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YOUNG SCEPTICS:
THE ROLE OF YOUTH VOTERS IN INCREASING EUROSCEPTICISM

By

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Undergraduate Thesis

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the University Scholar Distinction

Davidson Honors College

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Approved by:

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Introduction

The European Union (EU) has grown in size and scope since its foundations were laid with the founding of the European Economic Community in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. So too have the number of people affected by its policies and the concept of shared governance at an international level. Over the previous five and a half decades, the expansion of membership to include over half a billion people in 28 sovereign member states has been coupled with an extension of the EU's mandate in the social, political and economic activities of the bloc. Although the improvement of the lives of EU citizens and the strengthening of EU member state economies have both been generally positive outcomes in Europe since 1957, there have been drawbacks in the creation of a massive intergovernmental political and economic bloc across a continent that was traditionally known for its warfare.¹

The unprecedented success of the EU has not come without detractors. Particularly evident in the most previous European Parliament (EP) election held in May, 2014, was the increased focus on euroscepticism by European leaders and policymakers. According to Ariane Apodaca, eurosceptics are aptly described as a broad and nebulous range of individual “citizens or politicians who present themselves as ‘sceptical’ – critical – of the union which they say takes powers away from their national government and poses a threat to their national sovereignty.”² Additionally, the ideological spectrum of eurosceptic parties varies quite widely between and within states, and not all eurosceptic parties seek the same political ends. There is one unifying ideology that unites eurosceptic parties as a whole however: their stance toward continued European integration in the context of the EU by creating better-integrated common markets, standardizing immigration and foreign policies, creating more cohesive international governance structures, and the like. In the *Encyclopedia of the European Union*, “Eurosceptic” is defined as referring “generally to an opponent of further integration...of the EU.”³ Similarly, Ronald Tiersky defines euroscepticism as “a permanent doubting of ‘Europe’ as a great project, a vigilance about European integration conceived as building a new and powerful political actor in the international system” and asserts that “for Euro-skeptics, the European goal should be a ‘family of nations,’ not

¹ European Commission, “The history of the European Union,” European Commission, 2015, http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm.

² Ariane Apodaca, “Information Guide: Euroscepticism” (Academic report, Cardiff University), 3.

³ *Encyclopedia of the European Union*, ed. Desmond Dinan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998), s.v. “Eurosceptic.”

a merging of peoples.”⁴ While eurosceptic parties hold a minority of seats in the EP – roughly 13% of the seats (100) are in the grasp of EP groups that already represent eurosceptics⁵ – there is increasing concern among pro-European leaders that this eurosceptic movement could continue to gain traction in the future and create difficulties in keeping the EU together as a political and economic bloc. Indeed, the success of Syriza in Greece’s parliamentary elections in January 2015, sent another clear message to EU leaders in Brussels and other capitals across the continent that the matter of transnational fiscal austerity, which has been implemented in a wide range of struggling EU economies and has become a hallmark of integrationist economics since the 2009 European recession, will continue to be challenged at the polls across the bloc.⁶

This paper focuses on the role of young voters in the rise of eurosceptic politicians to EP positions from across the EU. I plan to answer two questions in my research project: first, what percentage of youth voters aged 18 to 24 at the time of EP elections have voted for eurosceptic parties in EP elections from 1994 to 2014? Next, I plan to determine whether economic factors are responsible for a change in support for eurosceptic parties at EP elections (if, indeed, such a rise in support does exist) by comparing youth unemployment data to support rates for eurosceptic parties among youth voters.

Framing Euroscepticism in the EU

The implications of my research could be valuable not only to the academic community that concerns itself with EU politics and policymaking, but policymakers and politicians themselves that see the importance of maintaining youth interest in the EU political and economic project’s continued success. An October, 2014, Eurobarometer report on the perception of Eurozone constituents (those 18 countries which are part of the EU currency union) about a variety of Eurozone social, political and economic issues points to a general contentedness with the euro as a currency – 64% of 15-24 year olds were likely to respond that the euro was a good thing for their country, compared to 54%-56% of older respondents in the survey.⁷ There is still hesitation

⁴ Ronald Tiersky, “Euro-Skepticism and ‘Europe,’” in *Euro-Skepticism: A Reader*, ed. Ronald Tiersky (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), pp 2-3.

⁵ European Parliament, “Previous Elections,” European Parliament, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00021/Previous-elections> (Accessed April 1, 2015)

⁶ “Greece’s Election: Beware Greeks Voting for Gifts,” *The Economist*, January 31, 2015, 17.

⁷ TNS Political & Social “The Euro Area: Report” (Economic and social report, European Commission, October, 2014) 9.

to increase coordination of economic and social reforms across the Eurozone at an international level, however.⁸ Nevertheless, the report generally indicates that young people in the Eurozone are content with the economic union overall, with a little over half of young respondents providing positive responses to questions gauging their support of the single currency area. This information is not applicable to the EU overall, but certainly provides some background for my research: the Eurozone makes up approximately 64% of the member states in the EU and, with nearly 333 million inhabitants, approximately 65% of the entire EU population.

Literature Review

It is well-documented that younger voters tend to support alternative methods of political expression and political parties that may not fall within the realm of mainstream politics and/or political expression, lending credibility to the idea that younger voters may be inclined to vote for Eurosceptic parties in EP elections more than other age groups. Sloam substantiates this theory by describing how young people are increasingly turning away from traditional political parties and politicians, but nevertheless engaging in political activities at increased levels in the EU, an important feature of youth participation in politics across the EU.⁹ Equally important, Flanagan argues that “younger citizens are more responsive to their political and socio-economic environment than older cohorts,”¹⁰ lending credibility to the idea that youth may dabble in politics or other forms of political participation that are more radical or outside of the mainstream as they form their voting habits. Similarly, Shaffer shows that alternative political appeals can gain traction among young voters in his study of neo-fascist music genres created to appeal to young voters in the UK during the last quarter of the 20th century; this was observed in the National Front’s campaign to increase youth voter turnout for their cause (in the UK, the National Front is a mostly defunct neo-Nazi political party).¹¹ By changing their political repertoires from being “less geared towards voting and more towards issue-based forms of engagement,” it follows that the more narrowly defined political platforms of eurosceptic parties may be more appealing to young voters than broad, pro-Europe parties’ appeal across the board. Sloam’s results are also indicative of a

⁸ *Ibid*, 50.

⁹ James Sloam, “‘Voice and Equality’: Young People’s Politics in the European Union,” *West European Politics*, 36:4 (2013): 850, doi: 10.1080/01402382.2012.749652.

¹⁰ *Ibid* & Flanagan, C. 2009. “Young People’s Civic Engagement and Political Development”. In *Handbook of Youth and Young Adulthood*, Edited by: Furlong, A. 293–300. Abingdon: Routledge.

¹¹ Ryan Shaffer, “The soundtrack of neo-fascism: youth and music in the National Front,” *Patterns of Prejudice*, 47:4-5 (2013): 460, doi: 10.1080/0031322X.2013.842289.

wider acceptance of anti-establishment politics among younger voters aged 18-24 and can shed light on whether young voters are indeed turning out for more eurosceptic parties at EP elections than they have in the past.

Esser and de Vreese make other important inroads in the study of youth political participation and identify a number of outside influences that can affect how younger people vote in EP elections.¹² They assert lower turnout among young voters is a problem for elections both in the United States and the EU, but attribute this to having “less to do with skepticism or opposition to the system and more with people’s perception that there is ‘not much at stake’” in major elections that used to have higher levels of turnout in both the United States and the EU.¹³ This is important to note: Euractiv, an EU news and policy forum, made a claim prior to the EP elections in May 2014 that the role of young voters may significantly change in the 2014 election cycle due to the continued level of economic instability across the EU and persistently high rates of youth unemployment in various member states.¹⁴ The claim that there is not much at stake is broad in the context of pan-European elections, and potentially inaccurate; the economic policies pushed by elected MEPs from May 2014 will no doubt be important to consider as Europe continues its shaky economic recovery in the coming years. The EP elections in May 2014 could signal a shift in younger citizens’ voting patterns, turning around the consistent decline of youth involvement in EP elections that has been observed since the first open elections to the EP in 1979.¹⁵

It is worth pointing out that the Esser & de Vreese article was published before the global financial and economic meltdown of 2007-2008 and the subsequent recessions that gripped the European continent in following years. This adds a previously unforeseen variable into their research results when analyzing them in a contemporary context and it follows that radicalization of the youth vote may have been more prominent in Europe following publication than the authors considered. The addition of two more EP elections since 2008 and the associated ascendance of eurosceptic parties, en masse, into the EP have provided opportunities for younger voters to turn

¹² Frank Esser & Claes H. de Vreese, “Comparing Young Voters’ Political Engagement in the United States and Europe,” *American Behavioral Scientist*, 50:9 (2007): 1197. doi: 10.1177/0002764207299364.

¹³ *Ibid*, 1208.

⁸ “Frustrated young voters could reverse declining turnout in EU elections,” last modified June 3, 2013, <http://www.euractiv.com/future-eu/frustrated-young-voters-reverse-news-528254>.

¹⁵ “Turnout at the European elections (1979-2009),” last modified May, 2014, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-%281979-2009%29.html>.

out at the polls across the EU to affect change for a variety of important issues that were and are at stake.

It is also necessary to understand the way that eurosceptic parties work in the context of pan-EU politics and the reasons that voters find them attractive in the first place. Adam & Maier, et al. go into detail on this matter by examining the results of the 2009 EP elections and the role that “eurosceptic fringe” parties had in that cycle compared to more traditional EU political parties that gain the majority of voters’ support at the international (read: EU) level of government.¹⁶ The 2009 election, which occurred during the height of the economic crisis in Europe following the 2007-2008 collapse of the global financial system, was a litmus test of sorts for the EU. It did not put eurosceptic politicians into significant power by any means, but the 2009 EP election cycle did allow voters to express their distaste for then-current austerity measures and EU-wide reforms that were being discussed to address the economic concerns of the day.¹⁷ Many EU countries are still facing acutely high youth unemployment and low levels of economic growth – particularly in the Eurozone – and this makes it even more important to understand whether or not young voters who will be electing future European Parliaments have been moved to vote for politicians that may not have a closely united Europe in mind.

Adam & Maier, et al. provide a departure point from previous literature on the issue of EP elections: the 2009 election was the first time that the EP was given a post-crisis mandate, which may have changed the entire paradigm of the elections among younger voters. Particularly for those voters who came of age during the periods of recession and economic crisis in the Eurozone and, more broadly, the EU, the success of eurosceptic parties in the 2009 election is important to note. Both the 2009 and 2014 EP elections allowed voters who lived through the economic crisis’s first few years and the subsequent slow recovery to express their opinions about the European Commission’s and European Parliament’s responses to the economic issues which were and are plaguing the bloc. Treib focuses on the May 2014 election in detail, and notes the importance of distinguishing between hard line and softer approaches that eurosceptic parties take to the EU, arguing that contemporary political scientists would do well to take heed of the turnout for

¹⁶Adam, Silke & Michaela Maier, et al., “Campaigning Against Europe? The Role of Eurosceptic Fringe and Mainstream Parties in the 2009 European Parliament Election,” *Journal of Political Marketing*, 12:1 (2013): 80, doi: 10.1080/15377857.2013.752245.

¹⁷Oliver Treib, “The voter says no, but nobody listens: causes and consequences of the Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 European elections,” *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21:10 (2014): 1543, doi: 10.1080/13501763.2014.941534.

eurosceptics at the polls.¹⁸ The works by Adam & Maier, as well as Treib, are also supportive of the idea that eurosceptic parties can be classified according to their stance on European integration.

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I consider Betz's 2013 discussion of 19th century American populist parties as "distant mirrors" for contemporary European populist movements to be a nontraditional approach to populist party movement studies, and his research raises serious questions about what drives populist movements into power in democratic systems.²⁰ Betz's work is focused primarily on anti-immigrant sentiment among voters in France, namely in support of the *Front National* (a eurosceptic French political party) led by Marine Le Pen. In the 2014 EP elections, the Front National beat every other French political party in the poll, garnering 24.68% of the national vote and 23 seats in the EP. Although not all eurosceptic political parties and politicians reside in the ideological "populist right" – as Betz defines the *Front National*²¹ – his definition of Western European populist right parties is helpful for understanding (1) how these parties market themselves to voters in order to increase turnout in favor of their candidates in elections and (2) the influences that may be affecting young voters' voting behavior in EP elections.²²

Significance of Original Research

Each of the aforementioned researchers tended to limit their cases studied in a variety of ways. Betz, for instance, focuses primarily on American anti-Catholic movements of the late 19th century to draw parallels to the anti-immigration ideology of the French *Front National* and the Swiss People's Party (SVP) in recent years. Adam & Maier, et al., are also limited in the scope of their study, focusing on the 2009 EP election in only 11 EU member states, with the focus of their research directed at the placement of the eurosceptic parties in question on an ideological scale from "fringe" to "mainstream" in nature.²³ Similarly, Esser & de Reese wrote their article in the mid-2000s, before the accession of the most recent three members of the EU to the bloc, and limit their results to 24 of the current EU member states as it was.

¹⁸ Treib, "The voter says no," 1543.

¹⁹ Adam & Maier, "Campaigning Against Europe," 81, 83-87.

²⁰ Hans-Georg Betz, "A Distant Mirror: Nineteenth-Century Populism, Nativism, and Contemporary Right-Wing Radical Politics," *Democracy and Security*, 9:3 (2013): 201, doi: 10.1080/17419166.2013.792250.

²¹ *Ibid*, 201.

²² *Ibid*, 202.

²³ Adam & Maier, "Campaigning Against Europe," 78.

In this paper I examine the eurosceptic vote in eight EU member states in EP elections from 1994-2014, with a focus on the youth vote in each EP election cycle. There is a large amount of work that has focused on the rise of euroscepticism over the past 20 years, but it is notable that there has been a lack of attention paid to the role of youth voters in the rise and election of eurosceptic politicians and parties in Europe, particularly in regard to EP elections. The dismally low turnout at EP elections has been widely documented across the EU; the turnout rate in the 2014 EP election was around 43% of eligible voters, a phenomenon Treib attributes to the “second-order nature” of pan-European elections.²⁴ Thus, measuring actual voter sentiment based on less than half the electorate’s population is a difficult task.

Research Variables and Hypotheses

Based on previous research, I hypothesize that young voters up to age 24 (the legal minimum age for voting in EP elections varies from 16-18 across the 28 EU member states) have increased their support for eurosceptic party candidates in EP elections. As part of my secondary hypothesis, I assess youth unemployment data in the two quarters preceding and following the EP elections in each member state since 1993. Across the EU, I believe that there will be a wide variation in reasons for young voters’ attraction to eurosceptic parties, but propose here that economic factors play a large role in the decision to vote for eurosceptics when young voters head to the polls. Where appropriate, and if the requisite data is available, I will list the primary reasons for a voter’s choice at the voting booth.

I used comprehensive post-electoral European Election Studies (EES) survey data to track voting trends across my case studies.²⁵ The EES program records political, social, economic, educational, opinion, employment, and other data of voting populations for European Commission after each EP election. All of my data, except where otherwise noted, is accessible from EES through the Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences.

Measures and Methods

The first question I have posed addresses the matter of whether or not youth voters are supporting eurosceptic parties and to what extent that support is being expressed at the polls in EP

²⁴ Treib 1547 Voter says no 2014

²⁵ <http://eeshomepage.net/home/>

elections based on voter age. To examine the voting patterns of different age groups, I have divided each EES respondent pool into the following age ranges: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65+. These divisions isolate youth voters from other age ranges of EU voters and enable me to determine the extent to which their votes went to eurosceptic parties in EP elections. Preliminary data observations indicated that most data agencies (EuroBarometer, Euractiv, the European Social Survey [ESS]) tabulate age ranges in a similar fashion.

The first dependent variable (DV) under consideration is the demonstrated support by young voters for eurosceptic parties. Because each member state has its own political parties that contest the EP elections, classifying eurosceptic parties in each state is vital to my analysis.²⁶ In each EP election since 1979, EES has collected party manifestos from political parties contesting the elections (data is available up to 2009; the 2014 party data information will be released in late 2015). Among its “Euromanifesto” questions EES scores the stance of each party on European integration on a 1-10 scale, whereby a score of “1” indicates a party is in favor of full European integration and a score of “10” indicates a party’s opposition to any integration. Few parties score either a “1” or a “10,” but some parties like the UK Independence Party are in favor of exiting the EU entirely. For this paper, all parties which scored a “6” or higher on the EES Euromanifesto question of integration support in each electoral cycle will be considered Eurosceptic. (See table A-1 in the appendix for comprehensive party data.) For the 2014 elections I use the eurosceptic party table compiled by Treib in place of the as-yet missing EES Euromanifesto data.²⁷ Once eurosceptic parties are identified, the vote share of each party is cross-tabulated with voter age and the total voter turnout from each EES survey; *n* values for respondents vary across survey years and member states and are noted in the data.

I have chosen to begin my study with the 1994 EP elections for two reasons. First, I seek to establish whether there is a notable change in youth support for eurosceptic parties, and a rich set of electoral data is available for the five EP elections since 1994. Secondly, beginning the study in 1994 allows for a number of member states to accede to the EU throughout the study period. The accession of Eastern European members on a “fast-track” process that has not been offered to other potential member states, even if those Eastern European political and economic systems were not “prepared” for access to the EU, did produce some ire among Western Europeans in the mid-

²⁶ Adam & Maier, “Campaigning Against Europe,” 80-81.

²⁷ Treib, “The Voter Says No,” (2014) 1544-1545.

2000s.²⁸ However, in examining the long-term trend in youth voting behavior, it is possible to establish a better understanding of the appeal of eurosceptic parties among young voter populations that has not previously been examined in great detail. This is not a point I analyze in my study, but it is worth noting for future research.

The follow-up question I study is what factors are driving the change, if one does exist, in young voters' behavior at the polls. I hypothesize that unemployment is the primary factor for anti-EU sentiment and the voting habits among young voters in EP elections. An argument can be made for such a relationship based on previous elections both in and outside of the EU that appear to show a relationship between economic hardship and political regime change; the US Presidential election of 1932 is shown by Courtney Brown to have served as a vote of support for either President Hoover's response to the Great Depression or Franklin D. Roosevelt's proposals to bring relief to poverty-stricken Americans.²⁹ The latter years of the German Weimar Republic are similar: in that time of economic and political turmoil, marked by a slow response of the government to the Great Depression, the political system of the country fell apart and allowed the National Socialists (Nazis) to gain traction in the Bundestag. Younger voters, particularly those bitter about the old vanguard government's policies concerning war reparations and the dismal economic situation, rallied behind the new nationalist leaders of Germany and allowed the Nazis to gradually take control of the state.³⁰ Other examples of youth voters' impact on political situations and movements can also be observed across the West: the 1960s student movements and more recent protests against austerity measures in the UK, Greece, France, Spain and other EU member states have increased the visibility of young voters' political concerns and may have had an impact on the turnout in the 2014 EP elections among younger voters.

To conduct examine this second question, I compare youth unemployment data with eurosceptic party success in the EP elections by case and year. This data, available from EuroStat,³¹ provides a point of comparison for economic factors that may be affecting young voters' behaviors in the polls. The previously mentioned Eurobarometer and European Social Survey data provided

²⁸ Jan-Werner Müller, "Eastern Europe Goes South: Disappearing Democracy in the EU's Newest Members," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April, 2014, accessed December 5, 2014, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140736/jan-werner-mueller/eastern-europe-goes-south>.

²⁹ Courtney Brown, "Mass Dynamics of U.S. Presidential Competitions, 1928-1936," *American Political Science Review*, 82:4 (1988): 1154.

³⁰ Dick Geary, "Who Voted for the Nazis?" *History Today*, 48:10 (1998): 9.

³¹ <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/database>

me the basis of this means of comparison. Additionally, future research can compare their plethora of quantitative data about social perceptions of immigrants and non-European wage-earners in the EU to determine whether or not they are impacting the eurosceptic vote in EP elections.

My preliminary review of news and academic journal pieces detailing the role that youth voters play in EP elections has revealed a lack of serious investigation into these matters. Euractiv, a policy analysis network that examines European politics and promotes debate about a range of issues pertaining to the EU does share data that details the decline in youth participation in EP elections, with a low of 29% turnout across the EU in the 2009 EP election.³² However, preliminary articles, even a year in advance of the 2014 election, indicated that there was a high likelihood that the turnout of youth voters would significantly increase due to the fact that the economic downturn still haunting the EU had hit younger people particularly hard in the southern member states, primarily Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain and Cyprus, and to a lesser extent, other members of the EU across the board.³³

Case Study Selection

I selected eight EU member states for analysis that would provide plenty of data to work with and also some variation in historical, political, social, economic and other backgrounds. Additionally, my independent variables – voter age and unemployment rates – were established to determine whether a correlational link exists between them and eurosceptic party support; this is discussed in greater detail below I formulated my project based on the 2014 EP election and worked back in time to select my cases on a variety of national variables.

- First, I determined which EU member states had elected a eurosceptic party to the EP in 2014, based on Treib’s eurosceptic party table (see Appendix, Table A-1) that records eurosceptic parties present in the 2014-2019 EP.³⁴
- Next, I figured unemployment data for under-25s from the last two quarters of the year preceding each EP election, as well as the first two quarters of the election year (See Figure A-3, below). EP elections are held in June each year studied with the exception of 2014, when they were held in May. For my data comparisons, I have averaged youth

³² “Frustrated young voters could reverse declining turnout in EU elections.”

³³ “EU elections 2014: Online tool aims to get the youth voting,” last modified September 20, 2013, <http://www.euractiv.com/eu-elections-2014/online-tool-aims-get-youngsters-news-530584>.

³⁴ Treib, “The Voter Says No,” (2014) 1544-1545.

unemployment from the four quarters studied, providing approximately a year during which youth unemployment may stabilize and potentially affect voters' mindsets.

- Working backward again, I divided states into five tiers based on the average unemployment in the last four quarters: 10-20%, 20-30%, 30-40%, 40-50% and 50-60%. Each state analyzed also demonstrated a notable change in unemployment over the 20 year period. At least one state was chosen from each tier.
- Given the many rounds of EU accession, I sought to include as many European regions as possible in the study. Five of the eight cases had been participating in EP elections since 1979, and the remaining cases were selected from the 1997 and 2004 rounds of accession. This provided me with Western, Northern, Eastern and Southern European states to work with. Ultimately, I chose to study the following eight EU members: the Czech Republic (CZ), Spain (ES), France (FR), Italy (IT), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Sweden (SE) and the United Kingdom (UK). Other states met my selection criteria, but were excluded due to my lack of resources to complete this project.

For ES, FR, IT, PT and the UK, elections from 1994 to the present were assessed; SE was assessed from 1999, and both CZ and PL were assessed from 2004.

Data and Plan of Analysis

As previously mentioned, all electoral data used in my research was made available by the EES databases housed at the Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. I have compiled the electoral statistics for eurosceptic parties by case and age across the relevant 3-5 EP electoral cycles, followed by figures showing the change in eurosceptic support among various age groups and then comparing youth unemployment, averaged over the four quarters preceding and including the relevant EP election, to the degree of youth support for eurosceptic parties at the polls. Figure A-3 tracks the youth unemployment rates in the previously defined periods that was used to determine case selection. (The full dataset can be found in the Appendix, Table A-2.)

There is a variety of eurosceptic parties studied in each electoral cycle, but each party studied up to and during the 2009 EP election had a minimum score of "6" on the integration perception scale as part of the EES Euromanifesto study. The full list of eurosceptic parties can be

found in Figure A-1.1 in the appendix for each case study, I name at least one prominent eurosceptic party that has contested at least two elections unless otherwise noted.

It is necessary to point out that there is a vast range in the number of individuals interviewed during each EES study. This creates an inherent problem in my data and analysis: one cannot hope to get an entirely representative picture of EP electoral habits broken down by age groups over the previous twenty years. The number of potential voters interviewed after each EP election ranges from a low of 500 in Portugal in 1999 to a high of 9708 in Italy during the same cycle. This spread in respondent numbers is representative of the voting populations of EU member states, but does create a lack of information about my target group of analysis. Given the nature of this type of research, however, such misrepresentations in the data are impossible to overcome without creating an entirely new and more representative survey for EU citizens to complete.

The shortcomings of this data are most apparent in the calculation of voter turnout: it has already been mentioned that EP elections see regularly underwhelming turnout rates given their second-tier nature, but the EES survey data indicates a much higher turnout for the EP elections than was actually recorded in each election cycle. To clarify, the turnout reported by the European Commission in the 2014 EP election was 42.61% across the bloc. In the EES data, much higher turnout is indicated among most of the countries than was officially recorded: Italy, whose official turnout in the 2014 EP election was recorded as 57.22% by the European Commission, registered a 68.63% turnout rate in the EES data. The EP publishes EP election turnout data on their official website which is free and open to the public at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html>.

Bearing all this in mind, the results yielded by my study should be taken as a guide to youth support for eurosceptic parties, nor an official statement about the state of youth electoral politics in the EU.

Analysis

Voter support for eurosceptic parties varies greatly across the chosen cases, warranting an independent discussion of each in its own context. To establish relationships between voter support for eurosceptics by age and youth unemployment, I have chosen to assess each state separately, including some contextual historical and political background information to clarify each case's situation at the time of their election. It was also notable in the data that there is a range of support levels among the different age cohorts (see Appendix B), making it practical to

speculate on the reasons for those outcomes and why youth support for eurosceptics may or may not have met my initial expectations. The countries are grouped into two typologies: those that have experienced youth unemployment below 25% on average over the past 20 years, and those that have experienced unemployment above the 25% threshold since 1994. More detailed analysis will be provided for one state of each category: France (over 25%) and the United Kingdom (under 25%).

Unemployment over 25%

France

The history of French nationalism stretches back hundreds of years and continues to this day under the leadership of the incredibly eurosceptic Marine Le Pen and her *Front National* political party.³⁵ *Front National* won the 2014 EP election in France with 24.86% of the vote.³⁶ Although this individual vote differs from the results shown by the EES data, there has nevertheless been an increase in eurosceptic party support across France in the 20 years analyzed. Young voters are not the drivers of this increase in eurosceptic success at EP elections in France; rather, older voters in the 55-64 and 65+ year old cohorts are pushing up eurosceptic election rates there. There is a link between youth unemployment and the percentage of youth reporting having voted for eurosceptic parties, but it is not incredibly strong. For example, the increase from 3.27% to 5.56% of total youth voting for eurosceptic parties between 2004 and 2014 amounts to a 70% increase in youth support for eurosceptic parties overall, but this is not closely correlated to the increase in under-25 unemployment from 20% to 24% over the same period, a marginal increase of 20% overall.

Spain

Spain has experienced dramatic fluctuations in youth unemployment since 1994, particularly since the global financial crisis of 2007-2008; it has had the steepest increase in youth unemployment since 2009 among my case selections. Interestingly, in this case, unemployment correlates well with the increase with eurosceptic support among young voters. Currently, Spanish youth remain among the most likely to be unemployed anywhere in the EU with unemployment

³⁵ Lars-Erik Cederman, et. al, "Testing Clausewitz: Nationalism, Mass Mobilization, and the Severity of War," *International Organization*, 65:4 (2011): 606, doi: 10.1017/S0020818311000205.

³⁵ Treib, "The Voter Says No," (2014) *Ibid*, 201.

³⁶ European Parliament, "Previous Elections."

hovering between 53-54% at the time of the 2014 EP election. Spain does not appear to have a strong record of support for eurosceptic parties, but there is a notable uptick in youth support at the 2014 elections. During this cycle, *Podemos* (Spanish for “we can”) became a prominent party on the eurosceptic scene in Spain, garnering approximately 10.2% of the vote among Spanish voters

Italy

Italy has a history of eurosceptic parties contesting EP elections since at least 1994 the hard-eurosceptic *Lega Nord* (Northern League) has consistently received sufficient support at the polls to get some candidates into the EP. Youth cohorts in Italy have shown a slow but steady increase in eurosceptic party support. The lack of a drastic increase in youth support for eurosceptic parties overall appears as if it will continue in future EP election cycles.

Poland

Poland joined the EU in 2004. Immediately, there was a large showing of support for eurosceptic parties – over 30% in the 2004 cycle – but this has since Among the early Polish eurosceptic parties was the League of Polish Families which came in second place in the 2004 elections; it has since lost clout in Poland, representing a decrease in the level of support that has been observed among Polish voters for eurosceptic parties in the past ten years. The youth vote share for electing eurosceptic tracks with unemployment rates among the under-25 population. In general, the Poles do not turn out en masse for the EP elections – the EES data never figures turnout above 45.85% and official EP data records an average turnout under 25% in each cycle.

Portugal

Portuguese euroscepticism is weak, at best. Those eurosceptic parties that do succeed in Portuguese EP elections are generally leftist: the Left Bloc and the Unitarian Democratic Coalition (comprised of communist and Green elements) have been the most successful Portuguese eurosceptics since 1999. For a time, youth unemployment and the percentage of youth voting for eurosceptic parties were closely correlated, but in the 2014 cycle this relationship appeared to end: a marginal increase of 50% in under-25 unemployment from 24% to 36% from 2009 to 2014 stands in stark contrast to the 76.4% drop in youth support for eurosceptic parties between the two elections.

Unemployment under 25%

United Kingdom

The relationship between the UK and the EU has frequently been fraught with tension. Former Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was very hesitant about integrating the UK into broad EU political, economic and monetary agreements; the current PM David Cameron (also a Conservative) has repeatedly promised a referendum on the UK's membership in the EU if his party wins the May 2015 parliamentary elections.³⁷ With the addition of the fiercely anti-integration UK Independence Party (UKIP) and other, smaller eurosceptic parties in the UK, the British eurosceptic movement is alive and well. There is still a notable lack of support for eurosceptic parties and politicians amongst youth populations, and the contribution of youth votes to eurosceptic party success has consistently been well under 10%. There is not a distinguishable relationship between youth unemployment and the degree of youth support for eurosceptic parties in the UK.

Czech Republic

The Czech Republic joined the EU in 2004. The country has seen stable youth unemployment between 10-20% since accession and has embraced the democratic norms of its western counterparts since democratization following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The slight increase in youth support as a share of eurosceptic party success in 2014 appears attributable to the decline in the support such parties earned from 25-45 year olds and the 65+ year old population. Also notable is the vast drop in overall eurosceptic vote shares from the general election, among the most precipitous declines in the entire study. The change in support from 2004-2009, correlated to unemployment, hints at a trend that would support my hypothesis, but it rapidly disappears in the 2014 EP election cycle.

Sweden

Sweden joined the EU in 1998. The country has seen consistent support for eurosceptic parties since accession, particularly among the 55-64 year old cohort. Youth support has been on the decline since Sweden's inaugural EP election in 1999, and the percentage of youth voting for Swedish eurosceptic parties has varied ever since. Youth support for eurosceptic parties does not track well as a share of the youth population with under-25 unemployment rates. There is a

³⁷ BBC, "Milliband: EU poll is 'clear and present danger' to jobs," BBC, <http://www.bbc.com/news/election-2015-32114191> (Accessed March 31, 2015).

consistent show of support for the eurosceptic Swedish Green Party (*Miljöpartiet*) and, to a lesser extent, the June-List Party (*Junilistan*) in EP elections overall.

Discussion of Results and Data

With the sole exception of the Czech Republic, there does appear to be a general increase in youth support for eurosceptic parties in EP elections across the cases studied in this analysis. Many would dismiss this increase in youth support as miniscule, and such critics would be correct: there is no increase larger than single digits in the eight cases studied here. Furthermore, the UK stands out as the only case in which more than 20% of the youth vote ever went to eurosceptic parties, as observed in the 2009 election (Figure B-8.2). Nonetheless, there are indications that youth support for eurosceptic parties is generally higher than it was ten or twenty years ago. The tendency of youth to support nontraditional political parties and engage in nontraditional means of political expression is probably partly to blame for this increase in youth eurosceptic support. From personal experience watching the campaigns for the EP while living in Europe in May, 2014, it was apparent that many eurosceptic politicians were not – and are not – afraid to engage in nontraditional means of political engagement and may even push the boundaries of acceptable discourse in the public sphere. Not only is the heavy burden of a pan-European economy weighing on the minds of these parties and politicians, but so too is the problem of integration – of border policies, social norms and customs, currency and trade. As the elections in 2014 clearly demonstrated, the frustration of voters in EP elections with integration is on the rise and eurosceptic parties benefited handsomely from their anti-integration stances.

Regardless of the increase in eurosceptic parties' success at the polls, there is no indication that this has been significantly affected by younger voter support over the previous five election cycles. Rather, the largest shares of eurosceptic votes generally belong to older cohorts across the cases studied in this analysis: The Czech Republic, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK each saw the 55-64 and 65+ year old age groups as making up the largest share of eurosceptic party votes in 2014 specifically and throughout the series more broadly (See Appendix B). Italy is one of the outliers here – rather than older voters, middle-aged voters of the 35-44 year old cohort and, to a lesser extent, the 45-54 year old cohort, were the largest contributors to eurosceptic parties' vote shares in most elections (Figure B-4.1). France appears to follow the pattern of older voters being the most important factor in eurosceptic parties' success, but there is an anomalous lack of

eurosceptic support among the oldest voting cohort in 2009 (Figure B-3.1) that is partly due to the small number of cases in the polling data from EES. I find the EES data for Spain to fluctuate enough that its representation not be of much use here, but it is important to note the rise of *Podemos* in the 2014 elections and the impact that a viable eurosceptic party had on the elections there (Figure B-2.1).

According to *The Economist*, the eurosceptics now control about a third of the 751 seats in the EP, of which approximately 100 are held by hardline eurosceptics advocating for extensive EU reform or abandoning the EU altogether.³⁸ While trends show an increase in eurosceptic party support across the EU as a whole, particularly in those states that have the biggest grievances with the central international government in Brussels, it is important to remember that the majority of the MEPs are still committed to a united Europe that will last well into the future. There were only 64 hard eurosceptic MEPs elected in 2009 when solely defined by their EP party group in 2009, compared to 100 in 2014, amounting to 8.63 % and 13.32% of the total seats in each parliament, respectively.³⁹ Although hard eurosceptics have been unable to create, or have thus far refused to join, coalitions capable of making lasting EU-wide changes, particularly as Europe moves toward further integration in upcoming years, these increases are important to note: hard eurosceptics' increased popularity tracks with the growing movement of mid-range and softer eurosceptics overall. The Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) coalition is the largest purely eurosceptic group in the EP today, led by Nigel Farage of UKIP, which was among the most successful eurosceptic parties in the 2014 EP elections; the *Front National's* MEPs have thus far refused to align themselves with any political coalition.⁴⁰

In light of the general, wide-ranging success of eurosceptic parties in the 2014 EP elections, there exists a real possibility that a renewed faith in the EU may grow among young voters. As I noted earlier, the EuroBarometer survey of October 2014 indicated a generally positive response to the EU among younger populations in the Eurozone and this may be representative of a larger growth in support for the EU than my hypotheses give young voters credit for. I believe that this is made evident by the fact that even though unemployment has increased in many EU states, there has not been a similar increase in eurosceptic votes among youth populations. This generally

³⁸ The Economist, "The Eurosceptic Union."

³⁹ European Parliament, "Previous Elections."

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

undermines my second hypothesis: that increasing unemployment among under-25s would result in higher turnout among youth voters for eurosceptic parties. Rather, it appears that youth have continued to vote for parties more in favor of further European integration. Of course, more research will be necessary to prove this hypothesis on its own and to see how it fares in future EP elections.

One of the limitations in this entire study has been the lack of wide-ranging survey data available for youth voting populations. Although EP election turnout has historically been low, it appears to be especially so among young voters as evidenced by the EES data. I know of no other accessible data source with the type and range of information that EES has made available to the public, but even more thorough state-by-state post-electoral survey data for young voters would be useful for future analyses of youth voters' voting habits. Better data may be available through the Eurobarometer survey, but this data also has its limitations – it surveys more people than the EES, but also poses the problems of age representation, political ideology, and the like when selecting participants. Based on EES survey results, it does not appear as if the rise of eurosceptic parties will be one fueled by the youngest voters, but as voters age there is a definite possibility that they will move further toward eurosceptic parties and their candidates for MEP seats. One will have to wait and see whether this is the case.

Conclusion

Within the limitations imposed the data I had access to, my assessment of EES electoral data has shed light on a surprisingly under studied aspect of EU democracy: the role of youth voters in putting eurosceptic parties and politicians into power in the EP. Although a plethora of research and information exists about the meteoric rise of eurosceptic parties and politicians in the EP, I think it is noteworthy that young peoples' role in this rise has not been studied in greater depth to this point in time. Particularly in the post-Soviet era, when all of the young voters today have grown up in the radically different post-Soviet paradigm than previous generations of Europeans, it is important to understand why young voters may have misgivings about a united Europe. Part of this may be due to the fact that today's youth never grew up in that Soviet paradigm their parents and grandparents remember so well, but going even further back is the matter of the World Wars that tore Europe apart. Clearly, the older cohorts are more attuned to the destruction that World War II wrought in Europe, either through familial memory or personal experience. The

effects of globalization have almost certainly had a reciprocal impact among youth voters: they are far more interconnected with their European neighbors than their parents or grandparents ever were through the internet and mobile telecommunications. This would be a good departure point for future researchers.

The need to understand youth voting habits may not be as important to academic researchers as I make it out to be in the case of EU voters, but the way in which parties connect with young voters can have an effect on how those voters continue to engage in political expression throughout their lifetimes. If more radical or nontraditional parties develop a surefire way to appeal to younger voters, they may ultimately gain enough seats in the EP to craft and pass legislation that would affect the EU's 500 million or so inhabitants: engaging voters at a young age and keeping them devoted to a party is an effective means for maintaining support and growing it among new, younger cohorts for each subsequent electoral cycle. If the parties cannot get that far, then at least they may turn into a powerful force to be reckoned with in the future. Overall, there is room for deeper studies of youth voting behavior in Europe, and particularly in today's context of having lived through the economic crises of the late 2000s and early 2010s. If the influences of these factors on youth voters are as relevant as I believe they are, then there may be very interesting years ahead for the EU as political and economic project. Researchers and European policymakers would both do well to watch the voting trends amongst young voters: the trickling increase in support for eurosceptics does pose the potential for an ever-larger increase in youth support for these parties and politicians, and if such an outpouring for support does occur then it should come as no surprise. Young voters today have learned some of the harder lessons of a united Europe and may not look forward to sticking together with neighbors and allies that they see as dragging them down economically, culturally or politically.

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Appendix A

Table A-1:

Euroseptic parties in the 2014 European Parliament Adapted from: <i>Treib, Oliver, "The voter says no, but nobody listens: causes and consequences of the Euroseptic vote in the 2014 European elections," Journal of European Public Policy, 21:10. 2014.</i> DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2014.941534			
Country	PARTY NAME	ORIENTATION (LEFT/RIGHT)	SCEPTICISM: HARD/SOFT
CZ	Communist Party	L	S
	Party of Free Citizens	R	H
	Civic Democratic Party	R	S
ES	United Left	L	S
	Podemos	L	S
FR	Left Front	L	S
	National Front	R	H
IT	The Other Europe	L	S
	Five Star Movement	Center	S
	Lega Nord	R	H
PL	Law and Justice	R	S
	Congress of New Right	R	H
	Right Wing of the Republic	R	H
PT	Democratic Unitarian Coalition	L	S
	Left Bloc	L	S
SE	Left Party	L	S
	Sweden Democrats	R	H
	Greens	L	S
UK	Sinn Fein	L	S
	UKIP	R	H
	Conservatives	R	S
	Democratic Unionist Party	R	S
* Based off of Treib (2014), see citation in paper draft*			
EES Data unavailable until late 2015; may be updated at such time that information is accessible			

Table A-2:
Youth Quarterly Unemployment - 1993 Q3 through 2014 Q2

Last update 05.03.15

Extracted on 07.03.15

Source of data Eurostat


S_ADJ Seasonally adjusted data

AGE Less than 25 years

SEX Total

GEO/TIME	1993Q3	1993Q4	1994Q1	1994Q2	1998Q3	1998Q4	1999Q1	1999Q2	2003Q3	2003Q4
CZ	8.4	8.1	8.4	8.8	13.2	14.7	16.4	16.7	17.8	19.0
ES	42.0	42.5	43.2	42.8	31.9	30.5	28.4	27.0	22.7	22.7
FR	33.9	35.2	36.0	35.8	37.7	38.1	38.6	38.3	18.8	20.0
IT	28.3	29.7	28.8	29.0	29.2	30.4	29.9	29.0	23.3	22.2
PL	:	:	:	:	22.7	24.3	26.8	29.1	42.4	41.3
PT	15.3	15.7	16.4	17.0	13.9	13.5	13.3	13.5	18.7	19.6
SE	24.1	24.1	23.6	22.2	16.0	14.3	13.4	12.5	17.4	19.0
UK	17.4	17.3	16.7	16.6	13.1	13.3	13.0	13.0	12.2	11.7
GEO/TIME	2004Q1	2004Q2	2008Q3	2008Q4	2009Q1	2009Q2	2013Q3	2013Q4	2014Q1	2014Q2
CZ	19.8	20.4	9.7	10.1	13.1	15.6	19.0	19.0	16.8	16.3
ES	22.2	22.4	25.2	29.4	34.4	37.2	55.7	54.9	54.2	53.1
FR	20.2	20.3	19.2	20.5	22.9	23.9	24.7	23.6	23.8	23.6
IT	23.2	24.4	21.8	22.3	24.1	24.6	40.7	42.2	43.2	42.6
PL	41.5	40.4	16.3	17.2	18.2	19.7	27.2	27.2	25.7	24.2
PT	19.3	19.3	21.7	22.8	24.2	25.2	37.8	35.7	35.8	36.0
SE	20.1	20.5	20.1	20.9	22.4	24.9	23.3	22.7	23.4	23.3
UK	11.7	11.8	15.4	16.4	17.9	19.2	21.0	19.7	18.8	16.8

Figure A-3



Appendix B

Czech Republic

Figure B-1 2.1:

CZECH REPUBLIC – EUROSEPTIC VOTE (EV)										
AGE GROUP	1994		1999		2004		2009		2014	
	n	% EV	n	% EV	n	% EV	n	% EV	n	% EV
18-24	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	15	3.59%	11	2.16%	6	1.57%
25-34	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	43	10.29%	29	5.69%	8	2.09%
35-44	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	42	10.05%	44	8.63%	14	3.66%
45-54	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	51	12.20%	35	6.86%	15	3.93%
55-64	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	59	14.11%	42	8.24%	16	4.19%
65+	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	50	11.96%	60	11.76%	17	4.45%
Euroseptic Vote	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	260	62.20%	221	43.33%	76	19.90%
Voting Respondents	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	418	100.00%	510	100.00%	382	100.00%
Respondents & Estimated Turnout	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	889	47.02%	1002	50.90%	1208	31.62%

Figure B-1.1.1:





Figure B-1.2:



Spain

Figure B-2:

SPAIN – EUROSCeptIC VOTE (EV)										
AGE GROUP	1994		1999		2004		2009		2014	
	n	% EV	n	% EV	n	% EV	n	% EV	n	% EV
18-24	3	0.23%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	12	1.95%
25-34	6	0.45%	1	0.17%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	20	3.25%
35-44	3	0.23%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	24	3.90%
45-54	3	0.23%	1	0.17%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	20	3.25%
55-64	0	0.00%	2	0.34%	0	0.00%	1	0.14%	16	2.60%
65+	2	0.15%	1	0.17%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	10	1.62%
Euroceptic Vote	17	1.29%	5	0.85%	0	0.00%	1	0.14%	102	16.56%
Voting Respondents	1320	100.00%	585	100.00%	745	100.00%	693	100.00%	616	100.00%
Respondents & Estimated Turnout	1972	66.94%	1000	58.50%	1208	61.67%	1000	69.30%	1097	56.15%

Figure B-2.1:





Figure B-2.2:



France

Table B-3:

FRANCE – EUROSCeptic VOTE (EV)										
AGE GROUP	1994		1999		2004		2009		2014	
	n	% EV	n	% EV	n	% EV	n	% EV	n	% EV
18-24	10	0.84%	4	0.96%	5	0.59%	5	0.75%	6	1.10%
25-34	13	1.09%	12	2.88%	11	1.30%	5	0.75%	10	1.84%
35-44	21	1.76%	10	2.40%	14	1.66%	4	0.60%	16	2.94%
45-54	11	0.92%	13	3.13%	17	2.01%	7	1.05%	15	2.76%
55-64	8	0.67%	12	2.88%	11	1.30%	8	1.20%	26	4.78%
65+	15	1.26%	14	3.37%	23	2.73%	0	0.00%	21	3.86%
Euroscaptic Vote	78	6.55%	65	15.63%	81	9.60%	29	4.35%	94	17.28%
Voting Respondents	1191	100.00%	416	100.00%	844	100.00%	666	100.00%	544	100.00%
Respondents & Estimated Turnout	1995	59.70%	1020	40.78%	1406	60.03%	1000	66.60%	1137	47.85%

Figure B-3.1:





Figure B-3.2:



Italy

Table B-4:

ITALY – EUROSCeptic VOTE (EV)										
AGE GROUP	1994		1999		2004		2009		2014	
	<i>n</i>	% EV	<i>n</i>	% EV	<i>n</i>	% EV	<i>n</i>	% EV	<i>n</i>	% EV
18-24	42	2.21%	93	3.27%	13	0.91%	10	1.15%	16	1.97%
25-34	49	2.58%	132	4.65%	21	1.48%	7	0.81%	32	3.93%
35-44	34	1.79%	154	5.42%	60	4.22%	18	2.07%	42	5.16%
45-54	48	2.52%	134	4.72%	65	4.57%	16	1.84%	39	4.79%
55-64	26	1.37%	75	2.64%	72	5.06%	13	1.50%	21	2.58%
65+	36	1.89%	17	0.60%	53	3.73%	15	1.73%	17	2.09%
Euroscptic Vote	235	12.36%	605	21.30%	284	19.97%	79	9.10%	167	20.52%
Voting Respondents	1902	100.00%	2840	100.00%	1422	100.00%	868	100.00%	814	100.00%
Respondents & Estimated Turnout	2078	91.53%	9708	29.25%	1553	91.56%	1000	86.80%	1186	68.63%

Figure B-4.1:





Figure B-4.2:



Poland

Table B-5:

POLAND – EUROSCPTIC VOTE (EV)										
AGE GROUP	1994		1999		2004		2009		2014	
	n	% EV	n	% EV	n	% EV	n	% EV	n	% EV
18-24	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	8	2.45%	5	1.09%	16	3.51%
25-34	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	11	3.37%	8	1.74%	16	3.51%
35-44	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	9	2.76%	14	3.05%	18	3.95%
45-54	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	25	7.67%	14	3.05%	28	6.14%
55-64	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	19	5.83%	31	6.75%	47	10.31%
65+	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	32	9.82%	29	6.32%	38	8.33%
Euroscptic Vote	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	104	31.90%	101	22.00%	163	35.75%
Voting Respondents	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	326	100.00%	459	100.00%	456	100.00%
Respondents & Estimated Turnout	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	960	33.96%	1002	45.81%	1299	35.10%

Figure B-5.1:





Figure B-5.2:



Portugal

Table B-6:

PORTUGAL – EUROSCeptic VOTE (EV)										
	1994		1999		2004		2009		2014	
AGE GROUP	<i>n</i>	% EV	<i>n</i>	% EV	<i>n</i>	% EV	<i>n</i>	% EV	<i>n</i>	% EV
18-24	0	0.00%	3	1.46%	10	1.54%	9	1.34%	2	0.37%
25-34	0	0.00%	5	2.44%	7	1.08%	21	3.13%	6	1.12%
35-44	0	0.00%	6	2.93%	19	2.92%	23	3.42%	20	3.74%
45-54	0	0.00%	7	3.41%	20	3.07%	17	2.53%	18	3.36%
55-64	0	0.00%	3	1.46%	9	1.38%	17	2.53%	21	3.93%
65+	0	0.00%	6	2.93%	7	1.08%	19	2.83%	28	5.23%
Euroseptic Vote	0	0.00%	30	14.63%	72	11.06%	106	15.77%	95	17.76%
Voting Respondents	1503	100.00%	205	100.00%	651	100.00%	672	100.00%	535	100.00%
Respondents & Estimated Turnout	1977	76.02%	500	41.00%	1000	65.10%	1000	67.20%	1132	47.26%

Figure B-6.1:





Figure B-6.2:



Sweden

Table B-7:

SWEDEN – EUROSCEPTIC VOTE (EV)										
AGE GROUP	1994		1999		2004		2009		2014	
	n	% EV	n	% EV	n	% EV	n	% EV	n	% EV
18-24	0	0.00%	6	2.45%	14	1.51%	11	1.33%	8	0.83%
25-34	0	0.00%	3	1.22%	27	2.91%	37	4.48%	49	5.10%
35-44	0	0.00%	4	1.63%	29	3.13%	32	3.88%	59	6.15%
45-54	0	0.00%	13	5.31%	52	5.61%	29	3.52%	49	5.10%
55-64	0	0.00%	5	2.04%	53	5.72%	31	3.76%	63	6.56%
65+	0	0.00%	5	2.04%	44	4.75%	28	3.39%	84	8.75%
Eurosceptic Vote	0	0.00%	36	14.69%	219	23.62%	168	20.36%	312	32.50%
Voting Respondents	0	0.00%	245	100.00%	927	100.00%	825	100.00%	960	100.00%
Respondents & Estimated Turnout	0	0.00%	505	48.51%	2100	44.14%	1002	82.34%	1142	84.06%

Figure B-7.1:





Figure B-7.2:



United Kingdom

Table B-8:

UNITED KINGDOM – EUROSCeptIC VOTE (EV)										
AGE GROUP	1994		1999		2004		2009		2014	
	<i>n</i>	% EV	<i>n</i>	% EV	<i>n</i>	% EV	<i>n</i>	% EV	<i>n</i>	% EV
18-24	10	1.11%	7	2.19%	18	2.00%	11	1.85%	8	1.14%
25-34	23	2.56%	13	4.08%	32	3.55%	28	4.71%	26	3.70%
35-44	32	3.57%	30	9.40%	61	6.77%	48	8.08%	31	4.42%
45-54	37	4.12%	26	8.15%	70	7.77%	46	7.74%	42	5.98%
55-64	36	4.01%	30	9.40%	73	8.10%	61	10.27%	55	7.83%
65+	88	9.81%	41	12.85%	109	12.10%	77	12.96%	144	20.51%
Euroseptic Vote	226	25.20%	147	46.08%	363	40.29%	271	45.62%	306	43.59%
Voting Respondents	897	100.00%	319	100.00%	901	100.00%	594	100.00%	702	100.00%
Respondents & Estimated Turnout	2096	42.80%	956	33.37%	1498	60.15%	1000	59.40%	1369	51.28%

Figure B-8.1:




Figure B-8.2:

