DRIVERS OF MIGRATION

Nicholas Van Hear, Oliver Bakewell and Katy Long
(University of Oxford)

Migrating out of Poverty
Research Programme Consortium
Working Paper 1
March 2012

Migrating out of Poverty
University of Sussex, Arts B
Brighton BN1 9QN, United Kingdom
Email: migrationrpc@sussex.ac.uk
Web: http://migratingoutofpoverty.org
Twitter: @MigrationRPC
Facebook: /migratingoutofpoverty
Blogger: migratingoutofpoverty.blogspot.co.uk

This is an output from a project funded by UK aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government's official policies.

© 2012 University of Sussex, School of Global Studies. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

Table of contents

Executive Summary....4

Drivers of migration....7

1. Approaches to the drivers of migration....7

2. Identifying drivers....8

3. Drivers of migration in South-East Asia: Indonesian domestic workers in Singapore and Malaysia 12

3.1 Predisposing and proximate factors: globalisation and regional economic disparities....12

Table 1: Economic Indicators for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore....13

Table 2: Number of Indonesian Migrant Workers Abroad, 1969 to 1994....14

3.2 Mediating factors: state policies and the emergence of a domestic worker recruitment industry....14

3.3 Conclusion: identifying drivers....16

4. Migration from Bangladesh to the Gulf....16

4.1 Predisposing factors: income disparities, demography, environment....17

4.2 Proximate factors: livelihoods, culture....17

4.3 Precipitating factors: economic shocks, family disputes, networks....18

4.4 Mediating factors: recruitment agents, cost of migration, policy regimes....19

4.5 Conclusion: identifying drivers....20

5. Refining the framework....21

5. 1 Differentiating drivers: dimensions of drivers....21

5.1.1 Locality....21

5.1.2 Scale....21

5.1.3 Timeframe/duration....22

5.1.4 Depth or tractability....22

6. Understanding driver complexes 22

6.1 The Afghan-Iran/Pakistan corridor 23
6.1.1 Driver complex one: outward migration and the political economy of conflict 23
6.1.2 Driver complex two: the political economy of opportunity 24
6.1.3 Driver complex three: shaping the journey and the Afghan presence abroad 26
7. The Somalia-southern Africa corridor 29
7.1 Driver complex one: the political economy of conflict and insecurity 29
7.2 Driver complex two: shaping the journey 30
7.3 Driver complex three: the political economy of opportunity 32
8. Conclusion 34
Acknowledgements 36
About the authors 36
References 37
About the Migrating out of Poverty Research Programme Consortium 43

Executive Summary

Over the last two decades a consensus has been reached that there are forces which lead to the inception of migration and to the perpetuation of movement. Taken together, these can be understood as the 'drivers' of migration. 'Drivers' are then the factors which get migration going and keep it going once begun. This paper attempts to identify key drivers of migration and explores different ways in which they may be configured.

Explanations of the inception and perpetuation of migration have focused on disparities in conditions between different places. Poverty was at first held to be a key driver of migration. However, since the early 1990s it has been recognised that the poorest often cannot migrate since resources are needed to do so, especially for international migration. This has led to much debate about the relationship between migration and development, in particular whether development can reduce the pressures that drive migration or in fact can stimulate more migration by giving people the resources to move.

The paper explores the relationship between determinants of migration which are often deeply embedded in the economic, social, political, cultural and environmental context, and more immediate factors. It suggests that it may be useful to distinguish between predisposing, proximate, precipitating and mediating factors.

Predisposing factors contribute to the creation of a context in which migration is more likely. Examples include structural disparities between places of migrant origin and destination shaped by the macro-political economy. Such predisposing factors are outcomes of broad processes such as globalisation, environmental change, urbanisation and demographic transformation.

Proximate factors have a more direct bearing on migration and derive from the working out of the predisposing or structural features. In countries and regions of origin, they could include a downturn in the economic or business cycle, a turn for the worse in the security or human rights environments, or marked environmental degeneration, including the effects of climate change. In places of destination, proximate factors might include opportunities that open up as a result of economic upturn.

Precipitating factors are those that actually trigger departure. They may be found in the economic sphere, including financial collapse, a leap in unemployment, or the disintegration of health, education or other welfare services. Or they may be located in the political or security sphere, and include persecution, disputed citizenship, or outbreak of war. 'Natural' or environmental disasters can also be precipitating factors. This is the arena in which individual and household decisions to move or stay put are made.

Mediating factors enable, facilitate, constrain, accelerate, diminish or consolidate migration. Facilitating factors include the presence and quality of transport, communications, information and the resources needed for the journey and transit period. Constraining factors include the absence of such infrastructure and the lack of information and resources needed to move.

Combinations of these predisposing, proximate, precipitating and mediating 'drivers' shape the conditions, circumstances or environment within which people make choices whether to move or stay put, or have such decisions thrust upon them.

This framework is applied to two migration orders as indicative cases: within South-East Asia (the migration of Indonesian domestic workers in Singapore and Malaysia) and between South Asia and the Middle East (migration from Bangladesh to the Gulf).

The paper then turns to other dimensions of drivers that need consideration:

Locality: Some drivers might be associated more strongly with the area of origin, such as demographic or environmental pressures. Others may be centred around the area of destination, such as immigration policies. Still others may help to shape the journey, such as geographical proximity. Drivers may also operate across these locations, transnationally or translocally.

Scale: Drivers operate at different geographical scales, from the local, national and regional to the global and at different social scales, from the individual, household or family to the community and wider society.

Duration or timeframe: Drivers may operate over different timescales – from acute, sudden onset upheavals to chronically unfolding conditions.

Depth or tractability: Some drivers operate on the surface of society, and may be liable to change readily with contextual shifts, while others are more deeply embedded and intractable.

Drivers do not work in isolation to initiate movement or to shape it once under way. Instead, migration drivers work in combination – in what can be termed driver complexes – to shape the specific form and structure of population movements. In any one migration flow, several different 'driver complexes' may themselves interconnect in shaping the eventual direction and nature of a group's movement.

To illustrate this the paper considers two migration corridors involving combinations of drivers – that connecting Afghanistan with Iran and Pakistan and that connecting the Somali regions to southern Africa – to identify in schematic fashion three sets of driver complexes operating at the place of origin, on the journey and in the destination area. The analysis indicates that, like individual drivers, such driver complexes may interact with one another and also shift in significance over time.

The challenge is to establish whether and in what circumstances some drivers are more important than others, and which combinations of drivers are more potent than others. This will lay the groundwork for exploration of the possibility that some drivers are amenable to policy interventions. Proximate and mediating drivers rather than the structural and

precipitating spheres appear to have greater potential for policy intervention to reduce poverty and optimise development.

Drivers of migration

Over the last two decades a consensus has been reached that there are forces which lead to the *inception* of migration and to the *perpetuation* of movement (Massey *et al*. 1998). Taken together, these can be understood as the 'drivers' of migration. 'Drivers' are then the factors which get migration going and keep it going once begun. This paper attempts to identify key drivers of migration and explores different ways in which they may be configured. It points to ways to assess their different significance or weight, and to investigate their relationship with development and poverty reduction. The paper gives an indication of the extent of the existing evidence, draws attention to research that needs to be done in this area, and points to the future shape of Research Programme Consortium (RPC) research on the drivers theme.

1. Approaches to the drivers of migration

Explanations of the inception and perpetuation of migration have focussed on disparities in conditions between different places driving movement. So-called 'push-pull' models in some of the classical literature suggested that migrants were pushed by low incomes in their countries or regions and pulled by better prospects in more affluent areas: sometimes conceptualised as equilibrium models, and initially focussed on internal migration, these approaches held that migration would result in these disparities eventually balancing out (Lee 1966; Harris and Todaro 1970). Critics of this neo-classical approach argued that long-standing inequities deriving from centuries of exploitation of poor countries by rich ones drove migration, which was perpetuated by the structures of labour markets in richer countries (Castles and Kosack 1973; Sassen 1988). Other explanations have been sought at the micro or meso level, in household decision-making and in social networks. Some have seen migration as a household strategy motivated by the need to spread risk, rather than an individual matter (Stark 1991). Others have underlined the importance of chains, networks and culture in keeping migration going once established by pioneers (Boyd 1989).

Poverty was at first held to be a key driver of migration. However, since the early 1990s it has been recognised that the poorest often cannot migrate since resources are needed to do so, especially for international migration (Tapinos 1990). It is therefore typically not the 'poorest of the poor' who migrate (UNDP 2009). While there may be a strong relationship between migration, poverty and its alleviation, poverty in itself may not be a driver of migration (Van Hear and Sorensen 2003). Acknowledgement of this has led to much debate about the relationship between migration and development, in particular whether development can reduce the pressures that drive migration or in fact can stimulate more migration by giving people the resources to move (for reviews of the debate on migration and development, see Spaan *et al*. 2005; Skeldon 2008; Faist 2008; de Haas 2010).

Some of these debates have been reflected in the policy field, where there has long been concern to address the 'root causes' of migration. Essentially this has meant that initiatives aiming to reduce migration (especially from the 'global South' to the 'global North') by

addressing the factors held to drive migration, especially violent conflict, disparities in living standards, and poverty in countries migrants come from: promoting development, alleviating poverty and reducing conflict in origin countries are thus the means to these ends. This policy thrust developed in the 1980s in the context of forced migration but later came to be applied to economic migration as well (Castles and Van Hear 2011). For example, efforts were made from the later 1990s to integrate approaches to migration and asylum in European Union policy (Boswell 2003). These included measures to alleviate migration pressure through development and conflict prevention. Concern with root causes, determinants and drivers has fed into recent international policy discussions, in initiatives such as the Global Commission on Migration and Development (2003-5), the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (2006) and the ongoing Global Forum on Migration and Development.

What follows reflects this evolution of analytical and policy thinking on the causes, determinants or drivers of migration. It attempts to synthesise and re-cast this thinking in a form which aims to be helpful in shaping RPC research and its application to policy. In the next section we first look at ways in which drivers may be identified and set out a framework for understanding them. In the following section we apply the framework to two illustrative cases, drawing on work by RPC partners in Bangladesh and Singapore. We then refine the framework by looking at different dimensions of drivers of migration, and introduce the notion of driver complexes or configurations. We apply this refined framework to two migratory streams – those of Afghans and Somalis – that feature both 'forced' and 'voluntary' migration. Finally, we review the arguments and reflect on the possibilities and challenges of policy intervention into drivers of migration.

2. Identifying drivers

The Department for International Development (DfID) developed an approach to 'drivers of change' in the early 2000s (DfID 2003). It saw the approach as a way of 'understanding the political economy of poverty reduction in developing countries' (DfID 2003: 2). The approach involved directing attention 'to the structural and institutional factors likely to 'drive' change in the medium term, and to the underlying interests and incentives that affect the environment for reform'. DfID understood drivers of change to be 'the *interaction* between structural features, formal and informal institutions and individual agents' (2003: 3, emphasis in the original). Structural features included the history of state formation, natural and human resources, economic and social structures. Institutions included the rules structuring the behaviour of agents, both formal and informal. Agents were individuals and organisations pursuing particular interests. There were causal links among the three spheres.

In our view this approach broadly still holds good, and in what follows we apply a modified version of it to the migration field, which we suggest is applicable to both 'forced' and 'voluntary' migration, as well as to both internal and international migration.

Key questions include how, where and when drivers operate to shape migration. They may operate at different *scales* and *levels* of social structure, for example. Drivers may operate in different *location*s – at places of origin, transit and destination. They may influence migration over different *timeframes* – as Massey *et al*. (1998: 42) observe, 'the conditions that initiate international movement may be quite different from those that perpetuate it across time and space.' Accounts of the inception and perpetuation of migration need to account for these different dimensions.

As a starting point, we explore the relationship between determinants of migration, which are often deeply embedded in the economic, social, political, cultural and environmental context, and more immediate factors. There has been a longstanding debate on such dynamics. Drawing on the work of Giddens, Richmond (1994) suggested that there were factors constraining and enabling migration of proactive and reactive kinds. He identified what he called predisposing factors, structural constraints, precipitating events and enabling circumstances. In a modification of this approach, Van Hear (1998) suggested that predisposing, proximate, precipitating and intervening factors shaped what he called migration orders.

We take these ideas as a point of departure for developing our conceptual framework. However, we seek to refine this categorisation of factors by noting that one factor may recur in more than one arena. Rather than ascribe particular factors to a category, we see them as having a range of *functions* in migration processes:

Predisposing factors contribute to the creation of a context in which migration is more likely. Examples include structural disparities between places of migrant origin and destination shaped by the macro-political economy. Such predisposing factors may be outcomes of broad processes such as globalisation, environmental change, urbanisation and demographic transformation. Economic disparities between territories sending and receiving migrants include differences in earnings, livelihoods and living standards shaped by the unfolding of the global political economy and its inequities. What might be called political disparities include the relative prevalence of conflict, persecution and other dimensions of human rights and human security, associated with trends of nation building, disintegration and reconstitution in regions of migrants' origin. Environmental disparities between sending and receiving territories include the presence or absence of resources, the relative fertility of the soil, water availability and the extent of forest cover. Geographical factors – not least proximity to borders and/or to a desired destination – also play in here. Some of these components are quantifiable, such as differentials in income per capita, in per capita expenditure on health and education, in the number of health workers per capita, the relative level of school enrolments and so on. The economic, political and environmental arenas might be grouped under the rubric human security, disparities in which predispose people to migrate.

Proximate factors have a more direct bearing on migration and derive from the working out of the structural features outlined above. In countries and regions of origin, they include manifestations such as a downturn in the economic or business cycle, a turn for the worse in

the security or human rights environments generated by repression or a power struggle, large scale development projects that involve displacement, or marked environmental degeneration, including the effects of climate change. In places of destination, proximate factors might include opportunities that open up as a result of economic upturn or wider societal improvement, such as new employment opportunities, the chance to set up a business or to pursue trade, or taking advantage of new educational openings. There is obviously overlap with some of the elements of the structural domain. Again, some of these features are to some extent quantifiable – the economic arena probably more so than the others. This domain includes particular manifestations of the economic, political and environmental disparities – or collectively, of human security – identified above as predisposing factors.

Precipitating factors are those that actually trigger departure. This may be the arena in which individual and household decisions to move or stay put are made. The precipitating factors may be in the economic sphere, such as financial collapse, a leap in unemployment, a factory closure, a collapse of farm prices, the imposition of punitive taxation, or the disintegration of health, education or other welfare services. Or they may be located in the political/security sphere, and include persecution, disputed citizenship, the escalation of conflict, massacre, outbreak of war, or invasion. Both arenas are again in some sense dimensions of human security, broadly conceived. 'Natural' or environmental disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes or flooding also precipitate the movements of population. Again, there is a strong relationship with proximate factors, but unlike the previous two domains, precipitating factors are often not so much measurable as observable, identifiable events or developments. While they usually occur in places of origin they may come about in places of destination too.

Mediating factors enable, facilitate, constrain, accelerate or consolidate migration, and arguably they may diminish migration too. Facilitating factors include the presence and quality of transport, communications, information and the resources needed for the journey and transit period. Constraining factors include the absence of such infrastructure and the lack of information and resources needed to move. The 'migration regime', which embraces the efforts of national and international organisations to manage migration, has a mediating function: the influence of the panoply of policies governing emigration, immigration and border crossing is subject to much debate. Policies and practices in other spheres – such as trade, education, agriculture, rural development, welfare and housing – are also likely to play a role here as factors enabling or constraining migration. Migrant networks encompassing source, transit and destination countries, and the burgeoning smuggling industry likewise feature here. A related factor is the 'culture of migration' that can arise among people and communities who become habituated to mobility. These components are again much less subject to measurement than some of the structural or proximate factors. In this domain of enablement and constraint, the volumes, forms and directions of migration are determined or shaped. If the decision to move is determined by precipitating factors, the decisions how and when to leave, which household members should go, and where to, are shaped by these mediating factors. They can be conceived as shaping the degree of risk encountered in the course of migration.

Combinations of these predisposing, proximate, precipitating and mediating 'drivers' shape the conditions, circumstances or environment within which people make choices whether to move or stay put, or have such decisions thrust upon them.

Broad agreement seems to exist that sets of such factors drive migration. However, debate continues over what functions they have in the schema outlined above. For example, the migration regime, trade policies and the development of a culture of migration could well be proximate and/or mediating factors. Moreover, the drivers prompting people to *leave* a place may not be the same as those which help bring about their *arrival* at another place. Further configurations of drivers may come into play in more complex migration trajectories – such as from A to B via C and D, and so on. A different set of drivers again may animate return migration. It is also not clear how drivers shape the *form* migration takes. For example, in terms of distance, what determines whether migration is from one rural area to another, from the countryside to the city, from a town to the country's capital, to a neighbouring country, or to another continent? Furthermore, how is the *kind* of migration determined – whether legal or illegal, labour, professional, student, refugee, family, marriage, and so on?

These and other particular manifestations of migration are partly shaped by the decisions and actions of the people and communities affected: how they exercise their *agency* to 'process social experience and to devise ways of coping with life, even under the most extreme forms of coercion' (Long 2001: 16). The extent to which they can exert agency will reflect both their individual and collective capabilities (Sen 1999) and the room for manoeuvre for exercising them in any particular encounter (Long 2001). Such capabilities are in turn shaped by people's social position in terms of gender, generation, class, ethnicity and other social cleavages. The influence of other actors and agents, such as national and local government officials, businesses, international agencies, civil society organisations and various kinds of brokers, also need to be worked into the analysis. Likewise, account needs to be taken of the internal dynamics of migration processes established by transnational social networks and the migration industry, which may stimulate further migration even in the absence of external drivers in areas of origin or destination.

The relationship between the agency of social actors and the structural conditions in which they operate is subject of longstanding debate (Bakewell 2010). While acknowledging the importance of taking account of the agency of the many actors involved to develop a comprehensive understanding of migration processes, we focus primarily on the realm of 'external' drivers rather than attempting to incorporate a full account of agency.

In the two following sections attempts are made to apply our preliminary framework to two migration orders – within South-East Asia and between South Asia and the Middle East – as indicative cases. These case studies reflect the regional expertise of the RPC partners. Although the cases detailed below describe regional, cross-border movements, rather than internal migration flows, this does not mean that the drivers model proposed is only applicable in

regional cases. The case studies are intended to illustrate the usefulness of the drivers framework in general, and so do not preclude the use of the framework in the analysis of internal migration.

3. Drivers of migration in South-East Asia: Indonesian domestic workers in Singapore and Malaysia[1]

Over the past two decades, a growing proportion of migrant women have been employed as domestic workers within countries in the Asia-Pacific region (see Huang and Yeoh 1996; Chin 1998; Chang and Ling 2000; Anggraeni 2006). The rising demand for such workers may be attributed to shifts in the occupational and class structures of highly industrialised economies, such as Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, that have seen a rapid expansion of middle-class and professional households in the light of advancing levels of education and affluence (Yeoh and Chang 2001; Young 2006). Along with sharp increases in female labour participation rates and a growing number of dual-income families, the demand for paid domestic work and other low-wage services has now expanded to form an integral component of these advanced economies.

Here the migration of Indonesian domestic workers into Singapore and Malaysia is explored, with specific reference to key migration drivers that propel and sustain the in-flow of these workers on a variety of levels. The case highlights the interconnected relationship between the global economy, state policy, business practices, and individual/family aspirations that facilitate and reinforce this migration process as an enduring feature of these economies. In addition, attention is paid to the ways that these processes and practices are shaped by particular forms of gender, class and ethnicity that inform the type of labour typically characterised by paid domestic work.

3.1 Predisposing and proximate factors: globalisation and regional economic disparities

The flow of Indonesian domestic workers into Singapore and Malaysia can be seen as a structural phenomenon driven by economic and demographic disparities within the region. Malaysia and Singapore are the top two destination areas in South-East Asia for Indonesian migrants, the majority of whom are women employed as domestic workers, nannies, and elderly care workers (IOM 2010b). Qualitative studies have shown that the main driving factors behind this type of migration are often economic (Ford 2001; Human Rights Watch 2005; Anggraeni 2006; IOM 2010b). Pay differentials provide a strong incentive for these women to migrate abroad in order to improve their livelihoods and social status.

As illustrated in Table 1, the proportion of Indonesia's GDP per capita in 2008 constituted only 27.4 and six per cent of the figure in Malaysia and Singapore respectively. High levels of

[1] This section is based on a briefing prepared by Grace H.Y. Baey of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. ARI is a core partner within the RPC.

unemployment and underemployment in Indonesia also make it difficult for individuals (and particularly women) to seek job opportunities locally.

Table 1: Economic Indicators for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore

Indicator	Year	Indonesia	Malaysia	Singapore
Population (millions)	2010	232.5	27.9	4.8
GDP per capita (USD)	2008	2,246	8,209	37,597
Unemployment rate (% of labour force)	2009	7.7	5.0	3.0
Female population with at least secondary education (% ages 25 and older)	2010	24.2	46.7	57.3
Human Poverty Index (HPI) rank	2007	69	25	14

Sources: Adapted and compiled from ILO (2010); *UNDP Human Development Report 2010*, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete.pdf; and the United Nations Statistics Division, available at http://data.un.org

Malaysia has experienced significant labour shortages in the low-wage sector since the late 1970s, owing to its state-led industrialisation programme – namely, the New Economic Policy (NEP) between 1971 and 1990, and the National Development Policy (NDP) between 1991 and 2000 – which sought to diversify the nation's economy through export promotion and the establishment of an educated workforce (Chin 2002; Kaur 2010). Likewise, economic restructuring in Singapore since the late 1970s has steadily attracted large numbers of migrant workers to predominantly low-skilled jobs in the construction, manufacturing, and waged domestic sectors increasingly shunned by locals (Wong 1997; Yeoh 2007).

In these destination areas, rapid industrialisation and an increase in women's participation in the workforce resulted in a steady rise in the number of dual-income families, which was accompanied by a strong demand for migrant domestic workers who served as paid substitutes for the social reproductive labour needed within these middle-class households (Huang and Yeoh 1996). In Singapore, for example, the current labour force participation rate among women aged 30-34 is 80.5 per cent (as of June 2008), which marks a substantial rise from the 1998 figure of 68.2 per cent (MOM 2009). It is estimated that Indonesian women constitute the majority (55 per cent) of the 196,000 migrant domestic workers in Singapore where one in every five households employs a live-in domestic worker (MOM 2010, cited in IOM 2010b: 54). This dependency is also apparent in Malaysia where a recent ban on new arrivals of Indonesian domestic workers (in June 2009) following a series of cases of abuse has triggered a domestic crisis where almost 35,000 households are said to be left without a helper (Beh 2011). In view of the acute dependency on migrant domestic labour in both Singapore and Malaysia, the consumption of waged domestic labour in middle-class households plays an integral role in enabling the sustained levels of economic growth characterised by these destination countries (Huang and Yeoh 1996; Chin 1998; Aguilar 2003).

In response to the demand for domestic labour, the Indonesian government has increasingly promoted overseas labour migration as a development strategy to address issues of poverty, domestic unemployment and underemployment, as well as to encourage foreign direct investment through remittances (see Table 2). According to the Bank of Indonesia (2008, cited in IOM 2010b), remittances to Indonesia reached approximately US$6.6 billion in 2008, which represents 0.7 per cent of its annual GDP. The majority of workers migrate with the intention of working abroad for a limited period of time in order to finance their children or siblings in school, or to save enough money for a house purchase or business venture (IOM 2010b). This pattern of migration stems from strict policies enforced by the Singapore and Malaysian governments which prohibit permanent settlement. An IOM (2010b) study has revealed, however, that it is not uncommon for migrants to be re-contracted overseas once their finances have been depleted, which feeds in turn into a self-perpetuating migration cycle.

Table 2: Number of Indonesian Migrant Workers Abroad, 1969 to 1994

State Development Programme	Period	Number of Migrants
1st Five-Year Development Plan[2]	1969 to 1974	5,624
2nd Five-Year Development Plan	1974 to 1979	17,042
3rd Five-Year Development Plan	1979 to 1984	96,410
4th Five-Year Development Plan	1984 to 1989	292,262
5th Five-Year Development Plan	1989 to 1994	652,272

Source: Department of Manpower, Directorate General of Overseas Labour (1994, cited in Sukamdi *et al.* 2001: 95)

3.2 Mediating factors: state policies and the emergence of a domestic worker recruitment industry

Since the 1980s, the Singapore and Malaysian governments have taken steps to regulate the labour market for migrant domestic workers in recognition of the growing need for paid domestic services within these countries (Wong 1996; Chin 2002). Policies have included measures ensuring stricter control of labour recruitment activities, and higher penalties imposed to deter illegal immigration and rogue employment practices. In Singapore, for example, the newly amended Employment Agency Act stipulates that agencies may be fined up to S$160,000 (US$124,550) together with up to four years of imprisonment for operating without a license (MOM 2011). Furthermore, employment agencies are required to refund 50 per cent of the agency fees paid for by domestic workers, in the event that their work contracts have been prematurely terminated by their employers within six months of commencement. At the same time, parameters have also been drawn up by the Indonesian government to enhance the protection and labour conditions of migrants working abroad.

[2] The 'Five Years Development Plan' (PELITA) is a short-term national development programme outlined by the Indonesian government based on certain aims, priorities, and targets.

The role of both sending and receiving states in regulating cross-border flows of migrant domestic workers between Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia has been crucial to the emergence of an extensive domestic worker recruitment industry within the region (Chin 2002; Low 2002; Yeoh 2004; Kaur 2007). As a result, labour recruitment for the domestic sector is almost entirely commercialised and managed by official recruitment agencies, along with a range of other intermediaries including private entrepreneurs (both licensed and unlicensed), labour contractors, and village brokers who deal in matters such as documentation procedures, transportation, training, and accommodation (Wong 1996; Kaur 2007). These networks have helped to reduce the costs and risks of migration for prospective workers through their various forms of assistance, although the multiple layers and fees involved make it easy for unauthorised migration to occur as well. Due to Indonesia's vast geographic span, weak economy, and limited access to education, trafficking and smuggling have remained a persistent problem particularly with respect to Malaysia (IOM 2010b).

Malaysia continues to receive the highest annual number of Indonesian domestic workers within the region due to its geographical proximity and ethnic and linguistic similarities (IOM 2010b). These connections allow easier communication between employers and Indonesian domestic workers, as well as facilitate the incorporation of these workers into the socio-cultural fabric of society such that they tend to remain 'hidden' from view. According to the Malaysian Home Affairs Ministry, approximately 230,000 of the 240,000 migrant domestic workers in Malaysia with recognised legal status are from Indonesia (cited in Orozco and Fedewa 2005: 8). It is also estimated that there are over 1.2 million undocumented workers in Malaysia, a significant proportion of whom are migrant domestic workers from Indonesia (Hernández-Coss *et al.* 2008). In the case of Singapore, Indonesian domestic workers are often a preferred option by employers due to their relatively low cost and perceived docility compared to their Filipino counterparts. It is a widely accepted 'norm' among employers that engaging the services of an Indonesian domestic worker implies that they are not legally obliged to provide any days off for the worker (Yeoh and Huang 1998). While Filipino domestic workers are entitled to a higher pay scale (roughly 30 per cent) and weekly day off, Indonesian workers are offered poorer terms of employment as they are generally perceived to be less skilled and less educated.

The aspirations of migrant domestic workers and their families that motivate the initial decision to migrate may be entirely different from what is expected of them at the workplace (Young 2006). While Indonesian women choose to migrate in hope of improving their economic situation, indebtedness and lack of education often make them vulnerable to exploitation and abuse (Huang and Yeoh 1996; Human Rights Watch 2005; Anggaeni 2006; HOME and TWC2 2010). Furthermore, the gendered and racialised nature of paid domestic work—exemplified through the unequal transfer of social reproductive labour to 'Third World' women in middle-class households (see Chin 1998; Pratt 1998; Chang and Ling 2000)—frequently translates into the systematic disempowerment of these women in terms of wages and working conditions. In Singapore, moreover, violence against Indonesian domestic workers appears to have increased

between 2005 and 2008 (Institute for Ecosoc Rights survey forthcoming 2010, cited in IOM 2010b).

3.3 Conclusion: identifying drivers

This case has identified the principal drivers of migration and shown how they operate on a variety of scales. On a macro-level, economic and demographic disparities stemming from the uneven processes of globalisation and demographic transition represent *predisposing* factors that underpin the sustained inflow of migrant domestic workers from Indonesia into Singapore and Malaysia. High levels of unemployment and underemployment in Indonesia are among the proximate factors that push many women to migrate into Singapore and Malaysia where higher wages are offered, and where growing demand for migrant domestic labour has become embedded in their labour markets. The encouragement of Indonesian out-migration to secure remittances and geographical proximity of migrant source and destination countries constitute other key proximate drivers inducing migration between the countries.

These migration flows are facilitated by state policies, in both sending and receiving countries, which play a *mediating* role in determining the proportion and type of migrant labour needed to meet specific labour demands within the market. At the same time, the regulatory and legal frameworks that are the manifestations of such policies reinforce the establishment of a regional domestic worker recruitment industry through which prospective workers are sourced, recruited, and trained. Cultural factors lubricate the migration and the industry associated with it. These practices occur within a web of power relations in which Indonesian women remain susceptible to the risks of deception, abuse, and exploitation at both ends of the migration chain. On an individual/family level, Indonesian women engage in labour migration often as part of family survival strategies and as a way of seeking upward mobility. However, the fact that paid domestic work in Singapore and Malaysia is overwhelmingly undertaken by young migrant women from economically less-developed countries like Indonesia implies that the factors driving this pattern of migration are not solely economic, but also deeply embedded within social hierarchies of gender, class, ethnicity, and age.

4. Migration from Bangladesh to the Gulf[3]

The number of officially recorded Bangladeshi international labour migrants increased from around 300,000 in 2005 to 900,000 in 2008. Between five and seven million Bangladeshis are currently thought to work abroad. Of these about two-fifths are thought to have worked in Gulf states between 1976 and 2009, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE accounting for most (Gamlen 2010). The majority of migrants are unskilled with relatively low levels of formal education, and tend to work in agriculture, construction and domestic services. A study commissioned by the International Labour Organization (ILO) suggests that 60 per cent of male Bangladeshi migrants move to Saudi Arabia, while some 40 per cent of Bangladeshi female

[3] This section is based on a briefing prepared by Jodi Rockman for RMMRU, Dhaka. RMMRU is a core partner within the RPC.

migrants travel to Kuwait (Plant 2008). The UAE is a third key destination for Bangladeshi Gulf migrants.

4.1 Predisposing factors: income disparities, demography, environment

The most significant driver of Bangladeshi migration to the Gulf states is economic inequality. There are stark differences between Bangladesh and Gulf countries in income levels, employment levels and standards of living. Bangladesh ranked 146 out of 182 countries on the Human Development Index and 112 out of 135 countries on the Human Poverty Index (UNDP 2009). Nearly 50 per cent of its population was said to subsist on less than US$1.25 per day and four-fifths on less than US$2 a day (UNDP 2009).

In contrast, the economies and living standards of the oil rich Gulf have grown rapidly over the past four decades. The great expansion of infrastructure projects following the 1973 'oil boom' led to a rapid increase in the demand for foreign labour, since GCC national workforces at that time were too small to meet demand (Winkler 2010: 10).

Bangladesh's demographic and environmental profiles also predispose Bangladeshis to migrate. Since independence, significant progress has been made in ameliorating Bangladesh population growth, which has fallen to 1.5 per cent per annum, half the 1971 level. The World Bank also calculates that poverty rates have fallen from 70 per cent in 1971 to 40 per cent in 2005. Nevertheless, Bangladesh remains one of the most densely populated states in the world, again contributing to difficulty in securing sustainable livelihoods for all its citizens, particularly those dependent on accessing land (World Bank 2007). Accelerated economic growth coupled with continued demographic overcrowding may predispose Bangladeshis to migrate. Much of the country lies within a densely peopled, flood-prone delta. River bank erosion, floods, cyclones, rising sea levels and drought have all been identified as factors driving Bangladeshis to move because of the difficulty of securing access to a sustainable livelihood under such conditions.

4.2 Proximate factors: livelihoods, culture

Bangladeshis who migrate to the Gulf do so to improve their standard of living, for income maximisation and accumulation of wealth for future investment in Bangladesh (Siddiqui 2001). For a large number of rural households remittances are a major source of earning to maintain subsistence, with empirical studies revealing that remittances constituted half of the total income of these rural households (Siddiqui and Abrar 2003). Bangladeshi migrants use remittances to pay off debts, or invest earnings in physical capital back home, including land and houses. They are also used to buy consumer items, such as televisions and mobile phones. Such assets partly serve as status symbols, accumulation of which plays into the marriage and dowry system. Migration by men from rural Bangladesh is driven by the prospects of upward economic and social mobility.

Environmental factors also create conditions making migration more likely and may interact with other drivers to create new patterns of migration. Siddiqui's study (2001) on female migrant workers from Bangladesh detailed a number of instances in which families from Manikgang and Nabangang lost agricultural land due to riverbank erosion, and as a result needed alternative means to maintain their livelihood. The availability of female employment contracts in the Gulf means that women migrate to provide their families with a much needed income, which could not be provided from the land. This is despite the cultural expectation that men should act as the main breadwinners. Climate change is likely to exacerbate existing environmental issues through the increasing frequency of sudden-onset events, such as hurricanes and floods, as well as slow onset processes, such as coastal erosion, sea-level rise, salt water intrusion and changing rainfall patterns (IOM 2010a).

Cultural expectations also play a proximate role in encouraging migration. Research by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (DRC 2009) demonstrates the importance of the husband's role as breadwinner in Bangladeshi villages, and that men's migration for work was often conceptualised as part of them fulfilling their obligation to provide for their families. Migration from Bangladesh to countries in the Gulf region in particular, also made more likely by the cultural and religious affinity between the areas. The population of Bangladesh is predominantly Muslim and so are those from Gulf countries. The opportunity to visit Mecca in Saudi Arabia is a factor which facilitates migration to the region. In Afsar's (2009: 26) study on migration from Bangladesh to the Gulf, many men attached religious value to going to Saudi Arabia and accepted jobs there as they considered the move a rare opportunity to visit the holy city. The ILO estimated that 15 per cent of Bangladeshi male migrants in Saudi Arabia had travelled using an Umra visa, which are offered free of charge to pilgrims completing Hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, and are relatively easy to obtain (Plant 2008).

4.3 Precipitating factors: economic shocks, family disputes, networks

Personal events are often those most likely to precipitate migration. Afsar (2009: 12) cites illness, death of a breadwinner, business losses and poor crop yield as factors contributing to a loss in income and subsequently to the increase in migration. Economic hardship, which has lead to debt and the consequent inability to break free from this debt, was cited by Afsar (2009) as a migration trigger. Her study of 60 Bangladeshi labour migrants living in the Gulf shows how respondents were being driven to migrate when they saw no other avenues to eradicate their debt.

Family and social issues experienced by Bangladeshis have been identified as factors instigating the decision to migrate to the Gulf, particularly for female workers. In Siddiqui's (2001) work on female migrants from Bangladesh, migration was often cited as offering a temporary escape from an unhappy marriage or domestic violence in a culture in which divorce is not an option. In addition, for unmarried and widowed women migration offered a means to avoid social stigma.

The Bangladeshi diaspora and returned migrants' 'success stories' are both major 'pull' factors and departure triggers. Existing networks in the Gulf act as a precipitating migration factor. Referring to statistics from the Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training database, Siddiqui (2001) points out that around two-thirds of recruitment is now conducted through individual initiatives and social networks. As Bangladeshis have a strong tradition of migration to Gulf countries, family members and friends in these destination countries provide social capital for future Bangladeshis to join their network. Afsar's (2009) study of labour migration to the Gulf found that an overwhelming majority of respondents – more than 90 per cent men and 80 per cent women – already had one or more relatives abroad.

4.4 Mediating factors: recruitment agents, cost of migration, policy regimes

In Bangladesh, private recruitment agencies, individual recruiters, sub-agents of registered recruitment agencies and travel agencies are important in encouraging and shaping the nature of migration flows. Middlemen are often engaged in a process of visiting households, persuading families to invest in the migration of female household members rather than marrying them off and paying large dowries (Siddiqui and Abrar 2002; Siddiqui 2001).

Most Bangladeshi recruitment agencies work with brokers in destination countries. At the same time, private recruitment agencies also work with local sub-agents, known locally as Dalals, who find and refer prospective migrants from villages and areas far from city centres (Afsar 2009). Concerns have been raised that many recruiting agencies exploit prospective migrants, charging high fees and failing to guarantee basic standards of employment (Plant 2008).

The different costs associated with migration to the Gulf also shape or mediate the nature of Bangladeshi labour migration. A recent IOM survey showed that 14 per cent of migrants decided to migrate to their current destination because it was too expensive to migrate to any other country (IOM 2009: 35). Other studies have suggested that for Bangladeshi migrants, UAE emerges on average as the most costly destination, followed by Kuwait. Gender also influences cost: the average cost of migration for men has been estimated to be around US$1,400-2000, but for women the cost was only around half this amount (Plant 2008; Afsar 2009).

Other studies have highlighted the fact that the high cost of migration in general, and limited options to finance short-term movement abroad, can act as a constraints for poor community members who desire to migrate to the Gulf states but are unable to cover the average costs to facilitate a move (Afsar, 2009). The pervasive practice of visa trading in destination countries and the inability of many aspirant migrants to directly procure recruitment agency services means that Bangladeshis accept a high level of risk and will move irregularly outside the formal migration framework in order to secure short-term overseas employment in the Gulf states.

Being able to mobilise resources to fund migration is therefore a key migration determinant. Access to loans and family members who can assist with funds and savings is key to migration

once the decision to move abroad has been made. In the Bangladesh Household Remittance Survey (IOM 2009), 67 per cent of respondents took a loan to cover partial or full costs of their migration. Money from family members was the next most common source (41 per cent), followed by selling of land (24 per cent), mortgaging of land (23 per cent) and selling of other assets (20 per cent). The most marginalised Bangladeshis are therefore unable to access migration channels because they do not hold sufficient financial capital.

The migration regime of both Bangladesh and those of Gulf countries shape and drive migration on various levels. In Bangladesh, the Ministry of Expatriate Welfare and Overseas Employment has been established to deal specifically with the protection challenges migrant workers face. In 2006 the Overseas Employment Policy was adopted, identifying principles for the protection of migrant workers abroad, and expressing a commitment to take legal action against illegal recruiters. In the same year the Bangladesh Agency for Manpower, Employment and Training and the main labour recruitment agency jointly agreed to enforce limits on recruitment fees. In these ways, the Bangladeshi state has sought to intervene in order to provide migrants with additional protection against exploitation (Plant 2008).

Migration policy has also shaped the gender profile of migrant flows from Bangladesh. In 2003, women were granted the right to migrate as independent workers, when the Government of Bangladesh changed its policy to allow women to migrate to the Gulf upon receiving training. Prior to the legislation reform, unskilled female migrants contributed to less than one per cent of all outgoing Bangladeshi labour migrants. By 2006, this figure had risen to almost six per cent (Siddiqui, personal communication 2011).

The various migration regimes of Gulf states have also shaped migration flows from Bangladesh. Female migrants tend to select Kuwait as their destination because its labour laws are seen as more favourable than those in other Gulf countries.

4.5 Conclusion: identifying drivers

In the case of movement from Bangladesh to the Gulf, socio-economic structural disparities and environmental stress have created a setting in which many Bangladeshis are predisposed to engage in short-term labour migration. Migration to the Gulf is made more likely by cultural expectations regarding livelihood provision, and the impact of environmental damage upon family livelihood strategies. The cultural and religious affinity between Bangladesh and the Gulf states is also an important factor which shapes the nature of Bangladeshi labour migration.

Precipitating factors which cause potential Bangladeshi migrants to actually depart for Gulf countries have several dimensions. Socially, access to networks both in Bangladesh and in Gulf countries plays an important role. Economic factors such as sudden financial shock commonly trigger migration. On an individual level, family disputes, deaths, violence or marital conflict can precipitate movement.

A number of factors mediate, or shape, migration from Bangladesh to the Gulf, among them mobilising resources to fund migration. Gulf states' interest in short-term temporary or circular labour migration shapes the nature of Bangladeshi movement to the region. The Bangladeshi state's restrictions – and recent liberalisation – regarding its out-migration policies (including restrictions on unskilled female out-migration) have also helped shape Bangladeshi migration, particularly in terms of encouraging an expansion in the numbers of regularised female Bangladeshi migrants to the Gulf.

5. Refining the framework

Having attempted application of our preliminary framework to two regional or inter-regional migration systems, we next attempt to refine our understanding of drivers by looking at some of their *dimensions* and the ways in which they may be configured in what we call *driver complexes*.

5. 1 Differentiating drivers: dimensions of drivers

We may think of a driver as arising from or being associated with a particular *domain* of the social world, such as culture, geography, politics, economy, history, environment or demography. However, this does not get us very far in our analysis: distinguishing between a historical, political or geographic driver does not tell us much about what the driver does or how it operates. We rather aim to tease out a number of dimensions which can be used to characterise drivers of migration and tell us something about how they work. As well as their *function* in the migration process as outlined above – predisposing, proximate, precipitating, or mediating – these dimensions include *locality*, *scale*, *duration* and *depth* or *tractability*.

5.1.1 Locality

Some drivers might be associated more strongly with the area of origin, such as demographic or environmental pressures. Others are more centred around the area of destination, such as immigration policies. Still others may help to shape the journey, such as geographical proximity. We also need to consider those drivers which operate transnationally or translocally, such as transnational labour markets, which might involve agents in the origin area recruiting to meet labour demands in destination countries.

5.1.2 Scale

Drivers operate at different *geographical* scales, from the local, national and regional to the global. A famine may force people to consider moving over a whole region; in contrast, the closing or opening of a large factory may change migration patterns from or to a particular town. Drivers may also operate at different *social* scales, from the individual, household or family to the community and wider society. Here, we may also need to explore the scale of drivers' coverage of a range of social groups. A driver may have a different impact on various social groups, defined by gender, generation, class, language, ethnicity, religion and so forth.

For example, the establishment of a new university may draw in new migrants over a wide area for education, but we would expect the migrants involved to be mainly young adults.

5.1.3 Timeframe/duration

Drivers operate over different time frames. For example, an acute political crisis may force people to leave their homes very quickly and take refuge elsewhere, as has been the case recently in Libya, or a chronic crisis such as that seen in recent years in Zimbabwe may result in an ongoing exodus of people over a long period. Is important to note that here we are concerned with the timeframe of the driver, not that of the migration. A short-term driver, such as violent conflict, may result in long-term or permanent migration and, likewise, a long-term driver may result in periodic movements back and forth rather than long-term migration.

5.1.4 Depth or tractability

Here we try to distinguish between drivers that operate on the surface of the society, which may be liable to change readily with contextual shifts, and those that are more deeply embedded and intractable. For example, if spending time away from one's community comes to be seen as an essential step on the way to adulthood – such as Mandela's claims of the South Africa labour migration system in the 1930s: 'in those days working in the mines was as much a rite of passage as circumcision school' (1994: 31) – the cultural driver for migration can be seen as deeply embedded. Some economic drivers may be less embedded and more responsive to changes in policies, such as visa requirements or employment restrictions, which make migration more expensive and less rewarding.

6. Understanding driver complexes

Having characterised drivers in terms of their *functions* and having explored some of the *dimensions* along which they operate, we now turn to ways in which drivers may combine to form different *complexes* or *configurations* which shape migration processes.

As we have indicated, particular migration drivers may predispose a population to move. However, they do not work in isolation to precipitate people's movement or to shape it once under way. Instead, migration drivers work in combination – in what can be termed *driver complexes* – to shape the specific form and structure of population movements. In any one migration flow, several different 'driver complexes' may themselves interconnect in shaping the eventual direction and nature of a group's movement.

In what follows we consider two migration corridors involving combinations of drivers – that connecting Afghanistan with Iran and Pakistan and that connecting the Somali regions to southern Africa -- to identify in schematic fashion three sets of driver complexes operating at the place of origin, on the journey and in the destination area. These two cases were selected because they have a rich and particularly complex history, connecting political insecurity, economic inequalities and cultural and social expectations. Both cases include 'forced' migrants as well as 'economic' migrants, and both movements have been subject to direct policy

interventions intended to influence the direction and duration of their movement. As a result, while neither the Afghan or Somali cases can be held to be 'typical' of migration flows, they were felt to be particularly useful contexts through which to illustrate the inter-connectedness of migration drivers.

6.1 The Afghan-Iran/Pakistan corridor[4]

6.1.1 Driver complex one: outward migration and the political economy of conflict

Afghan out-migration to Iran and Pakistan long predates the onset of civil war and the collapse of the Afghan state that followed the overthrow of the Afghan monarchy in 1973 (Monsutti 2006). If we are to understand the driver complexes propelling outward migration from contemporary Afghanistan, we must first recognise that as a result of four decades of political insecurity the Afghan migration complex has shifted from being one of fluid, continuous and multi-directional movement motivated above all by cultural and economic interdependency.

Since the 1970s, there have been at least three distinct waves of forced migration from Afghanistan towards Pakistan and Iran. The Afghan refugee population peaked in 1990 at 6.22 million, a number which represented around 40 per cent of the entire Afghan population. Despite huge repatriation efforts following the American-led invasion of Afghanistan and the removal of the Taliban from power in 2002, there remain around three million Afghan registered refugees, 2.14 million residing in Pakistan and 910 000 in Iran. These remaining refugees are long-term exiles, who have significant links with Iran and Pakistan. By the end of 2008, 77 per cent of Afghans in Pakistan had resided there for 30 years, while half the Afghan population in Iran had been resident there for 20 years (UNHCR 2008: 3). This development of a refugee diaspora is important to underline because, in conjunction with labour migration policy changes in Pakistan and particularly in Iran, the duration of the crisis in Afghanistan has changed the shape of Afghan migration, away from repeated and fluid transborder movement and towards permanent (and often irregular) settlement.

Since 2005, a political economy of crisis resulting from the retreat of the weak Afghan state and increased militarisation in regions such as Helmand and Kandahar has driven a new wave of displacement. However, militarisation of these areas has above all resulted in growing numbers of conflict-induced internally displaced persons (IDPs) and massive rural-to-urban flows towards Kabul. The International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that in March 2010 there were around 240,000 conflict-induced IDPs (including around 80,000 displaced prior to 2002) (IDMC 2010). In contrast, there has not been a mass refugee *influx* into Pakistan or Iran, where attention has instead focused on facilitating mass refugee *repatriation*.

The key to understanding contemporary Afghan out-migration to Iran and Pakistan lies in connecting this refugee repatriation to the continuing failure of the Afghan state to foster a functioning and secure society. This has resulted in new flows or *re*-migrations which are not

[4] This section was prepared by Katy Long of the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford.

primarily precipitated by the direct impact of conflict and militarisation, but by poor prospects for refugee reintegration. These are primarily perceived and acted upon in economic terms, although lack of access to sustainable livelihoods within Afghanistan is of course connected to the political weakness of the Afghan state and its inability to secure political or social space free from corruption and clientelism (UNODC 2010).

Afghan labour migration was viewed as an almost inevitable reaction to endemic state fragility and chronic economic underdevelopment resulting from decades of conflict and state militarisation. As UNHCR recognised in 2003, '...many of the reasons why Afghan [refugees] left their homes no longer apply... Economic factors have played an increasingly influential role in cross border movements and in sustaining the Afghan presence abroad' (UNHCR 2003: 3). These structural weaknesses were further exacerbated by rapid Afghan population growth. The rapid return of four million Afghan refugees from 2002 placed even greater pressure on Afghan's limited economic infrastructure. The deteriorating security situation from 2006 certainly exacerbated Afghan's critical lack of economic or political stability, intensified their physical insecurity (particularly in the south of the country), and prevented the successful 'early recovery' that had been anticipated after 2002. However, it is above all the political *economy* of Afghan *impoverishment* which – in combination with cultural and historical factors – is driving current migration flows out of Afghanistan towards Pakistan and Iraq.

The cultural and historical dimensions of the Afghan outmigration 'driver complex' relate both to Afghanistan's pre-crisis history and experiences of movement during the conflict. As highlighted, regional mobility and seasonal transnational migration patterns existed prior to the creation of an Afghan state, which imposed artificial and largely meaningless borders (Monsutti 2008). Livelihood strategies would often involve family dispersal, with male labourers travelling through the region in order to support a household within a settled Afghan community. These pre-existing labour networks and cultural familiarity with migration as an effective livelihood strategy have thus been co-opted into current outflows caused by the lack of a functioning Afghan economy and resulting human insecurity. Personal 'lived experience' of displacement in Pakistan and Iran also means that these areas and regions may often be viewed as at least as plausible a 'home' as Afghanistan for many returnees who were born in exile or left as children.

6.1.2 Driver complex two: the political economy of opportunity

As indicated above, contemporary migration outflows from Afghanistan towards Iran and Pakistan – at least at a broad macro-level – are not driven directly by physical insecurity (unlike IDP flight), but by the political economy of conflict and the failure of post-2002 reconstruction. They are facilitated by a cultural and historical legacy that encourages such out-migration responses to be viewed as an effective and readily accessible coping mechanism in light of the incapacity of the Afghan state to provide sustainable human security. Afghan migrants' reasons for *choosing* to move *towards* Iran and Pakistan are arguably easier to comprehend, and are closely tied to a political economy of opportunity.

The Afghan economy is far weaker and far less able to offer Afghan citizens access to sustainable livelihoods than the far more developed Iranian and (to a lesser extent) Pakistani economies. GDP (PPP) per head in the three countries reflects this economic disparity: Afghanistan's GDP (PPP) per head is US$934, in contrast to the Pakistani figure of US$2,683 and Iran with US$10,939 (World Bank 2010). Afghans migrate to Iran and Pakistan because their economies are larger and perceived to offer far greater opportunity to secure livelihoods, both for those actually migrating and their dependants who remain in Afghanistan. Both the Iranian and Pakistani economies are also structurally dependent on cheap migrant labour.[5]

Furthermore, the long exile of the Afghan diaspora has resulted in certain economic activities – such as taxi driving in Quetta – becoming the preserve of the Afghan migrant population. The specific contributions of some local skilled workers – notably Turkmen carpet weavers in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North West Frontier Province) – have also been recognised as making a valuable economic contribution to Pakistan. This has created particular spaces within the state's economy that are particularly dependent on Afghan labour, strengthening the political economy of opportunity offered to Afghans in Pakistan and Iran (AREU 2006).

Cultural ties, geographical proximity and socio-economic status also influence the choice of Iran and Pakistan as destination countries. Close cultural ties reflect economic interdependencies between the Pashtun communities that straddle the Afghan-Pakistan border. Similarly, the Tajiks (Persian-speaking Afghans in Herat Province) and the Hazara (a Shiite minority residing in central and northern Afghanistan) have particular ties to Iran. These ethnic and cultural ties are reflected in the profiles of the Afghan communities in Iran and Pakistan (ICG 2009).

The close proximity of both Quetta and Peshawar – key urban centres with large economies – to the Pakistan-Afghan borders, and the existence of roads linking these cities to the nearby Afghan cities of Kandahar and Kabul respectively provide an obvious explanation for the particular dynamics of these migration flows. This is true both in terms of earlier conflict-induced flight (when these routes offered the fastest pathway to physical security) and current movements in search of economic security (when ease of cross border-movement and the ability to make return visits to family remaining in Afghanistan are often an important dimension of migrants' strategic planning). Similarly, Afghans in Iran are concentrated in Mashhad and Zahedan, the two cities closest to the Afghan border, as well as in Tehran (Abbasi-Shavasi *et al*. 2005)

It is important to note, however, that this perception of a political economy of opportunity in Pakistan and Iran is relative to Afghans socio-economic status. There is a *global* Afghan diaspora, with significant resident populations in the US, Canada and the EU, often holding dual citizenship. This global diaspora reflects the economic stratification within the diaspora and the ability of the wealthiest migrants to travel out of the region and towards greater opportunities in other political settings (Van Hear 2006).

[5] This migration is not just from Afghanistan, but also involves considerable intra-state migration flows.

The populations that continue to travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan are not the poorest within Afghan society and have some access to capital. However they should be broadly categorised as labourers rather than middle-class or elite Afghans. It should be noted, however, that those elite Afghan families that spent time and often own property or hold business interests in Pakistan are also swayed by the lack of economic security within Afghanistan, and the economic opportunities available elsewhere.[6] These flows are not restricted to Iran and Pakistan: there are considerable numbers of elite Afghans resident in the UAE and other Gulf states as well as in North America and Europe (Jazayery 2002).

When exploring the driver complex propelling Afghan migration to Iran and Pakistan, it is important to underline that – in contrast with the driver complex drawing Somalis to southern Africa, considered below – neither Iran nor Pakistan offer the opportunity to practice a 'politics of freedom'. Iran is a restrictive theocracy which asserts a strong rule of law but understands this role as in direct opposition to liberal values. In Pakistan, endemic corruption coupled with the growing power of the Taliban and related Islamist forces – particularly in the north-west of the state where Afghan migrant flows are concentrated – mean that Afghan interests in accessing a political economy of opportunity should not be confused with either the ability to or an interest in securing liberal freedoms through migration.

Two million Pakistanis have now become internally displaced as a result of instability and continuing conflict in the north-west. This humanitarian disaster was exacerbated by the massive 2010 floods in the region (ICG 2010). There is some evidence that this has resulted in escalating hostility towards Afghan populations in the region, both because of increased competition for resources and the association of Afghans with the Taliban.[7] These changing political circumstances – economic deterioration and decreased cultural hospitality -- may result in the breakdown of the 'political economy of opportunity' perceived to exist in Pakistan by Afghan labourers, resulting in new driver complexes that shift these migration flows elsewhere.

6.1.3 Driver complex three: shaping the journey and the Afghan presence abroad

In the past ten years, Afghan movement from Afghanistan to Iran and Pakistan has broadly shifted away from forced refugee flight, responding instead to primarily economic insecurity. The nature of this journey has been shaped by a number of factors, including culture and geography. Above all, however, it is international and state-driven policy responses, aimed at both facilitating refugee return and regulating Afghan migration, that have made Afghan migrants' journeys to Iran and Pakistan into overwhelmingly irregular, clandestine and risky journeys.

---

[6] Another group of Afghans moving between Afghanistan and Pakistan are, of course, Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives engaged in military operations against the Afghan state and NATO forces. However, this group's reasons for movement are qualitatively different from those of Afghan labour migrants, and are therefore excluded from this analysis.

[7] UNHCR sources, June 2010.

The impact of culture and geography on routes into Iran and Pakistan are fairly straightforward. Kin networks and tribal links facilitate the development of informal migrant networks and smuggling routes, strengthened by the long history of people-smuggling over these borders during periods of refugee exodus. Similarly, the close geographical proximity of cities such as Kabul and Peshawar makes the planning of journeys to Pakistan relatively simple. The route between Kabul and the Pakistani Torkham border, as a result of a newly US-built road, now takes just three and a half hours and taxi drivers regularly cover the route. While border corruption and the risk of kidnapping or robbery on the route means that this journey can hardly be considered 'secure', it is relatively straightforward.

More problematic, however, is the insistence of both the Iranian and Pakistani governments on linking refugee repatriation with permanent removal of Afghan populations from their territory, marked by increasing restriction on Afghan access to labour markets, even by registered refugee populations. In both Iran and Pakistan, the governments have remained focused on the idea of return, insisting that 'displacement is reversible, and that all Afghans should/will return to Afghanistan' (UNHCR 2008: 17).

Some strategies pursued to encourage refugee return have acknowledged the connection between labour migration and repatriation – for example, in Iran's promotion of one labour-permit scheme whereby registered Afghans refugee could quality for a work and residence permit (renewable for up to three years) if they first took their families 'home' to Afghanistan (UNHCR 2008: 20).[8] Other Iranian programmes have offered work and residency permits in return for Afghan refugees' surrendering their Amayesh card (refugee identity document).

However, many observers see the Iranian government's actions as a covert means of increasing the rate of return. The US$70 cost of the Afghan refugees' work permit, and these permits' limited durations of just six months, mean that many former Afghan refugees have found themselves becoming part of an irregular and undocumented Afghan population in Iran *because* of the pressure to return permanently to Afghanistan. In 2007-8, 600,000 Afghans were deported from Iran, including many who had formerly held refugee status. A joint ILO-UNHCR study, however, indicated that the majority of these migrants would continue to make repeated irregular crossings, propelled by the economic insecurity in Afghanistan (ILO-UNHCR 2008)

In cold economic terms, the cost and restraints imposed on regularised migration mean that it is both cheaper and easier to risk repeated deportation rather than pay for permits. These state-imposed restrictions, however, on Afghans' legal and regularised access to Iranian labour markets, have had little impact on Afghan movements in terms of numbers because the underlying dynamics, or 'driver complexes', have not altered. Instead, Iran has only transformed Afghan labour migration from a regularised and open process, which involved temporary stays in Iran linked into historical transnational labour networks, into an irregular one that – because

[8] UNHCR (Afghanistan) email correspondence August 2009

of the risks involved in crossing the border – may actually result in longer or even permanent clandestine residency on the margins of Iranian society.

In Pakistan, there was arguably room for greater optimism prior to 2009, as the Pakistani state sought to recognise the complex dynamics between refugee repatriation, state reconstruction and Afghan labour migration could not be 'solved' through refugees' premature physical return to a weak Afghan state. A 2007 registration exercise saw 2.14 million Afghans registered not as refugees but as 'Afghans living in Pakistan', receiving three-year residence permits. This was hailed by UNHCR as an 'important milestone', in part because it underlined the notion of moving from refugee status towards migrant status under the protection of the Afghan government (UNHCR 2008: 14). However, the fragility of the Pakistani state and the floods of 2010 have cast doubt on the sustainability of this 'sustainable repatriation'/labour migration connection.

6.1.4 Changing driver complexes

In the past decade, Afghan movements to Iran and Pakistan have shifted away from being direct responses to physical insecurity caused by conflict and crisis and are now primarily motivated by the failure of the Afghan state to provide adequate economic security, particularly for a returning refugee population. Whereas Afghan flows were primarily refugee flows in 2000-01, they are now irregular labour migrant flows. The reasons for this shift in the nature of Afghan movement can be found in the changing driver complexes shaping these migrations.

While the continuing weakness of the Afghan state is undoubtedly a political consequence of decades of civil conflict and continuing physical insecurity, especially in the south of the country, motivations for movement to Iran and Pakistan are primarily understood by Afghans in economic and livelihood terms. These migration strategies reflect cultural and historical norms as well as the 'lived experiences' of many Afghans who have spent much of their lives in exile. These migrations are family and community-based strategies – rather than individual calculations – that connect the political economy of crisis in Afghanistan with the political economy of (relative) opportunity perceived to exist in Iran and Pakistan.

The interests of both these states in removing refugee populations from their territories and restricting Afghans' access to labour markets have resulted in numerous policy interventions intended to break these historical patterns of transborder labour migration. However, given the driver complexes propelling migration out of Afghanistan and towards Iran and Pakistan, such policies have not led to any significant reduction in Afghan migration flows, but mean instead that Afghan movements are increasingly clandestine, irregular and result in significant protection risks for those Afghans moving across the border and into proscribed labour markets.

7. The Somalia-southern Africa corridor[9]

7.1 Driver complex one: the political economy of conflict and insecurity

Out-migration from Somalia is a result of human insecurity resulting from endemic conflict and an inability to access secure livelihoods. This on-going conflict is the result of the interaction of a number of different political, economic and cultural factors within Somalia. There is a close relationship between Somali conflict and serious economic underdevelopment, exacerbated by environmental factors.

It is not the intention of this section to provide an analysis of the causes of Somali conflict (for this see ICG 2008; Menkhaus 2007; Prunier 1996). However, it is important to understand *how* the particular dynamics of this conflict have influenced the nature of Somali migration. Are migration flows precipitated by actual violence or by the longer-term collapse of the Somali state's infrastructure? Do Somalis themselves understand their choices to migrate away from conflict as primarily political or economic?

Currently, conflict in Somalia is centred in the south-central regions. Both Somaliland and Puntland regions are relatively non-violent with functioning basic political infrastructure. This is important, because migration from northern Somalia (Somaliland) is likely to be qualitatively different from migration from the south-central region, driven more by economic considerations and/or personal concerns (which could include persecution), rather than widespread violence and insecurity.

Concentrating on migration flows from south-central Somalia – which UNHCR and all neighbouring states recognise to be *prima facie* refugee flows – the majority of those on the move are seeking safety away from the armed conflict between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and Al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam and other Islamist groups. This conflict has been marked by a consistent failure of all parties to respect basic principles of international humanitarian law, resulting in loss of life/serious injuries, destruction of property and lack of access to food, medical services and livelihoods (UNHCR 2010). It is therefore the absence of a functioning political economy – both in terms of civil distribution and exercise of power and its impact on economic space – which provokes flight. However, it should be noted that it may in fact be a *lull* in fighting which actually precipitates population movement (even though the causes of this migration are violence and insecurity) (USAID 2010).

As Somali experts have stressed, some of the clans of south-central Somalia do not – unlike the Isaaq clans of Somaliland – have a tradition of seafaring 'adventure' and do not make up a significant proportion of the Somali diaspora. Groups such as the Digil, the Rahanweyn and the non-Somali Juba and Wabi Shebelle valley populations are not traditionally nomadic, but sedentary agriculturists who from 1991 onwards have found themselves particularly vulnerable to attack by armed militia with terrible economic and political consequences (Prunier 1996: 51).

---

[9] This section was prepared by Katy Long of the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford

The impact of this violent destruction on the limited infrastructure that existed pre-1991 in the south (its impact emphasised by the agricultural nature of settlement in the region), coupled with the inability of competing and factionalised warlords to establish their control over the region, has left this south-central region particularly vulnerable to the economic insecurities of war and exposed to the rise of politically violent Islamist factions seeking to impose order in the region (Menkhaus 2007). It is this continuing conflict – which has intensified since the fall of the Islamic Courts Union in Mogadishu in 2006 – which has led to mass displacement, including the flight of over 300,000 refugees to Dadaab camp in Kenya.

Importantly, both the terms of conflict and those of economic survival have also been heavily influenced by environmental stress. Persistent rains from March 2010 were causing widespread flooding in southern and central Somalia by June, causing widespread destruction of property, livestock and crops. At least 6000 additional household displacements were triggered by the floods, many moving into IDP camps (DRC 2010). UNHCR also reported a rise in the number of refugees arriving in Kenya. Previously, drought has also destroyed livelihoods: in 2005, the failure of the short (Deyr) rains led aid agencies to double the numbers targeted for humanitarian relief within Somalia, a figure which included 400,000 IDPs (OCHA 2006).

The conflict drivers of Somalia out-migration can be conceptualised as a complex centring on *human insecurity*. Human insecurity is both political and economic. In the Somali case, the absence of rule of law and basic physical security is most problematic because of its economic consequences. It is this physical security-economic livelihood connection which drives migration, rather than the absence of a broader complement of human or civil rights. This 'conflict complex' is exacerbated by environmental stress and particular cultural vulnerabilities among certain groups in south-central Somalia. However, it is also important to note that for other south-central groups such as the Ogaaden, and Somalis more generally, close cultural affinities with Somali populations in Ethiopia and Kenya and a long history of cross-continental diaspora movements may make the direction of Somali movement function as a more positive 'choice' for these groups, and mark the use of migration as a means of maximising their human potential.

7.2 Driver complex two: shaping the journey

A second collection of drivers combine to shape the nature of Somali journeys to RSA. These inter-related factors can be categorised in terms of logistics, culture, economics and policy. 'Logistics' in this sense can be considered to include the practical dimensions of planning a journey – particular migration routes available as offered by smuggling networks, the modes of transport available and the availability of food or shelter, for example.

Given that Somali out-migration is driven by conflict and human insecurity, many Somalis – particularly those from south-central Somalia – cross the border with Kenya to arrive as refugees at Dadaab camp. Although the Kenya-Somalia border has been closed since 2007, this

is generally observed, by both Kenyan state officials and international actors, as having had little impact on the numbers of Somalis moving through to Dadaab. Between January 2007 and mid-March 2010, 140,000 Somali refugees were registered in the Dadaab camps, and NGOs have estimated that at least the same number have moved through the border region to Nairobi without registering (Long 2010). This is an example of a deliberate policy intervention intended to divert – or halt – migration flows from Somalia to Kenya , but which has not had this effect, and which has made the journey undertaken by Somalis more precarious as they seek to avoid recognised and patrolled crossings (HRW 2010; Reuters Africa 2010).

The *prima facie* recognition of all south-central Somalis as refugees by Kenya has a significant impact on the nature of Somali movement. In combination with the concentration of international aid at Dadaab and the presence of a sizeable Somali diaspora at the camps, Kenyan asylum policy drives Somalis towards Dadaab. The Kenyan state insists on their encampment, heavily curtailing Somali freedom of movement, and prevents Somali access to labour markets. It is clear that subsequent onward journeys towards southern Africa are heavily influenced by the intersection of cultural values and practices – in particular entrepreneurship, migration for trade and the value of business – with policies designed to reduce such activities. This means that subsequent Somali onward movements to Nairobi are irregular and clandestine, but it does not prevent such movements. It is estimated that up to 80 per cent of Somali refugees in the East and Horn of African regions will move onwards from the place of their initial registration.[10]

The labelling of all Somali as 'refugees' has also influenced the shape of migration pathways. In particular, practices have developed in which refugee camps are used as 'pitstops' on journeys southwards, with Somalis identifying the camps as points at which international aid can be accessed in order to help sustain their continued movement. Up to 80 per cent of Somalis who arrive in RSA pass through a single refugee camp, Dzaleka, in Malawi (Long and Crisp 2010; IOM 2009). In this sense, international policy – the labelling of all Somalis as refugees and a particular understanding of what 'refugee' and 'international protection' involve – combines with logistical needs to shape Somali journeys to South Africa.

Logistical demands, cultural practices, economics and policy also interact in determining the nature and power of Somali smuggling networks. Though very little is known about the mechanics of Somali smuggling, it is clear that there is a sizeable economy based around people-smuggling from the Horn of Africa towards southern Africa, generating around US$40m per annum (IOM 2009). The strength of the Somali kin and clan networks and a cultural willingness to trust in these bonds, as well as the presence of a large diaspora in Nairobi and RSA able to fund smuggling and provide information to new arrivals, all strengthen the power of Somali smuggling networks in driving Somali migration flows towards southern Africa.

[10] Internal UNHCR paper.

Journeys are also shaped by smugglers' interests in avoiding border guards and ensuring profitability, often by gathering large numbers of migrants together across circuitous journeys through Kenya, Ethiopia and the Great Lake states. A recent development has been an increased reliance upon boat travel directly from Somali ports, Kisimayo in the south and Bosasso in Puntland (which has traditionally been the site for inter-regional economic migration to the Middle East via Yemen), to Pemba, Mozambique, thereby bypassing Tanzanian migration controls, which have received considerable investment from IOM and the Tanzanian state (Crisp and Kiragu 2010).

There is also speculation that increased efforts by the international community to deter would-be migrants from making the dangerous crossing to Yemen across the Gulf of Aden – which have seen the number of Somalis arriving in Yemen drop by up to two-thirds (UNHCR 2010a) – have led to increased flows towards southern Africa, as smugglers seek to evade increased controls and migrants choose less dangerous routes.

Arguably the most important of all driver complexes in shaping the journey is the interaction between cultural expectations, logistical capacity and a migrant's economic class and status. It is well recognised that economic status bears a direct relation to the distance travelled by those moving (Van Hear 2006). The poorest Somalis are likely to be the 1.5 million IDPs who remain within Somalia, and those who remain at Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. Those who are able to move to Nairobi are likely to have more resources; those who are able to move to southern Africa are likely to have more resources still, not least because of the high fees demanded by the smuggling economy. Access to resources also plays a particular role in determining the mode of transport used – the five per cent of Somalis who arrived in South Africa via air are likely to be those with the greatest access to finance, both in terms of paying for air tickets and in terms of ensuring that they hold the documents necessary to pass through airport immigration screening (IOM 2009).

Economic status is also influenced by Somali cultural practices and depends not only – not even primarily – on individual economic wealth, but on family and wider kin connections and resources. This is an important point in understanding how kin-based culture affects migration flows: not only do diaspora presences shape migration in terms of destination, they also shape the nature of the journey, often by providing the necessary economic resources to send one member of a family (often a young male) to a destination with the expectation that they will support family who remain in refugee camps or in Somalia through remittances. The individual may not be the most appropriate unit for analysing driver complexes influencing Somali migration, particularly when it comes to understanding the interplay of culture, class and logistics.

7.3 Driver complex three: the political economy of opportunity

In-coming Somali migration to RSA is a result of a combination of political, economic and cultural-historical factors that have resulted in what can be termed a political economy of

opportunity. This driver complex, working in tandem with the 'conflict driver complex' in Somalia, explains why there is a significant migration flow from Somalia towards RSA.

Since the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa has established a stable, democratic government under a constitution which is viewed as one of the most progressive in the world and which guarantees 'all people in our country' (not just citizens or legal migrants) a plethora of rights and freedoms (RSA 1996: Article 7).

However it is unlikely that these rights in themselves account for the direct attraction of RSA for Somali refugees and migrants, rather than the human security they frame which allows for economic opportunity. Onward movement of Somali refugees from Kenya is driven, above all, not by a search to find freedom from persecution or violence, or a search for a 'survival' livelihood (as this is already provided by the protections offered as 'asylum'), but by an interest in accessing the labour market and maximising economic opportunities. Importantly, South Africa (which does not recognise the Somali population on a *prima facie* basis) allows asylum seekers to work.

In assessing the connections between economics and politics in driving Somali migration to RSA, it is important to note that trade and entrepreneurship have a high cultural value for Somali populations. The extent of the Somali diaspora and its well-established trading networks, not only in RSA but more widely across Africa, in Europe and North America, also mean that Somali populations are well-recognised as being extremely effective and successful businessmen, who are often able to undercut local salespersons.

South Africa is the regional economic powerhouse, a middle-income country in a continent of low-income and often fragile states. It is closely integrated into the global capitalist economy and has excellent transport connections. These economic advantages have helped to facilitate the growth of Somali trade links and explain the economic rationale behind Somali migration to the region. The size of the South African internal market – RSA GDP per capita (at PPP) was US$10,291 in 2009, compared to the Kenyan figure (East Africa's regional economic power) of US$1572 – also offers considerable business opportunities (World Bank 2010).

Somali businessmen were, however, a particular target of the xenophobic attacks which occurred in South Africa in May 2008, arguably because of their success in capitalising on the economic opportunities offered in South Africa (Polzer 2010). This again reflects the interplay of cultural and economic factors: Somali reliance on Somali diaspora trade networks has reduced economic and cultural integration within South Africa, leading to a widespread perception of the Somalis as foreign interlopers benefiting from but not contributing to South Africa's economic growth. It is not yet known how the continuing threat of xenophobic retaliation and the consequent deterioration of Somalis' human security within RSA will influence Somali migration flows in the long-term. Thousands were displaced at least temporarily in 2008.

It is also important to consider how important RSA's structural dependence on foreign labour is in attracting Somali refugees and migrants. This factor is often cited in explaining intra-regional migration from other southern African states, and it undoubtedly plays a key role in explaining RSA's relative openness to in-migration in general. Yet, Somalis are broadly traders, shopkeepers and business people, rather than labourers. While more research is needed to properly map Somali occupations within RSA, the structure of the South African economy – as a capitalist market economy governed by a democratic state – is arguably more important to Somali assessment of RSA than its structural dependence on foreign labour.

In sum, the political and economic freedoms afforded by post-apartheid South Africa match the cultural values and resources of Somali out-migrants. Somali culture places a high value on trade and on economic opportunity rather than aid-dependent subsistence. South Africa's constitutional provisions allowing asylum-seekers to work offer this possibility, which is denied to those refugees who remain in East Africa. The growth of a large diaspora presence in South Africa since 1994 facilitates both economic trade networks and the perpetuation of cultural values that encourage migration to South Africa, but impede social integration, in contrast to other African migration flows to RSA.

This driver complex can be termed the Somali *political economy of opportunity*. Somali understandings of the 'protection' or human security that they most value centre on an economic autonomy that RSA is best placed to provide. This raises important policy questions about how best to respond to those populations judged to be in need of 'international protection' by virtue of the *human insecurity* they face in their communities of origin in south-central Somalia, but who do not feel that the security current models of asylum aim to provide is sufficient to meet their *human potential*.

8. Conclusion

In DfID's 'drivers of change' analytical framework mentioned at the outset of this paper, it was noted that structural features tend to be deeply embedded and to change only slowly; institutions are more fluid and more susceptible to change in the medium term. Agents can affect the institutional framework and also structural features and processes through the mediation of the institutional framework. Likewise, structural features influence agents through the mediation of institutions. In this framework, then, institutions were seen as key to understanding processes of change and in particular how they would have an impact on the poor (DfID 2003: 4).

This generally accords with the approach adopted in this paper, which has set out a basic framework for considering the drivers of migration and has illustrated it by drawing on cases in which both 'voluntary' and 'forced' migration feature. We first looked at drivers in terms of the *functions* that they fulfil – whether predisposing people to move, prompting movement, actually triggering movement, meditating it and shaping it once under way. This preliminary framework was applied to migration orders in South-East Asia and between South Asia and the

Gulf, as indicative cases. Drivers were then considered in terms of the dimensions they operate within – among them locality, scale, duration and depth. The notion of configurations of drivers or driver complexes was then suggested and applied to the Afghan and Somali cases, again as indicative examples: complexes were identified around the political economy of both acute and incremental social change, the political economy of opportunity/expectations, and shaping the journey. The cases show how different configurations of political, economic, historical, cultural, geographical, environmental factors interact with security, logistical, social status and policy dimensions to generate driver complexes operating on different scales, over different times and in different locations. The analysis indicates that, like individual drivers, such driver complexes may interact with one another and also shift in significance over time.

The paper points then to the combinations of drivers shaping migration in particular regions or corridors and how these configurations influence how people move and where they go. It has suggested an analytical and methodological framework which aims to:

- identify drivers of migration
- show how they operate in different localities and at different scales
- show how they change/shift over time
- assess their depth or tractability
- show how drivers interact
- show how drivers have different significance/weights at different times
- identify which drivers or combinations/complexes are amenable to policy intervention

Subsequent RPC research within the drivers strand will elaborate and refine the ways we can approach these different features. Particular focus is needed on the under-researched sphere of *drivers of internal migration*, and even more so on the *linkages between drivers of internal and of international migration* (King and Skeldon 2010). Among the most challenging tasks will be to establish whether, and in what circumstances, some drivers are more important than others, and which combinations of drivers are more potent than others. This will lay the groundwork for exploration of the possibility that some drivers are amenable to policy interventions.

Development agencies like DfID are unlikely to be able to influence the deeply embedded structural predisposing factors that drive migration. Nor are they likely to be able to influence precipitating drivers very much, since these are largely events that are difficult to predict. That would leave the proximate and mediating 'drivers' as fields where there is potential to exercise influence. This accords with the 'drivers of change model' elaborated earlier (DfID 2003), which suggested focusing on institutions that meditate between (deep) structures and agents – this makes sense in the migration context as in other development settings. However, as this paper has tried to show, it is not simply a matter of influencing particular drivers, since these may combine to form configurations which may have aggregate effects different from the particular drivers they combine – the whole is different from the sum of the parts. This means that addressing one driver alone may not have the intended effect: policy interventions will

therefore need to take account of such configurations and their effects. In this regard, work on the drivers theme will need to take account of the findings from the Foresight project on Global Environmental Migration (BIS 2011), which seeks to understand how environmental factors interact with other drivers of change to shape migration orders, as well as broader Europe-wide consultations on climate change and migration (European Commission 2008). Work within the theme will also underline the now often-made point that to influence migration a comprehensive approach is needed, including not just migration policies, but policy levers that have a wider reach – such as those covering trade, fiscal matters, welfare, security and so on – as well as taking account of the unintended effects of policies on migration over time (de Haas 2011).

Finally, much of course depends on the goals of intervention – whether the purpose is to prevent or control migration, to reduce migration pressure, to enable people to choose whether to move or not, or to engage with migration flows in order to reduce poverty and optimise development. We take it that DfID would align its purpose with the latter end of this range of goals. The identification of combinations of particular drivers of migration in particular places will prepare interested parties for the kinds of migration that are most likely to emerge. The overall purpose of RPC work would be to seek an understanding of drivers in order to lay the basis for steering migration – or some forms of migration – towards the goal of reducing poverty and where possible promoting development.

Acknowledgements

This paper has gone through a number of iterations in response to contributions and comments by RPC partners, the Consortium Advisory Group, DfID, and two anonymous reviewers. We are most grateful for the constructive criticism received and hope we have done justice to at least some of it in the final draft of this paper.

About the authors

The authors are researchers in migration studies at the University of Oxford. Nicholas Van Hear is Deputy Director of the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS). Oliver Bakewell is co-Director and James Martin Fellow at the International Migration Institute (IMI). Katy Long is an ESRC Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Refugee Studies Centre (RSC).

References

Abbasi-Shavasi, M. *et al.* (2005) *Return to Afghanistan?* A case study of Afghans living in Mashhad, Islamic Republic of Iran, AREU, October 2005, [online] available at: www.unhcr.org/434f69e92.pdf

Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) (2006) *Afghans in Quetta. Settlements, Livelihoods, Support Networks and Cross-Border Linkages,* January 2006, [online] available at: www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47c3f3c412.html

Afsar, R. (2000) *Rural Urban Migration in Bangladesh: Causes, Consequences and Challenges*. Dhaka: The University Press.

Afsar, R. (2009) *Unravelling the Vicious Cycle of Recruitment: Labour Migration from Bangladesh to the Gulf States.* Geneva: ILO.

Aguilar, F.V. (2003) 'Global migrations, old forms of labor, and new transborder class relations', *Southeast Asian Studies,* 41(2): 137-161.

Agunias, D. (2009) *Human Development Research Paper 2009/22 Guiding the Invisible Hand: Making Migration Intermediaries Work for Development.* UNDP.

Anggraeni, D. (2006) *Dreamseekers: Indonesian Women as Domestic Workers in Asia*. Jakarta: Equinox Publishing and ILO.

Anh D.N. (2003) *Migration and poverty in Asia: with reference to Bangladesh, China, the Philippines and Viet Nam*, Bangkok: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and The Pacific, [online] available at: www.unescap.org/esid/psis/meetings/migrationaug2003/Viet.pdf [accessed 26 January 2011]

Bakewell, O. (2010) 'Some Reflections on Structure and Agency in Migration Theory', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* 36(10): 1689-1708.

Beh, L. Y. (2011) Malaysia Facing Maid Shortage. *The Jakarta Globe*, [online] January 25, available at: www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/malaysia-facing-maid-shortage/419017 [accessed January 30, 2011]

BIS (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills) (2011) *Global Environmental Migration*, [online] available at: www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/current-projects/global-environmental-migration [accessed 25 May 2011]

Boswell, C. (2003) 'The "external dimension" of EU immigration and asylum policy', *International Affairs,* 79(3): 619-38.

Boyd, M. (1989) 'Family and personal networks in international migration: recent developments and new agendas', *International Migration Review,* 23(3): 638-670.

Castles, S. and Kosack, G. (1973) *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe.* London and New York: Oxford University Press.

Castles, S. and Miller, M. (2008) *The Age of Migration*. New York: Macmillan.

Castles, S. and Van Hear, N. (2011) 'Root causes', in Betts, A. (ed.) *Global Migration Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 287-307.

Chang, Kimberley A. and Ling, L.H.M. (2000) 'Globalization and its intimate other: Filipina

domestic workers in Hong Kong', in Marchand, M.H. and Runyan, A.S. (eds.) *Gender and Global Restructuring: Sights, Sites and Resistances*. London & New York: Routledge, 27-43. Chin, C.B.N. (1998) *In Service and Servitude: Foreign Female Domestic Workers and the Malaysian 'Modernity' Project.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Chin, C.B.N. (2002) 'The "host" state and "guest" worker in Malaysia: public management and migrant labour in times of economic prosperity and crisis, *Asia Pacific Business Review,* 8(4): 19-40.

Crisp J. and Kiragu, E. (2010) *Refugee protection and international migration: A review of UNHCR's role in Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa*, UNHCR Evaluation, [online] available at: www.unhcr.org/4c629c4d9.html

Danish Refugee Council (DRC), *Emergency Response in South-Central Somalia*, June 2010, [online] available at: www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MCOI-86GH2R?OpenDocument

de Haas, H. (2010) 'Migration and development: a theoretical perspective', *International Migration Review,* 44(1): 227-64.

de Haas, H. (2011). *The Determinants of International Migration: Conceptualizing Policy, Origin and Destination Effects*. Oxford: International Migration Institute, IMI Working Paper No. 32.

DfID (2003) Drivers of change, Department for International Development: London, [online] available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/contracts/files/ojec_5512_background.pdf

Development Research Centre on Migration Globalisation and Poverty (DRC) (2009) *Migration and Education Linkages: Lessons from India and Bangladesh*, Briefing No. 16 January 2009, [online] available at: www.migrationdrc.org/publications/briefing_papers/BP16.pdf [accessed 1 February 2011]

Dun, O. and Gemenne, F. (2008) 'Defining "environmental migration"', *Forced Migration Review,* 31:10-11.

European Commission (2008) Climate change and International Security: Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, S113/08 14 March 2008. Brussels: European Commission.

Ford, M. (2001) 'Indonesian women as export commodity: notes from Tanjung Pinang, *Labour Management in Development Journal,* 2(5): 2-9.

Faist, T (2008) 'Migrants as transnational development agents: an inquiry into the newest round of the migration-development nexus', *Population, Space and Place*, 14(1): 21–42.

Gamlen, A. (2010) *People on the Move: Managing Migration in Today's Commonwealth*. London: The Ramphal Centre.

Global Commission on International Migration (2005) *Migration in an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action*. Geneva: Global Commission on International Migration.

Haider, F. (2009) *Migrants return to Bangladesh*. BBC News, [online] 4 June 2009, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8082646.stm [accessed 1 February 2011]

Harris, J. and Todaro, M. (1970) ‘Migration, unemployment and development: a two-sector analysis’, *American Economic Review*, 60(1): 126–142.
Hernández-Coss, R. *et al*. (2008) *The Malaysia-Indonesia Remittance Corridor: Making Formal Transfers the Best Option for Women and Undocumented Migrants*. World Bank Working Paper No. 149. Washington DC: World Bank Publications.
Huang, S. and Yeoh, B.S.A. (1996) ‘Ties that bind: state policy and migrant female domestic helpers in Singapore, *Geoforum,* 27(4): 479-493.
Human Rights Watch (2005) *Maid to Order: Ending Abuse against Migrant Domestic Workers in Singapore*, [online] available at: www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/singapore1205wcover.pdf [accessed January 21 2011]
Human Rights Watch (2010) *Kenya: Police Abuse Somali Refugees*, [online] June 2010, available at: www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/06/09/kenya-police-abuse-somali-refugees
Humanitarian Organisation for Migration Economics (HOME) and Transient Workers Count Too (TWC2) (2010) *Justice Delayed, Justice Denied: The Experiences of Migrant Workers in Singapore*, [online] available at: http://home.org.sg/downloads/Justice%20Delayed%20Justice%20Denied%20Report%202010.pdf [accessed January 31 2011]
ILO-UNHCR (2008) *Co-operation Towards Comprehensive Solutions for Afghan Displacement: Research Study on Afghan Deportees from Iran.*
International Crisis Group (ICG) (2008) *Somalia Conflict History*, [online] September 2008, available at: www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/somalia.aspx
International Crisis Group (2009) *Afghanistan, What Now for refugees?,* [online] October 2009, available at: www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6290\&CFID=13882722\&CFTOKEN=11480080
International Crisis Group (2010) *Pakistan: The Worsening IDP Crisis*, Asia Briefing paper no.11, September 2010.
Internal Displacement monitoring Centre (2010). *Afghanistan: Country Profile,* [online] available at: *www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/%28httpEnvelopes%29/7BF2B87C0BBCFE1EC1257707002C3834?OpenDocument#1.2.1*
International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2009) *In Pursuit of the Southern Dream: Victims of Necessity, Assessment of the Irregular Movement of Men from East Africa and the Horn to South Africa,* [online] June 2009, available at: http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/index.php?main-page=product-info&productsid=507
International Organization for Migration (IOM 2010a) *Assessing the Evidence: Environment, Climate Change and Migration in Bangladesh*. Dhaka: IOM.
International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2010b) *Labour Migration from Indonesia: An Overview of Indonesian Migration to Selected Destinations in Asia and the Middle East.* Jakarta: IOM.

Jazayery, L. (2002) ‘The migration-development nexus: Afghanistan case study’, *International Migration*, 40(5): 231-254.
Kaur, A. (2007) ‘International labour migration in Southeast Asia: governance of migration and women domestic workers’, *Intersections: Gender, History and Culture in the Asian Context,* [online] available at: http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue15/kaur.htm [accessed January 18 2011)].
Kaur, A. (2010) ‘Labour migration trends and policy challenges in Southeast Asia’, *Policy and Society,* 29 (4): 385-397.
King, R. and R. Skeldon (2010) ‘”Mind the gap!” Integrating approaches to internal and international migration’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36(10): 1619-1646.
Kuhn, Randall S. (2000) *The logic of Letting Go: Family and Individual Migration from Rural Bangladesh.* Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, Labour and Population Programme, Working Paper Series 00-09.
Lee , E. (1966) ‘A theory of migration’, *Demography,* 3(1): 47-57.
Long, K. (2010) *No Entry! A Review of UNHCR's Response to Border Closures in Situations of Mass Influx,* UNHCR Evaluation, [online] June 2010, available at: www.unhcr.org/4c207bd59.html
Long, K. and Crisp, J. (2010) *A Long and Winding Road: Mixed Migratory Movements to Southern Africa from the East, Horn and Great Lakes Region of Africa ,* Background paper for Regional Conference on Refugee Protection and International Migration, Tanzania, 6-7 September 2010.
Long, N. (2001) *Development Sociology: Actor Perspectives*. London: Routledge.
Low, L. (2002) ‘The political economy of migrant worker policy in Singapore’, *Asia Pacific Business Review,* 8(4): 95-118.
Magoni, R., Roos, C., and Buda, D. (2007) *Migration from Africa: A Case Study on Root Causes and Factors Contributing to Migration from Senegal to the EU,* European Commission: Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen Support to External
Security. Mandela, N. (1994) *Long Walk to Freedom*. London: Abacus.
Massey, D. *et al.* (1998) *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Menkhaus, K. (2007) `The crisis in Somalia: tragedy in five acts', *African Affairs,* 106(424): 357 390.
Ministry of Manpower (MOM) (2009) *Singapore Yearbook of Manpower Statistics,* [online] 2009*,* available at: www.mom.gov.sg/publish/etc/medialib/mom_library/mrsd/yb_2009.Par.32940.File.tp/mrsd_2009Yearbook.pdf [accessed 2 October 2009).
Ministry of Manpower (MOM) (2011) *Factsheet on New Employment Agency Regulatory Framework*, [online] available at: www.mom.gov.sg/Documents/foreign-manpower/Employment%20Agencies/Factsheet%20on%20EA%20Regulatory%20Framework.pdf [accessed 30 January 30 2011].
Monsutti, A. (2006) *Afghan Transitional Networks: Looking Beyond Repatriation*, Kabul: AREU. [online] available at: www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com-docman\&Itemid=\&task=doc-download\&gid=432

Monsutti, A. (2008) 'Afghan migratory strategies and the three solutions to the refugee problem', *Refugee Survey Quarterly,* 27(1): 58-73.
OCHA (2006), *Consolidated Appeal for Somalia*, [online] available at: http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?Page=1357
Orozco, M. and Fedewa, R. (2005) *Regional Integration? Trends and Patterns of Remittance flows within South East Asia.* Washington DC: Inter-American Dialogue.
Plant, R. (2008) *Temporary Contract Labour in the Gulf States: Perspectives from Two Countries of Origin*, summary paper based on studies commissioned by the International Labour Office for the Gulf Forum on Temporary Contractual Labour Abu Dhabi, 23-24 January 2008.
Polzer, T. (2010*) 'Xenophobia': Violence against Foreign Nationals and other 'Outsiders' in Contemporary South Africa*, [online] June 2010, available at: www.migration.org.za/report/polzer-t-2010-xenophobia-violence-against-foreign-nationals-and-other-outsiders-contemporary-
Pratt, G. in collaboration with the Philippine Women Centre, Vancouver, Canada (1998) 'Inscribing domestic work on Filipina bodies', in Nast, H.J. and Pile, S. (eds.) *Places Through the Body*. London and New York: Routledge, 283-304.
Prunier, G. (1996) 'Somalia: civil war, intervention and withdrawal', *Refugee Survey Quarterly,* 15(1): 35-85.
Reuters Africa (2010) *Kenya Illegally Forcing Refugees Back to Somalia: UNHCR,* [online] 3 November 2010, available at: http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE6A20JL20101103
Richmond, A. (1994) *Global Apartheid: Refugees, Racism and the New World Order*, New York: OUP.
Sassen, S. (1988) *The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow*. Cambridge: CUP.
Sen, A. K. (1999) *Development as Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
*S*iddiqui, T. (2001) *Transcending Boundaries: Labour Migration of Women from Bangladesh.* Dhaka: The University Press.
Siddiqui, T and C. R. Abrar (2003) *Migrant Workers Remittances and Micro-Finance in Bangladesh.* Research report prepared for ILO. Dhaka: Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit.
Skeldon, R. (2008) 'International migration as a tool in development policy: a passing phase?', *Population and Development Review*, 34(1): 1-18.
Spaan, E., van Naerssen T. and Hillmann F. (2005) 'Shifts in the European discourses on migration and development', *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal,* 14(1-2): 35-69.
Stark, O. (1991) *The Migration of Labor*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Sukamdi *et al*. (2001) 'Country Study 2: Indonesia', in Wille, C. and Passl, B. (eds.) *Female Labour Migration in South-East Asia*. Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 94-134.
Tapinos, G. P. (1990) *Development Assistance Strategies and Emigration Pressure in Europe and Africa.* Washington DC: Commission for the Study of International Migration and Co-operative Economic Development.

UNDP (2009) *Human Development Report. Overcoming barriers: human mobility and development*. New York: UNDP.
UNHCR (2008) *Discussion Paper: 'Towards a Comprehensive Solution for Displacement From Afghanistan'*, [online] July 2003, available at: www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f1be2224.html [accessed 6 August 2011].
UNHCR (2010) Somalia - Country Operations Profile 2010.
UNHCR (2010a) *Somali Refugee Flow across the Gulf of Aden Slows Down this Year*, [online] April 2010, available at: www.unhcr.org/4bbf3af49.html.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2010) *Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by the Victims*, [online] available at: www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghanistan-corruption-survey2010-Eng.pdf
USAID (2010) *Somalia - Complex Emergency Situation Report no.7*, [online] 22 July 2010, available at: www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/somalia/
Van Hear, N. (1998) *New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities*. London: UCL Press.
Van Hear, N. (2006) '"I went as far as my money would take me": conflict, forced migration and class', in Crepeau F. *et al.* (eds.) *Forced migration and global processes: a view from forced migration studies*. Lanham MA: Lexington/Rowman and Littlefield, 125-158.
Van Hear, N. and Soerensen, N. N. (2003) *The Migration-Development Nexus*. Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.
Winkler, O. (2010) 'Labor migration to the GCC States: patterns, scale, and policies', in *Viewpoints Migration and the Gulf.* Washington DC: Middle East Institute, p.9-12, available at: www.mei.edu [accessed 20 January 2011].
Wong, D. (1996) 'Foreign domestic workers in Singapore', *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal,* 5(1): 117-138.
Wong, D. (1997) 'Transience and settlement: Singapore's foreign labour policy', *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal,* 6(2): 135-167.
World Bank (2007) *Bangladesh: Strategy for sustained growth*. Bangladesh Development Series Paper No. 18.
World Bank (2010) *Country Indicators,* [online] available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries
Yeoh, B. (2004) *Migration, International Labour and Multicultural Policies in Singapore*. Singapore Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series No. 19.
Yeoh, B. (2007) 'Singapore: hungry for foreign workers at all skill levels', *Migration Information Source,* [online] available at: www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=570 [accessed 6 2009].
Yeoh, B. and Chang, T.C. (2001) 'Globalising Singapore: debating transnational flows in the city, *Urban Studies,* 38(7): 1025-1044.
Yeoh, B. and Huang, S. (1998) 'Negotiating public Space: strategies and styles of migrant female domestic workers in Singapore', *Urban Studies,* 35(3): 583-602.
Young, K. (2006) 'Globalisation and the changing management of migrating service workers in the Asia-Pacific', in Hewison, K. and Young (eds.), *Transnational Migration and Work in Asia*. New York: Routledge, 15-36.

About the Migrating out of Poverty Research Programme Consortium

Migrating out of Poverty is a research programme consortium (RPC) funded by the UK's Department for International Development. It focuses on the relationship between migration and poverty and is located in six regions across Asia and Africa. The main goal of ***Migrating out of Poverty*** is to provide robust evidence on migration drivers and impacts that will contribute to improving policies affecting the lives and well-being of poor migrants, their communities and countries through a programme of innovative research, capacity building and policy engagement. The RPC will also conduct analysis in order to understand the migration policy process in developing regions and will update and extend world renowned migration databases at the University of Sussex to include internal migration.

The ***Migrating out of Poverty*** consortium is coordinated by the University of Sussex, and led by CEO Dr Dilip Ratha with Dr Priya Deshingkar as the Research Director. Core partners are: RMMRU in Bangladesh; the Centre for Migration Studies at the University of Ghana; the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore; the African Centre for Migration & Society at Witswatersrand University; and the African Migration and Development Policy Centre, Nairobi.

Migrating out of Poverty
University of Sussex, Arts B
Brighton BN1 9QN, United Kingdom
Email: migrationrpc@sussex.ac.uk
Web: http://migratingoutofpoverty.org
Twitter: @MigrationRPC
Facebook: /migratingoutofpoverty
Blogger: migratingoutofpoverty.blogspot.co.uk