The Crystal Image:
A theoretical approach to
image perception across
film and photography

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Thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Glasgow

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July 2002

This thesis is accompanied by a PowerPoint presentation on CD Rom at the back of this volume. Corresponding slide/pages numbers are indicated throughout the thesis.

Slides 1&2

ProQuest Number: 13818523

ProQuest 13818523

Acknowledgements

For my mother and father, whose support has been unbending and without question.

Abstract

This thesis uses the influential philosophy of Gilles Deleuze to understand the relationship that photography has with time. Deleuze's concept of the time-image, developed in his books on cinema after the philosophy of Henri Bergson, offers a glimpse of pure duration. From this he proposed a taxonomy of cinema in which certain cinemas represent time abstractly via movement (movement-images), whilst other cinemas engage perception of time directly (time-images). Time unfolds from the latter non-chronologically, because they force the viewer into contemplation of the act of photography itself. The result is the crystalline structure of memory-images that form perception and interpretation.

Deleuze initially dismissed the photograph as incapable of representing time in this direct manner, since photographs (as photogrammes) are the basis for the sensory-motor schema upon which the movement-image depends. The thesis re-investigates this situation and sets out the conditions in which photographs can, in fact, represent time directly, and without connection to this schema. From then on the thesis examines the crystal-image and the connection between photographs and cinema: both the act of photography and photography as an object in a relationship with memory.

Chapter One demonstrates how Deleuze's initial dismissal of photography can be re-oriented by returning to the essential conditions of the time-image. The chapter argues for some photographs to be considered as crystal images, as they fulfil three necessary conditions established from Deleuze's work: Time-images must demonstrate a splitting of time beyond the image's apparent connection to movement; time-images must be free of depicting space and time as interdependent, and must make 'tense' irrelevant to the image; time-images must be self-referential in order to create free indirect discourse between perception and the objects perceived. Chapter Two uses Deleuze's work on Leibniz to demonstrate the connection between cinema and the photograph suggested in Chapter One, and proposes that they are connected by a genetic element: the pure optical situation (*opsign*) that they share. The extraordinary diversity that is apparent between cinema and the·photograph is challenged by understanding this genetic element as a monad, a single entity with pleats

and folds that are viewed as entirely different. To demonstrate this, the chapter considers films in which photographs, or photography, are referenced, and where the problems of their representation of reality are questioned. These films, *In the Street*, *kids*, *Funny Face*, and *L'Année dernière à Marienbad*, are proposed as crystal-images that rely upon this monadic connection to be made apparent. Chapter Three considers the context of Henri Bergson's writing on memory and cinema. It compares the cinema of the Lumières to the photography of Eugène Atget in order to demonstrate the division of time by perception that Bergson, and then Deleuze, suggest. The chapter also accounts for the relegation of the photograph in criticism to a medium that is unable to depict time as a passing, and which is therefore persistently connected with death, as it is by Walter Benjamin and Roland Barthes. Chapter Four employs the photographs of Cindy Sherman as a case study to demonstrate the fragmentation of subjectivity and objectivity that occurs in their reference to film and visual culture. The critical responses these images provoke in writers demonstrate the structure or 'environment' of the crystal image – in this case promoted by the images' narrative ability, or narrativity. Chapter Five considers the process of photography that is at the heart of the crystal environment. The coming into being of the photographic image is understood via Deleuze's notion (with Félix Guattari) of becoming. The chapter uses the early experimental filmmaking of Andy Warhol, particularly *My Hustler*, *Poor Little Rich Girl*, and *Empire*, to explore the artist and his work as a demonstration of this becoming in photography. Becoming is the essential seed of photography's direct representation of time, and Warhol's work – which reduced artistic production to 'one extreme function' – presents the photographic image in its role as opsign before intervention by perception, criticism, and practice separates cinema from photography, and consequently creates the conception of photography and time which provoked the study in this thesis. The thesis has a short Conclusion that looks beyond the study of time represented in photography to propose conditions of the time-image in relation to painting and the digital image, and thereby across representation as a whole.

Contents

Introduction – The Photograph in Bergson and Deleuze – Introducing recollection and duration: A Matter of Life and Death *– Memory, tense and photography – Three Photographs: from free-indirect proposition to crystal-image – Conclusion: The conditions of the photographic time-image*

Introduction – Subjectivity and the Baroque Camera – Truth and the photographic image – Any and Every: The monadic in Helen Levitt's In the Street *– Truth and the Labyrinth in Larry Clark's* kids *– Subject and Object in Stanley Donen's* Funny Face *– Tensions of description in* Dans le labyrinthe *and* L'Année dernière à Marienbad *– Conclusion*

Introduction – The Division of Time: Modernity and Moment – Lumière and the ever-present present – Atget and the movement of statues – Conclusion: The Death of the Photograph

Introduction – Deleuze and subjectivity again: returning to the free-indirect discourse – Narrativity in literature, cinema, and photography – Indiscernibility as seed – The crystal-image in the photography of Cindy

*Introduction – Odalisque – Becoming-photography – Becoming Andy
Warhol – Adventures of the face – Adventures in landscape – Conclusion*

*Summing up – 'Time-image good, movement-image bad (?)' – Real and
Representation*

<u>Chapter One:</u>
<u>The conditions of the</u>
<u>photographic time-image.</u>
<u>Slide 3</u>

Introduction

The philosophical backbone of this thesis is the concept of the time-image
that Gilles Deleuze uses in his two-volume study of cinema. *Cinema 1:
The Movement-Image* (1983) and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (1985)
reconsider cinema practice and history, and re-orient them around a
discussion of time and perception that Deleuze had developed from the
work of Henri Bergson [1]. The books are not an attempt at a written history
of cinema, although Deleuze himself has described as a "natural history"
of sorts. His aim instead was to classify cinema according to images,
signs, and compositions "as one classifies animals"[2]. Deleuze intentionally
avoids orthodox classifications of cinema such as division by genre, public
taste, or genealogy, and instead guides the reader toward two basic
understandings of cinema: the *movement-image*, whose narration is based
upon a rational organisation of time and space, and cinema of the *time-
image,* which breaks such a system of representation to confront directly
our perception of time. It is from these two types of image that all cinema
has developed.

Deleuze's proposal of the movement-image and time-image is not one of
opposing systems of meaning or necessarily conflicting modes of
representation, but two alternate flourishings of the same principles of
cinema, one (movement-image) that has its ontological basis in the
movement within the cinema apparatus, and one (time-image) that exploits
any awareness of this reliance, thus (arguably) leaving it behind. The
movement-image as a classification accounts for much of the mainstream,
or the majority of cinema that has been often defined as that of 'classical
narrative' (cinema "of the American tradition" as Deleuze has it [3]).
Deleuze's first volume is an elaboration of the differing types of movement-
image cinema that have grown from one fundamental concept: the cinema
apparatus' division of time into discrete and static units – frames or
photogrammes on the film strip – which it reconstitutes to give the

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[1] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara
Habberjam, (1983), 2nd edn, (London: Athlone, 1997). (MI) Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-
Image*, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, (1985), 2nd edn, (London: Athlone, 1994).
(TI)
[2] Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations 1972-1990*, trans. by Martin Joughin, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1995), p. 46.

impression of time through the representation of movement in space. Deleuze saw the photogramme as an immobile section of time because it fixed movement into stasis or equilibrium. He saw the reconstituted cinema image (or shot) as a mobile section of time, because it strung these photogrammes together to create an image of motion. Time is presented through the depiction of motion in a *sensory-motor schema*, a perceptive organisation of space-time based rationally and informed by culture: the hands on a clock organise the perception of time by connecting it to movement in space that is recognised through habit. In the analysis of cinema, Deleuze develops this as the image of action (*action-image*) that ensues or is born of the opposition or duel between values that logically act and counteract – of which cause and effect is the defining example: "…situation-action, action-reaction, excitation-response…" [4] Time in cinema proceeds only according to the logic reflected in the mechanical projection of photogrammes that pass in series consecutively and without variation. The organizing principle within the apparatus *and* in the image it throws up is *chronology*: the logic of the action-image created is, in a way, a reflection of the movement of the film through the camera/projector.

From this key concept, Deleuze classifies movement-image cinema as a system of representation that organizes itself around larger and larger sections in chronological order. The shot is an extension of the photogramme; montage is extrapolated from the shot, and from montage flows narrative based on cause and effect. However, Deleuze was not satisfied that this cinema adequately expressed time in a way that truly mirrored or engaged our own perception of it. Drawing on his work on Bergson (as he had done in the concept of the movement-image), Deleuze identified certain cinemas that did not rely on the sensory-motor schema in order to depict time, and which instead depicted it directly through a disruption of this schema. The organizing principle is not chronology, but the disruption of chronology that reveals time understood only as change, that Bergson described as *duration* (*durée*). This is

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[3] TI, p. 211.
[4] MI, p. 206.

cinema of the *time-image*. In detaching itself from the chronology, this cinema does not offer any direct readings or perceptions that might be based on a sensory-motor recognition, as in the movement-image. Instead, interpretations and reinterpretations can be understood as unfolding in time from a cinematic image that confronts the perception of time directly and in the absence or disruption of the sensory-motor schema.

Deleuze's crystal-image, which can be seen as a character – or genus – of the time-image, is of particular interest to us since its own confrontation with perception allows it to be used to understand the photograph and the photographic image in general. The crystal-image is so called because it is created by the complex interpretation and reinterpretation of an image that unfolds without a pre-given direction. Such a constant re-evaluation of an image is brought on or provoked by a sudden of the challenge made by subjectivity on objectivity. Shots in film that linger a little too often, the constant use of mirrors, or a mobile camera, are, for Deleuze, examples of when the subjective perception of film is forced into a awareness of itself as subjective, but also of its relationship with the values of objectivity commonly reserved for cinema that relies upon the cause and effect logic of narrative time and space. This exchange or discourse unfolds in time or, as Deleuze suggests, in an experience of time that exists before any organisation by perception. The crystal-image is therefore a glimpse of the open-ended duration of which Bergson conceived; hence its characterisation as a time-image. It is an image of this duration in which there is not only perception, but also the perception of that perception, a kind of self-consciousness. This is never simply a 'reflexivity', or basic self-awareness, since the same self-awareness is part of this complex interaction. Instead Deleuze views this relationship as one of being in circuit, since not only is it is an unbroken exchange (the circuit is a perfect example of irreducible movement), but its only direction or progression is to lead on to further reinterpretations: "…the actual optical image crystallizes with its own virtual image, on the small internal circuit. This is

the crystal image...." [5] It is the constant emanation of mental images that creates the crystalline structure.

The issue of reflexivity in cinema and the fragmenting of unified subjective responses to the cinema – a fragmentation that characterises the crystal – suggest a reason for renewed interest in Deleuze's work. Recent years have seen a resurgence in the study of the Cinema books, accompanied by a similar interest in Deleuze's wider career as a philosopher. Sparked perhaps by Deleuze's untimely death in 1995, this re-discovery of writings that were originally published in the 1980s has come at the same time that those philosophical approaches that dominated that decade are diversifying – if not waning. On the one hand, psychoanalytic, gender-based, or spectatorship-led accounts of cinema, such as those that flourished in the UK journal *Screen* in the 1970s and 1980s, have been predicated on a singular or unified spectator. Strategies used to understand oppositional or divergent spectator positions, including the feminine or homosexual gaze, still relied upon discrete and essentially fixed values. The structural accounts of film practice that these approaches involve, such as in the identification of unified spectator positions based on class, race or gender, are inadequate to deal with the malleability, diffusion, and stratification of film practitioners and audiences alike. On the other hand, it is also possible that '*Screen* theory', as it has come to be known, has reached that end of its life as a defining paradigm of film analysis, and just as the medium itself seems in the throes of considerable change in terms of material production and development, so the analytical community searches for different paradigms to follow. Moreover, *Screen* theory's political stance – its championing of the Brechtian cinema of Jean-Luc Godard, or oppositional strategies of representation based on confrontation with gender hierarchies – is based on a cinema that is self-aware yet direct and without ambiguity in its address.

Deleuze's approach actually represents a moving on from *Screen* theory in all these respects, a divergence exemplified by a similar interest in a

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[5] TI, p. 69.

politicised de-stabilisation of gender, class, or race hierarchies. Deleuze's ideal political cinema is one whose resistance is altogether more indirect, though no less formidable, in that it seeks to break down cinema's established representation systems – whether mainstream or oppositional. In a philosophical approach common across much of his other work, Deleuze re-evaluates the binary logic of mainstream and resistance in culture as being incapable of accounting for the diversity, multiplicity, and heterogeneity of that culture. The values of subject and object, which underpin the spectatorship analysis of recent film criticism, involve just such a binary system of organisation. Whilst the cinema books are not a direct attack on *Screen* theory by name, Deleuze's attempt in the volumes to move beyond the limiting values of subject and object represent part of his overall understanding of a culture in which cinema is an enormous part. The time-image, for Deleuze, represents a frequent instance in cinema when the limits of such values are often revealed.

Deleuze's philosophy is not without its critics, and perhaps rightly suffers from its self-conscious cinephilia, which can provide for examples that seem erratic or otherwise only guided by Deleuze's personal interest. In its change of analytical focus from the role of reception to that of the material construction of *affect* in general, it can invite accusations of naïveté, or technological determinism, but this would be to misunderstand Deleuze's approach. In connecting cinema's relationship to perception with its apparatus (and the effect of the apparatus' principles on the representation of time and space), Deleuze's brings a philosophy of perception *of* cinema to a philosophy of perception *in* cinema, and finally to narrative and authorship: thus making it a philosophy of form as well as of politics.

Photography in particular invites a Deleuzean reading based on the concept of the crystal, and in relation to the discourse of subject and object. The crystal-image relies upon an actual image, located in the apparatus, in exchange with the virtual image of its interpretation, and the discourse of photography – with its attendant discussion of veracity against selectivity or personal response – suggests an immediate

comparison. We can recognise this immediately in cinema that involves an exposition of photography; such as when photographs are essential to film narratives, but especially when these photographs are used to question the nature of photography in the process of filmmaking. Similarly, the lingering camera serves to remind us that objects are being photographed, whilst the use of mirrors marks the presence of the camera through its visible absence. However, perhaps the most important analysis we will make is that this kind of self-consciousness is not simply demonstrated in cinema, nor even in cinema that references photography alone. By contrast it is a characteristic noticeable across photographic media; in cinema and the photograph.

The photograph has largely been ignored by orthodox criticism on the grounds that it is incapable of depicting time as *a passing*. This is perhaps because the photograph has been reduced in popular conception to the frame from which cinema is constituted. The photograph is often considered 'time-less', as negating time, or as simply poor in comparison to cinema: André Bazin, for example, might have talked of cinema as 'change mummified', but photography, for him, 'embalms time' itself.[6] However such an approach only considers time as chronology, and does not consider the possibility of an image of time that is not based upon a sensory-motor schema. Looking at a photograph offers its own experience of time altogether; one that is very different from chronological time, and which can only be considered in terms of pure duration. The crystal-image, which involves an unfolding of time from the image, already offers itself as possible means of demonstration that, in photography, it is the case that 'time-less' does not *necessarily* mean 'duration-less'.

* * *

The Photograph in Bergson and Deleuze

In order to proceed in the thesis and fully engage texts across cinema and photography that might offer the crystal-image of time in this way, this

opening chapter explores more closely Deleuze's ideas and their foundation in Bergson. Deleuze's approach to film (we shall employ a film as a useful analogy of this later in the chapter) offers a complex view of the relationship between perception and time that can, in turn, be used to reconsider the photograph as time-image.

Deleuze himself is initially dismissive of the photograph as a potential time-image. In conflating the photograph with the frame of a film strip, Deleuze is satisfied with its part in the sensory-motor schema and as only capable of presenting the first level of signification from which the movement-image develops. Deleuze thus ties the photograph (or instantaneous image as photogramme) to the *false movement* of cinema, as developed in Bergson's *Creative Evolution* of 1907, and from which the movement-image is a result:

> Cinema, in fact, works with two complementary givens: instantaneous frames which are called images; and a movement or a time which is impersonal, uniform, abstract, invisible, or imperceptible, which is 'in' the apparatus, and 'with' which the images are made to pass consecutively.[7]

However, Deleuze's own approach to the cinema books is to re-read Bergson, and invest an understanding of cinema with a deeper understanding of the time-image. Indeed, Deleuze largely stays away from *Creative Evolution* in favour of Bergson's earlier *Matter and Memory* from 1896.[8] *Matter and Memory* was written as an investigation of the perception of time, and deals with a simple relation between duration and motion-matter-image. Although Bergson went on to deal with cinema directly in 1907, Deleuze goes back (as he describes) to the earlier delivery of the philosophy of the movement-image and time-image in order to reconsider Bergson's original approach. [9]

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[6] Andre Bazin, 'The Ontology of Photographic Image', in *What is Cinema*, California, UoC, 1967, rpt. in Alan Trachtenberg, ed. *Classic Essays on Photography*, (Connecticut, Leete's Island, 1980), pp237-245, p. 242.

[7] MI, p. 1. See also Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (1907), trans. by Arthur Mitchell, (New York, Macmillan, 1911), p. 322. (CE)

[8] Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory* (1896), trans. by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (1911), (New York, Zone, 1996), 5th edn. (MM)

[9] MI, pp. 47-48.

Deleuze directly confronts Bergson's thesis on time throughout the cinema books, and develops the work on Bergson he started in the 1950s and which includes his *Bergsonism* of 1966 [10]. The methodology that Deleuze employs, in going back to the source and beyond, points towards our own methodology. It is Bergson's concept of time, and Deleuze's understanding of it, which must provide a point of departure for us. Moreover, it is in Deleuze's own words, and in particular his chapter on the crystal-image, that we find the key to an understanding of the photograph as time-image.

The reason why Deleuze never fully explores the photograph as time-image is clear: its part in the sensory-motor-schema renders it antithetical to Deleuze's conception of a direct image of time. Bergson's own understanding was based on this assumption. Cinema reconstitutes movement through the successive projection of single photographic images. To do this it must return movement, albeit abstractly, to an image which artificially creates stasis:

> Photography is a kind of 'moulding': the mould organizes the internal forces of the thing in such a way that they reach a state of equilibrium at a certain instant (immobile section). [11]

Deleuze's conception of the photograph, and of its treatment of movement, appears to be under the shadow of Bergson's theory. At a crucial point in *Matter and Memory*, Bergson likens the photograph to the organization of memory into abstract and discrete recollection images (other consequences of which we shall see later).

> The whole difficulty of the problem that occupies us comes from the fact that we imagine perception to be a kind of photographic view of things, taken from a fixed point by that special apparatus which is called an organ of perception...But is it not obvious that the

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[10] Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism* (1966), trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, (New York, Zone, 1997). (B)

[11] MI, p. 24.

photograph, if photograph there be, is already taken, already

developed in the heart of things and in all points of space? [12]

This passing notation strengthens this view of the photograph, particularly in its parallels with cinema, for cinema of the movement-image (of the sensory-motor schema) organizes duration into similar abstract and discrete units of space-time. Perception is perspectival ("the discarding of what has no interest for our needs"), and creates an image on the brain as a perception-organ that acts individually and which reflects its image of the universe as if in the ground glass or mirror that it is unable to penetrate without refraction or distortion. On the other hand, Bergson offers a universe that is already an infinite multiplicity of viewpoints that makes up the whole – as suggested by Leibniz, who we will look at later. The screen or mirror for this is a plane of immanence that Deleuze suggests is made up of "as many eyes as you like", from which the eye that senses is "one movement-image amongst others...because the eye is in things" [13]. Thus perception is a limitation of the whole by an interested point of view ("*What you have to explain, then, is not how perception arises but how it is limited...reduced to the image of that which interests you*" [14]) that easily assumes the specular paradigm of photography. From this difference – between the objective as the myriad of viewpoints and the subjective as a privileged, interested, one – Deleuze develops an idea from Pier Paolo Pasolini of a cinema image as always having the proposal of this difference within it:

Now Pasolini thought that the essential element of the cinematographic image corresponded neither to a direct discourse, nor to an indirect discourse, but to a *free indirect discourse* [15].

[12] MM, p. 39.
[13] Gilles Deleuze, *L'Image-mouvement*, (Lecture at Université Vincennes St-Denis, 1982), http://www.webdeleuze.com/TXT/CINEMA1.html: "...il y a autant d'yeux que vous voudrez, mais l'œil au sens que vous pouvez lui donner n'est qu'une image-mouvement parmi les autres, donc ne jouit strictement d'aucun privilege...C'est parce que l'œil est dans les choses."
See also MI, p. 76: "...a subjective perception is one in which the images vary in relation to a central and privileged image; an objective perception is one where, as in things, all the images vary in relation to one another, on all their facets and in all their parts."
[14] MM, p. 40.
[15] Ibid, p. 72.

This 'proposition' exists in all photogrammes for Deleuze, and flourishes as a discourse whilst it remains part of, or as an alternative to, the sensory-motor schema that constitutes its organisation into the action-image. Deleuze's adoption of Pasolini, which will become essential to the argument in this thesis, immediately suggests that the photograph contains a similar proposition as does the cinematographic image.

However, at this point Bergson's understanding of a perception governed by the metaphor of photography ("*we imagine perception to be a kind of photographic view of things*") deserves interrogation. The first photographs, whether by scientist, artist, or amateur, were instruments for the construction of tableaux, in the traditions of the picturesque. Photography was conceived to create privileged views of time and space. As photographic science surpassed eagerly anticipated landmark moments (the development of fine lenses, fast emulsions, colour processes) it became immersed in an understanding of the world through division and differentiation. It became more important to divide time into smaller and smaller elements rather than explore the experience of time *as a passing*. The experiments of the Lumières and Edison in the 1890s were to reconstitute time from images which were previously valued for their stasis. The conception of a moving image strung together from photographs was one of putting movement back into an image whose immobility had been considered one of its virtues. Early photographs of empty streets, a popular choice for the daguerreotype in the 1840s, were empty because the movement of pedestrians and vehicles could not be arrested. Photographic technology quickly advanced from a period in which movement could not be frozen by its long exposures, to the capturing of action as discrete images of hiatus taken from movement. The photograph was to eventually be prized for its ability to privilege certain views – as much of time as of space. [16]

A principle argument that can be made of Bergson's use of cinema as a metaphor for perception is that it contradicts history. The idea of cinema or

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[16] Beamont Newhall, 'The Conquest of Action', in *The History of Photography*, (New York: MoMA, 1982), pp117-141.

photography being the model for biological perception sounds absurd, as much for Deleuze himself as it might to neuroscientists, because sensory perception – if not affection – is fundamental. However, the use and expectations of the photograph, as object and as metaphor, suggest that whilst sensory perception might be unaffected, the perception-image (and subsequent affection-image) might not be. Let us offer an explanation for this conundrum.

Bergson was by no means alone in identifying the ways in which perception divides duration into discrete elements, and in using photography as a throwaway metaphor for it (although his use of the Cinématographe is less than throwaway). Photography was and has been used as a model or paradigm by various people. To demonstrate this we can use two examples of such 'photographic' discourse, firstly in nineteenth century literature (as an example of popular culture), and secondly in a contemporary scientific approach (in this case cognitive neuroscience or psychology). The first occurs a few years before Bergson's 1896 thesis, and the second is a discussion that proceeds from the late 1960s to the present day.

The first example is the novel *L'Eve future*, by Villiers de l'Isle Adam, which was published in 1886 [17]. Villiers's novel recounts an attempt by a fictional inventor (based very closely on Thomas Edison) to create an artificial intelligence in the shape of the wife of an English nobleman (Lord Ewald), in order to replace the nobleman's real (and undesirable) wife. The novel is filled with rich descriptions of technologies both recently revealed and anticipated by popular culture. As such, scenes in Edison's apartments and laboratory describe established inventions, such as the telegraph, telephone, and phonograph, which had already become instrumental in affecting the daily life of urban middle-class readers (*L'Eve future* had appeared earlier in the magazine *La Vie Moderne* [18]). Similarly those inventions whose emergence was then little more than dreamed of are described to similar effect: at one point the inventor shows Ewald a

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[17] Villiers de l'Isle Adam, *L'Eve Future* (Tomorrow's Eve) (1886), trans. by Robert Martin Adams (1982), (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001).

moving picture, in colour and with sound, of a woman who had once been the model for the robot (*andréid*) that he has built. Early on, in a chapter entitled 'Snapshots of World History', Villiers laments, through the character of Edison, the absence of photographers to record epochal moments of biblical history and mythology[19]. In one passage photography is both suggested as conflating time and space to fix the image or view of such events, and offered as a paradigm for the creation of those 'moments' in the narrative of history. History and mythology (with personnel reduced to their *cartes-de-visite*) at once assume the principle characteristic of the nineteenth century photographic album, whose own purpose was similarly to turn the family into narrativised (and thus socially ratified) history:

> Photography too has come along very late...Too bad. For it would have been delightful to possess good photographic prints (taken on the spot) of *Joshua Bidding the Sun Stand Still*, for example. Or why not several differing views of *The Earthly Paradise*, taken from *The Gateway of the Flaming Swords*; the *Tree of Knowledge*; the *Serpent*; and so forth? Perhaps a number of shots of *The Deluge, Taken from the Top of Mount Ararat*? [...] And photographs of all the beautiful women, including Venus, Europa, Psyche, Delilah, Rachel, Judith, Cleopatra, Aspasia, Freya, Maneka, Thais, Akedysseril, Roxalana, the Queen of Sheba, Phryne, Circe, Dejanira, Helen, and so on down to the beautiful Pauline Bonaparte! to the Greek veiled by law! to Lady Emma Harte Hamilton! [20]

Thus the whole of history is reduced to a staccato procession of discrete elements, reduced to particular views or images of significant figures. The predominance of the (gendered) 'view' suggests a spatial imperative clearly informed by the nineteenth century popularity of photography of the exotic - a power structure which demands noting. The passage is

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[18] Ibid. See Translators Introduction, p. xiv.

[19] Unsurprisingly, Villiers doesn't quite explain how the moving pictures are achieved, and hints at a strip of "transparent plastic encrusted with bits of tinted glass" that passes between a lens and a powerful reflector (p. 117). (Interestingly, the subtitle 'snapshots' is probably an anachronism in translation from '*photographies*': The term was not commonly used until after the first Kodaks were released in 1888. Ibid Newhall)

nonetheless an example of the reduction of the passing of time into tessellated passage of privileged views as fixed states.

This reduction of events into ever-smaller discrete elements is echoed in our second example, a recent study into the understanding of emotions and the operations of the brain in their formation. Joseph LeDoux has incorporated a model of affective perception called 'Flashbulb Memory'[21]. Paralleling Villiers's use of great events of antiquity, LeDoux uses the assassination of John F. Kennedy as an example of a world event that had the significant popular resonance. LeDoux suggests that the increase in adrenaline as a result of an event that has a significant consequential effect on the perceiver improves the brain's ability to recall the event in extraordinary detail (mirroring Bergson's formulation that perception will grasp only things which are most interesting to it). The defining paradigm for this is the anecdotal 'rehearsal' of the moment one heard that Kennedy had been shot, but similar events (such as the space shuttle Challenger disaster, the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, and the recent events in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania) just as easily apply. LeDoux attributes the Flashbulb Memory theory to an earlier article by Roger Brown and James Kulik who demonstrate this principle of consequentiality [22]. People will remember those events that have economic or political significance to them, particularly if this has ramifications in terms of civil rights in the workplace or, in basic terms, to put food on the table – as Kennedy's assassination did. They further suggest Flashbulb Memory as only an *analogy* or *metaphor* since these recollections are indiscriminate in the same way that photographs are:

> ...there is something strange about this recall...Indeed, it is very like a photograph that indiscriminately preserves the scene in which each of us found himself [sic] when the flashbulb was fired.

What relegates this to metaphor, rather than paradigm, is the intervention of selective memory, which they do not see paralleled in the photograph:

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[20] Ibid, pp. 21-22.
[21] Joseph LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 206-211.

An actual photograph, taken by flashbulb, preserves everything within its scope' it is altogether indiscriminate…In short, a flashbulb memory is only somewhat indiscriminate and is very far from complete. [23]

Brown and Kulik proceed with the assumption of indiscriminate objectivity and impartiality on the part of the photograph, forgetting or neglecting the subjectivity that points the perspectival and discriminating view of the camera's lens. Similarly, they neglect the malleable subjectivity of their informants, who are as likely to recall the mediation of the events as they are the 'hearing of the news'. Brown and Kulik disqualify two questionnaires because they recount the event in this manner, whilst LeDoux adds the intervention of the media as a caveat for the idea of Flashbulb Memory [24]. What this demonstrates is that, in proposing the idea, they then go on to produce a quantitative test based on the 'photographic view' as a defining paradigm, all the while negating it as anything more than a metaphor. They test the memories people have of the mediation of the event (hearing the news), which itself is dominated by television, radio, intercom, newspapers etc. as if that mediation had no bearing on their affective responses. Interesting also is Brown and Kulik's stress upon the 'live' nature of Flashbulb Memory, which emphasises an easy reliving of the events as if these were different to the recollection of other, more banal events. This interesting sidebar – both of the living potential of the photographic and the way we live through memory – will resurface again and again in this thesis. [25]

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[22] Roger Brown and James Kulik, 'Flashbulb Memories', in *Cognition 5*, (1977), pp. 73-99. Considering their use of the Kennedy example, this article and its subject invite comparisons with contemporary accounts of the World Trade Centre attacks in particular.

[23] Ibid pp. 74-75.

[24] Ibid, p. 78. See LeDoux, 1996, p. 209.

[25] Similarly, in more recent events that have been witnessed 'as they happen', it is difficult to discern the event itself from the mediation of it. This was particularly evident during the Gulf War, and during the attacks in New York. The media itself constitutes part of the event, since some of the traumatic effects of the event (in the case of the World Trade Centre at least) were due to the telepresence of people watching across the globe. In spatial terms, it is never clear where the mediated 'here' ends and the event 'over there' begins. Furthermore, in the case of both the death of the Princess of Wales and the New York attacks, the narrative-led organisation of the events by the media proceeded almost instantaneously, thereby confounding an easy separation of 'independent' perception of the events and their 'mediation' all the more.

Brown and Kulik themselves draw on the work of Robert B. Livingston, whose concept of a "Now print!" action of memory provides the foundation for their own [26]. The "Now print!" order is a 'concatenation' of sensory perceptions that fulfil the requirements of memories that must be retained in order to survive. Brown and Kulik's development of this idea is as much a proposal of why these memories might be important as it is an analysis of the quality and quantity of the memories involved. Since then, LeDoux has used the idea to explain the complex relationship between emotional memories, and memories of emotion[27]. Nonetheless, both Flashbulb Memories and the "Now Print!" order are examples of scientific approaches that see memory as a process that fixes the past into discrete elements, whether based on a survival mechanism or other emotional stress. More recently, Hubert D. Zimmer and Ronald L. Cohen's introduction to a collective publication in the field of cognitive psychology – *Memory for Action* – describe the various theories of episodic memory based on actions performed, rather than input received cognitively [28]. These include actions situated in the past, but also actions 'encoded' in such a way as to be performed later: such action-memories, or in Bergsonian terms action-images of memory, are stored as if contracted together and ready to unravel or otherwise spring out. However it is described and accounted for, memory follows a similar pattern in Villiers, LeDoux et al, and now in this performance based approach. Despite focussing on what they call actions that are "'smaller' than everyday actions", the authors of *Memory for Action* demonstrate Bergson's idea of

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[26] Robert B. Livingston, 'Reinforcement', in Gardner Quarton, Theodore Melnechek and Francis O. Schmitt eds., *The Neurosciences: A Study Program*, (New York: The Rockefeller University Press, 1967), pp. 568-577. The "Now Print!" order involves the analogy of print media, and possibly early computer printouts as an analogy of the storage of memory as data. Brown and Kulik suggest that Livingston misses the role that the media has in recording events in his use of the metaphor, and go on to propose reasons for this memory to exist before the analogy is used to name it – echoing Deleuze's critique of Bergson below.

[27] Livingston's work continues to employ technological metaphors In his book *Sensory Processing, Perception and Behavior*, (New York: Raven Press, 1978), Livingston quietly suggests holography (a technology in vogue at the time) as a potentially useful metaphor, amongst others (p. 30).

[28] Hubert D. Zimmer, Ronald L. Cohen, 'Remembering Actions; A Specific Type of Memory?', in Hubert D. Zimmer, Ronald L. Cohen, Melissa J. Guynn, Johannes Engelkamp, Reza Kormi-Nouri, Mary Ann Foley, *Memory for Action: A Distinct Form of Episodic Memory?*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

memory-images, imagined as fixed views, just as easily as the others do [29].

There is the suggestion here that, whilst these mental processes existed independently of the invention of photography (or any of the other technologies similarly used), photography and similar media have come to affect, if not actually be a part of, the events that are remembered. There is no adequately explained separation between the world, its events, and the photographs that represent them, since to experience these events is to experience their mediation in concert. Furthermore, there is a theme running under all these that suggests that media technologies such as photography have been developed partly in response to the need not only to remember significant events and their consequences, *but also to fix them sufficiently enough to make sense of them*. The *Memory for Action* approach ratifies memory finally as an operation that makes sense of the experience by organising it into discrete memory-images (it doubly supports Bergson's thesis, since what are shots but reflections of these action-memories?) with the act of photography as a prime example.

Bergson's tendency to use photographic imagery to describe perception and recollection is perhaps forgivable because the discussion of popular technology is seductive in any case (as demonstrated in Villiers, and there are plenty of contemporary examples). Bergson's argument *is* convincing as a beautifully wrought metaphor. However, it is clear that photographic technologies were developed partly as a response to an urge to organise perception that *could only* be met by photography, and later cinema. In these terms we might answer Deleuze's famous interrogation of Bergson and say that, yes, there really was a cinematographic perception before cinema [30]. Bergson's use of cinema and photography was no less a simple use of metaphor than a conscious effort to understand the effect modernity was already having on perception. In seeing it only *as* metaphor, we

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[29] Ibid, p. 18.

[30] This is the question that Deleuze asks at the beginning of Cinema 1: "Does this mean that for Bergson the cinema is only the projection, the reproduction of a constant, universal illusion? As though we had always had cinema without realising it?" See MI, p. 2. Deleuze's questioning is of Bergson's model of perception as cinematographic; a model that apparently only offers itself after cinema's invention . See Bergson CE.

neglect the fact that perception has become ruled by the technologies that once were perceived to have 'freed' it. It is now clear that, for whatever reason, photography is employed to fix the passage of time into a discrete element, or fixed state or view, and this follows a pattern set by the operation of memory. All of this suggests that photography was all but ignored by Bergson and his contemporaries as a medium capable of imaging duration, a view reflected in Bazin and other later scholars. Deleuze's work is no exception.

There is, of course, an alternative view. As the technologies of cinema (as a time medium) and photography (as a medium that negates time) have an identical material base, is it not possible that our perception of them might have more similarities than we would ordinarily acknowledge? Is it not possible that the contemplative affect of a photograph, the time spent lingering over a stilled image, might not be experienced from a shot; or that an experience of dynamism in movement and time might not be felt from a still image? Furthermore, is it not possible that the contemplation of the photographic image might be an experience of duration?

Deleuze extrapolates the sense of contemplation in his discussion of Bergson's 'glass of sugared water' from *Creative Evolution*:

> In this respect, Bergson's famous formulation, "I must wait until the sugar dissolves" has a still broader meaning than is given to it by its context. It signifies that my own duration, such as I live it in the impatience of waiting, for example, serves to reveal other durations that beat to other rhythms, that differ in kind from mine. [31]

The wait exposes the experience of duration as an internal perception. The dissolving sugar cannot be measured in chronology, and there is no visible sign that the glass has completely passed from one state to another. But just as the glass of water is dislocated from external chronology, so is the photograph. The experience of duration is not dependent upon external images, suggesting that not only is perception of duration internal, and that we are internal to duration; but that any image

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[31] B, p. 32. c.f. MM, p. 10.

holds the possibility of such a contemplation, whether an image of a glass and its contents, or a photographic image. A memory-image, or photograph, might create a fixed state or view extracted from the passing duration, but the experience of duration continues nonetheless. Might it not be a mistake to assume that the photograph replaces perception? After all, do we not perceive the photograph *as a photograph* at some level, so as to constitute an awareness of its immobility that is comparable with Bergson's waiting for his glass of sugared water?

A return to Bergson and his philosophy is appropriate, because it allows us to see why such a misconception occurs when viewing cinema and photography in relation to each other. Deleuze reviews Bergson's misconception in terms of cinema, and it is also possible for us to do the same in terms of photography. This requires a review of Deleuze also. The solution comes through a correction of the perceived difference between the two, and an understanding of the philosophy of difference in general. As Michael Hardt has pointed out, Deleuze himself adopts Bergson's approach to difference, in *Bergsonism* and after. [32] A similar approach might be useful for us.

Essentially, we can see that the difference perceived between cinema and photography is a misconception. They undoubtedly differ, but it is the *difference itself* that we must take issue with. Cinema and photography share a common practical connection; that of the frame and its material base. This means that they are not different in nature, although the popular misconception amounts to just that. Deleuze's dismissal of photography also highlights this misconception when he compares cinema to the photograph directly.

> The still life [in Ozu] is time, for everything that changes is in time, but time does not itself change, it could itself change only in another time, indefinitely. At the point where the cinematographic image

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[32] Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze – An apprenticeship in philosophy*, (Minnesota, University of Minnesota, 1993), pp. 1-26.

most directly confronts the photo, it also becomes most radically distinct from it. [33]

However in sharing a common physical base, the shot and the photogramme, or cinema and photography, are only radically distinct from each other on the condition that they remain part of the same whole. Where we perceive difference in the nature of the two media, we should actually observe differences in degree *within a single medium*. Common sense directs us to see cinema and photography as essentially different, because we experience cinema in entirely different circumstances to photography; and yet the fact remains that when we see films we are watching a succession of photogrammes that are easily understood as photographs, as Christian Metz notes. We will show as does Metz, how rather than separated, cinema and photography are joined by "the principle of the *taking*" [34]. First though, such a connection suggests that questions might be asked of Bergson's later conception of cinema. His opinion of cinema was based on his understanding photographs as immobile sections from which cinema is created. Where we might perceive a difference in kind, because one depicts movement and time whilst the other is static, he only saw a difference in degree.

But if this strengthens his argument of 'false movement', then how can we conceive of a Deleuzean approach to the photograph? Deleuze does not discount that cinema is made up of still images in succession. His principle argument is that cinema language (principally of the movement-image) exploits the abstract characteristics of the shot. Whilst photogrammes are immobile sections, they can be strung together to create shots, or mobile sections. These are then organized into sequences of montage, and yet again into chronological narrative. Each level is a discrete unit of time that flows directly from movement, but remains part of a closed system. Deleuze does not attack the physical basis of cinema, but the organization of narrative cinema that is centred on the sensory-motor schema. In order

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[33] TI, p. 17.
[34] Christian Metz, 'Photography and Fetish', in *October 34*, Fall, 1985, pp81-91, p. 82: "And at this point, after all, a film is only a series of photographs."

to present the time-image, Deleuze looks at cinema that goes *beyond* or is independent of movement and which disrupts narrative and montage based on chronology, suggesting that the time-image might exploit this characteristic in the photograph. If the photograph could also be seen as a dislocation of the image from chronology it might therefore be considered as a *proposition* of a *free-indirect discourse*. Some photographs could have the potential to be those most explosive images of time – the crystal-images – that we see in cinema. In the crystal-image, time bursts beyond the frame from the exchange between the actual and the virtual, made possible by the *free-indirect proposition* as an exchange between the scene photographed and the act of photographing, or filming, it. This is an act not exclusive to cinema or photography, but which constitutes their principle commonality.

On the other hand, this destroys the particular connection between the photograph and the sensory-motor schema. The photograph never offers any direction for time to proceed from its image, this is only added after, either when another photograph is used in succession (as in cinema), or when the perception-image seeks to use photographic language to make sense of it. We shall see that the photograph offers a depiction of cronos, but not chronos. Recollection experienced as a photographic image, to use Bergson's analogy, demonstrates the mechanics of re-collection itself, but does not provide a fulfilling explanation of the photograph in return.

By demonstrating the time-image's independence of the sensory-motor schema, Deleuze opens up a reading of the possibilities of the photograph as a time-image; but the difference commonly perceived between cinema and photography still stands in our way. The fields of cinema and photography study have rarely mixed. For those scholars to whom Deleuze himself turns in his cinema theses, including André Bazin and Christian Metz, cinema is conceived as different from photography through negation of time: "Movement and plurality [in cinema] both imply *time*, as opposed to the timelessness of photography which is comparable to the timelessness of the unconscious and of memory..." as Metz later

suggested [35]. In a complex reading of the dualistic negation of one by the other, Metz argued that "Film gives back to the dead a semblance of life..." (p.84) but also that film is "less a succession of photographs than, to a large extent, a destruction of the photograph, or more exactly of the photograph's power and action" (p.85). This difference is viewed as one based on the absence of time in the photograph (seen here as its peculiar power), rather than their material differences. An alternative view should be taken of this difference: if photography and cinema share a material commonality in the act of taking, as Metz suggests, then they might also, contrary to Metz, share a characteristic representation of time. The difference between time and timelessness should be seen as one of degree, rather than a difference in kind.

Cinema and photography culture – the discourses that surround them – creates an 'ideal' set of circumstances for a classical cinema, or a pure photography: cinema has developed its language around montage and the transparency of its apparatus. Conversely, in photography study there is a state of 'pure' photography that freezes a decisive moment to take it out of chronological time, and to flatten it into an abstract and tactile paper image. Where *Cinema* hides its manufacture of false movement, the *Photograph* makes its physical ontology explicit.

However, such a theoretical organization is blind to the movement between the two, both in the practice and reception. How can such a strict definition account for experimentation with the form of cinema by avant-garde filmmakers who draw attention to cinema's ontology by foregrounding it? What of filmmakers who reject the chronology of cause-and effect narrative, or the montage or editing conventions of classical storytelling? They do not fit into such a narrow organization of cinema practice. Similar questions can be asked of photography. As the photographic images of cinema and photography share the flat picture plane, so photography has come to borrow conventions of composition from cinema. Even in history, pioneers such as Eadweard Muybridge, have sat comfortably in neither the pantheon of photographers, nor the

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[35] Metz, 1985, pp81-91, p. 83.

pantheon of filmmakers. How should the apparent difference between photography and cinema cope with this?

An alternative view of cinema should be taken up that sees photography and cinema as abstract points in a single medium. Organisations into genres, movements, or practices, are therefore merely the creation of sets within larger sets that unfold to become an ever-growing singular entity (Deleuze's open-whole). The states of 'classical' cinema and 'pure' photography can only be seen as nominal, even idealized or perspectival, values that have been identified over time by criticism, and as such remain purely critical ones. In recognizing this we also see another way of reviewing Deleuze's approach to the time-image. The *free-indirect proposition* occurs when the physical aspects that make up the image are foregrounded; something which photography finds easy. The image created thus depends upon the nature of this reflexivity: Eisenstein's cinema, whose strongest political points relied on movement in film created from the juxtaposition of otherwise static images in series, interpolates this juxtaposition from photography, which is why Deleuze sees his filmmaking as a paradigm of the movement-image. Eisenstein's cinema is a cinema opposition based on the time/timelessness relationship established in photography and that reflects Metz' later analysis: movement and time is constituted from immobile sections (as timeless) that act as extended photographs – the montage of Kerensky's battle with Kornilov in *October* is an example. The time-image, on the other hand, is the fulfilment of the *free-indirect discourse* as a dislocation from the progression of images that make up the movement-image, a progression often accelerated by music – as in *October*. The time-image becomes a reality for Deleuze when sound and image become separated, and the image is considered *on its own terms as a purely optical situation*. The time-image foregrounds time/timelessness as an exchange, rather than an opposition. The strength of any political filmmaking is not through the opposition to but rather the awareness of and subsequent dislocation from

all language systems – classical, post-classical, counter-cinema (Wollen) –
that seek to organise this exchange into opposition [36].

We should therefore ask ourselves if Deleuze's study of the dicisign – the
free-indirect proposition – in cinema could not be extended to a study of
the dicisign in photography and, more importantly, to the continuum of
which they are both a part. The movement-image exists for both cinema
and photography, but in stepping away from the movement-image, we find
that all forms of cinema and photography exhibit the self-consciousness of
the dicisign. The relationship between photography and cinema should no
longer be seen as a confrontation based on external difference, but should
be given instead the paradoxical description: a *single heterogeneity* - one
medium whose discourse gives rise to a multiplicity of forms. It is from this
multiplicity that the time-image arises, and such differences should only be
seen as internal to the medium as a whole. The differences between
cinemas and photographies are differences in intensity, rather than
extensity: they are all *photography.* Where the intensity in cinema might
come from speed, in the photograph it exists in its infinitesimal slowness. It
is no longer appropriate to identify where cinema and the photograph
meet, for there is no 'no-man's-land' across which they stare at each other,
or for them to cross. Instead of a bi-partite schema of opposing poles,
there is a continuum that exists across the photographic medium that is
bursting with variations of the photographic process. If Deleuze found the
time-image in cinema, can we therefore not find it in the photograph?
Furthermore, where does the cinema-as-time-image end, and where does
the photograph-as-time-image begin?

The next chapter will consider the multiplicity that emanates from the
singular photographic image. By looking at Deleuze's own choice of
cinema directly, the chapter reconsiders his approach to the optical
situation in general, and the photographic image in particular. This will
create points of departure (or lines of flight) for the later studies. The
photograph-as-time-image is a constituent of time-image cinema but for

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[36] Peter Wollen, 'Vent d'est: Godard and Counter Cinema', in *Readings and Writings*, (London: NLB, 1982), pp. 79-91.

our purposes its relationship to duration should be considered under its own conditions. Furthermore, those conditions exist for it across *photography* as a whole.

In many ways, what this means is a realignment of Deleuze's central ideas. It is a bigger task than simply that of chalking off the various occasions that any writer has established the lack of contiguity between the photograph and cinema. Instead it is a matter of re-approaching the work of Deleuze to understand the conditions of the time-image and the ontology of photography that might fulfil them.

The aim is to demonstrate that the photographic time-image is possible when considering the conditions that Deleuze places on it, and from then begin to discuss the possibility of the photograph as crystal-image. First of all, in order to fully demonstrate how the photograph offers a potential time-image, we must consider the relationship between perception and photography by demonstrating in turn the relationship between duration and perception. To do this, we must return to cinema.

* * *

Introducing recollection and duration: *A Matter of Life and Death*
In Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger's 1946 film *A Matter of Life and Death*, pilot Peter Carter (David Niven) suffers brain damage after bailing out of his stricken plane over the North Sea. After this near-death experience, his position on Earth becomes hotly contested between the doctor trying to cure him, and the fantastical bureaucrats of the next world, whose oversight it was that caused him to survive the plane crash in the first place. During the film, as this battle of wits ensues, Carter is given over to a series of nervous attacks during which time around him stops. The first occurs while his new-found lover June sleeps,

> Conductor #71: She cannot wake, we are talking in space, not in time.
> Carter: Are you cracked?

Conductor #71: Look at your watch. It has not moved since you said, so charmingly, "Drink darling?" Nor will it move. Nor will anything move 'til we finish our little chat.

This is later followed by an 'interlude' whilst Carter sleeps. Conductor #71 re-affirms their independence from the 'tyranny of time':

Slide 4

These attacks are always signposted by depictions of time of differing abstraction, and the most striking of these interrupts a table tennis game. The ticking sound of the ball as it is passed from player to player is abruptly stopped, ball in mid-air, as if a clock were stopped. Time itself appears to be interrupted. In this silent world, the present exists only as an internal experience. Chronological, abstract time has been halted, and his experience is only one of pure change or duration. What is left is the time of Carter's mind as he argues and debates with his conductor. These *interludes* unfold as he wishes, and as each discussion or argument grows more complex and intense. Time, no longer governed by movement or sound, is simply duration: as long or as short an impression of being as it needs to be.

The film is significant for us because it introduces possibilities of considering time, the experience of time, and perception internal to time. It is useful to consider this film as a way into an understanding of the theory of duration underpinning Deleuze's cinema books. At its deepest level, life exists as absolute change, a duration defined only by the interaction of objects and perceptions. Duration is the foundation of life, a transition or change that is substance itself. Duration, as Deleuze describes of Bergson's concept, "is a *becoming* that endures" [37].

Separated from the abstract representations of time, the interludes are direct images of this duration. They bear no relation to the chronological

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[37] B, p. 37.

organization of time that surrounds them; they are visibly and sensibly different. In the physical world, time is organized through movement in space, a sensory-motor schema. Yet this is incommensurable with the pure inorganic duration in which Carter experiences his interludes. Carter's experience of time within these interludes is governed by his own perception; reduced to its most fundamental relation of memory and duration. Throughout the film, he is forced to deal with his predicament through a discussion of life perceived through his own recollection. This comes to a final denouément as he is forced to argue over not only his own past, but also a greater past of his race. The political aims of the film in 1946 give rise to an unfolding of recollection as the past of the English and Carter's own past are contracted [38]. This ongoing situation in the film presents a characteristic of a Bergsonian or Deleuzean understanding of duration and memory; namely, that duration and memory are co-existent, one as a becoming that endures, and one as the recollection of that becoming, a perception-image. In memory, Bergson notes that we first place ourselves into the past in general, and then into regions of the past, in an operation he called a contraction-image. This past continues to exist as a virtual image; it continues to grow as change endures. It is a virtual co-existence of past and the present that recollects it. In the film, for example, Carter continues to return to the chronological present of June and the others, creating past as the film progresses. As he argues for his life, he draws upon his actions in the past that co-exists with his own autonomous present – the present of his own perception. Carter's falling in love in the chronological present co-exists with his non-chronological interludes of perception. At the end of the film he draws upon a present that is also past, in a world (an other world) that will eventually become the present.

This compounding of memory exposes a sense of duration free of organic chronology bound to movement in space. Memory is the perception of duration: the image of this non-chronological change. Chronological time

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[38] The film has been acknowledged as an exercise in trans-Atlantic co-operation, but also as having tacit criticisms of the impending socialist bureaucracy that the newly elected Labour government of Clement Attlee might bring in. For a useful analysis and review of these various readings, see Ian Christie, *A Matter of Life and Death* (BFI Film Classic), (London: BFI, 2000).

considers that time has passed (by the organization of history through recollection-images) and that time will continue to pass and become future (by the contracting of all possible events into the concept of future). Memory is therefore a dualistic image of duration that forks or splits into two directions, one that considers the past, and another that considers the future. This is acknowledged in Deleuze's 1966 reading of Bergson.

> ...we find ourselves in a movement – which we will examine later – by which the "present" that endures divides at each "instant" into two directions, one oriented and dilated toward the past, the other contracted, contracting toward the future...It is clear that memory is identical to duration, that it is co-extensive with duration... [39]

We can see this forking of perception in Carter's disorienting relationship with time in the film. Chronos is ruptured by his interludes, and cronos bursts outward in this rupture: the Earthly-time of Carter's affair with June continues chronologically, whilst chronology is annihilated in his un-Earthly interludes. Time flows directly in the Earthly world, and indirectly in the un-Earthly world, but the free-indirect discourse exists *between* the two: as Carter moves between worlds, his perception-image of the Earthly world changes according to events in it. As he discusses possibilities as virtual images of perception, they come to pass and are actualized, whilst the consequences of these events later make those events virtual images of recollection. At this point the two become not only reversible, but also indiscernible from each other, and the actual world and the virtual world become crystallized together. Carter's interludes are therefore crystal-images of time, as we saw at the beginning of this chapter:

> But here we can see that the opsign finds its true genetic element when the actual optical image crystallizes with its own virtual image, on the small internal circuit. This is the crystal image, which gives us the key, or rather the 'heart' of opsigns and their compositions. The latter are nothing other than slivers of crystal images. [40]

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[39] B, p. 52.
[40] TI, p. 69.

As the film progresses, the differences between them become less and less discernible until the two reach a point of indiscernibility, from this point comes the forking of time which presents the extraordinary power of cronos. Recollection-memory and contraction-memory are both projected in heterogeneous directions from this point, as Deleuze notes in his chapter on the crystal-image in *Cinema 2*:

> Time has to split at the same time as it sets itself out or unrolls itself: it splits into two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the presents pass on, while the other preserves all the past. Time consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we *see in the crystal.* [41]

The splitting of time exposes the nature of image of duration as cronos, an image which Deleuze sees as 'non-organic' in that is confounds progression in any linear or predetermined way in favour of simple overall change.

Let us now explore the relationship between chronology and duration that this crystal-image of time exposes. It is Bergson's *Matter and Memory,* and in particular the first chapter 'On the Selection of Images', that provides the anchor for Deleuze's understanding of perception that he takes to he cinema books [42]. This is more fully developed on its own accord in *Bergsonism*, in which Deleuze uses Bergson's intuitive approach to ontology as a platform for an understanding of duration. Experience is a composite of duration and space; one giving us internalized progression ('a becoming that endures'), and the other giving us an exteriority without progression (space and movement). Consciousness is the exchange between the two. Memory is composed of recollection-images and contraction-images – the two basic *directions* of perception. It is from recollection that perception flows, and the brain makes sense of its world by organizing recollection. Part of this organization is chronology as the organization of heterogeneous duration – as expressed in the dissymmetrical split – into a homogeneous progression based on

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[41] TI, p. 81.
[42] MM, pp. 17-77.

movement in space. This is visible also in cinema chronology in general, which uses the logical progression to create a sense, or image, of time through the observation of movement. The hands of a clock (or the photogrammes on a strip of film) express time only through their ordered homogeneity. Duration (or *cronos*) still endures as a non-chronological becoming, but is hidden from common sense by an image based on a sensory-motor schema. Duration as pure becoming is obscured by a chronology that "denatures it". [43]

The formulation of chronology constitutes a *'leap into ontology'*, a leap that is constituted as discrete sections, or recollection-images. The formulation of cinema chronology can therefore be understood as an organization of recollection also. Rather than following the free-indirect proposition offered by the opsign, cinema chronology seeks to organize such images into a composition that mirrors recollection, an operation that arouses Deleuze and Bergson's suspicion. This organization is a mirror of perception: a "psychologization" enacted in order to make sense of Being. The brain seeks to create discrete recollection-images from the continual whole of memory in order to make sense of it [44].

It is the operation of memory that is disrupted in *A Matter of Life and Death*. One of the consequences of Carter's interludes is their effect on his memory. At times he is able to remember only parts of his experience, and others he is drawn toward precise recollection of his actions; still other times his memory of the events are questioned themselves, as his doctor assumes that they are dreams. At the same time however, he associates his interludes with action- images or sensations (he associates the Conductor with a peculiar smell – fried onions). As the interludes progress, these distinctions between his perception-images and dream-images are made more and more indistinct. This is a merging of the two experiences of time into a circuit. Finally the difference between the two levels of perception, internal duration and external chronology, are exposed. Space is irrelevant in the interludes – he cannot interact with the space around

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[43] B, p. 38.
[44] Ibid, p. 57.

him whilst he converses with the Conductor; the bell in his study will not ring, he cannot alter the positions of the table-tennis players – he experiences pure internalized duration and is separated from external time. Towards the end of the film, whilst he undergoes a life-saving operation - an actual image - the true test of his love for June and of his right to stay alive is argued in a giant virtual courtroom. As he wins his battle of wits, the virtual courtroom is actualized whilst the surgical theatre now appears as a dream-image. The film has moved from self-consciousness (dicisign) to pure optical situation, or crystal-image.

Slide 5

When Carter perceives the arrested moment of his interludes with the other world, he enters the image just as we might experience the photograph. Time in photography is arrested, and the image does not itself move. Chronology does not pass on for the photograph, just as it does not for Carter in his interludes; but just as Carter experiences a duration internal to chronology, so too does the photograph present such a duration. All of these are paralleled in the film by the Doctor's *Camera Obscura*, which takes its occupants into an inner world which observes the constant duration of the outside. Perception in the photograph is not regulated by external forces, and we experience its duration as Bergson did the duration of his glass of water. Our perception changes as we look at the photograph, and we are internal to that change. *A Matter of Life and Death* then presents to Carter the chance to do in reality what we do every day with photography; it is a fantastical extension of a very real occurrence. Detached from a sensory-motor connection, the photograph exists as a non-chronological perception image.

We can see now that there is a glimpse of pure duration in the photographic image. Where we view the photograph as a discrete element internal to chronology, it is easy to forget that it also presents an indirect proposition of duration. Like Peter Carter, we are internal to this becoming. But Carter's experience of pure duration is characterized by his knowing his interludes are distinct from chronological time; they are not pure

recollection-images nor are they pure dream-images, but instead constitute images of their exchange. This is a reflexivity not guaranteed in photography. Photographic language often blinds us to the image of duration offered, just as the cinema of the movement-image makes itself transparent. The reflexivity of Carter's interlude – perception within the frame of another perception – is characteristic of the crystal-image; and though the photograph does *not always* demonstrate this reflexivity, it does *not mean it cannot.* Moreover, Carter's ability to experience duration self-consciously – to perceive it as different from chronology – brings us to Deleuze's ultimate re-reading of Bergson's theses on time:

> Bergsonism has often been reduced to the following idea: duration is subjective, and constitutes our internal life...But, increasingly, he came to say something quite different: the only subjectivity is time, non-chronological times grasped at its foundation, and it is we who are internal to time, not the other way around. [45]

We must alter our perception of photography accordingly. We should not consider the photograph as an immobile section of chronology, but instead we should review it as a glimpse of duration; *a duration that we are internal to.*

We recognize duration when we question chronology and its abstract division of time, and can recognize the glimpse of duration in the photograph by questioning its connection to the sensory-motor schema, and looking at photographs that present a 'self-conscious' image. This is a dual action: the photograph's independence of the schema is demonstrated by the fact that it must be connected or organized into the schema. The two forces created from this push it towards an objective but abstract chronology, and expose the subjectivity within its glimpse of time. These forces create an unequal exchange in which one is in the process of actualization, and the other in the process of virtualization. The glimpse of duration, the free-indirect proposition, in the photograph is neither a consequence of its connection to the sensory-motor schema, nor its independence from it. It occurs in the indiscernibility between these two values.

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[45] TI, p. 82.

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Memory, tense and photography

Deleuze's approach to the photograph is characterized by the orthodox treatment of photography exhibited by cinema criticism, and yet Deleuze's work, and the work of those around him, still provide the basis of a rethinking of the photographic image.

The influence of film criticism, and particularly European criticism, is apparent in Deleuze's writings, and also his understanding of the photograph. His approach can be likened to that of Christian Metz and, before him, André Bazin. For Metz [46], Bazin [47], and Barthes [48], an understanding of photography was reached by comparisons made with cinema [49]. Like Deleuze, they saw photography only through its limitations, its paucity, in comparison to the cinematic image. Peter Wollen shares this conclusion that photography has no parity with cinema [50]. The photograph has a distinct contiguity with the time and the place at which it was taken, but its relationship with time is characterized by immobility, rather than any mobility that can be developed from it. It is a powerful argument, supported by histories and critical studies written before and after Deleuze, and on the face of it there seems no need to challenge or extend such a strongly established understanding.

The role of the photograph as *photogramme* is central to these comparative studies [51]. Christian Metz described cinema as 'unfolding' the

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[46] Metz, 1985. See also: Christian Metz, *Psychoanalysis and Cinema: the Imaginary Signifier*, London, Macmillan, 1982.

[47] Bazin, 1967. See also: Siegfried Kracauer, 'Photography', in *Theory of Film: Redemption of Physical Reality*, (Oxford, OUP, 1960), rpt. in Trachtenberg, A. ed. Classic Essays on Photography, (Conneticut, Leete's Island, 1980), pp245-269.

[48] Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida (La Chambre Claire)*,(1980), trans. by Richard Howard, 4th edn. (London: Vintage, 1993) (CL). See also *Image Music Text* (1977), trans. by Stephen Heath, 3rd edn. (London: Fontana, 1982).

[49] Alan Trachtenberg points to an older practice of cinema criticism (now lost) in which this is a common paradigm. See Alan Trachtenberg, ed. *Classic Essays on Photography*, (Connecticut, Leete's Island, 1980), p237.

[50] Peter Wollen, 'Fire and Ice', in *Photographies* 4, 1984, rpt. in John X. Berger & Olivier Richon, eds. *Other than itself: writing photography*, (Manchester, Cornerhouse, 1989) (no page numbers). See also: Peter Wollen, 'Photography and Aesthetics', *Screen* 19:4, 1978/79, pp9-28.

[51] MI, p. 82.

photograph into the shot, from which movement is derived [52]. This is the immobile section of the shot in Deleuze. The shot is simply a series of photographs that presents the impression of movement. For the most part, the photograph remains fixed to movement and the sensory-motor schema because of this ellipsis of time, or division, that the photogramme individually creates. But as Wollen has noted, movement itself is not a necessary feature of action cinema [53]. Cinema is a becoming 'strung together' from instantaneous images as determinants. The shot itself does not move, but it is a string of shots that implies movement abstractly. The photograph here is only a photogramme of reality waiting to be connected in a series that is the paradigm of cinematic movement. The photograph is therefore a privileged instant, or formal transcendental element of motion, from which movement can be derived, and from which time flows. This is a conclusion that leads Deleuze to consider the photograph as simply a constituent of the cinematic image early on in his thesis [54].

When reduced to the constituent of the shot, the photograph is treated simply the photogramme, and a common sense understanding of photography flows from this identification. Photography and cinematography (the process of the photogramme) share the recording of reality that in Charles Peirce's terms is its indexic value, and in Barthes' is the *eidos* [55]. But whereas the photograph can become a mould of space, the mobile section (the shot) presents a similar mould of change; a situation Deleuze notes, after Bazin, in his first chapter of *Cinema 1* [56]. This conception of the shot is rooted in the history of instantaneous photography exemplified by Eadweard Muybridge. At the time of Muybridge, visual culture was familiar with a movement-image in inventions that utilized an already understood science of the phi-effect. Hand crafted amusements like the zoetrope depicted a movement that flowed directly from a sensory-motor schema - an *impression* of motion, whilst the use of photographs in the kinetoscope had the affect of

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[52] Metz, 1985, p.82.
[53] Wollen, 1984.
[54] MI, pp2-5.
[55] Barthes, R. *Camera Lucida (La Chambre Claire)* (1980), trans. by Richard Howard (London, Vintage, 1982), p. 60. (CL)
[56] MI, p. 24.

presenting a movement-image contiguous with reality. De Duve, Metz and Wollen all see Muybridge's studies in animal locomotion as a natural precursor to the science of cinematography. Muybridge was not only adept in the sciences of photography, but was personally experienced in the pre-cinematic forms, and in particular through his own drawings for the zoopraxiscope [57].

Slide 6

Muybridge's 'shots', the images presented in sequential order, are immobile sections that rely upon the sensory-motor schema. They demonstrate the photograph's own immobility, as the photograph as photogramme exists only as a constituent of an unfolding movement-image. Time flows from movement organically in the sensory-motor schema imaged by the photogramme in series. Ultimately, the photogramme is a set that refers to another set (the shot) and this in turn refers to the whole of the horse's canter.

The above is a powerful historical argument that D.N Rodowick has seen as the seed of cinema's indirect representation of time [58], and which limits the photograph to being the photogramme for cinema. The difference is highlighted by Christian Metz, whose emphasis of the photograph's "immobility and silence" conflates the two as figurations of death. In so doing Metz predicates the photograph's ontology as one based on a relationship with movement. Sound, as argued by Metz, substantiates movement and time in cinema, and without sound, photography cannot unfold over time in the same way that cinema is able to. Like Deleuze, he saw that cinema's difference from photography was its ability to add an auditory sphere to connect the plurality of shots and become an experience of time [59]. Montage, the creation of movement from the shot, is made possible by the out-of-field (or off-frame) space implied by sound between successive shots that maintain a continuity. The fictional space -

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[57] Kevin MacDonnell, *Eadweard Muybridge: the man who invented the moving picture*, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p132. See figure 1.
[58] D. N. Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, (London, Duke Press), 1997, p. 9.
[59] Metz, 1985, p. 83.

Deleuze's sensory-motor situation - is implied by a movement-image temporally structured by the auditory sphere. The movement-image can provide a substantial out-of-field space, whereas the photograph can only imply this as possibility.

This strong link between the photograph and the movement image is, however, a red herring. For in Deleuze, sound and image must be dislocated from their causal link to each other in order to create the possibility of the time-image. They must be liberated from their motor-material link and become pure opsigns and sonsigns in order to go beyond the movement-image [60]. Divorced from a material connection to sound, the photograph is an opsign - its silence and immobility is its foundation as a time-image. The opsign and the sonsign are by no means interdependent, and cinemas such as early neorealism, which had to begin a cinema practice from scratch, had no synchronized sound [61]. By treating the auditory and optical separately but still within the cinematic image, Deleuze potentially frees the photograph from this reliance on sound in order to depict time.

What remains unconsidered in the orthodox approach is the photographic paradox: the conflict between the photograph as an *image* and as and image *of something*. André Bazin merely saw the contiguity between image and object as the unique nature of the photograph, thus solving any such problems [62]. However, Thierry De Duve locates the paradox of the photograph as the collision of its superficial and referential series [63]. The photograph is neither completely objective nor completely subjective, and yet criticism still attempts to places these values upon it. In De Duve, the photograph is balanced between a state of transparency (referential), such as in the instantaneous image in which the 'photography' is imperceptible, and a state of the pictorial (surperficial) in which the 'photography' is foregrounded. No matter how objective it appears to be, there is always a self-consciousness that threatens to overwhelm any assumed *verité*. De

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[60] TI, p. 6.
[61] MI, p. 212.
[62] Bazin, 1980, p. 241.

Duve singles out the example of Muybridge's animal locomotion studies as an extreme example of an 'aesthetic controversy': the horse's "unexpected, yet 'true' postures" revealed by photography contradict the artist's role in representing the sensation of their motion [64]. This is the free-indirect proposition (dicisign) that becomes the free-indirect discourse when it reaches the point of this reflexive and often-uncontrollable explosion of self-reference. As rationalising discourses seek to create stable and distinct values for the photograph, this conflict constitutes a near-unresolveable paradox.

On another note, Barthes, Metz, Wollen and others, all consider the photograph as immobile [65]. Bound to the scene depicted, it cannot be dislocated from the movement in space that it describes. And as time flows from movement in the sensory-motor schema, this creates a paradox in time demonstrated by its apparent representation of past moment. This is why in Bergson's *Matter and Memory* we found that perception was imagined as a photograph, a fixed view of things, and that this assumption dominated the human understanding of perception and especially memory [66]. The brain picks images from a continuum of points of space that exist independently and act upon each other. In freezing any one of these, the photograph is a *false image* of memory. It can only depict an abstract time. This is a privileged instant, artificially grabbed from a time that flows indivisibly – a virtual, or indirect image of time. It can only be a modulation or cast – "The photograph embalms time" as Bazin sees it – of a state of equilibrium that is artificially dislocated from an ongoing duration [67].

This false connection between memory and the photograph is rooted in the representation of moment which photography occupies in popular imagination, as we saw earlier. The photographic memory is seen through

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[63] Thierry DeDuve, 'The Photograph as Paradox', in *October 5*, Summer 1978, pp. 113-125, (p. 114).

[64] Ibid. p. 115.

[65] CL, pp. 78-79. This is a convergence of Saussure and Peirce in Barthes' last book. The analyses by De Duve, Metz, and of course Deleuze all use Peirce's Semiotics as the principle linguistic tool, largely because of the photograph's perceived contiguity with the referent; a fact initially pointed out by Bazin. *Camera Lucida* concentrates on this referentiality, albeit with a less structured approach.

[66] B, p. 38. See also, MI, p. 61.

[67] Bazin, 1980, p. 243. See also Bazin, A. *What is Cinema*, (California, UoC, 1967), p. 61.

a regime of tense, in that the past is separated from the present of consciousness, analogous to Bergson and Deleuze's *'leap into ontology'*. Peter Wollen has seen this as a sense of an ever-receding 'then', a fixed point, which recedes from the moment of looking at the image, and which *"has no fixed duration"* in itself. This leads to a division between cinema as *imposed reading time*, and photography as *free re-writing time*. Wollen develops this after Christian Metz, who suggested that the time of the image collides with the 'time of the look', an indivisible and unregulated time [68]. Photography is not reliant upon a depiction of time regulated by movement. Wollen attacks the idea of the *tense* of the photograph, and does so by referring instead to the photograph's own internal temporal structure, or 'aspect'. *Tense* can only present the moment in relation to the present moment of description, but the photograph contracts all pertinent images of time: there is the present of the photographic image; the past it represents; and the future of that past, which becomes the present of the image. This echoes Bergson, in that past, present and future are perception images that all flow from re-collection. Furthermore, as Deleuze notes, Bergson identifies these images as co-existent with perception: There is contraction because "recollection-becoming-image enters into a coalescence with the present." [69] The past does not, in fact, exist. It is only an image of memory that co-exists with the present as a contraction of the past in general, and regions of the past in particular.

The movement-image is a constitution of still-images founded on the organization of the past in general and in particular. It is an organization of recollection images, whose ontology is perceived through their difference from the present. They constitute a past as an *other*. Their value is not only time, but also an abstraction of time: in another word, *tense*. Duration is organized into recollection-images and contraction-images in the same way that language is an organization of utterances into sense:

> Far from recomposing sense on the basis of sounds that are heard and associated images [opsigns and their compositions], we *place*

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[68] Metz, 1982, p. 43.

[69] B, p. 65.

ourselves at once in the element of sense, then in a region of this element. [70]

This concept of recollection is demonstrated in the 'cone' that Bergson uses in *Matter and Memory* and that Deleuze takes to his studies. This cone demonstrates the whole of memory, and the regions that make up the recollection images that perception contracts in the present. Any particular recollection image also contains an image of the whole of recollection, and both co-exist with the present. Tense is annihilated in favour of contraction:

Slide 7

"The past AB coexists with the present S, but by including in itself all the sections A'B', A"B", etc., that measure the degrees of a purely ideal proximity or distance in relation to S. " [71]

This contraction-image is the *aspect* of duration. The photograph's aspect only refers to itself and its direct depiction of time. Without a motor material connection, the photograph is a state of zero duration – a contraction. It proposes a free-indirect discourse, as without duration it is not structured by direct discourses that rely on the sensory-motor schema. Signification can be radical and random. From this we can establish a 'condition' of the photographic time-image that to be met: all photogrammes (and hence photographs) go from the dicisign (a free-indirect proposition brought on by the photographic paradox) toward the opsign (the pure optical situation divorced from the sensory-motor schema). But only some flourish as time-images.

For Deleuze, the photograph as a material constituent of cinema (as the photogramme) can occupy only the first level of signification; a 'firstness' that Deleuze observes by following the semiotic study of Charles Peirce. Because the photograph offers a connection to the sensory-motor schema

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[70] B, p. 57.
[71] B, p. 59. See also MM, pp. 161-163.

(and hence cinema language) it offers a *potential* that we can see as this 'firstness':

> Firstness is thus the category of the Possible: it gives a proper consistency to the possible, it expresses the possible without actualizing it, whilst making it a complete mode [72].

Deleuze also notes, however, that Peircean semiotics cannot deal with the zero state that offers the chance of language to develop. It can deal with the logic of language but not the *proposition* of language. In a later recapitulation of Peirce's work, Deleuze proposes that the first order of perception exists within this zero-ness. The orders of language are simply organized forms that flow from a pure potentiality that exists within a zero state. This points to a perception that is outside the logical regime of semiotics [73]. The first order perception-image frames the perception that precedes it. It is the *dicisign, perception within the frame of another perception*, or the self-consciousness that we have already identified in the photographic paradox. The dicisign resolves the paradox of the photograph into a potentiality. Language in photography, as in cinema, flows from this image. In order for a photograph to be a time-image, it must be freed from its language by dealing directly with it. This is a reflexivity not in terms of a binary opposition, but instead as a self-consciousness of the language of which the photograph is a part. The photograph exists in language as a sign and a carrier of signs, but language has attributed to the photograph values of referentiality or superficiality that in their turn constitute the first order of meaning before the photograph becomes such a carrier. The photograph as time-image must exist in the gap between image and language, between objective and subjective, by not only offering this state of zero-duration, but also that of a *camera-consciousness* [74]. This zero-state exists because of, rather than in spite of, the exchange between superficial and referential. In order to depict duration, the time-image must also be an image of the change that it provokes itself: as Bazin has noted, "the image of things is likewise the

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[72] MI, p. 98.
[73] TI, pp. 25-44, Chapter 2: The Recapitulation of Signs and Images.
[74] MI, p. 76.

image of their duration" [75]. The image must draw attention to its own act of perception; to itself as cinema or as photography.

From the zero state time can only burst outward. This suggests that Deleuze's initial understanding of the photograph as static equilibrium was misguided, the photograph as individual image cannot contain the explosive force of the absolute zero of time. According to De Duve, the photograph (and in particular the photo-de-pose), offers a glimpse of this force. The "empty form of all potential tenses", the photograph is also "the absolute zero of time". However it also offers a splitting of time into a "*not anymore* and *not yet*" [76], an illogical and irrational proposition that describes the time that has past, and the moment that will not proceed. Empty of a logically based depiction of time, what is this time shown in the photograph? It is the traumatizing non-chronological time, which shatters the temporal flow of space-time, and projects "the immensity of past and future" [77] out into the 'time of the look', the out-of-field. We have thus discovered the true potential of the photograph as time-image: the non-chronological time – or cronos – that is crucial to Deleuze's concept of the time-image, *is also a potential of the photograph.* It is now simply a matter of seeking out the ways in which Deleuze's own understanding of the time-image can be used to qualify this. To understand the time-image, we must understand the conditions of the free-indirect proposition. Fundamentally, we can understand the photographic time-image by 'paring' from it the situations that limit the photograph to the sensory-motor schema, and by so excluding the motor-material, understand the photograph as pure opsign.

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Three Photographs: from free-indirect proposition to crystal-image
Cinema begins with the division of movement photographically, or more precisely photogrammatically. The history of photography is written as a history of the discrete instant: the photograph's perceived power is

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[75] Bazin, 1980, p. 242.
[76] DeDuve, 1978, p. 116-117.

balanced on an ability or inability to freeze time. Once this was achieved, it ceased to be the focus of discussion, and was overtaken by the analysis of composition and, lately, photographic language. The discussion of time and photography is now almost exclusively dealt with via a discussion of cinema, and the few discourses surrounding the still photograph tend to focus on the use of stroboscopy, ultra-high speed photography, or more interestingly, time-lapse photography.

Thierry De Duve points to the condition of the photograph in which time is depicted as a passing. Duration is depicted indexically, and metaphorically enunciated by the blurring of the timed exposure. Duration is a evanescence of time, from presence to absence, and is therefore the immobility and silence of the funerary that De Duve and Metz both describe [78].

But time-lapse photography offers something different. The Futurists used the technical limitations of photography at that time to explore movement. Antonio Bragaglia's time-lapse photographs describe movement within a discrete element of time. This representation is of the indivisibility of movement and is closer to the superficial arts that prefer the picturesque than it is to the referential. Bragaglia's photographs present movement as an element of the picturesque, and hence time is only a discontinuous material element used in the description of motion. The depiction of time is secondary to the representation of action. Bragaglia's photographs, if they reflect a memory-image at all, it is the episodic memory that we saw in Zimmer and Cohen above.

Slide 8

Time-lapse photography is directly descended from the photo-de-pose, in which the depiction of time is made primarily for aesthetic reasons, and appears continuous with nature. The picturesque in this manner is

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[77] MI, p. 32.
[78] DeDuve, 1978, p. 123. See also Metz, 1985, pp. 83-84.

perfectly demonstrated in Pablo Picasso's pictures taken with Gjon Mili, in all of which Picasso draws in the air with a 'pencil of light'.

Slide 9

Picasso drawing with the pencil of light: Bull, by Gjon Mili (1949), [79] is a concrete image of duration. Like Muybridge's galloping horse, it is an immediately apparent depiction of time expressed by movement. But this image presents a passage of time, which Muybridge's images individually do not. The studies in animal motion only present time when seen *in situ*, either through projection or as a collage. They present time through the unfolding of the photograph into a shot, binding them to the sensory-motor schema. *Bull*, on the other hand, presents time within the frame of the image. It is a modulation of space *and* of time.

Deleuze was keenly aware that the single image could present montage, or an impression of time and movement, from within the frame, and we see this in *Cinema 2* [80]. Similarly, *Bull* gives time to the photograph and presents montage within the image. It gives us the sense of time – the *durative* – within the instant – the *punctual*. Picasso's whole body has moved to create the image of the bull in the air, but he is also caught within the punctuality of the photograph, and in particular the flash burst. This is a collision of the instantaneous photograph with the timed exposure; a collision that presents itself as the possibility of free-indirect discourse, or an oscillation between the binary positions of the objective (the instantaneous image as referential to nature) and the subjective (the time exposure as the aesthetic picturesque).

As a durative image *Bull* is a cell of time, like the traditional photo-de-pose. Unlike the motor material photogramme, a single unit that conveys movement only as part of a series, it has no divisible units from which movement derives, and time flows, or unfolds, within the photograph. But as a cast or modulation of time – *Bull* is a set. *Bull* can only imply a fixed

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[79] Baldassari, A. *Picasso and photography: the dark mirror*, (Paris, Flammarion, 1997), p221.
[80] TI, pp. 16-17.

duration; the drawing of the bull in the air starts and ends. It reflects a memory-image in the form of the "Now Print!" order. In so doing the image organizes time into a discrete element, and whilst the frozen body of Picasso might impress upon us a flow of time beyond the moment, the limits of the air-drawing give us the boundaries of that moment. Instead of presenting an immobile section, it presents the mobile section, analogous to the shot. Just as the photograph is a mould of space, so it is a mould of time. *Bull* cannot imply an out-of-field so crucial to Deleuze's concept of the time-image. The out-of-field is a forking of thought, or memory, a possibility of a splitting of time which this image is denied [81]. The out-of-field only exists when unfettered from the sensory-motor schema, and not organized into a set.

The outcome from the absence of the out-of-field should not have been unexpected. Bazin's concept of the photograph as a cast is dependent upon the relation of movement to time. The idea of a cast implies not only an imprint or modulation, but also stasis and self-containment. As 'casts' the timed exposure photographs of Picasso are discrete elements discontinuous from time as a flow. They unfold only within themselves and present a set or section of time contiguous with movement. *Bull* can only be a mobile section of time, and an indirect image of duration

Bull's temporal ellipsis, demonstrated by the air-drawing, defines the image as a discontinuous set. It is a camera-consciousness, a proposition of free-indirect discourse, but this is directed toward the photograph's ellipsis. It can only present us with the potentiality of the time-image, a glimpse of a beyond of the movement-image, as seen from within the mobile section. It can imply a beyond of the movement-image, but only that.

We should be careful of concentrating too much on the photographic image that attempts to express time through the indivisibility or continuity of movement, since they create an artificial ellipsis of time. An important condition of the time-image is therefore apparent: *The photographic time-*

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[81] Ibid TI, p. 52.

image must express an unrolling or splitting of time beyond the boundaries of the image, and beyond the mobile section of the sensory-motor schema.

For the photograph to exist as a time-image it must be a pure opsign that exists independently of movement in space. In order for a photograph to be a pure image of duration, it must exist as an irrational break from the motor material. Deleuze could see the time-image in the shot, but only when irrationally dislocated, or discontinuous from the organic logic of the sensory-motor schema [82]. *Bull* is a confinement of the image of time, as much as it is a confinement of the image of space. The pencil of light's trace never leaves the frame of the photograph, whilst the action never leaves the section of time that the exposure marks out. *Bull's* dynamic image of time and space is reliant upon an entirely internalised logic.

Such a situation occurs in the photography of Henri Cartier Bresson, and in particular his *Pont de l'Europe* from 1932 [83]. An instantaneous image, the type of which Cartier Bresson was famous for, it is perhaps most closely related in Deleuzean analysis to the privileged instant; one of the initial determinants for cinema. However, *Pont de l'Europe* is a privileged instant which provides the irrational image of the pure opsign, for the privileged instant in this case is also De Duve's 'impossible posture'. The movement has been performed, yet the photograph refers to it in the act of happening. It is both past and present. The photograph presents a paradox in its treatment of motion [84].

Slide 10

This simple paradox destroys the logical contiguity between the photograph and its referent, the contiguity that is crucial to the linguistic regime of Peirce that DeDuve, Metz and Deleuze all draw upon. For the time-image, contiguity is crucial not in space between image and referent, but in time between past and present. The photograph is outside the

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[82] Ibid TI, p. 214.
[83] This photograph is also known as "Behind the gare St. Lazare".

implied logic of language, since although it can refer to the objects, it cannot adequately refer to the motion or time of these objects. Whilst the event remains in the past, the linguistic relation of it cannot but remain in the present. The impossible posture defies the organic logic of the motor-material and the depiction of time as logical progression – *chronological time.*

Pont de l'Europe is much more than a collision of past and present. It implies an out-of-field of the photograph, a continuance of time and space. Time no longer flows from movement, for that movement has been halted, or *annihilated*, by the photograph - *and yet* change will endure. Past and future divide from *Pont de l'Europe* in a forking of time. The event has happened, it is in the state of happening, and it is in the process of, or proceeding to happen. It is in the past, it is passing, and it will continue to pass. Tense is annihilated in favour of aspect. It is almost the same as Barthes' concept of the '*not anymore* and *not yet*' to which De Duve refers - *almost* because where Barthes saw immobility as a negative value, a semblance of death, using Deleuze we can see this as the seed for non-chronological time – 'the non-organic Life which grips the world' [85].

Pont de L'Europe presents an image independent of organic relations with other images, and therefore able to flourish properly as an opsign. Each aspect of time runs into the other in *Pont de l'Europe*, objectivity and subjectivity run into each other as Wollen has noticed, and as such *Pont de l'Europe* is the free-indirect proposition, or dicisign of the time-image. Time in *Pont de l'Europe* is not *chronos* (chronological time) but cronos, the *time* of the time-mage.

Conversely, now that we understand Wollen's thesis on the photograph as *zero-ness* of perception, we realize that it was appropriate for Deleuze to see the photograph as the determinant of cinema. As cronos, *Pont de l'Europe* is the foundation of the time-image, a photograph in which the paradoxical nature of the treatment of reality has created a potentiality for

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[84] DeDuve, 1978, p. 115.
[85] TI, p. 81. See also Deleuze's discussion of the crystal-image as a "seed image", pp. 74-75.

the bifurcation of non-chronological time. Not connected by the motor-material, it is a connection of thought and time; it is a direct time-image. There is, in this, another of the conditions of the photographic time image: *The photograph must depict cronos in order to be a time-image. It must be free of depicting space and time as logically connected, and must offer the foundation of time in the annihilation of tense.*

A question remains: How can we reconcile the photo-de-pose with the dicisign? The photo-de-pose, in De Duve's words "liberates an autonomous and recurrent temporality" [86] but as a 'time exposure' it is closely linked to the timed-exposure (such as *Bull*). In order to be a dicisign the image must offer the free-indirect proposition that the timed-exposure cannot. Creating an ellipsis in time, the timed exposure traps the photograph in the immobile silence to which Barthes, Metz and others have equated the state of death. But through De Duve we can see this as a liberation of sorts. For him, the photograph is both moment and monument, a past moment given the possibility of re-staging again and again. It is the paradox of the photograph exhibited by the photo-de-pose in the same way as had been exhibited by the snapshot. Past and present exist within the photograph, so that the photo-de-pose, rather than appearing as discontinuous as De Duve would have it, now projects outward in a splitting of time as had the instantaneous image. This "illogical conjunction of the *here* and the *formerly*" as expressed by Barthes, is amended and reconstructed by De Duve to create a proposition for the shattering of chronological time [87].

(The photograph as time-image cannot be divided into easily recognizable categories such as these. While the photo-de-pose rarefies the image to include one focal point, the instantaneous image is saturated with them. We must recognize such simple distinctions as purely critical values. We can only see such terms as 'snapshot' and 'photo-de-pose' as points of reference used to describe a medium that is by its nature a continuum of formal characteristics.)

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[86] DeDuve, 1978, p. 116.
[87] Roland Barthes, *Image Music Text* (1977), trans. by Stephen Heath, 3rd edn (London, Fontana,

Nan Goldin, an artist who obsessively records the people around her, took the photograph *Edwidge behind the bar at Evelynes, NYC*, in 1985 [88]. Taken with a flashgun, it combines the aesthetic characteristics of modern portraiture (of the modern photo-de-pose) with the formal characteristics of the instantaneous image. As a snapshot, it is exemplary of the free-indirect proposition because of its frank dealing with the photographic paradox (interestingly, Deleuze saw the perfect opsign as the image of the everyday) [89]. Furthermore, and representative of much of Goldin's other work, we can say that it is a pure time-image. *Edwidge behind the bar at Evelynes, NYC*, is demonstrative of the photograph that draws attention to its own paradox – it is the photo-de-pose within the snapshot, the durative within the punctual. It contains all the tenses within it, but as an instantaneous image, it annihilates those tenses to create an image of zero duration. From this *zeroness,* it offers the free-indirect proposition that enables the depiction of time directly.

Slide 11

The imposed reading time of tense is inverted to become a *free re-writing time*, Wollen's version of the proposition. The marker of this frame of perception is the flash glare, which has created a photogramme that does not act as the syntagma of cinema, but instead isolates it from the flow of chronology, or logical time. The flash glare in *Bull* could not cut loose the image from the temporal ellipsis which Picasso's movement implied. However, in *Edwidge* the image is not dependent upon the sensory-motor schema. It is aberrant from logical time, dislocated from chronology because time in all aspects is within the image and yet bursts outward. This pressure is a result of the saturation of the image. The flash glare is just one of a myriad of points of entry into the image. At a crucial moment, the importance of Deleuze's understanding of montage within the image becomes clear. Just as the tracking shots in Resnais, or the depth of field in Welles, create a movement independent from the camera, so Goldin's

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1982), p. 44. (IMT)

[88] Nan Goldin, ed., *Ballad of sexual dependency*, (London, Secker and Warburg, 1986), p. 101.

photograph, with its huge mirror absent of easily defined reflections, creates a potential for free montage *within* the image [90].

The image presents a further paradox: As photo-de-pose, it is rarefied around the image of Edwidge, just as *Bull* was rarefied around Picasso. But just as *Pont de l'Europe* had been saturated by the patterns of posters and puddle – the leaping man has a mirror image in the water, but also in the acrobat on the poster behind him - *Edwidge* is also saturated. Instead of time splitting, time shatters. The time of the image is incommensurable with its space, and bursts from within it. There are many possible reflections, and many further possible points of entry into the image, from the bottles with their own reflections of the flash burst, across the image to the deep recesses of the space that continues out-of-field. Each acts as its own point of indiscernibility between the image as we see it - the actual image; and the image as we imagine it within the time of the look - the virtual image. Each point within the image has its own little exchange between what we can see and what we can imagine as dream-images, world-images or recollection images. The mirror is crucial to this, as it creates a series of oppositions between the people or objects and their own reflections. Combined with Edwidge's attentive stare out of the image, they create a depth into which we plunge. Such oppositions are mutual images (after Deleuze, yet again), mutual because they bring together the actual images and the possible virtual images that issue from them to create an exchange between the two. The virtual image is no sooner actualized as recollection-, dream- or world-image than it virtualizes the actual image in an unequal exchange. The alternation of these is passed through the points of indiscernibility that both saturate and rarefy the image: the image presents not one exchange but many, as if they were individual facets on a crystal; and what is described is the crystal of time, or the crystal-image.

It has been important to bring ourselves slowly to this revelation, and to carefully discount each connection with movement that has prevented us

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[89] TI, p. 15.
[90] Ibid TI, p. 70.

from seeing photography as capable of producing the opsign. The overall aim of this thesis is to explore the specific nature of the crystal image; how Deleuze understands it; and crucially how it affects our understanding of the boundaries between the photographic and the cinematographic. This journey needs to start from a simple understanding. It is as a crystal image that *Edwidge* moves from indirect proposition, the unequal exchange of subjectivity and objectivity, to a time-image that is more completely realized.

The photograph presents the free-indirect proposition in a unique way. As part of the sensory-motor schema, the photogramme is bound to cinema by its representation of time through action in space. But the photograph is liberated from this when its deals with its own ontology rather than the depiction of space-time. There is only a true opsign when the photograph is dislocated from paradigmatic movement and time, a movement that continues unchanged beyond the image. Duration is absolute change, and Goldin presents a direct photography that seeks not only to record reality but to record the change brought about in reality by its very act. In imaging its own change, the photograph is a direct image of duration. The saturation of the image with myriad reflections causes multiple durations to unfold from a single image of duration. Mirrors are a visual acknowledgement of the eye of the camera, for only a mirror can truly stare back. Whilst Edwidge looks off behind the camera, the reflection in the mirror confuses the eye in the same way that the mirror in Édouard Manet's *A Bar at the Folies-Bergère* of 1881-2 confuses the eye and redirects from the girl's inquisitive gaze.

Slide 12

In both images, the reflections are virtual images that are actualized by their real counterparts. Any one reflection leads to multiple virtual images in an explosion of the crystal. But where the flashgun is a signifier of the real photographer, the man in the mirror in Manet's painting may or may not be the artist. The similarity between Goldin's photograph and Manet's painting is astonishing, and the crystal-image-as-painting remains an

alternative direction that a Deleuzean study could take. The truly striking connection that these images share is the relationship between the girl and the people around, or behind, her. In Manet's painting, they are made limpid by the painting's surface; they do not recede into the background. Yet they are virtualized, made opaque, by asymmetry of the mirror, which deflects attention back to the girl facing us. In *Edwidge*, this relationship is made more indistinct, and the action of indiscernibility more volatile. Instead of guaranteeing a photographer, (a popular conception of the photograph is that it can guarantee a referent, whereas a painting cannot), Goldin is both present and absent, made visible by the flash's glare, and hidden by it. Where the painting gives us the question of the painter's identity, the photograph questions the photographer's existence. This brings us back to the crystal and its reflexivity. The flash glare is both the reality depicted and the act of depiction, the perception and the frame of perception. It is a paradoxical relationship – an exchange – between the reality recorded and the act of recording with can only be truly recognized as a time-image, in which objectivity and subjectivity run into each other and time forks against the logic of chronology. Goldin photographs herself, but she has no concrete form to tie the image to the motor material as Picasso does. She is a virtual image only actualized by the flash glare, but without definite form, the flash glare becomes a virtual image of Goldin. She is there, and she is not there. She seeks to change reality by recording it, but her presence in reality is a central part of that act. The perception of duration is the perception of constant action/reaction, and Goldin's photograph is within this gap between action and reaction: it is the image of affection, or affection-image. As Deleuze puts it, the time-image exists in this gap, the interval between perception and action, and *Edwidge behind the bar at Evelynes, NYC* presents the photograph as existing within that gap [91]. It is contiguous with the change in reality it provokes, and the act of narration occurs within its own description. This brings us to a final condition of the time-image:

The photographic time-image must offer the act of depiction within the reality depicted. Only when it refers to itself, when the photograph addresses its ontology by drawing attention to its own nature and making,

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[91] Ibid TI, p. 46.

can it truly present the proposition that leads to free indirect discourse and the dislocation of the image from abstract time. It is this reflexivity that often leads to a direct representation of opposition, but here it is simply a proposition waiting to be fulfilled.

* * *

Conclusion:
The conditions of the photographic time-image

Above all, Deleuze's books provide a way of considering the conditions under which the photograph can be a time-image, despite his treatment of photographs in general. Deleuze has little time to deal with a thorough understanding of the photograph, his task in the cinema volumes is already considerable. Coupled with this is the irrelevance of a concentrated effort to deal with photography in the cinematic context. Historically, there is no reason why Deleuze should pay much attention to the photograph. For him, they have very separate lives that parted irreconcilably at the advent of cinema. But Deleuze does give us the opportunity to understand the photograph by describing its limitations. Furthermore, he also provides us with the conditions of the time-image that we can apply to photography ourselves. Deleuze's account of cinema therefore asks the initial question, and goes on to give us the tools to answer it. He gives us the means to define the determinants of the photograph as time-image, and from these we have been able to organize such determinants into a few simple conditions.

The photograph must offer a splitting or forking of time from the image. The timed exposure cannot do this, for it creates an unnatural ellipsis of time presented through its motor connection with action. The passing of objects in space is the marker of time within the image. Time flows organically from their movement. These photographs act as artificial sets within a flow of time that is presented only abstractly through its dislocation. They can only hint at time that continues outside this immobile section. It is offered by the timed exposure only as an index of action, and all of its depiction of time is turned inwards. The timed exposure is thus a

movement-image, and is directly related to the shot in cinema. They share a common ancestry in the photography that sought to 'conquer' action, and as such, the timed exposure is a form that can be seen to run from Daguerre to Eisenstein.

The direct image of time can occur only when the image is dislocated from the logic of organic depiction. Pure duration is not connected to movement, and in particular is not governed by the rational order of space-time. The pure image of duration must therefore constitute an irrational break, or aberrance, from such a connection. In the photograph, this motor-connection is implied by tense, and only the annihilation of tense can lead to the photographic time-image. The photograph must offer a zero state of perception in which the inward orientation of time is lost and time can only project outward with immense force.

Deleuze described time that is not organically rooted to movement as cronos, and it is this non-chronological time that exists in the zero state of the photograph. The photograph in this sense shares the nature of the photogramme as a foundation for the ordered time of the movement-image. It is not surprising that cinema scholars understood the photograph as the building-block of cinema for, as Deleuze has shown us, from this non-organic state of duration comes the organic state of abstract time depicted by the movement-image. However, the impossible posture of the snapshot offers a free-indirect proposition of cronos. Dislocated from a past, the image must create past at the same time as its present, and the present will become the future to that past. Tense no longer relates to the movement related, and is subsumed in favour of the aspect of duration. What is presented is a bit of time in its pure state.

Central to Deleuze's philosophy of the cinema is his view of the universe as a-centred; the 'free-indirect proposition' constitutes a description of incidents in which this is realised by cinema. Without the anchoring of organic time, perception can flow between values that in the organic world are crucial to action, but in pure duration are simply nominal. This is the free-indirect discourse, a discourse that occurs not in the imposed reading

time of action cinema, nor in the abstract ellipsis of the timed exposure photograph. Instead this discourse is an exchange between subjective and objective that occurs in the *free re-writing time* (after Wollen and Metz). This is the potential of the image that gives rise to, and is a determinant of, the time-image across cinema and the photograph.

In photography, subjectivity and objectivity reach this state of excited alternation when the camera is used as a frame of perception, or 'camera-consciousness'. Like cinema, photography that refers to the action of objects in time and space is limited to the movement-image. From this, the state of verisimilitude or psychological realism is almost as much a part of photography as of cinema. But as Deleuze has seen in cinema, so we also can see that when photography refers to its own taking it places perception within the frame of perception and creates the dicisign. It is liberated from the motor material and has the capability to go beyond the movement-image. From this understanding we can consider the shape and variety of the time-image in photography, but more importantly, we can consider the complex relationship between cinemas and photographies that can be seen to merge with each other. That is the task of Chapter Two.

The order of chapters thus proceeds as follows: Now that we have some conditions for the photographic time image, Chapter Two considers the connection between cinema and photography that the photogramme provides. It does so by looking at cinema that references photography, a study that is partly expected of this thesis partly expected of this thesis. Chapter Two deals with the photographic image's genetic element, its opsign, and Chapter Three has the dual task of considering the photograph's representation of time and how the opsign (as a photograph) came to be subdued as an immobile section by criticism and historical analysis.

Following this, we must at some point directly confront the 'seed' of Deleuze's approach to the photograph. In considering Bergson's two theses at the centre of Deleuze's philosophy of cinema, Chapter Three will

reconsider the photographic time-image and the very action of memory and perception on duration. It will consider the types, flavours, or characters of time that Deleuze develops in the cinema books, and in his earlier work. Crucially, it will consider these in relation to a photography and a cinema that have been either routinely associated with death (Eugène Atget), or routinely dismissed from film studies (cinema of the Lumières).

One thing that this leaves is a concise study of the operation of the crystal in the photograph, which is studied in Chapter Four. Cindy Sherman's early images are useful because they reference directly the cinematic image. Subjective responses to her work are defined by experiences of cinema, and cinema narrative. The crystal-image remains as the direct references are cast aside, thus doubling its extraordinary complexity and power. Formally, Sherman's are crystal-images because of their use of faces, mirrors, costume, and *mise-en-scène*. They are completed as crystals because, in various analyses of them, we can see them being actualised by critics as we watch. The analyses of Laura Mulvey, Rosalind Krauss, and others, make these crystal-images particularly dynamic.

Ultimately, we will have to engage with one of Deleuze's more widely known philosophical tropes – that of 'becoming' – and also try and understand more deeply the process – or becoming – of photography that creates the internal circuit of the crystal-image. Chapter Five sets about this. 'Becoming' raises the issue of authorship, and specifically *auteur*ship, perhaps more than in other chapters. Authorship as a becoming presents a motivated cinema that is powerful in its disruption of all direct discourses, this is what gives it (for Deleuze) its particular political dimension. Deleuze's cinephilia was informed by film studies practice that placed the director at the centre of meaning for a film (an approach paralleled in photography study). It is not surprising that he should see directors as much as philosophers in film as others have seen him as a philosopher of film. The problem of authorship in cinema and photography criticism never quite goes away. Nevertheless, one of the jobs of Chapter Five is to finally deal with this by studying an author who took pains to disappear from the

image of himself as author – Andy Warhol. The fact that he is often considered a Modern artist/author *par excellence*, whose name or image dominates even mildly pertinent discussion around him, serves only to demonstrate how completely his image has come to fulfil that artist's becoming-imperceptible. Warhol's life was spent as much creating the persona as it was retreating secretly from it, and as he made himself imperceptible, his experiments in doing so, his screen-prints but most especially his films, have continued to assume a larger symbolic greatness that dwarfs those subjects (the Empire State Building, Marilyn Monroe) he employed. Warhol's becoming-imperceptible is interesting because it demonstrates the processes of photography, including their own exchanges, circuits and becomings, that provide the seed of the crystal-image. We will come to explain this in due course. First, though, we must go back to the relationship that the film has with the photograph.

* * *

Chapter Two.

Camera-consciousness:

Towards the genetic element of cinema and photography.

Slide 13

Introduction

Garrett Stewart's exemplary study of the photograph in cinema has noted that in depicting the photographic, either through inset photograph or in the freeze-frame "The motion picture stalls upon a glimpse into its own origin and negation at once", and that "Each offers an instance, above and beyond plot imperatives, of cinema's empanelling an inquiry into its own affective and cognitive disposition."[1] Chapter One proposed that photography should be seen in continuum with cinema, rather than separate from it, and Stewart's conclusion initially seems to support this. Since photography now offers a time-image that Deleuze had not previously seen, we might assume that it is this link between cinema and photography that is at the heart of the crystal-image itself. This presents us with the task of understanding both the nature of this connection, and the way in which it manifests itself in the image. Stewart's study suggests that the reference of photography by cinema is indicative of a reflexivity in which the act of photography – and the role of the camera as its subjective tool – is brought into question. This neatly reflects the role of the camera as an identification of a subjective consciousness (the foregrounding of the photographer's eye). We now need to put this connection to the test by considering texts, and the approaches made to them, in the light of their reference to the photographic image or to photography. We will understand how the photographic image creates the internal circuit, or free indirect discourse, from which the crystal-image emanates, and we shall see how the photographic image as medium and trope is essential to it. We shall also understand the shape and form of a photographic continuum that is so diverse that it embraces even the most strictly exclusive disciplines of cinema and photography.

Stewart's study has shown us that not only are certain expectations placed upon any study of cinema and photography together, to neglect to consider these is to do so at one's peril. For instance both have, at the core of discourses surrounding them, the friction between subjectivity and objectivity. Deleuze identified the complex relationship between subject

[1] Garrett Stewart, *Between Film and Screen: Modernism's Photo Synthesis*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 10.

and object as poorly represented by any simple binary system. Instead, he suggested that situations of camera-consciousness give rise to a free-indirect proposition and that these expose the fluid reflexivity of the subject-object relationship. In short, this chapter is an investigation into just such a camera-consciousness. The heart of the crystal-image, lies in the essentially *photographic*.

This is how cinema and photography can be seen as in continuum when, by many accounts, there exists a fundamental difference between them. With such strongly established concepts of 'classic' cinema and 'straight' photography (the photography of Ansel Adams, for example), discussions that connect cinema and photography routinely focus upon the photogramme as a shared material basis, as is demonstrated in Stewart's study. Deleuze was not convinced by the reliance on the practical nature of cinema in Bergson's 1907 *Creative Evolution* (we shall deal with 'why' more closely in Chapter Three*)*. Instead he chose to concentrate, in those early chapters of *The Movement-image*, on the role of subjectivity, and especially the free-indirect discourse, the camera-consciousness, so crucial to the time-image. Deleuze's taxonomy of cinema is based on the *process* of subjectivity that cinema offers, and in order to understand the complex interaction of the objective and subjective, and hence more fully understand the free-indirect discourse, Deleuze turns to the pure optical situations that flow from the photographic image. Such optical situations appear in both the photograph and in cinema, as we have seen: the time-image flows from still images, or a collection of still images, since the cinema of the time-image never escapes its construction from the film strip. Underpinning the time-image then, is not so much any particular photographic process but *photography* itself. Whilst he decries the photogramme as an immobile section, the photographic image as a *process* is the essential seed of the time-image.

The cinema books themselves bridge the gap between his early work on Nietzsche and Bergson and Deleuze's later work on Leibniz. Leibniz's idiosyncratic view of the universe is of a complex, folding structure that he called *the monad*. The monadic universe is a structure without centres,

and in which there is only a continuum of pleats and folds. In this universe there is no fixed subjectivity but instead only the possibility of points of view, or inflections, that take in the whole. The only centres of the monad are those that are taken up in order to comprehend the monad itself, and the only divisions are those made by a particular point of view. Any appearance of multiplicity is accounted for in the pleats of the monad, and any amount of diverse elements is simply folds and pleats of a singular structure.

Leibniz offers us much more than this. To divide the continuum is to divide one monad into a series of monads, to an indivisible degree. The subject, which Deleuze replaces with the point of view, is just such an ephemeral inflection, and the monadic universe is thus reflected in a monadic subject. *The Fold*'s emphasis on the Baroque immediately offers a case study of philosophy and its relationship with aesthetics. As he did with Bergson, Deleuze returns to Leibniz's original work, and deals with it in the context of the culture of which he was part. *The Fold* is a recontextualization of Leibniz in the Baroque. Leibniz was not only the Baroque philosopher par excellence, as Deleuze would have it, but the Baroque permeates his philosophy. To use Leibniz in application is therefore to deal with the Baroque in some way.

The Baroque appears in our argument in the interplay between subject and object, characterized in the main by the inner world (or upper floor) of the soul and the outer world (lower floor) of matter that reflect each other. The inflection between them, the fold, is a point-of-view, or prehension of the world by the soul. Therefore the world is divided, in the Baroque and in general, into areas which reflect the soul, and those that reflect the material. In *The Fold*, Deleuze takes this representation through painting and architecture, emphasising in each turn the visible separation of the two worlds, and the role of the fold as a staircase, or threshold, between them. This leads Deleuze to conceive of the two levels as reflecting and interacting with each other. For Deleuze, this means that the text, whether painting, book, or even film, reflects the monadic form of the culture that produced it.

This occurs most often in the cameras (and the photographic and representational practices) that bring any photography into being. For Vilém Flusser, the camera cannot help but be an agent in such representation. By its operation, its mechanics, the camera carries out not the commands of the photographer who wields it with apparent freedom, but rather it carries out the encoded *program* of its makers. Built up over generations, according to laws so naturalised that they have become imperceptible, these encoded instructions ensure the dimensions and characteristics of the abstract image created, whilst the camera becomes a black-box in practice and in fact. But the camera is only a set of codes within another – sets within sets – that ensure the cultural and critical reception of photographs, so that programming widens to become *information*:

> If one now attempts a criticism of apparatuses, one first sees the photographic universe as the product of cameras and distribution apparatuses. Behind these, one recognizes industrial apparatuses, advertising apparatuses, political, economic management apparatuses, etc…the whole complex of apparatuses is therefore a super-black-box made up of black-boxes.[2]

Photographs of all kinds are created according to an ideological programming as well as scientific one. This programming informs the image from the very object of the camera (with manual controls informed by pictorial ideologues) outward to the social conditions of the act of photography. Indeed, for Flusser:

> The camera functions on behalf of the photographic industry, which functions on behalf of the industrial complex, which functions on behalf of the socio-economic apparatus, and so on (p. 30).

> …the structure of the cultural condition is captured in the act of photography rather than in the object being photographed (p. 33).

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[2] Vilém Flusser, *Towards a Philosophy of Photography*, trans. by Anthony Mathews, (London: Reaktion, 2000, c. 1983), p. 71. (TPP)

...choice is limited to the categories of the camera, and the freedom of the photographer remains a programmed freedom (p. 34).

Thus the workings of the 'black-box' are hidden from us, and we know enough only to understand "how to feed the camera...and how to get it to spit out photographs"[3]. Flusser's is a philosophical picture of culture that synthesises Marx, Althusser, the Frankfurt School, Leibniz, and finally Deleuze [4]. But the real intersection of Flussers 'nomadological' text and Deleuze's work is in his treatment of the image and its relation to the world [5]. The photograph is the image of a concept, and in this case, it is the concepts of the Cartesian camera that are imagined, not the free will of the photographer. The photograph's extraordinary resemblance to reality results in the acceptance, if not the expectation, of a direct link with reality. Jonathan Crary has noted this, and suggests that the optics of the camera affirms the objectivity of the "infallible metaphysical eye", since the optics of the camera mimic those of the human eye [6]. This connection (and the trust placed in its images) is a central element of the camera-consciousness – and necessitates, as Crary does – understanding the camera (or more precisely, the *camera obscura*) itself.

Leibniz also provides us with connection between cinema and photography; but not in the way in which Deleuze envisioned them. The time-image and the photograph share one vital genetic element – the opsign – despite the fact that Deleuze saw the photograph as an immobile section. The opsign is the point of indiscernibility between virtual and actual, and Deleuze is wrong to relegate the photograph to a simply material value. For the relationship between cinema and photography to be monadic, there has to be a single fold that runs between them, and that is reflected in any inflection (in any text) on that fold. As Leibniz, Deleuze, and Flusser suggest, the text will reflect the whole that composes it.

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[3] Ibid, TPP, p. 27.
[4] Flusser's "super-black-box" echoes the hierarchy of Deleuze's "sets within sets".
[5] Noted by Hubertus von Amelunxen, Afterword to: Vilém Flusser, *Towards a Philosophy of Photography*, trans. by Anthony Mathews, (London: Reaktion, 2000, c. 1983), p. 86. The significance of this observation will shortly become clear.
[6] Jonathan Crary, 'The Camera Obscura and its Subject', in Nicholas Mirzoeff ed. *The Visual Culture Reader*, (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 245 – 252, p. 251.

Therefore, if the genetic element must be shared across cinema and photography, it must be clearly visible in situations where cinema and photography would ordinarily seem diametrically opposed; that is to say, when cinema quotes photography, either through camerawork or through the narrative use of photographs. Since the genetic element is neither cinema nor photography, but an essential part of both, the opsign can only be in the photographic image itself, and the discourse can only be based around the 'photographic' in general. This chapter is therefore an investigation of the genetic element. The challenge is to take to texts an understanding of the discourse surrounding the photographic image, and demonstrate how the exchange of subject and object, is reflected in them. This should not just occur in avant-garde cinema, and not just in cinema that quotes photographs, but also in cinema that puts the veracity of the photographic image at stake, whether avant-garde or mainstream.

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Subjectivity and the Baroque Camera.

This chapter rejects the conceptual difference between cinema and photography that is centred on an ontology of negation. This conception is based on the comparison with cinema, and on an understanding of photography only as an agent of subtraction: photography is cinema's origin *and* negation, cinema can do what photography cannot. As Stewart and Raymond Bellour note, the discussion of photography within film serves only to reflect film's abundance when 'grasped through the spectre of photography".[7] Where cinema and photography meet textually is the site of photography's diminution. But this leaves unconsidered any approach to photography based on its historical and critical antecedents, whether in comparison with painting, or for its own sake. In the pages of *Critical Inquiry* an interesting alternative analysis of photography has emerged. This views its conventions as drawn from those pre-eminent in art and design in the two or three hundred years between the Renaissance and the beginning of the nineteenth century: Immediately substituting the contest of death with a contest of truth. At stake here is

less a discussion of the differences between the cinema and photography, but instead the autonomy of the photographic image in general. The photographic image might be chemically made, but it is culturally shaped. A real paradox exists between physics and point of view.

Whilst Deleuze never fully consolidates his attack on the notion of the subject in the cinema books, his later work on Leibniz, particularly on the *Monadologie*, more properly deals with the idea of a *point-of-view*. In *The Fold*, he continues his attack on the Cartesian subject by taking a view of the world and the mind based on Leibniz's influential anti-Cartesian philosophy, and the culture of the Baroque that surrounded it.[8] At the same time as attacking Leibniz for proposing a unified perspective based on relativism, *The Fold* is also a 'rehabilitation' of Leibniz, as John Mullarky has noted.[9] Deleuze reclaims Leibniz in the same way as he had done Bergson, and goes back to the former to explore the role of point-of-view as an inflection that strikes the monadic fold at a tangent – creating a relative, yet self-aware, apex of vision.

This is what offers us a chance to see beyond the merely physical connection of cinema and photography. Cinema and photography share a common base (the photogramme) but also an ever-changing relationship formed, as folds, by cultural distinctions. Furthermore *Cinema* and *Photography* as critical values should not be seen as a spatial modulation of this folding monad (ie. Two separate things – or as different in kind), but now a temporal modulation in a 'continuous development of form'.[10] The critical distinctions of classical cinema, or 'straight' photography are really only points of relative stasis in the development of photography and film criticism. They act as inclusions – or *inhesions* - of forms, but as critical values they exist only in time, as *events*, or *objectiles*. Since film studies and photography studies view these paradigms in retrospect, it is now easy to see this temporal characteristic. Cinema and Photography's critical

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[7] Raymond Bellour, 'The Film Stilled', *Camera Obscura* 24, (1991), pp. 98-123, p. 105.

[8] Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. by Tom Conley, (London: Athlone, 1993). (F)

[9] John Mullarky, "Deleuze and Materialism: One or Several Matters?", in *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 96, No. 3, (Summer 1997), pp. 439-464, p. 455.

[10] F, p. 19.

values (and the genres, movements, or oeuvres that are perceived within them) are misleading, as they create an image of the photographic medium as a tessellated and fragmented collection of forms – and obscure any continuity, such as an unfolding of one to become another. This is a side-effect of the monad in general, and cinema in particular, as Deleuze notes in his commentary on Leibniz in *The Time-Image*:

> Leibniz…showed that the world is made up of series which are composed and which converge in a very regular way, according to ordinary laws. However, the series and sequences are apparent to us only in small sections, and in a disrupted or mixed-up order, so that we believe in breaks, disparities and discrepancies as in things that are out of the ordinary.[11]

In fact, the monad is a continuum in which *any* division can be made, and where

> …the resolution into particular reasons can go on into endless detail, because of the immense variety of things in nature and the *ad infinitum* division of bodies.[12]

This is why Deleuze attaches importance to the *everyday* in cinema. Any division or inflection reflects every division. *Every* becomes *any,* and any particular point is merely a reduction of every possible point *ad infinitum*. In the monad, *any-instant-whatever* becomes *every-instant-whatever*. This is the structure of multiplicity in unity: a genetic element stretches across pleats and folds, creating a unity of multiplicity – the appearance of the monad – in the *concetto*. The *concetto,* as the apex of a cone, is therefore a view of the monad that fully realises the relationship between the one and the multiple as *every*thing and *the one – any* and *every*.[13] We now have a *cinephoto* monad – the photographic form that folds and pleats to become Cinema and Photography.

Before finally coming to the *concetto*, Deleuze first recasts the subject in

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[11] TI, p. 14.
[12] Nicholas Rescher, *G. W. Leibniz's* Monadology, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), p. 128.
[13] F, p. 126-7

Leibnizian terms. Unhappy with the term 'subject', with its connotation of Cartesian perspectivism, Deleuze's *superject* is a point of inflection in the monad, a threshold where the soul meets the material; expressive of the shifting nature of the *point-of-view.* The *superject* is the organisation of perception based on what is most useful to perception: an operation of inherence or inclusion by the soul. But Deleuze adds to this his work on Bergson, and concludes that the *superject* creates a virtual image of the material world, thus actualising it in the folds of the soul. This constitutes the *point-of-view.*

> A soul always includes what it apprehends from its point of view, in other words, inflection. Inflection is an ideal condition or a virtuality that currently exists only in the soul that envelopes it.[14]

The *superject* finds its instrument in the *camera obscura*, although not the *camera obscura* or *lucida* that inspired Fox-Talbot, Wedgwood and Daguerre. Their post-enlightenment *camera obscura*, was a tool of drawing upon to be used singly, and in which the individual eye organised the image and the whole camera's orientation; a tool to which we remain exterior. Its role as instrument can only support the organising principles of Cartesian order: the 'Flusserian' programming was already taking shape. But in the Baroque *camera obscura* the viewer is placed inside the cell of the camera, and watches a moving image on a white table or sheet. The inner subjectivity and the outer world are separated, but the fold of the lens yet remains to connect them. The viewer inhabits a variable perception within the *camera obscura*, and watches an image that is a reflection of the variable outer world. To understand the photographic image, we must bypass the Cartesian camera, and refer instead to the camera as an inner cell that actualises a virtual world into an image in time.

The camera-consciousness is therefore a foregrounding of the superject as an ideal condition of the *soul*, rather than an ideal condition of the object perceived. Crucially, this can be identified in what Deleuze later describes as a prehension of a prehension: a *self-enjoyment* of its own

becoming that pluralises the monadic space.[15] This leads to a nomadization of the monad by a self-enjoyment that is "the very essence of an event", as Tom Conley notes.[16] The camera-consciousness draws attention to itself as an event of perception, *a way of seeing* that exists in time, and that is subject to the variation of point-of-view. This means that we should consider cinemas that are driven by the camera as Leibniz's *Gestaltung*, an inflection that materialises an image of the world, but foregrounds this very action.[17] We must see the camera-consciousness as a *threshold* between the world and the soul, in such a manner that the world reflects the soul. Therefore filmic texts will present a monadic material world, and this will be reflected in their monadic representation of time. The threshold, or fold, between them will be the camera.

Deleuze incorporates Leibniz into his thought by separating Bergson's decentred virtual universe from the impression or prehension of the world as a centred, organised geography. The monad is just such a prehension, and must be made distinct from the world it perceives through inflection. This is where Baroque architecture, and in particular the *camera obscura*, manifests the threshold between the inner 'cell' and the outer world. The monad has no windows, but as Deleuze notes, folds replace holes (as well as wholes) in the Baroque. Rather than windows acting as apertures to see the visible world, instead the world is visualised, actualised and organised in the inner walls of the monad. This is why the *camera obscura* is the perfect architecture of the Baroque. The *camera obscura* does not let the visible in directly, but its complicated folding of optics focuses an organized and actualised image of 'moving, living folds' on its canvas. Deleuze's appreciation of the Baroque and subjectivity is to see the *camera obscura* for what it does as an apparatus in creating an apparently autonomous image of the outside on the walls of the inside. The canvas has been replaced by polished metal, gelatine, and later celluloid, and the screen has replaced *trompe l'oeil*. The chemistry of photography and the optics of the camera, to which are pinned the values of objectivity in

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[14] Ibid, F, p. 22.
[15] Ibid F, p. 78.
[16] Tom Conley, "From Multiplicities to Folds: On Style and Form in Deleuze", in *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 96, No. 3, (Summer 1997), pp. 629-646, p. 642.

modern photography, hide the camera's real roots in the Baroque: The perspectival view has replaced the monadic. Crary notes that:

> The monadic viewpoint of the individual is authenticated and legitimized by the camera obscura, but the observer's physical and sensory experience is supplanted by the relations between a mechanical apparatus and a pre-given world of objective truth.[18]

In these terms, the photographic image is, in fact, the site of contest between the referential and the aesthetic, just as the camera itself is a site of contest between the objective optics and the point-of-view. The paper print or filmic photogramme represents an attempt to fix the monadic and unfolding image after a rational fashion, as it were, whilst all the time the fact of the photograph as a point-of-view threatens to disrupt the artifice of objectivity.

This means that the manner of perceiving, as camera-consciousness, will reflect the objects perceived. That is why the crystal image reflects the operations of the narrative. The crystal-image is a product of a baroque (Baroque) camera. In *La règle du jeu*, one of Deleuze's often quoted examples, the depth of field 'ensures a nesting of frames, a waterfall of mirrors, and system of rhymes between masters and valets'[19]. The mobile camera pans horizontally like the lens of the Baroque *camera obscura*, and moves across as well as into labyrinthine interior, all the while reflecting the fluidity between the roles of master and servant. In Renoir's film, it is the large country house and its environs that present the inner and outer worlds.

Whether an actualized labyrinth, as in *La règle du jeu*'s mobile camera, or the virtual abyss created by mirrors in *Lady from Shanghai*, the labyrinth is an essential element of the monad. A labyrinthine material world reflects the inner soul in such a way that a consciousness of vision is forced into the open. It would be wrong to characterise all time-images as labyrinthine, but the shape of the crystal image already presupposes, with

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[17] F, p. 35.
[18] Crary, 1998, p. 245.

its unfolding of time, a labyrinthine structure in its actualisation of the virtual world. If we follow Deleuze through Leibniz, we will find that the crystal image is an inner monad of actualised images, each an event in time, reflecting the virtual world that is photographed. In the crystal image, actions and places that are filmed will take on the pattern of the labyrinthine, and that in turn will reflect the folds of the crystal. The labyrinth is a consistent presence in Deleuze's work, and *The Fold* is on one level an understanding of the order, or possibility of the labyrinth. He conceives it as the perfect expression of the monadic relation of the one and the multiple: the intricacies and complexities of an ever changing universe are simply enfoldings and unfoldings of a single entity that only *appear* as discrete and contrasting or opposing elements. The playful study of films that follows here tries to tease out some of these.

The identification of the point-of-view is what Mullarky has described as Deleuze's 'top-down' approach: a recuperation of the singular way of seeing from the abyssal variation of point of view.[20] The seed of the time image is truth as variation, rather than as fixity. Deleuze recognises Leibniz in this, as the time-image allows for the expression of all possibilities from all situations, destabilising causality in such a way that "time puts truth into crisis".[21] Since the crystal image offers a "webbing of time embracing all possibilities", it is the crystal-image that facilitates the *compossible*, the actualisation of the variation of truth and the creation of a particular point of view [22]. All events are actualised, but rather than annihilate each other, they remain crystallized and change from the compossible to the incompossible. It is this co-existence that creates the folding labyrinthine structure of the crystal image.

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[19] TI, p. 84-85.
[20] Mullarky, 1997, p. 458.
[21] TI, p. 130-132.
[22] F, p. 62.

Truth and the photographic image.

It is odd that modern critics who believe that the photographic process should be the starting point for criticism have had very little to say about what the process is, how it works, and what it does and doesn't guarantee.[23]

Deleuze's understanding of photography is based on the idea (after André Bazin, in his case) of the shared existence of photograph and object: the foundation of approaches to photography that accept the photograph as a definitive representation, or final truth, of the moment. This is a legacy of the Cartesian philosophy that influenced the culture of photography from its outset, and that led to an invention of a photography that satisfied the rules and conventions of the picturesque.

Whilst the journal *Screen* has concentrated on the post-Benjamin discourse of photography and post-modernity, and whilst *October* has concentrated more on the ontology of the photographic image in the face of other plastic arts, *Critical Inquiry* has debated instead the role of truth and representation in the photographic image and its ideological basis in artistic convention. The dialogues in *Critical Inquiry* are a direct inquest into the role that Cartesian perspective and causality has played in establishing the representational values often taken as given in the photographic image.

E.H. Gombrich challenges the association of the *camera obscura*, as a tool of drawing, with human perception [24]. The camera's optics unnaturally fix perception, whereas, for Gombrich, natural perception includes an awareness of environment and the ability to move in it. The post-Enlightenment *camera obscura* supported the principles of representation that Gombrich identifies in the ancient Greek standards of mimesis, taken up by Descartes:

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[23] Joel Snyder, Neil Walsh Allen, "Photography, Vision and Representation", *Critical Inquiry* 2, (Autumn 1975), pp. 143-169, p. 148.
[24] E. H. Gombrich, "Standards of Truth: The Arrested Image and the Moving Eye", *Critical Inquiry* 8, (Winter, 1980), pp. 237-273.

...the negative rule that the artist must not include in his image anything the eye-witness could not have seen from a particular point at a particular moment.[25]

This is the 'eye-witness principle' that Joel Snyder and Neil Walsh Allen termed 'the visual model', and that leads to an image that was an event in both space and time, a point of relativity from which the world was viewed. [26]

This is the argument also taken up by Deleuze in his attack on Cartesian relativism. Linear perspective creates an artificial centre for a decentred universe, and through which the universe is seen in an "architecture of vision", according to Michel Serres. Deleuze takes up Serres' argument and reverses the role of point-of-view. The point-of-view perceives the world through inhesion or inclusion based on negation or subtraction of information not deemed useful or having sufficient cause or reason to be within the perspectival 'cone' of vision. Deleuze never completely denies relativism: "A soul always includes what it apprehends from *its* point of view".[27] Instead he demonstrates this elastic point-of-view as the organisation and actualisation of the decentred, virtual world, and the real character of relativity. This is an attempt to understand the perception of truth and the relationship between truth and the point-of-view. Relativism, point-of-view, and perspectivism are not the apprehension of a disorganised world into an order based on cause and effect, but instead are the apprehension of the variation of such order:

In each area point of view is a variation or a power of arranging cases, a condition for the manifestation of reality...[28]

For Gombrich, perspectivism relies on causality and a trust that the viewer will believe the image because of their own environmental experience, 'correcting' any distortions made by optics and including or excluding parts

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[25] Ibid, Gombrich, 1980, p. 246.
[26] Snyder and Allen, 1975, p. 149.
[27] Ibid F, p. 22.
[28] Ibid F, p. 21.

that would not normally be visible.[29] Thus the causality of optics is effaced by a conception of causality based on a naturalised point-of-view.

Causality has its basis in reason, and in the *Monadologie* Leibniz announces that nothing is true without there being sufficient reason.[30] Gombrich's 'corrections' are sustained by such reason, or so it would seem. But this action is outweighed by the pictorial conventions that have been attached to the 'visual reason'. The rectangular photographic image, for example, is a convention imposed upon the photograph for economic reasons that hide ideological ones. Rectilinear images fit rectilinear paper easily, and allow for more of the film to be used. However, rectilinear images also follow the conventions of art practice promoted by those photographers who, even in the face of the enormously popular (and rarely rectilinear) daguerreotype portrait, strove to have their photographs accepted on an equal footing with painting. The work of Henry Robinson and Oscar Rejlander, for example, echo the motivations of Fox-Talbot, and demonstrate to us a facet of the photographic program that exists even today [31].

For Snyder and Allen, the camera's apparent autonomy creates a sense of inevitability:

> ...a feeling that a photograph is the end result of a series of cause-and-effect operations performed upon 'physical reality,' that inclines us to impute a special sort of veracity to photographs...[32]

This obscures any possibility of the photographer's eye guiding perception. It is hidden behind a notion of photographic truth based on optics and chemistry – things that can be trusted empirically – that are thoroughly mixed with conventions of representation so as to confuse the

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[29] Gombrich, 1980, p. 241. Gombrich notes that it takes variation of optics to 'jolt us out of our complacency'.

[30] Rescher/Leibniz, 1991, p. 110-120.

[31] John Tagg has written of the development of early portrait photography – particularly daguerreotypy – as inheriting the traditions of portrait painting. John Tagg, *The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories*, (London: MacMillan, 1988). See also, Beaumont Newhall, *The History of Photography: from 1839 to the present day*, (New York : Museum of Modern Art, 1949).

[32] Snyder and Allen, 1975, p. 157.

one for the other.

Despite this, Roger Scruton, in his essay 'Photography and Representation', maintains that, in the 'ideal photograph', the image is in causal relation to the object [33]. Causality according to logic supplies the reason behind the image's 'truth'. For Scruton, in the photograph the "appearance is not interesting as the realization of an intention [as in painting] but rather as a record of how an actual object looked."[34] He extends this to all photography, and announces that the drama of cinema is the drama of the action photographed, with the camera merely a 'gesturing finger'. The 'gorgeous irrelevancies' of photography obscure the dramatic aim: the masterpiece of *La règle du jeu* is dramatic before it is cinematic.

Scruton's limited analysis characterises the acceptance of perspectivism and the 'eye-witness' principle. Interest in a photograph stems from, and leads to, an interest in the object pictured, as in Bazin. The photograph never assumes the role of the object pictured, and the viewer never makes the mistake, but that acknowledgement serves only to strengthen the apparent causal link. Once accepted as natural, anything culturally attached, such as the conventions of artistic realism, are also accepted with similar ease. Scruton's approach is thus the antithesis of the plasticity advocated by Deleuze, despite the foundation of both approaches in Bazin. For Scruton the photographic image is a waxwork, "wedded to the creation of illusion". The camera leaves nothing to the imagination, and instead saturates the image with detail: it "can present us with what we see, but cannot tell us how to see it."[35] Thus Scruton does not question photography's *adequacy* in presenting the real in all forms, even though realism relies on such an adequacy, as Colin MacCabe attests. MacCabe's seminal analysis of realism demonstrates the classical realist text as a tool of ideology "in which there is a hierarchy amongst the discourses which compose the text and this hierarchy is defined in terms

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[33] Roger Scruton, "Photography and Representation", *Critical Inquiry* 7, (Spring 1981), pp. 577-603, p. 578.
[34] Ibid p. 581 and p. 579.
[35] Ibid p. 602 and p. 590.

of an empirical notion of the truth".[36] These discourses "fully adequate the real" because they present the world according to cause and effect: "The classical realist text cannot deal with the real as contradictory". But this has the double operation of placing the subject in a position of Cartesian "dominant specularity", and adequacy becomes a function that supports the realist image as objective – as in Scruton.[37] MacCabe's political comment is simple, and is certainly demonstrated by those cinemas whose opposition to the mainstream is through forced distanciation as a direct rejection of it. This is a genealogy in cinema that can be traced back to Eisenstein, whose political motives were reflected in his filmmaking strategies. Eisenstein's montage of attractions is based on the directness of his static images in opposing any fluid experience of duration. Deleuze's call for a politics of cinema relies instead on an approach that is an antecedent of the very direct discourses of either the mainstream or its opposition. This is the antecedence of the 'beyond', since Deleuze sees the political power of cinema as existing before language, before information. No amount of information, even the blasts in Eisenstein's shocking montages, will overcome or defeat those forces against which cinema as an art must rail, since these are direct discourses:

> "...no information, whatever it might be, is sufficient to defeat Hitler...what makes information all-powerful...is its very nullity, its radical ineffectiveness...it is necessary to go beyond information in order to defeat Hitler or turn the image over."[38]

MacCabe and Scruton diverge in politics - MacCabe's idea of resistance (shadowed by Peter Wollen's for example) is of a cinema that counterpoints the language of classical realism [39]. MacCabe and Wollen see Godard, for example, as a filmmaker of distanciation and direct resistance. Deleuze diverges from this because he sees the filmmaker instead as criticizing "two sides at once". Godard's is a cinema of "pure speech-acts" because it emerges from the debris of its attack on language itself. Direct discourses of power and resistance are predicated upon

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[36] Colin MacCabe, "Realism and the Cinema: Notes on some Brechtian theses", in *Screen* 15, No. 2, (Summer 1974), pp. 7-27, p. 8.
[37] Ibid p. 12.
[38] TI, p. 270.

defined truths and falsehoods, but a politically active cinema can only come from an indirect-discourse that is an acknowledgement of the monadic variation of truth: and understanding that a point-of-view is apprehended from the *any* and *every* of variation.

<p style="text-align:center">* * *</p>

Any and Every: The monadic in Helen Levitt's In the Street.
Helen Levitt's short film *In the Street* is a useful place to begin to explain the monadic variation of photography. Coming from the lyrical tradition of American photography of the 1940s and 1950s, *In the Street* foregrounds the tension between objectivity and subjectivity that was evident in still photography at that time.

Levitt had already exhibited her work at New York's Museum of Modern Art by the time she collaborated with Janice Loeb and writer James Agee on the 1952 short film. Levitt's early work emerged under the influence of photographers such as Walker Evans and Ben Shahn, and others including Loeb, Agee, and Berenice Abbott (all from the background of New American Photography), but also the then relatively-unknown photographer Henri Cartier-Bresson, who visited New York in 1935.

Slide 14

Levitt's photography demonstrates the New Photography's emphasis on what W.J.T. Mitchell describes as the 'concrete social encounter' between the photographer as eye of power and the subject as victim. [40] The photographic image was a site of the contest of truth, and the work that emerged from this period has attracted criticism. Abigail Solomon-Godeau and Martha Rosler have both questioned its acceptance of the transcriptive nature of photography as one that hides the photographer's

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[39] Wollen, 1982.
[40] W.J.T. Mitchell, "The Photographic Essay: Four Case Studies", in *Picture Theory*, 2nd edn. (London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 281-322, p. 288. Mitchell identifies the 'photo-essay' as a key form at this time. See Evans' and Agee's work for *Fortune* magazine: See James Agee and Walker Evans, *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men: Three Tenant Families*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1941).

political aim behind his or her use of a medium that 'guarantees' truth.[41] Mitchell's tacit description of this style of photography as an 'open espionage' takes this up in respect of Barthesian semiology. The photograph's ideological power relies upon the markers of its apparent objectivity: the conventions of photographic representation that have come to be seen as the 'correct' way to take truthful photographs. The ideologies behind the formations of these conventions have been obscured (as Flusser describes) to the extent that the 'look' of such photography guarantees 'honesty' to reality in representation. Such photographs confound Barthes' ideas: these photographs *connote* denotation itself [42]. Objective transcription is part of a social, political or journalistic act, but the characteristics of reportage that have become most often used themselves act as quotation marks around the subject. Such an emphasised point of view created tension with the notion of documentary truth that was fast emerging in critical discourse; questioning truth as perceived through the photographer's selectivity. Unlike her photography, Levitt's film is largely without such an inflection. By the time of *In the Street*, shot in 1945/46, only a short opening intertitle written by Agee demonstrates a connection with the lyrical style that coloured this tradition and which fed off this conflation of truth and point-of-view:

> The streets of the poor quarters of great cities are, above all, a theatre and a battleground. There, unaware and unnoticed, every human being is a poet, a masker, a warrior, a dancer; and in his innocent artistry he projects, against the turmoil of the street, an image of human existence. The attempt in this short film is to capture this image. [43]

But the tension between the transcriptive and the subjective is evident in Agee's essay for the 1965 retrospective book on Levitt, *A Way of Seeing*:

> The artist's task is not to alter the world as the eye sees it into a world of aesthetic reality, but to perceive the aesthetic reality within the actual world, and to make an undisturbed and faithful record of

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[41] See Abigail Solomon Godeau, *Photography at the Dock*, (Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press, 1991). See also: Martha Rosler, 'In, Around, and Afterthoughts (On Documentary Photography), in *The Contest of Meaning*, ed. by Roger Bolton, (Boston: MIT, 1989), pp. 303-341.
[42] See Roland Barthes, 'The Photographic Message', in IMT, pp. 15-32.

the instant in which this movement of creativeness achieves its most expressive crystallization.[44]

Agee presents Levitt's work as driven by the faithfulness of the camera to reality, but through an awareness of the changing fiction of reality itself. Max Kozloff, writing much later, also demonstrates this tension by describing her photography as the least tainted by the photographer's presence, but nevertheless possessing a *relativity* in its way of seeing.[45]

The connection between cinema and photography in Levitt's work is clear, not least in her developing career as a film editor for the MoMA. *In the Street* was conceived as "a cinematic version of Levitt's photographs" to be undertaken by Levitt, Loeb, and Agee.[46] Levitt saw the photograph as a 'sympathetic expression', perhaps requiring an essay to focus that expression. To create an independent 'intellectual vehicle', their combined interest was to make a film that was also the equivalent of the lyric poem: *In the Street* was produced by a photographer who was practically trained in, and visually influenced by, the emerging paradigms in film editing, and whose co-producers extended the photo-essay 'projects' of the transcriptive and the lyric.

In the Street thus demonstrates the continuum between cinema and photography. Monadic in its representation of space it follows that is will also be monadic in time. Levitt's silent images of East Harlem, mostly filmed during the summers of 1945 and 1946, are accompanied by a soundtrack written and performed by the MoMA's resident accompanist, but essentially they remain separate from any linear causality of logical

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[43] Opening intertitle from *In the Street*, (US. d. Helen Levitt, with Janice Loeb, James Agee, 1952).
[44] James Agee, 'A Way of Seeing', in Helen Levitt, *A Way of Seeing*, (New York: Viking Press, 1965), pp. 3- 8 & pp. 73-78, p. 4.
[45] Max Kozloff, 'A Way of Seeing and the Act of Touching: Helen Levitt's Photographs of the Forties', in *The Privileged Eye: Essays on Photography*, 2nd edn, (Alberquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988, (1987)), pp. 29-42, p. 30.
See also: Maria Morris Hambourg, 'Helen Levitt: A Life in Part', in *Helen Levitt*, (San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, 1991), pp. 45-64, p. 54. This tension is demonstrated in Levitt's approach, in which she employed a right angle finder so that she never appeared to look at her subjects when photographing them, to make them relax "as if they were inside": an approach she learnt from Shahn and Evans. The orthodox viewfinder of Levitt's movie camera meant she looked directly at her subject once more, and no 'alibi' is given to the photographer in her act of perceiving.

progression. The critics who have taken a great interest in Levitt's work have all focused at some point on Levitt's New York as a continuum, or eternal and indivisible theatre, and *In the Street* is no exception. Max Kozloff describes the continuum as one emphasised through touch, in which the day to day activities of the people becomes a mass of touching from which a subjective viewpoint must find fixity. Touch is the enfolding and unfolding, 'in abundance', of the street. Kozloff emphasises Levitt's *way of seeing*, mirroring Agee, as the disjointed and subjective isolation of episodes from the ongoing spectacle of the street.[47] The *act of touching* is thus a monadic fold upon which the *way of seeing* is the inflection. For Kozloff, the children "are small explosive parentheses on weary streets" which offer themselves up to the subjective eye.[48] For Sandra Phillips, each new game or mime offers up a variation on that which went before, and only the children's own actions create the points of departure for the photographer to follow. Thus the film follows these games throughout, and the order of cause-and-effect is replaced by an order of dance and play that has deeper roots in lyrical performance.[49]

Slide 15

Phillips contrasts this with Levitt's treatment of the city itself as a labyrinth of purified abstraction. She notes how the city at this time presented a decentred and uniform space that excited the formalist attentions of city planners and artists alike. The streets themselves are not identifiably New York streets, and there are none of the landmarks that have come to represent New York in photography. New York's landmarks offer artificial centres opposed to Levitt's rhizomorphic city. Levitt's is a decentred existence, and one in which *any* street is *every* street. Thus the New York of Helen Levitt immediately reflects Deleuze's city:

> What can be apprehended from one point of view is therefore
> neither a determined street nor a relation that might be determined
> with other streets, which are constants, but the variety of all

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[46] Ibid Hambourg, 1991, p. 58.
[47] Kozloff, 1988, pp. 34-38.
[48] Ibid p. 33.
[49] Sandra S. Phillips, 'Helen Levitt's New York', in *Helen Levitt*, (San Francisco Museum of

possible connections between the course of a given street and that of another. The city seems to be a labyrinth that can be ordered.[50]

This exchange of 'any' and 'every' exists in time also, and it is what makes *In the Street* a crystal image of time. The spatial framing or ellipsis that the city undergoes in Levitt's viewfinder is reflected in the temporal ellipses of each shot, and the film in general. Just as each street corner, stoop or gutter becomes an object in space separated from the continuum of touching, so the act of filming creates an object in time in each shot. Levitt's shots extend themselves just long enough for each to become a 'pause', a temporal *concetto* that temporarily fixes the moment. The pause, for Phillips, becomes "a metaphor for passing", a "sense of the eternal in the momentary" in which every moment is presented in this 'any-moment'.[51] That is why the games in Levitt's are not organised games but instead they represent the 'ongoing theatre' of dance and play. Any organisation, such as dressing up or the preparation for tag-games, are fragmentary glimpses of order that are soon disrupted by the unexpected crowding of faces around the camera, accompanied by unexpected syncopation in the soundtrack. The momentary appearance of a privileged instant only serves to emphasis its reality as any-instant-whatever.

Slide 16

The street life, which takes place on the stoop of each apartment and shop, is an unfolding and enfolding of action without division. As Deleuze suggests in his elaboration of baroque philosophy, the enfolding and unfolding of matter reflects a similar multiplicity of the soul. In this respect, the inner world of the city, its soul, is in the children, who actualise briefly in dance, mime and play the virtual world they see around them.

Modern Art, 1991), pp. 15-46.

[50] F, p. 24. The point of view that apprehends the streets is Levitt's camera, which at once sees the street and the city. Levitt's film eschews the title 'In the Streets' for the more generic *In the Street* precisely because of this.

[51] Phillips, 1991, p. 29. Phillips compares Levitt's work with Weegee, whose photography presented people as the soul of the city, forced out onto the street by murder, fire, and public gatherings.

The stoop thus acts as a threshold between this soul and the world, but also a place of threshold between the child and the adult. The teenagers are inner folds in the monad, who reflect the film itself, and the space and time of the street. The adolescents are the point of indiscernibility between the young children and the old people who inhabit the street: carriers of all the compossible futures and the all the games that they have played that become not necessarily true pasts: The incompossible actualisations of the soul of the street. Above all, they represent the threshold between the truth of variation of the point of view, and the fixing of truth in the ideology of the individual. This is what Deleuze was so suspicious of, and it is this threshold that Agee sees as presented in Levitt's work:

> Adolescence is a kingdom of fallen and still falling angels, but it is yet a kingdom, with its own kind of wild-animal glamour, with profundities of grave purity which are peculiar to it; with its unappeasable hunger and pity; and its own awful threshold to the world beyond, to that Babylonian captivity in which dreams are either manufactured by outside authorities or rest, as a rule, forever unformed and unsatisfied.[52]

<center>* * *</center>

Truth and the Labyrinth in Larry Clark's *kids.*

In each child, from very early, the germ of the death of childhood is at work.[53]

The teenage years present a threshold between an inner world of unexplored possibilities (the world of childhood), and an outer world of fixed ideologies and lived experiences (the adult world). But as Agee goes on to demonstrate above, this has a darker side. In Larry Clark's *kids*, teenagers are his subject, but his is a departure from the ethnographic depiction of teenagers and children in *In the Street* and instead towards a more serious aspect of this moment in life. The tension in Levitt's film was centred on the approach she took as a filmmaker who had grown up in the

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[52] James Agee, 'A Way of Seeing', in Helen Levitt, *A Way of Seeing*, (New York: Viking Press, 1965), pp. 3- 8 & pp. 73-78, p. 76.

traditions of the New American photography. This rests on the New American Photographer's use of 'real' people and 'real' situations. Conversely, the teenagers of *kids* are far from 'real', but instead actors chosen to play the parts that Clark bases on people he once knew.

With the development of characters, *kids* can concentrate on the various images of childhood and adulthood merging in the teenager in a way that *In the Street* only hints at. The stoops, parks and streets are a stage upon which images of childhood – comic books, skateboarding, sexual naivety – are actualised alongside images of adulthood – violence, drug-taking and rampant sexuality – to such an extent that at times they are difficult to discern from each other. The city in *kids* is full of such liminal spaces that are neither inside nor out, but instead are stages as thresholds. The sidewalks and stoops, but also the park and the open-air swimming pool are spaces that mix the public and private. Later their sexual meanderings are played out in packed living rooms and bedrooms at a party. In the streets, the teenagers verge towards innocent childhood play, but when in the bedrooms of their friends, this innocence is lost in favour of an emerging adulthood. *kids* opens with a series of lingering images of two teenagers about to have sex. This extended series of shots, of "innocent angels... having sex, smoking pot, drinking beer, having fun" as they later do, exposes the tension between the transparency of the camera in fiction film and the camera as gesturing finger in documentary. This in turn reflects the tension between innocence and decadence, childhood and adulthood, and subjectivity and objectivity that runs throughout the film and is its main narrative theme, as Amy Taubin notes:

> This shot, which seems to last forever but might be as brief as 20 seconds, gives us time to become self-conscious about our own response as we confront the activity that most adults want to shove out of sight, or at least turn into an abstraction.[54]

Slide 17

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[53] Ibid p. 76.
[54] Amy Taubin, "Chilling and Very Hot", *Sight and Sound*, Vol. 5, No. 11, (November 1996), pp.

This shot becomes a mise-en-abyme for the whole film, in presenting in the first few seconds of the film the labyrinth of viewpoints that are compossible, and which each are crystallised before making way for another. In Clark's book *Teenage Lust* (1983) one photograph of an act of fellatio is repeated with minor variation over twenty pages, producing the same effect of placing the twin subjects of photography and looking within their own frame. The enhanced longevity ruptures chronology, and it is from this rupture that the time-image grows. In this rupture is also visible the fold of the *cinephoto* monad.

The fact that childhood and adulthood meet in so many liminal arenas is testament to the city itself as a teenage space in which the worlds of matter and soul are almost indistinguishable. The city is a labyrinth of liminal spaces that are stages for the teenage threshold, in which places of fixity – adult spaces – are few and far between. Clark's city is also a labyrinth in time as well as in space, since the teenagers act as adults in the sex clinic, in the bedroom, and act as children in the streets and in front of their parents, in a way that changes and exchanges with such volatility that they become indistinguishable through the day. The ellipsis of the film – 24 hours in the life of these teenagers – is an object in time as much as the streets and parks are objects in the liminal, fluid landscapes of the kids' lives.

This shifting status of the teenagers is reflected in the shifting approach to subjectivity that critics noted in Clark's film. Like Levitt, Clark made his film after already establishing himself as a photographer. As with Levitt, *kids* can be seen as a film version of earlier photographic works, in particular Clark's *Tulsa* (1971) and *Teenage Lust*. Clark's own assertion that he has 'always been a storyteller' is supported by his aim to make a film version of *Tulsa*, and an overriding ambition to be a filmmaker.[55] His career demonstrates a development from a visual style influenced by the

16-19, p. 16.
[55] See Michael Cohen, 'Discussion with Larry Clark', htThP://www.artcommotion.com/VisualArts/indexa.html, (27/06/00), and also: Scott Tobias, "Larry Clark: I wanted improv...I'm always looking for the unexpected image, the unexpected action", htThP://theavclub.com/avclub3507/bonusfeature13507.html, (04/07/00); Jutta Koether, 'Interview with Larry Clark', in *Journal of Contemporary Art*, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 30-50.

documentary of the New American photography (particular that of Robert Frank) to one influenced by cinema, video and the mass media [56].

Slide 18

In *kids* the camera is more than a 'gesturing finger' and instead exploits the tension between what is expected of documentary filmmaking and the emphasis on what appear as committed points-of-view. Clark described *Tulsa* as "documentary with a fictive quality", in contrast to the reverse in *kids*.[57] Thus Clark's progress from *Tulsa* to *kids* is one also from photography as a contest of truth to a mixture of fiction. *kids* refuses to present one single viewpoint, but instead follows Clark's intention of presenting 'one theme from different angles' to such an extent that critical opinion of the film is markedly divided.

As Snyder and Allen noted, even the control of exposure in photography implies a process of selection rather than an autonomous adequacy, thus creating a problem of photographic truth. A resolution to this might be to discard the notion of a paradox as a problem at all; at least a problem that must be solved in favour of a truth or a fiction. Kendall Walton concludes that ideas such as those of Bazin (and hence Scruton) rely upon the value that is invested in photography as "a continuation or culmination of the post-Renaissance quest for realism".[58] Walton opts to handle Bazinian ontology with care, and questions instead the photographic *fiction* rather than the photographic real. Rather than the photographic image being a paradox of autonomy, Walton instead chooses to see it as a discourse of subjectivity and a 'mixture of fictions'. For Walton, the act of looking overshadows any other particular detail. More recently, Walton has eschewed the emphasis on reality in favour of a notion that to see the photographic image is always to accept it *as fiction*. This is a misconception that is a result of the urge to solve the paradox of truth and

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[56] *Teenage Lust* contains sequences of photographs as if they were photogrammes, whilst *Larry Clark 1992* (1992) and *Teenage Lust* both contain re-photographed teen posters and television screens.
[57] Cohen, 2000.
[58] Kendall L. Walton, "Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism", *Critical Inquiry* 11, (December 1984), pp. 246-277, p. 246-247.

fiction in terms of one value or the other. The paradox, or mixture, of fictions is a direct result of the inability of rational discourses (whether those of fiction, such as Walton's, or those of truth, such as the cognitive scientific approach) to account for the exchange of values that gives the photographic image its particular power. Photographic images provoke the responses they do because they confound rational discourses. Walton reminds us that the object *was* photographed, and that we cannot escape the subjectivity that selected, composed, framed and shot it. To look at the photograph *is* to see an object in the Bazinian sense, but it is also to see the object *as seen*. This is the mixture of fictions:

> We have now uncovered a major source of the confusion which infects writings about photography and film: failure to recognize and distinguish clearly between the special kind of seeing which actually takes place, between the viewer's *really* seeing something *through a photograph* and his *fictionally* seeing something *directly.*[59]

Walton rejects the Cartesian 'dominant specularity' in favour of a Deleuzean monadic point-of-view: The photograph is always *a way of seeing*, "...not truth according to the subject, but the condition in which truth of a variation appears to the subject".[60]

However, as we have found, the discourse between subjectivity and objectivity in cinema falls too easily into the trap of relativism. Deleuze instead picks up relativism and reorients the 'truth' of relativity. Deleuze's post-Leibniz concept of relativism is the expression of the *free-indirect discourse*, and the free-indirect discourse is the real truth of photography. All photography contains the discourse between *fictionally seeing directly* and *really seeing through photography*. Criticism and historicism fixes this exchange, and creates the values of objectivity (the truth of empirical evidence, for example) and subjectivity (the truth of spirit, or point of view), that are essential for the classical or the radical. However these are artificial values actualized from an indivisible exchange. Photographic truth does not lie in these values, but instead in the exchange from which they

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[59] Ibid, p. 254.
[60] F, p. 20.

are set, and the exchange is the fold. Cognitivists might put forward the notion that the eye's vision is always reliable and its data empirical. In Bergsonian terms, there is always a fundamental perception-image. On the other hand, the brain continually makes sense of vision, and perception becomes affection as interpretation occurs:

> There is hardly any perception which may not, by the increase of the action of the object upon our body, become an affection…So it does seem, then, as if there were a difference of degree and not of nature between affection and perception. [61]

affection-image) in order to act (action-image). Regardless of the eye's data, it cannot be separated from these attempts to make sense of it. This includes, in the viewing of a photograph, the awareness of it as a created image. The perception-image always includes a perception of the photographic image as just that. This is where the circuit develops its momentum. The paradox can be solved, but only in renaming it after what it is – an *exchange.*

This exchange occurs in time, since any instant whatever of the film presents at once the same element – the fictional discourse – of every instant. Clark's work, for example, exposes the *cinephoto* monad not simply because he 'always wanted to be a filmmaker', not even because (like *In the Street*) *kids* often looks like a collection of filmed photographs, but because his work places the photographic exchange within the frame.

Like *In the Street*, *kids* is a baroque film. Clark's teenagers appear "lit from within" as Taubin describes it, especially in the scenes where the tension of their emerging sexuality is exposed: at the swimming pool and at the party. At the party, the camera pans along the semi-naked bodies of the young boys whose stretching bodies appear out of the gloom like the subjects in a Caravaggio or a Fiorentino. As in Baroque figure painting, which took a naturalistic human form and attenuated it to reflect the convulsions of hell or the ecstasies of heaven in the earthly body, their pale bodies, half adorned by the armour of skate culture (cut-off jeans,

exposed torsos), carpet the floor of the apartment as if they were themselves one folding mass stretching between the two worlds. The party becomes a grotesque of El Greco with the cherubic young boys watching, as if they were angels, the world of the teenagers' sexuality unfold, while they themselves pass around a joint. Taubin rejects this scene as out of place amongst the rest of the film's realist camerawork, but it is this sequence, preceded by the scene at the swimming pool and climaxing in two scenes of teen sex, that merges the beauty, vitality, horror and sadness of the flourishing of teenage sexuality.

Slide 19

kids is also a film of the baroque city because, like *In the Street*, it presents its liminal spaces as indivisible folds of the decentred city. It is impossible to ignore the labyrinth in Deleuze. The Deleuzean model of the universe that follows in his work on Bergson (and of course the cinema books) cannot help but define the acentred universe as a labyrinth of sets, and sets within sets. But to deal with the labyrinth is also to deal with the characters that inhabit the labyrinth, especially those that populate the mythology of the Minoan maze that inspired Nietzsche and Deleuze.

The labyrinth and its mythology are metonymic of the philosophical search for truth that Deleuze develops in *Nietszche and Philosophy*. The people of the labyrinth characterize the various approaches to this quest: Ariadne and her thread represent a *becoming*: the search itself. In contrast Theseus and the minotaur represent ideology; a fixed and centred truth. But Dionysus and the labyrinth represent the joy of the search, a search for affirmation in which the only truth that exists is the search itself. The knowledge, or joy, of that search – the fact that the search is the real truth – is the *being of becoming*.[62] Rose Pfeffer notes that Nietzsche looks on 'the firm truth' as an illusion, just as the centre of a labyrinth holds only nominal value. Nietzsche's call is for a "philosopher with integrity", for

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[61] MM, p. 53.
[62] Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson, (London: Athlone, 1983 (1962)), p. 188-9 (NP)

whom knowledge is in the passionate search or process, not the result.[63] It is easy to see now how Deleuze forms an interest in Nietzsche, and later in Bergson and Leibniz. It is the free-indirect discourse – the exchange between objective and subjective – that is more important than a nominal fixity of the subjective positioning. The unified subject is merely an ideological or epistemological 'truth' that obscures the more important aspect of perception, that of the exchange that the mind has with an a-centred world in constant becoming.

For Deleuze the labyrinth is the site of Nietzsche's own 'problem of truth'.[64] Pfeffer acknowledges Nietzsche's identification with the god Dionysus through the joy of knowledge as a process of "ceaseless questioning".[65] Deleuze has Nietzsche's 'Dionysian longing', thus the mythological Labyrinth becomes a useful metaphor. The story of Theseus, and especially that of Ariadne, is a story of the passionate search for truth in which Ariadne's love (and the thread) is the "innermost secret of inquiry".

It is possible to make a Nietzschean/Deleuzean reading of *kids*: Jenny is a convincing Adriadne in search of truth. The story of *kids* is as much about Jenny's search for a truth as it is about Telly, whose quest to deflower virgins appears initially to drive the narrative forward. Instead, as we found with *In the Street*, it is the camera that is the driving force through the labyrinth, as through the camera we are most often offered the views that Jenny will see. The camera follows her past experiences, as much as it prefigures her future. Telly's deflowering of the anonymous girl at the film's beginning is a re-enactment of the encounter that Jenny later describes as having been between her and Telly; whilst the camera that hovers over the fumbling comatose kids at the party predicts her viewpoint as she later stumbles over them to the bedroom where she finally finds Telly. As she walks through the city from the sex clinic, Clark's framing places Jenny in long shot with the Empire State Building far in the distance.

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[63] Rose Pfeffer, *Nietzsche: Disciple of Dionysus*, 2nd edn. (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1974), p. 121-2.
[64] NP, pp.185-188.
[65] Pfeffer, 1974, p. 121.

<u>Slide 20</u>

The city has lost its centre, and Jenny now has to search for her own thread of knowledge that will lead her out of the labyrinth. Her search for Telly is one of affirmation, since he has given her the disease (AIDS) that will end both their lives, and by telling him she might stop his own search. As she journeys across the city, always one step behind Telly, it is as if she were winding up the thread until it leads her finally to him.

Jenny is ultimately doomed in this quest. Like Theseus, Telly will abandon her to her fate, and to her death. Deleuze takes up the story of Dionysus, who saves Ariadne from her island and receives from her a double affirmation of his own. But in one version of the myth it is Theseus who returns to the island to find Ariadne dead. This is no less an affirmation, for Telly, as Theseus, receives only the affirmation of his own death in Jenny. For Deleuze, Ariadne's double affirmation to Dionysus (her search for knowledge affirms his) is a release for her from the *ressentiment* – the reflection in woman of masculine power and dominance – to her own power and knowledge. The search for Jenny has been her *becoming*, as the labyrinth is the becoming in Deleuze. But for Jenny there is no Dionysus, and her search culminates in her rape at the hands of Casper while in a drug-induced stupefaction. His forced advances are reflected in her vague (un)willingness, reaffirming only the circular action of the disease she carries. As Ariadne she affirms only that Casper is the Bull; that her future and theirs is already decided.

<u>Slide 21</u>

The film ends with two shots that repeat and encapsulate both the shifting point of view and the aggressive camerawork that highlights it. That Telly's aggressive misogyny should end with a picture of such innocence is a contradiction that enforces Clark's aim that the film should treat one theme from different angles. After following Telly in his quest and visualising his roaring entrance into the adulthood that will end all too soon, the camera

offers us the other perspective that he is, after all, just a child. That bell hooks should find this so disturbing only serves to demonstrate how uneasily Clark's film adopts any fixed point-of-view:

> Suddenly they are made to look like innocent children. This scene undermines the violence of their encounter by suggesting that its outcome has been bliss.[66]

hooks directly attacks Clark's particular vision of the truth of the teenagers in New York: "The question, of course, is whose truth is being told?" She directly addresses the film as one that presents the sexually titillating when it should, perhaps, be objective. Yet neither hooks nor the film itself offers a distinct and fixed viewpoint, and we might argue that Clark has not achieved one even if he had tried to. Instead he has achieved a *more accurate* picture in expressing the liminal situation of the kids as the real truth of their existence, encapsulated in this shot, as if it were taken from his earlier *Teenage Lust.*

This film cuts from this to the partly comatose Jenny, as Casper rapes her. This shot returns us to the beginning of the film, and acts as a mise-en-abyme in just the same way. The camera has driven the film, and it is Clark's exploitation of a photographic realism – what one reviewer described as the "meticulous grooming of perfection" – that has created a webbing of all possible points-of-view: a time-image that exists in "shots that go on *just* too long enough and no more".[67] bell hooks describes Clarks lingering camerawork as if it were a series of still pornographic images that aid in our own "seductive identification".[68] But placing the image within its own frame of perception in this way leads not to a single viewpoint but instead invites an unceasing questioning of the truth of the image itself. It suggests that various possible readings of kids, such as the Nietzschean ones above, are ultimately only crystallisations that proliferate from shots that linger 'just too long'.

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[66] bell hooks, "White Light", *Sight and Sound*, Vol. 6, No. 5, (May 1996) pp. 10-12.
[67] Leslie Felperin, Review of *kids*, *Sight and Sound*, Vol. 6, No. 5, (May 1996) pp. 54-55.
[68] hooks, 1996, p.12.

Subject and Object in Stanley Donen's *Funny Face*.

In the light of our study, it is possible for us to see the appearance of the *cinephoto* monad readily in the work of Larry Clark and that of Helen Levitt. As photographer-turned-filmmaker, they each present a very safe example of the monadic connection, whilst as filmmakers removed from the mainstream of Deleuze's movement-image, they foreground their photography as pure optical situations of the time-image. In short, they each present almost too easy an example of the crystal-image. The real test of the *cinephoto* monad must come in a more mainstream (but not necessarily any less a time-image) cinema, and in a more tacit acknowledgement of cinema's photographic origins. A more stringent test would be on a mainstream film in which the technical reference to the photography in its production would be reflected in its narrative. In Stanley Donen's 1956 *Funny Face*, the acts of photography depicted merge with the film's cinematography, whilst this is reflected in the film's merging of star and character.

Funny Face contains both the elements of classical Hollywood in general and the elements of the reflexive musical so popular in the 1940s and 1950s. Its Cinderella narrative addresses popular interest in romance, whilst its song and dance numbers are exemplary of the genre's emphasis on visual pleasure. As in other musicals, the numbers in one way suspend the narrative, and in another advance it. The action in *Funny Face* crosses from the offices and bookstores of New York, to the fashion houses and cafés of Paris. Jo Stockton (Audrey Hepburn) is accepted into each new milieu that she encounters by way of a song and dance number. In this way *Funny Face* exemplifies the 'classic' formula of musical that came out of Hollywood at that time; from its director Stanley Donen and its two stars, Hepburn and Fred Astaire, to its Pygmalion story and its easy use of pastiche and parody. It is an unusual place to find a radical display of cinema's own ontology – its origins in the photographic image.

As Deleuze notes, dance in cinema maps out the directions in life of its characters, particularly in the musicals of its fifties heyday. In the musicals of Astaire and Donen, the dance that maps the world, and the dance that is taken over by the movement of the world, become indistinct. Peter Krämer notes that *Funny Face's* photography sequences act in much the same way, in that they act as romantic interludes as the traditional musical numbers do.[69] They suspend the story to give purely visual pleasure, but they also advance the story in presenting Jo's rise to stardom through her romance with Avery. Each number – and each photography sequence – present the choices that she has to make along the way, including whether or not to give up her quest for philosophical truth in favour of her obligation to her new employers, *Quality* magazine. The photography sequence presents a point of bifurcation in the narrative that emanates from a moment of both visual pleasure and narrative projection.

The story of Jo's passage and development as a model and woman is contracted into a pivotal sequence made up of photography sessions in which, Avery directs, and is then directed by her. The film contracts them to act as if they were a single musical number. Donen's exploitation of the flat picture plane of the photograph – with its links to the sensory motor situation – leads to the pure optical and sound situations of the time-image: As each image strobes from one colour wash to the next, each movement is accompanied by a burst of sound.

Slide 22

These sequences therefore present us with all the possible allusions to photography that Garrett Stewart and others have noticed: the inset photograph, the freeze frame, and the exposure of the film's structure (especially in negative). Jo's maturation as a model in this sequence is shown by her awkwardness in the first few (she is unable to move) to her

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[69] Peter Krämer, "'A Cutie With More Than Beauty': Audrey Hepburn, the Hollywood Musical and *Funny Face*", in *Musicals: Hollywood and Beyond*, ed. by Bill Marshall & Robynn Stilwell, (London: Intellect, 2000), pp. 62-69. See also: Stephen Winer, "Dignity - Always Dignity: Betty Comden and Adolph Green's Musicals", in *The Velvet Light Trap* No. 11, (Winter 1974), pp. 29-32.

mobility at the sequence's climax (she is unable to stop). Her acceptance into the world of fashion parallels her similar acceptance into that of philosophy, through an earlier jazz number. Jo journeys from one life-affirming choice to the next until she is offered both the world of fashion and the world of philosophy by Avery's proposal of marriage. Krämer notes how Audrey Hepburn's roles have been received as characters poised 'forever at her moment of momentous choice', and each musical number or photography sequence presents bifurcating paths that fork to create wider and wider possibilities. These still images, fixed for a moment as photographs-within-film, do not represent death as we found in Barthes and Bazin, but instead they contain the possibility of a life unfolding in time from each image. This is where we confront the central problem of difference between cinema and photography, as they saw it.

Death is the recurring theme in comparisons between cinema and photography. Stewart's study begins and ends with death, and in particular the stasis that the freeze-frame or inset photograph imposes on the movement of film.[70] However, whilst he attempts to resist this equation, it becomes one that he finds increasingly difficult to avoid:

> Narrative cinema, in other words, when fastening upon a single image, can invoke the deathlike stasis of photography.[71]

Thus the photograph's metonymy of death is transferred to the film: The photograph is a *memento mori* for the filmic spectator. Photography is the determinant of cinema, but its role is then reduced to that of the photogrammes that make up the film-strip: "Cinema dies, dies back into film..."[72] But this one-dimensional view takes the photographic image as a given constituent of cinema that can only present movement, time and hence life, when strung together in a becoming (ie. in the process of cinema).

It is the photographic image at the base of both cinema and photography (as disciplines) that is the matter in question. This is the substance of the

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[70] Stewart, 1999, pp. III-XI, and p.321.
[71] Ibid p. 49-50.

cinephoto monad – the photographic image (and its constituent acts, processes, uses, and consumption). Both Deleuze and Garrett Stewart question the arbitrary separation of photography and film, but in attacking Deleuze's analysis, Stewart actually brings the two approaches to their consensus. He takes up Deleuze's initial understanding of the movement image:

> 'Thus the photogramme is inseparable from the series which makes it vibrate in relation to the movement which derives from it' (83). In what sense inseparable? Would we not want to put it the other way around as well: that the strip (and its thrown image) is inseparable from the photogrammes that compose it?[73]

However, we might ask the question of both Deleuze and Stewart's analyses: Is the movement-image *ever* perceived as a string of photogram(me)s? Indeed, cinema is accepted as *photography* before it is accepted as a string of photographic images. Whether acknowledged as a string of fixed shots or not, there is an acknowledgement of the photographic act. It is the photographic image that is the essential and binding element of cinema and photography. We must conceive, therefore, of the photographic image not defined specifically as the fixed image, but instead in the act of photography. Time-image cinema is made up of photogrammes in series, just as the movement-image is. The distinction here is crucial: the movement-image depends upon the practical nature of cinema as its defining paradigm, and exploits it. On the other hand, the time-image is also constituted of photogrammes in series, but remains independent of its attachment to the sensory-motor schema. It does not need a direct acknowledgement of the practical base of cinema, and in fact thrives without it. The time-image is merely dependent on the *act* of photography, which both cinema and the photograph share. Photographs can be time-images or movement-images, just like cinema, depending on their necessary connection to, or freedom from, the sensory-motor schema. To equate the photograph with death simply because of its often-assumed relationship with chronology is to miss the depiction of time that

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[72] Ibid p. 321.
[73] Ibid p. 88.

the photographic image might offer. The frame of perception in the time-image (whether in cinema or photography) is not placed around the photogramme – or any material base *per se* – but instead around the photographic image or act.

This returns us to *Funny Face*. If each photographic interlude, or 'number' offers a 'moment of momentous choice', then each of them presents, not the metonymy of death, but that of life. Furthermore the particular narrative for Jo, that of the tension between philosophy and the soul and that of fashion and the material, is reflected in the photographs that punctuate each sequence. The crystal-image does not emanate from the inset photograph nor the freeze-frame, but the *act* of photography that they reflect; as focussed around Jo, and particularly around Audrey Hepburn *as* Jo.

Hepburn is never properly separated from the characters she plays, and they never become independent of Hepburn's own real-life image. The film is richly reflexive of both the musical genre, and of the photography culture that it parodies but, at the same time, is deeply indebted to. Fashion photographer Richard Avedon already had a working relationship with the ingénue Hepburn, and in life and art her image already mixed the cosmopolitan glamour of America with the old-world glamour of Europe, and especially Paris. The film blends her character with her existing star persona, and through much of the film's middle sequence in the Montmartre cafés, she wears the same gamine costume that she had made famous in 1954's *Sabrina*, and which had become a trademark of the Hepburn 'look'. A key moment in *Sabrina* has Hepburn framed by a doorway to create a silhouette that would be as recognisable on screen as her face in later films. She thus becomes herself a seed of the crystal-image:

> The actor is bracketed with his public role: he makes the virtual image of the role actual, so that the role becomes visible and luminous…But the more the virtual image of the role becomes

actual and limpid, the more the actual image of the actor moves into the shadows and becomes opaque.[74]

Deleuze has much to say about the instant recognisability of images in his later work on the face [75]. Faciality is a powerful drive that is elemental to the organisation of the visible world, and the Hollywood star system is a particularly good example of it. Hepburn's star persona is a fictional exchange, in which at stake is not the reality of actor or character, but their aesthetic value. This is reduced to the Hepburn silhouette that appears in *Sabrina*, and which reappears in *Funny Face* in a scene in which Hepburn's public persona most closely matches her character's. The awkward and confused innocent escapes the frivolity of the fashion world for the more intense intellectual pleasures of philosophy [76]. The facialization of Hepburn is reliant on her costume and hair-style, and her body becomes a recognisable landscape that can be at once exotically desirable and homely and familiar (emphasising both the European and American elements of her star persona).

Slide 23

In the musical it is routinely the musical numbers that expose the mixture of star and character, since we are always made aware that it is Astaire or Gene Kelly dancing, whilst at other times they remain 'believable' in their characters. Just as the musical numbers outline the movement of the world, according to Deleuze, so it is the 'dancer's individual genius' that allows this to occur. In these sequences we are not watching Gene Kelly's character, we are watching Kelly, but when we return to the film's implicit narrative, this interlude has made it all the more believable. The musical is therefore "a gigantic dream, but an implied dream, which in turn implies

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[74] TI, p. 72.

[75] See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia* (1980), trans. by Brian Massumi, 3rd edn. (London: Athlone, 1996). (THP)

[76] *Funny Face*'s thematic division is between the world of the mind and the world of the body. Philosophy and intellectual growth are represented by jazz and bebop, whilst joy and physical fulfilment (in Jo's case, quite literally a blossoming) are represented by popular and traditional melody. Astaire, whose background was in both jazz and traditional musical, bridges the gap as both star and character.

the passage of a presumed reality in the dream."[77] *Funny Face*'s photography sequences are like dream sequences, except that it is the photography itself that is the dance, and the model Hepburn is the dancer. Hepburn is caught between herself-as-object (playing her character) and Hepburn the subject, and this becomes most indiscernible in the opening credits and later 'studio' renditions of the title song. Hepburn's character and her own persona as international model and film star become indistinguishable, and give way to the later modelling sequence in which we watch Hepburn the model at her best. This more explicit facialization of Hepburn reduces her face to a series of black holes on white walls so that the image of Hepburn-as-Jo has become a series of abstract connections from the outset. This image, which appears at the beginning of the film as the 'funny face' in question, presents neither a realistic picture of Hepburn or her character, but a reduction of the two to a series of simple elements. The image facializes the indiscernibility between Hepburn and Jo, in the same way that its composition is never completely black holes on white walls or vice-versa. This is a facialization that exists to capture the indiscernibility between star and character, since it is on this indiscernibility that the plot (and audience identification) depend. This is an exchange between character and star that exists in the photograph as if caught in a loop, of circuit.

Slide 24

From this indiscernibility emanates a labyrinth of choice reflected, once again, in the city. Jo's search for a philosophical truth is reflected in her chase across Paris to the house of the mythical (and mythological) Flostre, the philosopher whose works have been an alternative spur for her travel to Europe. The labyrinth leads us to Being, and Being is the bull (Flostre is the bull in *Funny Face*, as it was Casper in *kids*). The Paris of *Funny Face* is a labyrinth divided in the Baroque manner, with the underground cafés and country retreats as the folds of the soul, and streets of the city as the pleats of matter. Jo is the fold between them, constantly poised between the philosophical and the material, and the photograph of Hepburn-as-Jo,

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[77] Ibid TI, p. 61-2.

reduced to black holes on a white wall, is the facialization of the enfolding of philosophical and material. It is a visual labyrinth reflecting the film's narrative labyrinth. Avery offers a marriage (her Ariadne, his Dionysus) of her wisdom and his photography; her search for truth amongst the intellectuals of Paris has educated him as much as the glamour has seduced her. In Nietzsche and Deleuze's version of the Labyrinth myth the god Dionysus comes to rescue Ariadne from the *ressentiment* [78]. Dionysus is the affirmation of truth in the search, and for Nietzsche it is Dionysus who reveals himself to be the Labyrinth, and the Labyrinth to be the search. The proposal Jo the material world of fashion photography combined with the search for philosophical truth. In return, Avery's ennui is cured by that search. Jo's acceptance is therefore a Nietzschean double-affirmation.

* * *

Tensions of description in *Dans le labyrinthe* and
L'Année dernière à Marienbad

The photographic image should be recognised less through a contest of accuracy or truth, and rather more as a mixture or exchange of fictions from which time unfolds in perception. At stake here are the conventions of subject and object that pervade critical analyses of both cinema and photography. To expose these conventions, is 'to make the machinery of photography grind'. One such person to achieve this, and to whom Deleuze turns considerable attention, is Alain Robbe-Grillet, and in particular his 1961 film *L'Année dernière à Marienbad* (*Marienbad*).

For Deleuze, *Marienbad* provides an excellent example of the crystal image ("...the entire Marienbad hotel is a pure crystal, with its transparent side, its opaque side and their exchange"), and he devotes considerable attention to the film and its makers. *Marienbad's* director was Alain Resnais, who all but acted as cameraman (by his own admission) in adapting Robbe-Grillet's richly descriptive script (published simultaneously

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[78] If we followed the pattern of Nietzsche's *ressentiment* each photograph of Jo would be a little death that signalled her death *as a woman*. However, such a conclusion privileges the tense

as a ciné-roman). The relationship between Robbe-Grillet and Resnais gives rise to many possible interpretations as has the film's often intentionally opaque plot, some of which are dealt with here. Jean-Louis Leutrat states the obvious when he suggests that "there are two *L'Année dernière à Marienbad*, a film signed 'Alain Resnais', and a screenplay signed 'Alain Robbe-Grillet'" [79]. Whilst Deleuze comes down very firmly on the side of Robbe–Grillet as the film's creative force, there are many reasons to consider the visual influence of Resnais, who had worked with Marguerite Duras in the adaptation of her novel for his earlier film *Hiroshima mon amour*: an earlier attempt to 'visualise the thoughts' of two lovers drawn together by the tragedies of war.[80]

In *Hiroshima mon amour* the parallel accounts of the lovers are visualised as intertwining stories that unfold through editing and mobile camerawork. For *Marienbad*, the film's images are extended tableaux, as if each were a separate recollection-image, and the camerawork for each is a tension between the mobile camera driven by Robbe-Grillet's script and the static images of Resnais. This is the result of the director Resnais conceiving and representing Robbe-Grillet's script in the form that confounds cinematic logic most easily, whilst continuing to follow a readable continuity of sorts. In order to highlight cinema as being a process of reading, or subjectively interpreting (which was Robbe-Grillet's desired effect for literature in his *nouveaux-romans*), Resnais produces a cinema that corresponds to something else that must be read – a comic.

Given the mythology of the antipathy that existed between them, it is possible to understand the frustration the director must have felt when presented with a script that included the large amount of description that Robbe-Grillet's contains. However, despite this, Resnais made very few changes to it, all of them with the consent of Robbe-Grillet, and relied

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perceived in photography, and not the time that unfolds from the photographic image.
[79] Jean-Louis Leutrat, *L'Année dernière à Marienbad* (BFI Film Classic), trans. by Paul Hammond, (London: BFI, 2000), pp. 52-61. For different interpretations of *Marienbad*, see Kawin, Kline, Houston and Kinder, below. See also Thomas Beltzer, '*Last Year at Marienbad*: An intertextual meditation', in *Senses of Cinema* (internet journal), htThP://www.sensesofcinema.com/contents/00/10/marienbad.html, (24/11/00).
[80] Georges Sadoul, 'Notes on a New Generation', in *Sight and Sound*, (August 1959), pp. 111-117, pp. 114-115.

almost entirely on the visuals to maintain a high level of creative input of his own. This makes Resnais's visual vocabulary all the more relevant.

During the years from 1949, in which American comics were banned in France, Resnais had copies of his favourite, the Chicago Tribune's 'Dick Tracy', sent to him. Resnais had more time for this simple strip than the complex and sophisticated *bandes déssinées* for which France in famous. There are immediate visual similarities between 'Dick Tracy' and *Marienbad.* Scott McCloud notes how Chester Gould's illustration for the strip (a style continued by current artists Dick Locher and Michael Kilian) uses "…bold lines, obtuse angles, and heavy blacks to suggest the mood of a grim, deadly world of adults…" [81]

Slide 25

This perhaps explains the significant emphasis of blacks and whites in the interiors of *Marienbad* – suggesting an intense adult, mental, world of games, in comparison with the muted and low contrast tones outside, a space for sensual play and physical seduction.

Slide 26

Comic strip panels do not, as the cinematic shot does, express a singular moment, but instead an attenuated passage of time. Whereas cinema can present the 'whole' of narrative progression as if in actuality through sequences of editing, the panel of a comic strip can only present what Lawrence Abbott calls the 'characteristic moment' [82] Thus a scene that might take up a few minutes in real time to occur, and also to read, is compressed into a single frame: a time that unfolds to include the past and the future as the eye scans eccentrically over the image to pick up both the words of the characters and any narration. Thus reading a panel of a comic strip, Abbott suggests, is as much an act of reading an image as it is

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[81] Scott McCloud, *Understanding Comics: the invisible art*, (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 126.
[82] Lawrence L. Abbott, 'Comic Art: Characteristics and Potentialities of a Narrative Medium', in *Journal of Popular Culture*, 19:4, (Spring 1986), pp. 155-176, p.167.

of reading a text, and yet neither can fully articulate the moment on their own. This is the comic strip's *ekphrasis*. According to William Mitchell, ekphrasis is a description of an image that cannot completely serve this function. Reciprocally, the image cannot fulfil its description in words. Both must be seen together, and yet the inconsistencies between the two give rise to complex exchanges of meaning resulting from an imbalance. The power of ekphrasis – and hence its common use in poetry – lies in the images that flourish from the *inability* of image and word to represent each other adequately [83].

Slide 27

Marienbad's visual structure is composed of shots presenting characteristic moments in the same way. In this shot the actors freeze whilst the camera tracks 180 degrees around them. Duration is compressed into a particular moment, characteristic of memory, but not necessarily of actual time. In such shots the eye is free to wander over the surface of the image, without the pressure of editing. Hence its similarity with comic monstration. This is not the only visual echo of comic strip narration: the labyrinthine space of the hotel is compressed by deep staging, in which both the foreground and background are in sharp detail. Difficult to achieve in cinema this type of deep staging is a staple of comic illustration. Cinematographer Sacha Vierny used specially made bifocal lenses that hold the near foreground and background in sharp focus at the same time - something which cinema finds it difficult to do routinely. Now commonplace, this innovative approach allowed Resnais to compress the action of a scene - particularly dialogue - into a single frame. This slows the progression of shots by discounting the need for alternation between speakers, and thus allows the meditative pace of the film's editing to be reflected in the single shot.

Slide 28

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[83] Mitchell, 1995, p. 154.

Having achieved this compression via deep-staging rather than by shooting flat compositions in themselves, Resnais then shot along corridors, or across halls and gardens. The represented space of the hotel and its events mutates and unfolds according to the memories and fantasies of X and A, causing it to change shape in successive sequences. As the shape of the hotel changes, so the time sequence of events changes accordingly. Characters of *Marienbad* appear to occupy the same time and space – the same image - as their memories and fantasies collide.

Slide 29

In the comic-strip the viewer's eye follow the passage of time along the passage of space, creating a continuity that is logical in comic strips – according to the reading of comics from left to right, in space and in time. Resnais takes this 'continuity principle' to *Marienbad*, where such a viewpoint more easily emphasises the unreliable subjective spectator position. The conventions of one medium expose the conventions - as conventions - of another. Resnais achieves with the camera what Robbe-Grillet achieved with his prose. Each image is a tableau in which the eye wanders, and in which movement is presented within frame and in space, rather than in time: "Throughout Resnais' work we plunge into a memory which overflows the conditions of psychology...", as Deleuze suggests. [84]

To concentrate on the visual influence of Resnais as director is to risk neglecting what Robbe-Grillet brings to the film. For Deleuze, Robbe-Grillet is concerned with the 'perceptual present' analogous to the Bergsonian image of duration. *Marienbad* is created through the friction between this and Resnais' tableaux as images in an 'architecture of time'.[85] The idea of a single perceptive present is echoed by Eugene Archer, who describes *Marienbad* as a melange of past, present and future that was influenced by the new novel.[86] It is also emphasised by

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[84] TI, p. 119.
[85] Ibid p. 104.
[86] Eugene Archer, "Director of Enigmas: Alain Resnais", in *The Emergence of Film Art*, ed. by Lewis Jacobs, (New York: Hopkinson & Blake, 1969), pp. 336-340, p. 337.

Bruce Kawin, for whom it is an excellent example of his concept of a 'mindscreen' cinema in which dream-images are just as valid as memory-images in subjective experience. However, where Kawin emphasises a camera that is not self-conscious and a world that is not a film. Subjectivity is thus privileged rather than viewed as part of an exchange.

Beyond time and memory Deleuze's interest is in Robbe-Grillet's attack on subjectivity and objectivity, expressed in *Marienbad* but also his 1959 novel *Dans le labyrinthe* (the year Deleuze finished his work on Nietzsche and was poised to return to Bergson). Far from providing a concrete narration, the photographic image in *Marienbad* and the rich and repetitive description of *Dans le labyrinthe*, serve only to offer a myriad of differing interpretations and conclusions that unfold in the subjectivity of the spectator, whilst events depicted have as evidence of veracity only the images that the film, or the book, gives. The autonomy of photographic or narrative image is immediately put under pressure.

In structure and style, *Marienbad* is a perfected version of *Dans le labyrinthe*, in that much of the earlier novel is written with precise and repetitive description that prefigures the visual repetition of camera movement and shots in *Marienbad*. In both, events and places that appear to be similar are revealed to be different, and familiar characters and spaces often appear alien. In *Dans le labyrinthe* streets and street-corners merge and become indiscernible. Descriptions of the painting that the soldier sees merge with descriptions of the rooms that he visits, as do its characters with the people around him. Robbe-Grillet's description constructs a material world that is a labyrinth of half-remembered vistas, and confusion of place and person, 'virtual' painting and 'actual' reality. A scene in *Dans le labyrinthe*, in which the description moves across the represented space of the café painting to rest on the young boy sat beneath, gives no impression of difference between either depiction. Each is as real or as virtual as the other. In a parallel movement in *Marienbad*, the camera at several times pans across the same hall to rest on a different vista through the window, whilst the out-of-field continuity of the baroque gardens emphasised by editing is confounded in later scenes.

In this sense, Resnais achieves with the camera what Robbe-Grillet achieved with his prose. In actual fact, the film's images *do* support X's descriptive, repetitive and malleable voice-over, since they are both revealed as unreliable. But they do so in a coterminous - even poetic - way. This is what Mitchell has called "ekphrastic fear"; the moment when we realise that verbal and visual representation are misaligned:

> This is the moment of resistance or counterdesire that occurs when we sense that the difference between the verbal and the visual representation might collapse...[87]

In these situations, new variations of events and their consequences are produced by the inability for word and image to be fully adequate to each other. Such events, Mitchell suggests, are the products of a desire for the potential inherent in these strange mis-coincidences to be released. To read these words or see these images is to search for a centre around which to orient the story of the film or the book.

There are many objects and events that offer themselves as a potential nexus, or virtual centre 'dans le labyrinthe'. The painting is one of these, but also the photograph of the soldier in full dress uniform that hangs in the room where the soldier dies. For Robbe-Grillet, photographs can offer proof, but also create confusion, and several passages are taken up with the soldier's attempts to animate the moment of the photograph in his mind. For the soldier the imagined moment of the photograph merges with possible memory, and the mapping of possible situations becomes one particular event that is described as if it were a memory of his own of leaving for the front. Whether the photograph is of our soldier or not is irrelevant, in this passage recollection–images vibrate with dream-images to the point that *any* soldier becomes *every* soldier:

> A coat with flaps folded back, puttees, heavy marching boots: the uniform is that of the infantry, as witness also the helmet with the chin strap and the complete gear of packs, kit-bag, flask, belt cartridge–cases, etc...the total effect is neat and as it were,

lacquered, due no doubt to skilful touching-up by the specialist who made the enlargement; the face itself, graced with a conventional smile, has been scraped, changed, softened, that now it has no character left, and resembles for ever all those pictures of soldiers about to leave for the front...[88]

In *Marienbad*, the question of objectivity and the veracity of the photograph, is asked of the camera. For Deleuze, the reflexive awareness of the camera was the key to his understanding of cinematic time: key because such reflexivity is manifest in the doubt that comes with the apparent objectivity of the camera. For A, in *Marienbad*, the photograph is a site of contest between memory of terror and dream of bliss. In the scene from the *ciné-roman*, A is surrounded on her bed with photographs she has discovered in her dressing-table of herself taken by X, as evidence of their affair, and more particularly the violence of his advances. This leads directly to a flashback in Robbe-Grillet's directions, in which X enters the room and violently rapes her. For the film however, this scene is excised and replaced by the same discovery, but this time of many copies of the same – banal – holiday snapshot of A in the garden at Fredericksbad or Marienbad. Following this is a scene in which the nature of X's advance is inconclusive. This changes the emphasis of the photographic image. In the *ciné-roman*, the scattered images, encroach and overwhelm her as X does:

> Toutes les photographies qu'elle a trouvées tout à l'heure dans le secrétaire sonts étalées autour d'elle: sur le lit, sur la table de nuit, sur le tapis, le tout dans un grand désordre.[89]

Resnais replaces this with A playing 'nim' (the game we see X and M playing) with the same photographs. The site of contest is changed from the depiction of many different photographs, to the photograph as object of

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[87] Mitchell, 1994, p. 154.
[88] Alain Robbe-Grillet, *In The Labyrinth*, trans. by Christine Brooke-Rose, (London: Calder and Boyars, 1967 (1959)), p. 56-57.
[89] Alain Robbe-Grillet, *L'Année dernière à Marienbad*, texte integral, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1961), p. 162. "After a while, all the photographs that she found in the writing-desk where strewn all around her: on the bed, on the night-stand, on the carpet, all of them in a great disarray" (My translation)

proof in general: For A, the single experiment can neither prove nor deny his account of their affair. This is the problem with ekphrasis: as Mitchell, notes, "Words can 'cite', but never 'sight' their objects"[90].

Slide 30

Both X's account and A's memory fail to explain adequately this photograph, or any of the photography in the film. This moment of photographic reflexivity simply serves to reiterate that what we see is, in fact, true, but *only* true to the narrative accounts on offer through X or A. The camera is identified as their subjective viewpoint, but leaves us no closer to making sense of their accounts. This is what finally returns us to Deleuze, and the problem of truth. For A, in *Marienbad*, the photograph is a contest of memory versus dream which is reflected in her account of meeting X in her room and his conflicting rapport. As with the streets and rooms of *Dans le labyrinthe*, all the rooms in the hotel look the same, as X describes, except the one in which he may or may not have raped her. The contest is thus between memory of terror and dream of bliss, with photographs as the nexus of this contest of accounts: a nexus of terror and play. The photographic image offers a vibration between dream and memory as in *Dans le labyrinthe*. The photographs of the script offer uncontestable images of both their meeting in the garden and the rape. Each is a 'plunge into memory', as Deleuze has it.

That A leaves with X resolves nothing, since it can be the result of her believing his account, or merely being seduced by it. The doubt remains, but rather than being a value of negation, it is one that implies the compossibility of all pasts. Jefferson Kline's psychoanalytic reading attributes the substitution or displacement of the rape-scene to Resnais, since it is present in the script but not in the film.[91] Kline also notes that because of Resnais's famous attention to detail (such as the naming of Robbe-Grillet's opening play-within-the-film, *Rosmer*) such details deconstruct the narrative, as mise-en-abyme, to engender re-readings.

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[90] Mitchell, 1994, p. 152.
[91] Jefferson T. Kline, *Screening the Text*, (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. 71.

Whether or not this subtraction is the work of Resnais or Robbe-Grillet is contestable, since this approach to detail, as in the case of H.M (Henri Martin) in *Dans le labyrinthe,* is a device of 'sabotage' for Robbe-Grillet.[92] The play and the game do indeed present a mise-en-abyme, as does the café painting in *Dans le labyrinthe*, and the idea that such details should offer an individual 'nexus' of possible readings points towards the game of nim that A plays with photographs as just such a detail. But the singular photograph suggests that it is the photographic image *per se* that is the site of contest, rather than any particular image. All the film's photography is contestable, since there is no anchorage to memory or to imagination offered. Kline has missed the point, since every image, and any image, is a mise-en-abyme. The camera is a vibration between an objective view, the photographic image, and a subjective perception (dream or memory), echoing not only Resnais's 'photography of thought', but also Robbe-Grillet's obsessive description. It should not be forgotten that the script that Robbe-Grillet penned provides a further momentum to the exchange of fictions. Whilst in the film the narration of X, and A's rebuttals or breakdowns, appears to drive the cinematography to create folding world of the Marienbad hotel, the script is still driven by the omniscient narrator of the scriptwriting process. This echoes his conflation of writer/narrator in *Dans le labyrinthe*, since the prepositions of 'he' and 'I' are both used to confuse the reader.

For David Meakin, Robbe-Grillet's heavy description sets out to destabilize the order that is imposed on perception in the traditional novel.[93] The result is a labyrinth of compossibilities that emanate from each description, guided only occasionally by Robbe-Grillet. To follow the description is to create mental images in the mind, each having its own autonomy as an actualisation of the story. The description thus goes from the real to the possible in the Bergsonian sense. This playful approach to narration in Marienbad is reflected in both the proliferation of games (chess, checkers, and especially nim) that contrast with A's moments of terror in *Marienbad,*

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[92] Robbe-Grillet identifies himself with the famous saboteur Henri Martin, who threw sand into his ship's engine, as if Robbe-Grillet himself were a saboteur of bourgeois fiction. The soldier in *Dans le labyrinthe* is trying to deliver a parcel that had belonged to a soldier called Henri Martin.

and in the contrast between the soldier's moments of humour with the young boy and his own terrible fear of illness and death in *Dans le labyrinthe*. Thus a series of tensions are set up around description: Play/terror; falsity/veracity, fiction/memory, narration/vision. These exchanges, decentred and without anchorage, lead to a shattering of order:

> In *Last Year in Marienbad*, and in all his work, Robbe-Grillet put into play a new asynchrony, where the talking and the visual were no longer held together, no longer corresponded, but belied and contradicted themselves, without it being possible to say that one rather than the other is 'right': something undecidable between the two.[94]

Robbe-Grillet's intention is to expose the real truth from within: to expose the oscillation between order and disorder that is the real truth of the world, a vibration of the objective and the subjective. For Robbe-Grillet, the order imposed through logic, causality and perspectivism can ultimately be laid at the door of Descartes, and has achieved such autonomy that Robbe-Grillet identifies with the saboteur of the engine, whose purpose is to throw sand into the workings to make the machine grind.[95] In this way, each image or inflection by Robbe-Grillet is a dicisign, a perception placed within the frame of perception. In both *Dans le labyrinthe* and in *Marienbad* the source of narration or vision is constantly in question as a fiction, and the result is an exchange or vibration that acts as a seed for the time image as a labyrinth of interpretation.

Both film and novel provide a material labyrinth of streets, corridors, a baroque garden in *Marienbad*, and a kitchen/parlour in *Dans le labyrinthe*. These are the pleats of matter in Deleuze, in that both the soldier's quest to deliver his parcel, and X's Dionysian (or Thesean) pursuit of A, are both straightforward searches that include and traverse a labyrinth: "As Leibniz

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[93] Alain Robbe-Grillet, *Dans le labyrinthe*, Intro. by David Meakin, (London: Blackwell, 1983, (1959)), pp. 11-12.
[94] TI, p. 250.
[95] Alain Robbe-Grillet, "Order and Disorder in Film and Fiction", trans. by Bruce Morrisette, *Critical Inquiry* 4, (Autumn 1977), pp. 1-20.

stated, there can never be 'a straight line without curves intermingled'".[96] But it is the rational trajectory – the attempt to make sense of the labyrinth – that provides the momentum of this search. As Beverly Houston and Marsha Kinder suggest, espousing the anti-Cartesian trajectories offered by the film, viewers should 'be carried along' by it, rather than attempt to create a coherent and causal whole from it.[97]

What carries the viewer along, and is thus the fold between the upper and lower worlds, is the camera. For Meakin, the intermediary level of the labyrinth between that of matter and soul is the artistic creation, or interplay between objective description and subjective perception that provides the 'total labyrinthine effect'. The photographic image for *Marienbad* acts as the fold between the real and the virtual. However, this creates a much more complex crystal than that which Deleuze initially describes, since as we have found, this film (and the others in this chapter) place their own material basis within the frame also. The photograph as object, and the photographic image as revealed in photographic effects, are vibrations at the heart of the crystal image, and each creates a labyrinth of possibility, or incompossibility, that emanates from it.

Incompossibility finally denies a fixed reading of either *Marienbad* (or any of our films). We might be satisfied with A as Ariadne, but is X Dionysus or Theseus? Is M Theseus or the Bull? We might prefer one reading in particular: X's account is the labyrinth, he is the labyrinth, A's departure with him is an affirmation of this, and is an escape from the *ressentiment* represented by M. This would not adequately suppress other possible, or compossible, outcomes and readings: critical writing on *Marienbad* is replete with these. For Robbe-Grillet, no specific order should prevail in *Marienbad*, and indeed, we should abandon the rational binarism of order and disorder that instructs us to create coherent readings anyway. Instead we should embrace Robbe-Grillet's idea of a decentred text that remains interesting only whilst 'unrecuperated'.

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[96] F, p. 14.
[97] Beverly Houston & Marsha Kinder, *Self and Cinema*, (New York: Redgrave, 1980), p. 254.

To offer a final interpretation of the film would defeat its purpose. The charm of the labyrinth, of its joy and its terror, is being in it. This is why *Marienbad* was so intriguing to Deleuze. The labyrinth is a metaphor that illustrates Deleuze's approach to truth from his early writing and throughout his career. And why it appears in his work on Bergson, Leibniz, as well as his work with Félix Guattari. For Deleuze, of course, the truth is not at the centre of the labyrinth: the truth *is* the labyrinth. Robbe-Grillet and Resnais were unable to agree - in public at least - on the 'true' ending of the film, or indeed, the true events of the 'last year at Marienbad'. For Resnais, they did meet 'last year', for Robbe-Grillet, they did not. Indeed, the apparent ambiguity of the film's ending, as well as this authorial rift, has been the starting point for many different interpretations of *Marienbad*, not least of which being that *Marienbad* is 'just a bad film'. But this would be to misunderstand the *ambivalent efficiency* of its ekphrasis. The combination of image and narration, working for Resnais as it does in the comic panel, is an agent to *unfix* meaning, as well as to fix it. Maybe that is the truth of *L'Année dernière à Marienbad* after all.

<div align="center">* * *</div>

Conclusion.

In an October 2000 feature review of *Julien-Donkey Boy*, a film directed by *kids* scriptwriter Harmony Korine, Danny Leigh compares the film with the work of Nan Goldin, and particularly *The Ballad of Sexual Dependency*. The comparison suggests a 'genetic' connection in their collective use of the everyday, as both film and slide-show "...document the grimy, disturbing minutiae of modern day-to-day life, to provide a mirror to reflect what would otherwise remain unseen."[98]

It is no accident that Deleuze found the time-image in the everyday. It is when the everyday is presented that the role of the camera, first as 'dominant specularity' and then within its own shadow or frame, is foregrounded. The situations of the everyday (sunsets, memories) or everyday things (household objects and the still-lives created from them)

are devoid of action, and offer an image from which time unfolds. The genetic element present in both Korine's and Goldin's work is the image of the everyday. In this chapter we have asked what is at the heart of the photographic image that connects the diverse forms of photography and cinema, and resolves the paradox of subjectivity that dogs the essays of MacCabe, Scruton, Kendall and others. We find our answer in this genetic element: in the *any-instant-whatever*.

As we found in *In the Street* and *kids*, the relationship of *every* with *any* is that of multiplicity in unity. The time-image unfolds from the everyday because the everyday reflects the camera and thus the subjectivity that perceives it. In the action-image the photography is not questioned, but instead the artifice of cinema and the false movement of the film-strip is hidden behind a veil of apparent truth; a truth that relies on the simplest equation of the photographic image with veracity. The time-image immediately places this under pressure – 'time puts truth into crisis'.

It is clear that any attempt to proclaim the photographic image as objective, to accept it as truthful, has a difficult task. But why has the photographic image been invested with such authority? For that we have to look to Descartes, and the post-Enlightenment culture that existed in the years prior to photography's mass explosion. The cameras that furnished the work of the photographic pioneers of 1839 were not those that began life in the Baroque, but were instead instruments that supported an ideology of causality and order; and the scientific advances that augmented the new camera soon produced a machine that recreated the pictorial according to the conventions of painting. We should not ask questions of the authority of the photographic image, but instead of the autonomy of the photograph.

Rather than a site of truth, the photographic image is a mixture or exchange of fictions; an expression of compossibility. This is why the critical distinctions of realism and verisimilitude, and even the classical values of cinema and photography, exist. For each it is a question of

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[98] Danny Leigh, "The beat-up kid", in *Sight and Sound*, (October 2000), pp. 20-22, p. 22.

whether we are really seeing through photography, or fictionally seeing directly. Compossibility accounts for the existence of both values as perceived in the photographic image, and accounts for the documentary photograph (from which *In the Street* is descended) and classical cinema (from which the action-image is descended). Compossibility therefore accounts for our recognition of the variation of truth in cinema and photography: that such distinctions exist. But the time-image, as we have found, places the compossible within the frame. In foregrounding the camera-consciousness, the time-image is a tremendous vibration of both the values of truth and our perception of them. The time-image is the condition in which the truth of variation appears to perception: it is the envisioning of the exchange of fiction that occurs when an object photographed is viewed. The truth of variation is the truth that the compossible values of objectivity and subjectivity are, in fact, incompossible. Incompossibility leads to a web of time that unfolds from this image, as each variation is crystallised and leads on to another. When the photographic image refers to its own fiction it is the power of the false that takes over, and the photographic image presents possible, but not-necessarily true, pasts: This is incompossibility. Incompossibility is therefore the frame of perception around the photographic exchange, is the central fold that runs through the *cinephoto* monad, and is the 'genetic element' of the crystal.

What is at stake here is not the photographic process, the film-strip, or even the photogramme, but the *photographicness* of the photographic image. We could not be satisfied that the photograph was merely part of the sensory-motor schema, any more than Deleuze could be satisfied that the photogramme was a direct image of time. Like Deleuze, we might write a taxonomy of the photograph, separating time-image from movement-image as he did, according to how direct they are. But this leads us to a more important conclusion: the genetic element of the time-image, the opsign, is *not* in the photograph (as a material object), but exists *in the taking* of it, as we found in Metz. The opsign exists in the photographic act, and moreover in the perception of that act. The photographic act, not the photographic object, is the camera-consciousness.

As we have found, Deleuze's approach to cinema was influenced by the philosophy of Leibniz even before he started work on *The Fold*. Already in the Cinema books we see that the crystal image is reflected labyrinthine house in *La Regle du jeu*. But the fold between them is also reflected. The camera follows the gamekeeper; the photograph blends Audrey and Jo in *Funny Face*; the camera plunges into Resnais' comic-strip tableaux; in fact, the camera-consciousness reflects the fold – the camera-consciousness *is* the fold.

The Leibnizian investigation that we have conducted has led us to this, because of Leibniz's particular view of the world. Leibniz saw the multiple and the one were not incompatible, but in fact necessary to each other, and this lead us to conceive of the *cinephoto* monad as a singular, albeit labyrinthine form. But Leibniz also saw how the material was reflected in the soul, so that the shape of the *cinephoto* monad was reflected in any, and therefore *every*, part of the image. Finally, our study of Leibniz is a call to recuperate the Baroque *camera obscura*, the camera that internalises its image, and that places its view of the world within its own architecture. A return to the principles of the Baroque camera offers the conditions of incompossibility, the truth of variation as it appears to the subject: we can see that it is the Baroque camera that forms the camera-consciousness.

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Chapter Three:

Time in the crystal ~ McCay, Lumières, Atget.

Slide 31

Introduction

Having understood the relationship between cinema and photography in Chapter Two, we must now ask what led to a division of cinema from the photograph. What were the ideas that led to such a division made by Bazin, for example, and hence Deleuze? How, if at all, does it relate to time? The photographic image is a foundational element of both the time-image and the movement image, whether in cinema or, as we have now seen, in the photograph. Most importantly, the photographic image provides the zero-ness of the time-image, and always has the potential to be a time-image before montage in cinema, whether organic (as in Griffith) or dialectic (as in Eisenstein) exploits its perceived immobility and places it within the sensory-motor schema. The project of *Cinema 1* is Deleuze's explanation of this process. It is also an exegesis of his understanding of time, particularly as Bergson described it, and it is this understanding that becomes our focus in this chapter. We cannot understand the crystal-image without understanding the division of time – of duration – that is the operation of chronology. We have to understand how chronology opposes the open-ended and indivisible duration of the time image, and how photography has come to represent the former – for Deleuze and others. Deleuze's description of time undergoes several changes throughout his career, and what he was to later call *Chronos* (chronological time) and *cronos* (non-chronological time) in the cinema books he had already elaborated on (as *Chronos* and *Aion*) in 1969 in *The Logic of Sense* [1]. Since these two descriptions of time, separated by more than a decade in his writing, approximate to each other well, it is these that we will be considering.

The central thrust of much of Deleuze's work is a critique of the cultural organisation of the universe into ontologically understood phenomena – the creation of sets from the wider becoming of the universe. His understanding of time is no different. In *Cinema 1*, his critique centres upon the organisation of duration into discrete elements; photogrammes, shots, montage, etc. in film. In *The Logic of Sense* this appears on a more

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[1] Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, trans. by Mark Lester and Charles Stivale, (London: Athlone, 1990 (1969)).

conceptual level, and displaying a less noticeable reference to Bergson. In spite of this, much of Deleuze's understanding of time in both studies relies heavily on Bergson's principles of cinematographic perception from *Creative Evolution*[2]. *Creative Evolution* came at a time of wide critical and philosophical discourse on the nature of modern experience, and in which the relevance of time to this experience was necessary. Leo Charney has described the *fin de siècle* and the decades surrounding it as characterised by an intense philosophical debate around the idea of moment, and in which the *ephemeral* was taking shape as the defining concept of the modern industrial experience. This widespread philosophical concern outreached its own time to include the work of Martin Heidegger and, most importantly for us, Walter Benjamin[3]. Benjamin was influenced by Bergson's 1896 *Matter and Memory*, and, like Bergson, placed heavy emphasis on the relationship between photography and perception (or experience, for Benjamin).

Both Bergson and Benjamin had an understanding of technology as responding to the needs of a population experiencing rapid change and heightened sensory awareness. For Benjamin this has routinely been interpreted as his understanding of 'shock', a theme that surfaces repeatedly in his work, including that on cinema. For Bergson, a similar example is his understanding of photographic, and most importantly, of cinematographic perception. Developed in *Matter and Memory* and taken up later in *Creative Evolution*, Bergson surmised that perception is the stringing together of discrete images into a becoming, in the same way that cinema strings photogrammes together to create a total image of movement. For Bergson, as for Deleuze, all cultural discourse proceeds on this basis – of the stringing together of arbitrarily individuated elements:

> We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these
> are characteristic of the reality, we have only to string them on a
> becoming...Perception, intellection, language so proceed in
> general. Whether we would think becoming, or express it, or even

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[2] CE. Mitchell translates Bergson's concept of perception as 'cinematographical'.
[3] Leo Charney, 'In a Moment: Film and the Philosophy of Modernity', in *Cinema and the Invention of Modern Life*, ed. by Leo Charney & Vanesa R. Schwartz, (London: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 279-296.

perceive it, we hardly do anything else that set going a kind of cinematograph inside us.[4]

There are two problems here. Firstly this 'becoming' is taken for being direct experience whilst only being an image of it, and secondly such perception is only characteristic, or mimetic,, of reality, inviting a false perception masquerading as pure perception. Just as this is a false perception of experience (each image being a discrete memory-image), so too is cinema an illusion of movement. This, of course, is the central thesis of Deleuze's work on the movement-image.

But in terms of Bergson's earlier understanding of photography and memory from *Matter and Memory*, his concept of cinematographic perception rings true. Deleuze largely agrees, but notes very early on that 'cinematographic illusion' is simply a new name for an older problem – that of the organisation of perception into discrete images; the very action of the sensory-motor schema. Deleuze's answer is to turn to *Matter and Memory*. Bergson's earlier work suggests, for Deleuze, that cinema is immediately a movement-image, but that Bergson does not see it because montage has not made the movement-image *mobile*:

> …what *was* cinema's position from the outset? On the one hand, the view point was fixed, the shot was therefore spatial and strictly immobile; on the other hand, the apparatus for shooting was combined with the apparatus for projection, endowed with a uniform abstract time. The evolution of the cinema, the conquest of its own novelty, was to take place through montage, the mobile camera, and the emancipation of the view point, which became separate from projection. [5]

Thus Bergson could not see the movement-image because cinema was not in the highly developed state of which Deleuze was aware at the time of his looking back. However, Bergson was describing, in cinema before montage, a zero-ness of cinema: a cinema in which a different

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[4] CE, p. 323.
[5] MI, p. 1.

understanding of time applied. The erasure of the markers of the movement-image (dialectical or organic montage, for example) takes away language and reveals the zero-state of cinema; the cinema of Bergson's experience. Rather than make this cinema necessarily static or immobile, it instead reveals that early cinema has a potential to be a time image that had not been curtailed by the sensory-motor schema at the time of Bergson's experience of it. If, as we saw in Chapter Two, the movement-image is a move from the possible to the real (a 'closing-down' of potential), then early cinema exists as a cinema of possibility – and that includes the possibility of the time-image. Deleuze's criticism *is* convincing, but Bergson's 'cinematographic illusion' suggests that, despite the fact that cinema was useful for Bergson to make an analogy with perception, a deeper understanding of early cinema is necessary. When Bergson says 'cinematographic', what exactly does he mean?

Firstly, what is the model of perception that Bergson describes? Bergson imagined the process by which perception might recreate the movement of objects for the screen – he picks the passing of a regiment along a street. For him, perception would automatically try and build such an image of movement by animating the movements of individual bodies:

> ...to give each of them the movement of marching, a movement varying from individual to individual although common to the human species, and to throw the whole lot on the screen.

Such a project would be overwhelming, and would not begin to express the movement of objects independent of the regiment: "How could it, at best, reproduce the suppleness of everyday life?"[6] The answer, of course, is cinematographic perception.

What Bergson was suggesting is that memory might create an image of movement, but to do so would be to try and actualise discrete elements of a virtual, durative, and ever-changing world in which movement could be individuated or isolated to bodies that act as discrete elements of the whole. Given the enormity of such a task, it is not surprising that

cinematographic illusion is so seductive. Cinematographic perception takes a pre-actualised image of the virtual – the snapshot – and links it to a becoming in which movement is reconstituted abstractly.

> Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially.[7]

Significantly, it is possible that contemporary technology had a strong influence over this concept. Was perception cinematographic before cinema came along? This is Deleuze's question also. Furthermore we might ask: was perception photographic before photography came along? We answered this in Chapter One. What we see in this new case is the double operation of perception, one which recreates the whole by means of constituent parts, organised through memory, and one which recreates the whole by taking pre-actualised images of the past and stringing them together. One seems informed by the technology of the modern, one does not. Perception that is not cinematographic can never reproduce the scene that was initially appreciated, since the whole cannot be adequately subdivided or individuated. But it can produce the impression of virtual movement – it can produce the perception of its becoming. What we can suggest is that after technological discourse had informed both popular perception and philosophies of it, only a rift or break from such a perception exposes it. This is the condition of Deleuze's time image. This however also suggests that it is the rift itself which provokes the direct representation of time, and which triggers pre-cinematographic perception. This perception is created from the ambiguity in this rift, a distancing of objects that were once close. We might suggest that the pre-cinematic perception is an auratic perception, which is why we need to deal with Benjamin.

It is worth noting first of all that Benjamin's final understanding of *aura* is ambiguous, given its recurrence in different forms throughout a project that is relatively unfinished. Consequently, it is a concept that occupies a great

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[6] CE, p. 321.
[7] Ibid, p. 322.

deal of critical discourse in the academy. This chapter is not an attempt to completely 'pin down' aura. However, the nature of aura as simultaneously distancing and bringing closer is of great interest. Perhaps Benjamin's most famous use of aura is in connection with the photograph, and in particular the photography that was most visible at his time of writing. The work of Blossfeldt brings the world closer through the technologies of vision afforded by the camera, whilst the slow exposures of Hill and Adamson allowed the sitters to grow into the photograph. Rediscovered by the academy after nearly 100 years, these images reproduce an aura that Benjamin was only to see in the work of Eugène Atget as a comparable example of his own time of writing. Atget's work was, all things considered, an anachronism of photographic technology. But it was an anachronism that exposed a temporal rift between the time of Benjamin's writing and the nineteenth-century. It 'stripped reality of its camouflage'; subtracting the crowds of the twentieth century and revealing the older city that remained [8]. It was a revelation that Benjamin experienced himself through his own concept of aura. Combined with an ambiguity of distance is an ambiguity of time, since Atget's pictures present a scene of action that simultaneously waits for new action as it evokes the old. These images provide an image of past *and* future, and are interesting to us *because* they are anachronisms. They are also photographs of the pre-cinematic world presented to people living in the cinematic, and this is perhaps why they had the enormous effect on photographic and artistic culture that they did.

This chapter's textual and philosophical direction relies on a confluence of historical and conceptual trajectories and dates. As Miriam Hansen notes, Benjamin intended his famous essay, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', to act as a telescope to view the nineteenth century [9]. Indeed much of Benjamin's work has, as its focus, the Paris of the nineteenth century: the Paris of the Lumière *père*, and also the Paris of

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[8] Walter Benjamin, 'A Short History of Photography' (1931), in *Screen*, (Spring, 1972), pp. 5-27. (SHP)
[9] Miriam Hansen, 'Benjamin, Cinema and Experience: "The Blue Flower in the Land of Technology"', in *New German Critique* 40, Winter 1987, pp. 179- 224, p. 183.

Atget [10]. Atget's career as a photographer (1898 – 1927) spans the gap between the invention of cinema and Benjamin's most famous period of writing, yet his photographs, mostly of Paris backstreets, boulevards, and countryside devoid of people, essentially presents a vision of a city still being shaped by Haussmannisation [11]. If Benjamin's essays provide a philosophical telescope to the nineteenth century, Atget's images surely provide the visual image for this telescope.

Significantly, *Matter and Memory* was written whilst cinematic invention took its greatest steps: Edison had been experimenting with the kinetoscope for at least five years, moving images had been the subject of scientific debate for at least eight years, and the Lumière brothers both perfected and demonstrated their Cinématographe (the practical model essentially behind Bergson's concept) as recently as March 1895. As studies such asLaurent Mannoni's of the prehistory of cinema suggest, *Matter and Memory* was written at a time of a 'white heat' in cinematic invention.[12] Similarly, Bergson's *Creative Evolution* was first published in 1907, at which time the period of cinema that has come to be known as 'cinema of attractions' was drawing to an end. Tom Gunning's ground-breaking essay on this period suggests that both the production and exhibition practices of cinema of the first decade of cinema demand a certain respect in examination, rather than being viewed simply as a primitive or undeveloped stage of cinema from which narrative cinema was a liberation [13]. This is a challenge to orthodox cinema history; an orthodoxy also evident in Deleuze's cinema books.

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[10] SHP. See also 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' (1936), in *Illuminations*, ed. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zohn, (London: Fontana, 1973), pp. 219-253 (WA); and 'Some Motifs on Baudelaire' (1939), in *Illuminations*, ed. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zohn, (London: Fontana, 1973). (SMB)

[11] Atget's itinerant practice of photography had amassed as many as 10,000 glass-plate images of the city of Paris and its surrounding countryside. He intended his work to be 'Documents pour artistes': photographs taken as reference material for archivists, illustrators, and painters. The latter included Man Ray himself, and Georges Braque.

[12] Laurent Mannoni, *The Great Art of Light and Shadow: archaeology of the cinema*, trans. by Richard Crangle, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2000).

[13] Tom Gunning, 'The Cinema of Attractions: Early Film, its Spectator and the Avant-Garde (1986)', in *Early Cinema: Space Frame Narrative*, ed. by Thomas Elsaesser & Adam Barker, 2nd edn., (London: BFI, 1994), pp. 56-62.

The Division of Time: Modernity and Moment

The historical context of Bergson's writing, as for Benjamin later, was a period of wide social and cultural change, represented in the visual arts, commercial art, and the industrial arts of photography and cinema. Ben Singer has described this period as being characterised by 'hyperstimulus', after the sociologist Michael Davis, a category of sensory effects that either caused or exploited the new technologies and which were the subject of popular concern and debate.[14] Not only did new technologies bring with them new experiences of speed and rapidity, but the city also brought experiences of bustle and claustrophobia. Spectacular and leisure activities exploited the sensory appeal of the dangers of new technologies and transportation, whilst cultural forms such as the 'yellow press' and cinema exploited their sensational appeal either by report or by mimicry. The new mechanised press used the new forms of storytelling available, such as comic strips, whilst simultaneously using traditional illustration to record the more spectacular crimes and accidents of the city. Similarly, cinema provided both a means of spectacle, as is evidenced by the popularity of travel films, sports films, or newsreels, as well as a commentary on the effects of modernity in general.

Modernity a had more subtle effect upon the experience of the everyday, and the technologies of vision, primarily cinema but also photography, responded to it. Miriam Hansen has commented on this period as being characterised by 'shocks', in Benjamin's terms that merely coincided with the development of vision technologies:

> The adaptation of human perception to industrial modes of production and transportation, especially the radical restructuring of spatial and temporal relations, has an aesthetic counterpart in the formal procedures of the photographic media – the arbitrary moment of exposure in photography and fragmenting grip of framing and editing in film...film rehearses in the realm of reception

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[14] Ben Singer, *Melodrama and Modernity: Early Sensational Cinema and Its Contexts*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 65.

what the conveyor belt imposes upon human beings in the realm of production.

Hansen sees film as largely coincidental with the experience of industrial modernity, and only useful to 'train' the population for the real shocks of everyday life. However, Leo Charney suggests that, perhaps seduced by the modern, cinema made a virtue of its response to the population's experience of it by "modernity's potential drawbacks to become aesthetic advantages. Shock, speed, and dislocation became editing.[15] Michelle Henning reinterprets Benjamin to stress how such representational technologies are a more direct response to changes in perception:

> According to Benjamin, the new technology of film did not produce a change in perception, and hence in consciousness. Rather 'a new and urgent need for stimuli was *met* by the film' (her emphasis).[16]

Benjamin, Hansen, and Henning, view cinema from the modern position of a narrative-dominated representation, such as came to dominate after the development of montage strategies like that of Griffith and Eisenstein. Such a cinema hides its apparatus in both conceptual terms (logical narrative etc.) as well as actual ones (hidden projector etc.). In these terms, early cinema, with its visible projector, sensational films, and flickering image, appears to neatly parallel the very 'shock' effect of the 'real' world. However, this view underestimates the relationship that early cinema had with the population. Cinema was, in fact, a stimulus that both caused a change in perception as well as represented its effects. This is something discernible in photographic culture in general, rather than cinema in particular. The use of photography or cinema as an analogy, or metaphor, for the change in perception of time and space neglects the *direct* influences it had. Cinema's division of time is evidence of a wholesale change in the perception of time, in which the durative was replaced by the punctual, and the attraction of the population to the mechanics and apparatus of cinema suggest a public awareness of this.

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[15] Charney, 1995, p. 293.
[16] Michelle Henning, 'Digital Encounters: Mythical Pasts and Electronic Presence', in Martin Lister ed. *The Photographic Image in Digital Culture*, (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 217-235, p. 229.

However, Bergson's use of a discourse of perception that is 'flavoured' by the technology of the day threatens to obscure this. In these terms we might answer Deleuze's question and say that cinematographic perception was a fulfilment of a desire that already existed [17].

However, in a discussion of modernity, it is easy to rely simply on the effects of the modern to display an understanding of what had gone before: to use technological discourses as analogies. In one sense we have to strip away the modern, particularly the conception of time that came with it, to see what remains of time. From Bergson's work in *Creative Evolution* and *Matter and Memory* come two very different senses of time that mutually coexist. It is these that Deleuze develops conceptually in *The Logic of Sense* and analytically in the cinema books. Bergson's model of perception as discrete elements created from an indivisible whole is a product of this division. Crucially, this is the division of time that turns the photograph into an immobile section, and reconstitutes it into the movement-image as cinema.

In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze conceives of an open-ended time, comparable to Bergson's concept of the *durée*, expressed only as an impression of future and past. This *potential* time Deleuze names *Aion*, and it has the same characteristics of *cronos*, the non-chronological time that:

> …splits into two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the presents pass on, while the other preserves all the past. Time consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we *see in the crystal.* [18]

Deleuze initially conceives Aion from the point of view of the event, which exists as an aleatory or arbitrary point upon a line of "proximate past and imminent future." Incorporeal and only potential, Aion is therefore the possibility of a past that has gone before and a future that exists merely as a promise. Since these exist only in the view of the event, any event "is

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[17] See MI, p.2. cf. Chapter One of this thesis.
[18] TI, p. 81.

adequate to the entire Aion", containing the past as recollection and the future as contraction [19].

In conceptualising the event, Deleuze also describes an essentially incorporeal structure of time. The event is the subdivision of Aion, the separation of past and future to create the present. However, given the indivisibility of Aion, such subdivision is infinite. It is a subdivision of the future from the past ad infinitum. This has the effect of creating a sense of time that operates, as we might visualise it, like a funnel, the inside of which acts as the instant, encompassing the largest unthinkable amount of time and dividing Aion to create the smallest unthinkable amount of time. It is into this instant, as if into a whirlpool, that the corporeal is sucked to create the moment

Slide 32

Rendered entirely random, or aleatory as Deleuze maintains, any point becomes the potential for every point. It is any point whatever on the line of Aion. By the time of the cinema books, this has become the any-instant-whatever of Deleuze's early treatment of Bergson.

However, the crucial element to Deleuze's thesis on time in *The Logic of Sense* has to do with the division that does occur in perception. It is not enough to suggest that Aion, as a description of duration, is a true character of time; Deleuze's thesis must cover the actual division of time that perception makes. Perception does, in fact, insert a corporeal element into the instant, making it tangible and sensible. This is the division of time that extends to chronology. Perception grasps the event and inserts itself to create the present, which "absorbs and contracts past and future".[20] Deleuze insists that this present is random, and that Aion, if it is ever subdivided, is only a time made up of interlocking presents that overlap. The present is thus limited by the sense of the 'now', but infinite in that the 'now' cannot be adequately extracted from the whole of duration as a

[19] LS, pp. 63-64.
[20] Ibid p. 61.

discrete element. The present is infinite in the sense that there is no answer to the question " when does the now end?" It is also infinite because it is indivisible, since no subdivision can ever place a boundary at the point at which the now ends and the future begins, or indeed at where the past reverts. Whilst Deleuze's definition suggests the present as circular – always returning perception back to present – it is perhaps preferable to think of the present as a *circuitry*. In this understanding the cause-effect chain continues but does not return perception to any beginning that was once past, yet at the same time it still manages to express the change of the whole. It is from this circuit that the crystal image flourishes.

The crystal image flourishes from *Chronos* then, since Chronos is the description given to this living present: a contradiction of Deleuze's later description of Chronos as if it were the perceptual backbone of the sensory-motor-schema. How can this be? There is a certain difference between the Chronos of the first thesis in *The Logic of Sense* (Chr) and the Chronos of *Cinema 2* (Chr'). Indeed, there is a point at which the instant or living present is burdened with a regulated succession, in which the future and past are mapped out, either conceptually by chronology, or practically by the film-strip, for example.

A tremendous force of organisation regulates the living present (Chr) to become the chronological (Chr') and in so doing inserts an element of the corporeal into the present that simultaneously coils up all relative presents, creating an actualised image of the whole. This is the memory-image, since it is viewed from the present and contains both the past in general and the past in particular, as we saw in Bergson's cone. This has only one effect for Deleuze, an overwhelming sense of the past that clashes with the unquieted sensation of the present that still exists. The presents pile up creating a vertiginous effect of the 'here and now' that cascades into an uncontrollable 'then'. Deleuze called this 'the becoming-mad of depth'.

Deleuze's development of his thesis on time and movement in cinema is much clearer now. The movement-image is a regulation of Chronos (Chr)

to become the image of chronology (Chr'). However, the time-image, stripping away the processes of regulation, or otherwise revealing their role, presents the character of time that exists before they do their work. This is the living present of Chronos (Chr). We are not seeing a contradiction here, but time expressed in two forms of Chronos, the 'good Chronos' and 'bad Chronos' that Deleuze develops in *The Logic of Sense*.[21] Opposing each other Aion and Chronos are incompatible since Chronos inserts the corporeal into the instant. Chronos cannot be envisaged without this corporeality: "The essential difference is no longer simply between Chronos and Aion, but between the Aion of surfaces and the whole of Chronos together with the becoming-mad of depths."[22] Thus there is a clear organisation from Aion into Chronos (Chr'), which passes through Chronos (Chr) toward its regulation. What should be understood here is that Chronos (Chr) does exist before the force of regulation overwhelms it. The task here is to reveal an image of Chronos (Chr) that exists before the corporeal is inserted into the incorporeal and, significantly, when the instant becomes the *moment.*

As Deleuze demonstrates, an understanding of time is central to understanding the development of cinema and, for us, the photograph. However, in this case the reverse is also true: understanding cinema and photography is essential to understanding the division of time. In the case of early cinema and the photography contemporary with it, this means that the regulation of time is represented in the media of the day. The period between the 1890s and the 1930s is replete with movement-images that express the regulation of time into chronology (Marey and Muybridge in chronophotography, or the Futurists in time-lapse photography). However, the same period is also replete with time-images that express the living-present of Chronos (Chr) as the infinite subdivision of Aion (or Bergson's *durée*). Furthermore the transition of the public and private space from the open-endedness and continual change of duration to the staccato 'jerks' of the modern is not only represented in film and photography, but such a representation is necessary to the transitions of modernity and the

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[21] Ibid p. 164.
[22] Ibid p. 165.

appreciation of the moment. These images of time both reflect and enforce a change in perception.

Benjamin was deeply suspicious of Bergson's *durée*, and instead was profoundly seduced by those "countless movements of switching, inserting, pressing...[and] snapping" that characterised the breaking up of time that was effected by the mechanised age [23]. But Benjamin's understanding of Bergson also displays ambivalence. Even as the open-endedness of *durée* threatens to eliminate the archetypal force of chronology – death – and thus achieve the perfect form of regulated time, elements of the living present remain, or images of the subdivision of Aion are revealed:

> Even though chronology places regularity above permanence, it cannot prevent heterogeneous, conspicuous fragments from remaining within it. [24]

This is as much to say that within a new emergent sense of chronological time, perceptible in the workplace (the factory, the office) as well as in popular representation (photography, cinema, the mechanised press) there remained discrete elements of the former consciousnesses of time – the Aion that stretches out to become an intangible past and future, or Chronos (Chr), the ever-present present that expresses only the 'here' and 'now'. These are nomadic forms, constantly slipping through the grasp of ontology or phenomenology. For example, history finds it difficult to talk about the films of the Lumières (how does one classify films made by filmmakers who had no interest in filmmaking?). The academy cannot neatly package the work of Atget, an artist who steadfastly refused the mantle of artist, or laid claim to any coherent artistic intention in his career.

Winsor McCay is another example. In developing the comic strip, his work seems at times anachronistic, other-worldly, charmed, or magical. The comic strip emerged alongside cinema as a new form of visual entertainment to express the popular consciousness of time. Significantly,

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[23] SMB, p. 171.
[24] Ibid p. 181.

as Tim Blackmore suggests, comics strips like cinema responded to the changes in the experience of space and time during this period: "The reader in 1905 welcomed the speed, compression and wit of the comic strip" which was, in turn, the "product of a new mode of thinking." [25]

For Blackmore, McCay's work demonstrates a friction between a mechanical mode of illustration (that trope that would come to dominate) and a mode which opposed its division of time (McCay's *Little Nemo in Slumberland*). Blackmore has no problem in reading McCay's strip which, from 1905 to 1927, chronicled the nocturnal adventures of Nemo, as a knowing allegory of the mechanical onslaught of the modern world on the magical world of the pre-modern. McCay and illustrators in his style are described as if they were sorcerers, whilst his strip is described as a paradoxical hiatus between the magical and the mechanical:

> It is as if there was a tiny pause before the onslaught of mass culture was felt; artists' work reflected the perverse situation of needing the machinery which was publishing them, while showing that the same machinery guaranteed the slow demise of the artform, the gradual grinding down and wearing away of the comic artist's fantastical powers.[26]

However, for us, it is in its demonstration of time through illustration that most directly expresses the strip's difference from mechanical chronology.

It would be a mistake to suggest that comics are less sophisticated than the narrative devices of cinema in representing time. *Little Nemo* exhibits a high-level of sophistication in demonstrating time and space within one or two panels. *Little Nemo*'s individual panels, like many other comics, represent the attenuated passage of time – the characteristic moment – that both Martin Barker and Lawrence Abbott have noted [27]. But whilst in most comic strips this approximates to the breaking up of time into an abstract chronology, in *Little Nemo* structuring elements appear that

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[25] Tim Blackmore, 'McCay's McChanical Muse: Engineering Comic-Strip Dreams', in *Journal of Popular Culture* 32, Summer 1998, pp.15-38.
[26] Ibid p. 21. Coincidentally, *Little Nemo* ran in its various publications between 1905 and 1927 (the date of Atget's death).

present chronology as if it were *in the process* of regulation. Some panels present a discrete passage of time as defined by a movement or a collection of individual movements:

Slide 33

At other times McCay's illustration serves to "squeeze and stretch panels to reflect the action they contain; the dynamic compositions which resulted are far from mechanical" [28]. In the first case illustration is defined by and subordinate to the movement depicted, and perception follows suit. In the second case, movement is unending in the sense that the frame does not limit (or follow the limits of) the action depicted.

Slide 34

The time expressed in these panels is limited because no action within the panel breaks out of the 'now', yet the time expressed is infinite because it is not subdivided within itself or individuated completely from the whole of the strip. These frames are instantaneous in terms of their depiction of movement and time from a point of view that is aleatory or arbitrary. This could be any-instants-whatever of the action. On the other hand, the time in these frames seems elongated, since the movement and time is potentially infinite in its division and extension; the frame does not curtail movement or limit the time expressed. The suggestion here is that within the regulated patterns of illustration that were coming to dominate even McCay's work, it seems that occasional images of Chronos (Chr) still revealed themselves. Is the same not possible with that other character of time – Aion? Aion is a time of interlocking presents that make up duration. This means that perceptually, Aion is only visible through Chronos itself – it takes an understanding of the regulation of time, or the pattern of interlocking instants – to reveal Aion.

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[27] Abbott, 1986, pp. 6-7.
[28] Blackmore, 1998, p. 24.

McCay's illustrations reflect Deleuze's 'architecture of time': The visual architecture of the image reflects the duration of our reading the image. They remain subordinate to perception, since it is the passing of the eye eccentrically across the image that defines the action depicted. Most notably, McCay demonstrates this by reversing it. In Slumberland, the represented space of Befuddle Hall and the events in it mutate and unfold according to the dreams of Nemo, and with which we identify. As he dreams, so we see; perception is foregrounded and placed within the frame of the illustrated perception of the strip. Then, as the shape of the Befuddle Hall changes, so the time sequence of events changes accordingly.

Slide 35

McCay thus highlights perception before movement and time, which both increases the charm of his stories, and makes an issue of the regulation of perception according to chronology. Once perception is made reflexive, the two senses of time collide, and they do so because the urge toward chronology (to follow discrete instances or frames), is in counter-point to the line of time upon which they rest and which they simultaneously make visible.

Slide 36

Along a sequence chronological panels, two perceptions of time are clearly visible. Each individual panel represents a discrete element of the whole, an illustrative trajectory that closely follows the emerging paradigm of comic-strip narration. Perception seeks to turn the movement expressed by the whole into a cause-effect chain that simultaneously represents the space in which it appears to occur. Scott McCloud suggests that we have been "…conditioned by photography to perceive single images as single moments. After all it does take an eye time to move across scenes in real life."[29] McCay's strip presents the process of such a conditioning. The

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[29] Scott McCloud, *Understanding Comics: the invisible art*, (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 97.

individual panel edges break the space into discrete elements, according to an urge to see photographically, as it were, and in so doing reveal an indivisible space that has been there all along. By seeing chronology in the process of emerging, and by foregrounding the perception that achieves this, the strip reveals the duration underneath. Chronos (Chr') reveals Aion.

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Lumière and the living present

Since Deleuze's genealogy of cinema starts, more or less, with Eisenstein and Griffith, it is perhaps logical to be curious about the cinema that existed before them. For Deleuze, Lumière and the other inventors of cinema were, for the most part, technicians who enabled the development of the moving image as a medium efficient enough to present the basic element of the movement-image – the mobile section. The project of *Cinema 1* is the classification of a cinema that takes as its defining paradigm the principle of cinematographic demonstration, mirroring as it does cinematographic perception (in whatever guise it existed before the name was applied). But Deleuze's project was to see beyond that to the time-image, and this is what we must do.

Why was Deleuze reluctant to consider the Lumières as anything more than gifted inventors responding to a popular urge for stimuli that both caused and was affected by modernity? Writing in the 1980s, Deleuze's activity is separated from the advances made in understanding early film history that flourished towards the end of that decade [30]. Deleuze's cinema work is characterised by a unique ability to connect a philosophy of perception *of* cinema to philosophy of perception *in* cinema and finally to narrative and authorship. Since the Lumières are not renowned for significant marks of authorship in their work (at least in the auteurist definition) and were famously disregarding of any intention to be filmmakers, it is not surprising that Deleuze gives them little more than lip service.

Tom Gunning has described the period of cinema, from 1895 to 1907, as the period of "cinema of attractions" (after Eisenstein)[31]. He suggests that the period was one of considerable sophistication, fitting neatly into already existent and emerging popular entertainment forms which it either subsumed (ie. magic lantern shows) or with which it competed (ie. music hall). More importantly, he suggests, as does Charney, Singer et al, that cinema exploited a population eager for visual excitement, heightened stimulus, and exotica. This does not mean that visual excess and narrative are incompatible, as Gunning describes:

> Rather, one can unite them in a conception that sees cinema less as a way of telling stories than as a way of presenting a series of views to an audience, fascinating because of their illusory power, and exoticism. (p.57)

Gunning thus characterises all cinema before 1906 as 'cinema of attractions', a classification based upon the consumption of cinema by an audience that desired its particular "accent on direct stimulation" (p.59), satisfied eventually by spectacular pleasures such as the close-up, which was "…not a device expressive of narrative tension; [but] itself an attraction and the point of the film" (p.58). This, of course, echoes Benjamin's emphasis on the close-up in photography.

This distinctive picture of cinema before 1906-7 must be placed alongside Bergson's account of 'cinematographic perception', based on the actual Lumière Cinématographe. The Lumières' apparatus and films demand a deeper understanding since, because of this historical connection, they have much to answer for philosophically.

As Gunning develops, in the first decade or so of cinema the apparatus was itself an attraction for the patron [32]. Similarly, we should not be surprised that Bergson uses this invention, whether Lumières' own or cinema in general, as a paradigm or metaphor for perception. He could

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[30] See Elsaesser, 1994 and Charney/Schwartz 1995.
[31] Gunning, 1986 (1994).

hardly have failed to notice the worldwide public fanfare that arose shortly after the Lumières' invention, and which reached such a peak that, as had happened with the first demonstration of the Daguerreotype in 1839, the invention was reported to show colour faithfully. This suggests a populace only too eager for evermore exciting stimulus, even if, as Jacques Aumont recognises, it came as much by hallucination as in fact.[33]

Both the scientific and popular press eagerly anticipated their invention (spurred on, no doubt, as the brothers were by Edison's success with the Kinetoscope), and the company provided photographs and articles on the Cinématographe to titles such as *Le Monde Illustré*, *Nature*, and *La Science Illustrée*, to which they also directed interested clients when necessary.[34]

The popular impression of the Cinématographe seems likely to have included an awareness of the characteristics of the film-strip as a succession of still images. City-based patrons at least were likely to have appreciated the spectacle as made up of a succession of still images. Significantly, the Lumière exhibitors' stock included a representative cutting on the outer tin of each film, whilst the company happily supplied newspapers and journals with portions of film cut from existing footage.[35] The result of this may have been the double awareness of the cinema's abilities to present incidental details of the scene with independence. Dai Vaughn's assertion that spectators would have been astonished at the ability for "the inanimate to participate in [its own] self projection" should be reconsidered from the point of view of perception [36]. That the lifelike should be revealed through a process that divides up time presents a film's audience with a seductive idea that in fact *reality* is made up of individual and discrete elements in progression. Once again, we have to be careful with conjecture. Three things are clear, however: 1) Bergson

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[32] Ibid p. 58.
[33] Jacques Aumont, 'Lumière revisited', in *Film History*, Volume 8, 1996, pp. 416-430, p. 425.
[34] Auguste and Louis Lumière, *Letters* (original letters of A. and L. Lumière), ed. by Jacques Rittaud-Hutinet, trans. by Pierre Hodgson, (London, Faber, 1995), pp. 3-117.
[35] Ibid p. 111.
[36] Dai Vaughn, 'Let There Be Lumière', in *Early Cinema: Space Frame Narrative*, ed. by Thomas Elsaesser & Adam Barker, 2nd edn., (London: BFI, 1994), pp. 62-67, p. 65.

was writing within a culture likely to be aware of the practicalities of what they observed in the cinema. 2) This was a culture experiencing a social and work environment characterised by regulated shocks or pulses. 3) This was a culture that consistently placed special emphasis on the properties of photography in revealing previously unappreciated truths of the world – as is demonstrated in writing on the photograph from as far back as 1839, and in Benjamin's writing as much as thirty-five years after cinema's invention. Ultimately, Bergson was writing from within a culture that continually placed perception within the frame of the photographic. What photography was seen to reveal was the truth of reality itself, both in terms of movement and its revelation.

This helps to explain a little the difference between Bergson and Deleuze's views on cinema. Bergson's model of cinematographic perception complements this popularly-held view of reality. In describing this effect, however, the Cinématographe is more than just a metaphor. Cinema did not just reflect this change in perception, but actively enforced it from a privileged position by which it was a tool of both scientific investigation and leisure activity or popular stimulus. This is even suggested by Bergson's own demonstration. In using the example of the passing regiment he is not imagining some event that might one day be of sufficient interest – instead he is describing actual footage from widely distributed films of a popular public spectacle. According to Aumont, such procession films made up almost half of all films produced directly or indirectly by the Lumières, giving him reason to suggest that it was not only their favourite topic for investigation and experimentation, but that it was a favourite topic of the patrons also.

Slide 37

Bergson's experience of the cinema therefore not only included an understanding of its actual working but an understanding of its popular appeal. It also reveals a tacit acknowledgement of modernity (expressed in the photographic) as directing perception. Later in this often-quoted passage, Bergson gives a description of this false becoming that reflects

not only on the photography behind it but also the emerging 'characteristic moment' of the comic strip:

> The cinematographic method is therefore the only practical method, since it consists in making the general character of knowledge form itself on that of action, while expecting that the detail of each act should depend in its turn on that of knowledge. In order that action may always be enlightened, intelligence must always be present in it; but intelligence, in order thus to accompany the progress of activity and ensure its direction, must begin by adopting its rhythm.[37]

Thus Bergson describes the paradigm of comic-strip narration, cinema monstration, and ultimately the popular perception of time and space as if based upon the 'pulse'. Given both impetus and representation by photographic means, this is perception subordinate to photography.

Interestingly then, Bergson is correct in proposing cinematographic perception, but Deleuze is also correct in opposing it. The cinematographic illusion is based upon the perception of movement and time as pulsing, and Deleuze's project is to reveal a cinema that breaks such a paradigm and produces an image that represents time without the enforced pulse of chronology. *Where the movement-image is perception subordinate to photography, the time-image is photography subordinate to perception.* Finally, rather than forgetting the thesis of *Matter and Memory* by the time of writing in 1907, as Deleuze has it, Bergson's cinematographic perception is a logical conclusion to make of a society whose experience had become dominated by the discontinuous moment.

However, let us assume that we should take Deleuze's project to the cinema that actually existed before the paradigm of montage took hold. Is Deleuze correct in his reading of early cinema as "immediately [giving] us a movement-image" because, as we have found, the principles of cinematography were well known?[38] Given this assumption, where does it

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[37] CE, p. 323.
[38] MI, p. 2.

leave the *films* of the Lumières, which nevertheless exist as films *a priori* the development of movement-image cinema directed by montage? As mobile sections (shots) they fit neatly into Deleuze's argument for the geneaology of cinema. But this would be to view them from the position of someone aware of the later historical development of cinema. Can we really think of them as 'shots' in this strictly defined sense, when they exist independently of narrative cinema as we know it? It is true that the Lumières had few pretensions to being filmmakers in our generally accepted sense. Instead, they were undoubtedly happy as 'film-makers' – engineers of materials and equipment. The Lumières largely made films to test and push the limits of the equipment itself, as Jacques Aumont further suggests, rather than follow the pattern of Edison and record pre-existing narrative sketches [39]. Later, after the massively more successful autochrome colour still process had been perfected and released to the public (coincidentally in 1907), the Lumières could be found taking pictures that exploited its particularly reliable properties of colour, upon which Max Kozloff has written [40]. Whether exploiting a product's dependability or flexibility, the Lumières displayed an affinity with the process of photographing and the mechanisms with which they accomplished this. This is significant to us at the moment (such an affinity with the photography machine will be crucial later) precisely because the Lumières knowingly unburdened themselves of the task of creating narrative for exhibition. The photography of the Lumières represents a zero state of cinema.

Bergson and Deleuze's respective theses are separated by a simple equation: Bergson sees perception *as* film, whereas Deleuze's re-invigorates perception *of* film. Since the Lumières films exist *independent of* the cinema of the movement-image, can they be understood instead as cinema of the time-image? Most importantly, can they be seen as crystal-images, reliant upon their reflexivity as photography for their images of time? How then are we to deal with the widespread knowledge of the

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[39] Aumont, 1996, p. 423.
[40] Max Kozloff, 'Autochromes: The Bouquet of Lighted Air (1980)', in *The Privileged Eye: Essays on Photography*, 2nd edn. (Alberquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), pp. 269-277. Kozloff's treatment autochromes does much to suggest that they possess a certain 'aura', in

mechanical principle, which suggests a movement-image by virtue of giving away its principles? Knowledge of the apparatus may have led to a 'willing forgetfulness' on the part of patrons because of their belief that photography revealed true perception – as we have seen [41]. Anthony R. Guneratne notes that both the early demonstrations of Murbridge's moving images and the Lumière Cinématographe to academic audiences involved presentations of the single static images *before* they were then shown to reconstitute real movement: a double reinforcement of photography's ability to reveal movement as divisible [42]. As Deleuze notes, the fact that the Cinématographe was both camera and projector dominates its control over perception, since it presents itself as both the imitation of natural perception – the eye – and the demonstrator of that perception. Simultaneously, the Cinématographe is an attraction as apparatus, yet transparent as an imitator of perception for the same reason.

The suggestion here is that at least some of the Lumière films offer an image of time before it is forced toward chronology. This can be seen in two ways. Firstly, from the perspective of hindsight, Lumière films can be seen as proto-narratives, or elements of narrative. This is the argument of André Gaudreault, whose investigation of narrative in the more famous Lumière films leads him to the understanding that:

> There are two types of narrative in the cinema; the micro-narrative (the shot), a first level on which is generated the second narrative level; this second level more properly constitutes a filmic narrative in the generally accepted sense.

He further suggests that not only has cinema therefore had narrativity from

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Benjamin's terms.

[41] Audience foreknowledge may be accounted for by the widespread anticipation of cinema and its popular appeal in the press. However, there were a few visitors to the Grand Café who went out of curiosity and were unaware of the limited press attention that the first few days' demonstrations themselves received. "Clément Maurice was to describe how success eventually came. 'What I remember as being typical was some passer-by sticking his head round the door, wanting to know what on earth the words Cinématographe Lumière could possibly mean. Those who took the plunge and entered soon reappeared looking astonished…'" (Lumières, 1995, p.84.) This is also illustrated by the 'panic' effect, in which patrons mistook the images for real trains, cars, or boats. For a discussion of this 'panic effect' see also Stephen Bottomore, 'The panicking audience? Early cinema and the 'train effect', in *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, June, 1999.

[42] Anthony R. Guneratne, ' The Birth of a New Realism: Photography, painting and the advent of documentary cinema', in *Film History*, Vol. 10, 1998, pp. 165-187, p. 170.

its beginning (Gaudreault points to *La Sortie des usines Lumière*, but most importantly to *L'Arroseur arrosé*), but that photographs have no such first level of narrativity, since they reproduce no movement.[43] He further suggests that all the Lumière films are discrete narratives in the cinematic sense, implying the division of time from the whole [44]. This appears to be an inability to envisage a concept of cinema that does not correspond with or rely upon narrative as a defining element. Films that appear to have either less narrative closure or a more limited structure are routinely seen as being proto-narrative, or as being primitive forms of later narrative paradigms.

Slide 38

In fact, the forces that give the Lumière films their diegetic structure are less perceptible than Gaudreault suggests. The Lumière films are not limited by their subject matter, but instead the Lumières set out to film events that could be represented by the uniform length of a reel of the Blair film that the Cinématographe used (about 15 metres). Restricted by mechanics, the Lumières were not necessarily restricted in time. Since the events depicted by the films existed in the everyday (unlike Edison's narrative films, or the filmed sketches that were soon to appear) these events were representative of events that appeared every day, or indeed any day. In representing the aleatory event they naturally reflect the possibility of infinite time. The Lumières were effectively exploiting the characteristic moment of the discrete element of time, according to Deleuze's concept. Whether spectacular, such as the arrivals of the many trains recorded around the world, or discreet, such as the more famous film of Auguste Lumière and his wife feeding their child in *Le Déjeuner de bébé*, none of these events were by any means unique, and few were special to anyone in the city.

Slide 39

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[43] André Gaudrealt, 'Film, Narrative, Narration: The Cinema of the Lumière Brothers', in *Early Cinema: Space Frame Narrative*, ed. by Thomas Elsaesser & Adam Barker, 2nd edn., (London: BFI, 1994), pp. 68-75, pp. 71-72. Gaudreault follows the work of Roger Odin on *La Jetée*.
[44] Ibid n16, p. 74.

This also suggests that, despite the occasional appearance of a Lumière (or three) in such films (Louis supervising *Démolition d'un mur* for example), the activity of the Lumières as filmmakers was imperceptible. Yet the fact remains that the lack of recognition as filmmakers in the film studies community does not obviate the foregrounding of filmmaking: there is still a camera-consciousness in their films. Indeed, films of the everyday foregrounded perception by placing it within the frame, or as the subject, of cinema. The procession films recreate the view of the passed spectator, whilst the train films offer the audience the fantastic view from the track itself as the train rushes toward them.

Slide 40

The films create astonishment as much by mimicry of perception as it does by demonstrating that it is *not* perception of the real, but perception of film. By developing a machine that proposed perception as cinema (as in Bergson) the Lumières produced a machine that enforced perception of perception (as in Deleuze). Since this means that at least some of the 1,000 or so Lumière films offer a camera-consciousness, it would suggest that they should be considered capable of representing time directly and thus being time-images. However, how do we reconcile this with the fact that many of the films in question are indeed discrete elements of time? In *La Sortie des usines Lumière*, for example, the factory's doors close once the building has emptied.

Slide 41

Deleuze is not necessarily opposed to the discrete element of time, but simply when its aleatory nature is subsumed by chronological organisation. This is when memory seeks to organise it, thus creating the cascade of moments that exists as the becoming-mad of depth.

However, at the same time, it is this operation of memory that provides the *sensation of experience* necessary for the free-indirect proposition – the

reflexivity of the cinematographic experience, in this case. What we now suggest is that the creation of moment is part of the new awareness of distance and proximity that is essential to experience. In terms of memory, Miriam Hansen suggests that experience is characterised by a 'dialectic of remembering and forgetting', or the distance perceptible between the present now and moments of the past. This is an extension of her work on Benjamin's theory of experience.[45] Hansen suggests a spatial correlation largely to emphasise this new understanding that the modern experience is actually the sum of experience plus the experience of experience. The proximity of the instant is counteracted by an awareness of the creation of moment. In other words, the passing moment is experienced both as the instant that passes and the instant that will pass; thus creating a sense of immediate loss. This is what seems to characterise hyperstimulus, since the spectacular sights and stimuli are experienced as ephemera, but are so with attention paid to the sensations itself. To see the modern as defined by shock alone is limiting, since it discounts the reflexivity of sensational apparatus, cinema being one of them. Benjamin adds something to this in his first essay on photography, since in the experience of the photographic, "the spectator feels an irresistible compulsion to look for the tiny spark of chance, of the here and now, with which reality has, as it were, seared the character in the picture."[46] Wiped out of narrative cinema by the re-take, this spark of chance is still apparent in the Lumière films. They offer the potential of future action as well as the instantaneous creation of the past. This is an *ever-present present*. In truth, the sailors rowing out of the harbour will never leave:

Slide 42

> *Sometimes* it will be said that only the present exists; that it absorbs
> or contracts in itself the past and the future, and that, from
> contraction to contraction, with even greater depth, it reaches the
> limits of the entire Universe and becomes a living cosmic present.[47]

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[45] Hansen, 1987, p. 216.
[46] SHP, p. 7.

Memory rushes in to turn this present into the *moment*, leaving Deleuze's Chronos (Chr) as largely conceptual. But of course, it is this event that is represented in the crystal: the crystal-image is the image of Chronos (Chr) becoming Chronos (Chr'). Chronos (Chr) cannot resist the force of memory that seeks to regulate it. This means that the Lumière films can be understood as crystal-images of time, as they represent not just Chronos (Chr), but the sensation of it from the vantage of memory. The 'sensational' aspect of the Lumière films guarantees that the experience of them is also the experience of their distance from real perception, but also their imaging of perception as an inter-relation between recollection and memory. They are at once the present that becomes memory, but also the memory that remains in the present; furthermore they are the image of this event. The time-image of the Lumière film is not simply the instant of Chronos (Chr) as it immediately appears, but the point at which the loss of that instant to Chronos (Chr') is felt.

Bergson's formulation of cinematographic perception was accurate, especially in the sense that such a popularly appreciated apparatus enforced modern perception of the moment. Furthermore, the 'sensation' of early cinema guaranteed its reflexivity. The everyday subjects of those early films appears even to have heightened this sensation, since hyperstimulus appeared as much in the perception of minutiae of everyday life (the movement of the leaves behind the family in *Déjeuner de bébé* was a principle 'attraction'), as it did of immensity, speed or danger. All of this suggests that early cinema can be considered a site of the time-image. But what makes some of the Lumière films crystal-images of time is ultimately their forced contradiction of distance and proximity to those events. This is time felt in the instant, but time becoming the 'moment' as its loss is experienced. Such films are the images of the 'living present'.

Whilst the Lumière films do not actually appear instantaneous, the instant is as capable of being an infinitely large amount of time as it is an infinitely small amount. The instant could be any length, and indeed it is only the length of the film magazine that limits the film. In responding to this

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[47] LS, p. 61.

restriction, the Lumières presented aleatory, quotidian, or vernacular subject matter whose everyday occurrence reflected the whole of time as the 'living cosmic present'. The everyday could be anyday, and by exchange *any* becomes *every*. A Lumière film, albeit short by most standards, is still an elongated or elliptical impression of events that otherwise have the capacity – in being indivisible – to be infinitely quick.

These films demonstrate that it is not necessarily time itself, but the experience of time, that makes up perception. This also means that what we might expect to be instantaneous – the still photograph, for example – has the capability of representing time as an experience of the infinitely slow. This is achieved when the prevalent character of time in the image is not Chronos (Chr) but instead Aion, and it is so in many of the photographs of Eugène Atget.

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Atget and the movement of statues

Given the distance that separates *Matter and Memory* from *Creative Evolution*, a distance made more significant by the explosion of cinema upon popular culture, it is perhaps surprising to suggest that the central thesis of memory as based on a 'photographic' perception of the past is carried easily from the one text to another. Accelerated by the sensational apparatus of modernity, photographic perception becomes cinematographic as it creates a sense of the past as an ordered cascade of discrete events. Perhaps cinematographic perception does have a name before the invention of cinema? Perhaps, as we saw in the first chapter, it is the relation of 'snapshots of world *history*'?

However, the understanding of time that underpins Bergson's twin theses on photographic perception is one that is beyond the modern. It is from the ongoing change of duration that chronology plucks the instant and inserts memory to create the moment. This is a time that exists before modernity divides it; it is *ante*-modern. This sense of time is the antithesis of the modern sense of time, not least because its open-endedness opposes the

loss felt at the passing of the moment. This is perhaps why Benjamin, as a scholar of the modern, confronts Bergson's concept of *durée*. The sense of passing that is essential to the experience of the modern is in direct contradiction with the "miserable endlessness of a scroll" that Benjamin sees in the unfolding duration [48]. Benjamin instead embraced the ephemeral moment, and its experience of sensation. The sensational experience was delicious for Benjamin because of its repeatability, its emphasis on the momentary, which was "at once a conjuring of life and a witness to death." [49] The passing of that moment was an essential part of the modern experience. Benjamin privileged order and regulation above the permanence of *durée*, and was clearly aware of the organisation of time made by perception – either in the creation of chronology as a means to make palpable the passing of the moment, or in the macro-level organisation of memory into history. Drawing on the writing of Baudelaire, but especially of Proust, Benjamin linked this to the latter's *mémoire volontaire*, the memory that perception organised so that it easily "obeyed the call of attentiveness". Such a memory is structured by the experience of the present through a simultaneous recollection of the past-in-general and the past-in-particular, as we found in Bergson: "Where there is experience in the strict sense of the word, certain contents of the individual past combine with material of the collective past". [50]

Benjamin adds to this, again after Proust, the memory that evades such ordered recollection and enters the present involuntarily. This *mémoire involontaire* produces a heightened awareness of the experience of the past, appearing, so it would seem, out of nowhere. Such instances of memory reveal the proximity of the present and the distance of the past. For Benjamin, famously, photographs trigger such memories, often because of their "posthumous shock".[51] Referring to the photograph of Dauthendey's wife, Benjamin cannot help but see in her image his own knowledge of her death reflected back: "…her gaze reaches beyond him,

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[48] SMB, p 181.
[49] Rey Chow, 'Walter Benjamin's Love Affair with Death', in *New German Critique* 48, Fall 1989, pp. 63-86, p. 72.
[50] SMB, p. 155-156.
[51] Ibid p. 171.

absorbed into the ominous distance." [52] *Mémoire involontaire* allows the photograph as an object the ability to look at us in return, as Benjamin was later to attest.[53] This also suggests a perception of the image freed of the constraints of the moment, and in which *mémoire involontaire* provides a sense of past and future. It suggests a direct connection with duration, since the photograph is filled with the past as well as the potential future. Furthermore it is so because it is seen through the awareness of the camera as a tool of *mémoire volontaire*. Given the ability of the photograph to fix memories into actualisations of the *durée*, as Benjamin and Bergson both agree, such instances of *mémoire involontaire* are emphatic as potential time-images. However, how can such examples of the ephemeral moment present a direct image of duration?

Of all the photography that Benjamin discusses it is the work of the Parisian artisan/photographer Eugène Atget that most clearly 'looks at him in return'. Atget's images are continually useful to him in the exegesis of aura that provides the backbone of his understanding of experience. The subject of aura remains largely ambiguous in Benjamin's work, and the essays on photography are no exception to this. Mary Price writes of the two essays that "[one] fights with Benjamin (or struggles with his text) not to win an argument but to discover what the argument is."[54] The discussion of aura changes its object between 'A Short History of Photography' and 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', and it is not altogether clear exactly how Benjamin feels about his own concept when applied to Atget's photographs. Since photography as reproduction brings reality closer, it destroys the aura that builds up around objects. But then even this does not fully encapsulate the idea of aura. On one level, in the second ('Artwork') essay, Benjamin's discussion of aura takes on a political dimension. The descriptive term for the ritually-based importance placed on a unique work of art, aura inheres its history of production and embeds itself in tradition. This facilitates Benjamin's discussion of photography, it both diminishes the aura of the

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[52] SHP, p. 7.
[53] SMB, p. 184.
[54] Mary Price, *The Photograph: a strange confined space*, (Stanford: University of California Press, 1994), p. 61.

work of art (since it renders it ubiquitous, for example) and simultaneously has no aura of its own [55]. However, aura has a clearly different meaning when applied to Atget's images of Paris streets. Aura in this sense is a 'sticky' or 'stuffy' atmosphere that Atget's photographs cleanse or purge, and which clearly attaches itself to specific objects [56]. Mary Price suggests that these two should be seen as if they are 'cloud' and 'fog' respectively: the first a reverence for an artwork that hides any political consequences of such rituals, and the second a "pretense hiding reality" in general [57]. Thus Benjamin is able to talk about both with ease, since the latter is an experiential (or directly personal) aura that corresponds, and occasionally conflicts, with a wider cultural aura of the former. Aura of the first kind is the product of *mémoire volontaire*, since its incorporation of rituals serves to create distinct phenomena whose meanings serve a political purpose. The second aura is the kind that fills the instant with the rapidity or shock of the modern, particularly characterised in this case by the flow of people through the streets. It is only when this is taken away – if there is one thing that Atget's images are largely bereft of, it is people – that a deeper reality comes to light.

Slide 43

This presents a contradiction in Benjamin, since his claim that Atget's photographs "strip reality of its camouflage" is not supported in his apparent seduction by Atget's images.[58] Firstly, we must ask what exactly has been stripped away from the images of the city? Alain Buisine describes the photographs as if they momentarily distilled the purity of the city, in the face of its extraordinary capitalist bustle and modernity.[59] In

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[55] The huge popularity, influence, and market value of Atget's images have rendered Benjamin's argument about great works of art (the most famous element of the discussion) moot in relation to the photographer's work. Criticisms of the 'Atget-industry' are aimed at both the hierarchical ideology inherent in the canon, and also at the museum structure that feeds off it: canonical photographers guarantee a certain 'box-office'. See Abigail Solomon-Godeau, 'Canon Fodder: Authoring Eugène Atget', in *Photography at the Dock: essays on photographic history, institutions, and practices*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 28–51.

[56] SHP, p. 20.

[57] Price, p. 48.

[58] SHP, p. 20.

[59] Alain Buisine, *Eugène Atget ou la mélancholie en photographie*, (Nimes: Éditions Jacqueline Chambon, 1994), p. 63: "...la ville, si souvent associée aux grandes convulsions socio-historiques

short, it is the people, and hence the ephemera of the streets, that leave only the signs of their passing. Atget's images are empty of the momentary, and they still dominate Benjamin's discourse. Secondly, much is suggested by his description of some of Atget's images as if a palpable atmosphere hangs in the air that evokes the past and future of a place.

> It has been justly said of him that he photographed them like scenes of crime. The scene of a crime, too, is deserted; it is photographed for the purpose of establishing evidence. With Atget, photographs become standard evidence for historical occurrences, and acquire a hidden political significance.[60]

This contrasts slightly with Benjamin's earlier description:

> Not for nothing have Atget's photographs been compared with those of a scene of action. But is not every corner of our cities and scene of action?[61]

One statement suggests the echoing of a past, the other a potential for the future. Both evoke the presence of people, but do so because of their absence; the silence of the image directly reflects the absence of the bustle – in terms of sound no less – in the streets. As Deleuze noted, such absences (which he describes as the out-of-field, and uses the example of sound in cinema) reflect the whole that spreads out from the time-image in crystallizations:

> [The out of field] is connected in this case to the Whole which is expressed in sets, to the change which is expressed in movement, to the duration which is expressed in space, to the living concept which is expressed in the image, to the spirit which is expressed in matter.[62]

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et aux frénétiques agitations commerciales et industrielles de la dynamique capitaliste, semble momentanément retrouver une délicieuse fraîcheur, une miraculeuse pureté".
[60] WA, p. 228.
[61] SHP, p. 25. Miriam Hansen, in a recent article on Benjamin and cinema, points to the possible unreliability of the more widely available translations of Benjamin's most famous essay. Cf. Miriam Hansen, 'Benjamin and Cinema: not a one way street', in Critical Inquiry 25, Winter 1999, pp. 306-343.
[62] TI, p 236.

Buisine suggests that such an absence constitutes the same kind of sharp affect that Barthes described as the punctum. Rather than something added to the image, as Barthes upholds, Buisine suggests that the absence in Atget's images is a more skilful and subtle punctum that remains in part as an incompleteness, or emptiness[63]. The suggestion is that the punctum is an awareness of both presence and absence. If so, then is all of this not, in truth, as close to Benjamin's most direct description of aura as one might get: "What is aura? A peculiar web of space and time: the unique manifestation of distance, however near it may be"?[64] Benjamin's seduction by Atget's images appears more clearly now to be a result of *mémoire involontaire.* For Benjamin, something comes rushing back to him from the past, whether his own or not, that inhabits the space left by the ephemeral or romantic city that Atget's photographs have forsaken.

This is a clue to Benjamin's interest. Even though photographed right up until the time of Benjamin's writing, Atget's Paris has subtracted the signs of the twentieth-century and left behind the city for which Benjamin lamented. As Price points out, this was the Paris of the nineteenth century, "a Paris that no longer exists" [65]. When Benjamin looked at Atget's images, he was reminded of the city that inspired him to write on Baudelaire, on Proust, and on the Arcades. Benjamin saw in Atget not a connection to the modern, but a connection to the past experienced through memory, and analogous to the bustle of modernity. What had been lost to modernity, and what Atget's pictures stripped bare, was the experience of time not as a series of shocks, but as what Leo Charney describes as a "continuous cumulation" of the past[66].

Benjamin was a victim of the entanglement of memory and perception. Atget has shut Benjamin's eyes to the modern, and Benjamin's memory –

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[63] Buisine, 1994, p. 64: "…en réalité Atget introduit le plus subtil des << *punctum* >> dans ses photographies, nullement une presence étonnante, dérangeante, transgressive, mais plus habilement l'absence en tant que telle…[e]n fait le *punctum* peut tout aussi bien consister en une incomplétude, un manqué, un évidement." See also, Christian Metz, 'Photography and Fetish', in *October 34,* Fall, 1985, pp. 81-91, p. 87. Metz also connects the off-frame to Benjamin's *aura.*

[64] SHP, p. 20.

[65] Price, 1994, p. 64.

[66] Charney, 1995, pp. 283-285.

collective and experiential – has taken over. He not only experiences his memory, but he is entangled in an awareness of memory.

> Experience now means the dissociation of experience from itself. In shutting his eyes, Bergson registers photographically the only possible experience left to experience: the experience of our non-experience.[67]

Cadava too notes the dominance of photographic language in both Bergson and Benjamin, and it proves appropriate here. This placing of Bergson/Benjamin inside the instant of recognition displays the operation of that instant as Chronos (Chr) contracting past and future. For Benjamin, however, unlike Bergson, it signals an awareness of the instant becoming moment, and thus predicting its passing; predicting its death. Photographs that have the ability to provoke such *mémoires involontaires* clearly express a potential to be a time-image, yet for Benjamin they are only an affirmation of the momentary, and an affirmation made through the continual evocation of death and passing. Whether it is Dauthendey's wife or Kafka's eyes ("immeasurably sad"), Benjamin's writing is also dominated by examples of the morbid and the melancholic. In his rush to fill the instant with something tangible, the tangible has become an actual body; the corporeal has become the corporal. This has led to a becoming-mad of depth, not unlike that of Roland Barthes' experiences in front of the portrait of his mother whilst very young, or in front of the portrait of Lewis Payne.[68] In all these cases the photograph, this time as the 'bad Chronos' (Chr') (the "revenge taken on future and past by the present in terms of the present") confronts the 'now' with the 'then'[69]. The effect on both Benjamin and Barthes of this is as profound as it is famous.

However, in this similar rush to fill the instant with the corporeal, or with what are essentially *mémoires volontaire* (and hence the paradox, the becoming-mad of depth?), the potential of such images has been forgotten. This is significant in the case of Atget. Other commentators have

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[67] Eduardo Cadava, *Words of Light: Theses on the photography of history*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 88-89.
[68] Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida*, trans. by Richard Howard, 2nd edn. (London: Vintage, 1993 (1980)). See also Buisine and Price.

similarly noted the pregnancy of Atget's images, which seem to *promise* as much as they evoke the past that cannot return. Both John Fraser and Berenice Abbott point to Atget's images as suggestive of 'stages' waiting for their *dramatis personae* to enter. Fraser takes this further by suggesting a life to the objects depicted, rather than simply their passing away. Commenting on one of the more famous Atget images, the cobblers/boot shop on the *Marché des Carmes*, Fraser talks in the present tense, with an accent on becoming, when describing those who have worn (and will wear – it is a shop, after all) the boots and shoes on display.

> But the facts are that Atget does again and again work in terms of juxtapositions of natural symbols and that the total effect in the boots picture is a simultaneous apprehension both of the lives of other people animating those boots and thousands of pairs like them, and of one's own shod feet upon the sidewalks.[70]

Memory inserts the corporeal in this case, but the photograph has caught it at the moment of insertion, hence the compounding of tenses (the memory of one's own life – one's own future – and the life and future of others). This photograph is not unique either, and a similar analysis could be made of the photograph of gentleman's hats on the *Marché du Temple*, any of the photographs of mannequins, and any of the photographs of shirts and corsets arranged on shelves, across packing cases, and hung from windows. Atget's images immediately present themselves as images of Chronos (Chr) becoming Chronos (Chr') in the way that they force the present to confront both past and future. They are crystal-images as are some of the Lumière films, because they present directly the plucking of the instant from Aion.

Slide 44

Slide 45

[69] LS, p. 164.
[70] John Fraser, 'Atget and the City' (1968), in Peninah R. Petruck ed. *The Camera Viewed: writings on twentieth century photography – Photography before World War II*, (New York: Dutton, 1979), pp. 197-217, p. 204. See also Berenice Abbott, *The World of Atget*, (New York:

However, Atget's images would seem to contradict this. Benjamin maintains that there is some photography that does present aura, particularly the aura of nature to which he returns several times.[71] The tacit connection made with Atget's work is that the photography of David Octavius Hill (with Robert Adamson) possesses an aura that translates from the people photographed, who 'grew into' the photograph over its long exposure.[72] The durative, it seems, has the potential for the same type of aura – the experience of proximity and distance – that Benjamin sees in the photographs of Kafka and the others. It connects to Atget possibly because of Atget's preferred equipment, or at least because of the durative quality of the images that implies its use. Hansen's allusion of the telescope to Benjamin is appropriate. Atget's work echoes such a relationship in its very apparatus. Despite working in a period characterised by bustling, rapid change, and heightened public stimulus, Atget chose to record it empty, alone, and with a plate camera that had no mechanical shutter. Buisine compares Atget's technique with those of the Lumières, who exhibited just around the corner from the photographer. Resistant to the onset of fast exposures and their role in the new entertainment medium, Atget's technique made it possible for him to "counter the heat and momentum of the period, to stifle its shocks, [and] to rein in its cinematic acceleration"[73].

The work of Atget and the Lumières both suggest the aleatory impulse of Chronos (Chr). However, without any temporality imposed on them at all (unlike the Lumière films), Atget's images immediately assume the universal character of time. They represent the potential of movement and action in the scene. Past and future stretch out as the incorporeality of

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Paragon, 1964)

[71] Cf. SHP, p. 20: "To follow, while reclining on a Summer's noon, the outline of a mountain range on the horizon or a branch, which casts its shadow on the observer until the moment of the hour partakes of their presence – this is to breathe in the aura of these mountains, of this branch." See also WA, p. 224: "If, while resting on a Summer afternoon, you follow with your eyes a mountain range on the horizon or a branch which casts its shadow over you, you experience the aura of those mountains, of that branch."

[72] SHP, p. 17.

[73] Buisine, 1994, pp. 112-113: "…fait tout son possible pour contrer l'ardeur at l'allant du siècle, pour contrecarrer son emballement, pour freiner son acceleration cinétique." (my translation) Buisine uses the anecdote of a family portrait to explain how, unusually for a photographer at the turn of the century, the small movements of the sitters were inconsequential to his pictures, since they required long exposures.

potential. This suggests that there is a different time in Atget's images, though no less a crystal-image if there is.

What is curious about this particular character of time is that, as it took Chronos (Chr') to reveal Chronos (Chr), this same passage from instant to moment (principally the insertion of memory) reveals Aion. It is here also that we must understand more clearly Aion's relationship with the Cronos of Deleuze's thesis on the time-image. Let us go back to the *mémoires involontaire* of Atget's photographs. As we saw, memory-images fill the instant of Atget's photographs with the corporeal, particularly as a contraction of past and future, as we saw in Fraser's description. This is a powerful effect of Atget's images, since this type of analysis appears again and again. John Fuller suggests that the tranquillity of the backstreets and alleys depicted "will be interrupted by violence".[74] Max Kozloff suggests that such scenes are settings waiting for actors (in comparison with Atget's *petits métiers*, who could be actors without scenes), whilst acknowledging that each picture is a "...frothing present conceived as a vision of the distant, immobile past: this could only be an hallucination, a long-term dream state...Every frame is a memory rehearsal of a dream."[75] Pierre Mac Orlan simplifies this to the powerful effect of Atget's decision to photograph the everyday:

> It is not the grand international hotels, the ministries and banks, the churches and temples that give a city its personality, but on the contrary one's intelligent recollections of those popular quarters where bars loom into view out of the fog...[76].

Buisine similarly describes photography, and in particular Atget's work, as "un art du peu"[77], but it is, of course, Benjamin who acknowledges such a

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[74] John Fuller, 'Atget and Man Ray in the Context of Surrealism', in Peninah R. Petruck ed. *The Camera Viewed: writings on twentieth century photography – Photography before World War II*, (New York: Dutton, 1979), pp. 218-235, p. 226.

[75] Max Kozloff, 'Abandoned and Seductive: Atget's Streets' (1986), in *The Privileged Eye: Essays on Photography*, 2nd edn. (Alberquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), pp. 279-305, pp. 288-289. For more depth on Atget's *petits métiers* series, see Jeff Rosen, "Atget's Populism", in *History of Photography*, Vol. 18, No. 1, (Spring 1994), pp. 50-63.

[76] Pierre Mac Orlan, 'Preface to *Atget Photographe de Paris*' (1930), in *Photography in the Modern Era: European Documents and Critical Writings 1913-40*, ed. by Christopher Phillips, (New York, 1989), p. 45.

[77] Ibid, p. 22.

focus for Atget: "He seeks the forgotten and the forsaken..." whilst being able to provide a similar past and future for Atget's images [78]. Mary Price's work on Benjamin leads her to the conclusion that "Benjamin has a talent for characterizing a still photograph as a narrative, implying the beginning and the end of a situation by his dramatic figuration of the middle."[79] This is indeed suggested by his description of Baudelaire, which is just as appropriate for pictures Atget took in the mornings before the city awoke:

> When Baudelaire takes the dawn as his theme, the deserted streets emanate something of that 'silence of the throng' which Hugo senses in nocturnal Paris.[80]

Once again it is the evocation of sound – as a memory-image – that is a structural force of the crystal-image.

The point to be made here is that the memory-images do not correspond to Chronos in any form because they do not create the past or future through discrete elements or contractions, but instead as an incorporeal whole or potential. These memory-images achieve what Bergson suggested in his hypothetical model of natural perception. However, these memory images of Atget's work imagine the movement as a whole. All of these examples emphasise their subjects as becoming, especially Benjamin's 'throng', a noun that is brought about in the vain attempt to actualise the bustling crowd in the past tense. 'Throng' always needlessly conflates 'thronging'. The image of the *Bar de Cabaret*, whose mirrors reflect the ghosts of the throng, might always be still, and to some suggest stasis or even death, but perception serves to recreate the life of the city through memory.

Slide 46

However these are not recollection images simply of the past: discrete images of ghosts. Instead they are images of the passing of time, time as becoming, and time as Aion. This image of time exploits the one potential

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[78] SHP, p. 20.
[79] Price, 1994, p. 40.

that the still image has over the cinema. It is the only medium with a preconditioned potential of representing indivisible time because the still photograph is in itself indivisible. Photographic images pluck the aleatory point from duration because the mechanics of photography divide up what is essentially indivisible – they make use of the impossible task that faces them. Atget's images demonstrate this by provoking the involuntary memory of the crowds, something new and peculiar to modernity, as a becoming. Most importantly, Atget's images simultaneously force their viewers to be aware of this. He not only picks places where the crowd would naturally throng (in front of shops, along boulevards, along the *rues* populated by prostitutes) but he photographs them deserted except, of course, for him. Since his apparatus requires careful use and much attention, he foregrounds the perception of the photography/er. Atget's images have a camera-consciousness; if there is loneliness in his images, it is because there *is always* someone there.

The above suggests that narrative ability – or narrativity – is an essential part of the crystal-image. Narrative ability presents an essentially unlimited past and future that leaves off from any point within the image. Limited only by memory in actualising narrative, even the implication of the term narrative is itself too limiting. A term must be applied that suggests the image of duration that exists to divide the past and the future to create the any-instant-whatever, and that represents the character of non-chronological time that this has. In *Cinema 2*, Deleuze calls this cronos, the time that allows the present to pass on yet co-exist with the past. In his earlier *The Logic of Sense*, this is the time of Aion.

Ultimately the conceptual connection between cronos and Aion is not the lengthy description that Deleuze gives to the non-chronological line of Aion that subdivides, but the effects of this subdivision. Throughout this discourse Deleuze's argument employs a genetic, or organic, flavour. Deleuze's 'true genetic element' from *Cinema 2* has its parallel in his description of the instant that is plucked from Aion. Simultaneously he

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[80] SMB, p. 164.

infers the dissymmetrical jets of cronos and the crystal structure that flourishes from them:

> "[The present] extracts singular points twice projected – once into the future and once into the past – forming by this double equation the constitutive elements of the pure event (in the manner of a pod which releases its spores)."[81]

This suggests that the aleatory instant (Chr) is the division of time, yet the memory-images that actualise it follow the line of Aion. Interestingly, Régis Durand suggests a similar genetic theme for the point at which the past and future divides [82]. Drawing on the work of Barthes as well as Deleuze, Durand follows the former's assertion that the photograph becomes a palimpsest as meanings (actualisation is what is inferred) are overlaid upon the image. Photographs carry the potential for meaning as if composed of 'marks' or 'accents' that merely suggest directions. The result is that "...we are dealing here with the genetic element of all images, the very division where perception occurs." (p. 143) Durand suggests that memory, both cultural and personal, provides the subjects for each image to become an "infinitely complex palimpsest" in the same manner as memory informs the actualisations of the crystal image – as we shall investigate further in Chapter Four. However, as his appreciation of the photograph refers back to the photograph as lagging behind the present (because of its referral to the past, a "failure to keep time"), this is a division of perception that leads only to the becoming-mad of depth.

Such an analysis suggests also an emphasis on the contemplative in photography. But if time splits in the instant to become a projection of past and future, and that split is essentially random and will not be contained by any temporal mechanics (such as cinema), then how are we to see it? Perhaps the temptation to look for the instant in the 'instantaneous' photograph (eg. Cartier-Bresson's decisive moment) is wrong after all. Perhaps instead we should look at the durative image of the everyday: the image that reflects in its frame the time that stretches to "the limits of the

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[81] LS, p. 167.

[82] Régis Durand, 'How to See (Photographically)', in Patrice Petro ed. *Fugitive Images: from*

entire universe". Reflecting the "living cosmic present" (Chr) for Deleuze is the unlimited time of Aion: "...it will be said that only the past and future subsist, that they subdivide each present, ad infinitum, however small it may be..." [83]. Such infinite subdivisions can only create a labyrinth of past and future, even if this is suggested as a single straight line ("a labyrinth more terrible still"). But to see this subdivision is to appreciate it through the slowness of time, rather than in speed. The time-image that presents Aion must do so by presenting a time that is indivisible. Many still images do this, especially, for example, Atget's empty streets. However, it is his photographs of the statuary of Paris' palace gardens that present Aion, and they do so because they offer the potential of movement and time, a potential that is palpable, though unfulfilled.

Max Kozloff's descriptions of these photographs are informative. Kozloff makes use of the juxtaposition of the statuary in the parc des Sceaux or Versailles with the nature that overwhelms it in those unkempt areas of the parks.

> The images tell of neglect or disrepair and the mortality of human enterprise that fails, is in the act of dying, or has passed away. But that response is uneasy. Certainly he gives us some explicit portrayals of physical decline, where the subject alone confirms a message about the injurious passage of time. The seventeenth-century figures at the parc de Sceaux are being read the riot act by nature, which chips and fissures and has overgrown them in a tantrum of decay.[84]

Buisine parallels this by suggesting that a statue of a *Gladiateur mourant* at Versaille is not so much dying from those wounds given him in battle, but instead from ravages of time as a "ghastly leprosy gnawing away at his body" (l'affreuse lèpre en train de lui ronger le corps).[85]

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photography to video, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 141-151.
[83] LS, p. 62.
[84] Kozloff, 1986, p.292.
[85] Buisine, 1994, p. 198. (my translation)

There are three images of time presented here. 1) Kozloff and Buisine's description immediately presents time ordered by memory. Chronos is here in the perception of the past that the statues enforce. When Atget photographs along a row of statues in the Tuileries, he presents an image of the past as a cascade of actualisations, provoking for Kozloff an acute awareness of their distance from the present – a becoming-mad of depth.

Slide 47

2) Kozloff's evocation of the acts of nature on the sculpted marble reveals, beneath the image of the past, a simultaneous contraction of the future. These statues will be overrun by nature, and those chips and fissures will open up to the extent that the statues will return to the natural forms from which they came. The image of time thus presented is both limited and infinite. The process will reach a conclusion that reflects the moment of their creation from the rough marble, but not only will this occur in a future unimaginably far away, the achievement of change is overwhelmed by the sense of duration which it covers. Like Bergson waiting for his sugar to dissolve, we are overwhelmed by the wait itself – and thus we experience duration first-hand.

3) The longest unthinkable time of Aion is presented, as a contraction, by the smallest unthinkable time. The instant is presented in its infinite regress by the slowness of the statues in their movement toward dissolution. Always still, they always move toward the unimaginable future. Such an image of the future bifurcates to create the crystal structure, yet remains incorporeal. Only the becoming of time is evident: they always move in general. Underneath Kozloff's becoming-mad of depth, there is a powerful effect felt from the movement of the world emphasised not by speed but by slowness, which is no less emphatic. This is revealed in Kozloff's article:

> One common misperception about Atget's work is that since it is largely depopulated it must be lifeless. On the contrary, he was exquisitely attentive to the vitality of the world, but did not think that is was available on short or casual notice. With him, movement was

> never so affecting as when it was only a whisper of some imminence. (p. 291)

Slide 48

Kozloff's urge was to categorise Atget's photographs as discrete images of the past, and follow the example of Benjamin and others. This is an urge to understand time according to the pulse, or shock. Kozloff expected to see images that remind him only of passing, just as Benjamin did. But both commentators, it seems, are confounded by the means by which that past is represented, since it is also an image of the future. Expecting perception that follows the punctuation of photography on the modern experience – perception subordinate to photography – they were presented with a photography that presented the limited and infinite perception of time as a passing in general. This is photography subordinate to perception, and to understand it, it seems, is to understand the movement of statues.

Slide 49

<p style="text-align:center">*   *   *</p>

Conclusion: The Death of the Photograph

As both conclusion and postscript, it is worth saying something about the effect of the division of time on photography, particularly as this has a great deal to do with how the photograph has often been accepted as metonymic of death. The work on photography and its link with death is, more often than not, influenced by an experience of the past that comes back, often as a deeply personal experience. This suggests that the connections with death rely upon a particular view of memory and a particular perception of time. But first, what is the problem with the photograph and death?

In his short article 'The Death of the Author' Roland Barthes aims a

162

polemic at the cult of authorship that has come to surround the literary author.[86] In an argument that translates across the creative arts, Barthes laments that not only has the author become accepted as the sole intender of meaning in a work of art, but that this has had important effects in the organisation of artistic history. It has not only led to a primacy of the author's intention over any other possible meaning, but has indirectly led to a method of scholarship that establishes hierarchies of canonical texts and contexts. In such a case one particular interpretation dominates over a text, oeuvre, genre, or in the case of photography, even the medium. However, "[o]nce the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text becomes quite futile…" he suggests, acknowledging that the deciphered text is merely an actualisation of a becoming (p. 147). Barthes' own call is for a liberation of the reader from the thrall of the Author and this kind of 'cult' that surrounds him: "the birth of the reader must come at the death of the Author." (p.148) But Barthes' title employs a complex metaphor, since it suggests that there has already been a death, that of the ability for a text (whether novel or photograph) to live. The Author and his cult guarantee the death of the text in duration, since it fixes it in history. The cult of the Author kills discourse.

The same can be said for the photograph. The photograph has become a dead space in critical discourse. There is the moribund intellectual debate that surrounds the photograph and finds its subject in the constant evocation of the photograph with death. This is one of the consequences of the photographic perception, since it conjures up a vertiginous image of the past that either terrifies or seduces (or both) the viewer. In truth, it is the consequences of the failure to see beyond the photographic perception as an organisation of memory. It is a failure to see perception as subordinate to photography, and a failure to reclaim perception, and thus reclaim photography. If photography is to be seen as a *becoming* then it must be because of this reclamation. *'The birth of photography must be at the cost of the death of the Photograph'*. Accordingly, a question remains: how did the photograph develop such a powerful link with death? The answer involves understanding the element of time that

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[86] Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author (1977)' in IMT, pp. 142-148.

Deleuze was particularly suspicious of: the *becoming-mad of depth*.

As we have seen, photographic perception fills the instant with memory to become moment ("...the full is an embroidery on the canvas of the void" [87]). These moments stretch back into the past as a co-existence with the present. Always interlocked by their connection to the past in general, they form a cascade that takes shape in Bergson's cone. But perception is not entirely complete at this stage:

> Our perceptions are undoubtedly interlaced with memories, and, inversely, a memory, as we shall show later, only becomes actual by borrowing the body of some perception into which it slips. These two acts, perception and recollection, always interpenetrate each other, are always exchanging something of their substance as by a process of endosmosis.[88]

The photograph offers itself up as an ideal body into which perception and recollection slip, firstly as an object that records the past, and secondly as an object that mimics visual perception itself. Each characteristic partly obscures the other, so that the photograph appears culpable in representing either ('it's just a photograph', 'a photograph is a memory'), and thus obscuring their mutual interpenetration. This is why the 'Flashbulb Memory' is such a beguiling idea.

This easy connection of perception to the photograph is symptomatic of the becoming-mad of depth. Deleuze's suspicion is focused on its seduction of the intellect, which enjoys the nostalgia of memories piled up like a stack of photographs. Photographs have become the simulacra of memories, and the photographic album, for example, is a practical facsimile of the becoming-mad of depth:

> Family photographs are quite often deployed – shown, talked about – in series; pictures get displayed one after another, their selection and ordering as meaningful as the pictures themselves. The whole, the series, constructs a family story in some respects like a

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[87] CE, p. 291.
[88] MM, p. 67.

classical narrative – linear, chronological... [89]

Annette Kuhn's description above succinctly describes the ways in which public and private perception merges with public and private recollection to connect what are often disparate memory-images. Photographs in this case can exist as once pure events (Chr) into which memory has been inserted in the present to be recalled in the future. It is an attempt not just to put such memories in order, but to tame the 'terrible labyrinth' of disparate elements that would otherwise exist. Here we can see how the becoming-mad of depth, once recollection and perception have slipped into the photograph, inverts Bergson's cone. In it memory images are discrete and connected only by histories and organic chronologies (*mémoire volontaire*) in an (often vain) effort to prevent rogue images (*mémoire involontaire*) from emerging out of its depth.(see fig. 2)

Slide 50

It is these images of *mémoire involontaire* that disrupt the order of family and social histories collected around photographs, and their peculiar power is all the more seductive in this disruption – witness the extraordinary autobiographical theme of Kuhn's study, and of course Roland Barthes' much quoted *Camera Lucida*. Overwhelmed by the power of a single photograph of his mother, Barthes is compelled to write on the similar power that photographs can exert in their conflation of the 'here and now' of the past with the 'here and now' of the present. Barthes is unable to fully express such a paradox, and tenses conflate as if to mirror the past and future that take revenge on the present:

> '*He is dead and he is going to die...*'...I read at the same time: *This will be* and *this has been*; I observe with horror an anterior future of which death is the stake. By giving me the absolute past of the pose (aorist), the photograph tells me death in the future.[90]

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[89] Annette Kuhn, *Family Secrets: Acts of Memory and Imagination*, (London: Verso, 1995), p. 17.
[90] CL, p. 95-96.

Mary Price notes how this is paralleled by Benjamin's fascination with the Dauthendey photograph, and there is a parallel with the Kafka photograph also.[91] Such memory-images constitute the becoming-mad of depth: a vertiginous array of present that extends back into the past, and that threatens to overwhelm us. This is the sickness of *nostalgia*. Presenting the past as if to haunt us, this is now the becoming-mad of *death*, and this is why Benjamin, and later Bazin, Barthes, and Metz are all drawn to photography. Deleuze was right to be suspicious of Chronos (Chr'), and it has taken revenge on the past and future instead. This is the price of the seduction by what Deleuze calls "the delirious future" and "delirious past": "Chronos wants to die..."[92]

But Deleuze has already offered us the zero-state of the living present in the same manner. There *is* a conflation of tenses in the photograph, but these are the conditional tenses of the uncertain future and past, and they lead to a mutual annihilation in the pure event that proposes a different view of the photograph.

> One cannot *say* of someone mortally wounded and that he will die, but that he *is* having been wounded and that he *is* due to die. This present does not contradict Aion; on the contrary, it is the present as being of reason which is subdivided ad infinitum into something that has just happened and something that is going to happen, always flying in both directions at once...The event is that no one ever dies, but has always just died or is always going to die, in the empty present of Aion, that is, in eternity. [93]

Still, as we have seen, Barthes' article has been unusually influential in photography and film criticism, perhaps more than Benjamin's writing, and has much to answer for. But from where has such a melancholic and morbid connection *in* the photograph arisen? For this we have to go back to Eugène Atget, and in particular the promotion and influence of his work begun, for the most part, by the photographer Berenice Abbott, and which

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[91] Price, p. 96. In Kuhn's chapter she confronts a photograph of her mother also. The auto/biographical urge is very strong in photography criticism, and Alain Buisine also submits to what he calls a "préface autobiographique" (p. 13).
[92] LS, p. 164.

has led to a melancholic visual style in photography that complements the theoretical influence of Barthes.

During the twenties, Abbott had been a portrait photographer and darkroom assistant to Man Ray. Whilst with the surrealist, she had herself become acquainted with the artisan (and Man Ray's neighbour) Atget. She took his work home with her to New York after his death in 1928, and split the collection with Julien Levy. A few images had been published by the Surrealists, but it was the first monograph and its review by Benjamin that brought Atget's work into the academic sensibility, a position it occupies to this day. [94]

The 1930 monograph had received reviews by American photographers Ansel Adams and Walker Evans. But it was Abbott's role that ensured that the Atget 'industry' that flourished in the late-twentieth century did so in New York, and not in Paris. From this moment, the rise of Atget as a central figure in US photography, despite never having exhibited seriously in his own lifetime in France or in America, was assured. The promotion in America that secured Atget's visual influence in world photography, particularly (but this is not the only case) in artistic terms. Both John Szarkowski and Max Kozloff have pointed to the visual comparisons between Atget's images and those of Diane Arbus, Richard Avedon, and Lee Friedlander, clearly suggesting a knowing accession to the French artisan's visual style [95].

Slide 51

The publication of the four-volume *Work of Atget* by Szarkowski and Hambourg with the Museum of Modern Art in 1985 [96], was met with a criticism by Abigail Solomon-Godeau that echoes Buisine's praise. Atget, for her, is

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[93] Ibid p. 63.

[94] Mac Orlan, 1903, pp. 41-49.

[95] John Szarkowski, 'Understandings of Atget', in John Szarkowski and Maria Morris Hambourg, *The Work of Atget*, Vol. IV, (London: Gordon Fraser, 1985), pp. 9-33. See also Max Kozloff, '

...currently positioned as the exemplar, progenitor, and patriarch of modern photography and [is] celebrated unanimously by the photographic community with an enthusiasm that brooks no question...[97]

There are two problems with this attack, however. The first is that although Atget's position is undoubtedly canonical, it is so because the academy is arborescent, or hierarchical, in its structure before the work of any approved artist is attached to it. In Benjaminian terms, ritualistic aura surrounds a work of art to act as a stabilising force for a hierarchy that already exists without it: the circumstances of Atget's discovery fits, albeit loosely. For example, Atget's position as a progenitor of the documentary or surrealist aesthetic is difficult to maintain: he was one of many commercial documentarians who worked in photography since its invention [98]. Similarly, Atget held no pretentions to artistic status identifiable in his work or his letters; the "most staggering detective work [has revealed] hardly a smidgen of artistic credo" is how Kozloff put it [99]. Atget had even declined a credit for those images submitted to André Breton's publication, in which they stood as *generic* images of an empty, surreal, Paris. Atget, it seems, had remained anonymous not *in spite* of the rarity or genius of his work, but simply because of its relative ubiquity.

The second problem is much more basic. There were many artisan photographers in Paris during Atget's lifetime, and Solomon-Godeau's accusations of cynicism do nothing to suggest a reason why Benjamin should take up Atget's work, for example. It offers no reason why Abbot's generation and the next, including Frank and Arbus, should want to take up Atget's style at all, particularly if his ubiquitous style could at that time

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[96] John Szarkowski and Maria Morris Hambourg, *The Work of Atget*, Vols. I-IV, (London: Gordon Fraser, 1985).

[97] Solomon-Godeau, 1991, p. 31.

[98] Documentarians such as Matthew Brady, Tim O'Sullivan, William Jackson, have since been 'rediscovered' in the vaults of US public service archives and similarly 'canonised'. Atget's work was by no means unique: Solomon-Godeau mentions Charles Marville as an earlier such artisan. Local documentary projects in England and Wales in the nineteenth century that attempted to record the disappearing rural customs and landmarks, are similar examples. See Tagg, p. 168-9. See also Solomon-Godeau, 1991, p. 40.

[99] Kozloff, 1986, p. 299.

have been described as workaday [100]. Indeed, Berenice Abbott herself leaves few clues to answer the question "Why Atget?"

Abbott appears as the photographer obsessed with the momentary that her position in history (photographing from the early 1920s) suggests. It is Abbott who, in her preface to her book on Atget in 1964, is one of the first to describe the emphatic nature of the photograph/er: "the photographer's punctilio is his recognition of the *now* – to see it so clearly that he looks through it to the past and senses the future".[101] This is a statement that apparently pre-figures both Deleuze's Chronos (Chr) and Barthes' *punctum*. Similarly, in a 1951 essay, 'Photography at the Crossroads', Abbott had made a claim that the photograph should be related to "the life of the times – the pulse of today"[102]. Do these sound like the words of someone who would be interested in Atget's durative and patient images?

The answer is in Atget's depiction of time. Pierre Mac Orlan, in his preface to the 1930 monograph, talks of photography as "creating sudden death…The camera's click suspends life in an act that the developed film reveals in its very essence"[103]. But life revealed "in its very essence" was Mac Orlan's claim, suggesting that it is the life of the city that Atget's photographs offer. What they reveal is the sense of duration that has been lost to the momentary trope of modernity. This is the duration that provokes "intelligent recollections" of the crowds that throng in the day: all those feet for all those boots, and all those heads for all those hats. Extracted from the blur of the city's bustle, they also echo Mac Orlan's claim that "what reveals movement, is stillness" – a thought that was echoed by Kozloff fifty-five years later.[104]

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[100] Abbott is criticised for dropping her sympathetic portrait style – particularly, as Solomon-Godeau notes, her "extraordinary" portraits of the lesbian *beau monde* of Paris – in favour of one that adopts Atget's (and thereby ensures patriarchal approval?) pp. 34-35.
[101] Abbott, 1964, p. xxvi.
[102] Berenice Abbott, 'Photography at the Crossroads (1951)', in Alan Trachtenberg ed. *Classic Essays on Photography*, (New Haven: Leete's Island Books, 1980), pp. 179-184, p. 183.
[103] Mac Orlan, 1930, p. 43.
[104] Mac Orlan, 1930, p. 44. Benjamin, was right, to a certain extent, new technologies do reveal a certain "optical unconscious", but just as they reveal speed, they also reveal slowness. See SHP, p. 7. See also WA, p. 239.

For Benjamin, Atget's photographs bridged a thirty year gap between himself and the era that interested him. For Berenice Abbott, Walker Evans, and Evans' assistant Helen Levitt, all living in New York, Atget's photographs as much served as a telescope into the past as they did a warning that the modern city had come to sweep away the old, just as it had done in Paris. (Abbott's next major project was photographing the areas of old New York that were disappearing even as the city's skyline ascended to become the new icon of modernity [105]) The adoption of the melancholy look that would dominate American photography was by then firmly established: Buisine describes Atget as "père spirituel" to the American school of photography.[106] The later generations of photographers educated using Atget's images and Benjamin's, Evan's, and Abbott's texts photographed discrete instances of alienation: time distanced from us by speed; time that emphasised death; in Deleuze's terms, time that wanted to die. What was adopted from Atget was a sense of past times, dead times, time as Chronos (Chr'). But this was a sense of time applied to Atget *a posteriori*: it was the melancholia of Benjamin, Mac Orlan and Abbott that was adopted, only imaged – or *imagined* – for them by Atget. Photography of the melancholy became a style that haunted the photography to come, from which it has since struggled to be free, and which spread – like a virus, according to Kozloff – through Bill Brandt and Robert Frank[107]. Since then every great photographer's catalogue contains alienated city streets, shop fronts, or isolated artisans and tradespeople. "Melancholy objects", is how Susan Sontag described them, and they have become the stock-in-trade of the educated photographer [108].

Slide 52

Left behind in Paris was a different sense of the life of objects. This is not the life of speed that modernism had made into a series of shocks – Chronos (Chr') – but a life of slowness; time as Aion from which the instant

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[105] Solomon-Godeau's suspicion may be justified. As John Tagg notes, Abbott's *Changing New York* project appeared in art galleries, not history museums. See John Tagg, 1988, p. 157.
[106] Buisine, 1994, p.11.
[107] Kozloff, 1986, p. 301.
[108] Susan Sontag, 'Melancholy Objects', in *On Photography*, 7th edn. (London: Penguin, 1989 (1977)), pp. 51-84, p. 68.

is plucked. Photographing with his plate camera, Atget photographed what few – including perhaps, Jean Cocteau – have understood. Kozloff recalls that Cocteau's castle, in his 1945 film *La Belle et la bête,* is reminiscent of Atget's photographs of Parc des Sceaux or Saint Cloud. But there is, in fact, a deeper connection between them. Death is also a recurring trope for Cocteau, but he effaces death by giving life to those most inanimate of objects. Cocteau's restless and omniscient statues, "read the riot act by nature" as Atget's have, present a sense of time lost to the modern world, just as the magic of the beast's castle is also lost.

Slide 53

Slide 54

Slide 55

Comparisons with Cocteau may only be taken so far, but it is clear that Cocteau's film presents a division between the time of the modern and the time that subsists and that the modern seeks to order. This has brought us to the work for the next chapter. We have seen how the representation of time in the crystal is in fact the representation of the division of time from the infinite Aion to the ordered Chronos (Chr'). We have seen how various crystal-images have demonstrated this process, from the resistance to chronology in McCay's comic strip, through the living present of the Lumière films and to the movement of statues in Atget's parcs. The crystal-image above all relies upon the making and presentation of memory to perception: Aion to Chronos (Chr) to Chronos (Chr'). This suggests that there is a further, underlying, understanding of the crystal-image that awaits us. It suggests that the crystal-image is an image of becoming, and it suggests that this becoming has a character of its own that is peculiar to the photographic image.

First, however, it is important to have a clearer picture of the crystal-image as it flourishes from the indiscernibility created by the fluctuation from Aion (cronos) to Chronos (Chr'). Since this fluctuation occurs within the frame of

a perception, this fluctuation is clearly a circuit. We have to see for ourselves a crystal-image and observe its structure. We need to understand it as an environment of actualisations of the virtual – as Chronos (Chr') made from the fluctuation of Chronos (Chr) and Aion. Lastly, we have to introduce ourselves to this process as a becoming, by observing how such images are informed by memory and actualised as if there were some ability of the photographic image to provoke this. If this means the application of narrative, for example, then this means understanding narrative ability, or narrativity. We move on to this with a clearer understanding of the characters of time in the crystal, and their representation of the creation of the corporeal in the incorporeal: the life of memories inserted in the movement of statues.

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Chapter Four:

The Crystal Environment: Narrativity and

the photography of Cindy Sherman

Slide 56

Some points to mention

After understanding the complex operations of time in Deleuze's philosophy in the last chapter, we must return to a more direct analysis of that philosophy as it stands in the cinema books. More specifically, it remains to be seen whether that particular description of the crystal-image – and especially *cronos* – adequately fits the photograph. In terms of the 'photograph', here we encounter the division that critical studies makes between cinema and photography, and the intervention of both art theory and film studies in analysis of the photograph as art. Just as there is a 'classic cinema', in whatever guise it appears, there is a 'classic' or routinely accepted concept of 'Photography'. Photography, like cinema, has its pantheon of great names, including some – Evans, Cartier-Bresson etc. – we have approached already. Cindy Sherman is a relatively new addition to this pantheon; 'new' in terms of her adoption by photographers as a photographer, rather than simply an artist who chooses to work in that medium. Until recently, the reputation of Sherman's work has been restricted to the art world and the academy, where she is the subject of discussions most closely associated with feminist issues.

Sherman's work is interesting to us for a number of reasons. Her work fits uneasily between art practice and popular culture, as much of it references cinema and other narrative forms, whilst her later work references the vernacular imagery of hardcore pornography, for example. The visceral nature of her work, which often deals with personal issues and representations of women in late twentieth century culture, has meant that critics such as Laura Mulvey and Rosalind Krauss have used appropriate psychoanalytic approaches, particularly that of Julia Kristeva, to interpret her photographs. Flavoured by personal approaches, these analyses are interesting because they demonstrate a striking element of Sherman's photographs: their ability to provoke *multiple* interpretations that will not easily be fixed by discourse. In fact, the prevalence of a diverse feminist, psychoanalytic approach only serves to demonstrate the inability of any one of Sherman's images to have any one unified meaning. The photographs, particularly the 'film stills', suggest so strongly certain films in particular that they immediately confound such an interpretation. They are

clearly not from any film they might immediately appear to reference, and this realisation only heightens the artifice of the images. These are very self-conscious photographs, not least because they make the critics quoted here conscious of their own self-image – particularly (as in the case of Judith Williamson) as women.

The fact that some of Sherman's images make reference to cinema in general makes them a useful object of analysis in this chapter. They photographs and *not* films, but this does not make them any less labyrinthine. They are photographs that reference film (if not *films*), and that makes them appropriate enough for analysis. Most, if not all, of the articles on Sherman discussed here treat the work of the artist as a general body of work, in which one image more often than not speaks for the others. Similarly, critical discussion of Sherman's work in retrospect regularly gives primacy to those early film stills and other 'untitleds' that helped create the artist's reputation [1]. This contrasts with Deleuze's treatment of the cinematic *auteur*, but only slightly, and it is the standard that we follow (Deleuze routinely uses the nominatives 'in Resnais', 'in Renoir'). Whether it was the artist's intention or not, discourse surrounding Sherman's work deals with it in the singular, and makes an Artist (if not *auteur*) of her. It is this approach that is our object of study as much as it is the images themselves, since Sherman's work and Sherman the Artist are both bodies fought over by those interested in the photographs, the cultural representations they portray, and the issues surrounding them [2].

Ultimately, the task at hand is to take Deleuze's notion of the crystal-image to the work of Cindy Sherman. It is hoped that, in understanding both the formal characteristics of her representation of time and space, first in their reception by critics, we shall see the shape of the crystal emerge. Reading

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[1] Whilst all of Sherman's images remain untitled (they are only numbered), her early work garnered attention in being introduced as *'Untitled Film Stills'*. Much of Sherman's early popularity was due to these images appearing as if taken from actual films, and much of the written criticism of Sherman's work focuses on these images and the narratives they suggest.

[2] See Judith Williamson, 'Piece of the Action: Images of "Woman" in the Photography of Cindy Sherman ', in *Consuming Passions*, (London: Marion Boyars, 1983), pp. 91-113: "I was certain his anger must have come from a sense of his own involvement, the way those images speak not only *to* him, but *from* him - and he kept blaming Sherman herself for it, as if she really was a bit of a whore".

the interpretations of her work is to view actualisations of the virtual spaces created in each image. It is to see the crystal-image in its most dynamic movement outward from the point of indiscernibility; as the superficiality of the Photograph merges with the various references to memory, popular culture, and to Sherman herself in the image. Above all, this chapter is neither a critical attack on feminism, nor even of its analysis of Sherman per se. There can be no denying that Sherman's photographs did speak to certain women and raise certain issues at a time when they needed to be raised. What is being questioned here is less the ability for the photographs, but rather the ability for critics provoked by them, to highlight these issues. Different social and gender issues have been raised in response to these photographs, but they highlight the crystal structure because of their difference. Each is an actualisation in the crystal: Cindy Sherman's work provides a case study of photographs in which the crystal-image can be seen in action.

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Introduction.

In his final chapter of *Bergsonism*, Deleuze reconsiders the actual-virtual exchange that we see in the crystal, and firmly identifies this as a creative force. This is a development of his study of Bergson which, as Michael Hardt has noted, has focused on Bergson's own attack on negation as an ontological force. Instead of difference being a negative supposition, in which virtual and actual negate each other, this difference should be seen as an exchange that leads to a positive emanation of being [3]. Art is a creative process from actual to virtual, from real to possible, and from singularity to multiplicity. But this situation can only occur when organization is unforeseeable, and this is what leads Deleuze to look for the creative image of time in cinema that disrupts homogeneous language in favour of heterogeneous creativity. Without the ordering principle of chronological narration in cinema, which is a reduction of the possible, creativity unfolds as a true image of creative duration. As Hardt notes:

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[3] Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze – An apprenticeship in philosophy*, (Minnesota, University of Minnesota, 1993). See also B, Chapter V.

"Without the blueprint of order, the creative process of organisation is always art." [4]

With the photograph separated from chronological order in so many ways, we can now see how an approach to creativity in the photograph can be made on the same methodological basis as Deleuze's approach to the creativity in cinema. Sherman's Untitled Film Stills demonstrate an abstract connection to time in their implication of the temporal ellipsis of film narrative. Each image implies a narrative of which it is a part, and which projects backwards and forwards in time around it. In responding to conventional codes and practices of mainstream filmmaking, these images correspond to Deleuze's first thesis on the cinema of the movement-image. Each photograph presents a set of objects as an immobile section of abstract time. Time, in this sense, is presented only by its connection to movement in cinema. Initially, these images appear to *ache* for sequential movement to be returned to them. They await the next frame to create their third (and only possible) meaning, as Barthes suggests, as if the next frame needed to be laid upon it like a 'palimpsest' [5]. The images that so closely imply specific filmic genres, narrative structures and even directors, express this connection most strongly. The cinema of the movement-image, which Deleuze described as reaching its zenith in the films of Alfred Hitchcock, reverberates inside those pictures that possess recognizable cinematic signifiers of that director's work. With visual signifiers that are so strong, is it surprising that the photographs should invite interpretations that are as critical of those films' representation of women as they are celebratory of Sherman's subversion of it? As Shelley Rice demonstrates, this representation, and its rationale, has a long history that is eviscerated by the photographs:

> No longer the object of a male painter's gaze, the woman in this picture [Untitled Film Still #21] is both artist and subject...Recreating, as her own personal artist statement, a role – that of the young, urban, working woman – made archetypal in the 1950s by the (male) directors of Hollywood films, Sherman refuses

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[4] Ibid p. 18.
[5] IMT, pp. 52-68, p. 67.

to exercise her option of subjectivity; private points of view, in her works, merge with the public icons of femininity.[6]

Slide 57

Cindy Sherman's photographs comprise a substantial body of work from her first exhibition in 1977, all of which deal implicitly with the role of narrative in still images. Her work can been recognized as dealing with the address of the spectator in both cinema and popular culture, and references cinema, advertising, classical painting, pornography and other aspects of visual culture. Notions of textuality dominate critical studies of Cindy Sherman's work. The majority of texts written on the artist have taken a broadly similar path that started almost from the moment of her first one-woman show. These studies have generally followed two central analyses. Firstly, in an article for *October* in 1979, Douglas Crimp summed up the notion of the post-modern as important to the formation and reception of these photographs [7]. Summoning up a sense of *déjà vu* with regard to cinema, magazine cultures, and later by abstraction art history, fairy-stories, and social conditions marked as post-modern, the images have since attracted theoretical criticism that has largely accepted this interpretation as a given. Sherman's images are routinely viewed as re-presenting identity stereotypes that already exist, and are continually marked out as part of a vast post-modern intertext of connected media as a result of the perceived subject matter of her pictures. When they do not appear to reference particularly stable identity types, they instead reflect (for some critics) the very same fluidity of identity as a post-modern anxiety. Secondly, critical analysis of Cindy Sherman's images has generally followed the structuralist, gender-based theory that emanated from the pages of *Screen* media journal in the 1970s. Laura Mulvey rightly suggests that it is feminism's investigation of the fluidity and interchangeability of gender stereotypes – which analysis lends itself to Sherman's work – that partly led to the recognition of such a fluidity in

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[6] Shelley Rice, 'Inverted Odysseys', in Shelley Rice ed. *Inverted Odysseys: Claude Cahun, Maya Deren, and Cindy Sherman*, (Massachusetts: MIT, 1999), pp. 3-26, pp. 7-8.

[7] Douglas Crimp, 'Pictures', *October 8*, (Spring, 1979), pp. 75-88.

identity by post-modern critics in general [8]. Focusing on the issue of spectatorship, '*Screen* theory' seeks to identify the signifiers in texts that are proof of a subjective response to cinema. Study of Sherman seemed a logical step to take after her first popular exhibitions of (imaginary) film stills from 1975-1980. Feminist critics Mulvey and Williamson have been joined by art historian and cultural critic Rosalind Krauss in demonstrating how theories of gender representation, including the male gaze, masquerade, and abjection, are central to Sherman's artistic practice [9]. The result of this trend is that, as early as 1992, review essays of Sherman's work had as much to say about the various approaches that feminism makes to it as any particular image in particular. Articles such as Jan Avgikos', for *Artforum*, tend to adopt the indefinite pronoun ("many critics" is a good example) when faced with having to describe the myriad interpretations that feminism (or feminisms, as Avgikos reminds us) places on the work [10].

A large amount of this critical work on Sherman's photography concentrates on the 'Untitled Film Stills', and the earlier 'Untitleds' for their analysis. In the case of Mulvey, she was able to view the earlier work of the artist in the context of both her current output, and in the broader context of her own articles on cinema and psychoanalytical approaches to cinema and gender. Mulvey is best known for her inspirational 1975 article for *Screen*, 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', which has since appeared in numerous anthologies [11]. That article is still relevant today (despite the criticism heaped upon it in the twenty-five years since) in understanding a gendered-visual culture in general, and psychoanalytic approaches to it in particular. Sherman's work can be put up as a testament to this. In other essays Mulvey makes use of Julia Kristeva's

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[8] Laura Mulvey, 'Cosmetics and Abjection: Cindy Sherman 1977-87', in *Fetishism and Curiosity*, (London, BFI, 1996), pp. 65-76, p. 69.
[9] Williamson. Laura Mulvey, ' Phantasmagoria of the Female Body: The Work of Cindy Sherman', in *New Left Review*, (Autumn/Winter, 1991), pp. 136-150.
Rosalind Krauss & Norman Bryson, *Cindy Sherman: 1975-1993*, (New York, Rizzoli, 1993).
[10] Jan Avgikos, 'Cindy Sherman: Burning Down the House', in Artforum, (January 2000), pp. 74-79.
[11] Laura Mulvey, 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', in *Screen*, vol.16 no.3, 1975, pp. 6-18.

essays on abjection, amongst other approaches in interpreting the work [12].
Krauss, Mulvey, and Williamson's use of psychoanalysis and the
construction and representation of gender relies on the two essential
components: an acquired reception behaviour (which is sometimes
informed by education); and a search for signifiers within the diegesis that
reinforce this. The structural analysis logically connects these fragments of
narrative with a projected context that has clues lying in the *mise-en-scène*
of each image. In a feedback loop of critical engagement, these analyses
search for signifiers within the image that lead to psychoanalytical
readings of her work according to the generic narratives to which they then
appear to refer:

> In the Untitled Film Stills we are constantly forced to recognize a
> visual style (often you could name the director) [13].

> The viewer is subject to a series of double takes, estrangements
> and recognitions [14].

Slide 58

Significantly, the projected context for each image is not just an imaginary
film or picture story but includes the intertext of each image and its subject
matter. These are seen to display Sherman's apparent knowledge and
exploitation of the subjective gaze, its theory, and its interpretations.

> Sherman's arrival on the art scene certainly marks the beginning of
> the end of that era in which the female body had become, if not
> quite unrepresentable, only representable if refracted through
> theory [15].

It is central to these critiques that Sherman is making a conscious
reference to cultural representation based on dominant social experience.
This only works during the suspension of disbelief which Sherman's work

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[12] Sherman herself has gone on to direct the film *Office Killer*, which cannot but have helped her
mythic status, and has drawn psychoanalytic readings of its own. Sherman still remains one of the
few photographers whose name is easily recognizable in the critical field of film studies.
[13] Ibid Williamson, 1986, p. 92.
[14] Mulvey, 1991, p. 141.
[15] Ibid p. 137.

inherits from cinema exhibition. This is then disabled by the recognition of the spectacle and artifice of the image; her self-conscious references to popular cultural forms have lead to an analysis of her work as 'saying something'. The context of Sherman's work is not only one of visual signifiers of cinema and its subject positioning, but the enforced subjective gaze itself. Sherman's use of cinematic conventions of the gaze is seen as a sharper weapon than open subversion of these conventions – by parody or pastiche – precisely because it is the viewer's memory that gives her images meaning. Viewer effectively reveal to themselves the workings of visual culture because they are forced into the self-conscious awareness of their own part in accelerating the representation of women in visual culture. As Judith Williamson notes (of the film stills and early 'untitleds'):

> Because the viewer is forced into complicity with the way these 'women' are constructed: you recognize the styles, the 'films', the 'stars', and at that moment when you recognize the picture, your reading *is* the picture. In a way, 'it' is innocent: *you* are guilty, you supply the femininity simply through social and cultural knowledge.[16]

That identity should rest in representation seems an entirely post-modern notion, and one that is still supportable, according to Lucy Lippard:

> [Sherman] began to explore *female experience* – more important to her than *female appearances* for which she is better known...This search for the artificial rather than the "real" epitomized the postmodern aesthetic.[17]

That this is a post-modern phenomenon is quickly refuted, however, if we include Shelley Rice's assertion (in the same volume) that Sherman's version of the masquerade should be put into an historical perspective in terms of popular photography that parallels the artist's place in art history. Sherman's photographs echo the practice of *cartes-de-visite*, and the masquerade as heroic, pious, or otherwise ideal types that the middle classes performed in their own self-representation:

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[16] Williamson, 1986, p. 95.
[17] Lucy Lippard, 'Scattering Selves', in Shelley Rice ed. *Inverted Odysseys: Claude Cahun, Maya*

> Clients confused in front of the camera were encouraged to identify with [actors on stage]...Before long, the fantasy aspect of these tiny photographs began to supersede their documentary exactitude. Clients insisted on renting formal clothing, on posing in elaborate furnished rooms, on aping the gestures of the rich and famous...Any fantasy scenario could be played out, for a price.[18]

Regardless of historical antecedents or exceptionally personal readings, and whether or not Sherman's images really are 'taken for' pared down film narratives, it is clear that the images represent flash-frames of a totality of representation and self-representation of women. "There *is* a narrative here, an actual life, interrupted by the artifice of public presentation imposed by the camera", suggests Lippard, who looks back on Sherman's work, and that particular moment of feminist criticism, with measured hindsight [19]. Sherman's images, in many senses, are "Now Print!" orders for a particular generation of feminist critics [20].

Sherman's work addresses a perception that flows from recollection, as her texts require the recollection of past experiences in culture. As carefully constructed stagings of fictional moments – each image appears as if taken from a much larger visual narrative. In this case, the images represent a *mise-en-abyme* of a virtual narrative, or a perception-image that is based upon recollection. Crucially, this happens as a dual action of splitting. The recollection is internal to the duration of the photograph, as discussed in Chapter One, but the perception unfolds outward and delimits the visual boundaries of the texts. It is here that we see Sherman's images as crystal-images of time. Instead of acting as closed sets of narrative, the images represent an *outward projection* of story, genre and context.

These *'Film Stills'* and the later work broadly titled 'back projections' and ' centrefolds', have drawn strong attention for their apparent narrative ability or 'narrativity'. Their relation to narrative, and in particular to cinematic

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Deren, and Cindy Sherman, (Massachusetts: MIT, 1999), pp. 27-42, p. 30.
[18] Rice, 1999, p. 14.
[19] Lippard, 1999.
[20] Cf. Chapter one of this thesis.

narrative, appears initially to make her images redundant as time-images. They appear to be *arbitrarily* dislocated from the sensory-motor schema of which they were once a part. However, such a dislocation also causes them to be reconsidered not as chronological images of time, but instead as purely optical situations. Furthermore this separation from ordered chronology reduces them to the zero-state of duration, and they must be recognized as free-indirect propositions, or dicisigns. The film still "scorns logical time" as Barthes suggests. [21]

This also invites a review of the concept of narrativity to which they can be so closely related. Narrativity, as we shall find, is a perception-image that flows from recollection. This is a recollection firstly of cinema in general (and hence the narrative organization in cinema), and then certain narratives in particular (through recognition of genre conventions, *mise-en-scène* etc.). Sherman's pictures exist not only as photographs, but each one is a nexus of perception-images formed around a basis of narrative experience, but within a self-conscious matrix of the photograph. However Sherman's images are saturated with points of entry, and the singular image leads to multiple recollection-images. This entails a narrativity that is not a given, and a perception image that unfolds heterogeneously. The photographs project narrativity beyond the image into the past (recollection-image) and into the future (contraction-image), and do so in an asymmetric, heterogeneous action. Narrativity should be reconsidered as a quality of creative perception, and potentially an action of the crystal-image.

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Deleuze and subjectivity again: returning to the free-indirect discourse

We must return to the matter by looking at Deleuze's work on the perception-image in *Cinema 1* [22]. The objective and the subjective should not be conceived of as fixed categories of perception. To consider them as

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[21] IMT, p. 68.
[22] MI, pp. 71-86.

such would be to privilege the objective world of objects (which would deny perception itself) or to privilege subjective perception (which would deny objects their own existence). This is an intuitive view of perception, and one that Deleuze develops from Bergson's own approach in *Matter and Memory*:

> It would greatly astonish a man unaware of the speculations of philosophy if we told him that the object before him, which he sees and touches, exists only in his mind and for his mind or even, more generally, exists only for mind, as Berkeley held. Such a man would always maintain that the object exists independently of the consciousness that perceives it...For common sense then, the object exists in itself, and, on the other hand, the object is, in itself, pictorial, as we perceive it: image it is, but a self-existing image. [23]

Instead of envisaging objectivity and subjectivity as two differing perceptions, we should therefore consider them as nominal values in a continuum of perception itself, as we have previously found. One is neither totally subjective, nor totally objective. Whilst this seems intuitively correct, common sense even, spectatorship theory still largely clings to subjectivity as a separate value. Where this view sees a difference in kind, we should only see a difference in degree. However, this approach to the subject is not without foundation, for cinema of the movement-image, in hiding its manufacture and apparatus, creates a subjective position that does not waver. If spectatorship theory presents a rationalised discourse of cinema as subject and object, it is only because cinema itself creates such an organisation in reality.

Perception is not adequately described through concepts of objectivity and subjectivity, and Deleuze initially describes the perception that exists between these values as *semi-subjective*. However there are two problems with this term: firstly the term itself could seem to privilege subjective perception; and secondly (as Deleuze notes) the term is still inaccurate to describe the action of perception itself. Subjective positioning in cinema is seen by Deleuze as a direct discourse, in that it forces a

particular perception. The objective is an indirect discourse, since there is no guarantee of a particular perception of the object itself. The action of perception that therefore exists between them is the free-indirect discourse, a combination of the objective, the subjective, and a perception or qualification of the subjective. This is analogous to the camera-consciousness, a formal presentation of cinema as cinema – or indeed the photograph as photography. Thus the free-indirect proposition is one of a circuit: the subjective is a virtual image of the object, but the acknowledgement of this actualizes the image, which becomes the actual image of perception. The object is virtualized, since it is now superceded by a particular point-of-view of it, but the acknowledgement of this actualizes it once again – hence point-of-view gives way to point-of-view ad infinitum. It is something that Deleuze develops in 'The Crystals of Time':

> There is a formation of an image with two sides, actual and virtual. It is if an image in a mirror, a photo or a postcard came to life, assumed independence and passed into the actual, even if this meant that the actual image returned into the mirror and resumed its place in the postcard or photo, following a double movement of liberation and capture". [24]

It is the third-order perception, the perception of perception, which creates the circuit and leads to the crystal. Rather than oscillate between objective and subjective, the action of this third perception creates an unequal exchange, since it is the recognition of perception *as* subjective. Experience is a combination of the subjective (the internal experience of duration) and the objective (the external experience of space) as Deleuze saw it in 1966 [25]. Perception is therefore a discourse between these as a self-consciousness. In order for the photographic or cinematographic image to be an image of duration itself, it must first reflect this. This discourse is the zero-state of perception from which the crystal-image unfolds.

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[23] MM, p. 10.
[24] TI, p. 68.

How can we relate this complex idea to the photograph in general, and
Cindy Sherman in particular? The relationship of duration and space in
the photograph is one of tensioned co-existence. Whenever a picture's
formal characteristics of chemistry and physics - its value as indexic record
- appear dominant, they are never divorced from the picture's nature as an
image of duration. To this end, the intervening characteristic of these
photographs is their constant state of translation between movement-
image and time-image. Now let us look to see how they correspond with
Deleuze's own early description of the three-fold regime of the image,
which he puts forward in his first chapter of *Cinema 1*, and which is quickly
simplified below:

Sets, or closed systems of objects (immobile sections of movement in
space)

Translation of movement to duration. (free-indirect discourse)

Duration as whole (time-images - images beyond movement).[26]

Photographs are thus immobile sections of movement that change
qualitatively into duration through a process of translation. This process of
translation transforms the closed set of objects, which is the picture-as-
object and the pictorial space, into the image of duration. The constant
present of the
photograph mirrors in actuality the virtual image of duration. The
photograph is placed into a context of mental-images, change-images,
and duration-images which is implied by this translation. The photograph
always appears as if taken out of context, for the context only exists as a
virtual image.

Context, in Sherman's work, is the implied narratives of films, magazine
stories and other fictions. The closed set of objects is the narrative made
explicit in the *mise-en-scène* and framing of each individual shot as
immobile section. The whole is the implied contextual narrative of the
fiction, and the alternation between them is the translation. This translation
is what we shall call narrativity, and as we will see, narrativity is a potential

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[25] B, pp. 38-39.
[26] MI, p. 11.

action of the crystal. Therefore it is important that we understand narrativity as an analytical application.

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Narrativity in literature, cinema, and photography.

Narrativity as a concept has a basis in literary criticism. Phillip Sturgess' account of narrativity, in both critical theory and in written practice, provides us with our immediate understanding.[27] He highlights the unusual modernist text (James Joyce's *Ulysses* is the principle text under analysis) as provoking special interest. Texts like this, which emphasise a foregrounded narration to which traditional narrative movement is subordinate, are chosen as possible vehicles for a pronounced narrativity to be understood. By contrast, the traditional novel is seen as having a narrative that involves heavily regimented codes and little more than disguised conventions of narration that have, over time, become naturalized.

Sturgess's approach to narrativity is to start by looking at these orthodox or traditional texts, which involve narratives of cause and effect in logical progression. In this respect, any particular part of discrete element of a narrative contains within it elements that identify the narrative to which it belongs. By this principle, any fragment of narrative will imply a narrative direction and resolution. This engages recollection by offering images of narrative in general, and certain narratives in particular. Narrativity in this sense is a perception-image based on chronological progression of a story. A text's narrativity is partly defined as the appropriateness of its length, and the relationship that any one part of the narrative has with this. Narrativity, in the established grammar of literature, is little more than an expression of relationship between texts, or between parts of the same text.

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[27] Phillip Sturgess, *Narrativity: Theory and Practice*, (London, Clarendon, 1992).

Sturgess' account can be simplified into an understand based on three principle elements. *Narrative* is the set of events implied by storytelling through the use of an established yet often arbitrary grammar. *Narration* is the exploitation of a naturalized grammar of story-telling which structures the patterns of narrative. A place of departure: Narration is not a collection of discrete units by which some possess more narrative ability than others, instead it is an immanent quality of any story structure [28].

Finally, *Narrativity* is the immanence of story. It is present in narrative as connections, or strands, between sets of objects and events, giving them the coherence to become a story. Sturgess conceives narrativity as a possession of any part of the text. Any division or unit of the text possesses this quality. As we have found from Deleuze's study of difference in Bergson, the division of something that is by nature indivisible can only be arbitrary or abstract. Therefore, for narrativity to exist in any part of the text, it must be indivisible over the whole text. Narrativity is only expressed in movements and intensities of story: the operation of narrative as the telling of the story. Narrativity is an operation in time that is indivisible. Narrativity exists in duration.

Sturgess sees narrativity as a perceived possession of the text, but this factor itself makes it a perception-image. Whilst perception sees narrativity as an object, the action makes it part of that object:

> We perceive things where they are, perception puts us at once into matter, is impersonal, and coincides with the perceived object.[29]

Therefore narrativity is a perception-image that is indivisible to the text, or any part of the text, but which is perceived as so in a false image of perception.

This quality is one of implication, of a story-ness, and that of a story that appears definite but is actually indefinite. It is a quality of contingency that implies a limited structure of movement and time, as in a traditional story, and hides a perception that is not given and therefore only exists within

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[28] Ibid p. 13.
[29] B, p. 25.

duration. Fragments of text, according to Sturgess are dislocated from chronology and have a quality which is *a-chronic*, that does not operate within chronology, but which is instead beyond it. Struck from the homogeneous chronology of narrative, and independent of it, these imply heterogeneity in narrative direction. Whatever discrete order or connection is implied by Flashbulb Memory or the "Now Print!" order to contain narrative, narrativity always exists as lines of flight that burst outward. Yet narrativity is not a liberation of the narrative from chronology, but instead chronology is a limitation of the quality of narrativity – a quality that exists, as a perception-image, in duration.

Narrativity is ultimately a translation of text, a constant alternation from a distinctness of narrative and transparency of narration toward a foregrounded narration for which narrative acts as simply an armature; and from a reflexive narration toward a self-elaborated narrative. Narrativity is the movement or exchange between the two. Neither regular nor irregular in either direction, this translation from one position to another occurs with simultaneity. This is a translation that occurs in Cindy Sherman's early work, and in particular her Untitled Film Stills. The Untitled Film Stills mimic the actual films stills that populate a cinema culture (in this case, mostly classical Hollywood and a few avant-garde films) that is already part of a huge intertext of imagery. They are not only photographs, and thus provoke recollection-images, but they are also explicit in their reference to film genres. Recollection in this case constitutes a leap into a past provoked on purpose, and for the purpose of recollection. The Untitled Film Stills offer an image of real narrative. However, because these are not stills from existing films, they offer a fiction of a fiction, and instead draw attention to themselves as photographs-that–look-like-film-stills. They capture a popular imagination with 'the odd allure of movies never made' [30]. Once recognized as fictions-of-fictions, the photographs are scrutinized for their attention to detail; the photography they use to refer to cinema becomes the focus of attention. The Untitled Film Stills are a translation from a dominant narrative that immediately appears, to a

[30] P. Plagens, 'The Odd Allure of Movies Never Made', in *Newsweek*, (vol. 129, no. 26, 1994), pp, 74-76, p. 74.

narration that takes over. Furthermore, once this has been recognized, the narrative becomes more important than ever before, for it is now laden with double meaning. Which is the true meaning in Sherman's image? Is it the 'original' meaning of the image as part of a 'real' narrative, or is it the meaning exposed by the explicit narration? Ultimately we should reconsider meaning in the films that she represents. This is developed by Ted Mooney, who 'invents' a Beckett-like question and answer session that plays upon the misrecognition of the photographs as a 'real' film still:

> Q What do you think is going on?
> A Going on?
>
> Q In the image.
> A Well, I mean it's pretty obviously posed. What's going on is that a photo is being taken.
>
> Q Any other possibilities?
> A I guess it could be from the movies – a still. The woman looks a little like Monica Vitti in an Antonioni film. L'Avventura comes to mind.
>
> Q Good. Let's stay with that. {Turns on recording device.} So if it were a film still, what would be happening in the film?
> A The woman is a Rumanian named Krysha...Krysha something...[31]

As we have seen, this 'imagination' of the film narrative is the most dominant trope in critiques of her work, which draw attention to both the 'imagined' narratives to which she refers, and her use of photography as the tool for this representation. It is suggested in these that the lack of stasis between narrative and narration is the key to their meaning. Perhaps the 'meaning' of her work is just this:

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[31] Ted Mooney, 'Cindy Sherman: An Invention for Two Voices', in Rice, 1999, pp. 151-158, p. 152.

> ...by refusing to signify and to make sense in her pictures, Sherman succeeds in turning our attention to the fragmentary condition of photography.[32]

It is the characteristic of narrativity as a *quality* which means that a story falls either into the category of autonomy of narration or autonomy of narrative; or into the category of a free alternation between the two. In referring to an 'imagined' filmic text, Sherman's images imply not only a connection to a definite narrative, but in their 'refusal to signify' they imply an indefinite and heterogeneous whole that is beyond narrative ellipsis.

Narrative and narration, as Sturgess' points out, are done so from a committed point of view. A fragment of narration is able to demonstrate its overall intentionality, as a *mise-en-abyme*, and such a fragment would demonstrate this implied ellipsis to the subjective spectator. The narrative world constitutes a fictional universe of parts and objects that act as a whole. Each set of objects and events is contained within an indivisible continuity of an open whole, characterized by duration and which is not given or limited [33]. For Sturgess, any 'slice' [34] of narrative contains the qualitative narrativity to connect it to any other part of its own story. Furthermore, in all film the general rules and conventions of logic and causality mean that actors, *mise-en-scène*, music and dialogue all show continuity, and therefore imply contiguity, with each other and across the filmic diegesis. By displaying photographs as if they were film stills, Sherman re-enacts the relationship that the immobile section of the closed set has with the abstract time of cinema of the movement-image. Consequently, in demonstrating the still's connection with the abstract time of cinema, she also demonstrates the relationship that the photograph as mobile section has with concrete duration. The Untitled Film Stills' direct

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[32] Antonella Russo, 'Picture This', *Art Monthly*, no. 181, (November 1994), pp. 8-11, p. 9.

[33] MI, p. 10.

[34] The term 'slice' is used here to imply the popular use of the term, in relation to a pie, as in the culinary use, or pie-chart in the statistical. The slice in a pie-chart represents a division of a circle (ie. that which is by nature indivisible) which, in being decomposed from it, always refers to its part of the whole. The shape of the slice implies both the whole (its curved edge) and its artificial division from the whole (the straight edges).

connection with the narrative of the imagined film mirrors the connection that photographs in general have with duration.

Sturgess' analysis can be seen above to provide ample enough weight for us to make assumptions about narrativity and cinema. Sturgess also makes a more direct approach toward cinema and narrativity by using for his analysis the work of Robert Scholes.[35] Scholes adapted his structural understanding of narrativity to show how he considered it as a quality of narrative which was crucial to signification, especially in traditional reception practices. Scholes offers a structuralist interpretation of narrativity in mainstream fictional cinema. Whilst not attempting an exhaustive study of individual films, Scholes uses his own interpretation of various cinematic scenes to demonstrate his thesis that narrativity is a quality possessed as much by viewer-as-subject as by the text.

For Scholes, narrativity is a property of the reader, but is promoted by the grammar of cinematic fiction. In cinema of the movement-image narrativity is the quality of viewing that places individual scenes, as immobile sections, within an imagined context. In this way narrativity also provides the context of unseen landscapes, and events, for scenes dislocated from such representations. Narrativity relies upon an intertext of memory-images from cinema, other media as well as the viewer's own experience. Furthermore, narrativity exists as part of the institutionalized grammar of cinematic signification. Narrativity is crucial, in Scholes' analysis, for logic and causality to have optimum effect, for narrativity is the process of acquiring the reading skills that are in turn required for narrative comprehension. The remembered reading experience is central to the future understanding of narrative. Narrativity is a useful description of the way in which narration is made transparent by narrative grammar, and it follows that disruptions to narrative grammar in radical or alternative filmmaking, such as in the foregrounding of narrational devices and strategies, would disrupt the processes of such a narrativity. The task now is to take Scholes' narrativity and use it to develop an understanding of

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[35] Robert Scholes, 'Narration and Narrativity in Film', in *Semiotics and Interpretation*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

conventional readings of Cindy Sherman's work, including its perceived psychoanalytical significance. These readings, and the importance of this idea of narrativity, are discussed in the last part of this chapter.

The account of narrativity as provided by Robert Scholes has the principle drawback of relying upon the subject, and in particular subjectivity, as a central part of meaning in cinema. This is problematic in a Deleuzean approach to cinema. Deleuze's understanding of subjectivity and objectivity is that they rely upon a homogenised and rationalised discourse of narration. Structuralism, as a branch of linguistics, relies on a system of codes and values which are in equilibrium, and whose signification is set by a homogeneous 'average'. Perception, in these terms, is centred on a unified and subjective spectator position. This does not take into account, however, the fact that any one subjective analysis of a character is automatically compromised by a simultaneous viewpoint from an objective position - that of viewing the character from outside the action in the first place. In order to deal with this dichotomy, Deleuze replaces this with a concept of heterogeneous perception that is based on a discourse between subjectivity and objectivity. Instead of having any fixed value, perception is a reversible alternation, or circuit, between these values, which in turn can now only be seen as classifications defined by criticism. Cinema of the movement-image organizes perception into the subjective, but this heterogeneity has the capacity to flourish under the right circumstances:

> ...if the cinematographic perception-image constantly passes from the subjective to the objective, and vice versa, should we not ascribe to it a specific, diffuse, supple status, which may remain imperceptible, but which sometimes reveals itself in certain striking cases?[36]

This question, to which the answer is Pasolini's concept of Mimesis, provides us with a crucial conclusion: Mimesis describes the quality of narrativity in cinema [37]. Rather than a homogeneous system of signifieds,

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[36] MI, p. 72.
[37] Ibid p. 73.

perception is instead a heterogeneous array of dialects which negate any one subject position.

It is important not to dismiss Scholes' structuralism simply because it relies on a unified subjectivity. Scholes' is not producing a conclusive argument because that is not his aim. He is proposing a cinematic narrativity only, and duly acknowledges that he asks more questions than he can answer. There is a further dimension to Scholes' promotion of narrativity which, when used to understand certain crucial elements of narration and photography, becomes useful when looking at Cindy Sherman's images. It is possible to look at her photographs through the concept of narrativity that Scholes' proposes. Sherman's work attracts critical analyses that search for signifiers in her images, and so Scholes' structuralism provides a useful way of taking us through it.

Narrativity, which fulfils narrative expectations, does so by connecting the immobile sections of a discrete unit of narrative with the larger set of which it is a part. Narrativity is as much as the strand that connects the set with its larger set, and on to the indivisible whole. This correlation is apparent because both concepts deal with the movement-image. In using Scholes to analyse Sherman's work, the notion of narrativity not only highlights her images' connection with their imagined whole, but also expresses the nature of photography's relationship with time. Whilst the photograph might immediately offer itself as a slice of time, no more expressive than the shot in cinema, it actually demonstrates an aspect of duration that is independent of chronology. Its constant state of present not only attests to the past of objects, but to the future of them. Whilst this is obvious in Sherman's film stills, which imply temporal ellipsis and abstract time; it is no less apparent in her other works, which imply the open whole of indivisible time, and the nature of the photograph as a pure time-image (as is demonstrated directly with her other work). This assertion is one of the central points of this thesis and is supported by Scholes' structural analysis.

From our understanding of Sturgess' conclusions on narrativity, we can simplify narrative and narrativity into a manageable concept of the content and the discursive apparatus of narration. Narrative is the story, for which narrativity is the immanence of the story telling. Whilst narrative is the fictional world and events depicted within it, narrativity is the quality of narration which determines the way in which the story is told and perceived. This simple understanding belies a very real complexity to narrativity which is extremely relevant to our new task of taking narrativity to Deleuze and the time-image, both in cinema and in the photograph.

One of the striking elements of Deleuze's time-image cinema is that of the foregrounded construction that appears in so many of the films he analyses: from this is created the camera-consciousness. In these cases, the narrative is subordinated to the narration, the editing, its relation to sound, the creation of narrative through montage, these are all placed higher in significance. Instead of a narrative that flows from invisible montage, as in the movement-image, narrative itself does not have a solid foundation. Homogeneity is replaced by heterogeneity. A similar view can be taken to the photograph. But in our new context, it is clear that with the foregrounding of the photographic process, any perceptible narrative becomes subordinate to narration, and the reflexivity between objective and subjective becomes a seed for the time-image.

Just as we found when we took the concept of narrativity from literature to cinema, so the same process can be taken from cinema to the photograph. A photograph that expresses a dominance of narration over narrative, in which the construction of image is more significant than subject matter, lends itself to the study of narrativity. However, what gives the operation of the photograph a very different character from cinema, is that it can only offer what initially appears to be a discrete element of the past. Deleuze's initial dismissal of the photograph as capable of depicting duration was in the light of Bergson's own perception of photography as central to the imaging of memory through abstract and discrete elements. We can see this operation working in the same way with narrative, and therefore an understanding of narrative should prove useful. Narrative can

be seen as the organization of recollection-images into a perception-image. (Once again we return to Deleuze's original work on Bergson). Narrative constitutes a jump or leap into the past. This jump is made first into the past in general, and then into a region of the past which corresponds to our actual needs. This past is perceived as externally different from the here and now, the present, whereas in fact it is a perception-image that is co-existent with the present. This co-existence is seen in Bergson's 'cone' from *Matter and Memory* [38]. This is the cone that we saw reversed as the 'becoming-mad of depth'. The becoming-mad of depth is, of course, an example of the creation of narrative from "Now Print!" orders.

However, it is not the co-existence of memory with perception that interests us, but what Deleuze describes as its 'psychologization' or actualization. The past is actualized in a process of contraction, firstly of the past in general, and then regions of the past. We will retain only those recollection-images that are most useful to, or interest us (the Flashbulb Memory, or "Now Print!" order), and so this actualization is stripped of irrelevances. Furthermore, the perception-image of duration is one of chronology, because the passing of time is remembered as recollection of objects moving in space; and it is one of homogeneity, because those movements are self-contained according to our own interest. Thus is created an intuitive understanding of narrative, a sequence of events recounted in logical progression of cause and effect. The past, and the narrative, remain virtual in a more or less contracted state, and co-exist with the present. Narrative recounts the past as if it were a different time from the present – an *other* time; whereas in fact this is just a virtual image that occurs (co-exists) with the actual present. Since narrative is an organization of recollection into perception, we can see that narrative is an image of psychological consciousness because it is an aspect of this actualization:

> This actualization has all kinds of distinct aspects, stages, and
> degrees. But through these stages and degrees it is the

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[38] See chapter one of this thesis; Slide 7.

actualization (and it alone) that constitutes psychological consciousness. [39]

Narrative thus presents a psychological actualization of recollection: the *formerly* exists as an image of the now, or the *here*. It should follow, therefore, that such a co-existence partly resolves DeDuve's paradox of the photograph, which used just these terms. The referentiality of the photograph is its representation of the *formerly*, and this collides with the photograph's existence in the present as a pictorial or superficial image of the *here* [40].

Narrative should now be seen as an aspect of the psychologization of the past, from recollection to perception. The actualization itself, the process of contraction, is narration. We see here the dissymmetric split that is the dual action of perception – recollection (leap into the past) and contraction (projection forward into the future). This contraction is seen in the virtual image of the past that co-exists with the present. Furthermore, narrative is a discourse from one person to another, narration by a first person provokes an actualization of recollection-images into perception-images by a second. This is an action that enforces a subjectivity upon the latter. The latter places himself or herself at once into a region of the past, and again into a certain area in particular. They recall only those recollection images that they find most useful to fit the narrative they are told. This is the function of narrativity, a perception-image that flows from recollection, but *through another perception.*

So we can understand narrativity, according to Deleuze's free-indirect discourse as follows:

> The subjective is a perception-image in direct discourse with the narrative told, which is perceived as objective. However, the narrative attempts, but cannot guarantee, a direct discourse, and as such the objective is indirect. The discourse between them has

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[39] B, p. 63.
[40] DeDuve, 1978, pp. 113-117. See also IMT, p.44.

foundation in neither objectivity nor subjectivity, but a free-indirect
discourse of the two.

In traditional narrative, and here we can see it as analogous to the
movement-image, the objective discourse appears to be direct. The
narration, such as language or any other storytelling apparatus, is
subordinate (or imperceptible) to the narrative. Thus the free-indirect
discourse is an unfulfilled proposition. However, this changes when the
perception of the objective as indirect is acknowledged, and when the
narration draws attention to itself as narration. This is a self-consciousness
that leads to a perception-image seen through another perception: the
free-indirect discourse. Sturgess' approach to literature saw such a self-
consciousness as an aspect of a story's discursive representation [41]. This
he terms narrativity. He saw Joyce as forcing a conscious
acknowledgement of the language that he used, which subsequently
forced a questioning approach to his intentions and the meaning of his
prose. Narrativity is a quality of self-consciousness that we can take, in
theory, to the photograph:

*The subjective is a perception-image in direct discourse with the
photograph, which it perceives as an objective representation of events.
However, the photograph's objectivity cannot be guaranteed, and its
discourse is therefore indirect. The photographs indirect discourse is either
hidden, which leads to a free-indirect proposition, or is exposed, which
leads to a free-indirect discourse.*

When the photograph is perceived as objective, it is a perception of
objectivity that flows from the subjective. However, when the superficial is
recognized within the photograph, it is a subjectivity perceived through a
subjectivity - perception within the frame of another perception. Here
Deleuze's antagonism toward subjectivity is clear. Subjectivity is not a
given, but is instead simply a point of classification of perception.
Subjectivity, however, is an aspect of actualization in which recollection
becomes perception. In so doing, it does not hide objectivity, but instead
hides the discourse within which they both exist. Subjective positioning

hides the free-indirect proposition that exists in cinema, as Deleuze argues. We might also say that it hides the same discourse that exists in the photograph also.

The impetus of narrativity comes from the manner of telling, and it is the rhetorical power of narrativity to advance a story through a discourse around telling. The narrative is advanced by the way in which it is narrated. In cinema, narration is through the editing and montage which Deleuze, early on in *Cinema 1*, proposes is the discursive matrix of the movement-image.[42] However editing is also a manner of discourse that is often distinct from the narrative being portrayed. Cinematic editing often bears no obvious connection to events depicted. Editing advances the story through a qualitative power quite apart from logical storytelling. Absence of logic in editing manipulates the narration by using the editing value as an asyndeton. It has meaning precisely because the meaning is not immediately apparent. Editing effects as simple as those of Kuleshov and Eisenstein rely far more on a rhetorical narrativity brought about through the splice, or *coup*, than the individual frame or shot. Eisenstein developed movement from two static shots simply through the cut between them. The edit, as narration, produced an impression of movement through the composition of immobile units. In *Battleship Potemkin*, Eisenstein develops an impression of movement of a gunshot through the use of two static shots in succession. The portrait of an old woman is immediately replaced by the woman's face having been shot. The impression of movement is given through the organic connection implied from one image to the next. Eisenstein called this instantaneous action 'without transition'; that is to say, without fade-in or fade-out, a direct cut that is imperceptible. The impression of movement is perceived through logical progression [43]. This constitutes the staple of organic composition in Deleuze's movement-image [44]. Eisenstein further composed a montage based on illogical movement in a montage of opposition. The statues of lions appear to rise

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[41] Sturgess, 1992, p. 11.

[42] MI, Chapters 1-4.

[43] Sergei Eisenstein, 'A Dialectical Approach to Film Form', trans. by Jay Leyda (1949), in *Film Theory and Criticism*, ed. Gerald Mast, Marshall Cohen, Leo Braudy, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), 4th edn. (1974), pp. 138-154, p.145.

[44] MI, pp. 32-40.

up against the Odessa massacre. Movement is created in the quick succession of the rising lion, three statues creating one rising animated statue, whose implied movement opposes the march of the soldiers down the Odessa steps. Once again narrative is implied through the impression of movement, but the flow is illogical and creates a visible opposition as the two movements counteract each other. The affect of this comes from its visible difference from logical montage.

It is what Eisenstein saw as montage based on emotion that more completely provides us with an understanding of the asyndeton. Kerensky's contest with Kornilov in *October* is followed in a montage of attractions, a montage of 'jumps', or what Deleuze calls 'qualitative leaps' between attractions. In this case the sequence depicting the two is alternated with 'plastic representations': statues of Bonaparte. This creates a direct political message that is enforced by its lack of movement [45].

Slide 59

The emotional composition is a rhetorical edit whose quality of narrativity is exposed in its break from the logical. Rather than convey narrative through implied movement, as in the logical edit, it conveys narrative through opposition. Thus Eisensteinian montage, one of the foundations for the movement-image, goes from free-indirect proposition to a direct discourse, in the break from montage based on logic to a montage based on rhetoric. This offers a return to the individual shot, which is at the beginning of Deleuze's reading of Eisenstein. The shot, or film still, when separated from montage, neither offers logic nor opposes it, but in proposing the possibility of both draws attention to itself. Eisenstein's direct political message, whilst eloquent, is a reduction of the power that the free-indirect proposition contained. Sherman's Untitled Film Stills, on the other hand, offer neither logic or a break from logic, but in referring to cinema as a language which expectations of narrativity, offer this proposition as a subject in itself.

* * *

Indiscernibility as seed

At times, in film, narrative appears propelled by its own causal conventions. As Sturgess suggests, these are often little more than the learned or acquired understanding of a widely accepted protocol of story-telling, an organization of perception. In this case what is *remarkable* in cinema or any other story-telling is the narrative itself. The events in the narrative are distinct, and appear independent from any extraneous characteristics of narration, which remain *transparent*. Narrative remains *limpid* and actual, in that it performs its function without calling its own devices into question. In this sense *limpid* infers clarity, rather than transparency . The narration itself is what remains *opaque* and virtual, and thus indistinct. In mainstream cinema, for which verisimilitude is crucial to narrative comprehension, narration remains limpid so that nothing prevents the *distinct opacity* of the narrative itself. The story appears to propel itself logically and seamlessly.

The obverse occurs in cinema that runs counter to institutionalized storytelling. In alternative, or counter-cinemas, it is narration that becomes more distinct, and the narrative more subordinate. Narrative merely becomes an incidence in story-telling. As such narration is *limpid* in comparison to the *opacity* of narrative, and becomes dominant. The story is not so important as how it is told. The narrative is propelled by the force of a distinct narration.

However, once again it should not be assumed that these are separate states of affairs. Neither situation exists independently, and it is the quality of narrativity that ensures narrative comprehension. Narrativity can be expressed by the narrative as the set of codes which govern logical progression, and by narration as those codes which govern the incidence of telling. Narrativity is a quality of anticipation of the narrative to follow a pattern, or through narration to deviate from it. To comprehend the subversion of logical narrative one must understand the rules to which it

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[45] Ibid p. 36.

normally adheres. Part of the organic development of the institutionalized narration that makes up cinema of the movement-image has been the exploitation of logic that began with Eisenstein. Logic is reinforced early on by apparent and well signposted opposition to it. Jump-cuts, unannounced flashbacks, digression from the story and picaresque illogicality are now mainstays as much of mainstream cinema as of the counter-cinemas which spawned them as techniques. Also, independent filmmakers rely heavily on general protocols of narration in order to go through the process of destabilizing them. As Deleuze notes toward the end of his first thesis on cinema, the cinema of the French New Wave involves characters whose identities and destinies exist in the any-space-whatever of a pure time-image only by opposing the characterization in the movement-image [46].

We can add this analysis to that proposed by structuralist criticism, particularly that of Peter Wollen, which first saw such a radical filmmaking as one of conscious opposition [47]. Deleuze's proposition goes beyond the simplistic one of the structuralists, in acknowledging the indistinctness of the any-space-whatever in such cinemas. Conscious opposition unfolds to become self-conscious discourse. What must be noted here is that it is the indistinctness of these situations that gives narrativity its rhetorical power. This power is gained from these situations *never* being stable, but rather always being in a state of flux. Narrativity unrolls from the indistinctness between narration and narrative. The flow from virtual narration to actual narrative is followed by a virtualization of that narrative by an actualized narration, and which continues in a circuit until the two are indiscernible from the exchange itself. As the exchange reaches this point of indiscernibility between the narration and narrative, it unravels from a singularity to create multiple directions of actualization and virtualization. This is a coalescence of narrative and narration that leads to a narrativity which is multiple in that it is a fragmentation, and yet all possibilities emanate from the single exchange. Narrativity is therefore a quality which has the structure of a crystal, in that multiplicity of image (refraction,

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[46] MI, p. 205.
[47] Wollen, 1982. See also Peter Wollen, *Signs and Meanings in the Cinema*, (London, Secker and

reflection) emanates from one image. We can see now how narrativity is a structuring principle of the crystal-image.

> The crystal-image is, then, the point of indiscernibility of the two distinct images, the actual and the virtual, while what we see in the crystal is time itself, a bit of time in the pure state, the very distinction between the two images which keeps on reconstituting itself. [48]

Deleuze described the indistinct moment, or the point of indiscernibility as the mutual image between an objective actual image of distinctness and a subjective virtual image of indiscernibility. In this case it is not an exchange between subjective and objective, but between a point of discernibility and a point of indiscernibility. Narrativity is a quality of perception which exists within this internal circuit. We perceive the crystal as having particular states, or in effect, we see the circuit as resting at one particular point. However this is not a false image, and does not imply a division of the circuit, but instead implies the reflection and refraction of a crystalline structure which emanates from a particular origin, as Deleuze follows:

> So there will be different states of the crystal, depending on the acts of its formation and the figures of what we see in it. We analysed earlier the elements of the crystal, but not the crystalline states, each of these states we can now call the crystal of time. [49]

Narrativity is the action of the crystal-image as an internal circuit of actual and virtual, of narrative and narration, and from this circuit the photograph or film still constitutes a crystal-image that is a seed for an environment of the possible. Deleuze notes that the seed image comes from the reflexive text, from the film-within-a-film. The presentation of a film's production within a film creates the reflexivity of the free-indirect discourse by its self-consciousness. This state of the seed is distinct from a mirror-image of cinema, in which a completed film within a film is a mirror of the overall. The seed image is a film which is in the process of production, and Deleuze points to the films being made within Frederico Fellini's *8 1/2* and

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Warburg/BFI, 1972).
[48] TI, p. 82

Jean-Luc Godard's *Passion*. In these cases, the *mise-en-abyme* does not create reflections of the overall narratives, but instead constitutes an environment of refractions of it. This film-within-a-film constitutes a translation from the real (a seed image) to the possible (an environment of perception-images) that we can trace back to Deleuze's original work on Bergson. In *Bergsonism*, Deleuze notes that Being is misrecognized as a passage from the possible to the real, a 'closing-down' of possibilities. Instead, possibility flows from the real, for the possible must contain it. In this case, the actual gives rise to virtualization (perception) because recollection is memory of what has already passed [50]. Photographs are popularly conceived as a translation of the possible to the real: they unnaturally divide movement into discrete units. However, in fact, they create environments of the possible because they annihilate chronology in favour of a non-chronological time that is indirect.

Cindy Sherman's Untitled Film Stills also flow from the real to the possible, and exhibit the translation or growth from seed to environment. They expose their own production as well as the production of film in general. Film stills in general reflect their production only as a transparent apparatus – they are derived from real movement-images, and express possibilities of the narrative only according to recollection-images of other, finite, narratives. A general film still constitutes a leap into ontology based on the recollection of film: we place ourselves at once into film, and then into regions of film genre, narrative resolution and so on, and perception-images of filmic narrative flow from this recollection. As photogrammes they have the potential of the free-indirect discourse, but not its fulfillment.

This can be further explained as a relationship of text and context. Mulvey and Williamson, and later Krauss, recognize the benefit of foreknowledge in analysing Sherman's work. As an example the terms 'grainy', 'Renoir-esque', 'New Wave', 'Neo-Realism', 'Hitchcock', 'Art movie', all appear in these articles as descriptions of the style of the images, and also the style

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[49] Ibid.
[50] B, pp. 17-18.

of the films referenced, hinting at a perceived narrative of which the image is a fragment:

> Something is worrying, not to say frightening, the women in photos like Untitled #80 - at least 90 minutes' worth of something [51].

These interpretations rely upon the action of memory in organising duration into discrete recollection-images as a becoming-mad of depth. It is the recognition of conventions of representation which prompts their analysis, and what they recognize as the common analysis by a spectator. Not only do they comment on the images as reminiscent of particular film styles, but further to this, in a double operation of narrativity and the perception of that narrativity, they acknowledge the reflexivity of the images themselves as images which explicitly reference established cinematic motifs. Furthermore, their approach to the work is on the condition of recognizing Sherman herself. Her visual presence in almost all the photographs is a visible marker of the camera self-consciousness.

> But the obvious fact that each character is Sherman herself, disguised, introduces a sense of wonder at the illusion and its credibility. And, as is well known in cinema, any moment of marveling at an illusion immediately destroys its credibility. [52]

Once the illusion of cinema is broken, the image is released from the sensory-motor-schema of the movement-image. This has a double consequence for Sherman's Film Stills, for they constitute a break not in cinematic illusion, but a virtual cinematic illusion. Sherman's images are seeds precisely because they are not real film stills. They present a film within a film that is already a virtual image of possibilities emanating from the photographic discourse of cinematographic syntax. They are derived from real photographs that are in turn derived from possibilities of narrative. In Sherman's work we place ourselves into photography and its possibilities, before placing ourselves into regions of filmic recollection *that are already virtual* because the *Film Stills* do not refer to actual films, but the possibilities in film. This environment is one of multiple states of the

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[51] Williamson, 1986, p. 99.

crystal-images: virtual images of which none in particular is privileged. The particular interpretation of each image, whether it is finally identified as Renoir-esque, or 'an Antonioni', is highly personal and unique – despite the similarities that communal cultural and social experiences will promote. (Interestingly, all the directors named imply a film experience of a particular level of education, class, and social and political experience – despite the 'shlock' to which they also refer. There are no Sirks, Hawks, or TV Movies individually remembered, and yet the object of Sherman's perceived criticism is, apparently, Hollywood.)

The photograph is a real, limpid or actual text that implies a virtual, indistinct or opaque context of unlimited possibility. This context is a narration whose opacity is due to foregrounding. As the context becomes actual it becomes limpid, so the text becomes virtual and opaque. The text becomes a distinct narrative through the structuring of the narration as transparency, and obversely the context becomes distinct narration through the structuring of the narrative. In this circuit, text and context become indistinguishable from each other. Their indistinctness creates the environment of the time-image, for which it acts as the seed. Deleuze's regime of the crystal and its relationship with narrative, narration and narrativity can be finally depicted as follows, in which the action of narrativity is the translation or the circuit from which the seed emerges:

| Actual | _ | Opaque/Limpid | _ | Virtual |

| | Explicitness | _ | _ | Implicitness | |

⇧⇩

Seed/Environment

The seed crystallizes the environment of the image. It crystallizes the actual narrative with virtual narration. It crystallizes the opacity of the explicit and the limpidity of the implicit. The seed is within this internal circuit, acting as the actual image to crystallize a virtual environment, for

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[52] Laura Mulvey, 'Cosmetics and Abjection: Cindy Sherman 1977-87', in *Fetishism and Curiosity*, (London, BFI, 1996), pp. 65-76, p. 68.

which it will then become the virtual image. The seed is a quality of indiscernibility between events depicted and the manner of their depiction. It is the virtual image that crystallizes the objects and events of the photograph, and yet which acts as the actual image in order to do so. The actual and the virtual, as Deleuze describes, are exchanged in indiscernibility. The future of the photograph is always virtual, crystallizing the objects within as an environment. In so doing, their quality as crystallizable renders the future of the image as actual. At any stage, these states appear as distinct, and yet are structured by the other. This appearance of distinctness, and the state of indistinctness which makes it possible, is the result of a relationship that is the internal circuit of the crystal. Furthermore, it is the result of a relationship in which its nature as a circuit is a quality. It is the quality of narrativity and it is narrativity which is the seed.

<div align="center">* * *</div>

The crystal-image in the photography of Cindy Sherman

It is narrativity that enables Williamson and Mulvey recognition of the conventions of representation Sherman's work. We can see all those facets of narrativity being engaged and subsequently demonstrated in analysis. Judith Williamson bases her interpretations primarily on her knowledge of cinematic conventions that require, enforce and reward narrativity according to Scholes' definition. Both stress the effectiveness of Sherman's work in conveying meaning, underlining the nature of narrativity as quality perceived in the narrative. They point to the ambiguity of interpretation that develops from a restriction of *mise-en-scène* and a denial of linguistic message, with Williamson pointing to the role of women in cinematic convention as 'thermometers' of narrative. Williamson sees the role of women as an imprint of action in narrative cinema, most explicit in the horror genre. The perceived emotion of the women acts as a signifier for the imagined narrative in this way. This is continued by Mulvey in her developing analysis of the Untitleds of 1981, in which the women appear to react to the camera which Mulvey perceives as a parallel to the fetishized spectacle of the pornographic gaze.

<u>Slide 60</u>

Sherman's work refers to the intertextuality of narratives which put pleasure as the reward for spectator activity, but these 'thermometers' are of virtual images of narrative. Narrativity is instrumental in the processes of interpretation in cinematic experience, and it is contingent upon the operation of memory at differing levels, or facets, in order to provide cinematic pleasure. Also, we can observe that narrativity, does not occur within the spectator, nor in the text as the spectator is directed to perceive. Instead narrativity is the translation from this opposition to a directed viewpoint. Sherman's accuracy of comment is perceived by Mulvey et al as effective through the artist's ability to demonstrate particular directed narratives and the spectator positions that support them. Narrativity is seen only as a reward for these directed readings. However the reflexivity of Sherman's work as a dicisign, or free-indirect proposition, dislocates these directed readings and provides the seed for an environment of the crystal-image in which these directed images of narrative are simply facets in an ever-growing crystal form.

The sense of narrative in Sherman is a by-product of her direct work with imaginary film stills. In the first analysis, it is these images which appear to have an open association with conventional understanding of narrative and narrative processes. The narrative quality of her later work is assumed to generate from these early and highly structured attempts as photographic story telling. Narrative is a contextual link between the most disparate images in Sherman's collection. To know the narrative processes in one Sherman photograph is to know them all. Sherman's earlier work becomes part of the recollection-image – the context that merges with the text in an unequal exchange – of this new photograph.

It is through this intertextual connection with cinema that Sherman's film stills also display their first dimension in time. The patterns of narrative which are evoked in traditional readings of her images mean that Sherman's work presents an elliptical narrative which extends as an

affection-image around the still *but remains limited* by the conventional parameters of cinematic narrative. Their nature as film stills implies their imagined narrative's genesis and conclusion. A narrative-image projects backwards and forwards around the still to generate an affection-image of a complete film. It is this facet of Sherman's images which promote and extend structural readings of her imagined narratives as exemplified by the gender-based debate examined above. Narrativity, as a demonstration of a still's *mise-en-abyme* and of its nature as immobile section, is ultimately restricted in the first instance to the movement-image.

In a Deleuzean analysis such an approach is limiting. In metonymic connection with a cinema which presents time abstractly through the display of movement, these are simply affection-images of an imagined movement-image. Narrativity imposed upon such images justly responds to a sense of narrative time based on a depiction of movement in space. Conversely, whilst some of the photographs appear as if they were stills from European, avant-garde, or radical filmmaking, a filmmaking which Deleuze himself promotes as a cinema of the time-image, such assumptions are still similarly limited. For these associations are far from the free indirect discourse of narrative dialects that are by nature present in such cinemas, but are instead the result of a reading of complex but conventional textual signifiers. *In such a limited analysis, they are limited by the cinema they are seen to represent, not freed by the time-images they really are.* Inasmuch as some stills contain Hitchcock heroines, others contain women from eighties' art-house movies, or Godardian starlets, to name but a few. All the women represented in the 1981 images, and from then on, act as textual signifiers in much the same way. It is not in their textual significance as film stills that we will find Sherman's images are time-images, but instead in their independent textuality.

The key to these photographs as time-images lies in their indiscernibility as textual signifiers. They present narrative and narration as their subject, and immediately invoke a narrativity in the process. Rather than the structural narrativity of Scholes, it is the narrativity as seed of the time-image which is

demonstrated by these pictures as texts. It is their textual indiscernibility which gives them the dimension of the internal circuit of the crystal-image. In focusing all imagined action into a fragment of narrative, the film stills present the virtual image of the film as a seed-image of the real image of the photograph.

In this event, a structuralist reading of Sherman's work is too limiting, as the crystal image is translated from immobile section into pure duration. Time splits in Sherman's photographs, not into the abstract notion of narrative ellipsis, but into a pure image of time which narrativity plants as a seed. The past of the image is constituted simultaneously with the present, and each is launched into a time-image - one of a past of the image, another of the future: "two dissymetrical jets".

It is in this splitting that the photograph encapsulates the moment of indiscernibility, the 'mutual image' or 'bit of time' that defines the crystal. The transparency of photography presents the crystal pane at its purest. The depth of the crystal is time seen in perspective in the image; moving back into the image and back in time. In this sense the crystal-image is *not* a time-image, but rather an image of the environment created by the time-image as pure optical situation. It is the image of the exchange, the point of indiscernibility reached, and the structure created by the emanating interpretations of the dicisign: Flashbulb Memories, "Now Print!" orders; actualisations. The photograph as object is the plane of immanence that is the limit between the virtual and the actual, yet in freezing the past, delivering it and yet not delivering, the photograph presents the future as heterogeneous and unbounded. It is an unequal exchange of virtual and actual that is perfectly presented in the photograph, in which the pane of the crystal, the transparent surface of the picture, marks the limit between the objective and the subjective and freezes its affect. The finite of the actual image gives way to an infinite virtual, an eternal potentiality which extends into a future made up of passing presents, and of making up pasts.

Sherman's photographs are a coalescence of the virtual and the actual. What has formerly been called the photographic language of her photographs, the narration, can now be seen as in a state of indiscernibility with the narrative. Narrativity liberates her photographs from their part in the sensory-motor schema, rather than confines them to it. Rather than images in chronology, they can present only non-chronological time. In this sense, chronology should not be seen as something to be added to Sherman's photographs to make them 'work', but instead should be seen as a limitation or organization of their depiction of time. Without chronology, we are caught in the cerebral *intervalle*, the point at which recollection-subjectivity (in which we choose those recollections which are most useful) and contraction-subjectivity (the perception of quality) actualize memory, according to Deleuze's reading of Bergson [53]. We see now that the narratives of Sherman's images are aspects of memory, and memory is the experience of duration in its pure state. It is memory that unfolds the pure time that is in the crystal; that creates the complex structure of the crystalline; that enacts virtually the narratives of the photographs. We exist within the free-rewriting time of the photograph that Wollen described, and each time we write a narrative and it is crystallized, it is altered by the exchange within the internal circuit, and a new virtual narrative is formed that does not replace the first, but instead refracts it. The crystal image of time in its pure state emanates from this internal circuit, first in the two dissymmetrical jets, and as these are crystallized, so the whole grows and continues to project outward and heterogeneously with its incredible force.

Slide 61

The internal circuit in Sherman is represented initially as a relationship of text and context. Text and context are in constant alternation in the Sherman image. The textual is a set of objects - the immobile section. This is the actual image which crystallizes the virtual image or the context. This is seen in Sherman's *Untitled Film Still # 4* (1977). The immobile section is the hallway, the door, and finally the woman. The virtual image is the past

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[53] B, pp. 52-53.

and future of the image. The action of the internal circuit is the narrativity, the quality of the image as a potentiality. This is a horror film. She is about to die. This is a melodrama, she is about to enter a lover's hotel-room. Each new narrative is crystallized and becomes the crystal-image. The exchange from virtual to actual relies upon narration. The actual image of the immobile set crystallizes potentialities and they become the actual image. In reflection the set becomes a mobile, virtual image, capable of change. The horror film becomes a melodrama. In Sherman it is the state of the woman that focuses indiscernibility. Sherman's women are always in the act of 'doing' when they are photographed. They provoke no distinct future, nor do they portray any distinct past, they can only represent a point of potentiality between the two. Their movement, however slow, is always an indivisible intensity that divides past and future. This is the point of indiscernibility - the quality of the image which makes it the crystal image. Judith Williamson approached this potentiality when she described Sherman's women as 'thermometers' of action. The picture presents the past as real, the staging of the photograph existed for the photograph to exist. But the image presents a possible future, a virtual image of the possible is crystallized by the actual image of the staged past. It is the pose of the woman that crystallizes the virtual image, she remains in the act of doing, of moving forward in time, yet not moving forward. The potentiality is now actual, and the staged photograph now virtual, an image of time. The woman's pose represents the point of indiscernibility or the crystal image. In fact, Sherman's women do not reflect the time of the image, for they are within the time of the image. Sherman's women are internal to the non-chronological time of the photograph-as-crystal, just as we are internal to time in Bergson's analysis.

Slide 62

In another picture, *Untitled Film Still # 16* (1978), a woman sits in a chair and looks out of shot. In this image, the crystal image is now more closely a mutual image, or unequal exchange. Its dislocation from a fictional world presents the limits of the crystal and the indiscernibility between a past of the image and a present. In this image the potentiality is focused on the

distinctness of the past. Whereas in # 4 the woman presented the potentiality of an indistinct future, the resting woman in # 16 presents only staged past and virtual past. It is the time of the image which launches into the future. There is no potentiality towards the future in this image, only a representation of past. And yet the mutual image still exists. The staged image remains as an actual image, which in turn crystallizes the virtual image of past narrative. As the narrative-image becomes actual, the actual image of the immobile set shifts, for it does not depict present, it becomes another virtual past. This is the unequal exchange of the Untitled Film Stills.

The most explicit crystalline structure in Deleuze's analysis is the mirror, and in Sherman the mirrors further concentrate the point of indiscernibility between actual and virtual. The virtual image assumes independence from its actuality through the reflection of its narrative into the narration. Mirrors in Sherman are almost invariably looking glasses. The exchange takes place in a space coded as feminine, coded as a place of masquerade and the creation, reflection and refraction of identity; focusing the exchange of actual and virtual through the potentiality of the actor.

Slide 63

Mirrors ensure a self-consciousness that immediately calls into question the role and creation of identity. Framed by the limits of the photograph, the face is further framed by a surface that becomes landscape, as the light sparkles off the dust on the mirror's surface. Like Man Ray's photograph of Duchamp's *Large Glass*, this image too has a landscape from which a face emerges, only to draw attention to its surface as a landscape, and make it virtual again.

Slide 64

In *Untitled Film Still #2* (1977) and *Untitled Film Still # 81* (1978), the women checking themselves blur to become virtual images while their reflection, of which we only see a partially obscured face, becomes

actualized. But unlike Welles' *The Lady from Shanghai*, they will never escape from the internal circuit that the reflection has created for them. The virtual image in the mirror becomes actualized and the woman disappears from view, she becomes virtual. In return, the image in the mirror actualizes the virtual character who becomes distinct. This actual image includes her bathrobe, in *#2*, which only partly covers her, it includes the doorway which frames her (in both), and reflects abstractly the 'bit' of time, or stolen moment. The potentiality exists in this exchange of time. The staged actual image exchanges with the fragmented virtual time of the image presented by the covert look through the doorway. This becomes actual to push the staged moment out-of-field and complete the circuit.

Doorways are crucial to the depiction of these crystal images. In *# 81* the doorway similarly acts as an element of the exchange that takes place in the mirror. In this image it is the gaze through the mirror towards the viewer which acts as the point of indiscernibility. The exchanges take place across this point, but instead of a present of the image, this photograph moves further to involve an explicit alternation between the subjective and objective. The actual image of the staged moment is detached from the subjective and exists as objective, but the framing of the doorway and the gaze through the mirror are actualized while the staged moment becomes virtual. This actualization becomes a complicity in the clandestine surveillance, before the woman-as-virtual-image is crystallized to become the actual once more. The mirror represents the smallest internal circuit, through which objectivity and subjectivity are exchanged as discourse. However, doubt always remains, and subjective or objective readings find no solid basis in this mutual image. Neither character or reflection is distinct in the internal circuit.

The mirror is finally central to the indiscernibility between the limpid and the opaque in Sherman's later images. Indiscernibility is focused through the mirror whilst around it the limpid and the opaque are separated by ground or earth.

<u>Slide 65</u>

In *Untitled #167* (1986) the mirror is the point of indiscernibility, but it is the ground that presents a barrier or plane between the two crystal states. The objects strewn across this blasted earth present the signifiers for narrative, according to a structuralist account. Each object serves to anchor further a concrete imagined narrative, made substantial by the strength of these signifiers. However, in a Deleuzean analysis, this is the visible, limpid narrative separated from the opaque by surface. In the *Cinema* books he saw water as a surface, both in Jean Vigo's *L'Atalante* and John Huston's *Moby Dick*, that turned the dualism of actual/virtual into one of limpidity and opacity. The surface of the water separated the knowable, limpid image of the decks of the ship, which constantly remain visible, from the dark and obscured opacity of beneath the waves [54]. In this image from Sherman, it is the diaspora of domestic objects that remains visible, whilst the disturbed earth hides the opaque image of what might be buried. Indiscernibility has a shifting operation within this photograph. There is the mirror as a focusing nexus of indetermination between the actual objects of the set and the virtual image reflected in the compact, but in a departure from the circuit portrayed in the early film stills, there is no actual character immediately recognizable to reflect in the looking glass. Instead, this shifting action takes place with the fragmented face which, unearthed from the dirt, appears as if rising to the surface from a deep pool. This really is the face that becomes a landscape, the face that emerges from a landscape made into a "Now Print!" order of woman.

As occurs in the early film stills, it is the returned gaze through the compact's mirror which actualizes the reflected, or virtual image, within it. The objects half obscured by the earth pass into virtuality, but in being crystallizeable, are actualized to become the dead face which emerges from the grave. The face in the mirror, now virtual, becomes the ghost of the dead, liberating in the mirror the body trapped in the mud. But in being crystallizeable, the actual image of death makes the objects become more and more opaque, they slip back under the dark earth, to become an

opaque image of disintegration. They return to virtual landscape. This returned gaze in Sherman's photographs adds yet another level to the reflexivity of the image: it alters the state of the crystal from one of growth to one of decomposition. The ever-growing reflexivity has been altered by the returned gaze, once a circuit, it is now once again a direct image, only this time there still remain echoes of the exchange that once took place. Deleuze's vision of the crystal in decomposition was in the incestuous world of the rich and aristocratic, inward looking, and incapable of escaping its own reflexive ontology except through decay [55]. When Sherman turns to look toward the camera-conscious, especially in *Untitled#167* from 1986 and *#175* from 1987, the reflexive look leads to the crystal in a state of decomposition. Here the sense of foreboding, the horror, are turned inward.

In two of the more recent sets, the sex pictures and the fairy tale pictures, we can see the crystal in the process of decomposition. Just as Deleuze saw decomposition in the cinema of Visconti, it is the decomposition of the environment of the photographic scenes that demonstrates the last stage of the crystal image. Each of Sherman's images, from 1977 to 1993, is a composition. Each photograph is a composed scene, and a crystalline environment of pure duration, focused on a point of indiscernibility, a mirror, or a woman's stance. In the history portraits the plastic breasts, facial prosthetics, and opaque make-up create the surface as a landscape from which the faces emerge only to recede. Each circuit is focused upon the actual Sherman and the virtual image, either in the reflection of the *mise-en-scène*, or in the refraction through the *mise-en-abyme*.

Slide 66

. In these later works, there is the limpid, actual image of the objects, and the virtual image refracted in *mise-en-abyme*. But Sherman's personal absence denies the internal circuit its plane of immanence. Shifting from potentiality to potentiality, the circuit has no point or peak around which to

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[54] Ibid p. 73.
[55] Ibid p. 94.

revolve. It unravels in a process of decomposition. As the crystal unravels and loses its autonomous integrity, the limpid slips into opacity. Unlike the unravelling of time within the crystal image, in which cronos is liberated from chronos, this is a chaotic unravelling or decomposition of time. The past disintegrates in integrity as an actual image, and the present only exists as a deeper and deeper abyss.

The limpid becomes ever more mysterious, dark and profane. Unlike Sherman's earlier images of horror, with their images of bodily viscera as a diaspora, there is no surface or plane to reflect the crystal. The images become ever more indistinct, as body parts lose their clarity and limpidity, and become mysterious shapes. They become echoes of the internal circuit, degenerating as the circuit unravels. As the image becomes ever more virtual, they do not cease to be crystallizeable, but instead this quality is an unfulfilled potentiality.

In structuralist criticism, such a narrative of death is focused in the objects themselves. In such an analysis narrativity is limited by the image as immobile section. Only the abstract narration of the movement-image can be envisaged as a result. It is only when the image moves beyond the visible and limpid and into the opaque and virtual that the image reveals itself as a time-image. The photograph is a time-image because it presents no time. More precisely, the image is not shackled to the constraints of the movement-image. It does not present time as chronological time. Decay in this sense is not the staccato death of Benjamin, but the evanescence – a return to former shapes – that we found in the statues of the Parc des Sceaux or the Tuileries. It presents no division of measured time, no abstract notion of a past or of a limited future, as do the film stills. Instead of presenting Chronos, a chronological time, *Untitled #167* presents Cronos, the foundation, or seed, of pure duration, and it does so presenting the indivisible mutability of form. Similarly, just as the earth is indiscernible from excretia in this image, so it is presented in *Untitled #175*, whose new surface of food and vomit – one is often indiscernible from the other – demonstrates the indivisible change from one state to another.

Slide 67

Mirrors and the diaspora resurface this image, and similar images from the set, which include *Untitleds #179* through *#235*. Here the objects once again present an opaque surface that hides the virtual image. It is the circuit from virtual to actual, from opaque to limpid that is the narrativity, the seed of the time-image environment. The seed act as the abyss (*mise-en-abyme*) out of which the time-image grows as an environment. The seed refracts the image, enlarging and projecting it rather than reflecting, as the mirror does. The exchange exists between actual and virtual within this abyss, but it does so as a constant, outwardly moving repetition. The time-image grows through this repetition. The mirror is a seed, but in Sherman's images the seed extends to become the peak, or point, of indiscernibility in the earth, or on the blood, vomit, semen and sputum strewn carpets of her later images. These surfaces repeat the exchange of limpid and opaque, of explicit and implied, to create an environment of pure time. Narrativity is the seed and narrativity finds its plane of immanence most effectively demonstrated in these flat surfaces.

Deleuze's adherence to the seed of the crystal is emphasized again through his dissemination of acting and role-play. In Sherman's early colour work, *mise-en-scène* is stripped bare, pared away to liberate narrativity from the constraints of the implied ellipsis of the film stills. Back projection, or deep chiaroscuro lighting, create a pure opsign, the image of time disconnected from any abstract impression of duration.

Slide 68

Absence of reflective *mise-en-scène* creates instead a *mise-en-abyme* which, following the nature of the crystal, refracts rather than reflects. The nexus, or plane of immanence of the crystal is no longer the mirror but the seed, and the seed is Sherman. Within a scene spare of the *mise-en-scène* of narrative, the image and its internal circuit are focused upon Sherman herself. The image gains mobility as the internal circuit revolves

around the concentrated image of Sherman-as-actor. We saw a sort of back projection in *Untitled Film Still #56*, in which the mirror's dust presented a surface that these projections now repeat. Faces emerge, but it is impossible, as Mulvey and Williamson found, to separate Sherman the actor from the fragments of character that she portrays. *Untitled #86* and *#96*, (from the 'Centrefolds') pared even from the back projection of the previous set, the deep lighting focuses the circuit evermore on Sherman.

Slide 69

Yet the surfaces remain, whether a tiled floor, or the opacity of the deep blacks that suggest both surface and depth. Even so, these images are stripped of the heavy signifiers of the movement image, and are at once liberated from it and instead caught within the circuit of the crystal image. The virtual image, untied from direct connection to objects, becomes less certain and is invested with more potential. The simplified form of *Untitled #96*, rather than direct or restrict narrative potentiality, frees it. It is the absence of signifiers that makes them pure opsigns in themselves. With the actual image limited to Sherman herself, the darkness presents an abyss of virtuality. The actor embodies a crystal, according to Deleuze, and never more so than in the freakish, or the horrific:

> ...the more the virtual image of the role becomes actual and limpid, the more the actual image of the actor moves into the shadows and becomes opaque: there will be a private project of the actor, a dark vengeance...this underground activity will detach itself and become visible in turn, as the interrupted role falls back into opacity. [56]

Sherman becomes these women, becomes Sherman. It is easy to be drawn, in this way, to Sherman's 'history' images, or the grotesques that make up a Grand Guignol in the fairy stories. Deleuze, after all, was drawn to the unfortunates who appear in Tod Browning's work. But it is in these two photographs, with their play on surface and depth, that we see the crystal exchange most visible. The crystal is more complex because they lack the prosthetics, the make-up – the plastic. It is the shadows that act

as the surface hiding the mystery of an opaque darkness, which in being realized becomes actual. This new actual image dominates the textuality of the scene, it is the new limpid image. Sherman, now as virtual image, having crystallized the virtual image within the shadows, disappears into the opaque.

Sherman's later work with depictions of sex acts displays the seed image reflexively. Sherman's sex images begin once again as immobile sets of objects. Vivid and lurid sexual acts are depicted in situ, through the use of inanimate sex toys, medical dummies, and Halloween masks. In one image, *Untitled #257, 1992*, fluid is caught, mid flow, as a droplet suspended in mid air. This is the actualization of the immobile section. Freezing time as in a snapshot, cinema image, or pornographic photograph. Sherman destroys the abstraction of time in the snapshot by using dummies and glycerine (or resin). She confounds the chronos of the immobile section by photographing immobile objects. Their movement is not in space as a movement-image, it is in intensity as a time-image.

Slide 70

These are seed images because they are works in progress, they are images within images, just as Deleuze saw the films-within-films of Fellini and Godard. The dummies present not only the construction of the image, the set of objects, but also the sex act itself, as if the sex act is a virtual image, always in construction – a virtual image always being crystallized, and always being replaced. These are images of a becoming-sex – but that is another story. The dummies are made virtual as each sexual foray is crystallized in imagination (we often say, of sexual imagery, that it leaves nothing to the imagination, but this is wrong). They are actualized by process to invite another virtual image. The crystal grows.

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[56] MI, p. 72.

Conclusion

This internal circuit of narrativity is the seed for the time-image. What grows from this seed is the photograph as an image of duration. The photograph is liberated from the abstract connection to time, via the freezing of action, and the time of the image ceases to have any abstract chronology. The movement-image, which can imply only an ellipsis of time, is translated by the internal circuit, by narrativity, into the crystal. There is no sense of this abstract time in Sherman's later images, because they are liberated from their outward depiction of chronology. But this belies a liberation that took place in those Untitled Film Stills; a liberation that was all the more hidden because they were 'film stills', and yet because of this was all the more violent. Even Mulvey found the Film Stills difficult to fix analyses based on the treatment of the spectator, and her words echo the shape of the crystal in her description of the fluidity of the subjective:

> But just as she is artist and model, voyeur and looked at, active and passive, subject and object, the photographs set up a comparable variety of positions and responses for the viewer. There is no stable subject position in her work, no resting point that does not quickly shift into something else. So the *Film Stills'* initial sense of homogeneity and credibility breaks up into [a] kind of heterogeneity of subject position... [57]

This brings us back to the beginning of the chapter, but lets us add to the Untitled Film Stills an understanding across Sherman's work. Sherman's later images, with the sex objects, the masks, and also the prosthetics that adorn her in those images which reflect historical painting, re-emphasize the importance of acting which is first enunciated in her film stills, and which point to the heart of the crystal; acting presents the embodiment of the exchange between actual (actor) and (virtual) persona. This is why contemporary critics of Sherman have been unable to separate the women in her pictures from the woman who plays them, Sherman herself. Whether attacking this duality of persona as willfully engaging in the female masquerade, or defending such an engagement with the

masquerade as a criticism of it, it is nevertheless crucial that Sherman is both actor and character. It is not just the women who represent the potentiality of the point of indiscernibility, but Sherman herself. Her presence in each image actualizes the objects of the photograph. Each photograph is a scene in which Sherman belongs to the real, and yet her ability to become transparent crystallizes the virtual image or the characters she portrays. And yet the crystal nature of the photographs, the co-existence of virtual and actual, is the reason why the image of Sherman is never dislocated from Sherman-as-image. They are never fully distinguishable from each other. Sherman as actor cannot exist alone without crystallizing the virtual image of the character she portrays, and as her presence in the real becomes virtual, she retains the crystallizeable quality – the quality of narrativity – that enables the circuit to repeat. She never ceases to be Sherman, and yet she never ceases to be those women she portrays. The presence of Sherman returns us also to that condition of the time-image that is most explicit in certain photography, for each picture refers to itself as a subjectivity, a perception, which frames the discourse between the subject and object that cinema, pornography, classical painting, and magazine culture embody. Sherman is the marker of self-consciousness in her work.

The crystal exists around a focal plane, a plane of immanence. In Sherman's work, the plane of immanence is a point of indiscernibility that begins as an object within a set of objects and is embodied in her. In those images in which she is absent – or becomes absent – the crystal decomposes. She constitutes the peak between the distinct and the indistinct, but also is the translation from this immobile section toward a mobile section of pure duration – a time-image. At times the plane of immanence is the mirror, which makes a continual reappearance throughout the work, at other times it is a set of objects which imply her presence but cannot replace it. Sherman is the 'diffuse, supple' object at the heart of the internal circuit. The true seed of the crystalline environment is Sherman herself. It is her appearance as actor and character in her work that demonstrates each scene as a whole, or an

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[57] Mulvey, 1996, p. 69.

entirety. It is her presence that makes each photograph or scene a pure opsign, a purely crystalline optical experience and it is her absence that causes the delicate structure of reversibility within the crystal to decompose.

The point of indiscernibility is the concatenation of Sherman as actor and Sherman as character. Narrativity lies in this indistinctness. Narrativity in Sherman is a quality of the point of indiscernibility that translates the immobile images of her photographs to become facets in the crystal. It is the *quality* of the crystal – the quality of this translation – that can be described as narrativity. As we have seen the crystal in its most perfect state, we have seen narrativity at its most powerful; and was we have seen the crystal decompose, we have seen narrativity at its most powerless. Finally, narrativity suggests an indivisible process that can only be described as a becoming. Attached to narrative forms such as the film still, the becoming of photography assumes a quality appropriate to narrative. This suggests that if we take narrative away from the photographic image, we are likely to see becoming-photography in its pure operation.

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Chapter Five:

From Environment to seed:

Andy Warhol and becoming-photography

Slide 71

Introduction

One of Deleuze's particular interests is in Jean-Luc Godard, whose cinema engaged thought by detaching perception from images as tracings of the world, and images of reality:

> Thus modern cinema develops new relations with thought from three points of view: the obliteration of a whole or totalization of images, in favour of an outside that is inserted between them; the erasure of an internal monologue as whole of the film, in favour of a free indirect discourse or vision; the erasure of the unity of man and the world, in favour of a break which now leaves us with only a belief in this world. [1]

A bout de souffle, for example, was shot on silent film, creating scenes in which sound and image do not match, but which instead enter into discourse with each other. The free-indirect discourse is created not simply by a pure optical situation, nor a pure sound situation, but from an absence of the connection between the two. What this detachment, or absence, guarantees for us is a film time and space that is *a priori* movement-image; one that Deleuze describes as pre-hodological [2]. Unable to make concrete connections, the crystal environment created by the free-indirect discourse of sound and image throws up a web of potential time-images.

To understand the opsign we have to consider it in lieu of the sensory-motor schema, and even in lieu of its relationship with the sonsign. We have to detach it from these, or look for instances in which it presents 'a beyond' of the sensory-motor schema. These new sites of investigation should be films that employ the very structure of cinema as their subject, since they are immediately self-reflexive - experimental films are common examples. These demonstrate, if not a link to the photograph, then a link to the genetic element of photography: the opsign.

As such, they certainly point to the kind of image-sound situation that Deleuze saw as the 'beyond of the movement-image':

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[1] TI, p. 188.
[2] Ibid p. 203.

> ...to cut perception off from its motor extension, action, from the
> thread which joined it to a situation, affection from adherence or
> belonging to characters. The new image would therefore not be a
> bringing to completion of the cinema, but a mutation of it. [3]

We can seek to understand the crystal environment, as we found in Sherman's photographs, but we also need to understand the process by which that environment comes-into being. We need to see the construction of cinema to see the crystal environment growing, or being made. We need to see its structures and materials at work, and in both production and in reception, in order to understand them less as a process, and more as a *becoming.* The indivisible structure of time can only be represented in an indivisible process of image-making - one without beginning or end - that presents the becoming of cinema. In this case, avant-garde cinema might be an appropriate place to look; particularly if we are indeed searching for filmmakers and/or photographers for whom the nature of photography, or the function of cinema, has a large stake in their work. Indeed, when such subjects are discussed, there are certain filmmakers – Maya Deren, Stan Brakhage, Hollis Frampton, and Michael Snow amongst others – who immediately develop a large gravitational field for critical discourse, or a 'critical mass'. Deleuze, for example, describes Snow's seminal 1967 film *Wavelength* as a film that "extracts a potential space [from a room], whose power and quality he progressively exhausts."[4] Avant-garde film is a vast subject; to attempt to reduce it to any particular set of dates, characteristics, philosophy, personnel, or critical discourse would be self-defeating in this respect. If anything, we should immediately acknowledge the potential to see avant-garde film as a molecular becoming: spreading by contagion, at once pack like and at once imperceptible, it is so difficult to define a genesis (Eiseinstein? Vertov? The Lumières?), a nemesis (Stone? Scott? Spielberg?), or a coda, that instead we must see that it is an opening up to view of the functions and processes of cinema. Without a definite beginning (it is oppositional) nor end (new technologies bring new

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[3] MI, p. 215
[4] Ibid p. 122

practices), it is only what Deleuze described as a *milieu*. Avant-garde cinema is thus the *milieu* of cinema.

Avant-garde cinema is a constant coming-into-being of cinema, since all films begin essentially with the same practices. But if it is a *becoming*, it is also true that historians continually seek to historicise or mythologise it. Many critics focus on mid-sixties New York, for example. Indeed, P. Adams Sitney has described this period as "the mythical stage of the avant-garde"[5]. The work of part-entrepreneur, part-critic, part-filmmaker Jonas Mekas' had a huge hand in the development of criticism and practice of avant-garde cinema in New York in the sixties. Mekas has written about this time as having the "feeling that cinema is only beginning", but also that filmmakers "demonstrated anew the immense capabilities of the camera to record life, its poetry and its prose – a fact often forgotten since Lumière took his first street shots."[6] Alongside critics such as Sitney, Parker Tyler, Annette Michelson, and others, Mekas helped develop a critical community which is only partly characterised by its home in New York, only partly by pseudonyms such as Structuralist, or Materialist Film, and only partly by its often simplified opposition to Hollywood. The avant-garde community was one that had a molecular structure, with filmmakers and critics forming groups more akin to animal packs, rather than families, and in which the term avant-garde belied any cohesion in the structural sense. The New York film avant-garde is poorly described by the term 'avant-garde', and better by the sense of becoming implied by 'avant-garde-ing'.

The molecular nature of this film avant-garde is reflected in the much larger artistic avant-garde *becoming* that was also experiencing fruition in New York in the sixties. This was a widespread post-war boom in art that involved the coming together of both social and market forces. Diana Crane unpicks the commercial and social interests of the patronage and

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[5] P. Adams Sitney, *Visionary Film: the American avant-garde*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 371.

[6] Jonas Mekas, 'Notes on the New American Cinema', in P. Adams Sitney ed., *Film Culture Reader*, (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 87-107, p. 92. See also Jeffrey K. Ruoff, "Home Movies of the Avant-Garde: Jonas Mekas and the New York Art World", in *Cinema Journal*, Vol. 30, No. 3, (Spring 1991), pp. 6-28.

capital investment that invigorated the artistic community. For Crane, this time/movement/period was marked by a struggle for definitions of mass (or low) and high culture in which not only were such distinctions mutated and contorted to become relatively indiscernible, but in which those within the avant-garde of the sixties "internalised values and goals associated with the middle class and with popular culture"[7]. For many, this meant cinema and its place in culture.

Mekas and the others can be seen only as one part of a much larger 'block' of becoming – larger even that the New York avant-garde itself. This is the block of becoming centred around Andy Warhol, for whom Mekas was a friend, colleague, and camera-operator. In fact, Andy Warhol was not so much a part of the New York avant-garde, but that the New York avant-garde was part of the block of becoming that we can call Andy Warhol. To understand Warhol as a block of becoming you cannot start at the beginning (since there is none), nor at the end (since again, there is none), you have to start in the middle. To understand Warhol, we have to start with *My Hustler*.

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Odalisque

My Hustler was filmed in 1965 and shown intermittently until it had a general release in 1971. Its sparse structure is a mutation from the single shot 'fixation films' toward the more complex narrative and split-screen films of Warhol's later work. *My Hustler* was Warhol's first outing (in more ways than one) with Morrissey as collaborator-in-film, and marks a point of transition in which the time-image cinema of Warhol's early work becomes rooted in the narrative, cause-and-effect, and sensory-motor-schema of the later camp action-image movies. *My Hustler* then, both historically and stylistically, is a film very much 'in the middle'.

My Hustler is essentially divided into two single shots, an exterior and an

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[7] Diana Crane, *The Transformation of the Avant-garde: the New York Art World*, 1940-1985, (London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 11

interior, which each last for about 33 minutes (the length of a reel). Whilst the first exterior shot has a few in-camera edits and at least two 180° pans (both the result of Morrissey's direction), for most of the time in this shot the camera frames the reclining figure of the hustler in question, played by Paul America, over which can be heard the conversation between his 'john' (owner/client) and the latter's houseguests. The second static, interior shot covers the bathroom in which hustler, houseguests and subsequently jealous 'owner' banter, barter and bicker over each other. The film therefore sets up a number of dualisms, including those of inside and outside, movement and stasis, sound and image, looked and looked at, camera and screen, and even homosexual and heterosexual. However, these dualisms are disrupted and made arbitrary by the body of Paul America. *My Hustler* is what Deleuze described as 'cinema of the body'. It is Paul America's body that prevents the image from becoming rooted to action, from becoming the action-image, and it is the body that ensures the pre-hodological space of the time-image:

> It may be here that the cinema of the body fundamentally contrasted with the cinema of action. The action-image presupposes a space…which can be called 'hodological'. But the body is initially caught in quite a different space, where disparate sets overlap and rival each other, without being able to organize themselves into the sensory-motor schemata…It is a pre-hodological space, like a *fluctuatio animi* which does not point to an indecision of the spirit, but to an undecidability of the body.[8]

The concentration of image upon the body of Paul America thus confounds the expectations created by action-image cinema. His body disrupts the organic flow of movement-images and from this disruption come new relationships of filmmaker and audience, looker and looked at, camera and screen. From this cinema, above all, comes a new relationship of subject and object – *the free-indirect discourse.*

Tony Rayns notes how very little of the dialogue is actually about Paul

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[8] TI, p. 203.

America, leading to the possibility that a print of the film exists without Morrissey's edits and which frees the film's discourse entirely [9]. What this demonstrates is that the film's dialogue - its sonsign - increases the potential complexity of the crystal-image, but that it is not *necessarily* required to do this. Morrissey's direction threatens to anchor the image to a sensory-motor schema based on a particular character (the 'owner' – Ed Hood) and his desire for another (America). But this is ultimately not carried through because of the strength of the opsign itself, particularly as the internal circuit of virtual and actual merges in the body of Paul America *as odalisque.*

Paul America as odalisque relies upon a reflexivity involving any knowledge of painting on the part of the viewer and Warhol's own experience of art history. The exotic body of the odalisque in mannerist and romantic painting is easily recognizable, especially in Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres' *La Grande Odalisque* (1814) and *Odalisque and Slave* (1839) [10]. However, *My Hustler* draws on a wider significance of the odalisque, to include Edouard Manet's *Le Déjeuner sur l'Herbe* but especially his *Olympia* (both 1863). Like *Olympia*, Paul America courts looking, and while he doesn't return the gaze as *Olympia* does, the barely reflexive dialogue with its occasional reference to him still ensures that the viewer is *caught* looking. As in Manet's *Bar at the Folies Bergères* (1881-82), in *Olympia* the outward gaze is a point of indiscernibility of which there are many. However for *Olympia*, *Dejeuner*, and *My Hustler*, (in which the whiteness of the odalisque is emphasized) it is the space created by the body that is indicative of the crystal at work.

Slide 72

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[9] Tony Rayns, 'Andy's Handjobs', in Colin MacCabe, Mark Francis & Peter Wollen *eds., Who is Andy Warhol*, (London: BFI, 1997), pp. 83-88, p. 85. See also Tony Rayns, Review of *My Hustler*, in *Monthly Film Bulletin*, vol. 38, no. 449, (June 1971), p. 123, p123. See also Callie Angell, 'The Films of Andy Warhol', in Callie Angell et al, *The Andy Warhol Museum*, (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Institute, 1994), pp. 121-145, p. 122: "Included within this massive accumulation of physical materials are many detailed clues to Warhol's filmmaking practice [including] unused 33-minute reels shot for films such as *My Hustler* (1965)..."
[10] Interesting visual comparisons can be made between the composition of *Odalisque and Slave* and the framing of Genevieve Charbon and Paul America, as can comparisons be made between the composition of *Dejeuner* and the framing of Paul America and Joe Campbell.

The body of the odalisque as oriental concubine makes the distinction between the public space of commerce and the private space of sensuality disappear. This is explicit in the boudoir of *Olympia*, as in Ingres' paintings, but it is also evident in *Déjeuner*, whose enclosed space suggests suggests a privacy broken and made public by the viewer's stare. This has a further dimension in *My Hustler*, whose Fire Island-beach location acts as a stage for the complex cultural codes and taboos involved in gay openness in public space. As R. Bruce Brasell notes:

> Gay men enjoying the view are reminded of its public inaccessibility within this supposedly gay space.[11]

Brasell carries this notion of inside/outside space into the second half of the film, whose single shot of the bathroom makes indiscernible the public and private space of the bathroom in gay culture.

This use, by Warhol, of both the beach location and the odalisque body suggest a rich appreciation of the art history that appears to have more than casually or coincidentally informed his work. The features of the body and the space of the odalisque in classical and modern painting are instantly recognizable – its pose makes it a body-as-face. Thus Manet's *Olympia* has antecedents in Titian's *Venus of Urbino* (1538), and earlier in Giorgione's *Venus Asleep* of 1510. Furthermore, Manet's composition in *Déjeuner* is one whose features are recognizable in Marcantonio Raimondi's engraving of the *Judgement of Paris*, 1520. Finally, the outward gaze of Ingres' *La Grande Odalisque* appears no longer whimsical considering Ingres repeated the figure and her gaze in his grisaille version of 1824-34. [12]

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[11] R. Bruce Brasell, 'My Hustler: Gay Spectatorship as Cruising', *Wide Angle: A Film Quarterly of Theory, Criticism, and Practice* 14, no. 2 (April 1992), p. 54-64, p.58. Similarly *Le Dejeuner sur l'Herbe* is painting that possibly draws on the role of the banks of the Seine as a site of prostitution in the nineteenth century.

[12] See John Berger, *Ways of Seeing*, (London: Penguin/BBC, 1972), pp. 62-64. Thanks to John Calcutt for pointing out to me the visual connections between these pieces. Warhol may only have been vaguely familiar with the odalisque tradition, but both the Ingres grisaille (purchased in 1938) and the Raimondi engraving (1919) are in the collection of New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art, one of whose curators, Henry Geldzahler, was Warhol's close friend.

<u>Slide 73</u>

The use of the repose of the romantic odalisque, as well as the public/private space, enforces a particular interpretation of Paul America as hustler. The signs of their profession are written on the body-as-face of the odalisque, as so for Paul America. Even the space of looking, as emphasised in so many odalisques who gaze outward from the canvas, appears emphasised in *My Hustler* by the dialogue. The camera has replaced the returned gaze. The visual genealogy of the odalisque does, in Warhol's case, point to a deep knowledge of the odalisque as a sexual tradition, motif, and metaphor, and yet because of this something about Paul America as odalisque seems almost *too* easily recognisable; suggesting that such an interpretation should in fact be resisted.

In this sense then, if the odalisque is an actualization of certain forces or traits – such as sex and commerce, looking and desiring, looking and owning – then the dialogue in *My Hustler* has a hand in making these forces implode, rather than actualise, since the dialogue emphasises the act of looking. *My Hustler* reveals the potential actualizations that are inherent in the image, and simultaneously prevents them from occurring. The camp dialogue, with its references to the activity of hustling, only makes these implosive forces stronger, and hence makes the image more indiscernible.

But to assume that it is only the presence of the dialogue that makes this image a crystal-image is, as we have said, to discount the complexity of the image itself as an opsign. There is certainly enough of a resemblance to odalisques to make the signification collapse upon itself, but to assume that the framing of Paul America has an explicitly sexual implication over and above, say, a religious one, is to try and falsely simplify an image whose power rests in its indiscernibility. After all, why should a strong religious message *not* be possible since, asTony Rayns notes, Warhol never parted company with religion? [13] And there certainly is reason to think of the image in religious terms, not least because Paul America

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[13] Rayns, 1997, p. 84.

lying on the beach at Fire Island looks extraordinarily like the languid, attenuated figure of Adam, stretching his arm out to touch God, from Michelangelo's painting on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel (1508-12).

Slide 74

But why should we make such a strong religious connection when *My Hustler*'s photography seems so explicit in its homoeroticism (over and above any homoeroticism which might be perceived in the Michelangelo)? Perhaps it is because *My Hustler* so neatly fits the progression of Warhol's career as told by so many biographers. As Stephen Koch notes, "Warhol was shortly to begin – more and more in collaboration with Morrissey – his long filmic meditation on the male body..."; a process that would lead him to a more narrative orientated movement-image, in which sexual messages were linked to action and sexual aggression made safe by camp [14].

Warhol's is not the only artist whose whole career overshadows the ambiguities of individual works. Robert Mapplethorpe's photographs of Lisa Lyons represent a difficult strand of work that is not easy to equate with his images of sado-masochistic or openly homosexual (though not always simply homoerotic) subjects. Even his *Man in a Polyester Suit* (1980) defies a purely homosexual reading, one that develops this overtone only in the face of Mapplethorpe's public lifestyle. The photographs of the athletic Lisa Lyons can be understood on three levels. Firstly, they expose the ambiguous sexuality of the classical art that they echo (in this case classical sculpture). Secondly, they expose a similar ambiguity in Mapplethorpe's own work, since they also mirror his male nudes in style. The sexual message is itself left ambiguous; and that is the photograph's message. However, thirdly it must be noted that the photographs do all these things because they exist in the pre-hodological space created by Lyons' body before the camera, and before the viewer's gaze. Whereas Mapplethorpe's images of men such as Ajitto can be

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[14] Stephen Koch, *Stargazer: Andy Warhol and His Films*, 2nd edn. (London: Marion Boyars, 1985), p. 85. See also, Brasell, 1992, p. 57.

easily connected to his public homosexuality, a comparative reading of his images of Lyons as similar *expressions of desire* confounds this.

Slide 75

Similarly, attempts by Paul Morrissey to inject Warhol's film with the traits of camp, that in the words of Brasell 'partially mask' the film's ambiguity, only constitute a move from the possible to the real. Like any attempt we might make to ascribe a sexual misrecognition (as if he sees only the masculine in Lisa Lyons) to Mapplethorpe's photographs, to suggest that the subject-object relationship in *My Hustler* has a distinct homoerotic looked/looked-at direction would only be to demonstrate how such readings 'close down' the images. They hide other possibilities offered, including, in *My Hustler*, the presence of Genevieve Charbon. Both Lyons' body in the studios of Mapplethorpe, and Charbon's on the beach with Paul America, visually create a point of indiscernibility not adequately controlled by queer readings of the individual works or even the careers in which they are situated.

For Brasell, the banal conversation and tight framing create a claustrophobic space of heightened homoerotic sexual tension. That Brasell notes how other critics have missed this is evidence that the ambiguity of the image yet remains for those unaware of gay subculture [15]. Such readings are crystallizations, or actualizations of the virtual space of the image, made all the more reflexive by the later use of mirrors (the bathroom mirror), but also by the multiple gazes (those of Ed Hood, Genevieve Charbon and Joe Campbell [16]), of fictional characters not quite separated from the real people who play them. Significantly, it is when Charbon enters the frame that the previously detached sound and image fully coalesce – except that this only serves to make more complex the crystal image by further making ambiguous the identification inherent in looking at Paul. Any attempt to create an *action-image*, such as a

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[15] Ibid, Brasell, 1992, p. 64.
[16] Stephen Koch has Ed MacDermott credited in this role, whilst Tony Rayns has Joseph Campbell. The general consensus is that it is Joseph Campbell. cf. Koch, 1985, p. 81. cf. Rayns, 1971, p. 123, & 1997, p. 85.

directed queer reading, is confounded. The presence of Charbon cannot be brushed aside as simply the presence of a 'fag-hag' to make the 'John' jealous and provide camp comedy. When Ed Hood talks of Genevieve running her fingers through Paul's hair, what is it that really prevents the assumption that Hood is jealous of *him* rather than jealous of *her*? There is much more at stake with the 'fag-hag' (and when she enters the homoerotic space) in terms of gay subculture, if not the Warhol coterie in particular, than readings such as Brasell's suggest. Ultimately, the image and sound of this sequence of *My Hustler* ensure that we can never really be *assured* of just who exactly is desiring who:

Slide 76

What this all suggests is that Warhol's films, at least up to his work with Paul Morrissey, do not easily fit into the queer readings that his later films might do.

One of the dominant threads in the writing on Andy Warhol, and in particular the writing on his films, is that of sexuality in general, and homoeroticism in particular. What is clear for us is that the development of more conventional narrative in Warhol's cinema – and the simultaneous emphasis on camp – actualized some of the images of sexuality more than others, and closed off many of the possible routes that Warhol's cinema could have taken. When Mapplethorpe photographed Lyons, he exposed the process by which sexualised readings of his images might be made just as he exposed the process of making refined studio photographs. Mapplethrope's career is still dominated by its homoerotic culture, however. Similarly, *My Hustler* is an extraordinary film because it reveals that process of 'closing-off' in Warhol's career as it was happening.

What this does reveal, however, is that Warhol was deeply interested in the signification involved in visual representation. It also becomes clear that it is necessary to consider the process that Warhol seems to be mapping in the static framing of *My Hustler*. This is the coming-into-being of the sexualised image, rather than its finite interpretation, whilst it

demonstrates that the crystal is the photographic image that comes into being. In fact, we must consider whether or not we have, at the centre of this environment, a photographic 'becoming', and to do so we must bring into our study at last one of the other great planks of Deleuze's philosophy, that of *becoming* itself.

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Becoming-photography

A Thousand Plateaus, part of Deleuze's work with Félix Guattari, is valuable to us because it demonstrates the various *abstract machines* that perpetuate the hierarchies of which they were suspicious [17]. Structures of language are rooted in fundamental differences. Similarly, structures of visual language are based on a fundamental difference expressed in the face. The becoming-world is converted to a face, or a landscape that assumes faciality. Since the face forms an "important loci of resonance" in signification, we look at the face of a person speaking to concretise what is being said to us. Thus Deleuze argues that it is only part of our nature, our becoming, to facialize any image in this way[18]. But in so doing Deleuze opens up the potential for movement within the fixed image, in the form of intensity, that we can take to the photographic image. It is now clear at this stage of the thesis that the movement of objects in space and time is not necessary to the time-image. We therefore need to understand the way in which time unfolds within the image, since all the terminology that bases itself on logical progression is ultimately inadequate to deal with it. It is the particular interaction of tense, the 'running into each other' of virtual image and actual image that creates the crystal. It is this involution, or intension, within the image that creates its enormous, a-chronological power, the power that leads to the immense and complex structure of the crystal. This is a different movement within the image, still a variation of speed and slowness, but in speed and slowness in intensity, made by the 'running into each other' of elements of the image.

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[17] THP.
[18] Ibid p. 168.

But the real lesson of Deleuze and Guattari's work on the face is that of deterritorialization. The abstract machine, the facialized image for example, reterritorializes the universe. It takes the open and diverse and enforces and often abstract order that constricts any possible permutations. Facialization is a 'closing-down' of potential meaning and effect. What Deleuze argues for is an understanding of absolute deterritorialization: the abandonment of conventions and hierarchies - the facializing discourse - and the open potentiality of progression – a line of flight – from the image. This is to understand the dualism of face and landscape and the potential to go beyond it, to create an image where the "cutting edges of deterritorialization become operative…forming strange new becomings, new polyvocalities"[19] To cast off such 'traits' of the face, to create a deterritorialized image, one must exist as becoming.

The concept of the monadic continuum is expressed here through discussion of molecularity and molarity. Molar entities are abstract assemblages, created by abstract machines. Singular and fixed, they hide the multiple becoming of the universe. Becoming has its own parts, or plateaus, that make up a continuum. These are waves of becoming that intersect each other, but above all, intersect the culture that surrounds us. It is a mistake to assume that Deleuze and Guattari's vision of becoming discounts the exterior, and merely deals with a sort of self-becoming. Context is doubly important to becoming, since what we once called the context of a work, or a person, is now simply a point in their molecular becoming. Deleuze and Guattari conceive of becoming as a continuum of experience that includes the effects of the abstract machine. In one of the most elemental molar hierarchies, they see in particular 'man as a standard', against which becoming-animal, becoming-woman, or ultimately becoming-imperceptible are ranged. To avoid such hierarchies, one must be imperceptible in their terms, but to be so, one has to negotiate these plateaus (and more) that intervene, according to Deleuze and Guattari. Care must be taken to avoid stumbling into

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[19] Ibid p. 191.

essentializing difference however. For Deleuze and Guattari, to see man as the standard is simply the acknowledgement of a majority in fact:

> When we say majority, we are referring not to a greater relative quantity but to a determination of a state or standard in relation to which larger quantities, as well as the smallest, can be said to minoritarian...

Becoming is a negotiation with the molarity, or majority, of man in the sense that hierarchies are organised with this majority in mind. Man is the molar entity against which molecular entities are ranged:

> It is not a question of knowing whether there are more mosquitoes or flies than men, but of knowing how 'man' constituted a standard in the universe in relation to which men necessarily form a majority. [20]

Becoming is molecular, and involves plateaus that in turn make up a block of becoming, but this is always seen in terms of its abstraction. Since the abstraction of film is the movement-image, and the abstraction of the photograph is the silent, immobile decisive moment, the time-image in photography (and of course, cinematography) is the result of becoming-minoritarian. Films, photographs, or any other part of our hoped-for becoming will reveal their relationship with the majority: becoming-minoritarian will be another plateau for them. This immediately suggests that to understand film, a study must at some point negotiate the molarity of filmmaker as author, as well as the molarity that has become 'avant-garde cinema'. We must avoid giving primacy to any one set of circumstances that influence film and photography.

An example that turns up in the Cinema books and in *A Thousand Plateaus*, is *Moby Dick*; a becoming that encompasses John Huston and Herman Melville, film and book, not to mention the whale itself. For Deleuze, the narrative trajectory of Huston's film/Melville's book is as important as either author: "Captain Ahab has an irresistible becoming-

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[20] Ibid p. 291.

whale"[21]. Deleuze's view takes in the input of writer, director, and the possible exterior influences or projections (from J.M.W. Turner to Orson Welles) of this becoming [22]. All these are quanta of the becoming that is most conveniently described as 'Moby Dick'. This demands an alternative way of seeing Deleuze's approach to the work not in terms of a relationship of author to text, but one in which each forms a greater or lesser part of a becoming that extends outward towards a whole that remains open. To centre a phenomenological approach to, say, authorship, around the text, the author, or even reception of the work, is to create a phenomenon that is molar in nature and centred only by abstract organisation according to rules of criticism. Such criticism does not look for patterns in such relationships, but moulds such relationships around pre-existent patterns. If anything, authorship remains central to becoming because authorship *is* a becoming which has a molecular structure involving these. The influence of one part on the other is by mutation or contagion, as we discovered with *My Hustler.* New readings may be made of Warhol's film, and each will be an actualisation of the whole of the becoming. Whether or not they take in the primacy of Warhol, they are restricted by the paradigms of authorship analysis around which his life is wrapped - his gayness, his campness, his Catholicism, and so on. Such becomings must be seen as assemblages, in the sense that they are, as Deleuze describes, "multiplicities with heterogenous terms, co-functioning by contagion" from which any order is the development of such assemblages into abstract organisations. Deleuze's advance from this is not to differentiate between types of becoming as if they were different species of animal, but instead to treat all becomings as if they all had the same multiple characteristic – as if they were an animal pack. It is these that we organise in culture, in order to make sense of them, by grouping them around a molarity:

> That is why the distinction we must make is less between kinds of
> animals than between the different states according to which they

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[21] Ibid p. 243.
[22] TI, pp. 72-73.

are integrated into family institutions, State apparatuses, war machines etc.[23]

In a closer analysis, film criticism is the organisation of the author/text into an abstract machine, limited to the direct influences on the filmmaker, his or her life, or the film's social reception, or other dynamic yet abstract models. But to discount these processes is to miss the point: the understanding of becoming is not a destructive force that negates the study of abstract machines, it *is* the study of abstract machines. To understand the becoming of photography, we must understand it as an abstract machine.

Vilém Flusser proposes just such an understanding of abstraction in photography. Flusser work preceded (and predicted some of) the extraordinary influence of abstract ideological apparatus in photography, centred not on the image or camera necessarily, but instead on the culture surrounding it. For Flusser, this represents in fact an abstract machine. As we saw, the Cartesian image, connected physically to the camera as apparatus, is merely an actual image of a virtual world. This actual/virtual relationship does not escape Flusser, who notes that "…the world is only a pretext for the states of things that are to be produced, but [only] amongst the possibilities of the camera's program". Flusser's expression of hope is that there are photographers who will realise that they exist within the camera, and the coming into being of photography of which they are a part. For us, Flusser's "pretext for the states of things" tells us that not only is there a process or operation at stake, but that the photograph itself, as well as the camera, is part of it. The process of photography in Flusser is molecular: it is quantum photography.[24]

For Flusser, the photograph as a 'state of things' is an abstraction of Manichean simplicity, of which the zenith is the black-and-white image. But even colour photographs, that convert a more complex code (but a

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[23] THP, pp. 242-243.
[24] TPP, p. 35 – see also p. 67: "The photographic universe is made up of such little pieces, made up of quanta…"

code nonetheless) only extend this abstraction. For Flusser this creates an interesting paradox, or more appropriately, a mixture of fictions:

> Black-and-White photographs are more concrete and in this sense more true: They reveal their theoretical origin more clearly: The 'more genuine' the colours of the photograph become, the more untruthful they are, the more they conceal their theoretical origin.[25]

Flusser therefore shares Deleuze's suspicion of the flat image as abstract machine that reveals itself only in dualisms. For Flusser, it is the double dualism of black-and-white, and of black-and-white and colour. For Deleuze, it is the dualism of face and landscape. The abstraction of the image to become a face, even for images of everyday inanimate objects, constitutes a 'facialization' that in turn leads to an organisation of the picture plane, in a further abstraction, the face dissipates as a face and re-emerges – reterritorialised – as landscape. All images become landscapes, or faces. Again there is a further, double, dualism or articulation. Not only is the facialization one of 'black holes on white walls' – shapes that are actualised once and for all, the black holes creating patterns on the plane as writing does on paper – but this actual image becomes part of a larger abstract machine, as it enters into processes of identification and language that seek to fix its meaning:

> Concrete faces cannot be assumed to come ready-made. They are engendered by an *abstract machine of faciality (visagéité)*, which produces them at the same time as it gives the signifier its white wall and subjectivity its black hole.[26]

Thus the odalisque, as we saw, is an abstract machine of faciality that, by reproducing the body in repose as if it were the "passional face of a loved one", organises the space of looking into one of easily coded desire:

> It is not the individuality of the face that counts but the efficacy of the ciphering it makes possible, and in what cases it makes possible. [27]

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[25] Ibid p. 44.
[26] THP, p. 168.

The genealogy of the body-as-face in the odalisque, that includes courtesan and goddess, forces the facialization with such strength that any concrete interpretation – not least in terms of gender, or orientalist exoticism – actually collapses. The facialized codes of Venus and odalisque are so strong in *Olympia* that her gaze becomes a line of flight:

> Sometimes the abstract machine, as the faciality machine, forces flows into signifiances and subjectifications...to the extent that it performs a veritable 'defacialization'...[28]

For *My Hustler* too, the instant recognisability of the odalisque frees the image from concrete interpretation. Rather than create a signification for the image, Paul America as odalisque deterritorializes it.

Thus Deleuze intersects all the dualisms or binary codes that inform the image: face/landscape; white wall/black hole; signifiance/subjectification, and he does so in the light of the face's most important power: to signify. For Deleuze, a release comes in total deterritorialization, face becomes landscape, becomes face, becomes imperceptible as either. For Flusser, the release comes from a similar deterritorialization from the encoded programming of the black box, and the abstract machine of the photographic universe. The photographers that Flusser talks about have the potential to break free from the Cartesian program encoded in the camera by exerting themselves beyond it. They are the embodiment of the new abstract machines that Deleuze finally calls upon; freeing themselves from the faciality machine to become Deleuze's *probe-heads*; "breaking through the walls of signifiance and pouring out of the holes of subjectivity".[29]

For a photographer to catch a glimpse of photography as becoming, they can no longer consider it in terms of singular elements. Becoming is not revealed in the molar, but in the molecular, and one has to be prepared to accept the multiple assemblages of becoming, and the multiple stages, or *involutions* of becoming that Deleuze sets out. Ultimately the task is to

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[27] Ibid p. 175.
[28] Ibid p. 190.

reveal the becoming of photography, to reveal becoming-photography, and that must include an understanding of imitation that reflects the photographic universe: photography does not imitate reality, but constitutes a block of becoming-reality.[30] Flusser's photographers, in this way, do not see the photograph as reality, but as an imitation of reality, since they appreciate that they can never know the full extent of their black-box. Perhaps the key to understanding the genetic element of photography, the becoming of photography, is to understand this type of photographer; who sees the abstract machine for what it is, and who constitutes a block of becoming-photography. To do so is to also understand Deleuze's plateaus of becoming: becoming-animal; becoming-molecular; becoming-woman; and becoming-imperceptible. Perhaps, on the basis of *My Hustler*, Andy Warhol was someone who realised for himself both Deleuze's and Flusser's abstract machines in fact, rather than in writing.

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Becoming Andy Warhol

It's certain that Warhol's life and work defy any simple classification. However, instead of considering how becoming is represented by any particular output of Warhol's; perhaps it is better to think of Warhol in terms of a block of becoming that is occasionally revealed by such output.

The surface of Warhol's work misrepresents the complexity that is uncovered by many of the studies of his career. There are hints of a carefully sequestered private life, private even from the social life that Warhol enjoyed as a figurehead of New York's avant-garde. In his contribution to *The Andy Warhol Museum*, the book published in conjunction with the inauguration of the museum in Pittsburgh dedicated to the artist's life and work, Richard Hellinger points to facets of Warhol's persona that were only revealed after his untimely death in 1987, and indeed seem to have been unknown to all but a very few of those who

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[29] Ibid p. 191.
[30] Ibid p. 305: "Becoming is not imitating...One does not imitate, one constitutes a block of

knew him. Hellinger notes the enormous collection of fine art that helped fill to overflowing some of the rooms of Warhol's Manhattan townhouse, an understanding of art history that was only hinted at by Warhol's 'Magpie-ish' 1969 show *Raiding the Icebox 1 with Andy Warhol*.[31] The townhouse and warehouses were also filled with Time Capsules, boxes filled with objects that Warhol took a fancy to, for some reason or another, over a period of time, sometimes a day, sometimes more, sometimes less. It seems, from the evidence of all this, that Warhol was not only a person for whom the strata of his life extend much deeper than his public persona, but that he was also a person who lived his life at various intensities of speed and slowness, and whose art continues to extend beyond the public person and the word 'Warhol'.

However it is not wise to jump to conclusions over the way in which Warhol represents, or stands for, New York, its avant-garde, or certain values of modern art in general. Warhol defies the kind of metonymic concatenation that Barthes saw in Albert Einstein, who became facialized in signs that incorporated values that took over in language and culture from the person and outlived him [32]. The two signs of Einstein, his own face and the equation E=mc_, have become facialized onto the surfaces of popular culture.

Slide 77

Metonymy, in this sense, is a result of the abstract machine of faciality. But it fails to do the same to Warhol, however, not only because the reach of Warhol encompasses so many other things, but also because Warhol continues to change to this day, as new Time Capsules are opened by the archivists, and new elements of his work uncovered.

The irony of all this, as we shall see, is that Warhol the man may have even dreamed of *becoming* the abstract machine that could not define

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becoming."
[31] Richard Hellinger, 'The Archives of the Andy Warhol Museum', in Callie Angell et al. *The Andy Warhol Museum*, (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Institute, 1994), pp. 195-203.
[32] Roland Barthes, 'The Brain of Einstein', in *Mythologies*, 3rd edn. (London: Vintage, 1993, c.

him. One of Warhol's most famous images, and which hangs in front of the door at the Pittsburgh museum, is his self-portrait photo-silkscreen of 1986. It is an implosion of the abstract forces of facialization: to be confronted by a self-portrait of Warhol, particularly a photographic one that lugs with it the baggage of truth to reality, is not to be confronted by a representation of the values of Warhol, but instead a *probe-head*. The image refers to the Warhol that *cannot* be facialized.

<u>Slide 78</u>

Indeed, if Warhol is facialized in any way, it is through his silkscreens of Marilyn Monroe or Elvis, or any one of his Campbell's Condensed Soup paintings of 1966. These images often 'stand for' Warhol, but never truly manage to stand for Warhol. It is often difficult not to think of Warhol at the mention of the name Marilyn Monroe. Just as, in the case of the Monroe images silkscreens, one is "ever mindful of her tragic life" as Deren Van Coke put it, it is just as impossible to think of Monroe and not immediately call the multiple images to mind [33]. These people, even as myths, become part of Warhol, rather than him becoming part of their stardom or fame.

'Warhol' also extends through the people, the coterie, that filled and filed through his Factory, the establishment that was the workshop for much of his art. The names of Edie Sedgwick, Candy Darling, or Velvet Underground and Nico cannot escape the entity from which they are lines of flight. As David James notes, the actors of Warhol's films became, and in many ways still are, the vocabulary of the public intercourse about Warhol [34]: in some ways it is even difficult to watch Elizabeth Taylor on screen, especially in *National Velvet*. At present, it would be obvious to say that Warhol remains very much in the public eye through recent films, including Mary Harron's *I Shot Andy Warhol* and Julian Schnabel's *Basquiat* (both 1996). The word 'Warhol' continues to be uttered, or

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1957), pp. 86-71.
[33] Deren Van Coke, *The Painter and the Photograph: from Delacroix to Warhol*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1972), p. 73.
[34] David E. James, 'The Producer as Author', *Wide Angle: A Film Quarterly of Theory, Criticism,*

facialized, every time someone becomes a minor celebrity, or when sixties graphics are back in fashion. Jonas Mekas, Amy Taubin, Gerard Malanga and others are still writing. It is becoming clear that this was a man who did not so much lead a double life, but a multiple one in which he as a person was startlingly anonymous. Indeed, seldom do we ever actually deal with Warhol the person, only parts of something much larger.

With Warhol, we do not so much deal with an artist who had a finite career, or who dealt with specific themes easily identified, or for whom it is easy to mark the limits of his influence. That particular Andy Warhol never existed. There is only becoming-Warhol. Warhol, it seems, has a molecular existence. No single part stands for Warhol, not even the man. New discoveries, new connections, new objects found in the Time Capsules: they do not make becoming-Warhol any larger, but instead reveal more strata that was obscured beforehand. Each box is merely a crystallization of an intensity felt in becoming-Warhol, just as those periods of excited activity and slow burn constitute variations of speed and slowness.

Any of the people or objects can be seen as lines of flight from the whole. They are all Warhol. This is the becoming-animal of Warhol: the pack-like nature of the people and works that make up Warhol. In terms of the plastic arts, he transcended the traditional disciplines of industrial design (illustration) and fine art. In terms of activity within those disciplines, widespread knowledge of his work extends far beyond the fervent periods of his career. Just as each piece of art facializes Warhol but fails to adequately represent the entirety of Warhol, so they also connect in the same way an animal pack connects. It is almost pointless to conceive of 'a Warhol' film, print, or happening as any kind of singularity, or as if it had occurred in some kind of artistic vacuum. Nor would it be any less absurd to try and crystallise Warhol in his/its entirety. Critical discourse is instead quicker to isolate a piece as 'a Warhol' than it is defined as print or film, just as science is happy to classify animals by species. No single

characteristic identifies Warhol, and it is not sufficient to consider his work historically, since its influence is felt today. As Deleuze might put it: Without a definite coda to Warhol, certainly not in his lifetime and now clearly not since his death, Warhol is a verb, rather than a noun. It is not a question of one or several Warhols, but that there is only Warholing [35].

It is difficult to find an origin from which Warhol's personal motivation issued, since the great influences on his life might precede Warhol, but are fundamentally changed in the eyes of art criticism by his connection. Arthur C. Danto re-instigates the critical link between Warhol and Marcel Duchamp, whose own controversial use of mass-produced objects – in particular the 'readymades' – gives Danto reason to question Warhol's originality. For Danto, Warhol's *Brillo Boxes* (1963) fail because they are indistinguishable from the 'real' thing, and are thus pale imitations of Duchamp's *use of* the real thing [36]. But perhaps Danto misses Warhol's point, and the point of Warholing: that originality is not, and never has been an issue, except for the status of art objects by those only interested in labels. Perhaps Warhol's lack of originality, or more precisely, lack of origin, is not something to be considered a failure. The fact that Duchamp and Warhol shared ideas is clear, not just from their short-lived collaboration in film (Warhol was to shoot a 24 hour movie of a day in Duchamp's life). But Warhol's use of ready-made objects quickly extended beyond household objects to include household names and faces. It is unlikely that any urinal will be seen as 'Duchampian', but it is arguable that Marilyn Monroe, star, image and even person, is 'a Warhol' in popular culture before any other connection is made. Monroe was Warhol's 'readymade'.

Warhol defies an origin as much as he does a definitive public persona. Whilst there definitely was a famous decadent New York artist who called himself Andy Warhol, this was the pseudonym of a man who lived with his mother, Julia Warhola; who stood behind a barrier, snapshot camera

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[35] THP, p. 239: "The Wolf is not fundamentally one characteristic or a certain number of characteristics; it is a Wolfing."

[36] Arthur C. Danto, 'The Philosopher as Andy Warhol', in Callie Angell et al. *The Andy Warhol Museum*, (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Institute, 1994), pp. 73-91, p. 81.

in hand, to meet the Pope; and was a devout Catholic until his death.
Even the simplest biographies have to start with the Andrew Varchola
who left Pittsburgh to make his fortune as an illustrator. Warhol the public
artist appears to have had a severe reaction to the attention his activities
received from the sixties onwards, particularly after the attempt on his life
by Valerie Solanas (another 'event' which eventually becomes a
Warholing, particularly through Harron's film). However, instead of
becoming a recluse in his workshop, Warhol only embraced all the more
his superstar lifestyle. Given that his works are more recognisable than
he was (a common occurrence in any of the plastic arts) Warhol might
have felt complimented by Danto's criticism that 'he became what he did'.
But even this undervalues the near total success and sheer innovation of
Warhol's becoming-imperceptible [37]. For Warhol the artist and person, the
best hiding was hiding in plain sight: disappearing could only be achieved
by being ever present to the point that his attendance at parties, on
television, at gala events, became passé. Whilst it is not unusual to
change one's name when entering public life (Warhol also dyed his hair
grey from an early age), he also had himself on the books for modeling
agencies, and was reputed to be happy to advertise anything. As his
explicit authorship was gradually erased in his films, as David James
notes, so his never-presence in public life was enforced by his ever-
presence.[38]

Naming his workshop The Factory gives only a hint of Warhol's desire to
become imperceptible within his manufacture of art. He was interested in,
if not obsessed with, recording his life using machines: movie cameras,
photographs, tape-recorders, video cameras – but never writing. As
Richard Hellinger writes, there is precious little written correspondence by
Warhol, but plenty of recorded telephone conversations.[39] So many, in
fact, that the sheer number and volume becomes un-listenable in its
entirety. Thus the constant availability of recordings only serves to make
Warhol disappear even further. Warhol spoke to Benjamin Buchloch of
developing a painting machine "that paints all day long for you and do it

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[37] Danto, 1994, p. 89.
[38] James, 1985, p. 26.

really well, and you could do something else instead, and you could turn out really wonderful canvasses" [40], demonstrating an understanding, even in jest, of the abstract machine. Whilst such a self-confessed 'fantasy' seems to eliminate the authorial process that Buchloch, and Danto, seem to hold dear, it actually demonstrates the author's necessary role as part of becoming-molecular. The abstract machine offers a way for artists to free themselves from the molar identity into which they are sometimes thrust by art criticism, and hence the restrictions of its limited universe, and instead enter a molecular relationship with their work that involves other influences. Becoming-imperceptible, it seems, is not only the freeing of the artwork from the author, but the author from the artwork. If Warhol indeed shared Deleuze's suspicion of molarity and desired to become imperceptible, he demonstrated this through his direct embrace with the abstract machine. Could it be that Warhol understood the power of the abstract machine, in Deleuzean terms, before Deleuze himself articulated it?

Perhaps, paradoxically, becoming-imperceptible is also 'revealed' in the increasing campness of the later film work, continuing through the Paul Morrissey-directed 'Andy Warhol' productions. Warhol was increasingly able to hide behind an easily recognizable *visagéity* of camp as his own practical control decreased. The popular conception and appeal of 'camp' facializes aberrant sexuality, to the extent that it creates significances that no longer need to be negotiated but instead are treated as if they 'go without saying': Different sexuality becomes imperceptible because the fixing of cultural codes under the overly-generalised 'camp' makes the unspeakable unspoken. However this has the same effect as the development of narrative and movement-image: that is to facialize completely what had once been a *free-indirect discourse*. The fluid relationship that Warhol had with women, or more precisely *woman*, becomes imperceptible. Camp obscures such fluidity by making easily readable what was once ambiguous, and what was essentially ambiguous in *My Hustler* was the becoming-woman of Warhol.

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[39] See Hellinger, 1994.

If we are to understand becoming-Warhol, we have to consider Warhol in terms of becoming-woman, for as Deleuze put it: "...all becomings begin with and pass through becoming woman". [41] But what is becoming-woman in terms of Warhol and his work? Warhol and Duchamp both assumed a transvestite identity (Warhol was famously photographed in drag by Christopher Makos; Duchamp – as the character Rrose Sélavy – by Man Ray) in photographs [42]. Even on the surface there are clear parallels between the facialization of Duchamp's becoming-woman with Warhol's. Also, the sexual politics of men fighting over/for a man/woman in *My Hustler* also has echoes of Duchamp's *The Large Glass* (*The Bride Stripped Bare by her Bachelors, Even*) of 1913. However, Warhol's becoming-woman did not involve a desire centred on his person, or on how his body appeared, but instead involved his consumption of images, and in particular the images of stars. This was where his 'readymades' departed from Duchamp's (and changed both in the process). The perfection of the camerawork in *My Hustler*, or the repetition of Monroe's photograph, was part of a negotiation with the image, particularly the photographic image of *the star*, and this negotiation was the major element of Warhol's becoming-woman.

There is a strong tendency to classify immediately Warhol's cinema as a queer cinema, or his gaze as a homoerotic one, and subsequently classify his treatment of women as one of 'identification with', rather than 'desire for' them. The focus of much of this critical writing on Warhol's film's, when not on the homoerotic gaze exclusively, in any case organises the various representations of men and women into roles in which homosexuality, its attendant anxieties, and the cultural mores attached to it are further crystallised. For example, Amy Taubin writes

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[40] Benjamin Buchloch, "Conversation with Andy Warhol", *October 70*, (Fall 1994), pp. 37-45, pp. 44-45.
[41] THP, p. 277.
[42] David Hopkins, "The Politics of Equivocation: Duchamp's Compensation Portrait and Surrealism in America 1942-45", seminar paper given at the University of Glasgow, 14th February 2001. See also, David Hopkins, 'Douglas Gordon as Gavin Turk as Andy Warhol as Marcel Duchamp as Sarah Lucas', in *twoninetwo*, issue 2, 2001, pp. 93-105. Hopkins uses a recent photograph by Douglas Gordon to emphasise the visual (and thus metonymic, or symbolic) connections evident in Gordon's appearance in drag, which Hopkins connects to Monroe, Myra Hindley, and Warhol.

that Warhol's identification with Shirley Temple constituted a "deeply transvestite position". But this assumption precludes any fluidity of identification based on stardom itself, or even the possibility of a not-easily-identified sexuality: Warhol was homosexual, *ergo* his identification with Shirley Temple, Mae West, or Marilyn Monroe was organised along specifically (and culturally) queer lines that have been cemented in popular culture. Whilst Taubin claims that Warhol 'destabilised' sexual identity, her understanding of this destabilisation is only in terms of a reterritorialisation of identity onto other fixed notions:

> In Warhol's films sexual identity is never naturalised. Constructed as a masquerade, it's an imperfect shield for a terrible anxiety about sexual difference. The Warhol superstars are either drag queens (Mario Montez, Fred Herko, Candy Darling), or women who exaggerate their femininity out of fear of being mistaken for boys (Edie Sedgwick, Viva), or studs (Gerard Malanga, Joe Dallesandro), whose obsessive focus on their own groins suggests a secret suspicions things might not be in order.[43]

What is interesting about this interpretation of Warhol's coterie, or their representation on screen, is not the interpretation itself, but the fact that the abstract machine upon which these interpretations are formed is not discussed. Warhol's superstars for the most part were made so by their roles in either the events or the art that came from the Factory. The identities they assumed, or which are pinned on them afterwards, are facializations, and yet critics seem to know or care little about the process that creates them. Such readings have difficulty dealing with the possibilities of desire involved in Warhol's photographing of women. The photography that precedes *My Hustler*, particularly of women, resists such simplistic interpretation. For example, if Warhol's later films, such as *Bike Boy* or *Lonesome Cowboys* (both 1967) are homoerotic "meditations on the male body", then are we to think of *The Thirteen Most Beautiful*

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[43] Amy Taubin, '****' in Colin MacCabe, Mark Francis & Peter Wollen eds., *Who is Andy Warhol*, (London: BFI, 1997), pp. 23-32, p. 29. See also Amy Taubin, 'My Time Is Not Your Time', *Sight and Sound* 4, no. 6 (June 1994), p. 20-24.

Women, or *Poor Little Rich Girl* as hetero-erotic meditations on the female body [44]?

To pigeonhole sexuality runs against the Deleuzean understanding of a 'thousand sexualities' that constitute sexual becoming. For Deleuze, sexuality is "badly explained by the binary organization of the sexes," and this is true in terms of both hetero/homosexual identification and its cultural mores, and masculine and feminine identification itself [45]. Similarly becoming-woman cannot be facialized in terms of transvestism. All becoming passes through becoming-woman, since becoming-molecular has to negotiate the central dualism of culture: woman culturally opposed to man. But rather than this leading to a continuance of the fundamental binarism of otherness that underpins psychoanalysis for example, becoming-woman is the primary quantum of becoming that leads to becoming-imperceptible.

The difficulty with dealing with Deleuze's understanding of becoming-woman is the ever-presence of the binary system that it deconstructs, but is easily capable of falling in with. However, becoming-molecular does not issue from the binary values attached to male/female. Instead molecularity is an opposition to the molarity of masculinity and femininity that such values create. In this way, the cultural constructions of femininity, particularly involving the masquerade of feminine identity, only constitute becoming-woman because they are cultural constructions. It is the negotiation of these that constitute becoming-woman, not the adoption of any essentially female characteristic:

> When the man of war disguises himself as a woman, flees
> disguised as a girl, hides as a girl, it is not a shameful or transitory
> incident in his life. To hide, to camouflage oneself, is a warrior
> function...Although the femininity of the man of war is not
> accidental, it should not be thought of as structural, or regulated by
> a correspondence of relations. [46]

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[44] Koch, 1987, p. 85.
[45] THP, p. 278.

In this sense, any becoming-imperceptible involves becoming-woman. Thus *My Hustler* relies upon the odalisque as a feminine role in history: any multiple identification or desire for Paul America as odalisque, whether crystallised by heterosexual or homosexual interpretation, must pass through becoming-woman. The odalisque, like the masquerade, is part of becoming-woman that constitutes the becoming-molecular of man, but that is only later organised into homosexual or heterosexual identification by interpretation. Similarly, the ambiguities of those photographs of Lisa Lyons constitute a becoming-woman also, since it is the femininity of the work that is the aberration in the career of the photographer - a destabilizing presence. Genevieve Charbon now takes on a further dimension, since her presence as a girl opposes all possible molarities of identification – man, woman, child, adult (Deleuze), to which we can add sexuality-as-a-fixed-identity. She is the destabilizing presence, preventing the body of Paul America to completely facialize as a purely homoerotic odalisque. This is why, for Deleuze, *the girl* is a 'line of flight', since her presence prevents, rather than fixes, concrete and organised identification. Genevieve's body does not simply complicate the sexual tension of *My Hustler*, but instead prevents desire from assuming any final identity.

The 'girl' in Deleuze's ideas on becoming-woman therefore has a particular power – that of destabilizing, or deterritorialising identity, and particularly desires based around perceived identities. However, to conclude that this particularly powerful role is gendered would be to misunderstand the sense of becoming that Deleuze aims to explain. "Becoming-woman produces the universal girl" was Deleuze's particular way of expressing how there is a universal value of becoming woman that exists before it is bifurcated toward heterosexual/homosexual desire and identification. For Warhol, what this suggests is that before his film production turned toward narrative, the ambiguity that created the free-indirect discourse of his camera-work was centred on the role of the girl. Again we should not jump to the conclusion that this excludes John Giorno, the sleeping Adonis of Warhol's *Sleep*, or *The Thirteen Most*

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[46] Ibid p. 277.

Beautiful Boys (1965), but instead take note of how the girl is a stage or plateau of becoming-woman, as Deleuze notes:

> The girl or child do not become; it is becoming itself that is a child or girl...the girl is the becoming woman of each sex, just as the child is the becoming young of every age. [47]

Thus the girl is a plateau of deterritorialized identification and desire, later facialized by culture, according to classifications and structures of sexuality. It is this ambiguity of identification and desire that is presented by the early portrait films of Warhol, as well as the Monroe silkscreens. Indeed, this as-yet-unfixed discourse of desire is evident in his connection to the stars of these pieces – both the very public stars of Monroe, Elvis and Kennedy, but also the clique of 'superstars' – Giorno, Paul America, Viva, Candy Darling, and International Velvet – who populated the Factory. So much so that the 'universal girl' is expressed through his, and their, becoming-star.

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Adventures of the face

Both Tony Rayns and Matthew Tinkcom suggest that the consumption of stardom as a particular characteristic of gay culture – to the extent that the two are inseparable. Tinkcom notes how fans "are rendered helpless in the sight of the star's image", and recognizes that "the ways that stars embody gay images...has been notoriously complex to document, especially given the ways that many gays have *identified* with female stars while *desiring* male stars."[48] Rayns, on the other hand, points to the uplifting effects of star glamour through negotiation by isolated gay men "exulting in vintage Hollywood fantasies of class, wealth and emotional fulfillment", and for whom star consumption is an immensely fulfilling experience involving the ability to "mentally edit or re-direct movies, to

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[47] Ibid.
[48] Matthew Tinkcom, 'Warhol's Camp', in Colin MacCabe, Mark Francis & Peter Wollen *eds., Who is Andy Warhol*, (London: BFI, 1997), p. 107-117, p. 113.

take from them what's interesting, exciting or sexy and to repress or ignore the rest."[49]

However, quite apart from the assumption that heterosexual fans do not consume stars in a similar way, this approach mis-recognizes as an essentially gay practice the complex identification and desire at work in the relationship between fan and star of either sex. Furthermore such an approach does not explore the abstract machine of photography at the heart of this relationship. By discounting the possibility of homosocial (or any other) identification these approaches nonetheless treat the star/fan relationship as a fixed discourse. But how else can this relationship be viewed?

For Richard Dyer, audience reaction to stars is one of consumption of values of which the star is a sign. Dyer notes the development across time in which the star moves from the status of god/goddess to that of person-in-the-street, a move demarcated by the coming of sound:

> ...in the early period, stars were gods or goddesses, heroes and models – embodiments of *ideal* ways of behaving. In the later period, however, stars are identification figures, people like you and me – embodiments of *typical* ways of behaving.[50]

However this involves a dualism difficult to fit over many of the stars in question: whilst Greta Garbo and John Gilbert might be godlike, or Woody Allen a face in the street, it also asks us to believe that stars such as Marilyn Monroe or Robert Redford are *typical*, whilst stars such as Buster Keaton or Mary Pickford are *ideal*.

Jackie Stacey, on the other hand, points to an active relationship between the female fan and female star that involves both senses of Dyer's identification. Stars offer the fan images of ideal femininity that they acknowledge as being remote or unattainable. However, this is accompanied by, rather than being opposed to, various attempts at

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[49] Rayns, 1997, p. 84.
[50] Richard Dyer, *Stars*, (London: BFI, 1979), p. 24.

becoming-star, the most common of which are the copying and imitation of stars through mimesis of performance, or extra-cinematic consumption of related fashions and products. This is therefore an acknowledgement of the ideal status of stars, but one that is not seen as something that *cannot* be made typical through a process of becoming. The pleasure is in the desire itself, rather than in the hoped-for stardom. Their desire to become stars is really a desire as becoming. Their acknowledgment of the "gap between star and fan" suggests that their imitation is the facialization of a real becoming-star.[51]

From this we can suggest that *facialization* is a particularly visible element of becoming-star, either by imitation, or by the consumption of star images via photographs. In this way Warhol's cinematic relationship with women, realized to strong effect in *The Thirteen Most Beautiful Women* (1964), constituted a chance for him to do in film what he had done with Monroe in silkscreen. The adventures of identification associated with the star are reflected in the adventures of the very lines and shapes on the surface of the screen or print. Furthermore, Warhol seems to have been happier in these cases as audience, rather than as filmmaker, as Amy Taubin writes:

> Like all newcomers to the factory, I was screen-tested: I was escorted into a makeshift cubicle and positioned on a stool; Warhol looked through the lens, adjusted the framing, instructed me to sit still and try not to blink, turned on the camera and walked away.[52]

Examples such as these constitute not only an awareness on Warhol's part of the abstract machine, but a desire to be part of its becoming. In Warhol's work, the facialization of the star no longer fixes the identification, but by repetition and deconstruction of the abstract machine – photography – allows it a line of flight toward total deterritorialization. It is the reduction of film to what Peter Gidal describes as "one extreme

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[51] Jackie Stacey, 'Feminine Fascinations', in Christine Gledhill, *Stardom: industry of desire*, (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 141-166, p. 151.
[52] Taubin, 1997, p. 25.

function" that releases it from any sensory-motor schema [53]. The face on screen becomes an adventure of the line on the surface of the image.

This is shown throughout the 'direct-view' screen tests that Warhol conducted (personally or not) through the sixties, and which make up the constituent parts of *The Thirteen Most Beautiful Women* and other films. This loose collection of filmed portraits (each 4 minutes in length), in which sitters do little more than stare at the camera, comprises both the anonymous and the notorious of The Factory's coterie of stars. Some of those filmed for the screen tests 'played up' to the camera: Eric Andersen and Debby Green kiss, whilst Nico drinks a beer from a can that catches the harsh lights of the studio. In these cases, they move towards the action-image, since they replicate or parody the shot in narrative cinema. On the other hand, the implacable and unblinking stare of Marea Menken, for example, opens up the shot to the contemplative. It is impossible, in watching the screen tests, not to let one's eyes wander across the image, constantly reinterpreting these stares. These are time-images, since they not only confound the expectations of filmed shots and photographic portraits at the same time, but also present the body as a locus of indeterminacy in response. The pre-hodological space waits to be filled with interpretation, yet simultaneously escapes it. In hers, Edie Sedgwick can be seen to break down as the effort of 'staring-out' the camera is too much. This moment draws the image back into action-image, and thus reveals the time-image that existed before. Once the stare (and the spell) is broken, one is free to return to the safety of the movement-image. Edie's distress is our comfort. The time-image is revealed in the shot's movement from it. Previously the movement of the face was in the intensity of the fixed black-and-white image that threatened to move and, in her case, did.

Warhol and these films of his 'stars' demonstrate that the photographic image in general is dominated by facialization: photography should be seen as 'adventures of the face' (Deleuze saw music as 'adventures of

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[53] Peter Gidal, ''The Thirteen Most Beautiful Women' and 'Kitchen'', in Michael O'Pray ed., *Andy Warhol: Film Factory*, (London: BFI, 1989), pp. 118-123, p. 118.

the refrain') [54]. It is the stasis of the screen tests that reveals their intensity, and the movement of black holes on white walls that prevents a total facialization. Billy Name's screen test, also completely still, involves such a vivid pattern of black and white that its negative image remains on the retina even as the film finishes and Billy Name fades to white. Nothing else could present Deleuze's black-hole-white-wall system with such efficacy, nor emphasise the racial ambiguities of both Warhol's coterie and the black-hole-white-wall system themselves. The fade out is the recurring element in the screen tests that fully ensures deterritorialization, since, as the image fades to white, it is not replaced by another shot but instead by the memory of the face and its whiteness. Such memories, of course, possess unlimited possibilities, since there is no unifying chain of meaning into which the image fits. If one has no personal memory of Nico, an overt significance of her swilling beer is lost - *but the image itself is no less significant.* Nico's life, as does Dennis Hopper's, merely adds another layer to the crystal that emerges from the images. Memories of them simply actualize the virtual that is offered. Hopper's youth in the image (demonstrated by his preppy awkwardness) contrasts strongly with present day public perception of him, and his intervening life simply makes the crystal structure of actualizations more complex. In the face of this molar hierarchy of representation, his youthful awkwardness simply brings us back to Deleuze's molecular and universal girl.

Slide 79

Paul Mattick notes how the Monroe images in particular have a similar historical dimension because of the death of Monroe recent to their production. Mattick is critical of Thomas Crow, whose Barthesian view of the Monroe images is a fetishization of the person through the keepsake of the photograph, But he does note how influential the image of the superstar is to the gay subculture within which Warhol moved. Mattick crucially acknowledges a further dimension to the (in this case, gay) identification of stars, in that Monroe and other female movie stars were "representatives of desire and desirability, of the artificiality of gender

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[54] THP, p, 302.

roles". This star identification is made even stronger when the star retains a youth and beauty through the image: "Monroe dead, for some purposes, can be superior to Monroe alive..."[55]

Thus the star is the universal girl; made only stronger by the mythology (even in the Barthesian sense) that surrounds Hopper and Monroe. Monroe presented desire itself as a becoming, beyond any sexualised constriction of it. Warhol engaged this mythical status, since as Mattick notes on Warhol's immersion in mass culture, "the myths mattered". In extending her myth, Monroe is made imperceptible in favour of desire and desirability. Hopper's career, independent of the New York avant-garde, has intervened in his case, to cloud over the image of desire that his youth represents. Not so Monroe, whose mythology was already in place and became part of something much larger through the silkscreens. The images no longer stand for Monroe, or Warhol, but becoming-Warhol, and the relationship with Monroe as star was an essential part of his becoming-woman. Since photography was so essential to the becoming-star of Monroe, it was only logical that it should be her photograph that Warhol was to deal with. The screen inks that colour the already simplified images of Monroe and the others add what Mattick describes as a "thin Warholian layer" to the image. Warhol was trying to insert himself into the process – trying to become the abstract machine – and thus continue his personal becoming-imperceptible. [56]

The serial repetition of the silkscreens emphasizes the coming-into-being of the image. Hand marks on the silkscreen reveal the human intervention in the manufacture: a presence that must be revealed in order for it to become imperceptible. In the same way, the apparatus of filming is inseparable from the image produced, since the sitters for the screen-tests know about Warhol's presence, and for one reason or another are made to ignore it, often because Warhol indeed wasn't there. This is a reflexivity that creates a circuit with the camera as abstract machine, in which Warhol as operator is imperceptible. There and not

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[55] Paul Mattick, "The Andy Warhol of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Andy Warhol", *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 965-987, p. 978.

there, the presence of audience and filmmaker becomes audience *as* filmmaker. This is the *free-indirect discourse* at work: the camera-consciousness. The screen tests have a particular effect of creating a camera-consciousness by conflating the event of photography, the camera, and the screening. There are several legends of Warhol arranging screenings of early Vitascope films before setting out to begin filming in 1963 [57]. As in early cinema, camera and projector cannot be separated. Peter Gidal explains:

> [In *The Thirteen Most Beautiful Women*] the filmapparatus can't be meta-physically subtracted from the from the film, from the effects produced, which are given, here, as specific transformations of and in film and film-meaning. [58]

The 'specific transformation' here is the facialization of the sitters; the 'filmapparatus' and film together are the abstract machine: "unstoppable, durable, unendurable" [59]. Part of this abstract machine, part of this camera-consciousness, was Warhol.

Most prominent amongst Warhol's 'superstars' was Edie Sedgwick, whose background as a spoilt rich-kid placed her in a milieu between the attainable stars of the Factory and the unattainable stars of Hollywood, the real-life star factory that Warhol's establishment seems to have both admired and opposed. Sedgwick's films with Warhol included *Beauty #2* and *Lupe* (both 1965), however it is *Poor Little Rich Girl* (involving references to both Sedgwick's own life and the 1936 Shirley Temple film of the same name) and the *Outer and Inner Space* (both 1965) that are both remembered. Both form parts of a series of films that Callie Angell, curator of *The Andy Warhol Film Project* describes as:

> ...basically extended portraits [that] can be regarded almost as documentaries – straightforward, unscripted filmings of Edie simply being herself...In Warhol's opinion, Edie was self-possessed and

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[56] Ibid pp. 984-985.
[57] Tony Rayns notes that the *Kiss* series was possibly influenced by a screening of the single shot film *The Kiss of May Irvin and John C. Rice*. Rayns, 1997, p. 83. Similarly, the Screen Test close up of John Cale's Lips (1965) mirrors such early sensation films as *The Big Swallow*.
[58] Gidal, 1989, p. 118.
[59] Ibid p. 121.

fascinating enough just to carry a feature-length moving just by playing herself.[60]

Both films are bipartite in their own way. Like *My Hustler*, *Poor Little Rich Girl* consists of two 33 minute reels projected consecutively. Filmed and then re-shot by Warhol because of a focusing error on the first attempt, it is a combination of latter reel in and the earlier reel out of focus.

Slide 80

Outer and Inner Space, on the other hand, involves the projection of two similar 33 minute reels simultaneously and side by side. In a further mirroring or doubling, Edie is filmed in front of a video of her recorded earlier.

Slide 81

Where *My Hustler* involved the facialization of the body, what is at work in the first half of *Poor Little Rich Girl* is the deterritorialization of face into landscape. What was the figure in the landscape for *My Hustler*, is the figure (and face) *as* landscape in *Poor Little Rich Girl*. The abstract machine of photography, that Warhol was attempting to become a part of, has a double articulation in the first reel of *Poor Little Rich Girl*.

Similar deterritorialization of the face occurs in the image of *Outer and Inner Space*, although this time it does so because the *doubling* of Edie on screen forces further contemplation of her face and each image of it. This is reinforced by Edie's own reactions to the video behind her. The space created by the 'live' Edie and the recorded one is uncomfortable: the video image is often larger than the "slightly livelier 'live' Edie". "Space is flattened, perspective destroyed", as J. Hoberman notes.[61] Callie

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[60] Callie Angell, *The Films of Andy Warhol: Part II* (Screening Programme), (New York: Whitney Museum of American Art, 1994), p. 22. Thanks must go to Callie Angell for providing these items personally.

[61] J. Hoberman, 'Nobody's Land: inside Outer and Inner Space', programme essay for *Andy Warhol & Sound and Vision* exhibition, Institute of Contemporary Art, 28th July - 2nd September 2001.

Angell recognises "emotional fractures" that demonstrate an "increasingly unhappy subjectivity" as Edie is seen to wince at her own recording.[62] Such 'emotional fractures' are given visual presence in the refracting and reflecting image, whose differing camera angles of Edie's face act like a hall of mirrors. It is in this space that the time-image is given seed, and the space created is its environment. The pace of the film further compounds this as the two reels oppose each other - one zooms in whilst the other zooms out. The sense of linear past and future is made nonsense by these movements, since they seem simultaneously to open up and close down the image, suggesting the same occurs in time. Without a linear pattern, time can only unravel or unfold as in the time-image.

Both films are often virtually soundless, with only an ambient soundtrack audible. Such a deterritorialization of sound even gives the sensation of a screening of something else going on in another room. If the abstract machine is essential to becoming-star, it is so not least because of a dependence upon sound. Sound is essential to the abstract machine through its absence. It was the absence of sound that elevated stars to the status of gods, according to Dyer, and their becoming-star was one of total facialization. *My Hustler*'s free-indirect discourse results in the first reel from a dislocation of sound and image, and in the second reel through the absence in dialogue (about hustling) of the subject of discussion (cruising). The dislocation of sound from action in the films with Edie Sedgwick further abstracts the face. As in the screen-tests, the absence of sound creates a vacuum that is filled by the internal circuit, and thus the crystal image, as Peter Gidal writes:

> The silence, durable, brings itself forth against the possibilities of (imagined) off-screen sound...The vacuum established in that noiseless period of duration is full [sic] as the noise of so many other Warhol films...Again and again it brings one back to the film, its concrete abstractions...[63]

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[62] Callie Angell, Programme notes to *Outer and Inner Space*, Whitney Museum of American Art, 15th October - 29th November, 1998.

It is the absence of sound in a world of sound that creates the environment of the crystal and liberates the time-image; leading us to suspect the same about photography in general. The mistake has always been to consider the silence of photography as an agent of *limitation* by absence. But these films show us that this silence instead is an agent of *liberation* by absence: Liberation from its connection to movement in space. The bodies in these films are faces/landscapes created by the shifting and merging of black shapes on the white screen. There are only intensities of black and white that form and reform, never concretizing long enough to be interpreted as a face, and yet they remain a faciality as landscape through the apparatus. This is most evident in *Poor Little Rich Girl*. Unaware of the technical hitch that produced it in recording, Warhol himself can only have become aware of this as he (as we) watched it for the first time. This facialization of a star refuses to signify, refuses to create a subject: is it a face on a screen or a screen on a face? Simultaneously, Warhol had erased his own presence by embracing the star and by making the image an adventure of the face. Warhol, Edie, the camera, the film, and the projector were together the abstract machine. But the abstract machine that turned the face into a landscape in *Poor Little Rich Girl*, had, it turns out, already turned the landscape into a face.

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Adventures in Landscape

As Warhol's career was turning toward narrative and a more concretely homoerotic position (but not totally, given the ambiguity, if not ambivalence, as late as 1968 in *Blue Movie*) influenced by his collaboration with Paul Morrissey, Warhol's use of the camera changed from a fluid or free discourse to one that was also concrete. What had gone before was a becoming imperceptible that saw Warhol making explicit the abstract machine. In *My Hustler* there is an emphasis on the fixed, or fixated, image in the early reel that is brought into narrative just as in *Poor Little Rich Girl* the blurred image is brought into focus. It is much easier to make interpretations on the later reels than their 'difficult'

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[63] Gidal, 1989, p. 120.

earlier ones. They are difficult to decode either because they are difficult to see (*Poor Little Rich Girl*) or because the image is too easy to make quick interpretations.

All this suggests that those 'fixation' films of 1963 and 1964 (*Sleep, Haircut, Eat, Blow-Job, Empire, Henry Geldzahler*) were not simply experiments with the camera, but that they themselves had deeper significance for their filmmakers (because they had so much possibility in interpretation) than they would outwardly appear. But how do they figure in the larger, encompassing becoming-Warhol? If they are a means to an end, and represent a development in form, this development reached its coda in *My Hustler*, at which time Warhol and Morrissey laid it to rest. They certainly present becoming in many respects, but each seems to have a flaw. *Sleep* invites too strong a homoerotic interpretation, *Haircut* sounds too camp, as does *Blow-Job*. All of them, including *Eat*, seem too much like film 'essays', as Deleuze noted, with conclusions to be made, and catharses reached, even in their depiction of the everyday [64]: Billy Name's haircut is ready; Robert Indiana finishes the mushroom; John Giorno wakes up; and the anonymous teenager comes. Even *Henry Geldzahler* appears to reach a final endpoint: as Warhol re-enters the room, the gallery-owner seems to brighten what was an otherwise deflated expression. Warhol re-enters both the room and the apparatus, perceptible in the film again. This is a visibility of Warhol the filmmaker that is otherwise missing from his other films, and indeed cinema in general[65]. It is too easy to think of the end of the film as a blessed relief for Geldzahler.

Slide 82

There is nothing emphatic enough about these everyday events to suggest that they are interminable, or that they will never end. These events create a sense of time, rather than reduce chronology to

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[64] TI, p. 191.

[65] Angell, 1994, p. 20 "This withdrawal of the artist's encouraging presence was crucial to the film's purpose, which was to use the unmitigated scrutiny of the camera to gradually evoke hidden aspects of Geldzahler's personality."

nonsense. That is, all except for *Empire*.

In *Empire*, the Empire State Building will not react to the presence of the cameraman, or cameramen, even when they are visible in the window's reflection (it remains a rare example of Warhol appearing in his own films). *Empire* may be eight hours of the Empire State Building, but there is nothing to suggest that it will fall over when the camera is turned off, or even that the film will continue until the building topples. Whilst its audacity has been described as egregious, there's nothing finally camp about *Empire*, and yet the building itself attracts fans including, of course, Warhol. Could it be that *Empire* is the film that presents the unrefined genetic element of photography? Could *Empire*, perhaps Warhol's most notorious film, reveal becoming-photography?

But why should *Empire*, a film of such little apparent purpose and of such a recognisable object, present becoming? Firstly it is clear that, as Gregory Battcock has attested, the building filmed will never be the same again. *Empire* has already entered any mythology that exists of the building. To this end, like any of the hangers-on of the Factory, it remains a part of becoming-Warhol (and is certainly the most famous of the Factory's stars) [66]. Thus *Empire* and the Empire State Building make up quanta of becoming-Warhol, in mythology, but also in practice.

Just as the face of the star was a creation of the abstract machine, so *Empire* exists as a facialization of the Empire State Building, and as Warhol himself famously said during filming: "the Empire State Building is a star!" [67] However, the difference, as becoming-star, between the Monroe silkscreens and *Empire* is that where Monroe's image expands outward from its surface to encompass Monroe's stardom, making a web

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[66] Although J. Hoberman suggests that *Empire* is a forerunner of contemporary video installations, it might be better to think of the film in terms of media less connected to the temporality of video. For example, it is now possible in 2001 to watch the sun set over the Empire State Building on the Internet. The timing of *Empire*, however, is only roughly chronological, since the projection time at 16fps is longer than the shooting time at 24fps, cf. Angell, 1994, pp. 16-18, also Hoberman, 2001. At this time the Empire State Bulding is again the tallest building in Manhattan, as a result of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre - an ironic fact suggested by Angell in conversation with the author.

[67] Koch, 1987, p. 60.

of crystallised images of her performances that saturate the image, *Empire* on the other hand reduces all the stardom of the Empire State Building to the flat surface – black holes on white walls – and outlines the rarefied shape of the building with such strength that the facialization bursts forward as probe-head. What deterritorializes the Empire State Building is the intensity created by its own immobility. The black hole/white wall system is an effect of the static building in open space that changes around it. In fact, the first reel of *Empire* seems to demonstrate precisely the abstract machine that Deleuze describes.

From Deleuze:

> The face, at least the concrete face, vaguely begins to take shape *on* the white wall. It vaguely begins to appear *in* the black hole.[68]

From Callie Angell:

> …the film begins with an image of total whiteness in the midst of which, as the sun sets and the light decreases, the shape of the Empire State Building gradually flickers into view…until the floodlights on the building's exterior are suddenly turned on creating a brilliantly illuminated shape which seems to hover in the sky over the city.[69]

Slide 83

The image therefore becomes a face in close-up, like any other in cinema, a face that "is a visual percept that crystallizes" out of an intensity of stillness. Angell's description continues to resonate with Deleuze's wall/surface, and builds an entire career for the film's star in one breath:

> For most of the film's duration, however, the glowing, free floating shape of the lighted tower is the sole claim to the viewer's attention, its unwavering presence suggesting at various times (to this viewer at least) a rocket ship, a hypodermic needle, a heavenly cathedral, or a broad paintbrush that has been dipped in

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[68] THP, p. 168.
[69] Angell, 1994, p. 16.

white paint and placed on the surface of a dark gray canvas."[70]

Slide 84

This is a strong example of how the white wall/black hole system acts as a seed of the crystal image, but as we have seen before in both cinema and photography, the crystal image is by no means guaranteed. Deleuze's attack is on the signification – the significance – that is attributed to the image, rather than the abstract machine that makes it work. As ever Deleuze is not interested in the final truth of an image, but only in the discourse from which others attempt to derive it. The power of *Empire* is that it is a landscape that not only becomes one face, but many, and of which none takes precedence. No sooner is the landscape actualised as the Empire State Building, but it becomes virtual again, and then a rocket, and then virtual again, and so on. This is a glimpse of the abstract machine at work, not just through the possibility envisaging a crystal environment that grows from this internal circuit, but because the duration of *Empire* enforces an awareness of this. The singular duration of cinema becomes, in *Empire*, multiple duration by each crystallisation.

Warhol's awareness of the abstract machine is emphasised by his producing in *Empire*, as he had done in the screen tests, the apparatus as 'one extreme function'. However, as apparatus, Warhol's understanding clearly extends beyond the camera to encompass the image, and the experience of watching *Empire* as a film. As Peter Gidal notes, this extreme function is one of "choice, a selection, a part, a difference"[71]. In this way the extreme length of *Empire*, its black and white image, and its absence of sound, constitute choices made by Warhol to emphasise the abstract machine at work and lay bare its operation.

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[70] Ibid p. 16. Gregory Battcock also compares the opening reel, in which the building emerges from a combination of actual fog and image flare, to the sequence of *Anna Karenina* (Clarence Brown, 1935) in which Greta Garbo emerges from the steam of a train – a 'star' comparison that Warhol would probably have liked. Gregory Battcock, 'Notes on *Empire*', *Film Culture*, no. 40, (Spring 1966), pp. 39-40, p. 39.

[71] Gidal, 1989, p. 118.

It is certain that *Empire*'s absence of sound results from Warhol's choice, since *Empire* was filmed using his new sound-synch Auricon camera [72]. But this is as much a presence in *Empire*, as it is an absence. Furthermore, the silence and the length of these fixation films are, for Gidal, connected. Without action to guide the film, especially enforced by sound, its only coda is material:

> Limit is the film's 100ft 'end' (or 1200ft 'end') not ontological and necessary but convenience given as such (enough is enough, philosophically and materially).[73]

Thus *Empire* demonstrates that it is the silence of the photographic image that frees it from movement, or allows it to remain free of any narrative trajectory or closure. The length of the film remains important only in material or exhibition terms. This is what Malcolm Le Grice has stressed as the importance of equivalence – the experience of a film's length as equivalent to its action – to Warhol's films, and avant-garde cinema in general [74]. To remain a single reel film would invite comparisons with timed-exposure photographs – or as a 'filmed photograph' – whereas several reel changes instead emphasise an attempt to represent the several lived durations of the Empire State Building that no discrete element can portray. With silence, once one reel change is effected, the project assumes a potentially endless length that is only curtailed as both Mekas and Warhol become tired of returning to the camera. The film assumes multiplicity because it could be *any* length, and as a film made up of barely changing repetition of a single photogramme, it assumes a potentiality of *every* length. One can sit and look at the Empire State Building indefinitely, but what will that add to your knowledge? This does what few photographs are capable of – it emphasises its temporal dimension as unregulated by chronology, and does so by making its projection time a central issue. It is time that deterritorializes the face/landscape, but not time connected to movement: instead it is time as intensity. This is what the photograph *can* offer, and what *Empire* does offer. For Warhol, the fact that *Empire* could be a photograph is the

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[72] Koch, 1987, p. 60. See also, notes on Mekas, p. 145. Rayns, 1997, p. 85.
[73] Ibid p. 120.

reason it needs to be a very long film. This is given a double significance by the building's own immobility:

> It becomes apparent that the slowest of movements, or the last to occur or arrive, is not the least intense.

In this way, a photograph would indeed express nothing of the intensity of the Empire State Building. In this case, only a succession of photographs, or a film, might be appropriate to do this, It is the stillness of the building, and of *Empire*, that creates the intensity of black holes on the white wall, and vice versa. As Flusser writes, it is remarkable stillness in the photograph that elevates it from redundancy:

> It is precisely this permanently changing situation that we have become accustomed to...the changing situation is familiar, redundant; progress has become uninformative, run-of-the-mill. What would be informative, exceptional, exciting for us would be a standstill situation...that would surprise and shock us. [75]

This is *Empire* as probe-head, bursting from over-signification brought about by its lack of event and movement and the extraordinary intensity of the 'holey surface' that can be created by nothing other than the stillness of a building.

The same can also be said of the black-and-white image. At its simplest level, black-and-white photography is an abstraction from colour photography, as Arthur Danto writes about *Empire*:

> A black-and-white photograph may be taken of a black-and-white object – a zebra, say. But it does not show the blackness and the whiteness of that object, it merely shows the difference.[76]

These thoughts are echoed by Gregory Battcock, who adds to this an importance of the role of the image (as opposed to blank film) as abstraction:

> The decision to film *an object* allowed for the presentation of the

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[74] Malcolm Le Grice, *Abstract Film and Beyond*, (London: Studio Vista, 1977), p.95.
[75] TPP, p. 65.

full range of tones, from black to white.[77]

Finally, for Flusser, the black-and-white image constitutes an attempt to reveal the concepts behind representation within the representation. The use of black-and-white is not a reduction by abstraction, but an extension of the abstract machine's operation:

> Many photographers therefore also prefer black-and-white photographs to colour photographs because they more clearly reveal the actual significance of the photograph, i.e. the world of concepts. [78]

This suggests a reason for Warhol's choice to use black-and-white film (or at least resist the expensive move to colour) in these early films. In its simplest terms it makes the Empire State Building and its surroundings more difficult to recognise (and only, in that event, recognisable by its shape); and in more complex terms it makes elements of the black-box of photography explicit. Warhol was not concerned with recording eight hours of the Empire State Building in a way that could be interpreted as an image of the state of things (facialized), but instead, by employing the extreme functions of cinema available to him, he was concerned with providing an image of the building that could not finally be facialized.

This interest in the building as unable to be completely actualized is made all the more emphatic by Warhol's own becoming-imperceptible that is evident in *Empire. Empire* was filmed by Warhol and Jonas Mekas, from an idea by John Palmer. Whilst Warhol was a cameraman for the film, and can clearly be seen returning to the camera in its later stages, Warhol was unfamiliar with the new model, and hence Mekas took most of this responsibility. Given that the concept for such a film was not entirely his, especially as we have seen how the conceptual abstraction is the film's philosophical drive, and that he was remote from the process of filming, there is not much of a case to describe Warhol as the *auteur* of *Empire*.

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[76] Danto, 1994, p. 76.
[77] Gregory Battcock, 'Notes on *Empire*', *Film Culture*, no. 40, (Spring 1966), pp. 39-40.

Empire therefore presents a problem for David James' approach to the "erasure of authorship", Warhol's "most characteristic authorial gesture" that progressed during his film career [79]. This is what became clear in Warhol's self-portraits, but also became clear in his becoming-star. Becoming-star simultaneously involves the erasure of the molar identity of the self, in favour of becoming-woman, and becoming-imperceptible. What is clear is that the Monroe silkscreens were a simultaneous becoming star and an erasure (at least in part) of Warhol's self. This is finally why the Monroe silkscreens are as much a facialization of becoming-Warhol as the self-portrait. Warhol's imperceptibility at such an early stage demonstrates how it was not a progression, but a milieu, or becoming. It is clear that, rather than such a degradation of the traditional authorship role occurring over time, *Empire* is an example of Warhol's becoming-imperceptible at a very early stage in his career.

Warhol's significant part in *Empire* was to step back from direct contact with the project and become an imperceptible part of the abstract machine. Becoming-Warhol is experienced not through any traditional authorial signature, but instead the experience is a molecular one of camera, filmmakers, image, viewer/s, and the information that flows into all of these from Warhol's reputation, the building, and cinema and photography in general. To describe *Empire* as *by* Warhol is to create a distinction where there needn't be: *Empire is* a Warhol. The difficulty experienced in pinning down Warhol's input in *Empire* does not diminish it, but if anything makes it more a part of becoming-Warhol. In reel seven, Warhol's reflection in the window of the Time-Life building office (Empire's shooting location) overlays the floating image of the building in the distance. In a few brief minutes, Warhol is perceptible in the filmmaking. However, this only makes clearer his near complete absence from the film, since the image is fleeting, translucent, and finally disappears.

Slide 85

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[78] TPP, p. 43.
[79] James, 1998, p. 26.

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Conclusion: Inside the black-box

This finally brings us back to photography and its genetic element. Warhol's approach to art, culture, and life in general, was as an experience of becoming. Warhol saw the photographic image as a crucial element in the organisation of this becoming into abstract phenomena. It is through photographs that he first encountered stardom (Shirley Temple and Mae West), and through the manipulation of photographs (and rarely the taking of them) that he negotiated with stardom. Warhol's becoming-woman had little or nothing to do with the trajectory of his sexual life. Rather, his becoming-woman was a becoming-star, realised in the 1986 self portrait, when he put that 'thin Warholian layer' over his image as he had done with Monroe, Jackie Kennedy, Elizabeth Taylor, and the others. At that point he had achieved the plateau of becoming-imperceptible.

It was his becoming-star that gave life to his relationship with Edie Sedgwick. *Poor Little Rich Girl* demonstrated the facialization of the star in process. The first reel, from which Sedgwick appears as landscape and unfacialized body, literally gives way to a facialization of Edie the star as the image cracks into focus. As in the mythology of stardom, Edie is literally plucked from obscurity.

His film of the Empire State Building, like the screen tests, demonstrates that a part of this becoming-star was a deeper interest (certainly at this stage) in the mechanics of stardom – the abstract machine at work that facializes the star. What these show is photography at work: the creation of the image as a 'state of things', but in this case suspended by its extreme abstraction. The landscape in *Empire* is so recognisable that within a few minutes it assumes another crystallization, and another face. The faces of Billy Name and Dennis Hopper are so recognisable that they become new landscapes as familarity is drawn from them. What *Empire* therefore also demonstrates is an apparent awareness on Warhol's part that the actual machine, the camera, was part of a wider process. As P.

Adams Sitney notes, the only way to "permit ontological awareness", is to direct it – to see the process at work one has to expose its mechanics [80]. These mechanics are what a Deleuzean study might call the *abstract machine*: becoming-photography.

It is the abstract machine that really informs our understanding of photography. Where Deleuze was so quick to dismiss the photograph as tracing, he was unprepared to consider it as a bifurcation, or branch, of the hierarchy created from becoming-photography: that of cinema and the photograph. Just as cinema labours as movement-image, from which the time-image bursts all too rarely, so photography as a discipline labours under the *program*. This is what Flusser demonstrated, in his remarkably Deleuzean project. Flusser's comments about the standstill might just as easily be applied to Duras' sunrises, Ozu's still-life compositions, as they are applicable to Sherman's Film Still's, or Atget's early morning streets. What Flusser was also able to describe however – the project of *Towards a Philosophy of Photography* – was the abstract machine whose mechanical and ideological workings inform the movement-image in both cinema and the photograph.

Empire shows an awareness of this abstract machine since it draws on the information that crystallizes - the reputation of Warhol himself, that of the building - and makes it indiscernible from the program that informs the photography. The shape of the Empire State Building emerges into the image from a white ground because Warhol chooses a medium (black-and-white film) that will not detect the presence of a *blue* sky or a *grey* building. Thus the program of the camera, film and all, informs the crystal environment as a process of abstraction: silent black-and-white cinema offers a time-image because it presents abstraction in the face of colour sound cinema. And of course this program is inseparable from the apparatus, so that the experience of watching *Empire* is equivalent to the experience of filming it. This is the apparatus of cinema of attractions, as Gunning described. Warhol, in watching the Edison films was not returning to the year zero, since cinema has no year zero. Warhol was

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[80] Adams Sitney, 1974, p. 374.

uncovering the zero-ness that had been obscured by the transformation of the shot into montage. He was returning not to any historical antecedents, but a genetic one, since the Edison films, as do the Lumières', present becoming-photography. As did the audiences of early film, to watch *Empire* is to watch the apparatus, but in the latter sense it is to watch the apparatus of facialization, the apparatus of culture.

But, of course, we still have to deal with the image. It is the magical image that excited Flusser: the image that existed before the technical image (the photograph), and that constitutes the subject of his lament; an image that acknowledged its surface, and that presented time according to the gaze:

> While wandering over the surface of the image, one's gaze takes in one element after another and produces temporal relationships between them. It can return to an element it has already seen, and 'before' can become 'after'.

But for Flusser even the magical image had its own turning point:

> They are supposed to be maps but they turn into screens…Human beings ceased to decode the images and instead project them, still encoded, into the world 'out there', which meanwhile itself becomes like an image – a contexts of scenes, of states of things. [81]

This is the creation of mythology, especially in the Barthesian sense, and it is against this that Flusser ranges the magical image proper. This is the problem Deleuze also saw, especially between painting ("adventure of the line") and photography; one a map and the other a tracing: Flusser's magical image is facialized, and Deleuze's opsign is turned into 'states of things' by the abstract machine. In the abstract machine, the image is inseparable from the apparatus, from the program, and from the information. The abstract machine extends from object to image, actualizing the virtual world. This is mythology at work. Barthes was only able to describe the 'states of things' that are created, that are facialized.

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[81] TPP, pp. 8-10.

It is Flusser who describes the components of the abstract machine that facializes.

But of course Flusser's magical image is the time-image, and the "before' that can become 'after" is the crystal. At first glance this implies a return to a primitive image, but as both Flusser and Deleuze note, this is the image *within* the abstract machine, rather than antecedent to it. The possible always remains, but the abstract machine makes it real. To find the magical image is not a question of going back into history, but of decoding the genetic element.

Flusser and Deleuze demonstrate the becoming-photography of the photographic image. Becoming-photography is the operation by which the virtual world becomes actual, and by which the universe becomes states of things. Unhappy that this should be final, Deleuze's search for the time-image was a search for probe-heads that rely upon the abstract time of cinema – photograms on a track – in order to burst out. Time-images are so because they draw attention to the abstraction of cinema, rather than obscure it or render it imperceptible, and the same can be said for the photograph as time-image. It is the *free-indirect discourse*, the camera-consciousness, drawing attention to a picture's surface, letting the eye wander over it and 'create its own temporal relations', that provides the seed for the crystal-image.

Flusser's final importance is due to his belief in the sheer scale of the abstract machine at work. Even when dealing with the photographic universe, he places it as one black-box within another. It is impossible to know every code and connection in the super-black-box, and this is the desperate message that runs through Flusser's study. However, this is why *Empire* is all the more important as a demonstration. What Flusser and Deleuze developed on paper, Warhol developed on screen. By taking the function to its extreme, Warhol managed to reveal the molecular structure of the black box: its reliance upon image, program, apparatus, and information. He revealed the black-box as abstract machine, but in suspending the image, by making it redundant, he

revealed the genetic element of photography that remains within it. *Empire* reveals the black-box because it cannot be finally facialized. It is impossible to know all the connections to actualise it.

That Warhol should present this shouldn't be a surprise, Warhol too is a black-box, since again we cannot know every connection that makes up becoming-Warhol. But finally, when considering Warhol, something else rises to the surface. Writing about the criticism of Warhol's 1963 *Brillo Boxes*, Paul Mattick rounds on Arthur Danto over the subject of labels:

> It is the recognizability of the sign…that allowed Danto to think of the artwork and the original as indiscernible and the difference between them as therefore problematic. But the point of the *Brillo Boxes*, it seems to me, is not so much the difference as more the visual similarity between the two, which the differences set off.[82]

From this, it is easy to make a quick impression of the role of labels in Warhol's work – the silkscreens of Monroe; of himself – that develop Mattick's criticism. The silkscreens of Monroe reveal the schism between the star and the life of the person. However, it is when we start to think of the facialization involved in the label, that we can see this operating in Warhol's films. The odalisque pose and naked torso of Paul America is a label for homoeroticism, if not homosexuality. The face and body of Edie Sedgwick is the label for narcissism and minor-celebrity. And of course the image of the Empire State Building is the label for great architecture or even, alternatively, 'a big nothing'. These are all interpretations encountered in this study [83]. But as Mattick notes, it is the label that interested Warhol: the label is the facialization, the product of the abstract machine. Most importantly, it is the 'recognizability of the sign' that leads to those interpretations and that obscures the workings of the abstract machine. To recognize the camera's framing in *My Hustler* as the homoerotic gaze is akin to thinking that *Brillo Boxes* made a comment on industrial design, or even that the boxes simply contained scouring pads. Warhol's effort was to make the abstract machine visible by changing the

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[82] Mattick, 1998, p. 970.

materials, exacerbating them, or taking them to the extreme.

Warhol appears to have realized early on that the photograph is a label for the photographic image, one that obscures the nature of becoming-photography by appearing to stand for it. The early film work was, it seems, not an attempt to re-introduce cinema or the photograph, but the becoming-photography that they label. *Empire* is the most effective example of such an attempt. As a film in which the composition does not change, it might immediately be thought that any one photogram might represent (or be the label for) the whole. But *Empire* defies this, and its longevity and inability to be defined by one photogram – even though nothing appears to happen – ensures that to know *Empire*, you really do have to watch it [84]. The relationship between one photogram to the whole of *Empire* is that of the action-image to becoming-photography. The action-image 'stands for' becoming-photography, but is unable to stand for it. This is what Deleuze reveals about the movement-image, which seeks to stand for cinema. And this is what is found with the photograph as action-image. It is this mis-recognition, labels standing for wholes or discourses, which *Empire* exposes.

It might seem like an anti-climax to find the perfect representation of the genetic element of photography – becoming-photography – in a film such as *Empire*. It is a film that holds little interest visually, and indeed it does not get a mention even by Deleuze. To the uninitiated, *Empire* would appear to tell us more about photographs in any case since it is, to invoke a cliché, little more than a moving photograph. Or else it might simply give support to those who criticise the mores of avant-garde cinema in general, since even during its recent showing at the Whitney Museum irate audiences stormed out (what did they expect from this film – romance?). Even for many champions of Warhol and avant-garde cinema, it still barely warrants a mention beyond the sheer audacity, or sheer monotony, or even sheer camp, of an eight-hour film of a building.

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[83] Brasell, 1992, p. 62; Annette Michelson, "Gnosis and Iconoclasm: A Case Study of Cinephilia", in *October* 83, (Winter 1998), pp. 3-18, pp. 12-13; Battcock, 1966, p.39.
[84] Callie Angell notes, in the 1994 Whitney programme, that the absence of critical comments on the final reels of *Empire* suggest that before 1994 no-one had sat through the entire film. cf.

Part-vilified and part-ignored, people still stare open mouthed when introduced to its concept alone. It seems, even talking about it, to fundamentally oppose everything for which cinema is popularly appreciated. Surely the secret power of the photographic image does not reveal itself in such a cinematic aberration?

But this is exactly what *Empire* demonstrates: the genetic element of photography is not a holy grail. Deleuze's project over the cinema books, realised alongside *A Thousand Plateaus*, was not merely to define the time-image. Instead it was to understand the drives that connect the image to the sensory-motor schema, or what frees the image from it. Similarly, there is much more for Flusser beyond his pessimistic vision of the black-box. The black-box-as-incomprehensible is an invitation rather than a bar to further study. Looking back, it has been important to come to these conclusions slowly. Above all, what matters is not the truth that appears to have been found, but the journey made in order to find it. The truth is not at the end of the labyrinth; the truth *is* the labyrinth.

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Angell, 1994, p. 17.

Conclusions:

Unfinished Business

Slide 86

Summing Up

The object of this thesis has been to 'peel away' some of the various understandings of the photographic image and its relation to time by using the influential analysis that Deleuze proposed in his two books on cinema. The thesis proceeds from what is essentially a 'throw-away' comment of Deleuze in relation to the photograph (here 'photography'):

> Photography is a kind of moulding: the mould organises the internal forces of a thing in such a way that they reach a state of equilibrium at a certain instant (immobile section).[1]

By invoking Bazin, Deleuze sets the photograph in opposition to the mobile section of the shot, and thus relegates the former as a static or abstract organisation of chronology. The whole project of this thesis has been firstly to re-view the photograph as capable of being a direct image of time, and to go on to understand the processes of photography that lie at the heart of both cinema and the photograph, and which are organised by perception into abstract time. The process continued by demonstrating that the photograph and cinema are always connected by the process of photography itself. The photograph as time-image is best understood in terms of the crystal-image, whose particular division of time is analysed in Chapter Three, and 'imagined' in the analysis in Chapter Four. At the heart of the crystal-image is the exchange or circuit from which it emanates. This is the constantly self-referential process of photography that is organised into transparency or self-consciousness, but which we can see is always a *becoming* from which these are abstractly deduced. This brings us to the end of the trajectory, but does not necessarily leave every possible question unanswered. This conclusion will attempt to cover some of these questions, and perhaps begin to answer them.

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'Time-image good, movement-image bad (?)'

Parts of this thesis have been presented as papers at conferences, or otherwise discussed at length. This has created a number of opportunities

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[1] MI, p. 24.

to consider directions that the thesis might have taken and areas of critical theory that needed developing during writing. Primarily, they have helped to bring some of the threads of the thesis together, either by critical discussion or by simple example, and have also demonstrated important threads to avoid. At the risk of writing as if this were an introduction rather than conclusion, it is worth mentioning them.

This thesis has intentionally avoided any direct confrontations with the Deleuze 'pedagogies' that have emerged over the last few years. With the exception of texts by D.N. Rodowick, Michael Hardt, and the Buchanan volume, which were briefly mentioned earlier, this thesis has steered itself away from the commentaries and meta-commentaries that have recently been published. This is for two reasons. Primarily, this thesis might use up a whole chapter to develop a review of these approaches, and in some cases that would simply mean commentaries on commentaries (on what are already commentaries, as Deleuze's books are as much cinephilic reviews as they are philosophical classifications). This 'chapter' has been put aside in favour of the discussion and dissemination of photography as a critical discipline, which is not altogether a small task in itself. Whilst parts of this thesis employ the commentary approach, particularly in tracing Deleuze's ideas from *Bergsonism*, through *The Logic of Sense* and into the *Cinema* books and beyond, it does so in an attempt to illuminate photography criticism and its relationship with film. Commentaries may form the central thread of the thesis, but the intention has always been to take it to photographs and films, especially to those not dealt with by Deleuze. It has been the intention of this thesis to try to deal with Deleuze's work directly, when it provides the backbone of an approach to photography, and turn to such meta-texts only when absolutely necessary. The occasional redundancy of using multiple commentaries was shown when we dealt with Benjamin. Meta-texts such as Mary Price's or Eduardo Cadava's, whilst being excellent in their own right, overlap too often, and occasionally act merely as primers for the original texts. Similarly, Benjamin's ambiguous notion of aura and experience provokes much discussion in any case, and has many commentaries. Whether it was because the relevant texts are so short, or because Benjamin died before

completing the project, the subject is one held in the popular academic consciousness or domain: everyone has their 'take' on aura. It was the fervent questioning of aura at a conference that led to a renewed rigour in dealing with it in Chapter Three. Nonetheless, and despite the awkwardness of some translations, as Miriam Hansen has observed in Benjamin's case, sometimes it is best to go directly to those texts in question rather than simply deal with the commentaries.

On the other hand, some commentaries are unavoidable, since many texts make reference to principle thinkers in a particular field. This has the effect of snowballing if there is limited variety in writing on the subject. This is shown in a few cases with references to Benjamin and photography, but it is particularly prevalent in references to Barthes.

Barthes' work, and in particular his *Camera Lucida*, is often the 'first-port-of-call' in discussions of photography, and turns up in varied texts by many authors. This is as much a result of the dominance of this particular work in photography study - particularly in an interdisciplinary context – as it is the practice that ensures that dominance. The snowballing has reached such a level that the work must be mentioned if only in passing, since it is now the expected text in a bibliography on photography. Whether we want to or not, we have to deal with *Camera Lucida*, as we have done throughout the thesis, but having to deal with so many micro-commentaries has been taxing. If nothing else, it suggests the need to look for other ideas and views on the photograph. Therefore the thesis has tried to bring together occasionally disparate or opposing approaches to visual studies, as is the case with Kendall Walton and Joseph LeDoux. In this the object was to demonstrate the common perceptual occurrence - perception of the image and its relationship with perception in general - from which they take divergent lines of study (or lines of flight).

There is a third reason for trying to avoid any Deleuze pedagogy. Deleuze has made a peculiar impact into film studies, and is fast becoming the object of love and derision in many of the already existent camps in the discipline. Psychoanalysis, for example, appears to regard Deleuzeanism

with suspicion, perhaps in response to his approach to the subject in the cinema books (as well as in his work with Guattari). Cognitive semioticians appear to find Deleuze's Bergsonism difficult to agree with. Finally, there are any number of criticisms that may be made of Deleuze by those who hover in between. Is Deleuze not too cinephilic? Is he not too auteurist? How can we use him to deal with mainstream cinema when he appears to view it with some contempt? If we want to conduct an analysis of *Hey Dude, Where's My Car?* what use is Deleuze? (It is partly with this in mind that we looked at *Funny Face*, a film that appears to be diametrically opposed to the concept of the time-image, or the 'serious' cinema to which the time-image is often attributed in Deleuze and after) What all these criticisms have in common is their suspicion of the epistemiology that has cemented itself around Deleuze as a popular figure, and the totalising discourse threatened in his becoming 'the-next-big-thing'. This is an approach that sees the application of his philosophy to avant-garde cinema, the *nouvelle-vague*, or any other arbitrarily decided group of cinemas, as 'speaking for' cinema in general. It also threatens to demote action cinema, spectacle cinema, or other popular genres that can be identified as movement-image cinema, to an inferior position with regard to the preferred time-image cinema that has captured the academic imagination. It is not accurate to suggest that the cinema of the movement-image should occupy this position, nor that Deleuze's work suggests that it should. Quite apart from the fact that at least a third of the cinema project is devoted to the movement-image, his treatment of some examples - particularly the burlesque comedy of Keaton and Langdon - is complex and erudite. It demonstrates an awareness of the impact the movement-image can have when created by certain individuals. In comparison Deleuze's description of the cinema of Hitchcock is rather swift (even off-hand); as if Keaton's movement-image is more erudite than Hitchcock's emerging time-image, even though the latter's innovation "introduces the mental image to cinema" [2]. The movement-image is too complex to dismiss lightly as the *bête noire* of academic analysis.

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[2] MI, p. 203.

However, his treatment of Keaton and Hitchcock exemplifies Deleuze's adherence to the idea of the cinema author or artist, and this is perhaps the most difficult problem we have in using Deleuze. It is made all the more difficult given that much film reception occurs in popular theatres where choices are made according to star, genre, language, and other recognised markers of content and quality.

Even so, this is no real challenge to using Deleuze to study popular cinema, especially as those magazines catering for the non-academic cinephile (as well as the academic one - viz *Sight and Sound*) routinely promote the role of the director as auteur. Indeed some auteurs are fetishised above others; Stanley Kubrick is a good example. It suggests that between the ideal 'characters' of popular audience and film academic there exists a middling class of cinephile for whom the auteur is an important figure, giving Deleuzean analysis more potential. In fact, though, there should be seen an exchange, rather than any discrete and mutually exclusive values. This exchange is the only way to describe the fluidity of auteurs and auteur-audiences. Stanley Kubrick may now be considered the auteur *par excellence* (his self-indulgent *Eyes Wide Shut*, plus the quixotic 'collaboration' with Spielberg on *A.I.* before his death helped in this regard), but there was a time when he was considered rather obscure, even 'difficult'. Auteur careers come and go, less so by their direct output and more by the waxing and waning of the love-affairs that various cognoscenti have with them. A number of directors singled out by Deleuze, including Kubrick but also Sam Fuller, have enjoyed and endured careers of this nature.

That Deleuze's auteurism should not be entirely indefensible suggests that to question Deleuze *per se* should not necessarily be to dismiss him, as some critics of Deleuze appear happy to do. This thesis starts with a major criticism of Deleuze, and of the school of thought behind his approach to the photograph. The task has been to give his approach the benefit of other theories and critical studies, whether they emerged after his death (such as the leaps made in the nineties in studying early film), or whether the academy and literate culture of which he was a part had not

acknowledged them (as is shown by the limitation of his analysis of photography to that developed by Bazin).

In contrast to the auteur fetish that currently exists is a more general technological fetish of cinema that comes in part from the development of digital technologies. This has been noted by both Scott McQuire, and Lev Manovich, who independently suggest that the replacement of celluloid with digital media (whether in actuality, or merely in the perception audiences have of cinema 'going digital') has in turn led to a fetishism of the look of cinema [3]. In a double affirmation of the auteur ideal, old classic cinema can be seen in 'cleaned-up' prints converted to Digital Versatile Disc, whilst Computer Generated Imaging gives precise control to the whim of the director in current film production. This occurs in the creation of worlds that appear with historical verisimilitude, such as in Baz Luhrmann's *Moulin Rouge!* (2001), and also in the desaturated image of Steven Spielberg's *Saving Private Ryan* (1997). The nineties, on the other hand, saw restorations of the *Star Wars* trilogy, but also the George Cukor *My Fair Lady* (1964). Importantly, it saw the restoration of Anthony Mann and Stanley Kubrick's *Spartacus* (1960), recently re-branded (with some difficulty) by popular magazines as assuredly a Kubrick product. Deleuze perhaps could not have predicted these developments, although Vilém Flusser certainly invoked them in 1983. Finally, digital technologies muddy the water considerably when they are employed by those directors who might otherwise be expected to adhere to the traditions of filmmaking. Jean-Pierre Jeunet's *Le Fabuleux destin d'Amélie Poulain* (2001) has created controversy by using digital technologies to 'clean-up' Paris in such a way that simultaneously evokes both Poetic Realism and *Cinema du look*, but also *le Front populaire and* Vichy [4]. Perhaps the biggest issue for us is that Jeunet was fast becoming the ideal auteur candidate, largely for the same reasons, yet chose to eschew the purity that might be valued in producing on untouched celluloid.

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[3] Lev Manovich, 'The Paradoxes of Digital Photography', in Hubertus von Amlunxen et al eds. *Photography after Photography: memory and representation in the digital age*, (Amsterdam: G&B Arts, 1996), pp. 57-65, p. 58-59. See also Scott McQuire, 'Digital Dialectics: the paradox of cinema in a studio without walls', in *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1999, pp. 379-397. p. 386.

[4] For a report on the reception of *Amélie* in France, see Ginette Vincendeau, 'Café Society', in *Sight*

Arguments over digital versus celluloid lead us to consider some of the films, photographies, and theories that have gone untreated in the thesis for various reasons. Some of these reached a late state of development and were left out at the last minute, whilst some remain faint whispers of projects perhaps yet to come. Still others were not taken up for very specific reasons. One film conspicuous by its absence is Chris Marker's *La Jetée* (1962). *La Jetée* is probably the first film that one thinks of when connecting cinema to photography, and indeed Garrett Stewart gives it due attention. Its time-travel narrative, told in photographs, gives it an immense gravitational attraction for a Deleuzean analysis, but it is avoided here precisely because it is so obvious a choice of film for study. Instead, we chose a different film from the period of the *nouvelle vague*, *L'Année dernière à Marienbad*. Despite its more subtle use of photography and photographs, it is no less labyrinthine in plot than Marker's film, and probably more so. *Marienbad* is more interesting because of its history of interpretation, which allows for a more intricate crystal-image to be viewed. Despite the conundrum created by its narrative, *La Jetée* has a rather linear plot in comparison, and interpretation of it is much less divided. Similarly, the photographs of Cindy Sherman are interesting because they are still hotly contested, their meanings appropriated and defended, and their profile raised higher still, by art criticism in general, and feminist criticism (in art history, film studies, and cultural studies) in particular. These reasons make them more useful as study than the work of Duane Michals or Tracy Moffatt.

Films that never left the notepad include Dziga Vertov's *The Man with the Movie Camera* (1929), and a few films from the New York avant-garde: work by Stan Brakhage and Hollis Frampton. These were pushed aside in favour of the work on Warhol, whose relationship to both avant-garde practice and the mechanisms of cinema (and his role as author) encapsulated all the issues for discussion. Other films reached a more developed state of analysis for the last chapter, including Michael Snow's *Wavelength* (1967), upon which Deleuze briefly wrote. *Koyaanisqatsi*

(1983), directed by Godfrey Reggio and filmed by Ron Fricke, was to provide a counterpoint against which to draw the picture of Warhol's films. The work on this was completed (it also included Fricke's later *Baraka* (1992)), but then discarded. These films were to be seen as movement-images, in comparison to the time-images of Warhol, setting them as inferior because of this. This would have created the same hierarchy that we decried above, and which is to be avoided. The other reason that all of the films above were 'lost along the way here' is that this thesis already fights with the tendency in Deleuze scholarship to 'claim' or 'reclaim' certain films as time-images, as if Deleuze himself would be writing about them now. Whilst this is ultimately speculative (Deleuze was nothing if not guided by his cinephilia, rather than by the duties of film scholarship), if we simply search for undiscovered time-image films, to do so would preserve the hierarchy that is in danger of emerging – that the time-image is good, that the movement-image is bad.

Nevertheless, this thesis is about the time-image, and so the process of discovery remains in part. This is why the thesis is more determined in its exposition of the optical situation that becomes the movement-image, the optical situation that is organised into the sensory-motor schema. The story of the photograph here is the story of its passage from pure optical situation, through organisation into an immobile section, from the possible to the real. This has the danger of creating a hierarchy of time-image over movement-image in the photograph also, and some steps have been taken to avoid this. It is the task of another thesis to question this rigorously.

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Real and Representation

All of the above examples have been films (or photographies) that remain unwritten in this thesis. Some of them, like *La Jetée*, perhaps lurk under the surface. Similarly, writers such as Roland Barthes, or Marcel Proust, might deserve a chapter of their own, since they recur on a few occasions. But if there is an unwritten chapter, it is prefigured by the relationship that

we discovered between Nan Goldin's photograph of her friend Edwidge and Edouard Manet's *A Bar at the Folies-Bergère* (1881-2). Indeed, *Bar* and its painter pose (and perhaps answers) some questions of reality and fiction, digital and celluloid, and author and spectator.

Slide 87

As an artist Manet cuts not too dissimilar a figure to Andy Warhol, especially if we consider some of the emphasis placed on their roles as authors of significant works that affected both the critical and public perception of art. This has inspired varied critical analysis intent on seeing them as artists whose lives are painted onto their canvases and silkscreens. As such they fulfil the caricature of the Author that Barthes drew in 'Death of the Author', and the various appraisals of them are testament to the difficulty of this type of authorship study. As a painting, *Bar* encapsulates the variety of interpretations of Manet and his work.

We have already seen a little of Manet. In contrast to *Bar*, *Olympia*'s overt sexuality gives it a limited range of interpretations, no matter how risqué they might have been at the time. Its exchange of glance and gaze frees it from the direct discourses of looked and looked-at, but as such, it remains a free-indirect proposition that is unfulfilled. On the other hand, there is an ambiguity in *Bar* that is evidenced by the greater diversity of interpretations that have been written on it. This has reached such a point that much of the new research into the painting springs from the fact that so many interpretations exist. Thierry de Duve's recent article for *Critical Inquiry* begins from this very premise. *Bar* resists interpretation for de Duve, and nothing else can explain the existence of books such as the 1996 anthology *Twelve Views of Manet's "Bar"* [5]. Manet's painting acts as a personal inkblot test for each candidate because the formal and textual ambiguities allow for only individual interpretation [6].

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[5] Thierry de Duve, 'How Manet's *A Bar at the Folies-Bergère* Is Constructed', in *Critical Inquiry* 25, (Autumn 1998), pp. 136-168. See also Bradford R.Collins ed. *Twelve Views of Manet's "Bar"*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
[6] De Duve, p. 163.

But de Duve's article demonstrates how, for many reasons, *Bar* should be included in this thesis beyond the simple fact of its resistance to interpretation. Like Atget before him, Manet is described as an artist interested in the minutiae of life, or in the everyday. He is, for some authors, *un peintre de morceaux* [7]. This not only reflects Atget, but is also echoed in Nan Goldin's photographs of her found-family in New York. Similarly, Manet's use of the mirror in *Bar* is given special attention by de Duve himself. It is the mirror, or more precisely its 'turning' within the painting's space, that excites de Duve's analysis of the many interpretations. Despite hints given to the contrary, de Duve is adamant that the spectator is not given an avatar in the figure of the dandy customer, but instead that the painting firmly addresses the spectator directly. This completes a series of conflations that the painting achieves. The turning mirror presents first one view of Suzon, and then another of Suzon and her customer. The painting manages, for de Duve, to address both the spectator in the Salon, and the posthumous spectator – although in this case there is little difference. Manet interrogates the spectator, and does so because the painting appears correct to the immediate eye, and then shows its distortion gradually – the mirror turns in space and annihilates time, or tense. The painting "obliterates the irreducible interval of time" between the views (of painter, of spectator, of client) – instead of the viewer moving, the painting ensures that "the viewer never leaves his or her place and never takes the place of the client"[8]. It brings the two together in a free-indirect discourse.

The painting takes the rules of Albertian perspective and then rejects them to powerful effect. This confounds the relativity that is expected from time and space in painting, a relativity that Rudolf Arnheim suggests is a perceptual system assigned to objects or sets of objects [9]. Tension in narrative cinema is created by the misalignment of time and space (the static heroine saved by the hero in the speeding car or train is his best example), and this tension is prefigured in Manet's intimate-yet-public

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[7] Paul Mantz, Jules-Antoine Castagnary and Théodore Pelloquet quoted in de Duve, p. 142.
[8] De Duve, pp. 164-167
[9] Rudolf Arnheim, 'Stricture on Space and Time', in *Critical Inquiry* 4, (Summer 1978), pp. 645-655, p. 654.

space; this ephemeral-yet-eternal exchange of looks, this glance that is also a gaze. Pictorial space, for Arnheim, is an integration of systems of subwholes – groups of objects in space and time – that are organised by perception based on the expectation of relativity. Arnheim thus reflects Deleuze's commentary on Bergson, who placed perception above the simple relation of cause and effect – the relation of objects in time and space:

> Bergson was [in *Matter and Memory*] working out new philosophical concepts relating to the theory of relativity; he thought relativity involved a conception of time which it didn't itself bring out, but which it was up to philosophy to construct.[10]

This, of course, is what ultimately led to the conception of the movement-image and time-image.

All this suggests a crystal operation of time in *Bar* (the use of mirrors alone gives it a certain candidacy). But, returning to de Duve, it is worth noting that another exchange takes place between the expectations of Alberti and the expectations of a new style of painting which drew from the role of the artist as avatar for the spectator. The mirror initially separates the realism of the figure of the barmaid (identified as Suzon, a real barmaid of the Folies, something also noted by Novelene Ross [11]) from the impressionism that de Duve sees in the rendering of the *grande salle* of the Folies itself. The 'world' of *Bar* is therefore a "real-fictional" space that conflates the objects as seen with the sensibilities that sees them. Leading to a dual, or split, personality in many interpretations of the painting, this echoes the conflict between notions of the real and notions of representation that we previously considered only in photography. There is no position to be cemented in this exchange, but instead only a point-of-view, a *concetto*, that is to be had of the exchange *as* an exchange.

It is the conflict between the image as real and as representation that has structured many of the discussions in this thesis. Even in Warhol's likening

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[10] N, p. 48.

himself to the machine of the camera and its culture, there is always the figure of Warhol himself that intervenes. But to decide that Warhol's images are simply always Warhol's, that they separate us from the reality of the objects depicted, that they are always fictions, is to try and create a singular direction for an exchange that is free and indirect. The same occurs with Manet. On the other hand, however, how can we not think of the painting itself as 'real'? Representation it might be, the carefully deliberated creation of a dying painter's last gasps it probably is, but that never separates us from reality because the painting *is* reality. This brings us back to Bergson, whose off-the-cuff remarks on perception and objectivity can be seen in a new light: "Such a man would always maintain that the object exists independently of the consciousness that perceives it..." In fact, there is always perception of an object in photography and, now we can see, in painting. It might, for some, be the *grande salle*, or it might be Suzon. This is general consensus that leads to the awareness of the paradox created by the conflicting views. However, the object is also the painting itself, which exists in reality but not 'independently of the consciousness that perceives it'. The problem for critical studies has been the separation of sensory, or cognitive, perception and perception-images in this manner. Bergson shows us that the two cannot be separated. But it takes the studies of Benjamin, and later Deleuze, to demonstrate it. Benjamin's experience of experience, Deleuze's perception of perception (after Pasolini) both demonstrate the ways that the mind deals with sensory perception – the creation of time-images, in this case [12]. The immense forces of organisation, which Arnheim noted, are what create the movement-image from this 'dealing': "the time dimension possesses no sensory medium of its own, [and] will anchor itself to any suitable perceptual embodiment.[13]" Thus it creates the 'fossils of duration' that he sees in Gaston Bachelard, or the becoming-mad of depth that we see in Deleuze [14].

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[11] Novelene Ross, *Manet's* Bar at the Folies-Bergère *and the Myths of Popular Illustration*, (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1980), p. 7.

[12] For a review of Benjamin's theories of experience and their use in understanding contemporary photography, see Rosalind Krauss, 'Reinventing the Medium', in *Critical Inquiry* 25, (Winter 1999), pp. 289-305.

[13] Arnheim, 1978, p. 654.

This thesis has not confronted the issue of 'real versus representation' squarely, but has instead reached this conclusion in a roundabout way. Perception is characterised by a tremendous urge to organise the exchange of points-of-view or values that assault it. This is the urge to fix a particular point-of-view from this variation of truth, but an urge that does not recognise this exchange of values as having a quality in itself. Instead, this exchange is 'directed' by rational thought – often in the Cartesian sense. Aberrations such as the exchange of fictions, the conflict between the real and the representation, are often referred to in scientific terms that describe a convolution, or inbreeding, of an otherwise natural cause-effect process: 'feedback loops', 'chimeras', 'paradoxes'. However, photography, film, and painting continue to present this aberrance as part of their own 'nature', and that is the power of their affect: 'suspension of disbelief', 'hyperreceptivity', the painting's 'istoria' [15]. Manet's *Bar* emphasises this because, like Sherman's 'fake' film stills, the various interpretations of the painting take for granted that this 'aberrance' is the result of a deeply felt political intention:

> They have moved to an interpretive, ideological, sometimes allegorical level of reading and have unanimously aligned themselves with the "plausible hypothesis..."

The need for a unified theory – to 'know' the painting once and for all – neglects the qualities that the exchange might have of its own.

But Manet's *Bar* is a *painting*, and therefore presents a problem for its inclusion in this thesis. It is the reason why it does not have a chapter of its own, but also it presents one of the many directions the thesis could have taken. An underlying question that remains of all the analysis conducted here on photography, and also of all of Deleuze's approach to the time-image, is whether or not the time-image is dependent upon the photographic image's (perceived) connection with the object photographed. Since Deleuze draws his study of the ontology directly from Bazin, we can suggest that it does depend upon this factor. Perception

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[14] Ibid p. 646.
[15] De Duve, p. 168. On 'hyperreceptivity', see also John Ellis, *Visible Fictions*, 2nd edn, (London:

has to see bodies moving in space and time, and it has to believe the photographing of them in those conditions. At the time of his writing, photography satisfied this criterion easily, and painting did not. Painting instead could be trusted as a 'dubitative process', a point that Peter Lunenfield makes after Hollis Frampton's wrestling with the 'photographic agony' [16]. This was his own presentation of the paradox between real and representation.

However, even as Deleuze was writing, Flusser was envisioning the change that would occur as the technologies of photography moved from analogue formats to digital. The photographic image is now also a dubitative process, since potentially any image can be wrested from its indexical connection to the objects, subwholes, or conditions photographed. For Flusser, as for Lev Manovich, this has meant a renewed trust in the analogue image that belies its own manipulability. When faced with the possibilities of digital enhancement and manipulation promised by the latest blockbuster, the manipulations and enhancements of the nineteenth-century pictorialists is ignored and the chemical photograph is implicitly trusted. This places the time-image in potential jeopardy: With this 'firstness' stripped away, how can we envisage the 'zeroness' of the opsign?

It is here that Manet's *Bar* can present an answer. Curiously, de Duve compares the painting to the digital image, since its creation is as much an effort of cut and paste (a process that is carried throughout much painting and into photomontage) as it is the passing-off of the framed diegesis as a believable world: "[it could be] a digital image, and it would still obey the same laws of optics and be subject to the same demonstration". [17]

Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1992), pp. 38-51.

[16] Peter Lunenfield, 'Art Post-History: Digital Photography & Electronic Semiotics', in Hubertus von Amlunxen et al eds. *Photography after Photography: memory and representation in the digital age*, (Amsterdam: G&B Arts, 1996), pp. 92-98, p. 95 (n20).

[17] De Duve, p. 155.

Both expose the exchange of values inherent in images – their exchange of real and representation – and thus require different conditions of spectatorship. De Duve suggests that the 'way' to view *Bar* is to resist the temptation to direct the exchange toward a specific reading that 'corrects' or accounts for the quizzical optics. Lunenfield suggests that a similar 'mutable aesthetic' is needed to view the photographic image in general after the development of digital technologies [18]. Both suggest a final coming-to-terms with the fact that images are never real, and never fiction, but always in an exchange between those two values (a free-indirect proposition). This must be a central conclusion of this thesis also. This is a view that takes the emphasis away from indexical relations, since they have *never* been reliable. Deleuze's theories of the time-image always in fact relied upon the spectator as much as they did the images of time and space, although he never openly acknowledged that. De Duve and Lunenfield's suggestions decentre the emphasis in perception from that of the image, and embrace instead the relationship that perception has with the image as object, as well as the relationship it has with the image as an image of something. This is an approach that suggests that the concept of time in photography can be taken to the painting, and that such study could only be limited by questions of the figurative, the dubitative, and the contemplative – a broad task in itself. It is an approach that suggests that the time of an image is dependent upon its relationship *as* an image with its viewer, operator, or spectator. It is an approach shared by Flusser, for example but, strangely enough, it is also very Deleuzean.

Slides 88-99 (Menu screens)

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[18] Lunenfield, p. 96.

Source: Alliance Atlantis VHS, 1999.

Richard Avedon, *In the American West*, (New York: Abrams, 1985).

John Szarkowski and Maria Morris Hambourg,

The Work of Atget, Vols. I-IV, (London: Gordon Fraser, 1985).

<u>Slide 52</u>:

Bill Brandt, *A Snicket, Halifax,* 1947

Robert Frank, *Barber Shop, McLellanville,*

South Carolina, 1955..170

Sources:

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<u>Slide 53</u>:

Eugène Atget, *Parc des Sceaux*, 1925.

Eugène Atget, *Trianon*, 1923-24..171

Source: John Szarkowski and Maria Morris Hambourg,

The Work of Atget, Vols. I-IV, (London: Gordon Fraser, 1985).

<u>Slide 54</u>:

La Belle et la bête, Fr. d. Jean Cocteau, 1946................................171

Source: Connoisseur Academy Video, 1996.

<u>Slide 55</u>:

La Belle et la bête, Fr. d. Jean Cocteau, 1946................................171

Source: Connoisseur Academy Video, 1996.

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**Film Clips**

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
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A theoretical approach to image perception across film and photography

Damian Peter Sutton

Thesis submitted for the degree of
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
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
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