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
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
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HITLER AT LIDICE:

LANGUAGE, REVENGE, AND SOCIAL PATHOLOGY IN WARFARE.

by

Stephen Donald Carey

B.A. The University of Montana, 1994

presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements


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Hitler at Lidice: Revenge, Language, and Social pathology in Warfare (152 pp.)

Director: Paul G. Lauren, PhD.

PGL

Revenge is a universal phenomenon in human behavior. All human societies that have established moral or legal codes of conduct have based these codes, to varying degrees, upon systemized retribution. In times of war, societies and their institutions undergo a transformation in which pathological behavior can potentially undermine the moral restraints that regulate the instruments of legitimized revenge. When this happens, especially in the case of military retribution against civilians, the result is an abhorrent tragedy.

Such a tragedy occurred in June, 1942, when elements of the German army destroyed the Czechoslovak town of Lidice in retaliation for the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich. The soldiers involved in the massacre were clearly not homicidal maniacs, yet they still were able to make the difficult moral decision to participate in the killing. By examining history, as well as psychological, sociological, and political theory, it is possible to develop a method for studying the means by which these soldiers were given adequate permission to engage in pathological activity.

This permission comes from two sources. The first source is found in personal psychological reactions to the context of war. The nature of partisanship evokes pathological behavior trends in nonpathological individuals. In this study, the phenomenon is called "unconscious" permission. The second source of permission comes from the language of individual leaders. Through rhetoric, propaganda, and direct orders, leaders can provide their subordinates with "conscious" permission to engage in pathological behavior.

Recent developments in diplomacy regarding military peacekeeping have placed more demands upon soldiers for rational, more mature decisions and behavior than ever before. Contemporary military leaders and statesmen must be aware of the effects of their language in the context of war if modern peacekeeping missions are to avoid the spectre of revenge.

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Chapter I Introduction

On the evening of June 9, 1942, elements of the German army, accompanied by the Czech gendarmerie, surrounded the Czechoslovak mining town of Lidice. They established roadblocks to completely isolate the community. None of the villagers could leave, and no outsiders could enter the town. The soldiers allowed only those miners returning from work to pass through the roadblocks. That night, the soldiers forced the people of Lidice from their homes and began to execute an order issued earlier that day by the acting Reichsprotector of Bohemia and Moravia.

The women and children were loaded onto trucks and taken to nearby Kladno. In the morning, the men were taken to the Horack farm. While the men waited in the farmyard, the Germans busied themselves dispersing the livestock and scouring the village, "requisitioning" valuables from the houses of Lidice. Later in the morning, a firing squad assembled in the farmyard and the execution of the men of Lidice began. The Czech men were marched into the farmyard

in groups of ten. The Germans made the men stand in front of mattresses placed against one of the walls of the yard. When one line of men was shot, another group was marched in and positioned in front of the last. The executions continued throughout the morning, with two pauses during which the executioners were served schnapps to relieve their fatigue, until the bodies of the men of Lidice completely covered the yard of the Horack farm.

Meanwhile, in nearby Kladno, the women and children were being evaluated and processed by the Germans. Those children deemed racially acceptable were set aside to be sent to German foster families. The rest were loaded onto trains and sent first to the concentration camp at Lodz, and from there to the extermination camp at Chelmno. Those children not yet one year of age accompanied their mothers to the concentration camp at Ravensbruck.

After the village had been emptied of its inhabitants, the Germans set to work demolishing it. Workers set off explosives in the buildings, dug up the cemetery, and set the village ablaze. Over the next few months, German workers hauled the rubble of Lidice away and planted fields

over the ruins, leaving only the faint traces of a few building foundations as testament to the fact that a town once stood on the spot.

The destruction of Lidice was an act of revenge: A direct response to the assassination of Reinhardt Heydrich, the SS officer in command of German-occupied territories in Czechoslovakia. The German actions at Lidice satisfied the need for retribution among the German occupiers of Czechoslovakia. As a behavioral process of healing, the destruction of Lidice served a vital function in satisfying the natural, emotional desire of the Germans for retaliation against their enemies.

To say that human beings are naturally driven to carry out acts of revenge for offenses committed against themselves or their affiliates is hardly a revelation. Revenge is a motive force in human behavior as natural and universal as any other aggressive survival tactic. It is likely that in any human language there exists a word or words that describe revenge, balancing accounts, an evening of scores. In Western romance languages, the etymological roots are found in the Latin: vincere, to conquer; vindex,

avenger; vindicta, vengeance. In German, die Rache or die Revanche, and Revanche in French, describe revenge. This linguistic phenomenon extends far beyond the cultures of Europe. In the native cultures of New Zealand, the Maori word, utu, denotes a continuing balance. Utu implies a process of retribution wherein the injured party may exact immediate retaliation or instigate a long, protracted partisan feud aimed at settling the score. The motivation for revenge goes far beyond the desire of an individual to "get even." Whether immediate or long term, action demands reaction to maintain the social balance.

Most of the recorded attempts at regulating social behavior through legalistic codes are founded on a system of balancing offensive action with retributive reaction. Religious texts shed light on the fundamental values regarding the **use** of revenge as a balancing force in human affairs. The following passage from The Koran illustrates the legitimate place of revenge in Islamic society:

We have therein commanded them that they should give life for life, and eye for eye, and nose for nose, and ear for ear, and tooth for tooth; and that wounds should also be

punished by retaliation.¹

In a passage that is nearly identical to the Islamic "Law of Retribution," the Hebrew book of Exodus outlines the foundations for legitimate revenge:

If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.²

The necessity for revenge in these passages seems evident. In order to regulate a population, rulers must establish certain strictures which provide for the possibility of retribution--the maintenance of a balance. As human societies grew in size and complexity, so did the legal codices expand to include more specific and complex systems to regulate conduct. At their core, though, human law codes have and continue to contain the fundamental philosophy of balance through retribution: Legitimized revenge.

In an atmosphere of peace and stability, human societies are able to effectively utilize this retributive

¹ The Koran ch. V.

² Exodus XXI.

philosophy to maintain social balance and harmony. The history of the human experience, as recorded through the ages, does not, however, portray a generally continuous atmosphere of peace and stability. As cultures expanded and came into contact with one another, the natural conflict generated by social groups competing for territory and resources more often than not led (and continues to lead) to violence. While revenge can effectively be used to maintain harmony and balance during peacetime, it is the tendency of humans at war to perpetuate revenge beyond the balancing of a social equation. In her philosophical work entitled, A Strategy for Peace, Sissela Bok describes this tendency in her analysis of what she calls the "Pathology of Partisanship."

In time of war or other intense conflict, partisanship can foster a pathology all its own. When this happens, partisanship goes beyond the emphasis on loyalty and cohesion needed for the well-being of any community and leads people to become obsessive and heedless of their group's long-range self-interest, and even of its survival.³

³ Sissela Bok, A Strategy for War and Peace: Human Values and the Threat of War (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), p. 6.

Though Bok does not address her analysis specifically to revenge, the transition from partisanship to revenge in her theory is not difficult to effect. The goals of warring partisans and people who carry-out acts of revenge are quite similar: Partisans fight to right perceived injustices done to them and their fellows; the Islamic "law of Retribution" provides the legal framework within which injustices can be righted. If partisans are vulnerable to a pathological escalation of their endeavors during warfare, then those people and institutions who attempt to exact revenge upon one another within the context of war are similarly susceptible. When this pathology comes to guide the hand of a society's military institution, tragic atrocities too often result.

These acts of revenge carried out by a society's military apparatus mar the record of human history since antiquity. In 146 BC, Roman forces, largely in retaliation for the humiliation of their own forces during Hannibal's Italian campaign fifty years earlier, destroyed the city of Carthage. All of the inhabitants were either killed or enslaved. The city was razed to the ground and the fields

sown with salt. During the Thirty Years' War (1614-1618) the distinction between combatants and noncombatants all but vanished as the Christian denominations of Central Europe fought a pathologically escalative war of annihilation. In the French Revolution of the following century, the towns and inhabitants of Vendee and Lyon suffered the same sort of retribution as had the Carthaginians so many centuries earlier during the Punic Wars. At Lyon, townspeople were tied to stakes and fired upon by the cannon of the Revolutionary forces. Robespierre's Terror is the very embodiment of pathological revenge during warfare.

The twentieth century has surpassed all other historical epochs in the horror wrought by vindictive behavior during war. Revenge for the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria in 1914 set in motion a chain of events that developed into a war which forever changed the culture of the Western world. Within three decades, place-names like Auschwitz, Chelmno, Ravensbruck, and Dachau would emerge in our vocabulary to conjure up dark images of Hitler's wartime revenge against the Jews: Retaliation for a fabricated Jewish movement which led to the German defeat

in World War I. The Allies decision to firebomb Dresden was driven exclusively by revenge. During the Vietnam War, United States soldiers, in an act of pathological revenge destroyed the village of Mi Lai and massacred the inhabitants. During the Gulf War, U.S. soldiers liberating Kuwait City were charged with war crimes, their vindictive behavior driven by rumors of the suffering of the Kuwaitis at the hands of the Iraqi soldiers.

Over the last few years, even the last few months, weeks and days, in international conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, Israel, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, and in civil wars in places like Sri Lanka, Rwanda, and Liberia, the world has been shocked again and again by tales of vindictive brutality and murder of civilians at the hands of military institutions. Wherever and whenever human societies lock themselves in mortal combat, the pathology of revenge produces a litany of names and places that become synonymous with terror and abject suffering. Few things produce more powerful emotions and reflection than news of military forces attacking defenseless civilian populations in acts of revenge.

When people witness a tragedy on the scale of a vengeful war crime, they are left searching for answers. As detailed above, most societies have at their legal base some form of systemized retribution. Both Judeo-Christian and Islamic societies have in their fundamental scriptures language that legitimizes, or permits revenge. These passages are intended to maintain equilibrium among the individuals of a society. The doctrine of life for life and eye for eye maintains this balance through proportional action and reaction: The severity of the punishment is determined by the severity of the crime. When pathological behavior comes to drive the natural impulse toward revenge, as seen in the case of Lidice, the proportionality of this retributive equation is upset, threatening stability within the parties involved.

It is convenient and comfortable to shrug-off the issue of revenge in war, evoking the kind of "all's fair" logic that is so often used to explain-away the horrors of war. While it is evident from Bok's examination of pathology in the context of war that human values and behavior are significantly altered through the experience of war, to

simply declare that, "In war, anything makes sense," truncates the problem after the fact and lends apathetic thoughtlessness to the issue. Many scholars have attempted to confront complex social and political issues with the intent on positing a solution--a solution that effects a change in human nature/behavior through enlightenment. This study represents just such an attempt to illuminate the issue of pathological revenge during war and speculate about possible solutions.

In order to ascertain the reasons why a Mi Lai or a Lidice occurred, one of the first appropriate steps would be an examination of the social values within the societies enacting the vengeful atrocities. This analysis will seek to identify such values by searching for *permissive* language--language that increases the possibility of an act of pathological revenge during times of war.

While it is possible to argue that warring societies *promote* acts of brutal revenge on the part of their military institutions, such an argument, as mentioned above, does not lend itself to the search for potential remedies. Even if it were the goal of this work to illustrate socio-political

trends in human behavior that promote wartime atrocities, to claim that human nature, even during war, promotes the massacre of innocents in the name of revenge is problematic at the least. While humans might not necessarily promote such atrocities, values must exist in any society that permit nonpathological people to engage in pathological behavior. Part of this permission can be found in contemporary language. Through the speeches and writing of national leaders, it is possible to identify certain permissive values that can rationalize pathological acts of revenge.

In examining acts of wartime revenge as they have occurred in the past, two types become apparent. All revenge has the same source--an emotional response to a transgression committed against a person, an institution, or both. After the initial act which precipitates the revenge, at least two courses of action can go into effect. In one case, revenge is immediate and taken without forethought. Individuals or groups respond instantly and emotionally to a situation. The massacre of civilians by U.S. soldiers at Mi Lai and the conduct of the 1st Marine Division during the

Gulf War are classic examples of this type of event-driven revenge. The soldiers, affected by past events and the present situation, initiated revenge as individuals, and as a group acted in concert without having any pre-arranged plan to do so.

Another type of revenge has the same emotional sources as the first, but takes a radically different course. Instead of being an immediate, irrational reaction to a situation, the actors set a deliberate plan into motion. Options are weighed, logical targets are selected, and the revenge is carried out deliberately and systematically, following a definite plan of action.

This second, deliberate type of revenge is the focus of this study. The case of Lidice provides a perfect model of this well-planned, *rational* act of pathological retribution.

As described above, Reinhardt Heydrich, the SS commander in the annexed territories of Bohemia and Moravia, was assassinated by Czech resistance fighters. The German response took the form of the execution or deportation of the entire population of Lidice and the complete destruction of the town. The remarkable issue surrounding the case of

Lidice is the lapse of time between action and reaction. Where the massacre at Mi Lai was a process of action and reaction occurring during a single day, the destruction of Lidice followed the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich by thirteen days.

The primary goal of this work is to provide an analysis of permissive values that undergirded Nazi society--values that permitted and provided justification for such action. This thesis rests on the assumption that the Germans, to a certain extent, acted voluntarily in committing these acts.

While it is true that they were acting under orders, each soldier in the firing squads, each worker who helped dismantle the village, and each soldier who sent the women and children off to concentration camps still, at some level, had to make an individual decision to participate in the destruction. In the absence of some degree of social permission, the only explanation left to analyze their motives is individual pathology. To argue that the forces arrayed at Lidice were entirely composed of homicidal maniacs would, of course, be foolish.

In order to discover these permissive values, this analysis will combine the disciplines of psychology, sociology, linguistics, and political theory with historical analysis. Chapter II outlines the general methodological approach. Using psychology as a base, it is possible to construct a behavioral model which enables an analysis of societal pathological behavior and its sources. Chapter III provides a contextual analysis of the increasingly pathological relationship between Germany and the Czechoslovak Republic between 1918 and 1942. Chapter IV, in part, employs the method developed in Chapter II to examine the rhetoric of Adolf Hitler for permissive values as they can be applied to revenge. Chapter V concludes the analysis of permission with an examination of human behavior as manifested and examined in political theory.

While this is a study of a single case in history, it is in no way intended to advance a description of Nazi society as being peculiarly permissive toward acts of revenge. To do so would promote the erroneous argument of a *Deutscher Sonderweg* and, more importantly, it would be an inappropriate and distasteful treatment of German culture.

By examining the actions of the Germans at Lidice and, more importantly, the language of Adolf Hitler, the purpose of this study is to illuminate institutionalized military revenge as a universal, species-wide phenomenon among humans.

This study is intended as a speculative view of the future of statecraft and military operations as well as an informative analysis of past events. Too often the importance of human emotions and feelings are ignored in decisions of state. In this era when global peacekeeping efforts rely more and more on military issues and organizations for success, there is a distinct need to incorporate the study of human emotions into all levels of the peacekeeping process: From the sweeping policy negotiations down to front-line troop leadership.

Chapter II

Theory and Method: Emotions and Pragmatics

Feelings and emotions--including that of revenge--often serve as the fundamental forces which drive human behavior. Our daily conduct is a progression of decisions based upon our emotional reactions to various stimuli. When we are confronted with events that require some sort of reaction or decision, our subsequent conduct, logical or not, is a product of our values and thoughtfulness tempered by our emotions. During crisis times such as war or natural disasters, the quality of human emotions can change, leading in some instances to irrational, or even pathological decisions.¹ As important as feelings and emotions are to human behavior, treatment of such phenomena is conspicuously absent both in scholarly analysis of historical events and the conduct of international affairs, such as treaties. Another area which lacks sufficient analysis of the role of human emotions in behavior is the field of military leadership. While leadership manuals detail various

¹ See Bok above.

emotional considerations military leaders must address in order to maintain the combat effectiveness of their troops, none directly outline the potential affectiveness of emotions of soldiers upon the manner in which they conduct combat operations.

In addition to providing an analysis of revenge in war, this work is intended, in part, to highlight the need for more detailed treatment of the phenomena of feelings and emotions in the development and implementation of international peacekeeping policy. In order to effectively address these issues, it is necessary to examine works of psychological and sociological theory that illuminate the important role that emotions play in human behavior and the manner in which emotions, experienced collectively, can influence political and social decisions and conduct. By combining psychological theory with the historical analysis of international relations, we can draw more complete and compelling conclusions regarding the influence of feelings and emotions both at Lidice in 1942, and in the more general framework of international security and peacekeeping.

One sociologist who has done extensive work in the role of emotions in human conduct is Thomas Scheff. His 1994

work entitled, Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism, and War, presents an examination of emotions that produce vindictive behavior in societies and the manifestations of these emotions in the outbreak of war. Scheff bases much of his work on psychological theories developed by Helen Lewis in her 1971 book, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis. Scheff focuses on Lewis's pioneering work in identifying shame as one of the primary motivating emotions in human behavior, and her further development of therapeutic approaches to problems in personal relationships and psyches caused by shame.

By analyzing the transcripts of dozens of therapy sessions, Lewis is able to define the nature of shame in human emotions, and further describe a pattern of potentially aggressive and destructive behavior produced by shame. She describes a certain level of contact or "connectedness" among human beings. Shame can result when the intensity of that connectedness is significantly altered, and individuals feel alienated. If human contact becomes so intimate that one party feels enveloped, exposed, or violated, that party experiences some amount of shame. Likewise, if the contact becomes too remote, a feeling of

isolation can produce shame. This breach in human solidarity can be caused by another person's actions, or an encounter with other "ill-defined" sources.⁵ Lewis describes shame as an acutely painful experience that results not only in a certain degree of mental anguish, but physical changes as well. This physical response to shame involves agitation resulting from the arousal of internal organs and kinesthetic feedback.⁶

Lewis's description of the physiological human responses to shame closely resembles the phenomenon commonly described as a "fight or flight" reaction. Any threat (such as pain) to the self elicits an agitated response in which the object of the threat is moved to either retreat from, or aggressively confront the threat. The natural desire to eliminate threats through aggression or flight is a primitive behavioral defense mechanism. Lewis addresses the need for humans to likewise defend themselves from the pain induced by shame. When individuals encounter shameful

⁵ Helen B. Lewis, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis (New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1971), p. 39. We can assume Lewis means that shameful emotions are not exclusively the product of other individuals' actions.

⁶ Ibid.

situations, as such situations imply some measure of hostility directed against that individual,⁷ natural reactions are to either distance themselves from the source of shame (through hiding, a form of 'flight') or, more commonly, repress the feelings of shame in an attempt to ignore them.⁸

Lewis claims that this phenomenon of "bypassed" shame leads to neurotic behavior. The emotion of shame itself can ultimately redirect the hostile emotions resulting from shame. When a person experiences shame from another source, it is shame and guilt, in the form of rationality, that diffuses hostility and leads to a nonaggressive resolution of the confrontation.⁹ If, in other words, a person is shamed and acknowledges the validity of the situation, much as in the case of an embarrassing public critique from a colleague, that person realizes the further shame and subsequent guilt that can arise from retaliation. They will feel bad for behaving vindictively.

⁷ Ibid, p. 41.

⁸ Ibid, p. 38.

⁹ Ibid.

If, however, in defense, individuals attempt to deny or repress their shameful emotions, it is impossible for them to acknowledge their shame, thereby denying a vent for the natural physical and mental agitation evoked by shame. By internalizing shameful emotions, individuals become more prone to "discharge" their anxiety in the form of hostility directed against others.¹⁰ It is this "bypassed" shame, Lewis argues, which produces vengeful emotions that, in turn, drive aggressively hostile behavior in an attempt to exact revenge and humiliate the source of the shame.¹¹

For shame to occur there must be an emotional relationship between the person [experiencing shameful emotions] and the "other" [source of shame].... In this affective tie the self does not feel autonomous or independent, but dependent and vulnerable to rejection. Shame is a vicarious experience of the significant other's scorn. A "righting" tendency often evoked by shame is the "turning of the tables." Evoked hostility presses toward triumph over or humiliation of the "other," i.e., to the vicarious experience of the other's shame.¹²

¹⁰ Ibid, pp. 40-41, 44-45, 179, 248-9.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 46.

¹² Ibid, p. 42.

Lewis's connection between the experience of shame and the onset of vengeful emotions is clear. This affective relationship between shame and revenge is not a mysterious puzzle accessible only to scholars of psychoanalytic theory.

We have all experienced the emotional process described by Lewis. When we are shamed, embarrassed, or harmed by another person, part of our natural response contains the desire at least to seek revenge, if not actual vindictive behavior.

Expanding on Lewis's theoretical work linking unacknowledged shame and emotional hostility, Scheff and Suzanne Retzinger make a close tie between shame and violent, destructive aggression in their 1991 book, Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts.

Using several different types of case studies, Scheff and Retzinger make a clear case for the commonality of the shame-hostility cycle in humans and further project this behavior onto a larger, society-wide canvas.

Part of their study focuses on human solidarity and alienation. In an analysis of several different sets of game show contestants, the reactions to winning and losing among the two-person teams were nearly identical. When

victorious, the contestants would display classic behavioral cues indicating pride and solidarity: Eye contact, wide-open eyes, smiling, closeness and actual physical contact. In defeat, these same pairs showed signs of shame and alienation: No eye contact, closed or hidden eyes (an attempt to hide), physical distancing from one another, frowns or grimaces.¹³ In a similar study of "victims" of Allan Funt's comedy show, *Candid Camera*, the reactions of the subjects of practical jokes all displayed strikingly similar shame cues. They either hid or closed their eyes, or "shrank" inward in an unconscious attempt to reduce their size (one man even crawled under a desk); most importantly, all the subjects displayed excited, agitated behavior.¹⁴

Combining an analysis of unacknowledged shame and violent emotions (based on Lewis's theory) with their analysis of the universal nature of human behavior resulting from shame and alienation, Scheff and Retzinger develop a theory of social conflict. Their theory outlines a process

¹³ Thomas J. Scheff and Suzanne M. Retzinger, Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 54-60.

¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 43-53.

that begins with a stimulus (verbal, linguistic, or paralinguistic) that evokes shame in a subject(s). If the subject is responsive to the shameful stimulus and acknowledges it, the bond between the subject and the "other" actually grows stronger, resulting in pride and solidarity. If, on the other hand, the subject is not responsive to the stimulus, alienation develops between the two parties which quickly develops into a pattern of pathological revenge. As a result of their unacknowledged shame, the subject becomes angry and responds disrespectfully to the "other" who, in turn, experiences shame, grows angry, and perpetuates the cycle of revenge.¹⁵ Scheff and Retzinger add to Lewis's theory of shame and hostile emotion to illuminate the tie between shame and violent, aggressive behavior:

Lewis (1971) referred to the internal shame-rage process...as "anger bound by shame" or "humiliated fury"... Shame-rage spirals may be brief, lasting a matter of minutes, or they can last for hours, days, or a lifetime, as bitter hatred or resentment.... Since such conflicts have no limits [due to the escalatory nature of pathological retribution], they may be lethal.¹⁶

¹⁵ Ibid, pp. 66-69.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 127.

In Bloody Revenge, Scheff uses the ideas that he and Retzinger developed in Emotions and Violence to describe warfare among nations as a product of shameful emotions as experienced by a society, and the naturally hostile discharge of those emotions. In order to link this emotional pattern to social behavior, Scheff proposes,

...that when leaders of nations and their followers face large-scale, emotionally charged conflicts, they utilize the only dispute tactics they know--the ones they learned beneath the level of awareness, in their families.¹⁷

Scheff is trying to identify the emotional causes of war as they are evident in human behavior. These emotions are products of behavior that individuals learn from the society within which they live and interact daily. The emotions that lead humans to seek revenge through violence, in this setting, are thus not pathological aberrations, but rather inherent facets of human behavior. The consequences of such emotions in the context of war, however, are often tragic. As it applies to his study, Scheff maintains an inherent connection between war (as revenge) and human emotions:

¹⁷ Scheff, p. 34.

"...war is not just out there, separate from us; it is also in here, inside of us."¹⁸

Focusing on the emotions of shame and pride, Scheff examines the following excerpt from Mein Kampf using Lewis's analytical style of "discourse analysis" to make his case for WWII as an emotional act of collective revenge. Those words conveying shameful emotions are here italicized and those which indicate pride are underlined:

Particularly our German people which today *lies broken and defenseless, exposed* to the kicks of all the world, needs that suggestive force that lies in self-confidence. This self-confidence must be inculcated in the young national comrade from childhood on. His whole education and training must be so ordered as to give him the conviction that he is absolutely superior to others. Through his physical strength and dexterity, he must recover his faith in invincibility of his whole people. For what formerly led the German army to victory was the sum of the confidence which each individual had in himself and all together in their leadership. What will raise the German people up again is confidence.¹⁹

While Hitler is not directly calling for the German

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 12.

¹⁹ Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf trans. by Ralph Manheim, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1943) p. 411. Also cited in Scheff, p. 114. [My italics and underlines]

nation to rise in arms against its enemies, it is clear that he is implying that "strength and dexterity" will provide the confidence which, in turn, will lead to victory and a restoration of Germany's former greatness. It is not an unrealistic assumption to connect Hitler's language to his desire for revenge and satisfaction. In one aspect, according to Scheff, World War II was an act of vengeance directed against Germany's enemies from World War I.²⁰

As mentioned above, Lewis examines the role of shame in producing neurotic behavior in individuals. Scheff relies heavily on Lewis's idea of "feeling traps" as well as the conflict theory outlined in Emotions and Violence to illuminate social emotions which can produce destructive behavior. Lewis describes a feeling trap as a process that begins with an insult. This insult immediately produces a feeling of alienation between the two parties. This alienation leads to shame which, should this shame remain unacknowledged (as described by Lewis), in turn produces rage and anger. This anger then leads to aggressive behavior, and even further to violence as outlined by Scheff

²⁰ Scheff, pp. 105-123.

and Retzinger.²¹ In Bloody Revenge, Scheff projects this process of feeling traps upon nation-states to describe emotional motives for aggressive behavior (war) as a vengeful response to a collective feeling of alienation and shame.

While Scheff's case for shame as the prime motivator for destructive behavior is well-established, his link between the emotions of individuals and social behavior is less clear. Up to this point, the theories examined have all been based primarily on psychological analyses of individuals. As a sociologist, Scheff identifies patterns in human behavior that indicate communal action resulting from individual values. He takes individual emotions and their effects, and projects them onto a social construct to explain social behavior. Scheff justifies this connection with a seemingly simple, yet very telling illustration of the historical evolution of shame in society.

In order to establish this connection, Scheff turns to a 1978 analysis of the evolution of manners by Norbert Elias. Elias details the parallel relationship between

²¹ Ibid, p. 69.

modernization and the "civilizing process...[of] the...moulding of the drive economy that we call 'shame' and 'repugnance' or embarrassment.'" Scheff emphasized Elias's analysis of the increasing social concern regarding and conventions governing "proper" behavior such as table manners, bodily functions, sexuality and anger.²² Elias is concerned mainly with the connection between the development of rational thought and modernization. Even so, his discussion of the connection between individual shame and social table manners is a good illustration of the link that Scheff draws between individual emotions and social behavior.

In the same vein, Scheff uses an analysis of politeness to describe the universal nature of social behavior as driven by individual emotions. In 1987, Brown and Levinson examined the common trends in human politeness behavior.²³ In their analysis, Brown and Levinson discuss universal trends in language produced by the desire for correct

²² Scheff, p. 46. He cites Norbert Elias, The History of Manners (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).

²³ P. Brown and S. Levinson, Politeness Behavior: Some Universals in Language Usage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

etiquette. As Scheff describes their analysis: "All known cultures provide elaborate means for protecting face, that is, protecting against embarrassment and humiliation."²⁴ In light of Elias's analysis, if politeness is a social behavioral trend aimed at reducing the occurrence of shame in individuals, then Brown and Levinson expand this idea to include all societies. Here, then, (in combination with the theories developed by Lewis, Retzinger, and Scheff) is an illustration of the two basic ideas pursued in this analysis: First, human social values (deriving from a composite of human emotions) are directly connected to an individual's decision/ability to participate in institutional acts of revenge and second, these values are not peculiar to a certain society (Germany), but are a universally human phenomenon.

Developing a theory is only half the task of this project. In order for the theory to have any meaning, it is necessary to develop a method for analysis. Scheff provides the theoretical model upon which this analysis rests. His method, however, is another matter. Scheff bases his method

²⁴ Scheff, p. 51.

of language analysis in large part on the Gottschalk-Gleser Content Analysis Scales.²⁵ As the title suggests, this work belongs to the larger field of behavioral study of content analysis. Content analysis, according to Gottschalk's method, is an attempt to quantify and analyze lingual and written communication as an "essential aspect of all social interaction, ranging from the interpersonal to the international levels."²⁶ Content analysis involves assigning numerical values to certain words or constructions,²⁷ and then numerically quantifying this code to identify and predict behavioral patterns. Evidence that the methods of content analysis embraced by psychologists and sociologists have influenced a number of historians and political scientists can be found in the work of Robert

²⁵ Lewis A. Gottschalk, Carolyn N. Winget, and Goldine C. Gleser, Manual of Instructions for the Gottschalk-Gleser Content Analysis Scales: Anxiety, Hostility, and Social Alienation-Personal Disorganization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

²⁶ Ibid, p. 1.

²⁷ Depending on the type of behavior that the analyst is attempting to illuminate--anger, shame, hostility, alienation, et c.--words and constructions will have different values as the objectives of the analysis change.

North and his associates.²⁸ In their handbook, the authors describe a method for quantifying the text of documents in order to identify aspects of human behavior that can affect decision makers and further affect the formulation and implementation of international policy, especially as it regards "international crises and the *behavior* of states in conflict."²⁹

As a method for quantifying text, content analysis is a valuable analytical tool. It is a means by which behavioralists can judge human conduct and make well-informed predictions based on mathematical probability. It is, however, not without limitations. North claims that his work is a solution to the enigmatic practice of analyzing the complex world of international relations through qualitative methods. In his introduction, North implies that qualitative analysis demands a somewhat undisciplined leap of faith, a plunge "into the dark."³⁰

²⁸ Robert C. North, Ole R. Holsti, M. George Zaninovich, and Dina A. Zinnes, Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963).

²⁹ Ibid, p. 3. [emphasis added]

³⁰ Ibid, p. xiii.

While this statement is valuable in light of the strengths as noted above, it is not analytical gospel. By reducing the language relative to international decision making to a numerical code, content analysis places very definite constraints upon one of the most complex and bedeviling issues facing modern scholars--human nature. Though it is a helpful and complicated tool that can be used to reduce the study of human behavior to numerically-generated conclusions, content analysis also limits the latitude necessary for analysts to draw more general conclusions about universal human behavior. By relying on content analysis, scholars roam dangerously close to the borders of monocausal explanation. As seen in Scheff's work, shame alone is heralded as the primary motivation for the First and Second World Wars. Any responsible historian must answer such an assertion with the critique: "It is not that simple."

As it pertains to this work on revenge and social pathology, content analysis is important in that it lends authority to the role that language plays in the formation of human values and the conduct of individuals. While content analysis is not the primary method employed here, it

is important to acknowledge the efforts of those who have, diligently, emphasized the importance of language through quantitative examination. Specific to the goals of this analysis, content analysis lays the scientific foundation for analyzing Hitler's rhetoric and extracting parts of his discourse which indicate shame and/or revenge.

Human emotions and behavior present analysts with such a diverse and vexing array of variables and possibilities that content analysis, for all its complexity and thoroughness, is simply too limiting a method for a broad, general examination. Content analysis, however, belongs in part to the larger discipline of linguistic analysis called pragmatics. Pragmatics, in turn, is a subfield of semeiotics, or semantics. Semeiotics refers to that field of study dedicated to examining the meaning(s) of words as those meanings change over time and in certain contexts.

Within the field of semeiotics, pragmatics focuses on the phenomena of cause and effect as affected by verbal communication. T. Givon describes pragmatics as,

an approach to description, to information processing, thus to the construction, interpretation and communication of experience. At its core lies the notion of context, and the axiom that reality and/or

experience are not absolute fixed entities, but rather *frame-dependent*, contingent upon the observer's *perspective*.³¹

Pragmatics refers to any study of language that focuses on the medium of communication, the sender, the interpreter(s), and the context within which the language is delivered and received. Concisely defined by Charles W. Morris, "...'pragmatics' is designated the science of the relation of signs [lingual or textual communication] to their interpreters."³² Pragmatics as a discipline contains many diverse subfields that range from complex coding systems such as content analysis to less restrictive, loosely-defined analyses of the interpretation of metaphor.³³

Whatever formats or methods, the objectives of all pragmatic analyses are similar. Analysts who engage in pragmatic examination seek to identify and extract

³¹ T. Givon, Mind, Code, and Context: Essays in Pragmatics (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1989) p. xvii.

³² Quoted in, Steven Davis, ed., Pragmatics: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) p. 3.

³³ See George Lakoff's discussions of pragmatics in Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), and, Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

connotative meaning from their target communication. One must be able to differentiate between denotative, or the *direct* meaning of communication and the connotative, or *implied* meaning of the same communication. All human communication has the potential to be used to affect both a direct and indirect understanding of the signs used in communication. I will use a hypothetical example to illustrate this point. If one person in a room was to say to another, "It is hot in here, don't you think so?", the direct meaning of the statement is clear--it is hot in the room. If we examine the context within which the statement is made, however, much more meaning may be gleaned from the statement. If the person who spoke is a guest at the second person's house, the statement can have an implied meaning by which the first person is trying to get the other to open a window and cool the room. If the second person represents an authoritative figure to the first, the reasons for using implied communication become more obvious. The first person (subordinate) is trying to affect approving action in the second (dominant) without seeming pretentious, rude, or insubordinate.

Connotative meaning does not have to be a direct and conscious effort as outlined above. The indirect effects of language on interpreters are affected by context and perception. A politician's speech might have a vast array of indirect meanings as the speech is perceived and interpreted by people of differing political views, economic situations, and religious preferences among others. Intentional or unintentional, the relationship between language and its interpreters is not limited to the perception of denotative meaning. Communication of meaning can potentially exist at several levels simultaneously when language is used.

When examined alongside the writing of such theorists of international perception and misperception as Robert Jervis³⁴, we can see the usefulness of pragmatics in the study of relations between states. While Jervis is mainly concerned with the ways in which the perception of individual statesmen affects their attempt to define the nature of the international system, his work provides a link

³⁴ Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

between the use of pragmatics to discover the hidden meanings in interpersonal communication and its application to a larger study of the rhetoric of national leaders and the values conveyed to/instituted upon the population as they perceive and interpret the signs used in communication.

Pragmatics, then, provides the general methodological construct within which to analyze Hitler's rhetoric and its language of revenge. As apparent in the discussion above, this analysis uses pragmatics and many other disciplines to approach the issue of revenge. While such an approach runs the danger of seeming too diverse and undisciplined to provide ought but a superficial analysis of the material, it also can be strengthened by the application of many different points-of-view. Indeed, this work does not belong to any one single academic discipline. It is not purely history, nor political theory, nor sociology, psychology or linguistics. Rather, it borrows from each of these disciplines to produce an interdisciplinary analysis of one isolated aspect of the human condition. As a result, this work might seem to lack the depth and detail of a strictly historical monograph. In its defense, however, where it lacks depth and detail, it provides breadth and diversity.

Scholars cannot completely describe the complexities of human conditions through singular, exclusive disciplines. Whatever the other, specific definitions of disciplines within the fields of art and science may be, they all aim to illuminate some aspect of the human condition. As content analysis is too limiting a method to analyze the nebulous relationship between communication and interpreter, so too are history, political science, sociology and the rest too limited to address the complexity of the human experience when used alone. In conjunction, however, these disciplines can combine to provide a new, multifaceted view of the human condition.

All academic efforts have their peculiar strengths and weaknesses whether they are used independently from one another or together. Paul Lauren analyzes this potential for marrying history and theory to develop well-informed policy. In his article, Lauren plays out the differences in approach between diplomatic historians and theorists and the manner in which two disciplines can combine to produce new thoughts in diplomatic scholarship. He asserts that through bleeding the borders of the realms of history and theory, students of diplomacy can attain a higher level of

scholarship that will result in "...better history, better theory, and perhaps, in turn and through use, even better policy."³⁵ Gordon Craig further describes the broadening of the field of international relations in his article, "On the Nature of Diplomatic History."³⁶ As is apparent in this chapter, the theory and method that provide the foundations for this study take many different disciplines into account

³⁵ Paul G. Lauren, "Diplomacy: History, Theory, and Policy," from Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, Paul Lauren, ed., (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 3-18.

³⁶ Gordon Craig, "On the Nature of Diplomatic History: The Relevance of Some Old Books," from Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, Paul Lauren, ed.,

in the hope that it will shed a many-colored light on a complex issue.

Chapter III

Historical Analysis: The Czechs and the Germans

The act of revenge for Heydrich's death carried out by the Germans at Lidice was not an isolated incident, rather, it was part of a continuing string of vindictive reactions. During the state of emergency which began on May 27, 1942, the day of Heydrich's assassination, and ended September, 1942, the Germans would arrest and execute over one thousand Czechs and murder or deport the populations of two villages in revenge for the loss of their leader.¹ From 1918 to 1942 animosity between Czechoslovakia and Germany increased in intensity from the mild tension common among neighboring states, especially in the wake of a war, to pathological partisanship. The tragedy of Lidice constituted one small facet of a larger process of reciprocity that began with the Treaty of Versailles and continued to the end of World War II. While it was a minor factor in the vengeful process of

¹ On July 24, 1942, the tiny Czech village of Lezaky was burned down. All the inhabitants, men and women (33 persons total) were shot because they had offered shelter to Czech resistance agents. Radomir Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans (New York: New York University Press, 1964), p. 210.

Czech-German relations before and during the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, the destruction of Lidice further represents a singular event within the total process of revenge meted out by the Nazis in direct retaliation for Heydrich's death.

Historians examining the revenge of the Germans at Lidice must view this event from the larger framework of not only World War II, but also the history of Czech-German relations from the creation of Czechoslovakia in 1918 to that fateful Spring of 1942. Here, one can clearly see a larger pattern of action and vengeful reaction dating from the close of World War I, and thus set the stage for what would occur.

Since the end of World War I, historians have described the peace imposed by the Allies as a vindictive, punitive peace designed to punish the Central Powers for initiating a war which caused unparalleled destruction throughout Europe.

In a style similar to the 1918 peace forced by Germany upon Russia at Brest-Litovsk, Germany was forced to pay for the damage wrought by the war in a variety of ways.³⁸ The

³⁸ John Wheeler-Dennett, Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March, 1918 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1956), p. 405.

Allies required Germany to pay M20,000,000,000 to the Allies in 1919-1920. Equivalent annual payments were further mandated until all international claims against Germany were dropped.³⁹ Negotiators at the Paris Peace conference further declared that the nations of Europe had the right to demand from Germany payment in kind of any material lost, broken, or destroyed as a result of the war.⁴⁰ France alone demanded 30,000,000 tons of coal delivered per annum throughout the period of European reparation.⁴¹ Furthermore, Allied negotiators demanded that Germany turn over to the Allies the whole of her shipping fleet weighing over 1,600 tons gross; half of her vessels between 1,600 and 1,000 tons; and one-quarter of her steam trawlers and other fishing craft.⁴² In total, German war reparations were set by the Allies at 25 per cent. of Germany's gross national

³⁹ Philip Burnett, The Paris Peace Conference History and Documents: Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference from the Standpoint of the American Delegation Second Subcommittee of the Commission on Reparation of Damage: Minutes of the Thirty-Second (and Final) Meeting, April 19, 1919, Annex I (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940) p. 751.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 746.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 751.

⁴² Ibid, Annex II, p. 754.

product to be paid between 1920 and 1921 alone.⁴³

The retribution exacted by the Allies in the treaty of Versailles, while totally debilitating in economic terms, was not limited to financial responsibility. In addition to requiring reparation payments, the Allies ordered Germany to demobilize her military, placed strict limits upon her maritime production and activity, and ordered the country to accept temporary military occupation of the Saar by the French. In addition, the treaty forced Germany to give up territory in the west to France, in the East to Poland and Czechoslovakia, and overseas to a variety of victors. Beyond all these physically retributive measures, however, the negotiators at Versailles exacted a measure of psychological revenge as well. Germany was forced, by the terms of the Treaty, to accept full moral responsibility for World War I.⁴⁴ Through reparations, occupation, territorial concessions and humiliation, the Treaty of Versailles represented an act of revenge by the Allies in response to a perceived relationship between German aggression and the onset of the most destructive war ever fought up to that

⁴³ Ibid, p. 744.

⁴⁴ Ibid, pp. 66-77.

time.

One of the most significant consequences of the Treaty of Versailles was the creation of new nation states throughout Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the Middle East. In the wake of the dissolved Hapsburg and Hohenzollern Empires, the Allies created the new nations of Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. This final act of creating sympathetic allied states on the borders furthered obvious geopolitical tension between Germany and the Allies. It also created ethnic tension which would eventually provide Hitler with convenient excuses and emotional rhetoric enough to justify the annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1939.

In his analysis of revenge, Scheff examines the language of Adolf Hitler to display the emotions necessary to explain World War II as an act of revenge on the part of the Germans. They acted in retribution for the humiliation and economic ruin of Germany resultant from the punitive peace at Versailles. Anyone who has read Mein Kampf could arrive at a similar conclusion. Hitler was obsessed with regaining lost German honor and was convinced that the means to secure that honor was the military defeat of its former

enemies.

Czechoslovakia, in particular, posed a serious problem for Hitler in his plans to establish a new world order. Czechoslovakia symbolized the three aspects of European society most hated by Hitler. As a creation of the Treaty of Versailles, the very existence of an independent Czech state served as a constant reminder of the Diktat, or dictated peace, and emphasized the postwar humiliation of the German people. Czechoslovakia also occupied lands traditionally dominated by German-speaking Austrians before World War I. Finally, Czechoslovakia boasted a liberal western democracy, a style of government Hitler simply detested.

Central to the Czech problem was the issue of the Sudeten Germans. When the Allies created Czechoslovakia, they included within its borders territory on the frontiers of Germany populated primarily by ethnic Germans. With the political collapse of the Hapsburg Empire and the economic ruination of Germany, the industrial and economic dominance of Germany and Austria-Hungary came to an end. The primary benefactor from this dissolution in Central Europe was the new Czechoslovak Republic. The nation, which before the

collapse of Austria-Hungary had represented only 26.4 per cent of the population of the Empire, now inherited over 70 per cent of its industrial infrastructure.⁴⁵ The Czechs moved to continue to modernize their industrial base. While the early days of the new Republic were marked by a definite German dominance of capital, the efforts of the Czechs between 1918 and 1929, combined with the economic disintegration of the Weimar Republic ended an era of German economic hegemony throughout central Europe.⁴⁶

This new economic situation shifted the financial dependence of Sudeten German industrialists from Germany to Czechoslovakia. By the time of the German economic collapse of 1931, German banks in Czechoslovakia could no longer serve the needs of Sudeten industrialists who, as a result, became almost completely reliant on the strong Czech economy for sustenance.⁴⁷ The bond formed between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans between 1918 and 1939 was, in economic

⁴⁵ Radomir Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: A Study of Czech-German Relations, 1933-1962 (New York: New York University Press, 1964), p. 7.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 9. Luza estimates the proportion of Czech and German banking capital at 75 per cent and 25 per cent respectively in 1929.

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 10.

terms, quite strong.⁴⁸ Any attempt by Hitler to turn the Sudeten Germans against the Czech government would be difficult due to the interdependence of the ethnic groups in the Sudetenland and the subsequent prosperity resulting from those ties.

In spite of the strong economic ties between Czechs and Germans, other problems arose within the newly created state that served to drive a wedge between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs in the years between 1919 and 1939. The resulting ethnic division of the population ultimately pushed ethnic tensions to a crisis point, enabled the rise of the Nazi Party in Czechoslovakia, and paved the road for Hitler's conquest of the nation in 1939.

One such problem began in 1919 with the passage of the Land Reform Law. In an attempt to break the feudal mold and modernize land ownership in the new State, Czech authorities

⁴⁸ "The [Sudeten] German industrialists feared that an incorporation into Germany might result in a decline and extinction of their industries, which were unable to compete with the much more advanced industries of Germany. Instinctively, the [Sudeten] German population disliked the idea of being cut off from their Czech hinterland and [incorporated in the German economy]. J.W. Breugel, "The Germans in Pre-War Czechoslovakia." in A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948 Victor Mamety and Radomir Luza, eds., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

created the Land Office within the Czechoslovak Ministry of Agriculture.⁴⁹ This office provided oversight of land redistribution throughout Czechoslovakia. From the onset of land reform in 1919, accusations arose from the Sudeten population of unfair and discriminatory treatment. Germans in the Sudeten borderlands alleged that nearly 400,000 ha (hectares) of land had been taken from German aristocrats and given to Czechs.⁵⁰ Although the Czech government attempted to placate the Germans by stressing that nearly 200,000 more ha had been taken from Czechs than from Germans,⁵¹ this redistribution was nonetheless perceived as unfair by the Germans. Furthermore, land reform in the Sudetenland also changed the ethnic make-up of a region traditionally dominated by ethnic Germans.⁵²

⁴⁹ Luza, p. 10.

⁵⁰ Ibid, pp. 10-11.

⁵¹ It is important to note that this figure comes from redistribution across the whole of Czechoslovakia, not just the Sudetenlands.

⁵² While Czechoslovakia had been ruled before World War I by the Austrian Hapsburg dynasty, and not by Germany, the German-speaking population of the Sudetenlands fell, in the rhetoric of Hitler and the Nazis, under the general rubric of Germandom--the ethnic German Nation whose destiny it was to rule Central Europe.

Divisive issues generated by the reapportionment of land by the new Czech government continued to develop throughout the 1920's into a fierce struggle for land between Czechs and Germans throughout the Sudetenland. Radomir Luza, a former Czech resistance fighter, now teaching in the U.S. describes the atmosphere of intensifying conflict:

[The Germans and Czechs] fought over even the smallest parcel of land, over every building lot and home property. The Germans were mostly on the defensive, with German landed property often passing without government interference into Czech ownership. ...For many of [the Germans] their relationship with the Czechs had been [before 1918] that of master and servant, and they could not yet believe that their former "servants" had reached full political, economic, social, and cultural maturity.⁵³

The potential for a crisis evolving from the land reform movement of 1919 is clear, with the most obvious issue being the perceived injustice of the process as seen by the Germans. The per capita confiscation and readjustment of German property in the Sudetenland seems unproportionately larger than the amount of land being

⁵³ Ibid, pp. 12-13.

redistributed from the Czech aristocracy.⁵⁴ In addition to the imbalance, perceived at least, in land redistribution, the inversion of the traditional social relationship between Czechs and Sudeten Germans raised new emotional problems. In their eyes, the Sudeten Germans had been robbed of their privileged position in the social hierarchy of Central Europe. For the Germans in Czechoslovakia, in lieu of the problems rising from Czech land reform and the social/emotional loss of their previous privileged status, the Czech state created by the Treaty of Versailles began to embody the consequences of Hitler's proclaimed "stab in the back."

By the end of the 1920's, although Czechs and Germans in Czechoslovakia had an economically symbiotic relationship, bitterness and ethnic tension intensified throughout the Sudetenland. The Germans claimed lack of adequate representation in the Czech government while the government answered such accusations with statistics and assertions which failed to address the real problems in the Sudetenland. The financial collapse of 1929 pushed these

⁵⁴ A mere 200,000 more ha throughout all of Czechoslovakia. See note #14 above.

German-Czech tensions even further toward a crisis. Throughout Czechoslovakia the depression shook the industrial foundations of the new Republic. Relevant to the Sudeten issue was the widespread perception among the German population that economic distress in Czechoslovakia was most evident in German industrial areas.⁵⁵ Luza describes the atmosphere of the depression as a climate within which the language of political extremists took hold among the distressed German population of Czechoslovakia:

As the catastrophic slumps of the years 1930-33 assumed greater proportions, the social and political structure of the borderlands underwent changes that made the people respond more easily to radical programs which promised early and easy improvement.⁵⁶

Luza is of course referring to the forces of Communism and Nazism. After several unsuccessful attempts at establishing a Nazi Party in Czechoslovakia, many of which were thwarted by Czech officials, a high school gym teacher by the name of Konrad Henlein was able to consolidate the National Socialist movement in Czechoslovakia (thenceforth called the "Sudeten German Party") and establish himself at its head,

⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 15.

⁵⁶ Ibid, pp. 15-16.

acting with the direct support of Adolf Hitler. After Hitler's rise to power in 1933, Henlein and the Nazis of Czechoslovakia gained a powerful voice in the increasingly volatile situation in the Sudetenland.

The depression unleashed into Central Europe forces of belligerent and intolerable government. In Czechoslovakia, the rise of the Nazi party increased the troublesome nature of the Sudeten question as the Germans there became more vocal and aggressive in their quest for autonomy. On May 13, 1936, the Czechoslovak government passed the National Defense Act in an attempt to get a handle on the impending crisis in the Sudetenland. Through this law, the government acquired extensive powers over industries essential to national security. The government acquired the right to dismiss from their work all persons "unreliable in the eyes of the State."⁵⁷ In January of 1937, the Czech government declared through the "Machnik Decree" that it claimed the right to limit the number of Sudeten German employees in

⁵⁷ U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945: Series D (1937-1945) Volume II, Germany and Czechoslovakia, 1937-1938 report from Ernst Eisenlohr, the German Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, to the German Foreign Ministry, October 11, 1937, (Washington: GPO, 1946), p. 12.

firms applying for government contracts.⁵⁸ At the end of June, 1937, the government passed a further law, against the opposition of the Sudeten German Party, which made military training compulsory for all citizens of Czechoslovakia, to include women.⁵⁹

The promulgation of the National Defense Law and the further mobilization of the Czech nation evoked loud criticism from the Sudeten German population. On October 11, 1937, Ernst Eisenlohr, the German Foreign Ministry Representative in Prague, sent a report to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin in which he listed several grievances filed against the Czech government by Germans. At the head of the list were several complaints stemming from the administrative treatment of Germans by the government under the auspices of the National Defense Act. The letter specifically mentioned expulsions, refusals of labor permits, and the seizure of German real estate in the name of national security. Furthermore, the letter cited discrimination against the Nazi Party in Czechoslovakia to

⁵⁸ Ibid, letter from Konrad Henlein to the German Foreign Minister (Eisenlohr), November 9, 1937, p. 51.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

include censorship of Party literature and an outright ban on Mein Kampf.⁶⁰ Eisenlohr criticized the duplicity in Czech President Eduard Benes's rhetoric and policy:

...President Bens had demanded [of the Sudeten Germans] a better knowledge of the Czechs. How was it possible to get to know each other if every statement on what today is engrossing all Germany is nervously kept from the eyes of the Czechoslovak people?⁶¹

On October 17, 1937, the tension between the Sudeten German Party and the Czech government turned violent. Karl Herman Frank, State Secretary in the Reich Propaganda Ministry, was arrested during a Party function at Telpitz-Schoengau. The German press in Czechoslovakia sensationalized the incident and published fictional accounts of a truncheon attack launched against members of the Party.⁶² In his report to Berlin, Eisenlohr described the incident as a Czech reaction caused by their increasing concern over the rise of Hitler in Germany and the Nazis' activities in Czechoslovakia: "...the conviction has been

⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 11.

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 15.

⁶² Ibid, report from Eisenlohr to the German Foreign Ministry, October 22, 1937, p. 20.

strengthened in the government and in wide circles of the population that even more must be done...for the security of the Republic, *internally and externally*."⁶³ The incident at Telpitz-Schoengau caused ripples in the Nazi Party felt by the elite of the Party. Hitler's propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, ordered an anti-Czech campaign which flooded Party newspapers throughout Central Europe with anti-Czech propaganda from October 17 to November 3, 1937.⁶⁴

By the end of 1937, Czechs and Sudeten Germans had effectively withdrawn into two partisan camps: The Czechs supported by President Benes and the Czechoslovak Government, and the Sudeten Germans backed by Hitler and the Third Reich. In December, 1937, at Jaegerndorf in Northeastern Moravia, the Czech Government evoked the National Defense Act in a massive expropriation of tenants and landowners. On December 18, members of the Foreign Ministry in Berlin met to discuss reciprocal countermeasures to be taken against Czech nationals living in Germany:

It was argued that 28 orders of expropriation should be issued along the same lines of

⁶³ Ibid, p. 21. [emphasis added]

⁶⁴ Ibid, minute from the German Foreign Ministry, Berlin, November 3, 1937, p. 29.

procedure as was provided for in the Czechoslovak National Defense Law, and that 120 summary dismissals should be ordered.⁶⁵

The deadline for the execution of these reprisals was set for February 1, 1938, with the writs of expulsion to be delivered by Christmas.⁶⁶ On December 22, the initial reprisals were ordered by the Government of the Third Reich.⁶⁷ On that same day, Adolf Hitler proposed that the ratio of reprisals against Czech nationals be increased from 1:1 (with relation to the expropriations at Jaegerndorf) to 2:1.⁶⁸

Throughout 1938, this pathological atmosphere of reciprocity between Czechs and Germans gained fearful momentum. In March, 500,000 Germans staged demonstrations throughout the Sudetenland. Their demands for autonomy within the borders of Czechoslovakia were a well-established rallying cry of the Sudeten German Party.⁶⁹ On April 2,

⁶⁵ Ibid, minute from the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin, December 18, 1937, p. 77.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid, letter from the German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in Czechoslovakia, December 22, 1937, p. 92.

⁶⁸ Ibid, minute from the German Foreign Ministry, December 22, 1937, p. 93.

⁶⁹ Ibid, report from Eisenlohr to the German Foreign

Eisenlohr reported to the German Foreign Ministry that the Government had begun supplying Czechs living in the Sudetenland with arms.⁷⁰ At the same time, the Sudeten German Party called for the establishment of a uniformed German volunteer force in the Sudetenland.⁷¹ On April 9, 1938, Eisenlohr filed the following report to the German Foreign Ministry:

Feelings becoming more violent in last few days in Sudeten area. K.H. Frank's secretary...described situation as "catastrophic and shattering." All classes of population from manufacturers to unemployed openly characterize negotiations of Sudeten German Party with Czechoslovak Government...as betrayal. Nor would autonomy protect Sudeten German area.... Tension is so great that a single shot for Sudeten Germans would start blood bath among Czechs.⁷²

Ministry, March 31, 1938, p. 209.

⁷⁰ Ibid, report from Eisenlohr to the German Foreign Ministry, April 2, 1938, pp. 213-214.

⁷¹ Ibid, letter from the German Foreign Ministry to Eisenlohr, April 6, 1937, 215. The German Foreign Ministry asked Eisenlohr to convey their wishes to the Sudeten German Party that the formation of such a militia be postponed for the present. Plans were already in the making for the legitimate annexation of the Sudetenland, and an outright civil war in the region would not have served the intentions of the Reich.

⁷² Ibid, report from Eisenlohr to the German Foreign Ministry, April 9, 1938, p. 226.

The fragmented and desperate nature of Eisenlohr's message was not lost on Hitler. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, Hitler used the tense situation in Czechoslovakia as an excuse for the further need to protect the "members of the German Nation" living outside the borders of Germany.

A pattern for pathological revenge was thus, by April, 1938, well established between Czechoslovakia and Germany. This vindictive pattern had roots in pre-Versailles Europe.

Although Czech officials declared the opposite, and the actions of many seemed to be genuine, even apologists for the behavior of the Czech government during the first years of the Republic must admit that the Czechs discriminated against the Germans living in their country.⁷³ Among other sources, this discrimination undoubtedly arose from a desire among the freshly-independent Czech nation for retribution for centuries of domination by and "servitude"⁷⁴ to the German nation. If we return to the language of Thomas Scheff, the desire among Czechs for reprisals against the

⁷³ See J.W. Breugel, "The Germans in Pre-War Czechoslovakia," in A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948 Victor Mamety and Radomir Luza, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 169-170, 173, 185, 187.

⁷⁴ See Kennan below.

Sudeten Germans could be a product of "shameful" emotions caused by generations of German "envelopment." As a natural process of healing, the Czechs, even without the entirely punitive backdrop created by the peace Diktat of 1918 would have been naturally compelled to exact some form of revenge against the Germans to atone for their own subjugation and humiliation. The Treaty of Versailles simply supplied legitimacy and amplified the idea of revenge directed against the Germans. Any action thus taken by the Czechs subsequently caused shameful emotions to build up within the German population of Czechoslovakia, emotions that would, in turn, undoubtedly manifest themselves in aggressive, vindictive behavior.

The next step in this cycle of revenge was not far-off. Hitler was ready for the forceful annexation of the Central European lands lost to the "German Nation" in the Treaty of Versailles. Czechoslovakia was part of this territory targeted as *Lebensraum*, or living space. In September of 1938, the very Western Allies who had created Czechoslovakia in 1918 now withdrew their promised support at the infamous Munich Conference and actually authorized Hitler to occupy the Sudetenland. Once he secured that territory, Hitler

then set to work threatening the Czechoslovak government into capitulation and the surrender of the entire country to German forces. In March of 1939, with the total military abandonment of Czechoslovakia by her Western allies (most notably Britain and France) the government of President Benes fled into exile. Hitler coerced the new regime under President Emil Hacha to consent to Nazi "protection," and proceeded to occupy the country, renaming it the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and appointing SS Obengruppenfuehrer Konstantin von Neurath at the Reichsprotector of Bohemia and Moravia. Czechoslovakia thus ceased to exist.

The Germans immediately set out to establish themselves in the role of "masters," reclaiming social superiority for the Sudeten Germans. A superiority that these members of Hitler's "German Nation" had enjoyed in the Austrian Hapsburg Empire until 1918. In material terms, the Germans began to reclaim property to which they perceived they had a traditional claim. George Kennan wrote in 1940 that the Czechs estimated that the value of property requisitioned by the Germans in one year of occupation at 22,000,000,000

Crowns, or between \$500,000,000 and \$1,000,000,000.⁷⁵

Furthermore, the idea of *Lebensraum* was manifested by the Germans in an increase in settlement. Shortly before the occupation, the population of Bohemia and Moravia was estimated at 6,804,000, of whom only 234,000 were ethnic Germans. By March of 1940, the total population of the Protectorate stood at 7,200,000. Of the Czechs originally living in the area, nearly 150,000 had relocated to Germany following the occupation. This would mean an influx of nearly 500,000 Germans to the Protectorate in just one year, bringing the total number of Germans to nearly 800,000, of which some 120,000 lived in Prague alone.⁷⁶ Across the country, Czechs were forced out of high-level corporate, professional, and governmental positions. Furthermore, the Germans began to place limits on education and training programs for young Czechs in an effort to stifle the progressive potential for future generations of Czechs.⁷⁷ In short, a new German elite replaced Czech in the new

⁷⁵ George Kennan, From Prague after Munich: Diplomatic Papers, 1938-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 228.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 232.

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 234.

Protectorate in the course of one year.

The German immigration also forced Czech culture out of the mainstream. Once an active part of the creative process in Central Europe, famous for music, literature, and cinema, Czech culture was reduced to the quiet cultivation of the language and artistic roots. The cinema industry in Czechoslovakia was totally Germanized, theater became "a sort of shrine for historical pageantry."⁷⁸ Of Czech culture under the German occupation, George Kennan said the following:

Popular imagination finds its expression mostly in the innumerable bitter jokes and rhymes and plays on words in which the average Czech seeks solace for his plight and which pass from mouth-to-mouth with a rapidity that even press and radio could scarcely improve on.⁷⁹

With their nation occupied and themselves subjugated politically, economically, and culturally, the Czechs could have capitulated mentally in 1940, as the Protectorate government under Emil Hacha compelled them to do. However, much in the same way that Germany had reacted to its humiliation by the allies following World War I and had

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 235.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

subsequently sought satisfaction through revenge, however, the Czechs reacted vengefully to the German presence in their lands. A resistance movement emerged in the wake of occupation which conducted limited but continuous operations against the German occupation forces throughout the war.

From the beginning of the resistance movement, Czech freedom fighters kept direct contact with the exiled government of President Benes, located in London. Indeed, throughout the occupation Benes encouraged the resistance movement through media broadcasts and propaganda publications. In a speech broadcast to the Czech people on June 24, 1941, Benes declared that "at the decisive moment we shall call you to the struggle which we are waging here with weapon in hand. Continue to remain united!"⁸⁰ For the first few years of the war, the Czech resistance largely served as an intelligence gathering apparatus for the Allies. In the Spring of 1941, for example, Czech operatives accurately relayed the date for the onset of Operation BARBAROSSA, or the German invasion of Russia, to

⁸⁰ Transcript of Speech delivered by E. Benes to the Czech people, June 24, 1941, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 371 series, #30841 [hereafter cited as Britain, PRO/FO].

the Soviets.⁸¹

With the entrance of the Soviet Union into the war, hopeful Czechs grew to expect an early victory for the Allies. In the Fall of 1941, the Czech resistance initiated several campaigns against the Germans.⁸² The resistance movement took the form of active acts of sabotage and boycott, as well as covert acts of industrial sabotage in the factories. Reinhard Heydrich, then Deputy Reichsprotector, confessed in late 1941 that the new wave of resistance posed a definite threat to the unity of the Reich.⁸³ In response to the new aggressive behavior of the Czech resistance, Hitler replaced Neurath with Heydrich as the Reichsprotector of Bohemia and Moravia. Heydrich immediately proclaimed martial law in the Protectorate and invested himself with absolute executive authority. In a speech whereby Heydrich declared a state of emergency, he announced that:

⁸¹ Callum MacDonald, The Killing of SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich (New York: The Free Press, 1989), pp. 70-79 addresses the connection between the British S.O.E. and the Czech resistance, and p. 103 describes the accuracy of Czech intelligence.

⁸² Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans p. 207.

⁸³ Ibid.

All actions violating public order, security, economic life or peaceful work, as well as the intentional possession of firearms or explosives or ammunition are subject to martial law... Whoever learns of such action or intentions without immediately reporting them...is also guilty and thus subject to martial law.⁸⁴

The day following Heydrich's declaration, six people were executed. From that point forward, daily executions were a regular occurrence throughout the Protectorate. During the night of October 7-8, 1941, less than one month after Heydrich declared martial law, over 800 instructors and staff from the Czech Sokol were arrested. Within eight months of the "state of emergency," only 60 to 70 of them were left alive.⁸⁵ This new and brutal wave of retaliation by the Nazi administration in retaliation for Czech resistance earned Heydrich the title of the "Butcher of Prague."

In response to Heydrich's brutal system of repression, the exiled Czech government in London, in close collaboration with the British S.O.E.,⁸⁶ developed and

⁸⁴ Ibid, pp. 207-208.

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 209.

⁸⁶ Special Operations Executive: British special forces.

launched Operation *ANTHROPOD*. In January of 1942, Czechoslovakian Army Sergeants Jan Kubis and Josef Gabcik parachuted into the Protectorate with orders to assassinate Heydrich.⁸⁷ Once in Prague, the two agents found shelter in a series of safe houses established by *JINDRA*, a central contact organization of Czech agents that provided mutual security and support.

On May 27, 1942, Gabcik and Kubis set an ambush for Heydrich's staff car on a Prague street corner. As Heydrich's car slowed to make the turn, Gabcik stepped out and attempted to fire his automatic rifle. His weapon malfunctioned. Kubis, on the opposite side of the street, hurled a bomb at the car which exploded, sending shrapnel into Heydrich's back. Although both Heydrich and his driver drew their weapons and attempted to pursue the attackers, Gabcik and Kubis escaped to *JINDRA* safe houses. Heydrich was rushed to a hospital where he underwent emergency surgery to repair the internal damage inflicted by the bomb. He developed an infection, and died of his wounds on June 4, 1942.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ MacDonald, pp. 123-125.

⁸⁸ MacDonald, pp. 169-173. Gunther Deschner, Reinhard

The German reaction to Heydrich's assassination was instantaneous. Karl Hermann Frank, Heydrich's immediate successor, declared a state of emergency, ordering that anyone guilty of aiding the assassins, indeed, anyone who condoned the act, be shot. Frank announced a reward of 20,000,000 Crowns (about \$300,000) for the return of the assassins and began to exact revenge for the attack. By June 5, some 170 people had already been executed by the Nazis for alleged connections to the attack.⁸⁹ Frank made the intended extent of the Nazi revenge clear in a declaration in which he publicly announced that German authorities would execute not only the attackers, but their families and associates as well.⁹⁰ Frank left Prague to personally report the situation to Hitler in Berlin, leaving Kurt Daleuge to assume the responsibilities of the office of Reich Protector. Daleuge immediately ordered that all Czech citizens report to the Nazi authorities to have their

Heydrich: A Biography (New York: Stein and Day, 1977), pp. 240-241.

⁸⁹ Report No. XIX from Eduard Benes regarding the Political situation in the Protectorate, 23rd May to 5th June, 1942, June 6, 1942, Britain, PRO/FO 371 series, #30837.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

identification cards stamped. Failure to comply meant execution. Across the Protectorate, more than 5,000 communities underwent stringent house-by-house searches; more than four million citizens reported to German check-stations; more than one thousand were arrested, some six hundred of whom were summarily executed.⁹¹

Hitler's reaction to the news of Heydrich's death was even more emotional and extreme. He ordered that 30,000 disloyal Czechs should be executed if Heydrich's assassins managed to escape capture. Though Frank was able to dissuade Hitler on the grounds that the Czech reaction to such a massacre would make the German position in the Protectorate untenable, the 'reign of terror' subsequently imposed by the German military instituted a program of deliberate revenge. By the end of the state of emergency in September, 3,188 Czechs had been arrested, and 1,357 executed.⁹² Julius Fuchik, a journalist imprisoned by the Germans in Prague, described the German reaction to the assassination as he experienced it in prison:

The route from Pankrac to the Petschek Palace

⁹¹ Luza, p. 209.

⁹² Ibid, pp. 210-211.

[Gestapo headquarters] and back now becomes the daily Calvary for thousands of prisoners. The SS men, acting as overseers in cars, are taking revenge for Heydrich. Already before the prison car has made it the first mile, blood of dozens of prisoners is flowing from their bruised faces and mouths beaten with pistol butts....

...Every night one hears the roll call downstairs in the corridor. Fifty, a hundred, two hundred people whom they will load bound hand and foot into lorries... for mass executions. The guilt? ...they are not guilty. They were arrested, they are in no way connected with any of the major cases, neither are they needed for further investigations; they are, therefore, suited for death....⁹³

Fuchik goes on to describe the discriminate killing of Czech prisoners at the hands of the police. Although his work must be analyzed very critically (he was, after all, a condemned prisoner of the German occupation forces), his description of the German process of revenge for Heydrich's assassination is important. He implies that the Germans intended to kill a certain number of Czechs (at least, as many as was practical), and that the majority of these people were killed because their usefulness in ongoing investigations was minimal. In other words, what Fuchik

⁹³ Julius Fuchik, Notes from the Gallows, (New York: Gibbs Smith, 1990) pp. 72-74. Fuchik was executed by the Germans on September 8, 1943.

wants us to believe is that the Czech arrested in direct connection to the Heydrich investigation would live to see the completion of the investigation while the Czech arrested for a minimal offense such as expired identification papers was slated for execution. Though Fuchik's motivation for writing such a passage is perhaps driven by his own desire for revenge against the Germans, he does raise an important point. The execution of Hitler's orders was deliberate and careful; Czechs had to die to atone for Heydrich's death, but only those Czechs not essential to continuing investigations were killed during the Summer of 1942.

On June 15, 1942, Sergeant Karel Curda, one of the Czech operatives, surrendered to the German authorities. From the information he provided, the Nazis were able to locate and raid several *JINDRA* safe houses, and further learned that seven parachutists, including Heydrich's assassins, were hiding in the Orthodox Church of St. Charles Borromeo in Prague. On June 18, over 700 Waffen-SS troops surrounded and searched the church. The German troops discovered the Czechs and, after a long and bitter fire fight which lasted most of the day, all seven Czech agents, running out of ammunition, committed suicide. Curda

identified the bodies of Kubis and Gabcik as Heydrich's assassins. In retaliation, the Nazis tortured and executed 252 members of the assassins' families along with other Czechs who had aided *JINDRA*. In addition to the families and associates of the assassins, the Germans executed Bishop Gorazd, the Orthodox Bishop in Prague, along with several other members of the Orthodox clergy. In one final act of revenge for the assassination, the Nazis dissolved the Orthodox Church in the Protectorate in October, 1942.⁹⁴

The most infamous act of revenge committed by the German military occurred at the small mining village of Lidice. On June 8, 1942, Himmler remarked: "It is simply our duty to avenge the death of Heydrich."⁹⁵ Less than 24 hours later, on the evening of June 9, Frank telephoned the SS in Prague with the following orders regarding Lidice:

- 1 All adult male inhabitants are to be shot;
- 2 Females are to be evacuated to a concentration camp.
- 3 The children are to be collected together; if capable of Germanization, they are to be delivered to SS-families of the Reich,

⁹⁴ MacDonald, p. 197. Luza, Transfer of the Sudeten Germans p. 212.

⁹⁵ Report No. XX from Eduard Bene_ regarding the Situation on the Protectorate from 7 to 12 June, 1942, June 12, 1942, Britain, PRO/FO 371 series, #30837.

and the rest are to undergo a different education;
4 The place is to be burnt down and razed to the ground.⁹⁶

The German military executed the orders with terrifying efficiency. As described in the introduction, the Germans surrounded the village on the evening of June 9. They allowed the workers returning from their jobs to enter the Lidice, but none could leave. The Germans established roadblocks and moved into the town. They loaded the women and children onto trucks and took them to the high school in nearby Kladno to await deportation to concentration camps. They assembled the men at a farmhouse and there executed them. The Germans then set the village ablaze and demolished the ruins with explosives. All told, the Germans killed 199 people in Lidice; 143 of the 184 women survived the concentration camps to return after the war; of the 98 children of Lidice only 16 could be identified and contacted after the war. In order to drive home the message of revenge, the destruction of Lidice continued for four months following the initial retaliation as the Reich National

⁹⁶ Gunther Deschner, Reinhardt Heydrich: A Biography (New York: Stein and Day, 1981) p. 273.

Labor Service methodically removed all traces of the village from the countryside.⁹⁷

The question remains regarding the Nazi's choice of Lidice as a target for revenge. Why Lidice? It was a small mining village with a population no greater than 300, including children. A population of this size posed no serious threat whatever to the German occupation even in the case of armed revolt. Furthermore, the Germans never proved the existence of resistance activity in Lidice.⁹⁸ After the destruction of the town, German investigators learned that SOE parachutists had been given addresses in Lidice, but they could make no such connection before June 10. Hitler needed a target for retribution, but the circumstances surrounding the destruction of Lidice were contrived at best; at worst, they were outright fabrications on the part

⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 274.

⁹⁸ There are diverse and conflicting accounts in which the Germans claim to have found arms caches in Lidice, but these were discounted as false following the war. German troops located a radio transmitter in Kladno, but this happened after the fact and was never connected to Lidice. The closest alleged connection between Lidice and the Czech resistance movement were the Horack and Stribrny families, both of Lidice, whose sons had gone abroad in 1939 and had not been heard from since. The German investigators assumed that they were involved in the resistance but were, again, unable to prove anything of the sort.

of the German command.

Though the reasons for selecting Lidice may not be perfectly clear, the policy of the SS toward Czechs during the summer of 1942 may provide some insights. As Fuchik implied in his observations, those Czechs arrested who had no connection to ongoing investigations were probable candidates for execution. The German command remained absolutely intent on the capture of all resistance and SOE operatives in Czechoslovakia, and were therefore quite unwilling to immediately execute prisoners that might help the investigation, though their crimes against the Protectorate might be more serious than others. A problem arose, then, regarding the means of satisfying Hitler's demand for blood vengeance. The solution, of course, was to answer Hitler's call for Czech blood with petty offenders. It stands to reason then, that this policy of detaining worthwhile suspects for investigative purposes while offering the lives of unimportant suspects to satisfy the emotional need for revenge could have translated to the selection of Lidice. The town had no strategic, political, or tactical importance, thus bypassing the potential loss of critical war material. Lidice was physically close to

Prague, thus ensuring that its destruction would be well-noted. Also, Lidice had a relatively small population concentrated in a small space, thus making the task of complete destruction easier than destroying the urban areas of Prague into which the assassins fled immediately following the attack. It served the dual needs of the German command perfectly--quick retribution with minimal loss to the investigation process.

While it fit the profile of the Nazi's needs, the inherent problem with the selection of Lidice is obvious. It is of diminutive stature. The destruction of a village of 200 plus inhabitants might go unnoticed in a struggle with the gigantic magnitude of World War II. It makes sense that a war-waging government exacting revenge for the death of a major statesman would certainly want the revenge to occur on a grand scale to display, internally and externally, both the determination of that government to maintain power and the peril faced by all who stood in its way. A radio bulletin announcing the destruction of a small mining village might, at best, excite a reaction along the lines of "big deal" from European urban centers, the grim populations of which wrestled daily with destruction that

overshadowed the horror of the events at Lidice. To ensure that the message got across to all enemies, the Nazis documented their efforts at Lidice in excruciating detail. They photographed and filmed the process of destruction. On June 11, the German Government made an official radio declaration:

In the course of the search for the Murderers of SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Heydrich irrefutable indications have been secured that the population of the village of Lidice u Kladna afforded support and assistance to the...criminals....

As the inhabitants of this village...have offended in the most crude fashion against the published laws the male adults have been shot, the women taken to concentration camps and the children sent away, so that they may be given the appropriate education. The buildings in the village have been razed to the ground and its name erased.⁹⁹

Not an unfortunate atrocity to be swept under the carpet,

⁹⁹ Benes, Report No. XX.

the "Murder of Lidice"¹⁰⁰ was proclaimed loudly to the world.

The reasoning behind the selection of Lidice should be clear by now, but what, exactly did the Nazis achieve by making an example of the small community? Some of the immediate German reactions to the event provide an indication as to the effectiveness of the Nazis response to the shock of Heydrich's assassination. Vojtech Mastny, a Czech national who served on the faculties of many U.S. universities, describes the enthusiasm with which Germans greeted news of the destruction of Lidice:

¹⁰⁰ "The Murder of Lidice" is the title of a 1942 poem by Edna St. Vincent Millay.

The Protectorate chief of the German Reich Labor Service, in which party members were required to serve limited terms as workers, commented on the "moral lesson" which the leveling of Lidice gave to his men: "The man who has been assigned to this spot intensifies his feelings, thus contributing to the strengthening of German power. The full effect will be achieved when his work obliterates all traces of the village and on the very spot where the enemy of Germandom used to live the earth is turned under the plow."¹⁰¹

Furthermore, Mastny writes, "The Security Service reported that the German population of Bohemia and Moravia welcomed the atrocity with 'great satisfaction and in many cases open joy...; they even say that officials in high places will now perceive how the Czechs should be treated.'"¹⁰² This reaction indicates that the blood revenge demanded by Hitler had successfully achieved the goals of retribution through revenge. The rationale follows a logical progression--the Nazis needed a quick and easy vent for revenge, and Lidice fit the requisite profile perfectly.

Lest we get swept up in the cold dispassionate tide of rationale, it is important to look at the peculiarities of

¹⁰¹ Mastny, p. 217.

¹⁰² Ibid.

Lidice's demise and understand it as an anomaly, albeit a small one, within the destructive framework of World War II.

Very few populations in Europe experienced the per capita destruction suffered by the residents of Lidice. Close to two thirds of the population was either murdered on the spot or died in concentration camps. Beyond that, most of the children of Lidice never returned from their fosterage in German families. Furthermore, after the war, only a few dim outlines of building foundations remained on the Czech countryside that would suggest that the village of Lidice had ever existed. The remnants of Lidice consisted mainly of a handful of survivors and their memories of the place. Though other urban centers throughout Europe suffered much more destruction in direct comparison with Lidice, pound-for-pound few suffered destruction with the totality that the survivors of Lidice faced. While logically and thoroughly planned and carried-out, the destruction of Lidice clearly stands as a tragic atrocity and an unparalleled act of revenge.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ There were a number of towns destroyed in the same manner as Lidice during the war, but none were a direct, vengeful response to acts of defiance against the Nazis on the same magnitude as Heydrich's assassination.

The relationship between Germany and Czechoslovakia between 1918 and 1942, and indeed to the end of the war when the Czech government deported much of the German population in Czechoslovakia to Germany,¹⁰⁴ indicates, in part, a well-established pattern of pathological revenge. The destruction of Lidice was a singular and remarkable instance in a cycle of retribution that began with the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. Due largely to the insensitivity of the Versailles peacemakers to the ethnic particularities of the region, tension developed immediately that, while subtle at first, would eventually erupt into violence and outright savagery. If the memory of Lidice can serve the peacemaking process at all today, especially in light of the tragedies of the last few years in the Balkans and Central Asia, it must serve to show the importance of ethnicity and emotions in the behavior of the populations of nation states. Failure to take the importance of emotions into account, contemporary efforts at peacemaking will never adequately compensate for the inevitability of partisanship

¹⁰⁴ See Radomir Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans.

and revenge.

Chapter IV

Textual Analysis—Documents

To explain the willingness with which human beings undertake a vengeful endeavor along the lines of Lidice, it is necessary to examine the fundamental values of human society and illuminate the sources which legitimize and determine the magnitude of revenge. To the intellectual historian, the writing and orations of Adolf Hitler can provide a glimpse the vengeful pulse within Nazi society. As Chapter 5 will reveal, the nature of a totalitarian regime mandates a study of the values communicated by the elite to the populace. In order for a totalitarian political system to succeed, as the Nazis did for some time, the population must largely accept the values and will of the elite. These values and will of the totalitarian ruler serve, therefore, to direct the behavior of a united national population. For the purposes of this study, then, the language of Adolf Hitler provides many useful insights to the general values of permissiveness toward revenge projected by the Nazis into German social values and behavior.

Hitler's magnum opus, Mein Kampf, is itself a study in reciprocity and revenge: Obsessed with regaining Germany's *anima*, disgraced and downtrodden in the Treaty of Versailles, Hitler identifies the necessity to reclaim past greatness and outlines a definitive path to the completion of his aims. In the years following the Nazi's rise to power, Germany would, by and large, follow the mandate detailed by Hitler. Though he does not specify widespread revenge in particular as a course for reclaiming German greatness, Hitler does use language in his book that provides potentially permissive attitudes toward the idea of revenge as it was enacted at Lidice.

In Mein Kampf, Hitler focuses on the humiliation of the German nation at the hands of the Western allies following World War I. This humiliation, mandated by the Treaty of Versailles, resulted, according to Hitler, from betrayal within German society rather than from military defeat. He emphasizes (correctly) that the German army held its positions in foreign territory at the end of the war. To Hitler, this indicated some measure of military victory. The German capitulation cannot, then, be clearly justified in the light of military defeat. In order to explain the

acceptance of the allies' terms at Versailles, Hitler fabricates and details what he called a Marxist-Jewish revolution that undermined the weak political system and shattered the very foundations of German society during the war, thus providing the "stab in the back" that compromised the heroic military "victory" achieved by the German army.¹⁰⁵ In Mein Kampf, Versailles and the subsequent humiliation of Germany provide the prime rallying point for potential German revenge.

Throughout his writings and speeches, Hitler uses language that, when analyzed using the methods outlined in Chapter II, illuminates the shame/rage cycle developed by Lewis, Retzinger and Scheff. Hitler evokes shame values by using such words as, "cowardice,"¹⁰⁶ "decay,"¹⁰⁷ "weakness,"¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ "...the assertion that the lost War was the cause of the German collapse [was] a lie. ...this military collapse was itself ...the consequence of a large number of symptoms of disease.... This was first the consequence...of an ethical and moral poisoning...which for many years had begun to undermine the foundations of the people and the Reich." Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. by Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943), p. 231. "...these parliamentary rabble [under the direct influence of a Marxist-Jewish movement] stole and struck from the hand of a nation its weapon of self-preservation [the army]...." *ibid*, p. 272.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 230.

to describe the nature and effects of the Marxist-Jewish "revolution" that caused the collapse of Germany. This discourse evokes feelings of alienation, which in turn produce the emotion of shame. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the emotionally painful nature of a shameful experience may lead to neurosis and aggressive/destructive behavior.

In Mein Kampf, Hitler illuminates clear targets against which the German nation should direct its aggression. Foremost among these are Jews and Marxists, as they are the forces which Hitler alleges to have directly caused the *shaming* of Germany. While the majority of the text is devoted to exposing this imagined conspiracy and detailing the manner in which it has attempted to destroy German society, Hitler does venture beyond his constructed fantasy to target more tangible targets as well. Principal among these is the Treaty of Versailles. While Hitler's destructive "revolution" of 1918 is largely imaginary, he uses the Treaty and all its disastrous effects on Germany as evidence of the result of the subversive activities of

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 246.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, p. 272.

Marxists and Jews. In this light, the mandates of the Treaty represent a clear threat to Germandom, and thus provide clear targets for vengeful (pathological) *rage* among Germans.

While Hitler's evocative language regarding the tragic erosion of German values, a process that led to the defeat (shaming)¹⁰⁹ of the German nation, reveals general emotions related to vengeful and aggressive values, the tie between the Treaty of Versailles and the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic narrows the scope of vengeful emotions to focus on the subject of this study. As historian Raoul de Roussey de Sales comments in My World Order;

Hitler promised his people to deliver them from the shackles of the Versailles Treaty and to do so against any opposition. The Versailles Treaty was not only unjust to the Germans and intolerable, it was also a threat to the peace of Europe. Until the wrongs of that treaty were righted, there could be no peace for any nation.¹¹⁰

By making the connection between Czechoslovakia and the Treaty, Hitler describes Czechoslovakia as a tool of the

¹⁰⁹ See Chapter II.

¹¹⁰ Adolf Hitler, My New Order, edited with commentary by Raoul de Roussey de Sales, (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941), 452.

"Western democracies" used to harm Germans and German interests. Throughout the entire section of his April 28, 1939 speech to the *Reichstag* that deals with Czechoslovakia, Hitler describes the Western Allies' intent to use Czechoslovakia as a platform from which to launch an assault on Germany. Hitler's intentions in connecting Czechoslovakia and the Allies is evident in the following passage from that speech:

The democratic peacemakers of Versailles can take the credit for having assigned to this Czech people the special role of satellite state, capable of being used against Germany. ...they did violence to other nationalities in order to give a firm basis to a state which was to incorporate a latent threat to the German Nation in Central Europe.

For this state, in which the so-called predominant national element was actually a minority, could be maintained only by means of brutal assault....¹¹¹

Hitler's language illuminates shameful emotions.

Germany is *threatened* with violence, and *brutal assault*.

The source of these threats? The *Czech people*. Hitler thus evokes shame through alienation and threat, and further identifies the cause of the shame, thereby identifying a

¹¹¹ Adolf Hitler, Official Translation of the Speech Delivered by Adolf Hitler before the German Reichstag on April 28, 1939 (Washington: German Embassy, 1939), 14.

target for vindictive aggression.

Also clear in this passage is Hitler's intent to intimately connect the mistreatment of Germans in Czechoslovakia to the Germans in Germany under the broad construct of ethnic nationhood. The Allies and the Czechs did not assault and harm states and countries, they harmed people, specifically "other nationalities" and the "German Nation." An emotional response might be less acutely felt if it is a reaction to an abstract construction such as a state or a border or a country. When, however, the object of aggression is given some sort of direct connection to humanity such as "nationalities" or ethnic "nations," the connection between the victim and the perceiver is cast in human terms, and is therefore more intimate. By describing a pattern of abuse directed against Germans as people, rather than Germany as a state, and further connecting these abuses to the shame of Versailles, Hitler enables his audience to experience an emotional response which justifies vengeful action. While Hitler's speech to the *Reichstag* was primarily aimed at addressing Western opposition to the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, he also used language that could have permitted German citizens and soldiers to

develop values that enabled them to accept and participate in acts of revenge against Czechs.

Another source which reveals projected permission for revenge is Hitler's speech to the *Reichstag*, of April 28, 1939.¹¹² Here again, Hitler's language provides some insights to the manner in which Hitler regarded the Czechs specifically.¹¹³ Throughout the section in which Hitler addresses Germany and Czechoslovakia, he defends the German occupation as beneficial for all of Central Europe. Hitler begins by making a tie between ethnic Germans and the territories of Bohemia and Moravia. Following the "inexplicable" migration of Germans from these lands, "...a foreign Slav people made its way into this territory and made a place for itself between the remaining Germans."¹¹⁴ This statement casts the Czechs in the role of unwanted guests, if not actual invaders.

Hitler furthermore claims that the destinies of the

¹¹² One month following the German occupation of Czechoslovakia.

¹¹³ Hitler, Official Translation of the Speech Delivered by Adolf Hitler before the German Reichstag on April 28, 1939.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p. 13.

Czech people and the Germans are interlocked and that the Czechs are dependent on Germany for their continued existence due to the strong ties between the two nations. This dependence, according to Hitler, is evident at many different levels. The countries are economically indivisible. Hitler claims that the Czechs can not exist as an independent economic entity "...except on the basis of a relationship with the German Nation and the German economy."¹¹⁵ Hitler goes on to declare that the "Czech economy owes its existence to the fact of having been part of the great German economic system."¹¹⁶ In addition to economic ties, Hitler describes Czech culture as being primarily dependent upon German culture. His claim is evident in the following:

The Czech nation is in its origin foreign to us, but in the thousand years in which the two peoples have lived side by side, Czech culture has in the main been formed and moulded by German influences.... The capital of this country was for a time a German imperial city, and it contains the oldest German university. Numerous cathedrals, town halls, and palaces of nobility and citizen class bear witness to the influence of German

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, pp. 13-14.

culture.¹¹⁷

In this language, Hitler describes the economic and cultural dependence of Czechoslovakia on Germany and in doing so creates a parasitic relationship between Czech society and German society that places the Czechs in the role of wards of the German state and German culture.¹¹⁸ This idea of wardenship would endure to the end of the war.

On February 21, 1945, one of Hitler's assistants, Martin Bormann, recorded the following as part of Hitler's political testament:

...we could not tolerate in the heart of Germany an abscess, small though it was, like an independent Czech state. We lanced the abscess in March, 1939, but in circumstances that were psychologically less favorable than those which would have obtained [sic] had we settled the issue by force in 1938. For in March, 1939, for the first time, we put ourselves in the wrong eyes of world opinion. No longer were we restricting ourselves to reuniting Germans to the Reich, but we were establishing a protectorate over a non-German

¹¹⁷ Ibid, pp. 13, 14.

¹¹⁸ Here, another aspect of the shame/rage theories developed by Lewis, Retzinger, and Scheff is evident. In other cases examined in this work, Hitler's language carries connotative meanings that evoke shame as a result of alienation through distancing or separation. Here, the language evokes shame through *envelopment* or uncomfortable proximity.

population.¹¹⁹

As the wardens of Czechoslovakia, then, Germans are responsible for its continued well-being as a part of the German nation. With any superior-subordinate relationship, there must exist at least an implied set of limits to regulate behavior. Whether it is the relationship between military leaders and their troops, teachers and students, or parents and children, there are accepted norms which address unacceptable behavior and reprisal or punishment. If a soldier stands guilty of insubordination, he may be reduced in rank. A student who distracts other students from their work may be sent to detention. A child who disobeys her parents may be subject to "time out" or a spanking. Similarly, when the Czechs reacted with defiance to the German occupation, they were, in the German perception, in

¹¹⁹ Francois Genoud, ed., The Testament of Adolf Hitler: The Hitler-Bormann Documents, February-April, 1945, trans by R.H. Stevens, (London: Cassell, 1959) p. 84.

need of corrective guidance. This guidance is not wholly punitive and negative in nature. When we discipline our own children, it is not to shame and harm them, but to correct their transgressions and help them to learn acceptable behavior. If German soldiers at Lidice possessed (consciously or subconsciously) this idea of wardenship of Czechs, it would enable them to carry out the atrocities at Lidice with the knowledge that their actions were not exclusively aimed at harming people, but by doing so they were helping the Czech nation to realize acceptable behavior that would promote harmony between Czechs and Germans.

Hitler raises another issue in this speech, one to which he would return whenever confronted with the Czech question. He details the brutal Czech mistreatment of the Germans, and in such light describes the German occupation of Czechoslovakia as an effort to protect Germans living within the Czech borders. As Hitler describes his motives: "Germany was primarily interested in one thing only and that was to liberate the nearly four million Germans in this country from their unbearable situation...."¹²⁰

¹²⁰ Hitler, Speech Before the Reichstag, April 28, 1939, p. 15.

Hitler first puts this mistreatment in historical context.

He states that,

...nearly four million Germans lived in this territory of Bohemia and Moravia [after the majority of the German nation had migrated westward]. A policy of national annihilation which set in, particularly after the Treaty of Versailles, under pressure of the Czech majority combined, too, with economic conditions and the rising tide of distress, led to the emigration of these German elements, so that the Germans left in the territory were reduced to approximately 3.7 million.¹²¹

In this excerpt, Hitler mentions two issues aimed at evoking an emotional response from his audience. First, he speaks in general of a program of "national annihilation" directed against Germans. By doing so, he has overtly laid the foundation for the justification of his occupation of Czechoslovakia. More important to this study, though, is the implicit meaning and effects of Hitler's language. The idea of national annihilation directed against Germans can excite in all Germans who read or hear this speech a vindictive reaction.

¹²¹ Ibid, p. 13. *Annihilation* and *distress* resulting from the *Treaty of Versailles* indicates the presence of alienation, shame, and a target for aggression.

We do not need to examine the work of a sociologist such as Scheff to understand a society-wide vengeful impulse in this context. When people see or hear about members of their group, whether it be a family, a team, an army, or a nation, being harmed, they naturally experience an emotional reaction that generates a desire to see the perpetrator(s) brought to justice. Americans need only look back to their reaction to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The United States followed the shame/rage cycle in textbook fashion through the language of President Roosevelt and the almost instantaneous declaration of war. In more recent memory, Americans can look to the Oklahoma City bombing of April, 1995, or the disaster that befell a platoon of US Army Rangers in Somalia in 1994, to recall painful feelings of loss (exposure, vulnerability, *shame*) and their emotionally vindictive reactions to these events. When we saw video footage of the Ranger being dragged through the crowded streets, we, as a national group, wanted to see the guilty parties punished.

Language that evokes shame (in accordance with the theories of Lewis, Retzinger, and Scheff), while key in understanding the manner in which nonpathological people are

"permitted" to engage in pathological behavior, is not the only indicator of the values projected upon the German population by Hitler. In addition to evoking shameful emotions and establishing targets for vindictive aggression, Hitler provides justification for aggressive behavior through the language with which he examines the submission of one state to another prefaces his attitude toward territories conquered by the Nazis and the peoples who inhabited these lands:

That the stain of cowardly submission can never be effaced; that the drop of poison in the blood of a people is passed on to posterity and will paralyze and undermine the strength of later generations...; even the loss of this freedom after a bloody and honorable struggle assures the rebirth of a people and its seed of life from which some day a new tree will strike fast roots.¹²²

Though he is referring directly to the German nation, the values held by Hitler regarding Czechoslovakia can be extracted from the text. The message here is twofold. First, Hitler condemns any society that willingly passes its sovereign torch to another power without a struggle. Such a society, such a race that submits willingly, has forever

¹²² Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 669.

compromised its fundamental honor and integrity, and has lost any rightful potential to continue as a society. This view lends a permissive attitude toward German aggression in an attempt to assuage the effects of shameful emotions ("*cowardly submission* [will] *paralyze* and *undermine* the strength of later generations"). Hitler's language also serves to justify the harsh treatment of Czechs due to their willing capitulation to Germany in 1939. As they gave up without a nationalized resistance, as a people, the Czechs lost their vitality as potentially progressive human beings.

To strip the argument to its bones-- since the Czechs submitted willingly, their destruction is imminent and necessary lest their 'poisoned blood' come to infect the rightful German conquerors. To kill Czechs is not, according to Hitler's values, an abomination, it is simply speeding them toward their inevitable destiny. Hitler details this idea further:

For this is the 'drop of poison' of which Clausewitz speaks: the spinelessness which once begun must increase more and more and which gradually becomes the foulest heritage, burdening every future decision. It can only become a terrible lead weight, a weight which a nation is not likely to shake off, but which finally drags it down into the

existence of a slave race.¹²³

In this passage, Hitler notes the qualifier that he mentioned beforehand. He states that the "poisoned" society is "not likely" to shake off the weight of past cowardice. This qualified statement suggests that if a society does resist, it can counter the otherwise terminal effects of cowardice. This second part of Hitler's statement exposes another facet of his permissive attitude toward revenge. Hitler suggests that a nation that resists the encroachment of another, though the first may be overcome and occupied, maintains confident assurance that they will eventually rise again to regain their past stature. With reference to the assassination of Heydrich, this idea takes on tremendous importance. If a country resists occupation, it plants the "seed of life from which some day a new tree will strike fast roots."¹²⁴

In order to ensure ongoing Nazi primacy in the conquered territories, any hints of resistance must be dealt

¹²³ Ibid, p. 670. Again, Hitler's language evokes shame: *spinelessness* will drag the nation *down* to the existence of a *slave race*.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

with swiftly and severely. Hitler's awareness of the rise of the Nazi party, both in speculative preview in Mein Kampf in 1925 and in reflection in 1942, made him sensitive to the potential of uprisings. "Passive resistance will never drive off occupying armies."¹²⁵ This language projects permissive values with regards to revenge in two ways: It evokes shame within German society for their past *passivity* in accepting defeat following World War I and also demands a savage response to Heydrich's assassination. This second, connotative meaning is evident if the voice of the phrase is inverted from passive to active: *Active resistance will drive off occupying armies*. Here, Hitler combines shades of past shame with the necessity to crush any active opposition to Germany's reemergence. As such, Hitler's language mandates active retaliation against threats to Germany's necessary ascension and expansion--a style of retaliation manifested by the Germans at Lidice. Though Hitler intended these passages as a call to arms for the German nation in response to the Treaty of Versailles, they shed light on his attitude toward nations that capitulate willingly, as did

¹²⁵ Ibid, p. 684.

Czechoslovakia. His language of predation suggests that such countries deserve such harsh treatment as they receive, and any resistance to occupation must be met with savage retribution.

In a conversation recorded by Martin Bormann on May 20, 1942,¹²⁶ Hitler, using language by now familiar, stated that,

...never in the course of history have the Czechs shown themselves capable of solving their own political problems, and even in their cultural development leant heavily on the German culture of the Hapsburg state. The right, and indeed, for the German Reich the obvious policy is firstly to purge the country of all dangerous elements, and then to treat the Czechs with friendly consideration. ...a certain feeling of guilt, coupled with the fear of being compelled to evacuate their homes, as the result of the transfer of population we are undertaking, will persuade them that it will be in their interests to emerge as zealous co-operators of the Reich. It is this fear which besets them that explains why the Czechs at the moment--and particularly in the war factories--are working to our complete satisfaction, doing their most under the slogan: "Everything for our Fuhrer, Adolf Hitler!"¹²⁷

¹²⁶ One week before the attack on Heydrich.

¹²⁷ H. R. Trevor-Roper, Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941-1944, trans. by Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Young, 1953), p. 400.

In this passage Hitler emphasizes the same ties he had drawn between the Czech State and Germany in April of 1939. He makes it clear that the Czechs are dependent on German guidance to survive. In addition, he makes two points that augment permissive values evoked by his language as it pertains to the Czechs. First, Hitler declares that the Germans must eradicate all "dangerous elements" within Czech society in order that the Czechs and the Germans can get on with a harmonious relationship. One can only assume that Hitler is referring to the Czech resistance efforts that had been active¹²⁸ since the German occupation in 1939. By labeling the resistance as dangerous elements, Hitler highlights the threat that they pose to German national interest. As such, he is advocating their elimination by any means necessary--he is not specific. If the resistance is relayed to German citizens and soldiers as being a threat to Germany's national interest, especially if intimate language is used, the permission for Germans to harm any Czechs associated with the resistance is clear.

¹²⁸ It is important to note that the Czech resistance was actively encouraged and backed by the British.

In addition to his reinforcement of the close ties between the Germans and Czechoslovakia, Hitler uses another style of language that lends itself to the harsh treatment of Czechs--dehumanization. He describes the treatment of Czechs whereby they are coerced through guilt¹²⁹ and fear to relocate and further provide a symbiotic labor force that produces war material for the Reich--the political, social, and cultural overseer upon which the Czechs are totally dependent for sustenance and protection. This is the slave race to which Hitler referred in Mein Kampf (see above).

Another example of the attempt by Hitler to dehumanize the Czechs (or certainly to delegitimize their state) is found in a speech delivered at Nuremburg on September 12, 1938 Hitler described the creation of the Czechoslovak state as "a short sighted piece of work..." and explained that

...the statesmen at Versailles brought the abnormal structure of Czechoslovakia into being. It was possible to violate the demands of millions of another nationality [Sudeten Germans] only so long as the brother nation itself [Germany] was suffering from the consequences of general maltreatment by

¹²⁹ We can assume that Hitler means the guilt that Czechs feel for their past programs of "national annihilation" conducted against the Germans.

the world.^{130 131}

Hitler's language is clear. The Czech state is an aberrant, "abnormal" creation of the Western allies. Czechoslovakia is not a traditional entity among the ethnic nations of Central Europe, and as such not only does it not belong, but it has directly "violated" the lives of ethnic Germans and is party to the general "suffering" endured across Europe by the German nation. Hitler's language implies that Czechoslovakia does not belong as a Central European state, and further implies that once that state is gone, German suffering will be reduced. By referring to the Czech state as "abnormal," Hitler is excluding it from legitimate ethnic citizenship in Central Europe. Hitler's language therefore permits revenge on two counts. First, he excludes the Czechs as a legitimate people of Central Europe (a form of dehumanization) and second, connects them directly to the suffering of the Sudeten Germans and indirectly to the hardships faced by Germans in general.

¹³⁰ Hitler, My World Order, p. 508.

¹³¹ Through the creation of *Czechoslovakia*, *The Treaty of Versailles* produced *suffering* within, and the general *maltreatment* of Germany--alienation, shame, and a target for vindictive aggression.

Any time a society at war can reduce its enemy to subhuman or a generally exclusive status, it eases the difficult task of actually killing that enemy. As experienced by American infantrymen around the world, this phenomenon is universally constant. Japanese soldiers in the Pacific campaign during WWII were "Japs." In caricatures on propaganda posters the images of Japanese soldiers bore no resemblance to real human beings, rather, they were rat-faced, yellow, leering, bespeckled figures that displayed a more demonic than human quality.¹³² To US soldiers in the Vietnam War and also to the American public, the Viet Cong were sneaky, silent, deadly "gooks" in black pajamas who exhibited almost superhuman qualities of stealth and murderous potential. The rest of the Vietnamese were often referred to as hapless "slopes." During the Persian Gulf War and various other US military deployments to the Middle East, the people in the engagement areas were referred to either as "Ragheads", "Bob" (short for "Bedouin Bob"), or "Sand Niggers" (Iraqis.) In all of the examples listed, people were trying to psychologically ease for

¹³² The Japanese were also characterized as "monkeys" during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).

themselves the enormous burden of killing other people. When Hitler painted a portrait of the Czech people as a subservient race whose sole purpose it was to provide the manpower that drove the German war industry, he made the task of killing Czechs, whether they were resistance fighters or civilians, easier for those soldiers ordered to perform the killing.

The previous textual excerpts have displayed several examples of the means through which the language of Adolf Hitler may have provided the citizens and soldiers of Germany the historical context and permission needed to carry out such atrocious acts as that committed at Lidice. Simple, general permission does not, however, provide German society with a psychological *carte blanche* that enables them to participate in all sorts of vengeful activities. The question of limits must be acceptably addressed. It is one thing to achieve retribution for a capital crime by hunting down and executing the perpetrator, and another issue entirely to massacre innocents to atone for a single death.

As discussed above, part of the motivation for the degree to which the Germans enacted revenge at Lidice was political. Soldiers and even civilians in a warring

society, however, are not uniformly moved to pathological brutality merely by descriptive political motivations based upon autobiographies or speeches written or delivered years before. There must, therefore, be some permission granted to these people regarding brutality as seen in the specific and immediate case of Lidice.

Another example of this permission is found in a conversation of Hitler recorded on May 22, 1942:

In the same way I am of the opinion that one should proceed with the utmost severity against other contemptible crimes which have sprung up under war conditions--for instance, theft under cover of a black-out. For, except by truly barbaric methods, how can one suppress such crimes...as bag-snatching, assaults on women, housebreaking when the cellar door is left open and so on? For all such crimes there must be one penalty alone--the death penalty, whether the evil-doer is seventy or seventeen years of age.¹³³

With this "zero-tolerance" language, Hitler legitimizes the control of petty crimes by "barbaric" means. If the penalty for these relatively minor infractions is death, the destruction of a village as punishment for the assassination of a national official might make sense on an escalatory scale. By promoting "barbaric" executions as punishment for

¹³³ Adolf Hitler, as cited in Trevor-Roper, p. 408.

theft and burglary, Hitler is lending implicit permission for such acts as perpetrated at Lidice. Indeed, throughout such works as Mein Kampf and the documents of Hitler's speeches and conversations, there exists an abundance of language that calls for severely punitive measures to deal with the enemies of the German nation. Hitler's "Final Solution" will ever bear testament to the brutality envisioned by the leadership of the Third Reich and the permission and legitimation of acts of brutality realized and actuated by Germans under Nazi rulership.

Summary

This section has developed an analysis of several documents in which the language of Adolf Hitler provided implicit permission for Germans to participate in acts of revenge. To reiterate, the focus of this work describes the need among nonpathological people for some sort of permission to participate in organized and deliberate atrocities as witnessed in the case of Lidice. Without some sort of implicit permission to instill the values necessary to slaughter civilians in an act of state revenge, human beings, regardless of the immediate context, be it war or

peace, would be unable to make a reasonably confident individual decision to participate.

This analysis relies heavily on the theoretical work of Lewis, Retzinger and Scheff regarding shame and vindictive aggression. It is evident, however, that shame alone did not enable Hitler to project pathological values upon German society. Analysis of the discourse of the preceding excerpts reveals the many levels at which language both revealed and evoked the values and behavior of German society under the Nazis.

Hitler's language provides this permission on several levels. In Mein Kampf, Hitler casts his vision of the destiny and the direction of the German nation in general terms. He speaks of the tragedy of willing capitulation and the dangers of insurrection. In other documents, Hitler is more specific in addressing the issues facing Germany and Czechoslovakia. He ties the German people to the lands of Bohemia and Moravia, and vilifies the Western allies and the Treaty of Versailles for manufacturing a political Czech state which serves to oppress Germans within its borders and further threatens the national security of Germany and the stability of Europe. Finally, Hitler reduces the Czech

state to an unacceptably abnormal entity and its citizens to a subhuman (sub-German) status. Through his language, Hitler sets the larger stage for the harsh treatment of enemies of Germany, then subsequently identifies the Czechs as enemies and casts them in the role of an inferior race, a race that only exists to serve the German nation. All of these perceptions of Czechoslovakia and its inhabitants create an atmosphere within which an act of revenge, even if it seems excessive, remains permissible within the values of German society.

Further examples of Hitler's permissive language can be found elsewhere. One can look at any portion of Mein Kampf or any segment of Hitler's speeches and conversations and find them replete with the same sorts of permissive language indicated above. While it was not likely Hitler's will to specifically target the Czechs and set them up for vengeful atrocities, and likewise was certainly not the collective will of the German people to do so, the extent to which Nazi propaganda confronted German society ensured that Germans in general and soldiers specifically came into contact with the ideas and language outlined above.

This chapter has also detailed the second assertion of this work--that this permissive, emotional language of revenge is a universal, species-wide phenomenon. Several instances where American society experienced certain aspects of emotional reactions and permissive language serve to show that the pattern of pathological behavior was not limited to Nazi Germany or other totalitarian systems. The Germans were not peculiar in their permissive values related to revenge. Even a superficial examination of the records of human history reveals widespread instances of state revenge.

Through comparison of the German experience as defined by language and values to certain recent American experiences, we can identify the *potential* universality of the issue.

Chapter V.

Political Analysis--Conscious and Unconscious Permission

The language of Adolf Hitler displays clearly the values which, as this study claims, provided the necessary permission for Germans to both participate in and react favorably to acts of pathological revenge as seen at Lidice. To claim, however, that the Germans at Lidice and in the Sudetenlands acted strictly in response to Hitler's will and/or Nazi coercion presents a gross oversimplification. The participants at Lidice were not simply automatons. Nor, as mentioned in Chapter 1, were they homicidal maniacs. In order to understand the nature of permissive values conveyed to the Germans involved in the tragedy at Lidice it is useful to consult works of political theory in order to form a more complete understanding of the mutually-affective relationship between Hitler and the German Nation.

With few, if any, exceptions, the political nature of the Third Reich and its leader have provided a subject for more political analyses than any other comparable phenomenon. Since the 1930's, political scientists have speculated about the meaning of the Nazis' rise to power and

wrestled with analyses of the consequences. Perhaps no political system, and certainly no individual have had a more profound effect on our lives today as the Third Reich and Adolf Hitler. These analyses all seek to shed some light on one of the more troubling issues of Nazi Germany-- the enthusiasm with which the German population embraced the ideas of Hitler and the Nazis, and the profound consequences that followed.

Historians tend to be accurate, though somewhat limited, in their analysis of the positive reaction of the Germans to the Nazis. Cast in the context of the crushing financial burden of the Versailles Diktat, the impotence of the Weimar government, and the devastation of the depression of 1929, it is easy to imagine the total desperation of the Germans. A desperation which allowed Hitler to deliver an attractive, messianic party-line to the German nation. In a sweeping description of the values shared by Nazis and Germans rising from the historical context of the inter-war years, Emil Ludwig portrays the attitudes of "average" Germans in a 1930 New York Times article:

...Versailles did great damage. Even [opponents to Nazi extremism] felt that we were defrauded--we, indeed, most of all

because we believed in a new Europe.
...under the pressure of [war reparations]
German prejudices are being strengthened
rather than weakened, and a foresighted
policy would favor a revision of the
[Versailles] treaty, for it is in this that
German advocates of *revenge* still find their
strongest arguments.¹³⁴

Ludwig describes the contextual seedbed for the Nazi
success. While he does not yet recognize or acknowledge (at

¹³⁴ Emil Ludwig, "The Average German Speaks," December 7,
1930, from Nazis and Fascists in Europe, 1918-1945, John
Weiss, ed., (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969). reprint from
the New York Times Magazine, December 7, 1930, (New York:
New York Times Co., 1930), pp. 76, 82. My italics. Ludwig
also identifies the connection in values regarding Poland
and Czechoslovakia. As the products of the Versailles
treaty, they were targets of collective envy-turned-loathing
through the vengeful rhetoric of the Nazis, See *ibid*, p. 78.

least in print) the nature of the Nazi movement, he does identify the general climate in which Germans were initially receptive to Hitler's rhetoric of reclaiming German greatness.

The Germans of the Weimar era were primed for the Nazis' language detailing an end to suffering and the emergence of a German phoenix from the ashes of 1918. Examining the peculiar nature of the inter-war years, the reasons for German enthusiasm toward the messages of the Nazis become clear. Less clear in the efforts of historians, however, is the nature of the relationship between the German people and the Nazis. While the historical context of the Weimar era effectively sets the stage for German acceptance of Hitler, history alone cannot provide a complete and detailed portrait of the relationship between Hitler and the Germans--the relationship from which springs the permission necessary for pathological tragedies like Lidice.

One very dominant and effective genre of political analysis regarding the positive relationship between the Germans and Hitler is found in the study of totalitarianism. Hannah Arendt, in her 1951 work entitled, The Origins of

Totalitarianism, describes totalitarian movements as

mass organizations of atomized, isolated individuals. Compared with other parties and movements, their most conspicuous external characteristic is their demand for total, unrestricted, unconditional, and unalterable loyalty of the individual member.¹³⁵

Arendt makes a clear case for the study of individual values and the effect of totalitarianism on the values and subsequent behavior of individuals within a totalitarian regime. Her language highlights the role of the individual as a participant in, rather than simply a subject of the totalitarian movement.

As totalitarianism demands the positive participation of the individuals comprising society, totalitarian elites must somehow secure this complete loyalty within the societies they intend to rule. Arendt details this point when she writes:

Total loyalty is possible only when fidelity is emptied of all concrete content, from which changes of mind might naturally arise.

The totalitarian movements...have done their utmost to get rid of the party programs which specified concrete content and which they inherited from earlier, nontotalitarian

¹³⁵ Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1951), p. 316.

stages of development.¹³⁶

Here Arendt speaks of some level of mind control. For totalitarianism to succeed, the leadership must create a new format for political loyalty. This new, revolutionary loyalty must contain exclusively the values stemming directly from the totalitarian elite. Unlike many other types of regimes, totalitarian leaders must resist the urge to build upon past values and ideologies which formed the previous "nontotalitarian" phases of their society.

In this portion of her analysis Arendt runs into a problem with Hitler and the rise of the Nazis, for Hitler certainly evoked values, perceptions, desires, and traditions from pre-Nazi Germany to attain and maintain the Nazi totalitarian state. For Hitler to have enjoyed "total loyalty" as described by Arendt, he would have had to employ not only rhetoric, but also instituted new cultural norms free from the influence of all previous German culture, society, and political systems. In theory, then, totalitarianism demands a complete social revolution that frees society from all previous "nontotalitarian" values.

¹³⁶ Ibid, p. 317.

This, quite simply, did not occur in Germany.

Arendt addresses this conflict between the theoretical demands and goals of a model totalitarian system and those manifested in the Fascist movements in Europe:

The true goal of Fascism was only to seize power and establish the Fascist 'elite' as uncontested ruler over the country; totalitarianism's aspiration to total domination eliminates the distance between the ruler and the ruled population. ...the ultimate goal of the dictatorial party, ie., the seizure of power and the occupation of the state machinery, is for the totalitarian movement only a transitory stage in its total expansion into the population....¹³⁷

Arendt mentions two crucial themes of totalitarianism as seen in Europe in the 1930's and 40's: The intimacy of the relationship between the "ruler and the ruled" (Hitler and the Germans), and the goal of total domination of the infrastructure of society. If we can believe that the only goal of the Nazis was to establish their "elite" as the sole motivating force in German society, and that this control produced an intimate relationship between the elite and the rest of Germany, then it is easy to develop theories regarding the ease and efficiency with which Nazi values

¹³⁷ Ibid, p. 318.

came to define and drive German social behavior.

Acceptable behavioral standards in totalitarian societies can therefore be related to a collective response to the language of leaders and the context within which that language is perceived and interpreted. Two works that reflect the connection between national decision-makers and national behavior are Foreign Policy Decision-Making, by Richard Snyder, H. Bruck, and Burton Spine,¹³⁸ and Psychological Aspects of International Conflict, by Ross Stanger.¹³⁹ Both books aim to describe the behavior of nation-states as defined and driven by decision-making. Their primary goal is to connect the actions of modern states to the behavior of specific individuals. Stanger, especially, examines this relationship in a psychological context. The authors examine the decision-making process on many levels (such as institutions, groups, and organizations) but invariably return to highlight the strong influence that the decisions of individual leaders have in

¹³⁸ Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Spine, Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New York: The Free Press, 1958).

¹³⁹ Ross Stanger, Psychological Aspects of International Conflict (Belmont: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1967).

affecting the behavior of the nation-state in which they serve some authoritative function. While the authors examine the potential for a mutually-affective relationship between individuals, organizations, and society at large, it is important to acknowledge the degree to which absolute authority (as wielded by Hitler) increases the affective potential of an individual leader's decisions upon national behavior. In other words, the more absolute the power of the elite, the more a single individual's decisions, or rhetoric, can potentially affect the behavior of society.

Harold Lasswell lends additional weight to the completeness with which Nazi values dominated German society. In the introduction to his 1965 compilation, World Revolutionary Elites, he asserts that totalitarian elites are completely self-defined.¹⁴⁰ In accordance to Arendt's analysis of totalitarianism, this assertion agrees with the idea that leaders such as Hitler had to somehow mold public opinion with regard to past, nontotalitarian traditions in German culture. Hitler's solution to the problem of

¹⁴⁰ Harold Lasswell, and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 5.

pretotalitarian values took the form of intense ideological manipulation through propaganda and censorship.

In a New York Times article of January, 1939, Junius B. Wood describes the manner in which the Nazis built a consensus through censorship and manipulation. Writing from Berlin, Wood tells us that "the newspapers are informed [daily] on government policy. They receive and follow instructions on what to print about it. ...they get the report of the official news agency...whose version must be used."¹⁴¹ Wood further describes the voracity with which the German population consumes the reports of the government-controlled media. The combination of media control on the part of the Nazis and the avaricious nature of the German readership is one example of the manner in which Hitler approached the problem of pre-Nazi values and traditions in German society.

This movement to control the minds of Germany was led by Hitler's propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels. In 1937,

¹⁴¹ Junius B. Wood, "Channeling News for the Nazis," from Nazis and Fascists in Europe, 1918-1945 John Weiss, ed., (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969) reprint from the New York Times Magazine January 15, 1939 (New York: New York Times Co., 1939), p. 130.

Albion Ross described the efforts of Goebbels in the New York Times, writing that "Thought control pervades the atmosphere. It stares out of every printed page. It accounts for the music that you hear on the radio. It crops out in every conversation. It is like the fixed idea that torments the Neurotic. *Even while you are resisting*, the propagandists are exercising their influence on you."¹⁴²

Ross describes the detail and enthusiasm with which Goebbels approached his work as propaganda minister. While skepticism and resistance are evident among Germans at the time of this article, Ross describes the Nazi efforts at mind control as a constant, determined process. In predicting the eventual success of Goebbels's efforts, Ross quotes him: "'The nature of propaganda is quite unlimited. It adapts itself to the person for whom it is intended.'"¹⁴³

The Nazi efforts at mind control did not begin and end with the media. German culture, as most cultures, was and is steeped in tradition. As it concerns the effectiveness

¹⁴² Albion Ross, "Goebbels Edits the Popular mind in Germany," Feb 12, 1937, New York Times Magazine as cited in Ludwig, pp. 137-38. [My italics]

¹⁴³ Ibid, p. 143.

of totalitarianism, these traditions are pretotalitarian and therefore problematic. Elizabeth Wiskemann, writing in the New York Times in 1934, describes the efforts of the Nazis to come to terms with the cultural problem:

...Herr Hitler and his followers [are attempting] not only a political and economic but also a cultural revolution. The sentimentalism, internationalism and individualism which had run riot before the World War [WWI] were to give way to qualities more suitable to the nature of an authoritarian and nationalistic state. The 'pure Aryan' was to have his innings in the arts as well as in business and politics.¹⁴⁴

While Wiskemann's claims of a total cultural revolution, especially regarding sentimentalism, do not completely stand-up to historical scrutiny, she does illuminate important aspects of the manner in which the Nazis coalesced their control of German values. The Nazis, while unable to affect a total social revolution in Germany, did manage, through the relentless efforts of their Propaganda Ministry and the intimacy of the relationship between the elites and the populace, to augment traditional German social values with the values of the Nazi elite. They created a new Aryan

¹⁴⁴ Elizabeth Wiskemann, "On the Cultural Front the Nazis Drive," May 27, 1934, New York Times Magazine, as cited in Ludwig, p. 160.

mythology which, rather than obliterating the past of Germandom, altered contemporary perceptions of Germandom and the manner in which Germans viewed the peculiarities of their collective past.

Evidence of their success is easily found in news reports of the time. On March 29, 1936, Otto Tolischus wrote an account of Hitler's success at consensus-building in the New York Times:

The German Nation goes to the polls today to endorse, with *practical unanimity foreordained*, Adolf Hitler and all his works and...to elect a new Reichstag chosen by him to shout approval whenever such demonstration is deemed advisable.

Taken at face value...the spectacle of a great people being at last welded into a national unity through the struggle for resurgence...is not without grandeur. ...the majority is bound to be so overwhelming that Hitler will still be able to repeat...the taunting challenge he flung out at foreign statesmen during the election campaign:

'Behind me stands the whole German people. Who stands behind you?'¹⁴⁵

Tolischus goes on to describe this achievement as the "result of the skillful wielding of the weapons of

¹⁴⁵ Otto D. Tolischus, "Spurring a Nation: The Nazi Way," March 29, 1936, New York Times Magazine as cited in Ludwig, p. 144. [emphasis added]

propaganda backed by the persuasive power of force."¹⁴⁶

As evident from the preceding analysis of totalitarianism, a convincing case can be made tying the values of German society during World War II to the manipulations of the Nazi elite. There is no shortage of thoughtful, interpretive analyses regarding the phenomenon of totalitarianism nor of evidence to bolster these theories. Within the confines totalitarian values the case for permissive language regarding revenge is clear. The intimate tie between the Nazi elite and the population enabled the Nazis to plant and then nurture such permissive values necessary in order to ensure compliance from the Germans, even to the extent of participation in and/or approval of a tragedy such as Lidice.

It is important to understand the manner in which the Nazi leadership acquired and maintained almost complete control of the perception of the German nation, and in doing so were able to effect behavior and values concurrent with that of the Nazi regime. This approach to understanding the behavior of the German people in World War II, though

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 145.

convincing, is problematic with regard to this work. While the phenomenon of pathological revenge can make sense both under the desperate conditions described by historical analyses and in theories of totalitarianism, these approaches to the problem fail to illuminate the universal nature of the phenomenon. If institutionalized revenge occurred only in countries undergoing some desperate plight induced by a foreign nation, or in countries governed by totalitarian regimes, this analysis of the nature of totalitarianism would provide sufficient explanation for revenge in war as pathological behavior. Examination of the human experience does not, however, back this claim. While it is easy to say that totalitarian regimes in general, and the experience of Germany in particular, enhance the probability of tragedies such as Lidice, revenge has, and continues to occur around the world within many different political and historical climates.

In order to analyze revenge as a more universal phenomenon, therefore, it is necessary to examine political theories that provide a more comprehensive view of human nature and political behavior. As a large part of this work uses psychological and sociological theories to examine

permissive language, it makes sense to consult psychological approaches to political theory. Herbert Kelman provides a solid foundation upon which to build more detailed ideas regarding psychology, politics, aggression, and revenge. In his essay entitled, "Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations," Kelman writes:

One cannot expect [due to the complexity of human societies] that the behavior of a nation will be a direct reflection of the motives of its citizens or even of its leaders. ... Leaders may engage in aggressive behavior for strategic reasons...and the population at large for reasons of social conformity.¹⁴⁷

Kelman illuminates two ideas regarding aggressive political behavior (war) which apply directly to this study of Lidice. The decision of national leaders to engage in aggressive behavior is thoughtful and deliberate. Hitler ordered the annihilation of Lidice in order to accomplish specific political and strategic aims: He provided retributive satisfaction for the German nation and made a strong display to the Czech resistance of the consequences of rebellion.

¹⁴⁷ Herbert C. Kelman, "Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations: Definition of Scope," from International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis H. Kelman, ed., (New York: Holt Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), p. 6.

The people involved in carrying-out the act were, according to Kelman, exhibiting behavior that enhances social conformity.

Like Kelman, Irving Janis discusses the conformist dimension of human behavior in his 1982 work entitled Groupthink.¹⁴⁸ While Janis's primary intention is to display the means by which "groupthink" can lead to misguided policy decisions, his definition of a psychological phenomenon can shed light on the manner in which a society might arrive at mass, concerted conclusions regarding permission and acceptable behavior.

As defined by Janis, "groupthink" is, "an easy way to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action."¹⁴⁹ This definition can be altered somewhat and applied to larger society in general.

¹⁴⁸ Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes 2nd edition, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982).

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 9.

Any successful society depends on some amount of uniformity and cohesion for survival. As such, they may strive to construct a "unanimity" of values that regulate behavior. A society that searches for this unanimity within the stressful context of war might collectively be extremely receptive and positively responsive to the suggestions and directives of their leadership. Americans witnessed this phenomenon during the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Although there had been a very significant protest against initiating an armed conflict with Iraq, once American forces had been committed to combat, Americans, both supporters and opponents of the war, responded positively to the language of the leadership who demanded that Americans "support the troops." German civilians and soldiers living in the context of a war in which Germany faced the threat of a powerful coalition of enemies undoubtedly formed a societal "in-group" and as such were susceptible to a larger form of society-wide "groupthink" as the language of their leadership developed and affected their behavioral values.

These analyses of the drive toward conformity in human society suggest an independent coalition-building tendency in human nature. Examined more closely with the help of the

more specific psychoanalytical theories outlined in Chapter 2, this phenomenon of social conformity reflects the society-wide manifestation of the shame/aggression cycle described by Lewis, Retzinger, and Scheff. Both Kelman and Janis relate unified social behavior to a perceived threat. As shown in Chapter II, a threat to an individual arouses emotions that indicate shame which, if *unacknowledged*, can lead to aggressive behavior--revenge. Keeping this psychological cycle in mind, aggressive social conformity in the face of a larger threat (from another nation, for example) that is channeled into violent behavior (war) represents a society-wide shame/aggression cycle.

This theory of unified social aggression, on the surface, implies that permission for aggressive behavior is not necessary for individuals to participate in or condone such acts. For this to hold true, theorists and historians must present a convincing body of evidence which clearly displays a trend of society-wide psychopathology that comes and goes with threats to that nation.¹⁵⁰ As mentioned in Chapter II, and again in the quote from Kelman above, the

¹⁵⁰ See Bok.

nature of social behavior and international relations is far too complex an issue to be satisfactorily explained by a singular theory. As stated in Chapter 1, this work is an effort to discover permission for pathological social behavior. As the internal aspects of international conflict and social behavior are nearly infinitely complex, the search for a singular type of permission will encounter the same problems as other monocausal analyses. This study, then, must expand and detail the idea of permission to present an adequate approach to social pathology.

One aspect of social behavioral analyses alluded to above that must be taken into consideration is that of context. Harold Lasswell outlines the contextual issues of international relations in his essay, "The Climate of International Action." Lasswell's general intent is an analysis of the affectiveness of contextual "climate" as indicated by the "mood" of a society. By climate, Lasswell refers to "the degree of intensity, or stress toward action and...the value orientation of the [social majority]."¹⁵¹ By this, Lasswell constructs an idea of climate which includes

¹⁵¹ Harold Lasswell, "The Climate of International Action," from Kelman, p. 341.

all factors acting upon the general population (ie., the economy, international situation, leadership) and the subsequent "mood"¹⁵², or qualities of social values generated among society as a result of these factors.

Having defined his terms, Lasswell continues to develop a theory of collective social moods, the intensity of which is directly reflective of the "crisis level"¹⁵³ experienced within a given society. This collective mood is evidenced by society-wide impulses that affect and are affected by individual moods. Regarding individual and collective behavior, Lasswell writes:

...collective as well as individual moods are important components of the international political process. Every initiative to act has some impact...upon the flow of mood; it is at the phase of mood formation that conflicting, facilitating, and nonrelevant initiatives are consolidated and focused toward narrower objectives....¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² For Lasswell, the terms "climate" and "mood" are nearly synonymous. "We equate the notion of climate in international affairs with the conception of *mood*, recognizing that mood can be distinguished by degrees of intensity and by general value orientation.", *ibid.* [My italics]

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 344.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

Lasswell describes the collective mood as the point where "all tributary initiatives and messages meet and fuse in a dominant channel leading toward activities that *conform to or modify* the previous requirements and policy."¹⁵⁵ The importance of mood as defined and directed by the contextual climate within which a society operates is key to understanding international behavior.

The difficult task, according to Lasswell, is identifying the "value orientation" of a society's mood. For political analysis to be truly effective, theories must provide some measure by which international behavior can be identified and predicted. For Lasswell, the language and rhetoric of national leaders provides the window through which analysts can determine the value orientation of a society.¹⁵⁶ Hitler's speech before the Reichstag¹⁵⁷ therefore not only displays Hitler's individual intentions regarding Central Europe, it also reflects the general value orientation of German society.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 352.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, pp. 342-343.

¹⁵⁷ See chapter IV.

Quite similar to Lasswell's discussion, Daniel Katz continues the analysis of collective values and moods in social behavior in his essay, "Nationalism and Strategies of International Conflict Resolution."¹⁵⁸ Katz maintains that by studying the nature of individuals analysts can draw conclusions regarding the behavior of society in general. As his study focuses on contemporary issues, Katz points to the nature of modern nation states and the ideology of nationalism as the psychological cement that transfers individual "moods" to collective moods, and vice versa.¹⁵⁹

Katz identifies four main forces which contribute to the arousal of nationalism. The first force is found in emotional and behavioral conditioning to national symbols. Flags, pledges of loyalty, national anthems and slogans are all emotionally-charged images that affect the behavior of individuals.¹⁶⁰ Katz maintains that this conditioning

¹⁵⁸ See also Dean Pruitt's essay, "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action," cited in Kelman, p. 391. Like Katz, Pruitt traces the behavior of the modern state to the behavior of individual citizens.

¹⁵⁹ Daniel Katz, "Nationalism and Strategies of International Conflict Resolution," cited in Kelman, pp. 358-360.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 365.

affects behavior due to the "perceived unanimity of others following a supposed patriotic course of action."¹⁶¹

Compliance with national behavioral norms occurs largely due to conditioning that begins at an early age.

The formation of a "self concept as inclusive of national identity is the second force of aroused nationalism. According to Katz, the identity of "self" includes a unique self as well as a self who is part of a larger national conglomeration.¹⁶² As individuals, we all have a perception of ourselves that distinguishes us from all others; as Americans, we also have a sense of self as a part of a larger collective, national identity. Individuals among all the modern nation states have the same dualistic identity which, as detailed by Katz above, serves to transfer individual emotions and behavior to national behavior.

The third force which Katz identifies is the idea that each individual has an instrumental role to play in maintaining the national structure and traditions of their

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid, p. 366.

society. This idea is based on the assumption that individuals hold close ties to their way of life and the structural integrity of the nation, and thus participate in the pursuit of collective progress.¹⁶³ Inverting this idea, it becomes clear (as most of the theorists cited in this work have proposed) that threats to the integrity of the nation will elicit emotional responses among the members of that society. These individual emotions, according to Katz, will eventually transfer to collective national behavior.

Fourth among the forces that affect the arousal of nationalism are compensatory feelings, or the projection of self-image upon others based on individual attempts to solve personal conflicts and insecurities.¹⁶⁴ This force is instrumental in establishing ties between individual and national behavior. When the international climate within which the national mood affects an emotional response among individuals, the source and nature of the response are unilaterally experienced by all members of that society. To use the example of the Germans and Lidice, the emotional

¹⁶³ Ibid, pp. 367-369.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, pp. 367-369.

reaction to Heydrich's assassination was experienced by all members of German society exposed to the event through either media reports or more direct contact. While the degree or intensity of these emotions invariably differed among individuals, there still existed, according to Katz's theory, a transference of emotion and desires among individuals in German society (both the Nazi elite and the general population) that eventually manifested itself in political action, a part of which was the destruction of Lidice.

The messages of the above-mentioned theorists, while each contains some unique characteristics, are all also remarkably similar. All maintain some measure of connection between individual emotions and national behavior. These theorists all claim that analysis of individual emotions can project the quality of social moods and intentions and further enable prediction of national behavior. Differences arise among the theories concerning the precise relationship between the general population and the elite regarding the role of each in affecting collective social values. Whether this connection is a result of, or reflected in the language of the elite is, ultimately unimportant. The major

contribution of these theories to this work are the emphasis that each theorist places on the strong role that emotions and feelings play in the nature of national behavior.

Summary: "Conscious" and "Unconscious" Permission

Examining the psychological theories outlined above encourages a further theoretical analysis of the issues surrounding the phenomenon of revenge and permission. As stated Chapter 1, the primary goal of this work is to illuminate the manner in which social values are articulated and manifested in societies, and the manners in which they provide adequate permission for otherwise normal individuals to engage in pathological behavior. Looking at the nature of certain psychological theories one can discern several different ideas regarding individual and social emotions, values, and conduct.

The theories of totalitarianism focus on the ability of an individual leader to dictate and manipulate national values and behavior of others. This social control is the product of total devotion or compliance on the part of the general population. To reinforce Arendt's theory, this loyalty must be complete in order for the totalitarian to

maintain control. Hitler acquired and maintained this total devotion through censorship and propaganda. By controlling the perceptions of German society, Hitler was able to control social behavior arising from a collective consciousness among the Germans. Through his language, Hitler controlled the perceptions and emotions of the German population. Applied to Lidice, Hitler articulated conscious, direct permission both for German soldiers to participate in the destruction of the town and for the German people to approve of the act, thus enabling collective pathological behavior among nonpathological individuals.

This idea of "conscious" permission is a key factor in understanding the behavior of the Germans regarding Lidice, but it provides far too limited a view to apply analysis to nontotalitarian social organizations. While analysis of Hitler's language is useful in examining the extent to which Nazi values permeated German society, it discounts entirely the role of independent individual emotions and values in the formation of national attitudes. In examining more general works of behavioral political theory, it becomes clear that individual emotions contribute to a collective

will (mood) manifested in national behavior (policy). The key to understanding this national behavior with regard to permission is the affective connection between individual emotions and national policy. A people united by a common ideology (nationalism) are conditioned to have similar emotional reactions to national images and traditions.¹⁶⁵ When international events affect these national images, the emotional reactions of members of that nation are common in quality if not intensity. It is from this common, collective emotional reaction that the idea of unconscious permission emerges. In the case of the Germans and Lidice, the assassination of Heydrich represented a distinct threat to a dominant image of the Nazi state. On an individual level, Germans felt threatened by some degree of alienation. As detailed in Chapter II, this alienation represents the initial emotion in the shame/aggression cycle developed by Lewis, Retzinger, and Scheff. Each German, to some degree of intensity, experienced the cycle of shame, the most common psychological outcome of which is aggressive behavior manifested in the search for a remedy to shameful emotions

¹⁶⁵ See Katz above.

through revenge. This shared emotional process provides "unconscious" permission--the second necessary aspect of permission for pathological behavior.

The tragedy of revenge during wartime is a problem which can be understood, in part, through an examination of emotions and feelings. Should policy makers adopt a more sensitive approach to the problems of emotions and revenge in war, their efforts to contain the potential for revenge would entail restricting the issuance of "conscious" permission for such acts. These efforts of decision makers regarding prevention of wartime revenge can, regardless of precautions mandated by policy, be easily compromised by military leaders, whose charges hold the will and the means by which wartime revenge is ultimately carried-out. This study attempts not only to illuminate the need for more sensitivity regarding feelings and emotions in international policy decisions, but also the need for a more enlightened approach to military leadership in this new era of international peacekeeping.

Hitler, on December 22, 1941, proclaimed himself supreme commander of the German military. By doing so, he projected his values onto the ranks of the German armed

forces. While German soldiers certainly did not adopt Hitler's values and opinions wholesale, there can be no doubt that Hitler's rhetoric, taken in the context of partisan armed conflict (a conflict atmosphere made even more bitter by Heydrich's assassination) enabled those soldiers to be more receptive to the more pathological attitudes of their Commander-in-Chief. John Keegan discusses the way in which Hitler established and utilized his "Theatre of Leadership."¹⁶⁶ In the following analysis of Hitler's command style, Keegan describes the means by which Hitler's emotional and evocative language affected the behavior of German soldiers--especially those soldiers of the junior ranks, who would have to make the individual ethical decision to carry-out the orders of their superiors.

Shameless though Hitler's manipulation of the heroic value system was, its effectiveness was borne out by results.

The German army of 1945, unlike that of 1918, fought unquestioningly to the end. ...the run of the mill officers and common soldiers gave him their total loyalty and surrendered at the last only when ordered to do so.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 304.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 307.

Just as Hitler used his rhetoric to affect the climate of German politics, he similarly infused his values among the ranks of the German military. The relationship between the attitudes of military leaders and the behavior of their troops is a very sophisticated matter, and one which is not likely to be conclusively detailed through any amount of psychological and political theory. The means by which leaders direct the behavior of their forces consists of, among other factors, an intangible quality that defies concise definition, yet it can never be denied that such a quality exists. From antiquity to the present, theorists have wrestled with this fundamental issue of the relationship between leaders and their soldiers: How do commanders come to effectively control of their soldiers?

Clausewitz described this relationship as the "military virtue of an army."¹⁶⁸

This is distinguished from mere bravery, and still more from enthusiasm for the business of war. The first is certainly a necessary constituent part of it, but in the same way as bravery, which is a natural gift in some men, may arise in a

¹⁶⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, On War Anatol Rapoport, ed., (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 254.

soldier as a part of an Army from habit and custom, so with him it must also have a different direction.... It must lose that impulse to unbridled activity and exercise of force which is its characteristic in the individual [bravery and enthusiasm], and submit itself to demands of a higher kind, to obedience, order, rule, and method. Enthusiasm for the profession gives life and greater fire to the military virtue of an army, but does not necessarily constitute a part of it.¹⁶⁹

The military virtue of an army thus describes a departure from personal heroics by individual soldiers, to a collective behavior, based on "habit and custom," that is shaped and utilized by commanders--"obedience, order, rule, and method." Anyone who has observed the military closely can appreciate this "invisible hand" of leadership produced by the relationship between a group of soldiers (specifically their collective behavior) and their leaders.

Soldiers follow orders for many reasons. Military indoctrination impresses upon soldiers the importance of following orders, for if a soldier fails to follow orders, the consequences could bring personal (and, in theory, political) devastation. Noncompliance in an individual

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

soldier could lead to his own death as well as that of other soldiers, thus putting the outcome of the mission, the battle, and perhaps even the war in doubt. Furthermore, the fear of punishment can coerce soldiers to act. Aside from indoctrination and fear, there is another aspect of the relationship between leaders and subordinates. Soldiers can mold their behavior to reflect and react to the intentions of their leaders in a response to a belief (or at least a sincere hope) that their leader truly makes decisions, especially in combat, that will provide for the good of the unit and realize the best potential for keeping the soldiers alive. As much as this belief is a powerful motivating force within military organizations, so can it provide motivation in a larger social scale in wartime.

As these motivating forces of leadership applied to the behavior of nations during World War II, every person in continental Europe, whether they were an actual combatant or not, could at least remain somewhat unsurprised should they be directly affected by the fighting. The Germans, due to the geographic centrality of their position were especially sensitive to the notions of total war and "a nation in arms." The effectiveness of Hitler's rhetoric in

influencing, directly and indirectly the behavioral values of the German people is evident in the context of the war and upon reflection on the theories outlined above. While Hitler's language was not the single force driving German values and behavior, German society was nonetheless heavily influenced by the words of a charismatic and trusted leader.

Applied to the role of today's military forces in international peacekeeping operations, the need to contain the potential for pathological behavior is paramount. The conduct of soldiers, like any other human beings, is affected by the language of their superiors. Through language, leaders can elicit emotional responses among their soldiers that will provide collective "unconscious" permission for pathological behavior via the emotional cycle connected with shame. Leaders, by virtue of their authoritative position, can further issue orders that provide soldiers with the "conscious" permission necessary for pathological retribution. Efforts must be taken at all stages of the implementation of international peacekeeping policy--from the formation of policy in negotiations to the execution of policy at the hands of military organizations--to contain the dissemination of permissive values that

increase the potential for pathological behavior and the tragedies arising from such behavior.

Chapter VI

Revenge now and in the Future

In February, 1991, the 1st Marine Division spearheaded the offensive to liberate Kuwait City from occupying Iraqi forces during the ground phase of the Persian Gulf War. Once the city had been secured by forces of the Allied Coalition, units of the 1st Marine Division were ordered to withdraw to the rear, charged with war crimes. It was alleged that the Marines had shot surrendering Iraqis (rather than take them prisoner) and desecrated the bodies of the dead. An interview with a former Marine who participated in the offensive (and who requested anonymity) revealed that he and his comrades had "killed every Iraqi [they] saw." He said that it did not matter whether the Iraqi soldiers were fighting or fleeing, the Marines engaged all with equally deadly force. When asked why they had done this, the Marine responded that they had been told stories detailing the gruesome brutality of the Iraqis in Kuwait just prior to the onset of the ground war. In addition, the operations order given to these Marines included the

directive to "sweep and clear with extreme prejudice."¹⁷⁰

It is clear that, at some level, the leadership of the 1st Marine Division provided the Marines in their command with both unconscious and conscious permission to engage in pathological behavior. By telling, or at least encouraging stories describing the brutality of the Iraqis in their treatment of the Kuwaitis, the Marine leaders potentially initiated psychological shame/rage cycles that provided the Marines with the unconscious permission for pathological behavior. Further, by using the language, "sweep and clear with extreme prejudice," the leaders provided the Marines with conscious permission to engage and kill the Iraqis without set limits of engagement. Without meaning to have done so, the Officers of the 1st Marine Division set the stage within which pathological behavior potentially overrode restraint and led to an avoidable tragedy.

While the intent of the Marine Officers during the

¹⁷⁰ Anonymous, interviewed by author, transcript, Missoula, Montana, 5 December 1995.

Persian Gulf War was undoubtedly not sinister, other, deliberate acts of revenge continue to hamper global peacekeeping efforts today. Recently, at the trial of accused Serbian war criminal, Dusan Tradic, testimony of residents of the Bosnian town of Brcko accompanied amateur video footage of the 1992 "cleansing" of that town. The video records images of a small child hanging from the minaret of a mosque. Another scene shows refrigerated trucks full of bodies pull up to a meat rendering plant and unload the corpses into large vats. Throughout the tape are panoramic shots of the village with bodies lining the roads.¹⁷¹

The Dayton Peace Accord, seen initially as a diplomatic triumph in the efforts to restore peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is in jeopardy due to the experiences such as the massacre at Brcko. The peace accord calls for the reintegration of the different ethnic populations of the region. The vengeful backlash from the experience of the war is evident today. Across Bosnia, the ethnic populations still enforce segregation with threats of violence. Efforts

¹⁷¹ Scott Peterson, "Justice for Bosnia May Rest on Mixed Memories," The Christian Science Monitor 10 May 1996, p. 1.

by UN peacekeepers to actively reintegrate Bosnia are met with equally active resistance. Recently, a Muslim addressing a crowd intent on stopping Serbs from returning to their neighborhoods said, "I'm from a village where [the Serbs] destroyed everything, where they killed many civilians. The people who did the crimes left, and now they want to come back. It is not allowed."¹⁷²

Clearly, the Serbs wanting to return to their neighborhoods are not necessarily guilty of war crimes; they are, however guilty by ethnic association in the eyes of the Muslims. The experience of four years of bitter warfare and partisanship has given all the ethnic groups of Bosnia unconscious permission to enact revenge against their former enemies. As leaders such as Serbs Radovan Karadzic and military chief Ratko Mladic continue to use vindictive rhetoric, they supply their followers with unconscious permission for pathological behavior. At the present, the peace in Bosnia is maintained through the threat of military force only. If the statesmen of the region continue to aggravate the tension between the ethnic groups in Bosnia,

¹⁷² Scott Peterson, "Dreams of a Unified Bosnia Fade as Ethnic Lines Harden," The Christian Science Monitor 20 May 1996, p. 14.

the peaceful unification of Bosnia will become increasingly less probable.

In another region wracked by conflict between ethnic groups, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has recently been threatened by Israel's offensive military operations directed against Hizbulla guerrillas in Lebanon. Acting in revenge for increased terrorism on the part of Islamic extremists, Israel's military campaign has claimed the lives of many civilians, to include an air attack on a UN installation on 18 April, 1996 which killed seventy refugees.¹⁷³

In Kuwait, Bosnia, and Israel, atrocities and continued tension have resulted from permission granted by leaders for people to engage in pathological acts of revenge. Whether this permission was granted intentionally or by accident, the results were, in psychological and sociological terms, nearly identical. There is little that leaders can do to contain or combat unconscious permission, as that type legitimation is a personal and social reaction to certain events and contextual stimuli. Efforts can be made,

¹⁷³ John Battersby, "Israelis See One Side of War," The Christian Science Monitor 19 April 1996, p. 1.

however, to limit the potential for war atrocities through eliminating and countering conscious permission through rhetoric and direct orders. These efforts place new burdens on statesmen, military leaders, and individual soldiers.

While these new challenges to peacekeeping are unprecedented, they have in recent years been met successfully. In the Fall of 1994, elements of the U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne division took-off in C-141 aircraft bound for Haiti. Their mission was to secure the city of Port-au-Prince and use force to ensure that the country's military regime stepped down and allowed popularly-elected president Jean Bertuand Aristide to take office. While the forces were en route, a diplomatic delegation led by former President Carter succeeded in negotiating a peaceful transfer of power. The soldiers of the 82nd Airborne had to quickly reorient their mission posture from direct combat to peacekeeping. This "mid-stream diaper change" presented a number of problems and demanded a high level of maturity from individual soldiers, some not much older than 18 years, and their entire chain-of-command. In the end, the 82nd Airborne's mission was a success and the U.S. forces were able to occupy Haiti without major incident.

While the success of the 82nd Airborne represents a triumph on the part of military leaders and soldiers in limiting the potential for pathological behavior and tragedy, recent efforts by the leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Israel are aimed at limiting the dissemination of conscious permission through rhetoric. On 24 April, 1996, the Palestinian National Council voted 504-54 to remove language from the charter of the P.L.O. demanding the destruction of Israel.¹⁷⁴ Such a move clearly represents an effort to stop rhetoric that conveys permission for normal people to engage in pathological acts aimed at destroying the state of Israel. While the P.L.O. leadership can do little to control vindictive emotions among Palestinians arising from long years of conflict with Israel, they are attempting to lesson the potential for tragedy by ending official sanctioning of violence directed against Israelis.

While this work is primarily intended as an analysis of behavior in wartime, it is difficult to undertake such a work without addressing potential solutions to the problems.

¹⁷⁴ John Battersby, "Palestinians Boost Mideast Peace, End Call for Destruction of Israel," The Christian Science Monitor 26 April 1996, p. 6.

Any effort to outline solutions to complex and troubling political problems such as revenge is bound to be incomplete due to the seemingly endless varieties of challenges posed in the international arena. If, as Quincy Wright posited, the study of international relations is an attempt to analyze the summation of all knowledge,¹⁷⁵ then the chances of developing a comprehensive solution are slim indeed. But the problem of revenge and permission in warfare needs to be addressed if contemporary peacemakers and peacekeepers are to hope for success in their endeavors.

Chapter V presented a bifocal approach to the phenomenon of permission and pathology. Any potential solution to the problem of revenge must address either conscious or unconscious permission, or both. Since unconscious permission is a product of an individual's reaction to contemporary events, little can be done to prevent its effects beyond acknowledging its presence and potential. If, however, national decision makers, military leaders, and soldiers are aware of the potential for disaster raised by their emotional reactions to certain

¹⁷⁵ Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955.

events, perhaps they can take steps to avoid giving themselves over to a shame/rage cycle that produces unconscious permission.

Conscious permission is a much easier issue to address.

Leaders must be aware of the affectiveness of their language. If a leader can understand the manner in which the use of certain inflammatory language increases the likelihood for pathological behavior among subordinates, then that leader can strive to avoid such language, as in the case of the recent efforts of the P.L.O.

The problem with this attempt at a solution is that many leaders are aware of the affectiveness of their rhetoric and welcome the potential for violence among their followers. Hitler certainly intended to grant what this study calls conscious permission to the German nation through his rhetoric. Leaders like Adolf Hitler, Radovan Karadzic, and any others who use language to "vow revenge" understand completely the manner in which their rhetoric influences the behavior of their followers. The destruction of Lidice in 1942 and the willingness with which his soldiers participated in the massacre could not have been much of a surprise to Hitler. He had been hard at work

since the 1920's to ensure that his followers would be able to engage in such pathological behavior when he ordered them to do so. No amount of enlightenment or attention to emotions can stop leaders such as this from granting conscious permission for revenge to their subjects.

In conclusion, then, this study aims to illuminate the problem of revenge, language, and social pathology in an attempt to limit the probability of still further, but avoidable wartime tragedies. The ever-increasing reliance of peacemakers on military organizations to enforce their arrangements demands a heightened awareness among military leaders of the manner in which emotions and language can affect their own behavior, as well as that of their soldiers. The U.S. military can no longer afford to ignore the importance of individual and collective emotions. Leadership courses and manuals must be updated for leaders from the infantry rifle team leader all the way up to the National War Colleges to include an examination of the important role that emotions play in affecting behavior among individual soldiers. Those leaders who continue to deliberately use language to grant permission for pathological behavior will always pose a threat to

international security. Perhaps, however, by identifying the potential that these leaders generate for tragedy, other national leaders and peacemakers might be able to anticipate trouble and thus move to block any further spread of hostilities that could result from such sinister manipulations of emotions.

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