


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Lokāyata: Journal of Positive Philosophy is an online bi-annual interdisciplinary journal of *the Center for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS)*. The name Lokāyata can be traced to Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, which refers to three *ānvīkṣikīs* (logical philosophies), Yoga, Samkhya and Lokāyata. Lokāyata here still refers to logical debate (*disputatio*, "criticism") in general and not to a materialist doctrine in particular. The objectives of the journal are to encourage new thinking on concepts and theoretical frameworks in the disciplines of humanities and social sciences to disseminate such new ideas and research papers (with strong emphasis on modern implications of philosophy) which have broad relevance in society in general and man's life in particular. The Centre publishes two issues of the journal every year. Each regular issue of the journal contains full-length papers, discussions and comments, book reviews, information on new books and other relevant academic information. Each issue contains about 100 Pages.

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Spirituality in Education: Indian Perspective

V.Prabhu & Bharat Konwar

Abstract:

Formal educational curriculum as practiced in schools in India, is oriented towards making the children as a knowledgeable person (Eapen, 2007). As Bull suggests, the school education is designed in such a way that ultimately helps the kids to realize one or the other principles of education - personal liberty, democracy, equality of opportunity and economic growth (Bull, 2008). There is hardly any attempt to impart elements of spirituality to the children in a formal setup. In this paper we highlight the importance of spiritual education essentially from the Indian perspective and corroborated from the current literature from the western perspective. Through this engagement, we like to argue that spiritual education needs to be imparted through formal education system.

Keywords: spirituality, formal education, curriculum,

Spirituality is considered as an important element of human life in promoting internal peace and social harmony. Many a thinkers, spiritual practitioners have emphasized the need of spiritual orientation amongst the humans because it leads to a harmonious life by giving people a meaning to their own existence and their existence in a society (Roger & Dantley, 2001). The present educational system in India is becoming mechanistic and concerned more with the machineries that can transmit the structures, contents and processes of knowledge rather than creating ideological situation that respect the cultural, religious and spiritual heritage of India. The purpose of education in ancient India was to attain three supreme values of life- Truth, Goodness and Beauty. These are like guiding lights of human life and can be achieved through spiritual and moral knowledge (Venkataiah, 2007).

It is not only the classical understanding of education, but even the contemporary Indian thinkers like Tagore, Gandhi, Vivekananda, Aurobindo are talking about the importance of spirituality in human life. For these thinkers spirituality is an aspect of human life. Without spiritual knowledge human being cannot attain the highest goal. Rabindranath Tagore understands spirituality in terms of people's harmony in feeling and action with all other creatures of the world. Science gives us knowledge and power, spirituality gives us joy which is the result of union with other. Highest goal in the life can be achieved through the harmonious relationship with other things. Mere intellectual knowledge cannot help people in achieving this end. Spirituality is necessary in maintaining a harmonious relationship among people. Spirituality gives perfectness to the human character. It helps to realize the inseparable relationship among the creatures in the world and leads to a peaceful living through harmony. There is an eternal spirit among all creatures and if people realize this truth then he can live peacefully and harmoniously in the world. He writes, "When he meets the eternal spirit in all objects, then is he

emancipated, for then he discovers the fullest significance of the world into which he is born; then he finds himself in perfect truth, and his harmony with the all is established” (Tagore, 1923, p. 9).

Mahatma Gandhi claims that the development of mental, physical and spiritual wellbeing is the end of human life. But, the spiritual development is more important than other two because it leads people towards perfection. Spirituality helps in developing a harmonious relationship among the people in society. Spiritual relationship among the people is far more precious than any other relationship because any relationship among the people where spirituality is absent is like a body without soul. Spirituality helps people to perform selfless action. In spirituality there is no room for self-praise. Gandhi claims that spirituality can be developed only through the exercise of spirit. For that people need to build a character that enable to work towards knowledge of God and self realization. Gandhi’s concept of spirituality is based on religion. For him temples were like spiritual hospitals and all sinful people have first right to be ministered. Spiritual training is much more difficult than the physical training (Gandhi, 1948).

Spirituality plays an important role in the writings of Swami Vivekananda. He divided people’s life into two aspects- physical and spiritual. Spiritual aspect is higher than physical aspect. Spirituality is the true basis of all our activities in life. He said that it is a good activity if we help people physically, but it can remove his wants for a moment because physical needs arise repeatedly. It is possible to remove people’s wants forever and if we help people to remove his needs forever then it will be a greatest help for him. Spiritual knowledge is the only mean through which people can destroy their miseries and remove needs forever. So helping man spiritually is the greatest help that given to him. A spiritually strong person can be strong in every aspects of life. Until there is spiritual strength in man, physical need cannot satisfy. He claims that selfless action or the devotion to duty helps people in spiritual development. He said that the world is a ground of moral gymnasium wherein we have all to take exercise to become stronger and stronger spiritually (Vivekananda, 1915).

Aurobindo claims that people have the potentiality develop their qualities like intellectual, aesthetic, emotional, moral, spiritual etc. But, spiritual development is more important than any other development because to reach the spiritual consciousness and the Divine is the ultimate goal of human being. Spirituality guides people towards the perfection. But to achieve the spirituality is not an easy task. Only full lighted liberated souls can achieve this goal.

Take up into itself man’s rationalism, aestheticism, ethicism, vitalism, corporeality, his aspiration towards knowledge, his attention towards beauty, his need for love, his urge towards perfection, his demands for power, and fullness of life and being, a spirituality that would reveal to these ill-accorded forces their divine sense and the conditions of their godhead, reconcile them all to each other, illumine to the vision of each the way which they now tread in

half-lights and shadow, in blindness or with a deflected sight, is a power which even man's too self-sufficient reason can accept as sovereign and to see in its own supreme light, its own infinite source (Aurobindo, 1949, p. 182).

Contemporary and current literature from the west is also supporting the merits of spirituality in human life. Spirituality, in common sense, is understood in terms of consciousness which is distinguished from purely physical and includes anything that has an influence over soul and spirit of people (Berryman, 1997). It is a process of growing the intrinsic human capacity that motivates people to search for meaning, purpose, contribution and connectedness of life (King & Benson, 2006). David Carr defines spirituality as a form of experience or understanding that has to do with transcendent. Through spirituality people can acquire certain ideals or goals. Spirituality can be achieved in the pursuit of transcendent truths beyond material truths.

Spirituality is a function of appreciation or reflection upon ideals or goals which are both apt for positive moral evaluation and concerned with those aspects of human experiences which attempt to reach beyond the mundane and the material towards what is transcendent and eternal (Carr, 1995, p. 90).

But concern of transcendence is only one aspect of the general business of spirituality and it is secondary to the defining features of spirituality. In current literature spirituality is defined in terms of relationality. In relational interpretation, spirituality is considered as a personal empowerment of human being that leads to the personal and collective relationship with other (Wane & Ritskes, 2011). In relational interpretations of spirituality transcendental aspect is also included as an important aspect (de Souza, 2012). It is a realm of common experience centering on our shared nature as human (Radford, 2006). Peter Wong Sin On defined spirituality in terms of people relationship to the other things in the world and its connection to the higher being and finally it leads to the internal peace.

The motivational and emotional source of an individual's quest for a personally defined relationship with people and non human environment; for same, it includes a connectedness with a higher being leading to enhanced feelings of well-being, inner peace, and life satisfaction (Wong, 2010, p. 211).

Andrew Wright also defines spirituality in terms of individual's relationship with the other people within the community through an appropriate manner.

Spirituality is the relationship of the individual, within community and tradition, to that which is- or is perceived to be – of ultimate concern, ultimate value and ultimate truth, as appropriated through an informed, sensitive and reflective striving for spiritual wisdom (Wright, 2000, p. 104).

On the basis of current literature on spirituality, Micheline Wyn Moriarty has presented a model of four dimensions of spirituality. This model includes- consciousness, relationality, identity and roadmap. Consciousness refers to the sensitivity to mystery and response to the awe and wonder in both immanent and transcendental world. Relatioanlity refers to our heightened spiritual experiences of people derived from the relationship with other living and nonliving being as well as the transcendent. Identity refers people's self-image and self-concept. Values and aspirations that provide vision in human life are the roadmap (Moriarty, 2011).

Spirituality can be considered as a way through which people can maintain harmonious relationship among themselves (Hay & Nye, 2006). It helps people to search the meaning, identity and purpose of life. It also helps people to form their own belief system (Yocum, 2014). It is the aspect of human life that helps to integrate various other aspects, like, physical, cognitive, emotional, social, moral etc. (Roehlkepartain, Benson, Ebstyne, & Wagener, 2006). It helps people in their self realization and gives sensitive feelings to the art and nature and helps people to treat other people with awareness and respect (Hay, 1997). The vision of human being that comes from the spirituality leads to a healthy living through co-existence (Sheldrake, 2007). Martin de Souza says that spirituality is an innate human trait that reflects the relationship with God and helps to live with relational awareness with other creatures, and leads to a harmonious living with nature (de Souza, 2012).

Though the importance of spirituality in human life is stressed by many thinkers, it is yet to see the light in terms of imparting it in a formal educational setup. State's concern with spirituality in school education is yet to gain prominence. It is not only that thinkers' have felt the importance of spirituality in one's life, but it is also the case that many thinkers have felt the need and talked about the importance of imparting spiritual curriculum in school. But the state's concern with school education is primarily on the four important principles of social justice for education based on four widely held public purposes of education- personal liberty, democracy, equality of opportunity and economic growth (Bull, 2008). But there is hardly any engagement from the state in terms of spiritual education in schools.

We are belonging to a sharing world. In many aspects we are interdependent to one another. Therefore a sense of mutual understanding among the people is important. In the present day society, people have become more materialistic and making of money in life and having material development is become the aim of life. But, along with these material aspects, pursuing of spiritual happiness is also an important aspect of human life. Only a sense of spiritual awareness can help to achieve this end. Therefore a systematic study of the nature on spirituality and its implementation in school curriculum is therefore become a definite need in present time (Halstead, 1994). Along with the outer life, through integrating, thinking, perceiving, feeling creativity and intuiting, spirituality nurtures the inner heart,

mind and soul also (de Souza, 2005). Spiritual education helps children in development of their inner worlds towards proper directions of life that leads to peace, joy, wisdom, empathy, and compassion through connectedness (Taplin, 2014). It helps students to develop a comprehensive understanding of moral consciousness and cooperation among people (Adams, Hyde, & Woolley, 2008). Spiritual education is helpful and should be imparted in school curriculum because it gives children a sense of meaning and purpose of life. It brings forward a sense of security and stability by virtue of creating a better and more enduring adjustment to real life circumstances (Semetsky, 2009).

Spiritual education is important to live harmoniously in the world by reflecting own nature and recognizing inseparable relation with others. Radford writes,

Spiritual education, it might be argued, is central in our understanding of the nature of human self consciousness, our ability to reflect on our own being, our behavior, and our lives in context of the lives of others and in relation to the larger environment which we find ourselves a part (Radford, 2007).

Motha Jennifer claims that spiritual education should be imparted to the children because it will help the future generation in the world. It helps to have an organic total integration among individuals regardless of race, gender, culture or religion. Along with cognitive knowledge, spiritual knowledge is also important to achieve the highest goal (Jennifer, 2011).

Importance on spiritual development should be given during the childhood, because early experience of one's spirituality provide the foundation for the more advanced phases of spiritual development that follow in later years (Wong, 2010). Mustakova Possardt also claims that spiritual education especially needed to impart in primary and middle schools because in this period children are in a phase of pre-critical consciousness. For him, without development of spiritual aspects of people, education cannot fulfill its responsibility to human potential.

Until education focuses on the cultivation of character and development of moral sense of identity and moral imperative, until it begins with purposefully emphasize models of authentic moral authority and foster moral responsibility and agency, until it makes central the cultivation of expanding levels of empathy, progressively embracing the human race and until it is willing to entertain an explicit spiritual conversation about truth and meaning of life, it cannot really fulfill its responsibility to human potential (Possardt, 2004, p. 266).

Martin Ashley says that spirituality helps us to live a harmonious life with other things. He used the term spirituality in a broad sense which is prior to morality and beyond religion.

The spiritually developed person is able to perceive meaning and purpose in life, as well as a mission or sense of purposeful vocation. He or she feels that all life is sacred and experiences

feeling of wonder and awe which allow the perception of life as 'holy' (whether or not this is conceived in a religious sense) (Ashley, 2000, p. 141).

Fisher has mentioned that spirituality helps people in four interrelated domains of life- intra-personal domain, inter-personal domain, environmental domain and global domain. In intra-personal domain spirituality helps people in searching meaning, purpose and values of life within themselves and helps people to create self awareness and identity. In inter-personal domain spirituality helps people to relate the quality and depth of their inter-personal relationship among people in terms of morality, culture and religion and helps people to live harmoniously in society. Environmental domain connected to the people's feeling of wonder and awe and attitude towards the care and nurture of the nature. And in this domain spirituality helps to develop the notion of unity with the environment. Global domain includes relationship of people's self with cosmic force, transcendent reality or God and in this domain spirituality helps to leads to the faith towards the mystery of universe (Fisher, 1999).

In the Indian scenario as well, it is not only that thinkers have shown the importance and need for spirituality in human life, but also the need for spiritual education, even some of the education committees have stressed and recommended the need for spiritual education. Education commissions of different times have recommended the imparting of moral and spiritual instructions to children. The Central Advisory Board of Education (1943-46) recommended that it is the responsibility of home and community to provide spiritual and moral instruction to the young to building up their character (Venkataiah, 2007). The University Education Commission also recommended that spiritual instruction should be available to all levels of education including university. The authentic spiritual insight helps people to increase the integration in personal life, heightened power and universal love (Radhakrishnan, et al., 1962). The Indian Education Commission (1964-66) has also recommended the instruction on moral, social and spiritual values to children in all levels of study, "The Central and State Government should adopt measures to introduced education in moral, social and spiritual values in all institutions under their direct control" (Kothari, 1966, p. 28). In 1972, National Council of Educational Research and Training recommended that the curriculum should relate to the cultivation of moral and social values to develop the character of children (Venkataiah, 2007). Though the importance of imparting spiritual and moral education in school is often stressed and discussed by different commissions and thinkers, it is seldom practiced in terms of modern secular type formal educational curriculum.

In spite of this overarching acceptance for spiritual education, it is yet to be implemented in a formal manner. P.C. Eapen opines that the serious inadequacy in present system of education in India is the absence of systematic instruction of social, moral and spiritual values (Eapen, 2007). We argue

therefore that given the merits of spirituality, there is the need for spiritual education, which will help the present children in terms of realizing their true potential through education.

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Indian Perspective of Ecology

Anu Khanna

Abstract

Concept of ecology has become hot and passionate subject in recent times so much so it has been introduced as a subject of study in many streams. The need of this has been felt due to alarming situation of our eco-system. There is flood of literature, both scientific-scholarly and popular fashionable. Most of these works on ecology express deep concern and alarm about the irreparable damages that are being meted out to the environment and warn that if things do not change for better, that if man does not take care of this planet now, one day life on it will be miserable and eventually impossible. The concern for ecology can also be traced back in all world religions. In this paper I have tried to find out how different religion have taken this deep concern and how they can influence the people and show them the right path to live in harmony with the nature.

Keywords: dharma, karma, ahimsa, interdependence.

The scientific and dictionary meaning of ecology is study of the interaction between organism and their environment. The term ecology is derived from the two Greek words 'Okios' means home and 'logos' means understanding. Ecological questions are related with biology, evolution, philosophy as well as those from other sciences such as chemistry, physics and geology. More generally is related to philosophy and its diversified branches such as eco-spirituality, eco-theology, and eco-ethics. Ecology concerns itself with the interrelationship of living organism, plants, animals, and their environment.

The environment infact is composed of all physical biological and cultural elements. It is sum total of conditions which surround man at given space and time. The physical elements including space land forms, water bodies, climate, soil, mineral, rocket whereas biosphere is constituted of plants, animals, micro-organism and man, the cultural elements are man-made features which constitute the cultural environment.

Man is influenced by the environment and environment has also deep impact on man. So the relationship between man and environment is twofold. Man has modified the environment by his growing capacity to do so. Man-environment relationship may be able to provide clue to one of basic framework within which a scholar can look at world. Looking into this relationship one can search for more challenging answers cause and effect.

In modern times, ecology has become a very hot and passionate subject. It is so because our environment is facing irreparable damage at alarming rate. It is warning for human race that if the

things will not change for better, the life on earth will be miserable and eventually even impossible. So the study of ecology has a deep genuine concern.

This concern for ecology is not new but it has deep roots in past. All the world religion has shown deep concern for ecology. Religion has sacred duty and responsibility to reform the physical and spiritual wellbeing of human.

In the Indian philosophical thought, the concept of ecology is related with dharma and it is called dharmic ecology. There is no doubt that Indian religion in ancient and medieval times has provided a system of moral guidance for environmental preservation and conservation. Environmental ethics as propounded by seers was practiced not only by common people but also by rulers and kings.

According to Hindu scripture, everything in this universe is made up of five elements and these ingredients of the world also support the life on earth. The life on earth depends upon the purity and balance of the five elements that surround us, they have to be kept pure and in balance, for this some rituals, ceremonies are conducted such as yajans to purify the environment and atmosphere.

The subject of ecology is also related with theory of karma. A definition of law of karma is that each act, willfully performed leaves consequences in its wake. These consequences are called karam-phalla. The karam-phallas are not felt immediately, but they are always with karmas. This theory of karma is directly related with ecology. Environmental pollution is one example of karma of those people who thought they could continue polluting the environment without realizing the consequences of their actions for future generation. All actions are interrelated with and interconnected to what eventually happen in this world. Although we may not face the consequences individually, someone is going to be burdened by or benefited from our action. It is in this context that concepts of dharma and karma become meaningful.

In Sikhism also the concept of ecology has been dealt with great importance. The Sikh view is that spirit and matter are not antagonistic. Guru Nanak declared that spirit is only reality and matter is only a form of spirit. The chasm between the material and the spiritual is in minds of humans only. It is limitation of the human condition that spirit and matter appear as duality and their unity is not self-evident. The material universe is God's creation. Its origin was in God and it operates within God's Hukam. It is clearly expressed in (SGGS,P.143-144).

Neither angels, nor demons, nor men

Nor Siddhas, nor seekers on the earth (will remain)

The lord alone is, no other save Him is there, O none;

He alone is ; yea, He the one

Moreover it is also expressed as that ever thing is in Him and He is every thing

A bird has nothing to call his own

(But), the water and the trees (all over) are his:

God, the only Giver gives;

(For), He alone; yea, He alone is

In Sikh belief, a concern for environment is part of an integrated approach to life and nature. As all creation has the same origin and end, humans must have consciousness of their place in creation and relationship with the rest of creation. Humans should conduct through life with love, compassion and justice. Becoming one and being in harmony with god implies that humans endeavor to live in harmony with all of God's creation. The Gurus taught humans to be aware of the respect and dignity of all life, whether humans or not. Such a respect for life can fostered where one can first can recognize the divine spark within oneself, see in others, cherish it , nurture it and fulfill it.

Jaina religious belief in ahimsa or non-violence is the need of hour to protect life and environment. A proper understanding of the principle of ahimsa and its honest practice by humans can immensely ameliorate the health of environment. Ahimsa, for Jaina, is not just a social virtue and a religious rule; it is the very criterion norm of spirituality and religiosity. This can be summarized briefly in the words of Jina: The living world is afflicted, miserable, difficult to instruct and without discrimination. In this world full of pain and suffering by their different acts, see the benighted one cause great pain. It is this awareness of the pain and suffering in living beings that gives meaning to non-violence, the supreme code of Jain's life. It is clearly written in Acaranga Sutra 1.2.3. "That All living being love (own) life; desire (carve for) pleasure, and are averse to pain; they dislike injury to themselves; everybody is desirous of life, and to every living being, his own life is dear". So everyone should know and realize this that by hurting any living being one harm one's soul and will again and again be born as one of them. Jinas declared all those born from earth, water, wind, grass, trees, and corn; mobile beings as living. So jaina monks are instructed to lead a life of full control over walking, travelling and even speaking. Even they cover their mouth and which prevents them from injuring the bacteria in air by inhaling them. They walk barefooted when most needed or only for religious purpose so that they should not harm the insects or ants under their feet. Even before answering the call of nature they scrutinize the place. Jaina monastic jurisprudence is an inspiring model of an alternate life-style worth following though it is full of hardships. It is based on right attitude to life, self control carefulness free

of passion which is need of the hour. This type of life-style is required to save our mother earth from pollution degradation and other ecological problems.

Like jaina and Sikh thought Vedanta the old Hindu thought also believes in unity in diversity. Hindu scriptures speaks that man is not a supernatural being incarnated on this earth to conquer, dominate or to exploit it, but as an integral part of this planet and is intimately related to all the beings of this earth in an unbreakable and inseparable existential bond and moving towards a common destiny. Any misdeed done to living or non-living being in this world has to be paid in the same form in this birth or in next birth. This is the law of karma which is the backbone of Hinduism. So while dealing with others one is to be very careful in the present life. An example will illustrate how careful the Vedic man was in a ritual of cutting a tree for making a sacrificial post. He places a blade of grass on the spot where the axe falls and this blade of grass is invoked to protect the tree and take upon itself the pain of tree. The axe with which the tree is cut is commanded not to inflict injury on tree. The tree is praised as a beautiful creation and life giver, and the woodcutter begs pardon of the tree for the sin he is committing. The tree is also prayed not to hurt the sky by its upper part when it falls down, not to hurt the mid space by middle part and not to hurt the earth when it lies down.

In Hindu religion even all Gods or deities are associated with some or other kind of life force like animals, mountains, rivers or trees etc. There are innumerable stories to narrate how these entities are protected by their presiding gods and goddess. Any cruelty or savagery done to the material world, therefore, is also seen as dishonor and ignominy meted out to god. Above this even main trend in Indian thought is this that whole perceptible world is mere manifestation of one and only one Brahman. In other words Brahman writ large is world. So any discomfort or harm to any part will affect the whole body. Unless and until every member of this body, every life, including the life of animals, plants and trees, is happy, my own happiness is incomplete. Differences are perceived due to ignorance of this identity of all beings. With knowledge this ignorance can be removed. This sense of unity of life is also a powerful reason and stimulus to see in all beings one's own self and view and respect all beings equally.

Budhism stems from the teaching of Siddhartha Gautum, who lived in India during the sixth century B.C. core moral values in Budhism are to be found in the following precepts:

Abstaining from killing living creatures,

Abstaining from stealing,

Abstaining from lying

Abstaining from intoxicants.

These values are the basic requirement for the living of good life and the establishment of good community. Some of these are relevant to conservationist ethic. The respect for life and property, the rejection of hedonistic life styles and notion of truthfulness emphasizing consistency in thought and action are all ethical premises relevant for the development of environmental ethics. . All creatures are co-existent. The Buddhist precept concerning abstention from killing living creatures focuses attention on the ethical premise concerning the value of life. The Budha asked people to abstain from destroying the life of human beings and animals and also condemned the infliction of suffering and pain on living creatures. He was also critical of the pleasure of hunting. The kings were expected to provide protected territory not only for human beings but also for beasts of forests and birds of air. All this shows great sympathy for living creatures.

The very principle of pratyasamutpada enunciated by Budha means that all living beings are interdependent on each other Moreover this principle of Dependent Origination provides us the way to look at ecological problem by the way of cause and effect and further it suggests the way to end the problem from its origin. The four noble truths and eight fold path given by Budha is the simplest and best way to tackle the environmental problem of today.

The concern and interest for ecology is not new but it had always been a basic element and keynote of all religions. Infact , a deep concern for ecology is one of the leitmotifs of all religions. Look into the sacred scriptures of these religions, into the teaching of the founders and early prophets, sages and gurus: they all unequivocally admonish people to love and respect the environment and maintain a friendly and caring relation with nature. But alas! Today ‘man is using the resources given by mother earth mercilessly in the name of development and industrialization. If man will not retreat his footsteps and follow the path given and taught by religion then nothing can stop the coming catastrophe in the form of natural disasters. So the need of hour is to live in the harmony with co-sharer of this beautiful abode given to us by our ancestors and hand over this to next generation intact and undamaged. It is rightly said by Ian Somerhalder

“The environment is in us, not outside of us. The trees are our lungs, the rivers our bloodstream. We all are interconnected, and what you do to environment, ultimately you do to yourself.”

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Descartes on the Problem of Other Minds

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Abstract

This article discusses how the problem of other minds originated from Descartes' mind-body dualism as well as from empiricist's point of view. My primary focus is to explore Descartes' writing to find out whether he discusses the problem of other minds. It is ultimately found that he was never explicit in discussing about the problem of other minds. For him solving the problem of the external world was much more important than this problem. However, at the end we go a step further to show how Descartes would have solved the problem of other minds and come to the conclusion that there is no problem of other minds. Besides this Descartes also proved that infants have minds while animals and machines don't.

Key Words: Descartes, mind-body dualism, problem of other minds.

Introduction:

There are many historically important conceptions of which two important conceptions seem to be very much relevant to the problem of other minds. One has been understood from the Cartesian tradition, while the other has been considered from the empiricists' account. According to the Cartesians, I am composed of two independent substances, a body and a mind or soul. All of my physical characters like my shape, size and so on are different features that describe my body, and my mental features like my sensations, feelings, and different emotions, etc. belong to my mind. Since, my body and mind are independent substances and belong to me, therefore, they are logically non-transferable. Hence, myself is composed of two distinct substances, and their modifications belong to me, it can't, therefore, be shared by any other being other than myself.

Secondly, from the empiricist's standpoint, we find that I am fundamentally a material body which is causally associated with my thoughts, sensations, images, and so on. My physical attributes strictly belong to my body, that is, they are the characteristics of my body; but my sensations, feelings and so forth, are not physical. They are, instead contingently associated with certain parts of my body. For instance, a sensation of pain may be causally associated with my burned hand. That is, in other words, my physical attributes belong to my body in the sense that they define its structure and material make up; but my experiences form only a loosely unified class that is intimately associated with my body.

In other words, from the empiricists' point of view, the problem of other minds is described in the following manner: let us suppose that a given experience belongs to an individual is to say that it is causally associated with the body of that individual. That means every individual has a distinct body with distinct experiences. For example, whenever someone experiences the pain she/he cries or laughs when someone cracks a joke. Since this body is of a particular individual, he experiences pleasure or pain that is causally associated with his body. For example, the expression 'pain,' which is applied to a certain individual's experiences, can also be meaningfully applied to the experiences of some other body called 'Jones.' And for this reason, the idea that an individual's experiences and the experiences of Jones's might occasionally have the same kind of experiences, is perfectly intelligible. Since, the individual's experiences are causally associated with the body, a question may arise; how do I know that anybody other than me has the similar experience? In this manner, the problem of other minds has been raised by the empiricists.

From one perspective we can say that these are the two ways the problem of other minds originated from the historical perspective leaving aside the concept of solipsism. In the following we will see in detail how Descartes' mind-body dualism led to the problem of other minds from and later it was made explicit by Gerould de Cordemoy. But our primary focus will be to analyse extensively Descartes' writings and find out whether Descartes was interested in this problem and considered it as a unique problem that philosophers needed to discuss. In my view Descartes never considered this problem to be a special one.

1. Descartes and the Problem of Other Minds:

It was at the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the early eighteenth century that philosophers thought the problem of other minds as a major piece of the philosophical problem and felt the necessity to solve it. No one can doubt that the problem originated on account of Descartes' mind-body dualism as we mentioned above but it was in the twentieth-century philosophers who started reconsidering this as an important problem.

Thus, from the historical point of view, the problem of other minds began with Descartes, and on account of this, he is identified as the source of all problems related to mind-body dualism. In fact, Descartes never considered the problem of other minds as a major piece of the philosophical dispute and nowhere in his writings have we found any explicit explanation regarding the problem of other minds. Nonetheless, it is important to know how Descartes offered proofs for the existence of the external world which was his primary concern. The proofs for the external world can enable us to have knowledge about the existence of the other minds from Descartes' point of view.

Descartes began his philosophy by claiming that his mind exists without the necessity of the senses. The concept of 'I' therefore is thinking and not merely a sensing thing. After this, he began his methodical doubt to do the kind of philosophy that he wanted. But it is unfortunate that nowhere in his writings especially in his *The Meditations*, we find any explicit proofs on other minds. And it is also assumed that he never thought that there is a need to explain about the knowledge of other minds. For, solving the problem of the external world was enough for him to solve the problem of other minds, if at all he considered this to be a problem. Thus, Descartes never made an attempt to explain as to how he jumped into the first person plural many times after his Second Meditations, as if other human beings were known to him before. This shift from singular to plural suggests that Descartes was not so much concerned with the other minds problem. The most important problem for him was to prove the existence of the self, God and the external world and proving the external world was enough for him to show the existence of the others as well.

The absence of such a proof troubled the seventeenth-century philosophers, and it was Gerauld de Cordemoy who was to be credited to have given an unambiguous formulation of the problem of other minds. Cordemoy in his *Discourse Physique de la Parole* (discourse) wrote, "Among the Bodies, I see in the World, I perceive some that are in all things like mine, and I confess, I have a great inclination to believe, that they are united to minds, as mine is. But when I come to consider, that my Body hath so many operations distinct from those of my mind and that nothing of what makes it subsist depends at all on her. I think that I have at least ground to doubt, that these bodies are united to minds until I have examined all their actions and I do even see that by the maxims of good sense I shall be obliged to believe, that they have no minds, if they do only such things, whereof I have found in myself that the body alone may be the cause."ⁱ

In this way, Cordemoy developed the epistemological problem by specifically taking for granted the knowledge of his mind and body and then finding ground to doubt the existence of others. One thing that is important to ask here is; why did Cordemoy think that it was essential to give justification for the problem of other minds? What made Cordemoy think that there is a special necessity to prove the existence of other minds?

According to Gideon Manning, "Like a work of mathematics that explains how to perform mathematical proofs but fails to prove the Pythagorean Theorem, Descartes' Meditations explains how to gain knowledge but fails to prove that other minds exist. In the former instance, a failure to prove the Pythagorean Theorem may be an oversight for someone interested in the Pythagorean Theorem, but it is hardly a flaw in work showing how to perform mathematical proofs."ⁱⁱ

That means, Descartes proof for the existence of the external world subdued the problem related to the knowledge of other minds. Though the arguments Descartes put forth to gain knowledge and more particularly the problem of the external world was successful, and it would also be helpful if Descartes had taken a note of the problem of other minds. But because it was ignored therefore the problem related to knowledge was superseded, and its solving was given more priority.

Now, what Cordemoy must have understood was that Descartes' claims in *Meditations* didn't have any answer regarding the problem of other minds while he discussed about the problem of the external world. Because, Descartes first denied the existence of the world, sky, mind and so on and then he went on to prove the existence of bodies. And again, he said: "Yet although the senses occasionally deceive us on objects which are very small or in the distance, there are many other beliefs about which doubt is quite impossible. Even though they are derived from the senses, for example, that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hands, and so on."ⁱⁱⁱ

Descartes though admits the shortcoming of knowledge obtained through sensation, and yet he admits the impossibility of certain knowledge going wrong even though these are obtained through sensation. Descartes further explains that God's knowledge and the knowledge of the self is something privileged while rest other knowledge can be obtained through inference. But this type of proofs perhaps did not satisfy Cordemoy for which he went for the special proofs for the existence of other minds. Cordemoy also must have thought that the solution to the problem of dualism and external world did not resolve the problem of other minds.

Now, let me try to examine particularly some of the most important passages of Descartes' writings from *Meditations* and *Discourse on Method* analysing how Descartes would look into the problem of other minds even though he never directly engaged himself in this problem.

Descartes in his *Meditations* writes, "One who is experiencing (*cogitate*) cannot but exist while he is experiencing,' is one of a number of 'common notions,' 'axioms,' or 'eternal truths.' Or, similarly, that the 'principle,' 'whatever experiences are or exist,' is learned through his observing in his case the impossibility of having experience without existing."^{iv}

So, to have experience one has to exist but how can we know the experiences of others which would prove their existence and thereby their having minds? This is a matter of our concern, but Descartes was never concerned about it because for him giving justification of the existence of the world was important and so, we may say that he only has hinted upon the problem of other minds in the following passage of his *Meditations*, "We say that we see the wax itself, if it is there before us, not that we judge it to be there from its color or shape; and this might lead me to conclude without more ado that

knowledge of the wax comes from what the eye sees, and not from the scrutiny of the mind alone. But then if I look out of the window and see men crossing the square, as I happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which could conceal automatons. I judge that they are men. And so, something which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of judgment which is in my mind.”^v

Just as the ‘scrutiny of the mind’ and the ‘faculty of judgment’ are needed to know the wax itself, in the same manner Descartes doesn’t suggest that whenever we see men and thereby bodies with mind needs a special kind of inference. So, what we find in this passage is that our mind can judge and infer what we may call it as ‘seeing’ even if ‘seeing’ is not a simple process. What we find in this wax example is that, the importance of senses has little to do as compared to our ‘faculty of judgment’ though it seems that in the beginning, it plays a major role. The mind can know that what we ‘see’ from our windows are men and not automation. Descartes thus is not suggesting whenever we see human beings we see the body and thereby mind needs a special kind of investigation.

What Descartes says in this regard is that besides the knowledge of ourselves and the knowledge of God’s existence, we always have difficulty in inferring that which is beyond our ideas. As a result of this, it seems that there is no distinctive epistemological problem of other minds as our clear and distinct perceptions provide us everything we need for resolving the epistemic difficulties. It is in the same way we come to know the problem of the external world and of other minds. It has been noticed that some commentators have tried to identify an answer to other minds problem in Descartes writings. However, Descartes had good reason to limit his attention to the skeptical problem of external world because the same strategies which he applied for acquiring knowledge about the external world also can be applied to the knowledge of other minds.

In the Second Meditations, Descartes proves the existence of mind and in the subsequent meditation, Descartes introduces self and consciousness to show that we are aware of ourselves as thinking beings. In this regard, we will enquire further how this has been understood by Descartes.

Let us now examine the notion of ‘self’ or the ‘body’ that was understood during Descartes’ time. According to the Scholastic Aristotelianism, the hylomorphic view of the conception of the body was that matter and form are the basic components of all the natural bodies. It means, matter and form will be present in every natural body, whether be it a rock, a chair, or even the embryo, the fully functioning human body or the body of a corpse. Aristotelians then went on to identify forms with souls. The Latin word for ‘soul’ is *anima*, from which the English word ‘animated’ derived. Souls, in turn, were differentiated from one another according to the functions they played. For example, a vegetative soul is in the form of a body that can grow and take its nutrition, and so plants have vegetative souls.

Animals that move and interact with the world through sense experience have a motive or sensitive souls. Human beings, who can contemplate and have the ability to rationalize, have rational souls or minds.

Thus, roughly speaking, whereas plants have one kind of soul in forming their matter, animals have another kind of soul that includes the functions of the vegetative soul, and human beings have yet another kind of soul that includes the functions of the other two. In each case, it would be wrong to identify the soul with the matter, but it would also be wrong to believe that living plants, animals or human bodies exist without their appropriate souls. So, this shows that mere human body is impossible. Though Descartes made a distinction between mind and body in his Sixth Meditation, yet he always tried to refrain from the skepticism about other minds, for him, to have a physical body would mean to possess a mind. Descartes assumption is that, human bodies will have minds unless and until they are proven to be wrong. But how are we to understand non-human animals that are capable of intelligent behaviour even if they are unable to speak any language? And secondly, how to understand human beings whose brains are completely damaged, and they are perennially in a vegetative state? These people may be in a coma and later regain their memory and behave normally or not. This however will not be taken up here as it will invite a number of other philosophical problems. I, therefore, will concentrate only those things that relate to other minds in Descartes' writings.

Descartes is also challenged to prove how infants have minds and he says that "Infants are in a different case from animals; I should not judge that infants were endowed with minds unless I saw that they were of the same nature as adults, but animals never develop to a point where any certain sign of thought can be detected in them."^{vi}

Here we don't find the clarity in the use of the term 'nature' which therefore has been used ambiguously. In the Sixth Meditations, Descartes discusses the various meaning of 'nature.' In the beginning, Descartes used the term 'nature' generally, but later he referred 'nature' to God himself, but when 'nature' was applied to human beings he considered it as; "the totality of things. [*complexionem eorum omnium*]."^{vii} So, from the above, we can be of sure that Descartes must have used the term 'nature' as 'the totality of things.' However, there is no explicit answer to this in Descartes secondary literature.

For John Cottingham '*eorum omnium*' is the 'totality of things.' For him it may be like this: "By my own nature, in particular, I understand nothing other than the *complexion* of all those things [*complexionem eorum omnium*]."^{viii} Yet we are not clear what this *complexion* means. The sense of 'nature' had been taken into consideration at Salerno where the Professors at Salerno translated it as temperament, which would mean a combination of qualities which maintains the temperaments of

living beings. Temperament or complexion may be considered as the combination of elements like water, air, earth, etc. which possess both qualities. Water, for example, possesses the quality of hardness and liquidity, the earth has the quality of smell and dryness, moisture, etc. Thus their combination gives birth to fundamental qualities of things and the mixture of these elements results in a mixture of fundamental qualities. Thus, when we understand the body as the combination of all these elements, they then become the fundamental qualities of living beings and especially human beings. So, the nature we share with infants is that we share the same complexion. We share the same bodily constitution. So, we can say that infants have minds even though they display no apparent signs of the mental apparatus.

There are other philosophers who too have been bothered by the question whether infants have minds. So infants not only don't but can't form any belief regarding other minds either by means of reasoning or analogical or anything in that regard nor can animals. Both infants and animals do have such beliefs. Infants don't infer or analyse by seeing a foreign organism whether they are accompanied by an angry or benevolent mind as they are not at all aware of it. The same thing also can be told regarding cats and dogs, but at times we find that domestic animals are sensitive to the emotions and volitions of the human beings with whom they live and have their existence. For at times we find that they respond to rebukes and within their limitation, they try to do whatever is possible.

It is true that infants have tactual sense, but they don't know how other senses like visual or olfactory give us the belief to have knowledge of other minds or selves. Though they may have beliefs for example whenever you want to take it up into your arms, it cries, but we don't know whether it has any knowledge of beliefs about the foreign body it sees. We, however, can this much be able to say that, infant may be able to incorporate certain types of behaviour, mostly of facial expressions and thereby can realize the existence of other beings.

According to John Laird, "The child discovers that his nurse and his mother will respond, and therefore, he comes very early to distinguish between human behaviour and other kinds of behaviour. Through the sense and experience the child comes to distinguish between responsive and unresponsive beings, and when he comes to distinguish himself as himself, he is able, by a gradual unconscious logic, to believe without a question that responsive beings have a like nature to his own."^{ix}

One may doubt the position of Laird because there is no mechanism to find out whether a child can differentiate human behaviour as distinguished from the behaviour of another animal. Nonetheless, it may be possible that as the child grows with others, he or she may feel that they both have similar nature but there is nothing by means of which we may be able to prove it. And there is a possibility that the child by means of gradual process may be able to understand other human beings.

So, animated bodies are not the result that we first come to know that there are bodies. We rather infer them because of their different qualities attached to their bodies like colour, shape, size and so on. But this doesn't mean that a baby will be able to make a distinction between her mother's mind and body, but it will certainly be able to comprehend that its mother is different from rest other beings, be it animal or other human creatures. Thus, if the child were not to know this, then its behaviour would have certainly become different from its usual behaviour. There is nothing contradictory in maintaining that the child is aware of minds long before it knows that there are minds, because to consider something as real is different from determining something in its real nature and trying to understand it.

In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes while proving the existence of material things of this world describes that we are certain about the knowledge of our existence and the knowledge of God's existence because they are very much evident to us. But when it comes to the knowledge of the world of objects or the existence of other minds they may only be considered as possible objects of knowledge. For, to prove their existence we have to invoke our cognitive faculty. This, however, doesn't guarantee us that we will have certain knowledge of them. Hence, when it comes to the knowledge of other minds we are in the similar situation in a sense, we can't say that we have certain knowledge of the minds of others.

Our critical examination of the *Meditations*, therefore, proved that nowhere Descartes mentioned that there exists the problem of other minds. Though somehow or the other we found how similar problems have been discussed and solutions have been sought out in the manner Descartes wanted. However, he never considered the problem of other minds as a distinct problem other than the problem of the external world.

Now, turning back to the Descartes' *Discourse on Method*, he writes, "Even though such machines might do some things as well as we do them, or perhaps even better, they would inevitably fail in others. Which would reveal that they were acting not through understanding but only from the disposition of their organs. For, whereas reason is a universal instrument which can be used in all kinds of situations, their organs need some particular disposition for each particular action. Hence, it is morally impossible for a machine to have enough different organs to make it act in all the contingencies of life in the way in which our reason makes us act."^x

Descartes' intention is very clear in distinguishing between human beings and machines. For, it is interesting to see that these days machines can do marvellous things and can even outperform in various ways as against human beings. But they are not quite successful in performing varieties of actions that are outside of their pre-set or designed program.

That means, in whichever way they may be designed they can't do anything beyond what is pre-set. However, we human beings are capable of handling any situation even outside of our normal behaviour. Though we may fail in this regard yet, our attempts will have a positive result or the kind of effect we wanted to achieve and it is our reasoning capacity that helps us to do that. That is why Descartes calls reason as a 'universal instrument' as we just saw in the above. And we may consider machines to be a particular instrument because even if a machine performs everything that a human being would do yet, it is highly questionable that it can do everything as we expect them to do, while human beings can do beyond their expectation as they are endowed with distinct rational capacity.

Hence, it is our reasoning ability that distinguishes us from animals and machines. We don't find in Descartes' writing that there are human bodies without minds. Thus, whenever he talks about mindless bodies, he only refers to animals and machines and not human beings. So, the example where he talks about 'gazing into the street through a window and finding human beings' is that they are not machines or mindless creatures but human beings. Descartes thus making a distinction between human beings composed of both mind and body from one perspective and machines and non-human animals another. Descartes thus concluded that automata don't possess mind, while human beings possess mind having reasoning ability. And mind according to him is not something that has some role to play about our souls but it refers to the soul itself which refers to our thinking ability.

Apart from this, language also has a great role in the life of human beings. Human beings not only think but also speak and that is why Descartes says that human beings are not machines and if machines were to be given the form of monkeys or any other creatures then we wouldn't be able to distinguish them. But because of their lack of reasoning capacity, we can know them. Descartes thus equates machines and non-rational beings and given the outward form machines can be equally like an animal without mind. Animals without minds are considered as *bête-machines*. So, from Descartes perspective machines may be understood as animals or monkeys. But at the same time, Descartes is agnostic regarding this because he only makes an epistemological claim regarding machine monkeys. In so far as non-human animals are mindless bodies or *bête-machines*, they are brought under the category of automata. Thus, for Descartes, a soul-less living body is an automaton. So, when we look at from our window into the street and find that there are living creatures moving around, we don't consider them to be *bête-machines*.

There is also, however, the conception of *homme-machines* which would mean mindless body. But is there any possibility of automaton having a living mindless body? Would God create a living human body without mind in it and at the same time don't fall into the category of *bête-machines* or human beings? If they were so, then we would certainly consider them as human beings who would neither fall

into the category of *bête-machines* nor would fall into the category of *homme-machines*. We would have therefore, considered them as human beings, but Descartes doesn't go further regarding this.

John Locke interprets man in two ways; on the one hand, man he considers as a human being and on the other hand, he considers as a person endowed with mind, a rational being. For Locke, the human being is a thinking being who can reason and reflect. Man, he considers as a mere creature having a certain form. But Descartes doesn't use the term 'man' in such manner. For him, the term man is composed of body and soul. And unlike Locke, he never uses the term 'man' to imply to a certain form of an animal. For Descartes, a man or a human being has both body and mind. Descartes did not see the need to distinguish between a human being and a person. Both were comprehended under his term 'man.' Since Descartes doesn't make any distinction in this regard, he also doesn't make any distinction between machines and monkeys or other animals. Because according to him language is such thing that it is privileged only to human beings. It is human beings who have the ability to make use of language in their communication. That means, it is rational human beings who are endowed with the ability to speak the language while animals are deprived of this.

Descartes in the *Discourse on Method* stated that "For it is a remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts."^{xi}

The first test of a real human being, therefore, is that human beings use language. It is possible that *homme-machine* may talk like human beings, but there is no reason to suppose that it will respond to every situation in a manner we human beings would respond. Secondly, the reason is universal, and it plays an important role in forming our judgments and speech. And there is not a human being who doesn't make use of his reason in his day to day life. But a machine can't do so. It is possible that a machine may be able to perform far better than human beings in a certain respect, but it will always fall short some way or the other in comparison to human beings. Human beings can be flexible and can adapt to any situation based on their reasoning ability but that we won't find in machines. So two things that are most important here to note is that Descartes leaves out the real possibility that a non-human animal may possess language; and secondly, Descartes rules out the real possibility that human animals lack reason. This, therefore, leads to our conclusion that only human beings can have minds. Thus, Descartes was fully convinced that all human animals have minds.

Descartes also recognises that animals such as parrots and magpies utter words just like ourselves, nevertheless, he concludes that they cannot speak as we do because they don't think as we do. Thus, Descartes concludes that all human animals have minds. Descartes thinks that there is also a logical possibility that non-human animal may have a soul or a human body mayn't have a soul. But if this

were to be possible then how are we going to make a distinction between a man having a soul and a creature without a soul? Descartes here seems to say that from the metaphysical point of view, God is considered as benevolent and supremely good. And on his gracious account, we wouldn't misunderstand human beings otherwise.

Descartes also makes a distinction between human being on the one hand and other lower creatures on the other hand because we human being too share certain things like lower creatures i.e. nourishment and growth. But does this mean that they too are endowed with the mind? Descartes denies this because mind for him is a kind of thinking ability and it is gifted only to human beings. Hence, even if the lower animals are endowed with souls yet, they lack the reasoning ability. Even if other animals behave just like we human beings do, yet it is human beings who are capable of behaving in a better manner because of their reasoning ability.

Hence, even if non-human animals behave in the manner like as we human beings do, yet they never make use of reason as their tool and so we can't expect them in the manner we human beings do. In this regard, Descartes states that "It is nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs, just as a clock, which is composed of wheels and weights can tell the hours and measure the time more correctly than we can do in all our wisdom."^{xii}

And further, in a letter to the Earl of Newcastle he writes that "If they thought as we do, they (non-human animals) would have an immortal soul as we do as well, which is not likely, because there is no reason at all to believe it of some animals without believing it of them all. And several of them, such as oysters, sponges, etc. are too imperfect for us to be able to believe that these would possess a mind."^{xiii}

Thus, we can conclude that non-human animals are not endowed with souls. For, if we were to believe that some animals have and some animals don't, then it would be difficult for us to decide and it would again lead to further problems. That is the reason Descartes again says, "When one comes to know how greatly they differ [that is, the soul of man and the brute], we understand much better the reasons which go to prove that our soul is in its nature entirely independent of the body, and in consequence that it is not liable to die with it."^{xiv}

We are here reminded of whatever we said earlier that there are different types of souls and there is a distinction between human soul and the souls of the rest of the creatures. The souls of the rest of the creatures die with the death of those creatures while the souls of human beings are not. And since, Descartes includes machines with animal creatures, therefore, they too don't have souls like human beings.

Earlier we found Descartes saying that ‘whatever experiences are or exist,’ and he learned through his observing in his case the impossibility of having experience without existing. But the question arises, how can one discover that there are experiences that occur other than one’s own and that such experiences belong to some other mind?

There are two ways we can make such discovery; one is direct, through sensory or extrasensory perception, and secondly, indirectly, through inference. Interestingly, Descartes doesn’t seem to find any difficulty in admitting the first alternative as a logical impossibility to the solution of the problem. However, he gives no reason to believe that the direct perception of another mind is an empirical possibility. The passage that describes the wax example may be one of the reasons for this. The following passage of Descartes’ letter to Henry More also may help us to find out why he accepts sensory perception as a solution.

“Being perceptible by the senses seems to be merely an external description of sensible substance. Moreover, it is not coextensive with such substance; if it concerns our senses, then it does not apply to smallest particles of matter; if it concerns other senses such as we might imagine God to construct, it might well apply also to angels and souls. I find it no easier to imagine sensory nerves so fine that they could be moved by the smallest parts of matter than to imagine a faculty enabling our minds to sense or perceive other minds directly.”^{xv}

Thus it is our external perception and our senses that are enough for us to give us the knowledge of the existence of other minds. If God were to construct different senses for us to know about other minds then through that special senses we would also know angels and so on. And such senses also would be applicable to angels, I mean they too would possess such sense which is not the case. Therefore, from Descartes perspective, if an individual wants to have the knowledge of other minds, then he will have to know empirically and non-deductively i.e. in his case. So, if he comes to know that for me to have a mind, I, first of all, need to have a body and therefore, experiences and if he proves this, then there will be no difficulty in admitting that there exists another being who has a mind. Thus, other minds problem, according to Descartes, is to be determined using non-deductive argument. This brings to our conclusion that; Descartes was not interested in the problem of other minds even though we see that in some part of his writings, he presents this case keeping in mind something important to solve.

Conclusion:

In our enquiry into Descartes writings we found that Descartes wasn’t interested to treat the problem of other minds as a kind of special problem. For him, solving the problem of the external world was important than anything else. For him, whenever we find a human body, we necessarily find mind in it.

And therefore, after solving the problem related to mind-body dualism he immediately made use of first person plural number in his Second Meditation. We also found that Descartes never considered machines and other animals to have minds even if they outperform human beings. It is their reasoning ability that makes human beings distinct from any other beings of this earth. It is reason which is the universal instrument and this enables human beings to have dialogue with one another and therefore there arises no problem of other minds. Therefore he considered infants to have minds and have also the knowledge of other minds. Besides this he also doesn't consider other lower creatures to have minds because of the fact that if we consider some then we are obliged to consider all, which is not justifiable. Descartes therefore had no interest in solving the problem of other minds.

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David Hume: Some Metaethical Reflections

Tarang Kapoor

Abstract

In the present paper I argue that historical metaethical debate on Cognitivism/Non-cognitivism has been developed under the influence of writings of David Hume. Hume's understanding of moral psychology i.e. the role of reason and passions in generating moral concepts, moral epistemology, distinction between impressions and ideas, is/ought distinction, motivation theory, desire/ belief distinction and others have been studied to bring out the significant ethical conclusions. The paper traces the origins of the above-mentioned significant concepts and undertakes a detailed study of several arguments in Hume's writings. Hume logically argued that morality neither originates in relations of ideas nor matters of fact. These views played a pivotal role in shaping the early emotivist A.J. Ayer's thesis namely; moral judgements do not express beliefs. Humean moral psychology influenced not only non-cognitivist C.L. Stevenson and R.M. Hare who argued that all moral judgements contain an emotive element, which distinguishes them from factual judgements but also influenced the Cognitivist thesis i.e. J.L. Mackie's anti-realism, G.E. Moore's non-naturalism and several other theories in metaethics.

In the beginning of the 20th century, G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein played a significant role in heralding a "linguistic turn" to philosophy and the way of philosophizing. Moore claimed that ethical inquiry should deal with understanding the meaning of moral terms. Along the same lines, early Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and meaning provided an impetus for the linguistic turn to the discussions on ethics. The legacy of Moore, early Wittgenstein's ideas on philosophizing, David Hume's understanding of psychology and the understanding of these ideas by Logical Positivists provided the much-required foresight into the metaethical enquiry by the analytic philosophers. This phenomenon helped in generating interest in metaethics. Therefore, the domain of ethical enquiry shifted from normative ethical theories (substantive morality) to the metaethical theories (nature of moral propositions and status of moral terms).

David Hume's views on epistemology, metaphysics and morality have influenced the development of a range of metaethical theories. In the first half of the twentieth century, the predominant metaethical theory was Non-cognitivism. However, the later half of the century paved way for Cognitivism.¹ The influence of the logico-linguistic approach to answering questions of ethics gave rise to interconnected

metaethical debates relating to the status of moral judgements.² The debate on Moral Absolutism/Moral Relativism, on the one hand and Cognitivism/Non-cognitivism on the other are responses to the question of the status of moral concepts and moral judgements from two separate points of view. The former, when the question is approached from the point of view of metaphysics and the latter, when it is approached from the point of view of epistemology. The metaphysical approach to the question is interested in discovering the metaphysical status of moral concepts and what is it that accounts for the truth or falsity of moral judgements. The epistemological approach looks into the question of the origin/source of these concepts. Thus raising the question, where do our moral concepts originate and how does this impact the nature of moral judgements? The debate on Moral Absolutism and Moral Relativism is about the metaphysical status of moral concepts and is nested in the debate on Cognitivism and Non-cognitivism that is about the epistemological status of moral concepts.³

When it comes to ascertaining the source of morality we encounter questions like- what motivates our moral actions? What motivates us to judge something as morally right or wrong? What influences our motive to act or restrain from an act? How do human beings become aware of morals? And so on. Traditionally, when it comes to answering these questions we see that philosophers, like, Plato have given primacy to reason over passions. However, Hume has argued that ancient as well as modern philosophy has been founded on the principle of reason. Metaphysicians have always ascribed the direction of the will exclusively to reason and have denied the influence of experience in motivating the will.⁴ There is a presumption of the supremacy of reason over experience. “Eternity, invariableness, and divine origin” is ascribed to the former and “blindness, inconstancy, and deceitfulness” is ascribed to the latter.⁵ However, David Hume believed that out of the two divisions of philosophy, namely: speculative and practical; morality belongs to the latter and therefore it is influenced by our passions and actions.

1.1 David Hume’s Moral Epistemology: Distinction between Impressions and Ideas

Hume traces the origin of morality to experience and acknowledges the importance of sentiments, feelings or emotions in determining moral judgements. In order to understand Hume’s arguments for the primacy of passions over reason, in the sphere of morality, we shall take recourse to his empiricism. Hume’s empiricism challenges the assumptions of rationalists in the sphere of metaphysics, epistemology and morality. There is no way in which we can formulate ultimate principles about the nature of things as well as human beings. In order to understand the science of human nature one has to observe and experience human action and reactions in different circumstances and situations.

Hume traces the origin of all knowledge to experience. Every action, including the judgements regarding moral good and evil, can be comprehended under perception. In this context, Hume asserts, “nothing is ever present to the mind but its perceptions; and that all the actions of seeing, hearing, judging, loving, hating, and thinking, fall under this denomination.”⁶ Perceptions are of two kinds; impressions and ideas. Impressions are original existence i.e. passions, pleasures and pains, which consist of impressions received by the senses from external objects. They arise in the soul, originally, and are uncaused by any other cause. Unlike impressions, ideas represent impressions and are caused by them. A passion has an original existence i.e. when I am hungry I am possessed with that passion itself. Till this extent my passion does not have reference to any other object except for the original existence. This passion cannot be contradictory to truth and reason because contradiction, if any, consists in the disagreement of ideas not impressions.⁷

1.2 Role of Reason vs. Passion

After a brief discussion of impressions and ideas we now move to the pertinent question concerning morals- “whether it is by means of our ideas or impressions that we distinguish between vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praiseworthy?”⁸ In order to answer this question we shall take recourse to another important distinction put forward by Hume. He divides the objects of our inquiry between ‘matters of fact’ and ‘relations of ideas.’⁹ First, propositions concerning ‘relations of ideas’ are proved by demonstration and known apriori. They can be discovered independent of experience and their truth does not depend on existence of things in the world. It is important to note that relations between ideas are discovered by reason and they never cause any action. We gather that abstract or demonstrative reasoning does not influence our will or actions. Because the abstract reasoning engages with the world of ideas about abstract relations between ideas i.e. mathematics, mechanics and others but the will is placed in the real world. Secondly, the truths regarding matters of fact are discovered via experience on the basis of the way things are in the world. Their denial does not imply contradiction. However, we cannot establish matters of fact through demonstration because it is not contradictory to say that the course of nature may change. Also, it would be fallacious (circular) to look for the proof in experience itself.¹⁰

Moreover, reason is merely the discovery of truth or falsehood, which consists in agreement or disagreement either to the relations of ideas or matter of fact.¹¹ On the other hand passions are not susceptible to agreement or disagreement because they are original facts and realities, which are independent of other passions, volitions and others. Moreover, impressions are not representative of

anything and therefore they are not capable of being true and false. While relations of ideas are responsible for representation or misrepresentation and therefore capable of being true or false but actions are incapable to being true or false on the basis of conformity with reason. Therefore reason is incapable of preventing or producing any action by rejecting or confirming it. Hence moral distinctions cannot be derived from reason. "Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals."¹²

At this juncture, it is important to look at Hume's understanding of passion. For Hume, passion is akin to impressions; an original existence, or modification of existence, which does not possess any representational quality.¹³ A state of passion possesses us in our entirety and can be understood through instances like; 'I am angry', 'I am happy', 'I am resentful', 'I weigh 60 kgs' and many others. Passions have a direct influence on the Will. For instance, If I get injured due to X's mistake then I develop a feeling of resentment towards X due to which I desire X's evil. We see that our passion, desires, affections are original existences, complete in themselves, which incapable of being true or false and therefore it is impossible for them to be either contrary or conformable to reason. Instead the chief motivating factor of all our actions is passion i.e. feelings, impulses, affections, sentiments and emotions. In our day-to-day life we observe that "To know that to do something is one's duty does not necessarily move one to do it unless one is actuated by a desire or feeling to perform such a duty."¹⁴ Therefore morality is determined by sentiments and reason (an inactive principle) does not have a direct influence on our passions.

It is in this context that Hume emphatically asserts, "first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passions in the direction of the will".¹⁵ We can understand this with an example; when we are in pain, we feel an emotion of aversion or propensity. However, this impulse does not arise from reason, but it is only directed by it. Relation of cause and effect is reasoning concerning matters of fact. The role of reason is a limited one of discovering this connection and their objects i.e. relational chain of cause and effect behind the action.¹⁶ From here we conclude that reason can neither produce any action nor is capable of preventing volition nor even disputing the preference of any emotion. The impulse of passion can be opposed only by a contrary impulse. In this way, our discussions about morality; vice and virtue, right and wrong and others are influenced by passions (impressions) instead of reason (ideas). "When I receive any injury from another, I often feel a violent passion or resentment, which makes me desire his evil and punishment, independent of all considerations of pleasure and advantage of myself."¹⁷ Hume argues for primacy of passion over

reason and declares, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."¹⁸

Reason cannot oppose or retard the impulse of passion. It can be opposed or retarded only by a contrary impulse as only an impulse can have an original influence on the will. Therefore moral distinctions do not arrive from reason and we see that reason cannot be solely responsible for the motivation of action. We mostly behave under the influence of some passion, which possesses us in spite of knowing which possible action to perform. At times, even the reasoning that acting in one particular way will ensure the greatest possible good does not influence us. It is in this context that Hume argues, "Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason."¹⁹ However, reason can influence our conduct only in two ways, "either when it excites a passion, by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it or when it discovers the connection of causes and effect, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion."²⁰ Moreover, Hume argues that passions themselves cannot be unreasonable and it is only that our judgements about passions are so. This is possible only in two senses.

First, a passion, for instance, 'hope' or 'grief' is founded on the suppositions of existence of objects, which do not exist. They are just mistakes of facts which are involuntary. Sometimes I commit a mistake in choosing certain wrong means to reach the passion. For e.g. At times I see a fruit at a distance and by mistake take it to be pleasant and delicious. I desire the sweet dish, which has an excellent taste but when I am convinced of my mistake my longing for the sweet dish ceases. Secondly, we deceive ourselves in our judgement of cause and effect. Error in understanding the connection of causes and effect cannot be the source or deciding factor for morality. When an agent becomes aware of the falsity of one's supposition or the insufficiency of means then reason overpowers passions without any opposition from them.²¹ But if the passion is not founded on either of the two conditions then our understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. E.g. it is not unreasonable to choose one's total harm and act out of passion without calculating the consequences of one's action.

1.3 Desire vs. Belief Distinction

Hume puts forward many arguments against the inefficiency of reason in determining moral knowledge. He argues, "it is impossible that the distinction between moral good and evil can be made by reason; since that distinction has an influence upon our actions, of which reason alone is incapable."²² Also, "Since reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition, I infer, that the same faculty is

as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion.”²³ Also, Hume shows that our desires and not beliefs (which is a result of reason) about the world govern our morality or moral decisions. One such argument in which he shows the redundancy of reason in determining moral knowledge runs as follows:

1. “All claims that can be known by reason are either empirical matters of fact or conceptual truths.
2. Moral claims do not represent empirical matters of fact.
3. Moral claims do not represent conceptual truths.
4. Therefore reason cannot give us moral knowledge.”²⁴

1.4 The Is /Ought Distinction

Another seminal concept brought forward by Hume is the is/ought distinction. There is a significant difference between what is the case (descriptive statement) and what ought to be the case (prescriptive statement). Although some moral philosophers believe that from what is the case we can derive what ought to be the case but Hume denies any such move. He argues that we cannot offer any explanation of how ought statements are derivable from is statements. We have already seen that for Hume the source or origin of morality lies in experience. According to Hume it is impossible to deduce ‘ought’ from ‘is’. Prescriptive moral judgement, namely: “the action of killing an innocent living being is immoral” cannot be derived from encountering the state of affairs where we witness children burning a cat alive. One does not commit any logical error if he fails to derive the former on the basis of the latter. Reason has a limited role in the discovery of truth and falsehood. Errors of reasons can be of two kinds i.e. misunderstanding related to relations of ideas or misunderstanding related to matters of fact.

1.5 Morality neither originates in Relations of Ideas nor Matters of Fact

Also, we can see another argument to point out the relations that constitute morality or obligation; wherein they consist and how do we know them. The principles of virtue and vice operate on the will and influence it. In the case of conflict we see that one dominates over the other depending upon the general character or the present disposition of the person. If virtue and vice or morality of an action were to be discovered by understanding then they must be objects of either matters of fact or relations of ideas.²⁵ Moral principles do not originate in matters of fact, as they are not capable of being demonstrated and being grasped through reason. We do not find motives, volitions, thoughts, vice, virtue and other passions in the action or its description. The vice doesn’t lie in the object itself and one can find it only after

reflection over a sentiment towards one's own action. This matter of fact is an "object of feeling, and not of reason. It lies in yourself and not in the object."²⁶

On the one hand if we take the essence of morality as lying in relation of ideas i.e. resemblance, contrariety, degree in quality and proportions in quantity and number, then a contradiction arises. If the essence of morality were to lie in these relations then the argument will be that they belong to matter in the same manner as they belong to actions, passions and volitions. Hume argues:

".....moral good and evil belong only to the actions of the mind, and are derived from our situation with regard to external objects, the relations from which these moral distinctions arise must lie only between internal actions and external objects, and must not be applicable either to internal actions, compared among themselves, or to external objects, when placed in opposition to other external objects."²⁷

These relations can neither belong to internal actions nor to external objects solely. In the case of the former we might be held guilty of crimes in ourselves independent of our situation with respect to the individual. In the case of the latter if these moral relations could be applied to external objects then it would follow that even the inanimate objects would be capable of morality. However, it is impossible to fulfil this condition of rational measure of right and wrong because we cannot explain the relations on which this distinction may be founded.²⁸

Also, at this juncture we shall take recourse to the relation between the action and the will. Hume has already shown that no relation can ever influence any action i.e. the fact that ingratitude towards parents is immoral cannot be discovered by demonstrative reasoning through relations of ideas. Instead when we reflect on this action we feel an internal sense of guilt by some sentiment. To explain this we choose an inanimate object i.e. oak tree. When we drop its seed it produces a sapling, which eventually springs up and grows and destroys the parent tree. Here the former tree is the cause of latter's existence and the latter is cause of destruction of the former. Can we compare this relation with ingratitude in human beings? In the case of human beings (killing of a parent) will is the cause from which the action of killing is derived and it produces the same relations, while in case of trees the same relation arises from other principles i.e. laws of matter and motion determine a sapling to destroy the oak which gives birth to it. The same relations have different causes.²⁹

In order to draw his point emphatically Hume takes the example of incest.³⁰ While incest in human species is criminal but the same action and relations in animals are not. Now the reasoning may be given that this action is not immoral in animals because they do not have the reason to discover its immoral

nature but since man is endowed with reason the same action becomes criminal to him. But this is arguing in a circle i.e. for reason to perceive the immorality of the act this relation must first exist and be independent of the decisions of our reason. If we allow this then we grant that essence of morality consists in these relations and therefore animals are capable of the same relations as human species and therefore capable of same morality. Also, it is their lack of certain degree of reason, which hinders them from perceiving their duties of morality. However, this does not hinder these duties from existing.

For the above mentioned reasons the connection of cause and effect cannot be discovered other than experience. Hume argues:

“All beings in the universe, considered in themselves, appear entirely loose and independent of each other. It is only by experience that we learn their influence and connection, and this influence we ought never to extend beyond experience.”³¹

It is impossible to show apriori that if these relations exist they would be universally forcible and obligatory. Because this would propose that the inanimate objects and animals are also capable of bearing the same relations with each other as human beings maintain amongst themselves.³² We observe that we do not draw similar moral conclusions in the case of human beings as we draw in case of objects or animals. Therefore, morality does not lie in any of these relations. From the above we gather that our sense of morality is neither derived from matters of fact nor relations of ideas. This analysis helps us to trace the historical development of the central debates in metaethics to the insights of Hume’s moral epistemology and moral psychology.

Hume’s emphasis on passions as opposed to reason inspired metaethical theories like, Non-cognitivism, Emotivism, Error Theory, Moral Relativism and others, which by and large concentrated on the nature of moral judgement- whether it expressed a belief about a moral fact or merely expressed a moral feeling or emotion. Moreover, this shifted attention on the nature of moral judgement was clearly the effect of linguistic turn that affected moral philosophy. According to A.J. Ayer moral judgements do not express beliefs. Moral statements are pseudo statements, which express emotions, desires and so on. They have no real meaning.³³ We gather that value judgements are incapable of being tested on the criterion of observation. The conclusion that follows is that unlike the physical world the ethical domain does not make itself available for verification. The assumption is that the natural sciences follow the criterion of observation and attempt to explain the real nature of the world and objects present in it. Owing to the scientific methodology A.J. Ayer in his thesis of Emotivism, argues that moral claims are merely expressions of our emotional attitudes, desires, feelings and so on.³⁴ Ethical sentences are not declarative sentences. They express or show speaker’s attitude towards the action or situation. Moral claims merely

express emotions or sentiments of approval or disapproval and therefore moral judgements have no truth-value. Moral knowledge is impossible because moral judgements have no descriptive meaning and therefore moral propositions are neither true nor false.

Hume situates all inquiry about morality in experience and argues for primacy of passions over reason as an influencing motive of the will. Ayer's emotivism can be traced to Hume's suggestion that at the sight of a gruesome crime, like murder one cannot point to any matter of fact, which is responsible for immorality of the action. One only finds passions, motives, volitions, reflection, thought, sentiments and no matter of fact. One can only find vice in the feeling of strong condemnation or disapproval, which arises in us. The feeling lies in us and not in the object in the world.³⁵ From here Ayer concludes that the assertions of metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics etc. are expressions of our sentiments and therefore unverifiable. We cannot attribute rationality to them. "Ayer denies that moral claims are conceptual truths, and he also thinks it is impossible to verify them through the evidence of the senses."³⁶ Scientific method only gives us knowledge about matters of fact, which does not involve moral values. Although it is possible to reason with people about their beliefs on the matters of fact but it is not possible to reason about their non cognitive attitudes. It is impossible to have a genuine ethical disagreement because the moral sphere doesn't allow for reasoning. Therefore Ayer declares that ethics is a pseudo science and ethical judgements are meaningless. Emotivism reduces discussions about morality to subjective expressions of desire, feelings, and emotions, which vary from person to person.

Post 1950, Non-cognitivism became more influential in the hands of C.L. Stevenson and R.M. Hare. Stevenson agrees with Ayer's position that all moral judgements contain an emotive element, which distinguishes them from factual judgements. He asserts,

"The emotive meaning of a word is the power that the word acquires, on account of its history in emotional situations, to evoke or directly express attitudes, as distinct from describing or designating them."³⁷

Unlike Ayer who maintains that moral assertions are emotive Stevenson's version of Emotivism argues that moral judgements and ethical concepts possess two components: attitudinal (emotive) component and factual descriptive (cognitive) component. Also, later cognitivists like G.E. Moore and J.L. Mackie have shades of Hume's insights in their theories.^{38 39}

Notes and References :

1. Patrick Loobuyck, "Wittgenstein and the Shift from Noncognitivism to Cognitivism in Ethics", *Metaphilosophy*, 36(3), (April, 2005): 381-399.
2. The debate on Moral Absolutism/ Moral Relativism, which deals with the status of moral principles and values, and the debate on Cognitivism/ Non-cognitivism are interrelated. The contours of the debate on Moral Absolutism/ Moral Relativism come out better when we also look at the historical evolution of the debate on the epistemological status of moral judgments. However, the debates overlap or criss-cross with each other and supporters of above-mentioned theories accept a wide array of metaphysical and epistemological views depending on the way they answer certain moral questions, like, whether moral concepts are absolute or relative? Do moral judgments express beliefs? And several others.
3. While Moral Absolutist argues that moral values/concepts are absolute Moral Relativist argues that they are relative to an individual/community.
4. David Hume, "Of the Influencing Motives of the Will" and "Moral Distinctions Not Derived from Reason" from *A Treatise Of Human Nature*, Book 3 in *Ethical Theory: An Anthology*, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Press, 2007), 10.
5. Ibid. 8
6. Ibid. 11
7. Ibid. 9
8. Ibid. 11
9. Ibid. 8
10. Ibid. 8
11. Ibid. 12
12. Ibid. 12
13. Ibid. 9
14. V.P. Verma, *Some Contemporary Meta Ethical Theories*, (Delhi: Delhi University Press, 1978), 8.
15. David Hume, "Of the Influencing Motives of the Will" and "Moral Distinctions Not Derived from Reason" from *A Treatise Of Human Nature*, Book 3 in *Ethical Theory: An Anthology*, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Press, 2007), 8.
16. Ibid. 9
17. Ibid. 10
18. Ibid. 9
19. Ibid. 12
20. Ibid.12
21. Ibid. 9
22. Ibid.13
23. Ibid. 9
24. Russ Shafer-Landau, ed. *Ethical Theory: An Anthology*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Press, 2007), 4.
25. David Hume, "Of the Influencing Motives of the Will" and "Moral Distinctions Not Derived from Reason" from *A Treatise Of Human Nature*, Book 3 in *Ethical Theory: An Anthology*, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Press, 2007), 14.
26. Ibid. 16
27. Ibid.14
28. Ibid. 15
29. Ibid.15
30. Ibid. 16

31. Ibid. 15
32. While we draw moral conclusions in the case of human beings we do not draw them in case of objects or animals.
33. A.J. Ayer, "A Critique of Ethics" in *Ethical Theory: An Anthology*, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Press, 2007), 18-24. Ayer was a follower of Logical Positivism, a prominent philosophical movement that was responsible for the logico-linguistic turn in metaethics. At the turn of the 20th century, with the Logical Positivism movement, the focus of philosophical enquiry shifted to developing an understanding of the world through the scientific method. The presupposition being that only scientific method gives us true knowledge and only scientific facts are real. A statement is meaningful if it is verifiable by our experience in the realm of observation (Carnap, 1936). Verification is the method of science through which we can develop an objective knowledge of the physical world. According to the verifiability criterion of meaning a sentence is meaningful only if it is either a conceptual truth i.e. '3-2=1' or it is a matter of fact i.e. 'Mercury is smaller than Jupiter'. Statements of matters of fact can be tested against the criterion of observation and therefore are capable of being objectively true or false.
34. In the contemporary discourse in metaethics Simon Blackburn (1993) and Alan Gibbard (1992, 1996) give non-cognitivist arguments. Blackburn's Quasi-realism maintains that moral judgements express our dispositions to form sentiments of approval and disapproval. Gibbard's Norm Expressivism argues that moral judgements express our acceptance of norms.
35. David Hume, "Of the Influencing Motives of the Will" and "Moral Distinctions Not Derived from Reason" from *A Treatise Of Human Nature*, Book 3 in *Ethical Theory: An Anthology*, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Press, 2007), 14.
36. Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., *Ethical Theory: An Anthology*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Press, 2007), 4.
37. C.L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), 33.
38. G.E. Moore, "The Subject-Matter of Ethics" in *Ethical Theory: An Anthology*, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Press, 2007), 51-57.
39. J.L. Mackie, "The Subjectivity of Values" in *Ethical Theory: An Anthology*, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Press, 2007), 25-35.

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A Critical Relation between Mind and Logic in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein: An Analytical Study

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Abstract

This paper deals with the study of the nature of mind, its processes and its relations with the other field known as logic, especially the contribution of most notable contemporary analytical philosophy Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein showed a critical relation between the mind and logic. He assumed that every mental process is logical. Mental field is field of space and time and logical field is a field of reasoning (inductive and deductive). It is only with the advancement in logic, we are today in the era of scientific progress and technology. Logic played an important role in the cognitive part or we can say in the 'philosophy of mind' that this branch is developed only because of three crucial theories i.e. rationalism, empiricism, and criticism. In this paper, it is argued that innate ideas or truth are equated with deduction and acquired truths are related with induction. This article also enhance the role of language in the makeup of the world of mind, although mind and the thought are the terms that are used by the philosophers synonymously but in this paper they are taken and interpreted differently. It shows the development in the analytical tradition subjected to the areas of mind and logic and their critical relation.

Objectives:

The fundamental objectives of this research paper are:

1. To examine and explain the relation between mind and logic, and also the role of Wittgenstein in this critical relation
2. To analysis the field of mind and the field of logic.
3. To define the role of inductive and deductive reasoning in the mechanism of mental processes and complexity.
4. It clarifies the ambiguities and opaqueness which resides in the knowledge of mind and the logic by the employment of analysis.

Keywords: Mind, Logic, induction, deduction, analysis, thought, Wittgenstein, Language, innate and Acquired.

Introduction

The concept¹ of mind is a complex phenomenon consisting of different processes occurring in it, some are known to us while others are mysteries; those which are known to us are thoughts, intentions, consciousness, understanding, willing, desiring, doubting, and judging, while those which are unknown to us are noumenon, hidden, absolute, deductive processes and mystical processes occurring in the mind.² Analytical philosophy and philosophy of logic has extended the research in cognitive science with the development of symbolic logic and predicate logic. Before the advancement of analytical philosophy it was stated that the logical truths had nothing to do with the processes occurring in the mind; there is only a psychological relation between the events not a logical one. Since logic is a normative science; so it deals with norms, axioms, rules and laws of the events or data.

Mind also thought process is the bundle of ideas that signify different things from the pre-Socratic philosophy. It seems that there is a close connection between the mental processes like reasoning, thinking, judgment, consciousness, understanding, sensation and the bodily movements like extension, shape, dimensions, hardness, size. Traditional Greek philosophy regards the concept of mind as something spiritual or mysterious vital part which is either opposite of physical or a life force, they are of the vision that mind is a spiritual part of the reality of which matter is a physical part. Idealists mentioned that mind is a consciousness that reflects the reality as the mirror reflects the image in front of it. Every part of reality is determined by the state of mind. In idealism mind is a universal idea or pattern of a thing and all other particular ideas are copied through this pattern. Mind according to rationalism is active which means that there are some innate potentialities or truth which constitutes the legitimate source into knowledge. In Rationalism, a-priori truths play a vital role to make up the constitution of reflection or understanding. Every process which occurs in the field of cognitive part like knowing, apprehension, understanding, abstraction, doubting and their way of interpretation are simply named as mind. Continental rationalists like Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley, believe in the conceptual process in the mind i.e., it is only the conceptual schema that results in analyzing the data. Spinoza illustrated the conceptual process with the example of a spider's spinning of a cobweb without having the idea of geometry, it means it is a-priori in the spider to spin its cobweb. Spinoza's two processes; (Natura Naturata) and (Natura Naturans), these are termed as what designates inner (mind) and outer (experience). British empiricists like Locke, Hume, Berkeley, accept mind as passive in the schematization of knowledge its role is like a blank state /white paper on which ideas lead their impressions or patches. Just like a blackboard acts as a tool for writing and a monitor which shows the form or picture of the input or inner. Empiricism accepts only experience or sense-perception which constitutes the essence of the mind, according to them what we hear, taste, smell, see, touch is our

mind or we can say that auditory sensation, gustatory, olfactory, visual, tactual are collectively known as the part of mind. Rationalism states that understanding or reasoning or doubting is the mental process and empiricism holds that experience, sensation, observation, calculation, is the mental process. While former believes in the input processing of mind and latter accepts output processes. Philosophers who integrate and synthesize the elements of both the rationalism and empiricism in the form of subject and predicate (S is P). Kant maintained that there are innate principles (input modules) and acquired sensations (outer experiences) which Kant named as reflection and sensation, in case of both input and output data, Kant argued that senses can collect the data and reason interprets it.

Wittgenstein is the great exponent of analytical philosophy. he used language as a tool to explain analytical philosophy and his philosophy is known as ordinary language philosophy, his work "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus" simply known as 'Tractatus' marked the revolution in the contemporary era. In his philosophy he discussed the concept of "symbolism"³ and its principles as well as the relations which are necessary between the words and things in any language. Wittgenstein exercised his philosophy of symbolism to verify traditional philosophical proposition as vague and contradictory as it does not have any objective reference or it does not profess actual state of affairs. He further maintain that traditional philosophy and ancient philosophical solutions contain ignorance in the principles of symbolism and they have misused language. Wittgenstein explained the logical structure of propositions and the nature of logical inference. He discussed most of theories like theory of knowledge, principles of physics, ethics, and finally mysticism but the most important of his theories were on the nature of mind, logic and language.

Concept of Mind in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein:

Wittgenstein was the great philosopher in the analytical tradition. He explored language to clarify and clear the facts that are palpable in the analysis. Mind or thought processes are used synonymously in the works of Wittgenstein. Sometimes processes like intention, desires, willing, understanding, are implied instead of Mind. Mind is a collective term of all the processes, simple or complex, conscious or unconscious, deductive or a-priori, finite or infinite occurring in the file of mind. Wittgenstein explained mind and its allied structure and mechanism with its comparison with the structure, nature and mechanism of language. According to Wittgenstein thinking is the process that occurs in mind. Not only thinking, perception and introspection are also the processes that cannot happen without the working of mind. Thought and language have many things in common. The structure of language designates the structure of the mind. Mind has a faculty to create and abstract new concepts intuitively and also from the old ones. Wittgenstein implied that what occurs in the mind (inner) is hidden and mysterious. It is experience (outer) which gives form to the outer. Mind manifests in the

variety of outer processes. The most obvious reason for believing the inner to be hidden is the uncertainty that affects our judgments about the inner states of others. When, for example, someone appears to be in pain, it seems self evident that what matters is not the complaints, but what lies behind them. The natural way of representing the situation is to say that ‘there is something inner here which can be inferred only inconclusively from the outer. It is picture and it is obvious what justifies this picture.’⁴ There are many mental activities and attributes like; abstraction, understanding, willing, thinking, judging, doubting, but the three basic mental activities are thinking, willing, and judging (Arendt, 1971, p. 69); they cannot be derived from each other and though they have certain common characteristics they cannot be reduced to a common denominator. To the question what makes us think? There is ultimately no answer other than what Kant called “reason’s need”, the inner impulse of that faculty to actualize itself in speculation, and something very similar is true for the will, which neither reason nor desire can move. Judgment, finally, the mysterious endowment of the mind by which the general always a mental construction, and the particular always given to sense experience, are brought together, is a peculiar faculty and in no way inherent in the intellect, not even in the case of determinant judgments where particulars are subsumed under general rules in the form of a syllogism, because no rule is available for the applications of the rule. These mental activities are basic because they are autonomous; each of them obeys laws inherent in the activity itself. In Hume’s famous dictum “Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions”, that is, to a rather simple minded reversal of the platonic notion of reasons uncontested ruler ship in the household of the soul. The main characteristics of mental activities are of having their invisibility. Properly speaking, they never appear, though they manifest themselves to the thinking, willing, or judging ego, which is aware of being active, yet lacks the ability or the urge to appear as such.⁵

Concept of Logic in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy:

Logic evaluates those mental processes and events that have concern with causal backup. The mental states and processes like pleasure and pain, aversion, will, desire, doubting, reflection, understanding and reason do not occur without certain logic. Now the question is, ‘How do these processes take place in the domain of mind?’ There are two ways to understand this question and to give its answer; one is that there are some innate principles (deductive hypothesis) that would check the data as per structure and norm of the data. These truths are not caused but they are the cause of everything and consequently mind works on the categories of these truths. For example every creation possess mind; Animal mind, mind of the birds and insects but their mental nomenclature and mechanism is different from the human. We can say that only deductive truths, inductive and abductive can differentiate among these. It is wrong that animals are governed by experience and do not contain

mind, they have limit mind as it is apparent from the thesis of the common sense that “those creature that have brain must have mind”. So, deductive system in mind studies the rulers that reflects and understands the data (as continental Rationalists agreed). Not only deductive logic implied its role in the schemata of mental process but inductive and abductive logic imparts it’s scientific nature to build up and nurture data formation and processing.⁶ The following are the problems which Wittgenstein faced related to logic.

- (i) The first problem as per Wittgenstein is the logical problem of implication. The problems occurs in our minds have logical assumption behind them. Suppose when we hear the concept ‘Bat’ our mind logically uses expectancy which kind of ‘bat’, animal, or wooden instrument it implies; same happens with the meaning of the things. Wittgenstein assumes that language is misleading and ambiguous, there is only logic which is universal symbolic language to mind. Here we are using logic (inductive/deductive/abductive) as a tool for implication or intension, so it is not a cognitive problem or the problem of the ontology but it is a logical problem.
- (ii) The second problem which Bertrand Russell maintained in his introduction to ‘Tractatu s’, is epistemological in its domain. The problem is what is the relation that exists between the thoughts ,words or sentences to express our thoughts so here again this problem is problem of mind and logic. logic studies relation, proposition and about terms and thoughts. Thought is a mental process which either asserts the fact or negates it. It is either true or false. Everything is governed within rules and customs even the thought is governed by rules. We use only language as the data to communicate and grammatize the thought process otherwise one can think without having the primary or secondary language. Human mind is has a faculty of design , schematize, and abstract universal language either symbolic or non-symbolic; that universal language is an ideal language without misconceptions and errors. The grammar used in the universal language is known as philosophical grammar or universal grammar.
- (iii) Third problem is “using of sentences so as to convey truth not falsehood” Bertrand Russell with regard to this problem holds that it is a special problem related to the subject matter of sentences in question , but as per the subject matter of logic and methodology of logic is concerned. it is a logical, because using of sentences could not only convey truth when there is in opposition falsehood. “as negation is determination” falsehood also convey validity of the proposition. logic studies about proposition and proposition are either true or false. No matter for a logically perfect language; the sentences must be truth-conveying not falsehood (falsehood must be demonstrated

(iv) The fourth problem is “what is the relation between one fact (sentence) have with another (fact) sentence and how one can be capable of being a symbol for that other. What is the symbolic relation between the one fact (sentence) and the other fact (sentence) how there relation is demonstrated; one act as a symbol for other and its vice-versa, this is a logical problem. (As for as my analysis is concerned; Bertrand Russell classified four problems from the philosophy of Wittgenstein; psychological, Epistemology, special & logical and all these problems can be reduced into two question one is psychological (Question of mind; related to mind or thoughts), and logical (Questions about proposition) related to logic. In his theory of symbolism; language must fulfill the conditions to make a logically perfect language. Wittgenstein is interested in exact symbolism. A symbolism in which a sentence means something definite.⁷

Logic deals with the two questions which Wittgenstein mentioned, while first is; in relation to symbolism; combination of symbols must fulfill the conditions for sense not the non-sense and the second is; Symbols or combination of symbols must accept the conditions for uniqueness of meaning or reference. According to Wittgenstein, a language should be logically perfect and it is perfect and definite only when it accepts the rules of syntax⁸ and these rules of syntax prevents the language from non-sense. Logically perfect language contains a single symbol which has a definite clear meaning. Ideal language⁹ is formulated only when it is meaningful in function. language is always more or less ambiguous and vague; only condition like syntax, meaning and its functions make it perfect. Language is the representation of our thoughts and essential role of language is to assert or deny facts. Language must have syntax and the meaning of a sentence in language is determined by the meaning of its component words to construct a language made of sentence and the sentence is representing a fact. So according to Wittgenstein there is a common relation between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the fact. This is perhaps the most fundamental thesis of Wittgenstein’s theory. (Wittgenstein 2002).

According to Wittgenstein logically perfect language consists of simple symbol. “ for an ideal language there should be one name for every simple and never the same name for two different simples”. All philosophical propositions are not true, some are false while others are senseless, we cannot prove their senseless but can state their senselessness. A simple symbol has no parts while the complex simple is made of parts. Most of the philosophical questions are vague and ambiguous and we are not able to understand their logic of the language. We can’t differentiate between them like whether “good is more or less identical then beautiful”. Whether truth is more or less identical than the valid. So, in the philosophical matter there are propositions that are very difficult to prove their validity. The complex

thing in the world is a fact. A fact which is a simple proposition is not made of other facts; Wittgenstein called it a “Sachverhalte” and the fact which is made up of two or more than two facts is called a “Tatsache”. Plato is an idealist (both sachverhalte and the tatsache) “Plato is an idealist and Socrates was his teacher” or “ stone is substance and igneous rock is a stone “(this fact is only tatsache but not a sachverhalte)”. It is necessary to make an assertion between two names (men) when they are accepted as simples, but we cannot make statement about two men of same names or simples. The position or statement should establish a certain relation between the two names or simples.

e.g. Aristotle loves Plato aRb

Plato loves Socrates aRb

Here the word loves which exists between the two words or terms Aristotle and Plato establishes a certain relation between them. So it is a fact that the sentence is able to assert a relation between the words Aristotle and Plato.

We must say that “a stands in a certain relation to b (aRb)

We must not say “a stands in a certain relation R to b (aRb).

Wittgenstein commences with the theory of symbolism with the statement –‘we make to ourselves pictures of facts’. Picture is the model of reality. picture represents the fact. The logical picture of reality is the relation that the things have in picture. Things in reality or in picture are in a logical form. There are two logical forms.

1. Inductive form
2. Deductive form

According to Wittgenstein, the logical picture of a fact is gedanke. A model or picture can represent a reality. This model or picture can correspond or not correspond with fact and if it corresponds with the fact then it is true(t) and if not then it is false (F). In both the cases of being true or false, a picture have the logical form with the fact Wittgenstein used a word ‘Bild’ for model or picture. He used some examples for the logical picture.

1. Gamma phone record
2. The musical thought
3. The scene
4. The waves of sound.

All these represent a pretrial internal relation between the language and the world. In all of these “logical structure is common” What comes first, language or thought? Intuition cuts both ways.⁹

According to Wittgenstein the logical constants are not signs but really they exist in propositions and represent the proposition like the facts. Every philosophical proposition is a bad grammar and the discussion in matters to these propositions is a mistake. "Philosophy is not a theory but an activity". The only role of philosophy is to classify the thoughts. The proposition and the fact must show the same logical manifold.¹⁰

Correlation between Mind and Logic:

Concept of mind is a unique and abstract term in the analytical philosophy of Wittgenstein, who implied the field of 'inner' and 'understanding' from this term (Wittgenstein, 2001). The idea of mind and the idea of logic are inseparable, of mind implies the factory and logic implies the workers, or one is a nest and other is a bird. Now the question is which comes first; mind or reasoning, but this question is useless. There is no metaphysical inquiry in the evolution of mind and the logic. Mind and logic are two different fields in which mind acts as a digestive system and logic as the food. Mind can't directly use the method of reasoning or argumentation; it needs data and that data is provided with the aid of language. If we take a look at the definition of mind as William James said i.e. "Mind is the stream of consciousness" or we can interpret it like 'it is the flow of thought or the collection of the ideas that resides in a place which we meant mind'. Nevertheless ideas reside in the mind which is the reservoir of all the ideas, concepts, universals, information's and processes. Now the fundamental question is 'Does mind work without the data collected by sense? Mind is the collection or galaxies of information which senses collect and reason interprets. Mind can't think in its emptiness; data is necessary for the processing of data to analyze, synthesize, doubt, reason and think. To make it clear we can analyze complex statement into simple statement, also is of proposition; objects or things are the substance of the world. World does not exist without substance. There are different types of substances as mentioned and explained by different philosophers from time to time like; Descartes: mental, spatial and physical substances, Spinoza; only substance, i.e. God or nature, Thales; substances 'water', Anaximenes; 'air', Anaximander; 'Apeiron', Pythagoras; number and so on.¹¹

Wittgenstein exaggerates the Spinoza's theory of substances that substance is the cause of itself. It cannot be composite as it then ceases to be a substance. Spinoza holds that substance is its own cause, if it is not the cause of itself then it would be produced by something other than itself. Substance is infinite; if substance is not infinite then it becomes dependent, substance is only one as Wittgenstein called it simple, it would cease to be substance as one if it is more than two and it will not remain independent. Likely Wittgenstein defined substance as that which is not composite, i.e. constituent of parts. World cannot exist without substance, as the substance is the reality of the world so is the picture

of the world (true or false) . Both the worlds transcendental world [world of imagination and the intellectual world; ‘world of reality’ have something common to them and that is their form. In Wittgenstein’s substance sense, the form of what is inner the thoughts and the form of what is in the sensation is same (true or false). The world of thoughts and the world of appearance have same logical form and these both are in the form of subject and predicate, both represents the reality one represents or picture the logical contents of the inner process and another picture and symbolizes the pictures or models of the outer world. These objects have the form and that form does not changes. The role of substance (mental or physical) is nothing except only to determine a form. material properties are systematically figured by means of propositions. Objects are colorless, as the substance, but substance is the cause of the color: as apple is cause of its redness, milk is the cause of whiteness for Wittgenstein is conceived. he depicted that “if two objects have the same logical form, apple is red; s is p, the only disjunction between them;

Man is mortal -s is p is that they are different in matter and not in form.¹²

Mental process designates to all the internal, covert activity of our minds, such as thinking, feeling and remembering. We can uncover the mysteries of mind by description, explanation and prediction.

Description –what is happening? the first step in understanding or perception of anything is to give it a name. description involves observing a behavior and nothing everything about it: what is happening, where it happens – to whom it happens, and under what circumstances it seems to happen.

Explanation –why is it happening?

Prediction: logic (when will it happen again) Determine what will happen in the future is a prediction. we can predict in previous research. Aristotle wrote in De Anima about the relation between soul and body.¹³ Soul can exist without the connection with body (Plato’s dualism). Sensations are the minds windows to the world that exist around us. without perception, we would be unable to understand what all those sensations mean – perception is the process of interpreting the sensations we experience so that we can act upon them.¹⁴ To fully understand how we do any of the thing we do (such as learning ,remembering and behaving) ,we need to understand how we think .how do we organize our thought? How do we communicate those thought to other? What do we mean by intelligence? Why are some people able to learn so much faster than other. Thinking (cognition) is a mental activity that goes on in the brain when a person is organizing and attempting to understand information and communicating information to others. Thinking or cognition from Latin means ‘to know’. Thinking includes memory.

When people think , they are not only aware of the information in the brain but also are making decisions about it , comparing it to other information, and using it to solve problems.¹⁵

Conclusion:

In contemporary philosophy the problem of mind and its correlations with reasoning and language has been elaborated and clarified by the analytical philosophers and the continental philosophers. While analytical philosophers like Gottlob Frege whose symbolic logic has turned the shapes of thoughts into logical truth tables and Gilbert Ryle whose nature of mind, its role and functions paved the way for cognitive psychologists and Wittgenstein's private language arguments and theories of other logicians has solved the problems of mind in a systematic and metaphorical way. The relation which holds between the three blocks viz. mind, logic and language is critical in contemporary philosophy especially in the field of analytical tradition. Analytical philosophy clarified the analysis of mind, analysis of reasoning, analysis of language and their inter-connectivity, as analytical philosophers think that all philosophical problems arises due to misunderstanding of language. There is a harmony that mind and logic are interconnected at deeper level. Philosophers started debate on the priority of innate capacities of mind over acquired ideas vis-à-vis innate over mind. The mainstream analytical philosophy has its roots in rationalism, empiricism, and in the tradition of synthetic-critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant¹⁶ According to Wittgenstein every mental image is a physical thing. I have a pain means that pain resides in things not a mental kind. There is no yellow or red color. It is actually the sensations of the objects which are giving us different colored impressions. Likely Frege gave the answer of the question 'what is the number one' in his work 'foundation of arithmetic's' that number one is thing. It is the thing which is counted as one but the number.¹⁷ Wittgenstein thought that it is just an ultimate fact about human beings that they find certain a priori inferences natural. Logicians are chiefly concerned with language used informatively in affirming or denying propositions, formulating arguments, evaluating arguments, and so on. Many other purposes are also served by language, however, and its informative use may be better understood when contrasted with other uses. The great philosopher of analytical tradition and notable logicians , insisted rightly in his work 'philosophical investigations, 1953) that there are countless different kinds of use of what we call 'symbols', 'words', 'sentences'. Among the examples suggested by Wittgenstein are giving orders, describing an object or giving its measurements, reporting an event, speculating about an event, forming and testing a hypothesis, presenting the results of an experiment, making up a story, play-acting, singing, guessing riddles, telling a joke, solving a problem in arithmetic, translating from one language into another, asking, cursing greeting and praying. Thus we can say that, Mind and logic is an approach in the philosophy of mind which explores mind, its analysis, its functions, and the task of inductive and

deductive reasoning in the operations of the mind. While both inductive and deductive processes are scientific, both the processes are dependent on each others. Mind is a software part of brain which is its hardware part. The attributes of mind are thinking, imaging, doubting, memorizing. There is no permanent place of mind but ordinary we argue that mind resides in brain. Mind is three dimensional and its structure as the persons enhances in age the structure and the functions of the mental processes also increases. Philosophy of mind not only explores the nature of mind but it also explains the theories like monism, dualism, behaviorism, functionalism, interactionism, epiphenomenalism and occasionalism. According to Wittgenstein every thought is a language and symbols or signs can only represent the thought. Symbol is the thought or the modification of the thought. Proposition represent thought. Thought is a logical process. It is either the formulation of simple ideas like sense datum or the predicate of the creation of complex social idea. When Kant used the statement that ‘everything is in the form of having subject and predicate’ Wittgenstein used both the terms to represent the cognitive system which includes the innate part of mind and the social part of mind (environment). In modern 21th century ‘mind’ is not a single filed but it is inter-connected with other fields. Mind cannot exist without logic and logic cannot work or perform its reasoning without having mind. It generates both simple processes and complex processes. It appears to me that ‘Mind has the power to create, to formulate laws, to analyze and to make relationship with other elements, for this it would take abundant energy that is why prophets hundred and thou sand years before showed the power of mind to generate complex processes and relations without variables and facts’. Mind is faster than computer if it is used in a proper. Every mind contains ideas, ideas are either deductive in character or inductive in character, while deductive part makeup the innate mechanism and inductive part makeup the outer social part of mind. Thus we can say that mind and logic are interconnected both in processes, mechanism, formulation, hypothesis, interpretation and conclusion as well as in reality, and in causation. It is wrong that mind cannot think in emptiness, actually mind can never can be empty, it contains certain things in it, which studies its rules, norms and axioms.

Notes and References:

1. Concept is a Latin term which means ideas that represent a class or category of objects, events, or activities.
2. Thought is not similar to mind, since mind is a place or we can say it is a set of different programs. We can't say that the data and the software are same. Thought manifests in diverse processes based on the time and space and the relation of the data. Earlier Psychologists and philosophers of the mind has named the term ‘Mind’ as mysterious and vague, but it seems to me that the analytical tradition has clarified and analyzed this term into its legitimate magnitude. Since the concept of inner structure appeared in the tradition of critical philosopher Kant; who said that mind can't function or is of having

no value without experience or sensation. His famous statement explains the concept of 'mind' in a simple manner i.e. concepts without percepts are empty and percepts without concepts are blind.

3. Symbolism is a concept which means "something which stands for something else". 1590 (Faerle Queene), (the use of symbols to express or represent ideas or qualities in language).
4. Paul Johnston: Wittgenstein rethinking the inner. New York: Routledge, (1993), p.167-173
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6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. ix-x.
7. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, Introduction by Bertrand Russell, F.R.S, p. x-xi
8. Syntax is defined as the set of rules, principles and processes that govern the structure of sentences in a given language.
9. Ideal language in analytical philosophy is a language that is precise free of ambiguity and clear in structure.
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Critical & Postmodernists' Theorists Approaches towards Rationality

Merina Islam

Critical Theory and Postmodernism are Intellectual traditions most familiar to people who work in Philosophy, Aesthetic Theory, Literary Criticism, and Women Studies. Critical Theory is associated with the Institute of Social Research established in Germany in 1923. This Institute was founded at Frankfurt (Germany), hence known as Frankfurt School. The chief exponents of this movement are Theodore W. Adorno (1903-1969), Max Horkheimer (1895-1973), and Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979). The most important recent representative of Critical Theory is Jurgen Habermas (1929-L), a student of Adorno and Horkheimer, who departed significantly from certain positions of the founders.

The Frankfurt school was founded to make an attempt to explain why the socialist revolution as predicted by Karl Marx did not occur as expected. Marcuse, Adorno, and Horkheimer thought that they had to reconstruct the logic and method of Marxism in order to develop Marxian philosophy relevant to the emerging twentieth-century Capitalism. Postmodernism on the other hand may be termed as a movement and can be found in a vast range of fields from art, architecture, music, film, literature, to dance, drama, and poetry. Postmodernism is a complicated term, or set of ideas, one that has only emerged as an area of academic study since the mid-1980s. But it is hard to define, what Postmodernism is. Even if you ask any "Postmodernist to say what Postmodernism is he is lost. There is no way to define it. It is a movement, an attitude or a mood, but not a systematic thing where you can develop concepts and relationships, precisely what the postmodernists are against... so postmodernism is basically a mood."¹ The chief exponents of this movement are Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean Francois Lyotard, Richard Rorty and many others.

As the Frankfurt school was opened initially with an aim to restructure Marxism, the postmodernists had no such specific objective. But postmodernism is essentially a reaction against the modernists' conception of foundationalism, truth, certainty, dualism and scientific knowledge.

As we know, both the Critical Theory as stands today and postmodernism, deal with a vast number of issues. It is not possible to deal with all those issues in this small paper. What we propose to do here is to analyse a specific issue that is the attitude of the Critical Theorists' and Postmodernists' towards 'the notion of Rationality'. Here an attempt is made to discuss certain fundamental questions, which come out of the criticism of 'Rationality'. To begin with; rationality is generally defined as "the quality of possessing reason, the fact of being based on reason; a rational or reasonable view or die tendency to regard every thing from a purely rational point of view"² To have a correct understanding of the term rationality we have to go back to the period of European Enlightenment of the

Eighteenth century. The French Revolution of 1789 was a high point of the spread of intellectual-spiritual as well as political-economic-social ferment in western society. This period also saw a tremendous development of science and technology with Newton's theory of gravitation and Force and Robert Boyle's theory of corpuscular composition of matter Galileo's invention of telescope was a landmark to prove not to accept anything dogmatically (as imposed by church) but every claim should be associated with rational justification. This phase also saw a correspondingly magnificent change in the field of medicine, communication systems, educational system and political-economic institutions. All these developments in the field of socio-political sphere as well as in the technological and scientific sphere made significant contribution towards asserting human sovereignty and individual autonomy. People refused to believe the injections of Church. They demanded that every truth can be practically and objectively verified. Hence in every field an attempt was made to overcome the dogmatic traditions (Social, Political, Cultural and scientific) by means of rational insights. Referring to this period Axel Honneth of the Frankfurt University, writes, "Thus, from the outset, what is unique to enlightenment is its immanent relation to a criterion of rational validity which acts as a standard against which opinions and convictions can be upheld by rational examination" .³ Though the very origin or the concept of rationality can be traced from the Enlightenment period yet the process lasted through the mid-eighteenth century with the spread of urban-technological-industrial society and with the formulation of the noted social theories like Positivism (August Comte) and Marxism.

Hence the whole phase of modernity and rationality are interconnected in a conceptually compulsory manner in such a way that both notions stand in an intrinsic and internal relation to one another.

But today, this notion of Rationality which originated in the-Enlightenment period and was invariably associated with the conception of modernity is facing an almost insurmountable barrier with the challenges from the interplay of Critical Theory and Postmodernism. James L. Marsh in this context writes, " The postmodern critique of rationality among such thinkers as Heidegger, Derrida, Adorno and Foucault has contributed to the thematizing new, overlapping and of philosophical enquiry; the legitimacy of modernity and the Enlightenment, the limits, meaning, and value of Western Reason the link between rationality and critique, the pathology of the modern, the possibility of postmodern alternative to modernity."⁴

Horkheimer was one of the prominent critiques of enlightenment rationality of the school of Critical Theory. He was firmly convinced that the will of Humanity was directed towards mostly over nature, " the domination of nature both inside and outside us by means of rational resolve"⁵ Referring to Hegel and Marx, Horkheimer describes this concept -the perfect domination over nature by means of limitless reason—as a dialectical one. He defended it on two fronts—against rationalism and against irrationalism, doing so

for the first time at any length in his essay 'On the Dispute over Rationalism in Contemporary Philosophy', and written while he was in Switzerland. On the other hand, (rationalism represented for Horkheimer, mainly by Positivism) considered the scientific disciplines in their current form to be the only legitimate form of knowledge, and saw speculative thought as not competent to discuss the problems of society as a whole. In Horkheimer's eyes, rationalism was therefore only an imperfect, inflexible, impoverished rationality. On the other hand, irrationalism represented for Horkheimer by the 'philosophy of life' (Lebensphilosophie), for example, and by existential philosophy—condemned thought as a destructive force, and made the Soul or intuition the sole deciding anteriority in all the critical problems of life. This school of thought thus demanded less rather than more rationality. Horkheimer saw rationalism as a fitting expression of the over-estimation of his or her own abilities by the type of individual never able to view matters as a whole, a type which had flourished in the liberal period of bourgeois capitalist society. In irrationalism, by contrast, he saw an expression of the growing powerlessness even of most members of the middle class in the phase of monopoly capitalism. Irrationalism was a transfiguration of the individual's subjection to a larger whole, which was even more obscure than ever. According to Horkheimer, "Irrationalism correctly recognizes that rationalism is bankrupt, but it draws the wrong conclusion. It does not criticize one-sided thinking and egoism in favour of a way of organizing the world, which would correspond to the human resources actually available. Instead, it leaves the economic laws which have produced current conditions basically untouched, and serves the interests of those who have economic power, who are merely the executors of economic forces, by encouraging 'blind recognition of them, demanding submission to the so-called larger, general interest.'"⁶

Horkheimer's notion of rationality was criticized as the loss of objective reason and about the disdain for speculation and contemplation. Marcuse wrote to Horkheimer after reading the *Eclipse of Reason*, "Especially the one which disturbs me most of all: that the form of reason which suddenly changes into complete manipulation and domination still never the less remains a form of reason, so that the real horror of the system lies more in its rationality than in its irrationality. That is easily said - but you must still provide the development for the actual reader—no one else can or will do so."⁷

The Postmodern Critique of Rationality is almost similar to the early Critical Theorists' critique of the same. This is clear from Michel Foucault's following observations, which came almost a decade and half after Adorno's death, where he said, "If I had known about the Frankfurt School in time, I would have been saved a great deal of work. I would not have said a certain amount of nonsense and would not have taken so many false trails trying not to get lost, when the Frankfurt school had already cleared the way."⁸ Here Foucault is referring to his programme as a 'rational critique of rationality'; Adorno has used almost exactly the same words in 1962 in a lecture on philosophical terminology to

describe the task of Philosophy. Philosophy; Adorno said should conduct " a sort of rational appeal hearing against rationality."⁹

Before analyzing the postmodern notion of Rationality let us take into account the modernistic conception of the same. The concept of rationality as the basis of modernity was introduced by Max Weber. Rationality simply means to those ideas and behaviors, which are logically coherent and consistent and amenable to empirical knowledge. According to Weber, the contemporary world is characterized by rationality. Max Weber believed that the key to understand modern society is to be found in its rational feature and rationalizing forces. For him, the modern Western world is characterized by rationality. As a result of this, human activity is marked by methodical calculations. Quantification, predictability and regularity become important. Individuals rely on logic, reason and calculation rather than on supernatural beliefs. To Weber rationalization means, "principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come, into play but rather one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. One need no longer have recourse to magical means in-order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious power existed."¹⁰

Weber views 'rationality' as a process of rationalization of social system and rationalization as a product of scientific specialization and teleological differentiation of Western culture. The two major ways in which Weber creates or handles rationality in his work are; (i) society as rationalization process and (ii) rationality as a methodological tool. Though going detail into these issues is out of our context, yet we want to mention that for Weber, a bureaucratic organization based on rationality is the essential feature of capitalism. Weber believes that modern bureaucracy is a social manifestation of formal rationality.

So we find Weber not only mark rationality but emphasize upon individuality and scientificity as the essence of modernity. For Weber modernity is, "an explicit recognition of what the self and society have been all along. Modern identity is not just another in a sequence of historic constructions; it is unveiling of what has been at the root of those constructions."¹¹

So Weber sees rationality is the main driving force for the construction of modern society. But it is beyond the scope of our study to deal in detail Weber's notion of modernity. We have already analyzed how the concept of rationality has been intrinsically related with the notion of Modernity, now our task is to examine how the same figures in the concept of Post modernity?

Lyotard holds that there is a notion of rationality in postmodernism, but a different sense. The only difference, which distinguishes postmodern rationality from modern rationality, is the irreducible plurality and its willingness to sustain it. In the words of Lyotard, "Postmodern knowledge refined our sensitivity to differences re-enforces our ability, to tolerate

the incommensurability".¹² So Lyotard sees a major shift of the meaning of rationality in postmodern science - a shift towards plural, indeterminate, tire random, die irregular and the formless. But this does not mean a farewell to rationality. In postmodern science, Lyotard holds that, it is natural to be plural, random and indeterminate in rationality. This is because it heats irrationality as an unavoidable counter concept of rationality. Hence Post modernity is the rewriting of modernity under new rubric holds true if we look die whole enterprise from 'rational point of view'. The notion of rationality in modernism can be found in 'postmodernism' also though being associated with indeterminacy, randomness, etc. Hence Bishop Gregorios observes, "the whole postmodern enterprise is still a child of enlightenment, it may question die overuse of rationality but it retains the fundamental assertion of the Enlightenment..."¹³ As it has already been mentioned that though Habermas belongs to the school of Critical Theory, yet his views on rationality significantly differs from that of the earlier Critical Theory thinkers. He equates Postmodernity with a new historicism and conservation and labels it with the nomenclature such as "anti-modern' , tendency: turn' etc.. The Habermasian objection to the concept of Posunodeftmy applies mainly to its critique of rationality. He is always on the look out for the evidence that die Postmodern critique of rationality is self - contradictory. He sees that the argumentative 'Liquidation of reason puts one in a logical dilemma'—that is you are rejecting reason widi the help of reason. This happens in the case of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Horkheimer, Adorno, Derrida and Foucault. Hence Adorno, Horkheimer and Foucault's notion what they call ' rational critique -of rationality' really establishes a new sphere of rationality in the name of over throwing the enlightenment rationality. So the basic question is if you want to displace rationality you have to argue rationally because rationality can't be over thrown by irrational agreements. Hence it seems the enlightenment rationality is still in force in spite of all attempts by the Critical Theorists' and Postmodernists' to displace it.

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An Enquiry into the Nature of the Absolute Being as Necessary Existent: A Review after Ibn Sīnā

Rejina Kabir

Abstract

The term, 'Absolute', is used by the philosophers to signify the ultimate reality regarded as one and yet as the source of variety; as complete, or perfect and yet as not divorced from the finite, imperfect world. The objective of this article is an analytical exposition of the concept of the Absolute Being as represented by Ibn Sīnā (980A.D.-1037A.D.) in his system of philosophy. Ibn Sīnā is one of the Islamic philosophers who have developed some unique and original concepts in their systems of study in medieval philosophy. As per Goodman, Ibn Sīnā has tried to meet the challenge by harmonizing reason with revelation, introducing innovations and refining philosophical techniques and analysis. Ibn Sīnā claims that the concept of Being is the first acquisition of the human mind. The knowledge of the concept of Being is arrived at both subjectively and objectively. Subjectively we are aware or conscious of our own existence. Objectively we acquire the impression of being through sense-perception and physical contact with the things around us. Ibn Sīnā classified the nature of being or existence into two types namely- necessary and contingent. This paper is mainly concerned with an analysis of the concept of the Absolute Being as Necessary Existent. Ibn Sīnā contends that the essence of the Necessary Existent can be no other than existence. In pursuance of the objective of this article it is designed in three sections namely, A brief introduction of Ibn Sīnā, The Notion of Being as per Ibn Sīnā, The Notion of Absolute Being as Necessary Existent.

Keywords: *Ibn Sīnā, Being, Absolute Being, Necessary Existent.*

The concept of Absolute Being is one of the most important concepts discussed in metaphysics. The term, 'Absolute', is used by the philosophers to signify the ultimate reality regarded as one and yet as the source of variety; as complete, or perfect and yet as not divorced from the finite, imperfect world.¹ The objective of this article is an analytical exposition of the concept of the Absolute Being as Necessary Existent after Ibn Sīnā (980A.D.-1037A.D.) in his system of philosophy. In other words, existence is the essence of the Absolute Being. In pursuance of the objective of this article it is designed in three sections namely, A brief introduction of Ibn Sīnā, The Notion of Being as per Ibn Sīnā, The Notion of Absolute Being as Necessary Existent.

A brief introduction of Ibn Sīnā

Ibn Sīnā (980A.D.-1037A.D.) is one of the Islamic philosophers who have developed some unique and original concepts in their systems of study in medieval philosophy. Medieval philosophy is the philosophic thought and systems, which are elaborated between the Carolingian renaissances of the last part of the eighth century A.D. to the end of the fourteenth century A.D., which is also recognised as the Dark Age in the history of western philosophy.² However, we must recognise some philosophers, who have continued their quest for the truth, which helps us to understand, analyse, and to continue the uninterrupted flow of philosophical discourse. It is recognised that the creative period of Islamic Philosophy is from the Ninth to the Eleventh Century.³ The name of Ibn Sīnā is one of them who have developed some unique and original concepts in their systems of study in this period, which are worthy to mention and deserves appreciation. As Goodman claims, that Ibn Sīnā has tried to meet the challenge by harmonizing reason with revelation, introducing innovations and refining philosophical techniques and analysis.⁴

In his *A History of Philosophy*, Copleston holds “The greatest Muslim philosopher of the Eastern group without doubt is Avicenna or Ibn Sīnā (980-1037), the real creator of a scholastic system in the Islamic world.”⁵ Ibn Sīnā was a devout Muslim and sought to reconcile rational philosophy with Islamic theology. His aim was to prove the existence of God and His creation of the world through reason and logic.

Ibn Sīnā was born in 980 A.D. at Kharmāithan near Bukhara the capital of the Samādin Empire. His full name is Abu Alī al-Husain ‘Abd –Altaḥ ibn Sīnā. His first book on philosophy in the Persian language is *Danish-Nameh ye ‘Ala’i* (*The Book of Knowledge*). Some other books are *Kitāb al- Šifā* (*The Book of Healing*) and *Kitāb al-Najat* (*The Book of Deliverance*).⁶

The objective of this article is an exposition of the concept of the Absolute Being as the Necessary Existent as represented by Ibn Sīnā (980A.D.-1037A.D.) in his system of philosophy. The concept of Being is dwelt in metaphysics and metaphysics is the science of Being as Being. Ibn Sīnā was a metaphysician by temperament.⁷ In support of this claim we need only note how, as soon as he sees them, metaphysical question take precedent in his work over all others. Throughout the Middle Ages, Ibn Sīnā was recognised in the West as the philosopher of Being.⁸ To understand the concept of Absolute Being we must understand, how Ibn Sīnā has explained the concept of being. The next section is dedicated to analyse the concept of Being after Ibn Sīnā.

The Notion of Being as per Ibn Sīnā

To understand the concept of Absolute Being we must discuss Ibn Sīnā's observation about the concept of being. The aim of this section is to provide a detailed analysis of the concept of being as represented by him. Ibn Sīnā says that the concept of Being is the first acquisition of the human mind.⁹ In the *Shifā'* he says:

“The ideas of *Being, thing, the necessary*, sketch themselves in the soul first of all. This impression is not one of those which need to be brought in by things more known than they are. But what is first conceived by itself is what is common to all things, like Being, thing, one, etc. Hence, it is not possible to explain anything without falling into a vicious circle, nor to use for this purpose anything which is more known than these.”¹⁰

For him, the knowledge of the concept of Being is arrived at both subjectively and objectively. Subjectively we are aware or conscious of our own existence. Ibn Sīnā has tried to explain the subjective awareness of the notion of Being with the help of an allegory of the blindfolded man which, he has used twice in the *Treatise on the Soul* in the *Shifā'*, and repeated it in the *Ishārāt*.¹¹ Ibn Sīnā contends that if we suppose a state where we are completely unaware of our body even then, we are aware of our existence in a manner that ‘we are’ or ‘we exist’.¹² In this allegory he holds that let us suppose that one of us is created in an instant, and created perfect. However, his eyes are blindfolded and he is unable to see any external objects. Not even that he is created floating in the air, or rather in the void, so that the resistance of the air which, he could feel, does not affect him. His members are separated and therefore, do not meet or touch one another. In this situation, if he asks himself, about his own existence, whether it is proved or not? Then, without any hesitation he would reply that ‘he exists’, although he could not prove the existence of his own external body parts like hands and feet or of his entrails or heart or brain; but he would nevertheless affirm that ‘he exists’, without establishing the fact that he has length, breadth or thickness.¹³ For Ibn Sīnā, the idea of Being appears as the first intuition of the mind confronted with its proper object. One may question in what sense can this be called intuition? For him, by intuition he means direct perception of Being by the mind, which is not impossible, for the soul as the form of the body.¹⁴ He also holds that the soul can be aware of itself by intuition because of its spiritual nature.¹⁵ But he also mentioned that this is not the normal way of knowing Being.

Objectively we acquire the impression of being through sense-perception and physical contact with the things around us. As being is not a genus, it cannot be divided into different species. However, there are two elements in it, viz. essence and existence. These two elements of being may be separated from one another or unified. We are concerned about these two elements only when we try to analyse the concept of being. However, when we observe beings, we are concerned to whether it is necessary or possible. If they are necessary then, the following questions arise – whether the being is necessary of its own account or it is necessary because of some outside agency?¹⁶ If the answer is in assertion to the first alternate of the concerned question then we get the Necessary Existent. If the answer is provided in assertion to the second alternate of the question in concern, then the existence of that being is possible or contingent. Regarding Necessary Existence, Ibn Sīnā contends, “Self-necessity applies to some beings but not to other beings.”¹⁷ The Necessary Existent cannot be united (*paiwand*) with any cause (*sabab*). Since its being is necessary in Itself without being caused, Its being cannot be due to a cause.¹⁸ On the other hand, a being is recognised as possible or contingent while the existence of that is necessitated or can be realized (*hāṣil*) by something other than itself.¹⁹ It signifies that the contingent being is necessary as a result of some outside agency.²⁰ Moreover, whatever is impossible in itself can never be realized (*maujūd*).²¹ From the above discussion, we can draw a logical conclusion that beings may take three forms. They could be necessary (*wājib*), possible (*mumkin*) or impossible (*mumtani*).²² In pursuance to the objective of this article the subject of our concern is the nature of the first form of being, namely, the Necessary being.

The Notion of Absolute Being as Necessary Existent.

Ibn Sīnā classified the nature of being or existence into two types namely- necessary and contingent. This section is mainly concerned with an analysis of the concept of Necessary Being. The Necessary Existent, according to him, has no genus (*jins*), differentia (*faṣl*), definition (*ḥadd*), place (*maḥall*), subject (*mauḍū*), opposite (*ḍidd*), species (*nau*), companion (*yār wa nidd*), receptive to motion (*tahgayyur padhīr*), or receptive to partition (*bahra padhīr*). Moreover, It is the cause of all contingent entities.²³

Definition, according to Ibn Sīnā, consists of relating a thing to its genus where it shares qualities with others and specifying or differentiating it from these others through its specific qualities.²⁴ Ibn Sīnā contends that the Necessary Being is indefinable because any attempt to define Necessary Being would

violate Its essence as a Unity.²⁵ The essence of Absolute Being cannot be divided in any form or parts, such as soul and body or matter or into logical divisions like genus and species or existence or essence. This difficulty of the unity and simplicity of Absolute Being made It indefinable.²⁶ However, he described the Absolute Being with the help of many attributes. He considers those attributes as the properties of the Absolute Being but, not his essence. As per Ibn Sīnā, properties can only describe a thing but unable to define its essence.²⁷ Now the question is what is the essence of the Absolute Being?

Ibn Sīnā contends that the essence (*māhiyya*) of the Necessary Existent can be no other than existence (*anniyya*).²⁸ That whose essence (*māhiyya*) is other than existence is not the Necessary Existent. An essence cannot be the cause of the existence of the Necessary Existent for the following reasons. If we assume that such an essence should have been the cause of existence of the Necessary Existent then, it generates two alternate possibilities:

- (i) Either the existence of the Necessary Existent could be derived from that essence, or
- (ii) This being were the cause of the existence.

If the second alternative is taken into consideration, then it would follow that the being of this essence would have to be realized prior to itself, which is logically impossible. Moreover, if the essence has no being, it could not be the cause of anything. That cannot be the cause of anything who does not exist. Since, the second hypothesis could not be the reason for Its being, so, an enquiry into the first alternative is being initiated.

In concern to the first alternative, i.e., ‘the existence of the Necessary Existent could be derived from that essence’ - it is to be said that the essence of the Necessary Existent is not the cause of its existence. Its cause, therefore, is something else. The Necessary Existence must exist, therefore, due to something else. This view, however, is not acceptable as it hampers the nature of the very notion of Necessary Existence.²⁹ Hence, it is logically evident that we must nullify the view under consideration that an essence can be the cause of the existence of the Necessary Existent. The analysis of the view only strengthens the view of Ibn Sīnā’s contention that the essence (*māhiyya*) of the Necessary Existent can be no other than existence (*anniyya*). In other words, the essence and existence of a Necessary Existent is identical.³⁰ For him, the Necessary Being is that which when supposed to be not existing, an impossibility occurs from it.³¹ The Necessary Being is the Ultimate Being who is necessary of itself.³² Its essence and existence is identical. The supposition of its non-existence leads us to self-

contradiction.³³ Hence, the essence of the Necessary Existent is the existence or in another manner the essence and existence is identical in the Necessary Existent.

Conclusion

Ibn Sīnā says that the Absolute Being is the only Necessary Being. The Absolute Being is the only being who is necessary of itself.³⁴ He farther argues that the mere fact that we have the notion of the Necessary Being proves that He exists. We conceive the notion of the Absolute Being as a Perfect Being and existence is nothing but a positive quality of perfection. It would be self-contradictory to assume that a being is perfect in nature but it does not have existence.³⁵ Ibn Sīnā logically established that the Necessary Being exists ‘due-to-Its-Self’ and has no essence other than existence.

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Cognition in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika System

Rajen Lakra

Abstract

Cognition (*buddhi* or *jñāna*) is held to be one of the important concepts in the history of philosophy. Different schools of philosophy have studied this particular concept from different perspectives. Several thinkers hold it to be an act, while some regard it as a relation. However, according to some it is self-subsistent and for a few others it is a quality. Nevertheless, in this article we shall deal with cognition as one of the twenty-four qualities in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. And we shall try to prove that cognition is an adventitious quality of the soul and it is not self-illuminating.

One can say that cognition is the most important quality because it reveals all other qualities. Further by this cognition only, we come to know that there are seven categories and their divisions. The second of the seven categories in Vaiśeṣika is referred to as *guṇa*. This term is usually translated in English as 'quality' or 'attribute'. Western understanding of the word quality is not the exact understanding of the word *guṇa* in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. In Western philosophy quality is understood as repeatable properties, while according to Vaiśeṣika, *guṇa* is not repeatable.¹ An attribute is defined as that which exists in a substance and has no quality or activity in it.² An attribute always depends for its existence on some substance and is never constitutive of things. Therefore, there cannot be an attribute of attributes, or we can say attribute is itself attributeless. Actually Kaṇāda, the founder of Vaiśeṣika school, gives us only seventeen qualities and Praśastapāda later adds seven more to it. Hence there are twenty-four kinds of qualities. These are: colour (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*), smell (*gandha*), touch (*sparsā*), sound (*śabda*), number (*sankhya*), magnitude (*parimāṇa*), differentia (*prthaktva*), conjunction (*samyoga*), disjunction (*vibhāga*), remoteness (*paratva*), nearness (*aparatva*), fluidity (*dravatva*), viscosity (*sneha*), knowledge (*buddhi*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), effort (*prayatna*), heaviness (*gurutva*), merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharmā*) and faculty (*samiskāra*).³

A question can be raised: why cognition is not a substance or an action but a quality? First of all, cognition is neither a substance nor a modification of a substance. Because cognition cannot be the constitutive cause of anything, nor can it be the permanent substratum of certain recognized properties.

Again cognition cannot be a modification of a substance as a pot is of clay. Because it is partless and also non-eternal. A substance that is partless, for example an atom is eternal, whereas a cognition such as perception of the pen on a particular table is non-eternal because it comes into existence and then ceases to exist. Therefore, cognition is neither a substance nor a modification of a substance.⁴

Secondly cognition is not an action. According to Naiyāyikas, all physical effects are due to some action while all mental effects such as cognitions are due to contact of the mind and the self. Hence, they are not caused by action, but they presuppose actions which are causes of causal conditions.⁵ A movement in space in the Nyāya ontology is an action and cognition has no spatial movement. Therefore, cognition is not an action. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamanjari* clearly states that *jñāna* is not an activity, but a product.⁶ Cognition is a product which arises out of a collocation of various causal conditions. Further, like all products, it arises in time and is replaced by others. A cognition being a *guṇa* cannot be shared in common by two selves, it is particular and in a sense private too.

However, the view of the Naiyāyikas stand in sharp opposition to the Buddhist who hold cognition as a thing or a substance and against Samikhya and Vedānta according to whom cognition is a modification of a substance called *buddhi* or *antahkaraṇa*. Further, *buddhi* or *antahkaraṇa* in Samikhya philosophy being a composite substance assumes the shape and the form of the object while in Nyāya the *jñāna* being a *guṇa* is without component parts. Therefore, it does not assume any form or shape. Similarly cognition is not an action so it does not bring about any change in the object that is known, as Bhaṭṭas wrongly regard it as doing.⁷

The next question that comes to our mind is whose quality is cognition? There are four possible answers to this question. A cognition is a quality either of a self or of the senses or of the sense objects or the mind. The Naiyāyikas argue that the last three alternatives have to be rejected so that only the first is tenable. Firstly cognition is not a quality of the sense or sense-object. It is very clearly stated in N.S. 3/2/19 नेन्द्रियार्थयोस्तद्विनाशेऽपि ज्ञानावस्थानात् ॥ - Knowledge belongs neither to the sense nor to the object because it continues even on the destruction thereof.⁸ If knowledge had been the quality of the

sense, it could not continue after the sense has been destroyed; but knowledge is found in the form of memory even after the sense has perished. For example, the cognition I saw exists even after the sense or the object has ceased to exist. However, such knowledge cannot be produced because the knower ceases to exist.⁹ The production of knowledge in spite of the absence of the sense or the objects indicate that the knower or the locus of the quality of cognition is a different entity.

Likewise, knowledge does not also belong to the mind as we read in N.S. 3/2/20 युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेश्च न मनसः ॥ - It does not also belong to the mind, the existence of which is inferred from the knowables not being perceived simultaneously.¹⁰ When we read N.S. 1/1/16 युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिंगम् ॥ - The mark of the mind is that there do not arise (in the soul) more acts of knowledge than one at a time.¹¹ Here we see that in spite of the simultaneous contact of the olfactory and other senses with smell, etc., the resulting cognitions do not simultaneously occur. Therefore, we infer that there exists an internal sense organ, i.e. mind and cognition is not a quality of this internal sense organ but a quality of the cognitive agent. A cognitive agent is the controller and that which is controlled is the instrument. If the mind had cognition for its quality then it would cease to be an instrument. A cognitive agent or knower is independent and the instrument is dependent upon the agent. Further, if the mind had cognition for its quality then this would lead to a mere difference in names. For just as for the cogniser the sense-organs are the instruments of cognition, similarly for the thinkers there should be an organ of thinking which is called mind. Thus, if both soul and mind were cognitive entities, it would not be possible to decide which cognition belongs to which of the two.¹²

Therefore N.S.3/2/42 clearly states परिशेषाद्यथोक्तहेतूपपत्तेश्च ॥ - Knowledge etc., must be admitted to be qualities of the soul by the principle of exclusion and on account of arguments already adduced.¹³ Cognition is a quality which inheres in a substance. That substance is neither the body, nor the sense nor the mind. Hence the abode of cognition is the soul which is permanent so that it can perceive a thing now as well as remember one perceived in the past.

The very definition of soul according to Annambhaṭṭa is "The substrate (*adhikaraṇa*) of a conscious state (*jñāna*) is soul (*ātman*)."¹⁴ The finite self has fourteen qualities nine specific and five generic: nine specific qualities are cognition, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, volition, pleasure and pain. The five generic qualities are number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction. Out of nine specific qualities the six qualities cognition, desire, aversion, effort, pleasure and pain are adventitious qualities of the soul.¹⁵ Because the same thing that cognizes a thing also desires to acquire it or shun it; it also acts to possess or shun it, and on reaching its goal experiences pleasure or pain. These qualities are the adventitious qualities of the individual self because the self also can remain without these qualities. Their relation to the self is one of inherence (*samavāya*). They are perceived when the mind as sense comes in contact with them. This sense-object contact is not one of direct conjunction (*saṁyoga*) but it is an indirect contact called *saṁyuktasamavāya*.¹⁶ However, we can say that cognition, is a quality of the psycho-physical organism: it belongs to the mind-body complex, while the mind, the body and the self individually are essentially non-sentient; the body when disjoined from the self is inert and the self in the state of release, divested of the body, acquired its natural form of a pure substance devoid of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, etc.¹⁷ To the Advaita Vedānta cognition or consciousness has been just the self, the very stuff of it. For Naiyāyikas and Prabhākara, the self is essentially a pure substance and cognition is one of its adventitious qualities which come and go without affecting its essential nature.

There is a difference of opinion among the philosophers with regard to the understanding of cognition. According to Naiyāyikas as we read in N.S. 1/1/15 बुद्धिः उपलब्धिर्ज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम् ।। - Intellect, apprehension and knowledge these are not different from one another.¹⁸ Therefore, we say that cognition means awareness or apprehension of objects and it includes all cognitions that have a more or less determinate objective reference. The object of apprehension may be a thing or a quality, an act or an emotion, the existent as well as the non-existent. As the light of the lamp shows physical things, in the same way cognition manifests all objects which come across. However, cognition as a quality of the self, is always directed to objects outside of and different from itself. Cognition is never self-manifested or

cognition cannot cognise itself. It can grasp not itself, but is perceived by another cognition which is called *anuvyavasāya* which is a kind of internal perception. When I have a state of cognition, say perceiving a table, I do not at that precise moment know that I have such a cognition. I come to know only at a subsequent moment that I have a perception of the table. This latter perception is known as the subsequent perception or *anuvyavasāya* of the original perception (of the table) which is known as *vyavasāya*. A cognition is directly apprehended by an internal perception, therefore, a cognition can never turn upon itself to make itself the object of cognition. A cognition is perceived by another cognition through the mind. Furthermore, there is no chance of infinite regress here because according to Naiyāyikas in God, there are two cognitions, one of which apprehends the entire universe, and the other apprehends that cognition. There is no need of postulating any other cognition in God. Actually, there is a difference between the divine cognition and the human cognition and an attribute of the former cannot be ascribed to the latter.¹⁹ As we said already cognition is said to be the property of manifestation that belongs to the self and without this manifestation we lose the ground of all rational practice and intelligent activity. However, according to Naiyāyikas a cognition is not inferred from the cognizedness of its object, as Bhaṭṭa school holds, nor is it cognized by itself as the Vedāntist, Buddhist Idealist and the Jaina hold. Rather a cognition is perceived by another cognition.

Here we find two sharp contrasted positions in Indian thought. One is in support of the view that consciousness is self-illuminating just as the light of a lamp manifests an object, but also manifests itself so does consciousness, while making its object known, makes itself known without needing to be objectified by another cognition. This view is supported by Samikhya, Yoga, Vedānta and Buddhism.²⁰ The other position is of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. According to them consciousness has a distinguishing feature in its function of manifesting. Consciousness has the property of having an object (*saviṣayakatva*). In fact, there is no objectless consciousness. In other words, it points beyond itself and can never be directed to itself. It is not necessary that every cognition is cognized, it is only when the self or mind attends to it then cognition is known or perceived. Thus, knowledge cannot be self-manifested.

According to Śankara, if consciousness is self-illuminating and the object is manifested by another, then the two must be opposed to each other like light and darkness. Thus, they cannot be together. Further, Śankara suggests that consciousness being an object must be a mystery and can only appear owing to ignorance (*avidyā*). Whereas Rāmānuja holds the opposite view that consciousness is both intentional and self-shining.²¹ However, for Naiyāyikas cognition is understood as a quality of self and is mainly connected with epistemological concern. We also must keep in mind that according to Praśastapāda, consciousness is non-locus pervading, while Udayana sees it as locus-pervading since its locus is without parts.²² Thus, we have two extreme positions one; consciousness is self-illuminating and the other; consciousness is intentional.

According to Naiyāyikas, there are four important aspects in all knowledge and these are *pramātā*, *prameya*, *pramiti* and *pramāṇa*. Although all these four aspects are equally important, yet *pramāṇa* is the most important because it is the direct cause of real knowledge. *Pramātā* is the subject of adequate knowledge. *Pramiti* is the resulting state of cognition. And *pramāṇa* is the means of valid knowledge and instrument of presentative knowledge.

Annamibhaṭṭa defines cognition as: "Cognition is consciousness and is that quality which is the ground of all linguistic usage."²³ It is on the basis of knowledge of some kind that all living beings deal with other objects of the surrounding world. Therefore, cognition is regarded as the ground of the behaviour or conduct of a living being. A living creature behaves differently in relation to different objects because it somehow knows them to be different. Cognition in the most comprehensive sense as the knowledge of objects, Naiyāyikas divide cognition into *anubhava* and *smṛti* or memory. In *anubhava* there is a presentational knowledge of objects. Hence it is original in character and not the reproduction of a previous knowledge of objects. *Smṛti* on the other hand is a reproduction of previous experience. Each of these have been further divided into veridical (*yathārtha*) and non-veridical (*ayathārtha*) forms. Further, *anubhava* is of two kinds valid and non-valid. Valid *anubhava* is called *pramā* which includes all cases of true presentational knowledge of objects. There are four kinds of *pramā* or valid

presentation, namely perception, inference, comparison and testimony. In each of these there is a presentation of some object as it really is. There are cases of knowledge which are presentational in character, but not valid. They are called *apramā*. These are of three kinds: doubt, error and hypothetical reasoning.

Memory is not *pramā* or valid knowledge, because it does not refer to presented objects. It is of two kinds: true and false. The true memory is in accordance with the real nature of the objects remembered whereas false memory does not match with the real character of the remembered objects. In our waking life, we have both of these whereas in our dreams the cognitions are false memory cognitions. However, all knowledge, including dream refers to some real objects and only dream is a false memorial representation of the real.²⁴

As we have seen above, it indicates the very wide sense in which the Nyāya along with most other systems of Indian thought use the word *buddhi* or *jñāna*, and to render these Sanskrit words into the English word 'knowledge' would be misleading. In fact, it is really the other word *pramā* which denotes ordinarily only a species of *jñāna* that permits itself to be translated as knowledge. The word *jñāna* and knowledge are not synonymous expressions because Nyāya would treat doubt as a species of *jñāna* while to doubt is not to know. However, doubting certainly involves some knowledge which is not itself doubting.²⁵

The concept of cognition is so important that *Nyāya Sūtra* itself starts with the proposition that in order to obtain the highest good, one must acquire the knowledge of the truth. Because knowledge of the truth drives away miseries, births and false knowledge and the result is *mokṣa*. The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas advocate the view that knowledge is not the essence of the self, but an attribute owned by the self. Just as Descartes and his followers hold that knowledge is the essential attribute of the mind or the soul substance, just as extension is the essential attribute of matter. Actually for Nyāya and Vaiśeṣikas the quality of cognition is an adventitious quality. However, we can say that it is the most important quality because it reveals all other qualities. Further by this cognition only, we come to know

that there are seven categories and their divisions. In other words, we can say that it is an index of all the qualities because whatever is there it is through cognition. In that sense cognition has an exalted position. It is a kind of intuition or revelation because the whole schema is revealed to the *āchāryas* like Gautama and Kaṇāda and they who have passed it to the disciples. Realistic theory of cognition is that whatever is not in the object it is not there in the cognition. So how do we know? Therefore, it is a kind of revealed truth.

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भारत में 1786 से 1856 ई. तक ब्रिटिश शासन के अधीन प्रशासनिक सुधारों का ऐतिहासिक अध्ययन

प्रकाश चन्द्र बड़वाया

Introduction

भारत में आने वाले ब्रिटिश गवर्नर जनरलों ने प्रशासनिक सामाजिक, आर्थिक, राजनीतिक तथा अन्य सुधार करने में लार्ड कार्नवालिस (1786–1793 ई.), लार्ड विलियम बैंटिक (1828–1835 ई.) तथा लार्ड डलहौजी (1848–56) के नाम विशेष रूप से उल्लेखनीय हैं इस शोध पत्र में कार्नवालिस, विलियम बैंटिक तथा डलहौजी के सुधार पर विशेष प्रकाश डाला है। लार्ड कार्नवालिस ने कम्पनी के कर्मचारियों के वेतन बढ़ा दिए ताकि वे भ्रष्टाचार और निजी व्यापार से दूर रहे। उसके द्वारा निजी व्यापार की समाप्ति, न्यायिक क्षेत्र में सुधार, पुलिस व्यवस्था तथा लगान व्यवस्था को एक नई दिशा प्रदान की। कार्नवालिस द्वारा बंगाल में शुरू किया गया स्थायी बंदोबस्त (Permanent Settlement of Bengal) सबसे महत्वपूर्ण सुधार था। लार्ड विलियम बैंटिक 1828 में भारत का प्रथम गवर्नर-जनरल बना था। लार्ड विलियम बैंटिक ने प्रशासनिक न्याय, शिक्षा, वित्तीय, सामाजिक सुधार तथा जन-कल्याण के अनेकों सुधार किए। लार्ड डलहौजी ब्रिटिश साम्राज्य को विस्तार देने वाला गवर्नर जनरल था, फिर भी उसने कई प्रशासनिक व सामाजिक सुधार किए। लार्ड डलहौजी ने यातायात तथा संचार साधनों में रेल विभाग की स्थापना, डाक-तार विभाग की स्थापना की। डलहौजी ने प्रशासनिक, व्यापारिक, शिक्षा सम्बन्धी, सामाजिक सुधार, सैनिक सुधार के साथ ही सार्वजनिक कार्य विभाग को स्थापित किया। इन सुधारों के कारण भारतीय समाज की सामाजिक बुराईयाँ दूर हुई तथा भारतीय समाज को एक नई दिशा प्राप्त हुई।

कार्नवालिस 1786 से 1793 ई. तक बंगाल का गवर्नर जनरल रहा। इन सात सालों में प्रशासनिक सुधारों के पीछे उसका मुख्य उद्देश्य प्रशासनिक कुशलता लाना, प्रशासन को सरल बनाना तथा इसके विभागीय अधिकार क्षेत्रों का स्पष्ट वर्गीकरण (Classification) करना और रिश्वतखोरी एवं भ्रष्टाचार का अंत करना था। इस सम्बंध में डब्लू एस. सेटनकार ने लिखा है, "कार्नवालिस के सुधार उसको अंग्रेजी नीतिज्ञों की पंक्ति में लाकर खड़ा करते हैं, जिन्होंने भारत में अंग्रेजों की प्रमुखता को पक्की तथा मजबूत नींव पर खड़ा किया है।" 1 आर. सी. दत्त के कथानुसार – "अंधकार एवं तूफानों के काल के पश्चात् भारत में सूर्य-प्रकाश की किरण दिखाई दी। लार्ड कार्नवालिस ने उन आशाओं को झूठा न होने दिया जो उससे की जाती थी।" 2 कार्नवालिस से बढ़ कर बहुत कम

1 The reforms of Lord Cornwallis have brought him in the line of those British statesmen who were responsible for laying the British Supremacy in India on firm and sound foundations – W.S. Setton Carr.

2 "There was a gleam of sun-shine in India after an eye of darkness and storms. Lord Cornwallis did not decline the expectation that had been formed of him." – R.C. Dutt, Economic History of India, Vol. I, P. 8-9.

गवर्नर जनरलों ने आंतरिक मामलों में उसके समान स्थायी सुधार किये।³ कार्नवालिस के सुधारों के सम्बन्ध में बी. एल. ग्रोवर तथा आर. आर. सेठी लिखते हैं—“प्रशासनिक सुधारों में जो नींव वारेन हेस्टिंग्स ने रखी थी, उस पर बड़े भवन का निर्माण कार्नवालिस ने किया। कार्नवालिस ने भारत को आधारभूत रूप से प्रशासनिक ढांचा प्रदान किया जो कि केवल कुछ ही परिवर्तनों के साथ लम्बे समय तक चलता रहा।”⁴

कार्नवालिस ने भूमि-कर व्यवस्था में सुधार (Reforms in Land Revenue System) अथवा बंगाल का स्थायी बंदोबस्त (Permanent Settlement of Bengal) लागू किया। इसमें जमींदारों को भूमि का स्वामी मानकर 1790 ई. में उनके साथ दस वर्ष के लिए एक समझौता किया गया। इसी व्यवस्था को कम्पनी डायरेक्टरों की स्वीकृति के बाद 1793 में स्थायी कर दिया गया जिसे, “स्थायी बन्दोबस्त” कहते हैं।⁵ यदि बंगाल, बिहार तथा उड़ीसा में लागू किया गया था। स्थायी बंदोबस्त के विषय में इतिहासकारों ने अत्यंत विरोधी मत प्रकट किये हैं। होम्ज (Homes) इसकी कड़ी आलोचना करते हुए लिखते हैं—“स्थायी बंदोबस्त एक दुःखद भूल थी। साधारण किसानों को इससे कोई लाभ नहीं हुआ। जमींदार निरंतर लगान देने में असमर्थ रहे और उनकी जमीनें सरकार के लभार्थ बेच दी गयी।”⁶ दूसरी ओर मार्शमन ने इस व्यवस्था की प्रशंसा करते हुए लिखा है—“वह एक साहस और बहादुरी वाला बुद्धिमत्तापूर्ण कार्य था—जिसने प्रथम बार भूमि के स्थायी लगान और अधिकारों को स्थापित किया। जनसंख्या में वृद्धि हुई, कृषि में उन्नति हुई और व्यक्तियों के स्वभाव और सुविधाओं में धीरे-धीरे स्पष्ट रूप से सुधार दिखाई दिया है।”⁷ आर. सी. दत्त के अनुसार— “यदि किसी राष्ट्र की समृद्धि तथा प्रसन्नता को बुद्धिमत्ता तथा सफलता की कसौटी कहा जा सकता है तो लार्ड कार्नवालिस का 1793 ई. का स्थायी बन्दोबस्त सबसे बुद्धिमत्ता वाला तथा सबसे अधिक लाभदायक कदम था, जो अंग्रेज राष्ट्र ने कभी भारत में उठाया था।”⁸ सन् 1793 से 1798 के मध्य सर जॉन शोर ने गवर्नर जनरल रूप में हस्तक्षेप न करने अथवा शांतिपूर्ण तटस्थता की नीति (Policy of Non-intervention or peaceful Isolation) अपनाई। सर जॉन शोर सर्वोच्च कौंसिल का

3 "Few were destined to do more permanent work than Lord Cornwallis especially in the department of internal affairs." – P.E. Roberts, History of British India, p. 225

4 "In his administrative reform, Cornwallis built a super structure where the foundation had been laid by Warren Hastings, Cornwallis gave to India the basic administrative set up that continued without many changes for long" – B.L. Grover and R.R. Sethi : A New look on Modern Indian History, p. 124

5 एल. पी. शर्मा—आधुनिक भारत, लक्ष्मीनारायण अग्रवाल, आगरा, 2010, पृ. 168

6 "The permanent settlement was a sad blunder. The inferior tenants derived from it no benefit whatever. The Zamindar again and again failed to pay their rent charges and their estates were sold for the benefit of the government" – Holmes.

7 "It was a bold, brave and wise measure... for the first time (was) created indetensible right and interests in the old, population was increased, cultivation was extended and gradual improvement become visible in the habits and comforts of the people"- Marshmen

8 If the prosperity and happiness of a nation is to be the criterion of wisdom and success. Lord Cornwallis permanent settlement of 1793 is the wisest and most successful measure which the British nation has ever adopted in India." – R.C. Dutt.

वरिष्ठ सदस्य तथा भूमि सुधार के संबंध में कार्नवालिस से घनिष्ठतापूर्वक संबंध रखता था। लार्ड वैलेजली (1798–1805 ई.) ने हस्तक्षेप न करने की नीति का पालन नहीं किया बल्कि इसके विपरीत हस्तक्षेप साम्राज्य विस्तार और युद्ध की नीति को अपनाया। जुलाई 1828 ई. में लार्ड एम्सस्ट के बाद विलियम बैन्टिक (William Bentinck) को भारत का प्रथम गवर्नर जनरल बनाया गया। विलियम बैन्टिक ने 1828 से 1835 ई. तक यह पद सम्भाला। बैन्टिक का समय मुख्यतः विभिन्न सुधारों की दृष्टि से महत्वपूर्ण माना गया है कुछ सुधार उसने कम्पनी की आर्थिक स्थिति और शासन व्यवस्था को सुधारने की दृष्टि से किये और कुछ अन्य सुधार उसने भारतीयों की स्थिति को सुधारने के लिए किये। 7 मार्च 1835 ई. को लार्ड विलियम बैन्टिक ने उस समय की सार्वजनिक शिक्षा समिति के अध्यक्ष लार्ड मैकाले (Lord Macaulay) के अंग्रेजी भाषा तथा पश्चिमी साहित्य के विकास के विचारों को स्वीकार कर लिया। वह अंग्रेजी भाषा तथा साहित्य का विकास करके भारत में इस प्रकार का वर्ग पैदा करना चाहता था जो रक्त तथा रंग में तो भारतीय हो, परन्तु बुद्धि, रहन सहन तथा विचारधारा में अंग्रेज हो। इस पर डाक्टर ईश्वर प्रसाद ने लिखा है—“इसने राष्ट्र भाषा का स्थान प्राप्त कर लिया तथा राष्ट्रीय एकात्मता तथा विचारों को इकट्ठा करने में सहायता दी। इसने यूरोपियन विचारधारा के माह्न भण्डार को हमारे सामने रखा तथा निश्चित रूप में बौद्धिक विकास को प्रभावित किया।”⁹ विलियम बैन्टिक के आने से भारत में लगभग सभी क्षेत्रों में अनेक सुधार हुए। देश की आर्थिक संकट से बचाया। कई सामाजिक कुरीतियों को दूर किया और नवीन शिक्षा प्रणाली की स्थापना की गई। डाक्टर वी. ए. स्मिथ के अनुसार – उसने भारतीय नीति को ऐसा मोड़ प्रदान किया जिसका झुकाव कल्याण तथा पश्चिमी नवीनीकरण की ओर था। इसके बाद वह प्रवाह चलता ही रहा।¹⁰

विलियम बैन्टिक का सबसे महत्वपूर्ण सामाजिक सुधार सती प्रथा का निषेध था। सती प्रथा को बंद करने में उस समय के प्रसिद्ध समाज सुधारक राजा राममोहन राय का बड़ा हाथ था। उसके मजबूत निश्चय, प्रबुद्ध तर्कों तथा निरंतर प्रयत्नों के कारण ही विलियम बैन्टिक की सरकार ने इस प्रथा को बंद किया।¹¹ इसके साथ ही विलियम बैन्टिक ने ठगी प्रथा का अंत, कन्या-वध का निषेध, तथा नर-बिल का निषेध कर दिया। विलियम बैन्टिक के शासनकाल में सार्वजनिक कार्यों की ओर ध्यान दिया गया। कलकत्ता से दिल्ली तक जाने वाली ग्रेण्ड ट्रंक रोड (G.T. Road) को फिर बनवाया गया तथा उत्तर पश्चिम प्रांत (U.P.) में नहरे खुदवाई गई। थॉर्नटन (Thornton) और बी.डी. बसु (V.D. Basu)¹² जैसे कुछ लेखकों ने लार्ड विलियम बैन्टिक की कटु आलोचना करते हुए यहाँ तक कह दिया कि उसके सारे कार्य स्वार्थपरता से प्रेरित थे और भारतीयों की अपेक्षा उनमें अंग्रेजों की भलाई का अधिक ध्यान रखा गया था, परन्तु हमें यह विचार में सन्यता बहुत कम नजर आती है। लार्ड

9 "It took the place of Lingua Franca, helped in the consolidation of national opinion and the exchange of ideas. It threw open the great treasures of the west which have influenced our intellectual growth" – Dr. Ishwari Prasad.

10 "He was able to give Indian policy a twist towards welfare and western innovation which it never afterwards altogether lost." – Dr. V.A. Smith.

11 "There is no doubt that it was greatly through his (Ram Mohan Roy's) firmness elightened reasoning and persevering efforts that the government of Bengal at last thought themselves enabled to interdict the immolation of widows." – Revd. J.Fox

12 Major B.D. Basu – Rise of Christian Power in India, p. 790

विलियम बैन्टिक का यह विचार था कि लोगों की भलाई में ही सरकार की भलाई छिपी हुई है। विलियम बैन्टिक के कार्यों की प्रशंसा करते हुए मैकाले ने लिखा है कि "विलियम बैन्टिक ने उत्तम बुद्धि, ईमानदारी तथा दयापूर्ण राज्य किया। उसने पूर्वी तानाशाही में अंग्रेजी स्वतंत्रता की भावना पैदा कर दी। वह कभी भी नहीं भूला था कि प्रजा का कल्याण ही सरकार का उद्देश्य है, उसने निर्दयी प्रथाओं का खंडन किया। उसने अपमानजनक भेदभावों का अंत किया, उसने जनता को अपने विचार प्रकट करने की स्वतंत्रता दी, उसने अपनी प्रजा के नैतिक तथा बौद्धिक विकास की ओर सदा ही ध्यान दिया।"¹³ इसके बाद लार्ड डलहौजी का 1848 ई. से 1856 ई. तक शासनकाल केवल उसकी साम्राज्यवादी नीति के लिए ही नहीं अपितु अनेक प्रकार के आंतरिक सुधारों के लिए भी प्रसिद्ध है। उसने आधुनिक भारत की नींव रखी। हण्टर के शब्दों में "लार्ड डलहौजी ने लार्ड वैलेजली के अवनत भारत को आजकल के उन्नत भारत में परिवर्तित कर दिया।"¹⁴ सर रिचर्ड टैम्पल (Sir Richard Temple) का कहना है कि –"एक प्रबंध कर्ता के रूप में लार्ड डलहौजी से, इंग्लैंड से भारत आने वाले योग्य व्यक्तियों में से कोई भी आगे निकलना तो क्या उनकी बराबरी भी नहीं कर पाया।" लार्ड डलहौजी ने 1853 ई. में बम्बई तथा थाने (Thane) के बीच पहली रेलवे लाइन बिछाई गई जो 32 किलोमीटर लम्बी थी। इससे भारत में राष्ट्रीयता के फैलने में काफी सहयोग मिला। इस सम्बंध में सर एडविन आर्नोल्ड (Sir Edwin Arnold) ने 1865 ई. में लिखा था—"रेले भारत के लिए वह कार्य कर सकेगी जो अनेक राजवंश भी न कर सके जो अकबर की विलक्षण प्रतिभा द्वारा भी न किया जा सका और जिसे टीपू सुल्तान अपने विद्रोह तथा अत्याचार से भी न कर सका। वे भारत को एक राष्ट्र बना सकेगी। लार्ड डलहौजी भारत में आधुनिक डाक व तार व्यवस्था का संस्थापक था। डलहौजी ने डाक व्यवस्था में सुधार करने के लिए एक कमीशन की नियुक्ति की। इस कमीशन की रिपोर्ट के अनुसार 1854 ई. में "पोस्ट आफिस एक्ट" (Post office Act) पास किया गया। उसने पोस्टकार्ड प्रचलित किया। आधे तोले तक के भार के पत्र का मूल्य दो पैसे रखा गया। ये पत्र भारत के एक भाग से दूसरे भाग में भेजे जा सकते थे। इस कार्य से सरकार के लिए व लोगों के लिए सूचनाएँ विभिन्न प्रांतों में भेजना सरल हो गया। इस प्रकार डाक प्रणाली बड़ी लाभदायक हो गई थी। कहा भी गया है कि—"*His reforms made the Post office into a source of revenue and were among the most abiding achievement.* सन् 1853 ई. में सबसे पहले तार लाइन कलकत्ता से आगरा तक स्थापित की गई। शीघ्र ही इस तार सेवा को पेशावर तक विस्तृत कर दिया गया था। रेलवे, डाक तथा तार निर्माण से भारत में परिवहन और संचार के साधनों में क्रांतिकारी परिवर्तन हुए। इतिहासकार डा. वी.ए. स्मिथ के अनुसार "डलहौजी भारतीय रेल प्रणाली का जनक था।"¹⁵ लार्ड डलहौजी

13 He ruled with eminent prudence intersity and benevolence.... who infused into oriental despolism the spirt of British freedom, who never forgot that the end of government is happiness of the governed who abolished cruel rites; who effected humiliating distinctions; who gave liberty to the expression of public opinion and whose constant study it was to elevate the intellectual and moral character of the nation committed to his charge" – Lord Macaulay.

14 "Lord Dalhousie Converted the stationary India of Lordwellesley into the Progressive India of our own day." – W.W. Hunter, Lord Dalhousie, p. 179

15 "Dlhousie was the father of the Indian Railways" – Dr. V.A. Smith.

द्वारा चलाई गयी रेलों का एक अन्य लाभ यह हुआ कि भारत की सभी जातियों एवं धर्मों के लोग इकट्ठे एक साथ बैठ कर रेल के डब्बों में यात्रा करने लगे, जिसके परिणामस्वरूप उनमें जातीय भेदभाव कम होने लगा। जनवरी 1855 ई. में एक अंग्रेजी समाचार पत्र में लिखा था "यह इस युग का एक अजूबा है कि भारत के लोग ने अपनी पिछली बीस शताब्दियों पुरानी आदतों को अचानक बदल दिया है।" 16 डलहौजी के शासनकाल में स्थापित तार व्यवस्था का उद्देश्य भी रेलों की तरह सैनिक व व्यापारिक था। 17 साथ ही डलहौजी की सस्ती डाक व्यवस्था शायद रेलों, तारों तथा शिक्षा से बढ़कर भारतीयों के पृथक-पृथक रहने के जीवन में क्रांतिकारी परिवर्तन ले आई। 18

निष्कर्षतः उपरोक्त विवरण के आधार पर हम कह सकते हैं कि लार्ड कार्नवालिस, लार्ड विलियम बैंटिक तथा लार्ड डलहौजी ने अपने शासन काल के दौरान विभिन्न क्षेत्रों में उल्लेखनीय सुधार किए। इन सुधारों के परिणामस्वरूप वह भारतीय समाज को एक नई दिशा देने में सफल हुए। आधुनिक रेल, डाक, तार, शिक्षा, राजनीतिक एकता, आदि सबका प्रचलन इनके काल में हुआ। उनके सुधारों से न केवल लोगों को लाभ हुआ अपितु उनमें जातीय भेदभाव कम होने लगा। रेलों द्वारा भारत में एकता की स्थापना हुई और बाद में राष्ट्रवाद को प्रोत्साहन मिला।

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16 It is one of the wonders of the age to see how the people of India have suddenly changed the stereotyped habits of twenty centuries" – Friend of India.

17 "They (Railway and Telegraph) appealed to him militarily as quick means of transport and communication and commercially as an outlet of British capital" – Ishwari Prasad and S.K. Subedar : A History of Modern India, p. 229

18 "Lord Dalhousie's half penny post has done more than perhaps his railways or telegraphs and possibly as much as even the great system of public instructions in revolutionising the old stagnant and self isolated life of India" – W.W. Hunter : Lord Dalhousie, P. 204

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Analysis of Achievement Motivation among participants of Yoga, Athletics and Aquatics

Anu Sharma & Mrs. Ramandeep Kaur

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to find out the significance differences between the participants of yoga , Athletics and Aquatics. This descriptive type of study was undertaken to find out the inter-sports differences among the participants of yoga, athletics and aquatics on the variable Achievement motivation. For the purpose of the study, a total of 90 subjects in the age group of 18 to 24 years studying in various colleges of Chandigarh were drawn through purposive random sampling technique to constitute the sample. The subjects were sportspersons who had participated in inter-college level competition in yoga, athletics and aquatics during the session 2004-05. Efforts were made to have subjects from both the gender groups in equal proportions. To measure the level of achievement motivation among the subjects, the sports Achievement Motivation Test developed by Kamlesh (1990) was used. For analysis the data, the same was subjected to statistical treatment through computer. To find out the inter-sports group differences between the three groups i:e Yoga, Athletics and Aquatics, one way ANOVA was applied and for finding out the intra-group gender differences, descriptive values such as mean, SD and t-value were got worked out.

INTRODUCTION:

Achievement Motivation is an essential element of human personality. It directs a person's activity and makes it more (or less) dynamic. Without the desire to succeed other psychological features and abilities do not provide nearly so much influence on performance. Achievement motivation influences other factors affecting performance in sport like: physical preparation, technique, tactics and even life style. Gracz and Sankowski (1995) concluded that the " driving power of activity", should be understood as the joint function of the motive power (which is a permanent property of personality) and the consequences of what a given individual experts of this own actions.

HYPOTHESIS:

It was hypothesized that there would be significant differences between the participants of yoga, athletics and aquatics on the variable Achievement motivation and also significant inter-sports differences between the male as well as female participants of three sports disciplines.

SIGNIFICANCE:

Sports achievement motivation is such a psychological variable which plays a great role in achieving success in sports arena. Infact, a number of studies have been conducted on this variable in specific game setting but in the present study an attempt has been made to explore this very pertinent variable among the three different types of sports participants i.e. Yoga, Athletics and Aquatics.

METHOD AND PROCEDURE:

1. Design of the study:- This descriptive type of study was undertaken to find out the inter-sports differences among the participants of yoga, athletics and aquatics on the variable Achievement motivation.
2. Selection of the sample:- For the purpose of the study, a total of 90 subjects in the age group of 18 to 24 years studying in various colleges of Chandigarh were drawn through purposive random sampling technique to constitute the sample. The subjects were sportspersons who had participated in inter-college level competition in yoga, athletics and aquatics during the session 2004-05. Efforts were made to have subjects from both the gender groups in equal proportions.
3. Selection of the test:- To measure the level of achievement motivation among the subjects, the sports Achievement Motivation Test developed by Kamlesh (1990) was used.
4. Statistical Design:- For analysis the data, the same was subjected to statistical treatment through computer. To find out the inter-sports group differences between the three groups i.e. yoga, athletics and aquatics, oneway ANOVA was applied and for finding out the intra-group gender differences, descriptive values such as mean, SD and t-value were got worked out.

RESULTS AND FINDINGS:

TABLE-1

Oneway ANOVA results with regard to the variable Sports Achievement Motivation.

Sources of variance	Ss	df	Ms	F-Value
Between groups	297.2889	5	59.4578	2.9588*
Within the groups	1688.0000	84	20.0952	
total	1958.2890	89	22.3066	

*P<0.05

TABLE-2

Mean, SD, t-ratio Matrix Among Male yoga, athletics and aquatics participants on the variable Sports Achievement Motivation.

Sr. no.	Group	N	Mean	SD	Std. E.M.	t-ratio	
						2	3
1.	YOGA	15	24.13	5.63	1.45	1.81	2.49*
2.	ATHLETICS	15	27.47	4.37	1.13		
3.	AQUATICS	15	28.27	3.10	.80		.58

*P<0.05

TABLE-3

Mean, SD, t-ratio Matrix Among female yoga, athletics and aquatics participants on the variable Sports Achievement Motivation.

Sr. no.	Group	N	Mean	SD	Std. E.M.	t-ratio	
						2	3
1.	YOGA	15	24.93	5.44	1.41	2.50*	1.41
2.	ATHLETICS	15	29.33	4.12	1.06		1.40
3.	AQUATICS	15	27.33	3.68	.95		

*P<0.05

DISCUSSION:

With regard to the variable Sports Achievement motivation, from the ANOVA results in table no.1, significant differences were found between the participants of yoga, athletics and aquatics (F-value being 2.9588,p<0.05). The mean values and t-ratio matrix as depicted in Table no-2 revealed that among the male participants, aquatics group had not only scored the highest mean value of 28.27 but were also found to be significantly better (p<0.05) than the yoga group (who had lowest mean score of 24.13). No other significant differences were noticed. However, as per the classification provided in the Test manual, the male participants of all the three sports groups fell in “moderate” category of sports achievement motivation. Among the female sports persons, the yoga group were again found to be having lowest level of scores of 24.93) and the athletes with mean score of 29.33 were found to be significantly better (p<0.05, table-3) than the yoga participants. No other significant differences were noticed among the female participants. Even among the female participants of the three groups, the level of their sports achievement motivation was found to be “moderate” as per the classification mentions in the Test Manual.

CONCLUSION:

The findings of the study will help the physical educators and coaches in understanding the dynamics of Achievement motivation in different disciplines of sports and games. Further studies may be undertaken involving subjects of other age group and belonging to other sports group.

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REPORT OF THE PROGRAMMES

Report on World Philosophy Day Celebration-2017




Continuing its tradition of “Celebrating World Philosophy Day” every year, the Department of Philosophy and Department of Hindi of P. G. Govt. College for Girls, Sector-11, Chandigarh organised an event on 16th November, 2017. Prof. Anita Kaushal, Principal of the college, felicitated the Guest-speaker, Ms. Sahar Gharachorlou, Founder of “Esitas Life Coaching Pvt Ltd.” and “Energy Healing Bliss”. Dr. Anita Khosla, Head, Department of Hindi introduced the distinguished speaker to the audience.

The main attraction of the programme was a thought provoking discourse by Ms. Sahar Gharachorlou. In the first stage of her lecture she discussed the philosophy of Louise L. Hay. Louise L. Hay, a metaphysical teacher has always said that she is not a healer, her work is a stepping stone on the pathway to happiness. The distinguished speaker highlighted the salient contribution of Louise L. Hay's philosophy:

- What we give out, we get back.
- What we believe about ourselves and life, becomes true for us. Our thoughts are creative. “If we love and accept ourselves and others unconditionally then we will attract people in our lives who are the same”.

- If you are experiencing difficult relationships and seem to have things working against you, it is because you either treat others this way or on some level believe that this kind of treatment is what you deserve. You may be totally unaware of this belief. Our subconscious thoughts manifest.
- Our thoughts are creative. Thoughts are like drops of water. They accumulate over time. As we continue to think the same thought over and over, it grows.
- We can release the past, and forgive everyone. Forgiveness opens the doorway to love. “Forgiveness is the key to your own release”.
- Holding onto old anger, hurt and upset causes dis-ease within the body. If you do not forgive, YOU remain the victim. Sometimes the hardest person to forgive is ourselves for things we feel we have or have not done.
- Forgive yourself and others, let it go, release the hurt and anger.
- We are worth loving, self-approval and self-acceptance are the keys to positive change. Love is the most powerful healing force there is. I am sure you have heard this before, what you do not hear so often is that the real healing love comes from within.
- Loving the self brings about healing on all levels and in all things. When you love yourself you do not hurt yourself and you will not hurt others. You cannot truly love another if you do not love yourself.
- Just be willing “have an open mind and an open heart”. Just be willing to try some of these things. Even if you cannot accept yourself exactly as you are right now, you can still tell yourself you are willing to try and that will enable your subconscious to work on it.
- In the end of her lecture, she said that don't search for happiness outside. It's going to happen within you. We have covered happiness with hate and jealousy for others. Be yourself. Never try to be someone else. Live in the moment, celebrate every day and every moment of your life. Create happiness in every small thing. Do not do multitask and concentrate on whatever is more easy to yourself. Happiness is a mental phenomenon, it's a state of mind that one feels light and expanded, the heart is open and joyful. Laughter is a physical expression as a result of a stimulus to the mind. That stimulus can be love, a good sense of humor, feeling good, etc.



A poster entitled, “Buddha on Happiness” was also released on this occasion. This was followed by an Interactive Session and the students discussed various concepts based on the theme of the lecture. Ms. Sahar answered to the satisfaction of the students and appreciated their zeal to learn. About 80 students and faculty members of the college participated in this programme.

Dr. Rama Arora (Dean) graced the function and interacted with the speaker on happiness. Concluding the function, Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal, Head, Department of Philosophy proposed a vote of thanks to the speaker and the audience. He observed that the lecture is a significant step to teach and acquaint students with the key concepts of the philosophy of happiness. The session was very gainful for one and all as it touched not only upon the theoretical dimensions but its application can have a long lasting positive effect on everybody's life.

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Format of Submission: The paper should be typewritten preferably in Times New Roman with 12 font size (English) and Kruti Dev (10) with 14 font size (Hindi) in MS-Word 2003 to 2010 and between 2500 to 3000 words. They should be typed on one side of the paper, **double spaced** with ample margins. The authors should submit the hard copy along with a CD and a copyright form to be sent to the editorial address.

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CPPIS, Pehowa (Kurukshetra)

Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS) Pehowa is a joint academic venture of *Milestone Education Society (Regd.) Pehowa* and *Society for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (SPPIS), Haryana* (online) to do fundamental research in the field of Humanities and Social Sciences.

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“My objective is to achieve an intellectual detachment from all philosophical systems, and not to solve specific philosophical problems, but to become sensitively aware of what it is when we philosophise.”

- Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal

