "BLANKET INDIANS"	54
Kiowas and Comanches	56
Cheyennes and Arapahoes	80
Santee and Yanktonais Sioux	99
Chapter	
III. WORK OR STARVE	122
Santee and Yanktonais Sioux	130
Cheyennes and Arapahoes	137
Kiowas and Comanches	149
Conclusion	161
.	
SOURCES CONSULTED	164



INDIAN TERRITORY, 1866 - 1889

drawn by E. Rogers

Source: Gibson, Arrell M. *Oklahoma: A History of Five Centuries*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981.



Map showing the location of Indian reservations in North Dakota.

Source: Raymond F. Schulenberg, "Indians of North Dakota," *North Dakota Historical Quarterly* (July-October 1956), p. 218.

INTRODUCTION

For forty years before the Civil War in America, clashes between Indians and Whites east of the Mississippi River were settled or sometimes avoided by removing the tribes westward beyond the frontier of White settlement. There, government agents regulated trade and encouraged the Indians to farm so that they might one day assimilate into the Europeanized American lifestyle.

With his inauguration as President in 1869, Ulysses S. Grant gave official sanction to a revised approach to American Indian policy made necessary by increased transcontinental commercial activity and the movement of pioneer families westward. The continued segregation of Native Americans from the rest of the population was no longer feasible. Grant's so called "Peace Policy" involved transferring the administration of the Indian reservations out of the hands of politically appointed government agents and turning it over to the representatives of America's Christian denominations. (It was even called the Quaker Policy, early on, since the Quakers were the most active demonination at its inception.) The agent's job was to convince the Indians to forsake their tribal relations, adhere to Christianity, and begin family farms on individual

plots of land. Indian reservations, greatly reduced in size to accommodate individual homesteads, would serve as the training ground for this experiment in acculturation until the reservations themselves could be opened to White settlement.

The purpose of this study is to examine how the Kiowas, Comanches, Southern Cheyennes, Southern Arapahoes, and bands of the Santee and Yanktonais Sioux responded to United States assimilation policy between 1867 and 1901. It will be important to become familiar with the unique experience of each tribe in order to understand to what extent it did or did not benefit from the government's sincere efforts on its behalf. American politicians and reformers of the time confidently presumed that by the end of the century they could simply replace Indian tribal values with the individualistic ethos of the expanding nation. Such a clear transformation did not take place. What occurred were complex changes that depended for the most part on the natural and human environments, the personality of the government agent, and socio-political character of the particular tribe. In all cases the Indians used their ability to pick and choose from the new culture being placed before them, integrating the traits they deemed most useful in their greatly altered circumstances, while at the same time remaining rooted in their own traditions.

Chapter I will trace the development of Grant's Peace Policy in the 1870s, and will show the results of its initial application on the three reservations by the church-supported Indian agents. Chapter II will show that most of these tribes had accepted the fact of the reservations by the 1880s, and had come to terms with it, each in their own selective manner. Chapter III will examine the goal of the assimilation policy--the allotment of Indian lands in severalty (individual landholdings). The idea of allotment and its emergence in the Dawes Act (1887) will also be discussed, as will its effect upon these five tribes through the 1890s. The conclusion will provide an evaluation of the assimilation policy on these reservations.

CHAPTER I

CONQUEST BY KINDNESS

In 1867 and 1868 representatives of the United States government met in council with leaders of the nomadic Indian tribes of the Great Plains to ensure safe transportation routes for Americans moving west. Treaties emerged out of these councils wherein those Indians who signed them agreed to exchange most of their vast hunting grounds for protected reservations and a government program of acculturation, leading to their eventual assimilation as citizens of the United States. It is doubtful that the segments of the tribes who participated in the treaty making process understood that the government's ultimate goal was to end all traditional Indian claims to communal landholding and to transform plains cultures of hunter-warriors into a uniform group of Christianized yeoman farmers. After the signing of past treaties there had always been enough buffalo to hunt and American pioneers had not yet settled on the plains. Now, however, the size of the reservations were greatly reduced, the buffalo were disappearing, and White settlers were fast filling the Great Plains.

Members of America's Christian religious denominations became the first Indian agents under President Ulysses S. Grant's Peace Policy of 1869. Their goal during the early reservation years was to teach the 3Rs to the Indian children and to encourage Indian families to become farmers on individual allotments of land. In western Indian Territory, later to become part of Oklahoma, Agent Lawrie Tatum brought the Peace Policy to the Kiowas, Comanches, and Kiowa-Apaches. On the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation to the north, this process was begun by Brinton Darlington, who was followed by John D. Miles. South of Devils Lake in Dakota Territory, later North Dakota, Agents William Forbes and James McLaughlin brought Grant's Peace Policy to the Yanktonais Sioux and the Sisseton, and Wahpeton bands of the Santee Sioux. By the end of the 1870s these reservations had become established institutions of Indian acculturation on the Great Plains.

Over the previous two hundred years European influence in America caused major changes to occur in the cultures of Native Americans. The horse spread north from the Spanish in Mexico through the Great Plains from the middle of the seventeenth century, finding its way to the Sioux, near the Great Lakes, around 1750. For the five tribes examined in this study the possession of the horse greatly increased the efficiency with which they could hunt buffalo and other

large game, such as elk, deer, and antelope. These animals formed the basis of their material culture providing food, clothing, skin tepees, utensils and tools, war shields, and even river transportation. With increased trade with Whites and other tribes, the plains Indians obtained steel knives and pots, guns, and glass beads which they quickly adapted to their own needs. They also came in contact with liquor and European diseases that had devastating results. In addition, the use of the horse increased their ability to conduct raids for captives and plunder against their Indian and White enemies. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the plains Indians were able to maintain continuity between their old ways of life and the environments, peoples, and technologies with which they came into contact.

While there were similarities in the lifeways of the Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Yanktonais and Santee Sioux, it would be misleading to ignore their differences. For example, they spoke different languages, had varied legal, political and social structures, and they each had a distinctive style of dress. It is also important to understand that each tribe saw itself as unique and often superior to all others.

Once the Indians were settled on their reservations they came in contact with a variety of non-Indians. The

latter were not legally allowed into Indian Territory until 1889, so the major influence on the tribes in the western part, besides agency personnel and traders, was that of the cowboys and cattlemen from Texas. The cowboy's transient lifestyle was more like the nomadic Indian than the yeoman farmer. But beginning in 1889, Kansas farmers from the north moved onto the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation, while from the south Texans occupied Kiowa-Comanche land. Blacks formed twenty-six towns, and Germans, Italians, Syrians, and Czechs were among the many immigrant groups who sought their fortunes as farmers and merchants in Indian and Oklahoma Territories.¹ We must also consider the influence of sixty-five Indian tribes in the two territories, with a population of 64,446 in 1890. Three-fourths of this total were members of the Five Civilized Tribes, among whom the forces of modernization had predominated over the previous two generations.²

In northern Dakota Territory, in the Red River Valley, 8,000 Norwegians had begun wheat farming by 1880. Highly literate and active in politics, the Lutheran Norwegians were the largest non-Indian group near the Devils Lake Reservation.³ From the summer of 1884, communities of less literate Catholic German-Russians began farming south and west of the reservation.⁴ The non-Indian Americans and immigrants who moved west after the Civil War were as much

interested in land speculation and merchandising in an urban setting as they were in working the land.

But until the 1880s it would be the ideas of reformers from the urban northeast, not those of western farmers, merchants, and land speculators that would have the greatest influence on reservation Indian policy. Through President Grant the reformers instigated a broad program of teaching the Indians to become agriculturalists and private land owners on their isolated reservations. Since the yeoman was supposed to embody the essence of the republican virtue which Americans valued so highly, it was the obvious place to begin the process of acculturating the Indian. America's first Secretary of War, Henry Knox, had suggested such an idea, and it was implemented on a small scale by President James Monroe in 1819. At that time most Americans believed that the Indian was doomed through his contact with White civilization. But as Americans and newly arrived European immigrants filled the west after the Civil War, and the Indian had not vanished, the acculturation policy took on a greater urgency. It would offer the Indians the virtues of White Civilization so they could individually combat its vices.⁵

The end of the Civil War marked the beginning of an ebullient rush by American miners, ranchers, farmers, and assorted entrepreneurs east across the Rocky Mountains, and

west across the Missouri River to rebuild their lives on the Great Plains. Now the men were bringing their women and children, signs of hope and permanence. Railroads and telegraph lines connected them to new markets in an expanding national economy. It seemed that Americans were about to fulfill their dream of dominating the continent at last. But before this could be achieved, they had to confront a human barrier of 225,000 native Americans of the plains and Rocky Mountains, who were determined to hold on to their vast hunting grounds.

During the presidency of Andrew Johnson a growing number of reformers, some of whom were former abolitionists, began speaking out against abuses in the administration of Indian affairs. Colonel John M. Chivington's November 1864 attack on Black Kettle's peaceful Cheyenne-Arapaho camp in southern Colorado showed how tolerant of those abuses Americans in the west still were. In response to this, Republican Senator James R. Doolittle of Wisconsin, on March 3, 1865, succeeded in passing through Congress a joint resolution to investigate charges of corruption against the frontier army, Indian agents, and White traders.

Their completed report, submitted to Congress on January 26, 1867, cited corrupt agents and traders for spreading disease, whiskey, and arms among the tribes, thereby defeating efforts for peace. It also chastised the

frontier army, as well as western newspaper editors and citizens who supported the army's aggressive posture, and recommended that the administration of Indian affairs remain under the Department of the Interior instead of being transferred back to the War Department. Lastly, the report suggested that five boards of inspection be appointed to monitor the effects of Indian policy, and have the power to correct abuses.⁶

By the end of 1866 the army had to muster out most of its volunteers. Since this would leave the cavalry shorthanded, the commander of the Army in the west, General William Tecumseh Sherman, was willing to experiment with a peaceful policy, which, if successful, would be much cheaper in the long run.⁷ In July 1867, Congress passed a bill authorizing President Johnson to select a commission of three army officers and four civilians empowered to make peace treaties with the plains Indians. General Sherman reluctantly accepted an appointment to the Peace Commission even though he and General Alfred Terry would probably be outvoted 5-2 by Indian sympathizers. At least they were going out on the plains to talk to the Indians, something he felt most of the humanitarians were unwilling to do. Sherman also favored this official hiatus in the fighting to give the plains army a chance to build itself up for a confrontation he thought was inevitable.⁸ The plains were

going to be cleared for the railroads and White settlers one way or another.

In October 1867, the Peace Commission concluded the Medicine Lodge Treaty with the Kiowas, Comanches, Arapahoes, Southern Cheyennes, and Plains Apaches. The treaty confined the movement of these tribes south of the Arkansas River. In the north, it took another year before a treaty could be made with Red Cloud's Sioux. The treaty of November 1868 kept the Sioux north of the Platte River. In return for these restrictions, the Indians were to receive annuities in the form of clothing and presents and a farming and education program leading to their self-support and eventual assimilation into American society.⁹

Historian Robert M. Utley has said that the "evangelical and antimilitary tone" of the Peace Commission's report, submitted to the President on January 7, 1868, was that of its leader and Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Nathaniel G. Taylor. Said Utley, "Conquest by kindness rather than armed force would be the guiding principle. Through wise and benevolent administration the Indian would not only be removed from the paths of expansion but also be lifted to the grace of U.S. citizenship."¹⁰

During this period the Quakers and the Episcopalians, led by the Bishop of Minnesota, Henry B. Whipple, joined forces in promoting a peaceful policy towards the Indians.

At the end of January 1869, both the Orthodox and Hicksite Society of Friends had audiences with the President-elect. They urged him to raise the status of the Indian Bureau by establishing it as a separate department from the Interior and War Departments. While Grant did not support this idea, he did want to experiment with the Quakers' suggestions by having them appoint the superintendents and agents for the Central and Southern Superintendencies.¹¹ This surprised many army generals who had previously thought they had gained an ally in the White House.

Grant had not really been converted to the Quaker plan to any great extent. Military men would still be running most of the agency posts. Where the Quakers were in charge, a dual approach to Indian administration would be followed. All Indians within the boundaries of the reservation would be the responsibility of the Quaker agent. All Indians who were outside their assigned reservation without the permission of their agent, would be subject to the jurisdiction of the army. Thus, it was hoped that this clearer separation of roles and responsibilities for the representatives of government policy, would clarify for the Indians the choices they had to make.¹²

This dual policy was also meant to calm the renewed controversy over the transfer of the control of Indian administration from the Department of the Interior back to

the War Department. But, on January 23, 1870, Major Eugene M. Baker led an attack on a Piegan camp in Montana, killing 120 men and 53 women and children.¹³ The outcry by Indian sympathizers in speeches and in the eastern press not only prevented a transfer bill from passing, but it drove Grant to remove the military from control of any of the agencies. In July, Congress attempted to regain control of agency appointments. Supported by the Board of Indian Commissioners, Grant reacted by distributing the seventy-three agencies among thirteen Christian denominations. Thus, a year after Grant's election the Peace Policy had become a great deal more church-civilian controlled than was originally intended.¹⁴

The purpose of the Peace Policy was to prepare the Indian people for the not-too-distant time when they would be forced to drop their communal lifestyle and religious observances, lose the protection of their isolated reservations, and adopt the role of individualized yeoman farmers. To achieve this no new treaties would be made. The Indian agent, with help from church personnel, would attempt to prevent the open expression of Indian culture and replace it with the institutions and values of Western civilization.¹⁵

Kiowas and Comanches

In the Spring of 1869, the Orthodox Society of Friends nominated Lawrie Tatum, a forty-seven year old Iowa farmer, to become agent "for the Kiowas and Comanches, who were wild, blanket Indians, and the Wichita and affiliated bands, who were partially civilized, some of them wearing citizens clothes, all located in the southwestern part of Indian territory [sic]." As Tatum reflected upon his nomination, he admitted that he "knew little of the duties and responsibilities devolving upon an Indian agent. But after considering the subject as best I could in the fear of God, and after wishing to be obedient to Him, it seemed right to accept the appointment." When Tatum assumed his duties on July 1, 1869, the newly completed Fort Sill had not been named yet, and the agent's adobe house leaked.¹⁶

The Kiowa-Comanche Reservation was bounded in the north by the Washita River (see map), on the west by the north fork of the Red River, on the south by the Red River, and on the east by the ninety-eighth meridian. According to T. R. Fehrenbach, "This was good, rich country, 5,546 square miles of rolling plains, hills, and valleys, 2,968,893 acres in all, stretching from the hazy granite slopes of the Wichita Mountains to the brush-lined bottoms of the Texas boundary." With thirty-one inches of rainfall annually, a mild climate, and killing frosts only between November and

April, there seemed to be a potential for farming in this area. Although there was ample large and small game to hunt within the reservation, the major bison herds roamed to the west on the Staked Plains of Texas.¹⁷

Prior to their contact with Whites, these two tribes hunted bison on the Staked Plains, and raided together into Texas and Mexico capturing horses and mules. They often killed the men and took the women and children as captives. Bravery and the capturing of horses and scalps established a warrior's status within the tribe.¹⁸

Agent Tatum "felt that his primary mission was to convert the Kiowas and Comanches into farmers."¹⁹ General William B. Hazen, the former superintendent of the southern reservations, who had run the agency before Tatum was appointed, had already had a few tracts of land plowed and had hired a local White farmer to teach the Indians. These Indians liked vegetables and fruits, especially melons. They also liked to cook corn by first removing the husks, and then burying the corn under hot coals and ashes.²⁰

During his first summer as agent, Tatum had land plowed for those Indians who wanted to settle and try farming. The Kiowas would have nothing to do with it, although probably a few Panetethka Comanches and the sedentary Wichitas and Caddoes living at Fort Sill were more than willing. By winter Tatum had the fields fenced,

and had arranged with the Indians to furnish teams for the spring plowing. As an incentive to remain near the agency and farm, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs authorized Tatum to offer sugar and coffee and \$1,000 to be divided among the twenty-five Indian farmers who raised the largest and best crops each year. To the men this seemed like women's work, especially when they could be out on the Staked Plains hunting buffalo or raiding Texans. For the women, the agent hoped to hire "thirty female cooks to teach the Indian women the finer points of domestic life."²¹

Tatum erected a 30' x 60' mission school, and in February 1871, Josiah and Elizabeth Butler, Quakers from Ohio, became the first teachers. Since but a few Comanches, and no Kiowas or Apaches would attend the school, Tatum got permission to fill it with Caddoes and Wichitas, who had recently been assigned their own agency, thirty miles to the north.²²

In order to start teaching the Kiowas, Tatum hoped he could find someone to live with them in their camps. On March 30, 1872, Thomas C. Battey, a Quaker from Iowa, teaching among the Wichitas and Caddoes, heard the Lord say, according to Tatum, "What if thou should have to go and sojourn in the Kiowa camps?"²³ It took three attempts over a period of eight months for Tatum to convince the commissioner of Indian affairs to consent to this unusual

"enterprise." Tatum finally received Quaker Superintendent Enoch Hoag's backing, convincing him that, "It might be a means of reducing the number of raids and depredations of the Kiowa Indians."²⁴ The Kiowa chief Kicking Bird helped when he visited Battey the day he heard the Lord's voice, and encouraged him to come to their camp to teach his last surviving daughter.²⁵

Battey finally opened his school about fifty miles northwest of the agency, on the Washita River, on January 23, 1873. School opened in a large tent, with "twenty-two scholars," plus an audience of chiefs, women, and young men. That first afternoon Battey had trouble.

So many spectators being present who know nothing about schools, I found it next to impossible to bring the scholars to anything like order. As soon as the children attempted to pronounce a word after me from the chart, the visitors would burst into a laugh, every one talking in a loud voice, so that it was utterly impossible to proceed.

He even was threatened by a "middle aged man" in war paint who came at him "with an uplifted hand-axe." Battey had to forcibly remove him from the tent.²⁶

After a less than auspicious beginning, Kicking Bird told Battey that the Caddoes had been telling his Kiowas that Battey's bad medicine had made several of their children sick. This upset the Kiowas because many of their children actually were sick at that time. Furthermore, according to Battey, the Kiowas moved their camp every day or two. He

gave up holding regular classes, but stayed with the band, taught some English and the advantages of White civilization, and learned some of the Kiowa language. He reported a detailed account of a Kiowa "medicine dance," which the agent did not attempt to prevent.

In the end, Battey's journal of his fascinating experiences in the Kiowa camps contains very few passages concerning education. He observed humbly, "They usually listened attentively to my talk, but mostly consider their own mode of life far preferable for them."²⁷ For Tatum, having Battey in their camp provided him with a crucial source of intelligence which they would share every two weeks when Kicking Bird's band came in to the agency for rations. After eight months among the Kiowas, frustrated and ailing, this itinerate Quaker teacher moved back to Iowa.²⁸

The Kiowas and Comanches could not accept settling permanently around the agency when their basic needs were not being met there. Tatum gave them permission to cross the Red River to hunt buffalo when their rations failed to arrive. Usually they did not wait for permission. When Tatum first arrived in their country in 1869, about half of the Kiowas and two-thirds of the Comanches were off the reservation. They had a thriving trade with the Comancheros from New Mexico. "In return for whiskey, tobacco, and guns

and ammunition, the Kiowas openly bartered cattle, mules, and scalps collected on raids into Texas."²⁹ The Indians also encouraged White traders to come on the reservation to trade horses for whiskey.³⁰

The commander at Fort Sill, Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson, supported Tatum in carrying out the Quaker Policy, and used his troops to inhibit the whiskey trade. They both conceived of the reservation as a city of refuge where their charges could end their warring and raiding lives and begin learning the republican virtues that came with tilling the soil.³¹

In a bold move, Tatum refused to continue the tradition of paying ransoms to Indians for White captives, and he withheld rations from those who continue to raid into Texas. His previous acquiescence to this policy encouraged the taking of more captives.³² He also took the initiative to disrupt the Indian political structure, by stripping Chief Big Bow of his rank for participating with White Bear (Satanta) in an attack on Whites at Salt Creek Prairie in May 1871. Tatum's increasingly assertive policy upset visiting Quakers from the Cheyenne-Arapaho Agency, who observed a military guard present during a ration issue. "Josiah Butler agreed that Tatum was tempting Divine Providence with an exhibition of little faith."³³ But a mounting number of incidents, including attacks on the

agency cattle herd and agency employees, convinced Tatum of the necessity of using the military to carry out the government's plans. In May 1871, he wrote Superintendent Enoch Hoag in Lawrence, Kansas, recommending "that in the future Indian murderers and kidnappers should be delivered to civil courts for punishment, in the same manner and to the same extent as if they were White criminals."³⁴ Later that year he asked Grierson and Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie to apprehend some Comanches out on the Staked Plains who had taken some White captives. But this Grierson would not do.³⁵

As a Quaker, Tatum felt increasing frustration having to proceed by using the military to implement the Peace Policy. After building schools, plowing land, and offering incentives for farming, the Kiowas and most of the Comanches continued to hunt buffalo, trade with the Comancheros, and raid Texas settlements. Tatum finally stopped paying ransoms to these tribes for the return of White captives and cut off rations to the raiders. The commander of Fort Sill, Colonel Grierson, also a Quaker, refused to enforce the dual aspect of the Peace Policy, that allowed the army to move against Indians who left the reservation without permission. Tatum's peaceful efforts were having almost no effect on the still lordly raiders of the southern plains. He resigned in the spring of 1873, feeling his authority undermined after the parole of White Bear and Big Tree from prison in

Huntsville, Texas, where they were serving time for their part in the massacre at Salt Creek Prairie.³⁶

Cheyennes and Arapahoes

North of this enclave the Washita River became the southern boundary of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation. As part of the Central Superintendency, which included Kansas and Indian Territories, this reservation also came under the jurisdiction of the Quakers. The aged Brinton Darlington became agent of the Upper Arkansas Agency on July 6, 1869. When he arrived, there were about thirty-seven lodges of Cheyennes, led by Little Robe and Eagle Head (Minimic), camped and receiving rations near Camp Supply, on the North Canadian River. Over five times that many Cheyennes refused to live on the reservation or accept rations, preferring to hunt buffalo on the headwaters of the Washita and Republican Rivers.³⁷ The Cheyennes and the Arapahoes complained to Darlington that the boundaries established for them in the Medicine Lodge Treaty had never been fully explained to them. They felt that the water of the Salt Fork of the Arkansas River was "too brackish for their ponies, rendering the area unfit for their occupation."³⁸

In August 1869 three members of the Special Indian Commission, representing Grant's Peace Policy, came to Camp Supply to talk with the Indians. The Arapaho chief, Little Raven, told the commissioner that he was willing to remain

with his people near an agency farther down the North Canadian; it bothered him to be so near "the thieving Osages and the Kansas frontier."³⁹ They wanted traders to be sent among them, and they insisted on continuing their traditional warfare against the Pawnees and the Utes. Chief Stone Forehead (Medicine Arrow), the Cheyenne Keeper of the Sacred Arrows, agreed with Little Raven, and added that he would bring the Dog Soldiers in from the north if the commissioners and Colonel Nelson, the commander of Camp Supply, would not inflict reprisals.

President Grant had already considered expanding the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation before receiving the report of the commissioners. By executive order, he declared the new boundaries to be the Cherokee Outlet on the north (a buffer between them and Kansas), the Cimarron River and the ninety-eighth meridian on the east, the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation on the south, and the Texas state line on the west (see map). The expanded reservation contained 4,297,771 acres of land.⁴⁰

Despite the expansion of the reservation boundaries, and the relocation of the agency headquarters farther east along the North Canadian in May 1870, only the Arapahoes settled near the agency in any numbers. The Cheyenne chief Stone Calf and thirteen lodges moved in, but most of the Cheyennes stayed away. Bull Bear, the Dog Soldier chief, and Stone Forehead intended to lead their people north to spend the summer of 1870 with the Northern Cheyennes.⁴¹

When Agent Darlington approached Little Robe and Little Raven about farming and schooling for their children they expressed little interest. At this time the buffalo were still plentiful, and the Cheyennes were determined to maintain as much of their traditional lifestyle as they could. Although the Dog Soldiers, a Cheyenne warrior society, had been defeated by the Fifth Cavalry, led by Major Eugene Carr in the summer of 1868, they were not yet ready to accept the dictates of the White man's civilization. Some Cheyennes and Arapahoes were willing to take rations and live peacefully on the reservation, but living as Christians, farming, and sending their children to school held no attraction for them.⁴²

Nevertheless, as a Quaker agent of Grant's Peace Policy, Darlington wanted to have plowed fields and a school ready for those Indians who were ready to use them. He had 220 acres of prairie broken to raise grain and vegetables, and he set up a school with his daughter, Mrs. Elma D. Townsend, as teacher and Israel Negus as the agricultural instructor. Darlington hoped the Cheyennes would follow the example of the Arapaho Big Mouth, who told his people how satisfied he was raising corn and how fortunate they were to have good White people to help them become farmers. But by the fall of 1871, according to Berthrong, "Only two Cheyenne families tried agriculture, planting fifteen acres

of corn and pumpkins. Eight Cheyenne children found their way into the Quaker school, and these undoubtedly were the offspring of mixed bloods or intermarried Whites."⁴³ With an abundance of buffalo still roaming west of the reservation, the Cheyennes and Arapahoes preferred to provide themselves with meat and skins, and barter their robes with traders at Camp Supply.

Agent Darlington became ill in the spring of 1872 while trying to acquire more arable land east of the reservation for those Indians who wished to begin farming. He died on May 1, having done his best to maintain peace between Indians and Whites. A month later John D. Miles, a Quaker and Kickapoo agent in Indian Territory, arrived to run the Cheyenne-Arapaho Agency.⁴⁴ Over the next year and a half the peaceful atmosphere of the previous four years began to unravel.

The Southern Cheyenne Sun Dance of June 1873 was probably their last as a buffalo hunting people. White hunters interested in supplying the eastern market for hides, shot approximately 7,500,000 buffaloes between 1872 and 1874. In addition to this, unlicensed White and Osage traders demoralized the Cheyennes with whiskey and arms in exchange for their ponies. Even when Agent Miles and Colonel J. W. Davidson caught eight whiskey peddlers in southern Kansas, the district attorney at Topeka did not prosecute them. These concurrent problems led to the Red

River War, and the defeat suffered by the tribes of western Indian Territory ended their free roaming days outside their reservations.⁴⁵

According to Loring Benson Priest, Miles, more than other Quaker employees of the Indian Service, was able to combine "power and a rare practicality" with sincerity. In other words, "he frequently sacrificed his principles to necessity."⁴⁶ The use of force against the Indians of the southern plains had broken the spirit of the Quaker involvement in the Peace Policy. Now that the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were completely dependent on the agency for survival, Miles' administrative abilities would be severely tested.

One of the problems was feeding the 1,650 Arapahoes and 1,662 Cheyennes on the reservation in the spring of 1875. Congress granted Miles only half of his five million pounds of beef for the 1875-1876 fiscal year, and they reduced his annuity funds as well. In addition, Texas beef contractors habitually misrepresented the amount of edible beef on the cattle they drove to the agency.⁴⁷ Determined that his charges would not starve, Miles defied the wishes of the army officers by providing arms to his Indians so they could hunt whatever buffalo remained west of the reservation. By the winter of 1877-1878, there were almost no buffalo left. To supplement this loss Miles bought beef

from Texas cattlemen, who had begun to drive their herds across the reservation to railheads in Kansas (see Chapter 2).

The Cheyennes and Arapahoes began to find their own ways of making a living. The agency traders procured buffalo hides for the women to tan and cure. In their first year they produced about 5,000 hides. The traders paid the women \$3.00 in credit for each hide tanned. This provided \$15,000 worth of food and other supplies for them and their families. In another enterprising effort, Powder Face's band of Arapahoes began trading buffalo robes and ponies for cattle along the Chisholm Trail, which ran east of the agency (now called Darlington).⁴⁸

In the summer of 1876, Miles suggested that the Indians begin hauling freight from Wichita, Kansas to Darlington. They would earn \$1.50 for every 100 pounds, for the 165 mile distance. The agent hoped the government would provide the wagons and harnesses, thereby helping the Indians earn income to apply to farming and other projects on the reservation. The Cheyenne-Arapaho Transportation Co. caught on slowly, but by 1880 it was the most popular form of employment on the reservation. Although not very profitable, freighting gave the Indians firsthand experience in an activity of a market economy.⁴⁹

To direct the Cheyennes and Arapahoes away from their traditional communal lifestyle, Miles supported a plan to break up the larger camps into smaller villages, settling them along the fertile creek and river bottomlands. He hoped to obtain a White farmer to instruct each settlement in farming techniques. But, as Henry Fritz has pointed out,

Teaching Indians the value of individual industry was a complicated task. Because farmers, blacksmiths, and carpenters were paid out of annuity funds, Indians regarded them as servants rather than teachers. They were paid with the Indian's money, therefore it was their duty to perform the Indian's labor.⁵⁰

Although in theory farming embodied the American yeoman ideal, Miles was aware that erratic rainfall on the southern plains would not produce a steady livelihood for White or Indian farmers. Results improved somewhat when adaptations were made to plains conditions by plowing the fields early in winter, letting the spring rains accumulate, and then packing the soil down before the corn was seeded. To supplement the meager farming output, Miles advocated that the valley farms be joined to the larger sections of higher grazing land to link farming with ranching.⁵¹

Cheyenne and Arapaho attitudes towards farming were very different. Arapaho chiefs encouraged their people to farm. They did quite well in 1878, considering issues of farm implements arrived late. They produced 9,600 bushels

of corn, 360 bushels of potatoes and various other garden vegetables. The Cheyenne men never were very enthusiastic about farming; they considered it women's work. They preferred freighting, making bricks for agency buildings, or raising cattle. But again, their desire to work at these jobs far surpassed the agency's ability to pay them.⁵²

For the adult Indians, the kind of work they found around the agency was not what they were used to, and they adapted slowly, if at all, to its regular schedule. The meager spoils of an occasional buffalo hunt only highlighted the disappointment of agency life. From the agent's point of view, and that of the Peace Policy, the future lay in the education of the young.

Before the winter of 1875-1876, the only school on the reservation was a Quaker mission school. No Cheyennes, and a few more than fifty Arapahoes ever attended it. On January 1, 1876, a new boarding school opened in Darlington, where the promise of regular rations attracted twenty Cheyenne and forty Arapaho boys and girls. By June, forty more pupils had enrolled, straining the school's capacity of 100. The goal of the school, besides basic literacy, was to teach the vocational skills needed to achieve self-sufficiency.⁵³

John H. Seger was appointed supervisor of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Manual Training School. He, along with two of the

older boys plowed, planted, and cared for the 110 acres devoted to the school's corn and vegetable crop. From the sale of the surplus from the first 2 years' crops, they started a school cattle herd of 171 cattle, and 40 swine. The boys were paid half of the profits from the sale of vegetables and cattle. By the late summer of 1879, Miles estimated that the school herd had grown to about 973 head, worth \$9,181.40.⁵⁴

Miles was proud of what Seger had accomplished in such a short time. He believed their herd to be the basis for a program which, once increased to 15,000 head, would give each student, upon graduation, 30 cattle with which to start their own herd. But trouble began just when the federal government observed the success of their programs. The commissioner of Indian affairs ordered the herd divided equally among the Indians. But 3 or 4 cattle per family was of little consequence, unless they were added to the herds some Arapahoes had already developed. The Cheyennes, who had still not participated very much in agency life, "usually sold, gambled off, or used the cattle as presents in place of ponies, or they killed them for a feast."⁵⁵

In the fall of 1879 there were two schools on the reservation; one at Darlington attended by the Arapahoes, and one a quarter mile north of the agency at Caddo Springs,

attended by the Cheyennes. Between them 375 pupils, or about one quarter of the children on the reservation, went to these schools. Besides learning reading, writing, and arithmetic, the boys helped tend the school crops, learned to butcher and cut meat, bake bread, feed and water cattle and hogs, mend shoes and harnesses, milk cows, and cut and store hay for the animals. The girls learned to cook, sew, and wash. Also by 1880, 70 Cheyenne and Arapaho children were attending Carlisle Institute in Pennsylvania, a boarding school run by Captain Richard Pratt.

While school enrollment had shown a slow increase during the latter half of the 1870s, 73 percent of the Cheyenne and Arapaho children were still living in their parents' camps, beyond the educational arm of the Peace Policy. Only nine students found work at the agency; among them Henry Roman Nose was a tinsmith, and Making Medicine preached the gospel in the Cheyenne language.⁵⁶ At this pace the acculturation of the Indian would take much longer than the architects of the Peace Policy had expected.

During the three years Brinton Darlington administered the Cheyenne-Arapaho Agency these two tribes were still relying on the buffalo for their primary source of food, lodging, clothing, and trade goods. Some Arapahoes took up farming, but the Cheyennes had no intention of doing what

they considered to be women's work. After the Red River War Agent John D. Miles did his best by helping his charges make their living and gain a basic education, geared to attain the skills needed to become an American citizen and a homesteader. Under the best conditions farming was marginal, so freighting supplies and ranching rose in importance. During the first decade adaptations began which would point to the future survival of these tribes on the reservations. But the resistance of the Cheyennes to acculturation would continue to be a major source of conflict with government policy.

Santee and Yanktonais Sioux

In northeastern Dakota Territory, bands of Santee and Yanktonais Sioux had been living their traditional nomadic-hunting life throughout the late 1860s. But game had become scarce and hunger was not uncommon. Although largely uninvolved in the Sioux wars in Minnesota between 1862-1864, the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Santee Sioux were driven west into the Dakotas in the aftermath.⁵⁷ Early in 1867, in an effort to settle these peaceful Indians, some of their leaders came to Washington with Benjamin Thompson, brother of the Northern Superintendent, to negotiate a treaty. Two reservations were established in the treaty--one around Lake Traverse, in present-day South Dakota, and the other, 250 miles north, between the southern tip of Devils Lake and

the Sheyenne River. Incorporated into this treaty were two important elements of the Peace Policy. The first was the allotment of the reservation into 160 acre tracts, with the owner receiving inalienable patents, if after 5 years he had 50 acres under cultivation. The second element was that rations would be distributed only in return for labor performed, except for the elderly and the infirm. Also, to prohibit the chase, no trade in furs was permitted.⁵⁸

Benjamin Thompson was immediately appointed agent at Lake Traverse, but it would take 4 years before 500 Indians--the minimum required by the treaty for the appointment of an agent--were at Devils Lake. The Catholics were assigned to this new reservation, and Major William H. Forbes was appointed its first agent. Forbes, 55, was from Montreal. He had begun working for Henry Sibley with the American Fur Co. in Mendota, Minnesota in 1837. He later ran a trading post on the old reservation in Minnesota, and became well acquainted with the Sioux people and learned their language.⁵⁹

Forbes chose as his assistant a 30 year old blacksmith, James McLaughlin, also a Canadian and a Catholic, had come to St. Paul in 1863. A year later he married a mixed-blood Mdewankanton Sioux woman, Marie Louise Buisson.⁶⁰ After trying a number of different jobs, including traveling salesman, he applied and was accepted on the new agency staff at Devils Lake. Because Forbes was not in good health,

he was glad to have the younger man with him. Even though the wages were low (\$1,500 a year for Forbes; \$720 a year for McLaughlin), these positions had a relatively high status.⁶¹

Except for the Cuthead band of Yanktonais, who would continue to roam as far west as the Milk River in Montana Territory, these bands of Santees had been influenced by American agents and missionaries since the 1820s. Major Lawrence Taliaferro, agent to the Santee near Fort Snelling from 1820-1839, promoted agriculture and supported missionaries like Stephen Return Riggs, who translated parts of the Bible into the Dakota language. Even at this time, travelers to Minnesota who encountered the Sioux, commented on the absence of wild game in their area.⁶² Because they could no longer rely on the chase, treaties could be made which settled them on reservations and included provisions for rations only in return for labor and the future allotment of their lands. The Santees remained peaceful throughout the 1870s. Only a single attack on a stagecoach in 1877 disturbed an otherwise quiet decade of travel through their country.⁶³ Also, many Santee and Yanktonais chiefs had come to accept the new regime and they became important allies of the agent in implementing the Peace Policy.⁶⁴

Since there were no new quarters for the agency, the first order of business was to fix up some old log buildings

for Forbes' use at Fort Totten, located on the south shore of Devils Lake. During the winter of 1871-1872, McLaughlin directed the agency employees and the Indians in splitting rails for fences, and squaring off enough logs to build twenty houses. By the fall of 1872, he had set up a sawmill and was building a considerable number of log houses complete with hand made furniture.⁶⁵

In 1871, under the direction of the mixed blood farmer, George Faribault, the Indians produced a good harvest of corn, turnips, and potatoes. They also put up two hundred tons of hay, and had enough oxen to prepare for the next spring's planting.⁶⁶

As Agent Miles had discovered on the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation, Forbes found that he could save a great amount of money and provide the Indians with a source of income by freighting supplies. After the Northern Pacific Railroad was built west to Jamestown in 1872, it was only an 85 mile haul with the ox teams from there to Devils Lake.⁶⁷

Forbes was not able to build a school and enlist nuns to teach until the fall of 1874. At that time 4 Sisters of the Grey Nuns of Montreal arrived to run the school for a salary of \$150 a year each. They agreed to teach all the girls, and the boys up to age 12. The Indians helped build a school under McLaughlin's direction. It was located 7 miles from the fort so as to be free from Army influence.

A system of double rations was used to attract the young people and their parents to come to the new boarding school.⁶⁸

In the summer of 1873, Lieutenant Colonel L. C. Hunt, at Fort Totten, observed that things were going pretty well for the approximately 1,000 "peaceable" members of the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Sioux living near the post. Some trouble had occurred earlier in the summer when a fire was set in the timber where enlisted men were chopping wood for the fort. In addition, the hay contractor, who was also the post trader, was shot as he returned to the post. Hunt did not think Indians from Devils Lake were responsible, but he did suspect the Chippewas from Turtle Mountain, ninety miles to the north.

Agent Forbes told Colonel Hunt that the Devils Lake Indians had "about 125 old shot guns, mostly flint locks and single barrels" for which "small quantities of ammunition are issued for hunting purposes." A recent arrival of 30 yoke of oxen had added to "this encouragement to labor," but for all this to have its fullest effect, Hunt felt that eventually the agency would have to move its facilities closer to the school and fields.⁶⁹

Hunt also saw a problem with the Cuthead band of Yanktonais, who roamed back and forth between the Grand River Agency, to the west, and Devils Lake. The issue was still not settled in March 1875, when he requested cavalry

companies to remain at Fort Totten to keep the peace when the Cutheads came to visit. They show "marks of great discontent, on account of the non-recognition of their claims to a share of the Sisseton and Wahpeton annuities."⁷⁰

In January 1875, the ailing Forbes, well aware of the crucial part McLaughlin played in the smooth running of the agency, wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Edward P. Smith, in an effort to raise his assistant's salary. The raise was granted, and henceforth McLaughlin would be paid \$1,200 a year. But on July 20 William Forbes died. To everyone's surprise, the Catholic Board nominated Paul Beckwith, a young Indiana politician, to become Forbes' successor. It seems that with the sudden death of Forbes, General Charles Ewing, the Catholic Commissioner, in his haste to make a replacement, missed the many recommendations for the McLaughlin appointment. Undaunted, McLaughlin managed to straighten things out over the next year, and replaced Beckwith on July 3, 1876.⁷¹

Writing his memoirs in 1905, McLaughlin recalled his goal as Indian agent:

To the men of my time was appointed the task of taking the raw and bleeding material which made the hostile strength of the plains Indians, of bringing that material to the mills of the white man, and of transmuting it into a manufactured product that might be absorbed by the nation without interfering with the national digestion.⁷²

Whether this mechanistic scenario of human transformation was in his mind at the start of his fifty-two years in the Indian Service (1871-1923), McLaughlin's tenure at Devils Lake, and later at Standing Rock, were widely praised. By the time he left Devils Lake in 1881, the Sioux had agreed to settle on individual allotments.⁷³

Some aspects of Eastern Sioux culture which persisted into the first few years of reservation life demanded the agent's attention if detribalization, as required by the Peace Policy, was to be carried out. Whereas the Quaker agents were still struggling to break the power of the chiefs during the distribution of weekly rations, by 1879 at Devils Lake the heads of families received their rations once a month. Opportunities to earn supplies were available working at odd jobs around the agency, on the farms, and by hauling goods from Jamestown. The Indians were paid with "checks" which were good at the agency storeroom. By being consistent in not allowing rations unless earned through individual labor, Agents Forbes and McLaughlin taught their charges the work ethic and an appreciation for private property.⁷⁴

Another custom they wanted to curb was the Indians' desire to visit their friends and relatives at other reservations, while occasionally stealing horses along the way. A month after the Battle of the Little Big Horn the

agent from Standing Rock, Dakota Territory, wrote McLaughlin: "I have the honor to inform you that some of the Indians of the Reservation [sic] are now visiting your agency. At this time it is proper for them to be at home." He applied for, and received permission from J. Q. Smith, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to obtain extra flour and beef to encourage his people to come back, although the rest of his supplies were depleted. He then added: "Everything is quiet here, but many sensational rumors."⁷⁵ The next day, July 28, 1876, McLaughlin wrote Commissioner Smith to dispel suspicions that any Indians from Devils Lake had joined the Hunkpapa Chief Sitting Bull. His Indians feared them as much as the Whites did, he said. The reason why some of the Indians from Devils Lake were off the reservation was because the recent departure of the previous agent, Paul Beckwith, had left the agency supplies critically low. They had to travel south to the Sisseton Agency to seek assistance from relatives, or hunt game and dig wild turnips. ". . . as soon as I received supplies," said McLaughlin, ". . . small as they were I sent out for them to return and they willingly and cheerfully obeyed."⁷⁶

If an Indian wanted to visit another agency, he was required to obtain a pass from his agent. Sometimes the agent wrote ahead, as did C. A. Ruffe of the White Earth Agency, when he let McLaughlin know that he had issued a

pass to a chief to come to Devils Lake. In recommending him, Rufee wrote, "He cultivates the soil and is industrious."⁷⁷ The acting Sisseton agent, H. H. Hart told McLaughlin, "I shall give few passes this year." One of them was given to a former scout at Fort Totten, who wanted a pass to "visit your Reservation [sic] and bring back his children."⁷⁸

Apparently, McLaughlin was considered quite hospitable. Standing Rock agent W. T. Darling, sent him a list of 164 people from his reservation who, he was told by "some of our most reliable Indians . . .," ". . . were being subsidized by you." Complained Hughes, "The habit of Indians roving about from one agency to another has become a source of great annoyance to the agents and it should be broken up."⁷⁹ Fort Berthold agent, C. W. Darling, expressed similar chagrin to McLaughlin,

. . . any Indians who may come here from your agency without a proper pass from you will get anything but a pleasant reception from me & I hope you will refuse to give any of this agency any thing [sic] to eat but at once order them back where they belong. such [sic] visits are made with no other purpose but for begging in which they are quite accomplished.⁸⁰

Also, many letters were sent between agents, and between White settlers and agents, circulating rumors and accusations of horse stealing. Few of the rustlers were caught, and as often as not the thieves were White men. Just that occurred in the spring of 1878, when 23 horses

were stolen from Fort Berthold, 145 miles west of Devils Lake. At first the Berthold agent, E. H. Alden, insinuated that some of these horses were at Devils Lake. Some Indians from Fort Berthold even came over and retaliated by stealing 8 horses from Devils Lake. If the original charge was true, it would have broken a peace treaty made between these two tribes in 1870.⁸¹

In order to investigate the matter, McLaughlin and his charges sent their own peace commission to visit the Berthold Indians during the last two weeks of July 1878. In their council, once they had determined that two White men were headed up towards Canada with their stolen stock, the Berthold people

. . . did everything possible to make the visit a pleasant one and gave a number of ponies to the Devils Lake Indians in return for the ones taken, also added a number as a fine for having broken the treaty of Peace made between them in 1870. A new agreement was drawn up and signed by the representative men of both Agencies.

In August, McLaughlin was subpoenaed as a witness to the U.S. District Court in Fargo, D. T., where one of the two White men had been captured, along with five of the stolen horses.⁸²

The effort to strip the Indian of his identity continued on the reservation with an effort by McLaughlin to change the traditional way the Sioux wore their hair. McLaughlin wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,

E. A Hayt, that in February 1878, "I had the honor to maintain the steps taken to induce the Indians of this reservation to cut off their hair, the result has been most gratifying, nearly 200 adult-male Indians (a majority of all) have now cut their hair and are not ashamed of having done so, this is quite a sacrifice [sic] for an Indian, . . ."⁸³

Besides the way the Indians looked, the persistent power of the Sioux spiritual leaders remained an annoyance for McLaughlin. Those chiefs and medicine men who refused to conform to his policies were seen by McLaughlin and other agents as being responsible for blocking progress on the reservation. He urged the commissioner of Indian affairs to back him in deposing them from power. A mixed blood Sioux named Tiawashta [spelling unclear] was, according to McLaughlin, "selfish and unprincipled, he is a strong medicine man, greatly attached to all Indian ways, and is very much opposed to schools and Missionary teachers."⁸⁴

These men led the "medicine dances," which McLaughlin banned from the reservation. "Before leaving Devils Lake," he said, "I put a stop to a sundance, and believe that it has never been practiced there since."⁸⁵ The Presbyterian missionary, John P. Williamson, applauded McLaughlin's efforts:

That medicine dance is the greatest curse to all the Minnesota Sioux, and has blocked many an effort to teach them Christianity. I fear it is not dead yet for I believe it has as many lives as a cat. But I am very glad you have taken the thing in hand and hope you will not become weary or become discouraged in well doing, and that the Lord will prosper all your efforts to change the wild nature of these people.⁸⁶

McLaughlin initiated other parts of the Peace Policy during his five years as agent at Devils Lake. His monthly reports reflect confidence in an expanding farming program. As the extreme cold of winter began to subside in March 1878, the agency farmer, George Faribault, began to visit the Indian camps to pay the people for previous work, and to plan for spring planting and other necessary chores.⁸⁷ Although still getting some snow in April, "the Indians of the reservation have never shown such a spirit of contentedness, nor such a determination to increase their fields. . . ." ⁸⁸ And by the end of May McLaughlin was boasting of the Indians' willingness "to overcome any obstacle to place themselves beyond want next winter by planting larger fields than in former years."⁸⁹

As a greater number of the Devils Lake Sioux were willing to try farming and live in log houses, McLaughlin became increasingly concerned that the little timbered land there was should be surveyed and allotted according to the treaty of 1867. "There is no other question," he said, "so annoying to the Agent here as this one of disputed timber

claims, it also causes much dissatisfaction and many petty quarrels among the Indians, which can only be remedied by the survey and proper allotments."⁹⁰ He hoped to achieve an equal distribution by dividing three townships into forty acre tracts.⁹¹ As an individual improved his land, the agent provided him with new farm equipment as a reward. Wheat production, begun in 1878, increased so much in two years that they were able to build their own flour mill at the agency.⁹²

The Indians also made money by cutting wood for the school, the agency, and the fort. In a contract for hauling wood to Fort Totten from September 18, 1877 to April 29, 1878, 35 wood carriers hauled 251 cords, earning \$697.78.⁹³ Their biggest money maker was freighting supplies from Jamestown, 85 miles to the south. The rate was usually about \$.70 per 100 pounds. In December 1878, the Sioux took 9 of the best ox teams to Jamestown to get medical supplies, bedsteads, and lumber. It took them 14 days, and "everything was brought through in good shape by the Indians."⁹⁴

At Devils Lake, the double ration system developed by Agent Forbes helped fill the school to capacity. But by 1877, both McLaughlin and the Indian commissioner agreed that although the agency school should remain a boarding school, double rations were no longer affordable.⁹⁵

Initially McLaughlin felt that extra rations were needed because the school farm was not producing enough food. But by 1878, the children had a 6 acre garden with 2½ acres of potatoes (yielding 40 bushels), 2 acres of corn, and 1½ acres of onions, beets, carrots, squash, pumpkins, cucumbers, tomatoes, cabbage, peas, and beans. The agent also recommended the school be allowed to purchase more cows, 15-20 sheep, and a wooden loom, so "One of the Sisters can teach carding, spinning, & weaving."⁹⁶

In 1878, McLaughlin was granted permission to build an addition to the school, with a wing for a hospital (one of the Grey Nuns had already been serving as a physician). To serve the older boys, who had not been receiving instruction at the agency school (St. Michael's), a log cabin was built, where the Benedictine Fathers and Brothers would teach them vocational and manual arts.⁹⁷

Throughout the 1870s, White settlers established themselves in the area around the Devils Lake Reservation. With a minimum of 3,000 acres each, 91 bonanza farms developed successful wheat production in this arid land.⁹⁸ A resurvey of the western boundary of the reservation in 1883, discovered that the true line was 64,000 acres westward. Since Whites were already established in that area, Congress decided to compensate the Indians at \$1.25 an acre. The \$80,000 which they finally received in 1891, was

used to buy stock and farm machinery to support agriculture on the reservation.⁹⁹ By 1883, James J. Hill's St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railroad had reached the northeast corner of the reservation, thus eliminating the Indians' freighting opportunities, which had been a crucial source of income to many.¹⁰⁰

Other pressures from encroaching White settlers were being experienced by the Pembina and Turtle Mountain Chippewas, just ninety miles to the north of Devils Lake. Members of these bands came to express their concerns to McLaughlin about the great loss of game in their area and the Canadians hauling away some of their best timber. McLaughlin saw that among the White settlers:

. . . there is a growing desire to have the Indian title extinguished and the country opened for settlement. The country claimed by these Indians is among the best in Dakota, being both well watered and timbered, and the rush of immigration coming into this great wheat growing region, is such that another year will undoubtedly see the greater portion of their country over-run by whites.¹⁰¹

McLaughlin's observations were to prove accurate for many reservations during the 1880s and beyond. Western pressures to open Indian land to White settlement influenced the passage of the General Allotment Act in 1887. This made individual land allotment and the responsibilities of American citizenship mandatory for Indians, whether they were ready for them or not. These were not new ideas, but

ones which had appeared in treaties from 1854 onward and were clearly stated as goals for the Peace Policy by the Board of Indian Commissioners in 1869.¹⁰²

During the 1880s Norwegian and German-Russian immigrants farmed and built towns bordering the Devils Lake Reservation. Agents Forbes and McLaughlin worked hard to prepare their charges for the kind of America they would have to compete in once the terms of their treaty expired. The Santee Sioux had eagerly signed their treaty with the United States in 1867. Fourteen years later, when McLaughlin left to become agent at Standing Rock, the Devils Lake Indians had been assigned individual allotments of land; he had established the structure for them to stand or fall as yeoman farmers.

Along with land allotment, McLaughlin carried out a persistent attack on Santee and Yanktonais communal tribal culture. He stopped them from stealing horses and leaving the reservation for visits among their relatives without first receiving his permission. He made them cut their hair and wear the shirts, pants, and dresses ("citizens' dress") worn by most non-Indian men and women on the frontier. And perhaps most important, the agent would not tolerate the Indians' desire to integrate Christianity within their traditional religious practices. What McLaughlin considered heathen had to be stopped.

Thus, through the authority of the agents and the nearby presence of the United States Army, the government's program of civilization for the Indian was promulgated throughout the 1870s. Each tribe came to terms with the reality in its own way. The Arapahoes and the Santee Sioux appeared ready to experiment with the farming life, whereas the Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, and Yanktonais Sioux all chose to fight the imposition of a foreign culture. This chapter has been concerned primarily with the general responses of these five tribes to the agents' efforts to implement Grant's Peace Policy. Chapter two will follow each tribe into the 1880s and examine the wide range of adaptations individual Indians made to the reservation milieu.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

¹H. Wayne and Anne Hodges Morgan, *Oklahoma: A History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), pp. 42-47, 57-61.

²Douglas Hale, "The People of Oklahoma: Economics and Social Change," in *Oklahoma: New Views of the Forty-Sixth State* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982, edition by Ann Hodges Morgan and H. Wayne Morgan), pp. 34-36.

³Robert P. and Wynona H. Wilkens, *North Dakota: A History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), p. 63.

⁴Elwyn B. Robinson, *History of North Dakota* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), p. 285.

⁵Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., *The White Man's Indian: Image of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), pp. 142-145; and Brian W. Dippie, *The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1982).

⁶Robert W. Mardock, *The Reformers and the American Indian* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971), pp. 19-20.

⁷Henry E. Fritz, *The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), p. 62.

⁸Robert G. Athearn, *William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), p. 172-75.

⁹Discussions of the formation and activities of the Peace Commission can be found in Fritz, *Assimilation*, pp. 62-70; Mardock, *Reformers*, pp. 25-46; Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), pp. 130-141.

¹⁰Utley, *Regulars*, p. 134.

¹¹Fritz, *Assimilation*, pp. 54-55, 72-73.

- ¹²Utley, *Regulars*, pp. 189-90.
- ¹³Ibid., p. 191.
- ¹⁴Fritz, *Assimilation*, pp. 74-76.
- ¹⁵Robert M. Utley, "The Celebrated Peace Policy of General Grant," *North Dakota History* 20 (July 1953): 121; Utley, *Regulars*, p. 190; Berkhofer, Jr., *White Man's Indian*, p. 169; Dippie, *The Vanishing American*, p. 146.
- ¹⁶Lawrie Tatum, *Our Red Brothers*, forward written by Richard N. Ellis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), pp. xvii-xix.
- ¹⁷T. R. Fehrenbach, *Comanches: The Destruction of a People* (New York: Knopf, 1874), p. 478.
- ¹⁸Clark Wissler, *Indians of the United States* (Garden City: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 245-46; and Lee Cutler, "Lawrie Tatum and the Kiowa Agency, 1869-1873," *Arizona and the West* 13 (Autumn 1971): p. 233.
- ¹⁹Cutler, "Lawrie Tatum," p. 228.
- ²⁰Tatum, *Red Brothers*, p. 27.
- ²¹Cutler, "Lawrie Tatum," p. 233, 229; and Tatum, *Red Brothers*, pp. 32-33.
- ²²Tatum, *Red Brothers*, pp. 93-94.
- ²³Ibid., p. 101.
- ²⁴Ibid., p. 102.
- ²⁵Ibid., p. 105.
- ²⁶Thomas C. Battey, *A Quaker Among the Indians* (1875), p. 116.
- ²⁷Ibid., p. 192.
- ²⁸Tatum, *Red Brothers*, p. 105.
- ²⁹Cutler, "Lawrie Tatum," p. 228.
- ³⁰Ibid., p. 230.

³¹W. S. Nye, *Carbine and Lance: The Story of Old Fort Sill* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1937), p. 193; and Richard N. Ellis, *General Pope and U.S. Indian Policy* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970), p. 135.

³²Tatum, *Red Brothers*, p. 47; and Nye, *Carbine and Lance*, pp. 143-151, 174.

³³Nye, *Carbine and Lance*, pp. 143-44, 151.

³⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 171, 174.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 193.

³⁶Utley, *Regulars*, p. 212; Tatum, *Red Brothers*, pp. 159-60; for a discussion of the Salt Creek Prairie massacre see Father Peter John Powell, *People of the Sacred Mountain: A History of the Northern Cheyenne Chiefs and Warrior Societies, 1830-1879, With an Epilogue, 1969-1974*, 2 vols. (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981), 2: 796-98; Utley, *Regulars*, p. 209-11; and Tatum, *Red Brothers*, p. 115-18.

³⁷Powell, *Sacred Mountain*, p. 736-37.

³⁸Donald J. Berthrong, *Southern Cheyennes*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), p. 345.

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 347

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 347.

⁴¹Virginia Cole Trenholm, *The Arapahoes: Our People* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), pp. 239-40; and Powell, *Sacred Mountain*, p. 743.

⁴²Berthrong, *Southern Cheyennes*, p. 348.

⁴³*Ibid.*, pp. 352, 355, 364-65; also see John H. Seger, *Early Days Among the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians*, ed. Stanley Vestal (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), pp. 62, 65.

⁴⁴Berthrong, *Southern Cheyennes*, p. 366-67.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 372-376, 138, or chapter 16.

⁴⁶Loring Benson Priest, *Uncle Sam's Stepchildren: The Reformation of United States Indian Policy, 1865-1887* (New York: Octagon Books, 1969), p. 40.

⁴⁷ Donald J. Berthrong, *The Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal: Reservation and Agency Life in the Indian Territory, 1875-1907* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), p. 99.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 11, 16.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12, 67, 70; and Priest, *Stepchildren*, pp. 139-40.

⁵⁰ Fritz, *Assimilation*, p. 31.

⁵¹ Berthrong, *Ordeal*, pp. 64, 68-71.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

⁵⁴ Seger, *Early Days*, pp. 62, 65.

⁵⁵ Berthrong, *Ordeal*, p. 66.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 79-85.

⁵⁷ Roy W. Meyer, *History of the Santee Sioux: United States Indian Policy on Trial* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), pp. 109-54.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

⁶⁰ According to Father Peter J. Powell, Mrs. McLaughlin served as an important interpreter for her husband, and later assisted Frances Densmore in the 1918 classic, *Teton Sioux Music*. She also wrote books of her own; interview at St. Augustine's Center for American Indians, Chicago, Illinois, February 1982.

⁶¹ Louis L. Pfaller, O.S.B., *James McLaughlin: The Man with an Indian Heart* (New York: Vantage Press, 1978), pp. 3, 7-8, 15.

⁶² Meyer, *Santee Sioux*, pp. 35-54.

⁶³ Robinson, *History of North Dakota*, p. 183.

⁶⁴ McLaughlin, *My Friend*, p. 6.

⁶⁵ Pfaller, *James McLaughlin*, p. 24.

⁶⁶Meyer, *Santee Sioux*, p. 225.

⁶⁷Pfaller, *James McLaughlin*, p. 18; James McLaughlin to E. A. Hayt, August 9, 1878 *McLaughlin Papers*, Roll 19, Frames 180-186. The microfilm edition of the McLaughlin Papers will be abbreviated below as MP.

⁶⁸Pfaller, *James McLaughlin*, p. 19; Meyer, *Santee Sioux*, p. 228.

⁶⁹Lt. Col. L. C. Hunt to Col. N. H. Davis, August 25, 1873, MP, Roll 31, Frame 347.

⁷⁰Lt. Col. L. C. Hunt to Assistant Adjutant General, March 15, 1875, MP, Roll 31, Letter 42.

⁷¹Major William H. Forbes to Hon. Edward P. Smith, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, January 10, 1875, MP, Roll 1, Frames 18-19; Pfaller, *James McLaughlin*, pp. 27-38; the following references in the McLaughlin Papers (MP) contain correspondence relating to the Beckwith affair: Role 1, Frames 20, 26-27, 31, 37-38, 39, 49, 55-57, 66, 103, 113-14, 124-26.

⁷²McLaughlin, *My Friend*, p. 3.

⁷³Robinson, *North Dakota*, p. 180.

⁷⁴Tatum, *Red Brothers*, pp. 72-73; Pfaller, *James McLaughlin*, p. 42; and Meyer, *Santee Sioux*, pp. 229-30.

⁷⁵Standing Rock Agent to McLaughlin, July 27, 1876, MP, Roll 1, Frame 141.

⁷⁶James McLaughlin to J. Q. Smith, July 28, 1876, MP, Roll 1, Frames 142-43; Pfaller, *James McLaughlin*, p. 38.

⁷⁷C. A. Ruffe to James McLaughlin, June 25, 1878, MP, Roll 1, Frame 465.

⁷⁸H. H. Hart to James McLaughlin, May 3, 1877, MP, Roll 1, Frame 233.

⁷⁹W. T. Hughes to James McLaughlin, July 16, 1877, MP, Roll 1, Frames 273-75.

⁸⁰C. W. Darling to James McLaughlin, September 13, 1876, MP, Roll 1, Frame 154.

⁸¹E. H. Alden to James McLaughlin, May 22, 1878, MP, Roll 1, Frames 435-36; also May 27, 1878, Roll 1, Frames 444-45; and June 13, 1878, Roll 1, Frames 456-57.

⁸²McLaughlin to E. A. Hayt, Commissioner of Indian Affairs (CIA), August 9, 1878, MP, Roll 19, Frames 180-83.

⁸³McLaughlin to Hayt, April 4, 1878, MP, Roll 19, Frame 9.

⁸⁴McLaughlin to Hayt, September 17, 1878, MP, Roll 19, Frames 254-58.

⁸⁵Pfaller, *James McLaughlin*, p. 40; McLaughlin, *My Friend*, p. 32.

⁸⁶J. P. Williamson to McLaughlin, March 15, 1877, MP, Roll 1, Frames 207-08.

⁸⁷McLaughlin to Hayt, April 4, 1878, MP, Roll 19, Frames 6-11.

⁸⁸McLaughlin to Hayt, May 1, 1878, MP, Roll 19, Frame 50.

⁸⁹McLaughlin to Hayt, May 31, 1878, MP, Roll 19, Frames 101-06.

⁹⁰McLaughlin to CIA, February 23, 1880, MP, Roll 19, Frame 564.

⁹¹McLaughlin to Armstrong, October 9, 1879, MP, Roll 19, Frame 503.

⁹²Pfaller, *James McLaughlin*, p. 42; McLaughlin to Very Rev. J. B. A. Brouillet, December 6, 1880, MP, Roll 19, Frames 763-64.

⁹³Devils Lake Agency record, April 29, 1878, MP, Roll 1, Frames 421-22.

⁹⁴McLaughlin to Hayt, December 31, 1878, MP, Roll 19, Frames 405-06.

⁹⁵J. Q. Smith (CIA) to McLaughlin, July 10, 1877, MP, Roll 1, Frames 270-72.

⁹⁶McLaughlin to Hayt, June 1, 1878, MP, Roll 19, Frames 112-13.

⁹⁷McLaughlin to Hayt, July 20, 1878, MP, Roll 19, Frames 158-159.

⁹⁸Robinson, *North Dakota*, pp. 129-37, 138.

⁹⁹Meyer, *Santee Sioux*, p. 237.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, p. 236

¹⁰¹McLaughlin to R. E. Trowbridge (CIA), November 17, 1880, MP, Roll 19, Frames 754-55; September 25, 1880, MP, Roll 19, Frames 730-36.

¹⁰²Fritz, *Assimilation*, p. 206.

CHAPTER 2

THESE ARE NEARLY ALL "BLANKET INDIANS"

The struggles on the reservations during the 1870s centered around the Indian agents establishing control by breaking the influence of the traditional leaders, and by convincing the Indians to send their children to school and to begin farming and ranching like the White man. This chapter will discuss the political, economic, and religious institutions through which some Indians came to terms with reservation life, and still maintained their Indian identity. The agent allocated political power to the Indians by appointing those most amenable to his program to positions on the Indian police force and the Court of Indian Offenses. Ranching and the leasing of rangeland to cattlemen in western Indian Territory and wheat farming in the Dakotas were the dominant economic activities through which individuals or groups of Indians could become economically self-sufficient. The Ghost Dance and peyote ceremonialism represented the religious responses the Indians made to establish new forms of spiritual renewal in the face of the government's attack on their old observances.

Among the Kiowas and Comanches of western Indian Territory and the Devils Lake Sioux of Dakota Territory, the

Indian police and Court of Indian Offenses functioned according to the government's plan. The police kept intruders off the reservations, carried out the orders of the agent, kept the peace, and arrested law breakers. The Court of Indian Offenses tried those whom the police arrested and imposed appropriate sentences. These institutions had less success on the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation where the Cheyenne Dog Soldiers, a traditional warrior society, retained their power throughout the decade, resulting in little cooperation with government policymakers.

The most viable economic institution in western Indian Territory, considering the small Congressional appropriations for beef and the Indians' general lack of success in farming and ranching at this time, was the leasing of reservation rangeland to Texas cattlemen. The Kiowas and Comanches, although split into factions over the issue, did benefit economically from leasing during the 1880s and 1890s. The open hostilities between the Dog Soldiers and their agent prevented leasing or other government supported alternatives from developing on the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation. The Sioux of Devils Lake and their agent benefitted from the boom in bonanza wheat farming and high prices of the early 1880s. They sold their surplus wheat to several local markets, bought modern

farm machinery, and expanded their agricultural output throughout the decade.

Indian religious innovation was a prominent feature of reservation life at this time. Here we see the distinct personalities of the tribes, as they responded to the various religious movements in their own ways. The Comanches adopted the peyote rituals and the Kiowas produced several messianic movements, including the peaceful Ghost Dance of 1890-1891. The Arapahoes participated in the peyote rites and the Ghost Dance, while the Cheyennes did not commit themselves to either as a tribe, but participated individually in both. Catholicism was dominant among the Sioux of Devils Lake, where public performance of their native ceremonies was prohibited. However, with a change of agents in the 1890s, resulting in less control on the reservation, traditional religious practices surfaced again.

Kiowas and Comanches

Kiowa and Comanche leaders emerged out of all three of these newly developed institutions. Although grossly underpaid, the Indian police formed a cadre committed to carrying out the orders of the agent. They attempted to keep the peace among the Indians, escorted intruders off the reservation, and worked as laborers on the upkeep of the agency. The Court of Indian Offenses was also active,

fulfilling its mandate to promote the values of the individualized White society through its judgments. The agent had to approve all of the court's rulings and sometimes allowed the judges to decide questions based on traditional tribal principals of justice. In economics, important relationships developed between Texas cattlemen, agents, and Comanche leaders especially. Quanah Parker, a Quahada Comanche chief, emerged as a pivotal personality on all fronts throughout this period. Three times during the 1880s, messianic visions inspired the Kiowas to dance and sing for the return of the buffalo and for the disappearance of the Whites. The Comanches found spiritual solace in the rituals surrounding the ingestion of peyote.

In the early reservation years, Congress had not provided for any kind of local police force for either the maintenance of order, or for the supervision of the government's program for civilizing the Indian. A few agents had already established forces of their own,¹ but it was taking Congress a long time, as usual, to recognize the need and to appropriate funds for Indian policemen. The most recent law applying to Indian affairs in general was the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, which gave the agent the authority to remove trouble makers from the reservation. By 1878, the commissioners of Indian affairs had received sufficient testimony--including a letter from Kiowa-Comanche

Agent J. M. Haworth, concerning horse thieves and whiskey peddlers on their reservations--to persuade Congress to authorize Indian police forces in May 1878. An appropriation of \$30,000 allocated \$8 per month for officers, and \$5 for privates. Within six months, one third of the agencies in the country had police, and by 1890 they were installed at all of them.²

This was one of the first institutions under the federal government's assimilation program that allowed the Indians some control over their own lives and recognized the prior existence of indigenous systems of social control within the different Indian societies.³ At the same time, the reservation police served to disrupt traditional Indian institutions by aggressively carrying out the orders of the Indian agent. Agents sought out the progressives over the traditionalists: those mostly younger Indians who were willing to try the White man's road as opposed to those who clung to their identities as Indians. A testament about the usefulness of the police to the civilization process was made by the acting commissioner of Indian affairs in 1880:

. . . in general, at all agencies Indian policemen act as guards at annuity payments; render assistance and preserve order during ration issues; protect agency buildings and property; return truant pupils to school; search for and return lost or stolen property, whether belonging to Indians or white men; prevent depredations on timber, and the introduction of whiskey on the reservation; bring whiskey sellers to trial; make arrests for disorderly conduct, drunkenness, wife-

beating, theft, and other offenses; serve as couriers and messengers; keep the agent informed as to births and deaths in the tribe, and notify him promptly as to the coming on the reserve of any strangers, white or Indian. Vigilant and observant by nature, and familiar with every foot-path on the reservation, no arrivals or departures, or clandestine councils can escape their notice, and with a well disciplined police-force an agent can keep himself informed as to every noteworthy occurrence taking place within the entire limit of his jurisdiction.

Not only would the police protect and spy on their fellow tribesmen, but they would also serve as a model for the transition from Indian to White man:

The lessons of self-control, of respect for the rights of others in person and property, of the maintenance of social order by law administered by the community instead of revenge obtained by the individual, when once learned, mark an important advance in the scale of civilization, and rudimentary lessons of this sort are daily taught by the Indian police system, which calls upon one Indian to arrest and pronounce deliberate judgement upon another for offenses, many of which hitherto have not only gone unpunished, but have been unrecognized as meriting punishment.⁴

On the Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Reservation, the new agent, P. B. Hunt--a Kentuckian and former lieutenant colonel in the Union Army--had to contend with resentment created by the recent killing of two Comanches by soldiers before he could enlist a group of trustworthy policemen. However, the tenure of the Quakers had ended at this agency with the departure of Agent James M. Haworth, and Hunt would be less concerned with appeasement than were his two peaceful predecessors. The goals of the Peace Policy were still in effect despite the retirement of the Quakers from

directing the Central Superintendency. Its further implementation would be accomplished by men with much more practical sensibilities. In this case, Hunt chose to recruit his policemen by refusing to allow the Indians to go out on their annual buffalo hunt until the ranks of the police were filled. By November 1879, two officers and twenty-six privates formed the first force of Indian police at that agency.⁵ This was a tactic that helped Hunt establish control early in his term as agent.

Until this time, Indians arrested by the Indian police were either tried by the agent, or taken to a federal court in Texas or Arkansas, where fair trials for Indians were rare. However, it was not to lighten the trial load of the agent or to achieve justice for Indians accused of crimes that the Court of Indian Offenses was established. It was, according to Commissioner J. D. C. Atkins,

. . . to destroy the tribal relations as fast as possible, by abolishing the old heathenish customs that have been for many years resorted to, by the worst elements on the reservation, to retard the progress and advancement of the Indians to a higher standard of civilization and education.⁶

In traditional Comanche society, justice was obtained not in a court or council, but on a one-to-one basis, where each party understood the acceptable sanctions for each offense. Typical crimes were adultery, wife stealing and seduction. According to Wallace and Hoebel, "the aggrieved

and his personal supporters had to push the process to its conclusion, or nothing would be done at all to provide relief or redress."⁷

The structure of the new reservation courts was outlined by Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Thomas J. Morgan:

Each court consists of three judges who are appointed by the Indian police, upon the nomination of the respective Indian agents, for a term of one year, but are subject to removal at any time. The court holds regular sessions twice a month. The crimes and offenses named in the rules are Indian dances, plural marriages, practices of medicine men, theft, destruction of property belonging to another, payments or offers of payment for living or cohabitating with Indian women, drunkenness and the introduction, sale, gift, or barter of intoxicating liquors.⁸

Although these rules were first published in 1883, under Secretary Henry M. Teller and Commissioner Hiram Price, most reservations did not have Courts of Indian Offenses until 1886. Even then, since no compensation was provided, the judges had to be chosen from the ranks of the Indian police, which presented conflicts of interest. Congress finally made appropriations for the judges' salaries in 1888, of from \$3 to \$8 per month. These rose to a yearly average of \$7 per month by 1904.

Like the Indian police, the Court of Indian Offenses offered the opportunity for Indians to attain status and power on the reservation when the agent awarded judgeships to those men who appeared most willing to commit themselves to his civilization program. In making these important

appointments, the agent had to be sensitive to the Indian's own power structure and to the criteria of officials in Washington. This was not an easy task.⁹

The first Court of Indian Offenses on the Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Reservation, appointed by Agent Captain J. Lee Hall in 1886, contained all Comanches, including Quanah Parker. Hall's court dissolved two years later after he was dismissed for drunkenness and dishonesty. No doubt the other tribes on the reservation were not very happy with such an unrepresentative court anyway.¹⁰

In 1888 the new agent, E. E. White, appointed another Court of Indian Offenses with a broader representation. He chose Quanah of the Comanches, Lone Wolf of the Kiowas, and Jim Tehnacana of the Wichitas. White felt that the friendlier atmosphere of their own reservation, where moral support and bail money would be more accessible, would somehow reduce the number of crimes.¹¹ The judges were not paid at first, but eventually the commissioner set their salary at \$10 a month. Lone Wolf presided over only one decision of the court--one in which an Indian was fined \$24 for drunkenness. He was replaced by his brother, an Indian policeman named Chaddle-kaung-ky.¹²

For the next thirteen years, the Indians at the Anadarko agency would have some opportunities to implement their ideas of justice through the Court of Indian Offenses.

For example, the head of the Indian police, Eagle Tail Feather, remembered how Quanah decided a dispute between two Comanche men who both claimed the same piece of land. The land was awarded to the one who was determined, by testimony, to have been the braver warrior, not to the one who had claimed the land first.¹³ An Indian found guilty of killing a friend with an "unloaded" gun was given ten days in jail; and the plaintiff in a bigamy case was awarded \$10 and a "well-broken pony."¹⁴ On the other hand, the judges had to support the agent's effort to eliminate Sun Dances, Scalp Dances, medicine-making, and polygamy. Surely, it seemed to them that their whole culture was on trial.

Throughout Quanah's career as a judge (1885-1898), he was embroiled in controversy over his refusal to stop being a polygamist. Most Indian men who were married before the reservation began had more than one wife. Nevertheless, the complaints of Quanah's enemies (those who opposed his pro-leasing stance, for instance) reached Commissioners Morgan and Jones. They said they would remove the progressive chief from the Court of Indian Offenses if he would not give up four of his five wives. Quanah told the government officials to come down and choose for him which of his wives he had to let go. They knew better than to attempt that. Meanwhile, Agents Adams and Baldwin defended Quanah and the other progressives by urging the commissioners

to accept polygamy as a practice from the old days which should be left to die naturally in the new environment, as indeed, from their point of view, the traditional Indian himself was doing.

Besides, the progressive Indians were supporting the government's policies on the reservations. The agent commended the effort the Indians were making

. . . through their council which drew up three new laws on marital relations. They provided for punishment of women deserting their husbands, and of husbands taking up with new women, with or without abandoning the first wife.¹⁵

Despite the agent's approval, the commissioner eventually removed Quanah and Apiatan from the Court of Indian Offenses after being influenced more by the enemies of the two chiefs. The court dissolved for the Kiowas, Comanches, and Wichitas when the government allotted the reservation in 1901.

A constant economic problem throughout these years was a shortage of food.¹⁶ Until the late 1870s, the Kiowas and Comanches were able to supplement their meager rations with annual buffalo hunts. By 1879-1880, the great southern herds had been destroyed by commercial hide hunters, and the Indians were thereafter tied to the agency for subsistence. After two years of severe drought, Agent Hunt concluded,

Nothing is more certain than that this country is badly adapted to agriculture, the scarcity of rainfall cutting short the crops one and sometimes two out of three years.¹⁷

He felt that rations should have been increased after the buffalo were gone, for he really had little hope that ranching would succeed there either. During the previous year, Hunt had issued 600 head of cattle to those Indians most likely to build up their own herds. But rations were only lasting four days out of a week, and the Kiowas and Comanches were forced to butcher their own breeding cattle. Hunt said,

It will be very difficult to prevent this altogether, so long as the present state of things exists. It is well known that the ration issued to the Indians is insufficient, that it does not by any means satisfy their appetite.¹⁸

Meanwhile, a boom market had developed in Texas cattle. Range stock which sold for \$7 or \$8 a head in 1878, would reach \$30 to \$35 by 1882.¹⁹ On the way north to Abilene or to Dodge City, Kansas, cowboys let their herds drift onto the Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Reservation to feed on the rich grasses, that had so recently sustained the buffalo and the Indian. The poorly equipped Indian police, accompanied by a military escort, were kept busy locating and disarming trespassers, and moving them off the reservation.²⁰ Once this was accomplished, wrote historian Martha Buntin,

Both the police and military detail were required, by their instructions, to return the arms at the border, count the cattle, list the number under each brand, and report fully to Agent Hunt.²¹

Even when the agent collected the legal fee of a dollar per head, the ranchers considered trespassing on the reservation worth while. By 1881, amidst this confusion, opportunities emerged for individual Indians to profit and to influence reservation politics for the next twenty years.

The agency headquarters was moved north from Fort Sill to the Wichita Agency at Anadarko in 1878. The consolidated three tribes now cost the government \$10,000 a year to administer, instead of \$18,000. The military was not very happy about the move, because it made their job of protecting agency personnel more difficult. The army supported the Comanches who preferred to remain in territory familiar to them in the southern part of the reservation.²² The Comanches had been and remained the most obstinant settlers on the reservation since they were led into Fort Sill by the defiant young Quanah in 1875. Now that they had an eighty mile roundtrip to obtain their weekly rations at Anadarko, it seemed less likely that they would settle down as farmers any time in the near future.

As the winter of 1881-1882 came to an end, Agent Hunt was faced with a 25 percent cut in the beef ration for his agency. The previous summer alarm spread among agency personnel when the Kiowas refused to accept the meager beef ration, complaining that it was too small to subsist on. Also, drought and overstocking of the open range in Texas

made cattlemen especially eager to use the reservation grass.²³ Since the Indians were hungry, and it seemed impossible to keep the cattlemen off the reservation, Hunt allowed the cattle to remain until July 1, in return for 340 head. But before the cattle were delivered, Congress made an emergency appropriation, restoring the beef ration to the higher level of 1881. A persistent effort by Hunt resulted in the commissioner allowing him to distribute the 340 head from the ranchers as cows for breeding purposes. This transaction established the White ranchers as part of the reservation milieu.²⁴

Since the Comanches were the first tribe to encounter the cattlemen grazing their herds along the Red River, it is instructive to examine their reactions to this new intrusion on their lands. At first all the Indians were opposed to letting Whites occupy large sections of their continually shrinking domain. But as the tribe faced the reality of survival within the confines of the reservation, with its chronic shortages of food and other necessities, splits occurred within the Comanche leadership, which the cattlemen and agents were quick to exploit. Since hunting and war no longer comprised the central activities through which leadership was attained, new ways had to be found under the new conditions. In order for the ranchers to protect their interests, they made payoffs to a variety of Comanche headmen.

Among the first Comanches to gain influence with the cattlemen was the religious leader Eschiti, who in 1874 had a vision which inspired the attack on the White buffalo hunters at Adobe Walls. Another Comanche on the ranchers' payroll was Parmansu, or Comanche Jack, an Indian policeman. A third, and possibly the most influential Comanche over the next thirty years was Quanah, who in 1875 surpassed Eschiti as leader of the Quahada band (one of about twelve Comanche bands), and lead them in to surrender at Fort Sill. The cattlemen paid Quanah \$50 a month for his services, and \$25 for the others.²⁵

Born about 1852, Quanah was the son of the Comanche war chief Peta Nocona, and the White captive Cynthia Anne Parker. While his White heritage may have caused him hardship early in life, he survived and became an influential young warrior. Under the new conditions of the reservation, where government officials viewed the tribe as a unified entity, Quanah drew favorable attention when they learned his mother had been a White captive. Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie, who brought the Comanches into Fort Sill, made an effort to link Quanah up with his mother, only to find out she had died. At that time, with the terror of Comanche raids into Texas so fresh in their minds, none of Quanah's other White relatives were willing to meet with him. Only years later, after newspaper reporters had made him a

celebrity, did they step forward and claim him as their own. Early in his term as agent, P. B. Hunt tried to help Quanah claim a piece of land his mother had been given in compensation for her years as a captive of the Comanches. This effort failed, but it was indicative of the Whites' attraction to the rising Quahada leader.

Hunt also had great influence in maintaining Quanah as the head of his ninety-three member band. Band leader was a key position of authority, since rations and annuities were obtained through the band chief. If the agent opposed the influence of a particular band chief, he would encourage a more cooperative leader to split off with his followers and form a new band, thereby diminishing the power of the former band leader. This resulted in the creation of an additional twenty bands in the five years they had been on the reservation.²⁶ In this way Quanah was able to surpass other potential leaders such as Mowaway, chief of the Cochethkas; Toshaway and Esahabbe, of the Penetethkas; Howeah and Iron Mountain, of the Yamparekas; or Horse Back, a Noconie. These men were all, wrote William T. Hagan, "of sufficient stature to be signatories in 1867 of the treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek, which provided the legal framework for their reservation life."²⁷ Quanah, who was also there, did not sign the treaty.²⁸

Of course these new dealings between Indians, like Quanah, and cattlemen were contrary to what was supposed to be taking place on the reservation as envisioned by eastern reformers and politicians. They were well aware that the Indians were not farming successfully and only a few had built up their own cattle herds, yet there was money to be made in leasing. In addition, an intense lobbying effort was being made by Indians and cattlemen in 1884-1885.

Quanah and Parmansu, along with the Kiowas Big Bow, Howling Wolf, and Tohauson, went to Washington in August 1884, and the two Comanches went again in February 1885, accompanied by ranchers E. C. Sugg and George W. Fox. Out of the latter meeting with Interior Secretary Lucius Q. Lamar, came the decision not to interfere with the cattlemens' proposed 6-year lease of 1.5 million acres, including an annual rent of 6 cents an acre, and a promise to employ 54 Indian herders at \$20 to \$35 a month.²⁹

Most of the Kiowas were opposed to the leasing agreement because the cattlemen were not as interested in their lands, situated in the northern part of the reservation. Not all the Comanches were behind the plan either. About a third of them, led by Tabananaka and White Wolf, felt the pro-leasing leaders had sold out to the cattlemen, and wanted them demoted from their positions as chiefs. They refused to accept their \$9 per capita of the

second "grass payment" (about \$7,300 of \$27,306), issued in January 1886.³⁰ This money was put on deposit for them in the U.S. Treasury, while the money accepted by the pro-leasing group quickly found its way into the coffers of the reservation traders. A more constructive use of these funds, thought Agent J. Lee Hall, would have been to build up the Indians' cattle herds. Unfortunately, Hall was dismissed from his duties in October 1887, after being charged with embezzling \$14,008. His successor, Special Agent E. E. White, a vocal critic of Hall, leased reservation land himself, and then sublet it to the cattlemen for his share of the Comanche grass money. It appears that some agents viewed their jobs in the Indian Service as opportunities to get rich.³¹

The organized efforts of the cattlemen and Indians on the Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Reservation during the 1880s had so great an impact that they probably contributed to the delay in the opening of the reservation until the turn of the century (see Chapter 3). In February 1891, Congress passed a law which would allow grazing leases for periods of up to five years. Also, the anti-leasing faction among the Kiowas dissolved when it was learned that \$50,000 worth of deposits had accumulated in the U.S. Treasury for those who had refused grass payments over the last five

years. Soon Lone Wolf was representing the Kiowas on delegations to Washington for the negotiation of new leases.³²

Quanah Parker continued to lead the pro-leasing faction. According to Hagan:

Presumably the cattlemen saw Quanah as their most able Indian advocate of leasing, and he seemed happy to play the role. The Texans got an articulate Comanche ally and expressed their gratitude in financial terms to a young Indian trying to live like a white man.³³

In addition to his trips to Washington, the cattlemen sent Quanah to Fort Worth and Dallas, where eager newspaper reporters talked to the Comanche chief and made the most of his warrior past and his bright entrepreneurial future. They gave him gifts of diamond stick-pins, engraved pearl-handled revolvers, and helped him build a large house for his family. As early as 1884, Quanah had a cattle herd large enough to sell forty head to the government for distribution as rations among his own people.³⁴

While some Indians became policemen and judges, and some of those and others leased their land to Texas cattlemen, at the same time the Kiowas and Comanches needed to survive spiritually. Here too, they made their adaptations to reservation life. No matter how many problems government officials and missionaries encountered in getting the Indian to adopt "civilized" pursuits, nothing frustrated them more than the Indians' devotion to their own rituals and

religious leaders, or "medicine men," as they were called by Whites. The anthropologist Clark Wissler noticed this about 1900:

Other Indians loitered about the agency, but not the medicine man; he was always going somewhere or coming, with the manner of one who had use for every moment of his time. No doubt this behavior alone was sufficient to arouse both respect and hostility, for to the churchman he was the symbol of iniquity, to the reformer he stood as the greatest obstacle, to the official he expressed the determined conservatism of pagan life, the self-appointed leader of the opposition. Even the trader had little use for him because he bought sparingly and set his influences against credit, debt, and changes in the standard of living. . . . The young educated Indians, many of whom had been converted to Christianity, would vie with each other to tell me how foolish and silly they believed the medicine man to be, but not within his hearing, for in reality they respected and feared what he stood for.³⁵

Many of the practices Secretary of Interior Teller hoped to do away with when he proposed the Court of Indian Offenses reflected the importance of religious leaders. "Steps should be taken," said Teller, "to compel these imposters to abandon this deception and discontinue these practices, which are not only without benefit to the Indians, but positively injurious to them." If found guilty of practicing his trade, the shaman was to be jailed "for not less than ten nor more than thirty days."³⁶ The Kiowa-Comanche agent, Charles E. Adams, complained in 1890 that "among the less intelligent the 'medicinemen' have still the greatest influence."³⁷ These officials were well aware that despite their success at destroying the Indians' traditional

buffalo hunting economy and their political institutions, the Indians were very much alive spiritually. The shamans had succeeded the peace and war chiefs as the most important tribal leaders during these desperate reservation years.³⁸

The modern Kiowa writer, N. Scott Momaday, wrote that his grandmother, Aho, was seven years old when the Kiowas gave their last Sun Dance in 1887. For the next three years, efforts to hold this most sacred ceremony were prevented by the agent and the military.³⁹ The Comanches were more individualistic in their rituals than were the Kiowas, but they did have a few communal rites. They had not held their Beaver Ceremony or Eagle Dance for many years, and had their only Sun Dance in 1874.⁴⁰

In the late 1880s, a new pan-Indian movement began to spread under the government's forced assimilation policy, designed to end Indian identity. Weston La Barre suggests that this development was facilitated by the intermingling of young Indians at the off-reservation boarding schools. While attempting to replace Indian culture with the trappings of White civilization, the schools created a network of inter-tribal friendships that were maintained through visiting and letter-writing once the Indians returned to their reservations.⁴¹ What they found among their people was an intensified search for spiritual renewal. This came from the south in the form of peyote rituals, and from the

north through the Paiute Wovoka's vision of the Ghost Dance. Alice Marriott has written: "There was a restlessness running along under men's minds all through that country, and it came down across the edges and into the Kiowa country, and soon all the tribes were thinking the same things."⁴²

Amazingly enough it was Quanah, favored among cattlemen and government officials, who according to La Barre, was "by far the most important peyote leader among the Comanche."⁴³ The use of peyote was not new to them. Even before the middle of the nineteenth century, Comanche warriors obtained the plant from the White Mountain Apaches, and used it as a powerful aid in foretelling danger, and locating horses or enemies. Since 1874, when Eschiti's vision failed at Adobe Walls, and other traditional guardian spirits appeared to have lost their power to resist the Whites, peyote offered group cohesion and sacred visions to ease the pain of reservation life.⁴⁴

Whether the Kiowas obtained their peyote ritual from Quanah or through the Mescalero Apaches is not important here. They were suffering the destruction of their old way of life, and had to look forward to putting a plow to the earth, and sending their children to school. The messianic vision of Buffalo Coming Out, in 1881, failed to bring back the buffalo or stop the Whites from filling up their land. Peyote ceremonialism provided the Kiowas with a needed link

with the past by integrating traditional practices such as sweatbaths, ritual singing, drumming, smoking, prayer, and visions into the new reality.⁴⁵ In Marriott's *The Ten Grandmothers*, the Kiowa Eagle Plume has gone to his first peyote meeting near Quanah's big house. In the vision he has his old power the mountain boomer, a bird, speak to him:

You have that Grandmother bundle. That was good power for your father. In his day he needed it. It is still good power. Anything that teaches people to live right is good power. But this time has come. The old power needs to be helped. It needs helping from the outside, from all the people.⁴⁶

From Agent White's perspective, peyote "not only makes physical wrecks of them in a short time, but it destroys their mental faculties as well." He said the White settlers living in the area "were becoming alarmed for their safety," knowing how much they used peyote. The agent issued an order to cease its use under threat of cutting off all rations, annuities, and grass payments.⁴⁷ But while Quanah was a peyote cult leader, and a judge on the Court of Indian Offenses, no cases concerning its use were tried in his court.⁴⁸ Once the reservation was opened to White settlement in 1901, pressure increased from missionaries and government officials to ban the use of peyote. But with the help of James Mooney, of the Smithsonian Institution, the state of Oklahoma granted a charter, on October 10, 1918, for its use as a sacrament in the Native American Church.⁴⁹

Another ceremony offering the hope of spiritual renewal and a return to their old way of life was the Ghost Dance, inspired by the vision of the Paiute prophet Wovoka, far to the northwest. The Comanches found little attraction in this, possibly because they were so involved with peyote, and also because they remembered the complete failure of Eschiti's messianic vision of 1874. The Kiowas, on the other hand, despite two more recent unfulfilled prophecies of Buffalo Coming Out (1881) and Pá-ingya (1887), were thoroughly committed to the Ghost Dance from the summer of 1890 to the spring of 1891. It should be recalled that the Kiowas had been prevented from giving their Sun Dance since 1887; their last attempt at the great bend of the Washita River on July 20, 1890, was disrupted by soldiers from Fort Sill. Wrote Momaday: "My grandmother was there. Without bitterness, and for as long as she lived, she bore a vision of deicide."⁵⁰

Although the return of dead relatives was a feature of the Ghost Dance, the movement itself was part of an ancient religious tradition which saw man, animals, and the land linked in a balanced relationship. When the buffalo disappeared Indians believed them to have been offended and therefore they performed the Ghost Dance mainly to restore the former balance.⁵¹ Instructed in the rite by Cheyenne and Arapaho neighbors, the Kiowa Poor Buffalo led the first

Ghost Dance among his people at the Anadarko agency in the summer of 1890. The Arapaho Sitting Bull came down in October, and inspired the Kiowas with stories of his personal contact with Wovoka the previous winter. The Kiowas held hands, dancing and chanting in a circle, praying for a vision which would put them in touch with departed loved ones.

Having recently lost a young daughter, according to Mooney, the Kiowa Apiatan, Quannah's ally on the Court of Indian Offenses, made a pilgrimage to Wovoka to learn more. Apiatan returned to his people disillusioned with the Paiute's prophesies, for Wovoka had learned of the tragic consequences of his vision at Wounded Knee and was withdrawn. This ended the high point of dancing for the Kiowas; however the shaman Bianki revived the Ghost Dance again in the mid-1890s.⁵² Although Agent Adams could see that the Kiowas were completely peaceful in their observance of the ceremony, he could not go as far as Lieutenant Hugh L. Scott, leader of the Indian Cavalry at Fort Sill, who saw the positive social and religious aspects of these large gatherings of the tribes. To Scott they had the feeling of the old-time Baptist camp meetings.⁵³ He thought that if the missionaries had been so inclined, they could have gained many converts through the help of Wovoka's peaceful vision.⁵⁴

For the Kiowas and Comanches, the 1880s was a time of adjustment to the hard realities of reservation life. Most of the people were hungry because of reduced government rations, and the failure of farming. Quanah Parker emerged out of a pool of traditional Comanche leaders to establish a strong base of political power through his relations with a series of Indian agents and cattlemen. He may have profited financially, but through his efforts, the Kiowas and Comanches received grass payments and were living communally--the way they wanted to--throughout the 1890s. The government's half-hearted program to make them into farmers and ranchers had failed, so they became something just as American: landlords. Unfortunately, the cattlemen got the best of the deal, and the Indians were still starving. Despite his ties with cattlemen, Quanah maintained a position of respect among most of the Comanches as a teacher of peyote rituals, and as presiding judge on the Court of Indian Offenses. These were considerable accomplishments under such novel conditions.

The Kiowas did not have such a leader, and suffered greatly from the loss of their Sun Dance. They became faithful followers of three messiahs during the decade, in an effort to bring back the old way of life, all of them peaceful. They shared with the Comanches in receiving grass payments, participation in the Indian police and the Court of

Indian Offenses, and the observance of peyote rites. In the face of much suffering, the two tribes found their own ways of selectively participating in or boycotting the opportunities the government offered on the reservation. Through the strength of their religious leaders, and men such as Quanah and Apiatan, who were willing to keep a foot in both the White and Indian worlds, they fought to meet the challenges of their new life.

Cheyennes and Arapahoes

Bordering the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation north of the Washita River, the Southern Cheyenne and Southern Arapahoes were also suffering from hunger due to the loss of the buffalo, poor conditions for farming, and reduced government rations. Their response to the new situation was significantly different from that of their neighbors to the south. The Arapahoes were willing to settle down on individual plots of land, become farmers, send their children to school, and generally comply with the agent's program. They were active with the Indian police and the religious revivals of the late 1880s. The Dog Soldier society of the Cheyennes, however, maintained strong control over its people, and prevented Indian agents from carrying out their programs throughout the decade, including the leasing of reservation land to Texas cattlemen.

Agent John D. Miles organized the Cheyenne-Arapaho police force in the late 1870s, and his annual reports praise the "undisputed success" of his forty man force in "the almost total suppression of horse stealing and kindred crimes" on the reservation.⁵⁵ John Charlton, a member of the Board of Indian Commissioners, had an opportunity to observe justice in action on an 1879 tour through western Indian Territory:

The Indian police here and at the Osage agency does admirably. The Cheyenne Indians tried a member of the tribe on a charge of murder, the agent acting as magistrate. After careful examination the defendent was acquitted, the agent concurring.⁵⁶

The agency farmer and chief of police, J. A. Covington, agreed with Miles that the force was underequipped and underpaid. On the other hand, he felt they were well placed throughout the reservation, "there being members of the police force in every band of either tribe who reside in the villages and are held, in a manner, responsible for the keeping of the peace in their immediate vicinity."⁵⁷

Historian William T. Hagan has called the Indian policeman "the reservation handyman." Arresting disturbers of the peace, and escorting trespassing cattle off the reservation took up only a small part of their time. Their job consisted mostly of doing or supervising the work of the agency. Roads had to be built, irrigation ditches had to be cleaned, a census taken, and messages carried.⁵⁸ Big Man,

the father of Arapaho artist Carl Sweezy, was a tribal policeman. Sweezy remembered how both a village chief and a policeman would accompany a supply train of from 5 to 40 wagons up to 165 miles from the railheads in Kansas to agency headquarters at Darlington. They shared the leadership; their different uniforms symbolized a time of great change in Indian society: the chief wearing buckskin, or citizens' dress and moccasins, and the officer dressed in blue trousers, blue blouse with gold buttons, a badge, and a blue hat. The chief went along as a representative of the Arapahoes' interests, the policeman represented the agent, or as Sweeny said, "to be in authority when they reached the town where they picked up their loads. They were off the reservation then, and someone in authority must be responsible for them."⁵⁹

In his 1881 report to the Board of Indian Commissioners, Agent Miles spoke of the progress many of his charges were making along the road to civilization. Out of 1,200 children of school age, 250 were at agency schools, 70 at Carlisle in Pennsylvania, and 12 at other schools in the states. The hauling of supplies had been a great success, since "not one article has been lost or damaged." Many Arapahoes like Powder Face, Yellow Bear, Little Raven, and Left Hand, and some Cheyennes such as White Shield and Wolf Face had begun building cattle herds, but drought over the

last two or three years had discouraged much farming.

Concerning the police, Miles said they carried out his orders well, but only the Arapahoes took them seriously.

". . . the Cheyennes still cling to the recognition of their own 'soldier element'; but time and progress will bring it around all right in a very few years at the farthest."⁶⁰

The "soldier element" Miles referred to was the Dog Soldiers, which was the most powerful of the seven traditional Cheyenne warrior societies. They were also considered one of the ten bands making up the camp circle of the tribe, which gathered only during the summer months for communal hunts or large movements against enemy tribes.⁶¹ Possibly it was this position of great prominence within the tribal society which sustained the authority of the Dog Soldiers through the first twenty years of reservation life. By 1890 "time and progress" had greatly weakened their morale, but until then this tightly knit group completely usurped the authority of the tribal police and the agent on the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation. Their overwhelming influence caused the tenure of cattlemen there to be very short indeed.

In his last annual report on the Cheyennes and Arapahoes in 1885, D. B. Dyer noted, "These are nearly all 'Blanket Indians'." He said they have no written language, no code of laws, no systematic government, and the Court of

Indian Offenses had not yet been established there.⁶² Not until the summer of 1889, after two other agents had come and gone, would judges be appointed by Agent Charles R. Ashley. White Snake, an Arapaho, and the Cheyennes Wolf Face and Pawnee Man made up the first triumvirate of judges. Considered one of the most progressive Cheyennes, Pawnee Man pleaded with Acting Agent Campbell, in October 1879, to allow his son Dick to exceed the agency's quota of students being sent east to school at Carlisle. In the ensuing years, Pawnee Man became an agency policeman, and farmed ten to fifteen acres of corn near Darlington. During the most turbulent year of the leasing controversy, 1884-1885, he came under strong attack from the Dog Soldiers for agreeing to fence and plow forty acres for the Cheyenne Boarding School. They threatened to kill all his horses if he continued the work. This seems to have had a significant effect on him, because from then on his actions reflected a confused effort to support the agent's policies, but not if it meant defying the Dog Soldiers and the interests of his people.⁶³

Throughout the 1890s, we find Pawnee Man desperately trying to find his place in the new scheme of things. In the 1889-1890 school year, Agent Ashley challenged the Dog Soldiers' policy of convincing Indian families to keep their children out of the agency schools. To receive rations, the

heads of families had to present a certificate from one of the school superintendents showing that their children were enrolled. The Dog Soldiers, according to Ashley's report, were enraged at the idea of "selling the children for rations." In response to this action, said Ashley,

"Pawnee Man," captain of the dog soldiers [sic], backed by eight or ten of his men, entered the commissary with cocked rifle and drove every person out. I was notified at once and immediately ordered his arrest, which was accomplished by the police without serious trouble.

When questioned by the agent, Pawnee Man said he meant no harm, but was following the orders of his chiefs and headmen to prevent the distribution of rations to parents who put their children in school. Ashley chastized him, and told him that it was the Indian police, not the Dog Soldiers "whose duties were, under the agent, to protect them in their rights and compel obedience and good behavior on the part of every one." The next morning Pawnee Man had placed his daughter in the Cheyenne Boarding School. "The schools were filled without further trouble," Ashley wrote.⁶⁴

On the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation, as previously indicated, the Court of Indian Offenses was allowed, with the concurrence of the agent, to decide many cases according to the Indians' idea of justice. This did not occur among the Cheyenne and Arapaho, except in cases concerning property. When issues relating to tribal customs came before the court, Agent Ashley did not leave the verdict to the judges. He

asked Pawnee Man what he thought the probable outcome would be if polygamy was at issue. The judge said, according to Ashley, "that God made the Indian to have as many wives as he wanted, and an old Indian to buy a young wife if he wanted to, and if I undertook to interfere in these matters I would get into trouble."⁶⁵ With Judge Wolf Face agreeing with his fellow Cheyenne on the court, and the Arapaho White Snake supporting the agent, it is easy to see why the Court of Indian Offenses did not survive the year 1890. The agent hoped that young graduates of Carlisle and Haskell Institute would eventually be able and willing to become qualified judges on the court. At this time the "non-progressives" were too strong.⁶⁶ Pawnee Man was willing to work hard along the "corn road," farming and performing his other duties, unless it involved violating tribal laws. His actions reveal an intense inner struggle with these issues throughout the early reservation period.

Economically, the early 1880s found the Cheyenne and Arapahoes in the same needy circumstances as the Kiowas and Comanches were to the south. Congress had cut their beef rations, and made further appropriations very uncertain. The Indians were hungry, and the cattlemen were anxious to use the lush grass on the reservation. By 1882, progressive Cheyennes like Little Robe and Cohoe were getting \$350 to \$500 a month in cash for their bands from the Dickey

Brothers, who were grazing 22,500 cattle just within the reservation's northern boundary, near the army post of Cantonment. To regulate these leases, and to provide for a more equal distribution of grass money among both tribes, Agent Miles called for a council between Cheyenne and Arapaho chiefs, and representatives from the cattlemen on December 19, 1882. With the support of the agency staff, traders, intermarried Whites, a few mixed bloods, and money provided by the cattlemen to persuade the Indians, 17 Cheyenne and 9 Arapaho chiefs signed an agreement to lease 2.4 million of their 4.3 million acres.⁶⁷

All of the parties involved awaited a response from Interior Secretary Henry M. Teller, as to the legal status of the proposed lease agreement. With Congress alone empowered to alter Indian treaties, Teller was careful not to give the ranchers the impression that they were getting leases that were legally binding. They were being allowed temporary permits to graze, and were to be protected against other cattlemen who did not have such permits. Cheyennes and Arapahoes were to be hired as herders, and as long as they did not molest the herds the Indians were to be allowed to graze their ponies anywhere they pleased.⁶⁸

John H. Seger, who served on the reservation as a teacher, builder, and farmer for over 50 years, used Indians to build over 300 miles of fence for the cattlemen at this

time. According to him, the way the new leaseholders behaved angered even the progressive chiefs. "Most of the men who held cattle in the Cheyenne and Arapaho country," said Seger, "were Texas men who were prejudiced against the Indians." They continued to use the White cowboys they were familiar with, and refused to hire Indians eager to make money herding and mending fences. They also became alarmed when they found Cheyennes and Arapahoes grazing their pony herds on the leases, fearing they might steel cattle or burn the grass. Thus, the situation worsened among the Indians who had supported leasing and who now found themselves forced off their land, spending time around the agency with nothing to do.⁶⁹

During the summer of 1883, resistance against leasing began to develop among about 700 Cheyennes, who were living in bands near Cantonment. Cantonment was about 50 miles northwest of Darlington, on the North Fork of the Canadian River, just south of the Cherokee Outlet. These Cheyennes, led by Chiefs Little Robe, Stone Calf, and White Shield refused to accept their share of the first semiannual distribution of grass money. The chiefs said that they had not signed the leasing agreements from the previous winter, and that they were being forced off their land. To add fuel to the flames, on October 15 Agent Miles issued a grazing license to cattleman George E. Reynolds for 714,249 acres

of land around Cantonment, on the land of the dissenting Cheyenne bands. Faced with a critical report of his agency by Indian Inspector Robert S. Gardner, and growing dissent among the Cheyennes, Miles resigned on March 31, 1884, after a tenure of twelve years. He was the last active agent in western Indian Territory to have been appointed under Grant's Peace Policy. He did his best to provide the Indians with the skills and experience to help them assimilate into American life. Miles had pledged earlier that if his leasing program was rejected he would resign. The Dog Soldiers proved to be more than a match for him.⁷⁰

Miles was replaced the next day by D. B. Dyer, who, according to Donald J. Berthrong, "was a brusque and stubborn man who expected his smallest wish to be granted immediately by his charges; the Cheyennes would make no such capitulation to any man."⁷¹ As starvation increased, especially among those who refused grass money, the Dog Soldiers became more active. Indian children were taken out of school, tribal ceremonies were conducted more openly, and large numbers of cattle were being killed for food. In his first annual report, Agent Dyer painted a grim picture:

It is the practice of the "dog soldiers" to compel the attendance of all Indians on their medicine making, and on refusal of one to attend his teepee is cut up, chickens, hogs, and cattle killed, growing crops destroyed; they rule with an iron hand, and their will right or wrong, is absolute law.⁷²

Not all of the Cheyennes living near Cantonment were against leasing. Some had been dealing with cattlemen in the Cherokee Outlet for years. They had developed their own network of trade, independent of the government agent. Non-Indian men married to Indian women--squaw men, like Amos Chapman and Wesley Warren--had served as intermediaries between the cattlemen and the Indians. The Indians were making more money this way, and were becoming independent entrepreneurs. Of course, the reservation was owned by both tribes, and therefore the agent was compelled to act in the interests of all the Indians. But no one like Quannah Parker emerged from the pro-leasing faction, who was able to gain enough support among the Cheyennes and Arapahoes to push the leasing program through.

The independent spirit of the Dog Soldiers was demonstrated on May 4, 1884, when the Dog Soldier Running Buffalo refused to allow Texan E. M. Horton to drive a herd of 400 horses across his land to ford the North Canadian River. After Running Buffalo shot into Horton's herd in an effort to stampede them, Horton or one of his men shot and killed the Dog Soldier. The Texan and his men quickly fled to Cantonment, where the Menonite missionary, Reverend S. S. Haury gave them refuge in the stone bakery, and put their horses in the corral. The next day, upon the arrival of Indian policemen and a troop of cavalry from Fort Reno,

Left Hand Bull convinced the Dog Soldiers who had gathered to accept an offer to release the prisoners in exchange for half of Horton's horses. This was done, but Horton's horses were eventually returned to him. These kinds of confrontations, occurring far from the agency, made Dyer feel helpless:

"The Indians know that those in charge here are powerless as things now are, hence they defy all authority whenever they see fit." He demanded that the Dog Soldiers be disarmed, and 500 soldiers be sent to reinforce the cavalry at Fort Reno.⁷³

Over the next year the Dog Soldiers did as they pleased, making life very hard for the agent. The Indian police had to spend much of their time protecting cattle drovers from them as they roamed the reservation killing cattle to relieve their hunger.⁷⁴ The policemen, who tried so hard to satisfy the agent, suffered tremendous harrassment at the hands of their angry fellow tribesmen. While Pawnee Man was carrying out Agent Dyer's orders to cut posts to fence forty acres of land for the Cheyenne Boarding School, the Dog Soldiers threatened to kill all his horses. After graduating from Carlisle, the Cheyenne White Buffalo found work in the agency tin shop. Because of his education and position, he was verbally attacked by the Dog Soldier Mad Wolf. The pressure caused him to quit his job and return to the camps of his people.⁷⁵ The Arapahoes also suffered from these attacks.

Left Hand Bull killed six of Chief Little Raven's ponies, and destroyed the fencing around Horse Back's land.⁷⁶

Early in July 1885, Indian Inspector Frank C. Armstrong was sent to the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation to investigate the turmoil over leasing. After holding interviews, Armstrong recommended that the Indian soldier societies take over the jobs of Indian policemen and scouts at Fort Reno, and that they should be trained by army personnel. He heard complaints from Cheyennes who had signed the leasing agreement back in 1882, and from those who had not, and felt that the cattlemen's licenses should be revoked. Armstrong also thought that there were too many Whites on the reservation, and that they should have to leave.⁷⁷

On July 15, 1885 Generals Philip H. Sheridan and Nelson A. Miles arrived in Darlington to do their own investigation. Stone Calf spoke for the dissident Cheyennes. He decried the killing of Running Buffalo by Horton at Cantonment, and said that the cattlemen, and the traders and squaw men who served their interests, should be removed from the reservation. Other Cheyenne chiefs said that Whites had either stolen some of their cattle, or they had somehow been absorbed into their herds. Even Whirlwind, a Cheyenne chief who had signed the agreement, said he had done so under pressure from the trader George Bent, and that his people were being unjustly accused of crimes. Powder Face, an

Arapaho chief for sixteen years, also complained that the cattlemen were driving his people out of camps they had lived in since they came on the reservation a decade ago.

The generals also took testimony from cattlemen like Ed Fenlon, who denied all of the Indians' accusations, and put the blame for the turmoil back onto the Dog Soldiers. Nevertheless, the reports of these investigators, along with an opinion by Attorney General Augustus H. Garland, that the cattlemen had no legal standing on the reservation, caused President Grover Cleveland, on July 23, to order the removal of the cattle from the reservation within forty days. General Sheridan removed Agent Dyer, and replaced him with Captain Jesse M. Lee of the Ninth Infantry. The military agent enforced the removal of the cattle, which was completed by November 6, 1885. Leasing on this reservation had come to an end.⁷⁸

Most of the Arapahoes had been willing to tender grazing privileges to the cattlemen, and to follow the agent's lead in most matters concerning their eventual progress on the road to assimilation. The prominence the Dog Soldiers maintained on the reservation, however, gave the Cheyennes the strength to hold on to their old ways longer, and gain enough support from important government leaders to drive the cattlemen off the reservation. They exerted more power, by far, than the Indian policemen, and

consequently defeated all efforts by the agents to control them. It was a victory for self-determination, but it left the Cheyennes and Arapahoes short of funds needed to feed their families. Also, as Berthrong has pointed out, with the cattlemen on their side the Indians may have been able to delay the allotment of their lands under the Dawes Act of 1887.⁷⁹

Religious revivals occurred on the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation too during this period. The Ghost Dance took a firm hold among the Arapahoes. As Mooney and Wissler have noted, the agency and boarding schools gave the Indian children the skills to write letters to each other in English. Southern Arapahoes and Cheyennes were informed of the teachings of Wovoka through letters sent from friends they had made at eastern boarding schools.⁸⁰ The fact that an Arapaho man like Black Coyote was an officer of the agency force, and was specifically charged with discouraging traditional religious practices, did not prevent him from being a leader of the Ghost Dance. Early in 1890, Black Coyote, along with Washee, also a policeman, and the Cheyenne Tall Bull made a pilgrimage north to see Wovoka. Washee returned early, falsely believing that the reputed second Christ was a half-blood. Black Coyote returned in April 1890, fully committed to teaching the songs and dances he had learned to his brethren in the south. Tall Bull

remained with Black Coyote in Nevada, but was not impressed with Wovoka's vision. The Cheyennes were not committed to the Ghost Dance to the extent that the Arapaho were. They tended to join the Arapaho dances as individuals.⁸¹

During the summer of 1890, according to Mooney, the Ghost Dances were going all night, two or three times a week. After the Arapaho Sitting Bull, an early disciple of Wovoka, came down from Nevada in September, and made his camp east of Cantonment, the dancing became even more intense. But government officials did not seem to mind the increased activity. A Member of the Board of Indian Commissioners, John Charlton, observed:

They have had the "Messiah" craze in a mild form since last summer when they held their "ghost" dance and indulged in the ecstasies of that, to them, solemn service; but in no case that has come to my knowledge has there been any demonstration that could be tortured in the belief that they wished to disturb the amicable relations existing between themselves and their white neighbors.

It was so peaceful that the wife of former Agent Dyer was not afraid to travel across the reservation with a guide during this time, and to spend the night, according to her, "in a wild and dreaded Cheyenne camp, entirely at the mercy of the savages, comparatively unprotected."⁸²

Agent Ashley was not as adamant about stopping the Ghost Dance, however he wanted the ceremonies held no closer than five miles from the agency schools. After Black Coyote and Tall Bull had returned from visiting

Wovoka, he refused to allow others to make the trip. Things quieted down considerably after the Cheyennes and Arapahoes received a letter from the Shoshoni Agency, stating "that Christ had written to the Great Father at Washington notifying him to remove the whites within two years or they would all be destroyed." After this, said Ashley, "the Indians decided to remain quiet the two years on the reservation."⁸³

Two contemporary descriptions of Black Coyote reflect the transitional nature of that time:

Black Coyote in full uniform, with official badge, a Harrison medal, and an immense police overcoat, which he procured in Washington, and riding with his three wives in his own double-seated coach, is a spectacle magnificent and impressive. Black Coyote in breechcloth, paint, and feathers, leading the Ghost Dance, or sitting flat on the ground and beating the earth with his hand in excess of religious fervor, is equally impressive.⁸⁴

Although dressed in his dark blue uniform, glittering with buttons of polished brass and a great expanse of immaculate shirt-front, he wore adornments enough of savage insignias to make him picturesque, . . .

To Mrs. Dyer, even Black Coyote's "dingy moccasins wherein he clothed his feet savored of the wild and romantic."⁸⁵

It is obvious that men like Quanah, Pawnee Man, and Black Coyote were enigmas to White observers because of their success at adopting certain trappings of the White culture, without losing touch with who they were as Cheyennes, Comanches, etc. While Whites were bemoaning the disappearance of the Red man, the Indians were making the

changes necessary to survive as Indians. Fortunately, the Ghost Dance remained peaceful among the tribes of western Indian Territory. Even though they were held during the crucial farming months, men like Ashley, Scott, and Mooney were able to see what was beneficial in the dancing, and what the consequences would be in breaking them up. In October 1892 Sitting Bull, his wife, and Washee led another group to see Wovoka. This time even Sitting Bull became discouraged when the prophet told them he was tired of visitors, and that they should stop dancing.⁸⁶

As the Ghost Dance lost adherents, the use of peyote among the Arapahoes increased. La Barre cites the case of the Arapaho Jock Bullbear, who upon his return from Carlisle in 1884 may have obtained peyote from the Comanches. Other accounts say that in 1888 Medicine Bird, who may have been Chief Left Hand, learned about peyote from the Kiowas, Apaches, or Caddoes. The Southern Cheyennes did not begin to use peyote until 1901, when they learned the peyote rite of Quanah Parker through the Kiowas. Each tribe developed their own variations according to earlier tribal practices or the personalities of their leaders. An innovation of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes was to give presents to friends and visitors in the morning, at the ceremony's end.⁸⁹

Agent A. E. Woodson did not have the religious tolerance of his predecessor. Throughout most of the 1890s,

the agent did his best to prohibit all traditional Indian religion. He worked especially hard on a bill submitted to the Oklahoma territorial legislature outlawing the use of peyote and the practices of Indian religious leaders. With the help of Senator Geroge W. Ballamy, of the Oklahoma Territorial Council, Woodson's "mescal and medicine man" bill was passed and signed by Governor C. M. Barnes, despite the protests of many Indians. Nevertheless, peyote ceremonials continued to unite the Cheyennes and Arapahoes in their own world, separate from the Whites. According to Trenholm it helped them control their drinking, escape the oppressive life of the reservation in a protective group atmosphere.⁸⁸

With such similar environments and opportunities, the two reservations of western Indian Territory made very different responses to reservation life in the 1880s. The Kiowas and Comanches, while not united, did make concessions to the cattlemen and Indian agents that they thought would benefit their tribes. It appears, however, that the Arapahoes and Cheyennes, although peaceful towards each other, could not have been more different in their attitudes concerning their agents and the cattlemen who wanted to use their land.

The Arapahoes wanted to farm and to cooperate with the agents' programs. Dog Soldiers like Stone Calf and Left

Hand Bull felt that they should be able to make their own arrangements with the cattlemen, without the agents' interference. Their distaste for the agents' attitudes kept both tribes from making the adjustments in their economic lives which they would eventually have to face. While the Arapahoes were willing to farm and send their children to school, they were the most active in the Ghost Dance and peyote rituals, which united them in their continued identification as Indians.

Santee and Yanktonais Sioux

From the southern plains, we again shift our focus 900 miles north to the northeastern part of Dakota Territory. Of the three reservations examined, the one at Devils Lake seemed to have been following the government's model for the Indians' progress most closely during the 1880s. Both the Indian police and the Court of Indian Offenses were established and functioning soon after the commissioner of Indian affairs announced their formation. With the speculative boom in wheat farming, and the proliferation of markets in the first half of the decade, the ideal of the yeoman farmer appeared to be growing naturally out of American soil. Even the pan-Indian religious revival which swept over so many tribes on the plains, did not penetrate the air of Catholic devotion which had influenced the reservation since its inception. But, with the downward

turn in the economy in the last half of the decade, drought, and the departure of Agent John W. Cramsie, the ideal economy of Devils Lake collapsed.

Agent James McLaughlin established a five-man Indian police force in 1878. Four years later, under a new agent, its ranks had grown to fifteen members. Considering the low salary of \$15 a month, said Agent John W. Cramsie, they

are all that could be expected of them, and perform their duties cheerfully and promptly and watch with a jealous eye any signs of infringement by whites on the reservation. Since receiving their revolvers quite a noticeable difference is perceptible in their bearing and manner.⁸⁹

The police watched for cattle owned by Whites drifting onto the reservation, and guarded the agency's wood reserve from poachers. They stayed sober, and kept the peace among their fellow tribesmen.⁹⁰

In 1883 Cramsie appointed three men to the Court of Indian Offenses. The reservation was divided into three school districts, and the judge who lived in the district was responsible for making sure the children attended school. At first there was no pay allowed for the judges, and the agent wondered whether men of quality could be found under such conditions. But soon, Cramsie began to marvel at the judges' ability to get at the facts in a dispute between Indians, "whereas a white man could be fooled, as they express it." He also appreciated being free of "much

disagreeable work and odium in connection with the duty of imposing fines or imprisonment upon offenders." During 1884, out of forty-two cases, thirty-four resulted in sentences.⁹¹ The next year, the agent began to notice that the judges were not as committed to their positions as they had been at first. He wanted to remedy this by paying them a per diem for their services out of the \$186 in fines collected.⁹² By 1887, after the novelty of being a judge had worn off, and funds to pay them were still scarce, Cramsie moaned, "now it is about impossible to get a good intelligent man to accept the position."⁹³

Four years later, the Court of Indian Offenses was still meeting every other Saturday in the agency council chamber. All the police attended the hearings, and reported on the violations in their districts. The head farmer served as clerk. Three judges who served in this period were Waanatau, a Cut Head chief; Tiowaste, a Wahpeton chief; and Ecauajinka, a chief of the Sissetons. The policeman in whose district the offense occurred announced the case, and asked for witnesses. The accused defended him or herself, the judges deliberated, and then imposed the penalty of "a small sum of money, a few cords of wood, tons of hay, or a pony."⁹⁴

Polygamy was no longer a problem (except among older Indians), according to the next agent, John W. Waugh.

He said they were mostly "monogomists," but still many cases of desertion, rape, bastardy, and adultery came before the court. Other offenses were gambling, drunkenness, assault and battery, and medicine making.⁹⁵

Just as a boom in the cattle industry had opened up opportunities for some Indians of western Indian Territory to become more independent, so the boom in wheat farming in the Dakotas gave the Devils Lake Sioux similar opportunities. The arrival of speculative capital with the railroads, and sufficient rainfall made the years 1879-1886 profitable for many Dakotans, both Indian and White.⁹⁶ In the mid-1870s, Oliver Dalrymple, a Yale-educated lawyer, demonstrated the great potential of settling and raising wheat along the Northern Pacific railroad line. Due to his successes, improved flour milling in Minneapolis, and the railroad building energies of James J. Hill, the Dakotas east of the Missouri River were settled by 1885. The population of North Dakota had risen 400 percent, from 37,000 in 1880 to 152,000 in 1885.⁹⁷ These developments were a mixed blessing to the Santee and Yanktonais Sioux of the Devils Lake Reservation. During 1883, a branch of Hill's St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Manitoba railroad came west from Grand Forks to the north shore of Devils Lake. A community of White settlers was established there, quickly growing to 1,000 inhabitants by December 1884.⁹⁸

John W. Cramsie was appointed agent in 1881, after James McLaughlin was transferred to Standing Rock Agency. In 1867, Cramsie was an employee of the Quartermaster Department at nearby Fort Totten, and because he spoke the Sioux language, Lakota, he was assigned to take a census of the Indians and to distribute their rations. He also served as an interpreter under the first agent, Major Forbes. Roy W. Meyer has written that "he was thoroughly familiar with the situation at Devils Lake and apparently in sympathy with the policies followed by Forbes and McLaughlin."⁹⁹

During the 1880s in North Dakota, this meant continuing the effort toward total self-support through agriculture. Although Cramsie was well aware of the expansion of the huge bonanza wheat farms on all sides of the reservation, he still saw the solution to "the Indian problem" to be represented by a verse he quoted in his annual report: "We'll have a little farm, a horse, a pig and cow; and she will mind the dairy and I will guide the plow."¹⁰⁰ Even though this romantic image of the yeoman farmer did not reflect the realities of the farming business in America,¹⁰¹ Cramsie worked long and hard to make it come true for his charges. He encouraged them to increase their acreage under cultivation yearly, and helped them procure the most modern farm machinery.¹⁰²

The agents praised their most successful Sioux farmers in their annual reports "to show what an Indian has done and what many others are doing, . . ." In 1880 Mclaughlin cited the fifty year old Shipto (Sipto) who, with his family's help, "has now 50 acres inclosed with a good 8-rail fence, well staked and ridered, and uniformly built; . . ."¹⁰³

Four years later, Sipto had purchased his own self-raker, and was considered the best farmer on the reservation.¹⁰⁴ Agent Cramsie noted a group of ten enterprising farmers who "have selected places out on the prairie, and have broken from 10 to 20 acres each to sow to wheat next season." Led by "Oyesna," they expressed a desire collectively to purchase a self-binder. Cramsie told them it would cost \$300, and that he would put up the difference for them until they sold their grain. With \$88.50 put up by the ten farmers, and \$192 from his own money, they were able to purchase a "McCormick self-binder" for \$280.¹⁰⁵

In 1882, 1884, and 1889, for example, the number of acres under cultivation at Devils Lake was 1,500, 2,480, and 5,500 respectively, with about half to wheat.¹⁰⁶ Since all ration issues were stopped in 1884, except to the old and infirm, and the annual appropriation from Congress was so small, the Sioux had to develop a cash economy. They supplied the agency and its schools with wheat by selling it to the trader, who ground it at the agency grist mill for

\$2.50 per hundred lbs., and then sold it to the agency. Besides the agency buying much of the surplus crops, the trader proved to be a very good market for the fruits of their other labor too. In 1885, one of the best years, the trader paid the Indians \$6,000 for various "sundries," including:

Down wood, 1,500 cords at \$3 per cord, \$4,500; wheat, 700 bushels at 55 cents per bushel, \$380; bran, 10,000 pounds, at 50 cents per cwt, \$50; buffalo bones, 190 tons, \$800; hay, 60 tons, at \$4 per ton, \$240; potatoes, 150 bushels, at 30 cents per bushel, \$45.

Also, reflecting the tail end of the speculative boom going on throughout Dakota Territory, the towns like Devils Lake and surrounding communities purchased \$8,000 worth of similar items. And finally, the Devils Lake Sioux were proud to sell some of their surplus wheat to their old enemies, the Chippewas of Turtle Mountain, who lived just north of them.¹⁰⁷

Like Oliver Dalrymple, who had become famous by adapting the great organizational skills of large industry to the bonanza farm, John W. Cramsie, on a somewhat smaller scale, tried very hard to increase the organization, mechanization, and efficiency of wheat farming on the reservation. He encouraged neighbors to combine their resources to buy the necessary self-binders, mowing-machines, horse-rakes, fanning mills, and seeders. He preferred to use "American horse teams" over work oxen because of their speed, which could make a great difference during the

harvest. In 1887 he complained to the commissioner that if progress was to be maintained toward the government's goal of civilizing the Indian, he must receive more funds to buy the machinery necessary to keep pace with their increased wheat production.¹⁰⁸ Cramsie felt that if he had a skilled White farmer as an instructor for every twenty-five Indians, he could compete with "the other extensive and bonanza wheat and stock farms of Dakota." Without this needed assistance, "the advancement of the Indians" cannot "be otherwise than slow and up-hill work."¹⁰⁹

Despite Cramsie's dissatisfaction, the Devils Lake Sioux had accomplished a great deal during the 1880s. They had settled on individual parcels of land, organized clubs to purchase the necessary farm machinery to work their farms, found markets for everything from down timber to buffalo bones, and hauled freight until the nearness of the railroad eliminated that as a source of income. They had come a long way towards supporting themselves by their own efforts in a market economy. But in 1889 Cramsie reported that the early frosts of the last year had caused the Indians' crop yields to be low, and the current drought was expected to have similar results. He appealed for government aid for clothing, food, and seed for next year. In the conclusion of what he thought would be his last report (there would be one more), he stated bluntly: "The magnitude of the

undertaking is not understood nor appreciated by Congress, or money sufficient would be appropriated to accomplish the object in view."¹¹⁰

The Whites in North Dakota did not do too well either after the boom was over, and many left the area.¹¹¹ The Devils Lake Sioux could not leave. Except for 1891, drought foiled their efforts at farming the next few years, and they did not make an effort to develop cattle herds with the stock issued to them by the government. Their crops had been depended on for cash to pay the trader, and now they had little credit left. According to their agent in 1892, "Fifty per cent of them will not have a dollar to live on this winter."¹¹²

The future for most Devils Lake Indians looked bleak. Meyer has written: "From a condition at least approaching self-sufficiency, the Devils Lake Indians slipped back in a few years to almost total dependence on government assistance."¹¹³ In addition to the failure of the economy and their farming efforts, Agent Cramsie departed in 1890. For twenty-three years he had served these Indians, the last nine as agent, carrying on in the paternalistic, reforming spirit of his predecessors, Forbes and McLaughlin. While most of the Indians worked only 5-10 acres, a few succeeded on farms of 50-60 acres. It is a reflection of the perseverance and continuity of these agents' efforts to lead

their charges to becoming independent farmers, that so much was accomplished during the 1880s. But the majority of Indians were just getting by. No doubt the departure of Cramsie during hard times gave a dormant resistance to the policies of the last twenty years a chance to emerge.

In religious matters, the practice of Catholicism was dominant throughout the 1880s. The Devils Lake Indians did not use peyote or participate in the Ghost Dance, although the latter caused quite a scare for the surrounding White communities in 1890. In the late 1870s, McLaughlin made a concerted effort to eliminate all Indian ceremonies from the reservation, and to indoctrinate the children into Catholicism through the reservation boarding school run by the Grey Nuns of Montreal. Later, Agent Cramsie happily reported on the progress of "Reverend Jerome Hunt, O.S.B., a zealous worker and eloquent preacher in the Sioux language, is fast dispelling the prejudices and superstitions of the Indians, and instructing them in the knowledge of the Christian religion." With Hunt's guidance, a society of St. Joseph was formed, under whose banner Indians came to church once a month to receive holy communion. Said Cramsie, "On these monthly meetings it is truly an encouraging sight to see men, young and old, who have promised to discard and abandon all Indians habits and customs, . . ."114

Whether the agent really believed the Indians of Devils Lake could "discard and abandon" who they were with such ease, the annual reports are filled with such wishful thinking. It is true that compared to the Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and the Teton Sioux, his Indians were much more tractable, but we see in various reports from years later that they had not lost their "Indian habits and customs." When James McLaughlin returned to Devils Lake as an Indian inspector in 1895, he was very disappointed at how the agent had allowed conditions to deteriorate. According to McLaughlin's biographer, Reverend Louis Pfaller, he found that the non-progressive element had even taken control of the Indian police and judges, and "were permitting polygamy and wild dances to grow."¹¹⁵ This was a sure sign that an agent had lost the control McLaughlin felt was necessary to civilize the Indian. Without control, even the subdued Devils Lake people openly defied the Great White Father. Into the early 1920s, the older people were holding traditional dances regularly throughout the reservation, and the tribal police and the Court of Indian Offenses were still functioning.¹¹⁶ Thus, we see that traditional Indian culture had not died at Devils Lake.

But this had not happened by 1889-1891 when the Ghost Dance was spreading throughout the Great Plains. Just

southwest of Devils Lake, along the west bank of the Missouri River, the Sioux who had fought Custer were promulgating the most anti-White of all the Ghost Dances. The Miniconjou Sioux band chief, Kicking Bear, was among the group of Teton Sioux, Northern Cheyenne, and Shoshonis who visited Wovoka in Nevada early in 1890. Also in this delegation was Sitting Bull, the Arapaho who, as we have seen, brought his fervent, but peaceful interpretation of Wovoka's vision to his relatives in western Indian Territory.¹¹⁷ When Kicking Bear returned to his home on the Cheyenne River Reservation, he became one of the most devout proponents of the Teton Sioux version of the Ghost Dance. This would not only bring back the buffalo and dead relatives, but would also "wipe the white race from the earth;" a catalysm which was supposed to occur some time in the spring of 1891.¹¹⁸

On the adjoining Standing Rock Reservation to the north, lived the notorious Hunkpapa Sioux chief and religious leader, Sitting Bull and his nemesis, Agent James McLaughlin. Being the leading nonprogressive among the entire Sioux tribe, the old warrior was a persistant thorn in McLaughlin's hard-line civilization program. In June 1890, McLaughlin told the commissioner of Indian affairs that he sensed no danger of an uprising at Standing Rock, but he would like nonprogressive leaders like Sitting Bull, Circling Bear, Black Bird, and Circling Hawk removed from the reservation.

Since Sitting Bull had not broken any law, this could not be done.¹¹⁹

During the summer Sitting Bull made a number of requests for permission to visit Kicking Bear to learn about the messiah. The preachings of Kicking Bear and his brother-in-law Short Bull were known to the agent, so he refused to allow Sitting Bull to go. The chief then sent some of his own followers to invite Kicking Bear to come to his camp on the Grand River. Kicking Bear agreed, and brought Wovoka's prophecies and dances to Sitting Bull and his followers on October 9, 1890. As the dancing began to intensify on Grand River, McLaughlin wrote a long letter on October 17 to Commissioner Morgan explaining the visit of Kicking Bear, the violent atmosphere of the Ghost Dance, his feelings about Sitting Bull, and the necessity of arresting him.¹²⁰

Morgan leaked the letter to the press, and almost immediately fear spread through the White communities of North Dakota. The people of Mandan and Bismark, north of Standing Rock, thought an attack was imminent. Because the Devils Lake Indians were so peaceful, almost all of Company C, 22nd Infantry, at nearby Fort Totten rode to reinforce Fort Yates, the closest post to Sitting Bull's camp. Once the troops had left Fort Totten, the citizens of the town of Devils Lake petitioned Governor Miller for enough guns to

raise a militia. D. S. Dodds said that the Devils Lake Indians had wanted to have a Ghost Dance the previous week, but Agent Waugh stopped them. He feared that only 11 Indian policemen, and 5 White agency employees with 15 guns and ammunition between them, were no match for 400 mad Indians.¹²¹

A year later Waugh reviewed the situation:

During the late outbreak, when many Indians worked themselves up to such a pitch as to become frenzied from continued ghost dancing, the Indians of this reservation remained cool, quiet, and tranquil, although the timidity of some of the settlers near by gave rise to the sending out of sensational and dynamite reports as to their temper and disposition. Not a single Indian from this reservation joined the hostilities.

He also congratulated himself on the absence of dancing in general, "and the growing disposition to look upon it with disfavor by the Indians themselves."¹²²

With the buffalo long gone, the Santee and Yantonais Sioux camped near Devils Lake in the late 1860s were hungry, and anxious for a stable relationship with the United States government. The three agents who served them for the first two decades of reservation life were honest men, who strove with the commitment of belief to hold their Indians to a program of eventual assimilation into the American mainstream. With Indians who saw little use in exerting their independence, and agents who held them firmly in check, few innovations outside the agents' modus operandi took place. Some men, like Sipto and Oyesna, successfully

farmed over fifty acres and bought farm machinery with the profits. During the 1880s they found markets for their surplus crops with the agency trader, the Turtle Mountain Chippewas, and nearby White communities. Drought and the failure of many bonanza farms and railroads throughout North Dakota at the end of the decade, brought the good times enjoyed by few Indians to an abrupt end. The Indian police and the Court of Indian Offenses were active throughout the 1880s, and continued to give the Devils Lake Sioux control of their own lives into the next century. Although open performance of traditional religious rituals were prohibited under Cramsie, it emerged again after his departure. The Ghost Dance and peyote rites, so popular further out on the plains, never developed at Devils Lake. Despite the relative success of his efforts, Cramsie left blaming Congress' lack of support for the depressed condition his Indians had again reached.

These three case studies reflect the unique personalities of the five Indian tribes involved. Despite relatively recent military defeats at the hands of the U.S. Army and a policy of forced assimilation on their own land, each tribe responded courageously and purposefully to the political, economic, and religious options available to them on the reservation. They retained what they could of their

traditional cultures, and brought vestiges of the old to what was new.

The religious leaders held the allegiance of the people as keepers of their spiritual traditions, the one area of their lives which remained inaccessible to most White men. While the roles of the peace and war chiefs disappeared with the buffalo, the reservation milieu offered men like Quannah, Pawnee Man, Sitting Bull, Apiatan, Black Coyote, Sipto, and Oyesna chances to assume leadership roles which may not have been available to them before. These men were under pressure from the agent to lead their people away from Indian values towards the individualism of the American way. But, although they were making every effort to adapt to the new life, these men seldom abandoned their loyalty to their peoples and their traditions. The Cheyenne Dog Soldiers were still strong enough to flaunt the authority of Agent Dyer and to eliminate the leasing of grass to cattlemen on the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation.

With these experiences and accomplishments to their credit, these tribes then had to face another assault on their lands as the General Allotment Act was implemented in the early 1890s. The next chapter will explore how these tribes responded to this new challenge, and clarify if it in fact helped or hindered the assimilation process.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II

¹Oakah L. Jones, "The Origins of The Navajo Indian Police, 1872-73," *Arizona and the West* 8 (Autumn 1966): pp. 225-258.

²William T. Hagan, *Indian Police and Judges: Experiments in Acculturation and Control* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966) pp. 41-43, and Chapter 2 in general.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 11-18; Earnest Wallace and E. Adamson Hoebel, *The Comanches: Lords of the Southern Plains* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952) Chapter 9.

⁴*Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1880*, ix-x, hereafter cited as AR of CIA, 1880, E. M. Marble, ix-x.

⁵William T. Hagan, *United States-Comanche Relations: The Reservation Years* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 149, 139; AR of CIA, 1879, P. B. Hunt, 64, 68.

⁶AR of CIA, 1885, J. D. C. Atkins, xxi-xxii.

⁷Wallace and Hoebel, *Comanches*, pp. 224-225.

⁸AR of CIA, 1890, T. J. Morgan, lxxxiii.

⁹Hagan, *Indian Police*, pp. 111-113.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 127-129.

¹¹AR of CIA, 1888, E. E. White, 98.

¹²Hagan, *Indian Police*, p. 130.

¹³Wallace and Hoebel, *Comanches*, pp. 341-342.

¹⁴Hagan, *Indian Police*, p. 135.

¹⁵Hagan, *Indian Police*, pp. 138, 135-140; See also Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, pp. 186-188; Albert S. Gilles, Sr., *Comanche Days* (Dallas: SMU Press, 1974) p. 40, see Chapter 4, pp. 38-49, for contemporary view of polygamy among Comanches (around 1900).

- ¹⁶Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, pp. 144-146.
- ¹⁷AR of CIA, 1881, Hunt, 75.
- ¹⁸AR of CIA, 1880, Hunt, 74.
- ¹⁹Walter Prescott Webb, *The Great Plains* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1931) pp. 232-236; William T. Hagan, "Kiowas, Comanches, and Cattlemen, 1867-1906." *Pacific Historical Review* (August 1971): p. 336.
- ²⁰AR of CIA, 1880, Hunt, 75.
- ²¹Martha Buntin, "Beginning of the Leasing of the Surplus Grazing Lands on the Kiowa and Comanche Reservation," *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 10 (September 1932): p. 369.
- ²²Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, p. 140.
- ²³Buntin, "Beginning of Leasing," pp. 371-372; W. S. Nye, *Carbine and Lance: The Story of Old Fort Sill* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1937), p. 329.
- ²⁴Hagan, "Kiowas, Comanches," pp. 339-340.
- ²⁵Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, p. 151.
- ²⁶William T. Hagan, "Quanah Parker," in *American Indian Leaders: Studies in Diversity*, ed. R. David Edmunds (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1980), pp. 179-180; also AR of CIA, 1880, Hunt, 73.
- ²⁷Hagan, "Quanah Parker," p. 179.
- ²⁸H. Glenn Jordan and Peter McDonald, Jr., "Quanah Parker: Patriot or Opportunist," in *Indian Leaders: Oklahoma's First Statesmen*, ed. H. Glenn Jordan and Thomas M. Holm (Oklahoma City: Oklahoma Historical Society, 1979), p. 164.
- ²⁹Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, p. 152-153.
- ³⁰Jordan and McDonald, Jr., "Quanah Parker," pp. 168-169; and Hagan, "Kiowas, Comanches," p. 343.
- ³¹Hagan, "Kiowas, Comanches," p. 344; and Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, pp. 168-169.
- ³²Hagan, "Kiowas, Comanches," pp. 346-347.

- ³³Hagan, "Quanah Parker," p. 183.
- ³⁴Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, pp. 157, 144.
- ³⁵Clark Wissler, *Indian Cavalcade, or Life on the Old-Time Indian Reservations* (New York: Sheridan House, 1938), pp. 294-295; see also Avlin M. Josephy, Jr., *Now That the Buffalo's Gone: A Study of Today's American Indians* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), pp. 77-78.
- ³⁶Henry M. Teller, "Court of Indian Offenses," in *Americanizing the American Indian: Writing by the "Friends of the Indian," 1880-1900*, ed. Francis Paul Prucha (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 298; and Thomas J. Morgan, "Rules for Indian Courts," in *Ibid.*, p. 302.
- ³⁷AR of CIA, 1890, C. E. Adams, 186.
- ³⁸Conversation with Joseph Epes Brown, Stevensville, Montana, October 1982.
- ³⁹N. Scott Momaday, *The Way to Rainy Mountain* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), p. 11.
- ⁴⁰Wallace and Hoebel, *Comanches*, p. 175.
- ⁴¹Weston La Barre, *The Peyote Cult* 4th enlarged edition (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1975), p. 113.
- ⁴²Alice Marriott, *Ten Grandmothers* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1945), p. 196.
- ⁴³La Barre, *Peyote Cult*, pp. 112.
- ⁴⁴Wallace and Hoebel, *Comanches*, pp. 332-333.
- ⁴⁵La Barre, *Peyote Cult*, pp. 112, 43, 45.
- ⁴⁶Marriott, *Ten Grandmothers*, p. 171.
- ⁴⁷AR of CIA, 1888, White, pp. 98-99.
- ⁴⁸Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, p. 193.
- ⁴⁹Wallace and Hoebel, *Comanches*, pp. 336-337.
- ⁵⁰Momaday, *Rainy Mountain*, p. 11.

⁵¹ Raymond J. DeMallie, "The Lakota Ghost Dance: An Ethnohistorical Account," *Pacific Historical Review*, November 1982, p. 391.

⁵² My discussion of the Ghost Dance among the Kiowa is derived from James Mooney, *The Ghost Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890*, abridged, with an Introduction by Anthony F. C. Wallace, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 163-175; Wallace and Hoebel, *Comanches*, pp. 343-345; and Merriott, *Ten Grandmothers*, pp. 196-205.

⁵³ Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, pp. 190-191.

⁵⁴ Hugh Lenox Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier* (New York: The Century Co., 1928), pp. 148-152; for a discussion of the links between Wovoka's message and Christianity see Robert M. Utley, *The Last Days of the Sioux Nation* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 65-55; also DeMallie, "Lakota Ghost Dance," p. 387.

⁵⁵ AR of CIA, 1880, J. D. Miles, p. 69.

⁵⁶ Board of Indian Commissioners, *Eleventh Annual Report for the Year 1879*, 84.

⁵⁷ AR of CIA, 1870, J. A. Covington, 76.

⁵⁸ Hagan, *Indian Police*, pp. 51, 45.

⁵⁹ Althea Bass, *The Arapaho Way: A Memoir of an Indian Boyhood* (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc./Publisher, 1966), pp. 44-45.

⁶⁰ Board of Indian Commissioners, *Thirteenth Annual Report for the Year 1881*, pp. 54-57.

⁶¹ E. Adamson Hoebel, *The Cheyennes: Indians of the Great Plains* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 31-32; see also George Bird Grinnell, *The Cheyenne Indians* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1923), 11:63-64.

⁶² AR of CIA, 1885, D. B. Dyer, p. 75.

⁶³ Donald J. Berthrong, *The Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal: Reservation and Agency Life in Indian Territory, 1875-1907* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), pp. 83, 105, 146.

⁶⁴ AR of CIA, 1890, C. F. Ashley, 177-178.

- ⁶⁵Ibid., p. 179.
- ⁶⁶Berthrong, *Ordeal*, p. 146.
- ⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 92-93, 98; also Miles to CIA, 1882 (ser. 2261, 48 Cong., II Sess., Exec. Doc. 17, pp. 27-28).
- ⁶⁸Berthrong, *Ordeal*, pp. 94-95.
- ⁶⁹Bass, *Arapaho Way*, p. 56; John H. Seger, *Early Days Among the Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians*, ed. Stanley Vestal (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), pp. 89-92.
- ⁷⁰Donald J. Berthrong, "Cattlemen on the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation, 1883-1885," *Arizona and The West* 8 (Spring 1971):7-8; Berthrong, *Ordeal*, pp. 96-99.
- ⁷¹Berthrong, *Ordeal*, p. 99.
- ⁷²AR of CIA, 1884, Dyer, 71; Mrs. D. B. Dyer, *Fort Reno* (New York: G. W. Dillingham, Publisher, 1896), pp. 190-191.
- ⁷³Berthrong, *Ordeal*, pp. 100-103; also Dyer to CIA, 1884 (ser. 2261, 48 Cong., II Sess., Exec. Doc. 16, pp. 6-8).
- ⁷⁴E. E. Dale, "Ranching on the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation 1880-1885," *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 6 (March 1928):55.
- ⁷⁵Mrs. Dyer, *Fort Reno*, p. 110; Ser. 2261, 48 Cong., II Sess., Exec. Doc. 16, pp. 13-14.
- ⁷⁶Berthrong, *Ordeal*, pp. 105-106.
- ⁷⁷Ibid., p. 108.
- ⁷⁸Ibid., pp. 109-117.
- ⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 116-117.
- ⁸⁰Mooney, *Ghost Dance*, p. 148; Wissler, *Indian Cavalcade*, p. 88.
- ⁸¹Mooney, *Ghost Dance*, p. 150; Berthrong, *Ordeal*, pp. 215-216.
- ⁸²Board of Indian Commissioners, *Twenty-Second Annual Report for the Year 1890*, 29-30; Mrs. Dyer, *Fort Reno*, p. 187.
- ⁸³AR of CIA, 1890, Ashley, 178.

- ⁸⁴Mooney, *Ghost Dance*, p. 154.
- ⁸⁵Mrs. Dyer, *Fort Reno*, p. 197.
- ⁸⁶Mooney, *Ghost Dance*, p. 158.
- ⁸⁷La Barre, *Peyote Cutl*, p. 114; Virginia Cole Trenholm, *The Arapahoes: Our People* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), p. 296; Berthrong, *Ordeal*, p. 219.
- ⁸⁸Trenholm, *The Arapahoes*, pp. 297-298; Berthrong, *Ordeal*, pp. 219-220.
- ⁸⁹AR of CIA, 1883, J. W. Cramsie, 26.
- ⁹⁰AR of CIA, 1891, J. W. Waugh, 317.
- ⁹¹AR of CIA, 1884, Cramsie, 32-33.
- ⁹²AR of CIA, 1885, Cramsie, 27.
- ⁹³AR of CIA, 1887, Cramsie, 32.
- ⁹⁴AR of CIA, 1891, Waugh, 317.
- ⁹⁵AR of CIA, 1893, Waugh, 229.
- ⁹⁶Harold E. Briggs, "The Great Dakota Boom, 1879 to 1886," *North Dakota Historical Quarterly* Vol. 8, No. 2 (January 1930):153.
- ⁹⁷For details of the Dakota boom see Elwyn B. Robinson, *History of North Dakota* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), pp. 137-143, 153; Roy W. Meyer, *History of the Santee Sioux* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), pp. 236-237; and Briggs, "Great Boom."
- ⁹⁸Briggs, "Great Boom," p. 95.
- ⁹⁹Meyer, *Santee Sioux*, p. 235.
- ¹⁰⁰AR of CIA, 1886, Cramsie, 61.
- ¹⁰¹Janet Dimock, "The Effect of United States Land Allotment and Religious Policies on American Indian Culture," *Historical Journal of Western Massachusetts*, Vol. I, No. 2 (Fall 1972):18.
- ¹⁰²Meyer, *Santee Sioux*, p. 235.

- 103 AR of CIA, 1880, J. McLaughlin, 29.
- 104 AR of CIA, 1884, Cramsie, 31.
- 105 AR of CIA, 1883, Cramsie, 24.
- 106 AR of CIA, 1882; 1884; 1889, Cramsie, 20; 30; 140.
- 107 AR of CIA, 1885; 1884, Cramsie, 25; 31-32.
- 108 AR of CIA, 1887, Cramsie, 29.
- 109 AR of CIA, 1884, Cramsie, 34.
- 110 AR of CIA, 1889, Cramsie, 140, 146.
- 111 Robinson, *North Dakota*, p. 153.
- 112 AR of CIA, 1892, Waugh, 317.
- 113 Meyer, *Santee Sioux*, p. 239.
- 114 AR of CIA, 1883; 1884, Cramsie, 26; 33.
- 115 Louis L. Pfaller, C.S.B., *James McLaughlin: The Man with an Indian Heart* (New York: Vantage Press, 1978), pp. 203-204.
- 116 Meyer, *Santee Sioux*, pp. 325-327.
- 117 Mooney, *Ghost Dance*, pp. 148. For a view that explains the Ghost Dance violence among the Teton Lakota as a reaction to the long-term suppression of Indian religious expression by the government see DeMallie, "Lakota Ghost Dance," pp. 392-99.
- 118 Utley, *Last Days*, pp. 61-62, 73.
- 119 *Ibid.*, p. 81; and Pfaller, *James McLaughlin*, pp. 89-94.
- 120 Utley, *Last Days*, pp. 97-100; Pfaller, *James McLaughlin*, from McLaughlin's letter, pp. 128-132.
- 121 Louis L. Pfaller, O.S.B., "The Indian Scare of 1890," *North Dakota History*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring 1972):5, 12-13.
- 122 AR of CIA, 1891, Waugh, 318.

CHAPTER 3

WORK OR STARVE

Concurrent with the attempt by the tribes and their agents to come to terms with the new realities of reservation life, White Christian reformers and government officials were fashioning legislation that would forcibly end tribal relations and attempt to assimilate the Indian as an individual into the American mainstream. The traditional policy of isolating groups of Indians from avaricious Whites before the Civil War was no longer practical. The new government policy encouraged the Indians to adopt the competitive individualism of the White Americans and immigrants who were fast becoming their neighbors.

It was through their communal institutions, however, that many of the Indians during the 1800s, made significant progress in adapting to the White man's culture, as well as surviving its dislocation. The agent for the Devils Lake Sioux urged them to work adjacent sections of land in groups so that they could raise enough wheat to buy more machinery to expand their operations further. Lieutenant Hugh L. Scott, the head of the Indian Scouts at Fort Sill, saw the positive benefits of the Ghost Dance for the tribes of western Indian Territory. He approved of the Christian

influences he saw integrated into the native ceremony. Despite these and other adaptations that were slowly evolving, many reformers felt that there was no more time to waste. The signing of the Dawes General Allotment Act on February 8, 1887 completed an old government effort to make the Indian survive on equal terms with the White man.

It was clear to seventeenth century colonials, said Francis Paul Prucha, that Indians who chose to live among the English should hold land and other property individually according to English custom. In the early days of the American republic, men like Henry Knox and Thomas Jefferson endowed the idea of the individual landholder with the power of "transforming the Indians into acceptable members of white society."¹ This idea was incorporated into the treaties made between the United States and various Indian tribes, whose leaders bargained away large cessions of land for smaller areas in severalty (individual possession). To insure against the free alienation of the land, the government usually did not allow the Indians to hold the land in fee, with unrestricted title. If voluntarily abandoned, the land would become the property of the United States and be redistributed according to specific procedures or with the consent of the President. However, in the few cases where patents in fee were given, as with the Brothertown Indians of Wisconsin, the Ottawas, Chippawas,

Potawatomis, Shawnees and Wyandots, the Indians soon sold their lands and spent the small amount of money they were given for them. In any case, from 1853 on most treaties included the taking of land in severalty as an important feature.²

"It is a part of the Indian's religion not to divide the land," said Colorado Senator Henry M. Teller in January 1881. He told his fellow Senators that of the "sixty-odd treaties with Indians" made over the past thirty years, most "have taken the land in severalty, attempted to live on it and have subsequently abandoned it and resumed their nomadic habits."³ In his study of the implementation of the Dawes Act, D. S. Otis cited numerous instances of the failure of allotment of Indian lands since 1835. "Where Indians had the right of selling their lands," he said, "it was the nature of things that those lands should slip from their grasp."⁴ Since most Indian peoples had been hunters or herders, they had not developed a concept of landed property and were not interested in becoming individualized citizens or farmers.⁵ But even though treaties were still being made with Indian nations until 1871, it had been clear since early in the nineteenth century "that as Indian power declined the United States would choose to treat the native American in his individual rather than in his collective capacity."⁶

As the 1880s began, Prucha notes, the great migration of White settlers westward and the coincident desire for religious unification in the United States combined to give new energy to the movement for Indian assimilation.⁷ With White towns and homesteads touching the borders of the Indian reservations, Christian evangelicals sought to extend their idea of individual salvation to the Indian. Reformers felt too that the only way Indians could join the rest of American society in overcoming its problems was as individuals in monogamous family groups, rather than as communal members of polygamous tribes.

To promote this end Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ezra A. Hayt began the legislative process early in 1879 which would result eight years later in America's first allotment law applicable, with a few exceptions, to all Indian tribes. To protect the Indians from past abuses, Hayt proposed that the government hold each allotment in trust for twenty-five years to give the Indians time to become educated for citizenship and prepare to hold their lands in fee. Some tribes, like the Omahas, agreed with Hayt that individual landholdings would at least protect them against the onslaught of White settlers, which the government was unable or unwilling to stop.⁸

The idealistic church orientation of the Indian Bureau during Grant's Peace Policy reverted back to politics

as usual in the 1880s and beyond. During the early reservation years, westerners hungry for Indian land were at odds with eastern churchmen and reformers who believed the tribes had to be protected in their isolation while they slowly learned the arts of civilization. As the Christian denominations lost their strong influence in Indian affairs, eastern and western interests came together over the idea of assimilation. White settlers west of the Missouri River rejoiced to hear the friends of the Indian become committed to forcing the tribes to sell their surplus land in order to accelerate their adaptation to civilized ways. This coalescence of means among groups with such different ends in mind, moved the Dawes Act towards its final passage in 1887.⁹

In January and February of 1881 a general severalty bill introduced by Senator Richard Coke of Texas was hotly debated on the Senate floor.¹⁰ The Coke bill received enthusiastic support from Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz, successive commissioners of Indian affairs, the Board of Indian Commissioners, and various Indian rights organizations. Its major provisions were that when the President decided that a reservation was suitable for agricultural purposes he could order the issuing of allotments of land in severalty as follows:

. . . 160 acres to the head of a family, 80 acres to single persons over eighteen years of age, 40 acres to orphans under eighteen, and 20 acres to other children. The sale of excess lands to the government was to be

negotiated with the tribes. The allotment of the reservation could be made only with the consent of two-thirds of the males of the tribe over twenty-one years of age; and the allotments were to be inalienable for twenty-five years. Once the allotments had been made, the laws of the state or territory in which the Indians lived would govern the Indians. The bill did not apply to the Five Civilized Tribes, which consistently opposed the measure.¹¹

The Coke bill also contained a provision which gave individual Indians the right to take allotments whenever they wanted to, but required the consent of two-thirds of the adult males to apply allotment to the whole tribe.¹²

But the flood of White settlers had become so frantic by the 1880s that the Indian could no longer be allowed the luxury of adapting gradually to White culture. Totally against obtaining the consent of the Indians in this matter was the Congregational minister Lyman Abbott. He told a gathering of reformers at Lake Mohonk in New York "that the reservation system is hopelessly wrong; that it cannot be amended or modified; that it can only be uprooted, root, trunk, branch and leaf, and a new system put in its place." "I would begin at once," Abbot said, "a process for the survey and allotment of land to individuals in severalty."¹³

Taking a more moderate stand on this issue was the man whose name was attached to the final measure, Senator Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts. Dawes had been a member of Congress since 1857 and a leading liberal reformer for the cause of Indian rights.¹⁴ In a letter to Interior

Secretary Henry M. Teller in September 1882, Dawes stated his agreement with allotment in theory, but expressed some misgivings about putting it into practice. He doubted whether the majority of Indians who did not speak or write English, who did not want to work or make money, and who did not understand our laws or system of courts could survive on their own.¹⁵ Just over a year later though, either with his doubts resolved or through pressure from his constituency to hurry the Indians' independence, Dawes emphasized "civilizing" the Indian rather than protecting him from undue exploitation. He introduced his own bill in the Senate early in 1886, and it became law a year later.¹⁶

The Coke bill and the Dawes Act were essentially the same, except for an important shift which evolved during the 1880s over the issue of obtaining Indian consent. Reformers had accepted the threat of force as a tolerable tool in convincing the Indians to agree to allotment, therefore the requirement of obtaining two-thirds consent among the males was excluded from the Dawes Act.¹⁷ The bill allowed the President at his discretion to allot 40 to 160 acres to each Indian on a reservation, with good agricultural and grazing land, without the consent of the tribe. If after four years from the President's order individuals had not chosen their allotments, the Indian agent or a special agent was to make it for them. Once the allotment was approved by the

secretary of interior, he would issue a patent to the land which was to be held in trust by the government for twenty-five years. The surplus land which remained after allotments were made would be sold to the government and the land would then be opened to homesteaders. The money paid to the Indians for their surplus land was to be used for the education or "civilization" of the specific tribe as Congress saw fit. The act granted American citizenship to any Indian who took an allotment, who was either born in the United States or was living in a "civilized" manner away from his or her tribe. All Indians who became citizens under the act were then subject to the civil and criminal laws of the state or territory in which they lived. Special agents were appointed by the President to survey the reservations and make allotments, with the assistance of the specific Indian agent.¹⁸

With the passage of the Dawes Act the Indian Rights Association and other reform groups rejoiced in their victory. They rated that moment of freedom for the Indian with "Runnymede and Magna Charta, Independence and Emancipation," and hoped it would become a national holiday.¹⁹ Although President Cleveland wanted to apply the act gradually, after seven months Senator Dawes announced with alarm that the "landgrabbers" had already pressured the President into allotting six reservations.²⁰ Indeed, said historian D. S.

Otis, "The application of allotment to the reservations was characterized by extreme haste."²¹ In 1881 there were 155,632,312 acres of reservation land belonging to the Indians, by 1890 there were 104,314,349 acres, and by 1900 only 77,865,373 acres were left.²²

Santee and Yanktonais Sioux

The reformers demonstrated their naivete concerning the real problems on the Indian reservations by the way they dropped out of the reform organizations soon after the allotment act was signed. "Instead of realizing that the Dawes Act added to their responsibilities," said Loring Benson Priest, "most members of Indian associations considered their work was ended."²³ Agent John W. Cramsie of the Devils Lake Agency, could have used their continued help in Congress to obtain the minimum aid he thought necessary to carry on the serious efforts his Indians were making toward self support.

The Sioux of Devils Lake tried to expand their wheat farming operations throughout the 1880s. In the first half of the decade, surrounding White communities prospered and served as markets for the Indians' surplus wheat crop. By the 1890s, drought and economic depression drove many Whites out and the Sioux were left to subsist as before. Since so many Indians were already living on allotments, the

passage of the Dawes Act was very welcome to the agent, who overcame the tribe's initial objections. For Cramsie, allotment was the key to Indian independence from government wardship. But the interest shown by reformers in the 1880s waned in the following years and the dream of Indian assimilation seemed further and further away.

Article 5 of the Santee Sioux Treaty of 1867 called for the allotment of 160 acres to each family head or person over twenty-one years old "who may desire to locate permanently and cultivate the soil as a means of subsistence."²⁴ If fifty acres of the allotment had been fenced, plowed, and planted after five consecutive years of occupation, an inalienable patent would be issued. While patents had not been issued at Devils Lake after twenty years, over half of the Sioux families were doing some farming and living on allotments.

So it was with great enthusiasm that Cramsie responded in August 1887 to a circular letter from the "Department," requiring agents to chart the course by which their Indians would become civilized and able to support themselves "by agriculture as soon as possible."²⁵ "The first solid step necessary" to accomplish this end, the agent said, . . . is to make allotments of land in severalty to the Indians, . . . " But this alone would not be a cure-all. Cramsie felt that if Congress made sure they were supplied with the proper

farm animals, equipment, and good agency farmers, the Indians could make themselves self-supporting in from four to six years. Speaking candidly, he said that without the support of Congress and a good agent all the "flowery, philanthropic, sentimental, and theoretical rules and laws for the elevation of the poor red man, . . . will be money spent and time wasted."²⁶

All Cramsie could do was annually remind the commissioner of the needs of the Devils Lake Sioux, and carry on with whatever resources were at hand.²⁷ In 1887 he eagerly began allotting farms, but had to stop when he learned that a special agent was required for the work. When Malachi Krebs arrived two years later to do the work, Cramsie and his people were well prepared. The agent had already surveyed the reservation and had made copies of the Dawes Act, translated into "the Sioux language," so the Indians would understand what was happening to them.

The Indians' response revealed much old business that needed resolving before they would allow the official break-up of their tribal relations. They claimed that as a consequence of the 1862 outbreak in Minnesota, which according to them was the work of other Sioux bands, they were never paid money due them under the Treaty of Traverse des Sioux of 1851.²⁸ They also cited the admission by the government that they were to be compensated for 64,000 acres

of the best land on their present reservation, which had mistakenly been left outside the western boundaries and was subsequently settled by Whites. And they wanted payment for the right-of-way they had granted to the Jamestown Northern Railroad six years previous. With this tradition of not honoring treaties and agreements, Cramsie sensed their underlying fear of

. . . taxation, the white man's laws and citizenship, which would render them liable to arrest and punishment by the white men's laws, which they know nothing about; that the white men are anxious to get possession of their lands, and that the law would be enforced for every trivial offense for the purpose of driving them out of the country with this end in view.²⁹

If these old debts were taken care of, the Sioux felt they could buy the stock and machinery necessary to succeed in farming. Cramsie shared many of the misgivings his charges had concerning the unresponsiveness of Congress to their present needs. Nevertheless, he did his duty as a representative of the government and "met all the objections and explained the many advantages that would accrue to them by being citizens."³⁰

With the opposition apparently quieted and a new special agent, Joseph R. Gray, on the job, allotment of about 100,000 acres of the 166,400 acres on the reservation was completed by the end of 1891. Agent John W. Waugh spoke very highly of the job Gray was doing in allotting the head of every family "some timber, some meadow, and some plow

land." He was hopeful that in just a few years "the ideal of a small farm" would become a reality for all the Indians of Devils Lake.³¹

In 1892, with allotment still not quite completed and the third special agent on the job, Waugh observed:

The Indians are all very well satisfied at the results of taking their land in severalty, and great good to them must follow by fixing them in a permanent place which they can call home, and which has heretofore been embraced in the one work "tipi," the location of it being changed from one part of the reservation to another every season. It was almost impossible to have the majority of them remain long enough in a place to make any permanent improvements, but since they have taken their lands in severalty they are appreciating the necessity of trying to live like the white man.³²

By the end of 1892, 1,132 allotments were completed and the patents were issued in April 1893. The next year, 4,000 of the 80,000 tillable acres on the reservation were being cultivated by 270 families located on their allotments. Because of the hot July winds that had been prevalent for the last few years, the 3,000 acres planted to wheat produced only 12,000 bushels and brought less than forty cents per bushel at the grain elevators.³³ In 1885, for example, families on 200 allotments covering 3,000 acres produced 40,000 bushels of wheat at fifty-five cents per bushel.³⁴ Certainly more families living on individual allotments did not guarantee a better life.

In 1893, Agent Ralph Hall discovered that at least half of the Devils Lake Sioux were living on parched corn

and wild turnip roots. One old man told Hall that in the future he would only raise potatoes and corn since they usually provided him with something to eat. He said wheat was either a failure, or when he did manage to raise a good crop it all went to pay his debts. In sum, the agent thought that only about seven to ten percent of the families on the reservation were totally independent, and that this would not improve until the older, nonprogressive Indians had died off and were replaced by the more educated and secularized youth.³⁵

Hall's annual report for 1895 appears unreliable in a few particulars. Although the harvest had not been completed, he estimated that 3,000 acres of wheat would produce 54,000 bushels, more than four and a half times greater than the previous year. He also applauded the efforts of his Indian police and Court of Indian Offenses for preventing the performance of grass dances and medicine feasts, which he claimed had been rampant five to ten years earlier.³⁶

These findings are in conflict with those of Inspector James McLaughlin who, we have already noted, visited Devils Lake at this time and found a total breakdown in the discipline that he and John Cramsie had maintained during the previous twenty years. According to Pfaller, McLaughlin found dancing and polygamy being permitted by "nonprogressive" police and judges, and encouraged Hall to replace these men with the more "progressive" element.³⁷

In 1897, his last year as agent, Hall felt similar to Cramsie eight years earlier. He cited the parsimony of the government in keeping eight "partially educated" young men dirt poor on their allotments. Without the necessary tools and animals they could not farm, and there was little day labor to be had on the reservation. He thought that unless they received immediate assistance, they would remain forever "dependent upon the charity of the Government."³⁸

The story was the same throughout the rest of the decade. Although 240 families were living in log houses in 1897, by 1900 the number living on and cultivating their allotments had fallen from 285 to 252.³⁹ Only 109 of the 235 children were enrolled in school and the \$10,000 in 1895, served only as "direct relief and did little more than keep them alive from year to year."⁴⁰

To the end of the century the Devils Lake Reservation remained dominated by the will of the agent. The annual reports are conspicuously void of any mention of the actions of individual Indians. It is almost as grim as the depiction of the reservation Indian by a later commissioner of Indian affairs, Francis E. Leupp: "Nothing was demanded of the Indians in return except that they obey their Agents and keep quiet."⁴¹ How quiet the Sioux actually were is hard to determine; their religious leaders were probably trying to maintain a sense of tribalism amid the despair.

Soon after the Dawes Act was passed Senator Dawes said:

If the Mohonk people, and those who have sent them here, shall feel that they have done their duty and have accomplished their work by simply enacting such a law as this, they have brought upon the Indian a calamity instead of a blessing.⁴²

Living in a hostile environment which had defeated many White farmers and having been misunderstood and abandoned by the federal government, the Indians of Devils Lake must have taken some long backward glances as they stepped into the twentieth century.

Cheyennes and Arapahoes

The tribes of Indian Territory were not included in the Dawes Act, so a special commission was appointed in 1889 to negotiate for the surplus lands there. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes had not fared well in the 1880s; after the Dog Soldiers drove out the cattlemen the Indians did some farming, but essentially they remained in their camps living off rations and annuities. The Arapahoes were eager to farm, but the arid climate and the intransigence of the Cheyenne Dog Soldiers made that very difficult. By the end of the decade increased interest in peyote and the Ghost Dance disrupted all farming operations. The Cheyennes continued to resist change in their talks with the Jerome Commission, but a few of them, along with most of the Arapahoes, felt that it was time to try a new road. At the

mercy of a stingy Congress and a stern and inflexible Indian agent, the 1890s became a disaster for these two tribes.

White interest in Indian Territory grew throughout the 1880s, as the rest of the Trans-Mississippi West was being rapidly settled. The only Whites allowed there until 1889 were the employees of Indian agencies and cattlemen holding grazing leases or permits with the tribes. Cattlemen supported the Indians in opposing efforts by the railroads in Congress to open the area to homesteaders. On the side of the railroads were the regional business interests, who joined the competition by hiring promoters called "Boomers" to rally the cause for the opening of what one of their leaders labeled the "New Canaan."⁴³ Their plans were aided by an article written in the February 17, 1879 issue of the *Chicago Times* by the Cherokee attorney for them, Elias C. Boudinot. In it he claimed that 14 million acres in western Indian Territory were part of the public domain and should be opened to homeseekers.⁴⁴

During the 1880s the Boomers made numerous "raids" into central Indian Territory, only to be driven out by the United States cavalry from Fort Reno and other posts. These actions gave them valuable newspaper coverage and drew the attention of a number of Congressmen who supported the opening of the area to White settlement. An opening wedge was finally achieved with the Springer Amendment, a

rider attached to the 1889 Indian Appropriation Bill. The Springer Amendment called for the opening of the Unassigned Lands, an area just east of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation. It also empowered the President to appoint a commission to negotiate with the tribes for the sale of their surplus lands. Once these lands were ceded they would become part of the newly established Oklahoma Territory.⁴⁵

The group authorized by President Benjamin Harrison to negotiate land cession agreements with the tribes of Indian Territory was called the Cherokee, or Jerome, Commission. It included David H. Jerome, former governor of Michigan, Wayne G. Sayre of Indiana, and Judge Alfred M. Wilson of Arkansas. Over a period of two and a half years the commission negotiated eleven agreements, which were ratified by Congress, for over 15 million acres. They came to the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation in the summer of 1890.⁴⁶

Prior to that some of the Indians' former agents and attorneys tried to cut themselves in on the payments for any land cessions the Indians would make to the government. This group included John D. Miles, D. B. Dyer, and G. E. Williams. According to the account given by Berthrong, these men took a few of the more educated Indians and select tribal leaders, like the Cheyenne Little Chief and the Arapaho Left Hand, to Oklahoma City to entertain them and reawaken their interest in selling their share of the

Cherokee Outlet, which they had vacated, but never formally ceded to the United States.⁴⁷ Under very questionable circumstances these friends of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes persuaded them to sell their interest in the Cherokee Outlet for \$1.25 an acre, with a ten percent commission for their services. The final contract, approved by Secretary of Interior John W. Noble, allowed Miles, Dyer, and attorneys Matt Reynolds and Samuel J. Crawford to be paid a percentage of any lands the government would buy from the Indians.

When the Jerome Commission arrived at Darlington on July 7, 1890, another group of Indians lost their lands. All the necessary conditions were present: the tribes had been divided into contending factions, key chiefs had been deceived by their supposed friends, the Indian policy of allotment required implementation, land-hungry whites were waiting for the reservation to be opened for settlement, and easy money was waiting for white spoilsmen.⁴⁸

Agent Ashley gathered the Cheyenne and Arapaho leaders to talk with the commissioners. The traditionalist Cheyenne chief Old Crow set the tone for most of his tribe when he said:

The Great Spirit gave the Indians all this country and never tell them that they should sell it. . . . See, I am poor. I have no money; I don't want money; money doesn't do an Indian any good. Here is my wealth [pointing to the ground]. Here is all the wealth I want--the only money I know how to keep.⁴⁹

Little Big Jake, Spotted Horse, Young Wirlwind, Wolf Face, and Little Medicine all agreed that the Cheyennes did not want to sell their land. Sergeant Meat and Little Man recalled being told by General Sheridan in 1885 to retain

control of their reservation no matter what. Although the Springer Amendment and not the Dawes Act was being used to gain these land cessions, the commissioners freely invoked their ability to force the Indians to accept allotments under the Dawes Act if they refused to accede to their more liberal offer.⁵⁰

Despite the intractable Cheyennes, there were a few under Cloud Chief, and most of the Arapahoes who followed Left Hand, who were willing to negotiate. Over two weeks of talks in July 1890 and one more week in October, the terms reached by the Jerome Commission with the Indians were as follows: The Cheyennes and Arapahoes ceded the Cherokee Outlet and all land in Grant's 1869 Presidential Proclamation reservation except their allotments. Every tribal member was allotted 160 acres, half in farmland and half in grazing land; these choices had to be made within ninety days of Congressional approval of the agreement or the choice of allotments would be made by the allotting agent. Allotments were inalienable for twenty-five years in accordance with the Dawes Act. The Indians were paid \$1.5 million (about \$.50 an acre) for their surplus land (out of 4,294,415 acres, 3,764,723 acres were considered surplus once allotments were completed); \$500,000 of that would be distributed in two per capita payments, the first would be sixty days after Congressional approval. One million dollars

remained on deposit in the United State Treasury earning five percent interest, distributed annually on a per capita basis. Also, the Cheyennes and Arapahoes would continue to receive their annuities under the Treaty of Medicine Lodge until 1897.⁵¹

According to the Treaty of Medicine Lodge, three-fourths of the adult males had to approve any land cessions. Before a final agreement could be reached, Chairman Jerome had to remove the former agents and attorneys from the council meetings because the Indians had repudiated them. However, they were allowed to charge their fees based on what the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were paid for the Cherokee Outlet. They used their influence and money to encourage the progressive Indians to obtain enough signatures to ratify the opening of the reservation. Agent Ashley decided he had the right number of signatures by November 13, 1890 and despite a protest of his methods and numbers by traditional Cheyennes, Congress approved the agreement on March 3, 1891.⁵²

It took a month for a required census to be completed and a year before all allotments were surveyed by the special agents. At first Old Crow, Young Whirlwind, Red Moon, White Shield and their bands desired to be allowed to live without money and allotments in the western part of the reservation. As time went by, many of their followers

saw the fancy wagons, clothes, and sweets others were buying with their silver dollars, and they too enrolled and took their allotments.⁵³

In early April 1892, when the pressure from homeseekers to open the reservation was greatest, the chiefs who had led the negotiations, Left Hand and Cloud Chief, protested that not all of its stipulations had been met. But it was too late to delay any longer. At "high noon" on April 19, the 3,210 member Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation was open to a run of 25,000-30,000 land-hungry settlers.⁵⁴

The shock of losing seven-eighths of their reservation land to White settlers, whose "deep prejudice often bordering on racism" allowed them to take advantage of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes at every turn, prevented the move toward independence the government had hoped for.⁵⁵ But again, as with the Sioux of Devils Lake, the politicians and reformers seemed to have reached a laissez-faire attitude toward the Indian problem. Congress refused to allocate the farm animals and machinery necessary to give these less acculturated Indians a start in developing an agricultural economy.⁵⁶ And although Congress passed a law in 1891 which allowed non-Indians to lease allotments from the Indians for a three year period, they refused to extend the time to five years when agents and settlers claimed three

years was unworkable.⁵⁷ It was difficult enough for Congress to alter a law, let alone be flexible in its administration.

It is no wonder then that the annual reports of Major A. E. Woodson, who succeeded Agent Ashley in 1893 and served until the end of the century, reflect a profound frustration at the persistence of Indian cultural life. Their preference for living in camps instead of on allotments, for visiting relatives and friends in other bands and tribes, their commitment to being generous with their property, for their religious beliefs and practices, and for their continued respect and adherence to the wisdom of their elders and spiritual leaders gave much anguish to the agent. Over thirty years these traits helped the Indians maintain their identities in the face of the ethnocentric and misguided policies of the United States government.

"The old habit of living in villages and bands," said Agent Woodson, "is difficult to overcome."⁵⁸ In an effort to remedy this he petitioned the commissioner in 1894, for funds to increase the number of his police in order to assist the military in forcing the Indians onto their allotments. He also hoped to set up sub-agencies run by White district farmers who could provide the equipment and the assistance to get the Cheyennes and Arapahoes started as farmers on their allotments.⁵⁹ Soon Woodson claimed to

have most of his Indians living on their individual plots of land located in ten farming districts, each with a White farmer, an Indian farmer, a blacksmith, and a butcher. He hoped these self-contained locations would induce the Indians to remain settled.⁶⁰

But while the Arapahoes were willing to work at farming, the Cheyennes rarely remained long on their allotments. "The most common and pernicious custom among them is the habit of visiting their relatives and friends and eating their substance."⁶¹ Agents were irked by this practice in the 1870s and continued to complain in the 1890s:

Their lavish hospitality militates against the accumulation of wealth by individuals. . . . The visiting tribe is loaded down with presents that the donors can ill afford to bestow. Often the last pony or blanket will, in a fit of generosity, be given away, while frequently the party making the gift is in debt and owing more than he is able to pay.⁶²

The agent gave permission to "progressive" Indians to visit friends nearby who had been living on their allotments. But he denied permission to a group of traditionalists who wanted to travel 500 miles to visit the Utes in Colorado.⁶³ In their own defense, the Indians pointed out that since they were citizens they should be able to come and go as they pleased.⁶⁴

Visiting also incurred the agent's wrath because under the influence of the "medicine men," the Indians held

ceremonies and dances for days on end.⁶⁵ Young people, who had been educated by the government would drop their civilized pursuits and join the rest of the tribe in these celebrations. Woodson further believed that the spiritual leaders had a "retarding influence" on their people by keeping them from having their illnesses treated by the agency physician, which he felt led to a high death rate.⁶⁶

Besides the "medicine men," Woodson accused the older chiefs and headmen for retarding the progress of their people. "The fact that these chiefs are consulted in matters pertaining to their people and are required to witness the issues of rations, clothing, farming tools, and other supplies seems to magnify their importance until they assume an air of censorship and control over the Indians and agent as well."⁶⁷ He wanted the government to outlaw their influence because, out of respect for them, the young "progressive" Indians allowed them to dominate the councils and other affairs at the agency. They were the ones who perpetuated the traditional tribal relations that Woodson was trying so hard to destroy.⁶⁸ Woodson received permission from Commissioner D. M. Browning to withhold rations and annuities from those chiefs, mostly Cheyennes, who he felt had not tried to make themselves independent of the government's generosity. By 1897 the agent saw his efforts had succeeded: "the end is near, and the opposition

almost gone."⁶⁹ The Cheyenne chiefs at Cantonment were still defiant, but only Thunder Bull of the Arapahoes offered any opposition.⁷⁰

There was an even more conservative influence blocking the Indians' road to civilization, according to Woodson.

It is quite evident that the Indian women are the least progressive; they cling more tenaciously to primitive customs than the men; they are wedded to old-time methods and their influence is retarding in many ways; they hold chiefs and medicine men in awe and are thoroughly superstitious.

Woodson hoped to increase his staff of field matrons, who could combat the traditional influence of the Indian mothers over their daughters by teaching them the homemaking arts. "The sarcasm and ridicule of the old squaws," he said, prevented the young women from adopting more sanitary methods of cooking, housekeeping, dressing, and caring for the sick.⁷¹ He even blamed the women for keeping the Indians from living on their allotments. "Their natural love of company and gossip," and "their abhorrence of solitude" were what kept the camp alive.⁷² Woodson also blamed the wives and mother-in-laws for most family quarrels.⁷³

Woodson's annual reports reveal that most of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were not supporting the allotment policy. After all, their previous experience with farming was very disappointing, ranching and leasing had not worked, and their educational and political development had not progressed to the point where they could survive without the

government's help. But the government did not provide enough of the proper personnel or material for these experiments to have a chance to work. Woodson was aware of these shortcomings, but his commitment to making the Indian into a Christianized yeoman farmer never allowed him to question the policies themselves.

Instead of building trust, the Jerome Commission, Agent Ashley, former agents and attorneys, intermarried Whites, and Indians of mixed ancestry combined to deceive the Cheyennes and Arapahoes into signing most of their reservation away. Throughout the 1890s, as the parsimony and neglect of the government increased, and the Indians were surrounded by eight to ten times their number of prejudiced White citizens, they reacted by holding fast to their tribalism. Agent Woodson then heaped blame on the "so-called chiefs" and "coffee coolers," the spiritual leaders, and the older women for keeping the young educated Indians from becoming like young White farmers.

When Agent George W. H. Stouch took over in 1900, he found that only fifteen to eighteen percent of the adult males were farming their own allotments.⁷⁴ From reading Woodson's published reports Stouch had expected to find almost all of the able bodied adult males involved in farming. This did not occur because Agent Woodson was more concerned with controlling his Indian wards rather than

attempting to accomplish change through respectful diplomatic negotiations. It is a tribute to the Cheyenne and Arapaho people that they were able to retain their identity amidst such ethnocentric attitudes.

Kiowas and Comanches

The Kiowas and Comanches were the last tribes with whom the Jerome Commission had to negotiate for allotments and surplus lands before all of what had been Indian Territory was opened to non-Indian settlement. These Indians had recently seen the rush of homesteaders onto the lands of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes and were therefore feeling extremely cautious. Their relationship with Texas cattlemen over the last few years had provided some with enough money and land to become relatively prosperous and it provided others with the money to buy the tools and animals they needed to begin farming.

The Kiowas and Comanches negotiated and signed the Jerome Agreement in the fall of 1892 and applied enough pressure, along with the cattlemen, to forestall its approval by Congress until June 1900. In the meantime White settlers and local merchants used their influence with the Indians, agents, and politicians to press for the opening of the reservation as soon as possible. The eight year delay proved to be fortunate for the Indians, not only

economically, but also for the assistance they received from two agents who tried to protect the Indians interests as they saw them. The reports of Agents Major Frank D. Baldwin and Lieutenant Colonel James F. Randlett reflect little of the racial prejudice of Agent A. E. Woodson of the Cheyenne-Arapaho agency. This helped the tribes prepare for the inevitable break-up of their lands.

The Jerome Commission met with the Kiowas, Comanches, and Kiowa-Apaches at Fort Sill and Anadarko between September 28 and October 17, 1892. In his opening statement Chairman Jerome reminded the Indians of the great opportunities for their future well-being in what they were bargaining for: ". . . the Government wants nothing from you but that it gives you something that is a great deal better for you than the land." Commissioner Sayre also noted that after a hundred years of Indians living on reservations and Whites living on farms, ". . . the Indians on reservations are and always have been poor and the white man living upon his farm is and always has been rich."⁷⁵

The Kiowas and Comanches, however, had to deal with the reality of what the opening of their surplus lands to settlement by homesteaders would mean to them. Certainly in leasing their lands to cattlemen and their participation on the Indian police force and Court of Indian Offenses the Comanches and Kiowas showed more willingness to

participate in reservation life than had the Cheyennes to the north. They also knew that under the Treaty of Medicine Lodge their reservation was guaranteed to them through 1897.⁷⁶

After signing their agreement with the Jerome Commission, the Cheyennes and Arapahoes came down to Fort Sill and sponsored a dance for the Kiowas. Iseeo, the head of the Indian scouts at the fort, told the commission that in return for the dance the Kiowas gave their visitors ponies that they badly needed. He said:

The Cheyennes came to this military reservation and brought their wagons and fancy shawls, velvet blankets, and carriages, and told us that the money that the Great Father had given them was all gone--that the money they got was invested in these things. Now the wagons are old, being used very hard, and the velvet shawls will be worn out.⁷⁷

The Kiowa Big Tree commented, "They are poor; they will be poor in the future, they had made a mistake in selling their country; that money was given them but it was all gone."⁷⁸

In discussing the matter with the other Indians, the Comanche Quannah Parker urged the ones who were anxious to sell to move slowly. ". . . I want a thorough understanding and I thought it would be better to wait until the expiration of the other treaty."⁷⁹ The Kiowa chief Lone Wolf recalled the progress his people had made in sending their children to school where they were learning "to

live like white people, and soon they will be civilized." And because many people were building houses and making good progress, ". . . we ask the commission not to push us ahead too fast on the road we are to take."⁸⁰ On the other hand, Lone Wolf was totally against allotments:

If each of us were given 160 acres we would not be able to work it like white people--a white man is taught from his youth up to work, we are not--and instead of this 160 acres being a blessing it will be disastrous.⁸¹

In the years ahead Lone Wolf would remain vehemently opposed to allotment, whereas Quanah was less against allotment than he was opposed to the sale of their surplus lands to Whites. After all, Quanah had done very well leasing grass to cattlemen. The Indians generally supported Quanah's view, hoping to become more economically secure on their allotments before opening the rest of the reservation.⁸²

Over the weeks of negotiations kind and harsh words were exchanged as the commissioners explained their offers and the Indians proposed counter-offers.⁸³ The Kiowas and Comanches were assisted by the usual coterie of attorneys, agency traders, intermarried Whites, and Indians of mixed ancestry. Their agent George D. Day encouraged the Indians to include the latter group of "friends," which included himself, in any deal they made with the Jerome Commission: "I know that they do not want to part with them; that they wanted to share with them"⁸⁴ Historian William T. Hagan has

said that experience had proved that the best way to insure approval of land cessions with the Indians was to include people in them "who might favorably dispose the Indians toward it." These "friends" were very active in the rush to obtain the required three-quarters of the adult males to sign the agreement.⁸⁵

Quanah led the Comanches in the meetings. On October 5, when he demanded \$2.5 million for their surplus land (the commission offered \$2 million), he even gained the support of Lone Wolf. The commissioners agreed to leave the \$2 million figure in the agreement and let Congress decide upon the higher figure. Like the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, the Kiowas and Comanches would each receive 160 acres, half in farmland and half in grazing land, their payment for their surplus land would earn five percent annually, the interest to be distributed on a per capita basis. The first \$500,000 would be distributed in three per capita payments, with five percent interest over two years.⁸⁶

The last few days of the negotiations were held at Anadarko where most of the Kiowas lived. The agreement was strongly opposed by Big Tree and Apiatan. Nevertheless, the commissioners obtained 456 out of 562 adult male signatures with relative ease. Some Kiowas asked that their signatures be removed, but this was not allowed.

Other Indians blamed Kiowa interpreter Joshua Givens for misleading them. But with Quanah supporting the agreement, disunity among the Indians, the threat of the commissioners to enforce the more strigent terms of the Dawes Act, and the active promotion of twenty-five "friends" living on the reservation, there were not many who could withstand the pressure to sign.⁸⁷

Since Quanah and other leaders who were benefiting from their relationships with the cattlemen came to feel that the government was going to get their land eventually, they threw their weight behind the Jerome Agreement. With the support and influence of the cattlemen they worked for a higher price per acre than the commission offered, larger allotments, and made an intensive lobbying effort to delay Congressional approval of the measure for as long as possible.⁸⁸ When Congress ratified the agreement eight years later it had been modified to include a 480,000 acre tract of land that the Indians could hold in common, but they were paid only \$2 million for their surplus land at four percent interest.⁸⁹

Meanwhile, the Kiowas and Comanches were the most prosperous in the years before allotment finally came. In 1890 Agent Adams could still say "Agriculture is the principal industry."⁹⁰ By 1892 Agent Day noted that although farms and stockraising among his Indians was going well,

grazing leases had become the best source of income. That year he led a contingent including Quanah, Lone Wolf, and the Kiowa-Apache White Man to Washington to gain support for an expanded leasing program. They came away with the government's sanction to make yearly leases of their surplus land to cattlemen, which Day enthusiastically predicted would bring in \$100,000 annually.⁹¹ In 1900 the Indians of the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation earned \$232,000 on leases.⁹² Between 1885 and 1906 gross money totalled over \$2 million,⁹³ confirming Day's prediction.

In his first annual report in 1895, Agent Major Frank D. Baldwin observed that only the elderly seemed to be against an attachment to property and hard work. But the issue was more complex than that. Baldwin pointed out that the Comanches, led by the positive influence of Quanah Parker, "are the most progressive and industrious of the three bands, . . ."⁹⁴ However, the Kiowas were in constant turmoil, he said, because "nearly all of them want to be chiefs." Further, in his opinion the Kiowa-Apaches were hopeless because they were so "indolent and shiftless." The latter two tribes "have got to be made to work or starve," Baldwin said.

The agent also was disturbed by the influence of "traders and speculators" as to how the Indians spent their funds. These men opposed a decision made by the Indians to

spend \$50,000 of their grass payments on young heifers in order to build up their cattle herds.⁹⁵ It was \$50,000 out of their pockets. During his four years at Anadarko, Baldwin was not afraid to use his police to confront the traders and other Whites who were ever present to take advantage of the Indians' growing prosperity.⁹⁶

Under Baldwin's term as agent the number of Indians who benefited from this new prosperity grew. One of the main reasons for this was the government's 1891 decision to allow more leasing than ever before. This was a clear deviation from the Dawes Act, which sought to protect the Indians' land from alienation for a twenty-five year period, during which they could become independent farmers.⁹⁷ Since most of their land was unfit for farming and the government did not supply them with enough cattle to eat and build herds of their own, the Kiowas and Comanches chose to lease their grazing land to cattlemen. Stable relations of long standing with cattlemen, and the favors they bestowed, made them preferred leasing customers over the itinerant Whites.⁹⁸ Another reason for increased grass payments to the Kiowas and Comanches was Baldwin's ruling that an Indian or a squaw man (intermarried White) could hold only ten acres for each head of stock he owned, with a maximum of 5,000 acres. The herds owned by people such as George W. Conover and Quanah Parker, who held 36,640 and

44,000 acres respectively, were greatly reduced. By 1898, Baldwin had again helped to raise the tribes' income by getting the leases extended from one year at \$.06 an acre, to three years at \$.10 an acre.⁹⁹

The agent supported his Indians' view that the Senate should not confirm the Jerome Agreement. They had seen its unfortunate effects among the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and other tribes, when thousands of greedy Whites suddenly invaded their lands. "No bands of Indians have ever been able to cope with the whites," Baldwin said, "and when thrown among them they invariably have dwindled down to almost nothing, becoming a degraded, begging class." Instead of opening up their reservation to "men who have no friendship for the Indian," the Kiowas and Comanches, according to Baldwin, preferred to make their surplus lands available to other Indian peoples.¹⁰⁰ In 1897, the confederated tribes suggested adding 50,000 acres of their land to the Fort Sill Military Reservation for Geronimo's band of Apaches, and selling 160 acre allotments to some Wyandots searching for a new place to settle. But, as Hagan has said, Congress was more interested in providing room for White settlers, and would not seriously consider the matter of the Apaches and the Wyandots.¹⁰¹

From 1897 to 1900 the Kiowas and Comanches had three different agents, and they all remarked how civilized and

industrious many of them had become, especially in comparison to most White frontier families.¹⁰² A sign of their improved attitudes was their desire to live in houses. Agent Willaim T. Walker, a former Oklahoma newspaperman, said in 1898 that 600 houses had already been built on the reservation. The government provided the materials and the Indians paid \$50 for the labor in constructing the house. In 1900 Agent Lieutenant Colonel James F. Randlett said that over 100 houses had been built over the last year and that in each case the Indians had chosen to build where they would have once an allotment act was finally passed for them. Randlett had encouraged them to make these choices, for he knew allotment was not far off. He said:

. . . while all have experienced sorrow that no hope could be encouraged that the event could be delayed until the people generally were prepared intelligently to accept such conditions with advantage, it has been evident, that they were endeavoring to profit by the advice given.¹⁰³

On June 6, 1900 allotment finally came for the Kiowas, Comanches, and Kiowa-Apaches. Within a year the land was surveyed and allotted, and in the summer of 1901, 13,000 White homesteads were opened through an organized lottery, instead of a chaotic run.¹⁰⁴ For the next few years the Indians' income came mostly from leases to cattlemen on the 480,000 acres the agreement of 1900 left to the Indians in common. They also received payments from the sale of their

surplus lands, and rent money from their allotments. Generally, White renters lived in the houses, while the Indians went back to living in camps as they used to.¹⁰⁵

The evidence suggests that three factors occurred simultaneously in the 1890s to provide some short term prosperity for the people of this reservation. The independent, individualistic spirit of the Comanches seems to have allowed them to adapt more easily to reservation life. The urgent need of the cattlemen for grazing land gave a few Comanches the opportunity to attain wealth and prestige among Indians and Whites. Agents Baldwin and Randlett were flexible and sincere in protecting the interests of their charges, which provided the positive milieu for Indians and cattlemen to form stable, long-term relationships. Just as the Cheyennes influenced the Arapahoes, the Comanches may have encouraged the Kiowas to make their own accommodations within the reservation milieu. Although the Kiowa leader Apiatan finally joined Quanah in support of the Jerome Agreement, Lone Wolf continued to lead a small contingent against it after 1900. By 1910 the Comanches were no closer to being farmers than they ever were.¹⁰⁶

After two decades of adjustment to reservation living, American Indians were confronted with the prospect of the break-up of their tribal relations and the sale of most of

their land to non-Indians. The fight to pass an allotment bill had finally created a consensus among eastern and western White interests. The westerners got the land they always wanted and the easterners were satisfied with protecting the Indians' title to individual allotments and exposing them to the good influence of industrious White yeoman farmers.¹⁰⁷

The Indians of each of the three reservations under study opposed allotment based on their previous experiences with the government. The Devils Lake Sioux felt that the government had not upheld its treaties and agreements with them over the previous forty years. They were also afraid of becoming subject to the White mans' laws, which they did not understand. Among the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, Old Crow spoke for many of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes who were against the sale of their lands. However, chiefs such as Cloud Chief and Left Hand felt that the time had come to compromise with the Jerome Commission. Many Whites and persons of mixed ancestry who had worked with these people over the years, and who could profit from allotment encouraged these Indians to settle. Most Kiowas and Comanches were not against allotment, but were very afraid of selling their surplus lands to non-Indians. Seeing that their resistance to the Jerome Commission was useless, Quannah and others chose to use their powerful coalition

with the Texas cattlemen to get the best terms possible and delay the opening of the reservation as long as they could.

The eastern reformers dropped the Indian's cause after the passage of the Dawes Act, and the agents' reports are filled with disappointment at the lack of support from Congress. In addition, Agent Woodson of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation blamed the traditional attitudes and habits of the spiritual leaders, chiefs, and especially the older women for retarding the progress of their people. On the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation, the one not allotted in the 1890s, individual Indians were more successful than anywhere else. The whole tribe benefited from the \$2 million generated through leases between 1885 and 1906. While the Kiowas and Comanches were better off than the other reservations during this period, they had little left once their lands were allotted and the cattlemen were gone. If anything, the Dawes Act served to destroy any independence the Indians of these three reservations had managed to attain.

Conclusion

The Indian agent of the post-Civil War era believed that the transformation of the Indian into a Christianized yeoman farmer was in the Indian's and the nation's best interest. This paper describes the Indian's response to

the federal assimilation policy as not merely a reaction to that policy, but also as an effort to control the pace and kind of change that was taking place. That is to say traditional practices such as ceremonials, intertribal visiting, polygamy, and living together in camps were some of the ways the Indians chose to maintain self-determination in the face of the government's attempts to destroy their way of life. The clash of cultures and individuals on the reservation frontier produced the diversity of assimilation among the five tribes herein discussed.

Despite the agent's orders to establish farms on individual allotments, most Indians continued to live in isolated camps. They came to the agency for rations and annuities, but kept their children away from its schools. Years of training at the Carlisle Institute proved futile as returning students could not find enough jobs at the agency and were soon living in their parents' camps again. There the spiritual leaders, through the Ghost Dance, peyote ceremonials, and other rituals, sought to extend traditional forms of religious renewal into the reservation milieu. Besides the medicine men, Indian women seem to have been the keepers of the sacred traditions. The camps continued to be the center of traditional Indian life even after allotments of land in severalty were made.

Indians continued to visit other camps and reservations, with or without the required passes, while hunting and stealing horses along the way. Agents watched incredulously as an Indian family in grief gave away all of its possessions. To them these were signs of the Indians' low position on the scale of civilization, and justified their continued efforts to transform them into individualized farmers, stripped of their tribal identity.

While controlling the quantity and quality of change in this way, Indians responded to the agent's program in a manner suited to their individual and tribal needs. Whether ranching, farming, leasing their land, tanning hides, freighting supplies, or serving as Indian policemen or judges on the Court of Indian Offenses, most tribesmen made accommodations in order to survive. The agents, however, valued these activities for their presumed power to deaden the qualities that made the Indian what he was so that he might enter American society as an acculturated White man. We have seen this pattern on all five reservations. Therefore it may be safe to generalize that under the conditions of the post-Civil War Indian reservations the persistence of tribal traditions gave Indians the strength to confront the government assimilation policy on their own terms, not as passive victims of the governments overwhelming power.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III

¹Francis Paul Prucha, *American Indian Policy in Crises: Christian Reformers and the Indian, 1865-1900* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), pp. 228-229.

²*Ibid.*, p. 231; and Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The Indian in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 235.

³Henry M. Teller, "Debate in the Senate on Land in Severalty," in *Americanizing the American Indian: Writing by "Friends of the Indian," 1880-1900*, edited by Francis Paul Prucha (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 134.

⁴D. S. Otis, *The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands*, ed. with an introduction by Francis Paul Prucha (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973), p. 50.

⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 51-54.

⁶Washburn, *Indian of America*, pp. 234-235.

⁷Prucha, *Crises*, p. 152.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 241.

⁹Brian W. Dippie, *The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1982), pp. 162-164.

¹⁰Prucha, *Crises*, pp. 243-245.

¹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 242-243.

¹²Dippie, *Vanishing American*, pp. 174-175.

¹³Lyman Abbott, "Criticism of the Reservation System," in Prucha, *Americanizing the American Indian*, pp. 35-36; also see Prucha, *Crises*, p. 245.

¹⁴Prucha, *Americanizing the American Indian*, p. 27.

¹⁵Prucha, *Crises*, pp. 248-249.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 249-250; Henry E. Fritz, *The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), pp. 211-212.

¹⁷Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The Assault on Indian Tribalism: The General Allotment Law (Dawes Act) of 1887* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1975), pp. 53-57; and Loring Benson Priest, *Uncle Sam's Stepchildren: The Reformation of United States Indian Policy, 1865-1887* (New York: Octagon Books, 1969), pp. 241-247.

¹⁸Prucha, *Crises*, pp. 252-255; and Otis, *Dawes Act*, p. 179.

¹⁹C. C. Painter, in Prucha, *Americanizing the American Indian*, p. 255.

²⁰Henry L. Dawes, "Defense of the Dawes Act," in Ibid., p. 107.

²¹Otis, *Dawes Act*, p. 82.

²²Prucha, *Crises*, p. 257.

²³Priest, *Uncle Sam's Stepchildren*, p. 249.

²⁴Roy W. Meyer, *History of the Santee Sioux: United States Indian Policy on Trial* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), p. 396.

²⁵AR of CIA, 1887, Cramsie, 28.

²⁶Ibid., 28-29.

²⁷Meyer, *Santee Sioux*, pp. 237-238.

²⁸AR of CIA, 1889, Cramsie, 143-144.

²⁹Ibid., p. 143.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 146, 143.

³¹AR of CIA, 1891, John W. Waugh, 317; also AR of CIA, 1889, Cramsie, 140.

³²AR of CIA, 1892, Waugh, 350.

³³AR of CIA, 1894, 1893, Ralph Hall, 217; 229.

³⁴AR of CIA, 1885, Cramsie, 26.

- ³⁵ AR of CIA, 1893, Hall, 229-230.
- ³⁶ AR of CIA, 1895, Hall, 228-229.
- ³⁷ Louis L. Pfaller, O.S.B., *James McLaughlin: The Man with an Indian Heart* (New York: Vantage Press, 1978), pp. 203-204.
- ³⁸ AR of CIA, 1897, Hall, 213.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 211; AR of CIA, 1900, F. O. Getchell, 309.
- ⁴⁰ Meyer, *Santee Sioux*, p. 240.
- ⁴¹ Francis E. Leupp, *The Indian and His Problem* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910), p. 26.
- ⁴² Henry L. Dawes, "Defense of the Dawes Act," in Prucha, *Americanizing the American Indian*, p. 103.
- ⁴³ Arrell Morgan Gibson, *Oklahoma: A History of Five Centuries* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981), pp. 173, 176.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 174.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 175, 176, 179.
- ⁴⁶ Prucha, *Crises*, p. 389.
- ⁴⁷ Donald J. Berthrong, *The Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal: Reservation and Agency Life in Indian Territory, 1875-1907* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), pp. 148-149. The Cherokee Outlet was included in their Medicine Lodge Treaty reservation of 1867, but was informally ceded through Grant's 1869 Presidential Proclamation reservation.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 150.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 151.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 161-162.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 168, 1975.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 164-167.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 169-170.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 181-182.

- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, Chapter VII, esp. p. 207.
- ⁵⁶ AR of CIA, 1894, A. E. Woodson, 231.
- ⁵⁷ Berthrong, *Ordeal*, pp. 197-198.
- ⁵⁸ AR of CIA, 1893, Woodson, 247.
- ⁵⁹ AR of CIA, 1894, Woodson, 232.
- ⁶⁰ AR of CIA, 1895, Woodson, 243.
- ⁶¹ AR of CIA, 1897, Woodson, 224; and AR of CIA, 1895, Woodson, 243.
- ⁶² AR of CIA, 1895, Woodson, 243.
- ⁶³ AR of CIA, 1897, Woodson, 225.
- ⁶⁴ AR of CIA, 1899, Woodson, 225.
- ⁶⁵ AR of CIA, 1898, Woodson, 235.
- ⁶⁶ AR of CIA, 1899, Woodson, 284; and AR of CIA, 1894, Woodson, 235.
- ⁶⁷ AR of CIA, 1895, Woodson, 245.
- ⁶⁸ AR of CIA, 1894, Woodson, 235.
- ⁶⁹ AR of CIA, 1897, Woodson, 229.
- ⁷⁰ Berthrong, *Ordeal*, pp. 212-214.
- ⁷¹ AR of CIA, 1899, Woodson, 285.
- ⁷² AR of CIA, 1894, Woodson, 235.
- ⁷³ AR of CIA, 1897, Woodson, 225-226.
- ⁷⁴ AR of CIA, 1900, Stouch, 326.
- ⁷⁵ "Commissioner's Journal," Ser. 3731, 55th Cong., III Sess., *Senate Document 77*, Vol. 7, p. 10.
- ⁷⁶ William T. Hagan, *United States-Comanche Relations: The Reservation Years* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 206-207.

- 77 "Journal," p. 23.
- 78 Ibid., p. 14.
- 79 Ibid., p. 12.
- 80 Ibid., p. 19.
- 81 Ibid., p. 20.
- 82 Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, pp. 202-204.
- 83 Ibid., pp. 210-211, 251.
- 84 "Journal," p. 31.
- 85 Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, pp. 210, 214.
- 86 Ibid., p. 206; also "Journal," pp. 18, 50.
- 87 Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, pp. 213-214; also Forest D. Monahan, Jr., "The Kiowa-Comanche Reservation in the 1890s," *The Chronicles of Oklahoma* 56 (Winter 1957-1968).
- 88 William T. Hagan, "Quanah Parker," in *American Indian Leaders: Studies in Diversity*, ed. R. David Edmunds (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1980), p. 187.
- 89 William T. Hagan, "Kiwias, Comanches, and Cattlemen, 1867-1906," *Pacific Historical Review* (August 1971):351.
- 90 AR of CIA, 1890, Charles E. Adams, 186.
- 91 AR of CIA, 1892, George D. Day, 387.
- 92 Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, p. 219.
- 93 Hagan, "Kiwias, Comanches, and Cattlemen," p. 355.
- 94 AR of CIA, 1895, Frank D. Baldwin, 251.
- 95 Ibid., p. 252.
- 96 AR of CIA, 1897, Baldwin, 231; Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, pp. 241-242.
- 97 Dippie, *Vanishing American*, p. 79.
- 98 Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, pp. 231-238.

- ⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 238-239.
- ¹⁰⁰ AR of CIA, 1897, Baldwin, 233.
- ¹⁰¹ Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, p. 255.
- ¹⁰² AR of CIA, 1898, W. T. Walker, 237; AR of CIA, 1899; 1990, James F. Randlett, 288; 332.
- ¹⁰³ AR of CIA, 1900, Randlett, 332.
- ¹⁰⁴ Hagan, *U.S.-Comanche Relations*, pp. 268-269.
- ¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 266, 272.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 286-287.
- ¹⁰⁷ Dippie, *Vanishing American*, pp. 162-164.

SOURCES CONSULTED

Government Documents

- U. S. Department of Interior. Office of Indian Affairs.
Annual Reports, 1879-1900.
- U.S. Department of Interior. Board of Indian Commissioners.
Annual Reports, 1879-1900.
- U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. House Ex. Doc. No.
17, 48th Cong., 2d sess., 1882, serial 2261. House Ex.
Doc. No. 16, 48th Cong., 2d sess., 1884, serial 2261.
- U.S. Congress. Senate. Senate Ex. Doc. No. 77, 55th Cong.
3d sess., 1899, serial 3731.

Books and Articles

Athearn, Robert G. *William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956.

Bailyn, Bernard; Davis, D.B.; Donald, D. H.; Thomas, J. L.; Wiebe, R. H.; and Wood, G. S. *The Great Republic: A History of the American People*. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1977.

Bass, Althea. *The Arapaho Way: A Memoir of an Indian Boyhood*. New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc./Publisher, 1966.

Battey, Thomas C. *The Life and Adventures of a Quaker Among the Indians*, 1875.

Berkhofer, Robert F., Jr. *The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present*. New York: Vintage Books, 1978.

Berthrong, Donald J. *The Southern Cheyennes*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963.

_____. "Cattlemen on the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation, 1883-1885." *Arizona and the West* 8 (Spring 1971):5-32.

_____. *The Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal: Reservation and Agency Life in the Indian Territory, 1875-1907*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976.

_____. "Legacies of the Dawes Act: Bureaucrats and Land Thieves at the Cheyenne-Arapaho Agencies of Oklahoma." *Arizona and the West* 21 (Winter 1979):335-354.

Briggs, Harold E. "The Great Dakota Boom, 1879 to 1886." *North Dakota Historical Quarterly* 4 (January 1930):78-108.

Brown, Joseph Epes. *The Sacred Pipe: Black Elk's Account of the Seven Rites of the Oglala Sioux*. Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1953. (Reprinted, Baltimore: Penguin Books 1971.)

_____. Stevensville, Montana. Conversation, October 1982.

- Buntin, Martha, "Beginning of the Leasing of the Surplus Grazing Lands on the Kiowa and Comanche Reservation." *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 10 (September 1932):369-382.
- Cutler, Lee. "Lawrie Tatum and the Kiowa Agency, 1869-1873." *Arizona and the West* 13 (Autumn 1971):211-244.
- Dale, Edward E. "Ranching on the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation, 1880-1885." *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 6 (March 1928):35-59.
- _____. "The Cheyenne-Arapaho Country." *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 20 (December 1942):360-371.
- DeMallie, Raymond J. "The Lakota Ghost Dance: An Ethnohistorical Account." *Pacific Historical Quarterly* Vol. L1, No. 4 (November 1982):385-405.
- Dimock, Janet. "The Effect of United States Land Allotment and Religious Politics on American Indian Culture." *Historical Journal of Western Massachusetts* 1 (Fall 1972):18-33.
- Dippie, Brian W. *The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy*. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1982.
- Dyer, Mrs. D. B. *Fort Reno*. New York: G. W. Dillingham, 1896.
- Edmunds, R. David, ed. *American Indian Leaders: Studies in Diversity*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980.
- Ellis, Richard N. *General Pope and U.S. Indian Policy*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970.
- Fehrenbach, T. R. *Comanches: The Destruction of a People*. New York: Knopf, 1974.
- Fritz, Henry E. *The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963.
- Gibson, Arrell M. *Oklahoma: A History of Five Centuries*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981.
- Gilles, Albert S., Sr. *Comanche Days*. Dallas: SMU Press, 1974.
- Grinnell, George Bird. *The Cheyenne Indians*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923. (Reprinted, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972.)

- Hagan, William T. *Indian Police and Judges: Experiments in Acculturation and Control*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
- _____. "Kiowas, Comanches, and Cattlemen, 1867-1906." *Pacific Historical Review* (August 1971):333-355.
- _____. *United States-Comanche Relations: The Reservation Years*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
- Hoebel, E. Adamson. *The Cheyennes: Indians of the Great Plains*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960.
- Hoxie, Frederick E. "The End of the Savage: Indian Policy in the United States Senate, 1880-1900." *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 55 (Summer 1977):157-179.
- Jones, Oakah L. "The Origins of The Navajo Indian Police, 1872-73." *Arizona and the West* 8 (Autumn 1966):225-238.
- Jordan, H. Glenn; and Holm, Thomas M. ed. *Indian Leaders: Oklahoma's First Statesmen*. Oklahoma City: Oklahoma Historical Society, 1979.
- Joseph, Alvin M., Jr. *Now That the Buffalo's Gone: A Study of Today's American Indians*. New York: Knopf, 1982.
- La Barre, Weston. *The Peyote Cult*. Fourth Enlarged Edition. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1975.
- Lamar, Howard; and Thompson, Leonard, ed. *The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.
- Leupp, Francis E. *The Indian and His Problem*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910.
- McLaughlin, James. *My Friend the Indian*. Introduction by George Bird Grinnell. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926.
- Mardock, Robert W. *The Reformers and the American Indian*. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1971.
- Marriott, Alice. *Ten Grandmothers*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1945.
- Meyer, Roy W. *History of the Santee Sioux: United States Indian Policy on Trial*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967.

- Miner, H. Craig. "A Corps of Clerks'" The Bureaucracy of Industrialization in Indian Territory, 1866-1907." *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 53 (Fall 1975):322-331.
- Miner, H. Craig, and Unrau, William E. *The End of Indian Kansas: A Study of Cultural Revolution, 1854-1871*. Lawrence, Kansas: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1978.
- Momaday, N. Scott. *The Way to Rainy Mountain*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1969.
- Monahan, Forrest D., Jr. "The Kiowa-Comanche Reservation in the 1890's." *The Chronicles of Oklahoma* 56 (Winter 1967-1968):451-463.
- Nye, Wilbur S. *Carbine and Lance: The Story of Old Fort Sill*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1937.
- Otis, D. S. *The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands*. Edited, with an Introduction by Francis Paul Prucha. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973.
- Pfaller, Louis L., O.S.B., ed. *The Microfilm Edition of the James McLaughlin Papers*. 37 Rolls and two Index Rolls. Richardton, North Dakota: Assumption Abbey Archives.
- _____. "The Indian Scare of 1890." *North Dakota History* 32 (Spring 1972):4-17,36.
- _____. *James McLaughlin: The Man with an Indian Heart*. New York: Vantage Press, 1978.
- Peterson, Karen Daniels. "The Writings of Henry Roman Nose." *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 42 (1964-65):458-478.
- Powell, Peter John, Father. *People of the Sacred Mountain: A History of the Northern Cheyenne Chiefs and Warrior Societies, 1830-1879, With an Epilogue, 1969-1974*. 2 Vols. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981.
- _____. St. Augustine's Center for American Indians, Chicago, Illinois. Interview, 11 February 1982.
- Priest, Loring Benson. *Uncle Sam's Stepchildren: The Reformation of United States Indian Policy, 1865-1887*. New York: Octagon Books, 1969.

- Prucha, Francis Paul. *American Indian Policy in Crises: Christian Reformers and the Indian, 1865-1900*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976.
- _____, ed. *Americanizing the American Indian: Writing by the "Friends of the Indian," 1880-1900*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973.
- Rahill, Peter J. *The Catholic Indian Missions and Grant's Peace Policy, 1870-1884*. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1953.
- Robinson, Doane. "Sioux Indian Courts." *South Dakota Historical Collections* 5 (1910):402-414.
- Robinson, Elwyn B. *History of North Dakota*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966.
- Scott, Hugh L. *Some Memories of A Soldier*. New York: Century, 1928.
- Seeger, John H. *Early Days Among the Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians*. Edited by Stanley Vestal. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979.
- Seymour, Flora Warren. *Indian Agents of the Old Frontier*. New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1941.
- Spicer, Edward H. *A Short History of the Indians of the United States*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1969.
- _____. *The American Indians*. Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982.
- Tatum, Lawrie. *Our Red Brothers: and the Peace Policy of President Ulysses S. Grant*. Foreward by Richard N. Ellis. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970.
- Trenholm, Virginia Cole. *The Arapahoes: Our People*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970.
- Unrau, William E. "The Civilian as Indian Agent: Villain or Victim?" *The Western Historical Quarterly* III (October 1972):405-420.
- Utley, Robert M. "The Celebrated Peace Policy of General Grant." *North Dakota History* 20 (July 1953):121-142.

- _____. *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891*. New York: Macmillan, 1973.
- Wallace, Earnest, and Hoebel, E. Adamson. *The Comanches: Lords of the Southern Plains*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952.
- Washburn, Wilcomb E. *The Indian in America*. New York: Harper and Row, 1975.
- _____, ed. *The Assault on Indian Tribalism: The General Allotment Law (Dawes Act) of 1887*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1975.
- Webb, Walter P. *The Great Plains*. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1931.
- Wiebe, Robert H. *The Search For Order, 1877-1920*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1967.
- Wissler, Clark. *Indian Cavalcade, or Life on the Old-Time Indian Reservations*. New York: Sheridan House, 1938.
- _____. *Indians of the United States*. Garden City: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., 1966.
- Zwink, T. Ashley. "On the White Man's Road: Lawrie Tatum and the Formative Years of the Kiowa Agency, 1869-1873." *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 56 (Winter 1978-79):431-441.