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INTERACTION AMONG SOME SEATO POWERS:  
AN EFFECT ON SEATO

by

Jack Andrew Quilico

B.S., Eastern Montana College, 1953

Presented in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of


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
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## PREFACE

My interest in what we call Southeast Asia and, in particular, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization began some time ago. Part of my Naval service was spent in the general area, but it was during the 1959-1962 Laotian Crisis that my professional interest was most particularly aroused. Press reports during the period of the crisis were inconclusive and my curiosity concerning the diplomatic moves of our country and its allies made me wonder what was taking place behind the scenes. The subsequent settlement of the crisis raised serious questions concerning the efficacy of the SEATO alliance that had been in effect since 1955.

In pursuit of answers to my questions I used the standard sources of data contained in the University library and then found it necessary to pursue more elusive aspects on their home grounds. Through arrangements made with the United States State Department I was able to travel extensively throughout some SEATO nations. Although travel arrangements could not be made to enter Pakistan at this time, I was able to make a study in Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Singapore, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, India, Nepal, Lebanon, Greece, Italy, France and Germany. The success of the trip was due in no small

measure to the excellent cooperation that was obtained from the embassies and missions during the course of the trip.

Of particular note was the seven days I was able to spend in Bangkok at the SEATO Headquarters, where every aid and courtesy was extended by the staff of the Secretariat. His Excellency, the Honorable General Jesus Vargas, Secretary General of SEATO, was most kind in letting me interview him on three separate occasions. These meetings with various officials lent deep insight into the various countries outlooks.

I am indebted to the Chairman of the Political Science Department at the University of Montana, Dr. Leo Lott, to Dr. Forest L. Grieves, and to Sally A. Vogel who served on my committee and gave aid and comfort. Any conclusions presented here are, of course, my own responsibility.

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## Chapter 1

### INTRODUCTION

History has recorded the formation, and then extinction, of many organizations that were brought together to bring some form of security to the collective membership. At the heart of almost every formation of any organization has been the expectation that the member-units perceived that they would receive from such membership. If, on one hand, they failed to receive what they perceived to be "right and proper," then membership desirability would decline.

It is becoming increasingly obvious that SEATO,<sup>1</sup> The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, is a victim of the disillusionment that sets in when member-units of such an organization have failed to receive enough of those true benefits for which they were originally organized.

Contiguity is not a critical qualitative factor in the formation of any organization; it nevertheless can be expected to play an important role, depending on other factors which may or may not be in co-incidence. While one of the underlying premises of this study is that the

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<sup>1</sup>See Appendix B for abbreviations used in this paper.

dis-contiguity of the member-units is an important factor in what has been and is happening to SEATO,<sup>2</sup> the major premise is that the "out-side" issues of the SEATO members have so dominated individual attention as to render effective cooperation within the organization increasingly impossible because of a conflict of political considerations.

SEATO is at best a consultive organ, but more importantly it requires unanimity prior to any action that needs to be taken by the organization. It therefore follows that there must be some type of common thinking or like-mindedness on the part of the participants if any agreement is to be reached. Increasingly, however, factors external to SEATO have created a dysfunctionism which has caused deterioration to set in. The national interests of the members, on an individual basis (particularly France, Britain and Pakistan), have been redirecting their major focus of foreign policy away from Southeast Asia, and hence away from SEATO.

While granting the importance of a detailed study of the internal political structure of the individual states which make up the SEATO body, it is necessary to confine this discussion to a study of the interaction among some SEATO states as they reacted to specific political events on the international scene. The thesis then poses the

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<sup>2</sup>See Appendix A for meetings of the organization.



general question as to whether or not the individual country reactions to the specific political events examined later on in any way contributed to the general decline in attitude toward SEATO by those same countries. It should be readily recognized that a decline within the SEATO powers in regard to country attitudes toward stated SEATO goals has set in. The question at hand is what has been the cause or causes to make this happen.

An overview of the past and present together is necessary to correlate what is taking place. The political phenomenon is an elusive thing. For the most part, it can be illogical to both participants and viewers. While the goals of one nation or unit may "appear" to be most logical to their intended aspirations, given the conditions of the times, they might be quite contradictory to "naturally assumed" allies.

Politics and people are indivisible, bringing into focus a sum or totality of environment and conditions. What must be remembered is that these conditions are the handiwork of time and events, and that what occurs in the present is the result of what has transpired in the past.

Such a truism formed the background for those units and actors which came together to form SEATO.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>The terms "actor," "state," and "unit" are used interchangeably. The term "actor" is also used for an individual.

Many political developments have taken place prior to and since the formation of SEATO. If total precedence were placed on "formal" political events such as conferences, meetings, and the like, resultant conclusions could prove deceptive or, at the least, superficial.

The Geneva Conference preceded the Manila Conference. The Berlin Conference preceded the Geneva Conference, and the Bermuda Conference preceded the Berlin Conference. By themselves, these political events are important, and, taken together, they begin to form a picture of interaction among the various states of the Global System. But this is not enough to form a true analysis.

A feeling for History, as Churchill put it, is essential. But other ingredients and factors must also be added to obtain as complete a picture as possible. Events, political ones in particular, do not just come about. People make them, and there are forces working behind them that cause them to act in the manner that they do.

What about the leaders or actors of these nations: what was their background; at what stage in their political careers were they; what were some of the motives that guided them? Who, individually or collectively, had "bargaining power"? These are questions that should be looked into. At the same time, it is essential that a perspective is given to this, for much of the discussion hinges on how the separate leaders of the SEATO nations saw SEATO in relation to how it would benefit their own particular nation.

The Manila Conference occurred one and one half months after the Geneva Conference, which had met primarily to discuss the Korean and the Indo-China questions. That the two are interrelated should not be subject to question. However, it does not necessarily follow that the creation of SEATO at the Manilla Conference was a direct outgrowth of the results of the Geneva Conference.

Causal factors emerged as a force behind this political move on the part of the United States under the directorship of former Secretary of State Dulles to create SEATO. A quick explanation of two items can perhaps best simplify and delimit the dichotomy that was present at the time in Washington: the establishment of a "peaceful" status quo, and the recognition that there was now on the global scene a power that could upset what had supposedly been achieved on the battlefield, "victory for democracy."

First, there was (and perhaps still remains) a persistency on the part of the victors at the conclusion of World War II to "create" a new world order. Having established some modicum of stability with their victory, they sought a restoration of the status quo, and to give legitimacy and "legalize" that condition, formed the universal body of the United Nations. In this way, the powerful victors, having permanent seats in the Security Council of the United Nations, could wield effective use or control of coercive power to put down any state or

grouping of states that sought to upset this balance now supposedly achieved.

Second, having come to realize that it was one among their own group of victors (the Soviet Union) that sought to change the status quo, and it being a strong power,<sup>4</sup> the next "logical" step was to create some sort of force or deterrence that would dissuade any overt challenge to the balance of power that had been established. To do this would require some collective force that would be credible. The creation of NATO,<sup>5</sup> as a "shield" to Europe was their answer. This was the beginning of the general policy of containment and encirclement which was to be followed by SEATO and, ultimately, by the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO). Good and necessary as this economic plan and later protective shields were, it nevertheless set in motion certain social, economic, and political forces which continue to affect world relations.

Many observers would classify the split which exists between East and West as ideological. Some of those same people would mark this split as being distinct by the end

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<sup>4</sup>The Soviet Union is generally accredited with the title of "superpower" after her acquisition of a nuclear device (September 23, 1949) with credible means of delivery.

<sup>5</sup>NATO came into being April 4, 1949. It has 15 member states: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, West Germany. (Greece, Turkey, and West Germany were later signatories to the Treaty.)

of World War II and at the beginning of the Soviet Union's push into Eastern Europe.

An ideology had taken root in a previously backward country (Russia). That society had now emerged and asserted itself not only internally, but through ideology externally as well.

World War I shattered empires in Europe. World War II shattered empires all over the globe, and colonialism was being cast aside. Millions of people were now forged into newly formed states, notwithstanding the fact that many of these newly-formed entities did not even have an indigenous professional or college graduate within their population<sup>6</sup> with which to make the crudest sort of a beginning of a modern political infrastructure.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares (3rd rev.; New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 288, 298-299. See also John G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations: World Politics in Our Time (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 127-129. For an Asian view see Ayub Khan, "Pakistan Perspective," Foreign Affairs, XXXVIII, No. 4 (July, 1960), 548. See also Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Islam and National Integration in Pakistan," Asian Political Systems: Readings on China, Japan, India, Pakistan, ed. Betty B. Burch and Allan B. Cole (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1968), p. 340.

<sup>7</sup>Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 11. The editors argue effectively that any society, no matter how primitive, has political structure. However, in the "competitiveness" that exists in the Global System, one criterion for success and achievement would be a more advanced form of political structure with the ramifications that go along with it.

Peoples previously held back by the superimposition or dominance of alien cultural values (including coercive power) now had some opportunity to readjust their newly obtained independence with their own societal values.<sup>8</sup>

It was with this type of background that SEATO, under the guiding hand of John Foster Dulles, American Secretary of State, came into being.

Events, bearing directly and indirectly on the countries uniting in SEATO, occurred rapidly. Europe had had its "Soviet" scare, NATO was born, the Warsaw Pact was created, Chiang Kai-shek fled from the mainland of China and Mao Tse-Tung was in power. The Netherlands were in the throes of trying to re-establish colonial control over the Dutch East Indies (later Indonesia), and were meeting mounting resistance in their efforts. The French were engrossed in the same process in Indo-China. And finally, the Korean War had begun, helping to some degree in the

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<sup>8</sup>Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (2nd ed.; Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 31, 76-77, 191. See also Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins, International Relations: The World Community in Transition (3rd ed.; New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), pp. 448-449; Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (4th ed.; New York: Alfred Knopf, 1967), pp. 83-86; A. G. K. Organski, World Politics (2nd ed.; New York: Alfred Knopf, 1968), pp. 29, 189. For an Asian view see Ayub Khan, "Pakistan Perspective," Foreign Affairs, XXXVIII, No. 4 (July, 1960), 548. See also Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Islam and National Integration in Pakistan," Asian Political Systems: Readings on China, Japan, India, Pakistan, ed. Betty B. Burch and Allan B. Cole (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1968), p. 340.

election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States because of his promise to go there and bring peace.

The passage of eight years since the end of World War II, created, in certain quarters in the United States, an intense feeling of hostility toward the Soviet Union and the Communist menace it was felt to represent. The era of "McCarthyism" was a manifestation of this attitude.<sup>9</sup> On top of this also lay a mixed feeling of betrayal through the loss of mainland China to a Communist regime. The cases of Owen Lattimore, Alger Hiss, and Whittaker Chambers revealed some of this feeling.

With the introduction of "Chinese volunteers" on a massive scale into the Korean conflict against American and allied forces, it may be easily understood why the electorate of the United States reacted in the anti-Chinese (Communist) and anti-Russian fashion as it did. John Foster Dulles, appearing on the political and diplomatic scene at this time, gave expression to these feelings through an American anti-communist, foreign policy, which met with no objection from President Eisenhower.

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<sup>9</sup>Excellent accounts of this stage are given in D. F. Flemming, The Cold War and Its Origins (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1961), Vol I, pp. 331-540; Vol. II, pp. 543-706. See also John Lukacs, A New History of the Cold War (3rd. ed.; Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., 1962), pp. 58-136. For more detailed account of this period see chapters 21, 22, 29, 34, 38, 57, and 70 of Dean Acheson, Present at Creation (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969). See also Wayne S. Cole, An Interpretive History of American Foreign Relations (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 521-542.

Elsewhere, politics were in flux. France, during the continuing period of the Fourth Republic, still suffered from domestic instability, which from 1950 to the end of the Geneva Conference saw eight governments come and go. In many respects, it was a tragic replay of the 1930's when similar political instability marked the French Third Republic.

England, with a semblance of stability, nevertheless faced mounting economic problems. Before World War II, the English pound sterling was probably looked upon as the most stable currency in the world and the one currency upon which world traders pegged their transactions. With the tremendous expenditures in men, material, and other resources that World War II cost the English, the pound sterling has never really recovered its preferred status.<sup>10</sup> Since the war, two

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<sup>10</sup>F. S. Northedge, British Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962), pp. 33-39. "Britain's economic plight at the end of World War II was extremely grave. One fourth of her national wealth had been used up in fighting the war" ( 7,300 million). On August 21, 1945, President Truman signed a proclamation ending lend-lease. This put an even heavier burden on the British: 4,200 million of British foreign assets had been sold to help pay for arms aid. "Britain, a recipient of nearly two thirds of all lend-lease was now expected to assume liability for supplies in transit or in British hands or waiting to be delivered under existing contracts. The shock of this decision, effected without consultation with the British Government, was such that Churchill, now leader of the Opposition, said he could not believe it was the last word of the United States on the subject. . . ." The result was that a loan was arranged ( 930 million) with 2 per cent interest. In addition, Britain had to agree to terms that: she undertake to make sterling freely convertible into other currencies not later than twelve months after the loan agreement came into force; not to apply quantitative restrictions



devaluations of the pound have marked its decline. At one time, the Bank of England could probably have withstood any abnormal run on the pound. That situation no longer existed and major stabilizing measures were brought to bear from international sources such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. Britain's economy was spent, and an increased trade was necessary to gain its goal of recovery.

For centuries England had reigned supreme as a world power. Two World Wars, irrespective of the fact that they were victorious, had bled the British to the point where they were nearly fiscally prostrate. From the heights of world prominence and leadership, the British now found themselves in a very definitely lowered position with regard to big power consultations on world affairs. It was a position that they were not used to.

At the same time, the vaunted Empire that England had had, was fast disappearing as country after country broke away to establish its independence. A definite decline had set in for the British that they found hard to stop or even slow down.

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discriminatingly against dollar goods, which implied that any British restrictions on purchases from the United States applied in order to conserve dollars would have to extend to imports from every part of the world; consented to enter into negotiations with countries holding British sterling liabilities with a view either to scaling them down or refunding them; from the American point of view this would have the effect of diverting to the dollar market the import demands of countries holding sterling balances which they might otherwise liquidate by purchases in Britain.

If anything, the Suez adventure of 1956 (which will be fully discussed later) could be viewed as a last desperate attempt on the part of the British to re-instate themselves as a world power with which to be reckoned.

As is to be pointed out, United States' reaction to this British move, along with the French and Israelis, came as a shock to the British. This was further compounded by the manner in which the United States treated British interests in the United Nations in obtaining a cease-fire and subsequent withdrawal of combatant forces from the canal area. A British "dream" of the "Imperial Lifeline" was broken for all time to come. What had been a British bastion in South Asia and the Far East was long gone. Now, the symbolic link itself was irretrievably broken.

The closing of the Berlin Conference (January 25-February 19, 1954) in which the United States, Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain participated, brought with it the decision to set up a meeting of states at Geneva to work out details for a general peace in Korea. Communist China (over the objections of Dulles) was made party to the conference<sup>11</sup> which also was to deal with the Indo-China situation.

The Berlin Conference had been concerned mainly with European issues--NATO pressures on the Soviet Union, German

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<sup>11</sup>Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), pp. 84, 99.

reunification, and the European Defense Community (EDC). Here, there was some disagreement among the allies. France was under pressure from both Britain and the United States to implement the EDC so that there could be a greater "military solidarity" against any "potential" aggressor. France was hesitant as it was a desire of the French leaders to maintain a military superiority over the West German nation.

At the Geneva Conference (April 26-July 21, 1954), the differences that were beginning to appear among the allies showed themselves to an even greater degree.

Dulles had begun to sound out various powers concerning a form of collective defense arrangement for the Far East. But his timing was bad, and he was being opposed by the British.<sup>12</sup> The main British view was that any formation of a "bloc" of defense in Southeast Asia should await developments at Geneva so as not to compromise the talks.

There was an incongruity about these events, for although the American position was to set up some type of defense in Southeast Asia against the Communist enemy, China, the allied (this refers mainly to Britain, France,

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<sup>12</sup>Britain, still remaining with her policy of contact with the Commonwealth, had found that Nehru was adamantly opposed to the formation of any type of bloc arrangement in Southeast Asia. See Northedge, op. cit., p. 30. See also John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), pp. 210-211. See also "Did U.S. Almost Get Into War?" U.S. News and World Report, June 19, 1954, pp. 35-39.

and the United States) unity which was essential for the success of any type of venture such as this, was being severely tested upon strictly European questions.<sup>13</sup> The "allied" position could not have appeared more futile.

At Geneva, the end came quickly for the French. Dien Bien Phu fell during the conference, and the Laniel Government collapsed. Pierre Mendes-France, the new French Premier, stated that he would end the stalemate at Geneva in one month or resign. The impasse was broken, and a cease-fire agreement with subsequent new alignments of the Indo-China states was made.

The United States, free of commitments at Geneva,<sup>14</sup> now concentrated on the establishment of what was to become SEATO. The invited states met at Manila to fashion the details for this new bulwark against Communism. Present were Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States. The SEATO Treaty and corresponding Pacific Charter were the result of this Manila Conference. That result was a "consultive" agreement.

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<sup>13</sup>Tang Tsou, "The American Political Tradition and the American Image of Chinese Communism," Political Science Quarterly, LXXVII (December, 1962), 571-572. See also Bernard Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1966), pp. 461-462. See also "Why Diplomats Are in Trouble," U.S. News & World Report, May 21, 1954, pp. 25-38.

<sup>14</sup>The United States did not sign the Geneva Agreements, but instead, General Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State, made an oral declaration that the United States would adhere in principle to these agreements.

SEATO should be looked at in the overall perspective of the general political questions that were then dominant, and not in the false light of being a new entity in the Asian area, or even of being the "final" pact that finished the encircling containment of Communism in Eurasia.

The gathering of these diverse states into SEATO was a crude amalgamation--Dulles' attempt to complete some kind of a "containment" of the Communist menace that he saw. That Communism was expanding depends on one's frame of reference. Dulles' grouping together of these states, in addition to being a mistake in timing, was also a miscalculation of the nature of the units he brought together.

There can be no denial that at least in Australia and New Zealand such a "breakaway" move from dependency on Britain to closer association with the United States was welcomed. SEATO could be viewed as the culmination of the "Pacific Defense Pact" that Dulles had envisioned during the negotiations on the Japanese Peace Treaty.<sup>15</sup> It was in some ways complementary to the ANZUS Treaty. As Leicester C. Webb, writing in SEATO: Six Studies, points out repeatedly, Australia and New Zealand were far from satisfied in the roles that their countries had previously played in the overall British picture of Empire defense. In the two great wars, Australian and New Zealand troops had been taken

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<sup>15</sup>Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (New York: University Press, 1969), p. 66.

from the Pacific area and transferred to the European and/or Middle Eastern area. The defeat of British forces in Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore during World War II by the Japanese and the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse--the main strength of the British fleet in the Far East--brought home the fact to Australia and New Zealand that they had to find some type of arrangement that would give them a better security arrangement than they had had previously within the British Commonwealth.

Britain was opposed initially to the creation of the ANZUS pact. When she later tried to gain membership on at least an observer basis, the application was rejected.<sup>16</sup> But even this turn of events should not be taken at face

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<sup>16</sup>Leicester Webb, "Australia and SEATO," SEATO: Six Studies, ed. George Modelski (Melbourne, Australia: F. W. Cheshire), p. 55. "In the British House of Commons Winston Churchill, answering Labor attacks, said that he 'inherited a certain situation' but that he had 'never concealed the fact' that he regretted the manner in which the ANZUS Pact had developed. . . . At the time the pact was signed the British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, told the House of Commons that 'it would not have been unwelcome to us if we had been included in the proposed pact,' but that it was quite clear that the discussions would not work out this way. . . . Between 22 and 26 September, 1952 military representatives of the parties of the Pact met in Honolulu and at the same time the United Kingdom let it be known that a request that British observers should attend the meetings had been rejected. For this decision the Australian and New Zealand governments were strongly attacked in Parliament and the Press. Both governments refused to disclose whether the exclusion of the United Kingdom had been at the instance of the United States and emphasized that the decision had been unanimous. In this connection it seems that main instigation came from the American Government." See Acheson, op. cit., pp. 686-688.

value as a full satisfaction of Australian and New Zealand desires. So far, no governmental references are available indicating whether or not the ANZUS pact actually represented a quid pro quo for the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty with which they were displeased.

The Australians, New Zealanders, and Filipinos could be expected to go along with an American direction that would place emphasis in the Pacific area. However, even in the case of the Philippines, there was some reluctance to enter into such a collective pact as can be noted in this interview with Philippine President Magsaysay:

INTERVIEWER: Communism may not be a great menace in the Philippines now, but isn't it a danger elsewhere in Asia, and hence a threat to the Philippines? Do you think there is any need for a Pacific defense pact, possibly modeled after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?

MAGSAYSAY: Right now, it is difficult for us to enter into any such alliance because we have our own problems here, and they are difficult to solve. We have homework to do. Our house is leaking very badly. If we don't repair our house, the Communists would not need an invasion force to capture the Philippines; we would simply go under because of our weaknesses. Unless we do something about land tenancy--if there is corruption in the government, if we can't give our people three square meals a day, shelter and a piece of land--then we'll wake up some morning and find that the Communists have taken over. It won't be an army coming from the Chinese mainland either, but our own hard core Communists capitalizing on our failures. . . . Of course I am interested and always have been interested in the security of the Pacific, because that directly affects us. I feel, however, that it is important that we first attend to our own problems before anything else. Anyway, most of us have mutual-defense pacts with the United States, and each of us can contribute our share

to the security of the Pacific by complying with our obligations under those pacts.<sup>17</sup>

Britain and France, on the other hand, were less interested in the Pacific area. Britain still had her base in Singapore and had understandings with Malaya, Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak, and was, within the Commonwealth, committed to Australia and New Zealand.

Although the problem of colonialism in North Africa was beginning to trouble the French, the chief problems as they saw it remained in Europe. EDC was at the same time a political, military, and economic problem that threatened allied solidarity. German rearmament without restrictions was anathema to the French. The high stakes involved in being a world power meant that both Britain and France must belong to the "nuclear" club. The problem, though, was the cost involved.

There was little meaning in France joining SEATO. A French presence in Southeast Asia after Dien Ben Phu could now be only on an economic level. Militarily, the French Army had had staggering losses, "the cream of its regular officers dead or crippled, the rest of them embittered and thinking little else but applying upon their own country

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<sup>17</sup>"Driving the Communists Out of the Philippines," an Interview with Ramon Magsaysay, President of the Philippines, U.S. News & World Report, April 23, 1954, pp. 72-78.



the same revolutionary-warfare methods as the Viet-Minh had used upon them."<sup>18</sup>

The plight in which both Laniel and Mendes-France found themselves at Geneva was humiliating. Another "diplomatic" setting in Manila would not remove this blow which had befallen France. Perhaps Bernard Fall says it best:

And Bidault, like France herself, stood there alone. The delegations of the three little Indo-Chinese states of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam were of little help at this juncture. The British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was the co-chairman (with Russia) of the conference and, in view of Britain's role in the Indo-China conflict during the recent weeks, barely on speaking terms with his French colleague. As for the United States delegation, the Secretary of State, in one of his repeated confusions between the appearance and reality of American prestige, had preferred to return to the United States and leave the American delegation in the capable but less prestigious hands of his Under Secretary, General Walter Bedell Smith. Bidault was reported to have said to an associate that he had come to Geneva with "a two of clubs and a three of diamonds" as his only diplomatic cards. As he looked around him before he began to speak, at his fellow Western diplomats and their embarrassedly down-cast eyes and at the Communist diplomats staring at him unblinkingly, he was the very picture of France's loneliness in her defeat.<sup>19</sup>

The United States was the chief architect of the Manila Conference (SEATO), and Thailand was perhaps the only power attending that was fully in accord with United States' wishes. But even the Thais did not obtain what they really

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<sup>18</sup>Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 223.

<sup>19</sup>Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, pp. 423-424.

wanted. For SEATO become (Article IV of the Treaty, Appendix C) a "consultive" body, and not the NATO-like structure that the Thais wanted. There were no defense forces assigned to SEATO. For the Pakistanis, SEATO represented an association with a "military" alignment that would somehow offset the insecurity they felt with regard to India.

### The Brecher Concept

The trials and tribulations of SEATO may be somewhat explainable if viewed in the framework of Michael Brecher's theory of Dominant v. Sub-dominant systems. In this context, then, the treaty area of SEATO actually becomes subsidiary to the more internal concerns of the various powers of SEATO.

This does not mean that a base cause of SEATO troubles does not in reality stem from the ideological conflict that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union. A causal determinant might be closer to the truth of the situation if it can be determined what direction the individual nations are taking, and whether that direction is, if not coincidental, at least not in major conflict with the stated goals of SEATO.

If we can accept Michael Brecher's view, and at this point of time there would seem to be much validity in it, then it should be assumed for purposes of analytical probing that the concept of a "rivalry" or conflict between

the various systems does in fact exist and serves as a base motive for other factors which appear on the international scene.

If we can assume that this has some basis in fact, then we must look at this base problem in a longer time continuum (longer in fact than the 15 years of SEATO existence). If then such a "yardstick" is used, we can perhaps see the more basic and complex problem emerging that in reality is masked over by moves in other quarters.

While the base problem is not the focal point of this paper, it nonetheless serves as a primary factor when considering the way the power makeup of SEATO and its "environmental" fluctuation fits in when the actions of the individual powers or participants are viewed.

There are many demands which are both implicit and explicit in the maneuverings of the states which are going on at present. If we can use both the struggle between East and West and the evolution of the Brecher theory as a somewhat liberal frame of reference, then we can perhaps better understand the moves which are taking place within the entity that is SEATO.

Professor Brecher in an article on Southern Asia makes the point that there are five definable Subordinate Systems in the world--Southern Asian, Middle Eastern,

American, West European, and West African.<sup>20</sup> At the same time he postulates that there is a superior Dominant System which is made up of the two superpowers. A further definition of levels is made within the Subordinate Systems, indicating some strengths and weaknesses of the various members. It is within this "structure" that the action and interaction of the various members of the systems, both Dominant and Subordinate, take place.

If Brecher's concept of the "Southern Asia system" is accepted, it then follows that his further definition of the makeup of that system must also be used:

(1) its scope is delimited, with primary stress on a geographic region; (2) there are at least three actors; (3) taken together, they are objectively recognized by other actors as constituting a distinctive community, region, or segment of the Global system; (4) the members identify themselves as such; (5) the units of power are relatively inferior to units in the Dominant System, using a sliding scale of power in both; and (6) changes in the Dominant System have a greater effect on the Subordinate system than the reverse.<sup>21</sup>

Just as the sub-systems are different according to their own particularistics, so too are the nations and actors that make up the sub-systems. Determinants of power (as A. F. K. Organski describes it) or elements of power (as Hans J. Morgenthau describes it) can be important when trying to make an evaluation of the moves and counter-moves

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<sup>20</sup>Michael Brecher, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (Rev. ed.; New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 156.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 157.

that the nations make. Geography, national resources, industrial capacity, population, national character, national morale, quality of government--all of these go into the complex makeup of the societies and cultures that in turn creates the nation-state, which combined with other contiguous counterparts, makes up the sub-system.<sup>22</sup>

It is highly useful, and even necessary, to understand these individual differences between the varied states that make up SEATO. Such tools or determinants as these Political Scientists use are meaningful, for if used properly, they can give a perspective to the sometimes blurred international picture. It is from these basic sources that most goals of the nation-states are evolved.

The argument here is that, from the beginning of SEATO, there were two misjudgments, one at the subordinate level, the other at the sub-system level. The subordinate error was that Britain and France, although client units of the Dominant System, were nonetheless primary members of the West European System. In this case, the West European System and Dominant System were on divergent courses rather than coincidental paths. The sub-system error was that there were serious miscalculations in all four steps of the unifying force concept (see page 35), the most serious being in the recognition of the need for unity and in the rewards

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<sup>22</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (4th ed.; New York: Alfred Knopf, 1967), pp. 106-143; and A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (2nd ed.: New York: Alfred Knopf, 1968), pp. 87-189.

for grouping. It is a major contention that the organization has never surmounted these two distinct and vital misjudgments.

The United States serves as the chief elite of the Dominant System. (In the Global-Subordinate Systems, the Dominant System is classified in the Bipolar sense.) Because of its superior military might (in nuclear capability, manpower, and technology) the United States found itself as the seemingly unquestioned leader of what was then termed the "Free World." The aftermath of the war saw both Britain and France prostrate from the expenditure of resources to gain victory. Only the Soviet Union stood as a potential challenger to American leadership. With startling suddenness political developments occurred that took the shape of a confrontation between East and West blocs:

- a. The establishment of Communist governments in East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia;
- b. Soviet pressure in Iran;
- c. The Berlin blockade; and
- d. "Sovietization" of the Czech government.

American response was quick and was launched by the now famous Truman Doctrine. The Marshall Plan, which was designed to rehabilitate the European economy, quickly followed. Under General Lucious Clay, the Berlin airlift soon blunted the blockade that had been imposed. American pressure, plus Iranian adroitness, facilitated a Russian

withdrawal from the northern territories of Iran. And the final reaction to the problems of the East was the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in which an attack on one was considered an attack upon all. The counter-reaction to this move was the creation of the Warsaw Pact on May 14, 1955.<sup>23</sup>

These events gave impetus to the creation of the Bipolarity (or Dominant System) that has since dominated the international scene. This does not mean that Bipolarity was a result of these political happenings. Bipolarity had as its cause many deeper roots, of which the political occurrences were merely symptomatic, or manifestations, of underlying forces. A discussion of causal factors in the creation of Bipolarity would be the subject for a paper in itself. Pertinent to the present problem is the fact that Bipolarity was established, hence creating some of the conditions that are operative today.<sup>24</sup>

It is a premise here that because of the total resource capabilities of Britain and France (both

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<sup>23</sup>Warsaw Pact members are: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union.

<sup>24</sup>R. N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," International Politics: Introductory Readings, ed. George S. Masannat and Gilbert Abcarian (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), pp. 212-213. See also Stoessinger, op. cit., p. 175. For further discussion, see Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 335-337, and Organski, op. cit., pp. 364-367.

member-units of the West European System) that these nations act as elite lieutenants<sup>25</sup> in relation to SEATO. They are in a "superior" position to that of other members of the organization who would be classified as mere members, or client units. Another distinction that would further remove Britain and France from the role of clients within the SEATO framework is their geographic position. Theoretically, because of their total removal from the defined territorial area that comes under SEATO protection, they can only contribute some form of allocated resources rather than receive some type of reward function.

The Subordinate Systems of West Europe and America are antecedent to those of West Africa, Middle Eastern, and Southern Asia. In addition they normally have deeper roots through their contiguity than does the Dominant System, or sub-systems, which for the most part are more subject to variables in their creation. This does not mean that contiguity is a prime factor in the creation of a Subordinate System. The great number of wars in Europe, for example, argue against that. However, the factor of contiguity in association with ethnoculturism can lend a force of equilibrium that will more clearly define an area such as a Subordinate System.

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<sup>25</sup>Etzioni, op. cit., pp. 45, 329. Here the term "elite lieutenant" is substituted for "member-elite" with essentially the same meaning as the author uses. It is felt that the term "lieutenant" will more clearly mark the distinguishing feature of levels.



The West African, Middle Eastern, and Southern Asian Subordinate Systems in relation to their potential are still in an embryonic stage, due not only to the comparative newness of their formation but also to the fact that the majority of the under-developed and developing nations in the world (micro and otherwise) are located in these three systems.<sup>26</sup>

Considerations for this paper deal mainly with the Dominant, West European, and Southern Asian Systems with the SEATO units being grouped accordingly:

DOMINANT SYSTEM  
United States

WEST EUROPEAN  
United Kingdom  
France

SOUTHERN ASIA  
Pakistan  
Thailand  
Philippines

(Members of the Global System, Australia, and New Zealand do not fit into a definable Subordinate System as yet.)

World War II (as any other major conflagration) left its indelible scar upon the levels of European society. By far the greatest political effect that the war had was a shifting of the center of balance of international political decision-making away from the European capitols to Washington and Moscow. While this had a tendency to diminish the

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<sup>26</sup>An important element in consideration of these new systems is that they are the product of colonialism that has just been cast off. Political Scientists will have much to work with in charting the progress of these many and varied states and the eventual systems that they gravitate toward.

power of the Europeans<sup>27</sup> it has in no way diminished the West European System from ranking much higher than the other subordinate systems in terms of power resource.

The history of Europe has been the story of a struggle for primacy on the continent. There are a multitude of reasons for struggles by some and passiveness by others. Resource capabilities, ambitions, both national and personal, have played their role in shaping the moves that the various nations have made. To the surprise of noone, some form of this struggle is still taking place on the continent, but now it is more economical than political.

For example, the colonial empires of Britain and France served as one point of rivalry between these two states. Now that they no longer control vast empires, their rivalry must now be on the European continent. This took form with the European Economic Community (EEC) created January 1, 1958, consisting of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. Such a "union" of European states, being exclusive, meant that here was a potential economic force that must be matched or at

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<sup>27</sup>In this sense, Europe is meant as the major countries of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany who had previously dominated the continent for such a long period. (This may be somewhat of a contradiction to Henry Kissinger; I include Germany. While it may not have all of the attributes or determinants of a "Great Power," it nonetheless was a powerful political factor that had to be, and still has to be, considered.)

least checked, for the vital area of trade and general economy is of utmost concern to any modern power.

Under the leadership of Britain, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was created on January 4, 1960, in response to the "Common Market." EFTA (or "the outer seven") consists of Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

While it may be true that these two sub-systems are rivals of each other, it does not lessen the structure or diminish the West European Subordinate System. But it does point up the rivalry that exists.

The Southern Asia Subordinate System consists of Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, North Vietnam, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand.<sup>28</sup> For geographical and political reasons, mainland China is omitted from this subcontinent archipelago description.

The area and unit membership of this System are extremely important to SEATO if only for the reason that the defined territorial limits of the organization are located within this area.

Diversity of background was a distinct yet underlying factor at Manila. In a broad sense, here was a combining of elements of two Subordinate Systems, a Dominant System, and elements close to a Subordinate System. The

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<sup>28</sup>Brecher, op. cit., p. 157.

United States represents the Dominant System. Britain and France are members of the West European System, as well as being client units of the Dominant System. Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand belong to the Southern Asia System, while Australia and New Zealand, belonging to no system, are attached to the Southern Asia System geographically, while culturally, ethnically, and economically still attempting to retain ties with the West European System.

Territorial contiguity need not be a critical factor in determining the success or failure of any type of multi-state organization. However, when dis-contiguity is added to other determinants which, for the most part, are heterogeneous rather than homogeneous, it can then be anticipated that such an organizational formation has serious problems to cope with.

Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines form part of SEATO. Both Pakistan and the Philippines gained their freedom after having had some form of colonial past. Thailand, on the other hand, is the only Southern Asian state never to have suffered colonial domination.

Territorially, and from the standpoint of population, Pakistan is the largest of the three units of the Subordinate System. Notwithstanding this fact, Pakistan suffers from tremendous problems in its nation-building process, that in certain aspects, places it behind its smaller counterparts. Karl W. Deutsch ranks Pakistan sixth, the Philippines 17th, and Thailand 19th in a rank order of

what he terms human needs. In his rank order of potential power, he ranks Pakistan 27th, with the Philippines following in 38th, and Thailand, 45th. His ranking in the indicator used for human welfare finds the Philippines 87th, Thailand 93rd, and Pakistan 106th.<sup>29</sup> These, of course, are not the only indices in any nation-building process, but they do serve as an indicator of some of the problems that go into that process.

The newness of Pakistan as a nation is not the least of the problems that are pertinent here. Pakistan, like India, gained its independence (partition in 1947) on a mainly religious basis. (Pakistan is predominantly Moslem; India is mostly Hindu.)

The division of the sub-continent into the states of Pakistan and India was bloody at the onset, and the animosity engendered from this traumatic birth continues. The latest manifestation of this was the 1965 Indo-Pakistani clash in the Jammu-Kashmir dispute. Peculiar to the general nation-state system is the example of Pakistan being geographically split. The economic-communication network in a developing country is a problem, but it is immensely compounded when there is a geographic barrier placed in the way. It is further compounded when the political

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<sup>29</sup>Karl W. Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 252-270.

factors of non-cooperation of the geographic barrier (India) are added.<sup>30</sup>

Adding to the weighty problems of Pakistan is the internal schism of the Bengali, or East Pakistan area.<sup>31</sup> Whether or not an inability to cope with the problem was a factor in Ayub Khan's decision to step down is at this point conjectural. But this factor must be taken into consideration when making an assessment of the internal political makeup of today's Pakistan.

Thailand, like Pakistan, is a contiguous part of the Asian mainland. Unlike Pakistan, however, Thailand has had a long history of nationhood and no colonial domination.<sup>32</sup>

Politically, Thailand is still in a transitory period. The coup in 1932 removed the absolutism of the Royal family. Since that time, various factions of the military oligarchy have ruled Thailand, the latest being headed by Field Marshal Thanon Kittikachorn (Prime Minister).

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<sup>30</sup>In population, Pakistan is outnumbered on an approximate 4 to 1 ratio with India. See Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), pp. 185-211. See also Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins, International Relations: The World Community in Transition (3rd ed.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 62.

<sup>31</sup>The general concept for the "division of labor" is a good example here in Pakistan, for one of the chief criticisms of Rawalpindi by the East Pakistani is that they are being exploited by the West Pakistani. See Deutsch, op. cit., p. 30.

<sup>32</sup>Thailand during World War II did have a form of Japanese occupation during the Pridi regime. A measure of autonomy was retained during this period.

King Bhumiphol Adulyadej, of the House of Chakri, is the ninth monarch to ascend the throne.<sup>33</sup> The Royal House is a recognized symbol of unity in this kingdom. The present King and his wife, through their Westernized upbringing and subsequent trips throughout the world, have helped considerably in popularizing Thailand. Internally, the Royal family has also been much more involved with the Thai public than had previously been the case.

The Thais, though able to maintain their independence through the general period of European colonialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, nevertheless have had conflict on a more local basis. There have been wars with the neighboring Burmese, Lao, and Khmers (Cambodians) over the centuries. Boundary shifts and animosity have been the results which still persist today.<sup>34</sup>

The Philippines, since the close of World War II and the gaining of independence from the United States, have been in a constant state of nation-building. The United

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<sup>33</sup>King Bhumiphol became King following the strange shooting death of his brother, King Ananda Mahidol, in June, 1946. The Coronation was held in May 5, 1950. Thailand: Facts and Figures (Bangkok, Thailand: Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation, 1967). See also Valentin Chu, Thailand Today (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1968). Information was also supplied in several conversations with the Thai Ambassador to the United States, H. E. Bunchana Atthakor.

<sup>34</sup>"Thailand: Holder of the Kingdom, Strength of the Land," Time, May 27, 1966, pp. 28-34. See also "Thailand: A Fighting Ally for U.S. in Asia," U.S. News & World Report, February 27, 1967, pp. 46-48.

States, like Britain, had been a "gentle" master as regards building up the island-nation to the time when it would receive its freedom. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the Philippines has chronic economic problems that bring with it political overtones. The Philippines, even though it does enjoy a high standard of living in comparison with other Asian states, still remains in the class of a "developing" nation.<sup>35</sup>

Philippine politics, mercurial at best, chaotic otherwise, is a product of the same socio-political system that it must stabilize in order to bring some kind of solution to the vast economic problems which face the country. The prevalence of a high incidence of graft and corruption on both the governmental and non-governmental levels does not lend itself to needed reforms which must come if stability (at least on the political level) is to come about.

The Philippines, like Thailand, and Pakistan, are in a transitional stage (in the case of Pakistan and the Philippines, they must, almost, be categorized as developing nations). There are a multitude of internal problems

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<sup>35</sup>Alden Cutshall, The Philippines: Nation of Islands (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1964), pp. 46-60, 68-90. See also George S. Taylor, The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 134-145. Carlos P. Romulo, Crusade in Asia: Philippine Victory (New York: John Day, 1955), pp. 60, 91-93, 201-205, 232, 234. Carlos P. Romulo, I Walked With Heroes (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), pp. 95, 322-324.



besetting these nations, which when weighed against external demands of other powers often affect the decision that these nations make in regard to those demands. Therefore, careful attention should be given to these internal political forces.

If a failure on the part of American diplomats to recognize these problems was not a factor in the formative stage of SEATO, then, certainly, it has become one now. Failure now, on the part of American diplomats, to alter American hopes as regards SEATO in light of these problems, will do further damage to that body.

Whenever states come together to fashion some type of unifying force, be it an alliance, pact, treaty, or understanding, prerequisites for the success of such a venture dictate that certain minimal conditions should be met. Usually there are at least four implicit factors. First is the unifying or common purpose factor. Some form of credible or tangible evidence of benefit should be available to the intended units. A problem should be clearly recognizable and accepted as such on the part of all the units. Additionally within this acceptance by the member units is the willingness to contribute an individual allocation of resources to meet the agreed-upon goals of such a force. (The individual unit believes that there will be no conflict or interference with previously committed

internal and/or external functions.) The Second factor is the identive one<sup>36</sup> which includes cultural as well as ideological patterns of similarity. The third is the factor of resource development and availability.<sup>37</sup> The fourth factor is the promise of rewards. Any grouping or amalgamation must have with it some sort of incentive or reward function that will fulfill the expectancy of any single unit. This can take the form of a number of results, be they material or non-material.

The situation studies following are intended to show that, in particular, reward functions did not materialize in a number of instances, systems being in conflict, resource development on the part of some of the member-units was not activated or put to good use; and to a lesser, but still important degree, the recognizable problem that should have united all member units (military and political threat) was not in itself fully accepted by all members of the body.

There are three situational studies used in this paper to demonstrate the premise of the thesis. These are political events which occurred and had direct relationships

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<sup>36</sup>Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), p. 39. This is close to his usage though not as broad in meaning. Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 33. The term identive would have close association with the idea of interest articulation.

<sup>37</sup>This is more socio-economic oriented, including the vital stage of technological/industrial development, i.e., material/mineral availability, a definite managerial competency sector, facilities for basic research, some degree of wealth.

with various members of SEATO. They are also occurrences which, by their very nature, had profound effects on internal processes of those member-units and, in the opinion of the author, an adverse effect.

## Chapter 2

### SUEZ CRISIS

The Suez crisis took place two years after the formation of SEATO. Its location was thousands of miles distant from the Treaty territory, yet is important in the study of SEATO in that it involved the three elites of SEATO--Britain, France, and the United States. It involved, in other terms, a "conflict" between the Dominant System and units of a Subordinate System, and to a lesser degree another sub-system--NATO.

While the leadership in the United States was the same at the time of Suez as when SEATO was formed, in Britain, the then Foreign Secretary under Winston Churchill was now the Prime Minister; and in France, Guy Mollet, a Minister to Mendes-France, was now Premier. Relatively, then, the same participants were involved.

There were divided interests. Britain saw the takeover of Suez by Nasser as a direct threat, both economically and politically. The French saw Nasser's action as a further threat to Algeria, its remaining colony in North Africa. The United States, on the other hand, viewed the reactions of their allies as endangering the U.S. policy of bettering relations with the Arab states. (Arab feeling

against the United States in view of withdrawal of promised aid in building the High Aswan Dam was strong.) Not at any time since the formation of SEATO or afterward had such an issue so openly split the three elite states.

At this time also the beginnings of British withdrawal in the area of Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore was making itself felt. In 1951, the ANZUS Pact was concluded between Australia, New Zealand and the United States with the British left out completely.

In 1956, the British saw to their dismay the United States acting in a manner that they perceived to be quite opposite to their own basic national interest, the safeguarding of the once regarded "Imperial Lifeline."

Karl Deutsch's point on the formation of foreign policy certainly applied to the British at this time. He states that "The foreign policy of every country deals first with the preservation of its independence and security, and second with the pursuit and protection of its economic interests (particularly those of its most influential interest groups)."<sup>1</sup>

By 1951, Britain had given up nearly all vestiges of the colonialist trappings of imperialism. Only a few outposts of Crown Colonies were left of that former, glorious Empire that in the Nineteenth Century caused the remark:

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<sup>1</sup>Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 87.

"We hold a Vaster Empire than has been."<sup>2</sup> That which remained of what had been the Empire was now transformed into the larger and more autonomous Commonwealth or had broken off into independent nations cut off from all ties to the former mother country.

This reduction of empire, irresistible as it may have been what with the pressure of peoples for an independent status, had not come about without objections on the part of the British hierarchy<sup>3</sup> or a reduction in British power and prestige on the world scene. Empires often have the attribute of "dying hard," and it was, perhaps, no different with the British Empire than it had been with other empires.<sup>4</sup> Whether viewed from the point of vested industrial interests in Britain, that saw the units of the Empire as a steady source of materials and profit, or in a purely nostalgic sense, those "elites"

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<sup>2</sup>Statement on a Canadian stamp of 1898 in reference to the British Empire.

<sup>3</sup>Winston Churchill on one occasion remarked that "I did not become the King's First Minister to see the dissolution of the Empire." John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations (14th ed.; Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1968), p. 924.

<sup>4</sup>While it is recognized that those peoples who severed ties as colonies did so mostly under peaceful conditions, as opposed to the French example of Algeria and Indo-China, the point is valid that a considerable amount of British public opinion did not wish to see this change come about.

or leaders of the government viewed this cutting of ties with great reluctance.<sup>5</sup>

It should not be surprising, therefore, that Suez, the very "symbol" of British power and prestige in their prime, should produce this strong reaction on the part of the British elite segment. The nationalization of the Canal by Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser was anathema to Anthony Eden. It should never be forgotten that Eden took great pride in having been a participant in the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936.<sup>6</sup>

Suez had for years represented the "Imperial life-line" to British holdings in the Far East, especially India, and much British blood had been shed in the defense of the Suez Canal. Aden, on the Southern entryway to Suez, still remained a link to the past, while the oil-rich Arab principalities of Q'tar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the Trucial states represented an investment of millions of pounds to British interests, and had to be protected.

The relationship of Suez to the British might be equated to Panama's relationship to the United States. It is conjectural what the United States reaction would be if there should be a threat to the Panama Canal. Dulles and Eisenhower, therefore, should have been more perceptive in

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<sup>5</sup>A majority of lands and peoples dissolved ties with the Crown under the Labor Government of Clement Attlee.

<sup>6</sup>Eden, op. cit., p. 248.

anticipating that the British would not be in any sort of a bargaining mood while Suez was at stake. Unless the action were pro-British anything Dulles and Eisenhower did, however much in the name of "peace," would continue to widen the gulf between the leaders of the two countries.

The American view concerning the growing tension of Suez was conveyed in several letters that President Eisenhower forwarded to Prime Minister Eden:

From the moment that Nasser announced nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, my thoughts have been constantly with you. Grave problems are placed before both our governments, although for each of us they naturally differ in type and character. Until this morning, I was happy to feel that we were approaching decisions as to applicable procedures somewhat along parallel lines, even though there were, as would be expected, important differences as to details. But early this morning I received the messages, communicated to me through Murphy from you and Harold Macmillan, telling me on a most secret basis of your decision to employ force without delay or attempting any immediate and less drastic steps. . . . For my part, I cannot over-emphasize the strength of my conviction that some method must be attempted before action such as you contemplate should be undertaken. . . . I have given you my own personal conviction, as well as that of my associates, as to the unwisdom even of contemplating the use of military force at this moment.<sup>7</sup>

Momentous political developments were taking shape during that year. The Suez Crisis, the Hungarian uprising and the American Presidential election were all to fall approximately at the same time period and were to have their global ramifications. Eisenhower had informed Eden of his

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<sup>7</sup>Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-1961 (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), p. 664.



reservations on the use of force, and his general lack of enthusiasm for any precipitate British action which he felt would not be backed by American public opinion.<sup>8</sup>

Further developments in the crisis caused Eisenhower to write again to Eden:

I am afraid, Anthony, that from this point onward our views on this situation will diverge. As to the use of force or the threat of force at this juncture, I continue to feel as I expressed myself in the letter Foster carried to you some two weeks ago. Even now military preparations and civilian evacuation exposed to public view seem to be solidifying support for Nasser which has been shaky in many important quarters. I regard it as indispensable that if we are to proceed solidly together to the solution of this problem, public opinion in our several countries must be overwhelming in its support. I must tell you frankly that American public opinion flatly rejects the thought of using force, particularly when it does not seem that every possible peaceful means of protecting our vital interests have been exhausted without result. Moreover, I gravely doubt we could here secure Congressional authority even for lesser support measures for which you might have to look to us.

I really do not see how a successful result could be achieved by forcible means. The use of force would, it seems to me, vastly increase the area of jeopardy.  
 . . .<sup>9</sup>

This letter was dated September 2, 1956, while the date of the former letter was July 21, 1956. There was increased diplomatic activity. Dulles, on orders from Eisenhower, journeyed to London and Geneva to convey to the allies the American position.<sup>10</sup> Eisenhower in a letter of

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 667.

<sup>10</sup>Beal, op. cit., pp. 265-271.

September 8, 1956, was again to reinforce Dulles by direct communication to Eden:

Whenever, on any international question, I find myself differing even slightly from you, I feel a deep compulsion to re-examine my position instantly and carefully. But permit me to suggest that when you use phrases in connection with the Suez Affair, like "ignoble end to our long history" in describing the possible future of your great country, you are making of Nasser a much more important figure than he is.

We have a grave problem confronting us in Nasser's reckless adventure with the Canal, and I do not differ from you in your estimate of his intentions and purposes. The place where we apparently do not agree is on the probable effects in the Arab world of the various possible reactions by the Western World. . . .<sup>11</sup>

A later communication, on October 30, 1956, more clearly defined the gulf that existed between the American position and that of Britain and France:

When on Monday actual military moves began, we quickly decided that the matter had to go immediately to the United Nations, in view of our Agreement of May, 1950, subscribed to by our three governments.

Last evening our Ambassador to the United Nations met with your Ambassador, Pierson Dixon, to request him to join us in presenting the case to the United Nations this morning. We were astonished to find that he was completely unsympathetic, stating frankly that his government would not agree to any action whatsoever to be taken against Israel. He further argued that the tri-partite statement of May, 1950, was ancient history and without current validity.

Without arguing the point as to whether or not the tri-partite statement is or should be outmoded, I feel very seriously that whenever any agreement or pact of this kind is in spirit renounced by one of its

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<sup>11</sup>Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 669.

signatories, it is only fair that the other signatories should be notified. . . .<sup>12</sup>

Besides the distinct differences that each of the Allied leaders felt concerning the situation, there also existed a difference in what each of them felt was the actual reasons for the stand that they took.<sup>13</sup> At least one thing was clear: there was not going to be any recognition by the United States of the tremendous stakes that the British felt were involved with Suez. It was a form of "Pax Americana" coming into the open.

The Suez crisis was muddled. Of that there can be no doubt. If one views the proceedings strictly from the point of Anglo-American cooperation on the world scene, it was a disaster. However, another element, the personal relationships of the individuals involved, should be examined. There was a decided animosity between Dulles and Eden; this even took the form of the British leaders

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<sup>12</sup>Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 212-217. Hughes records Eisenhower making several remarks concerning the allied powers: ". . . 'Damn it, the French, they're just egging the Israeli on--hoping somehow to get out of their own North African troubles. Damn it, they sat right there in those chairs three years ago, and we tried to tell them they would repeat Indochina all over again in North Africa. And they said, "Oh, no! That's part of metropolitan France!"--And all that damn nonsense. . . . (of British action) I just can't believe it, . . . I can't believe they would be so stupid as to invite on themselves all the Arab hostility to Israel. . . . (in terms of British relations with Washington) Are they going to dare us--dare us--to defend the Tri-partite declaration?'"

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 219.

suggesting to Washington that Dulles not be appointed Secretary of State.

Sometimes there is a fine line that separates the "objectivity" of policy making from the personalities of those involved in making the decisions. While it would be unwise to state that the "seeming" uncooperative attitude on the part of American leaders was due to this form of personality conflict, this clash of minds should be kept in focus as events continued.

How the British felt had been indicated by Eden on as early an occasion as a speech in January, 1952, delivered at Columbia University:

The American and British people should each understand the strong points in the other's national character. If you drive a nation to adopt procedures which run counter to its instincts, you weaken and may destroy the motive force of its actions. This is something that you would not do--to an ally on whose effective cooperation we depend. . . .<sup>14</sup>

Eden, not without self vanity, had taken over the Prime Ministership at a time when his party was being subjected to continual criticism from the Laborites (the Tories had defeated the Labor Government four years previously). Following the footsteps of so giant a British leader as Churchill was no easy task for anyone. In addition, he was facing strong criticism from elements within his own party for "appeasement."<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Northedge, op. cit., p. 190.

<sup>15</sup>Anthony Sampson, Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity (Harmondsworth, England: C. Nicholls & Company, Ltd., 1968),

Eden was to reveal the depth of the differences that separated his government from that of the United States in his memoirs:

The course of the Suez Canal crisis was decided by the American attitude toward it. If the United States Government approached this issue in the spirit of an ally, they would have done everything in their power, short of the use of force, to support the nations whose economic security depended upon the freedom of passage through the Suez Canal. They would have closely planned their policies with their allies and held stoutly to the decisions arrived at. They would have insisted on restoring international authority in order to insulate the canal from the policies of one country. It is now clear that this was never the attitude of the United States Government. Rather did they try to gain time, coast along over difficulties as they arose and improvise policies, each following on the failure of its immediate predecessor. None of these was geared to the longterm purpose of serving a joint cause.<sup>16</sup>

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p. 117. "The case of Eden, with some help from hindsight, is more explicable. By early 1956, after only a few months as Prime Minister, Eden was facing ugly Tory discontent: he was accused of weak government by the Daily Telegraph; he was infuriating his colleagues with his fussiness and interferences; and, more dangerous--in spite of his old fame as an anti-appeaser--he was coming under heavy fire for appeasing both the Russians (over Indo-China) and the Arabs. It was a time heavy with humiliation for the Conservative right wing, particularly in the Middle East. The arch-enemy was Nasser, who seemed at that time to many people in both parties to be part of a great Russian plot to sweep into the Persian Gulf and Africa. Eden was very vulnerable to criticism. It was he who had negotiated the 'scuttle' (as Churchill called it) from the Suez base in 1954--with the help of Selwyn Lloyd--and who assured the Tories that Nasser could be trusted." See also AP dispatch, Argus Leader (Sioux Falls), August 2, 1956, p. 1. Eden accuses Nasser of "broken faith and broken promises."

<sup>16</sup>Eden, op. cit., p. 512. See also AP dispatch, Argus Leader (Sioux Falls), August 3, 1956, p. 1. "Dulles flew home from London--hopes that the issue can be settled. A conference of the states involved is being called in about two weeks to discuss the problem." See also AP dispatch, Argus Leader (Sioux Falls), August 4, 1956,

If ever a diplomat, statesman, elite, government leader gave an example to fit the words of Deutsch in his foreign policy description, it was Anthony Eden. Here he described his attitude not only toward the leadership in the United States, which he felt had turned away from him, but also toward the crisis that he felt that his nation faced. It was upon this perception that the British leadership acted, in concert with French leadership.<sup>17</sup>

Suez represented then an issue that the British considered vital to their national interests. When the issue was brought before the Security Council of the United Nations, the British used their veto for the first time in direct opposition to an American-sponsored resolution.<sup>18</sup>

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p. 1. Quoting Dulles: "Some people had advocated immediate forcible action--such action would have violated UN principles, led to the spread of violence and endangered world peace."

<sup>17</sup>Eden, op. cit., p. 485. ". . . Pineau now declared that his Government were unanimous in desiring urgent and decisive action. The Suez Canal had been built by the French. Moreover, the repercussions of Nasser's actions touched France closely in another and vital sphere. From the first, Pineau emphasized the effects that it would have in Algeria and upon the entire French position in North Africa. If Egypt were allowed to succeed in grabbing the Canal, the Algerian nationalists would take fresh heart. They would also look to Egypt for backing, which they would certainly receive, both in arms and clamor. France could not permit this threat to develop. We agreed with M. Pineau's forecast and supported his views. . . ."

<sup>18</sup>Eden, in Full Circle, chronicles the events within the UN regarding the Suez crisis. In his description of the vote within the Security Council to transfer the subject to the General Assembly he declared that the crucial seventh vote necessary to pass the resolution was cast by the United States. He fails to take into account the fact that

United States actions seemed to disregard British concern over the issue. Where British leadership had felt that at worst the American attitude would have been one of pained indifference, the actual pressures, diplomatic and otherwise, that the Americans used on the British, French, and Israelis proved to be a rude shock. Such tactics as stipulating a cease-fire on the part of the British prior to an American loan to ease the run on the pound sterling did not for instance set well. The placement of American warships of the Sixth Fleet to act as an "accidental" barrier to British and French fleet operations added to the overall picture of non-cooperation on the part of the United States.<sup>19</sup>

Where the issue is held to be as vital as the Eden government viewed it to be, then it is inevitable that the American reaction to this affair served to humiliate the British and thus strain the relationship that existed between the two governments. The same strain was also felt by the French, for they perceived that they had just as high a stake in the Suez affair as did the British.

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Nationalist China (casting a similar vote) might not have done so if Britain had not recognized mainland China previously.

<sup>19</sup>Sampson, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-124. See also Hugh Thomas, *Suez* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 144-146. See also AP dispatch *Argus Leader* (Sioux Falls), October 31, 1956, p. 1. The United States Sixth Fleet was helping in the evacuation of United States citizens. Units of the fleet moved to the Mediterranean ports of Egypt and Israel.

"Nasserism" was an idea that was beginning to take hold, not only in the Middle East, but North Africa as well. Anything that stirred Arab nationalism was anathema to the French, for nationalism was the very thing that could weaken and even destroy their hold on Algeria as well as spelling trouble for their economic return to the areas of Lebanon and Syria.

In terms of alliances, the Suez crisis produced the event of the United States, ally of Great Britain and France in NATO and SEATO, working against her own allies to side with the raison d'etre of these alliances, the Soviet Union.

The more nation-states are involved in external interests, i.e., other systems, alliances, etc., the more varied or broader must be their scope. Purely nationalistic interests serve to narrow one's room for maneuvering; for what one nation perceives to be a necessary goal that must be pursued, some other nation may view as something to be opposed--it being in conflict with its own perceived interests. If such a conflict of interest exists, and the two or more nations are joined in a system or alliance, then, depending on how strong the motivations are for continuing these courses, that system or alliance must inevitably suffer at the expense of the nationalistic interest.

The Suez Affair cannot be postulated as "the" reason for the differences that now separate some of the



member-units of SEATO. But it is important. Fundamental to any of these situational crises is the ever-present aspect of how those member-units view the ideological conflict between the Dominant System and the "menace" of Communist aggression; the "demands" that each Subordinate System extracts from its own membership as a "price" for primacy within that system, and the ever-present competition with each other that some of the member-units find themselves in.

The Suez Affair may be viewed in this context. While the bonds that had bound Britain, France, and the United States together for so long a time may not have been severed over this quarrel, it nonetheless must be looked at in the sense that a gap had been made to which other differences of opinion and policy could only help widen.

## Chapter 3

### LAOTIAN CRISIS

The Laotian conflict of 1959-1962 provides further insight into these differences that divided the thinking of the elites of SEATO. Not only is it important from that aspect, it was highly relevant to the whole idea of SEATO, for here was a conflict situation existing right in the defined Treaty area. It should also be taken into account that Laos was in fact a Protocol State, and therefore had a direct linkage with SEATO, as well as being geographically within the Treaty area.

There was trouble in Laos as the 50's ended and the 60's began. The government in Vientienne was clearly trying to prevent a collapse of order in the government-controlled portions of the country. The Pathet-Lao was an observable entity. North Vietnamese forces were operating in Laotian territory and the United States and the Soviet Union once again were involved as Superpowers interested in an area they each considered vital. In the background Peking, now at ideological odds with Moscow, was giving aid to Hanoi.

On March 27, 1961, the SEATO Council of Ministers convened the seventh SEATO Council meeting in Bangkok. Its communique, issued March 29, 1961, is interesting for what

is said about Laos, but more interesting for what it failed to mention.

The resolution contained in the first part of the communique (in particular paragraph six) was expressed in strong language. Indeed, this resolution, and the communique issued at the special meeting of the Council of Ministers in Washington, D.C., September 26, 1959,<sup>1</sup> were the strongest statements ever issued by the SEATO organization about a development within its treaty area.

What was not revealed in the communique was the lack of unanimity for action within the council. Because of this division of opinion, the organization could take no steps. In particular, timing and/or reluctance on the part of the British delegation, headed by Sir Alec Douglas Home, prevented any actional unanimity. Britain, as Co-chairman of the previous Geneva Convention (the Geneva Conference of April 26, 1954, through July 21, 1954, the Soviet Union being the other Co-chairman), was awaiting a reply from the Soviet Union about an appeal to be directed mainly at Hanoi

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<sup>1</sup>"SEATO," Select Documents on International Affairs: No. 8 (Canberra, Australia: Queen's Printer, Department of External Affairs, June, 1966), p. 47. "Considering that the situation in Laos is one which might endanger the peace of the area, members of SEATO will continue to consult under the Manila Pact on measures which should be taken for the common defense. In the event of its becoming necessary to defend the integrity of Laos against outside intervention, SEATO has made preparations so as to be able to act promptly within the framework of the Manila Treaty."

for a cease fire in Laos. As they had earlier stalled formation of SEATO until after the Geneva Conference, the British once again deferred action that might compromise or sabotage the response they hoped to receive from the Soviets.

The French, under the delegation leader M. Maurice Couve de Murville, Minister of Foreign Affairs, were just as resolved not to become involved, fearing entanglement in another Indo-China war.<sup>2</sup>

The American position at this time was far from secure. John F. Kennedy had taken over the presidency in January, 1961, and was still setting up his administration. On April 17, 1961, Cuban refugees (with clandestine American help) attempted an ill-fated invasion in the Bay of Pigs with the hope of toppling Fidel Castro from power. It failed two days after the President made the decision not to intervene militarily. Kennedy had inherited a growing American concern over Laos from the Eisenhower administration. Theodore Sorensen recalls: "'Whatever's going to happen in Laos,' the President-elect said to me in Palm Beach, 'an American invasion, a Communist victory or whatever, I wish it would happen before we take over and get blamed for it.'"<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 195. Also see Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 644.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 640.

When one refers to the "Laotian crisis," it is almost necessary to ask, "Which one?" Since the ending of World War II, Laos had seen almost constant strife, with only intermittent periods of peace.

If the strife in Laos can be grouped into phases, then the first phase of conflict arose from the French attempt to re-impose mastery over its former colonies in Indo-China. A period of nine years marked by strife followed before the French, bowing to the inevitable, withdrew as a colonial power from this part of the world.<sup>4</sup>

Resistance, in whatever form it takes, can breed new groupings and attitudes that are far different from those which generated the conflict. This is dependent on (1) how homogenous or heterogenous such groups are at the beginning, and (2) the point on the "development scale" of the various entities or societies. The latter point carries the implicit question of the state of advancement of their political infrastructures. Resistance can also harden or rigidify previously soft or fluid positions. The reaction to the attempted French imposition did just this for the various peoples in the Indo-China peninsula. Where previously some sort of higher role than a French protectorate or territory might have met political demands, such a solution was soon inadequate. When the French, in a

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<sup>4</sup>Results of the 1954 Geneva Conference.

desperate attempt to forestall calamity, sought such a political "incorporation," it was then too late, for the nationalist groupings which the resistance had spawned wanted nothing less than complete independence. Foremost among these nationalist groups was the Vietminh under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh.<sup>5</sup>

In Laos, the three Princes, Souvanna Phouma, Souphanouvong, and Boun Oum na Champassak, and the King, Sisavang Vong, represented the ruling group. The King, however, held little actual power and served mainly in the role of a national symbol or unifying figure. Laos, although small in population, is far from a homogenous society. It is fragmented by ethnic and religious divisions.

Racially, the country is composed of Lao, Kha, Meo, Black, White, and Red Tais, and to a lesser degree by Moi, Thais, Khmers, Mans, and Lolos.<sup>6</sup> There is a relationship between the Lao and the Thais (Siamese) and the Shans of Burma. During the past centuries, warfare between the Lao

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<sup>5</sup>D. F. Fleming, op. cit., pp. 661, 667-673. See also Bernard S. Morris, International Communism and American Policy (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), pp. 99-100; and Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., pp. 60-78; and Michael Field, The Prevailing Wind: Witness in Indo-China (London: Methuen & Company, Ltd., 1965), pp. 36-67, 41-42.

<sup>6</sup>Dommen, op. cit., pp. 3-5, and Field, op. cit., pp. 30-32.

and their neighbors dominated the fortunes of the then small Kingdom of Luang Prabang. (Luang Prabang, now the Royal capitol of modern-day Laos, is a province and received its name from the Buddha which was placed in the main temple--"Town of the Golden Buddha").<sup>7</sup>

The original Kingdom of Lan Xang broke up into the smaller kingdoms of Luang Prabang, Vietienne, Champassak, Xieng Khouang and lesser states. The kingdoms of Luang Prabang, Vietienne, and Champassak survived the feudalistic struggle.

In contemporary times, it is the Kingdom of Luang Prabang that warred with the Thais and the Vietnamese, and to some degree with the Burmese; Vientienne and Champassak with the Vietnamese kingdom of Annam; and Champassak with the Khmers (Cambodians). The people are divided almost equally between Buddhism and Animism.<sup>8</sup>

Souvanna Phouma and his half brother Souphanouvong represent the Royal House of Vientienne. Boun Oum represents the Royal House of Champassak. To a large degree, the polarizing of the ambitions of Princes Souphanouvong and Boun Oum triggered the second phase of the Laotian strife. In place of a united front against the French, that front was fragmented into the usual trial of several

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 14-15.

contestants for internal control. It could be said that this was the Laos of old in a new setting.

The people in the Indo-China peninsula exhibit great complexity and diversity. Quiet and peaceful as the Laotians are, it would be a mistake to assume that in the latter part of the Twentieth Century the various societies with the Lao country and outside of it have plateaued or reached any equilibrium. Change is still taking place. It was against this background that the locale of Laos was brought into the general resistance picture by the Vietminh.<sup>9</sup>

Ho Chi Minh and General Giap did not achieve the final liberation that they had fought for and sought at the conference table in Geneva in 1954. With Ngo Dinh Diem (former Premier, and then President of South Vietnam) consolidating his hold within South Vietnam, it was inevitable that pressure would be placed on the Saigon regime. To meet logistical requirements it was necessary that the narrow confines of the seventeenth parallel be broached. The easiest way to accomplish this was to go westward into the central regions of Laos. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was created to funnel supplies and men southward.<sup>10</sup> The Pathet-Lao,

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<sup>9</sup>In this sense the term "Vietminh" is used to denote all of the followers of Ho Chi Minh and all movements within the general national liberation organization.

<sup>10</sup>Rober Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1967), pp. 119-120. And see Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., p. 318.



supported by both regulars and irregulars from North Vietnam, used the Northern Lao territories of Phong Saly and Sam Neua as a grouping or staging area. From here it was fairly simple to move westward and southward against Royalist forces.

While the existence and use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail was clearly a breach of the Geneva accords, neither Laos, South Vietnam, nor the United States (after August 4, 1964) ever used this violation as a pretext to make a military movement against it. Only movements in the north of Laos occasioned the recognition that violations of the Geneva accords were taking place against the Royalist regime.<sup>11</sup> Military recognition was also given to the fact that should the combined forces of the Pathet-Lao and the North Vietnamese so choose, they could very easily overrun all of Laos.<sup>12</sup>

Souphanouvong is generally credited with being the leader of the Pathet-Lao. While the Pathet-Lao are generally Lao people, it was the foreign addition of the North Vietnamese's far superior forces that triggered the denunciations from Vietienne.

In trying to reach some accommodations with all factions,<sup>13</sup> agreements were worked out whereby the various

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<sup>11</sup>Hilsman, op. cit., p. 91.      <sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 131.

<sup>13</sup>Here, for the sake of simplicity (and also in accordance with most other writers), Souphanouvong and the Pathet-Lao are labeled "leftist," Souvanna Phouma, "neutralist," and Boun Oum and his followers, "rightist."

ministries of the Government were divided among the rival parties. Usually this would work for a period of time and then break down when one rival felt he did not have a key ministry. Then instability would occur with the jockeying of the various military sides. Territory would be fought over. In the northern area of Laos this would usually be for the strategic *Plaines de Jares*.<sup>14</sup>

For two reasons this was an intolerable situation. First, if pro-Communist forces were to take over Laos, then the Communist frontier would be moved right to the boundary of Thailand. This the Thais were determined would not happen.<sup>15</sup> Secondly, a chain-reaction effect was starting to make itself felt. With the increased tempo of military activity in South Vietnam by Ho Chi Minh and the increasing activity of forces in Northern Laos, the United States was beginning to take more of an interest in the area. Both the Soviet Union and Red China were supporting Hanoi in its bid to "drive the imperialists out." However, the Soviet Union and Red China had now come to ideological loggerheads, and each was trying to outdo the other in its support of

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<sup>14</sup>AP dispatch, Argus Leader (Sioux Falls), January 2, 1961, p. 1. ". . . Boun Oum announces that Communist forces advanced on Laos' strategic plains--creating a threat to the Royal seat at Luang Prabang and the Administrative capital."

<sup>15</sup>Bangkok dispatch, Manchester Guardian, December 29, 1960, p. 5, col. 2.

national liberation fronts. It was a battle to see who would emerge as the leader of the Communist forces in the world. Such a struggle inevitably led to increased Russian support of Pathet-Lao forces. This then represented a threat to the United States, which, since 1951, had mutual defense arrangements with the protocol states.

The United States under the Eisenhower administration had invested much money and aid in Laos.<sup>16</sup> The situation in Laos was deteriorating militarily, and with increased pressure from the Thais, the United States made several warnings concerning United States interest in the continued sovereignty of Laos.<sup>17</sup> The activity of the Pathet-Lao and its supporters had been on the increase since 1959. Now, with Washington, Moscow, and Peking involved also, the situation quickly spread into an international rather than a local situation.

Rightist forces under Prince Boun Oum succeeded in gaining control of the government. Since they represented the anti-Communist faction of the country, United States

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<sup>16</sup>The American Almanac: 1970 (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1970), p. 791.

<sup>17</sup>AP dispatch, John Hightower, Argus Leader (Sioux Falls), January 1, 1961, p. 1. "A statement approved by President Eisenhower sharply warned Red China and North Vietnam against armed intervention in Laos. . . . The United States is committed by Treaty to help meet the common danger 'in event of aggression in Southeast Asia.'" See also U.S. Superintendent of Documents, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1960-1961 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 626, 641.

support gravitated toward their side. The fact that Boun Oum did not have the internal support militarily and politically to stay in power necessitated a later shift in American policy.<sup>18</sup> This did not detract from the fact that the Pathet-Lao and its supporters were making increasing incursions into what was considered to be government-controlled territories. The result was a call from the United States to the SEATO powers.<sup>19</sup>

The British reaction to the Laotian crisis was to re-establish its neutral stance and to seek a cease fire that would hopefully halt further incursions.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>There was considerable political fluctuation, including the "revolt" of Captain, later Colonel, Kong Lae. This followed the period of instability of Prince Somsanith.

<sup>19</sup>AP dispatch, Argus Leader (Sioux Falls), January 2, 1961, p. 1. "In another diplomatic step the United States called for a meeting of the 8-nation South East Asia Treaty Organization Council to discuss the crisis. The Council meets in Bangkok, Thailand and instructions for the meeting went to U. Alexis Johnson, American envoy there. The State Department also said Sunday 'We have further instructed our Ambassadors to all SEATO capitals to inform their governments to which they are accredited of these new developments in Laos and to explain the United States view that these actions warrant considerations by the SEATO Council. We have begun preliminary consultations with some of our allies here in Washington.' Under Secretary of State Livingston Merchant conferred with British Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia and with Claude Lebel, the ranking French diplomat there."

<sup>20</sup>Manchester Guardian, December 22, 1960, p. 3, col. 4 & p. 5, col. 2. "On Monday the Foreign Secretary and Lord Privy Seal made it clear that it was the British Government's hope that a broadly based government could be formed in Laos including all political leaders ready to cooperate. The British Ambassador was instructed to convey this view to Prince Boun Oum."

The members of SEATO received few answers to questions of United States intentions at this time, for the Kennedy administration was just taking over after eight years of the Eisenhower administration. It was not really known just what moves the new President would make, nor, at the beginning of the year, who his Secretary of State would be. There would be further time needed for the new President to get used to his presidency. At one time during the early part of the Kennedy administration, it was suggested that a moratorium of six months be asked of the Soviets so that the new President could adjust to the new situation.<sup>21</sup> However, political movements do not wait on American Presidents and situations had to be reviewed and decisions made.

Boun Oum's position deteriorated as his military forces, under the leadership of General Phoumi Nosovan, fell back steadily under the pressure of Pathet-Lao and North Vietnamese forces. At one time these forces were reported a mere twenty-two miles from the Royal capitol of Luang Prabang. The American alignment with Boun Oum was in jeopardy.

Pathet-Lao and North Vietnamese forces were being openly supplied by Soviet air-lifted supplies in the Sam Neua-Plaines de Jares-Phong Saly area, while American

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<sup>21</sup>Sorensen, op. cit., pp. 291-292.

air-lifted supplies were reaching the Laotians in the Southern area. The commitment of both the United States and the Soviet Union in Laos was soon to become obvious to all.

President Kennedy, on March 23, 1961, four days before the opening of the SEATO meeting in Bangkok, held a news conference in Washington, where he outlined his Laotian position. In the conference he made public his reliance on the SEATO organization:

SEATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization--was organized in 1954, with strong leadership from our last administration, and all members of SEATO have undertaken special treaty responsibilities towards an aggression in Laos.

No one should doubt our resolution on this point. We are faced with a clear and one-sided threat of a change in the internationally agreed upon position of Laos. This threat runs counter to the will of the Laotian people, who wish only to be independent and neutral. It is posed rather by the military operations of internal dissident elements directed from outside the country. This is what must end if peace is to be achieved in South East Asia.<sup>22</sup>

That reliance, as it turned out, was not met to the fullest degree by the entire membership of SEATO.

Whereas the United States had been placing its support behind the "legal"<sup>23</sup> government of Prince Boun Oum,

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<sup>22</sup>U.S. Superintendent of Documents, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 214.

<sup>23</sup>In his takeover of power, Boun Oum and General Nosavan had ousted Kong Lae, who then went over to Prince Souphanouvong and his followers. Pressure was placed on

Britain and France had given at least tacit support to Prince Souvanna Phouma, who was now no longer in the country. The remaining political leadership was the polarized factions of Boun Oum and Souphanouvong. The military fortunes of General Phoumi continued to slip, and it was becoming increasingly evident that Prince Boun Oum and his General could not hold out much longer against the mounting pressures of the Pathet-Lao and the North Vietnamese.<sup>24</sup>

To hold as much as they could of Laos for neutral territory, the West opted for an international conference on Laos after a cease fire had been called for and achieved. The Communist powers, to gain more territory and consolidate gains already made, held off for as long as possible in answering this call for a cease fire.

But the "front" that President Kennedy had tried to put forth in his statement of March 23 failed to hold. This became evident in the language of paragraph four of the SEATO Resolution of March 29: "It is believed that these results ought to be achieved through negotiations and

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the King to recognize the Boun Oum regime as the legitimate regime, which he did. Just prior to that, Prince Souvanna Phouma had tried to form a government of "national unity" which would include all political factions. General Nosavan would have had the post of the Ministry of Defense, but he failed to take up that position. The Boun Oum move followed, and Prince Souvanna Phouma left the country for Cambodia.

<sup>24</sup>Field, op. cit., pp. 125-126.

cannot be hoped for if the present fighting continues."<sup>25</sup> It was only after this issuance of the SEATO communique that the Soviets answered the Aide Memoire of March 23 that the British had sent them requesting a cease fire in the name of the co-chairman of the previous Geneva Conference.

Divisions had prevailed within SEATO. The United States had to shift from the earlier position of energetically supporting Laos as a pro-Western bastion. Now the United States had to back a Laos that would be neutral without ties with the West.

Politically, this move was a necessity. To have done otherwise would have meant that a unilateral United States response, in the form of full military support, would be mounted to prevent a complete takeover of Laos by the Communists. The new President did not choose to follow this course, and an International Conference on Laos was convened in Geneva on May 16, 1961.<sup>26</sup>

From a standpoint of SEATO, the "Laotian Crisis" served to undermine the very base of the organization.

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<sup>25</sup>SEATO Communique of March 29, 1961, Annex C to SCM/61/VT, p. 125.

<sup>26</sup>The conference was originally scheduled for May 12, but the question of who was to represent Laos from the three factions delayed the opening. This conference lasted from May, 1961, to July 23, 1962, and subsequent events in Laos (the renewal of fighting and violation of the cease fire) prompted the United States to exert military pressure in the form of the landing of United States Marines in Thailand. The troops were a direct warning to the Communists.



While it may have been politically expedient for the United States (chief elite of the organization) to change its policy regarding Laos, its change triggered two international effects: (1) it disillusioned some members of SEATO concerning the continued viability of that organization;<sup>27</sup> and (2) part of the treaty area was in fact nibbled away through negotiation from the original area.

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<sup>27</sup>Manchester Guardian, December 29, 1960, p. 5, col. 2. ". . . the Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, recently wrote that Thailand would increasingly seek better understanding with 'other nations who do not share our views on world issues . . . even . . . those who do not share our social system.' This astonishingly Nehruvian remark from a spokesman of one of the most vocal anti-neutralists in South-East Asia marks in part the final weariness with carrying the American standard against the crises of 'lackey' and 'when are you going to become Asian again?'" Subsequent Thai pressure on the United States to reassure the Thai position evolved in the issuance of the Rusk-Khoman declaration of March 6, 1962: ". . . The Secretary of State reaffirmed that this obligation of the United States does not depend upon the prior agreement of all other parties to the Treaty, since this Treaty obligation is individual as well as collective." It is interesting to note that the British took an exact opposite view from that of the United States. Rt. Hon. Michael Stewart, "British Foreign Policy Today," Australian Outlook, XX (August, 1966), 123: "Question: What is the attitude of your government in Vietnam? Answer: That is, of course, a point on which we and the American Government take a different view. The American Government, as I understand it, do regard their presence in Vietnam as being in fulfillment of obligations under the SEATO Treaty. We do not feel, looking at what the Treaty requires, that it would be incumbent on us to put forces there because the SEATO Treaty exists. If you study the wording of the Treaty I think you will see that we are justified in taking this view. We have held therefore, that such help as we have given Vietnam, civilian help and so, although entirely consistent with SEATO, is not actually carrying out of our obligations. You will notice that SEATO requires that, in case of direct aggression each country considers how it will act in accordance with its constitutional processes--we are not all obliged under the Treaty to take the same view, and broadly speaking we have not considered this a case where the SEATO Treaty applied, but it is open to the United States to take, as they do take, a different view."

## Chapter 4

### PAKISTAN-INDIAN CRISIS

In a region also close to the Treaty area, and including a member-state of SEATO, another problem was in the developing stage that soon strained relations between other SEATO powers.

Pakistan, also a member of CENTO, is the third Asian member of SEATO. Its geographic location makes Pakistan important. Its 100-million-plus population marks it as a potential power state. Yet by the same criteria, Pakistan has inherent problems that distract it from realizing its potential.

Geographically, Pakistan is a divided nation with over 1,000 miles of Indian territory separating its two parts. In its goal of becoming more industrially oriented, Pakistan is beset with the problem of her population. The people must be fed; being mainly an agrarian state, Pakistan does not have the immediate wealth available (using only one criterion) to transform itself into an industrial society. This is difficult enough in a unified state, but compounded in a nation that is geographically divided.

The principal problem facing the Pakistanis is India, or rather the enmity that exists between the Moslems

and Hindus. This is not a factor of nation-building, but is a real political factor that was at hand before the partition; led to the confrontation in 1965; and remains a problem today. How the Pakistanis view any external situation is usually in the light of how it will affect the Pakistani-Indian situation.<sup>1</sup>

It is problematical whether in one hundred years the feeling now existing between the Moslems and Hindus will still have the importance that it has now. But to understand the intensity of feeling between Pakistan and India, it is necessary to go back into the beginnings of these two states.

The whole of the sub-continent of India had been pressuring Britain for many years to gain its freedom. Mohandas K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, leaders of the All Indian Congress Party, led the drive that eventually gained this freedom. But when freedom came, the continent was far from being a homogenous unit. It was stratified not only sub-politically, but ethnically, linguistically, culturally, and religiously. Politically, India had been a fragmented collection of over 500 princely states. By far the greatest division, however, was the religious one that separated Hindus and Moslems.

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<sup>1</sup>Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 116-119. See also Drew Middleton, America's Stake in Asia (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1968), pp. 147-151.

Mohammed Ali Jinnah, head of the Moslem League, had been at one time a member of the All India Congress Party.<sup>2</sup> Because he wanted equality in political matters for the "Pakistanis" regardless of the fact that numerically they were inferior to the "Indians," he broke with the Congress Party when it failed to meet his demand. The result was the creation of the Moslem League with the political purpose of setting up a separate state for Moslems.

Such a political course, with the goal of breaking up what was then British India, was in direct conflict with the leaders of the Congress Party. The Indian (Congress Party) goal was for a secular state in which all religions would exist side by side, with religious freedom granted to all. Religious freedom, however, did not carry with it "political equality." What the Indians wanted was a state, including all that was then India, incorporated into an independent India. It would follow, under the rules of democracy, that the large majority of those Indians with a Hindu background would then dominate the new political structure. What the Moslems wanted was a two-state formation based on a religious disposition.

Such a dichotomy could not long continue. Sir Stafford Cripps headed the British delegation which had come

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<sup>2</sup>Norman D. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy, ed. Dayton D. McKean (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 165.

out to India to arrange a general plan of independence. Although he and others made many attempts to reconcile the differences between the Moslem League and the Indian Congress, all failed. The final British decision was to partition the country, carrying out the Moslem plan.

In reality, partition did not settle basic issues. In place of the equality that Jinnah had wanted for the Pakistani, all that he really obtained was a new political setting. In some respects, this left the Pakistani Moslems in an even more inferior position. Now the problems of nation-building had to be met by the Pakistanis in an impoverished geographic and industrial environment.<sup>3</sup> While the sub-continent is not without resources, its transformation into an industrial and self reliant area demands technology and wealth. Thus, two nations are, because of partition, competing for resources and available technology that, for the present and foreseeable future, is adequate only for the development of a single nation.

While the partition and religious question remain vital factors that affect the relationship between the Pakistanis and Indians, the problem of Jammu and Kashmir is one situation that is in reality a manifestation of the above problem.

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<sup>3</sup>For a discussion of both Pakistani and Indian industrial capabilities, see *Ibid.*, pp. 77, 89-90, 101; W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India and Pakistan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 142; Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 333-335, 337-338.

Technically, Jammu and Kashmir are separate states, but they are considered together as the "Kashmir problem." In a discussion of the Kashmir problem, Norman D. Palmer makes a succinct observation: "The 'story of Kashmir' has often been told, but perhaps never in a way which interested outside observers would find both objective and intelligible."<sup>4</sup> Kashmir, including Jammu, can be likened to a catalyst that keeps aflame the basic enmity dividing the Pakistanis (Moslems) and Indians (Hindus). Since the partition in 1947, this problem has been the vocal issue in which politicians of both countries could take refuge. In August and September, 1965, however, it flared into open clashes between the armed forces of both Pakistan and India. After a period of eighteen years of talking, complaining, jockeying, and making bellicose statements, antagonists provoked open warfare in Kashmir.<sup>5</sup> Both sides threatened an armed clash, but probably neither wanted it. Yet both sides suffered considerable casualties and loss of war material; and, in the end, the issue of Kashmir still was not settled.

Kashmir, in effect, represented a "final" piece of the partition that had never been settled in 1947. Kashmir and Jammu were small in size, but by being in the northern

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<sup>4</sup>Palmer, op. cit., p. 230.

<sup>5</sup>AP dispatch, New York Times, August 11, 1965, p. 2, col. 4. See also AP dispatch, New York Times, August 12, 1965, p. 1, col. 4.

China-border area, they were correspondingly important beyond their size. Kashmir covered some 84,471 square miles (about the size of Minnesota). Its population before partition was, however, extremely important. Moslems accounted for approximately 77.11 per cent, Hindus for 20.12 per cent, Sikhs for 1.64 per cent, and Buddhists for 1.00 per cent. The remaining few were Christians. While the country was predominantly Moslem, the ruling family of Maharaja Hari Singh was Hindu.<sup>6</sup>

The partition had its legal base in the Indian Independence Act of 1947. British India was the direct object of this act. The Princely States of India, however, had a different status, and could, under the Act, choose either Pakistan or India for making an accession. Because Moslems predominated in Kashmir, Pakistan fully expected that Kashmir would elect to become part of Pakistan. However, the Maharaja was reluctant to make any kind of decision. He did not like India, nor did he like Moslem Pakistan. He also mistrusted the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten,<sup>7</sup> with the result that he applied to both Pakistan and India for a "Standstill Agreement."

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<sup>6</sup>Brown, op. cit., p. 159.

<sup>7</sup>He had had an escapade in Britain some years earlier and had received bad publicity. Ibid., p. 159, and Chaudhri, op. cit., p. 288.

Such an agreement for Kashmir was to be a "working" relationship in the area of railway and general communications facilities among autonomous units until more permanent arrangements could be worked out. The Maharaja of Kashmir offered this agreement to both Pakistan and India, but only the Pakistanis accepted the arrangement.<sup>8</sup>

Events building to a Kashmir confrontation were hastened by a march of tribesmen from Poonch. Whether or not this movement was originated, encouraged, abetted, and/or armed by Pakistani authorities<sup>9</sup> is a moot question. In any event, tribesmen invaded the Kashmir area in a vengeful march on October 20, 1947. After considerable violence and bloodshed, the state forces of Kashmir, composed of the security forces of the Maharaja, were routed by the tribal lashkar. The Maharaja fled Kashmir to Jammu and there urgently requested assistance from India to help restore order in Kashmir.

The Indian Government's reply to this appeal by the Maharaja produced the fait accompli that has since evolved into the present dispute. The Government, in effect, told the Maharaja that for it to comply with his request for

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<sup>8</sup>Brown, op. cit., p. 162, and Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 288.

<sup>9</sup>There is some disagreement concerning whether or not this "intrusion" by Moslem tribesmen was done without the knowledge of Pakistani authorities. Brown and Chaudhri Muhammad Ali take opposite views.



help, he would have to sign the instrument of accession to India. This he did, and India at once treated Kashmir as an integral part of India. The Pakistanis refused to recognize this "legalization" of the Kashmir matter. Pakistani troops eventually moved into the disputed area to confront Indian forces. In retaliation, and perhaps to gain public support for its side, the Indians introduced the "Kashmir question" to the Security Council of the United Nations.

The United Nations Security Council, along with the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNICIP), had made several attempts at settling the long-standing dispute. Failing that, both bodies had sought to bring the sides together for meaningful negotiations. All had failed. The only concrete result of United Nations efforts had been the stationing of personnel along the demarcation line that separated the forces of both countries.<sup>10</sup>

The Pakistani contention before the United Nations was that India had violated its own agreement to conduct a plebescite in Kashmir. The Indian position was that certain prerequisites to such a plebescite had to be met, namely that all Pakistani forces would be withdrawn and infiltration into Kashmir halted. The Indians maintained that these

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<sup>10</sup>AP dispatch, New York Times, August 24, 1965, p. 6, cols. 1 and 2. See also AP dispatch, New York Times, August 25, 1965, p. 11, col. 1.

pre-conditions had not been met. In addition, now that the instrument of accession had been signed, the Indians regarded it as no longer a valid point for discussion, since Kashmir was now an integral part of the Indian union.

The United Nations was able to effect a cease fire between the two adversaries in the 1965 armed confrontation.<sup>11</sup> A meeting between President Mohammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India, took place in Tashkent (the Soviet Union) after that country offered its good offices in assisting in a negotiation.<sup>12</sup>

Since the early 1950's, relations between the United States and Pakistan, which at one time had been most warm and cordial, began to "cool" considerably. The clash between Pakistan, a CENTO and SEATO ally, and India, also a friend of the United States, posed an immediate and anguished dilemma for the United States: the position it should take in this confrontation between two nations with whom it had good relations. The United States, seeing no way out of this dilemma, chose a legalistic approach,

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<sup>11</sup>The United Nations Security Council Resolution (authored by the Netherlands) was passed 10-0, Jordan abstaining. It called for a cease-fire within 48 hours between the belligerents. AP dispatch, New York Times September 21, 1965, p. 1, cols. 6 and 8. See also ibid., September 22, 1965, p. 1, cols. 6 and 8, and ibid., September 23, 1965, p. 1, cols. 5, 7, and 8.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., September 20, 1965, p. 1, cols. 6, 7, 8, and p. 2, col. 1.

working through the machinery of the United Nations to bring about a cease fire. This occasioned the imposition of a moratorium on arms shipments to both Pakistan and India. Britain followed suit.

Pakistani reaction to this American move was predictable:

Karachi . . . Informed sources said today it was highly unlikely that Pakistan had categorically told the United States that she would seek Soviet military aircraft if Washington would not agree to replace obsolete F-86 jet fighters of the Pakistan Air Force.  
 . . .

Washington . . . The State Department said today it had no evidence that Pakistan would receive military jets . . . The White House has held up an expected pledge of \$300 million in aid to Pakistan pending a review of the growing Pakistani ties to Moscow and Peking. Pakistan has reacted bitterly with charges that the United States is seeking to impose aid with strings attached.<sup>13</sup>

Pakistan's war resources were inferior to India's in armed forces, war material, and the capacity for making such equipment. Pakistan needed to buy almost all of its basic material abroad. As a SEATO ally of the United States, Pakistan had received almost \$4 billion in military and economic aid over the last decade.<sup>14</sup> But as the Pakistanis viewed it, their military needs were quite urgent.

In addition, what the Pakistanis had been claiming for three years came about: the vast quantities of aid and arms that the United States and Britain had given to

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., August 14, 1965, p. 2, col. 5, and p. 4, col. 4.

<sup>14</sup>Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 270.

India in 1962<sup>15</sup> in its border clash with Red China were now being used against Pakistan. India, of course, was making the same claim to the United States--that arms given the Pakistani for "anti-Communist" defenses were being used against India.

The unequal treatment they had received from the United States had long rankled the Pakistani mind. The Pakistanis maintained that as an ally of the United States, their nation should have a preferred position, as against a country who (1) was not an ally, and (2) often opposed United States policy on "ideological" grounds. India, it had been estimated, had received some \$5.9 billion in American aid, and, since the Sino-Indian clash, had obtained an additional \$200 million in military aid, with \$80 million more expected.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>This refers to the Sino-Indian border clash which occurred between October 20 and November 20, 1962. The United States and Britain sent massive shipments of arms to help bolster Indian defenses. Both the United States and Britain stipulated that these arms were to be used only in Indian defense against the Chinese invasion, and that they were not to be used in any conflict with the Pakistanis. The Indians gave these assurances.

<sup>16</sup>New York Times, September 12, 1965, p. 1, cols. 7 and 8, and p. 2, cols. 3-8. See also Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., "American Diplomatic Tactics and Neutralism," Political Science Quarterly, LXXVIII (September, 1963), 424. Pakistani officials publicly conceded, for example, that the military buildup of their country would "force" India to reach a settlement of the deadlocked Kashmir question. While American arms were intended for defense, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan stated that "it is an Asian country (India) that has been oppressing us and continues to oppress us." Evident differences existed between Washington and

Pakistanis were rapidly deciding that it was not worth being an ally of the United States if their chief enemy was to get better treatment. They began to look elsewhere for aid.<sup>17</sup>

A definite rapprochement with both Moscow and Peking took place. There is evidence that Peking definitely helped Pakistan during the confrontation with India by making sudden demands on India during the height of the fighting. The Chinese issued an "ultimatum" to India to dismantle its bases on their mutual border,<sup>18</sup> which had the effect of

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Karachi concerning the circumstances under which such weapons might legitimately be used. To New Delhi, American officials stressed that Karachi was pledged to "consult" with the United States before employing them. Yet President Khan stated openly, "'At times, our American friends seem to question our right to defend our territory even, or take such action as will bring security. . . . America should be mindful . . . that if our territory was violated, we should spend our time dealing with the enemy rather than putting American weapons in cotton wool.'"

<sup>17</sup>Khan, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-119, 155-157. "Another major loss we suffered in joining the Pact (CENTO) was that we were deprived of the opportunity to understand the Soviet Union earlier. The Russians were our neighbors and, as later events proved, we would have been able to understand each other better if some contact had been established between us. Because of the absence of any contact, many misunderstandings cropped up and the leaders of the Soviet Union decided to give full support to India. This more than nullified whatever economic and military advantages we gained from the Pact. . . . Both the SEATO and CENTO Pacts have lost much of the value they had, though they still retain some kind of formal significance."

<sup>18</sup>AP dispatch, *New York Times*, September 15, 1965, p. 1, cols. 2-3. See also *ibid.*, September 17, 1965, p. 1, cols. 6 and 8. The Chinese extended their deadline by three days to the Indians; *ibid.*, September 20, 1965, p. 1, cols. 5 and 8 and p. 2, col. 1. See also Anwar Syed, "Sino-Pakistan Relations--An Overview," *Pakistan Horizon*, XXII (Second Quarter, 1969), 115-116.

diverting much Indian strength to the northern frontiers, where there were reports of an exchange of fire between the Chinese and Indian forces. It is quite probable that this "help" was not lost on the Pakistanis, when during the fighting, they found themselves almost "frozen out" from their Western partners.

Better relations between Pakistan and China appeared evident in the 1963 border realignment agreement between the two countries. A Pakistani military mission was more than cordially received in Peking.<sup>19</sup> While the Pakistanis, as allies of the United States, had previously spoken out in favor of a two-China policy, they no longer continued in this vein. And it should be noted that China, unlike the Soviet Union, made no objection when Pakistan joined SEATO.<sup>20</sup>

The Soviet Union also did a diplomatic about-face regarding relations with the Pakistanis. There had been much made of the favorable balance struck between India and the Soviet Union since the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to New Delhi. Pakistani relations soon broadened into a much firmer relationship which had as its result military

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<sup>19</sup>Syed, ibid., p. 111. See also the speech of Air Marshal Nur Khan, "Pakistan-China Relations," Pakistan Horizon, XXII (Third Quarter, 1969), 288. See also Dilip Mukerjee, "India's Defence Perspectives," International Affairs, XLIV (October, 1968), 666-667.

<sup>20</sup>Harish Kapur, "China's Relations with India and Pakistan," Current History, LVII (September, 1969), 158.

and economic benefits to Pakistan. War material (mostly MIG jets), loans, and Soviet experts assisting in several industrial developments came to Pakistan.<sup>21</sup> The Pakistanis were also now receiving loans and trade missions from East European countries.

Needless to say, this apparent shift of Pakistan away from the United States caused concern in some circles. Other issues--Indonesian independence, recognition of Red China, the United States keeping the "Tunisian" question from the United Nations Security Council agenda, and other aspects of the cold war--on which the United States had expressed itself have found Pakistan on the opposite side.

Pakistan is Moslem. This aligns it with other Moslem states in regard to the Israeli situation. Therefore Pakistan as a nation now looks toward the other Moslem states with more than just kindness. The United States' deepening commitment to Israel further widens the gap between Pakistan and the United States. But for the present, the central issue is Kashmir.

This new phase in Pakistani relationships with other major powers bodes a turn away from past relatively traditional ties to the United States. How it will eventually affect Pakistani ties to SEATO remains to be

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<sup>21</sup>Official communique issued in Rawalpindi on the occasion of the visit to Pakistan of Premier Kosygin. Pakistan Horizon, XXI (Second Quarter, 1968), 220-221.

seen in future developments. However, if past utterances of Pakistani leaders are to be taken at face value, then it may well be surmised that SEATO, as well as CENTO, ties will lose what significance they held and a new posture of alignment for Pakistan will unfold.

These then are the three primal cases needed for an examination of political forces that were in progress with direct effects on several of the powers belonging to SEATO. They are used because of their critical nature and the fact that they did involve five of the eight members. While it might be difficult to claim that in themselves they were turning points or benchmarks as regards those particular power's outlook in their relationship toward either the United States or SEATO, the claim can be made that taken together they provide an essential insight into some of the patterns of political directions that were, and are, taking shape. It is from these patterns that a factor of probabilities can be projected.



## Chapter 5

### DISCUSSION

David Easton, in A Framework for Political Analysis, states that for "tool" purposes, "any set of political elements we wish to consider a system automatically becomes one."<sup>1</sup>

This study has used the "tool" of Professor Brecher's concept of a "geographic" system, i.e., Dominant System, Subordinate System. It is assumed that the idea of a geographic system is a system in reality.

The study of SEATO has been made within such a constructed framework, with the series of situational crises being presented as evidence. It must be clear, however, that the core area of concentration thus far has been in the political interchanges among the members or units outside the system of SEATO--with the exception of the Laotian Crisis. This paper is not a study of the sub-system of SEATO as such.

For purposes of discussion, a focus can now be made on the core area of SEATO. What effect have the actions of members had on the sub-system?

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<sup>1</sup>David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965), p. 31.

It is well known that there are in the Global System many groupings, alliances, and pacts that, irrespective of some degree of cohesive quality, cannot bridge the division that exists between their members. There should be no difficulty in accepting the idea that for conceptual purposes, the total collection of other systems and sub-systems that surround the sub-system of SEATO represents the Extra-Societal Environment.<sup>2</sup> The remainder of the totality of environment is made up of those socio-economic-cultural aspects which affect the society both internally and externally.

If it is accepted that there are other systems and sub-systems existing within the Global System,<sup>3</sup> it should not be too difficult to accept that these other entities have a relationship that is important to SEATO in two respects. First, one or more of these entities could conceivably be in competition or conflict with SEATO, if their goals were diametrically opposed. Second, where no goal-competition existed between SEATO and other systems, dual-membership in other systems by member-units of SEATO has taken place. As a result, the possibility exists that the

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<sup>2</sup>The term "surround" is not used in the perjorative sense where the object is the focal point; it merely connotes the idea that the object has a random setting spatially. The fact that such a unit could have another or other units in competition with it is not used at this point.

<sup>3</sup>This precludes membership in a Universal Actor such as the United Nations.

total allocative values of any unit, instead of being at the disposal of SEATO, would have to be distributed on a wider basis. This is not to project that, because of the availability of such resource to the individual units, such an allocation on their part would be immediately forthcoming to the sub-system of SEATO. That determination or interaction is implicit in this discussion.

The point has been raised that even during the formative period of SEATO certain factors were present in the system which were certain to produce stress.<sup>4</sup> At the system level, Britain and France were already engaged in the process of restructuring their goals to match their diminished capacity of resource allocation. Such a restructuring of goals necessitated political decisions which pointed to a lesser involvement on the world scene.

Notwithstanding the fact that nation-states ultimately must fix the primacy of their own goals or national interests, the question must be raised as to whether inducements or rewards from the chief elite might not influence these political decisions. Notwithstanding, the decisions of Britain and France to alter their "presence" in Southeast Asia would have a delimiting effect on their membership

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<sup>4</sup>No contention is intended that an alliance, pact, or sub-system is created that can be free from stressful qualities. In any association, it is assumed that the authoritative person or persons has made an assessment of factors present, with the hope or conclusion that positive factors outweigh negative ones.

in SEATO and participation in the various functions of that body.

It should be kept in mind that in the case of the French, there was political demand for complete French withdrawal in the Indo-China area.<sup>5</sup> Internally, the French political structure was going through a long period of instability. Other member-units could no longer count on long term commitments from France in this area.

Another distraction (in the formative stages of SEATO, and continuing to the present in varied degrees) for the Western European Subordinate System was the question of the EDC. For many months a series of negotiating sessions had been held with the view of constructing some form of joint European defence community. After the plan reached the ratification state, French consent was crucial. But British promises of cooperation and United States promises of aid apparently were not enough to overcome the French fear of a re-armed Western Germany.<sup>6</sup> This was a setback to the plans of NATO for an overall defensive strategy.

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<sup>5</sup>"Why Diplomats Are in Trouble: Their Own Governments Can't Back Them Up," U.S. News & World Report, May 21, 1954, p. 36. Also see in op. cit.: "U.S. Allies-- Getting Weaker," pp. 28-29; "Mendes-France: It Is the End of a Nightmare," July 30, 1954, pp. 89-90.

<sup>6</sup>It is somewhat ironic that Britain, the very nation that broached the idea of a type of "European" army in the beginning, to a large degree was responsible for its defeat. Anthony Eden in a speech in Rome declared that Britain, while supporting the formation of such an entity, could not itself join such a force.

The result was that French reluctance created a serious strain in Allied councils. The French presented a proposal that Britain and West Germany would not accept; the West Germans had a plan that the French and British would not accept; and the British were reluctant to make anything but a nominal promise of assistance. Yet, to the Western mind (mainly the United States), EDC, or some form of closer linking of European defense plans and resource capability, in conjunction with NATO, clearly served as the key feature in the whole global concept.

Essential to any perspective or understanding of SEATO is the recognition and acceptance of two explicit elements contained within the sub-system. First is the item that SEATO, like other similar defense treaties, is a response body. Second, there must be unanimity among the units in regard to any action that the collective body takes. Closely associated with this second element is the fact that the language contained within the instrument of the Treaty denotes that "constitutional processes" of the members will be met.

It could be argued that such a shaping of SEATO at the very beginning into a sort of deliberative body precluded that it could ever be able to meet any military commitment of its stated goal: the containment of aggression. On the other hand, it could be logically argued that the level or spirit of agreement attained by the language

of the Treaty was all on which the participants would, or could, effectively agree. It should also be remembered that the United States made an explicit addendum "understanding" to the Treaty.<sup>7</sup> Again, like other similar measures, SEATO is an open system. More stringent measures or additional features can be added at later times. One noteworthy addition has been the adoption of a more sophisticated mechanism in the Secretariat.

Both Easton and Young remark that an overload may occur if "the channels of communication to receive such demands cannot adequately handle the volume of the demands."<sup>8</sup>

In the discussion of SEATO the aspect of membership is important. First of all, only three of the eight member-units are in fact members of the "region" wherein the Treaty Area lies. The other members are extra-regional.<sup>9</sup> This has caused disturbances from intra-societal areas. The "non-Asiatic" quality of the majority of the member-units of SEATO has caused adverse reactions from the Asian states. India, Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia have all adversely commented on not only the "non-Asiatic" quality of the membership of SEATO, but even on

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<sup>7</sup>Appendix C, p. 134.

<sup>8</sup>Young, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

<sup>9</sup>Melvin Gurtov, Southeast Asia Tomorrow (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 1-3.

the fact that a force for collective defense was created in the area. And central to this general area of country discontent was India. She had been, is, and probably for some time in the future will remain, a leader of the "Third World" nations.

The concept of boundary provides the basis for a second point about membership. While Article VIII of the Treaty defines the geographic area or boundary that is encompassed, the very idea of boundary must then connote something else because of membership. While the Treaty area is Asian, the Treaty group is made up of countries with dual membership obligations, for in some cases the members belong to other sub-systems or Subordinate Systems. It must then be accepted that the political boundaries of SEATO range much farther than the stated Treaty Area. In fact, we can assume for political purposes the SEATO boundaries extend to the influential limits of each member-unit.

While this may be a fundamental concept, it nevertheless poses levels of a potential conflict of interest, which, if occurring, could bring resultant conditions of stress on the sub-system. The relationship between sub-systems, in the form of NATO for example, or the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and SEATO, could be on divergent courses. As such, some powers, having membership in these other organizations, as well as in SEATO, would be caught

up in a foreign policy dilemma. Added to this relationship is the problem that extra-regionalism poses, with conditions and demands of other subordinate areas which also contain SEATO power members posing an equally serious dilemma.

While there is no evidence as yet obtainable pointing to the making of a demand by France and Britain on the United States for example, for certain dispositions within the NATO structure concerning their actions during the Suez affair, it would be hard to imagine that the subsequent United States attitude and actions in response to French and British moves did not have a profound effect on these countries within the scope of their membership within the Subordinate System of Western Europe. It can be further argued that such United States actions, if not directly, at least in an indirect fashion, influenced later thinking and political decision-making on the part of these two powers. If the failure of the Suez venture can be credited as being the cause for the resignation of Anthony Eden as British Prime Minister, then certainly the United States, because of the actions that it took, must assume part of that responsibility.

Earlier, the criterion of the qualitative factor was mentioned as being important in that a demand, because of its nature, could produce within a given system, such a disturbance as to result in stress against that very system. In this fashion, note should also be taken of subsequent



French actions occurring within the framework of the sub-system of NATO, having an effect in the Subordinate System of Western Europe where that sub-system is located. This refers of course to the French decision to request a withdrawal of all NATO facilities from French soil.<sup>10</sup> A French demand that a change of policy on the part of the United States was needed, with the implication that there will be no French cooperation in stated goals, was thus injected within the sub-system. Increasingly, French attention, under the then firm rule of Charles De Gaulle, was being devoted to making France paramount on the Continent. Anything that detracted from this goal was in basic conflict with French interests. From the many remarks that President De Gaulle had made on the subject, it can be seen that the presence of United States forces, although a necessary facet of NATO tactical and strategic concepts, was nonetheless

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<sup>10</sup>"For some years, the French Government has indicated on numerous occasions, both public and in conversations with the Allied Governments, that it considered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as no longer fulfilling, insofar as it is concerned, the conditions prevailing in the world at present, which are fundamentally different from those of 1949 and the years thereafter. . . . The French Government considers these agreements in their entirety, as no longer fulfilling the present conditions, which lead it to reassume full exercise of its sovereignty on French territory, in other words, to accept being responsible in any respect whatsoever to authorities other than the French authorities. It is prepared to study and eventually, to settle with the United States Government the practical consequences of this. . . ." French Foreign Policy: Official Statements Speeches and Communiqués 1966 (New York: Ambassade De France, Service de Presse et d'Information, 1966), pp. 25-27.

interpreted by De Gaulle as being an inhibitor to the French. Further, and to a larger degree, the presence of United States economic prowess, as manifested by the increasing influx of powerful corporate interests into the European economic life further enlarged these French fears.

In SEATO the situation of both demands and conflicting "cross-demands" has been experienced. As was seen in the Laotian Crisis, the demands by the chief elite were of such a nature as to cause a disturbance within the subsystem. At that point, the communicative process of a feedback was either being ignored by the chief elite--the United States--or was at a low stage because of a failure to alter goals, or was a combination of the two induced by the inability of the United States to alter its own objectives, thereby setting into motion diplomatic maneuvers which met objection by other member-units.

There are several alternatives which can be taken when a system is presented with an imbalance or disturbance leading to a stress condition.

If a system or state cannot cope with the stress, then it can "escape," or at least relieve some of the pressures of the induced stress by several methods. Essentially, these fall into three general areas or levels; first it can accept the condition; second, it can reject such conditions or demands that impose the stress; or third, it can either alter the structure of its own

organization so as to comply with the conditions set forth, or alter the nature or status of those demands so as to conform with the already established structure or system.

For France, regarding her problems in the sub-system of NATO and the Subordinate System of Western Europe, it can be discerned she opted for the form of the second solution. In the case of the Laotian Crisis, it will be seen that the third solution, with the alteration of goals or demands made by the chief elite was made with subsequent adjustments in problem perception carried out. Such a reduction by the chief elite, in its qualitative demand for strong measures--conceivably culminating in the use of force in the back-up of those demands--thereby resulted in a better acceptance by the other SEATO powers.

Built into the structure of SEATO is the conflict-mechanism--conditions for disturbance--of unanimity. While this mechanistic function was an accepted feature of SEATO, it nonetheless must be viewed as a definite impediment to a system. A condition of reciprocity can set in when a unit on the "losing" side views the response of the "winners" (in this case the diminished or altered collective response) as not meeting what it believes to be minimal conditions for its continued functioning or participation in the system.

This whole area of discussion leads to an important element as crucial to this review as it is to any foreign

policy deliberation: that is the concept of problem-perception on the part of the individual members of the sub-system.

David V. Edwards, describing conditions of problem-perception, states that: "Man reacts, of course, to how he perceives reality rather than to reality as such. The sum of what we think we know, rather than what is really true, determines what plan or policy we adopt and what actions we then attempt."<sup>11</sup> And, of course, the critical factor of this "perception" on the part of the decision-makers or states is the concept of values.

Values, in this context, takes on added significance as Edwards makes the comment: "Throughout history those who have been concerned with human action have often contended that one or another action or institution was the 'best' or 'correct' one. Such contentions have often resulted in arguments and even wars because debaters were arguing about objective facts rather than about preferred values."<sup>12</sup>

In any discussion of SEATO, one must always come back to the base motive of each power for joining SEATO. Just what was there in the suggested alliance that would attract states to join such a body? Would such a joining result in the enhancement of their individual position and

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<sup>11</sup>David V. Edwards, International Political Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 23.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

would it benefit the goals or values that they had set forth for themselves to follow, and, if possible, achieve?

Could it not perhaps be a deduction that there were some three broadly conceived ideas that motivated the eventual members of SEATO in joining the alliance? The United States, as the prime architect of SEATO, still remained in the throes of its struggle with the menace of Communism as manifested in the actions of the Soviet Union. The absorption of Poland into the Red orbit--accompanied as it was by the mysterious death of Jan Masaryk in Czechoslovakia--did little to alleviate United States' suspicions concerning overall Russian expansionist endeavors. Added to this was the trouble that the Allied powers had had with the Russians in Berlin and the subsequent airlift to overcome the Russian "blockade." And there had been the costly Korean War that the United States and its allies had concluded with a stalemate. Such "evidence" as this convinced many of the decision-makers in the United States that the Communistic monolith could only be combatted successfully by a "ring of containment." Finally, there was the deteriorating situation that the French found themselves in in the Indo-China area with the "Communist" forces of the Vietminh.

• If anything further was needed to convince the American administration that Communism was indeed on the march against the principles and ideals of Western democracy, there was the loss of mainland China to Communist control.

Surely, only a show of resolve and force in the way of a buffer or "dike" could prove effective to settle this dilemma. That buffer would be SEATO.

Thailand viewed the evolving situation in South-East Asia and the Far East in much the same light that the United States did. The Thais were increasingly worried about their own large segment of Chinese living in Thailand. There was the further worry of the Northeastern and Southern provinces that were, in effect, soft-spots in the Thai position. Then, too, not only were the French fighting next door in the Indo-China area, but the British as well were having their Communist troubles in Malaya.

It is quite true that these problems did exist. It is also true that there was at that time a feeling of uneasiness concerning the colossus that China was felt to be and the eventual designs that she was thought to have outside her territory. It would be quite easy to rationalize that because of these problems being so close to Thailand, that she was justified in feeling endangered. It would be therefore quite logical for her to give support to a plan that would in some manner offer her a collective-type security arrangement.

Cognizance should be given to the fact that logic often fails to lend perception when trying to fathom between that which is real and that which is merely superficial in foreign policy. This would hold especially true in the case

of Thailand. Professor George Modelski gives an excellent account of Thai politics and their seeming fluctuating state.<sup>13</sup> According to Prince Wan Waithayakorn, the then Foreign Minister of Thailand, the specter of mainland China did indeed pose a problem for the Thais for which they sought assistance in relieving this seeming pressure. At the same time, Thai membership in the Treaty was viewed as ". . . not only non-aggressive but also non-provocative."<sup>14</sup>

While this attitude may have been the prevailing one at the time, and in spite of the fact that Thailand now lets armed forces of the United States be stationed on Thai soil thereby permitting somewhat "clandestine" air strikes being made in Laos and Vietnam, it would nonetheless appear that there is a change occurring in the Thai role toward its big neighbor China.

Part of this change, subtle as it may appear, apparently stems from Thai reaction to what they felt should have occurred in SEATO as regards the Treaty Area, and what in fact did not. With that in mind, it should not be too surprising to see that the Thais would begin to re-examine their position to see what new avenues would have to be explored in order to preserve the essential ingredient, Thai sovereignty and integrity.

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<sup>13</sup>George Modelski, "Thailand and China," Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents, ed. A. M. Halpern (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 348-367.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 352.

As an indication of this new attitude, the publicly stated views of the current Foreign Minister, Dr. Thanat Khoman, should be examined quite closely. A second indication of this attitude would be Thai participation in--and in one case, Thai organization of--the relatively new, strictly Asiatic regional organizations that now appear in this area.

It is conjectural at this point whether or not the joining by Thailand of substitute organizations would have taken place if they felt completely satisfied with SEATO. Certainly the economic aspects of ASEAN and ASPAC represent a hope for increased development in this area of the world that is so in need of every economic tool of which it can take advantage. Yet at the same time, the appearance of this development, accompanied as it is by Thai official statements that ". . . Thailand would increasingly seek better understanding with other nations who do not share our views on world issues . . .,"<sup>15</sup> would lend strength to the idea that a change of direction is being instituted in Thailand's foreign policy outlook.

Pakistan and the Philippines present differing outlooks in how they viewed the construction of SEATO. On the one hand, the Philippines have had traditional ties with the United States and it was axiomatic that they would go along

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<sup>15</sup>Palmer, op. cit., p. 165.



with the United States on such a venture. They were insular, and such a further "commitment" in addition to the Mutual Security treaties of 1951, 1952, and 1953 with the United States was not without benefit as President Magsaysay saw it. In addition, the Philippines was just emerging from an internal fight with the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Huks) who, from many appearances, did have some Communist connections. Yet, an increasing anti-American feeling has begun to make itself evident in the Philippines with a subsequent shift of Philippine policy becoming more independent from that of the United States.<sup>16</sup> An indication of this change, for just one example, was the withdrawal of the 2,000 man Philippine contingent that had previously been sent to Vietnam to assist South Vietnamese and American forces.

In the case of Pakistan, the enigma and "Achilles Heel" that exists in both her internal as well as external policies has at its root the problem of India. This has caused, and will continue to cause, blind spots in the Pakistani quest for general security. Be that as it may, it does not cover up serious and even extreme problems that have and will face the Pakistani on their road to

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<sup>16</sup>This position was corroborated in an interview I had with the Speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives. A further indication of the position was also given by an aide to the now President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos.

nation-building. "The unity of Pakistan lies in its adherence to Islam, yet Islamic thought, and the retrograde attitudes of the sect leaders, hinders the creation of a meaningful political entity." Leicester Webb here touches on a most salient point, and it is perhaps the real crux of the problem of Pakistan.

Nevertheless, the polity of Pakistan has, and more or less to the same degree establishes, its view toward other powers in light of their position and attitude to India. This has led to a Pakistani rapprochement with both Moscow and Peking--the latter ironically being the central reason for the formation of SEATO. Thus there would appear to be truth in the statement that ". . . Pakistan's main concern was the alleged Indian threat and not the defense of South-East Asia against Communist expansion. . . ."17 Such a rapprochement or re-alignment would of necessity mean a shift of ties or loyalties away from a strictly doctrinaire stance that is posed by the presence of SEATO. It should be noted, however, both in the case of Pakistan and Thailand, that Red China did not really direct any polemics against them merely because of their membership in SEATO. It was really only after the stationing of United States armed forces in Thailand that Red China began a

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<sup>17</sup>Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Pakistan and China: The Scope and Limits of Convergent Policies," Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 231.

concerted campaign of implied threats against Thailand, for, rightly or wrongly, the Chinese viewed such a measure as a constituted threat against them directly.

On a comparative note, Australia and New Zealand, because of their location, population, and lack of an adequate armed force capability, can be considered minimal powers. Their previous adherence to the protective capability of Britain was divested by Britain herself due to the retrenchment of resources at home and the ensuing withdrawal of British forces "East of Suez." Faced with this reality, and positioned as they are in an environment of over one billion Asiatics, who are in one form or another somewhat hostile to Western culture and the memories of colonialism that it conjures up, it is not too surprising that they should gravitate toward the one power whom they feel they have close ties to and who, at the same time, has interests in the Pacific area--the United States. Only the United States, a friendly power as it were, had sufficient power to fill the vacuum that the departure of both the British and French created. So, in addition to being gratified with the creation of the security that the ANZUS Pact brought, the formation of SEATO posed yet another answer, and, as it were, the supposed additional security of additional powers confronting the Communist threat. At the heart of the matter, though, was the overwhelming power

capability of the United States that gives reality to this or any commitment.

The problem perception of Britain and France presented an entirely different appraisal of the situation as that looked upon by the other powers of SEATO. Both were colonial powers at the time. While Britain was giving up her Empire on a relatively easy basis, France was engaged in a bloody and hotly-contested war in Indo-China that was proving costly to her in men and resources, and was beginning to be so unpopular at home as to affect the stability of the government.

Britain still had close ties with Australia and New Zealand as well as Malaya, Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei and her Crown Colony of Hong Kong. And it should be assumed that Britain would remain loyal to these ties in the event of any real trouble that affected them. Notwithstanding, it could be assumed that the British decision was motivated, not so much in the vein that Red China constituted a real threat in the form of expansionist moves, but served as a ready-made solution that had the advantage of permitting a reduction of British forces in the area under the "safety" of an American presence. At the same time it retained a British "voice" as regards any serious decisions that had to be made in that area, and through this medium also retained some measure of the old "Empire Life-line" presence that could serve as a redeeming factor to both

Britain and the colonial and Commonwealth members in that area. Underlying though it may be, a British participation in the SEATO Treaty of 1954 made up for the omission of Britain in the 1951 ANZUS Pact.

In essence, then, it can be surmised that the above represented some goals or values that could be achieved, or at least benefit a powers membership in such an organization as SEATO.

But time stands still for no one, and while the period of fifteen years that SEATO has been in existence can be considered a short span of time, it can also be more than enough to witness events and elements of change that by their nature either alter or even obviate values and goals once considered important.

Polarity, which once was an accepted state of existence in the world scene, has now evolved into a form of "soft" polarity, or even a form of polycentrism. Causing that evolution has been a series of factors, but central to it has been the detente that has come about between the two giants, the United States and the Soviet Union. As such, the problem or perceived threat of Communism to the Western and Third World has seemed to diminish. And with that diminution has come a shift in attitudes on the part of the leaders of many countries, not the least of which includes members of the SEATO organization toward both the Soviet Union and China.

If, then, the Soviet Union and China really do not represent a threat to the vital interests of the members comprising SEATO, and for that matter the other nations as well, then positions taken, attitudes assumed, and allocations of resources made can be shifted to other areas. In this case, those areas of concern and concentration would be the internal ones of the various states.

Few nations of the world are so well resourcefully and technologically advanced--with attendant industrial capacity--that they can long afford to have their society and economy geared constantly to an external crisis level. Fewer still have societies that would allow such a situation to continue if only a "stalemate" occurred from the resultant process. There are several reasons for this, but if only one is advanced, it would be the level of competition in economy that exists between the many nations of the world. A nation today can ill afford to fall behind in the race for progress.<sup>18</sup> As J. J. Servan-Schreiber points out, a very real dilemma faces the nations of Europe.<sup>19</sup> The need for growth and development at a faster rate encompassing the levels of innovation, technology, and scientific

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<sup>18</sup>This excludes consideration of the underdeveloped nations and takes into account primarily the nations of Europe and Japan. Because of their advanced status, it would also exclude the two superpowers.

<sup>19</sup>J. J. Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge (New York: Atheneum, 1969), pp. 26, 40-41, 102-105.

research are the criterion that will be needed. This can be achieved easier in a political environment that is relatively free from the economic burdens that a crisis is generally accompanied by. This is not meant to imply that those nations who are free from foreign entanglements are necessarily going to advance more rapidly than others. There are many examples to the contrary. However, that nation or nations which are relatively free from foreign commitments perhaps have a better chance at succeeding.

In this vein, whether by design or happenstance, the posturing of both Britain and France would seem to bear this out. They may rationalize differently concerning their motives, but the end result is that they are ridding themselves of outside encumbrances and focusing their attention more and more within the Subordinate System that is Western Europe.

And here, also, the economic struggle carries with it political overtones. It might be said that politics protects the economic level, while the economic level in turn supports the political level. Clashes of interests had already taken place. It was primarily in consideration of its stake and position in Algeria that moved the French to join with Britain and the Israel in the attempt to subvert Nasser's position during the Suez crisis. As much as the American stance proved humiliating to the British, it was equally hard for the French to accept.

General de Gaulle, during his long tenure in office as French President, had as his primary goal the restoration of France as the principal power on the European Continent. To accomplish this necessitated a severe reduction of an American political as well as economic presence on the Continent. Servan-Schreiber's book builds a very compelling French case. The moves by the General as regards his actions against NATO, and subsequent monetary positions against the dollar were in line towards such reduction.<sup>20</sup>

At the same time, to further the role of France as the leader in fact as well as spirit, the General sought to hurry the East-West detente along by political moves, statements, and trips that would re-establish the previously held close French relationship with the Soviet Union thereby further reducing the tension-level between the two ideological camps.

French recognition of Red China; withdrawal of the French representative at SEATO Ministerial Council meetings; General de Gaulle's pronouncements in Cambodia; all seemed designed to accomplish the same thing with China as had been done with the Soviet Union. There was a tacit recognition that a problem did not in fact exist, and with that understanding, the assumption that each was relatively free to

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<sup>20</sup>Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt, France, Germany and the Western Alliance (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), pp. 58-78.



pursue what they considered to be their own national courses, somewhat assured that those courses would not collide.

Coincidental to this was the development of a French force de frappe--which would not inhibit in the least the stature of France--and the still to be relied upon American nuclear deterrence capability that existed in NATO and SEATO, organizations that the French had not resigned from.

A further example of clashes within the Subordinate System level was the struggle between Britain and France concerning British entry into the Common Market. Britain wanted in and France wanted to keep her out. And although external to Western Europe, the Anglo-American Skybolt affair could not but have its adverse effect on British standing on the Continent. The British had once again been dealt a blow by their American friends.<sup>21</sup>

Thus it can be found that a changed atmosphere and conditional setting has come about. It should be no wonder then that some of the attitudes of the SEATO powers has also been affected by this change.

Slowly taking shape, and thereby creating the beginnings of a new trend in the Asiatic area, is a manifestation of one of these settings: the appearance of new forms of Regionalism that is relegated to entirely Asiatic members.

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<sup>21</sup>For an account of this, see Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 30-55.

Starting with the "Colombo" powers conference of 1950,<sup>22</sup> a new sense and form of regionalism has entered the Asian area. States, previously aloof from the problems and concerns of other states, slowly began to realize that their own problems were also problems of sister states. An awareness of interdependence is gradually displacing previous animosities.

Colombo, MaPhilIndo, ASA, ASPAC, ASEAN, and ADB all represent a moving together rather than a movement away from each other. SEATO can fit within this movement.

While there are many differences in the above organizations, it should be recognized that they have a common ground in the possible uniting of peoples and societies to bring solutions to age-old problems. In this area where there is such a serious population problem and where poverty is, for the most part, a way of life, there is at least a foundation for new hope.

It is significant that some solidarity within the Subordinate System of Southern Asia is beginning to make itself felt. It bodes a shift away from the Western European Subordinate System and even from the Dominant System. In this context Western influence is gradually

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<sup>22</sup>Carlos P. Romulo, former Foreign Minister of the Philippines, uses the Bandung Asian Conference of 1956 to mark the new era of regionalism in Asia. Carlos P. Romulo, "The New Asian Ideology," Pacific Community, I (October, 1969), 37.

being replaced by the awareness of a newfound strength by the units that make up the Southern Asian system.

ASA, ASPAC, and ASEAN all had their beginnings after the formation of SEATO. It is noteworthy also that Thailand, previously one of the most vocal adherents of SEATO, was a firm proponent in the formation of these other sub-systems.

Thanat Khoman, the Thai Foreign Minister, made this statement:

The European powers in Asia have all returned to Europe. They are not interested in this area anymore. They are parochial and insular. They are now only regional powers.

The British and the French, for example, have left forever. The Americans will leave one day. The days of the big military pacts are over. In Europe, NATO, and in Southeast Asia, SEATO, are in general decay. Collective defense arrangements therefore have great problems.

What then is left? I have scratched my head hard enough to think of alternative policies to meet the problems and there is only one answer. All countries in the region must rely on themselves. They must stand on their own feet, improve their economies, their social structures and their capacity to withstand subversion from without and from within. This can only be done by means of regional co-operation between the countries of the area through organizations like ASPAC and ASEAN to which we in Thailand attach great importance as means of political, economic and social interchange and the exchange of information of common interest.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Opening Address, Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman at the Inaugural Session of the ASEAN Ad Hoc Committee on Civil Aviation, Bangkok, June 25, 1968 (Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, Press Release No. 52, July 8, 1968), pp. 3-4.

The formation of such systems does not assure these units of automatic success or accomplishment of goals. There are many problems to be faced, but the very formation of such systems is an important step. The membership of the several systems is all Asian. Extra-regional powers are conspicuous by their absence.

ASPAC--including Japan--is the largest of the new systems. Somewhat contrary to Thai aims, ASPAC does not preach any anti-Communist doctrine,<sup>24</sup> in view of the desire of the Japanese to build stronger economic ties with the mainland. ASPAC does, however, concentrate on economic, social, and cultural interests--as does ASEAN. These pacts may in the future form the basis of some type of security arrangement.<sup>25</sup>

The economic character of ASEAN, ASPAC, and others can lend great assistance to political stability. In seeking to overcome the visible economic shortcomings that most of the developing nations have in Southern Asia, the

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<sup>24</sup>Kiichi Aichi, "ASPAC Still Young and Fluid," Pacific Community, I (October, 1969), 5.

<sup>25</sup>Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand: Revolution and Reaction in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 16-17. See also Bernard K. Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 98-130. Gordon states that ASA (forerunner to ASEAN) represents the "second" phase of the development of Asian regionalism; the "first" phase being Colombo, ECAFE, and SEATO involving non-Asian powers. See Eugene R. Black, Alternative in Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 43-45.

countries have first had to solve some of their intra-regional problems such as the Indonesia and Malaysia problem and the differences between the Philippines and Malaysia.

This is being done and steps toward economic cooperation and integration are taking place. Adding significance to this development is the instituting of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). While such asset capabilities as the ADB does have is small in comparison to the vast demands that can be placed against it, it nonetheless signals a new recognized level in the overall regional picture unfolding in that part of the world.

Regional development, with its concentration on the economic aspect, will not in itself guarantee success for the present and future member states. Basic to any success, either individually, or collectively, lies the need for political stability to be maintained in the respective countries. That, of course, hinges on several factors, not the least of which is the present rivalry that exists between Moscow, Washington, D.C., and Peking.

Economic development for these under-developed nations in large measure depends on their ability to make an almost total resource allocation toward this goal. Implicit within this factor, which in itself presents many and varied problems, is that for such an allocation to be made, the general area should be free from any "security" type problem. At the time of this writing, I do not foresee

that such a "security" type problem will not in fact present itself: either Russia could make a power move into the Indian Ocean with the subsequent ramifications that that could bring with it, or there could be a further intensification of the rivalry between Moscow and Peking.

This is problematical and only the future can tell what some of the end results will be. It nevertheless points to very possible difficulties that lie ahead.

As originally conceived, SEATO, in conjunction with NATO, and later with the Baghdad Pact (now CENTO), completed the loose geographical framework of containment of the Soviet and Chinese Communist threat. The Treaty specified both overt and covert threats to its area, and the United States stipulation to the Treaty was clearly aimed at a Communist threat. This has been and remains the goal of SEATO: a rejection of Communist expansion into the Treaty Area.

The United States action in Vietnam is an indication of this country's attitude toward such incursions. That the SEATO goal, as manifested by United States action was not wholly accepted by members of the system can be seen by the minimal specific support given to it by only four members--Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. On the other hand, three members--Britain, France, and Pakistan--have declined any form of support. And in the case of the

Philippines, such specific support--2,000 combat engineers-- has now been removed.

Such a degree of non-support is damaging in itself. But since South Vietnam is one of the Protocol States of the Treaty, the situation is all the more delicate in terms of relationships among the member-units.

The situation is further compounded when the factor of "stipulated" invitation, as set forth in the Treaty, is taken into account. An aggrieved government must first invite the participation for SEATO action prior to: (1) it becoming an agenda item to be discussed; and (2) a collective decision being taken for a form of action.

Given the above conditions, it then becomes evident that such governments as Laos and South Vietnam would be counseled not to make an appeal to SEATO, since it would be known beforehand that such an appeal for intervention or action on the part of SEATO would be doomed by a failure to achieve a unanimous consent.

Three alternatives present themselves. First, those units desiring a complete fulfillment or achievement of stated or perceived goals may continue to push for these at the expense of creating such a condition of stress as to endanger the continued existence of the organization. Second, in lieu of such a fulfillment, the goal might be perceptibly altered so as to gain complete unanimity. Third, leaving the system intact as it is, unilateral or bilateral

action on the part of certain powers may be taken, but not in the name of the system. It would appear that this third alternative is in effect at the present time as regards the United States.

But even this third alternative is beginning to change under pressure. United States involvement in the Vietnamese conflict has never been popular, at home or abroad. One of the stated goals of Richard Nixon in his Presidential campaign, as well as later when he had assumed the office of the Presidency, was that he would bring an end to American involvement there. It might be seen that such a policy as "Vietnamization," and the espousal of the "Nixon Doctrine" to alter the type of any future American involvement, represents a feedback response on the part of the chief elite of SEATO to make a decided change of policy that presumably would find a general consensus within that system. It remains to be seen, however, if this will result.

It cannot be said that SEATO has been an absolute success. Neither can it be said that it has been an abject and dismal failure. Success, after all, is a relative thing, and given the diversity of membership that exists within the SEATO membership, it can naturally be assumed that some will be perfectly satisfied with what they conceive of SEATO having accomplished, while others will take an opposite stance.



The stated objective of SEATO has been the rejection of aggression in the Treaty area, or against any state designated as aggressive by the SEATO powers. In a strict interpretation of that objective, SEATO has indeed fulfilled its requirement as a deterrent force. The directed meaning of aggression was of course aimed at Peking. With the exception of the Sino-Indian border dispute, there has been no overt expansive moves by the Chinese since the Korean War, which occurred prior to the formation of SEATO.<sup>26</sup> At the same time, the present Vietnamese conflict should not be considered as pertaining to SEATO per se, for it too had its beginnings prior to the Manila Pact. That is taking into account the legalistic approach which might be used, that technically the Geneva Accords of 1954 had been violated. It should be remembered, however, that the United States was not a signatory to those accords.

It is conjectural what would have happened in South-East Asia had there not been the presence of a security system like SEATO in effect--the same speculation would lend itself to NATO in Europe. Access to diplomatic records in Peking and Moscow are unavailable to Westerners, so at this time it would be impossible to ascertain whether or not Peking really did have expansionist designs in South-East

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<sup>26</sup>This of course excludes the Sino-Russo border dispute which was limited to strictly Communist powers.

Asia and was in fact deterred by the factor of SEATO and the nuclear might of the United States which backed it up. The fact remains, however, that there has been no overt move on the part of the Chinese.

The above represents an affirmative or optimistic view. A negative or pessimistic view would have to record the level of disrepute that SEATO is held in, not only by some Third World powers, but by some SEATO members as well. If, as some quarters profess, some powers who are members of SEATO at present are in effect giving indications to Peking that they will do nothing to hinder Chinese moves in an area that normally could be considered as being within the Chinese sphere of influence, then much of the deterrent quality of SEATO would have been nullified. There is no denying the fact that disillusionment has set in with some members of SEATO, and this could well be an indication of future troubles for that organization.

#### Conclusions

Not too long ago, an American President made a statement to the effect that we no longer solve problems in the international area, we cite them and try to manage them.<sup>27</sup> In that statement was the recognition that the United States does not have the capacity to "solve" problems

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<sup>27</sup>Sorensen, op. cit., p. 511.

that erupt from interactions among world powers. To solve the problems would mean that the United States would have to involve itself with other states, a situation which it neither desires nor has the capacity to enact.

In a similar vein, the author would not want to fall into a trap of having made an examination of a problem by using a still hypothetical approach, adding to it material which is not in itself exhaustive, and then trying to draw concrete conclusions.

Instead, in the absence of hard conclusions, there remain definite indications toward conclusive possibilities.

Likelihood Number One: The forces of polycentrism--and with it, the subsequent attending attraction of the respective Subordinate system--are beginning to make more and more of a demand on the individual members of SEATO with a resultant reduction of ties to that sub-system. An allusion was made in the beginning that because of membership in other systems, both natural and artificial,<sup>28</sup> a sort of "spill-over" effect was beginning to make itself felt within the sub-system of SEATO.

In particular, Britain and France fall into this classification because of their European orientation. Their membership in the NATO sub-system presents added political

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<sup>28</sup>Here the term "natural" refers to geographic contiguity, hence Brecher's rationale; while the term "artificial" refers to a constructed system made up of elements at large whether contiguity is or is not a criterion.

problems which have resulted in divisions between not only themselves as units of the system, but also with the chief elite.

The presence of EEC adds the element of economics and related political problems. As previously stated by the French, one of the factors for their opposing British entry into EEC was the general unbalanced state of the British economy. One of the major drains on any economy--and in particular the British--is the budget for defense. Such a budget is determined largely by previous or predicted political commitments. Such a posture by the British to effect serious reductions in their troop commitments on the Continent, their policy of withdrawal "East of Suez," and the withdrawal from the base at Aden, point to a British realignment that is designed to bring about a general strengthening of the British economy.

From the French view it would seem that a goal of French hegemony on the Continent would in no way be compatible with a more chauvanistic policy elsewhere, particularly in Indo-China where memory of the defeat at Dien Bien Phu still must be considered a psychological and political factor. In addition, with French economic leadership making itself felt in former French possessions in Africa, a hard political stand in South-east Asia by the French would undermine gains already made in these politically sensitive areas.

A supposition could be made that these factors influence to a greater degree the actions of Britain and France than do the considerations of SEATO, the other system to which they belong.

Likelihood Number Two: The political scene as well as political leadership is changing. One factor of consequence in that perceived change is an easing of tension in the Cold War. A result is the reevaluation of once-held doctrines by SEATO members, as well as by other members of the Dominant System and Global System.

As pointed out by many responsible political scientists and historians, the polarization which once was paramount in the international scene has gradually started to soften. Political figures of both the East and West have for some time made public statements and, we can surmise, corresponding diplomatic moves to ease tensions that heretofore marked the division between West and East.

Foremost among the political figures who had sought to achieve this re-orientation had been President Charles de Gaulle of France. Such a detente (on a bilateral basis) has also been sought--and achieved with a high degree of success--by the Pakistani. Noteworthy is the fact that London, Paris, and Rawalpindi have all recognized Peking.

Note should also be taken of the French persistence and courses of action taken designed to "thwart" and thereby reduce American influence both in NATO and in the economic

sector on the Continent. Whether the rapprochement that Paris seeks with Moscow has as its base the desire to reduce Russian-European tensions and open the way for further French hegemony advancements on the Continent, or the exclusion of American economic influence for the same result, the political consequences remain the same. The "specter" of Soviet expansion into Western Europe is being eroded.

Pakistani pre-occupation with the Kashmir problem can be credited with the change of political attitude of Rawalpindi toward both Moscow and Peking. In this change, it would seem a remote possibility that the Pakistani would assume any position which could be construed as being anti-Moscow and anti-Peking. With SEATO oriented toward an anti-Chinese stand, Pakistani moves, as evidenced by their recent statements in SEATO communique, are a continuation of this policy of an "understanding" with the Communist giants.

If it can be accepted that a general rapprochement is being made, SEATO, as it was conceived, stands in conflict with such a movement.

Likelihood Number Three: A "new" American attitude toward general engagement in the Far East and Southeast Asia has been given impetus with the several declarations that President Nixon has made regarding future commitments of United States resources in this area. The "Guam Declaration" and other statements would lead one to believe that,

once the United States has extricated itself from Vietnam, the United States will henceforth revert to a theme of the "Forties," that of being an arsenal.

If this is to be the American policy, then this also would have a tendency to de-emphasize the SEATO system. A forerunner of this policy might be the report by "American officials" to the effect that the recent meeting of the SEATO Council was largely "ritualistic" in nature.<sup>29</sup>

Likelihood Number Four: Any "fear" that reliance on only SEATO commitments might lend an element of danger to countries in and around the Treaty Area is offset by the contingency of further bilateral ties to the United States, and the added emphasis that these might be given. The Treaty Area is specified as being in the Asian region. Such an application is of immediate concern to Thailand on the Asian mainland, to a lesser degree by Pakistan which has no common border with either the Soviet Union or mainland China, and to far lesser degrees by the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, who are insular.

If we assume that because of the division of interests that now dominate the member-units of SEATO any direct or indirect threat would not find a consensus for action to be taken, then we can further assume that defense against an actual attack on a member would not be of major concern of other units.

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<sup>29</sup>AP dispatch, New York Times, July 4, 1970, p. 1, col. 8.

The United States has mutual defense pacts with several countries on both a bilateral and a collective basis. The Thais, in addition to having treaty obligations with the United States, sought to bolster a firmer commitment of the United States to come to the aid of Thailand in the case of an attack. This was done through the medium of the "special understanding and declaration" enunciated between Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand and Secretary of State Dean Rusk on March 2, 1962.

Australia and New Zealand both place great confidence in their ANZUS pact with the United States. They also have close ethnic and linguistic ties to the United States. The Philippines also has an advantage of previous ties with this country, and this special relationship has been constantly reinforced by the various administrations since the granting of Philippine independence.

Any "fear" that reliance only on SEATO commitments might endanger the security of these countries is offset by this contingency of further ties to the United States.

Likelihood Number Five: The question of security remains one of great importance. What condition or setting that may be in effect today does not necessarily guarantee its continuance. With the absence of a security type orientation in ASEAN, ASPAC, and Colombo, the qualitative security factor of the already established sub-system of SEATO could offer an answer to that problem, assuming that



problem-perception and membership could be altered without a disruption to the system. SEATO has as its primary function the generation of a military capability, should the need arise. Of secondary importance is the social-economic-cultural capacity that it now supports. While such a supportive role could fulfill an integrative function for SEATO, it is doubtful that, given other political considerations which weigh against it, this would greatly help the organization.

The extra-regional membership of such an "Asian" organization grossly outweighs any contributive role. There has been agitation on the part of Asian powers for the creation of a strict Asian organization whose membership would be restricted to only Asian members. ASA, ASPAC, and ASEAN (successor to ASA) can be seen as a large step in this direction. Thailand, while once the most vocal United States supporter, has done an almost about-face in this regard, and makes no secret of her disillusionment with SEATO. Thailand was the creative force in ASA and ASEAN, and from all outward appearances would seem to be a strong advocate of ASPAC.

Pakistan, in addition to her CENTO ties--which by her own admission she no longer believes to be of any consequence--is merging more and more into an economic partnership with the RCD--Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey.

It would seem, therefore, that with these moves now afoot, the future of SEATO is questionable. The issue of security is one that is always present, and given the fact that the Asian alliances at this time do not provide for such a collective entity, this could prove to be a positive factor on the side of SEATO. If, however, the question of security is solved on strictly an Asian basis, then a drastic change in SEATO goals would have to evolve, if the organization were to survive.

Likelihood Number Six: SEATO--according to the United States understanding appended to the Treaty--was formed as a defensive vehicle to ". . . apply only to Communist aggression. . . ." <sup>30</sup> Explicitly, this would refer to overt or open Red Chinese invasion of any of the signatory or Protocol powers. Implicitly--and events lately would tend to lean this way--a "new" recognizable influence is seeming to shape itself in regard to interpretive understandings. A revised view of the problem of insurgency, as a type and form of "aggression," is beginning to take form.

A new attitude seems to be developing by the SEATO powers to the effect that problems of insurgency are "local" and therefore are the exclusive problem of the state in which they occur.

If we can accept at face value some of the statements of the Red Chinese hierarchy regarding "insurgency"

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<sup>30</sup>Appendix C, p. 134.

and forms of "national liberation," then it would seem to follow that new forms of resistance would have to be developed. In this context, perhaps the old form of "collective" security is archaic and must be replaced by new concepts. If this is true, then it follows that internal stability of the state is a prerequisite to the fashioning of a defense against internal disturbances, whether internally or externally organized.

Assistance in peaceful nation-building steps would seem to be the order of the day. Rather than expending large resources on conventional armed forces, a shift to socio-economic emphasis might realize greater benefits in the long range period, thereby completely obviating the necessity for today's thoughts on collective security.

This is not to say that in developing nations there is no need for some type of conventional force. Internal "policing" is still a requirement that is needed not only by developing, but by developed nations as well. But should external threats be seen as no longer valid, then an allocation of resources could be shifted to the all important sector of building up the society and capacity of the country.

From the evidence at hand, these six conclusions have been drawn. At the outset, no claim was made as to this being an exhaustive review. The very fact that the nation-states involved--the United States, Great Britain,

France, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and their natural membership in other Subordinate Systems--precludes such an examination, for it would of necessity be too wide range and far reaching. Of necessity, this review has confined itself to some chosen aspects of political interaction which occurred between these various states over a period of time.

Five criteria were envisaged as contributing to the basic problem involved with SEATO: first, was the issue of problem-perception of the member-states, and how they originally conceived themselves in relationship to the organization, and their subsequent re-evaluation of that perception. Second, the issue created by a necessity of some of the nations to become more "inward" seeking because of either a reduction of "power" status, or a demand on the part of their societies to allocate more available resources to internal problems, or a combination of both. Third, the evolvement of a form of polycentrism whereby natural geographic contiguities form themselves into meaningful Subordinate systems which in turn can be accompanied by cross-purpose demands in any interaction which occur between these systems. Also the various members of the respective systems, seeking a position of primacy within those systems, can increase the number of conflicting demands due to the very nature of their struggle within that system. Fourth is the overlapping issue of the Cold War which is closely

interwoven in the above but which, because of the two nations involved and the respective power they have, must be singled out. And fifth is the issue of the political interactions which took place between some of the member-states and the resultant consequences which followed.

This then was the thesis presented. Evidence has been examined, a discussion made of that evidence, and from that, six probable conclusions have been drawn. Although these conclusions are not of an absolute nature, it remains the feeling of this author that conditions remain too fluid to do otherwise. At the same time, I am confident that these will serve as guidelines by which to observe future developments in this area.

- APPENDIX A MEETINGS OF THE SOUTH EAST ASIA TREATY  
ORGANIZATION
- APPENDIX B ABBREVIATIONS USED
- APPENDIX C THE SOUTH-EAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENCE  
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## APPENDIX A

### MEETINGS OF THE SOUTH EAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION

1955	February	Bangkok, Thailand
1956	March	Karachi, Pakistan
1957	March	Canberra, Australia
1958	March	Manila, the Philippines
1959	April	Wellington, New Zealand
	(September)	Washington, D.C.*
1960	May	Washington, D.C.
1961	March	Bangkok, Thailand
1962		(no formal meeting)
1963	April	Paris, France
1964	April	Manila, the Philippines
1965	May	London, England
1966	June	Canberra, Australia
1967	April	Washington, D.C.
1968	April	Wellington, New Zealand
1969	May	Bangkok, Thailand
1970	June	Manila, the Philippines

\*Special meeting of the Council of Ministers

## APPENDIX B

### ABBREVIATIONS USED

ABD . . . . .	Asian Development Bank
ANZUS . . . . .	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Pact
ASA . . . . .	Association of Southeast Asia
ASEAN . . . . .	Association of Southeast Asia (successor to ASA)
ASPAC . . . . .	Asian Pacific Council
CENTO . . . . .	Central Treaty Organization
EDC . . . . .	European Defense Community
EEC . . . . .	European Economic Community
EFTA . . . . .	European Free Trade Association
MAPHILINDO . . . . .	Malaysia, Philippine, Indonesian Pact
NATO . . . . .	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
RCD . . . . .	Regional Cooperation for Development
SEATO . . . . .	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
UN . . . . .	United Nations
UNICIP . . . . .	United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan



## APPENDIX C

### THE SOUTH-EAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENCE TREATY AND THE PACIFIC CHARTER

(Manila, 8 September 1954)

The Parties to this Treaty,  
Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties,  
Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set  
forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire  
to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the  
United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights  
of self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they  
will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote  
self-government and to secure the independence of all  
countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake  
its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and  
to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty  
and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being  
and development of all peoples in the Treaty Area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of  
unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that  
the Parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective  
defence for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

#### ARTICLE I.

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the  
United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which  
they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that  
international peace and security and justice are not endan-  
gered, and to refrain in their international relations from  
the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with  
the purposes of the United Nations.

## ARTICLE II.

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

## ARTICLE III.

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

## ARTICLE IV.

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty Area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty of political independence of any Party in the Treaty Area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defence.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

## ARTICLE V.

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning

the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the Treaty Area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

#### ARTICLE VI.

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

#### ARTICLE VII.

Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party of the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

#### ARTICLE VIII.

As used in this Treaty, the "Treaty Area" is the general area of South-East Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the South-West Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the Treaty Area the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the Treaty Area.

#### ARTICLE IX.

1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other signatories.

2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective

constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.

3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

#### ARTICLE X.

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

#### ARTICLE XI.

The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.

#### UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to Communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954\*

\*Signed for Australia by Richard G. Casey, Minister of External Affairs; for France by Guy La Chambre, Minister of State; for New Zealand by T. Clifton Webb, Minister of External Affairs; for Pakistan by Chaudhri Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Foreign Minister; for the Republic of the Philippines by Carlos P. Garcia, Vice President and Secretary of Foreign

Affairs, Francisco A. Delgado, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Thomas L. Cabili, Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada, and Representative Cornelio T. Villareal; for Thailand by Prince Wan Waithayakon Krommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh, Minister of Foreign Affairs; for the United States by John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, Senator H. Alexander Smith, and Senator Michael J. Mansfield.

#### PROTOCOL TO THE SOUTH-EAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENCE TREATY

Designation of states and territory as to which provisions of Article IV and Article III are to be applicable:

The Parties to the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

The Parties further agree that the above mentioned states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures contemplated by Article III.

This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol to the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

#### THE PACIFIC CHARTER

The delegates of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America:

Desiring to establish a firm basis for common action to maintain peace and security in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific;

Convinced that common action to this end in order to be worthy and effective, must be inspired by the highest principles of justice and liberty;

Do hereby proclaim:

First, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities;

Second, they are each prepared to continue taking effective practical measures to endure conditions favourable to the orderly achievement of the foregoing purposes in accordance with their constitutional procedures;

Third, they will continue to cooperate in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote higher living standards, economic progress and social well-being in this region;

Fourth, as declared in the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, they are determined to prevent or counter by appropriate means any attempt in the Treaty Area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity.

Proclaimed at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

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