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Title

The Metaphysics of Intentionality:

**A Study of Intentionality focused on Sartre's and
Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind and Language.**

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ABSTRACT

With this Thesis an attempt is made at charting the area of the Metaphysics of Intentionality, based mainly on the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. A Philosophical Analysis and an Evaluation of Sartre's Arguments are provided, and Sartre's Theory of Intentionality is supported by recent commentaries on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Sartre's Theory of Intentionality is proposed, with few improvements by the author, as the only modern theory of the mind that can oppose effectively the advance of AI and physicalist reductivist attempts in Philosophy of Mind and Language.

Discussion includes Sartre's critique of Husserl, the relation of Sartre's Theory of Intentionality to Realism, its applicability in the Theory of the Emotions, and recent theories of Intentionality such as Mohanty's, Aquilla's, Searle's, and Harney's.

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I. Introduction.

In the Introduction I shall attempt a description of the first use of the term "Intentionality" by Brentano; in addition, I shall provide an outline of some of the components any theory of Intentionality has to have in order for it to use the term comprehensively and to follow the legacy that Brentano left us.

i) Intentionality: Brentano's Use of the Term.

The word comes from the Latin *intendere* (to stretch, to point at), and means the metaphorical stretching of consciousness in order to be *of* something, i.e., to have an object, which may or may not actually exist.

Brentano¹ first coined the term *Intentionality* for distinguishing (from other kinds of acts) and characterising mental acts as "the direction of the mind to an object" in perception, judgement or belief, approval or disapproval. In Brentano's theory the mental acts contain their object intentionally within themselves.

With what is called "Brentano's Irreducibility Thesis" it is claimed that Intentionality is an irreducible feature of mental phenomena, and since no physical phenomena could exhibit it, mental phenomena could not be a species of physical phenomena.

¹ See in Franz Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874).

Brentano also coined the phrase "Intentional Inexistence of the Intentional Objects of Mental Acts", to indicate that the intentional object may or may not exist in reality. By this he meant that even though we cannot want or believe without wanting or believing something, what we want or believe may not necessarily exist. For example, we may want the care of ex-associates of ours, while they disregard us and it is almost certain that they shall not care for us in the future; or we believe that ex-associates of ours still care for us, even though it is almost certain that they do not.

ii) What any proposed account of Intentionality must therefore have as components and criteria.

(These are necessary components and criteria but not sufficient. I am not certain whether we can ever establish the necessary *and* sufficient criteria of Intentionality. These criteria can be as varied as the human minds themselves!)

Three major truths have to be taken into consideration, if any proposed account of Intentionality is to be faithful to the legacy of Brentano:

a) The modes of Intentionality may or may not be only symbols, sentences, propositions. Intentionality is far more complex than any known mode of representation, having as parts logical, linguistic, emotive, imaginary, conscious and unconscious elements and relations. These elements and relations that can involve the body, the will and the intellect, cannot be easily put in any single category of representation.

b) Intentionality does not only have as objects things that exist, or have existed, or that shall exist. It may also have things that never existed, or shall never exist (e.g. things such as fictional beings, and even logically impossible beings).

c) Intentionality is also of things that are not ours, i.e., do not belong to human intellects, neither to their artifacts. An example of this is a cliff for a geologist and a painter, or a poet; a drift-wood for an artist, etc. The cliff and the drift-wood do not actually have Intentionality in the same way as for example a book has Intentionality for a reader, however they are treated as if they had it (this point shall become clearer later on).

iii) Additional components and criteria that any valid theory of Intentionality should have.

Any account of Intentionality has to take into consideration at least some of the theses of those students of Brentano who were most successful in defending their teacher's theory, allowing thus Phenomenology to survive almost seventy years of austere philosophical criticisms. A discussion of these will also clarify the notion of Intentionality further, and will make our consequent investigations on Husserl's and Sartre's theories of Intentionality more digestible. The following account is based on Reinhardt Grossmann's, Phenomenology and Existentialism: An Introduction², with few alterations and additions from me.

-There is an "act" of presentation that is the foundation of every mental "act": nothing can be judged, desired, hoped or feared unless one has a

² Reinhardt Grossmann, Phenomenology and Existentialism: An Introduction, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1984, pp.29-67.

presentation of that thing. (I put the word "act" in quotation marks to indicate my disagreement with the use of the term by Brentano and his followers. I shall explain my reasons for this later on in relation to Searle's and Mohanty's views, see III,iii,c and VI,i,iii).

-Every intentional phenomenon is directed toward an object. This differs from Brentano's «all mental phenomena have an object»; this difference is important because it is not clear that such mental phenomena as pain must always have an object; it keeps Brentano's truism however, that any occurrence of Intentionality must have an object of some sort.

-An occurrence of Intentionality must involve a relation of sorts to an object (Grossman³ calls this the Intentional Nexus, a term I agree with and shall keep). For example, Tom's belief that the earth is round is related in some way to the earth being round.

-The objects of an occurrence of Intentionality can be individual things (e.g. an elephant), but also states of affairs, circumstances, and relations between individual things (I will discuss these issues more in my investigation of Husserl).

-The Intentional nexus does not really hold between a mental "act" and its object, but between a property of a mental "act" and its object. For example, Tom and Alex believe that the earth is round: we have two mental "acts" here but the same object. The property that is the same in both "acts" is called the content of those mental "acts".

- Relations form a metaphysical category of their own, since they can neither be things nor properties of things. The reduction of relations to properties of

³ Ibid.

things and acts of comparison is not satisfactory since a property is an unfortunate term to describe the complexity and multi-applicability of "x greater than y" etc., and since an act of comparison can always be analysed in terms of a description of a relation but not *vice versa*.

-Relations also give order and have a direction. They can be distinguished into symmetrical (the relation R is symmetric iff whenever aRb in that order, then bRa in that order, e.g. being in two parallel lines) and non-symmetrical (any relation that is not symmetric). Asymmetrical relations hold iff the following is always the case: if the relation holds between A and B, in that order, then it does not hold between B and A, in that order.

-Intentional relations are asymmetric: if an intentional nexus holds between the content of a mental "act" and an object, then it does not hold between the object and this content, i.e., the relation of content to object is one-way.

-Non-existent objects and relations to them cannot be explained in terms of some property of the non-existent object (as in Brentano's, Alexius Meinong's and the Aristoteleians' view), nor in terms of real and nominal existence and being (Russell's distinction between existence and being), but in a way similar to Kasimir Twardowski's distinction between what a given idea represents (what its object is), and whether or not this thing that is represented exists. In this account every idea has an object, and the intentional nexus always holds, even when the intentional nexus does not connect with an existent.⁴

⁴ See Kasimir Twardowski, On the Content and Object of Presentations, transl. by R. Grossman, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1977.

-The Intentional nexus need not have itself as its object (and it usually does not). In such cases it avoids infinite regress of mental "acts" (it also goes against Brentano's distinction between primary object- which is the object-, and secondary object- which is the "act" itself). Also it may be that the Intentional nexus cannot or it is very difficult to have itself as an object (for example Freud's repressed desires are supposed to be the object of an "act" in some way when they are repressed; however, the same desires cannot be or it is extremely difficult for them to be the object of "acts", when the person who has them attempts to analyse his/her behaviour without the help of psychoanalysis).

-Finally, there is the additional metaphysical category of structures. In this way, there are things (substances), properties of things, relations of things, and structure of things in a whole (*Gestalt*). Two things can share the same property, be in the same relation to each other, and be isomorphic to each other. Two structures (Tx and Ty) can be isomorphic iff: for every non-relational part of Tx there is a precisely one non-relational part of Ty, and conversely; and for every relation of Tx there is precisely one relation of Ty and conversely; and the parts of Tx that correspond to the parts of Ty stand in the relations of Tx to each other that correspond to the relations of Ty and conversely (e.g. the series of even and odd positive integers).

In this way one complex thing can represent another complex thing. Language can represent the world.

The Four Dogmas that come as a consequence, introduced by Christian von Ehrenfels⁵ are: a structure is not the same as the set of its parts; a whole may have properties which none of its parts has (emergent properties), and these

⁵ Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932), a famous student of Brentano.

properties may be or may not be anthropomorphic; a whole cannot be analysed; a whole is not determined by its parts, but, to the contrary, determines the nature of its parts.

After we have seen the origin of the term in Brentano, some of the necessary components and criteria any theory of Intentionality must have to use the term comprehensively and successfully, and some additional elements which any Theory of Intentionality would find useful to have in mind, we can turn now to the main target and raw material for Sartre's own theory: Husserl's concept of Intentionality.

II. Husserl's Theory of Intentionality.⁶

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), a student of Brentano, tried to formulate a response to the Idealist attacks of the Neo-Kantians and the Neo-Hegelians on Brentano's theses by developing a new methodology for doing philosophy: *Phenomenology*. With it he (and all early Phenomenologists), tried to follow Brentano's steps in purging Philosophy from all prejudices regarding consciousness and its contents, and developing it according to the standards of a rigorous science (but not an empirical one). Phenomenology, however does not stop at methodological considerations: Husserl himself after Frege's critique on his early psychologist account of numbers (evidenced in Husserl's psychologist *Philosophie der Arithmetik. Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen*, Vol.1, 1891), launched with his *Logical Investigations*

⁶ My main sources for the ideas expressed in this section were: Robert C. Solomon, Continental Philosophy Since 1750: The Rise of the Self, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1988; Michael Hammond, Jane Howarth and Russell Keat, Understanding Phenomenology, Blackwell, Oxford, 1991; David Woodruff Smith, Ronald McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality, D.Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984; David Bell, Husserl, Routledge, London, 1991.

(1900), not only a methodological revision of his philosophy, but also a review of his *Metaphysics* to determine what of its corpus is agreeable to such a rigorous methodology.

Husserl's emphasis was placed on the investigation of things, but not as they are in themselves; Kant and the Idealists of his time were far too influential to allow such an optimistic aspiration. And Husserl's veneration of Descartes' distinction between the mind and the body placed a further serious obstacle in the wholehearted acceptance of any theory of metaphysical realism. Things were to be investigated as they appear in the mind, as *intentional contents*, and not as they are, independently of their observation.

In such an investigation, logic had to be the main tool of analysis; the actual circumstances surrounding the existence of things in the world had to be bracketed and reserved for a later inquiry. Husserl called such a bracketing "*epoche*"⁷, and the analysis carried out while in "*epoche*" he called phenomenological. His main targets with such a bracketing were Naturalism, Historicism, Psychologism, and all reduction of necessary truths to empirical science: his earlier experience in the area of Philosophy of Mathematics, had convinced him that these theories and approaches could not escape scepticism and relativism.

Husserl maintained that phenomenological descriptions should get to the essences of things in terms of kinds (*eide*) and not particulars. Phenomenological descriptions in this way become pre-suppositionless: analyses not of various "facts" of experience, but of those features of experience, which are "absolutely given in immediate intuition".

⁷ Obviously taken from the Stoic *εποχή*.

The phenomenologist according to Husserl should limit his investigations only to what is inside his consciousness: within his consciousness he can find the essential foundations for his experience of the whole world. To go outside consciousness would be to invite scepticism and relativism; for any distinction between appearances of things, and things-in-themselves makes these appearances relative, and radically divorces them from the things they are appearances of.

With the "*epoche*" the phenomenologist attempts to understand the full potential of his consciousness; with the help of "*epoche*" the phenomenologist avoids interferences from an undue importance on things and distorting prejudices about their reality. He/She realises the essential feature of Human Consciousness, which is to be intrinsically and necessarily tied to intentional objects: what Brentano called the Intentionality of Human Consciousness.

After the exercise of this "*epoche*" we also begin to realise that there is an ego or a self which accompanies all of our mental presentations but is beyond them, and which is different from the empirical self that the Naturalists identified with the totality of the self. In the Cartesian Meditations Husserl claims that even if the whole universe outside us were to be destroyed, this transcendental ego would still remain.

Such a radical emphasis on *epoche* and the existence of the transcendental ego however, should not be seen as Husserl's attempt to escape from reality: Husserl's Phenomenology had a serious commitment to Realism. One of its most frequently stressed mottos was "back to the things themselves" (*zu den Sachen selbst*): with this motto the Phenomenologists stressed the fact that their

sole concern is not to get locked within Human Consciousness, but to purge it, and thus make it reach out to things in a better condition than before. Its objects, stripped from their spatio-temporal "natural" existence, gain their true value as intentional objects.

In this way, one's perceiving an object becomes a *cogitatio*. The description of the object of consciousness (*cogitatum*) becomes a *noematic* description; and the mode of consciousness or *cogito* (e.g., perceiving, remembering, etc.) with which consciousness is tied to the object becomes *noetic* (and its description a *noetic* description). In this theory of consciousness, Husserl's views on Intentionality⁸ become of paramount importance for our (and his) investigations: "Conscious processes are also called *intentional*; but then the word Intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness *of something*".⁹

The Intentionality of any mental "act" is due to there being associated with the "act" an entity which Husserl calls its *intentional content* or *noema*. He sharply distinguishes the noema of the act from the act's object. The *object* intended in an "act", (i.e., that toward which the "act" is directed), is usually some ordinary sort of thing like a physical object (existing or non-existing). The *noema* of an "act" is an abstract, or "ideal", entity, and in Husserl's words a "meaning" or "sense". In this way, Husserl's theory of Intentionality, according to many commentators, is not an object-theory but a mediator-theory, since an "act" is directed toward an object through an intermediate "intentional" entity, the "act's" noema.¹⁰

⁸ In the Second Meditation, of his book Cartesian Meditations (*Cartesianische Meditationen*).

⁹ See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, transl. by Dorion Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1977, p.33.

¹⁰ See David Woodruff Smith, Ronald McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality, D.Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984, p.87; see also Dagfinn Føllesdall, "Husserl's Notion of Noema",

In a phenomenological investigation, objects around us come to be known by us through their transformation (*via* Intentionality) into intentional objects, a "third realm of entities", or *noemata*. Objects gain their *meaning* according to Husserl completely within our experience of them, and not outside it (in the world). This meaning is arrived at intuitively and directly from the facts, once they become parts of contents of consciousness.

In his early works, Husserl keeps the role of the transcendental ego in rather low profile. With the Cartesian Meditations (1929-35) however, he transforms the whole phenomenological endeavour into an "*egology*": the study of the essential structures of the ego, a discovery, to be intuited directly; and in Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929), Husserl insists that the transcendental ego exists absolutely, and everything else is relative to it. In his last book The Crisis of European Philosophy (1936) however, he considerably weakens such options, insisting that the transcendental ego is "correlative" to the world, and shifting his emphasis from the individual transcendental ego to the intersubjective community of individuals. In this last book he also remarks on the importance of history, and the contribution of community practices and the unarticulated principles of daily life (*Lebenswelt*) to the standards of rationality and scientific knowledge. However, he never rejected his earlier views that the truth is to be found in the self, and that this truth is universal and necessary.

It is also important to note Husserl's emphasis on the Intentionality of the Human Mind as a necessary **structure** of the ego. The ego does not merely have a certain **property**, evidenced in a **relation** to things; the ego does not exist and cannot exist **except as in relation** to things. And it cannot be reduced

Journal of Philosophy, 66 (1969), pp.680-87; Dagfinn Føllesdall, "Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception", in R.M.Chisholm, ed., *Die*

to awareness of things. (This part of Husserlian phenomenology becomes clearer once one considers our earlier discussion of the metaphysics associated with the categories of substance, property, relation, and structure in a single whole- the *Gestalt* theory of consciousness.) Intentionality here attains a significance of far more importance than in Brentano's earlier Irreducibility thesis, since the Husserlian ego is not reducible to mental states (or even mental "acts"); such a reduction would make the ego an empirical self, a transformation which Husserl rejected, due to its Naturalistic tendency to identify the empirical self with the totality of the self.

Husserl's theory of Intentionality thus is richer and has more metaphysical commitment than Brentano's, through its connection to a slightly different philosophy of mind regarding the ego.

In addition, we see in Husserl a turn of emphasis from the object of the "act" to the "act" itself. The Intentionality of an "act" is a **phenomenological** feature of the "act" itself. Any problems in the theory of Intentionality become problems not about the kinds of object that "acts" intend, but about the nature of consciousness itself insofar as consciousness is intentional. In this way, Husserl's theory of Intentionality is not a theory about the ontological status of objects of consciousness (as the theory of Brentano and, in some ways, that of Frege and his circle are) but an integral part of a phenomenological theory of mind.

In particular (and as a consequence of Husserl's drive away from the object and into the consciousness), Husserl attacked Brentano's doctrine of "intentional inexistence": Husserl holds that the object of an act is not a mental or "immanent" entity that literally "exists in" the "act" in which it is intended.

Only "acts" of reflection are directed toward subjective states or processes in the subject's own stream of consciousness, and even for these "acts" Husserl distinguishes the object intended in an "act" from the "act", or experience, that intends it. In the case of non-reflective "acts", the object of an "act" is not something subjective or immanent to consciousness, but an "external" and "transcendent" entity (e.g., a physical object). For example, when someone sees a tree, the object of his perception is not a sense-datum or any other kind of intentional object; it is a tree, a physical individual in the world.

In other words, there is no distinction between the intentional presentation and its actual object: they are the same and, when appropriate, the intentional presentation is *as* its external object. In this way, a distinction between the object intended in an "act" and the "act" that intends it is always maintained and observed. However, Husserl does not disagree with Brentano in this: the object intended in an "act" is not what makes the «act» intentional; imaginations, hallucinations and other "non-veridical" experiences show that an «act» can be intentional even if there fails to exist any object to which the «act» relates. The object of the "act" is a "merely intentional" one: it has to exist only in the *intentio* (as a real constituent of it); only the intention, the "meaning" (*Meinen*) of an object with such and such qualities has to exist for the "act" to function properly.¹¹

After we have seen some of the main elements of Husserl's Theory of Intentionality, I proceed now to the examination of the Husserlian Theory by Sartre, Sartre's own theory of Intentionality, and its Critical Evaluation.

¹¹ For more on this and other issues related to Husserl's and Brentano's theories of Intentionality see Smith and McIntyre, *ibid*, pp.1-145; the above mentioned works by Follesdall; Barry Smith "Frege and Husserl: The Ontology of Reference", *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 9 (1978), pp.111-25; Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, Vol.I, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960.

III. Sartre's Critique of Husserl's Theory of Intentionality and Sartre's own Theory.

There are three main critiques (as far as the philosophical corpus is concerned) that we have from Sartre on Husserl's thought.

The first comes in "*La Transcendance de L'Ego: Esquisse d'une description phenomenologique*" (translated in English as The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness)¹² ; the second comes in "*Une Idee fondamentale de la phenomenologie de Husserl: l'intentionalite*" ("Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology")¹³ ; the third comes in his "*L'Etre et le Neant*" (Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology)¹⁴; Sartre also wrote critiques on Husserl's Phenomenology in his writings on the Imagination and the Emotions, but since they just repeat or apply the ideas expressed in the above named works, we shall enlarge on them only when required (for the critique contained in Sartre's work on the Emotions, see our relevant Section).

We shall deal in this section with all three main works, but we shall enlarge only on the first, since the first is the most definitive in the formulation of

¹² Jean-Paul Sartre, "*La Transcendance de L'Ego: Esquisse d'une description phenomenologique*" (translated in English as The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness, by F. Williams and R. Kirkpatrick, Octagon Books, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, N.Y., 1972), first published in *Recherches Philosophiques*, VI, 1936-37. My references on the original French text shall be from Jean-Paul Sartre, *La Transcendance de L'Ego: Esquisse d'une Description Phenomenologique*, Intr., notes et app. par Sylvie Le Bon, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Sorbonne, Paris, 1965.

¹³ Jean-Paul Sartre, "*Une Idee fondamentale de la phenomenologie de Husserl: l'intentionalite*" (translated in English as "Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology", by Joseph P. Fell, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 1, 1970, pp.4-5), first published in *Nouvelle Revue Francaise*, LII, January, 1939, also published in *Situations I*, Paris: Gallimard, 1947.

¹⁴ Jean-Paul Sartre, *L' Etre et le Neant* , first published in Gallimard, Paris, 1943; translated in English as Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, by Hazel E. Barnes, Methuen, 1958.

Sartre's own Theory of Intentionality. We shall refer however, to developments of Sartre's theory from the first to the third.

We shall close this section with a comparison to the work of Wittgenstein, and some proposed improvements on Sartre's theory.

i) The Transcendence of Ego: The Negative Critique of the Husserlian Consciousness.

The Context and Outline.

In this early work, we find Sartre's avowal of the basic Husserlian intuition that intentional objects, existent and non-existent, can and should be described in their own right. Any valid theory of knowledge thus can bypass questions of consciousness and deal directly with the intended objects of consciousness and principles governing them. Sartre also accepts Husserl's disregard for the "psychologists' confusions" that had turned the philosophy of mind into an endless battle of arguments concerning the distinction between "physical", and "psychical" or "mental" events. He follows Husserl in adopting the methodological principle of *epoche* to eliminate in reflection all evidence for one's own existence as a particular person. (We shall see that later on in Being and Nothingness he gives up on *epoche*, see III,ii,b)

However, Sartre finds a serious point of disagreement, in this essay, over the issue of whether, after the *epoche*, consciousness can be found to be presided over by a "transcendental ego" or not.

This disagreement occurs for two reasons: first, if the transcendental ego presides over consciousness, then objects are not encountered in their own right, but are altered somewhat by the ego; second, the importance of the

essential characteristic of human consciousness, Intentionality, is lost, and the emphasis is turned from consciousness to the ego. Further elaboration is needed for these two disagreements to make sense, and it shall be given in the commentary of the work later on, but for now it should suffice to mention briefly Sartre's justification for having these two reasons for disagreeing with Husserl.

For the first, it is important to note that if such an ego exists, and if, as Husserl maintained, it is an intentional consciousness, then it must make contact with some reality different from itself. Otherwise it cannot escape its own subjectivity and thus cannot perceive things as they really are. The ego therefore needs a third reality of some kind, which will participate in the characteristics of both the ego and the objects. This third reality employed is the hybrid termed "*hyle*" by Husserl, which is contained in the consciousness but is able to represent or resemble the objects intended by the ego. The Intentional object thus becomes the product of the activity of the transcendental ego upon the directly given contents of consciousness, called "sense-data". Furthermore, the study of the Intentional object in phenomenology becomes the study of the principles of the transcendental ego's activity constituting intentional objects out of sense-data. The final result for the admission of the transcendental ego thus, is to make consciousness have contents, and refer the character of every object of consciousness to its activity. With many of the disciples of Husserl, Sartre argued here that the addition of the transcendental ego turns phenomenology into a version of Neo-Kantianism, which was in fact an original target of phenomenology's criticisms. Sartre proposed instead the only way phenomenology would be saved from such an ironic result: it has to deny the existence of a transcendental ego, empty consciousness from all contents, and make it a pure spontaneity, placing all content on the side of the object.

With such a disagreement and proposal, Sartre elevates Intentionality from being one of the essential and necessary features for any (human) consciousness, to its sole characteristic. He also gives back to the object of consciousness its originally intended character, as analysable in its own right. The World is divided again into Consciousness and Objects, Intentionality and the Non-Intentional.

However, he also realises (we see the kernel of such a realisation in this essay), that one more element from the Husserlian corpus has to be disregarded: *epoche*. There is no need for it anymore, because consciousness is now empty of all contents. The being of objects (or of the "in-itself" of *L'Etre et le Neant*) is discovered without exception in every act of consciousness. This makes consciousness the "revealing intuition of things", and forces it to be involved in the existing world, contrary to the detached and neutral standpoint that Husserl intended for phenomenology. Phenomenology in Sartre becomes the study of the contact human consciousness has with Otherness and negation in the world.

The Essay¹⁵.

From the very first paragraph, Sartre outlines his endeavour in this essay.

He divides the believers in an ego into three camps:

a) Those who believe in the ego as an "empty" principle of unification, a formal presence at the heart of *Erlebnisse* (a technical term of phenomenology, indicating the event or occurrence of consciousness).

b) The psychologists who believe that they have discovered its material presence as the centre of desires and acts, in each moment of our psychic life.

c) Philosophers like himself who believe that the ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness, but can be found only outside in the world. This

¹⁵ It is important to note that in my exposition of the work, even though I followed to a great extent the Williams and Kirkpatrick text, I deviate from it on many occasions for reasons of obscurity, repetitiveness, errors in style and printing errors which exist in their text.

means that the ego is metaphysically of the same status as the status of any being of the world, including the ego of another.

Part I: The *I* and the *Me*.

Section A. The Theory of the Formal Presence of the *I*.

Sartre starts this Section with a series of distinctions between, on the one hand, Kantian Critical Philosophy and, on the other, Husserlian Phenomenology concerning the Metaphysics of the Ego (and its correlates the "*I*" and the "*me*"). First he attacks the view that Kantian critical philosophy gives metaphysical justification to the existence of an "*I*" which *in fact* inhabits all our states of consciousness and *actually* effects the supreme synthesis of our experience. According to Sartre, the Kantian problem is concerned only with validity, and Kant was concerned with transcendental consciousness only in so far as this was relevant to the set of conditions that are necessary for the existence of an empirical consciousness. Kant's aphorism that "the *I Think* must be able to accompany all our representations" indicates that not only had Kant no intention to make any claims about the nature of the "*I*", but he must also himself have seen that there are moments of consciousness without the "*I*". Otherwise he would not say "must be able to accompany".

These observations on Kantian Critical Philosophy leave unfounded Husserl's claims for the actual existence of a transcendental "*I*", which inhabits all our states of consciousness, and actually effects the supreme synthesis of our experience. His thesis stands now in need of a separate philosophical background and justification. Husserl tries to make the transcendental "*I*" into a reality, an inseparable companion of each of our "consciousnesses". In so doing factual claims about the "*I*"'s existence are made, rather than claims about the validity of its theoretical use in certain conscious states. This endeavour of Husserl's has nothing to do with Kantian Critical Philosophy.

The question therefore that needs an answer at this point is whether Husserl is justified from within the Phenomenological Movement to make such a metaphysical claim about the ego. Granted the Kantian claim that the "I" must be able to accompany all our representations, we still need to answer whether it does in fact accompany them.

Sartre here finds that an answer to this question leads on to a second question: in the case of a certain representation which passes from a state in which it is unaccompanied by the "I", to a state in which it is accompanied by it, will the representation remain unchanged? This second question leads on to a third: should we understand here that it is the "I" which (directly or indirectly) effects the unity of our representations, or that the representations of a consciousness are always so united and articulated that it is possible to discover an "I" in them?

This third question is not a question of validity for Sartre, but a question of fact: whether the "I" that we encounter in our consciousness is made possible by the synthetic unity of our representations or whether it is the "I" which in fact unites the representations to each other. This question, as a question of *fact* cannot be answered by Kantians, but one of the main contenders for an answer is the Phenomenology of Husserl.

Phenomenology studies consciousness **scientifically** and not "critically". According to Sartre its essential way of proceeding for Sartre is by "intuition". The reason for the addition of quotation marks becomes evident in the following paragraph.

Williams and Kirkpatrick in their annotation to their translation of Sartre's work¹⁶ give I think due importance to the point that the concept of "intuition" as employed by Sartre and the Phenomenologists is quite distinct and different from "intuition" as used in every day English and in British-Analytic Philosophy. An "intuition" in Phenomenology is an act of consciousness, by which the object under investigation is present rather than absent. An example of this may be imagining or seeing the Eiffel Tower with all its details, in distinction from just having it in mind or briefly referring to it. In this way, all cognitive inquiry must have intuition as its foundation, even if it includes other evidence (such as inductive reasoning, etc.).

The method of phenomenology thus becomes intuitive in the investigation of consciousness: for consciousness must regard itself, in order to determine just what consciousness is, and what it does and does not include. When Sartre maintains that phenomenology is a "scientific" rather than a "critical" study of consciousness because its method is one of "intuition", he therefore means that its most important and fundamental requirement is to look at the subject matter. This is in contrast to Kantian philosophy, which begins with the nature of science and subsequently constructs an account of consciousness by inference.

By "intuition" thus, from now on, we shall not mean any of the following: mystical insight; identification with the object (in the Bergsonian¹⁷ sense); mere "sense-perception" (since it can also include introspection); a specific level of abstraction (since it can occur at any level of thought); knowledge of an object's existence (unless we "intuit" the present); or knowledge of everything that there is to know about the object, since we cannot know everything that there is to

¹⁶ Williams and Kirkpatrick, *ibid*, note 2, p.109-113.

¹⁷ Henry Bergson, 1859-1941, influenced greatly Sartre on issues such as time and the metaphysics of emotions, the laughter and the comic, even though Sartre himself has not recognised this; some of his most important works include *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*, 1889; *Matière et mémoire*, 1896; *Le Rire*, 1900; *L'Évolution créatrice*, 1907; *Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion*, 1932.

know about the object through "intuition". Basically this is due to the inadequacy of sense-perception to tell us everything that there is to know about the object. It is characteristic of "intuition", that it forces us to know things only "in profile", and never in all their aspects. The last characteristic of the concept of "intuition" also gives us its uncertain nature as a form of knowledge of the object.

Phenomenology, by having "intuition" as its method of investigation, puts us in the presence of the object. It thereby transforms itself into a science of fact, and a descriptive science. The problems it must solve are specific problems of fact.¹⁸ One of these specific problems of fact is the relation of the *I* to consciousness: Sartre classifies this as an **existential** problem. For both Kant and Husserl *epoche* leads to the transcendental consciousness; but, for Husserl it is not a set of logical conditions, nor any hypostatisation of it in the form of an unconscious. It is an absolute fact, a real consciousness, which constitutes our "empirical" consciousness with its psychic and psychophysical aspects.

Sartre finds Husserl's observations about the existence of a constituting consciousness (and its characteristic quality of constituting the world through its imprisonment in empirical consciousness), quite agreeable. He also finds quite agreeable Husserl's intuitions regarding the psychic and psychophysical *me*, and its fall as a transcendent object before the *epoche*. What he finds troublesome however, is Husserl's doubling of the psychic and psychophysical *me* with a transcendental *I*, a structure of absolute consciousness. If one does not double the *me* in this way, his account of ego is benefited as follows: a) the transcendental field becomes "pre-personal", without an *I*; b) the *I* appears only at the level of humanity, and is only one aspect of the *me*, the active aspect; c) the *I Think* can accompany our representations, because it appears on a

¹⁸ Note here that the emphasis on "fact" rather than essences is Sartre's and not Husserl's -see the William's and Kirkpatrick's Note 3, p.113.

foundation of unity which it did not help to create (rather this prior unity makes the *I Think* possible); d) personality, including the abstract personality of an *I*, loses the importance it had before. Its necessity as an accompaniment of a consciousness becomes obsolete. This supports the conception of an absolutely impersonal ("pre-personal") consciousness.

Husserl dealt with this issue in the following manner: he first determined (in *Logische Untersuchungen*) that the *me* is a synthetic and transcendent production of consciousness, and then he returned in *Ideen Zu Einem Reinen Phanomenologie Und Phanomenologischen Philosophie* to the classic position of a transcendental *I*. This *I* is behind each consciousness as a necessary structure of consciousness whose rays (*Ichstrahlen*) would light upon each phenomenon presenting itself in the field of attention. In this way transcendental consciousness becomes thoroughly personal.

Sartre maintains however that when we ask whether this notion of the *I* is necessary and compatible with the definition of consciousness given by Husserl, we see that Husserl has created an unnecessary and quite problematic notion. The only justification that can be found to support Husserl's notion is the need that consciousness has for unity and individuality. According to Husserl, consciousness is necessarily unified, because all of one's perceptions and all of one's thoughts refer themselves back to it. It is also necessarily unified because one can distinguish his own consciousness from someone else's.

This need that consciousness has for unity and individuality is obsolete in Phenomenology. Intentionality, as it is used and elaborated by Phenomenology is a far better and more consistent notion than the Husserlian modification of the *I*. Consciousness, as defined by Intentionality, also transcends itself through Intentionality's help. The problem of unification of consciousness is solved with the help of Intentionality: consciousness unifies itself by escaping from itself. In

every single conscious activity (such as adding two plus two) there is an enormous amount of active consciousnesses involved; these consciousnesses are unified not by yet another consciousness, but by and through the common object of consciousness.

Those who believe that the object of consciousness is the *content* of one's representation may need to posit in addition a transcendental and subjective principle of unification, such as an *I*. By contrast for Husserl and the Phenomenologists there is no need for such an *I*; the object is transcendent to the consciousness which grasps it, and in this way the object itself becomes the unifying principle of the consciousnesses involved.

The further problem of unity *within duration* can also be resolved through Intentionality. There is nothing to worry us in the positing of transcendental objects outside the flux of those consciousnesses whose objects they are. Consciousness unifies itself by a play of "transversal" intentionalities, which are nothing else but the concrete and real retentions of past consciousnesses. In this way, consciousness refers perpetually to itself, even in the continual flux of consciousness as it is engaged in the world. Both in *Vorlesungen Zur Phanomenologie Des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, and in *Cartesianische Meditationem*, Husserl unifies consciousness through Intentionality in this way, and not through a synthetic *I*.

The individuality of consciousness is guaranteed in the same way. By its nature, consciousness can be limited only by itself. It constitutes a synthetic and individual totality, entirely isolated from other similar totalities. The *I* can only be an expression, and never a condition of this incommunicability and inwardness of consciousness, and it is only through this incommunicability and inwardness that the "I" can exist.

In this way, the unity, the individuality, and the personality of consciousness are maintained and fully supported. The notion of the transcendental *I* or ego put forward by Husserl is totally unnecessary.

However, it is not only its non-necessity that renders the transcendental *I* problematic in any valid theory of consciousness. The transcendental *I* is also a hindrance to the unity, and homogenous nature of consciousness.

Sartre argues that such a transcendental (and superfluous) *I* would divide consciousness, sliding into every consciousness like an opaque blade. Consciousness exists because it is consciousness of itself. Consciousness is aware of itself (or is the consciousness of itself) only when and in so far as it is also the consciousness of a transcendent object. So the consciousness of a consciousness, or of an *I*, which is itself out of consciousness as a transcendental existence, would mean the extinction of consciousness. This is what Sartre has in mind when he writes the aphorism "The transcendental *I* is the death of consciousness" (p.40). In order for consciousness to be alive then, it needs to be clear and lucid through and through; and this for Sartre is "the law of its existence".

It is obvious however that the consciousness of consciousness cannot be **positional** (except in the special case of reflective consciousness, which shall be discussed later on). That is to say, consciousness cannot be its own object: it can only be absolute inwardness. The object of consciousness is by its nature outside consciousness, and that is why consciousness in its outward reach towards the object can posit and grasp it in the same act. Sartre describes this consciousness as absolute inwardness, consciousness in the first degree, or *unreflected* consciousness.

If there was to be an *I* or an ego of some sort in this sort of consciousness, it would neither be the object of consciousness (since by hypothesis it would be internal to consciousness), nor a product of consciousness, since it can be only something *for* consciousness, i.e., one of the conditions for consciousness to occur). And if it is not a translucent quality of consciousness, then it has to be in some way an inhabitant in it. In this way, and continuing the same line of inquiry, such an *I*, no matter what level of formality and abstraction one is to give to it, would be a sort of centre of opacity. In fact, it would be an infinitely contracted psycho-physical *me*. And such a contraction of *me* would be totally opaque, obfuscating the lucidity of consciousness, and predetermining its spontaneity. In addition, if such an inhabitant were to be allowed in consciousness, the defining difference of the Husserlian Cogito from the Cartesian Cogito would be lost. The Husserlian Cogito takes pride in being a consciousness that is the *non-substantial* absolute: it remains a "phenomenon", in the sense in which "to be" and "to appear" become one. If such an infinitely contracted *me* were to be allowed to inhabit consciousness, such an *I* would be raised to the rank of an absolute together with the surrounding consciousness, "loading down" the surrounding consciousness, making itself and it "heavy" and "*ponderable*", losing consciousness' characteristic of being the absolute existent by virtue of non-existence.

Thus, the only way such an *I* can be thought of is not as a part of but as an object for consciousness.

Section B. The *Cogito* as Reflective Consciousness

Sartre proceeds now to the investigation of consciousness as reflected upon by consciousness. He has investigated the metaphysics of consciousness in so

far as it has an object out in the world, and has found that it consists in the clarity and lucidity of its existence as a non-substantial absolute.

He now begins by distinguishing the Kantian *Cogito* from the *Cogito* of Husserl and Descartes. The first is a condition of possibility, being concerned only with validity. The second is an apprehension of fact, the "factual necessity" of *Cogito*. According to both Husserl and Descartes the *Cogito* is necessarily true whenever is in fact thought without any choice of object or special operation.

However, according to Sartre, Husserl also recognises the fact that the *Cogito* is personal: in "*I Think*", there is an *I* that thinks, and this gives the basis for an "*Egology*". The apprehension of thought does not only involve thought, but also the *I*, which transcends thought. The remembrance of a certain landscape is connected to the memory of *me* perceiving the remembered landscape. Husserl calls this the possibility of *reflecting in memory*.¹⁹

In this way, Husserl achieves what he considers to be the factual guarantee of the Kantian claim concerning validity: all of one's consciousnesses that are apprehensible are provided with an *I*.

Sartre sees certain difficulties with such a position. He points out first that all the writers who have described the *Cogito* have dealt with it as a reflective operation, an operation of the second degree. Consciousness is directed upon consciousness as an object. According to Sartre however, when consciousness is directed upon consciousness, the certitude of the *Cogito* is absolute, and there is an indissoluble unity of the reflecting and the reflected consciousness. This unity is a synthesis of two consciousnesses, one of which is the consciousness of

¹⁹ In *Vorlesungen Zur Phänomenologie Des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins*.

the other. In this way, the essential principle of Phenomenology "all consciousness is consciousness of something" is preserved.

The reflecting consciousness, however, does not take itself for an object when the *Cogito* is effected; it takes as its object the consciousness reflected on. So, insofar as the reflecting consciousness is consciousness of itself, it is *non-positional* consciousness; it becomes positional only by directing itself upon the reflected consciousness that itself was not a positional consciousness of itself before being reflected. In this way, the *I* that thinks becomes the *I* of the reflected consciousness, as an object of thethetic act. Indeed, all reflecting consciousness is in itself unreflected on, and a new act (of the third degree) is necessary in order to posit it. In this process there is no infinite regress, since there will always be a consciousness that does not posit itself as an object, and can serve thus as the consciousness reflected upon, the object of thethetic act. This reflecting consciousness also gives birth to the *me* in the reflected on consciousness, thus preserving the phenomenological truth that every thought apprehended by intuition possesses an *I*. Sartre at this point concludes that an unreflected thought, when it becomes reflected on, not only loses its "*naïveté*" (as Husserl believed), but also gives birth to the *I*, which was hidden in it.

Sartre supports his conclusions about the existence and non-existence of the *I*, by analysing an example of a "concrete experience". In every unreflected consciousness, being a non-thetic consciousness of itself, there is a non-thetic memory that one can consult. This memory can be consulted through the reconstitution of the complete moment in which this unreflected consciousness appeared, a process which for Sartre is by definition always possible. An example of such an unreflected consciousness is one's absorption in his reading of a novel. When we try to remember the circumstances of our reading with all their details, our attitude, the lines that we were reading and so on, we are reviving not only the external details but a certain depth of unreflected

consciousness, since the objects could only have been perceived *by* that consciousness and since they remain relative to it. This unreflected consciousness is not to be posited as an object of reflection however; that would destroy our exercise and its purpose. We must direct our attention to the revived objects, but *without losing sight of the unreflected consciousness*, by joining in a sort of co-operation with it, and making an inventory of its content in a non-positional manner. In such an inventory we shall find everything else but our *I*. In other words, the only things present in such an inventory are consciousness of objects and non-thetic consciousness of itself. Thus it is shown that there is no *I* in the unreflected consciousness.

As a response to the objection that memory is of a questionable value because of its uncertainty, and that we should focus instead more on the certainty of the reflective act, Sartre argues that memory of the unreflected consciousness is not opposed to the data of the reflective consciousness. No one denies that the *I* appears in a reflected consciousness. We simply have a choice between a reflective memory of our reading (for example) and a non-reflective one. But both memory and reflective act are suspect and uncertain. The validity of a present reflection, in fact, does not reach beyond the consciousness presently apprehended. Moreover, reflective memory, which we perform in order to reinstate elapsed consciousness, besides its uncertainty as memory, is also suspect, because (also according to Husserl) reflection modifies the spontaneous consciousness.

In this way, since all the non-reflective memories of unreflected consciousness show us a consciousness *without a me*, and since theoretical considerations on the intuitions of essence regarding consciousness (Part I, Section A) have determined that the *I* cannot be a part of the internal structure of *Erlebnisse*, the conclusion that there is no *I* on the unreflected level for Sartre is unavoidable. When we are absorbed in a specific endeavour of ours such as

chasing after a car, contemplating a portrait, etc., there is no *I*. We are plunged in the world of objects. They, with their attractive and repellent qualities, are what exist for us; we have disappeared, we have annihilated ourselves. There is no place for *me* at this level. And this is not due to chance, but due to the very structure of consciousness.

Sartre arrives at the same conclusion (that the *I* does not exist as consciousness, nor does it exist on the unreflected level of consciousness, and it exists only as an object, and at the reflected level of consciousness) also through a description of the *Cogito*. He utilises Husserl's conviction that the certitude of the reflective act comes from the apprehending consciousness without facets, without profiles, completely (without *Abschattungen*). On the other hand, the spatio-temporal object always manifests itself through an infinity of aspects, existing only as the ideal unity of this infinity. As for meanings and eternal truths, they affirm their transcendence in that the moment they appear they are given as independent of time, existing in a consciousness which apprehends them and is individuated through and through in duration.

What then is the mode of existence of the *Cogito*? One of the alternatives is that it might be a full and concrete consciousness gathered into a real moment of concrete duration. It can not be this however, because, if it were, it would be a perishable structure of actual consciousness. The *Cogito* affirms its permanence beyond this consciousness and all consciousnesses, making its type of existence to be nearer to that of eternal truths, than to that of consciousness.

The Cartesian idea of a thinking substance, according to the above analysis, was a mistake of making the *I* and the *Think* of the *Cogito* be on the same level. Husserl, according to Sartre, was making the same mistake when he gave to the *I* a special transcendence "from above", even though different from the transcendence of the object, based on metaphysical and Critical preoccupations,

which have nothing to do with the *epoche*, and lead one to further problematic entities such as the distinction between "transcendent" and "immanent" essences, "transcendent" for the ego-loaded-consciousness, and "immanent" for the non-ego-loaded-consciousness.

According to Sartre, if the *I* in the *I Think* affirms itself as transcendent, this is because the *I* is not of the same nature as transcendental consciousness.

Sartre's further investigation into the nature of the *Cogito* reveals that it does not appear to reflection as the reflected consciousness: it is apprehended by intuition and thus as an object grasped with evidence (even though evidence of limited certainty- see our above comments on intuitive knowledge). But this evidence with which it is apprehended, is, if we use Husserlian terminology, neither apodeictic (as being necessarily so), nor adequate (grasped in its entirety); it is not apodeictic since by acknowledging the ego we claim more than we can know, and it is not adequate because the ego is presented as an opaque reality, whose content is not unfolded. The ego presents itself as the source of consciousness, and that is the reason why it appears veiled, indistinct through consciousness, as if it were itself consciousness being the source of consciousness.

If the *I* was part of consciousness however, there would be two or even three *I*'s: the *I* of the reflective, the *I* of the reflected, and even a third *I*, that of transcendental consciousness. For Sartre such a hypothesis is inadmissible: even if the *I*'s are real elements of consciousness, there should be no communication between them, even in the form of their identity in one unique *I*.

Sartre finishes this Section dedicated into the Metaphysics of the *I*, by summarising the main four points and conclusions that he has made in it:

First the *I*, is an existent, of such a concrete type of existence, as mathematical truths, meanings, and spatio-temporal beings. The *I*, even though transcendental, has as much real existence as these other entities.

Second, the *I* offers itself to an intuition of a kind different from the perceptual intuition of physical objects, which apprehends it, always inadequately, behind the reflected consciousness.

Third, the *I* never appears except on the occasion of a reflective act. When such an act occurs, the complex structure of consciousness has as follows: there is an unreflected act of reflection, without an *I*, which is directed on a reflected consciousness. The reflected consciousness becomes the object of the reflecting consciousness without ceasing to affirm its own object (a chair, mathematical truth, etc.). At the same time, a new object appears which is affirmed by reflective consciousness, even though existing in a different level from both the object of the reflected consciousness (a chair, mathematical truth, etc.), and the reflective consciousness itself. This transcendent object of the reflective act is the *I*.

Fourth, the transcendent *I* must fall before the stroke of the phenomenological reduction. The *Cogito* affirms too much: what it affirms is "*I have* consciousness of this chair", what it should affirm is "There is consciousness of this chair". This content for Sartre is sufficient to constitute an infinite and absolute field of investigation for phenomenology.

Section C: The Theory of the Material Presence of the *Me*.

Up to this point, Sartre's focus was on Kant's and Husserl's shared position that the *I* is a formal structure of consciousness; he tried to show that an *I* is never purely formal, and that it is always, even when conceived abstractly, an infinite contraction of the material *me*. At this point he wants to deal with the psychological theory which for a psychological reason wants to affirm the

material presence of the *me* in all our consciousnesses. He names this theory «the Theory of the "Self-Love" Moralists». According to these theorists, the love of self- and thus the *me*- lies concealed within all emotions in a thousand different forms. The *me*, as a function of this love that it has for itself, would desire *for itself* all the objects it desires. The essential structure of each of my acts that are caused by these self-centred desires would be a *reference to myself*. The "return to me" would be constitutive of all consciousnesses.

If one was to raise the objection to such a theory that this return to one's self is not present to consciousness (when I am thirsty, it is a glass of water that is desirable), it would cause no alarm to them. They would respond in a manner similar to La Rochefoucauld that self-love *conceals itself* under the most diverse forms, and that the *me*, if it is not present to consciousness, is hidden behind consciousness and is the magnetic pole of all our representations and all our desires. In this way, the desire or, better, the desiring *me* is given as the end, and the desired object as the means.

Sartre notes that this thesis is confusing the essential structure of reflective acts with the essential structure of unreflected acts. It overlooks the fact that there are two forms of existence always possible for a consciousness.

When we see someone in pain or distress, immediately we pity him, and we run to his assistance. For our consciousness only one thing exists at that moment: him-having-to-be-helped. This quality of "having-to-be-helped" lies in him. It acts on us like a force. It conforms to the Aristoteleian "the desirable is that which moves the desiring". At this level, the desire is given to consciousness as centrifugal (transcending itself, being a thetic consciousness of "having-to-be" and non-thetic consciousness of itself) and as impersonal (there is no *me*: actions come to adhere as qualities to the things which call for them, of the same kind as the colour of an inkstand).

This first desire that we have to help the distressed and helpless when we see them, for the "Self-Love" Moralists and Psychologists, is not a complete and autonomous moment: the origin for the desire to help is found in the disagreeable state into which the sight of his sufferings has put us and which remains in a half-light at the moment we have the desire to help. However, this disagreeable state can be known, and one suppresses it only following an act of reflection. The structure of both reflected and unreflected consciousness exists here in a similar way as with the *I*; a distaste on the unreflected level, transcends itself in the same way that the unreflected consciousness of pity transcends itself: it is the intuitive apprehension of a disagreeable quality of an object. The distaste is accompanied by a desire not to suppress *itself*, but to suppress the unpleasant object. Thus the disagreeable state becomes an object and in order to be suppressed (and that is what the "Self-Love Theorists" claim when they believe that it can be hidden) it has to be reflected upon. Otherwise there would be no need for it as "hidden" and as a further cause; it would be "in the light" and obviously the only desire moving us.

In this way, Sartre renders useless the attempt to place behind the unreflected pitying consciousness an unpleasant state which is the underlying cause of the pitying act: unless this consciousness of unpleasantness turns back on itself in order to posit itself as an unpleasant state, we will remain indefinitely in the impersonal and unreflected.

Sartre in fact has made these psychologists and moralists to realise that in their thesis there is the absurd assumption, unknown up to this moment to them, that the reflected is first, original, and concealed in the unconscious. The absurdity for this assumption is evident when one considers the case that even if such a thing as the unconscious exists, who can claim that in it are contained spontaneities of a reflected sort? In order for such spontaneities to exist as

reflected there has to be a consciousness reflecting them. If this is not the case, then one would have to believe that the reflected is first in relation to the unreflected. Such a belief conflicts with the ontology of the reflected and the unreflected: even in the cases where a consciousness appears immediately as reflected, the unreflected has the ontological priority over the reflected because the unreflected consciousness does not need to be reflected in order to exist, and because reflection presupposes the intervention of a second-degree consciousness.

The conclusion that unreflected consciousness must be considered autonomous then is unavoidable. Unreflected consciousness is a totality that needs no completing at all, and the character of unreflected desire is to transcend itself by apprehending on the subject the quality of desirability. Everything happens as if we lived in a world filled with things which in addition to their qualities of warmth, odour, shape, etc. they also have qualities such as being repulsive, attractive, useful, etc., and as if these qualities were forces having a certain power over us. Only after reflection these additional qualities of things are posited as desires, fears, etc. Only in the case of reflection can we think "we hate x, we pity y, etc."

Contrary to these non-Sartrean theories, it is on the reflected level that the ego-life has its place, and on the unreflected level that the impersonal life has its place (a position which is completely different from the position that all reflected life is egoistic, or that all unreflected life is necessarily altruistic). Under such a metaphysics and ontology of the reflected and the unreflected consciousness, reflection "poisons" desire, since the previously unreflected quality of someone's "having to be helped" is transformed into a reflected state, where we watch ourselves act, and *my* helpful consciousness of ourselves exists as having to be perpetuated. Even if we only think that we must pursue our action because "it is good" the good qualifies the *me* part of our conduct, our

pity, etc. Desires are "pure" before being reflected, after they are reflected they are "poisoned" from the point of view we have taken toward them.

In this way, even a purely psychological examination of the "intra-mundane" consciousness leads us, according to Sartre, to the same conclusions as our phenomenological study: the *me* must not be sought *in* the states of unreflected consciousness, nor *behind* them. The *me* appears only with the reflective act, and as a noematic correlate (or noema) of a reflective intention, i.e., the terminus of an intention as given for a reflective consciousness. Under the light of this analysis, we apprehend the fact that the *I* and the *me* are only one. In the next part Sartre shall attempt to show that this ego, of which *I* and *me* are but two aspects, constitutes the ideal and indirect (noematic) unity of the infinite series of our reflected consciousness.

The *I* is the ego as the unity of actions. The *me* is the ego as the unity of states and of qualities. In Sartrean theory, the distinction between these two aspects of one and the same reality seems simply functional, not to say grammatical.

Part II: The Constitution of the Ego.

According to Sartre, the ego is not directly the unity of reflected consciousnesses. By this he means that it is not perceived directly as such a unity, but it is conceived as such through reflection as a "noema" (see the paragraphs above).

For him there exist two kinds of unities of reflected consciousnesses: an *immanent* unity, which is the flux of consciousness constituting itself as the unity of itself; and a *transcendent* unity, which is the states and actions. The ego

is the unity of states and actions, and, optionally, of qualities. As such, it is the unity of transcendent unities, and itself transcendent. Appearing solely in the world of reflection, it is a transcendent pole of synthetic unity, in the same way as the object-pole of the unreflected attitude, the only difference between them being that the first appears only in reflection.

What Sartre intends to investigate now is the constitution of *states*, of *actions*, and of *qualities*, and the appearance of the *me* as the pole of these transcendences.

Section A. States as Transcendent Unities of Consciousness.

The state appears to reflective consciousness as a given, as the object of a concrete intuition. Hatred for someone is a state that one apprehends by reflection. It is *present* to the gaze of reflective consciousness and *real*. However, the state is not immanent and certain. Reflection is not a mysterious and infallible power, nor are its products indubitable *because* they are produced by reflection. Reflection is limited both in validity and fact to the consciousness it posits. Everything that reflection affirms regarding the posited consciousness is certain and adequate. But the situation is not so when the reflected objects are not consciousnesses and appear to reflection through consciousness.

To illustrate the point, Sartre considers the reflective experience of hatred. When we see someone and feel profound convulsion of repugnance and anger at the sight of him (while being on the reflective level), this convulsion is consciousness. There is no mistake in saying that we feel at the moment a violent repugnance for him. But this experience is neither hatred nor given as such properly speaking. Hatred involves both past and future experiences. An instantaneous consciousness of repugnance could not be hatred then on this

account. If we limit our claims to the proper ontology and use of the words employed, the instantaneous character of our experience destroys our claims that we hate him.

Hatred appears to our consciousness both as our experience of repugnance, and *through* this experience. Hatred is given *in* and *by* each movement of disgust, of repugnance, and of anger, but at the same time it is *not* any of them. It escapes from each one of these movements by affirming its permanence. In this way, it effects by itself a distinction between *to be* and *to appear*, since it gives itself as continuing to be even when we are absorbed in other endeavours and no consciousness reveals it. This proves that hatred is not *of* consciousness, since it overflows the instantaneousness of consciousness and it does not follow the absolute law of consciousness for which no distinction is possible between appearance and being. Hatred then is a transcendent object: the transcendent unity of the infinity of consciousness. Each *Erlebnis* reveals it as a whole, but at the same time the *Erlebnis* is a profile, a projection (an *Abschattung*). The situation here resembles the one we have when we perceive *an* inkstand, *the* blue of the blotter.

What the situation allows us to claim is that this someone we perceive is repugnant to us. However, it is and will always remain doubtful that *I hate him*. Such an affirmation infinitely exceeds the power of reflection. Hatred nevertheless remains a real object apprehended through the *Erlebnis*: the point is only that it is outside consciousness, and the very nature of its existence implies its "dubitability".

In this way, there seem to be two reflections: one is pure, merely descriptive, with a certain domain and a sphere of adequate evidence, and which, by keeping to the given without making claims for the future, disarms the unreflected consciousness by granting its instantaneousness; the Other, impure and

conniving, with a doubtful domain and a sphere of inadequate evidence, effects a passage to the infinite, and through the *Erlebnis* abruptly constitutes its transcendent object. These two reflections apprehend the same, certain data, but the one affirms *more* than it knows, directing itself through the reflected consciousness upon an object situated outside consciousness.

Once one departs from the domain of reflection and investigates the results of reflection, the confusion between the transcendent character of *Erlebnis* with its character as immanent is easily arrived at. Through such a confusion the psychologist commits two types of error: the first is to believe that introspection is deceptive because of the frequent mistakes in identifying emotions (love when in hatred, complex emotions, etc.); in such a case the state is distinguished from its appearances, we assume a relation of causality between the emotion and its appearances, and we believe that a symbolic interpretation of all appearances is necessary in order to determine the emotion; in all this process the unconscious gains importance and function in human psychology. The other type of error has to do with the transfer of the certitude of introspection from the consciousness of repugnance (in which such a certitude is sound) to the emotion (in which such a certitude is not sound); in this way, we conclude that hatred can shut itself up in the immanence and adequation of an instantaneous consciousness.

By emphasising that emotions are *states*, and by investigating emotions as *states*, Sartre points out the **passive** character of emotions. There are theories of the emotions which claim that emotions are forces, irresistible drives etc., but an electric current or the fall of water are also forces, without losing their passivity and inertia of their nature: they receive their energy from the *outside* (their energy has a different qualitatively ontological source: electric current from heat or magnetic fields, water falling from magnetic fields and gravity). Sartre relates *passivity* and *existential relativity* in this way: "The passivity of a spatio-temporal thing is constituted by virtue of its existential relativity. A relative

existence can only be passive, since the least activity would free it from the relative and would constitute it as absolute" (p.66). In such an ontology emotions are inert since their existence is relative to reflective consciousness. Emotions appear to consciousness both as inert states and as forces that create conflicts of the strength and independence of *physical* forces. For Sartre the whole psychology of states (including non-phenomenological psychology in general) is a psychology of the inert.

The state exists as a kind of intermediary between the body (which acts as the immediate "thing") and the *Erlebnis*, acting differently on the body and on the consciousness. Its relationship with the body is unmitigatedly and straightforwardly causal: it is the cause of my bodily behaviour. Its relationship with the consciousness is more complex; there are two exigencies to be accommodated here: from one hand we have hatred as being the first, and the origin; from the other we have the spontaneity of reflected consciousness of disgust. The consciousness of disgust appears to reflection as a spontaneous emanation from hatred.

The notion of emanation is extremely important for the relation of inert psychical states to the spontaneities of consciousness. Repugnance produces itself *at the instance* of hatred and *at the expense* of hatred. Hatred appears through the consciousness of disgust as that from which the consciousness of disgust emanates. In this way the relation of hatred to the particular *Erlebnis* of repugnance is not logical, but rather it exists as a *magical bond*.

Sartre indicates here the point that he shall reveal later: that we can speak of the relations of *me* to consciousness exclusively in *magical terms*.

Section B. The Constitution of Actions.

From the start of this Section, Sartre makes clear that he shall not attempt to dissolve one of the most difficult problems of phenomenology in establishing the distinction between *active* and *spontaneous* consciousness.

What Sartre wants to achieve in this Section however, is a descriptive ontology of actions. Actions such as "playing the piano", "driving a car", "writing", due to their ontological commitment to the world of things, are obviously transcendent; but even actions of a purely psychical character like doubting, reasoning, meditating, making a hypothesis, should be conceived as transcendent as well.

The dual character of action as a noematic unity of a stream of consciousness, and as a concrete realisation, here may deceive us in granting to action the status of non-reflected consciousness, but we should be more careful: action requires time, moments, to be accomplished; to these moments correspond concrete, active consciousnesses, and the reflection which is directed on the consciousnesses apprehends the total action in an intuition which exhibits it as the transcendent unity of the active consciousnesses.

In this perspective, the spontaneous doubt that invades me when I glimpse an object in the shadows is a *consciousness*, but the methodological doubt of Descartes is an action, that is to say, a transcendent object of reflective consciousness.

However, there is an ambiguity here: is the Cartesian "I doubt therefore I am" a matter of the spontaneous doubt that reflective consciousness apprehends in its instantaneousness, or is this precisely a matter of the enterprise of doubting?

This ambiguity for Sartre is the origin for many serious errors that he has described in detail above.

Section C: Qualities as Optional Unities of States.

In Sartre's excursion in the *Metaphysics of the Ego*, the ego is not only, directly, the transcendental unity of states and of actions. Qualities also exist in it as an intermediary between actions and states. Through the experience of hatred and other emotions on repeated occasions, we unify these diverse manifestations by intending a psychic disposition for producing them; such a psychic disposition is a transcendent object. It represents the substratum of the states, as the states represent the substratum of the *Erlebnisse*. In such an account the stratification of the sort (from the foundation up) Psychic Disposition (Quality) -State- *Erlebnisse* emerges.

The relation of this disposition to the emotions however, is not a relation of emanation. Emanation only connects consciousnesses to psychic passivities. The relation of the quality to the state (or to the action) is a relation for actualisation. The quality is given as a potentiality which, under the influence of diverse factors, can pass into actuality in the state or the action. This account makes the state be completely different from the quality: the state is a noematic unity of spontaneities, while the quality is a unity of objective passivities. Even in the absence of any consciousness of hatred, hatred (the state) is given as actually existing, while in the absence of any feeling of spite, the corresponding quality remains a potentiality. Potentiality here is not mere possibility however; it presents itself as something which really exists, but its mode of existence is potency; examples of such type of things are faults, virtues, tastes, talents, tendencies, instincts etc., with the unavoidable and important influence of preconceived ideas and social factors.

Unifications such as qualities however, are never indispensable (and that is why they are optional), because states and actions find directly in the ego the unity that they demand.

Section D: The Constitution of the Ego as the Pole of Actions, States, and Qualities.

From the perspective that Sartre expounds in this work, "the psychic" is different from consciousness. The psychic is the transcendent object of reflective consciousness, and the object of the science called psychology. In an important Endnote (Endnote 24), Sartre points out that it should not alarm us that the psychic, being the object of reflection, can also be aimed at and reached through perception of behaviour; for Sartre all psychological methods have a deep-seated identity.

The ego appears to reflection as a transcendent object effecting the permanent synthesis of the psychic. In this way, for Sartre, the ego is *on the side of* the psychic. This ego is psychic, not psycho-physical. The separation of the two aspects of the ego is valid here as well. The psycho-physical *me* is a synthetic enrichment of the psychic ego, which can very well (and without reduction) exist in a free state by itself and with no association to the psycho-physical *me*. An example of such a free-state psychic ego is that when we say "I am undecided", we do not refer directly to the psycho-physical *me*.

At this stage of the investigation into the nature of the ego, it is easy to make of it a "*subject-pole*" like the "*object-pole*" which Husserl places at the centre of the noematic nucleus supporting determinations and predicates. For Husserl, predicates are predicates of "something"; this "something" is their point of

attachment and their support; it is distinguishable from its predicates, even though unseparable from them; its predicates are unthinkable without it and yet distinguishable from it. In this kind of relation, things for Husserl are syntheses which are at least ideally analyzable. Things become synthetic complexes of qualities, and their qualities are tied to each other by being tied to the same object. What is logically first are unilateral relations by which each quality belongs to the object like a predicate to a subject. In this way, an analysis here is always possible.

Sartre himself recognises that this notion is highly debatable. The notion of the object-pole suggests to us that an indissoluble synthetic totality, which could support itself, would have no need of a supporting object-pole or anything like it, provided of course that it were really and concretely unanalyzable. To illustrate this point Sartre uses an analogy from music: if we take a melody, there is no object-pole which serves as support for the different notes. The unity here comes from the absolute indissolubility of the elements which cannot be conceived as separated, save by abstraction. The subject of the predicate is the concrete totality, and the predicate is a quality which is separated from the totality in abstraction, and becomes meaningful only when connected to the totality.

For these reasons (the relation of a pole to its predicates, and the analysability conditions) the ego should not be seen as a sort of a pole which would be the support of psychic phenomena. Such a pole would be indifferent to the psychic qualities it would support; the ego however, is always "*compromised*" by them. The ego is nothing outside the concrete totality of states and actions it supports. It is transcendent to all the states it unifies, but not as an abstract pole whose mission is only to unify. The ego is the infinite totality of states and actions which is never reducible to *an* action or to *a* state. The ego is for consciousness of the second degree (the reflective

consciousness), what for unreflected consciousness is the *World*, conceived as the infinite synthetic totality of all things.

There are cases in our life where we apprehend the World beyond our immediate surroundings as a vast concrete existence; things surrounding us appear only as the extreme point of this World which surpasses them and envelops them. The ego is to psychical objects what the World is to things. The difference between them is that the World "reveals" itself very rarely, according to specified conditions (and here Sartre refers to Heidegger's specifications in *Sein und Zeit*²⁰); on the contrary, the ego always appears at the horizon of states. Each state, each action is given as incapable of being separated from the ego without abstraction. And even abstraction separates them to bind them immediately back again. The result of a more or less permanent separation would be *emptiness and falseness in meaning*. To *preserve meaning* such an operation of abstraction has to be given as an incomplete process, which gains its completion in movement for a synthesis.

As a transcendent totality, this totality, participates in the dubious and uncertain character of all transcendence. Everything given to us by our intuitions of the ego is always given as capable of being contradicted by subsequent intuitions. Our intuition that we are clearly ill-tempered etc. may be mistaken. We may even *deceive ourselves* about our intuition, since the error in our intuitions may not be committed on the level of judgement, but on the level of *pre-judgmental evidence*. The latter is possible due to intuition being the fundamental source of evidence, and not explicit judgement. This uncertainty regarding the ego does not signify that there is a *true me* which I am uncertain about, or about which I make intuitional errors, but it only signifies that the ego has in itself the character of dubitability (even in certain cases the character of

²⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1953.

falsehood). The *malin genie* of the ego for Sartre extends so far as to allow the metaphysical hypothesis that the ego's composition is of elements which never existed in reality, and of elements which are nothing but false memories.

Even if the nature of the ego is a dubitable object however, it does not follow that the ego itself is *hypothetical*. The ego cannot be a hypothesis, because it is the spontaneous and transcendent unification of our states and our actions. We can say "perhaps we hate X", but we can never say "perhaps we have an ego" (if its existence is taken for granted). The unification of our consciousnesses under the title of "hatred" adds a certain *meaning* to them, it qualifies them. The incorporation of states in the concrete totality *me*, adds nothing to them. The *me* exists almost independently. The relation of the ego to the qualities, states, and actions is neither a relation of emanation (like the relation of consciousness to emotion), nor a relation of actualisation (like the relation of the quality to the state); it is a relation of *poetic production* (in the sense of *poiein*), or a relation of *creation*.

If we examine the transcendent ego as it reveals itself in intuition, we arrive at the undeniable fact for Sartre, that each new state is fastened directly (or indirectly by the quality) to the ego, as to its origin. This form of creation is a *creation ex nihilo*, in the sense that the state is not given as having formerly been in the *me*.

Even if we consider hatred as the actualisation of a certain power of spite or hatred (in agreement to the above expounded theory), it still remains something new in relation to the power it actualises. The unifying act of reflection not only attaches the new state to the concrete totality *me*, but also intends a relation which traverses time backwards and which gives the *me* as the source of the state. The same conditions exist for actions in relation to the *I*. Qualities, although qualifying the *me*, are not given as something by virtue of which the

me exists; this would make the *me* an *aggregate* as the wall is the aggregate of bricks, which exist by themselves, and which make the wall exist as their aggregate only by virtue of each one of them. Qualities are maintained by the ego through a genuine, continuous creation, even if the ego cannot be apprehended as a pure creative source without the qualities. There is no skeletal pole of the ego which persists if we take away all its qualities. The ego appears as beyond all qualities because the ego is opaque like an object: we would have to perform an infinite plundering to take away all its powers. At the end of this plundering nothing of the ego would remain: it would have vanished in thin air. The ego in this way is the creator of its states and sustains its qualities in existence by a sort of preserving spontaneity. This creative or preserving spontaneity is not to be confused with Responsibility, which for Sartre is a special case of creative production on the part of the ego.

The ego progresses to its states through means which are magical (most of the time) and rational (in the case of reflective will), but there is always a ground of unintelligibility. The nuance of the creation involved varies according to the different consciousnesses involved (pre-logical, childish, schizophrenic, logical, etc.), but it always remains a poetic production. In the peculiar and interesting case of *psychoses of influence* ("They make me have evil thoughts") meaning is irksome, and Sartre promises to investigate this further in *L'Imaginaire*, but what is certain for him is that the spontaneity of the ego is never negated: it is in some way *spellbound*, but it remains.

Sartre however, cautions us not to confuse the spontaneity of the ego with the spontaneity of consciousness. The spontaneity of the ego is a pseudo-spontaneity, a resemblance of a spontaneity since the ego itself is an object and *passive*. Genuine spontaneity must be perfectly clear for Sartre: it is what it produces and can be nothing else. If it were tied synthetically to something other than itself, it would become obscure, and even passive, in the transformation.

There would be a necessary passage from *itself* to *something else*, as a result of spontaneity escaping from itself. Now, the spontaneity of the ego does escape from itself, since an emotion such as hatred, belonging to the ego, although unable to exist quite by itself, possesses in spite of everything a certain independence with respect to the ego. In this way, the ego is both surpassed by what it produces, and it *is* what it produces. That is how surprises regarding our behaviour come about; the concrete totality of *me* intuited up to this time weighs down the productive *I* and holds it back a little from what the *I* has just produced. Such a linkage of the ego to its states cannot but be an unintelligible spontaneity. Bergson in *Essai sur les Données Immédiates de la Conscience* described such a spontaneity, and thought it was freedom, without realizing that this spontaneity is an *object* rather than a consciousness, and that the union posited is perfectly irrational because the producer is passive with respect to the created thing.

The meaning of this irrational union is that the ego is both an object apprehended, and an object *constituted* by reflective consciousness. The ego is a virtual locus of unity, constituted by consciousness in a *direction contrary* to that actually taken by the production: *really* consciousnesses are first, states are constituted from consciousnesses, and then through states the ego is constituted; however, as consciousness imprisons itself in the world to flee from itself, consciousnesses are given as emanating from states, and states as produced by the ego. In this reversal of the real process, the ego-object being totally passive needs the creative power that its new role in this falsification of reality necessitates; consciousness projects on the ego-object its own spontaneity, and gives to it in this way the needed creative power. However, this spontaneity of the ego becomes degraded and illusionary, since it is not real, but is only *represented* and *hypostatized* in an object, *magically* preserving its creative power even when it is passive. In this way, the notion of an ego is **profoundly irrational**.

Sartre here breaks his probing into the metaphysics of the ego to note that this is not the only false and degraded aspects of conscious spontaneity. Clever and expressive mimes can present to us the *Erlebnis* of others in all its meaning and freshness. No matter how hard they try however, they cannot conceal the *degraded* and *passive* nature of what they are trying to achieve. *Magical objects* surround us which retain a memory of the spontaneity of consciousness, yet continue to be objects of the world. Man is always a sorcerer for man, in the same way that we are sorcerers for ourselves each time we view our *me*, when we use sorcery in the fundamental meaning of "participation" or the poetic connection of two passivities in which one creates the other spontaneously.

By virtue of this passivity in its nature the ego is capable of being *affected*. Consciousness being spontaneous and a cause of itself cannot be acted upon. The ego on the contrary is "compromised" by what it produces. The action and the state, produced by the ego, turn back and qualify it. There is a relation of "participation" taking place here: each new state produced by the ego colours and tinges the ego slightly the moment the ego produces it. The ego is in some way spellbound by this action, it "participates" in it. In the famous case of Raskolnikoff (in Dostoyefski's Crime and Punishment) what was incorporated in his ego was not the crime in its real form, but in a condensed form, in the form of a "killing bruise" in the ego. In this way the ego is affected by everything it produces, *and only* by what it produces. The *me* cannot be transformed by external events (catastrophe, change in social environment etc.), except only insofar as external events are for the *me* the occasion of states or actions. The ego is protected by its phantom-like spontaneity from any direct contact with the outside; it communicates with the World only by the intermediary of states or actions. The reason for such an isolation is simply the metaphysics of the ego: the ego is an object which appears only to reflection, being thereby radically cut off from the World.

The ego is not only an irrational synthesis of activity and passivity, it is also a synthesis of interiority and transcendence. The ego's "internal" nature, which is more "internal to" consciousness than states, is precisely the interiority of the reflected consciousness contemplated by the reflective consciousness. This interiority consists in the characteristic of consciousness that to be and to be aware of itself are one and the same thing for consciousness. This characteristic may be expressible in many ways, some of which are that for consciousness appearance is the absolute to the extent that it is appearance, or that consciousness is a being whose essence involves its existence. From the nature of this characteristic we can claim that one *lives* interiority (one "*exists inward*"), and that one does not contemplate it, since by its condition it is beyond contemplation.

At this point, Sartre explains one very significant aspect of his and the whole phenomenological movement's philosophy of the mind: why we are unable to apprehend others' consciousnesses. According to Sartre when reflection posits the reflected consciousness it cannot also posit its interiority, because the case is a very special one; reflection and reflected are only one, and the interiority of the one fuses with that of the other. To posit interiority before oneself is necessary to load it down to the level of an object. Once this process starts interiority closes upon itself and shows us only its outside. In order to understand this interiority one has to "circle about" it. The ego gives itself to reflection in exactly the same way as this interiority. It is closed upon itself, it is *inward for itself*, and *not for consciousness*. This constitutes a contradictory composite because absolute interiority never has an outside. It can be conceived only by itself, and that is why we cannot apprehend the consciousness of others, which is an absolute interiority quite different from our own. For Sartre, this is the only reason for our disability in understanding the consciousness of others, and not because our bodies separate us.

This degraded and irrational interiority can be analysed into two special structures: *intimacy* and *indistinctness*. The ego in relation to consciousness is given as intimate, it is as though the ego were *of* consciousness. It cannot be *of* consciousness however, because the ego is opaque to consciousness, and this opaqueness is apprehended as *indistinctness*, i.e., interiority seen from the outside, or the degraded projection of interiority. This indistinctness is what one may find in Bergson's "interpenetrative multiplicity", and in the God of many mystics before the specifications of *natura naturata* takes place. In some cases it may be interpreted as a primitive undifferentiation of all qualities, in some other as a pure form of being, anterior to all qualification. In Sartre's perspective both forms of indistinctness belong to the ego. Before the action the ego appears as a naked power which will specify itself and congeal itself in contact with events (this happens in the frequent cases where overwhelmed by passion we claim that "I am afraid of myself"). After action reabsorbs the accomplished act into an interpenetrative multiplicity. In both cases what is involved is a concrete totality, but the totalizing synthesis is effected by different intentions. A helpful, but also dangerous for Sartre, overschematization would be to say that the ego with respect to the past is interpenetrative multiplicity, and with respect to the future it is bare power.

Sartre points out at this stage of the investigation into the nature of the ego that the *me* remains unknown to us. The *me* is given as an object, and as such it should follow the usual epistemological methods of observation, approximation, anticipation, and experience. These procedures however, even though well suited for all *non-intimate* transcendents, they are not suitable here because the *me* is too intimate. A truly external viewpoint and self-examination on it is impossible. When we take distance from it, it follows us; it is infinitely near and we cannot circle around it. The only way we can establish some facts about ourselves is by getting the opinion of those who know us, or by a collection of

facts concerning ourselves, and an interpretation which should be as *objective as if it were a question about someone else*. Our intimacy with it is no help here, but an obstacle, since it is the *me* which bars our way. In this way to really "know oneself" one has to take toward oneself the point of view of others, a viewpoint which is necessarily false. To really try to know oneself for Sartre seems to consist in an endless effort to reconstitute from detached pieces and isolated fragments what is originally given *all at once*, at a stroke.

In addition, the intuition of the ego is a constantly deceiving mirage, simultaneously yielding everything and nothing. This is so because of the nature of ego as the *ideal* unity of states and actions, and not the real totality of consciousness (such a totality for Sartre would be a contradiction). The ego, being an ideal unity, can embrace an infinity of states. Intuition on the other hand becomes full and concrete by apprehending this unity insofar as it incorporates the present state. An infinite number of empty intentions are directed toward the past and toward the future from this concrete nucleus, and aim at the states and actions not presently given. The ego is at the same time an ideal unity of states, the majority of which are absent, and a concrete totality wholly giving itself to intuition, signifying in this way that it is a *noematic* rather than a *noetic* unity (unity as the object of consciousness, rather than consciousness itself). The *empty intentions* of both the past and the future can always be fulfilled, and any state or action whatsoever can always reappear to consciousness as produced or having been produced by the ego.

What prevents the acquisition of real cognitions of the ego is the way it appears to reflective consciousness (or better the way it does not appear to reflective consciousness). The ego appears only when one is not directing one's attention to it. In order for the ego to appear, reflection must be fixed on the *Erlebnis*, insofar as it emanates from the state; then the ego appears in the horizon behind the state. In this way, the ego is never seen except "out of the

corner of the eye". As soon as we try to have it as a direct object of reflection without passing through the *Erlebnis* and the state, it vanishes, since we fall onto the unreflected level, and the ego disappears together with the reflective act. Any attempt to base the tracking down of the ego on the fact that it is on the side of consciousness, and thus it should reveal itself in reflection, is futile, due to the *fugitive nature* of the ego.

What is certain however, is that the *I* does appear on the unreflected level. It shows up in our responses to questions regarding our behaviour while we are pre-occupied with what we are doing. If someone asks us what we are doing, while we are trying to solve a very difficult problem in geometry, or while we are trying to paint a picture of some fruit, we shall respond in the first person using the "I", without even thinking that it is *we* and not anyone else who is trying to do something. This "I" for Sartre here is no mere syntactical form. It has a *meaning*, even though it is an empty concept which is destined to remain empty. Our ability to think of things in their absence, is extended to allow us to think of the *I* in the absence of the *I*. Statements regarding our future or past behaviour refer to the *I* in this kind of way. The *I* however, by falling from the reflective to the unreflected level is not only making itself empty, it also degrades itself, and makes itself lose its *intimacy*.

The empty concept of the *I* can never be filled by data from intuition here, because now the *I* is of different metaphysics than the metaphysics of the unity of consciousness which was before. The *I* here is the support of actions that we do, or have to do in the world insofar as these actions are qualities of the world and not unities of consciousness. The *I* becomes here of the same metaphysics as the wood that *has to* be broken in small pieces to light a fire. The *I* in the same way *has to* be there otherwise the conditions in the world cannot be fulfilled, but this has nothing to do with the *me* as a unity of consciousness. The *I* in this way here provides only the objective and empty support for the action

at hand. At this point Sartre brings forward the role of the body in the consummation of the emptying of the *I*. The body and bodily images for him can consummate the total degradation of the concrete *I* of reflection to the "*I*-concept" as its illusory fulfilment. In our behaviour in the world of things the body serves as a *visible* and *tangible symbol* of the *I*. Sartre at this point summarises the series of refractions and degradations with which an "egology" that he has sketched in this Section would be concerned:

At the Reflective Level we have a) the Reflected Consciousness with its Immanence and Interiority, and b) the Intuited Ego with its Transcendence, and Intimacy (which exists in the domain of the psychical here).

At the Unreflected Level we have a) the *I*-concept which exists as Transcendent, Empty and Without "intimacy", and b) the Body as the Illusory Fulfilment of the *I*-concept (existing in the domain of the psycho-physical).

E. The *I* and Consciousness in the *Cogito*.

Sartre at this section deals with possible objections arising from Cartesian orientated phenomenologists.

One of their objections may be that if the *Cogito* is correctly performed it is an apprehension of a pure consciousness, without any constitution of states or actions. In such an apprehension there is no *I*, since it cannot be a direct unity of consciousnesses. In this situation, consciousness might even perform a pure reflective act which delivers consciousness to itself as a non-personal spontaneity.

However, Sartre points out here one thing that all sound phenomenologists must have always in their mind: phenomenological reduction is never perfect. A host of psychological motivations intervene and make the phenomenological reduction incomplete. An example of how phenomenological reduction can be tampered with by human motivation is Descartes himself. When Descartes performs the *Cogito*, he performs it in conjunction with methodological doubt, with the ambition of "advancing science" etc., which are characteristic *actions* and *states*, or in other words, undertakings of an *I*. In this way, it is quite natural that the *Cogito*, which appears at the end of these undertakings and *which is given as logically bound to methodological doubt*, sees an *I* appear on its horizon. This *I* is an affirmation that the doubt and the *Cogito* are of the same nature and thus both impure. The *Cogito* can be considered a spontaneous consciousness of some form, but it remains tied synthetically to a consciousness of states and actions. The proof of this dual nature of the *Cogito* is the motivation for it: the *Cogito* is the logical result of doubt, and the thing that puts an end to doubt. If the *Cogito* was a reflective apprehension of a spontaneous consciousness as non-personal spontaneity it would have to be accomplished *without any antecedent motivation*. By seeking a way out of his doubts Descartes destroyed the value of his *Cogito* for a paradigmatic phenomenological reduction. In fact, according to Sartre, such a reduction is possible in principle but extremely rare in our human condition. What appears in the horizon of the *Cogito* is not an *I* which produces a conscious spontaneity, but what is really the case is that consciousness produces itself facing the *I* and goes toward it, to rejoin it. Sartre finishes this section by adding "That is all one can say".

Conclusions.

To conclude his Essay, Sartre offers three remarks which are directly concerned with applications of the theory expounded to other areas such as moral psychology, solipsism, and Marxism.

1. He starts with an amplification of what his theory means for psychology, and moral psychology in particular.

For Sartre, one of the main aims that his theory really achieves is the purification and liberation of the Transcendental Field. The Transcendental Field purified of all egological structures, recovers its primary transparency as a *nothing*, since the *me* and all physical, psycho-physical, psychic objects and truths are outside it and not part of it. However, this nothing is *all* since it is the *consciousness of* all these objects. Theories of "inner life" (Brunschvicg's for example) become meaningless, since nothing can be an *object* and partake of the intimacy of consciousness at the same time. In this way, doubts, remorse, "mental crises of consciousness" etc. (including the content of intimate diaries) become sheer *performance*, with unavoidable moral connotations.

In the same way however, one's emotions, states, even the ego itself, stop being one's exclusive property, and become public. Any distinction between the objectivity of a spatio-temporal thing, or an external truth, and the subjectivity of psychical "states" becomes obsolete. The subject ceases to have a privileged access to his own states. Anyone's psychical state can be reached and intuitively apprehended by anyone, in the same way that the chair can be intuitively apprehended by anyone.

In psychology understanding occurred by analogy, since this "privileged status access" is of paramount importance. In phenomenology, as proposed here, *states* are objects, and an emotion as such (love or hatred) is a transcendent object, and cannot shrink into the interior unity of a

"consciousness". One's thought about one's own emotion is the same thing as someone else's thought of it; both of them, when they speak about it, speak about the same thing; they apprehend it by different procedures, but these procedures can be equally intuitional, i.e., they can both confront directly the public object in question (the ego). If we allow phenomenology to maintain the *me* as an essential structure of consciousness, then we allow the emotion to be drawn into consciousness, since it is a part of the *me*. Sartre's proposal however does away with this. He posits the *me* as a transcendental *object*, and in this way makes the *me* accessible to two sorts of intuition: an intuitive apprehension by the consciousness *whose me it is*, and an intuitive apprehension less clear, but no less intuitive, by other consciousnesses.

In both cases the intuition provides inadequate evidence. Thus everything about one's ego is a public domain, or at least as much public as private. The only thing that is impenetrable is one's consciousness, which for Sartre's phenomenology is *radically* impenetrable. It is not only refractory to intuition, but even to thought itself. We cannot even conceive our own consciousness without making an object of it (and in so doing we do not conceive it as specifically *ours*). If we could do this, we would have to think of it as pure interiority and as transcendence *at the same time*, which is impossible. On the other hand, a consciousness cannot conceive of a consciousness *other* than itself. What Sartre's proposal thus allows us to distinguish, is a sphere accessible to psychology through external observation and introspection (both seen as equal in importance and usefulness), and a pure transcendental sphere accessible to phenomenology alone.

This transcendental sphere is a sphere of *absolute* existence; in it exist pure spontaneities which can never be regarded as objects, and which determine their own existence. The ego can not be the owner of this consciousness, it can only be its object. As such, it can not lead us to have a consciousness that is of our *me*, except perhaps in a designative sense as in the case of indicating things or

events as our possessions. We do spontaneously constitute our states and actions as productions of the ego, but they are also objects. The common thinking error that such a prospect is possible is due to the fact that when we investigate the ego and consciousness on the level of meanings and psychological hypotheses, we indicate them *emptily*. That is we do not try to verify them intuitively: we just have them in mind, like a thought of the sea when we are in our inland house.

With this mistaken perspective in mind, one is blind to the meaning of Rimbaud's "I is *an other*", where the ego appears on the *horizon* of spontaneity. This spontaneity of consciousness is *individuated* and *impersonal*, but nothing more.

A more "coarse and materialistic" version of the same mistake is the thesis accepted by some psychologists that thoughts could arise from an impersonal unconscious and "personalise" themselves by becoming conscious. These psychologists had the correct intuition that consciousness does not "come out" of the *I*, but instead of acknowledging that spontaneity produces itself, they made up the unconscious, without realizing that any consciousness that comes out of the unconscious would necessarily be *passive* and thus not a consciousness (p.98 in the Essay; here Sartre most probably means the psychologists of the psychoanalytic persuasion).

According to Sartre therefore, the only way to escape serious error in the metaphysics of consciousness is to acknowledge the fundamental fact that transcendental consciousness is an impersonal spontaneity. Once we hold this fact constantly in mind and try to work out the various consequences for the rest of the associated metaphysics we are in safe waters. We realise that this impersonal spontaneity determines its existence at each instant, without any possible preconceptions regarding its determination: at each instant it is a creation *ex nihilo*, a totally new existence, and not just a new *arrangement*. This

revelation is distressing if not alarming, since our own selves and consciousnesses are being created and coming into existence tirelessly and quite independent from us. Man can see this as a continuous escape from himself, a continuous overflowing of himself, a continuous surprise from the unknown. He tries to find an account of himself in the *me*, an explanation of why consciousness always surpasses it; he rushes to the unconscious to make the unknown more known. But the *me* can not help him, since *the will*, encompassing the *me* in action, *is an object which constitutes itself for and by this spontaneity*. The will directs itself upon states, emotions, things, but it can not turn back on the consciousness; an example of this helplessness of the will is given in each occasion where we try to *will* a consciousness (for example to fall asleep, to stop thinking about something etc.). According to Sartre what is necessary in such cases is to maintain and preserve the will *by the consciousness which is radically opposed* to the one we want (if I *will* to fall asleep, I stay awake; if I *will* not to think about this or that, I think about it precisely on that account).

Sartre sees this "monstrous" spontaneity as the origin of numerous psychasthenic ailments. As a result of its quite peculiar and complex metaphysics, consciousness is frightened by its own spontaneity: for this spontaneity is *beyond* freedom. To illustrate his theory, Sartre brings an example from Janet. A young bride was in terror, when her husband left her alone, of sitting at the window and summoning the passers-by like a prostitute. Nothing in her education, character and past could serve as an explanation for such a fear. Sartre explains her behaviour as a characteristic case of a "vertigo of possibility", triggered by some unnoticed element in a conversation, reading etc. She found herself monstrously free, and this vertiginous freedom appeared to her as *the opportunity* for this action which she was afraid of doing. This vertigo is comprehensible only if consciousness has suddenly appeared to itself as overflowing in its possibilities the *I* which ordinarily serves as its unity.

But then what is the use of ego in Sartre's perspective? It might seem to have no other role but as a source of error and an illusion. Sartre however, does not think so. He assigns to the ego a very essential practical function. Since it cannot account in theory for the unity in phenomena, its theoretical role is no more than that of an *ideal* unity, far from the concrete and real unity which is effected before the existence of the ego takes place. The ego's practical function then is to mask from consciousness its own spontaneity. When described phenomenologically, spontaneity seems to render impossible any distinction between action and passion, or any conception of an autonomy of the will. These notions have meaning only when all activity is seen as emanating from a passivity which it transcends, i.e., when man views himself as both a subject and an object. In spontaneity there is no possible distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary.

It is as if consciousness sets up the ego as a false representation of itself, absorbing itself in the ego, to make the ego its guardian and law. Due to this existence of the ego, distinctions between the possible and the real, appearance and being, the willed and the undergone, can be drawn and thought about.

When consciousness suddenly produces itself on the pure reflective level however, as the ego, but escaping from the ego on all sides, dominating the ego and maintaining the ego outside the consciousness by a continued creation, there are no distinctions between possible and real structures of consciousness since appearance is the absolute; there are no more limits, since there is nothing to hide consciousness from itself. Consciousness at such a moment notes that its own spontaneity is fatal to the ego and is suddenly profoundly anguished. This dread, undirected, absolute and without remedy, and the fear of itself (both constitutive of pure consciousness) come to the fore holding the key to many psychasthenic ailments. By contrast, if the *I* of the *Cogito* (I Think) is

considered as the primary structure of consciousness, and indeed as consciousness itself, this dread is impossible.

If we accept Sartre's proposal however, not only there is an explanation for such ailments, but we also have a permanent motivation for carrying out the phenomenological reduction. Sartre²¹ points out that this "natural" attitude makes the phenomenological reduction unnecessary, and without any motivation. This natural attitude can be perfectly coherent, without any contradictions, but it unfortunately turns Husserl's *epoche* into a miracle.

Husserl himself in *Cartesianische Meditationen* made a vague allusion to certain psychological motives which would lead to undertaking reduction, but both the insufficiency of the motives provided there, and the fact that Husserlian reduction is a knowledgeable operation, needing of serious and lengthy study and commitment, make the reduction if not totally unjustified, at least gratuitous. On the other hand, in the Sartrean perspective, the "natural attitude" appears wholly as consciousness' attempt to escape from itself by projecting itself into the *me* and becoming absorbed there, an endeavour furthermore that is never completely rewarded. It is always able to self-destruct by a means of a simple act of reflection, tearing conscious spontaneity from the *I* and giving it as independent. In this context the *epoche* is no longer a miracle or an intellectualistic endeavour and method: it is an unavoidable anxiety which is imposed on the human condition. The *epoche* here becomes both a pure event of transcendental origin, and an ever possible accident of our daily life.

2. For Sartre however, the usefulness of his approach does not end in the proper understanding of consciousness and the ego, and the *raison d'être* for *epoche*. It also presents to him the only possible refutation of solipsism. According to Sartre, the refutation which Husserl presents in *Formale und*

²¹ Agreeing here with Eugen Fink.

Transzendente Logik and in *Cartesianische Meditationen* is insufficient to countenance the arguments of a determined and intelligent solipsist. In the Husserlian perspective the *I* remains a structure of consciousness, and as such, it is always possible to oppose consciousness, with its *I*, to all other existents. In such a situation, the *me* produces the whole world. Relation to others may be necessitated in certain facets of this world by their very nature, true, but this relation can be easily transformed into a mere quality of the world, created by the *me*. And if so, we are in no way necessitated to accept the real existence of other *I*s.

If the *I* however, is both transcendent and an object of consciousness it participates in all the changeable nature of the world. It is not an absolute, nor the creator of the universe: it falls like the other existences at the level of *epoche*. Solipsism becomes unthinkable here, since the *I* has no privileged status, and there is no "inner" life. One's *I* is *no more certain for consciousness than the I of other men*, the only difference being that of intimacy. *Epoche* has rendered statements such a "I alone exist as absolute" meaningless. It asserts only the statement "absolute consciousness alone exists as absolute". But the solipsist needs the ego with its personal nature, and not an impersonal and spontaneous consciousness, and therefore cannot but acknowledge defeat.

3. In this, the third remark, Sartre answers objections from the "extreme" Left, that phenomenology is a new version of idealism, transforming reality into a stream of ideas.

He points out, in opposition to theorists such as Brunschvicg, that phenomenology, properly construed, cannot fly away from external circumstances, cannot allow for suffering, hunger, and war to be diluted in a slow unification of ideas. Sartre's proposal on the contrary is committed to the investigation of reality. It attempts to throw man back into the world, to provide

full acknowledgement of man's agonies, sufferings and rebellions. If the *I* were to remain a structure of absolute consciousness (as the mainstream phenomenologists believe following Husserl) phenomenology is doomed to be transformed into an escapist doctrine, pulling us away from the world, turning our attention away from the real problems. In Sartre's proposal however, the *me* is an existent strictly contemporaneous with the world, its existence having the same essential characteristics as the world.

Sartre is not afraid here to indicate his disagreement with the interpretation of historical materialism under the brand name of metaphysical materialism, although he considers historical materialism to be a fruitful working hypothesis. Metaphysical materialism is unacceptable for Sartre because it makes the object precede the subject, just in order to fight the establishment of spiritual pseudo-values, and because it leads to a system of ethics which could not be further from reality. His version of phenomenology makes the *me* contemporaneous with the World, and allows the purely logical subject-object duality to disappear. The World has not created the *me* (as the metaphysical materialists would want to claim), and the *me* has not created the World (as the idealists would want to claim). Both the World and the *me* are objects for the absolute, impersonal, consciousness, and it is by virtue of this consciousness that they are connected.

This absolute consciousness, when it is purified of the *I*, no longer has anything of the *subject*, and is void from all representations. It is simply a first condition and an absolute source of existence. This absolute source of existence establishes the relation of interdependence between the *me* and the World. This relation is sufficient for the *me* to appear as "endangered" before the World, and (indirectly and through the medium of states) to draw the whole of its content from the world. This comprises the foundation for a system of ethics and politics which is absolutely positive.

**ii) "Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology":
The Positive Critique of the Bursting Consciousness.**

In this brief essay, Sartre communicates his excitement over the work of Husserl and the reason for such an excitement. He finds that both French Realism and French Idealism of his time have lost touch with ordinary experience even though they had as their purpose to bring their perspectives close to it. Both perspectives, instead of dealing with direct experience of things, just duplicated them in consciousness, based on an unexpressed and dubious correspondence theory, which provided them with surrogates for the real things, instead of the things themselves. Parallel to this emphasis on Husserl's contribution for a return to "the things themselves", we see Sartre's analytic skills at work on purging immediate experience from its deceptions.

He starts his essay with a metaphor from the animal kingdom. He makes an analogy to a spider which traps things in its web, covers them in white spit and then slowly swallows them, to refer to the view of consciousness "digesting" the reality of things, by reducing them into classes of "contents of consciousness". Realism and Idealism for Sartre have in common the tendency to believe in the illusion that "to know is to eat": instead of reducing things such as tables, rocks, and houses, into assemblages of "contents of consciousness", and classes of such contents, we should focus on the things being the actual content of our perceptions, and our perceptions being the present states of our consciousness. Realists and idealists failed to satisfy this drive towards the "solidity" of things, and instead provided through assimilation, unification, and identification the "soft and genteel" mentality of themselves.

Sartre finds that Husserl's theory, opposed to the empirico-criticism of the Neo-Kantians and all psychologism, retains the indissolubility of things, and keeps them distinguished from consciousness: a perception of a tree, does not reduce the tree to its perception, but keeps the perception and the tree distinct; the tree is in a specific place, "outside", existing in a specific way and relation to the perceiver (with a specific level of accuracy in perception, under specific weather conditions, to the right or the left, in front or behind). In such a description however, there is no room for Bergsonian or similar realisms: the particular existence of the tree is not an absolute which will subsequently enter into communication with us; consciousness and the world are so intertwined, that even though the world is essentially external to consciousness, it is essentially relative to it. Consciousness and the world thus become irreducible facts: to know something is to go out of one's self, to get out of his consciousness, to thrust one's consciousness towards something in the world, since the world cannot be dissolved within my consciousness.

Sartre describes such a possessionless description of consciousness as "purified", and "clear as a strong wind". Consciousness becomes nothing else but movement of fleeing itself, a "sliding beyond itself". A refusal to being a substance, a being beyond itself, an absolute flight, these are what comprise and constitute consciousness. Sartre at this point warns us of the danger in any committed attempt to enter "into" a consciousness: it would be like being "seized by a whirlwind and thrown back outside, in the thick of the dust". Such a violent reaction shall occur within us due to the peculiar ontology of consciousness: it simply has no "inside".

It is important at this point to emphasise the extension of meaning and significance Sartre places on the Husserlian phrase "All consciousness is consciousness *of something*". Consciousness for Sartre has the essentially tragic character of being "a connected series of bursts which tear us out of ourselves,

which do not even allow to an "ourselves" the leisure of composing ourselves behind them, but which instead throw us beyond them into the dry dust of the world, on to the plain earth, amidst things". The comprehension of such a consciousness becomes an extremely dramatic event in one's life: we become "rejected and abandoned by our own nature in an indifferent, hostile, and restive world".

Under the perspective of such a philosophy of transcendence, with all the dangers that it brings for us, and its "dazzling light", any philosophy of immanence, with its compromises, "protoplasmatic transformations", and its "tepid cellular chemistry" becomes obsolete, "effeminate".

And here is where a connection with Heidegger's version of phenomenology occurs: Heidegger's "being-in-the-world" indicates most successfully consciousness' flight to the world, the springing out of the nothingness of the world and of consciousness, and the bursting out as consciousness-in-the-world.

Consciousness thus needs the world: it cannot exist without it, since it can only destroy itself when it tries to look back onto itself. This necessity for consciousness to exist as consciousness of something is what Husserl called "intentionality".

Intentionality is not only evidenced in the knowledge of things in the world; knowledge or "pure representation" is only one of the many forms of consciousness "of" something in the world. Other such forms are love, hate, fear. Consciousness surpasses itself not only in knowing about things of the world, but also in engaging in a more emotional response to them.

Such "subjective" reactions to the world as the emotions are pulled out by the phenomenology that Sartre puts forward here, from the "malodorous brine

of the mind" that the empirico-criticism of Neo-Kantians had them floating in, to the elevated realms of the "bursting" consciousness.

Emotions, on the other hand, do not become properties of our consciousness, but they are *properties of the things around us*: "It is things which abruptly unveil themselves to us as hateful, sympathetic, horrible, loveable". The subjectivity with which empirico-critical philosophy had dressed the emotions is an inappropriate description for Sartre and the phenomenology he endorses. Emotions become as real and as objective as things in the world: "Being dreadful is a *property* of this Japanese mask, an inexhaustible and irreducible property which constitutes its very nature- and not the sum of our subjective reactions to a piece of sculptured wood".

No wonder Sartre gives a messianic character to Husserl's contribution: "Husserl has restored to things their horror and their charm. He has restored to us the world of artists and prophets: frightening, hostile, dangerous, with its heavens of mercy and love."

Sartre at this point informs us of his project in amplifying Husserl's insights on the emotions to a full blown treatise, whose kernel shall appear in his *A Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions* (I shall refer to Sartre's *Esquisse d'une theorie des emotions* also as *The Emotions: Outline of a Theory*). This endeavour shall be based on the simple truth which all the other approaches (including Proust's) have disregarded with contempt: "if we love a woman, it is because she is loveable". It will also deliver us from the fascination for the "internal life": everything is outside, "even ourselves". The discovery of our most intimate parts is disconnected from the investigation of our intimate thoughts, since it takes place "Outside, in the world, among others [...] on the road, in the town, in the midst of the crowd, a thing among things, a man among men".

To summarise then, we see Sartre in this short essay to be engaged in two kinds of endeavours: in the first, he fights against his contemporary metaphysics of mind, rejecting Neo-Kantian and all empirico-critical theories as "psychologist" and as assimilating the properties of the world, turning them into properties of the mind; on the same line he opposes all idealism and realism, the first for making a too obvious concession against the reality of the world, the second for making things in the real world absolutes which are in need of a special kind of communication with our mind. A variation of realism (or idealism, depending on which perspective you look at it), is also rejected: the philosophy of immanence cannot accommodate important truths about us and our relation to the world, and makes the same mistake of compromising our demands for reality with surrogates of reality, through "protoplasmic transformations", and "tepid cellular chemistry".

As a second endeavour, he tries to cleanse the philosophy of mind of his time from contaminations with confused and seriously wrong metaphysical theories; he rejects here all subjectivism regarding the emotions as compromising their Intentional content, and their objective existence as parts and properties of their objects. He also rejects all innatism and internalism regarding the mind: the mind does not exist isolated from the others' experience of it; it is "outside", in the world, together with the things of the world and the other minds.

In connection to the metaphysics of the mind and the emotions however, we have to observe here two important issues: first, Sartre does not favour any behaviourist account of the mind, where mental phenomena are reduced to behaviour. Secondly, when he rejects subjectivism it is not because he accepts objectivism (regarding the mind and the emotions); it is more because he seems to reject both. A woman shall not be loveable to all, not even objectively

loveable to some. She is loveable, because she is loveable to one, and she is loveable to him, even though she may be distasteful to all the rest.

We shall see all these issues being rediscussed (often with minor additions and re-adjustments) in the later sections of our Thesis. One major change is his disillusionment with Husserl's theory and especially Husserl's insistence on the "*epoche*", and the Husserlian conviction that through it one can go "back to things themselves". We shall see the metaphysical side of this disillusionment in the next section (on Reality), and the practical side of it in the section on the Emotions, but first it would be useful to discuss and evaluate the ideas which are expressed mainly in the first (which is and the more important for our purposes) of these two early works on phenomenological ontology, the *Essay on the Transcendental Ego*.

iii) Critical Evaluation and Analysis of the Essays:

The Superiority of Sartre's Theory.

In this part of my review of Sartre's essays I shall endeavour to establish that Intentionality as primarily put forward by Husserl, and as modified and reconstructed by Sartre, is of primary importance for an adequate understanding of the metaphysics put forward in the essays, and of the metaphysics of mind and language that I shall develop in the substantial part of my argument. I shall divide my Evaluation in parts, dealing in each part with a specific aspect of the Essays²².

I shall focus mainly on the points made in the Essay on the Transcendental Ego, but some of my evaluation will refer to points made in the shorter work on Intentionality.

a) Intentionality: The Foundation for a proper Metaphysics of Consciousness.

The main purpose of the essay is to show the inadequacy of the Husserlian account of the Transcendental Ego. Husserl put forward such an ego to unify and individualise consciousness, which without this ego would be just a loose connection of states, actions, and qualities, with no causal relation between them, no time continuity, and no structure.

Sartre²³ gives in his own account an alternative to the Husserlian Ego by referring directly to the most important concept of Intentionality. For him, *consciousness is defined by Intentionality*. With the help of Intentionality

²² I am greatly indebted to Dr. Jim Edwards, Mr. Dudley Knowles, and Mr. David Campbell for suggestions and criticisms on ideas expressed in this sub-section.

²³ In p. 38 of his Essay.

consciousness finds the means to *escape* from itself and *transcend* itself. The thousand distinct active consciousnesses by which I have added, do add, and shall add two and two to make four, is the *transcendent object* "two and two make four". Without the permanence of this eternal truth a real unity of consciousness would be impossible to conceive, and there would be irreducible operations as often as there were operative consciousnesses.

We must emphasise here two points which Sartre himself emphasises in connection to consciousness and Intentionality. First, that making the transcendental object "two and two make four" (as a thought on numbers) be the *content* of one's representation is a very serious mistake: anyone who does this can be very easily fooled into conceptualising a transcendental and subjective principle of unification, which will then be the *I*. And by doing this one misses an important truth about the metaphysics of consciousness: *the object is transcendent to the consciousness which grasps it, and it is in the object that the unity of the consciousness is found.*

The second point concerns unity within duration. The following objection might be raised against Sartre's theory having to do with the need for a principle of unity *within duration*: such a need, the objector would argue, is evident once one realises that the continual flux of consciousness has to be capable of positing transcendent objects outside the flux. Sartre acknowledges that consciousnesses must consist in perpetual syntheses of past consciousnesses and present consciousness. But he also points out that this subjective unification of consciousnesses belongs to consciousness itself and not to the synthetic power of a Transcendental *I*. (Unreflected) consciousness unifies itself, concretely, by a play of "*transversal*" intentionalities that are concrete and real retentions of past consciousnesses. In this way, consciousness refers perpetually to itself, unifying itself in time. Whoever says "a consciousness" says "the *whole* of consciousness", and this singular property belongs to consciousness itself, apart

from whatever relations it may have to the *I*. In addition, since consciousness can be limited only by itself, it constitutes a *synthetic and individual totality* entirely isolated from other totalities of the same type, and the *I* can be only an *expression* (and not a condition) of this incommunicability and inwardness of consciousness. (The *I* cannot be a *condition* since, if it were so, it would interfere with the unification of consciousness in the object: the *I* being now itself a subjective principle of unification.) Thus, the phenomenological conception of consciousness not only renders the unifying and individualising role of the *I* totally redundant, but also makes the unity and the personality of the *I* (as *expressions* of consciousness) totally dependent for their existence on consciousness.

It is important to note that as a support for both of these points (the rejection of the view that the transcendental object is the content of representation, and the assertion that consciousness itself accounts for the unity-within-duration characteristic of consciousness) the concept of Intentionality is one of paramount importance. This I want to claim is not by accident. Intentionality, if taken seriously as the fundamental characteristic of the metaphysics of consciousness, cannot accommodate the object of a representation (as a thought) being its (consciousness') content. This would make the idea of Intentionality redundant, since consciousness would not need to refer to anything outside itself. In such a case we would have two possible alternatives: on the one hand consciousness would remain locked into its own representations of a world, with no certain access to that world. This would allow solipsism and scepticism to poison consciousness itself by attacking respectively its spontaneity and certainty, making consciousness a mere chimera and an illusion. On the other hand, supposing that the object of conscious representation is inside consciousness with no problems of solipsism and scepticism, then an infinite regress of intermediate stages of mental representations would be necessary if the content is to be appropriately dealt

with. By this I mean that the object of conscious representation, being something certain (by hypothesis) cannot be accommodated in consciousness *as an object of consciousness*: this would put it on the same footing as the ego and thus make it uncertain (a prospect which would make it a self-contradictory concept). But even if we do accept this prospect, to cope with this contradiction, consciousness would have to create infinite intermediary stages to form a bridge between itself (its spontaneity and certainty) and the object of conscious representation (which now has the hybrid nature of uncertainty *and* transcendence).

An example here would make things clearer. Consider the sun *out-there*, as a physical object, and *in* conscious representation, as a mental object. Intentionality cannot accommodate the sun as an object of conscious representation being merely its content: the sun out-there. It has to be *more* or *less* of an object (depending on your perspective) and definitely something *different* from the thing out-there: the sun. If the sun out-there was the content of conscious representation (for example in a form similar to that of "sense-data"), there would be no need for Intentionality, since consciousness would have direct and certain access to the physical object "sun" by just directing its attention to its retained perception or memory, whenever it is needed. However, in such a case, consciousness would have only direct and certain access to retained *perceptions* of the physical object "the sun" and not the physical object itself. This idealist standpoint would allow scepticism and solipsism to infiltrate consciousness and destroy its certainty and spontaneity. If, on the other hand, we proceed with the hypothesis and we grant to the retained perceptions and memories of the sun the certainty and spontaneity they require to make spontaneous consciousness immune to scepticism and solipsism, then the mental object "sun", being certain as the spontaneous consciousness is, but heterogeneous to it (since it is posited as an object, and it is not spontaneous), would need an infinite regress of intermediary stages of hybrid mental objects

(e.g., sun-0-perceived-certain-but-heterogeneous, sun-1-perceived-certain-but-less-heterogeneous-than-sun-0, ..., sun-N-certain-and-homogenous-to-consciousness), if the content of this mental object is to come in contact with the spontaneous consciousness.

Here we see the radical difference between Sartre and Husserl in their philosophies of mind: Sartre had a clear commitment to the direct access of consciousness to the world (with the help of Intentionality); Husserl on the other hand, while he propounded the dogma of "back to things themselves", as we saw earlier, he nevertheless defeated his purpose by announcing that there is a mediating entity called the "*noema*" which is what our consciousness has a direct access to. That is why Sartre has no need for such an arbitrary notion as the "*epoche*" and why Husserl has a desperate need for this "purging" methodological item in his phenomenology: whoever has the notion of a "noema" or any other kind of mediating entity needs methodological assurances that there are no arbitrary relations and associations within this mediating structure or entity; Husserl found such assurances in his dogma of "epoche", only to increase the metaphysical problems in his theory, over what such an "epoche" entails.

In addition, if an object were a content of representations in consciousness, it would not only have intrinsic problems of storage in an entirely different environment, but also problems of recognition and identification as an object and not as consciousness itself. Divisions between consciousness-proper and consciousness-object-related would have to be devised, with an elaborate account of their relation and communication. Such an apparatus would be too cumbersome for any verification, and far too complex for any coherent comprehension, not mentioning problems of preservation of spontaneity in a consciousness far too complex to sustain any spontaneity.

I cannot but wholeheartedly agree with Sartre here, that objects (even in the form similar to "sense-data" of the objects out-there) should never be regarded as contents of representations and that consciousness has no need for a unifying ego, since by itself through Intentionality is unified within duration. I can only add the following consequences for my and his theory of consciousness: neither Sartre nor I can accept the idea that representations are *in* consciousness.

The only place suitable for them *as objects of consciousness* is *in* the Ego. They are incorporated in the Ego in a process such as the following: consciousness spontaneously, *via* Intentionality, becomes aware of an object external to it (e.g., sunset on 4th of November 1989); immediately it posits this as an object (sun in a set of circumstances *t*) and in this way it classifies it in the Ego, indistinguishably from itself, together with other objects (representations of the object with other set of circumstances- e.g., sunset on 5th of June 1991). The physical object (sun) in this way is always unknowable (in its entirety) and known only in specific aspects or circumstances. Consciousness preserves its identity within duration because it can always maintain, transform or change the classification of past objects retaining them in or divesting them from their former meaning. This is done spontaneously, and independently from the Ego.

The Ego on the other hand can only react *de facto* and try hopelessly to keep up with the arbitrariness of the spontaneity of consciousness, through the making of regularities and laws of classification (found in the usual "comfy" ideas we have of ourselves and others).

Where Sartre and I seem to disagree however, is in his view that mathematical truths and meanings are not part of the *I*, but are existences as concrete and as real as the *I* and spatio-temporal beings, but "undoubtedly different" (p.52 in the Essay): the *I* is different from physical objects as a transcendental object of consciousness, and different from mathematical truths

and meanings, due to the fact that truths and meanings are grasped and altered by "*apodeictic*" evidence, and the *I* by *intuitive* evidence: thus truths and meanings are certain, and the *I* always in doubt. Sartre here is extremely close to a naive Platonist position on Mathematics and meaning, undoubtedly influenced by the phenomenological tradition he inherited, but still liable to the same destructive sceptical criticisms that the phenomenological tradition and Frege have attracted ²⁴. I would prefer to make mathematical truths and meanings mental states *of* the *I*, classify and analyse them in the same way that Sartre classifies and analyses mental states of this kind. This I would prefer to do for two reasons: first, I do not believe that mathematical truths and meanings have an independent existence from the *I*. They are modified by, and depend for their existence within duration upon the *I*. Second, we would escape Fregean extremes where mathematical truths become contents of representations, the same as meanings (and Fregean "senses" of words), and where both exist in some form independently from the perceiver.²⁵

Sartre and I would agree that consciousness unifies itself within duration. This accords with our shared notion of Intentionality and is a necessary consequence of it. However, I want to disengage myself from certain rather magical and mysterious aspects of his analysis. He first introduces Intentionality as a necessary condition of consciousness (p.38-39 in the Essay), only to make it a mystical fantasy later on in connection with the relation to the Other, and previous selves (I shall analyse my views on this later, in the section on the Emotions). I think that time is not independent of the *I*, being just an aspect of

²⁴ For these criticisms one can see the later Wittgenstein, and especially his critique on what he sees as the Augustinian Tradition, see the first part of his Philosophical Investigations; also Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982; Crispin Wright, Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics, Duckworth, London, 1982; Crispin Wright, Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects, Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen, 1983; Michael Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy, Duckworth, 1981, esp. article on Realism, pp.428-472.

²⁵ My position here is much closer to Wittgenstein's position (see the above mentioned bibliography and my analysis of Wittgenstein's views in the sections dealing with Realism and the Emotions).

the unification of states, actions, and qualities in the *I* and the *me*. Therefore, to speak about the unification of consciousness *within duration* or *in time* is to talk nonsense! (For more on Time see the section on Reality.)

Thus, my answer to certain critics of Sartre would differ from Sartre's own answer. I cannot think at present why Sartre himself did not see this answer and use it. It is by far more effective than the one he uses in the above mentioned passage. Perhaps it was out of place at this part of the Essay. Nevertheless, I think such an answer is essentially Sartrean both in its nature and its methodology.

Finally, any account of the Theory of Intentionality as found in this Essay would be deficient if there were no analysis of the significant phenomenon of the Intentionality of Desire.

Sartre (p.58-60 in the Essay)²⁶ himself delineates such an Intentionality by claiming that "... we must acknowledge with no qualifications that the character of unreflected desire is to transcend itself by apprehending on the subject the quality of desirability." (p.58).

Unreflected desires, being unreflected consciousnesses, participate in the metaphysics of unreflected consciousness, and as such, they have Intentionality themselves, together with spontaneity and unity within duration.

The Intentionality of Desires, being a necessary consequence of Sartre's theory of the autonomy of unreflected consciousness, indicates that the metaphysics of the unreflected consciousness is not only epistemologically based, but it is teleologically based as well and serves the function to "know"

²⁶ From now on whenever I indicate only page numbers I shall mean the page numbers of the Essay on the Transcendental Ego. Also, whenever I refer to the Essay, I shall mean the Essay on the Transcendental Ego.

the world, in a varied, general, but equally important way. Feelings, desires, and intuition, not only augment perception, but become themselves equally important to perception in this drive of the unreflected consciousness to the world, which is Intentionality (more on this in the section on the Emotions).

b) The Two "Aspects" of the Ego (*I* and *Me*) and Body-Mind Distinctions: Analytic worries on the Sartrean theory of Consciousness.

Sartre's Essay puts forward the theory that consciousness is spontaneous and translucent. Consciousness exists as spontaneous and translucent whenever it does not reflect upon itself as something outside it. (At the moment of reflection, it divides itself into consciousness as an object -ego, i.e., *me* or *I*- and spontaneous consciousness.) We saw above that the innermost and fundamental characteristic of consciousness, which makes consciousness exist in this way, is its Intentionality: i.e., that it is a nothingness (with no objects or contents in it) and that it can not exist except as outwardness towards an object. Because of this characteristic, consciousness is determined to render itself alienated and posited as something not belonging to itself: this must occur sooner or later, when it has to view what it has performed as good or bad, effective or ineffective. The ego on the other hand is heavy and ponderable, because of its nature and metaphysics as an object.

When consciousness reflects upon itself as something outside of it, fulfilling its most important characteristic of Intentionality, it posits an ego. In the beginning of his Essay (p.31) Sartre makes clear his intentions regarding the ego: "We should like to show here that the ego is neither formally nor materially *in* consciousness: it is outside, *in the world*. It is a being in the world, like the ego of another." Such an ego, posited as an object by the unreflected and

translucent consciousness has two aspects: the *I* is the ego as the unity of actions, and the *me* is the ego as the unity of states and qualities.

The *I* here is both the formal presence of consciousness in the posited and reflected upon consciousness (encompassing Kantian intuitions, but not the entire Kantian dogma), and the *I* of the *Cogito* as reflective consciousness posited as an object (encompassing here Cartesian intuitions but again not the entire Cartesian dogma).

The *me* is the material presence of the ego in the form of states (emotions), and qualities of perceived objects in the world (such as attractiveness, repulsiveness, etc.) on the reflected level. (States and qualities have an unreflected counterpart, something which makes unreflected consciousness be autonomous.)

Now, what is important to note in Sartre's account is that he recognises from the first part of his Essay that "...the *I* and the *me* are only one. ... this ego, of which *I* and *me* are but two aspects constitutes the ideal and indirect (noematic) unity of the infinite series of our reflected consciousnesses. ... The distinction that one makes between these two aspects of one and the same reality seems to us simply functional, not to say grammatical." (p.60 in the Essay). From this quote we can see that the distinction between them is deemed to have no real importance. If one simply substitutes "mind" for what Sartre says about the immaterial presence of consciousness, and "body" for what he says for the material, we have what might be the most successful and effective solution of the body-mind problem in modern philosophy! According to the view put forward here, the metaphysical and epistemological problem (i.e., what is a mind, how do we know it exists, and what is its relationship with a specific body) does not exist, it is a pseudo-problem, arising out of confused thinking regarding the two "aspects" of the same reality. (Though Sartre himself uses

the word "aspect" here, I am hesitant to use it in connection to Sartre's theory because of the known associations of the word in "double-aspect" theories in the contemporary philosophy of mind; for lack of another suitable word I use this word. I have to note however that Sartre's philosophy of the mind has nothing to do with "double-aspect" theories.) The grammatical and functional distinction between these two aspects has taken an uncalled for metaphysical weight, confusing philosophers and driving them into arguing that we have here two substances or realities. This diagnosis of the Cartesian disease which has made philosophy ill for four centuries now, seems to work much better than traditional monist/dualist, behaviourist, and double aspect theories²⁷. It also connects this problem with the metaphysical materialistic interpretations of Marx, something which Sartre has in focus even in this early work.

Sartre would deal in few words with problems such as that of AI (i.e., whether a computer has a mind or not), in the same way as problems having to do with our and other people's physiology of the nervous system. The "thought", that AI people claim computers can have, has in Sartre the same ontology as a Sartrean posited object would have (i.e., the same treatment as an arm or leg). And since, in the way that AI people talk about thought, thought can only be treated or regarded as an object (or an epiphenomenon of an object, and thus analysable to it), there would be no distinctions between thoughts, fingers, toes, micro-chips, chairs, tables. The only difference between human-things (bodies, looks, behaviour, language) and non-human-things (rocks, sea, air) would be one of our stance towards them. Note however, that in dealing with human beings as such (and not their "thingness"), the ontology of the Other (through the "look", etc.) transforms this stance into a lived ontological

²⁷ The theory proposed here agrees not only with my own views, but with Wittgenstein's as well (even though his was a different prescribed treatment and prognosis from mine and Sartre's); for more on this see the section on the Emotions. In addition, I have to point out that the theory put forward here is not harmed in any way by the later Sartre's views on the "lived experience" (*le vécu*), see Sartre's Interview in Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, Open Court, La Salle, Ill., 1981, pp.22-23.

structure, so real and certain as to effect a radical transformation of one's whole entity even cause one's self-destruction. (The Sartrean stance here is not like Dennett's view, since the Sartrean perspective is based on a metaphysics which for Dennett cannot be acceptable; in short, Dennett tries to "explain away" consciousness and Intentionality as some sort of chosen theoretical tools to explain what goes on at the neurochemical level, or as some kind of heuristic devices that we employ when we have to deal with objects that resemble us; Sartre on the contrary analyses the phenomenon on an ontological basis: we cannot choose not to have this stance we have towards human beings and what ever is in their realm. When we confront a human being for Sartre there is no choice on the matter: we recognise him/her as such *pre-reflectively*; for Dennett it becomes a reflective behaviour facilitating social interaction.)²⁸

It would be useful here to discuss reactions that philosophers in the Analytic tradition may have to Sartre's theory of consciousness. In this way, not only will Sartre's theory be further clarified, but the comparison will show more clearly any virtues it may have.

Let us start with the most fundamental. Analytic philosophers can see the point of the Husserlian Ego and "noema" more clearly than Sartre, and actually find the Theory of Unreflective Consciousness irksome if not problematic: common usage treats unreflected consciousness as an object. (A proof that common usage treats unreflected consciousness as an object is found in the fact that grammatically it is a noun. The concept described by the noun can be easily transformed in the Husserlian tradition into the Transcendental Ego, and in this way into an object which is an as "objectified" -through universalization- object

²⁸ See Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, Penguin, 1991; The Intentional Stance, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass., 1987.

as possible.) If one were to regard unreflected consciousness as not an object, one would have to use a different syntax and language.²⁹ I think the best answer to this criticism is that unreflected consciousness is treated as an object due to the employed realistic presuppositions in common language. The situation differs once one considers language with non-realist pre-suppositions (see the section on Realism). Sartre's own views on Language are analysed in the section on the Emotions; but to put it briefly the Sartrean view is that common use is not (and can not be) an objective criterion for the meaning of an expression. If, for the purposes of a given task, we differ from common use on the meaning of our expressions, this is no serious problem, once we acknowledge the irksomeness and difficulty involved in explaining our own use (irksomeness and difficulty are not philosophical mistakes *per se*).

An associated problem is the determination of the reflected consciousness that objects are objects for. To answer this I think we need to distinguish two problems here. Firstly, what unifies bits of reflected consciousness? One may answer for example, as Strawson did, that these bits are just aspects of a specific body³⁰. Secondly, how are these unifications themselves unified in time? One may inquire how in Strawson's theory bodies are themselves unified.

One can answer these questions in the Sartrean perspective like this: bits of reflected consciousness are just "aspects" (I put the word in quotation marks because I do not think such a word here, with its known philosophical

²⁹ I think A.J. Ayer, Mary Warnock, and Alvin Plantinga in their critiques of Sartrean theory have a similar line of attack: see A.J. Ayer, "Jean-Paul Sartre", *Horizon*, Vol. XII, No. 67/68, July/August 1945, pp. 12-26/101-110; A.J. Ayer, "Some Aspects of Existentialism", *The Rationalist Annual*, 1948, ed. by Frederick Watts, Watts & Co, London, 1948; A.J. Ayer, "Reflections on Existentialism", in A.J. Ayer, *Metaphysics and Common Sense*, Macmillan, London, 1969, pp. 203-218; Mary Warnock, *The Philosophy of Sartre*, Hutchinson, London, 1965; Alvin Plantinga, "An Existentialist's Ethics", *Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 12, 1958-1959, pp. 235-256. I discuss and attempt to give an answer to these critiques in my Unpublished Dissertation Constantinos Athanasopoulos, "Jean-Paul Sartre's Ontological Theory of Freedom: A Critical Analysis", University of St. Andrews, 30th of September 1991, pp. 63-70.

³⁰ See P.F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*, Methuen & Co, London, 1959.

associations, is very successful; I use it for lack of another word) of a specific entity: Mr. Berkeley, Mrs. Hobbes, etc. What makes these entities different is the unreflected consciousness, which is different from one to the other; unreflected consciousness makes different the entity which it is an "aspect" of, defining and distinguishing it from all other items in the surrounding world, and distinguishes the other aspects of this same entity from similar "aspects" of other entities. In this way, one entity (Mr. Berkeley) has three "aspects": reflected consciousness, unreflected consciousness, and body. Intentionality, to work fully, needs only reflected and unreflected consciousness. The body is not necessary for unreflected consciousness to work; it is only useful in social interaction, and in our relation to the Other. (The body in Sartre's theory of unreflective consciousness and Intentionality is not as necessary as it is in Merleau-Ponty's, *Phenomenologie de la perception* (1945). The phenomenological conceptions of Intentionality in Sartre and Merleau-Ponty differ mainly on this: their emphasis on the body and the World; a difference that Merleau-Ponty did not notice with care.)

Actually, both the issue of one's identification with a specific entity (one's own) and one's differentiation from other entities in the environment is discussed in detail and with I think great depth in Part Three of Sartre's Being and Nothingness, entitled "Being-for-Others", especially in the two chapters leading to the chapter "Concrete relations With Others" (Third Chapter) in which the Attitudes Toward Others are analysed, and in which emotions and language are discussed. These two chapters³¹ the first entitled "The Existence of Others" and the second entitled "The Body", contain what in contemporary British Analytic terms can be described as criteria of identity. They deal with the metaphysics which determine how one entity (in Sartre's words a "totality") is distinct from another. In the first chapter the problem of the existence of others is described more or less like this: Am I by myself in the world? Are all others automata and

³¹ Being and Nothingness (from now on BN followed by page numbers) BN 221-359.

things in the world? What can guarantee the existence of Others? The problem as outlined in the form of these questions becomes rather serious, since it has received solutions from many influential modern philosophers who have formed traditions with great philosophical output. Solipsists believe that we can only be certain of the existence of ourselves; idealists "objectify" the existence of others and turn them to an abstract idea; realists in their turn "objectify" and turn our (unreflective) consciousness into an abstract idea, running between the two extremes of behaviourism and physicalism (for the materialistically bent) and of critical realism (for the immaterialistically bent, since in effect it is an idealism in disguise). In the Sartrean frame of mind, both idealism (including Hegelian idealism and dialectics) and realism are just modes of solipsism. (For more see the section on Realism.)

Sartre dismisses all these solutions as unacceptable since they either choose to ignore the existence of others, or choose to ignore what is not body in their totality. Using ideas from Husserl, Hegel, and Heidegger, but rejecting all three accounts of the Other as problematic, he formulates his own theory of the Other which guarantees both the existence of one's totality and the existence of the external world and the Other. In sum, what Sartre claims is that we start to think about ourselves as belonging to a specific entity (Mr. Jones, or Mrs. Smith) after we are confronted with the Other at the pre-reflective level of consciousness in the form of one of the emotions, perceptions (e.g. of someone looking at *me*), or other modes of awareness. That is, through Intentionality our (unreflected) consciousness starts to think about this body as *our* body, this structure of consciousness as *our* consciousness, etc., only after it recognises through emotions (fear, shame, etc.) and other non-reflective modes of awarenesses of the world and the Other, that the Other is treating this body or this structure of consciousness as an object: as this or that entity or totality (even items used or created by the Other can work in the same way as our confrontation with the Other).

Without Intentionality, i.e., without the direct and non-reflective involvement of our consciousness with the world and the Other, we would not even know or come into any contact with our own body: our body is as different from our consciousness as the Other is different to our consciousness. Without Intentionality, in any of our actions having to do with the Other we would have four entities instead of two (the other, his/her body, our consciousness, our body, instead of the Other and us). Through Intentionality, the Body (as a posited object) not only appears to us as a structure of our consciousness, but it is also *lived* in a direct and unreflected way (evidenced in all our actions where we do not have time nor any desire to think).

Both the knowledge we have of ourselves and the knowledge of the Other depend on these non-reflective modes of awareness of the Other's existence. In this way, both the knowledge of ourselves and the knowledge we have of the Other do not become "objective principles of subjectivity or objectivity" (as in Kantian realism), nor dialectical phases in the comprehension of a universal self-consciousness (as in Hegelianism). In short, they are not knowledge in the idealist nor the realist conceptions of it; they are knowledge in the Sartrean sense of a lived experience in the presence of absolute Being³². Actually, in BN, Sartre even goes to the point of acknowledging the fact that he was mistaken in thinking that the Husserlian corpus could be saved by the rejection of the Transcendental Ego. In BN he maintains that the Husserlian corpus needs to be seriously revised and re-organised if one is to be saved from its idealistic and realistic solipsisms. In this we can see Sartre's rejection of the "*epoche*" as able to guarantee our knowledge of the world and the Other; however, we do not see the rejection of the Husserlian idea of Intentionality which is maintained in a most rigorous way throughout BN. What is Sartre merely pointing out here is that the theory of Intentionality which Husserl first systematically propounded

³² See BN 171-218 and our section on Realism.

can be maintained without serious contradiction only if one rejects "*epoche*", and the Husserlian idealist and realist presuppositions (together with the Transcendental Ego)³³.

To summarise, both our identification with this or that entity, and the differentiation of one (reflected) consciousness from another, and our identification of this (unreflected) consciousness as belonging to this entity (Mr. Jones, or Mrs. Berkeley) emerge non-reflectively in each of our non-reflective involvements with the environment. In addition, these emerge not as forms of knowledge in the traditional sense, but as *lived* experiences.

To illustrate this further, consider the case of R. Louis Stevenson's Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: can the Sartrean theory explain the phenomenon of multiple personalities, and even of multiple personalities having as their source altered states of the same body? I think that Sartrean theory can give an answer: in the cases of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde we have two different bodies, giving rise to two different "me"s (*me* as the body structure in the more encompassing structure of the *I*). All these are structures and components in a single entity. Intentionality and the choice to follow self-deception or not in one's (and the Other's) apprehension of one's entity as one or two entities (or un-free pseudo-entities), will determine what the entity itself will give as self-report on its situation, and what we will accept. But the phenomenological analysis of the specific example will be that it is one entity with two altered states in its body, and possible altered states in its structure of the *I*. Without Intentionality we would have two entities inhabiting the same body something extremely problematic in itself.

However, Analytic philosophers may not feel comfortable with Sartre's treatment of solipsism. Some may see in Sartre a confusion of the two separable

³³ See mainly BN 235.

notions of immediacy and involuntariness: a solipsist while accepting involuntariness (we accept perceptions of the external world and of others that we cannot totally control), does not accept immediacy (we do not have direct perceptions and evidence of the external world). Both the solipsist and the scepticist may unite on this: we have no direct and immediate (and thus certain) evidence of the external world. Sartre does not distinguish clearly between the two, being open thus to a second attack: the Sartrean Theory of Intentionality does not support the view that there has to be an external world. In this way, a Solipsist can accept the Sartrean theory of Intentionality and still not believe in the existence of the external world.

Taking into account Sartre's theory of Freedom however, I do not think that Sartre would accept involuntariness even at the level of perception. For Sartre, our contact with the external world is "filtered" and transformed by unreflected consciousness. What guarantees the existence of the external world is the existence of unreflected consciousness as translucent and as a nothingness and the existence of Intentionality as its fundamental characteristic. Since the unreflective consciousness is a nothingness and a translucency, it needs the external world for raw materials with which it can build the reflected (posited) consciousness (the *I*). Without Intentionality, i.e., without the fundamental characteristic of relating directly to the environment in each of its moments, unreflected consciousness would be a nothingness with no prospect of being anything, and thus it would not exist; because of the heaviness, opaqueness and solidness of the external Being, unreflected consciousness gains being with the help of Intentionality, and becomes the *I*: what can be and is reflected from the unreflected consciousness. In this way, the unreflected consciousness as nothingness and translucency, and Intentionality as its fundamental characteristic guarantees the existence of the external world, and the existence of the *I* proves that there is external world. Of course, even though we can be certain that the external world and its structures (the Other, etc.) exist and provide the raw

material for the unreflected consciousness, we cannot be certain about the way this world exists (in its mode of existence); for this, one needs the Sartrean phenomenological ontology (as both an ontology and a discipline and methodology), and, even there, some things have to be left more or less undecided and uncertain; for example our in-itself, the relation of the for-itself to the in-itself, etc.

Another associated worry for Analytic philosophers is that the Sartrean theory of consciousness is a hybrid mixture of representationalism and an adverbial account of consciousness. A Sartrean response to such a worry might be the following: Representationalism cannot exist in the Sartrean theory of consciousness since the Sartrean Ego (the *I*) is always "outside" unreflected consciousness, and exists on the same ontological level as the physical objects of our awareness. In addition, unreflective consciousness does not depend on ideas or representations of perceptions for its awareness of the external world, it is "hooked" onto the external world continuously and without an intermission. This is due to the existence of Intentionality as the condition without which unreflective consciousness cannot exist. Unreflective consciousness cannot accommodate any ideas or perceptions in it, since it is translucent; the ego (or *I*) however can accommodate them, and that is where we can find them in the form of memories, etc. The adverbial account of consciousness, having as its origin Ryle's account of consciousness in The Concept of Mind³⁴, cannot be acceptable in a Sartrean theory of consciousness because first it uses an idea of language that is alien to Sartre's theory; and second, and most importantly, because the Verb/Adverb account cannot accept the separate existence of the ego (*I*), and turns consciousness into a disposition of sorts. Sartre and

³⁴ Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson, London, 1949; a clear overview of Ryle's thought on this point exists in Ryle's own essay "Adverbial Verbs and Verbs of Thinking", in K. Kolenda, ed., Gilbert Ryle: On Thinking, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982 (1979), pp.17-32.

Wittgenstein³⁵ were both opposed to dispositionalism as a theory of the mind and consciousness: for Sartre it becomes just another version of behaviourism and attributism³⁶. And the ego is such an important concept in the Sartrean theory of consciousness that without it human entities would have no existence: since by definition the unreflective consciousness is a nothingness, what makes the entity a something- with the help of Intentionality- is the posited consciousness. Dispositions for Sartre must exist in the *I* and the *me*, and they cannot incorporate the *I* in its totality (see for more discussion on these points in our sub-section on self-deception).

Related to the above is the worry regarding the unity of consciousness in the object and the impossibility of the object of representation being the content of consciousness in Sartre's theory of Intentionality.

I think we need to discuss here Sartre's views on Representation and Presentation, the Content of Representation, and the Object as Content of Representation.

In Hazel Barnes' key to her translation of BN (p.634) we find: "Presentation. That which is present to the mind as an object of consciousness. Sometimes distinguished from Representation. When this distinction is observed, Presentation refers to actual objects of which the mind is conscious, Representation to imaginary ones."

In the Essay, when Sartre refers to the problem of making the transcendent object of consciousness the content of representation³⁷, he refers to

³⁵ On some of the reasons why Wittgenstein was opposed to dispositionalism, see Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Blackwell, Oxford, 1982.

³⁶ See BN 82-4 and 294-5.

³⁷ See p.38 in Williams and Kirkpatrick text, and p.21-22 in Sylvie Le Bon text.

representation and not to presentation. In his text he refers to the danger³⁸ of appealing to a transcendental and subjective principle of unification which will then be the *I*, once we accept that the object of consciousness is the content of representation. Taking the Barnes explanation of the words "presentation" and "representation", Sartre's whole idea seems rather obscure, but I think it can be clarified once we get rid of the metaphysics that is rather alien to Sartre.

Unreflected consciousness is not passive: it is pure activity and it is a locus of origin for all the activity and outwardness that is evidenced in Intentionality. It is not a cupboard for items labelled "ideas", "impressions", "images": quite the contrary, all these items are foreign to unreflected consciousness, and have as their storage facility the Ego. With this metaphysics in mind, the text is illuminated to a great extent. What Sartre seems to say here is just that in the unreflected consciousness there is no object-subject differentiation. The object "out-there" ("out" meaning an external locus of awareness, even if this locus is part of the Ego) is what exists in awareness, and (unreflected) consciousness preserves its ontology as nothingness. When a representation appears *as a representation of something* (an object of sorts) the object "out-there" becomes something "in-here" (content of representation or not), and as such, in need of a subjective principle of unification (the Ego). At the level where the object out-there exists in awareness there is no need for such a unifying principle. The object "out-there" is all that is needed for awareness to be unified. Unreflected consciousness is unified (at its autonomous emotive and other parts) just by having this object in awareness.

Again, this has nothing to do with passivity. That is what Sartre means when he writes in the Essay "It [consciousness] unifies itself by escaping from itself": this escape with the help of Intentionality is what unifies consciousness, with no need for anything else. When Sartre says in the Essay that "The unity of a

³⁸ His actual phrase is: "...may be obliged...".

thousand active consciousnesses by which I have added, do add, and shall add two and two to make four, is the transcendent object "two and two make four", what he means is just that all these parts of unreflected consciousness which make it autonomous are acting in unison and together, in a single instantaneous and spontaneous moment, "dressing" the object out-there and making it the locus of all this unreflected totality (i.e., unreflected consciousness).

It is also clear why the object "out-there" cannot be *merely* the content of the representation, i.e., it cannot exist "by itself" as *mere* "sense-data" in consciousness. At the moment of being aware of the object, there is no distinction between unreflected consciousness and the object, as something which is a content of something else.

To the Analytically oriented the thesis of the unification of consciousness in the object may sound like a confusion between the problem of unity of content and the problem of personal identity. We have to note however, that the two problems are related: if we solve the problem of personal identity over time, then the problem regarding the unity of content over time and different circumstances in the meaning of words is solved as well. There is also a hierarchy of solutions here: once the problem of personal identity is solved then the problem of meaning can be solved, for the simple reason that once we accept Sartre's theory regarding meaning and consciousness (see later) meaning and consciousness cannot exist without each other. In a Fregean theory of meaning, perhaps, the two problems may have different and unrelated solutions; but in the Sartrean theory the two problems become inseparable since meanings, etc. exist in (reflected) consciousness, and since both Intentionality and the ontology of (unreflected) consciousness require that consciousness cannot exist except as giving meaning to the world. (See also the section on Emotions and especially the sub-section on Language.)

Before we close the discussion of possible problems regarding the Sartrean theory of the Ego, the *me* and the body-mind relationship, it would be useful to sum up the Sartrean theory related to Unreflected Consciousness, the *I* (or Ego, or Reflected Consciousness) and their relation to a specific body.

The picture is somewhat like this. Unreflected consciousness becomes *I* after reflection; the body through the *me*, which for all practical considerations is the *body for the I*, comes into contact with the *I*. The *me* in this way is the part of the *I*, which is totally uncontrolled by the unreflective consciousness: Intentionality in consequence has no access to it. This may sound like anomalous monism but it is not: in Sartreanism we do not know and we cannot know the body and the *me*, because they are out-there with the physical things and the *I*. In anomalous monism what we have are problems in epistemological justification; we know some things with certainty (physical laws) but we cannot fit the mental into this classification and explanation; that is all. In Sartreanism we have epistemological difficulties in everything except unreflected consciousness, and there is nothing like it *for us* in the entire universe! (Only for the Sartrean theists can God provide an exception here; otherwise this principle of epistemological certainty is exceptionless.)

Now the Physicalist maintains that the *me/body* control the *I*; however, he falls into problems when the parts of the *I* which are not controlled by the *me/body*, are what is influencing the *I* and the behaviour emanating from it. These relations emanate new forms of, and more complex relations with the body, which for a physicalist theory are the source of extreme theoretical (and not only) difficulties. (Such difficulties are serious for all physicalists who want to be honest scientists as well, and do not want to choose the extreme position of ignoring adverse data or falsifying observations.)

An illustration of this account could be depression, as seen from the Sartrean ontology of consciousness and the *me*, and as seen from the physicalist perspective. While the physicalist would claim that a properly prepared biochemical substance, administered appropriately to the depressed, can cure him/her from the problem of depression (which in some cases reaches the extremes of suicidal depression and manic-depression), the Sartrean claims that we can cure the problem only with a combination of bio-chemicals (properly prepared and administered) and a radical interpretation.

Generated by the body, depression affects the *I*. We are aware that we have depression only upon reflection on our *I*. Depression in this way can be cured only if we always change the *I* so that no established relation exists between the body and the *me*. We can either have the *I* change the body with different relations between the *I* and the *me* and the *me* and the body, or make the *I* totally independent from the body by changing the connections between *me* and the body or even the *I* and the *me* (even though the latter case is much more difficult).

The physicalist here may accuse us of having some kind of double aspect theory like Spinoza's, but if we suppose this regarding the *me* and the entity then what controls what? Does the body aspect control the consciousness aspect, or vice versa? Either way is the wrong way for Sartreanism, which accepts absolute freedom³⁹ as one of its most fundamental beliefs. In addition, such "aspects" seem only theoretical constructs, to explain the phenomena at hand, whereas Sartre's "aspects" are so much immersed in metaphysics and ontology as for all humans to literally *live* them. And not as "aspects", but real-life experiences: unreflected consciousness does not see them as "aspects"; it is

³⁹ Freedom for Sartre has not the traditional common sense meaning of «no impediments to action», but it is ontological freedom, i.e., freedom as a defining characteristic of our consciousness: the lived experience of having the choice to go either way and not having the choice not to choose. For more details see my Unpublished St. Andrews Dissertation, on Sartre's Theory of Freedom.

only with reflection that they can be termed as such. And Sartre's discussion invokes not two "aspects" but three: Unreflected Consciousness, Reflected Consciousness and the *me*, and the body; and when we pass to the autonomy of the emotions as consciousnesses the Sartrean theory is transformed into a multi-aspect theory⁴⁰. Such consequences make the relation of Sartre's to Spinoza's theory a failure.

Other accusations may be that the *I* has not the power which it is portrayed as having, or that we support the theory with *a posteriori* empirical data (like the dopamine effect). One can see however that these accusations fail, since the whole methodology of Sartrean phenomenological ontology is totally alien to that of the empirical sciences: its findings cannot therefore be falsified/verified with empirical data (see our section on the Emotions).

The physicalist may still accuse us here again of a more straightforward double aspect and a physicalist feedback loop theory. This accusation also fails however, since, as we showed above, Sartre's theory cannot be an "aspect" theory in the traditional sense, and no physicalist empirical data can give substantial support to or destroy its credibility.

c) States, acts, and qualities.

It is important to enlarge on a point of clarification regarding Sartre's classifications. For Sartre there is no distinction between mental and physical actions, in the way for example that theorists such as Searle think there is. John Searle in Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind⁴¹, maintains that beliefs, desires, and fears should be classified as mental states, reserving the

⁴⁰ See the section on the Emotions.

⁴¹ John R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p.3, and Chap.3.

term mental acts for things such as forming a mental image of the Eiffel Tower after an order to do so⁴². Searle's and other contemporary theorists' (mainly from the British-American Analytic tradition) observations about the mental states and actions are quite alien to Sartre's classification of the two aspects of the ego in his Essay (the *I* as the unity of actions, and the *me* as the unity of states and qualities; see Sartre's Essay, p.60), and his entirely different metaphysics of states (see for more discussion on this point the section on the Critiques on Sartre's Theory). This point of clarification is extremely important in any discussion of Sartre's Theory on States, Actions, and Qualities.⁴³

As I maintained above in my note on the two aspects of the ego and body-mind distinctions, no distinction between the mental and the physical can survive long in Sartrean metaphysics. It has to be diffused into talk about aspects of the same reality. However, the difference between theorists such as Searle and Sartre is not only in the morphology of the classification of states and action, it is also in their employed metaphysics.

To give a somewhat simplistic account of their role in Sartrean metaphysics, states and qualities exist at two levels: the unreflected and the reflected. Their unreflected existence is due to the autonomy of the unreflected, spontaneous, and translucent consciousness (p.58), while for their reflected existence one has only to look in the ego as an object. States at the unreflected level are wants or desires which can only be recognised as such (i.e., as wants or desires) on the reflected level. States at the reflected level are emotions, which are more solidified or permanent wants and desires. Qualities are properties of things which satisfy our wants and desires: aspects of things as related to the ego. Qualities are therefore hybrid mixtures of states and actions: they are the psychic dispositions attached to objects for producing states. Actions, whether

⁴² Searle, *ibid*, p.103.

⁴³ The reservations expressed here serve as an explanation of why I disagreed earlier with the Brentano's school's emphasis on *mental acts*. See also VI, i, iii.

physical such as driving a car, or psychical such as doubting are transcendences of the same sort as states and qualities. They are posited by consciousness as its objects, since the many active consciousnesses of their moments of actualisation need to be unified into concrete parts of the ego. In this schema, the necessary elements of the ego are states and actions. A separate category of qualities is optional, since states and actions can find directly in the ego the unity they demand.

In this perspective (which I endorse), actions, states, and qualities are all parts of the ego, thus participating in its metaphysics and leaving consciousness undetermined by them. In this way, consciousness remains spontaneous and translucent⁴⁴.

Thus for Sartre and his metaphysics there are and can be no distinctions between mental and bodily actions, even when mental actions are as subtle as a doubt. This seriously disagrees with Searle's and other accounts; but it is nevertheless a consequence of Intentionality as the essential characteristic of consciousness. (I shall enlarge on this later, in the section on the Emotions; see also above for the diffusion of body-mind distinctions, and for self-reflection.)

d) Meaning and Consciousness.

The first time Sartre refers to meaning is to compare the type (or mode) of existence of the *I* to the type of existence exhibited by the existence of mathematical truths, of meanings, and of spatio-temporal beings (p.52). There is no doubt here that the existence of meanings and mathematical truths as such is considered an indisputable point. It is taken for *real existence* and as real as that of spatio-temporal beings. But is Sartre here propounding some sort of

⁴⁴ Note however that Sartre's position here escapes Idealism; see the section on Realism.

Fregean and Platonistic view regarding the metaphysics of meaning and mathematical truths (in the way of senses or forms)? I think not. Even though their existence is not disputed, it remains debatable whether the existence proposed here by Sartre is of things or entities such as Platonic forms and Fregean senses. One would be nearer to Sartre's own view, I think, if one were to claim that meaning is something concrete, though not in the way a chair is. There is no claim from Sartre here regarding the origin, metaphysical nature and qualities of such meaning⁴⁵. Undoubtedly, consciousness and the ego have a major part to play in Sartre's account, but nothing explicit regarding them is stated here.

The second time Sartre refers to meaning is in connection with cases where a specific quality's *fullness of meaning* cannot be apprehended till it is connected again to the totality it was abstracted from (pp.73-74). Sartre refers here to the ego seen in the Husserlian perspective as a sort of an X-pole which would be the support of psychic phenomena, and as such, indifferent to the psychic qualities it would support. In this Husserlian perspective there are unilateral logical relations by which each quality belongs to this X like a predicate to a subject, making an analysis always possible. Sartre claims on the other hand that the ego is more like an indissoluble synthetic totality which can support itself, and has no need of a supporting X. Sartre illustrates his point by using an analogy from music: in a melody it is useless to presuppose an X which would serve as a support for the different notes. The unity here comes from the indissoluble order of the notes, which when separated by abstraction lose their meaning and significance for the melody. The subject of the predicate here is the concrete totality, and the predicate is a quality abstractly separated from the

⁴⁵ And any hasty parallels between Sartre's and Husserl's thoughts on this point (beyond their common background in Phenomenology) are unfounded. Sartre does not even claim here a pure epistemological existence for meaning, such as some might think Husserl was trying to put forward with his Transcendental Ego.

totality, a quality which has its full meaning only when connected again to the totality.

Sartre acknowledges the fact that the separation of the quality/predicate from the totality/subject is possible by judgement, as in the case of states being separated from the *I* to which they belong (p.75). However, he points out that such a movement of separation would end in an *empty and false meaning* if it were not given as incomplete, and if it did not complete itself by a movement of synthesis. Moreover, this synthesis as a transcendent entity participates in the fallibility and dubitability of all transcendence: we can always be wrong or deceive ourselves in our synthesis of ourselves, and the error would not be here on the judgmental but on the pre-judgmental level (pp.75-76). (For more analysis of the phenomena of self-deception and "emptiness" of meaning and their connection to intuition see next sub-section.)

In a few more places in the Essay Sartre gives a clearer picture of what he considers meaning to be. In p.76 he shows that meaning is some *qualification* we add on things, as when one unifies one's consciousness under the title "hatred". In pp.89-91, Sartre refers to the meaning of the pronoun "I", in such replies to the question "What are you doing?" as "I am trying to hang this picture" or "I am repairing the rear tyre" while we are still engaged fully in what we are doing. Sartre writes that this "I" is no mere syntactical form, it has a *meaning*, it is quite simply an *empty concept* which is destined to remain empty. It has the same status as the word "chair" in the absence of any chair. In our use we employ the corresponding concept without the present existence of the item being described. In pp.93-95 Sartre maintains that Sartrean phenomenology will not allow one to have privileged status towards one's own psychical states. (This claim is one of his arguments against the claim that the *me* part of the ego is not a transcendent object, but an essential structure of consciousness.) Psychical states are as public as chairs and tables. Furthermore, they have both

the certainty and the *meaning qualifications* as a chair and a table, i.e., two men speaking of the same state are not only talking of the *same* thing, but are as certain about it as if it were a chair or a table.

From this short exposition of what Sartre writes regarding meaning in this Essay we can claim the following: a) meaning has concrete and definite real existence, but not as concrete and as definite as that of a chair and a table; b) meaning has degrees of fullness (less or more) and its fullness depends upon the necessity for a connection to a larger whole (if the meaning of a thing cannot properly be apprehended but by a connection to the larger whole of which it is a part, then its fullness shall be reached only through such a connection); c) meaning is some qualification we add to things: things first exist and then they acquire meaning through our unifications of them, and in this way meaning comes after things; d) meaning can exist even for "empty" concepts, i.e., concepts which are not properly used in a specific case, but which still have meaning out of their association to previous usages.

It is important to note that Intentionality as put forward by Sartre in this Essay explains and gives a *raison d'être* for claims (c) and (a) above (why things in the world are as real as meanings but more concrete and more definite, and why things exist first and meanings come after); while claims (b) and (d) make sense because of Intentionality. There is no sense in talking about the degrees of fullness in meaning if meaning does not depend for its existence on consciousness as Intentionality (which allows for variation in degrees of direct acquaintance with things), and there is no sense in "empty" concepts if Intentionality does not make recompense for it (through its multi-applicability and its close relationship to consciousness). This also explains why certain structures of the ego are related to it in the way they do only through Intentionality. (For more on this see the section on Emotions, subsection on Language).

e) Self-Deception and Intentionality.

In this section, I think it is a good idea to differentiate between two forms of self-deception: Epistemological Self-Deception, having to do with deceiving oneself in the investigation of one's consciousness; and Metaphysical Self-Deception, having to do with the metaphysics of the things one is investigating. Of course, this differentiation is a fairly trivial one: an epistemological self-deception has to do with acquiring the wrong metaphysical point of view, and a metaphysical self-deception has to do with wrongly acquired habits of investigation. I think however, that it would aid our analysis of the phenomenon of self-deception as depicted in this Essay.

I shall finish this Section by adding a case where according to Sartre there is no self-deception involved, even though one would expect it to be a paradigmatic case of self-deception.

Epistemological Self-Deception

Sartre gives a very important role to types of evidence regarding the metaphysics and the relationship of our consciousness to our ego, in his explanation of the common phenomenon of self-deception.

The first time he achieves the connection is in pp.51-52 of the Essay, where he discusses the peculiar metaphysics of the *Cogito*. He observes that the *I Think* does not appear to reflection as the reflected consciousness but is given *through* reflected consciousness. It is apprehended by intuition and is an object grasped by means of evidence. The *I* is apprehended, always inadequately,

behind the reflected consciousness (p.53). There are two things to be clarified here in order to comprehend Sartre's thought: intuition and evidence.

By *intuition* is meant that essential way of proceeding which makes Phenomenology distinct from other approaches to philosophising. According to Husserl it is what puts us in the presence of **the thing** (p.35). "Intuition" here is a technical term used to indicate that an act of consciousness occurs by which the object under investigation is **confronted**, rather than merely indicated *in absentia*. A word (such as a name for example) when used in a phrase quite casually, in an indicative way, is quite "*empty*". It awaits to be "*filled in*" by the use of the exact same word in a careful observation of the object under description in an act of imagination or perception. The indicative act is "empty", the intuitive act is "filled in". In this way, and in accordance with the orthodox phenomenological pursuit every cognitive inquiry must ultimately base its claims upon acts of intuition, even if supplementary modes of evidence (such as inductive reasoning, etc.) must be invoked to develop the inquiry. In phenomenology, since consciousness is what is under investigation, consciousness must regard itself in order to determine what consciousness is and what it is not. It is important to note with regard to intuition as a method of investigation that its conclusions cannot provide certainty with respect to the existence of the thing under investigation, nor everything there is to know about it: for it appears, even intuitively, "*in profile*". In the specific context of p.51, Sartre simply means that the *I* is apprehended by directly confronting it with consciousness.

When the *I* is described as an object grasped by means of evidence, what is meant is just that it is grasped by **intuitive** evidence. Sartre clearly opposes any view that such evidence is apodeictic (i.e., necessarily so), since by saying *I* in "*I Think*" (the *Cogito*) we affirm far more than we know (p.51). He also denies

that such evidence is adequate (i.e., can be grasped in its entirety), since the *I* is presented as an opaque reality whose content has to be unfolded (ibid).

The connection with self-deception arises from the fact that the *I* manifests itself (misleadingly) as the **source of consciousness *sometimes apodeictically*** (i.e., necessarily so) due to preconceptions and prejudices regarding the metaphysics involved, and ***sometimes adequately*** (i.e., as if it is grasped in its entirety) committing thus the fallacy of Converse Accident or hasty generalisation⁴⁶, even though we know that nothing but unreflected consciousness can be the source of consciousness (p.52). We know this because if it were not so, there would have to be two *I*'s (the one of the reflective and the one of the reflected consciousness); or even three if we are to follow Fink, and his postulated *I* of the transcendental consciousness, disengaged by the *epoche*.⁴⁷

The impossibility of any communication between these two or even three *I*'s and of any identification of them in one unique *I* makes such a proliferation of *I*'s a chimera (p.52). It is important to note that this sort of self-deception is not something that humans have any choice over: it occurs due to the metaphysics existent in the spontaneous consciousness, the ego, and their relationship. Even when a consciousness appears immediately as reflected, its ontology as reflected betrays the ontological priority of the unreflected, which does not need to be reflected in order to exist. Reflection presupposes the intervention of a second degree consciousness (p.58). This ontological priority of the unreflected is a consequence of its autonomy (p.58). The unreflected is a totality which needs no completing at all, and it is one of the characteristics of its ontology that it has to transcend itself by "apprehending on" the subject the quality of the reflected.

⁴⁶ Irving Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 7th ed., Macmillan, N.Y., 1986, p.100.

⁴⁷ Eugen Fink, "Die Phanomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls In Der Gegenwartigen Kritik. Mit Einem Vorwort Von Edmund Husserl", *Kantstudien*, XXXVIII (1933), pp.356ff., 381ff.

Deception can also occur at this stage, when someone deceives himself by thinking that he is not watching himself act while he does watch. *The reflected states, as reasons for some specific behaviour, are posited as such through our reflection on them.* Reflected states are not independent from our choice of them as reasons. For example, suppose that I describe the reason of my action by the name of a reflected state (states can exist both at the unreflected and the reflected level, preserving thus the autonomy of the unreflected): by taking it from the unreflected to the reflected existence, I "*poison*" this state, I deceive myself in giving it the reflected existence it did not have as an impetus for my action (Sartre here uses the example of "Peter having to be helped", and Peter's attractiveness, as our unreflected state upon the sight of Peter in trouble, and "It is good to help Peter" out of pity as the reflected state, p.59).

Deception occurs at the pre-judgmental level as well. An example of such deception is brought forward by Sartre when he points out the questionable character of the Transcendental Ego (p.75). The constitution of the ego as given to us by our intuitions of it, is given in a way which may always be contradicted by subsequent intuitions. *Clear intuitions regarding the states of our ego, as of ill-temper, jealousy, etc., may be self-deceptive attempts to convince ourselves that we have such states.* Moreover, according to Sartre, these self-deceptive errors occur on the level of pre-judgmental evidence. Such an occurrence is possible due to the *most important ability of intuition to allow evidential experiences prior to explicit judgement.* This questionable character of our intuitions regarding our ego does not indicate the existence of an ego which is the *true* ego, apart from what the actual intuitions reveal to us, nor that the ego is a hypothetical notion which never exists in reality, but only that the intended ego has in itself the character of dubitability (p.76), always making deception look the most natural and easy, almost unnoticed, process in our metaphysics of consciousness.

One more case of self-deception is observed in the purported *law-like and "guarded" behaviour of "normal", "healthy", "upright citizens" and human beings*. Sometimes we think that our psychological make-up, and the social behaviour that it gives rise to, are lawlike, always guarded by strict rules which guarantee distinctions between "normality" and "abnormality", "sanity" and "insanity", "morality" and "immorality".

According to Sartre, this happens due to the false representation of consciousness, and the self-inflicted absorption of its spontaneity in the ego which it postulates (p.101). Such an *atrophic* consciousness gives rise to naturalism, *the "natural" attitude*, which according to Sartre makes *epoche* into a purposeless endeavour, and a wild-goose chase. This is because the "natural" attitude is perfectly coherent, involving no contradictions from within the system of beliefs that the ego constitutes, giving rise to no problems, and thus providing no reasons for involving oneself in the *epoche*. In this way the occurrence of *epoche* appears as a miracle. (For the same reason the Kierkegaardian absolute dread is also a mystery; I shall enlarge on this phenomenon later, in the section on the Emotions.)

This lack of serious justification for the exercising of *epoche* in Husserlian Phenomenology, transforms *epoche* into an intellectualistic endeavour far removed from common grasp and far too "knowledgeable" to be anything else but gratuitous (p.102-103). Sartre, on the other hand, by making consciousness realise the false spontaneity of its postulated ego through a simple act of reflection provides a full justification both for the *epoche*, which now becomes both a pure event of transcendental origin and an ever possible and unavoidable accident of every day life, and for the absolute and irremediable dread and fear of consciousness for itself and what it can become.

It is important to indicate here that Intentionality is of paramount importance in understanding the Epistemological kind of Self-Deception. Because unreflected consciousness cannot have an ego-structure in it, and it has to be translucent to have Intentionality as one of its main characteristics, that is why we deceive ourselves by making this unbearable fact about our metaphysics less unbearable by "discovering" ego-structures where there can be none. The very need for such "discoveries" is modified according to the extent we grant Intentionality its proper role in consciousness.

Metaphysical Self-Deception

One would have a deficient account of Sartre's discussion of self-deception in this Essay, if one left unmentioned the more subtle and thus more serious forms of self-deception: those having to do with errors in the metaphysics of our states and actions. These errors for Sartre have to do with the confusion of the transcendent meaning of *Erlebnis* (the translation of the term is problematic; it most probably means "intentionally lived moment")⁴⁸ with its character as immanent (p.65). This confusion leads the psychologically inclined theorists to commit two types of error: either they conclude that introspection is deceptive because they are often mistaken about what their emotions are at some instance or another; or because they are often good at identifying states at the consciousness level (e.g., of a repugnance against someone, etc.) for as long as they have them, they think that the certitude applies with no problems to the emotion itself (emotions at their reflected level, are parts of the ego). And since these theorists are psychologically inclined, they resolve (in the first case) to separate the state completely from its appearances, and hold that a symbolic interpretation of all appearances (considered as symbols) is necessary. This symbolic interpretation is necessary not only in order to determine the nature of

⁴⁸ See p.47, n.48, in *Jean-Paul Sartre, La Transcendance de l'Ego: Esquisse d'une Description Phenomenologique*, Intr., notes et app. par Sylvie Le Bon, Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Sorbonne, 1965.

the emotion, but also to make the relation between the emotion and its now symbolic appearances a *causal* one. In this case, the unconscious re-emerges as the source of meaning for these symbols. In the second case (where certitude is transferred from introspection to the emotion), psychologists see no need for symbols, and they convince themselves that the emotion is not only *immanent* in instantaneous consciousness but that instantaneous consciousness provides *adequate* evidence for its presence. Now, these two types of error are both types of the same error: the psychologists try desperately to find certainty somewhere where there is no certainty to be found. In one way, this error is a different form of the previously investigated self-deception: that of "law-like" or "normal" behaviour. Both take the ego and its structures as having a certainty that they do not have.

One other type of self-deception has to do with the metaphysics of our actions (p.69). For Sartre, it is clear from the start that actions (both of the physical kind such as manipulation of objects, bodies, etc., and of the psychical/mental kind such as doubting, reasoning, meditating, etc.) should be considered as transcendences, and thus as structures of the ego. Actions however deceive us by covering up their transcendent metaphysics (as noematic unities of streams of consciousnesses) beneath their nature as concrete realisations. If they only looked like noematic unities we would have them immediately classified as structures of the ego. Actions however *occur*, and even though some actions look instantaneous, they are not such instantaneous phenomena as the active consciousnesses which produce them. Actions require time to be accomplished, they have articulations, and moments. To these moments correspond concrete, active consciousnesses, and the reflection which is directed onto these consciousnesses apprehends the total action, in an intuition which exhibits it as the transcendental unity of the active consciousnesses. For example, an "action" such as the spontaneous doubt that invades us when we glimpse an object in the shadows is merely a *consciousness*,

while the methodological doubt of Descartes is a proper action: that is to say it is a transcendent object of reflective consciousness. There is an intrinsic ambiguity in cases such as Descartes' declaration: "I doubt therefore I am" (and in any such declarations), since it is not clear whether this refers to the spontaneous doubt that reflective consciousness apprehends in its instantaneousness and thus not to a proper action, or to the enterprise of doubting, which is a proper action. Sartre is the first to recognise this ambiguity (p.69), and also the first to mark it as "the origin of serious errors" (ibid).

In this kind of Self-Deception, the significance of Intentionality is also quite evident: both emotions and actions are liable to be items of deception in our accounts of consciousness; this is due to the inability of Intentionality to move backward onto itself at the same time that is directed outward. The time that is needed to make Intentionality move back onto itself, and the unreflected consciousness that it emanates from, is the time needed to make an unreflected consciousness into a reflected one.

A Case of No Self-Deception (?)

To illustrate the determinate nature of what Sartre had in his mind when he was elaborating his theory in this Essay, here is a case where no self-deception seems to be involved.

In pp.98-99, Sartre identifies transcendental consciousness as *impersonal* spontaneity, and proceeds to describe at full length the extent to which this spontaneity is impersonal. The first characteristic he brings forward in support of this identification is the fact that each instant of our conscious life is without anything *before* it: it is a creation *ex nihilo*. This characteristic brings us to the second one: confronted with a conscious existence that is always new, and not merely a new arrangement, we are always distressed, caught unwillingly in a

continuous creation of which we are not the creators. The third characteristic has to do with the metaphysics of the human will. The will for Sartre is an object which constitutes itself for and by the spontaneity of consciousness. Therefore it directs itself upon states, upon emotions, or upon things, but it never turns back upon consciousness. Now this for Sartre is an undeniable truth of human consciousness; so much so, that we do not even dare to conceal it in the form of a self-deception of sorts, when we have to *will* a consciousness. When there is no other way to effect a change in one of our consciousnesses, except simply to *will* it, it is *by essence* necessary that the will be maintained and preserved *by that consciousness which is radically opposed* to the consciousness it wants to give rise to. For example, if I *will* not to think about this or that, I think about it *precisely on that account*; if I *will* to fall asleep I stay awake.

In order to fully comprehend Sartre's thought here we have to make a distinction of two levels: At the level of simply *having to effect a change in one of our consciousnesses* there is no self-deception, and there can be none: we simply have to deal with the metaphysics of our own consciousness, and if we *want to effect* a change, *willing* the opposite consciousness from the one we want to "maintain" or "produce" is the way *par excellence* this change is going to come about. We can deceive ourselves however, once we *decide not to effect* such a change for one or another reason (we do not want to will it, we are afraid to will it, etc.). This level is different from the first one, where we just *have to will* a change. And that is why we can deceive ourselves in the last but not in the first.

An analysis of an example might make things clearer here. Suppose we want to go to bed and sleep but we are not sleepy. There are two possibilities open for us: either we decide we do not want to go to bed and see a Marx Brothers or Monty Python movie and keep awake, or we try to read a very difficult book

and feel sleepy. Both may be self-deceptions or not depending on the justification we gave to our decision to keep awake or fall asleep. There are two levels of justification: on the one we convince ourselves that we have *a choice in deciding to maintain ourselves awake or asleep*, on the other we convince ourselves that we have *a choice to maintain ourselves awake or asleep*. No self-deception is involved when we not only convince ourselves we have a choice to *decide to maintain* ourselves awake or asleep, but also when we convince ourselves we have a choice to *maintain* ourselves awake or asleep. Sartre here seems to refer to the often repeated excuse "the spirit is ready, but the flesh is weak". Once we realise that this is an excuse and that even the "flesh" part of the *me* is controllable by spontaneous consciousness we are liberated from self-deception. And we can have no other choice but to liberate ourselves from self-deception when we have to accept by the circumstances that the "flesh" has to be strong.

Here the calculation of costs over benefits requires that self-deception be unveiled, and lose its grip on our consciousness. The costs involved (e.g. loss of life if that is what is valued highly, or other highly valued item) make the benefits of having self-deception seem miniscule, and create thus the situation in which self-deception not only does not exist, but it cannot exist, taking the individual's total plan of life into consideration. The disability to unveil and liberate consciousness from the unwanted now self-deception, or, even worse, the disability to get rid of self-deception at this critical point of time⁴⁹, and the promptness to deceive oneself with some other mask of reality marks the coming of serious psychasthenic illnesses of the sort that Sartre only hints at page 99.

Here Intentionality is meeting an unexplored territory of consciousness: the realm of Will. Some of this uncharted territory shall be discussed in the

⁴⁹ For example in cases where the pain is too great to bear and be alive one has to ignore it.

following sections (especially the section on the Emotions). But first it would be useful to discuss the metaphysical presuppositions and commitments of Sartre's theory of consciousness, and especially his commitment to Realism.

IV. INTENTIONALITY AND REALISM.

i) Introduction.

In my investigation into the Sartrean Theory of Intentionality and Consciousness I touched occasionally on one of the most important and fundamental issues in metaphysics and ontology: the reality of the world, and in particular whether Sartre believed that with his theory he was propounding realism regarding the external world and the Other, imagination, meaning, time, and the knowledge we have of them.

This section focuses on this issue (or group of issues)⁵⁰. I consider this section to be extremely important for any Theory of Intentionality and Consciousness, since: if one were to acquire the Realist or the Idealist standpoint one would have no specific need for Intentionality. For the Idealist, there would be no need to appeal to Intentionality to guarantee and make certain his contact with the world, and for the Realist (or at least for some kinds of Realists- the so-called Naive Realists) the directedness of Intentionality would be trivial, since access to the world is guaranteed metaphysically. On the other hand, Intentionality has to have some reference to an existence independent of the awareness concerned, and thus is committed to some form of realism, even of a very limited one, due to its ontology as reaching out of the

⁵⁰ I shall not investigate in detail Sartre's views on Imagination and Reality, even though I know that I leave out a very important topic in my exposition of Sartre's views on Realism and Idealism. Unfortunately, the limited space I have here does not permit me to enlarge on Sartre's theory of Imagination, and that is why I avoid doing so. And any brief discussion of this important topic would do nothing but damage to the Sartreanism that is discussed (and supported) here. For Sartre's theory of Imagination one can see *L'Imagination, etude critique*, Felix Alcan, 1936; in Engl.: *Imagination: A Psychological Critique*, transl. by F. Williams, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1962; *L'Imaginaire: psychologie phenomenologique de l'imagination*, Gallimard, 1940; in Engl.: *The Psychology of Imagination*, transl. by Bernard Frechtman, Rider, London, 1949; Anthony Manser has discussed Sartre's views on Imagination in length in Anthony Manser, *Sartre: A Philosophic Study*, University of London, The Athlone Press, London, 1966; I have discussed some aspects of Sartre's views on Imagination in work presented to the Postgraduate Seminar in Aesthetics under the direction of Dr. Berrys Gaut, U. of St. Andrews, Spring 1991.

consciousness concerned. Idealism, on the other hand, is always a danger, since Intentionality again due to its Ontology is a characteristic of consciousness, and the danger always exists of making all physical (non-consciousness related) reality an illusion, a falsity or a fantasy.

Any discussion on Realism and Idealism would not be sufficient if Meaning, Language, Self-Deception and the Emotions, as applications of our views on Realism and Idealism, are not discussed as well. In Sartre's theory this is even more so, since they are just aspects of relating reflectively and non-reflectively with the Environment and our or the Other's Reflected Consciousness and Body.

From these, Emotions and Language shall be studied in detail in the next section, since Sartre's Theory on the Emotions is by far the most influential application of Sartre's Theory of Intentionality not only in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, but also in the psychotherapeutic fields of Existential Psychoanalysis, Logotherapy, and Psychodynamics.

This section of the Thesis brings together ideas from other works of Sartre, that support, illustrate, or even modify in some way the ideas expressed in the Essay on the Transcendence of the Ego.

ii) Is Sartre a Realist or an Idealist?⁵¹

What do we mean by Realism?

⁵¹ The argumentation in this sub-section, has been influenced greatly by questions and comments from Ms.Mary Haight, Dr.Jim Edwards, Mr.Dudley Knowles, and Dr.David Campbell. I thank them all. For the stubbornness, and the sometimes extreme philosophical positions expressed here I am solely responsible.

A definition of the word "Realism" in General Metaphysics could run as follows: Realism is the belief that the things or objects in the world have an independent existence from the subject for whom they are objects/things. According to this definition, a Platonic Realist about the meaning of words we use in our language or about our concepts claims that this meaning and these concepts are copies or representations of certain abstract forms. These abstract forms exist independently of their copies/representations (both in the sense that they cannot be influenced by the copies/representations, and in the sense that they cannot be known directly from a "shallow" investigation of their copies or representations). A Naive Realist about perception would claim that we perceive ordinary objects of the world as they are, by a direct relation without the need for interpretations, sense data, and other theoretical equipment. To take another example, the Realists regarding both Epistemology and sense-perception, are not only committed to the view that things-out-there exist independently of our perceiving them, but they are also committed to the view that either at least one conscious entity (which can communicate with us) can "see" them as they really are out-there, or that they can at least infer their true existence out-there through certain principles of rationality.

Now, is Sartre a Realist?

The best work to start from is Being and Nothingness⁵².

From the start, Sartre rejects all dualisms: dualism of being and appearance, potency and act, appearance and essence⁵³. He replaces these dualisms with the opposition of infinite/finite⁵⁴. What appears (the finite) is only an aspect of what could appear (the infinite), and never what it really *is*. Sartre here *could be* considered a realist of sorts, in the way for example that Kant can be considered

⁵² Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'Être et le Néant: Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique*, NRF/Gallimard, Paris, 1947; in English, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, transl. by Hazel Barnes, Routledge, London, 1969.

⁵³ *Ibid*, Sartre's Introduction (The Pursuit of Being: I. The Phenomenon, pp.xxi-xxii).

⁵⁴ *Ibid*.

a Realist. But Sartre rejects all reference to Kantian realistic aspirations: "... the first consequence of the "theory of the phenomenon" is that the appearance does not refer to being as Kant's phenomenon refers to the noumenon. Since there is nothing behind the appearance, and since it indicates only itself (and the total series of appearances), its being cannot be *supported* by any being other than its own".⁵⁵

It would be wrong however, to claim that Sartre has no realistic aspirations whatsoever: he belongs to the tradition of phenomenology. His ontological descriptive enquiry of the phenomenon of appearance has to pay its dues to Realism as an heir of the name "phenomenology" coined by such realists as Husserl and Heidegger. Through the "eidetic reduction" of Husserl and the ontic-ontological status of the human reality, granted by Heidegger, Sartre believes that we can pass beyond the phenomenon toward the being of the phenomenon. We can pass from the particular object, its qualities and the meaning which they imply, to its essence, and this passage is from an *homogenous* category (meaning of qualities) to another *homogenous* category (the meaning of the object as its essence, i.e., as the principle of the series of appearances which disclose it).⁵⁶

Note that in Sartre's account regarding the essence of man-made artifacts as put forward in the written form of a lecture of his with the title Existentialism and Humanism,⁵⁷ we see an apparent difference of opinion: there the artefact refers to its function, given almost *a priori* by the maker. I have to point out that the two Sartrean views are not in a great disagreement: the function in the case of the artifacts is not *ontologically* different from the meaning of the object as its essence, *the principle of the series of appearances which disclose it*, the

⁵⁵ Ibid, p.xxiv.

⁵⁶ Ibid, pp.xxiv-xxv.

⁵⁷ Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'Existentialisme est un humanisme*, Les Editions Nagel, Paris, 1946; in English: Existentialism and Humanism, Methuen, 1989 (1948), pp.26-27.

function is the meaning of the artifact, or at least a **main part of its meaning**. Besides, Sartre himself in one of his Interviews, among other places, has said emphatically that we should not pay particular attention in his Existentialism is a Humanism, since many of his ideas there are either underdeveloped or over-simplified and the source of much confusion in the minds of his commentators and critics.⁵⁸

However, we cannot come into direct contact with the being of the object whose phenomenon we have in front of us; we can only "see" the **essence** of the object, i.e., the **meaning** of the object, the principle of the series of appearances which disclose it. The object does not refer to being as to a signification; it does not *possess* being, its existence is not a participation in being, nor any other kind of relation: "*It is*".⁵⁹

The existent⁶⁰ is a phenomenon. As such it designates itself as an organised totality of qualities. It does not designate its being. Being⁶¹ for Sartre becomes in this way, simply and only, the condition of all revelation (being-for-revealing, *etre-pour-devoiler*) and not revealed-being (*etre devoile*). This is the only description that he can give about the being of the object.⁶²

⁵⁸ Mainly see *Sartre, texte du filme realise par Alexandre Astruc et Michel Contat*, Gallimard, Paris, 1977; in English, *Sartre by Himself*. Tr. by Richard Seaver, Urizen Books, New York, 1978; also see Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, *Les Ecrits de Sartre*, Paris, NRF/Gallimard, 1970; in English, *The Writings of Jean-Paul Sartre*, tr. by Richard C. McCleary, I-II Vol., Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Ill., 1974, 1st Vol., p.133; I discuss this point at great length in my unpublished St.Andrews monography on the work entitled "Sartre's Existentialism and Humanism".

⁵⁹ BN, p.xxv.

⁶⁰ For Barnes "Existence" signifies a concrete, individual being here and now, having a subjective quality when applied to human reality; see her Key, *ibid*, p.631.

⁶¹ For Barnes Being (*etre*) includes both Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself, but the latter is the nihilation of the former; Existence is individual and subjective, Being is all-embracing and objective, see her Key, *ibid*, p.630.

⁶² *Ibid*, pp.xxiv-xxv.

From all this we see that Sartre, regarding the being of the object, is an agnostic of sorts: no one can get hold of the true, *real*, ontological description of the being of the object; we can only claim that the Being in relation to this object is the condition of all revelation regarding this object: its essence, meaning, qualities. We have no epistemological justification in our claims that this essence, meaning and quality are more "real", or "true" than any other, and this is so, not because there is something which can be considered as "real" or "true" and which we do not and can never attain, but because there is no reality or truth independently from the essence, meaning, and qualities which are in the series of the appearances or phenomena of the object.

Unfortunately, major works in philosophy only provide two major alternatives to Realism: Idealism and Phenomenalism.⁶³ From such a treatment of the world around us as the one found in Sartrean Metaphysics, and this tendency of major works in philosophy, one can easily think that Sartre is an Idealist or a Phenomenalist of sorts.

However, if one was to brand Sartre's Metaphysics as Phenomenalism (i.e., that material objects exist only as groups or sequences of *sensa*, actual or possible) this could not be more incorrect: Sartre's whole theory of consciousness as translucent with its characteristic of Intentionality as directly relating to the world is a refutation of any kind of mediation and is fully committed to the existence of the material world.

There is no better way to refute Phenomenalism than to refute idealism and any kind of mediation, all in one move. Sartre's Metaphysics is just doing this; with the addition that he also destroys a major part of the realist dogma as well. Instead of jumping into unwarranted conclusions and making hasty

⁶³ See Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.7-8, McMillan, London, 1967, Article on Realism by R.J.Hirst, p.77.

generalisations we would do well to pay an even more special attention to the Sartrean corpus.

But can one claim that Sartre is an Idealist of sorts? Idealism claims that material objects and in general physical realities do not exist apart from our knowledge or our consciousness of them. Versions of Idealism can claim that a material object is nothing else but ideas in our or someone else's mind; or they can claim that the existence of the external world can be considered only *a priori* and the objects of our experience, in the sense of things existing in space and enduring through time are nothing but appearances, having no independent existence outside our thoughts; or they can claim that all that exists is but forms in one's mind; or they can claim that all that can be known of objects is contributed by the human beings who perceive them. In all these versions of Idealism we see the following characteristics: a) the reality of the external world is denied or at least the impossibility of knowing it (of "how it really is" and of "whether it is or it is not"), is emphasised; b) talk about objects of the external world is avoided and is replaced by discussions and investigations of appearances, ideas and sensations.

Now, it may be that Sartre is an agnosticist of sorts regarding the "how" of Being, but he is more than certain that Being exists (in the sense of physical and other realities existing in themselves, with no need of human or other subjects' interference for their subsistence), and it has a place of paramount importance in his Metaphysics, since it becomes a condition of all revelation (being-for-revealing). In addition, his whole theory of Consciousness and Intentionality is geared towards accommodating this paramount importance of Being as condition of all revelation (being-for-revealing). From these reasons we can understand why Sartre cannot be regarded an Idealist of sorts.

We shall return to the investigation of Being however, later on when we investigate in more detail the issue of realism and idealism in connection with the Being-In-Itself.

We shall try to see now what happens to the **being of the appearance**, or phenomenon, which even though in a different ontological status from that of the Being in general, is related at least epistemologically to it. Could it not be viewed with some kind of realist aspirations in mind?

Sartre claims that it cannot. Appearance or phenomenon for Sartre has no being: i.e., it has no being of the same description as being-for-revealing, but it has a being *as a phenomenon*. An example here may make things clearer. Suppose we see a table in a room: we may distinguish the table, the being of the table, the phenomenon of the table, and the being of the phenomenon of the table. For Sartre, being-for-revealing is only the being of the table, and this is the condition of all revelation. The meaning/essence of the table is the principle of its series of appearance which disclose it. The phenomenon of the table or better the phenomena of the table are constituents of the series of appearances which provide this essence/meaning. The phenomenon of the table has no being itself (*qua phenomenon*), since then it would not be a phenomenon of something, but a being which reveals other phenomena (a **being-for-revealing**). Thus we are at a puzzle when someone asks us what is the being of the phenomenon of the table. This is what Sartre means by "the phenomenon of being requires the transphenomenality of being".⁶⁴ In order to describe the phenomenon of being *as a phenomenon*, you must not treat it as a being. Because then, you treat it not as a phenomenon, but as a being-for-revealing, and thus at the end you will not reach any conclusions about it *as a phenomenon*, but as a being-for-revealing.

⁶⁴ BN, p.xxvi.

In this way, we can safely conclude that Sartre has no realist aspirations for the being of the phenomenon, since all realist considerations about the being of the phenomenon are treating the phenomenon of being as a being of sorts, thus claiming something that goes beyond what his descriptive phenomenological ontology allows us to claim.

But what about the **being of being**? We saw above that Sartre is an agnosticist about it. However, it is conceivable that one can be both an agnosticist and a realist about Being. Such a person claims that we cannot know Being directly, and thus we should not claim that it is this or that, but we should only claim that it exists on pure inference from what we can know. For example, philosophers and theologians in the Augustinian Tradition have been agnosticists and realists about God claiming that even though we cannot know God directly, since His attributes and qualities are infinite, we nevertheless can know that He exists, because His existence is a necessary consequence of the metaphysics employed in our language, and certain principles of our rationality.

In addition, epistemological realism (i.e., that we can know Being directly) is not reducible to ontological realism (i.e., that Being exists) so proving that Sartre is not an epistemological realist says nothing on whether Sartre is an ontological realist. In other words, that we can have a direct knowledge of Being (with no mediation of appearances, etc.) does not mean, nor guarantee, the real existence of the Being (we may have a direct knowledge of a false Being- a chimera-, or something different from a full-fledged Being, perhaps even of parts of ourselves misconstrued as real Being!).

Sartre himself recognises the validity of all these questions.⁶⁵ He answers these questions by firstly recognising that consciousness, as positional and self-transcendent, has to be self-conscious consciousness (because otherwise it would be some sort of unconscious consciousness, a claim that is absurd); based on this recognition he claims that the only thing which we can be certain of is that things, while they appear in consciousness, exist *for us*, and not that things (in their being) exist in themselves.⁶⁶

But, should we proceed from this conclusion (that we cannot be certain whether things-in-themselves exist in themselves) to the conclusion that things-in-themselves and their existence are unreal, cut off from any ontological commitments? Sartre accuses Husserl here of deceiving himself when he chooses to make this inference, since even as unreal the things-in-themselves have to exist. Sartre draws on the paradox of ontological commitments to guard off any irrealist aberrations: any claim in ontology, even the claim that there is no ontology, has to assume certain ontological considerations.^{67/68}

Sartre answers this difficult problem by choosing to place himself in the Augustinian Tradition and claim that as God for Augustine so Being for Sartre cannot have any other but an Ontological Proof: the certainty that there is a being of the perceived object, independent from the perceived object *as perceived*, is derived for Sartre *from the pre-reflective being of the percipiens* (and not by perceiving directly Being).

⁶⁵ Ibid, pp.xxiv-xxvi.

⁶⁶ Ibid, p.xxviii.

⁶⁷ Ibid, p.xxxv.

⁶⁸ Even consciousness as nothingness (and thus with no ontology) depends on being (and its ontology) for its existence: without Being-for-revealing there would be no revealed-Being. Our discussion here may sound to philosophers brought up with the known (and rather simplistic) distinction between Metaphysics and Ontology as rather strange and foreign, but it is not always true that what sounds strange and foreign is in addition false...

Sartre's reasoning is as follows: if we take as our basic premise that all consciousness is consciousness *of something*, to be confronted with something is to be confronted with a **concrete and full presence which is not consciousness**.⁶⁹

However, this does not mean that the being of the object is *a lack of something*: a lack of something is parasitic on what exists; consciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself. If anything is "parasitic", it is consciousness on the being of the object.⁷⁰

Here Sartre distances himself radically from all Idealists and this is where Sartre and Husserl actually *differ* in their concepts and ontology of Intentionality: **Husserl misunderstood and did not recognise the realist commitments that his theory of Intentionality was forcing him to acknowledge, while Sartre's theory of Intentionality is fully and wholeheartedly incorporating these commitments, and gives them a functional role in his general theory of consciousness of paramount importance**.⁷¹

Husserl, according to Sartre here, tried to acquire a realist flavour through the notion of "pure subjectivity" (i.e., the Ego) which somehow transcends itself as subjectivity and posits an objective perspective. Sartre believes not only that it is impossible for such a notion to transcend itself as subjective and reach something objective, but also that the very notion of "pure subjectivity" is problematic.⁷² What can properly be called subjective for Sartre is "consciousness (of) consciousness". This consciousness of being consciousness can only be qualified as revealing intuition, and as such it implies something

⁶⁹ Ibid, pp.xxxvi-xxxvii.

⁷⁰ Ibid, p.xxxvii.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

revealed. Subjectivity can be established as absolute only in the face of something revealed, and immanence can be defined only within the apprehension of a transcendent.

This analysis, far from the epistemological purposes of Kant in refuting idealism, aspires to the ontological endeavours of Descartes. The question involved is not of whether inner sense implies the existence of objective spatial phenomena, but of whether consciousness ontologically implies a non-conscious and transphenomenal being. In this way we have just moved from the epistemological considerations mentioned above to a more holistic and complete view of the question of Being and its reality by addressing directly the ontological issues involved.

Referring to "pure subjectivity" i.e., to a consciousness which is void of something that it is consciousness of, is pointless in such an ontology, since even in the form of a subjectivity such a consciousness cannot constitute itself by constituting the objective. In fact, if consciousness is consciousness of **something** (as Husserl himself admits), then the objective as a revealed-revelation of a being which is not consciousness has to already exist when consciousness reveals it. In such a schema of things, to bring subjectivity first and then base objectivity on it is not only inconsistent in the tradition of Husserlian Phenomenology, but also clearly flawed.⁷³

But what about Consciousness itself? Could not someone claim that consciousness has a being which is different from the being related to the phenomena (i.e., the being of the in-itself), but which is a being of sorts in the sense that the phenomena of being relate to it and its being, and not to the being of which they are phenomena? To be more clear, we need not only to refute the Husserlian Ego as it exists in the Husserlian corpus, but we also need to secure

⁷³ Ibid, pp. xxxvii-xxxviii.

Sartrean intuitions regarding Consciousness from an existence of a similar ego arising from some kind of noumenal being that Consciousness in Sartre's theory may have.

Sartre, to escape such a scenario, defines **Consciousness** as "*a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself*".⁷⁴ This Heideggerian formulation has no other purpose but to make even more evident that the being of consciousness can be none other than the transphenomenal being of phenomena. This transphenomenal being is not a noumenal being which is hidden behind the phenomena, but it is the being of the world which is implied by the ontology of consciousness; it is the being of this table and chair that I see now in front of me. Such a transphenomenal being requires only that the being of that which appears does not exist *only in so far as it appears*. For Sartre "the transphenomenal being of what exists *for consciousness* is itself in itself (*lui-meme en soi*)".

Such a quite minimalistic realist commitment keeps Sartre's Theory of Intentionality from losing contact with the world and is thus more plausible than Husserl's account, in relation to the transphenomenal being of phenomena.

On the other hand, the primary characteristic of the being of an existent is never to reveal itself completely to consciousness. This being however, refers to a certain mode of being, since "[t]here is no being which is not the being of a certain mode of being"⁷⁵ none which cannot be apprehended through the mode of being which manifests being and veils it at the same time".⁷⁶ In this way, the epistemological account of being (of knowing *this* mode of being) and the ontological account (the entirety of modes and the impossibility of our knowing

⁷⁴ Ibid, p.xxxviii.

⁷⁵ Sartre's own expression is "*maniere d'etre*", Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'Être et le Neant: Essai d'ontologie phenomologique*, Gallimard 1943, Renouvele en 1970, p.29.

⁷⁶ BN, pp.xxxviii-xxxix.

it) safeguard the differentiation between the existent and its being: "[a]n existent cannot be stripped of its being; being is the ever present foundation of the existent; it is everywhere in it and nowhere".⁷⁷

This limited apprehension of the being of the existent by Consciousness is not an apprehension of its being itself, but of the **meaning of this being**; Sartre calls this relation between Consciousness and the being of the existent *ontic-ontological* since "a fundamental characteristic of its transcendence is to transcend the ontic toward the ontological" (ibid, p.xxxix).

Someone may suspect an anti-realist or irrealist turn at this level of the Sartrean Metaphysics of Being. Note however that for Sartre even Meaning, an intrinsically cumbersome notion for the realist perspective in Metaphysics, is treated with what one can clearly characterize as a "realist" attitude: "The meaning of the being of the existent in so far as it reveals itself to consciousness is the phenomenon of being. This meaning has itself a being, based on which it manifests itself".⁷⁸

Of course, Sartre here has no intention of claiming that being is a sort of meaning, nor that the being of the meaning has itself a meaning. Sartre does not want to make the first move because he has already stated that (i) meaning is the epistemological relation of consciousness with the being-in-itself, (ii) being-in-itself is ontologically necessitated by consciousness, but totally independent from it, (iii) the meaning of the being of the phenomenon⁷⁹ is not necessitated in the same way as the being-in-itself by consciousness.

In addition, Sartre does not want to make the second move as well (i.e., claim that the being of the meaning has itself meaning). He refers in the text to

⁷⁷ Ibid, p.xxxviii.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Being-in-itself, here; see Catalano, ibid, p.41, footnote 14.

the distance his metaphysics here have from the scholastic argument according to which there is a vicious circle in every proposition which concerns being, since any judgement about being already implies being. Sartre's position is far from an implication of a vicious circle, since for him it is not necessary again to pass beyond the being of this meaning toward its meaning: "the meaning of being is valid for the being of every phenomenon, including its own being" [ibid]. To elucidate what Sartre has here in mind one has only to think that Sartre's "meaning of being" is working like the phenomenon of being, which does not have being but indicates and requires it *universally*. Sartre's ontological proof which from the phenomenon of being proves the being of the phenomenon is not applied *especially* and *uniquely* for every single phenomenon. There is one ontological proof for the whole domain of consciousness: "this proof is sufficient to justify all the information which we can derive from the phenomenon of being...[which] like every primary phenomenon, is immediately disclosed to consciousness".⁸⁰ In a similar way, the meaning of being is "valid for the being of every phenomenon, including its own being", i.e., it gives us a *universal* ontological perspective on being.

At this point, however, Sartre hastens to remind us that this universality of meaning of the being of the phenomenon is valid only for the **realm** of the being of the phenomenon (of the revealed-revelation of the being-in-itself, *l'etre-en-soi*); it cannot extend its applicability to the realm which is opposed to the realm of the being-in-itself, that of the being-for-itself (of the revealed-revelation of the being-for-itself, *l'etre-pour-soi*); that for Sartre is of a totally different type⁸¹ of being.

At this level of analysis (in his Introduction of Being and Nothingness), Sartre wants only to indicate that the concept of Being forces upon us

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ A better expression might be "mode" here; Sartre's own is *autre type d'etre, L'etre et le Neant*, p.30.

phenomenologically the division of Being into two completely separate types and regions of Being, that of the in-itself and that of the for-itself. The meaning of either of the two cannot be fixed according to Sartre until he has fixed their true connection with the Being in general (i.e., how these two regions of being can be placed under the same heading), and until the relations which unite them are investigated and analysed thoroughly. Sartre proceeds to investigate and analyse these relations in the main corpus of Being and Nothingness. We are not going to accompany him in these specific investigations however, since what concerns us here is his alleged realism, idealism or phenomenalism, insofar as these have consequences upon his (and any) theory of Intentionality and Consciousness.

We continue with Sartre's views in the Introduction, by citing his conviction that his Metaphysics escape any realistic or idealistic characterisations.⁸²

He rules out a realistic conception of the relations of the phenomenon with consciousness based on his examination of non-positional self-consciousness; he found that the being of the phenomenon can on no account act upon consciousness: consciousness is spontaneous and relates directly to the environment through Intentionality, and cannot accommodate a schema in

⁸² Ibid, p.xl. Also see Anthony Manser, *ibid*, p.71 where there is a clear disassociation of Sartre's theory from all Idealisms, even Kant's Transcendental Idealism; Manser refers to and analyses the BN Chapter on Transcendence, the one which is by far the closest to Kant (with the famous aphorism "the world is human" *EN*, 270); Manser and I see here a great difference from Kant and the Idealists (which is seen more clearly once the aphorism is put in the context of the ontology of the for-itself and the in-itself. In this we differ from one of the interpretations Timothy Sprigge gives on the philosophy of Sartre (esp. on the early, in connection to Sartre's critique of the Transcendental Ego), in T.L.S. Sprigge, Theories of Existence, Penguin, 1990 (1985), pp.59-60, 65-66; Sprigge in *ibid*, p.130, gives a direct Realist interpretation of Sartre (esp. on the theory in BN); in a later consultation I had with Prof.Sprigge he explained that Sartre's theory (together with Heidegger's) could be characterised as Idealist in the way that for example scientists's view of nature is different (more idealistic) from the one we have in our daily life; Sartre's theory could also be classified as a direct realist because he followed the Husserlian tradition (even though Prof.Sprigge thinks that Sartre is more of an idealist than a realist); I will discuss the Realist interpretation of Sartre in the sub-section on McCulloch.

which objects perceived cause the emergence of ideas or representations of sorts in consciousness. We would hasten to add that the term "the being of the phenomenon", as a term, would be non-sensical if what we have in mind is ideas and representations of sorts. Now, if we take into consideration that realism in its traditional sense depends on the belief that there exists a mind-independent environment and that we have access to that environment through perception or thought based on this perception, we understand Sartre's conviction that he is not a realist. It is impossible in his schema to have access to that mind-independent environment except through the extremely partial and limited path of the appearance, which due to its phenomenology is far from both guaranteeing the nature of the environment and its details. Such a contact with this environment is far too limited for any realist (in the traditional sense) aspirations.

Sartre however, also rules out any association with idealism; his reason for doing this is his conviction that he has proved (with the examination of the spontaneity of the non-reflective *Cogito*) that consciousness cannot get out of its subjectivity once subjectivity is granted, and that there is no epistemological possibility of objectivity. In addition, and once subjectivity for the realm of consciousness is granted, consciousness cannot act upon transcendent being (because it would be radically cut off from it) nor can it without contradiction admit of the passive elements necessary in order to constitute a transcended being arising from them (because it would then appropriate them, and divest them of their objective transcendental characteristics, thus making the endeavour futile and self-defeating). Idealism, finally, is radically refuted by the Sartrean endeavour to show that being is not meaning.

The only possible route open for Sartre is to **"show that the problem allows a solution *other* than realism or idealism"**.⁸³

⁸³ My italics; *ibid*, p.xl.

However, we have to note that this route cannot be the one of phenomenism nor for that matter of epiphenomenalism (the view that physical objects cause mental images but the mental life of the subject is not connected in a strict causal way with the objects he/she perceives nor his mental life influenced from the environment), since the additional factor of Intentionality as the paramount characteristic of consciousness makes such alternatives self-defeating. Once we accept that Idealism and talk about physical objects as unknowable (even in Sartre's limited sense) is rejected by Sartre's own metaphysics (who claims that **we can know** an object's finite appearance of now and here but never its infinite number of appearances) any claim that he falls into the charms and pitfalls phenomenism can be nothing but illfounded aberration (together with any other associations to other branches of idealism such as epiphenomenalism).

An idealist move towards **Creationism** (the belief that God as a divine subjectivity gave being to the world granting it a certain passivity) in relation to Being is also rejected as inadequate by Sartre. His reason is that if being is conceived in a subjectivity, even a divine subjectivity, it remains a mode of intra-subjective being with no possibility of even the representation of an objectivity, let alone the possibility of actually creating an objectivity itself. Even when being is suddenly placed outside the subjective (through moves such as Leibniz's fulguration), it affirms itself only as distinct from and opposed to its Creator, otherwise it could be dissolved in Him. In the theory of perpetual creation, being disappears in the divine subjectivity. God cannot give it independence, since it would then be so limited that it still would not be enough to admit an objectivity. If being exists as over against God, it has to have its own ontological support, it has to lose the least trace of divine creation. In this way even if it had been created by God, being-in-itself would be *inexplicable* in terms of creation (i.e., it would not admit an objectivity, nor a relation between

the subjective and the objective), since it assumes its being *beyond* the creation. Sartre here concludes that, ontologically and for the purposes of our phenomenological endeavour, we would do better to treat being as uncreated.

This conclusion does not however support the additional idealist claim (and realist claim- depending on the explanation) that being creates itself, and is prior to itself. This claim would make being a *causa sui*, and would give it the same ontological status as consciousness. What this conclusion and the previous investigation allows us to claim is only that **being is itself**.

This investigation also enlightens us on how to deal with the rest of the realist/idealist ontological equipment. The ontology of being presented here has to do with a metaphysics which goes beyond the characterisations akin to realist/idealist terminology.

The distinction between activity and passivity, and the characterisation "active" or "passive", are alien to the proper phenomenology of being and cannot describe it. Such distinctions are akin more to the phenomenology of man, since things can be active or passive in relation to him. Being on the other hand is self-consistent, comes even before this distinction, and does not and cannot depend on the phenomenology of man and characterisations akin to it.⁸⁴

Another distinction and characterisation that Sartre rejects is the one of *affirmation* and *negation*. Sartre finds that these characterisations, as acts, are distinguished from the things that are acted upon. In this way, the act of affirming is distinguished from the thing affirmed, and the act of negating distinguished from the thing negated. But even in the case where the thing acted upon comes to fulfil the act and is thus confused with it, this act cannot itself be characterised as "affirmation" or "negation" due to too much plenitude and the

⁸⁴ Ibid, pp.xl-xli.

immediate inherence of the *noema* in the *noesis*. (I.e., it is impossible to say what is affirmed/negated since the thing acted upon is affirmed/negated in its fullness of being.) In such a plenitude only consciousness can find being, which becomes now the *noema* in the *noesis*, or the inherence in itself without the least distance from itself. The term "immanence" for being is also rejected by Sartre, since immanence, in spite of all connection with self is still that very slight withdrawal which can be realised away from itself. Being however, as Sartre indicates, is *glued to itself*.⁸⁵ Being for Sartre cannot even be an undifferentiated self-affirmation, nor even an infinity of self-affirmations: it would escape such characterisations through an infinity of modes of self-affirmation. According to Sartre we can only say about Being that *it is in itself*.⁸⁶

Advancing his critique on Idealism, Sartre attacks here even the form of **Absolutism** which claims that being refers to itself in the way that self-consciousness refers to itself (and of which himself may be accused, since he makes Being refer in at least a very superficial way to itself). Being is itself so completely that the perpetual reflection which constitutes the self is dissolved in an identity. In the final analysis, being is beyond the *self*: being is opaque to itself precisely because it is filled with itself. *Being* for Sartre is *what it is*, but with no analytic/idealistic commitments: analytical statements are based on the principle of identity and as such may be considered idealist. Sartre wanting to escape even this possibility of being accused of Kantian idealism, delineates the nature of his statement (*Being is what it is*) as that of a regional principle: it designates a particular region of being, that of the **in-itself**, and differentiates this region, from the region of **for-itself**. The latter is dominated by the principle of "being what it is not and not being what it is". As such the statement "**Being is what it is**" has the nature of a synthetic statement and not

⁸⁵ Ibid, p.xli.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

analytical. In addition, wanting to distance himself even more from Kant and also now from Hegel, Sartre claims that **only being in-itself is what it is** for consciousness; **being for-itself has to be what it is**, but **as it is**, is what it is not, and it is not what it is.

To clearly preclude any associations with Idealism, even in epistemological terms, Sartre maintains that the statement "being is what it is", which is purely ontological in character, has consequences for general epistemology and for the philosophy of language: in the region of being-in-itself beings who exist **have to be what they are** and as such their being is no longer a purely *axiomatic* characteristic, but becomes a *contingent* principle of being in-itself. The principle of identity as the principle of all analytical judgements thus becomes a regional synthetical principle of being as well. However, the opacity of being-in-itself, as well as its syntheticity, has nothing to do with realistic, idealistic or phenomenalist concessions: being-in-itself is opaque not because we observe and apprehend it from "without", but because it has no "within". (In this way it escapes characterisations and connections in laws, judgements, and consciousnesses of itself.) And even though it is a synthesis, it is the most indissoluble of all. For Sartre the in-itself has nothing secret and it is the synthesis of itself with itself: *it is solid (massif)*.⁸⁷ This syntheticity of being is far from any connection with what it is not it, and it is also far from any theories of transition and becoming: its full positivity is far from any relation to any negativity, even in the form of transition or time. Temporality assumes a state in which one can say of something that it is now and it is not later. Being can never be subjected to such characterisations: consciousness can perceive of it that it no longer is, only because consciousness itself is temporal. Being however does not and cannot exist *as a lack*, even of what it is not: "the full positivity of being

⁸⁷ Ibid, p.xlii.

is re-formed on its giving away. *It was and at present other beings are: that is all*".⁸⁸

It is important to note that this disassociation of being from time and temporality is part of Sartre's project to distance himself from all forms of Idealism/Phenomenalism and Realism, since any association of being with time has to solve the problem of the reality of time from the start. But to associate time and temporality in general with consciousness, protects being and its metaphysics from an undue realistic or idealistic stress. Of course the problem of time and temporality and its reality has to be dealt with even with regard to consciousness. But note that the metaphysics of consciousness as "being what it is not and not being what it is" is a more manoeuvrable position in relation to realistic/idealistic commitments (or no commitments) when we come to associate it with time.

As a continuation of the discussion regarding being and the philosophy of time, Sartre discusses being in connection to this other great area in metaphysics, modality or the metaphysics of the possible and the necessary. Sartre believes that being cannot be reduced to the necessary, nor derived from the possible. Necessity for Sartre concerns "the connection between ideal propositions but not that of existents".⁸⁹ It is important to explain why Sartre thinks so. He attempts yet again not only to distance himself from the Idealist's presuppositions but also from the Realist's hasty and inappropriate generalisations. He would nurture idealistic presuppositions if he were to claim that necessity concerns those ideal propositions which are the expression or inner structure of "existents"; such a claim would not only force him to support the distinction between ideal and real, but also put in addition an undue emphasis on the ideal since it is the less problematic of the two, the more

⁸⁸ My italics, *ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

dependable and more apt for classifications and categorisations. He would be generalising hastily and inappropriately, if (driven by the realist's zeal) he claimed that necessity rules over the realm of existents. For if he claimed this, he would be able to formulate laws, etc. regarding existents and thus merge human classifications with the metaphysics of the being-in-itself which is alien (ontologically) to human affairs.

Far from all this, Sartre not only claims that necessity concerns the connection between ideal propositions and not those concerning existents, but also that an existing phenomenon can never be derived from another existent *qua existent* (i.e., for such a derivation further additions by a human consciousness are needed which are unrelated to the metaphysics of the being-in-itself) making thus the being-in-itself *contingent* and thus unexplainable. However, this does not mean that being in-itself is or can be derived from a possibility.⁹⁰ For Sartre, the possible and the impossible are structures of the for-itself, and as such they cannot give origin to nor be incorporated in nor be equated to the being-in-itself. In terms of a metaphysics of modality, consciousness tries to categorise being-in-itself in anthropomorphic terms, by saying that it is *superfluous (de trop)*. The consciousness which comes into terms with this being-in-itself, disengaged now from all anthropomorphism (realist and idealist) finds itself in a rather *tragic* situation. Sartre summarises this tragical character of such a consciousness by: "Uncreated, without reason for being, without any connection with another being, being-in-itself is *de trop* for eternity".⁹¹

At the close of his preliminary examination of the phenomenon of being in the Introduction to Being and Nothingness, Sartre not only summarises the

⁹⁰ Sartre in the original writes "C'est ce qu'on appelle la *contingence* de l'être-en-soi. Mais l'être-en-soi ne peut pas non plus être dérivé d'un possible.[...] L'être-en-soi n'est jamais ni possible ni impossible, il est", in *L'être et le néant*, Gallimard, 1943 (ren.1970), p.33.

⁹¹ BN, p.xlii.

three main characteristics which his examination allowed him to assign to the being of the phenomena (**Being is, Being is in-itself, Being is what it is**); he also charts the area he is going to investigate in the main corpus of his book, the questions he is trying to answer, and the problems he is trying to solve. One of the problems he will be trying to solve is that of a more appropriate characterisation and explanation of those relations which *in fact* (and not in theory) unite the two regions of Being (*in-itself* and *for-itself*) with each-other and with Being: "If idealism and realism both fail to explain the relations which *in fact* unite these regions which *in theory* are without communication, what other solution can we find for this problem?"⁹²

From our investigation into the Introduction of Being and Nothingness we saw how carefully Sartre sets out his Phenomenological Ontology, and with what caution he distances himself from all known kinds of realism and idealism in traditional philosophy.

Two questions however have to be answered before we end this part of our investigation into this aspect of Sartre's Theory of Intentionality and the conclusions we can derive from it for a valid theory of Intentionality.

The first has to do with Sartre's theory. Even if we do find that Sartre's theory is distanced from any realist and idealist theory in traditional philosophy, should we nevertheless characterise his philosophy as realist or idealist for purposes of understanding his thought better? We shall try to answer this question by examining briefly the claims of Gregory McCulloch in his book Using Sartre: An Analytical Introduction to Early Sartrean Themes⁹³.

⁹² *Ibid*, p.xliii.

⁹³ Gregory McCulloch, Using Sartre: An Analytical Introduction to Early Sartrean Themes, Routledge, London, 1994.

The second question has to do with the very purpose of investigating whether Sartre's Theory is Realist or Idealist: What is at stake when someone claims that Sartre's or any other theory of Intentionality is (or is connected with) a Realist/Idealist Theory of Knowledge, Perception, or Ontology?

I want to claim that not only Sartre's but any valid Theory of Intentionality has to distance itself from all Realistic and Idealistic presuppositions if it is to be a valid Theory of Intentionality, i.e., if its purpose is to explain how Consciousness relates to the environment (Inner -in the form of the ego/I, and Outer -in the form of objects and Being in general) and how Consciousness is pre-reflectively certain for the existence and the way of existence (as real or illusory) of what it relates to. Choosing sides (the Realist or the Idealist) for the reality of the environment not only does not solve the problem of the relation of consciousness to a reality of a different from it ontology, but also creates two more areas for debate and criticism: What exactly is the nature of consciousness that comes in contact with such an environment (or what is the nature of the intermediate stages)? And how exactly does this two way relation work so that realist or idealist presuppositions can be sustained even in the face of evidence which goes against them? The Sartrean way of resolving the ontological *impasse*, with its shift of emphasis from the environment to consciousness, apparently cuts the problems by half. The *onus* is now on the Sartrean metaphysicians to prove that this solution escapes the criticisms that Idealists and Phenomenalists have attracted from the Realist camp. However, even from the brief examination here, we can clearly see that Sartre himself was aware of the shortcomings of the Idealist position, and tried to distance himself equally from both the Realists and the Idealists.

It may be that Sartre maintained realist aspirations (mainly regarding the Being), and in this way making the task of defending his views from realistic attacks easier, but his stand on Realism as a metaphysical position, and

especially traditional Realism is more than clearly negative.⁹⁴ More on this issue in our examination of McCulloch and other subsequent sections. In addition, his clear differentiation from the Husserlian idealist apparatus (in connection to the “*epoche*”, the “*hyle*”, and the Transcendental Ego), and his clear opposition to traditional Idealism, make any accusations that his theory is Idealist totally unfounded.

It would be useful at this point to see Sartre’s views on Time, Qualities, Meaning, and Ethics, and in this way see whether Applied Ontology can also support my claims. It will also be useful for the understanding of the importance of Intentionality in any investigation into the field of Applied Ontology⁹⁵.

Sartre's Applied Ontology: Time, Qualities, Meaning, and Ethics.

Sartre investigates the connected issues of time and temporality in Being and Nothingness, Part Two, Chapter Two (entitled “Temporality”, and in Chapter Three (entitled “Transcendence”)⁹⁶, Section IV (entitled The Time of the World). For any proper treatment of the issues he discusses in these passages, the short summary of his views presented here is extremely inadequate: it is useful however, for the connection of time to the Sartrean theory of consciousness and Intentionality, to discuss his theory briefly.

⁹⁴ See for Sartre's own views on his asposal of realism and the “bad realism” of BN, in Paul Arthur Scilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, Open Court, La Salle, Ill., 1981, pp.9-11, 13.

⁹⁵ I use the term “Applied Ontology”, knowing very well that there is currently a great debate over the terms of Metaphysics and Ontology, and their applicability. I define the field of Applied Ontology as the field of Ontology which has to do with the being of specific areas of Being, such as Meaning, Time, etc. An investigation into the Being itself is (pure, unadulterated) Ontology. Metaphysics in my view is the more general investigation into what may or may not exist, does or does not exist, and in any case far more general than Ontology (which studies only what exists).

⁹⁶ BN pp.107-170; pp.204-216.

In these passages Sartre propounds a view of time that is far from the traditional realist and irrealist conceptions of time.⁹⁷ It is obvious from the start that Descartes, Husserl and Bergson are the main influences on his theory, even though he hastens to criticise them for isolationist tendencies (Descartes and Bergson), and for turning into an in-itself and an object something which is a for-itself.⁹⁸ In addition, we see Sartre from the start oppose the fragmentation of time into the three temporal dimensions of past, present, future, and claim that we have to see time and temporality as a totality which dominates its secondary structures and which confers on them their meaning autonomously.⁹⁹ And, even though he acknowledges Heidegger's account as the most correct ontologically, he chooses to accent the present *ekstasis* instead of Heidegger's accent on the future.¹⁰⁰ Even in this accentuation of the present however, he believes that the present is "not ontologically "prior"" to the past and the future, and that the present is conditioned by them as much as it conditions them.¹⁰¹ It is just the "mould of indispensable non-being for the total synthetic form of temporality".¹⁰²

He sees temporality and time (Present, Past, Future) as subjective processes and structures of the For-itself, with which the For-itself continuously lives its project of nihilating the In-itself. Time and Temporality have the same ontology as the For-itself (they are nothingnesses), and they are the ways with which the For-itself sets up its own measure for the duration and self-identity of things.

⁹⁷ See Robin Le Poidevin, and Murray MacBeath, ed., The Philosophy of Time, Oxford University Press, 1993; esp. Introduction, pp.1-24; Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, Duckworth, London, 1978, articles entitled: "A Defence of McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time", pp.351-357, "The Reality of the Past", pp.358-374; D.W. Hamlyn, Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp.127-160; George N. Schlesinger, Metaphysics, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, pp.97-121.

⁹⁸ BN pp.109-142.

⁹⁹ BN, p.107.

¹⁰⁰ BN p.142.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

Things do not have time independently of the For-itself; time "flows" over things and transforms them in such a way as to make them appear to unreflective consciousness as having an objective mode of being, what Sartre terms as "universal temporality".¹⁰³ Unreflective consciousness in its continuous relation to the world through Intentionality can not be a consciousness *of* time; for that it needs to become reflected consciousness; the world appears temporal and as having time to unreflected consciousness through Intentionality and because of Intentionality.¹⁰⁴ This theory of time however, should not be regarded as a disregard for the importance of the notion of time in the Sartrean metaphysics and ontology; one should see time as gaining more importance than in other theories, because of this association to consciousness. In fact, one can define the For-itself in Sartrean Metaphysics and Ontology in terms of what has been (Past) as a flight (Present) toward what it projects to be (Future).¹⁰⁵ And for Sartre, the For-itself can not be except *in* temporal form.

To the worries of Analytic philosophers that the Sartrean Theory of Time is the worst private language argument that a philosophy of time has ever produced, one can respond that the Sartrean Theory of Time distinguishes two main conceptions of time: time as a non-dynamic phenomenon (in the form of Past, Present, Future) and time as a dynamic phenomenon (as *duration*). In the second conception of time we see Kant's refutation of Berkeley's idealism, and the Leibnizian argument that change by itself implies permanence. Sartre is not an idealist; to disengage himself equally from both realism and idealism he describes the "several errors" of these theorists who reduce temporality to the status of a measure and order of change. For Sartre duration or the time of consciousness is "human reality which temporalizes itself as a totality which is

¹⁰³ BN p.204.

¹⁰⁴ In Sartre's own words, BN *ibid*: "Universal time comes into the world through the For-itself. The In-itself is not adapted to temporality precisely because it is in-itself and because temporality is the mode of unitary being in a being which is perpetually at a distance from itself for itself."

¹⁰⁵ See Barnes' Key to Special Terminology, BN p.634.

to itself its own incompleteness".¹⁰⁶ This totality is not consciousness however; the for-itself cannot be (is a nothingness); temporality as the totality we mentioned above (as a human reality) temporalizes itself entirely as the refusal of the instant, and thus has an objective being (to oppose the being of the instant). In this peculiar form of dialectics, Sartre escapes idealistic conceptions of time, and provides the foundations for the guarantee of the existence of time in the public domain: "public time" becomes the "outsideness" which unreflective consciousness "sees" when it communicates with the Other and sees the Other having the objective temporality of universal time.¹⁰⁷ This Sartrean conception of what Analytic philosophers call "public time", is a central notion in Sartrean metaphysics; so central as to lead Sartre to engage in Marxist Dialectics in his later philosophy to investigate fully how his theory of consciousness can be applied in such communicativeness of time in the social domain.¹⁰⁸

We saw, in the Critical Evaluation of the Essay, Sartre's position on the issue of Qualities. Qualities are another greatly discussed issue in all major theories dealing with the reality of the world.¹⁰⁹

As we saw, qualities in the Essay belonged to the ego (reflected consciousness) and were reflected upon structures of the world based on our wants and desires. It is important to note from the start that Sartre did not

¹⁰⁶ BN p.149.

¹⁰⁷ BN pp.204-216, and pp.150-170.

¹⁰⁸ See *Critique de la raison dialectique*, Gallimard, 1960; in English: *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Vol. I, Theory of Practical Ensembles, tr. by Alan Sheridan-Smith, Verso, London, 1982; *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Vol.II, The Intelligibility of History, ed. by Arlette Elkaim-Sartre, transl. by Quentin Hoare, Verso, New York, 1991; "The Ambivalence of History and the Ambiguity of the Historical Fact", in Jean-Paul Sartre, *Cahiers pour une morale*, ed. by Arlette Elkaim-Sartre, Gallimard, 1983; in English *Notebooks for an Ethics*, transl. by David Pellauer, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992, pp.20-68; also see Hazel E. Barnes, *Sartre*, Quartet Books, London, 1974, pp.46-53

¹⁰⁹ See D.W.Hamlyn, *Metaphysics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, pp.11-33; C.S.Whiteley, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Methuen, London, 1950, pp.77-78.

engage in the discussion of primary and secondary qualities in the way Berkeley and Locke did.¹¹⁰ Sartre's way of dealing with them is not and cannot be termed "idealist"¹¹¹ and Sartre most definitely rejects realism as equally inadequate to idealism in the explanation of the relations which unite consciousness with the being-in-itself¹¹².

In Part Two, Chapter Three (entitled Transcendence) of his Being and Nothingness, Sartre attempts to describe phenomenologically the being of qualities like this: "Quality is nothing other than the being of the *this* when it is considered apart from all external relation with the world or with other *thises*."¹¹³ In simpler words quality for Sartre is the being of any object in the world when it is reflected apart from any evidence from the world. This theory may sound like extreme subjectivism, but it has nothing to do with "the subjectivity of the psychic"¹¹⁴. Sartre knowing too well that if quality is conceived as a simple subjective determination one is led to the rejection of the objectivity of the quality-of-being in the quality.

To offer an example, for Sartre the yellow of the lemon is not a subjective mode of apprehending the lemon; it *is* the lemon. The quality of being yellow that the lemon has, is not distinct from the essence of the lemon. The lemon and its being yellow are one and the same thing. We cannot think of a lemon that is not yellow (as long as we do not engage in fictional discourse). And here we should not think that an object X (e.g., a lemon) appears as the empty form which holds together disparate qualities. The object (a lemon) is extended throughout its qualities, and each of its qualities is extended throughout each of the others: it is the sourness of the lemon which is yellow, it is the yellow of the

¹¹⁰ See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690; (Bishop) George Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, 1710.

¹¹¹ See Sartre's critique of Berkeley BN, pp.xxvi-xxxvi.

¹¹² BN, p.xi-xliii.

¹¹³ BN p.186.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

lemon which is sour. Sartre goes against theorists such as Husserl who unite only colour and form in the object due to an "unconditional synthetic necessity"; Sartre believes that all qualities change with any change even in one of them.

In this way, every quality of being is all of being; with the direction of our consciousness and Intentionality upon a quality of an object, the presence of the absolute contingency of being and its indifferent irreducibility strikes us directly and unavoidably. Even though the apprehension of a quality does not add anything to being, except the fact that being *is there as this*, qualities do not exist as "outside" of being; there is no "inside" and no "outside" in being. They exist and have being as ontological relations to the For-itself¹¹⁵. The intuition of a quality is not the passive contemplation of a given, since the For-itself makes known to itself what it is by means of quality: for the For-itself to perceive red as the colour of this notebook is to reflect on itself as the internal negation of that quality¹¹⁶. In each of the qualities we perceive on objects we intuit our emptiness and distance from them. In each of our perceptions of the totalities of the undifferentiated and united Being, the For-itself using its Freedom constitutes itself by negating the total revelation of being "in profile"¹¹⁷. Quality as co-present to the for-itself-to-come (the For-itself which always creates itself), has a specific meaning, revealed by *abstraction*, a phenomenon of presence of the for-itself to being, since abstract being preserves the for-itself's transcendence¹¹⁸.

Some may accuse Sartre again here for Abstractionism and Idealism, but as Sartre himself notes, they do that because they can not distinguish the constitution of the "this" and the act of abstraction. The for-itself is an "abstractor" not because it realises the psychological operation of the

¹¹⁵ BN p.187.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ BN p.188.

¹¹⁸ BN p.189.

abstraction, but because it rises as the for-itself's presence to being with a future, i.e., beyond being. Abstraction in this way does not enrich being, it is only the revelation of a nothingness of being beyond being. And it is not liable thus to the classical objections to abstraction, since the Sartrean conception of abstraction is far removed from any considerations of being as a *this*.

The relation of the *thises* to one another can be neither be based on interactionism, nor on the upsurge on the same ground of the world. Our perception of *this* constitutes the other *thises* as the ground on which the *this* confronted is raised in relief. In this way, the original relation of *this* to *that* is an external negation: *that* appears as not being *this*. This external negation is revealed to the for-itself as a transcendent, since the for-itself is determined *en bloc* to not-be the totality of "this-that" on the ground of the world¹¹⁹.

Thus, Sartre clearly cannot be accused of Idealism nor Realism in his views on the Qualities. But we need to further discuss some of his points to investigate whether his theory is not suspect of logical flaws. Some philosophers may see in the reduction of all qualities to the same ontology a serious threat to the Aristotelian (and Platonic in a way) tradition of distinction of causes (e.g., final, material, etc.) from which some may also be qualities. One however, may respond that these differentiations are not incompatible with the Sartrean theory: Sartre would accept that qualities have the outlined above ontological relation to consciousness, and that consciousness adds other relations to these, which can be the study of the empirical sciences and so on.

To the much deeper common-sense worry that in this way we wipe out all mind-independent qualities from our metaphysics, I would propose that this common-sense insistence on the mind-independence of qualities is problematic in itself. Wittgenstein among others investigates and censures some of the

¹¹⁹ BN pp.189-190.

fallacies of the common-sense view in his book On Certainty¹²⁰. But I think Sartre would accept the intuitions of common-sense in his ontology more or less like this: the unperceived qualities, and the mind-independent qualities that the common-sense view propounds are the ontological *substrata* on which we base our descriptions of what we see when we perceive objects with specific qualities. In other words, when we perceive a red balloon the redness of the balloon existed before we perceive it: in the presence of the light conditions in which it is a balloon (and not a head), in the presence of the chemical producing this shade and the other material characteristics of both the balloon and our bio-neurological make up producing the perception "red"; but also the redness of the balloon did not exist before we perceive it: the redness did not exist as *our recognition* of "red"; "red" as the same colour as our favourite shirt, with the same shade, etc.; before we see the balloon clearly and with adequate light conditions, it was but a thing in the sky; when we perceived it more clearly we felt more familiar with it: the balloon is red, as my favourite shirt is red. Our previous feeling of nothingness in the presence of the fullness of being of this colour, is brought up and we gain again the familiarity which we strive to maintain in the confrontation with the hostile domain of the Being.

Before I associate the redness of the balloon to my shirt's, the balloon was not a balloon, it was a disturbingly unknown flying thing. In this way it did not exist *as a balloon* (and even more as *red* balloon). Sartre would never deny that objects do not exist independently of our perceptions of them, only that they have this or that *quality*. And that is why our perceptions do not disappear in thin air when we have to change our judgement regarding the qualities we perceive (e.g. we decide later that the balloon was yellow). The *substratum* remains, the quality changes. The relation between the *substratum* and the perceived quality however depends on the for-itself: from any substratum one

¹²⁰ L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, transl. and ed. by Anscombe and von Wright, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969.

can perceive anything he likes (something that occurs frequently in hallucinations, etc.). On the other hand without this *substratum* there would be no perception (or at least no perception that could be shared with others).

Intentionality here guarantees both the communicability of our perceptions and our success in establishing causal relations between the *substrata* and the qualities we perceive; with Intentionality also we can distinguish between hallucinations and real perceptions. In short, Intentionality guarantees the reality of the *substrata* without guaranteeing the reality of the qualities.

It is evident from the above what the ontology of meaning is for Sartre. Like the qualities of objects, meaning is not in the object, as its ontological component, nor does it exist in an abstract world of ideas. That is the reason why there can be "empty meanings" in Sartrean metaphysics. They are uses of words with no meaning as in the phrase: "I am fixing the car", the "I" here is empty; on the contrary, the "I" in "I am here" is full of meaning. In addition, this "fullness" of meaning is not given to objects and words from an entity such as the Husserlian Transcendental Ego. In Sartrean metaphysics what decides the meaning of things is firstly the unreflected consciousness, with its determinate fixation made by the reflected consciousness (which can also proceed in future revisions). It is evident from the above that this Sartrean concept of meaning has nothing to do of with the Fregean and the Russelian theories of meaning. Words in Sartrean theory are used always with meaning; they are not mere syntactical forms. It is only that their meaning sometimes (or always, if no revision occurs) remains empty, waiting for the fullness that the reflected consciousness shall grant to it. It nevertheless has a correspondence with every day linguistic use: we grant meaning to words, and when we choose to not grant meaning it is

again we who do this¹²¹. In this framework, linguistic use has realistic aspirations (at least): a realism that does not depend so much on external and *a priori* conditions, but at the synthesis of the Other's understanding of me and my own understanding of my own expressions as a language user. (See also the Critical Evaluation of the Essays, and the section on the Emotions, sub-section on Language.)

Finally, we shall investigate Sartre's applied ontology in relation to Ethics¹²².

Some philosophers may consider Sartre's metaphysics to be the origin of and basis for an idealistic or utopian ethics, which is far from any ethical realism. To disprove such a claim we shall refer briefly to Sartre's theory of Authenticity, and the possibility of living an authentic life. Then we shall deal directly with the issues of ethical realism and idealism.

We have to point out from the start that freedom is a necessary notion in Sartrean metaphysics. We cannot but choose either to accept our true metaphysics and be in authentic existence, or try to conceal it in the form of bad/good faith.

It is important to note here that Good Faith is not "good" in the moral sense¹²³. It is a form of faith and thus unacceptable by Sartre, since only the recognition of our true metaphysics is acceptable for him. "Good" is the faith

¹²¹ See Iris Murdoch, Sartre: Romantic Rationalist, Chatto & Windus, London, 1987, pp.64-80, 138-150, and esp.p.142.

¹²² In my presentation and analysis of Sartrean Ethics I see a common line of evolving thought from the early work of Sartre to the later, in this I disagree with Thomas C.Anderson, who claims that there are two Sartrean Ethics: the ethics of authenticity and the ethics of integral humanity, see Thomas C. Anderson, Sartre's Two Ethics: From Authenticity to Integral Humanity, Open Court, Chicago and La Salle, Ill., 1993.

¹²³ Mary Haight in A Study of Self-Deception, The Harvester Press, Sussex, 1980, pp.53-72, is on the right track of disengaging Sartrean Metaphysics from traditional moralistic ideas; however, it is doubtful if Sartrean Metaphysics can be disengaged from Sartrean Ethics, see Jean-Paul Sartre, Notebooks for an Ethics, pp.468-471, and Jean-Paul Sartre, Truth and Existence, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago Ill., 1992, esp.pp. 68-75.

that has as its base an approximation to Sartre's metaphysics, but which is "frozen" in time (with arrested possibilities for the future). Good Faith is a posited metaphysics of the unreflected consciousness, reflected and fully justified by the *I*. The *I*, always in need of justification for its chosen existence tries to escape the level of Bad Faith by choosing to be in Good Faith, i.e., attempts to explain the actions emanating from it based on a metaphysics which it postulates with certainty as valid, without knowing with certainty that such a metaphysics is valid. As we saw the area of unreflected consciousness is an area which is totally inhospitable to epistemology. We can always postulate with phenomenology its ontology but never be certain on anything in it, except that we are always free in respect to our choices. When in "Good Faith" we try to be certain of something which we can never be certain; in addition, we try to be certain regarding our unreflected consciousness *in the same way* that we can be certain regarding our reflected consciousness. Such a metaphysics is alien to Sartrean ontology proper (reminding one of the Husserlian Transcendental Ego, which was rejected by Sartre), which distinguishes clearly and most decisively the two areas of reflected and unreflected consciousness.

Good Faith is not only a recognition of our Freedom in the metaphysics of our Consciousness, but also a "freezing" of such a recognition: in Sartre's words a "refuge" in Being. It is a desperate escape from Bad Faith to a faith and a belief in Being, without achieving certainty (it has no intuitive certainty of any sorts).¹²⁴

In this way, authentic existence is possible, but very difficult to achieve, because the costs for living in this way may be very high (continuous creation of an *I*, chaotic view of ourselves, anxiety, anguish, and life filled with trembling over the infinity of our possibilities), and thus very rare.

¹²⁴ See Sartre's Chapter on Bad Faith, in BN pp.47-70.

We do not "inevitably" act in Bad or Good Faith, since we always have a choice (even if this is a very difficult choice, and frequently, due to our weakness, we choose to be in Bad or Good Faith). Sartre's Metaphysics here do not allow necessitation.

Good Faith is not related to Bad Faith in an "either-or" relation. First, they are not the only options we have to relate to our ontology (we can also choose authenticity). Secondly, an attempt at good faith (contemptible as it is to Sartre) is not liable to defeat *a priori*; it will depend upon the effectiveness of the "freezing" that I mentioned above, in relation to Good Faith. This supposed "inevitability" can not be logical nor causal, since there is no inevitability to begin with. It is causally possible for good faith to be sometimes sustained and some other times defeated, and at other times first sustained and then defeated, replaced by Bad, or yet another Good Faith, or authenticity; and this is also logically possible, since both good and bad faith are structures which, together with authenticity, have to do with reflected consciousness.

Considering Sartre's Ethical Theory we see Sartre distancing himself from all traditional views of Realism and Idealism. In his Notebooks for an Ethics, we see Sartre repeating the analysis of action found in the Essay we reviewed (that there is a synthesis of means and ends, and that this synthesis reveals itself with the appearance of the world; e.g., a revolutionary book reveals itself as *to be written*, a cry of pain reveals a person *to be helped* etc.), but also attacking both analytic (mainly Kantian) realism, and idealism. He finds that analytic realism considers man as a whole closed-in on himself and faced with another whole closed-in on itself, the world. Man's ends are solely the result of his being and thus *a priori*; in order to realise them he relates to the world; the world in this way becomes an inessential means of realising one's ends. Such a disregard for the importance of the world leads one inescapably to ethical idealism.

Sartre proposes that instead of this vicious circle in the fallacious game of traditional realism and idealism, one should regard as his start the being-in-the-world: the original and ontological relation of man to the world, with the understanding that man constitutes himself in and through surpassing the world toward the world. In this perspective the end and all its means become indiscernible: the world-yet-to-come clarifies the present world and the present world is a certain sketch of the world-yet-to-come, all the concrete features of the world-yet-to-come being provided to the project by those of the present world. The ends are learned in the world and not through an *a priori* intuition; they are learned by and through our employed and chosen means. Through our very perception of the world the ends-means whole is organised or re-arranged continuously.

But Sartre is not totally alien to realistic aspirations: he does not relativize ends; for Sartre the complex whole ends-means is an absolute, but its internal structures either mutually reinforce one another or are self-destructive. The indicated end may vanish through an internal contradiction of the *complexus* or, on the contrary, be reinforced¹²⁵. The end, without being relativized, is not unconditional; there is a hierarchy of ends with more or less relative ends, the more relative being transformed into means themselves, which *as means* become involved with other ends that they cannot destroy by positing themselves as absolute ends. On the other hand, all the ends (from the more to the less relative) indicate the means which satisfy them and set aside the means that are incompatible to them¹²⁶.

Sartre rejects all traditional naturalistic, realistic, and psychologicistic conceptions of ethics which discuss ends as two external things which need balancing in a set of scales; he refers to the *elasticity* of ends that corresponds to

¹²⁵ Notebooks for an Ethics, p.241.

¹²⁶ Ibid, p.242.

one's own elasticity: marginal means alter the ends in their content but not in their form ("one more change and it bursts"). Two opposing and contrary ends may be means in relation to a larger end: one's *standing*. Usually we choose the one that runs the lesser risk of upsetting this end. In this way the world appears with its pathways already drawn; this does not limit our freedom however; we can always change paths, even the world itself! ¹²⁷ The ends-means complex has a life of its own which is revealed to me through and by my acts ¹²⁸.

The ends actually are transcendent noematic correlates, but not the correlates of pure intuition; they are rather the correlates of a creative act and of a (self-imposed) determination on one's freedom ¹²⁹.

Values do have a foundation in the world: the ends-means complex makes them part of the perceived world ¹³⁰.

In this way, Ethics for Sartre becomes a *concrete* Ethics: a synthesis of the universal (understanding within a larger group) and the historical (in the sense that existential ontology is itself historical: there is an initial event of the appearance of the For-itself through a negation of being) ¹³¹. The structure of the universal (as a necessary structure of action) is derived from the consideration that any finite series of particular *real men* is a particular case of the infinite series of *possible* men. And the structure of the possible man comes from the concrete man: *me, us*. ¹³² Ethics for Sartre becomes the theory of action; and action is abstract if it is not work and struggle ¹³³. In this theory of Ethics, there

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, p.243.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, p.245.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, p.246.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*.

¹³¹ *Ibid*, pp.7-8.

¹³² *Ibid*.

¹³³ *Ibid*, p.17.

is no place for oppression: ethics as the theory of action is the ethics as a theory of conversion. Conversion cannot exist but as communication.

Communication does not exist by itself, it has to be brought about, and since it can not exist in a world of violence, it contains the will to end the universe of violence. This is brought about by establishing forms of communication such as Love, Appeal, Conversion. In these forms of communication subjectivity is radically divorced from realistic pre-suppositions¹³⁴.

From all three the most successful is Conversion since it depends on myself (recognition of myself as ec-static For-itself) and since it leads to the recognition of the spirit as detotalized totality, away from tendencies to seek unity (as in the substantialism of the spirit- Fascism), or plurality (plurality- individualism) as in Appeal, without the need for the presence of an external observer or under the sign of oppression as in Love.¹³⁵

Ethics thus through a special form of dialectics is the ethics of conversion and the ethics of action, away from all abstraction and categorisation; it becomes the source of authenticity in the world and it is itself the expression of this authenticity: to have the other in myself as another and yet as a free source of my acts, to will one's act both with his freedom and the freedom of others¹³⁶.

Evidently in such an Ethics as the Sartrean Ethics there is no room for traditional realism and idealism. The only good is life and action in authenticity, and the only bad is life and action in alienation. Traditional Realism in the form of naturalism, the theory of duty, of right, and of values leads one inevitably to

¹³⁴ Ibid, pp.45,470,450-9. Compare Sartre here to traditional (and non-traditional) views on Moral Realism as found in David McNaughton, Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics, Basil Blackwell, 1994 (1988), pp.7-8, 39-41, 46-50, 134-44, 108-14, 39-40, 50-4, 186-9, 134-6, 84-8.

¹³⁵ Ibid, pp.8-10.

¹³⁶ Ibid, pp.10-12.

Idealism regarding the Other and oneself. In these there is no understanding of freedom as self-alienation.

In order for our freedom to suppress alienation it has to universalise itself through conversion¹³⁷. On the other hand Sartrean realistic aspirations do exist: Ethics becomes an Ontological Ethics, and the Good is what has to be done as distinct from the agent; it depends on subjectivity and an acting subjectivity, but it is beyond it. But it exists and it exists universally in each of our authentic actions, i.e., in each of our creations of ourselves. It has a transcendence (it is always beyond *me* as *having to be done*) and an objectivity (to posit the good in *doing it* is to posit *Others as having to do it*)¹³⁸. In this objectivity and transcendence of the Good and of the Sartrean Ethics one can find a realism far from the traditional conceptions of it, but nevertheless of serious realistic aspirations.

iii) Can Sartre be a McCullochian Realist?

Gregory McCulloch in his book Using Sartre: An Analytical Introduction to Early Sartrean Themes¹³⁹ dedicates a whole Chapter¹⁴⁰ to what he considers to be "Sartrean Realism". My attempt here is both a Critical Evaluation of what Sartrean Realism is according to McCulloch, and of Realism as a characterisation of Sartrean Theory in general.

¹³⁷ Ibid, pp.468-470.

¹³⁸ Ibid, pp.555-560.

¹³⁹ Gregory McCulloch, Using Sartre: An Analytical Introduction to Early Sartrean Themes, Routledge, London, 1994. Another commentator on Sartre who claims that he is a Direct Realist is Prof. Timothy Sprigge, in Theories of Existence, p.130. I shall not discuss Prof.Sprigge's claims because his claims do not include the claim that he gives an authoritative interpretation on Sartre. McCulloch's claims however are another matter.

¹⁴⁰ McCulloch, *ibid*, Chapter 7.

In his description of Sartre's Theory, as related to the existence ("being") of the perceived world, McCulloch uses the term "Sartrean Realism" to mean the following:

- 1) Sartre is a Direct Realist¹⁴¹.
- 2) Sartre is a Non-Cartesian Realist¹⁴².

Both claims actually are reduced by McCulloch to one: Sartre is a Non-Cartesian (Direct) Realist¹⁴³.

His argument for his claim is an **Argument from Default**: he gives a list of possible alternatives and then he eliminates the possibilities down to one, which he thinks is Sartre's own position. McCulloch's Argument thus seems suspect on at least three accounts: first, one may argue with him about the exclusion or inclusion of alternatives in his list of possibilities; secondly one may argue with him on the way he eliminates possibilities; and thirdly one may argue with him on whether Sartre's position has any relevance or similarity with the positions in the list.

We shall see that indeed McCulloch's account is problematic on all three accounts.

But what exactly is his Argument from Default in relation to Sartre being a Direct Realist? The Argument goes as follows:

- a) There are three possibilities open for Sartre in relation to the being of the perceived: Cartesian (Indirect) Realism, Berkeleyan Phenomenalism, and Direct (Naive) Realism.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, Chapter 6: Realism and Idealism, cfp.87.

¹⁴² Ibid,p.86, pp.103-104.

¹⁴³ Ibid, pp.103-104, footnote 3: p.118.

b) Sartre rejects Cartesian Realism, i.e., Indirect Realism¹⁴⁴: perception of material things is mediated by our ideas or sense-data or visual representations of them, of which we are directly aware.

c) Sartre rejects Berkelyan Phenomenalism¹⁴⁵: perception *consists in* having the sense data: there is no mediation because there are no "external", mind-independent things.

Thus Sartre is a direct realist by default:

"Clearly then, first: since Sartre rejects both Cartesian realism and Berkeleyan idealism, he has to be a direct realist in perception by default. If he thinks we perceive material things, and denies that mediating entities exist, what other alternative is there?"¹⁴⁶

McCulloch brings as textual support for his claim the following text from Being and Nothingness: "Perception is articulated only on the ontological foundation of presence to the world, and the world is revealed concretely as the ground of each individual perception" (BN:181). He also cites the following text in Being and Nothingness: " We shall best account for the original phenomenon of perception by insisting on the fact that the relation of the quality [i.e., perceived property such as colour] to us is that of absolute proximity (it "*is there*", it haunts us) [...] but we must add that this proximity implies a distance. It is what is immediately out of reach, what by definition refers us to ourselves as an emptiness [...] [it is] not a subjective impression." (BN:187).

In addition, McCulloch considers Kantian Empirical Realism *cum* Transcendental Idealism (material things are not collections of ideas but somehow objective, and that perception of such objects is mediated by

¹⁴⁴ McC.'s definition, *ibid*, p.87.

¹⁴⁵ McC.'s definition, *ibid*, p.87.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*.

awareness of ideas) claiming that Sartre is not suspect of having affiliations with this philosophical position either¹⁴⁷.

Later on he adds to the list of refuted alternatives Metaphysical Realism and Platonism¹⁴⁸, where he actually recognises his mistake in excluding other possible alternatives, and claims: “[Since Sartre has already rejected Berkeleyan idealism, this makes him a Realist: there is no middle ground. But this]¹⁴⁹ is not to say that there is only one form of realism: as remarked, Sartre is not a *Cartesian realist*. It seems that he is thus also committed to denying what is sometimes called *metaphysical realism*¹⁵⁰ and sometimes *Platonism*¹⁵¹. If so, then he is probably committed to denying the correspondence theory of truth, as Putnam argues. But this is not so much because there is something wrong with the notion of truth or "objective reality", but because there is nothing mental (ideas or whatever) to correspond to it. Putnam often comes perilously close to missing this point¹⁵² and it is not clear that Morris' formulations of "conceptualism" can be sustained if the point is given due weight¹⁵³. ”¹⁵⁴

It is obvious from the above that McCulloch's list even with the additions he made later on is still far from inclusive of all possible alternatives. What happens to versions of the above theories which combine one or more elements from two or more of the stated possibilities? Surely a mixing up of theories is possible in more than the cited Kantian one! (Examples here could be a Platonist Direct Realist- things out-there are as we perceive them, but they are approximations and "inferior" copies/representations of what is true in some abstract and

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, p.88.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, p.118, footnote 3.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, pp.103-4.

¹⁵⁰ McCulloch here refers to H.Putnam, *Realism and Reason*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.

¹⁵¹ McCulloch here refers to M.Morris, *The Good and the True*, Clarendon Press, OUP, Oxford, 1992.

¹⁵² Putnam, *ibid*, pp.144-7, 207.

¹⁵³ Morris, *ibid*, pp.15-20.

¹⁵⁴ McCulloch, *ibid*.

immaterial form; a Non-Naive and Non-Mediated Direct Realist- realist about the world, with no mediations but not naive: things are not as we perceive them, etc.).

Still, even if we do accept that the list is all inclusive that leaves the questions of the procedure that McCulloch adopts and of whether what he says is relevant to Sartre unanswered.

In fact these two questions are related in this way: an Argument from Default such as McCulloch's, in order to work, has to take into account the fact that it can provide conclusive evidence if and only if a) there are no other relevant alternatives left outside the investigated list and b) if the characterisations contained in the list and the theory thus characterised are compatible.

We saw that the first of the conditions is not satisfied. We shall see that the second is not also satisfied from a close investigation of Sartrean Text.

The cited texts in McCulloch are taken out of context: the first text refers to the totality of being as negated in the lack of being in consciousness; the second refers to quality, and quality for Sartre is "nothing other than the being of the *this* when it is considered apart from all external relation with the world or with other *thises*" (BN:186).

From both contexts it is evident that the cited Sartrean texts have nothing to do with what McCulloch is doing (Sartre is not concerned with what the theories put forward by McCulloch are concerned about: the "truth" or "reality" of perception as distinguished from the world out-there), and actually make references to the "Sartrean Porridge-like Stuff" (which is the unconscious environment) seem useless¹⁵⁵. Sartre believes that characterisations such as truth

¹⁵⁵ For these strange characterizations, see McCulloch, *ibid*, p.115, and footnote 10, p.120.

and reality are human/mind-dependent characterisations (for more see Sartre's account of time, space, and qualities¹⁵⁶ - McCulloch's account of some of these is inadequate and leaves them as questionmarks¹⁵⁷).

We can safely say that McCulloch's account of Sartrean Realism leaves much to be desired, and should not be accepted as a valid characterisation of Sartrean theory, not only because of the logical flaws in McCulloch's claims, but also of the very strong position Sartre has taken in his Introduction of Being and Nothingness in which he attempts repeatedly and in different areas of metaphysics (in modality, in the philosophy of time, in perception, epistemology and ontology) to distance himself from traditional Realism, Idealism and Phenomenalism (in *all their varieties*)¹⁵⁸.

iv) Can Sartre be a Hegelian in his views on Being?

Some commentators write about Sartre as some sort of Hegelian. This characterisation needs a brief discussion since if Sartre is a Hegelian he is a traditional Realist (or Idealist -depending on which angle you look at Hegel's philosophy), a Realism (or Idealism) that he explicitly rejects. So, what exactly happens here, is Sartrean theory self-contradictory or not?

It will be useful to examine some of the claims of one of the commentators who claim that Sartre and Hegel converge in significant issues in their philosophies¹⁵⁹.

¹⁵⁶ BN Introd., and pp.3-46, 107-219.

¹⁵⁷ See McCulloch, *ibid*, pp.111-117.

¹⁵⁸ For more discussion on this point see above my sub-section on whether Sartre is a realist, and Sartre's Introduction in BN, esp. p.xxiii where S. claims that he is an agnostocist about Being; p.xxxvi where S. distances himself from phenomenologists; pp.xxxvii-xxxviii, where Sartre distances himself from Kant and the transcendental idealists; p.xxxv, pp.xxxix-xl where he rules out both realism and idealism; and pp.xl-xliii where Sartre distances himself from the usual terminology and ideas of Realists, Idealists and Phenomenologists.

¹⁵⁹ See Pierre Verstraeten, "Hegel and Sartre", in Christina Howells, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Sartre, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp.353-372.

The first (and most important) issue that these commentators bring up is the frequency of Sartre's citations of Hegel's ideas and writings. However, I have to note that this is no proof of Sartre's allegiance to Hegel: one can cite the work of someone with great frequency because he is more than convinced that the cited work is wrong and fallacious, and wants to make as explicitly as possible his difference from the cited work.

As philosophical issues of convergence are cited their similarity in their treatment of the limited and the unlimited, the unlimited and the infinite, the being-for-itself, being-for-others and the recognition of consciousness, is pointed out. In all these it is claimed that the two thinkers are not only treating similar ontologically issues more or less similarly, but that Hegel has influenced Sartre to the extent that he has turned him into his disciple against his will. These claims cannot but be totally unfounded. The claims both are based on problematic isolation of passages and surface analysis, without taking notice of the underlying dynamics of Sartre's positions, and on serious confusions both of Hegel's and Sartre's own thought. To illustrate let us deal only with one issue: being-for-itself (since it is the main concern of this thesis).¹⁶⁰ It is claimed that the for-itself in Hegel has the same ontology as the Sartrean for-itself¹⁶¹. To support the claim, passages from Hegel's Science of Logic are compared to Sartre's Being and Nothingness. In these passages the for-itself as *self-related negation* is made to be the same as Sartre's theory of the for-itself, based on it being a nihilation (and thus made-to-be by the in-itself) and an internal negation: by means of the in-itself it makes known to itself what it is not and consequently what it has to be.

Can we accept such a thesis? I think not.

¹⁶⁰ Other theses are not far from similar refutations; see for example the most severe refutation of the thesis regarding the role of the Other and the Master-Slave analogy in BN pp.236-244.

¹⁶¹ Verstraeten, *ibid*, pp.362-3.

Such a thesis disregards Sartre's rejection of all noumenal beings which in the form of principles and laws compose the for-itself; for Sartre the being-for-itself *is* the transphenomenal being of phenomena, and in this it is aided by the Sartrean theory of Intentionality.

For Hegel even though consciousness of the object is the phenomenon of the object and is self-external¹⁶², in his Logic he talks about the Being-for-itself as being *One*.¹⁶³ This *One* being-for-itself is for Hegel completed Quality; as such, its ontology contains abstract Being and Being modified as non-substantial elements. However, Sartre himself in his Notebooks for an Ethics¹⁶⁴ (the work with the most citations of Hegel) attacks such a notion of Quality. (This comes as no surprise: Quality for Hegel is in a determinate mode, immediate and identical with Being; a something is what it is in virtue of its quality, and losing its quality it ceases to be what it is; quality is a category only of the finite and for this reason it has its proper place in Nature, not the world of Mind.)¹⁶⁵ Sartre sees in Hegel's theory of consciousness a theory that provides as an ontology of consciousness a series of unactualized determinations (talents). In this way consciousness has an immediate and unactualized essence (and we can easily understand how great an anathema essentialism is for Sartre's theory of consciousness). Sartre finds that Hegel's account is far from being adequate, since it does not account for the ontology of consciousness as the drive to: a) impose its form on what is not it, b) to transform itself into the element of other-being, i.e., to transform itself into a marble, gold, etc., to enrich itself for itself with the depth that these elements gain in the realisation of a project, c) to make itself sacred as that reality endowed with an infinite depth by all other consciousnesses.

¹⁶² See Hegel's Philosophy of Right, transl. with notes by T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1952, pp.315-316.

¹⁶³ See Hegel's Logic, transl. by William Wallace, Oxford University Press, 1975, pp.141-2.

¹⁶⁴ Notebooks for an Ethics, pp.122-3.

¹⁶⁵ See Hegel's Logic, *ibid*, p.134.

In Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, we see how his theory of consciousness works, and why Sartre rejects it with such a great emphasis. Hegel's theory of consciousness does great service for his ideas of absolute rights and property¹⁶⁶: in that work Hegel makes consciousness exist for another consciousness only on the basis of ownership (I am distinct from another on the basis of what I own or what I can own). Sartre attacks exactly this connection in Hegel, and accuses him of completely disregarding the very notion of creativity. He sees in Hegel's work the givenness of originally determined nature: Hegel's notion of *found effective reality*. Hegel sees in it qualities and talents, accepting the psychological idea of the passive, purely contingent "gift" of being (analogous to a "beautiful voice"). Work is opposed to the "gift", only as this gift is passing over to actualisation. In this way, consciousness sees itself in the work as in a mirror and there is *nothing more* in the work than in consciousness. Action "simply translates an initially implicit being into a being that is made explicit" and consciousness "has to hold on to the original content of its essence"¹⁶⁷.

Nothing can be more alien to Sartrean theory than this crypto-essentialism and determinism. Sartre finds this Hegelian exposition of the relation of consciousness to the world, and the formula of "one only finds in things what one has put into them" absurd. Since, even for one to find in things what one has put into them, even for this, it is necessary that one subsequently find there infinitely more than one wanted to; with Hegel this is logically impossible!¹⁶⁸ Sartre acknowledges the fact that the additions in this "framed" picture of the world are made by the existence of others, but he complains (with good justification) that this ontological "safety-valve" appears too late. And even with this late arrival, the concept of work is doomed to two equally flawed

¹⁶⁶ See *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, pp.37-38.

¹⁶⁷ See *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, p.239. First translation in *Hegel: The Phenomenology of Mind*, transl., by J.B. Baillie, Allen and Unwin, London, 1931.

¹⁶⁸ See Sartre, *ibid*, pp.123-4.

ontological possibilities: either the individual finds himself in the work (because *it is his*, and the distinction between a content which is explicit for consciousness only within consciousness itself, and an intrinsic reality outside it no longer exists) or the work appears as an alien, discovered reality¹⁶⁹. Sartre finds these possibilities flawed since they condemn one in extreme subjectivism. Sartre accuses Hegel of transforming without any warrant an ontological issue into an epistemological one: the work has an ontological relation to me not only an epistemological; Hegel speaking about consciousness only on terms of knowledge thinks that it suffices for consciousness to project a conscious modality on the world as a screen, in order to immediately see it there. However in this way Hegel locked the ontology of consciousness into an extreme subjectivism, thus allowing it to exist in a climate of Idealism; moreover, this Idealism is permeated by determinism¹⁷⁰.

We should not be surprised by such a strong emphasis on divergence rather than convergence. Sartre would never accept history in the way Hegel thought about it. The lack of the ontological considerations and conclusions that led Sartre to the philosophy of time that he has (with the future demanding a creative act more or less *ex nihilo*), makes Hegel's metaphysics alien to Sartre's thought. But this serious divergence would not be sufficient if their theories of consciousness had a serious convergence. We saw however, that this is impossible: Hegel's theory of consciousness is permeated by essentialist and idealist pre-suppositions, which are rejected by Sartre from his very Introduction to Being and Nothingness (see above, the sub-section on whether Sartre is a Realist, and on whether he is a McCullochian Realist).

¹⁶⁹ Sartre, *ibid*, p.124.

¹⁷⁰ See Sartre, *ibid*, pp.124-5.

With these few remarks and brief analysis, I think it is made more than obvious that Sartre and Hegel differ greatly in their metaphysics and their commitments to realism and idealism.

v) Sartre and Wittgenstein on Reality.

This section was mainly devoted to Sartre and the investigation of whether Sartre was a Realist or not. We saw that Sartre attacked ferociously both Realism and Idealism. We also saw that his attack was mainly on the metaphysics employed by these two rivals (often successive states in one's philosophical development), even though he also has an epistemological critique on them.¹⁷¹

This small subsection shall deal mainly with Wittgenstein. Even though Wittgenstein's main concerns had to do with epistemology and language, and not with metaphysics, we shall attempt to see whether the interpretations offered regarding his later philosophy cannot give evidence regarding his metaphysical suspicions (since it would be an "anathema" to speak about Wittgensteinian metaphysics in Wittgenstein's later philosophy).

We will try to see in particular whether Wittgenstein was a Realist or not. If he is clearly a Realist in his work (and especially a Realist in the traditional sense), then surely we cannot claim that Sartre had similarities to Wittgenstein. Once we establish that on such a fundamental area as Metaphysics and Ontology they differ, and in such an important area then we surely have to do with two very different theories.

¹⁷¹ See for an under-developed epistemological critique, BN, pp.216-218.

Well, I think from the start we can be certain that Wittgenstein's later thought is not a Realist nor an Idealist philosophy. He attacks both directions with utmost severity. One can claim, following many commentators of Wittgenstein, that all the later work is exactly a refutation of earlier insistence on Realist and Idealist pre-suppositions¹⁷².

Actually, some recent work maintains that Wittgenstein is an anti-realist or an irrealist¹⁷³, some other that he is a scepticist¹⁷⁴.

Without going through the arguments in detail, I would like to venture an analysis of what exactly it would be for Wittgenstein to be an anti-realist or a sceptic, and then based on this analysis to see if he is or is not a Realist.

Well, if someone is an anti-realist regarding meaning for some area in time (e.g. the past) then it is obvious that he has to be a realist for some other (even a community based realism)¹⁷⁵. On the same considerations if someone is a sceptic regarding some area in time then, again, he has to be a realist for some other (even a community-based realism)¹⁷⁶. In order for someone to not be a realist at all, he has to be a "global" anti-realist, but even he espouses realism at least in a theoretical sense, otherwise he would not be able to categorise a given perspective as anti-realist. A person who does not care about realism is in a different category: it would be a mistake to consider him a realist at either the theoretical or the practical level of his theory, since the issue of realism would

¹⁷² See Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein, pp. 2, 10; A.C. Grayling, Wittgenstein, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp.63-111; David Pears, The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy, Vols. I-II, Oxford University Press, 1987, I:pp.10-12, 14, 17, 28-32, 65, 171, 184, 188, II:pp.233, 267n81, 268; Peter Winch, Trying to Make Sense, Blackwell, 1987, pp.37-8, 39-46, 53; Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, Duckworth, 1978, p.xxxiii.

¹⁷³ See Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, pp.xxx-xxxix, 145-165; Wright, Realism, Meaning and Truth, pp.85-106, 26-29; A.J.Ayer, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Penguin, 1985, pp.111-145.

¹⁷⁴ See Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Basil Blackwell, 1982.

¹⁷⁵ See Dummett, *ibid*; and McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning, Blackwell, 1984, pp.180-200.

¹⁷⁶ See McGinn, *ibid*.

not be on his theoretical map. Even a sceptic (and even more a pyrrhonian or pyrrhonist sceptic) considers realism to be important: without his allegiance to realism he would not have such strict standards regarding the certainty of knowledge.

Why do I claim all this? It is just to show that a phenomenological analysis the last 20-30 years in Wittgensteinian analysis and commentary, and of Wittgenstein's own views, is not foreign (again phenomenologically) to Sartre's espousal of realism, in his attack on both traditional Realism and Idealism.

In this way, we can say that Wittgenstein and Sartre are both on the same line of thinking regarding realism: they both consider it a theoretical possibility, even though they both attack ferociously traditional forms of realism (mainly naive realism, critical realism, dialectical realism, Fregean realism, and Husserlian realism). Of course they had different interests in their critique; for Wittgenstein it was his distrust for metaphysics and his emphasis of language, while for Sartre it was his metaphysical pursuits that brought him into this battle against traditional metaphysics.

Apart from these theoretical considerations, in the actual views they hold on such issues as meaning, decision theory and ethics¹⁷⁷, freedom, action and rule-

¹⁷⁷ One may complain regarding my claim that Sartre and Wittgenstein have similarities in their views about meaning that Sartre and Wittgenstein differ greatly on their views about meaning since Sartre is interested in the metaphysics, and Wittgenstein in the epistemology involved; I would respond that even if this is the case, one has to prove that epistemology and ontology are not related; for example one can claim following Eric Matthews that we can decide over disputes about knowledge-claims based on shared standards of rationality, and these standards can be context-dependent, but this context-dependence even though not against the notion of objective truth, is quite incompatible with the notion of a context-free "absolute truth"; in Matthews' analysis (and our own) ontology and epistemology are connected, see Eric Matthews "Knowledge and Relativism" in Venant Cauchy, ed., Philosophy and Culture, Vol.2, Montreal Ed Montmorency, 1988, pp.898-901; indeed, it would be a very unnatural thing to do if we were not to connect them (some have actually tried with disastrous results; see the tradition of logical positivism). For an interesting commentary on Wittgensteinian views on Ethics and Moral Philosophy on which we can see similarities to Sartre's theory, see Paul Johnston, Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy, Routledge, London, 1989; Colin McGinn, *ibid*, p.134, n56.

following considerations, the emotions, the "look", relation of soul and body, and their relationship with others¹⁷⁸, we see far more convergence than divergence.

However, it would be useful at this point to investigate Sartre's applied ontology more closely in order to find out whether Sartre and Wittgenstein indeed converge in that very important area of human interaction, generally called "the Emotions".

¹⁷⁸ See for more discussion in Philip Dwyer, "Freedom and Rule-following in Wittgenstein and Sartre", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol.1, No.1, September 1989, pp.49-68; Kathleen Wider, "Hell and the Private Language Argument: Sartre and Wittgenstein on Self-Consciousness, the Body and Others", *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol.18, No.2., May 1987, pp.120-132.

V. INTENTIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS.

Sartre, mainly in his work The Emotions, Outline of a Theory¹⁷⁹ puts forward a theory of the human emotions which in many ways is opposite to traditional psychological and psychoanalytic theories of the emotions, and which is a forerunner of the psychotherapeutic method (initiated mainly by Sartre's work) called existential psychoanalysis.

In our analysis of this work and of his views in *Being and Nothingness*, we shall refer briefly to his main theses, offering a critical evaluation and comparison with modern alternatives, and we shall attempt to tie them with his and our main concern which is consciousness and its most important characteristic: Intentionality.

We shall see that in order to fully appreciate the value of Sartre's Theory on the Emotions we must connect it with his contribution to the Philosophy of Language.

We shall see in this way through a brief comparative analysis with Wittgenstein's positions on the emotions and language, that not only did the two philosophers have a lot in common in their philosophical positions, but that actually in these areas their perspectives are almost identical.

i) Sartre's Theory of the Emotions.

¹⁷⁹ Jean-Paul Sartre, The Emotions, Outline of a Theory, transl. by Bernard Frechtman, Philosophical Library, 1948; original: *Esquisse d'une theorie des emotions*, Hermann, Paris, 1939; my edition, is from Jean-Paul Sartre: Essays in Existentialism, ed. by Wade Baskin, The Citadel Press, N.J., USA, 1965, pp.189-254, from now on EOT.

Sartre's Attack on Traditional Views in Psychology and the Social Sciences.

In his work on the Emotions we see Sartre dismantling both psychological and psychoanalytic theories and rejecting them as being limited in their scope of investigation (the psychological), and as problematic in their theory of inner causation and signification (the psychoanalytic).

Regarding the psychological theories of the Emotions, Sartre first provides a philosophical analysis of their methodology and aims, i.e., a Philosophy of Science focused on Psychology. According to Sartre, Psychology, as a discipline aspiring to be positive, places an overwhelming emphasis on *facts* and draws from only two types of experiences, that which gives us the spatial-temporal perception of organised bodies, and the intuitive knowledge of ourselves that is called reflexive experience.

Psychology, as a Science of Man, is not interested in limiting and defining its object of investigation *a priori*, but is satisfied with an empirical idea of man as a number of creatures who present analogous natures to experience. The psychologist does not commit himself over the nature of the object under investigation, nor does he consider the men about him as *his fellow-creatures*.

The psychologist should confer upon himself a human character, according to his own strict methodological considerations, only *a posteriori*, and he cannot regard himself as a privileged member of the group of individuals with a human character, except for the sake of experiments. In this way, he will learn only *from others* that he is a man and his nature as a man will not be revealed to him in any particular way by introspection. Introspection can for the psychologist only produce facts, of the same nature as "objective" experimentation.

An idea of man can exist in such a discipline only as a sum, a synthesis, of the established facts which it allows us to unite, and as a unifying hypothesis invented to co-ordinate and grade the infinite collection of facts which have been brought to light. Even if a particular psychologist assumes a specific conception of man as a working hypothesis, *before* this ultimate synthesis were possible, this is done strictly as a personal act, without ever losing sight of the fact that it is a regulating concept.

In this way, psychology, insofar as it claims to be a science, can furnish only a sum of miscellaneous facts most of which have no connection with the others. This is due to the very principles of psychology: because of its aspiration to be positivistic and its expectation of the isolated fact, it disregards the essential, the necessary, what brings order, and places emphasis on the accidental, on the contingent, and on disorder.

Sartre accuses the psychologists here of short-sightedness and lack of scientific understanding, since they can not realise that it is impossible to get to the essence of things by accumulating disordered, and contingent accidents¹⁸⁰.

And if it is only this that they are trying to achieve with their endeavour, i.e., just accumulate details of knowledge, their purposes of being a collector has little, if any, value for anyone else. If, on the other hand, they have the hope that their monographs and isolated collections of facts are going to provide the basis for an anthropological synthesis, then, according to Sartre, they are in total contradiction with themselves. This contradiction, evidenced in their hope to achieve an anthropological synthesis while having a methodology which allows them to collect only disordered, contingent and accidental facts, is not only a contradiction inherent in the Human Sciences, but it is also found in the Natural Sciences. The Natural Sciences have also the contradiction of hoping to

¹⁸⁰ EOT, p.192.

understand the World as a synthesis, while having methodologies which through their criticism eliminated the concept of a unified World, and in its place have put the possible conditions of certain general phenomena. In this way *man* becomes of the same type as *the world*. Here Sartre meets Heidegger who believes that the notions of the World and of "Human Reality" (*Dasein*) are inseparable. In order not to contradict itself, Psychology, according to Sartre, should forget about the notion of a human reality and of a man, if ofcourse such a notion can exist (according to Sartre such a notion cannot exist).

All this criticism regarding the methodology, scope, and purposes of the human science called Psychology is not without a purpose: Sartre endeavours with such a criticism to evaluate the contribution that this science has made towards understanding the phenomena called emotions. The psychologists investigate emotions as "irreducible novelties" in relation to the other phenomena which fall within the scope of their science, such as attention, memory, perception, etc. These other phenomena, no matter how hard we try, will always remain with no essential connection with the phenomena of emotions, with the emotions called and diagnosed as such due to what psychologists take as indications (facts) from experience. In this way, we conclude from the psychological (scientific) study of emotions that emotions are first of all and in principle *accidents*. All investigations into the possible conditions of an emotion, of whether the very structure of human reality makes emotions possible, and how it makes them so, appears useless and absurd to psychologists: "what good is it to ask whether emotion is possible precisely because it is?"¹⁸¹

The limits and definition of emotive phenomena are delineated by the psychologist based on experience which is somehow guided and sorted out with

¹⁸¹ EOT, p.193.

the help of a mysterious "invisible hand" (since the criteria for such limitations and definitions are never very clear). Facts group themselves before the eyes of the psychologist and confirm his idea of what emotion is and what it is not. He starts with a principle of demarcation and experience confirms such a principle without raising any questions regarding its validity.¹⁸²

What is at stake for the psychologist is the study of the isolated emotions: he determines the factors of the complex state of the emotions, and he isolates the relevant *bodily reactions, behaviour, and state of consciousness*. Based on these he will formulate laws and offer explanations, uniting these three types of factors in an irreversible order. For example, the follower of the Intellectual Theory sets up a constant and irreversible succession between the inner state considered as antecedent and the physiological disturbances considered as consequents. On the other hand the follower of the Peripheric Theory who believes that "a mother is sad because she weeps" limits himself in the reverse order (he starts from the physiological disturbances and ends with the inner state).

What is important for our purposes is that the psychologist will never seek the explanation or the laws of emotion in the general and essential structures of human reality, but *in the processes of the emotion itself*, making even the fullest and most complete of the descriptions and explanations of the emotion under analysis a fact closed in on itself, i.e., a fact which will not permit an understanding of anything outside factual experience, and which repels anything associated with what can be an essential reality of man.

Reacting to such a climate of explanatory difficulties and problems, Husserl put forward the thesis that essences and facts are incommensurable, and that one who begins his inquiry with facts will never arrive at essences. For example,

¹⁸² Ibid, p. 194.

if one begins his inquiry with the facts which are at the basis of the arithmetic attitude of the man who counts and calculates, he shall never arrive at the reconstitution of the arithmetic essences of unity, number, and operation. On the contrary, Husserl and the Phenomenologists, while retaining the value of experience (through the motto of "back to the things themselves", and the method of eidetic intuition), they place emphasis on the experience of essences and values, and recognise that only essences alone permit us to classify and inspect the facts which are available to us. Since they have implicit recourse to the essence of emotion, they can distinguish better and more efficiently than the psychologists the facts of emotivity among the mass of psychic facts, they can prescribe the explicit recourse to it, and with concepts set up the content of this essence once and for all. In this way, the idea of man is no longer an empirical concept and a product of historical generalisations, but, on the contrary, it acquires an "*a priori*" essence of human beinghood, and thus it provides a somewhat solid basis for the generalisations of the psychologist. This priority of phenomenology over psychology is evidenced also by the situation we are faced in each one of our psychic facts. The essential structure of our psychological life (or "psychic facts" as Sartre calls them) is nothing else but man's reaction against the world. As such, our psychological life assumes man and the world and it can take its true meaning only after these two notions have been sufficiently elucidated. Any psychological theory to be valid has to start by going beyond the psychic and man's situation in the world, to the very source of man, the world, and the psychic: the transcendental and consecutive consciousness, which we attain by "phenomenological reduction" ("putting the world in parentheses").

Husserl and the Phenomenologists, taking advantage of the absolute proximity of consciousness in relation to itself, try to find in the transcendental field the essences which preside in it and try to fix them with accurate descriptions in the form of precise concepts. Facts do not enter into their

investigations and analyses at this level, since not only they do not exist at this level, but even if they existed they would not have any recourse to general hypotheses to clarify anything and thus they would produce nothing but confusion and chaos. In this way, emotion is studied as "a pure transcendental phenomenon", not through the investigation of particular emotions, but "by seeking to attain and elucidate the transcendental essence of emotion as an organised type of consciousness".¹⁸³

Heidegger, wanting to illustrate this quite extraordinary inquiry into "the human reality" speaks for an "assumption" of self, which each one of us humans undertakes once we realise that the existent under scrutiny is *ours (us)*, and thus as creators of it *we* are responsible for it, being its own possibility, and "choosing" ourselves in our (and its) being. These Heideggerian thoughts show yet another facet of the psychologists' confusion; the psychologists try to investigate something by first sterilising and disinfecting it from what cannot be sterilised and disinfected: their own investigating selves. Heidegger tries to show with this "assumption" that all human reality implies an understanding of self however obscure this understanding may be. This is exactly what the psychologists try to avoid considering: "In effect, understanding is not a quality coming to human reality from the outside; it is its characteristic way of existing. Thus, the human reality which is *I* assumes its own being by understanding it. This understanding is mine. I am, therefore, first, a being who more or less obscurely understands his reality as man which signifies that I make myself man in understanding myself as such. I may therefore interrogate myself and on the basis of this interrogation lead an analysis of the "human reality" to a successful conclusion which can be used as a foundation for an anthropology"¹⁸⁴.

¹⁸³ Ibid, p.196.

¹⁸⁴ By anthropology here Sartre means the totality of the Human Sciences, amongst them Psychology. Ibid, p.197.

This inquiry into our own human reality has nothing to do with introspection however; in introspection we only meet facts, and in the understanding of our own human reality there are no facts, and much explanation and clearing up ("authentication") is needed before this understanding becomes less obscure and thus of any use for a proper psychological introspection. In all this we see a total and absolute reversal of the way of the psychologists: we start from the synthetic totality that is man and establish the essence of man *before* making a start in psychology.

In the realm of phenomenology what is studied is not the fact but the phenomenon, i.e., that which manifests itself, and whose reality is appearance. Human reality, for Heidegger, exists only when it assumes its own being in an existential mode of understanding; for consciousness to *exist* is, in a similar way, to *appear* in the Husserlian sense of this word, i.e., to appear as a self-manifestation whose being is not hidden (partially or totally), but consists and is totally exhausted in its appearances (actual and possible). In this way appearance becomes the absolute and it is the only thing which must be described and interrogated. And because in the Heideggerian theory, in every human attitude we shall find the whole of human reality, emotion becomes the human reality which assumes itself and which "aroused" "directs" itself toward the world. In parallel lines (but also in a somewhat different climate, since Husserl is an essentialist and not an existentialist), the Husserlian theory claims that any phenomenological description of emotion will make evident the essential structure of consciousness, since an emotion is precisely a consciousness. However, Phenomenology does not only differ in what it considers as worthy of investigation and its methodology: it differs also in the questions which considers as most important. For psychology, the question of whether there exist types of consciousness which do not include emotion as one of their possibilities is not only insignificant, but also irrelevant; for phenomenology however, the question of what exactly a consciousness must be

in order for emotion to be possible or even necessary is of paramount importance and indicates one of the main concerns in any phenomenological inquiry regarding the human reality.¹⁸⁵

Out of this and the fear psychologists have for signification, they mistrust Phenomenologists, and reduce all psychic states into accidental facts. For the phenomenologist this reduction is absurd, since every human fact is in essence significative, and if you remove its signification you remove its nature as a human fact.

This important difference between phenomenology and psychology on the importance they give to signification explains why the psychologists consider emotions as psychophysiological disorders.

For the psychologists, emotions are without any signification, and thus they are considered simply as accidental facts of a psychophysiological nature, with no consequence nor any meaning for the human being that has them. In this way emotions become something alien to the organism that has them, something coming "from the outside", an intruder of sorts that disturbs or creates a problem in its day to day maintenance.

For the Phenomenologists, because emotions are considered as having a signification, i.e., as true phenomena of human consciousness warranting explanation and analysis of what they stand for as any other true phenomena of human consciousness, they must be studied not for the record keeping of the relevant psychophysiological facts, but to develop the signification of the relevant behaviour and of the affected consciousness so that the thing signified becomes explicit. And for the phenomenologist the thing signified is a particular human reality, expressing from a definite point of view the human synthetic

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, pp.198-199.

totality in its entirety. However, making emotion a particular human reality does not reduce it to an *effect* of human reality, nor a description of a specific accumulation of facts. Emotion for the phenomenologist is the human reality itself in a specific form. It has its essence, its particular structures, its law of appearing, and its signification. Facts by themselves cannot describe such a reality nor an accumulation of them. There is no outside intervention or intrusion, "it is man who assumes his emotion, and consequently emotion is an organised form of human existence".¹⁸⁶

In this way, psychology can only be subordinate to phenomenology, i.e., it can only claim completeness as a discipline which studies *man in situations* and in its explanations regarding man's psychic life in situations, only after the notions of man, world, being-in-the-world, and situation have been fully elucidated by an anthropology, i.e., a phenomenology of man. And since such an anthropology is far from being achieved currently, psychology must regard emotions and other psychic (psychological) events in human life as not only corporeal phenomena, but as "assumptions" of human reality by a specific man, conferring a signification meaning on its corporeal manifestations. This can only be done if the consciousness which gives this signification role on the corporeal phenomena has been interrogated fully for the meaning of such phenomena, since specific emotions are what they are only insofar as they appear as such (e.g. joy as joy, sadness as sadness), and the meaning and characterisations of their appearance can only be described accurately by the consciousness which creates them.¹⁸⁷

This change in the way psychology looks at emotions and other psychic (psychological) phenomena has as a consequence the shift of emphasis and attention from what has been previously accepted as the only methods of

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, p.200.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, p.201.

inductive introspection and external empirical observation, to the now necessary eidetic method of grasping and fixing the essence of phenomena. These changes however, will not mean the transformation of psychology into a phenomenology of sorts; psychology's aim can not be the *thing signified* as such, i.e., the human reality, since it is not the eidetic science *par excellence* which is phenomenology. The aim of psychology now can only be the phenomenon *insofar as it is significative*.

To the claim that the psychologist and in general any scientist of human behaviour becomes in this way some sort of a linguist, Sartre notes that the linguist studies a word such as for example "proletariat" *insofar as it signifies this word* (proletariat) and he will not enter into an investigation of the vicissitudes of the world as a carrier of signification. In other words, the linguist is interested only in words only insofar as they signify themselves, in isolation, away from all function they may have as a behaviour of sorts for the individual who utters them or the society that uses them. Psychology and the other human sciences study human phenomena and their significations within specific vicissitudes of the world, man and man-being-in-the-world carrying specific forms of significations.

What Sartre tried to prove with such an analysis of the aims and methodology of psychology is only that human reality appears to the psychologist as a collection of miscellaneous data because he has readily taken a point of view from which reality had to appear to him as such. For proving that emotion and other forms of human reality are *significative* phenomena, Sartre has to enter into the grounds of phenomenological psychology and treat emotion as a *phenomenon*.

Sartre's Critique of the Classical Theories of the Emotions: James and Janet.

In a Chapter entitled "The Classical Theories" in his work on the Emotions¹⁸⁸ Sartre reviews his current literature and psychological, psychiatric, and psychophysiological work which he considers relevant to his attempt to prove that emotions are significant phenomena.

He starts with the Peripheric Theory of the Emotions, and the criticisms that it attracted summed up in the work of William James on the Emotions.¹⁸⁹

As we have already noted, the Peripheric Theory of the Emotions came as an opposition to the Intellectual Theory of the Emotions or the postulation of a constant and irreversible succession between the inner state considered as antecedent and the physiological disturbances considered as consequents. The Peripheric Theory claimed that such a succession is a myth and that we should seek the explanation and the laws of emotion in the processes of the emotion itself, position which is encapsulated in the phrase "a mother is sad because she weeps". We saw that Sartre rejects this Theory (the Peripheric) together with the Intellectual Theory, because both, in their own way, attempt to reduce emotions to facts. He saw in both of these theories attempts of psychologists to make emotions abnormal states in our psychic life, and de-signify them by reducing our psychic world and important decisions for our existence in the world to a collection of empirical facts.

The criticisms that Sartre cites against the Peripheric Theory of Emotions can be grouped in the following worries: How can we grant that commonplace

¹⁸⁸ EOT, pp.203-215.

¹⁸⁹ Mainly in W.James, "What is an Emotion?", *Mind*, 1884; W.James, The Principles of Psychology, New York, 1890; also see W.B. Cannon, "The James-Lange theory of emotion: a critical examination and an alternative theory", *American Journal of Psychology*, 39 (1927), pp.106-24.

organic reactions can account for qualified psychic states? How can modifications which are qualitative in their own right, correspond to other qualitative series of states which are irreducible among them? As an example of such worries he brings the problem of joy and anger; if the physiological modifications which correspond to anger differ only in their intensity from those which correspond to joy (as some proponents of the Peripheric Theory maintain) then why is anger, insofar as it presents itself to consciousness, not more intense joy? Even in the pathological case of "idiots" who pass from joy to anger while rocking on a bench and accelerating their rocking the "idiot" who is angry is not "ultra joyful"; even if he has passed from joy to anger very fast and continuously, anger is not reducible to joy.

Sartre sums up these worries against the Peripheric Theory of the Emotion by citing William James' distinction between two groups of phenomena in emotion, a group of physiological phenomena and a group of psychological phenomena, and James' thesis that the state of consciousness called "joy", "anger", etc., is nothing other than the consciousness of physiological manifestations- their projection in consciousness. The critics of James' examination of emotions as states of consciousness and their relevant physiological manifestations, do not recognise some sort of projection or a shadow cast in consciousness from the physiology. They find in consciousness not only something *more* but also something *else*. They find something *more* because one can, in imagination, push bodily disorders to the limit, and still not be able to understand why the corresponding consciousness would be a *terrorised* consciousness. Terror is an extremely painful, even unbearable, state, and it is inconceivable that a bodily state perceived for and in itself should appear to consciousness with this frightful character. The critics however, find also that emotion is something *else*, something radically different from physiological manifestations. Even if emotion perceived objectively presents itself as a physiological disorder, insofar as it is a fact it is not at all a disorder or

an utter chaos. It has a meaning and a signification, and not as a pure quality of sorts, i.e., it exists in a certain relationship of our psychic being to the world, which cannot be described in terms of a possession of some kind of quality. This relationship of our psychic being with the world together with the consciousness of this relationship is an organised and describable structure of specific meaning and signification.

Even elaborate accounts of physiological and anatomical details, showing how specific neurological centres such as the cortico-thalamic area etc. are responsible for the appearance and development of emotions, fall short of reaching an answer of how a physiological disturbance, *whatever it may be*, can account for the organised character of emotion.¹⁹⁰

This is exactly what, according to Sartre, Janet¹⁹¹ "understood quite well, but expressed unfortunately, when he said that James, in his description of emotion, lacked the psychic"¹⁹². Janet, having a desire to be as objective as possible, recorded only the external manifestations of emotion. But even in the observation of these external manifestations of emotions, he had to class the observed phenomena into two categories, psychic phenomena or behaviour, and physiological phenomena. Janet, wishing to restore to the psychic its preponderant role, made emotion a matter of behaviour. Janet however, was caught into the trap of fact-finding psychologism and emphasised the appearance of disorder which all emotion presents. In this way, he made emotion a less well adapted behaviour, a behaviour of disadaptation, a behaviour arising from a setback of sorts: when the task at hand is too difficult

¹⁹⁰ Sartre refers to Sherrington, see C.S., Sherrington, "Experiments on the value of vascular and visceral factors for the genesis of emotion", *Proceedings of the Royal Society*, 66 (1900), pp.390-403.

¹⁹¹ Pierre Janet, 1859-1947, French psychiatrist, Professor of Experimental and Comparative Psychology at the *College de France*, very influential in German, Austrian, and French psychiatric and psychological circles.

¹⁹² *Ibid*, p.205.

and we cannot maintain the superior behaviour which would be suitable to it, the psychic energy liberated is spent in maintaining an inferior behaviour which requires a lesser physiological tension.

Sartre at this point cites many examples from the plethora of examples which are analysed in Janet's books and mainly in *Obsession and Psychasthenia*¹⁹³. Amongst them the most common is the one found in a discussion and serious disagreement with a friend, where we remain calm as long as the contest seems equal, and become irritated the very moment we find nothing more to answer.

With such analyses Janet, according to Sartre, reintegrated the psychic into emotion: the consciousness which we take of emotion (and which is not an epiphenomenon, but only a secondary behaviour- "a behaviour of behaviour") is no longer the simple correlative physiological disorder, it is the consciousness (behaviour) of a setback and a setback-behaviour. Such a theory is certainly a *psychological* thesis and has a quite mechanistic simplicity: "the phenomenon of derivation is nothing more than a change of path for freed nervous energy".¹⁹⁴

But even with such a reintegration of the psychic into emotion that Janet's theory provides, the theory is still problematic according to Sartre. Janet is using implicitly with the notion of a setback-behaviour a finality which is not only obscure, but which is also rejected by his theory. If Janet means by "setback-behaviour" the automatic substitution of one (inferior) behaviour for a superior behaviour that we cannot maintain, then nervous energy could discharge itself at random and in accordance with the law of the least resistance, making the ensemble of the active reactions an absence of behaviour, a diffuse organic reaction and a disorder in place of an adapted reaction. This is exactly what James says about emotion!

¹⁹³ Pierre Janet, *Les Obsessions et la psychasthenie*, Paris, 1903.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid*, pp.206-207.

James gives to emotion the role of an ensemble of disorders which is brought about in the organism at the moment of an abrupt disadaptation. Of course, Janet gives more emphasis to the *setback* than James does. But if one is to take "setback" for an automatic derivation in an individual as a system of behaviour, then "setback", as a behaviour, stands for a diffuse ensemble of organic manifestations. If "setback" is to have its full psychic signification, then one has to add to Janet's theory a foreign element such as the notion of consciousness which must intervene and confer this signification upon this ensemble, keeping the superior behaviour as a possibility, and grasping emotion precisely as a setback *in relation* to the superior behaviour. It is this notion of consciousness however, that Janet did not want to have in his theory at any price.

In fact, Sartre sees in M.Wallon¹⁹⁵ the views of Janet as they would be acceptable to James. Wallon offers a model of psychological-physiological constitution such as this: the child as soon as it is born formulates primitive organic reactions-adaptations as primitive behavioural systems with inherited elements. The more it grows it learns and realises new set-ups, new systems. But when, in a new and difficult situation, it cannot find the adapted behaviour that is suitable, it returns to the primitive one. Wallon's theory differs from that of James only on the new element of an organic unity which would connect all the emotive manifestations. James would accept this theory if it had been proven at his time, since Wallon's modifications are modifications of a strictly physiological order. In this way, Wallon, being a most apt theoretical bridge between James and Janet, proves the failure of Janet to reintroduce the "psychic" into emotion. Janet does not explain why there are *various* forms of setback-behaviour, and almost all of his analysed examples come back to slightly differentiated emotional upheavals (sobs, hysteria etc.) which are much closer to what is properly called emotional shock than to qualified emotion.

¹⁹⁵ M.Wallon, article in *Revue des Cours et Conférences*, other details unknown.

But Sartre finds that in some places in Janet's works there is an element of finality in emotion, i.e., the setback behaviour is not purely automatic, but it becomes an object of choice. Sartre accuses Janet of confusing these two interpretations of emotion, and notes that only the interpretation of emotion with the element of finality can be called properly a psychological theory of the emotions, since it sees emotional behaviour as not a disorder but as an organised means aiming at an end. A variation in this emotional behaviour represents a particular subterfuge, a special trick, each one of them being a different means of eluding a difficulty.

Sartre, in a rather lengthy quotation from P. Guillaume's Psychology of Form,¹⁹⁶ gives what can be acceptable from Janet's theory in "the pure theory of emotion-behaviour".¹⁹⁷ Guillaume, utilising the work of Lewin¹⁹⁸ and T. Dembo¹⁹⁹ found that in a simple psychological test where it is impossible for one to achieve the specified goal there arises a variety of emotional responses, relative to the positive attraction of the goal and the negative attraction of the given barrier. An act of replacement or substitution (*ersatz*) of the barrier is involved, either by the subject's act of freeing himself from some of the imposed conditions and the nature of his task, or with the help of unreal, symbolic acts such as a specified behaviour (vain gesture), a re-description of the act/goal/task, or an imagination of fantastic, fictitious procedures outside of the real/imposed conditions which would permit its being accomplished.

If the acts of replacement or substitution are impossible or if they do not produce sufficient resolution, the persistent tension manifests itself by the tendency to give up, to run away, or to retire into oneself in an attitude of

¹⁹⁶ P. Guillaume's Psychology of Form, *Bib. de Philosophie scientifique*, pp.138-142.

¹⁹⁷ Sartre, EOT, 210-212.

¹⁹⁸ Lewin, "Vorsatz, Wille und Bedürfnis", *Psy.Forschung*, VII, 1926.

¹⁹⁹ T. Dembo, "Der Aerger als dynamisches Problem", *Psy. Forschung*, 1931, pp.1-144.

passivity. Since the subject has agreed to subject himself to the positive attraction of the goal and the negative attraction of the barrier, he has also conferred a negative value on all other items in the field of his attention, so that all diversions foreign to the task are *ipso facto* impossible.

The subjects under such conditions see *escape* as a "brutal" solution since they have to break the general barrier and accept a diminution of the self (the breaking of their promises to keep the rules of the test). They also see withdrawing into themselves, their *encystment*, an act which raises a protective barrier between the hostile field and the self, as an equally feeble solution.

If we continue the test we will see the subjects get tangled in conditions of emotional disorders, which form yet other more primitive forms of the freeing of tensions. An example of such a condition for an emotional disorder is the appearance of violent anger. In an extreme simplification, in anger and in general all other emotions, there is a **weakening of the barriers which separate the deep and the superficial layers of the self and which normally assure control of actions by the deep personality and the mastery of the self; a weakening of the barriers between the real and the unreal.**²⁰⁰

From the fact that our chosen action is blocked, tensions between the external and the internal continue to increase, transforming all other items in our field of attention and giving them a negative character. The privileged direction of the goal having disappeared, the differentiation between negative and positive items in our field of attention is destroyed. Particular facts and the varied physiological reactions which are associated or even identified with emotions by psychologists, can have a signification and this signification can be intelligible only on the basis of this combined conception of the *topology* of emotion.

²⁰⁰ Sartre, *ibid*, p.212.

Sartre sees in Guillaume's account a functional conception of anger: anger is not an instinct, nor a habit, nor a reasoned calculation; it is an abrupt solution of a conflict which assimilates Janet's distinction between superior and inferior (or derived) behaviour, and which takes on the full meaning of such a distinction by making the inferior behaviour an object of our choice when we choose to make fewer our needs and satisfy ourselves with less expense. Being unable, in the state of high tension, to find a delicate and precise solution to a problem we act upon ourselves, we lower ourselves, and we transform ourselves so that we can be satisfied with "crude" and less well adapted solutions (for example we shout or tear up a letter, stating the problem).

In the cases of emotional disorders, the subjects choose to avoid a well-adapted behaviour and resort to fits of hysteria etc., because in this way they will avoid coming face to face and providing information about the "heavy and undifferentiated pressure" which the world exerts upon them. In the cases of our anger at the moment when we are unable to provide an acceptable reply, the anger occurs due to our goal to "conquer" our opponent and our choice to use "derived" (*ersatz*) means to achieve our goal: instead of witticism as a reply to the witticism of our opponent, we choose to intimidate and inspire fear to him, through the use of abuse and threats, which are *equivalents* for the witticism we could not find.

But even with this transformation of Janet's theory found in the theory of Guillaume, the theory still leaves much to be desired. In particular, the problem with Guillaume's theory is that it cannot give an account of what exactly it is that breaks the one form and forms the other (e.g., what destroys the one goal and creates the other, or what chooses to employ these means instead of other). Guillaume, according to Sartre, failed to notice that an entity such as a consciousness, which alone, by its synthetic activity, can break and reconstitute forms ceaselessly, can also account for the finality of emotion. Emotion as "a

weakening of the barriers between the real and the unreal", as a destruction of the differentiated structure which the problem has imposed upon the field, and as a transformation of a given connection between the world and the self, can only be accounted fully through the recourse to consciousness.

In this way, Sartre has led us in this examination of the Classical Theories of Emotion from the physiological theory of James to Janet's theory and distinction between superior and inferior behaviour, and then to the functional theory of emotion-form. In all these theories we saw that the one led to another by their very inadequacies in explaining fully the phenomenon of emotion, and we also saw that any such explanation has to have a recourse to consciousness, in order to account for the finality in emotion.

Sartre can start now with the very phenomenon of consciousness in order to elucidate how it accounts for the finality of the emotions. But first, we have to see Sartre's critique of the alternative source for the finality and the signification of the emotions, that of the psychoanalytic unconscious.

Sartre's Critique of the Psychoanalytic Theory.

After the analysis and critique that we saw Sartre exercising on the Classical Theories of the Emotions as represented by the work of empirical psychology and psychiatry, we can easily guess the main points of his attack on psychoanalysis.²⁰¹

Sartre immediately points out that the psychoanalysts throw to the unconscious the organising theme of the emotion, disassociating the total organised character of the emotion, and granting it an inevitable character.

²⁰¹ Ibid, pp.216-222.

Phobias become in psychoanalysis refusals to re-live memories, anger becomes a symbolic gratification of sexual tendencies or a possible signification of sadism. Leaving aside the validity of such significations, Sartre questions the very principle of psychoanalytic explanation.

According to Sartre, the psychoanalytic interpretation considers the very phenomenon of consciousness as the symbolic realisation of a desire repressed by censorship. However, for consciousness this repressed desire does not exist in its *symbolic realisation*; it only exists for consciousness *as what it appears* to be: an emotion, a desire for sleep, theft, a phobia of something etc. If we had consciousness of (even a glimpse of) the symbolic realisation as symbolic realisation, then we would have to be dishonest (granted that we exhibit behaviour appropriate to what it appears to us as our desire). In psychoanalysis, the signification of our conscious behaviour is entirely external to the behaviour exhibited, since the *thing signified* is entirely cut off from the *thing signifying*. Only the psychoanalyst can decipher with appropriate techniques the signification of a given behaviour, as an archaeologist and linguist deciphers an ancient and forgotten language. The bond of causality and signification that unites the exhibited behaviour (the thing signifying) with the repressed desire (the thing signified) will only be perceived, recognised and identified once the necessary technical knowledge is applied.

Now, can we accept that consciousness of a given behaviour is a thing in relation to its signification? That is, can we accept that signification comes to consciousness from without, from an entity other than consciousness? If we accept this, then we have to admit that consciousness is established as a signification without itself being conscious of the signification which it establishes. There is an apparent contradiction here, and the only way for this contradiction not to exist is to make consciousness a thing, to renounce entirely

all Cartesian intuitions about the *Cogito*, and make consciousness a secondary and passive phenomenon.

If on the other hand, consciousness makes itself, and does not exist merely as a thing, then it always is what it appears to be, and any signification that it possesses is contained in itself as a structure of consciousness. However, according to Sartre, even if this signification is contained as a structure in consciousness, this does not mean that it has to be perfectly explicit. One can accept many degrees of consideration and clarity. It only means that the signification comes from within, *in it*. If we accept the Cartesian Cogito and if its possibility is taken for granted, then consciousness itself is "the *fact*, the *signification*, and the *thing signified*".²⁰²

Sartre acknowledges that even though his other opponents (the proponents of the Classical Theories of the Emotions) were relatively easily refuted, the refutation of Psychoanalysis is more difficult, due to the conviction of the psychoanalysts that the signification is not being conferred upon consciousness from without.

For the psychoanalyst there is always an internal analogy between the conscious fact and the desire which it expresses, since *the conscious fact symbolises by means of the complex which is expressed*, and this symbolisation is *constitutive* of the conscious fact itself. This is perfectly acceptable to all those who believe in the absolute value of the Cartesian Cogito (like Sartre himself). Now, if symbolisation is constitutive of consciousness, it is permissible to perceive that there is an immanent bond of *comprehension* between the symbolisation and the symbol. In this way, there is nothing "behind" consciousness and the relation between symbol, thing symbolised, and symbolisation is an interstructural bond of consciousness (with the only possible

²⁰² Ibid, p.220.

point of dispute being what exactly structure of consciousness is consciousness *constituted of* in symbolisation).²⁰³

The problem arises for Sartre on the psychoanalytic thesis that consciousness symbolises under the causal pressure of a transcendent fact which is the repressed desire. This thesis makes the same mistake as the previously described theory: it makes of consciousness a secondary and passive phenomenon, allowing for the signification (symbolisation now) to take place in a non-conscious mode (in the psychoanalytic theory, it makes the relation of the thing signified to the thing which signifies a causal relation). According to Sartre, it is "the profound contradiction of all psychoanalysis to introduce both a *bond of causality* and a *bond of comprehension* between the phenomena which it studies" and he is convinced that "*these two types of connection are incompatible*".²⁰⁴

In addition, to promote these two bonds further, and as an expression of them, the psychoanalytic theoretician establishes transcendent bonds of rigid causality between the facts studied (for example, in dreams, a pin cushion always *signifies* a woman's breasts etc.), while the practitioner tries to get successful results by studying the facts of consciousness in comprehension, that is, the intra-conscious relationship between symbolisation and symbol (and not thing symbolised, symbolisation, symbol; as it was mentioned earlier, the relation of thing-symbolised and symbol is one of causality primarily and consciousness secondarily).

Sartre accepts the results of psychoanalysis when they are obtained by comprehension. What he rejects is the value and intelligibility of the psychoanalytic theory of psychic causality. What Sartre forces the psychoanalyst

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid, pp.220-221, my bold and italics.

to recognise is that since he uses comprehension as a psychoanalytic tool to interpret consciousness he should recognise as well that everything that takes place in consciousness must receive its explanation only from consciousness itself: "it is consciousness which *makes itself* consciousness, being moved to do so by the needs of an inner signification".²⁰⁵

The psychoanalysts however, have a come-back here. They can offer problems for Sartre's theory as well. Sartre recognises this and puts forward their problems in accepting his theory so that he can answer them in his "Sketch for a Phenomenological Theory" (the following chapter). The problems have as follows:

i) If consciousness organises emotion as a certain type of response adapted to an exterior situation, how does it come about that it does not have consciousness of this adaptation? The importance of this question is evident from the start, since the psychoanalytic theory has no such problems in the union of signification and consciousness.

ii) Also, if consciousness organises emotion as a certain type of response adapted to an exterior situation, why in most cases do we struggle as a conscious spontaneity against the development of emotional manifestations (in mastering our fears, calming our anger etc.)? It seems that not only we do not have consciousness of the finality of emotion, but we repress emotion with all our strength, as it invades us in spite of ourselves.

In the final chapter of his small book on the Emotions, entitled "A Sketch of a Phenomenological Theory", Sartre starts by pointing out yet another fallacy of the psychologists and the theorists which he has described up to now: they think that the consciousness of an emotion is first a reflective consciousness, that is, as if the first form of the emotion *as a fact of consciousness* appears to us as a

²⁰⁵ Ibid, p.221.

modification of our psychic being and is perceived as a *state of consciousness*. Indeed, many theorists take consciousness of emotion as the *affective structure of consciousness*, as when we say "I'm angry, I'm afraid etc."

What these theorists do not see however, is that fear is not originally consciousness *of* being afraid, any more than the perception of this book in front of me while working in the word processor is consciousness *of* perceiving the book.

Emotional consciousness is *at first unreflective* and on this plane it can be conscious of itself only on the non-positional mode: "Emotional consciousness is, at first, consciousness *of* the world".²⁰⁶

This issue, for Sartre, is so evident, that any need for a theoretical support is superfluous.²⁰⁷ Observations of everyday life such as our behaviour when we are afraid is more than enough; in these everyday cases we are afraid *of* something, even when in those indefinite anxieties which we experience in the dark, in a sinister and deserted passageway, we are afraid of certain aspects *of* the night or the world. Almost all of the psychologists have noted that emotion is set in motion by a perception, a representation-signal etc., but instead of enlarging on this, they think that the emotion then withdraws from the object in order to be absorbed into itself. It escapes their attention that *the emotion returns to the object at every moment and is fed there*. For example, the psychologists describe the flight in a state of fear as if the object were not a flight *from* a certain object, as if the object fled did not remain constantly present in the flight itself, as its theme, its reason for being, *that from which one flees*. It also escapes their attention that we can not talk about anger in which one strikes,

²⁰⁶ EOT, p.223.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

injures, and threatens, without mentioning the person who represents the objective unity of these insults, threats, and blows.

For Sartre, "*the affected subject and the affective object are bound in an indissoluble synthesis*" and in this way emotion becomes "*a certain way of apprehending the world*".²⁰⁸ From the psychologists he has mentioned in this work, Sartre sees only Dembo as having noticed this, although as he points out, Dembo gives no explanation for it.²⁰⁹

To analyse the example of anger, in yet another way, the subject who seeks a solution of a practical problem is outside *in the world*, perceiving the world every moment through his acts. His irritation in his failure to achieve a solution is a way in which the world appears to him; and between the action which is not carried out (the solution which is not reached) and the anger, it is not necessary for the subject to reflect back upon his behaviour. According to Sartre there can be a continuous passage from the unreflective consciousness "world-acted" (action) to the unreflective consciousness "world-hateful" (anger), without the mediation of a reflexive consciousness, *with the second unreflective consciousness being a direct transformation of the other*.²¹⁰

This view of Sartre may seem strange to most action theorists who believe that action is a constant passing from the unreflective to the reflective, from the world to ourselves. For these theorists, we first perceive the problem (unreflectiveness-consciousness of the world), then we perceive ourselves as having the problem to solve (reflection); on the basis of this reflection we conceive an action insofar as it ought to be carried on *by us* (reflection), and then we go into the world to carry out the action (unreflective), no longer considering anything but the object acted upon, till new difficulties, or partial

²⁰⁸ Ibid, p.224.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

checks which might require a restriction of adaptation send us again to the reflective plane. In this way, action is constituted by "a constant going and coming".²¹¹

Sartre accepts this account as one of the possible analyses of our acting in the world. But he points out that most often an operation *on* the universe is carried out without the subject's leaving the unreflective plane. And this is not due to habit: habit can make us act with a specific series of acts in a specific order (e.g. writing *particular* words in a *particular* order), and it cannot explain the somewhat original everyday actions such as writing. The series of acts called writing cannot be termed unconscious; they are in their totality a present structure of our consciousness, only they are not conscious *of* themselves. While writing, we take an active consciousness *of the words* insofar as they are created ("born under my pen" as Sartre says, *ibid*); we do not take them into account as being *written by us*. We intuitively grasp the words insofar as they have the structural quality of being created *ex nihilo*, of not being created by themselves, of being *passively created*. We *wait creatively* for the hand to write the word that we know, and expect to realise itself. But not in a way that we are conscious of the words being created while looking over the shoulder of someone else writing.

The essential difference between these two forms of waiting is the fact that my intuitive apprehension of what my neighbour is writing is of the type called "*probable evidence*". I perceive the words which his hand forms well in advance of its having completely formed them, through an intuitive perception, and the word is given as a *probable reality* (in the *same manner as a table or a chair* in front of me).²¹² In opposition to this, our intuitive perception of the words which we are writing delivers them to us as *certain*, in a somewhat special sense

²¹¹ *Ibid*, p.225.

²¹² See Sartre, *ibid*, p.226.

of certainty: they are not certain in that they will come out for certain, but only that *if they appear, they will appear as such*. In this way for Sartre "***the action constitutes a class of certain objects in a probable world***" (ibid, italics and bold mine). These objects, insofar as they are real, future objects, they are probable (since they have not occurred), but insofar as they are potentialities of the world (since, again, they have not yet fully occurred), they are certain (since they occur in intention).

Another difference is on whether these two kinds of waiting are making demands on us or not. The words which my neighbour is writing make no demands: we contemplate them only in their order of successive appearance as we would look at a table or a clothes-hanger. In opposition, the words which we write are *exigencies*: the very way we perceive them constitutes them in their appearance as potentialities *having to be realised* (demanding to be realised), only this demand is not directed at us, it just exists, and we feel it. As Sartre puts it: "The *I* does not appear here at all. I simply *sense the traction* which they exert. *I feel their exigence objectively*. I see them realising themselves and at the same time *demanding to be realised further*".²¹³ We may think that the words that our neighbour is forming are demanding their realisation from him. *But we do not feel this exigence*. We do feel the exigence of what we write and it is directly present to us: "They tug at my hand and guide it. But not in the manner of live and active little demons who might actually push and tug at it; *they have a passive exigence*".²¹⁴ Our hand is seen (and felt) as an instrument by which the words realise themselves; it is an object in the world and at the same time present, lived, and felt. Any hesitation in the writing process or doubt, is just a conflict between rival potentialities. Action as spontaneous unreflective consciousness constitutes a certain existential level in

²¹³ Ibid, p.227, my bold and italics.

²¹⁴ Ibid, my bold and italics.

the world, and in order to act it is not necessary to be conscious of the self as acting.

However, unreflective behaviour is not unconscious behaviour; it is conscious of itself non-thetically; it would be thetically conscious of itself if "it transcended itself and seized upon the world as a quality of things" (ibid) (i.e., it saw in things the behaviour demanded from a specific subject, *me*). In this way, according to Sartre, one can draw up a "*hodological*" map of our environment, based and varied according to our acts and needs. In normal and adapted action, the objects "to be realised" have the appearance of having to be realised in certain and specified ways. The means to realise these objects appear as potentialities which demand existence. In this way, the world around us (German's *umwelt*), the world of our desires, our needs, and our acts, appears determined "as if it were furrowed with strict and narrow paths which lead to one or the other determined end, that is, to the appearance of a created object".²¹⁵ We have a *pragmatic intuition of the determinism of this world* when we apprehend the means to realise an object as the only possible way to reach the end (or if there are *n* means, as the only *n* possible means, etc.). Variation in the given paths is given by the decoys and traps which are scattered around here and there throughout our *umwelt*.

This world (our *umwelt*) is difficult. The difficulty of the world does not depend on our consciousness: it is not a reflective notion which would imply a relationship to us. It is there, on the world; it is a quality of the world which is given in its perception, in the same way that the above described paths towards the potentialities and the potentialities themselves and the exigencies of objects are given (e.g., books *having* to be read, etc.). This difficulty is according to

²¹⁵ Ibid, p.228.

Sartre "the noematical correlative of our activity whether undertaken or only conceived".²¹⁶

From this phenomenological description of our situation in our world (our *umwelt*) we can easily understand what an emotion is. *Emotion is a transformation of the world.* When the paths (means or ways to realise objects and ends) become too difficult, or when we see no path, we can no longer live in so urgent and difficult a world. Even though all the ways are barred, *we must act.* So we change the world, we live as if the connection between things and their potentialities were ruled not by deterministic processes, but *by magic.*²¹⁷

However, this change is not a game nor is it an object of reflection, nor is it carried out with the consciousness that it is something *we* do. It is not a game, because we cannot help ourselves in not playing it: "we are driven against a wall, and we throw ourselves into this new attitude with all the strength we can muster" (ibid). It is not self-conscious nor the object of reflection, because "it is the seizure of new connections and new exigencies".²¹⁸ At the moment we seize an object as an impossible to get hold of or to be achieved object, or when an object gives rise to a tension which cannot be sustained, our consciousness simply seizes or tries to seize it otherwise. We are familiar with such a change when we look at a picture which has no clear lines and forms, and subsequently are told that in there we shall find the form of an animal or something else we are familiar with. We immediately disregard our previous confusion and frustration and "see" the animal or our familiar something.

According to Sartre, "*through a change of intention, as in a change of behaviour,* we apprehend a new object, or an old object in a new way" (ibid, bold and italics mine), and this change is done *unreflectively.* The connection

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid, p.229.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

between intention, behaviour, and the change in apprehension is not accidental here, nor in the very similar case of the emotions. These three are connected as follows: the impossibility of finding a solution to the problem objectively apprehended as a quality of the world serves as a motivation for the new unreflective consciousness; this new unreflective consciousness now perceives the world otherwise and with a new aspect, requiring a new behaviour *through which this aspect is perceived* and which serves as *hyle* for the new intention.

In the case of emotive behaviour, the difference lies in that it is *not effective*: its end is not to act upon the object, but only to confer upon it another quality, a lesser (or greater) existence or presence. According to Sartre "in emotion it is *the body* which, *directed by consciousness*, changes its *relations* with the world in order that the world may change its *qualities*".²¹⁹ Sartre's attitude toward the emotions can be easily summed up in his celebrated phrase: "*If emotion is a joke, it is a joke we believe in*" (ibid, italics, bold mine). To understand this phrase, one has only to bring into his mind the situation he brought himself in when he had to change his mind about the desirability of a specific object once he realised he could not have it (an example exists in Aesop's story about the fox and the hard to reach grapes). It is as if we were playing a theatrical play, and better, a comedy on ourselves, from one hand allowing ourselves to want something very much and attempt, unreflectively, to get hold of it, and from the other to try to convince ourselves of its undesirability. This *magical* and incantatory ability we have to change the quality of the impossible to get hold of item of our environment allows us to boost the half-seriousness of the comedy we play on ourselves, and when the situation is more urgent, *believe* in the effectiveness of our incantations, and thus have emotion.

²¹⁹ Ibid, p.230, bold, italics mine.

Sartre pays special attention in his analysis of examples of emotions; he distinguishes between passive and active fear, passive and active sadness.²²⁰ The maladapted fainting from fear in the face of extreme danger (passive fear) is a behaviour of *escape*. Fainting is a refuge into the dream consciousness, an "unrealizing" consciousness, risen from the need to annihilate normal methods and the deterministic links which cannot be accepted. According to Sartre, all those who think that the physiological behaviour of passive fear is pure disorder, miss the point that this behaviour represents the abrupt realisation of the bodily conditions which ordinarily accompany the transition from being awake to sleeping.

On the other hand, all those who believe that active fear is rational behaviour miss the point that active fear is not prudence; it is an attempt to distance ourselves (psychically if not physically) from the dangerous object. With the flight, fainting is enacted; the **magical behaviour** which consists of denying the dangerous object with our whole body by subverting the vectorial structure of the space we live in comes about by abruptly creating a potential direction on the *other side*. In this way we *forget* the danger.

In this way, the *true meaning of an emotion such as fear* is that it is a consciousness which, through **magical behaviour**, aims at denying an object of the external world, and which will go so far as to annihilate itself (if not actually, at least symbolically) in order to annihilate the object with it.

In the case of passive sadness (behaviour of seclusion, oppression, muscular resolution, pallor, coldness at the extremities, silence, solitude etc.), we find very rarely the occasion where someone really cherishes and utilises fully his time of grief to meditate profoundly upon it. In most of the cases of passive sadness we find that one of the ordinary conditions of our action has

²²⁰ Ibid, pp.231-236.

disappeared, and that the world nevertheless requires that we act in it and on it *without that condition*. With the exception of this condition that has changed, the world with its potentialities (of which only a very small percentage has also changed), that is, the tasks to do, the people to see, acts of daily life to carry out etc., have remained the same. The problem for us arises however, in that the means of realising the old potentialities (the ones we are used to realise), the ways which cut through our "hodological space" have changed, and we do not want them changed, and not only we do not want them changed, but we do not want ourselves to recognise and believe that they are changed. According to Sartre "sadness aims at *eliminating the obligation to seek new ways*, to transform the structure of the world by a totally undifferentiated structure".²²¹ This totally undifferentiated structure refers to the previously longed for and desired objects, which with sadness acquire an affectively neutral reality, and which allows them to be considered as perfectly equivalent and interchangeable. This neutralisation of the desired objects through sadness occurs due to our lack in power and will to accomplish the acts we had been planning through new ways of realisation. The neutralisation helps us in our behaviour of sadness since through this neutralisation the universe no longer requires anything of us.

According to Sartre in passive sadness we acquire two main attitudes (which are and the two usual forms of passive sadness), the one which forces us to "dim the light" and has as its noematic correlative "*Gloom*", and the other forces us to "withdraw into ourselves" and has as its noematic correlative "*Refuge*". In this way, when we find ourselves in passive sadness, we usually look for a dark corner in the no longer demanding universe which can be *our corner*: "a bit of darkness which hides its gloomy immensity from us".²²²

²²¹ Ibid, p.233, my bold and italics.

²²² Ibid.

Active sadness according to Sartre can take many forms. Hysteria in the face of a confession we do not want to make, is a "*Refusal*". Again here we see a negative behaviour which aims at denying the urgency of certain problems and substituting others. We do not want to make a confession or we want to make it in a different environment from the one we have. We bring this about by the use of our body and its pitiful state. With the psychosomatic disturbance we effected on our body, we gained the impossibility of our action in circumstances we did not want to have. In this way, with the emotional crisis we abandon (or we believe we abandon) our responsibility, due to a *magical exaggeration* of the difficulties of the world. The world preserves its differentiated structure, but it appears now (*magically*) as *unjust* and *hostile*, because it demands *too much of us*, more than what is humanly possible to give.

The emotion of active sadness thus becomes a magical comedy of great importance: the sick person here resembles servants who, after having invited thieves in their master's house, have themselves tied up so that it can be clearly seen that they could not have prevented this; with the only difference that in the case of the sick person, he is "tied up *by himself* and *by a thousand tenuous bonds*".²²³ And to anyone who sees the painful feeling of freedom which the sick person wants to get rid of as necessarily reflective, Sartre responds the following: in the case of the sick person (and from his perspective) freedom appears not as *his* freedom to choose this or that behaviour, but as freedom existing *in* the object, *to be created freely*, as having to be accepted as given and being able to be transformed into a more acceptable existence.²²⁴ Of course, as Sartre himself acknowledges, there are "other functions and other forms of active sadness".²²⁵

²²³ Ibid, p.234, my bold and italics.

²²⁴ Ibid, pp.234-5.

²²⁵ Ibid, p.235.

He ends his brief description of emotions by analysing joy into its two forms the *joy-feeling* (which for Sartre represents a balance, an adapted state) and *joy-emotion* (which is characterised by a certain impatience). With the joy-emotion we **magically** hold as our absolute property, and seize at one swoop as an instantaneous totality the "imminent", but not yet there, desired and longed for object. However, even if the longed for object is there in front of us, it still leaves much to be desired: it can only be given to us little by little, and that intensifies our joy-emotion.²²⁶ In this way joy (as an emotion) is "a magical behaviour which tends by incantation to realise the possession of the desired object as instantaneous totality".²²⁷ This behaviour not only anticipates this possession, but it is accompanied by the certainty that the possession will be realised sooner or later. Muscular hypertension, gestures, dances and songs, represent symbolically approximate behaviour, incantations which attempt to possess at one swoop, **symbolically**, the desired object, even though we know that the object we desire can only be acquired through a prudent, difficult behaviour which should be maintained for long. Examples of this magical behaviour are the elations, dances and songs of men who have just been told that their beloved woman loves them; they try to realise in one moment all the desired object they long for, even though they know that the woman will not become theirs (they do not want to think that a human being can never be determined in its behaviour- it is enough that the possibility of determination in their body is *certain* for them) if they do not persist in a long and prudent, often extremely difficult behaviour. In the dance or the song, the woman as a living reality does not exist; she exists as an object which through the dance or the song can be possessed in its totality by magic; the dance or the song just "mimics the possession".²²⁸

²²⁶ Ibid, p.235.

²²⁷ Ibid, p.236.

²²⁸ Ibid.

Sartre with the above analysis only wants to show the functional role of the emotions, and not to exhaust the variety of emotions. He proposes however to deal with two more problems: the reducibility of emotions (that many emotions can be reduced to fewer, more basic ones), and their nature.

Regarding the first, he notes that even though all emotions have to do with the setting up by us of a magical world through the use of our body as a means of incantation, the individual emotions are *irreducible* and *different* one from the other, since "in each case the problem and the behaviour are different".²²⁹ To fully analyse each specific emotion, to grasp fully its significance and its finality it is necessary to know and analyse each particular situation. For example, some theorists maintain that if the fear of the timid person is suddenly moved to anger this anger is an ordinary type of anger; Sartre notes that this can not be so; it is *fear* which has been *surpassed* without in any way being reducible to fear.²³⁰ In this way, the infinite variety of emotional consciousness can only be understood by someone who has been convinced of the functional structure of emotion.

Regarding the nature of emotions, Sartre first notes that "behaviour pure and simple is not emotion, and pure and simple consciousness of that behaviour is not emotion either".²³¹ With this obviously Sartre wants to supplement his rejection of reductivists, but he also indicates that were the behaviour related to emotions and the consciousness of that behaviour something "pure and simple", the finality of the emotion would be much more easily understood and comprehended, and consciousness would be able much more easily to get rid of unwanted emotions.²³² Thus the ontology of the emotions is very complex and there are a lot of interconnections with the behaviour exhibited and the

²²⁹ Ibid, p.237.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

consciousness of that behaviour, with the result that its finality is found with difficulty and only with careful attention paid to the relevant ontology. With this kind of attention and care we can discern that there are *false* emotions which are not behaviour, i.e., there are emotions which do not have the appropriate ontology or there do not exist the appropriate interconnections between exhibited behaviour and the relevant ontology, and thus are false. Such are cases where we are given a gift that we do not like or do not like much; we may clap our hands, may jump, or may dance (behaviour which under other circumstances would be characterised as joy by an external observer). However, such behaviour is not that of joy; or better it is the behaviour of a false emotion (falseness here being not a logical characteristic of certain propositions, but an *existential* quality). False emotions nevertheless can be distinguished from those of an *actor*. The actor mimics joy and sadness, but he is neither joyful nor sad in reality, since his behaviour is addressed to a fictitious universe: "*he mimics behaviour, but he is not behaving*".²³³ In false emotion the behaviour exhibited is self-sustained and is voluntary, the situation is real and we conceive it as demanding *this* behaviour; in addition, we intend to invest magically real objects with certain *false* qualities.

Nevertheless false emotions are not imaginary, nor must they necessarily annihilate themselves later. According to Sartre "their falseness arises out of an essential weakness which *presents itself as violence*".²³⁴ He calls this weakness *violence*, since in the false emotion the desirability and agreeableness of the object which was just given to us as a present etc. exists as an exigence, a *need* and not a reality. If it has any reality, its reality is one of tributary and parasitic form, which we strongly feel. We know that we "project" it upon the object through our decision; once we stop our incantations it will immediately

²³³ Ibid, p.238, my bold and italics.

²³⁴ Ibid.

disappear; but we can not do otherwise because the desirability of other objects associated with the given situation make our behaviour necessary.

On the other hand, the ontology of true emotions is always accompanied by *belief*. Any qualities which are conferred upon objects are taken by the person who has the true emotion as *true qualities*, that cannot be abandoned nor stopped at will; they have to exhaust themselves at their own time. Our behaviour itself cannot but sketch upon the object the emotional quality which we confer upon it. When we have a true emotion we are under its spell, "flooded" by it. The formal frame of our behaviour is filled with something opaque and heavy which serves as its matter. The physiological phenomena associated with behaviour are of a paramount importance here; they represent the *seriousness* of the emotion as a phenomenon of belief.

This is exactly where the problem lies regarding those theorists (mainly of the peripheric sort) who separate the physiological phenomena from the behaviour (either making the behaviour a symbolisation and a consequence of the physiological phenomena or making the physiological phenomena a consequence of the behaviour). The physiological phenomena (hypertension, vaso-constrictions, respiratory difficulties etc.) *at first* present a certain analogy with the behaviour, symbolising quite well a behaviour which aims at denying the world or discharging it of its affective potential by denying it; but *then* once they achieve the first step they enter with the behaviour into a total synthetic form and cannot be studied by themselves. However, they are separate from the behaviour with which they form a synthesis: we can stop ourselves from fleeing, but not from trembling.

In this way, behaviour and physiological phenomena form a peculiar sort of synthesis: emotion is a behaviour of a body which is in a certain state; the emotion appears in a highly disturbed body which retains a certain behaviour,

with the disturbance sometimes surviving the behaviour, and with the behaviour constituting the form and the signification of the disturbance. Without the disturbance the behaviour would be pure signification and an affective scheme. The synthesis necessitates a high level of disturbance so that the magical behaviour is *believed*.²³⁵

It is important to note at this point, that even though physiological phenomena and behaviour form a synthesis and are components of emotion, emotion has only consciousness as its point of departure; to understand this one has only to acknowledge that the body has a two-fold character: it is an object in the world, and it is something directly *lived* by consciousness. Since the body is both "outside" and "inside" consciousness, we can easily understand why *emotion is a phenomenon of belief*. With consciousness not only do we project affective signification upon the world around us, but we *live* the new world which we have established. We live in the newly established world directly; we are interested in it; we *endure* the qualities which our behaviour has set up. This means that when in a dead-end our consciousness degrades itself into the magical world of emotions, it is a new consciousness facing the new world, establishing it with its most inward part and as directly as it can ever be. This new consciousness resembles the consciousness which is asleep. Like the sleeping consciousness, the new consciousness in emotion transforms its body as synthetic totality in such a way that it can live and grasp this new world through it.

In this perspective, physiological manifestations are very trivial disturbances; they represent the total and commonplace disturbance of the body while it puts itself on the level of behaviour. The behaviour alone will decide whether the disturbance will be in "diminution of life" or in "enlargement". Consciousness realises with the body an obscuring of itself (since the body is heavy and full of

²³⁵ Ibid, p.239.

matter, not translucent) and lives it spontaneously. This obscuring even as a synthetic totality, can not be divided or localised in parts; only through scientific analysis and for the purposes of the study of the "biological-body" or "thing-body", we can localise and focus upon troubles in such and such organs.²³⁶

According to Sartre "the origin of emotion is a spontaneous and lived degradation of consciousness in the face of the world";²³⁷ and it is a degradation because consciousness, not enduring some aspect of or an event in the world, tries to grasp it in another way by approaching the consciousness of sleep, dream, and hysteria. However, Sartre notes two things in relation to this degradation of consciousness: first, *consciousness does not thetically have consciousness of itself as degrading itself*; it only has positional consciousness of the degradation of the world (which is brought about by the non-thetical degradation of consciousness and) which takes place in the magical level. It is only in this respect that someone can say that an emotion is not sincere. Also it is evident now that the finality of the emotion is not placed on the emotion by a thetic act of consciousness (that is why we cannot easily see this finality). This finality however, is not unconscious; it exhausts itself in the constitution of the object (one can say that it is non-conscious in relation to the thetic consciousness). The second thing that Sartre wants to note is that consciousness is caught in its own belief, since it lives the new aspect of the world by *believing* in it, in a similar way to that of dreaming and hysteria. The captive consciousness is its own captive, and not by anything external; it does not dominate the belief that it strives to live, and it does so precisely because it is absorbed in living it.

The spontaneity of consciousness here can not be meant as being able always to deny something at the very moment that it posits this something; such a

²³⁶ Ibid, pp.240-241.

²³⁷ Ibid, p.241.

spontaneity can be only the source of contradiction. Consciousness is by its very nature *transcendental*: it transcends itself making it impossible for it to withdraw into itself so that it may suppose that it is outside in the object; it only knows itself as *in the world*. Any doubt can arise only in relation to the constitution of an existential quality of the object, i.e., how dubious or how effective is the reflective activity of reduction of the new consciousness upon the positional consciousness (this doubt ofcourse can only mean more often the perpetuation, and less frequently the transformation or neutralisation of the emotion). In this way, as consciousness sees the magical world into which it has cast itself, it tends to perpetuate the world in which it holds itself captive. Consciousness becomes concerned with its emotion, rising in value: the more one flees, the more frightened he is. The magical world is delineated, takes form, is inflated and then is compressed against the emotion and arrests it. The emotion does not wish to escape; it can only attempt to flee the magical object, granting it thus a still stronger magical reality. And this captivity is not realised as belonging in consciousness, only as belonging to the object; the objects are captivating, enchaining, seizing continuously upon consciousness. *Freedom can only come from a purifying reflection, or a total disappearance of the affecting situation.*²³⁸

The emotion would not be so absorbing if it apprehended in the object its conditions *as they really are*: that a certain object is terrifying, bringing joy etc., *at this time, in this lighting, in such and such* circumstances. What is constitutive of the emotion is that it perceives in the object something which is not; something which exceeds it and magnifies it beyond measure. Emotion appears in effect with its world; in the world which is joyful, sad, frightening etc., relations of consciousness with objects are exclusively magical. In the worlds of emotions there occurs what happens in the worlds of dreams and the worlds of madness: there is a world of individual syntheses maintaining

²³⁸ Ibid, p.242.

connections among themselves and possessing *qualities*. These qualities are conferred upon the objects only by *a passage to infinity*: each particular quality represents the **unity of an infinity of real and possible *abschattungen*** of this quality (including border-line cases etc.); any qualities which the emotions confer upon the objects and the world they confer them *ad aeternum*, even if only tacitly. With emotions we affirm qualities upon objects and the world as their **substantial** qualities, and in this way we pass into infinity, establishing infinity as it were in the heart of the things and the world, as **constitutive of them.**²³⁹

In this way, an overwhelming and captivating quality of the thing appears to us through the emotion, exceeds and maintains it; it spreads over from the present to the future and makes its presence felt and certain; in Sartre's words "it is a revelation of the meaning of the world".²⁴⁰

At this point of his analysis, Sartre explains the difference of delicate from weak emotions (two very frequent distinctions in theories of emotions). A *delicate* emotion in his theory is an emotion in which we apprehend an objective quality of the object through a behaviour which is barely outlined, through a slight fluctuation of our physical state.²⁴¹ In addition, this diminution presents itself as such (it is not a diminution effected bythetic consciousness); and it may effect an abrupt change, a domination by this or another emotion, quite outside the control ofthetic consciousness (an example of this is a slight depression which gradually is built up, ending in panic in the face of a meaningless or a disastrous life).

Weak emotions are the emotions whose affective grasp of the object is slight; the difference from the delicate emotions is one of *intention*, which is motivated

²³⁹ Ibid, p.243.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid, p.244.

by the situation and not by consciousness. The somatic state and the behaviour may be the same in delicate and weak emotions; the functional role of the two however differs, and the difference is one of intention in that functional role (the weak has a different intention and role from the delicate); an example of a weak emotion can be a slight sadness at the cloudy or rainy weather for a native of Scotland; notice how different (both in its nature and its effects) this slight sadness (as an example of a delicate now emotion) can be to one who is not a native of Scotland, who is native of a place with 300 days per year sunshine, and in addition, has associated negative thoughts and feelings with this weather!

Sartre's theory of the emotions can also accommodate phenomena which may appear to many as impossible to be explained by his theory; such phenomena are certain *abrupt* reactions of horror and admiration which appear *suddenly*. In these sudden emotions it seems that there is no finality at all (at least not the kind that exists for other emotions). In addition, in these sudden emotions there is something immediate and direct about their perceptions; there is not even an impulse to flight, or behave in any way associated with usual emotions. However, as Sartre himself indicates, these emotions can also be explained by his theory; these emotions indicate that there is "an existential structure of the world which is magical".²⁴² This *magical* structure of the world is magic performed on us; here the conditions of the situation have turned upside down; instead of performing magic and transforming the world through our emotions, the world performs magic on us through our emotions. The world reciprocates, and instead of revealing itself to consciousness as determined (situation that exists for normal emotions), it reveals itself as undetermined and with a finality of its own totally independent of our own; the magical thus proves not to be an ephemeral quality which we impose on the world, but it exists in the world independent of us (but revealing itself only to us).

²⁴² Ibid, p.245.

However, this category termed by Sartre as "*magical*" deserves special treatment and analysis if it is to be acceptable. Sartre provides this in the last few pages of his third chapter entitled "A Sketch of a Phenomenological Theory" in his short work on the Emotions.²⁴³ He maintains there that the "magical" governs the interpsychic relations of men in society and, in particular, our perception of others. As regards the ontology of the "magical" it is an irrational synthesis of spontaneity and passivity. It is "of passivity" because the magical occurs as an inert activity, a consciousness rendered passive. And that is exactly how others appear to us: consciousnesses as transcendent objects through a modification of passivity. This modification is not due to our relation to them, nor the effect of our passions; it is essentially necessary, since in order for others to be perceived by us as others they have to have their consciousness modified so as to appear and (as far as we are concerned) *be* passive (both through their bodily appearance to us, and with their characterisation as this or that man). With the meaning of a face we do not have a sign of consciousness but an altered, degraded consciousness, a passivity. In this way, a man is always a *wizard* for another man, and the social world is at first magical.

Of course there can be always deterministic views of the interpsychological world and imposed rational superstructures upon this world. But they can not be anything else but ephemeral and without equilibrium. They become ineffective as soon as the magical aspect of faces, of gestures, and of human situations appears as too strong. In these occasions of the apparent ineffectiveness of determinism and rationalism, consciousness seizes upon the magical as magical and forcibly lives it as such. Words such as "suspicious", "alarming" form in their phenomenological attributes categories of words which designate the magical insofar as it urges consciousness to live it. Abrupt passages from a rational apprehension of the world to a perception of the same world as magical, if it is motivated by the object itself and if it is accompanied

²⁴³ Ibid, pp.245-247.

by a disagreeable element is what is termed as "*horror*"; if it is accompanied by an agreeable element it is "*wonder*".

These abrupt passages into the magical are not foreign to the previous Sartrean analysis of emotions. They just formulate a second main form of emotions: with the first (of the type of love, hate etc.) we constitute the magic of the world to replace the deterministic activity which can not be realised, with the second it is the world itself which abruptly reveals itself as being magical.

With horror we suddenly perceive the upsetting of the deterministic barriers. The face of a stranger appearing on a window is not the face of a man who might attack us, but he is given as passive, in immediate connection on the other side of the window with our body, we live and undergo his signification, and we establish it with our own flesh (the freezing and stopping of breath). Our consciousness plunged into the magical world, draws the body along with it, insofar as the body is belief, and believes in it. The synthesis with the disturbance of our organism is perfected not with our behaviour, but with the appearance and expression of the face and movement of the other man's body. In this way, the first magic and signification of the emotion come from the world and not from ourselves.

Of course magic as a real quality of the world is not restricted to the human only; a disturbing interpretation of a landscape, certain objects in a room as traces of a mysterious entity bear the mark of the psychic, and perform magic on us through our consciousness.

Through these two types of emotions and many mixtures of the two (since most emotions are not pure), consciousness, by realising through a spontaneous finality a magical aspect of the world, manifests itself as magical. If, on the other hand, the world is given as magical, consciousness specifies and completes the

constitution of this magic, diffusing it everywhere, or concentrating it on a single object.

According to the above analysis of emotion, emotion cannot be an accidental modification of a subject in an otherwise unchanged world; this can be the thesis of theorists of emotion who consider emotions as "accidents", or not very frequent and peripheral psychosomatic disturbances. Sartre's theory is far from this viewpoint. Sartre's theory accepts emotional apprehension of an object "only on the basis of a total alteration of the world".²⁴⁴ In order that an object may in reality appear *terrible*, it must realise itself as an immediate and magical presence *face to face* with consciousness. This can only be achieved in an act of consciousness which destroys all the structures of the world that might *reject* the magical and *reduce* the event to its proper proportions. The destroyed structures of the world are not destroyed by rationality or conscious rational arguments; the rational interpretations which give support to the appearance of emotions come *after* the appearance of emotions.

The structures of the world are destroyed in their perception, and destruction and perception occur at the same time. The structures have no more their character of instrumentality in the world. They are destroyed and perceived as the unitary basis for the appearance of the emotion. All structures of the real world which may stop or reject the magical and reduce the event to its proper proportions (even if employed in their previously effective use as a last attempt to escape the grip of the emotion) *intensify* the abruptness and strength of the emotion we strive to be freed from. An example of the dynamic of emotions is a nightmare where locks, steel doors, etc. can never stop the murderer or thief from achieving his goal; all these previously protective devices only intensify our horror and fear, since in order for the object of our fear to achieve its purpose it must be more cunning, more determined in its goal, and thus more ferocious. In

²⁴⁴ Ibid, p.248.

short, the object of emotion becomes an object on the basis of a world which reveals itself filled with emotion.

In this way, consciousness can "be-in-the-world" in two different ways: first, the world can appear to it as a complex of instruments so organised that if one wished to produce a determined effect it would be necessary to act upon the determined elements of the complex; each instrument here refers to other instruments and there is no absolute action or radical change that one can immediately introduce into the world; this is the familiar way of our consciousness relating to the world, with our actions, our body, etc. The other way is for the world to appear to consciousness as a non-instrumental totality, modifiable by large masses with no intermediary. Categories of the world here act upon consciousness directly and are present to it with no distance. Consciousness aims at combating these dangers or modifying those objects without distance and without instruments by absolute and massive modifications of the world; this aspect of the world is coherent in Sartre's theory as the *magical world*. In Sartre's theory *emotion is an abrupt drop of consciousness into the magical*; the *abrupt vanishing of the world of instruments* and the *appearance of the magical world in its place* [ibid, p.250].

In Sartre's theory emotion is not and can not be a passive disorder of the human organism, coming from the outside to disturb an otherwise normal psychic life. Emotion in his theory is the return of consciousness to the magical attitude, one of the great attitudes which are essential to it, with the appearance of the correlative world, the magical world. In addition, emotion can not be an accident in our psychic life; it is a mode of existence of our consciousness, one of the ways in which it *understands* (in the sense of the Heideggerian *Verstehen*) its "being-in-the-world".

A reflective consciousness can always direct itself upon emotion, and recognise it as a structure of consciousness, always having meaning and

signification for our psychic life. And here exactly is yet another difference between Sartre and other theorists of the emotions such as James: for them emotion is unexplainable; it has a pure and inexpressible quality. In Sartre the purifying reflection of the phenomenological reduction perceives an emotion insofar as it constitutes the world in a magical form. This phenomenological endeavour is recognisably far from the ordinary reflections upon our emotions; we ordinarily explain our emotions by reference to the object of consciousness, and not consciousness; and since objects become in this way all-powerful, *passions* constitute themselves and gain an independence from reflective consciousness.²⁴⁵

In his Conclusion to his short work on the Emotions, Sartre gives the purpose of his endeavour here as "an experiment for the establishment of a phenomenological psychology".²⁴⁶ His work's shortness is due to its being just an example of how his proposed phenomenological psychology can give signification and coherence to a psychic fact which for other theorists is a lawless disorder or an unanalysable and mysterious inner feeling. Sartre himself recognises that for the foundation of his phenomenological psychology one should start with the fixation on an eidetic image of the essence of the psychological fact which it is investigating; he claims he has done this on a work for the *mental image*.²⁴⁷ However, with this short work he has achieved at least the conclusion that emotions can be properly understood only with the comprehension of their signification for our psychic life, and only through the analysis achieved by his phenomenological psychology. And since this phenomenological psychology can only be useful as a tool once its limitations as

²⁴⁵ Ibid, p.251.

²⁴⁶ Ibid, p.252.

²⁴⁷ Probably he means the *L'Imagination*; in English, Imagination: A Psychological Critique; but he has also dealt with this issue in *L'Imaginaire: Psychologie phenomenologique de l'imagination*; in English, Psychology of the Imagination (for bibliographical details see Bibliography).

a psychological research have been clearly delineated, he goes on to attempt exactly this in his Conclusion.

The signification of a fact of consciousness always indicates the total human reality which *becomes* moved, attentive, perceiving, willing etc. With the study of emotions so far this principle has been verified; an emotion always refers back to what it signifies: the totality of the relationships of the human reality to the world. With the emotion our "being-in-the-world" is totally modified according to the very particular laws of magic. However, such a descriptive analysis has limitations: the psychological theory of emotion that Sartre offers supposes a preliminary description of affectivity insofar as it (the affectivity) is constitutive of *our* human reality, of being affective human reality. This comes as a total contradiction to the usual psychological methodology: ordinary psychologists start from the emotions or the inclinations which might indicate a human reality not yet elucidated, and hope to achieve the elucidation of this human reality as the ultimate and remote goal of all their research; however, such a hope can be nothing else but a pure ideal beyond the short-term reach of anyone who begins with the empirical.

Sartre's phenomenological psychology of the emotions places the description of affect *on the basis* of the human reality described and fixed by an *a priori* intuition. Sartre's mixture of the empirical or *a posteriori* (the study of the emotions as they are) with the *a priori* (the study of the emotions within the framework of the *a priori* intuitions for our consciousness and its relation to the world) makes his theory vulnerable to attack from the supporters of both these traditions in philosophy and psychology. Some can attack him for mixing two elements that can not be mixed; others for acknowledging the value of the empirical; and others for venturing into the relatively uncertain realms of intuition. Sartre has replied to the last and has indicated why their stubbornness in their common sense *naiveté* of the empirical can create nothing but confusion

and other additional problems for them. He has also replied to those who believe that a mixture is impossible; he attempts to give with his Conclusion a satisfactory reply to phenomenologists who mistrust the empirical. He replies to them that if phenomenology can prove that emotion is in essence a realisation of human reality insofar as it is *affection*, it will be impossible for it to show that human reality must necessarily manifest itself in *such* emotions. Empirical data mainly through observation and analysis are needed to establish that there are such and such emotions and only these; this need manifests without any doubt the *factitiousness* of human existence. It is this factitiousness which makes necessary a regular recourse to the empirical, since the factitious can not be properly investigated by honest *de profundis* intuition. It is also this factitiousness which prevents psychological regression and phenomenological progression from ever coming together. That is, the empirical data which we gather through observation and analysis in Sartre's phenomenological psychology will never be sufficient to replace the need for *a priori* intuitions into the signification of these empirical data.

ii) Critical Evaluation of Sartre's Theory

Relation of Sartre's Theory of the Emotions as presented in his Being and Nothingness and his general Theory of Consciousness and Intentionality.

We saw in brief detail the main ideas contained in Sartre's short work on the Emotions. These include a rejection of the methodology, scope and aims of the (traditional and modern) psychological study of emotions; a wholehearted acceptance of Heidegger's inseparability of the World and *Dasein* and the establishment of phenomenology as the most appropriate way of elucidating

phenomena of human consciousness such as emotions. We also saw him indicate the many problems traditional psychological and psychiatric theories (especially those of James and Janet) have on their views of the human emotions, the two most important being the limitation of the study on the behaviour of the body involved in emotion and the insistence on considering emotion as an abnormal psychological state. In addition, we saw Sartre accepting the symbolic character of emotions, but rejecting both the psychoanalytic insistence on externalising the source of this symbolisation and the introduction of a bond of causality and a bond of comprehension running side by side in psychoanalytic studies of emotion.

Sartre also attacked phenomenologists and psychologists who believe that consciousness of the emotion is first a reflective consciousness; he maintained here the theory of Intentionality (which we previously saw analysed in relation to his attack on Husserl) according to which consciousness first and most importantly is positional and not aware of itself as being consciousness of something. Only at a later time can this consciousness become consciousness of itself, and this again without being self-aware of itself doing this positing. With emotions, as with other forms of consciousness, we perceive, act in and respond to the world without our consciousness becoming reflexive: one unreflective consciousness ("*world-acted*") becomes a direct transformation of the other ("*world-hateful*") with no mediation from a reflexive consciousness.

The fact that emotions in this way form an *indissoluble synthesis* between the affective subject and the affective object, has serious consequences for their ontological commitments: emotions become certain ways of apprehending the world.

His views on the unreflective consciousness brought him in opposition to action theorists who think otherwise; we saw him maintain that *our* actions (in

opposition to other people's actions) constitute a class of certain objects in a probable world. In order for us to think of an action we have already acted in intention, but in a way which is not publicly accessible. Our actions, our words, and the objects of our feelings demand from us to be realised in a way in which other people do not sense. They have what Sartre termed as "*passive exigence*". Our unreflective consciousness has nothing to do with the unconscious; it sees the world as full of paths leading to the appearance of created objects; in this way we gain a *pragmatic intuition of the determinism* of this world and, when we see this determinism as too difficult to accept, we respond with the help of emotions. That is why emotions are *transformations* of this difficult to accept world. They are our direct actions in the face of insurmountable difficulties. And since this means that we must overturn the previously intuited determinism, we decide to see the connections between things and their potentialities (the paths towards our longed for objects) ruled by *magic*.

However, all these processes are performed without realising that they depend on us for their existence; in order for magic to work one must believe in it. The body is directed by unreflective consciousness which is fully immersed now into the emotion and changes its relations with the world in order that the world may change its qualities. With this, our relation to our body and to our environment becomes one and the same thing: we get trapped fully into the emotional world we create.

Through the analyses of many types and forms of emotions, we saw Sartre proving the irreducibility and different character of emotions, which, while preserving their own different dynamics, unite in their symbolic meaning for the unreflective consciousness.

Through an analysis of false emotions, Sartre concludes that emotions are phenomena of belief, and freedom from them can only come from a purifying reflection or a total disappearance of the affecting situation.

Another distinction he made was between weak and delicate emotions, accepting that their difference lies in the intention, motivated by the situation, and not by consciousness.

Analysing his concept of magic, Sartre acknowledges that it governs the interpsychic relations of men in society, and in particular our perception of others, but he also points out that this *irrational synthesis of spontaneity and passivity* exists as a real quality of the world, and as such, exists for disturbing interpretations of landscapes, etc.

Lastly, in his Conclusion to his work, we saw him accepting the value of empirical data, which we gain through observation and analysis, for the factitiousness of human existence. That is, once we accept the phenomenological truth about emotions as affections, the type and forms of emotions as manifestations of this need for affection can only be investigated through an empirical study.

The analysis of the phenomenon of emotion in his early short work on the Emotions, agrees up to a large extent with the theory contained in his Being and Nothingness. In Being and Nothingness (from now on referred to as BN), we see Sartre placing an emphasis in the investigation of the emotions which have gained permanence in our behaviour: the passions.

In BN pp.440–451 Sartre connects the issue of the passions not only with the issue of our freedom but also with the phenomenology of our language:

"language informs me of my thought".²⁴⁸ With a phenomenological analysis of the way we use the word "passion" to explain our behaviour, Sartre finds that passion is the emotion which we found as impossible to control; we name it "passion", because we have already decided to grant to it a deterministic role over our behaviour and restrict in this way our freedom. In BN p.443 Sartre gives the following account for Passions: they are first a project and an enterprise; they posit particular states of affairs as intolerable, forcing the for-itself to effect a withdrawal in relation to these states of affairs, and to nihilate them by isolating them and by considering them in the light of an end (i.e., of a non-being). In this way, passions not only have their own ends, which are recognised at the same moment at which they are posited as non-existent, but they have equal autonomy as our will. In fact, Sartre equates the existence of our freedom with that of our will and our passions thus: "Freedom is nothing but the existence of our will or of our passions in so far as this existence is the nihilation of facticity; that is, the existence of a being which is its being in the mode of having to be it."²⁴⁹ This "having to be" points to nothing else but the nihilating power of our will and our passions; this power is ontologically related to the for-itself which has as a consciousness the characteristic of Intentionality. Consciousness with the help of Intentionality relates directly with this or another mode, choosing in this way to act passionately or deliberately. Both will and the passions are intentional; they refer one to the choices of the for-itself to be deliberate or passionate. The for-itself projects itself as intellect (in the case of an act of will) or as body (in the case of a passion) in the past, present or future activity. In this way the for-itself confirms its ontology, i.e., that *to be is to act*.

Will and Passion are not fully autonomous however; the ends pursued by an act of will or an act of passion are not chosen by the will nor the passion. In addition, the end pursued is not where the difference between passion and will

²⁴⁸ BN p.451, my bold and italics.

²⁴⁹ BN, p.444.

lies: the same end may be pursued by an act of will or an act of passion. Passion and Will are autonomous only in respect of the means employed. And that is where their ontological difference lies: the (different) subjective attitude in relation to a transcendent end.²⁵⁰

In this way we see Sartre in Being and Nothingness not only following in general his early ideas on the emotions and passions,²⁵¹ but fully applying them in relation to the ontology of passions and their relation to Freedom. In Sartre's Cahiers pour une morale (in English Notebooks for an Ethics)²⁵² we see not only the analysis of emotions as presented in EOT, but it is there connected with his discussion of Freedom in much the same way as in Being and Nothingness, with the only addition being the emphasis on the subjectivity of emotions and passions.²⁵³

The Importance of Sartre's Theory of the Emotions for Contemporary Discussions in the Philosophy of Mind.

All the elements in Sartre's theory of emotion that we see developed here form a continuity between his early work on the Imagination and Husserl's ego, and Being and Nothingness. In Being and Nothingness these elements find a more worked out form and classification.

²⁵⁰ [See Joseph S. Catalano, A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1980, pp.196-202; I discuss this issue in my Unpublished Dissertation: Constantinos Ahtanasopoulos, "Jean-Paul Sartre's Ontological Theory of Freedom: A Critical Analysis", University of St.Andrews, 30th of September 1991, pp.13-15.]

²⁵¹ See Sartre's *Esquisse*, EOT, p.245.

²⁵² Jean-Paul Sartre, Cahiers pour une morale, Editions Gallimard, 1983; Notebooks for an Ethics, transl. by David Pellauer, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1992.

²⁵³ But not the reality of the emotions/passions; see our section on Sartre and Realism, and Sartre's Notebooks of an Ethics, pp. 45, 470, 559.

The attack on psychology which in many aspects resembles Husserl's own attack, from the very evident form which we see here in the very early works, becomes in *Being and Nothingness* more metaphysical; discussion there focuses on realism and the structures of being.

The cognitive but not self-reflective character of the emotions, their dependence on Intentionality of consciousness for their existence, their synthetic being and their very close association with (but not identity with) the body and behaviour, their created reality and roots in a perception of a world which is difficult, all these elements find development in his analysis of the problem of nothingness and the phenomenon of bad faith, in his investigation into the *Being-for-Itself* and the *Being-for-Others*, where analysis of the emotions takes the form of analyses of different attitudes toward others and one's self.

It would be worthwhile to enlarge on these developments of Sartre's thought on the Emotions, but it would mean a significant enlargement on this work and since the topic of our investigation is Intentionality, it is better to stop here and enlarge only on the significance of Intentionality for the appearance and development of emotions. And, indeed, this significance is of paramount importance for the comprehension of the phenomenon of emotion.

For any true emotion to appear, there has to be in consciousness a direct and unreflected relation to the world. Once this relation is reflected true emotion disappears. In order for any true emotion to appear, unreflected consciousness has not only to perceive the world, but it has to perceive the world in such a way as to be engulfed in the emotion that this world demands from consciousness. A critical and reflected relation between consciousness and the emotion that the perceived world demands from it is impossible (that would falsify the emotion). As we saw in our investigation and analysis of Sartre's ideas in his critique of Husserl's ego, this unreflected and direct relation with the

world is guaranteed only once we accept Intentionality as the most important characteristic of consciousness. In fact due to this Intentionality the phenomenology of emotion as presented by Sartre not only makes sense, but provides an explanation for the falsification of emotions. In false emotions we just force our consciousness to interfere and reflect upon the desired emotion, i.e., we force unreflected consciousness to become reflected, so that the behaviour we exhibit conforms with the standards of the behaviour we want to exhibit.

Intentionality in this way, as an aid to the phenomenology of emotions presented here, proves yet again the inferiority of the psychological theories (from the experimental to those based on advances in artificial intelligence) which forget that the behaviour associated with an emotion in its biochemical, somatic or verbal manifestations is but one very limited aspect of the emotion. The most important and most significant aspects of the emotions are the psychological processes and the dynamics that feed these processes, which are invisible to microscopes and electro-magnetic instruments. It is these processes and dynamics which can give an explanation to the phenomenon of emotion. Through Sartre's and our work we see that the significant role of these processes and dynamics for the manifestation of emotions cannot be properly understood and explained if the characteristic of human consciousness termed Intentionality is not properly understood and explained.

Attempts such as those of the Behaviourists, the Dimensionalists, James, Schachter, Lazarus, Izzard, Hofstadter, medical biologists, psychiatrists, computer mechanics and mathematicians not only misinterpret empirical data to suit their theories, but miss the most important fact about emotions: they are ways for our consciousness (invisible to electromagnetic instruments and microscopes) to exist in the world, to think and act in the world; with emotions we can get a glimpse of and proof for the importance and significance of the

most intrinsic characteristic of human consciousness: that of Intentionality (which is equally invisible to instruments).²⁵⁴ Emotions can not be reduced to the behaviour of molecules, facial expressions, or epiphenomena of computer programmes. They have a signification and an aspect which not only is not, but cannot ever be exhibited and contained fully in any somatic manifestations. The theorists named above, as well as those criticised by Sartre, miss the most significant aspects and role of the emotions, and reduce them into something they are not and cannot be.²⁵⁵ As we shall see, even philosophers who have immensely influenced British and American Analytic Philosophy such as Wittgenstein have also condemned all such reductivist attempts on grounds similar to Sartre's. In this way, reductivists who attempt to reduce or equate the phenomena of emotions to mechanical operations and silicon chips' performances can have a more or less universal condemnation.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁴ For modern theories of emotions, see Peter Lloyd, Andrew Mayes, et al., Introduction to Psychology: An Integrated Approach, Fontana, London, 1984, pp.437-447; Douglas R. Hofstadter, Goedel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, Penguin, London, 1979; Douglas R. Fofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett, The Mind's I, Penguin, London, 1981; Alan Ross Anderson, ed., Minds and Machines, Prentice-Hall, N.J., 1964; Dick Gilling, "The Keys to Paradise", in Simon Campbell-Jones, ed., Horizon: At the Frontiers of Medicine, BBC, London, 1983, pp.59-78; Margaret A. Boden, Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man, The Harvester Press, Sussex, 1977; for a relatively recent behaviouristic account of emotions, see D.E. Broadbent, Behaviour, Methuen, London, 1961.

²⁵⁵ Even theoretical models and carefully worked out conditions in which they can work such as those found in Hilary Putnam's "The Mental Life of Some Machines", John O'Connor, ed., Modern Materialism: Readings on Mind-Body Identity, Harcourt, Brace and World, N.Y., 1969, pp.263-281; Jerry Fodor's "Banish DisContent", in William Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition: A Reader, Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp. 420-438, miss the significance of their nature as theoretical constructs. For example a theory which does not work on the same theoretical presuppositions (rationalism, epistemological or ontological realism etc.) but is equally "scientific" can prove quite destructive for them; see Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, and James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science, Cardinal (W.Heineman), London, 1991 (1988), pp. 292-300.

²⁵⁶ For other philosophers in the British-American Analytic Tradition condemning reductivists see Cynthia Macdonald, Mind-Body Identity Theories, Routledge, London, 1992; Norman Malcolm, Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1971; Colin McGinn, Problems in Philosophy: The Limits of Inquiry, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993; John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, MIT, London, 1992; John R. Searle, Minds, Brains and Science, Penguin, London, 1984; Thomas Nagel, "What is it like to be a bat?", in Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, pp.165-180.

Even the argument of computer theorists and reductivists,²⁵⁷ that there has not been enough time spent in laboratories to fully prove their case and that they will prove their case fully in the future, misses the most important point about emotions: we saw Sartre expressing the view that the way of empirical human sciences is the wrong way to understand anything related to humans; David Hume and his extreme empiricism on the issue of passions (as well as on anything else belonging to human activities and psychological make-up), has torn the idea of a unitary science of man into pieces.²⁵⁸ A piecemeal interpretation of man and his emotions is what laboratory psychologists and computer theorists try to offer us promoting the ideas of Hume at the experimental level. They try to offer us scholarship of the parts of man, but are lacking in explanations of how this pieces-man acts as a whole in any given situation. This is what Sartre and Wittgenstein (in his own way) try to do: offer a holistic idea of man, who through unreflective, but not unconscious, consciousness directs himself in the world, as one whole thing with a body, reasoning faculties, and immaterial consciousness.

Of course, Sartre's appeal to magic is an unnecessary jump into mysticism, and perhaps an empiricist may find it highly objectionable. But this is not a difficult problem for Sartrean Theory. Sartre's use of the term "magic" is clearly metaphorical; its meaning as an irrational synthesis of passivity and spontaneity is clearly established by Sartre in his own text. It can be understood as a synthesis of man's spontaneity in the form of his will, in the face of adversities. Man reacts spontaneously in the face of an extreme adversity and changes either the world or himself, depending on which conditions of the world (which

²⁵⁷ Expressed mainly by P.Feyerabend in his "Materialism and the mind-body problem", in C.V.Borst, ed., The Mind-Brain Identity Theory, Macmillan, London, 1970.

²⁵⁸ See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, (ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge), Oxford University Press, 1958; Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge), Oxford University Press, 1962; Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, 2vols (ed. T.H. Green and T.H. Grose), Longmans, Green, London, 1875.

appears **difficult**) he sees himself able to change. In this way, he preserves his sense of absolute freedom through a direct act of his will, even in the face of an intuition of the deterministic difficulty of the world.

However, in order to show the value of what this account offers, let us now compare it to some of the alternatives.

For reasons expanded above we shall not turn to theories of emotions which have an extreme empiricist character. These cannot be acceptable in any comparative critique of Sartre, who places his theory on a totally different level. Sartre clearly thinks that piece-meal extreme empiricism is always the wrong perspective when we are trying to explain human actions (with I think a most valid justification), and we have to respect his most essential convictions, if we are to improve or offer any valuable critique.

Plausible candidates for theories of emotions from which we can formulate a valuable critique on Sartre's theory of emotions can be found in the works of Ryle and Kenny.

Ryle in The Concept of Mind²⁵⁹ puts forward a theory of emotions with which he thinks he refutes the supporters of the "ghost in the machine" (i.e., Cartesians). In this book he maintains that "emotion" is used to designate at least three or four different kinds of thing, which he calls "inclinations" (or "motives"), "moods", "agitations" (or "commotions"), and "feelings". Inclinations and moods, including agitations, are not occurrences and do not therefore take place either publicly or privately. They are propensities, not acts nor states. They are, however, propensities of different kinds and their differences are important. Feelings, on the other hand, are occurrences, but the

²⁵⁹ Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Penguin, London, 1949, pp.81-111.

space that any mentioning of them should take in descriptions of human behaviour is very different from that which the standard theories accord to it. Moods or frames of mind, unlike motives but like maladies and states of weather, are temporary conditions which in a certain way *collect* occurrences, but they are not themselves extra occurrences. For Ryle, emotions as explanations of people's behaviour can be either motives or inclinations from which intelligent actions are done, or else moods, agitations or perturbations, of which some aimless movements are signs. He rejects the idea of emotions as impulses, and of impulsive actions based on emotions as para-mechanical myths of the occult antecedents of actions. In short, emotions are nothing else but behaviour trends to behave in a specific way (that way which is depicted when we say that someone has a particular emotion).

Kenny in Action, Emotion, and Will, but more recently in The Metaphysics of Mind²⁶⁰ accepts that one can experience an emotion only if one can manifest it. Kenny believes that emotions are more closely linked with actions than beliefs. And of course even though some emotions can be private events, Kenny does not accept that all emotions can be private.

It is evident from our above exposition of Sartre's theory of the emotions, that both Ryle and Kenny are missing a very important point: emotions cannot be restricted to some of their manifestations, for example behaviour. The behaviour of emotions (linguistic or not, it is irrelevant) is only an aspect of the emotions: perhaps the poorest, since one can mime emotions, or fake them.

The theories of Ryle and Kenny however, bring out one other aspect of Sartre's philosophy that Sartre himself saw no need to develop fully at this stage of the development of his philosophy. This aspect is his views on Language. The

²⁶⁰ Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion, and Will, Routledge, London, 1963; The Metaphysics of Mind, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp.50-65.

work of Ryle and Kenny depends on a theory of Language, since they base their observations, distinctions and (re-)structuring of traditional classifications on linguistic modes of expression regarding emotions. They see contradictions in the traditional (mainly Cartesian) talk about emotions and they try to formulate a theory of emotions (and other "elements" of our mind) which shall do away with these contradictions: again a theory based on common sense language. What will mainly concern us here is: Can Language be considered an emotion-free vehicle of thought? Can Language be considered as an "objective" means of communication, and thus be a certain basis for universalizable observations regarding our mental life?

These questions we will attempt to answer through an investigation of what Sartre considers Language to be, and what he considers to be its significance and its meaning.

iii) Sartre and Language.

Sartre himself refers to Language in connection to his views on the Emotions, both in the short work on the Emotions that we saw, and in his Being and Nothingness, where Language becomes a continuation and furtherance of our goal in our Love towards the Other: the captivation of the Other's Freedom, and the bestowing of a fullness of Being on us. In his Being and Nothingness, Part Three, entitled "Being-for-Others", Chapter Three, with the title "Concrete Relations With Others", after a description in Ontological terms of what exactly is love in relation to the Other, Sartre proceeds to describe the nature of Language, the second of the three steps of our First Attitude toward others: Love, Language, Masochism (the Second Attitude is Indifference, Desire, Hate, Sadism)²⁶¹.

²⁶¹ BN, pp.364-379.

Aiming at *seducing* the Other (i.e., producing in the Other the consciousness of his state of nothingness as he confronts the seductive object: *me*), and making myself a *fascinating* object (i.e., an object full of being in the presence of the Other's non-thetic consciousness of being a nothingness) I constitute myself as a *meaningful object* and thus employ various expressions. Through these expressions, I try to direct the Other towards the depth of my objective and hidden. By suggesting, through the employment of undifferentiated other real and possible actualities which transcends me and present myself a dead-possibilities, to the exact extent to which that is, I try to make the Other believe that he may desire, even these, I can offer to her to the beloved, so that I can constitute myself as the bridge between her and the world; I manifest through my acts and expressions infinitely varied examples of my power over the world (money, position, "connections", etc.).

In short, I try to propose myself as unsurpassable through the presentation of myself as a being constituted by an infinity of depth, and as identifiable with the world. But this proposal is not enough by itself; to make myself a fascinating object, I do not only need to *besiege* the Other through this proposal I am putting forward, but I also need the *consent* of the Other's freedom; I try to capture this freedom and its consent by making it recognise itself as a nothingness in the face of **my plenitude of absolute being.**²⁶²

In this whole attempt to transform ourselves into a fascinating object for the Other, we employ various forms of expression which necessarily presuppose a

²⁶² BN, *ibid*, p.372.



language. Sartre acknowledges this and maintains that these are not only language but a fundamental form of language. The existence, the learning and use of a *particular* language is a matter of psychology and history; however, language as a fundamental form of expression is not a phenomenon added on to being-for-others: *it is originally being-for-others*. For Sartre language has to do with my subjectivity (my for-itself) experiencing itself as an object for the Other. Language in this way becomes an *original relation of one subject with another subject*, discarding all talk about the "discovery", or "invention" of language.

In the inter-subjectivity of the for-others, the recognition of the Other *as Other* already provides and accounts for the existence of language. In this way (that whatever I do, my acts as freely conceived and executed, my projects launched toward my possibilities have outside of them a meaning which escapes me and which I experience as escaping me) Sartre assimilates Heidegger's "*I am what I say*", and transforms it into the Sartrean aphorism "*I am language*".²⁶³

Even though for Sartre language is fundamental to human existence, he distances himself from both the theorists who claim that language is a kind of human instinct in our human nature, divesting thus language from all subjectivity (one could name them "the objectivists on language"), and the theorists of the opposite extreme who believe that language is an invention of our subjectivity (one can name them "the subjectivists on language"). Language also lacks the independent existence associated with the "being-outside-of-self" of the Heideggerian *Dasein*.

²⁶³ BN, *ibid*, pp.372-3; for Heidegger, Sartre quotes A. de Waelelens, *La philosophie de Martin Heidegger*, Louvain, 1942, p.99, and Heidegger's own text: Martin Heidegger, *Holderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung*, p.6; in English, *Existence and Being*, transl. by Douglas Scott, Henry Regnery, Chicago, 1949, p.297.

For Sartre, language forms *part of the human condition*; with language my for-itself proves its existence as a being-for-others, and in this way avoids the narcissistic extremes of solipsism. But with language I also surpass this proof and, utilising this guaranteed access to the world (language), I move toward other possibilities of contact and action in the world: I can change (or at least do my best to change) the Other's perception of me. Thus, *language becomes indistinguishable from the recognition of the Other's existence.*

Language arises at a primitive level as the condition of my being through and because of the Other's look: it is subsequent to the other primitive attitude confronting the Other (Love). These succeed each other in a circle, each implying the other. Language at this level is not seduction; *seduction* as the *complete realisation of language* does not presuppose any earlier form of language; language is revealed by seduction *entirely and at one stroke*, as a primitive mode of the being of expression.²⁶⁴ By Language Sartre means all the phenomena of expression; the articulated word, in all its forms, both written and oral is just a derived and secondary mode of expression, whose appearance can be made the object of a historical study, but is far too poor in ontological significance to encompass all language.

In seduction, where language reveals its ontology entirely and at one stroke, language also reveals its true aim and goal: *causing the Other* (and our being-for-others) *to experience.*²⁶⁵ This aim and goal is extremely important; if language aimed at *giving to be known*, a mainly epistemological endeavour, then the whole attempt at expression may easily be futile in the end; the Other can engage in a sceptical refutation of our epistemological claims and thus our attempt to become the object of fascination prove to be worthless. If on the

²⁶⁴ [... *la seduction ne suppose aucune forme anterieure du langage: elle est toute entiere realisation du langage; cela signifie que le langage peut se reveler entierement et d'un coup par la seduction comme mode d'etre primitif de l'expression. (L'etre et le neant, pp.422-423).*

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

other hand we try to cause the Other to *experience* (what we want the Other to experience) then we will eventually achieve our goal: we will *entrap* the Other into *our situation, our proposed fullness of being*, with extremely few chances of escape. *The Other will be a prey* (and will always be a prey) as long as our *trap* and the devices in it keep the Other from ever using his/her own devices (mainly *reason*) to escape.

In our drive to find a fascinating language, we proceed blindly, since we are guided only by the abstract and empty (general) form of our object-state for the Other. And even if we were able to fully control the fascinating language which we employ, we could not conceive what effect our gestures and attitudes would have, since they would have to wait for a freedom (the Other's) to take them and confer upon them (any) meaning. In this way, the "meaning" of our expressions always escapes us. We never know exactly if we signify what we want to signify, nor even if we are signifying anything at all! Due to this lack of knowing what we actually express for the Other, we constitute our language as an *incomplete* phenomenon of **flight outside ourselves**. At the moment we express ourselves we can only guess at the meaning of what we express, and, since in this perspective to express and to be are one, we can only guess the meaning of what we are.

For Sartre thus the Other becomes the focal point for the use of language: the Other is always there, present and experienced as the one who gives language its meaning. With each of our expressions and gestures, each of our words, we have a concrete proof of the *alienating reality* of the Other. This is exactly the truth, "the realisation of the human condition" according to Sartre, which psychopaths suffering a psychosis of influence know so well when they speak about people "stealing" their thoughts. Actually for Sartre, the very fact of expression is a "stealing" of thought since thought needs the co-operation of an alienating freedom in order to be constituted as an object. Of course

"stealing" here has no materialistic associations (as it may have in the case of psychopaths), but refers to the ontological shift in the ownership of ourselves: instead of us owning us (as both objects and subjects), someone else owns us through our words (mainly as an object, but also as an Other- which ontologically can not be an object, since it is another "alienating freedom").

In this way, language in its first aspect becomes *sacred*. It is sacred, since our words (the *sacred objects*) are in the world (as verbal/written behaviour) and point to a transcendence beyond the world. This transcendence is the freedom of the one who listens or reads in silence and which is revealed to us with each use of language.

For the hearer and the reader we are and always will be *meaningful objects*. Our attitudes, expressions and words can only indicate to them other attitudes, expressions and words. The Other is "locked" in our object state and perceives our transcendence as unreachable. Thus language for the Other becomes a *magical object*: it is an action at a distance (and thus uncontrollable by the Other) whose effect the Other knows exactly and with precision (knowledge that we cannot have). In this way, the word is *sacred* for us who utter or write it, and *magic* when the Other hears it.

Our body has this ontological and epistemological resemblance to our language: *we cannot have the knowledge we desire in our relation to the Other*. We can not hear ourselves speak nor see ourselves smile. This similarity makes Sartre acknowledge that: "The problem of language is exactly parallel to the problem of bodies, and the description which is valid in one case is valid in the other".²⁶⁶

²⁶⁶ BN, p.374.

But even if our drive towards fascination (through our language) succeeds in producing a state of fascination in the Other, it cannot by itself succeed in producing love. We know this and that is why we do not feel satisfied by only seducing the Other. Seduction can only provide the Other-as-object, but never the Other-as-subject.

Love can be born in the beloved only from the proof that he has regarding his alienation and flight toward the Other; however, the beloved will be transformed into a lover only if he projects being loved. His wish as a lover is not to overcome a body but the Other's subjectivity as such.²⁶⁷ This comes as a consequence of Sartre's earlier views regarding the emotions.

In his views on language we see Sartre placing an equal emphasis on behaviour (his talk about the similarity between our language and body) and the thought "behind" language (his talk about expression being a "stealing of one's thought"). Note here that Sartre can never be classified as a behaviourist of sorts in relation to his theory of language: for that one would need a stronger claim than a mere "similarity" between language and body. Perhaps a talk about "identity", even a "type-type/token-token identity", or some kind of supervenience theory may be enough for some kind of analogy to contemporary discussions in language, but Sartre never attempts such a comparison nor can we see any indication in his work to support such comparisons in any way.

On the other hand, in his views on the emotions (in both the earlier works and now in BN) we see Sartre grant to behaviour an even smaller role: here behaviour is not only unimportant, but also *ontologically* the most insignificant aspect of an emotion. We see Sartre claim that what is important to love is not the behaviour of seduction or fascination, but the projection that we do of ourselves as *being loved by the Other*. We surpass in this way the world of

²⁶⁷ BN pp.374-375.

objects, of bodies and behaviours, and we transcend it to achieve a connection in the level of subjects, of freedoms and subjectivities. We overcome our drive to possess the Other-as-object, and we replace it with our Love towards the Other-as-subject that loves *us*.

Love in this way is not the behaviour of the lover, or the behaviour of the loved, or even the behaviour of both the lover and the loved; love is for the lover to be held captive by his very demand to be loved. Actually, the lover as a subject wants to be loved by the Other-as-Subject as an *object* (because his for-itself desires to be transformed into an in-itself by the beloved), and in this way he transforms love into a drive towards an alienation of his and the Other's freedom. This "escape" from one's freedom in an original intuition, the target of both lover and beloved, can only be a contradictory ideal for the for-itself. Each one of the lovers wants the Other's love, without realising that this can occur only on the condition of the offer of love to the Other. In this way, love relations are a system of indefinite reference under the ideal standard of the *value* "love", or, in other words, of a fusion of consciousnesses in which each of them would preserve his otherness in order to found the other.²⁶⁸ Actually what we see here is a total rejection of behaviour from Sartre, and an ontological reference of one consciousness to another, with no limitations from behaviours and bodies.

In this way, the futile character of all emotions gains its ontological significance and the true meaning of the "magical" comes to the forefront: emotions and any other drive of consciousness towards the Outer with the help of Intentionality is doomed to failure. In our drive to free ourselves from the agony and extreme pain of having an absolute freedom, freedom to create and destroy the world with a single glance, we seek the help of the Outer, the world as the foundation of our freedom; the Outer however cannot help us because it

²⁶⁸ BN, pp.374-376.

is itself created by our consciousness. Our agony is, in this way, only multiplied, since through a transversal of Intentionalities the Outer becomes the foundation of both our agony for our absolute freedom, and for choosing this Outer to escape from it. Intentionality in this way becomes a true Pandora's box and a devil for our consciousness: a Pandora's box because it may look like a salvation, but actually is a menace; a devil because instead of using it to help us in our true ontological connection with ourselves (life in authenticity) we use it to deceive ourselves, and through the magical which it grants to the Outer we use it to control our consciousness and alienate it from its true character as an absolute freedom.

iv) Wittgenstein and Sartre on the Emotions and Language.

Ludwig Wittgenstein²⁶⁹ in his own position on the emotions is not far from Sartre's theory.

Wittgenstein not only considers the behavioural manifestations of emotions as not important (since one can mime them), but also maintains that "emotions colour thoughts", or that emotions cannot exist without thought and thought without its colour, emotions.

It is important to note in relation to our claim that Wittgenstein disregards the behavioural manifestations of emotions, that some of the commentators on Wittgenstein's later thought may look upon our claim with extreme disbelief and doubt. They see an important influence of logical behaviourism in Wittgenstein's

²⁶⁹ In Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, (pb.ed.) Vols I-II, (ed. and transl. by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright), Blackwell, Oxford, 1980 (1990), mainly para. 836, pp.148e-149e. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd ed., transl. by G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, 1968 (1953), pp.174, 187-189.

later thought, and claim that Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle (in his Concept of Mind) are very much alike in their logical behaviourism (some even claim that Ryle actually got his views from Wittgenstein- Ryle himself supports this in some of his work)²⁷⁰.

I am opposed to all commentators who make a logical behaviourist out of the later Wittgenstein. I follow here the line of commentators like Peter Winch,²⁷¹ P.M.S. Hacker,²⁷² Norman Malcolm,²⁷³ A.C. Grayling²⁷⁴ and David Pears.²⁷⁵ In their books these commentators (Winch et al.) claim that not only was Wittgenstein opposed to a clear behaviourist perspective, (in both their forms of psychological and logical- like that of Carnap and the Vienna Circle), but he also adhered to some elements of the philosophical opponent of behaviourism, that of innatism.²⁷⁶

What actually makes some commentators think that Wittgenstein was a logical behaviourist (and thus for our purposes a reductivist in the theory of emotions) is Wittgenstein's over-emphasised opposition to Cartesianism. They

²⁷⁰ See P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, Volume 3 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, Part I: Essays, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, (pb.ed.) 1993, p.114; Gilbert Ryle's "On Bouwsma's Wittgenstein" in Konstantin Kolenda, ed., Gilbert Ryle: On Thinking, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1979.

²⁷¹ In Peter Winch, Trying to Make Sense, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987, article entitled: *Eine Einstellung zur Seele*, pp.140-153.

²⁷² In P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, Volume 3 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, Part I: Essays, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, (pb.ed.) 1993, pp.97-126.

²⁷³ In Norman Malcolm, Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1971, esp. pp.80-103.

²⁷⁴ In A.C. Grayling, Wittgenstein, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988, pp.87-98.

²⁷⁵ In David Pears, The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988, p.270.

²⁷⁶ Innatism here is not reducible to the Cartesian ideas about the Inner. For a commentator on Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind, who claims a similar view to the one expressed here, see Malcolm Budd, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology, Routledge, London, 1989. For a very interesting and supportive to my claims about Wittgenstein view see Stephen Mulhall, On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects, Routledge, London, 1993 (1990), esp. pp.53-90, 152-3, 91-155.

disregard his anti-behaviourism, and especially his opposition to the Vienna Circle and those influenced by it, like Carnap and Bertrand Russell.

In particular, Winch, when analysing *Philosophical Investigations*, Part II, Section iv and especially Wittgenstein's "My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul", finds that even though Wittgenstein has accepted the use of the word "belief" in the ascriptions of **particular** states of thought and feeling to other people, he objects to using the same word in ascriptions of the **general** view we have of them. In other words, when it comes to acknowledging that a specific being in front of us has or hasn't the necessary conditions for having emotions and other states of consciousness, we act and speak at a different level than that of mere belief. Our reaction towards this being is more or less **unreflective** and this unreflectiveness is part of the primitive material out of which our concept of a human person is formed. In addition, this unreflective attitude does not have as an object the behaviour (even the linguistic behaviour) of the being in front of us, nor the being itself in its physical and somatic existence. That is why Wittgenstein uses the word "soul". He wants to indicate that our relation with the being in front of us is more internal than any behaviourist (linguistic or not) or any physicalist/reductivist perspective would allow. And what will really surprise all behaviourists and physicalists is that Wittgenstein believes that this internal relation is not an attitude we can adopt or abandon at will. It is not only unreflective but it looks almost instinctive (i.e. both necessary and not having to do with logical laws etc.). Both of these characteristics of our internal relation to others (unreflectiveness and instinctiveness) and their ontology (as not being able to be translated to any behavioural pattern and computer programme, since they are unreflective and instinctive and thus not able to follow logical or behavioural laws) quite probably make behaviourists and physicalists see such an interpretation of Wittgenstein as their worst nightmare coming true!

P.M.S. Hacker on the other hand, through a detailed investigation into the origins and the development of the philosophical forms of behaviourism still thriving at the time of Wittgenstein (Vienna Circle, Carnap, Russell, et al.), and a comparative analysis between Wittgenstein and the behaviourists, finds that "despite these important converging lines, it is fundamentally misguided to classify Wittgenstein's descriptions of the grammar of psychological expressions as a form of logical behaviourism".²⁷⁷ According to Hacker, Wittgenstein did not deny the existence of the mental (as psychological behaviourists do) nor did he reduce the mental to behaviour (as logical behaviourists do). What Wittgenstein tried to do is to explore the grammar of the expression or manifestation of the Inner. In fact he was opposed in his account of the Inner to many of the logical behaviourists' strategies. First, in *Philosophical Investigations*, para.571, he opposed the reduction of the psychological explanation of processes in the psychical sphere to some sort of physical nomologic explanation, in the way physical explanations are applied in the sphere of the physical (Hacker also discusses in connection to this: Wittgenstein's remarks in Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol.I, paras. 287, 288, 292).

Secondly, the relations of behavioural expression to what it is an expression of are not external: they are internal or grammatical (and not of the sort an unobservable entity has to its causal effects). The mental is a *criterion* of the behavioural expression: it is possible for pain to occur without being manifest, and it is possible for pain-behaviour to be displayed without there being any pain. This grammatical relation, though distinct from entailment, nevertheless allows for certainty even if it a defeasible certainty.

²⁷⁷ Hacker, *ibid*, p.115.

Thirdly (and as a consequence of the second point), the logic of expression (*Ausserung*) is not the logic of correlation of distinct domains, and the grammar of psychological words used in verbal manifestations of the mental is not the grammar of names of objects (PI para. 293).

And Hacker concludes: "One might say that behaviourism, no less than dualism, failed to appreciate the grammatical (logical) significance of the fact that "I have a pain" is an *expression* of pain."²⁷⁸

Later on Hacker directly attacks the logical behaviourist interpretations of Wittgenstein by analysing the claims of C.L.Hull²⁷⁹, that from "colourless movements" and "mere receptor impulses as such" (as opposed to intentional, goal-directed behaviour) one can deduce or construct psychological concepts such as purpose, intention, desire, etc. Hacker repeats his claim that Wittgenstein distances himself from such behaviourist theories, and he rejects directly all claims that the Wittgensteinian theory of the criterion is a novelty that Wittgenstein offered for the logical positivist camp of the Vienna Circle, to save it from apparent difficulties of mediation between observable behaviour and psychological state.²⁸⁰ What Hacker mainly brings against the logical-behaviourist interpreters of Wittgenstein is the fact that they disregard the emphasis that Wittgenstein himself places on the surroundings, and in general the context within which a given behaviour occurs. In this way, the Inner and the Outer intermingle and become so inter-dependent that the outer becomes a criterion for the inner and the outer becomes unavoidably and essentially describable in terms of the inner.²⁸¹ Hacker closes his attack on the logical-behaviourist interpretation of Wittgenstein, through a very apt interpretation of PI, p.178: "The human body is the best picture of the human soul"; Hacker

²⁷⁸ Hacker, *ibid*, p.117.

²⁷⁹ In C.L.Hull, *Principles of Behaviour*, New York, 1945.

²⁸⁰ Hacker, *ibid*, p.124.

²⁸¹ Hacker, *ibid*, pp.124-126.

writes that Wittgenstein wrote this not because the soul is manifest in something bodily, but precisely because the soul is manifest in behaviour.²⁸²

I think that this survey mainly into the work of Winch and Hacker suffices as an adequate support for my claim that Wittgenstein is not a logical behaviourist.

It also suffices as a support for my claim that in connection to his views on the emotions and his claim that "emotions colour thoughts", Wittgenstein made exactly the point that Hacker makes in connection to C.L.Hull's theory of "colourless movements". Wittgenstein, stressing the context within which an emotional behaviour is observed or stated, directly attacks the behaviourist (psychological and logical) presuppositions about behaviour (psycho-somatic or verbal) which make it the sole criterion for the existence of an emotion. When he mentions the fact that one can mime behaviour without actually having the emotion concerned, Wittgenstein further supports his attack on behaviourism and provides sufficient grounds for making the claim that he is clearly an anti-behaviourist.

Of course I do not claim (nor do any of the cited commentators) that Wittgenstein clearly adhered to some sort of innatism, or that he supported some theory in relation to emotions which makes them "things inside the head". Wittgenstein was neither an innatist nor a behaviourist. What I actually want to point out with all this in mind is the equal emphasis Wittgenstein and Sartre place both on the behaviour associated with an emotion (and any other psychical process) and on the context within which this emotion occurs. With Wittgenstein the context will be clarified through a grammatical investigation of the language-game associated with the emotion concerned (we must not forget that "behaviour" itself, and what counts as "behavioural evidence" are specific

²⁸² Hacker, *ibid*, p.126.

language-games), and through an understanding that the language-game is independent of philosophical pre-suppositions and theories. (Our language has a life of its own- a "form of life", with primary, primitive experiences which cannot be reduced to or analysed in terms of other experiences.) With Sartre one has to use existential psychoanalysis in order to clarify the symbolic character of a given emotion within one's plan and choice of life.

I also want to emphasise that most of the philosophical theories that Wittgenstein tried hard to dismantle were the target of Sartre as well. Both attacked theories from "both sides of the tunnel": both criticised in a very rigorous way behaviourists, physicalists, innatists and especially Cartesians. Both tried to incorporate elements from all of the criticised theories, Wittgenstein having as a guide the grammar of specified language-games, and Sartre guided by the phenomenological ontology of the human situation.

In relation to their views on Language, we see that both differentiate themselves from behaviourists, even though they both emphasised the behavioural aspect of language. Sartre actually gave linguistic behaviour equal worth with the thoughts that are expressed by it, and he emphasised the similarity of language and body. Wittgenstein on the other hand, while emphasising that linguistic behaviour and its grammar are the sole guide for meaning and thought as expressed in employed language-games, criticised in his own way the theory that linguistic behaviour is the *sole* guide in determining the meaning and the thought expressed. He spoke of "forms of life", and language-games that do not follow laws and specifiable rules. In the later works one can clearly see a sceptic (or at least an anti-realist) Wittgenstein who does not hesitate to dismantle behaviourism in all its forms, since behaviourism as a

philosophical movement and a tradition considers itself immune to scepticism and anti-realism.²⁸³

It would be useful next, before our concluding section, to investigate how Sartre escapes some of the criticisms that commentators have made on his concept of Intentionality.

²⁸³ See for example the work of Crispin Wright, in Crispin Wright, "Wittgenstein's Rule-following Considerations and the Central Project of Theoretical Linguistics", in Alex George, ed., Reflections on Chomsky, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989, pp.233-264; Crispin Wright, Wittgenstein on the Foundation of Mathematics, Duckworth, London, 1980; Crispin Wright, "Rule-following objectivity and the theory of meaning", in S.Holtzman and C.Leich, eds, Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981, pp.99-137; and Saul Kripke in Saul A.Kripke, Wittgenstein On Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, (1982) 1989; of course Kripke's views are not without problems; I discuss these problems in detail in my unpublished "A Critique of Kripke's Wittgenstein", paper read at the Postgraduate Section of the Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, St.Andrews, September 1993; also see John McDowell, "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule", *Synthese*, 58 (1984), pp.325-363; Paul A. Boghossian, "The Rule-Following Considerations", *Mind*, 98 (1989), pp.507-549; Alex Miller, "Boghossian on the Sceptical Solution", *The Oyster Club*, June 1992, pp.15-17.

VI. CRITIQUES ON SARTRE'S THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY.

In this section of the Thesis, an analysis of certain critiques of Sartre's theory shall be attempted. In particular, the views of Jitendra N. Mohanty,²⁸⁴ Richard E. Aquilla,²⁸⁵ John R. Searle,²⁸⁶ and Maurita J. Harney²⁸⁷ shall be critically discussed and compared to Sartre's own theory. These theorists have been selected both because they have dealt directly with the topic of our Thesis (Intentionality), and because they have produced a theory that challenges Sartre's. Two of them (Mohanty and Aquilla) have directly discussed Sartre's theory. Even though these theories are not the only ones who might produce a serious threat to the plausibility of Sartre's theory of Intentionality, they represent the types or kinds of objections that can be presented: we have critiques based on the metaphysics and ontology employed by Sartre (Mohanty, Aquilla), on linguistic considerations (Searle), and on both ontological and linguistic considerations (Harney).

i) Jitendra Nath Mohanty: Intentionality and Indian Philosophy of Consciousness.

Mohanty in his study of the concept of Intentionality wishes to continue his own previous work on the logical aspects of Husserl's theory of meaning.²⁸⁸ In this work he studies the noetic aspect of Husserl's theory of meaning, i.e., the nature of consciousness and of its contact to the world through Intentionality.

²⁸⁴ In Jitendra Nath Mohanty, The Concept of Intentionality, Warren H. Green, St.Louis Missouri, USA, 1972.

²⁸⁵ In Richard E. Aquilla, Intentionality: A Study of Mental Acts, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park and London, 1977.

²⁸⁶ In John R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.

²⁸⁷ In Maurita J. Harney, Intentionality, Sense and the Mind, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1984.

²⁸⁸ J.N.Mohanty, Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1964.

After a detailed study of the concept of Intentionality found in Brentano, he tries to prove that any attempt to "explain away" Intentionality is doomed to failure.²⁸⁹ In particular he attacks idealist attempts to claim that consciousness is free from reference to objects and thus "explain away" Intentionality as useless metaphysical jargon, vulnerable to the principle known as Ockham's Razor. He also attacks realists who deny any peculiar reference of consciousness to an object, and who claim that there is a *real* relatedness of consciousness to its object, in which both *relata* are equally real, their qualitative differences notwithstanding. Such realists replace intentional directedness either by a neutral compresence or by a causal relation, or at best by some relation which cannot be further analysed, but which is nonetheless real for that.

He finally dispenses with attempts (mainly from philosophers in the British-American Analytic tradition) to attack all theories of Intentionality as either having too many commitments to the "cursed" Cartesian dualism, or as wrong analyses and descriptions of our mental states when we act or use language. In response to these attacks, he claims that these philosophers, who claim that the objects of intentional attitudes are linguistic entities and so that all intentional sentences can be replaced by sentences relating people to linguistic entities, are trying to reduce Intentionality to such a linguistic relation because they are concerned about the notion of the mental²⁹⁰ and other dualistic notions that have been associated with Intentionality.²⁹¹

Mohanty maintains that the concept of Intentionality does not stand or fall with the concept of the mental in general, and is committed neither to a

²⁸⁹ Mohanty, The Concept of Intentionality, pp.37-50.

²⁹⁰ See Carnap in R. Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudo-problems in Philosophy, transl. by R.A. George, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1967; Quine in W.V.O. Quine, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, Random House, New York, 1966.

²⁹¹ Such as Brentano's notion of mental acts; see Russell in B. Russell, The Analysis of Mind, Allen & Unwin, London, 1961 (1921).

philosophy of the ghost in the machine, nor to dualism.²⁹² It is also not committed according to Mohanty to the mechanistic or naturalistic type of thinking about the mind, or even about the body.²⁹³ In addition, any talk about mental *acts* is mistaken, since an act is what is characterised as such by Intentionality; intentional directedness itself (reference to, or being-about), is not an act.²⁹⁴

What the reductionists of Intentionality cannot understand, according to Mohanty, is that the Intentionality thesis is neutral as between realism and idealism and quite compatible with both; and that the true nature of Intentionality cannot be grasped unless one refuses to ontologize, keeping faithful to the precepts of phenomenology.²⁹⁵

In his critique of other theories of Intentionality, Mohanty incorporates Sartre's theory in his target, even though he finds it more faithful than Heidegger's to the Husserlian dogma of the irreducibility of Intentionality and of the necessity of placing it in the realm of consciousness.²⁹⁶

Mohanty finds that Merleau-Ponty's and Paul Ricoeur's criticisms on Sartre are accurate, and he follows them up to a great extent. He adopts Merleau-Ponty's attack on the Sartrean dualism of the for-itself and in-itself, his proposed degrees of Intentionality and his notion of *bodily Intentionality* as an original phenomenon, irreducible to the Intentionality of consciousness or of thought -

²⁹² Here Mohanty cites Quinton in "Mind and Matter", in Smythes, ed., Brain and Mind. Modern concepts of the Nature of Mind. The Humanities Press, New York, 1965, who claims that the Brentano thesis rules out behaviourism, and that Intentionality is compatible with an identity theory according to which the identity between bodily and mental states is not logical but contingent; Mohanty rejects the first claim of Quinton, see Mohanty, *ibid*, p.197n22, and thus differs from our Thesis that behaviourism is indeed ruled out by a theory of Intentionality such as Sartre's.

²⁹³ See Mohanty, *ibid*, p.50.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid*.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid*.

²⁹⁶ Instead of the *Dasein* as in Heidegger's; *ibid*, pp.128-137.

even though he finds that this attack leaves the for-itself ill-defined and curiously vague.²⁹⁷ Mohanty however considers Ricoeur's critique of Sartre's for-itself to be more successful, since he directs the attention to the *volitional interpretation of Intentionality*. The Husserlian ego is not to be thrown away as an unnecessary metaphysical burden (as Sartre tried to prove, with his notion of pre-reflective consciousness and the for-itself), but accepted as a special case of pre-reflective consciousness, the *pre-reflective volitional consciousness*. In this consciousness "I see a tram car" is not reducible to "This is a tram car"; on the contrary, in the pre-reflective volitional consciousness, and in making one's mind act in a certain way, one posits one's self as the agent of the decision. This reference to the subject pole is still pre-reflective, not an inspection or reflective observation of oneself. This is what is termed by Ricoeur "*pre-reflective self-imputation*": I figure in the project as the one to whom the action can be imputed. Moreover, this relatedness of an intention to the self is not revealed so explicitly in other kinds of acts, and this is why Sartre's idea of the pre-reflective consciousness is still useful, though not universally applicable. The Sartrean dogma of the transparency of consciousness however must be dropped, since in the volitional pre-reflective consciousness one finds the *I* or ego, and thus not transparency, emptiness and nothingness. For Ricoeur pre-reflective consciousness is transparent in all other modes but the volitional mode. In this way he believes in the transparency of consciousness, but not in its complete transparency.

In addition, Ricoeur, being more faithful to Husserl than the majority of existentialist phenomenologists, keeps the notion of *hyle* and accommodates the psycho-analytic notion of the unconscious within the framework of his phenomenological theory of consciousness. He believes that consciousness always contains within itself affective matter which is never fully transparent to it; in this way there is infinite room for self-questioning and self-interpretation in

²⁹⁷ Ibid, pp.137-143.

the areas of need, emotion and habit. When this affective matter is left meaningless and unformed, it gains extreme weight and becomes too burdensome, leading one to psychiatric illnesses. With the help of the psychoanalyst the patient gives meaning to this unformed matter for the first time and thus is delivered from his painful burden.

Ricoeur looks upon the world as the intentional correlate of the body and regards the body as essentially open to the world, and consequently as intentional. Ricoeur accepts that outer perception is always from a point of view; through dialectic he attempts to prove that in perceiving an outer object, we anticipate all possible points of view of all possible percipients; thus we come to *mean* the thing itself, not a perspective of it, as the object being perceived, even if this meaning-intention can never be totally fulfilled. Further, the power of creating absurd significations (e.g. "round-square") shows that Intentionality is not exhausted by fulfilled presence, and that it is a transcendence of the limitations imposed by the world.

However, one should not be fooled by the emphasis on the creativity that Intentionality allows us in Ricoeur's account: Ricoeur is not Sartre. According to Ricoeur, absolute creativity is totally un-Husserlian; for Husserl, the creativity of consciousness is tied to a "transcendental guide", the object of sense, and without such a "transcendental guide", the flux of consciousness would submerge us. Given this indispensability of the layer of sense, Intentionality becomes a less than absolute contact with the world, and the idea of objects (individual or eidetic) as totally self-given is de-emphasised, and restated in the light of the dialectics of intention and fulfilment. In this way, phenomenology is not a philosophy of "freedom" but of "sense".²⁹⁸

²⁹⁸ Ibid, pp.143-8.

Mohanty finds that through these criticisms on Sartre we can see where the problems start for Sartre's theory: his emphasis on the Husserlian transcendental ego leads him to disregard the fact that this ego was later (in *Ideen II*) said to be constituted in a manner radically different from that of objects. In fact, according to Mohanty, Ricoeur has shown quite well that although the pure ego (even in the form of transcendental subjectivity) is not to be met within the stream of consciousness, a reference to the ego (covert or overt) may nevertheless accompany all acts, and make subsequent reflection possible.

Another source of worry regarding Sartre's theory is the proclaimed "openness", absolute transparency, emptiness and nothingness of consciousness.²⁹⁹ According to Mohanty, one can claim Intentionality as against a representational theory of consciousness, but one need not attribute a passive openness to it. Mohanty claims that such an open and passive consciousness is not a human consciousness; he prefers man condemned to meanings, the active *Sinngebung*, to a man condemned to be free. Mohanty finds that only Husserl's theory of the noema can accommodate both these facts about our consciousness (Intentionality as against representationalism, and consciousness as active *Sinngebung*).³⁰⁰ And once Sartre's theory of the transparency of consciousness is seen as a problem, Sartre's attack on the functionalism of Intentionality becomes one more source of difficulties. Sartre claimed that functionalism at the level of consciousness would end in an infinite regress; and since it is not evident to unreflective consciousness that such an infinity exists, we should discard such a prospect. Mohanty claims that once we accept that consciousness is not transparent, we need not be so certain regarding its contents.

Finally, he sees that the recognition of bodily intentionalities in the later Husserl (*Ideen II, III, and Phanomenologische Psychologie*) does not lead

²⁹⁹ Ibid, p.150.

³⁰⁰ Ibid, p.150-1.

phenomenology to monistic reductionist moves, of the sort that make bodily Intentionality a pale reflection of the Intentionality of consciousness, or the Intentionality of consciousness an epiphenomenon of bodily Intentionality.

What Mohanty goes on to establish in the later sections of his book is the precise relationship between these two radically different sorts of Intentionality. In addition, he believes that these two types or kinds of Intentionality cannot be investigated *a priori*, but must become the topic of a descriptive phenomenological investigation. In this way, the body-mind dualism is transformed into a dualism of intentional relations.³⁰¹

In fact, he actually maintains that through an investigation into the concept of Intentionality, and its relationship to consciousness, one is led to a phenomenology of subjectivity.³⁰² The nature and concept of subjectivity and Intentionality can be defined by Mohanty as follows. They constitute a higher order reflective concept emerging in the attitude of phenomenological reflection. Intentional reference is pre-reflective as well as post-reflective, and the concept arises from a certain type of reflection. It is not a generic but an analogical concept: it does not designate the common essence of all intentional phenomena, but as we move from acts to intentionalities which are not acts, or from the mental to the bodily domain, the sense of Intentionality radically alters so that we not only encounter different sorts of intentions but also intentions which are *as intentions* different.³⁰³

This theory of Intentionality is radically different both from Heidegger's³⁰⁴ and Sellars'³⁰⁵. Heidegger's concept of being-in-the-world itself is covertly intentional; and Sellars' realist commitment to an isomorphism between intellect

³⁰¹ Ibid, pp.151-2.

³⁰² Ibid, p.178.

³⁰³ Ibid, p.182.

³⁰⁴ In Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1953.

³⁰⁵ In W. Sellars, *Science, Perception and Reality*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1963.

and the world, as "a necessary condition of the intellect's Intentionality", is rendered non-sensical by the intentional inexistence of the intentional object.³⁰⁶ Mohanty proceeds to other possible objections, but since they are not directly related to Sartre's theory we will not examine them.

It is obvious from the above account that Mohanty has a lot in common with Sartre, but also some great differences. We saw that both Mohanty and Sartre oppose reductionist tendencies regarding Intentionality, and both (together with Wittgenstein) seem committed to reducing ontology to the minimum. Mohanty however opposed reductionism because he thought that all the concerns of the reductionists can be accommodated in his theory of Intentionality; Sartre on the other hand takes a clear stand and condemns all traditional realist and idealist theories as ill-founded and circular. In addition, the Sartrean theory of Intentionality could never be satisfied with an identity theory, or any traditional form of behaviourism. We also see Mohanty's theory agreeing with many of our "essentials" for any theory of Intentionality,³⁰⁷ but disagreeing with the majority of considerations which exist for Sartre. In this we see the value of Sartre's theory: it can protect theories of Intentionality from incorporating extreme positions, and from letting themselves open to reductionist exploitation.

We see this reductionist exploitation in full blood in Mohanty's citations of Merleau-Ponty and Paul Ricoeur, whose intentional misunderstandings of Sartre make Sartre's theory look like just another version of the reductionism that he (Mohanty) himself propounded in his definition of Intentionality³⁰⁸.

³⁰⁶ Mohanty, *ibid*, pp.186-7.

³⁰⁷ See my Introduction in the first section of the thesis.

³⁰⁸ It is important to note here that Mohanty does not see Sartre's diffusion of dualisms. It is frequent to accuse Sartre of preserving all dualisms in the for-itself in-itself differentiation. This could not be further from the truth; see my Section on Realism, and David E. Cooper, Existentialism, Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp.79-94, 39-78.

He seems that he deliberately ignores the Sartrean arguments against subjectivity and any structure (Kantian, Husserlian, or any other) that can guarantee objectivity through its subjectivity, and the Sartrean theory of consciousness as pure activity; and also Sartre's essential distinction between what is posited, reflected and thus passive (full of reviewed and revisable meanings, etc.) on the one hand, and on the other the unreflected consciousness which is pure activity, because it is translucent, an emptiness and a nothingness. He also ignores Sartre's critique of the Freudian unconscious, and the drive behind that critique to keep the freedom and creativity of unreflected consciousness intact, and Sartre's theory of the body and its intentional relation to the world, other bodies, and its owner. Note also his emphasis on sense and meaning, to the detriment of the creativity of unreflected consciousness; and finally note that in his account the absolute freedom of unreflected consciousness is sacrificed for the existence and restraints of transcendental meaning and subjectivity.

Taking into consideration the Sartrean critique of the Husserlian Transcendental Ego, of functionalism and the burdening of unreflective consciousness with opaque structures such as meanings and subjectivity, we need not fall into the trap of Mohanty's concept of Intentionality. Intentionality is an ontological guarantee for the transparency of consciousness, its emptiness and its nothingness, its essence as pure activity. We have seen from Sartre's investigation that any denial of these attributes to unreflected consciousness is a fatal mistake, reducing Intentionality to unnecessary metaphysical garbage. Our investigation of Mohanty's theory, shows that such a reductionist drive, in an otherwise valid climate for the proper description of consciousness, can lead to the extremities of subjectivism and transform body-mind dualism into a mere relational dualism: a dualism closer to a double-aspect theory (or in Mohanty's account the Naiyayika and Samkara Indian philosophies) than to a phenomenological theory of consciousness and Intentionality.

ii) Richard E. Aquilla: Intentionality as the Study of Mental Acts.

Aquilla's investigation lies in the realm of ontological and metaphysical enquiries related to the status of objects of mental states, and of the relation that unites awareness and the world. He defines Intentionality as the phenomenon of awareness or conception when it is construed in the *de dicto* sense (i.e., when we just report that a mental state is, or involves, the awareness, or conception of some object). He also defines mental states that exhibit this feature as mental acts.³⁰⁹

He finds that there are two main alternatives in the philosophy of consciousness having to do with Intentionality: the first emphasises the object of awareness, and supposes that some unique sort of *relation* between mental acts and their objects is necessarily involved whenever we have awareness and conceptions *of* such objects. This alternative has to face the difficulty of objects which do not exist; and in the face of such a difficulty Aquilla reviews Meinong's theory³¹⁰ that a relation with objects of awareness does not in fact require that there be any such objects for one to be related to; Russell's theory³¹¹ which just claims that we do not have any such awareness, Bergmann's theory³¹² that the realm of "real existence" comprises only a vanishingly small part of the total realm of being; and finally the theories of Frege and the later Husserl,³¹³

³⁰⁹ Aquilla, *ibid*, p.ix.

³¹⁰ In Alexius Meinong, "*Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung*" and "*Über Gegenstandstheorie*", in *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig, 1929, 2:382-3, 492; *Über Annahmen*, Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig, 1910.

³¹¹ Mainly in B.Russell, *Analysis of Mind* (see above for bibliographical details), and *The Problems of Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, London, 1943.

³¹² Gustav Bergmann, *Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1967, and *Logic and Reality*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1964.

³¹³ Frege mainly in Gottlob Frege "On Sense and Reference" in *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, transl. by Peter Geach and Max Black, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1960; and "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry", transl. by A.M. and

who claim that we are always in fact aware of objects of a sort which are simply overlooked by materialistic theories of reality. His second alternative is the one found in Brentano and the early Husserl, who emphasises the *act* rather than the object of awareness or conception; this alternative attempts to account for the awareness or conception of objects solely by appealing to the internal contents of such acts. Aquilla attempts to combine elements from both alternatives and, without claiming the "content theory of consciousness" to support the view that the very notion of a "mental content" which, by virtue of its quasi-linguistic character, is capable of performing these functions, can be explicated only if we presuppose that there exist certain primitive relations of immediate apprehension, of the objects given to consciousness.

I think that the key issue here is what exactly is meant by "mental content". Aquilla, after an attempt to prove that we cannot avoid a distinction between the "contents" and the objects of mental acts, maintains that to be aware of an act's intentional character is not to be aware of some actual relation with the object of that act's intention, but it involves awareness of some other dimension present in the act. Aquilla designates this dimension by the term "content".³¹⁴ It is obvious how great is the difference between Aquilla's theory of Intentionality and Sartre's. To prove the existence of Intentionality in the form of a primary relation or mental state directed toward certain sorts of objects, *via* the study of mental contents as semantically significant features of possible mental states (for that is how Aquilla later describes these contents) is totally to ignore two very important features of Sartre's theory: first, that semantic features enter into the consideration of the posited consciousness, and not of the non-reflected one; and secondly that Intentionality is a fundamental characteristic of the unreflected consciousness, not of the reflected.

Marcelle Quinton, *Mind*, 65, No.259 (July 1956); Husserl mainly in Philosophical Investigations.

³¹⁴ *Ibid*, p.119.

Taking into consideration Sartre's attack on any attempt to merge the quite distinct ontologies of these two modes of consciousness, one cannot but consider the attack of Aquilla on Sartre as irrelevant³¹⁵. Sartre's theory has nothing to do with states of affairs "containing only that [the intentional] object itself as its constituent". Far from this, Sartre attacks any content theory for Intentionality and consciousness. Repeatedly we see Sartre opposing any attempt to place the object in consciousness, and not only in the Cartesian way that Aquilla rejects.

iii) Searle: The Intentionality of Speech Acts.

Searle starts his investigation into the Philosophy of Mind and Intentionality by relating his current work³¹⁶ to his earlier work on speech acts.³¹⁷ He believes that "the capacity of speech acts to represent objects and states of affairs in the world is an extension of the more fundamental capacities of the mind (brain) to relate the organism to the world by way of such mental states as belief and desire, and especially through action and perception".³¹⁸

For Searle speech acts are a type of human action, and the capacity to represent through speech acts is part of a more general capacity to relate to the world. These two positions make it necessary for the theory of speech acts to include an account of the mind's more general capacities and of its relation to the world.

³¹⁵ See Aquilla, pp.158-9n8 and p.61.

³¹⁶ See Intentionality, pp.vii-i.

³¹⁷ See John R. Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge University Press, 1969; Expression and Meaning, Cambridge University Press, 1979.

³¹⁸ Intentionality, p.vii.

Searle considers sentences to have the status of objects in the world. As such, they cannot have an intrinsic capacity to represent; they need something else, by and through which they can refer and represent. This is the Intentionality of the mind.

The Intentionality of Mental States is what can be considered as fundamental to Searle's Speech Act Theory: without this Intentionality the SAT (Speech Act Theory) would be doomed to a vicious circle. IMS (the Intentionality of Mental States) has intrinsic characteristics which make these states stand by themselves, with no need to refer to anything else.

A sentence for Searle is a syntactical object on which representational capacities are imposed. Beliefs and desires by contrast are not such syntactical objects: their representational capacities are not imposed but intrinsic. The fact that beliefs and desires have intrinsic representational capacities, does not however affect in any way their being a social phenomenon. Thus the forms of Intentionality underlying language are social forms.³¹⁹

Searle, in his theory of Intentionality, goes consciously against Functionalism, Behaviourism, and Turing-machine type of theories which deny the specific mental properties of mental phenomena. But he distances himself from dualisms as well: What he believes is that "mental phenomena are biologically based: they are both caused by the operations of the brain and realised in the structure of the brain".³²⁰ In this way, Searle links human biology to all possible theories of consciousness and Intentionality. For him "it is an *objective* fact about the world that it contains certain systems, viz., brains with *subjective* mental states, and it is a *physical* fact about such systems that they have *mental* features".³²¹ His solution to the Body-Mind Problem is not to deny

³¹⁹ Ibid, pp.vii-i.

³²⁰ Ibid, p.ix.

³²¹ Ibid.

the reality of mental phenomena, but to “properly appreciate” their biological nature.³²²

An obvious criticism to this view is to ask why, if mental phenomena are biological, can they not be fully explained in biological terms. Searle’s reply is that it is the particular nature of these phenomena that prohibit one from ever giving a complete explanation of their occurrence strictly on biological terms. To support his claim he refers to the role of Intentionality in the structure of human action: not just its description, but its very structure.³²³

Searle defines Intentionality in this way: Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world.³²⁴

Then he points out some important points in his definition:

a) Only *some* states and events have Intentionality. In this account beliefs and desires “must always be about something”, but things such as nervousness and undirected anxiety and depression need not be.³²⁵ In this way he distinguishes between directed and undirected mental states.

b) Intentionality and Consciousness are distinct.

Some Intentional states such as beliefs and desires may not be conscious at one or another point; as an example Searle brings forward his own belief that his grandfather spent his entire life in the USA. Since he has not thought about it before, this was an unconscious belief, up to the point where he thought about it. Searle also makes a distinction between the Intentional state and what it is directed at.

³²² See *ibid*, pp.262-272.

³²³ *Ibid*.

³²⁴ *Ibid*, p.1.

³²⁵ *Ibid*.

c) Intentions and intending have no special status in his Theory of Intentionality, they are just one form of Intentionality among others. In relation to this he also clears up the confusion related to "mental acts". Beliefs and desires for Searle have nothing to do with the description of "acts". All Intentional states are merely events and states, and not acts.³²⁶

Searle includes in his list of Intentional states belief, love, joy, elation, irritation, shame, lust, sorrow, pleasure, anxiety etc. He thinks that "it is characteristic of the members of this set that they either are essentially directed as in the case of love, hate etc. or at least they can be directed as in the case of depression or elation."³²⁷ He also points out that one may have an Intentional state even for things non-existing.³²⁸

Searle also investigates the relation between Intentional states and speech acts, to determine the relation between the Intentional state and the object or state of affairs at which it is directed. He finds that Intentional States represent objects and states of affairs in the same sense of "represent" that speech acts do this, though he attempts to show³²⁹ that speech acts have a derived form of Intentionality. Thus they represent in a different manner from Intentional States, which have intrinsic Intentionality.

Searle notes however that by associating Intentionality and Language in this way he does not want to claim that Intentionality is essentially and necessarily linguistic. On the contrary, he acknowledges the fact that animals and infants, which have no language in the ordinary sense and no ability for speech acts, nevertheless have Intentional States.

³²⁶ Ibid, pp.79-111.

³²⁷ Ibid, p.4.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ ibid, pp.160-179.

He gives two reasons why we cannot but attribute Intentionality to animals:
 a) We can see the causal basis of the animal's Intentionality as very similar to our own; and b) we cannot make sense of their behaviour otherwise.

Searle stresses that even though he shall use language heuristically to make clear the nature of Intentionality, he nevertheless believes that language is derived from Intentionality and not conversely. As he puts it: "the direction of pedagogy is to explain Intentionality in terms of language; the direction of logical analysis is to explain language in terms of Intentionality"³³⁰.

He further on points out to four points of similarity and connection between Intentional states and speech acts³³¹:

a) The distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force, a distinction familiar within the theory of speech acts, carries over to intentional states. Searle believes that just as someone can order someone else to leave the room, predict that he will leave the room, and suggest that he leave the room, so one can believe that someone else will leave the room, fear or hope that he will leave the room etc. Searle actually names what corresponds to the propositional content of the Intentional state "representative content" or "intentional content".

b) Searle also carries over from speech act theory the concept of directions of fit: he distinguishes between classes of acts and states (the commissive, the assertive etc.) where direction of the fit is either word-to-world, or world-to-word, and he also believes that there are null cases where there is no direction of fit.

c) Searle believes that in the performance of each illocutionary act with a propositional content, we express a certain Intentional state with this

³³⁰ Ibid, p.5.

³³¹ Ibid, pp.5-13.

propositional content, and the Intentional state is the sincerity condition of that type of speech act.

d) Searle also believes that the notion of conditions of satisfaction applies quite generally to both speech acts and Intentional states, in cases where there is a direction of fit.

In his "Minds, Brains and programs"³³², Searle puts forward a theory of consciousness and the mind which comes as a continuation of his earlier work, but which also advances it in some way. The purpose that Searle's essay serves is to indicate that formal programs cannot have Intentionality: it can only exist in humans, and machines like humans. Only these can understand (as opposed to respond to) symbols and other modes of representation.

Searle's theory cannot but be full of problems for anyone with close proximity to the Sartrean theory of Intentionality. Both Searle and Sartre avoid talk about "mental acts"; in fact, it is strange for Sartre to do this, since he comes from a tradition that is based on this terminology. I think extreme caution about the ontology usually associated with the term has made Sartre unfaithful to the tradition. Sartre does not talk about "mental states" either, again due to ontological caution.

Searle's problems start from the fact that without actually defining, analysing, or even describing human consciousness, he charts its area, classifies it, and even draws parallels with the consciousnesses of the other inhabitants in the animal kingdom. Firstly, beliefs and desires are and can be objects, and their representational capacities can be imposed and not intrinsic. An example of this is the Bad/Good Faith Theory of Sartre, and the Unconscious of Psychoanalytic Theories.

³³² See John R. Searle, "Minds, Brains and programs", *Behavioural and Brain Science*, Vol.3(1980), pp.417-24; see also his Minds Brains and Science, The 1984 Reith Lectures, BBC, London, 1984.

Secondly, Searle's certainty that the intrinsic character of beliefs and desires (as having Intentionality) can co-exist with their being social phenomena is something totally private to Searle! Many commentators and interpreters of the later Wittgenstein, and especially his work on rule-following considerations have claimed that this certainty is a paper tower, ready to be blown away with any sceptical wind³³³.

Thirdly, Searle does not explain what happens to those pathological cases (or not so pathological in our days) where we believe, desire, fear, have anxiety about something but not a specific thing: for example we believe and fear that something bad will happen to us but we do not know what; or we are anxious about our love or financial life but we cannot pinpoint what it is we are anxious about, or we have a desire to feel pain and any pain will do.

Fourthly, in his theory, we see Searle disengaging beliefs and desires from such complex phenomena as depression and anxiety. Such a disengagement, even for the purpose of linguistic analysis, is totally unfounded in modern psychotherapy.³³⁴

Fifthly, there is Searle's rather curious view that unconscious beliefs are beliefs. Surely beliefs are necessarily connected with claims of knowledge. If someone says he has a belief and that he does not know it, he is talking nonsense!³³⁵

³³³ See Kripke and his work on Wittgenstein and rule-following considerations.

³³⁴ See the work of Logotherapists, and existential psychoanalysts on which I have referred in the section on the Emotions.

³³⁵ To the obvious objection to my criticism here that common sense agrees with Searle's account of unconscious beliefs I would respond like this: a) common sense does not use unconscious beliefs in the way that Searle is using them, nor the meaning of unconscious beliefs in common sense is the same to the one found in Searle; b) what exactly is the meaning that common sense gives to unconscious beliefs? Even if common sense believes that unconscious beliefs exist this does not mean that these things exist! See for example much of

Sixthly, some of Searle's Intentional states have no specific objects or can not have any: undirected anxiety for example.

Finally, I disagree with Searle on the point that formal programmes have no Intentionality, or as he puts it "syntax is not semantics". To claim this, one has to wipe out a history of two thousand years of philosophy of language (beginning with Plato) based on the conviction that syntax depends on semantics, and in this way, formal programmes on Intentionality. Without semantics there would be no syntax, without Intentionality there would be no formal programs. What makes human consciousness however, is not Intentionality, but the metaphysics of this Intentionality. I claim that machines can have Intentionality as much as humans, but their Intentionality does not exist *in* them due to their ontological make up. In this way, machines and formal programmes and anything non-organic can never achieve a truly authentic form of Intentionality. However, being organic is only a necessary condition: for a sufficient condition we need an ontology that is either human or comparable to it (i.e., belongs to a species that has a mind).

iv) Maurita Harney: Intentionality of Sense.

Maurita Harney's theory of Intentionality follows pretty much the same lines of thought as Aquilla's and Searle's. She begins by examining the paradox of two traditions with totally different pursuits and purposes, but having the same origin both in their thematic references and their conviction that mental phenomena can succeed in achieving objective reference. These two traditions

what the later Wittgenstein and Ryle among others have written about the Cartesian metaphysical garbage that common sense may believe in.

are the Phenomenologists, and the Wittgensteinian circle of Anscombe, Geach and Kenny. Both have their origin in Brentano.

Harney believes that even though the conclusions that these two traditions draw are incompatible (in respect to mentalism), they nevertheless are based on premises which are not inherently inconsistent with one another. These premises are:

- a) Mental phenomena can succeed in achieving objective reference (Thesis 1).
- b) Mental phenomena are distinguished by the fact that their objects need not exist (Thesis 2).

Harney believes that a satisfactory theory of Intentionality must incorporate both of these theses. Actually, the central aim of her book, as she herself puts it is: "it is only by appeal to Frege's notion of sense that a satisfactory theory of Intentionality can be construed".³³⁶

She supports her claim about Frege's notion of sense by proving first that Brentano's theory of Intentionality is unavoidably mentalistic, and secondly that if Intentionality is understood as a feature of language rather than as a feature of phenomena, we can have a theory of Intentionality that escapes the fallacies of other mentalistic theories. Thirdly, she sets up a three-levelled semantical framework consisting of sign, sense, and referent. In this framework we can have both theses since it allows for signs (i.e., names) which have a sense but which do not refer to anything.

What can we say about such a theory?

³³⁶ Ibid, p.2. Harney in her emphasis on meaning and the Fregean sense is not alone. For a theory on Intentionality ephasising meaning see the work of Dagfinn Føllesdal, and his "followers" Smith and McIntyre. For a similar "linguistic" approach see also Carlos J. Moya, The Philosophy of Action: An Introduction, Polity Press, 1990, pp.61-79.

First, if it is valid, then the Sartrean theory has to be invalid. They have quite incompatible theories of consciousness: the theory of sense that is put forward by Harney totally destroys the Sartrean theory of the for-itself, and Sartre's views about language. But is it valid?

The first problem we can see in Harney's account exists also for Searle's and Aquilla's theories: without any definition or even a description of consciousness and its ontology, they proceed in charting and classifying its contents.

Secondly, we see an emphasis on the "objective" reference of mental phenomena. Taking into account the Sartrean attack on the objective-subjective dualism³³⁷ we cannot but view such an emphasis with suspicion. What interests Harney is the Sartrean posited consciousness; but what happens with the unreflected consciousness?

A related point is that, Harney's notion of "Sense" looks like both the Husserlian "noema" and the Fregean "Sense" (she actually admits that she is following them here).³³⁸ According to Sartrean theory both of these structures exist at the level of reflected consciousness. What is Harney's argument that they also exist at the unreflected level? There is none: she ignores Sartre's distinction. More importantly, she ignores the insistence of Sartre that Intentionality proper exists only at the unreflected level.

With all these considerations, I think it is evident that Harney's theory is not only problematic but irrelevant to a theory such as Sartre's.

³³⁷ See BN, Introduction.

³³⁸ See *ibid*, pp.3-9.

VII. CONCLUSION.

In our investigation into Sartre's theory of Intentionality we attempted to describe, analyse, and evaluate its metaphysics. In our analysis of Sartre's theory, we saw that with few improvements it cannot only satisfy the main requirements for any successful theory of Intentionality³³⁹, but it can also prove quite devastating to some of the claims regarding our mind and consciousness put forward mainly from physicalists and the AI world, through its provision for a quite novel theory regarding the mind-body relationship. We saw that it is near to Wittgenstein's views, especially regarding subjectivism and objectivism, certainty, solipsism, realism and idealism. We also saw that Wittgenstein and Sartre are extremely close in the application of their philosophies in areas such as emotion and language.

In addition, we saw that the majority of contemporary theories of Intentionality, being Sartre's philosophical antagonists, leave much to be desired both in their employed metaphysics, and in their lack of self-conscious methodologies.

This thesis is presented with the hope that it will force theorists in the areas of Intentionality, the human mind and consciousness to reconsider their

³³⁹ Few words should be added here regarding the satisfaction of the requirements. Sartre's theory is faithful to the legacy of Brentano, in regard to the three major truths I mentioned in my Introduction. Sartre's theory allows for variability in the modes of Intentionality (some of these modes are emotions and imagination); it also allows for the inexistence of the object of our awareness (even though Sartre would not claim that the object of our awareness does not exist, he would accept that it may not exist, and in any way Sartre would accept that it does not matter if the object exists *as we see it*) (for this see his theory of Imagination and the analogon theory); finally it allows for things which are not ours to be "dressed" with Intentionality since they could easily be ours (see my analysis of emotions and the Other). Actually all three truths can be understood without major difficulties only through Sartre's theory of Intentionality (and the improvements proposed here). My proposed revised version of Sartre's theory also incorporates most of the additional suggestions proposed in the Introduction. A full analysis of these points would require at least 40-50 pages more on a thesis which is already too long. I hope I shall be able to develop these ideas fully in the years to come.

“linguistic” accounts of Intentionality and Consciousness in the light of Sartre’s arguments.

I believe that our age has suffered far too much from an undue emphasis on absolutist, realist, and mechanistic ideas about man, the world, and their relation.

Let us assimilate the Promethean spirit of ontological liberation and freedom to which Sartre condemns us and escape the Olympian despotism of senses, meanings, and "revolutionary" AI economics!

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