AN ANALYSIS OF THE "INTERNATIONAL CITY" STATUS AND AMBITIONS OF LYON

Sean Michael McDonald
B.A., M.A.

Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

University of Glasgow
Faculty of Social Sciences

Department of Geography
and Topographic Science

DECEMBER 1993.

CONTENTS

TABLE OF TABLES

TABLE OF FIGURES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This opus maximus was made possible through the kindness and assistance of a great many people both professionally and personally. It is impossible to name or give proper thanks to everyone at this time, but I would like to take this opportunity to single out a few of those to whom I owe the most. Obviously, all errors and sins of omission and ignorance are my responsibility and mine alone.

First and foremost I would like to express my thanks and appreciation to my supervisor, Professor Ian B. Thompson. Professor Thompson's advise, insight and encouragement during our numerous conversations was invaluable. My warm reception by the staff and fellow Post-Graduates in the Department of Geography at Glasgow University was also distinctly appreciated.

In Lyon, John Tuppen deserves special thanks for helping me learn my way around Lyon, its resources and the best pizza in town. A note of thank is also needed for Paul Mingret and Emmanuelle Sabot for their kindness. Thanks also to Jacques Bonnet, Andre Vant, Jacques Bethemont and Pierre Kukawka who took the time to discuss various aspects of this project.

For the sake of my tenuous grip on sanity and inspiration I need to single out Darren Comber for being a great host, friend and companion in that oh so special once in a lifetime experience of writing up to a deadline. Additionally, Bruce Vaughn was an inspiration and competitor (as always) who shared the experience of chasing Phred in a strange land and can understand the experience. The remainder of you vagrants in Boulder, Ann Arbor, Phoenix and numerous other odd points of call, many thanks for all manner of support provided.

Most significantly, I would like to thank my family. The support and generosity of the Wagners and Taylors during this time was greatly appreciated. Mom and Dad, as always, it is impossible to adequately express my thanks for your continued example and support in all matters...you done good!!

To Lesly, who shared and contributed to every aspect of this project with her usual grace and good humor, I give special thanks for the love and inspiration that ultimately led to the conclusion of this thesis.

McD
Glasgow, Scotland
December, 1993.

THIS THESIS IS DEDICATED TO

LESLY

WITH ALL MY LOVE
AND DEEPEST APPRECIATION

McD

ABSTRACT

"The primacy of Paris inhibits the regional sphere of activity of second-ranking French cities. Lyon is particularly disadvantaged in that to the west lies the low population density Massif Central, to the south is the city-port of Marseille with direct international maritime connections, to the east, Grenoble is a dynamic and, to some extent, rival pole while to the north-east Geneva has a well-established international role. To combat the primacy of Paris, and the competition of neighbouring cities, Lyon is justifiably attempting to develop an international and trans-national role to enhance its economic, political and demographic base".

The objective of this thesis is to test the above hypothesis through reference to objective empirical data and subjective qualitative methods. An examination of Lyon's status in the context of a theoretical model of an "International City", an empirical ranking of 165 European cities and Lyon's own long-range planning policy provide the framework for this study. Lyon's demographic strength, political situation, physical facilitators, (transportation, tourism and other infrastructure) and Lyon's international economic position will help place Lyon within the domestic and European urban hierarchy. Finally, an examination of Lyon's relations within the Rhône-Alpes Région will provide a clearer picture of Lyon's status and potential trans-national role.

FIGURE A
LYON IN EUROPE

FIGURE B
THE RHONE-ALPES RÉGION



INTRODUCTION

The author of this thesis is by training a historian and political scientist, who has had the opportunity to live, study and travel extensively in Europe. As compared with the repetitiveness of American city functions and landscapes, the author was aware of the specificity of "place" in Western Europe - that is, the immense variability of urban characteristics, atmospheres and functions, a result at least in part of locational and spatial features frequently absent in the United States. In part this reflects the longer and more complex history of Europe; but also the fact that to a larger degree than in the United States, the evolution of European cities has taken place within an international spatial setting. As compared with the continental scale of the United States, few major Western European cities are located more than 500 kilometres from an international boundary. Moreover, since the formation of the European Community (EC), these boundaries are becoming increasingly permeable and thus new politico-economic spatial systems are evolving. Although not a geographer by training, it seemed appropriate to the author that a deeper understanding of the spatial implications of European city development could best be achieved by researching in the context of a geography department and by adopting the integrative approach specific to the field of Geography while retaining the virtues of past training in the operation of political systems.

Having established the field of inquiry as being the international dimension of city development at a time of increasing trans-national integration in Western Europe, the question arose of how to define a specific project based on the academic resources available at Glasgow University. For reasons of prior experience and linguistic competence it was clear that it would be rational to select a French perspective. Secondly, given the growing links between the Glasgow Geography Department and institutes of Higher Education in Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région, it was logical to select Lyon as a focus of research. Moreover, given that these links are still in a developing stage, it was hoped that the author could contribute to the partnership rather than simply rely on elaborate and long-standing collaboration.

The choice of Lyon was not, however, simply a matter of convenience; but was also conditioned by certain specific features of the French national urban hierarchy. Whereas in most Western European nations there is a degree of decentralization of political and economic power commensurate with city size, in France, history has determined that Paris should enjoy a quasi-monopoly in the urban hierarchy. Lyon, with all the qualifications of location and hinterland to be a major city in the national urban system, finds itself relegated to the status of a secondary regional capital, at the head of a regional urban hierarchy which it does not entirely dominate. Conversely, no provincial city in France has seen its national and international transport connections so radically transformed in the last decade. Given a location close to three national frontiers (Italy, Switzerland and Germany), it is not unrealistic for Lyon to entertain international European aspirations as a counter-balance to the overwhelming weight of Paris. This, in fact, is the stated aim of the city authorities in their strategic planning. This leads the author to state as a hypothesis:

> "The primacy of Paris inhibits the regional sphere of activity of second-ranking French cities. Lyon is particularly disadvantaged in that to the west lies the low population density Massif Central, to the south is the city-port of Marseille with direct international maritime connections, to the east, Grenoble is a dynamic and, to some extent, rival pole while to the north-east Geneva has a well-established international role. To combat the primacy of Paris, and the competition of neighbouring cities, Lyon is justifiably attempting to develop an international and trans-national role to enhance its economic, political and demographic base".

It is the objective of this thesis to test the above hypothesis by reference to objective empirical data and more subjective qualitative information. This evidence is evaluated against a conceptual and empirical framework which forms the basis of the next chapter. It is important to stress what the thesis does not attempt to achieve. The thesis does not attempt to model the case of Lyon in any quantitative or economic sense. It does, however, aspire to be analytical in the sense of establishing the present status, objectives, achievements and ambiguities of Lyon's current situation. The precise methodology is indicated in Chapter Two and is pragmatic and eclectic rather than concerned with theoretical issues. This approach attempts to blend the systematic skills of the political scientist with the spatially integrative approach of the geographer. However, this task does require a statement of the theoretical and empirical framework upon which this thesis is constructed. This framework is presented in Chapter One.

PART ONE
THE CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

CHAPTER ONE
THE CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL BASIS

The notion of an "International City" is surrounded by vagueness, lack of definition, and a limited amount of empirical research leading to definitive results (Bonnafous, 1991). In a world economy which is becoming increasingly global, virtually every large city has an international dimension. This is far from conferment of the status of "International City"; especially in terms of controlling or directing an international space.

This chapter aims to clarify the meaning of the term "International City" and to introduce the case study which is to be examined in detail, the City of Lyon. Accordingly, this chapter reviews, in turn, a largely theoretical and exploratory study presented by Panayotis Soldatos (Soldatos, 1989) which attempts to define a model of "International" status, and an empirical study carried out by DATAR[1] and Maison RECLUS under the direction of Roger Brunet, applied specifically to 165 European cities with the aim of producing an international hierarchy (Brunet, 1988). Finally, the case of Lyon is introduced as a city which aspires to European status. The "Projet de Schéma Directeur de l'Agglomération Lyonnaise" report presented by the Syndicat d'Études et de Programmation de l'Agglomération Lyonnaise (S.E.P.A.L.) entitled LYON 2010: Un Projet d'Agglomération pour une Métropôle Européenne, illustrates the ambitions of Lyon for the future and assesses Lyon's current position in the regional, national, and European context (S.E.P.A.L., 1991).

This chapter will provide both a conceptual and empirical context as an introduction to an evaluation of Lyon. In addition, the statement of

[1]DATAR; Délégation à l'Aménagement du Territoire. A state strategic planning body established in 1963 to guide policy on regional development matters.

intent from Lyon establishes a firm foundation upon which to examine in detail the feasibility of "Lyon: Métropôle Européenne".

1.1 THE SOLDATOS THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL CITIES

Panayotis Soldatos, Director General of l'Institut d'Étude des Villes Internationales (IEVI-Canada), presents one example of the current thoughts, theories, and definitions surrounding the concept of "International Cities" in his paper La Nouvelle Génération des Villes Internationales dans un Monde Transnationalisé (Soldatos, 1989). Soldatos asserts that there is no proper definition of what constitutes an "International City". Scholars must, he argues, proceed to define the concept of an "International City" for two reasons. First, a clear conceptual base is needed for theoretical work on "International Cities". Second, methodology and policy orientation need to be grounded in a solid conceptual framework. Currently, the term "International City" is being used politically by urban leaders to create an image and atmosphere to support short-range policy making. The political usage of this concept does little to help Soldatos and others create the linkages and conceptualizations needed by scholars and others to pursue future studies in this field.

1.11 CRITERIA FOR INTERNATIONAL STATUS

Despite the evident problems associated with defining exactly what constitutes an "International City", Soldatos argues that currently there exists a new generation of "International Cities". Throughout history there have always been "International Cities", however, in the last 25 years, a distinctive new style has emerged. Soldatos presents six tables of different criteria that are essential to his definition of the new order of "International Cities". The first table, entitled "Le Profil International Modern des Villes" has 13 criteria. These criteria include such factors as geographic location, international services and support, important institutions in both the public and private sector, and an active local government geared towards facilitating international linkages. This provides an overview of the minimum requirements and actors needed for International status, but does not give any specifics or details on the scope of these factors.

The second table, consisting of 19 criteria, is entitled "Services Stratégiques de Support dans une Ville Internationale". This is an extension of one of the criteria in Table One that states that a high level of support services are required for international status. The infrastructure of professional services in this table include banking, finance, insurance, leisure facilities and a trained workforce. This is a section that can be approached in an empirical fashion. A city does, or does not, possess these specific support services needed for attracting and operating international businesses and institutions. One can empirically deduce, to a certain degree, which of these services are effective and available at an appropriate scale. For example, the number of multi-nationals or corporate headquarters in a city, or the relative strength of its banking or insurance sectors, are factors that can be made quite clear. One can also effectively compare the rankings of different agglomerations in these categories. This service support infrastructure is the simplest of the six sectors of the theoretical model to quantify.

The third table concerns "Les Tendances Dominantes de l'Evolution de la Nouvelle Génération des Villes Internationales". The common factor of all twelve criteria in this table is that they are all conscious efforts by city planners to enhance the internationalization of their city. Urban marketing, creating an urban network between cities, increasing linkages between all public and private sectors including higher education and research and development facilities, and increasing the level of participation by the local government in actively promoting the city in an international context are some of the key criteria of this table. The common thread of these factors maintains that all cities are attempting to coordinate, on all levels, their approach to improving their current status. However, the problem is that the nature of local politics, intra-urban relations and public sector-private sector relations is very fluid and ever changing. It is a Herculean task to coordinate any of these factors for a specific project at a specific point in time. To attempt to quantify this over an extended period to draw specific conclusions is imaginative indeed. These factors require instead, frequent qualitative asssesment within the context of specific projects

The fourth table, "L'Internationalité des Villes aux États-Unis et en Europe", is a brief comparison between American and European approaches to the criteria set out in Table Three. The broad differences in flow control, horizontal versus vertical linkages, and the levels of political and private activity in the city's development are discussed. The approach in the United States is centred towards private institutions and investors promoting their city. This system is based strongly upon horizontal linkages with the private sector being firmly implanted upon the top of the structure. The United States is also perceived as holding the advantage in service infrastructure over its European peers. The European experience has been more evenly balanced according to Soldatos. A vertical linkage has developed between the public and private sectors. This has led to a somewhat more advanced role for the European urban governments as they have more responsibility in promoting all phases of their internationalization than do their counterparts in the United States. The consequence of this division in Europe is that it requires a higher level of coordination at the local political level between numerous political administrations with different agendas, thus complicating the task.

The fifth table is concerned with the fourteen criteria that form what Soldatos refers to as "Les Principales Fonctions Stratégiques Recherchées par l'Internationalisation des Villes". Such criteria as power, research and development, production, and international cooperation are needed to pursue a genuine international role. The foundation of this section of Soldatos' theory is the distinction made between international characteristics and international functions. More simply put, between power and image. The crux of this section revolves around who controls the flow of resources. A powerful city controls the direction of the important flows of capital, resources, services and information while a less powerful city accepts various flows with few inputs or modifications.

The sixth and final table that completes the foundation of Soldatos' theory on the "New International Cities" is concerned with the "Elements Constitutifs d'une Polarisation Spatiale du Déploiement Internationale des Villes". These criteria are designed to link the regional, national, and international characteristics of an international city into a spatial context. Familiar themes of wealth retention, critical mass and an active presence in both the regional and national urban networks are reiterated as the essential criteria in this section and are expanded into a spatial argument.

All of these criteria are broad and many overlap; the crucial point being that all cities that strive for an expanded international role must provide superior and increasing levels of higher services and resources. This phenomenon has been referred to as the rise of the "Generic City" (Cheshire, 1990). Also, the local powers that be, either in the public or private sector, must strive to actively pursue and coordinate a cohesive and aggressive strategy for their city to compete on the international stage.

1.12 CRITICAL MASS

An introduction of the currently popular concept of critical mass in the context of "International Cities" and the difference between active and passive cities will complete the theoretical basis of the Soldatos "International City" model. Soldatos and others have attached the concept of critical mass to explaining the growth and possible future fortunes of cities with international ambitions. Critical mass is the point where one has sufficient components and linkages to provide a driving force. In the context of a city, once a sufficient number of the criteria defined by Soldatos have been achieved to an adequate degree, then the growth and expansion of a city becomes a power unto itself. With critical mass thus achieved, basic economic, market, and social forces will drive the growth of the city regardless of other indicators.

Critical mass must, like everything else, be kept in context. There is a different level required and desired at a regional level as opposed to an international level. Critical mass for a regional capital is much smaller then the critical mass needed to drive a world city. Also, a city need not be taken as an individual entity at all times. An alliance between cities can prove profitable. The criteria needed for improving a city's status could potentially be better met by two or more cities in many cases than by a single city. Therefore, an alliance between Lyon and Grenoble, for example, could prove highly advantageous for both by achieving critical mass through a joint effort rather than wasting time and resources in competition.

What critical mass is not is equally important to understand. Critical mass is not a set figure or amount that when achieved is instantly recognizable and is the key to a prosperous future for a city. To attempt to quantify all of the elements, intangibles, and criteria that make up the elusive critical mass is not possible. The task of empirically defining the needed linkages is even more difficult. To further complicate matters, it is not unusual to have local politicians telling the world that their city has indeed achieved, or is on the verge of achieving, critical mass. It is important to realize that because a city's urban marketing campaign pronounces that internationalization is eminent does not make that fact true. Critical mass is an important yet imprecise concept. The theory is sound but much less visible and more difficult to judge in this context than in physics.

Tied into the concept of critical mass is the differentiation between an active city and a passive city. An active city, according to Soldatos, is one that has achieved that elusive critical mass and boasts linkages, both horizontal and vertical, between all criteria and institutions. An active city is one that is powerful enough to influence and control important flows be they economic, political, information based or social. A passive city has some of the essential elements and criteria needed to begin thinking about international status. However, a passive city will have little to no control over vital flows, tending to accept what comes its way rather then exporting and influencing their direction. A passive city is also characterized by having more regional than international functions.

What then can be stated as a theoretical framework for the archetypal "International City"? The framework that Soldatos presents stresses an advanced degree of infrastructure coupled with strong horizontal and vertical linkages between institutions, businesses and politicians to coordinate the internationalization and expansion of the city. Such a broad yet complex and integrated framework makes quantification of specific criteria and concepts difficult and imprecise.

1.2 A EUROPEAN EMPIRICAL STUDY - DATAR-RECLUS

To expand and help illustrate the Soldatos theoretical base, a quantitative study designed to rank 165 European cities in hierarchical order is examined. The DATAR/RECLUS sponsored project, Les Villes Européennes, was an empirical study that included all cities with a population over 200,000 in the twelve European Community countries along with those in Switzerland and Austria. The purpose of this study was to rank these 165 major European cities into a hierarchical ranking based on empirical data (Brunet, 1988).

The methodology used was relatively straight-forward thus making the study a solid foundation for ranking and comparing the included cities. The project used three criteria for comparing these cities:

1. International Functions
2. Place in New Technologies
3. Demography

These three basic criteria were further divided into sixteen indicators. These sixteen indicators divided all 165 cities into either five or six categories per indicator, (Table 1.1). All sixteen indicators were then judged empirically, factually and qualitatively on both a domestic and international scale. Through this methodology, the study was able to rank 165 European cities from number 1 (London), to number 165 (Mönchen-Gladbach). One must note that each category has a different quantitative value thus the application of the DATAR-RECLUS project is of value for comparative purposes.

TABLE 1.1

RESULTS OF THE DATAR-RECLUS STUDY

	CRITIERIA	#	LYON	PARIS	GRENOBLE	GENEVA
1	POPULATION	6	4	1	5	5
2	POPULATION GROWTH	5	4	3	4	3
3	MULTINATIONALS	6	3	1	5	4
4	INFRASTRUCTURE TÉCHNOPOLITAINES	5	1	1	1	4
5	ENGINEERS, MANAGERS TECHNICIANS	5	2	1	3	4
6	RESEARCH FUNCTIONS	5	2	1	2	3
7	UNIVERSITY FUNCTIONS	6	3	1	3	4
8	FINANCIAL FUNCTIONS	6	3	2	6	2
9	AIRPORT TRAFFIC	6	4	1	6	3
10	PORT FUNCTIONS	6	5	5	6	6
11	CULTURAL SPHERE	5	3	1	3	2
12	MARKETS AND SALONS	6	4	1	5	4
13	CONFERENCE CENTRES	6	5	1	5	2
14	MEDIA	5	3	1	4	2
15	TELECOMMUNICATIONS	5	3	1	4	2
16	SPECIALIZATIONS	5	2	1	2	1

Source: Brunet, 1988.

An examination of Lyon's ranking in the sixteen criteria provides a broad idea of the city's strengths and weaknesses.(Table 1.1). Lyon is one of eleven cities that ranked in the premier category in respect to its "Téchnopolitaines" infrastructure and activity. In France, Lyon is joined in this category by Paris and its Rhône-Alpes neighbour, Grenoble. This is, however, the only category in which either Lyon or Grenoble are able to break into the premier rank. Lyon complements its strong technological base with a solid second rank showing in both its professional/white collar workforce and its research capabilities and functions. These three criteria are Lyon's strongest scores relative to the rest of Europe in the DATAR-RECLUS study. This is a positive indicator for Lyon. These are some of the key criteria that help attract and maintain new and innovative businesses.

These rankings also illustrate the poor performance of Lyon with regard to both Airport Traffic and Conference Centres. Not only is Lyon-Satolas International Airport substantially less utilized than the two major airports of Paris, as are all French airports, but it also lags considerably behind the airports of Geneva, Nice and Marseille. Lyon's airport traffic is at a similar level to the airport traffic at Toulouse, Aberdeen and Naples.

The state of Lyon's luxury hotel and conference industry reflects a lack of the most basic infrastructure. Comparatively, Geneva is a world class conference city ranking just behind Paris and London while Lyon is of equal status with Angers, Metz and Newcastle. These are obvious weaknesses that have a tangible effect on Lyon's ability to increase its international role and image.

Lyon is ranked well behind the urban powers of Milan, Frankfurt and Barcelona in the DATAR/RECLUS study. However, Lyon is in the middle of the next tier of "Eurocities" which includes Glasgow, Geneva and Turin. Figure 1.1 illustrates Lyon's relative position within the European urban hierarchy and provides a valuable bench-mark for placing Lyon within a European context in subsequent chapters.

FIGURE 1.1
POINTS RANKING OF NON-CAPITAL "EUROCITIES" BY DATAR/RECLUS



SOURCE: BRUNET, 1988.

For the majority of the remaining criteria Lyon ranks well behind Paris yet at an equal or superior level to the other French cities. Table 1.1 illustrates where Lyon ranks criteria by criteria against Paris, Geneva, and Grenoble. This is to provide some indication of the stranglehold that Paris holds on France and the interplay between Lyon and its most significant neighbours. The basic flaw of the French urban framework is shown in Table 1.2 by the large gap in rankings between Paris and any other French city in the DATAR/RECLUS study. The dominance of Paris within the French urban hierarchy is a major problem for France and one that shall be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters with particular emphasis on its effect on Lyon's international ambitions.

Turning to the final rankings of the 165 cities, it is clear that London and Paris are the dominant cities in Western Europe. Lyon places in the fourth level of cities, ranking twentieth overall: a single point and position ahead of Geneva. Lyon is the second ranking French city after Paris yet falls well behind its major competitors in the "Eurocity" rankings. The major European non-capital cities of Milan, Frankfurt, Barcelona, and others all rank clearly ahead of Lyon in this study. However, Lyon is close enough to these "Eurocities" to set an agenda for the future that will help it to close the gap between itself and the other non-capital "Eurocities".

TABLE 1.2
DATAR/RECLUS classification of the 32 French agglomerations studied

1.	Paris
2.	None
3.	None
4.	Lyon
5.	Marseille, Strasbourg, Toulouse
6.	Lille, Nice, Grenoble, Bordeaux, Montpellier, Nantes, Rennes
7.	Nancy, Rouen, Clermont-Ferrand, Metz, Orléans, Angers, Reims, Tours
8.	St-Etienne, Le Havre, Dijon, Caen, Amiens, Cannes, Brest, Toulon, Valenciennes, Mulhouse, Le Mans, Lens

Source: Brunet, 1988.

Obviously, such a project as the DATAR/RECLUS ranking of 165 Western European cities has its limitations. There is no international accord on definitions and demarcations of cities. To differentiate between agglomerations, conurbations, urban regions and city boundaries in 14 countries to determine what constitutes a city is not an exact science. Another dilemma is the use of certain criteria/indicators such as "Téchnopolitaines". This is a predominantly French concept that does not exist or translate well outside of France. Therefore, French cities rank quite highly in this category as compared with other European cities. Also, the Northern European countries have many of their largest and most prestigious Universities in small towns not counted in this study. Oxford in England and Heidelberg in Germany are but two examples. A third such dilemma is the fact that these indicators were judged qualitatively. This is mandatory in any study that attempts to rank human habitation. It does, however, always leave the issue of ranking cities open-ended.

TABLE 1.3
L.E.T. "EUROCITY" RANKINGS

INTERNATIONAL CITIES	SCORE	IN THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONALIZATION	SCORE
LONDON	98	LYON	80
PARIS	98	VIENNA	78
BRUSSELS	96	BERLIN	74
AMSTERDAM	96	ROTTERDAM	68
FRANKFURT	94	STRASBOURG	68
GENEVA	92	ATHENS	62
MILAN	92	HAMBURG	60
BARCELONA	90	COPENHAGEN	56
ROME	86	STOCKHOLM	56
ZURICH	86	DUSSELDORF	54
MADRID	84	TURIN	52
MUNICH	82		

Source: Bonnafous and Buisson, 1991.

A study completed by Alain Bonnafous and M.A. Buisson at the "Laboratoire d'Économie des Transports" (L.E.T.) in Lyon, published in April 1991, was entitled <u>A quoi reconnait-on une Ville Internationale? Tentative de reponse par consultation d'experts (Methode Delphi)</u>. This study compares the DATAR/RECLUS results with those of a panel of experts using a set questionnaire in ranking the internationalization of the leading "Eurocities". The rankings were similar but contained a number of interesting differences, (Table 1.3). The Swiss cities of Geneva and Zurich were ranked higher by the "expert" panel than by the DATAR/RECLUS project, with Geneva ranking as the sixth most international city in Western Europe. The Northern Italian cities of Milan and Turin were ranked lower by the "expert" panel. While the DATAR/RECLUS study ranked Milan third in Europe, the "experts" only ranked Milan seventh (Bonnafous and Buisson, 1991).

In this ranking, Lyon is on the verge of international status. Lyon is ranked as the thirteenth city in Europe as compared to its twentieth place ranking in the DATAR/RECLUS study. Comparing these two studies is valuable in determining that the rankings do indeed change depending on the specific study undertaken. This comparison also illustrates that, according to both studies, Lyon is not yet an "International City" but is well positioned to potentially achieve international status in the future. This comparison is also useful in that it illustrates that no single study is definitive on such a qualitative issue.

For the purposes of this thesis these are valuable empirical studies that illustrate the relative rankings of European cities. These are not the only studies undertaken to attempt to position the European cities in some form of order, but are the most current and topic-specific to this thesis. Therefore, these two studies will form the general background for our rankings and determinations of status of various European cities. These provide a good reference point to illustrate Lyon's position in the European urban hierarchy and to indicate its strong and weak points. The two rankings show that Lyon is a city that can and should have high ambitions for its future. These rankings also illustrate that Lyon is not yet a true urban power in Europe and must make a concentrated effort to improve its ranking and image or it will be left behind.

1.3 LYON 2010, THE CITY'S LONG RANGE PLAN

After an examination, by reference to Soldatos, of what in theory an "International City" should possess and a recent empirical study that actually ranks 165 European cities in a hierarchical order, an examination of Lyon's statement of intent for the next 20 years is required. LYON 2010: Un Projet d'Agglomération pour une Métropôle Européenne is a detailed voicing of Lyon's grand ambitions for the next two decades. Chapter Four of this report is entitled, "Une Stratégie Internationale pour Lyon". This chapter clearly spells out Lyon's assessment of its current position in the European hierarchy and details an ambitious scheme for improving its position as a "Eurocity". This study also illustrates that Lyon is well aware of the theoretical study by Soldatos and the DATAR/RECLUS project and its results. Many of the same concepts and language espoused by the LYON 2010 project is similar to the concepts put forward by Soldatos. The need for critical mass, increased service infrastructure and control over various directional flows is explicitly expressed. The maps used to illustrate the DATAR/RECLUS project are used by the LYON 2010 project to illustrate its position in Europe and to highlight its strengths and address its weaknesses.

This chapter of the LYON 2010 plan begins with an overview of Lyon's geographic position, size and ranking within the French urban hierarchy along with its stated ambition to be a "Eurocity" by consciously improving its level of internationalization. Lyon's geographic position is a huge natural asset. Lyon is a traditional gateway between Northern and Mediterranean Europe. Lyon visualizes itself as the natural link between the industrial north of Italy and the Iberian Peninsula with the industrial megacore area of industrial Northern Europe. This crossroads position between different yet complementary economic and social areas of Europe is vital to Lyon's future growth. Lyon is also situated on the main north-south transport axis of the Saône and Rhône river valleys. Lyon is planning to utilize its prime geographic location to its best advantage in developing a European function in the next two decades.

Further, Lyon regards itself as the second ranking city in France and the only French city with the requirements needed to be a true "Eurocity" outside of Paris. Lyon views its demographic size and industrial and technological strength, along with its prime geographic location and new found proximity to Paris via the TGV (Train à Grande Vitesse), as the cornerstones of its claim to be of "European Stature". Lyon also argues that it does indeed have the superior functions and infrastructure needed to be a viable alternative to Paris. This claim will be examined in detail in subsequent chapters.

The second of the four foundations that Lyon spells out in its proposal is the desire to develop itself as the centre of a European transportation/communication network. Lyon views this as a crucial step in utilizing its prime geographic location to maximum benefit. Lyon envisions itself as having a central crossroads location in the European motorway system which would require most north-south overland traffic to pass through the Lyon area. Lyon's port facilities on the Rhône and Saône rivers are now able to accommodate 4,500 ton barges. Lyon also envisions itself as a centre of any future European wide TGV network. A new TGV station at Lyon-Satolas International Airport will make this the first airport directly served by the TGV. This, it is thought, will increase the image and usage of the airport and reinforce Lyon's image as a multi-modal transportation hub for Europe. To complete its communication base, Lyon is striving to improve its telecommunication network and to establish itself as an important "Téléport".

The third foundation of Lyon's proposition is to achieve international status and capability for its urban infrastructure. Lyon recognizes that it must improve its high level support infrastructure such as banking, insurance, accountancy and other financial services. One focus is upon greater decentralization from Paris in both the public and private sector. These services must transfer more power and decision-making responsibilities to the regional level and all must expand their international functions. Lyon must also concentrate heavily on the non-business side of international service functions. As the DATAR/RECLUS project illustrated, Lyon is visibly lacking in conference capability and lacks the needed business class hotels. The DATAR/RECLUS project also showed Lyon's lack of significant tourist attractions and recognizable cultural institutions. There is a recognized need to improve its cultural, recreational, educational and other such functions. The vast and rapid improvement of these professional and social functions is seen as imperative if Lyon is to achieve its stated ambitions.

The final foundation of the internationalization of Lyon in this plan is perhaps the vaguest, yet most important to grasp and to apply in a tangible fashion. Essentially, it advocates the construction of a tighter and more cooperative urban network within the Rhône-Alpes Région with Lyon functioning as the régional capital and métropôle. Not only does this encourage much closer contacts between Lyon - Grenoble - St. Etienne, but includes Geneva as well. Lyon considers it vital to be acknowledged as the effective rather than nominal capital of the Rhône-Alpes Région. Lyon also perceives the promotion of itself as regional capital and métropôle as being in the best interests of the region through increased political and economic coordination and cohesion within Rhône-Alpes. A region that is centred around one strong and recognized métropôle that can speak with one coherent voice will improve the overall standing and power of that région. Lastly, Lyon argues that it would benefit France as a whole if there was a second grand métropôle with southern connections to promote the international interests of the nation as a whole. Lyon claims that it would be ideally suited to assume that position. If Lyon can indeed secure a position as the true capital and métropôle of the thriving Rhône-Alpes Région, then it will have gone a long way towards achieving its international ambitions.

1.4 SUMMARY

This chapter has summarized a theoretical proposal for the definition of an "International City", an empirically based study to rank 165 European cities in hierarchical order pointing out their relative strengths and weaknesses, and Lyon's statement of intent for the next twenty years that combines both the theories of Soldatos and the data of the DATAR/RECLUS project to mould an operational policy proposal for municipal planning. The actual situation of Lyon will now be examined and discussed to determine if the reality of Lyon's situation matches its current ranking and ambitions for the future.

The notion of the "International City" has a world-wide currency, both as a concept and as a basis for action. This is particularly the case within Europe, where the process of regional devolution, in turn structured around powerful city regions, is beginning to solidify. To function efficiently and effectively, such regions seek to gain direct international roles, rather than to be dependent on transmission through the national capital. Arguably, such a system is evolving spontaneously, reflecting the relative strength of the various cities and urbanized regions of Europe along with the emergence of the European Community as a growing political and administrative force. Equally, it is a field where deliberate intervention, be it stated politically, economically, or in terms of infrastructure creation, has a vital role to play. The emergence of "European" scale city regions is thus a process involving political and economic dimensions which need to be coordinated if a coherent strategy is to be financed, managed and made operational. It is also an area in which myth and reality are commonly blurred, given the determination of every major town and city to be considered "European" in function.

The case of France is especially interesting given the long history of centralisation and the overwhelming power of Paris at the apex of the urban hierarchy. By virtue of their frontier location and historical linkages, certain French cities such as Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing and Strasbourg may claim a European role . The remaining French cities have essentially exercised a purely regional function, relaying the commands of Paris to their respective hinterlands. To this may be added the major port cities of Marseille, Le Havre-Rouen and to a lesser extent Bordeaux, with obvious international trade links (but overseas rather than with continental Europe).

The dominance of Paris, which has manifestly attained the "critical mass" stage in Soldatos' criteria of "International" scale, has led certain French cities to seek a direct European dimension in their functions rather than to attempt the impossible task of challenging and eroding the power of Paris. This involves consolidating direct linkages into European spatial systems, acquiring certain higher functions on a European scale and striving to attain a "critical mass" at a European if not world level.

This thesis attempts to explore the endeavour on the part of France's second largest city, Lyon. At first sight, Lyon's excellent location and industrial power base would appear to make it a credible candidate. Similarly, Lyon's location within a network of towns which has exhibited some of the greatest economic and demographic growth in France , suggests that there is sufficient dynamism in the Rhône-Alpes urban system to justify an aspiration for "EuroCity" status. The thrust of this thesis is that although Lyon may superficially resemble a European scale city, the reality exists that it is still far from having reached the first rank of non-capital European cities. This view if proved, does however provide a bench-mark against which to evaluate Lyon's metropolitan planning strategy. It is conceivable that although Lyon has not yet achieved notable European rank, it has embarked on a development path which may, in measurable time, result in an enhanced European role.

The terms "International City" and "Eurocity" have been used almost interchangeably in this thesis. As stated above (p. 4) virtually every large city has an "international" dimension within an increasingly global economy. Lyon's efforts to achieve "Eurocity" status thus also imply an enhanced role at a scale extending beyond Europe. Conversely, the wider Lyon's international prominence, the more credible its role as a Eurocity. The distinction between the two terms is therefore semantic and a functional separation is not possible. The two terms have been employed interchangeably depending on the context concerned and the sources utilized. The prime objective is to consider Lyon's international role at a European scale without excluding the wider global context.

CHAPTER TWO
METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

2.1 GENERAL APPROACH

Before turning to the specifics of methodology it is important to establish the approach which characterizes this thesis. At the outset, two approaches offered themselves. Firstly, a strictly quantitative approach, as adopted by the DATAR-RECLUS study ranking 165 European cities, could have been utilized, involving the acquisition of survey data. Secondly, a qualitative approach based on a review of policies, opinions and attitudes would have been possible adopting a purely "behavioural" philosophical approach. In practice, it was considered that the most effective explanatory value would be achieved through the combination of both approaches. Thus the approach was established as qualitative in nature yet supported in all instances by reference to quantitative data and objective facts.

2.2 THE SURVEY APPROACH

Although theoretically possible, given greater time and abundant resources, a thesis based exclusively on the accumulation of survey data was considered inappropriate. A number of reasons may be advanced for a rejection of this method of primary data collection:

1) The scope of the hypothesis was broad by definition. In this sense, a single, even multiple surveys, would have been quite inadequate to resolve such an open-ended topic.

2) The type of information required covers such a vast spectrum that a single or limited constituency of respondents would have been ineffective. Similarly, a structured sample, ranging from the "man in the street" to the business executive, would have been incapable of scientific analysis.

3) The size, structure and complexity of the Lyon agglomeration (over 1.2 million inhabitants), implies that it would have been impossible to have obtained a valid sample size and structure.

4) Specific elements, including the planning basis, political priorities and regional aspirations are manifestly unquantifiable and represent ideas rather than observable facts.

5) The concepts of "Eurocity" and "International City" are in themselves ill-defined. It would be extremely difficult to conduct sample surveys of a "standard" nature based on a common understanding of the proposition.

6) Conducting a survey of the industrial and business sectors of the local economy would have raised questions of commercial confidentially if they were answered with any degree of reliability. This would have inhibited meaningful analysis.

7) The topic implies a regional as well as a local scale centred around Lyon. It was practically and logistically impossible to conduct, by conventional methods, any form of reliable survey based on a significant sample size or of qualified respondents at the scale of a region of 5.4 million inhabitants.

8) It was felt that sufficient data existed in the public domain, albeit very dispersed and difficult to combine, to arrive at valid conclusions that provide a convincing test of the stated hypothesis.

2.3 A QUALITATIVE APPROACH

A strictly qualitative approach, based on a subjective analysis of published works, planning documents, opinion polls, press opinions, political statements or media coverage was considered equally unreliable. The scope of the subject and the size of the base population implies that an analysis based on surrogate sources without objective data as a foundation was also methodologically unsound. The task of eliminating political bias or poor information would have been virtually impossible. The qualitative approach is perhaps better exploited at a lower scale of base population and on less abstract issues than the present hypothesis.

2.4 A COMBINED APPROACH

After considering the above alternatives, a combined approach that blended elements of both approaches was indicated. Consequently, this thesis adopts as its approach basic qualitative methods underpinned in all cases by quantitative objective evidence to support the qualitative arguments and conclusions advanced. In practice this is "behavioural" in that it examines policies advanced by the political and planning élite while concurrently evaluating the response of public will as expressed, for example, in key elections. Certain facts are readily established, such as transport data, demographic characteristics or industrial structure. Other elements, planning objectives or regional aspirations, are more difficult to measure in a substantive manner. The originality of this thesis is to integrate and merge disparate sources of information and surrogate data into a convincing statement as to where Lyon actually stands in relationship to its stated ambitions of "International" status. The main sources of statistical data, together with insights gained by personal interview are now summarized.

2.5 STATISTICAL AND PLANNING SOURCES

Access to published statistical data is the least of the problems confronting the social science researcher in France. The collection of national, regional and local data is entrusted to the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE). Based in Paris, this government organization also has regional offices, including a major bureau in Lyon serving the Rhône-Alpes. Thus, in addition to national scale data, notably the National Census, the regional bureaux produce regional tabulations and monographs dealing in detail with statistical and thematic matters (for example employment and housing) which are available for public consultation and purchase. The author was fortunate in that the summary results of the 1990 National Census of Population were published early in the period of research, although a detailed breakdown at the local level was not available immediately.

The National Census is more than a population enumeration; it includes a wide range of socio-economic data down to the local (commune) scale, while at the same time aggregating data at a variety of larger scales (canton, arrondissement, agglomeration, labour catchments, département and région). The 1990 Census, and, for the recording of trends, previous census results, were a primary source of demographic data. In addition to the Census volumes, the researchers of the regional INSEE conduct "enquêtes" (desk studies) and "sondages" (sample studies) covering a wide range of socio-economic matters, which are referred to in this study.

A valuable and substantial source of statistical data was the Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Lyon, (C.C.I.L.). The C.C.I.L. is a much larger, better financed and more important organization than its counterparts in the United Kingdom. The C.C.I.L. is directly responsible for financing and managing projects such as the expansion of Lyon-Satolas International Airport, operating ports along the Rhône river, operating the École Superieur de Commerce and providing data and infrastructural help to companies relocating in the area. In sum, the C.C.I.L. as an organization is well established as a principal source of statistical information as well as infrastructural planning and financing, economic performance and other areas of significance in Lyon and the surrounding area. The C.C.I.L. maintains a documentation service and library in Lyon which was an important source of both quantitative data and business reports.

In terms of economic data, the C.C.I.L. and its subsidiary l'Agence de Dévelopment de la Région Lyonnaise (ADERLY) provided copious data on the economic infrastruture of Lyon, the international corporations that operate in the area and a singular vision for Lyon's future in their opinion. Since the C.C.I.L. operates the ESC Lyon (Graduate Business School) it was possible to access a wide number of past and present economic documentation in the ESC Lyon library. All documents published by the C.C.I.L. and most other primary data and articles/information pertaining to the economic situation in the Lyon agglomeration were available in this library.

The Lyon agglomeration contains a large number of organizations that provide information on transportation. The SNCF Direction Régionale was a source of information concerning rail transportation both within the Lyon area and Lyon's position within the future European TGV system. The Compagnie Nationale du Rhône (CNR) and La Direction Départementale de l'Equipment du Rhône provided substantial information on the ports of Lyon including the amounts and destinations of maritime foreign trade and potential future expansions. Lyon-Satolas International Airport provided information on its capacity, international passengers and destinations along with detailed studies on the impact of the new runway, TGV station, cargo areas and terminal redevelopment.

Political and urban planning documents comprised a major source of direct information concerning Lyon's current ambitions. The Syndicat d'Etudes et de Programmation de l'Agglomération Lyonnaise (SEPAL) and the Agence d'Urbanisme de la Communauté Urbaine de Lyon provided a substantial collection of current data on infrastructural projects. The Cité Internationale convention and hotel centre, expansion of the métro system with linkages to Eurexpo and Lyon-Satolas International Airport, and other such infrastruture projects were documented and explained in detail in specific publications by these two organizations. Both SEPAL and the Agence d'Urbanisme de la Communauté de Lyon had their own documentation centre where it was possible to consult and purchase the specific plans and ambitions for these and other important infrastrutural projects. Additionally, SEPAL produced the LYON 2010 planning document (Chapter 1) on the future projects under consideration in Lyon and their impact on Lyon's international future. This was a primary source of information concerning Lyon's current view of its position, international ambitions and specific proposals to achieve its international ambitions. Articles related to the LYON 2010 plan were another valuable source of information that was obtained through SEPAL.

On a more political level, the Préfécture de la Région Rhône-Alpes, the Conseil Régional Rhône-Alpes and various departments of the Ville de Lyon and the Rhône Département provided documentation on the political agenda of the various political bodies that interact within the Lyon agglomeration with regard to specific projects and concepts, be it the construction of the Eastern Autoroute by-pass or importance of establishing greater regional linkages and international functions. The ability to access planning documents and policy statements to compare with projects in current or planned phases was valuable in discerning fact from wishful thinking along with providing a better understanding of the complex interworkings of a multi-layered local political system.

The Communauté Urbaine de Lyon (COURLY) consists of the 55 communes of Lyon and its immediate surrounding area. The offices of COURLY provided a wide range of basic data on the day-to-day operations of Lyon and these neighbours. Information from bus routes to rubbish collection were available through COURLY. More significantly, a breakdown of local tax structures, voting patterns and other socio-economic indicators concerning the immediate urban area of Lyon were available. COURLY is a cornerstone of Lyon's international ambitions (Chapter 4) because it provides a basic political linkage of the majority of the Lyon urban area. For example, the COURLY, as a political body, had to approve the LYON 2010 plan. This was achieved despite numerous political difference, (party affiliation, priorities, tax structures, economic needs etc.) between the leaders of the 55 communes. Direct access to COURLY data and plans provided a better understanding of the degree and level of local co-operation that exists in Lyon and the amount of co-operation that will be needed in the future if Lyon is to achieve its stated ambitions.

With reference to urban redevelopment, the Maison d'Aménagement de Gerland provided data and the official policy on the ambitious Gerland redevelopment project. This made it possible to analyse the official plans for this area and help provide an understanding of which sections of this redevelopment plan have been delayed or cancelled in the light of recent negative economic conditions. The Association Rhône-Alpes pour l'Innovation Urbaine et de Développement Local (INUDEL) provided information on urban planning in other cities within the Rhône-Alpes Région. Data on the economic and infrastrutural expansion of Annecy, Chambéry, Valence and Grenoble were available. Additionally, INUDEL explored the connections between Lyon and the other major urban areas within the Rhône-Alpes Région including the often neglected southern areas of the region.

The publications of the Délegation á l'Aménagement du Territoire (DATAR), the State strategic planning agency, provided a contextual reference to long range policies on the organization of the French national space. For example, information on New-Town developments such as l'Isle d'Abeau, and the planning strategies of les Métropôles d'Equilibre were obtained through DATAR. DATAR documentation was distributed in Lyon through the office of La Documentation Française in La Part Dieu. A visit was also paid to the main DATAR office and documentation centre in Paris.

2.6 ACADEMIC LITERATURE

In addition to private sector and government sources, this thesis draws on a large volume of published work in academic books, journals and monographs. A vital access for such sources was the Laboratoire de Géographie Rhôdanienne, a documentary library and database located in the Institut de Géographie at the Université de Lyon III. The regional geographical journal, the Revue de Géographie de Lyon, as well as its sister review, the Revue de Géographie Alpine at Grenoble, offered fundamental sources covering a wide range of academic issues concerning Lyon, Grenoble and the entire Rhône-Alpes Région. Another advantage to these publications was that they provided the ability to trace the evolution of certain concepts and projects over an extended period of time. Such issues as Lyon's locational advantage, Lyon's position within the national and European urban hierarchy, the domination of Lyon by Paris and the role of local government are all given a broader historical perspective.

The Laboratoire d'Économie des Transports (L.E.T.), located in Lyon, was the prime source of information relating to transport and complemented the raw data provided by the C.C.I.L. L.E.T. provided detailed academic papers, programmes and analysis of the transportation infrastructure of Lyon. This included the importance of Lyon's location and a number of commissioned studies on the future impact of Lyon's advantageous position and the methods of optimal utilization of location. Details on autoroute, aviation, fluvial and rail transportation along with a variety of academic and professional opinions (often in disagreement) added to an appreciation of the key role that transport will continue to play in Lyon's future. Additionally, L.E.T. offered economic data and academic interpretation concerning Lyon and a wide variety of in-house publications unavailable elsewhere.

Other academic sources consulted were provided by: the Centre de Documentation et de Recherche Européenne (CDRE) at the Université de Lyon III, the Centre de Recherche sur la Politique, l'Administration et Territoire (CERAT) at the Université de Grenoble II, the Centre Universitaire de Recherche Européenne et Internationale (CUREI) at the Université de Grenoble II. These institutions provided valuable data and information specifically in the form of a series of five reports entitled Rhône Alpes dans l'Espace Européen. Additionally, the numerous and very useful documents written by Pierre Kukawka on the relationship of the Rhône-Alpes Région with the rest of Europe and Lyon's relationship with its regional neighbours were published through CERAT. These were documents that were impossible to obtain except on location. A visit to the library of the Department of Geography at the University of Grenoble also provided useful information on the current situation of Grenoble, its future plans, and its relationship with Lyon.

Finally, the European Documentation Centre at the University of Glasgow, an official repository of European Community documents, was helpful in providing basic data on the Rhône-Alpes Région.

2.7 PERSONAL INQUIRY AND INTERVIEW

Direct interview has proved valuable in this study as an aid to the interpretation and analysis of the data cited above. This method is valuable provided that certain controls are adopted as follows:

1. The interlocutor should be expert, experienced and willing to devote time to serious questioning.

2. The range of interlocutors should be varied in terms of position of responsibility, political allegiance and organizational connection in order to gain a cross-check on views.

3. An "informal" interview is preferable to a questionnaire approach in terms of eliciting in depth responses.

In relation to the above criteria, (a modified Delphi Method), a number of individuals were contacted. In academic fields, a number of persons were contacted because of their experience in either a specific area or city. Jacques Bonnet and Paul Mingret at the Université de Lyon III, and J. Bethemont at the Université de St. Etienne, offered critical views concerning the position and strategy of Lyon in both a local and international context. Their long professional interest and research into Lyon's status along with their own views of Lyon's international future were instructive. Emmanuelle Sabot, with connections at universities in both Lyon and St. Etienne, provided additional first hand judgements on the current situation of both cities.

Pierre Kukakwa at the Centre de Recherche sur la Politique, l'Administration et Territoire (CERAT) at the Université de Grenoble shared valuable insight into the issues of regional co-operation between various regional agglomerations and Lyon, the status of Geneva and the potential for the Rhône-Alpes Région to play a larger role within a Europe of regions. The chance to discuss specific areas and the overall concept of my project with local experts provided a valuable sounding-board. This helped maintain perspective and clarify the process and direction of research.

In was also necessary to conduct personal inquiries with non-academic persons. Discussions and interviews with persons concerned with the operational end of matters was helpful in obtaining a better understanding of the workings of Lyon. Discussions with the Head of

Documentation at the C.C.I.L. provided details on the operational mandate of the C.C.I.L., its role within the agglomeration, how it is financed and information on the types of material available through the C.C.I.L. documentation service.

Discussions with public relations officials at Lyon-Satolas International Airport, SNCF-TGV office in La Part Dieu, and the SEPAL office provided insight into the transport issues facing Lyon. Two discussions with a functionary at the mayor's office in Lyon served to reinforce the official political position on the importance of Lyon becoming an International City.

I attended a number of political rallies in the week immediately preceding the Regional Elections of 1992. By attending these rallies, the largest of which was an anti-F.N. rally, I was able to draw certain basic conclusions concerning these elections (Chapter 4) that were subsequently enhanced by the voting results and the various exit polls in local newspapers and national magazines. In brief, these elections revolved around national issues, primarily the rise of the F.N. as a political organization. Regional issues and the concept of "Europe" were absent from the campaign.

Finally, I had numerous discussions with the "man on the street". French and international students at ESC Lyon, fellow bus commuters, cafe patrons, political campaigners and a variety of other persons. Unscientific as this may appear, the views of a cross-section of persons in Lyon on the issues of Lyon's future position and status, economy, and political leaders is an important reality check in that it confirms certain issues and refutes others. For example, the image of Mayor Michel Noir as the dynamic leader of Lyon is currently mocked by the citizens of Lyon because of his legal problems. This bit of reality will not be found in the official documents published by the city of Lyon. Informal discussions with a wide range of locals also imparts a flavour of the people, the city and the area that is impossible to obtain if one is not on location and has been a useful factor in my study of Lyon.

2.8 THE MEDIA

By definition, the media seek to express matters of interest to the public and in the case of regional newspapers, radio and television, to raise matters of local significance. During the periods of residence in Lyon, a systematic appraisal was made of the media to evaluate regional interest in European matters and to monitor editorial comments and reports of speeches by public figures concerning Lyon and Europe. The author was present in Lyon during the Regional Elections of March 1992 specifically to monitor the interest, or lack of, in European matters during the campaign and subsequent voting.

The three main types of media that were utilized during the course of this project were, daily newspapers, specialized magazines and publications, and the radio and T.V. broadcasts. The local papers of Lyon were consulted daily during periods of research in Lyon. These publications included: Le Progres, Lyon Libération, Le Dauphiné Libéré, Le Monde (Rhône Alpes edition), Le Figaro (Rhône-Alpes edition - especially the Economic supplement every Monday). Additionally, the national issues of Le Monde and Le Figaro were consistently consulted while in Glasgow. These sources were indispensable for extracting the results of the Regional Elections and the Maastricht referendum. The above newspapers were a valuable medium in terms of monitoring social, economic and political events in the city and region as well as public reaction.

France produces a large quantity of quality weekly and monthly magazines dealing with industry, business and French politics. These, including back editions, were consulted in the libraries of both L.E.T. and ESC Lyon. The most useful of these specialized magazines were: L'Expansion, La Vie Industrielle, Valeurs Actuelles, L'Activité Economique, Science et Vie, Le Point, and L'Evenement. These publications were useful in providing large scale surveys, opinion polls on both economic and political issues, and questionnaires of business and government executives on issues such as internationalization, regional perceptions and urban rankings.

Radio and television is the manner in which the majority of France obtains its news. These forms of media do not present a detailed or academic examination of an issue yet they provide a valuable insight into the opinions and attitudes of the city and country as a whole. Local radio was especially valuable in determining political motivation during the Regional elections of 1992. "Call in" radio programmes, official press announcements and candidate debates helped clarify issues of the French political process and complemented press reports.

2.9 PROCESS OF ANALYSIS

The analytical process adopted in this thesis is inferential. However, inference was based wherever possible on quantified data. In this sense, as inferential analysis is cumulative; final judgements, however subjective, are based on an accumulation of objective and measurable fact to support and validate qualitative opinions. In order to establish a valid process of analysis, the thesis was divided into three sections each with its own internal logic.

Part One is explicitly contextual and attempts nothing more. A statement of three contexts was proposed as a basis for examining the central hypothesis. The Soldatos model was adopted as a working theory. Other literature on the international city was considered, but the Soldatos model was adopted as offering certain key notions which appeared a priori to be particularly appropriate to the case of Lyon. These were "critical mass", "synergy" between sections of the economy and the notion of a "threshold" necessary to attain international status. Each chapter refers back to these key concepts. Secondly, reference is consistently made to the DATAR - RECLUS study. This study simply ranks Lyon in relation to other European cities, whereas this thesis explores the detailed criteria underlying the status of Lyon. Thirdly, the thesis recognises that a key element is the attitude adopted by the city in relation to its strategic planning. Consequently the plan for LYON 2010 is considered to be a key reference point for analysis.

The analysis adopted is reflected in the basic structure of the thesis. Part One, in addition to establishing the conceptual basis and methodology, examines the demographic context and the political framework. The demographic basis is particularly crucial since a city lacking demographic dynamism would scarcely be a credible candidate for International City status. In spite of a general trend in France towards counterurbanization, Lyon, and most of the urban centres of the Rhône-Alpes display a positive demographic balance. Secondly, Chapter Four identifies the political will as a major factor in a European future. After an analysis of the local and regional political structures, this chapter exploits the results of the Regional elections and the Maastricht referendum as quantitative sources of information on European sentiment. These two chapters serve as a benchmark, establishing the demographic power of Lyon, with implications for market power and labour supply, and its political power to direct these human resources towards a European future. The method of analysis adopted in Part One is primarily quantitative.

Part Two constitutes the majority of the original analysis in the thesis. This section attempts to establish those aspects of contemporary Lyon which may be regarded as facilitators towards achieving European status. Specifically, the transport infrastructure is regarded as being of international class, whereas the financial, commercial and hotel sectors are identified as falling short of European-scale status. The internationalization of the urban economy is examined by sector, including the education, diplomatic and media activities. Again, quantitative data is presented to adduce qualitative conclusions.

Part Three involves a change of scale from the agglomeration to the region. In particular an effort is made to evaluate the attempt of Lyon to enhance its international status by creating poly-nuclear structures to increase critical mass and synergy. It is clear that this objective lies within the realm of aspiration rather than reality. Accordingly, the analysis is qualitative rather than quantitative.

In summary, the analysis is not based on a positivist approach in the sense that every aspect is subjected to some form of empirical data analysis. Nor is the analysis entirely qualitative, since wherever possible quantitative data has been used to support the arguments adduced. The mode of analysis adopted has thus been essentially pragmatic; qualitative and behaviourist analysis have been supported by objective and quantitative data. Where analysis has involved informed speculation rather than objectively established fact, this has been openly admitted.

CHAPTER THREE
THE DEMOGRAPHIC BASIS

The 1990 French census enumerated 56,614,493 people in metropolitan France. This represents a total increase of 2.3 million people from the 1982 census. During the years between 1982 and 1990, France experienced a 0.5% annual population growth. This is a healthy increase from the 0.2% annual increase recorded between 1975 and 1982 (INSEE, Recensements, 1991). Historically, population has always been of concern to the French. During the later years of the nineteenth century and the first half of this century, the slow population growth in France led to a great deal of political anxiety.

The end of the Second World War in 1945 set off a population growth of a proportion unseen in modern French history. The "Glorious Thirty" years between 1945 and 1975 saw a rapid expansion of French population, economy and living standards. During these years population remained an important issue (House, 1978). The rural exodus led to a depopulation of the countryside and a vast increase in the population of the major urban centres (Labasse, 1978). The repatriation of French Algerians in the 1960's (McDonald, 1969) and the current dilemma over official and illegal foreign immigration have kept the issue of population in the forefront of the French national consciousness.

Population also plays a significant role in the ranking and stature of any city claiming to have international status. Both the theoretical model of Soldatos and the DATAR/RECLUS project's evaluation of a city's suitability for international status begin with an examination of population size. Population is the first true test of a city's position, is easily visible, quantifiable and is undeniably critical to a city's position and capacities. Population is important in developing the critical mass required to present the facilities, services and urban environment needed to enable a city to claim international standing. This chapter will examine in detail the population of Lyon and the administrative areas that are inter-connected with Lyon. These administrative areas include the Rhône-Alpes Région, the eight départements within the Rhône-Alpes Région, and the local urban agglomerations including the distinction between the actual cities and the total agglomerations as well as other administrative units specific to the Lyon area. This will provide a basis from which to view Lyon's position and potential and will be examined first to provide a spatial and demographic context to future discussions of Lyon and its international ambitions.

3.1 REGIONAL POPULATION GROWTH

The Rhône-Alpes Région had a population of 5,350,701 according to the 1990 census. This places the Rhône-Alpes Région clearly ahead of all other French regions in population size except for Ile-de-France (Table 3.1). Ile-de-France has a population of 10,660,554, almost exactly double that of the Rhône-Alpes. The third largest region demographically is Rhône-Alpes' southern neighbour, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, with a 1990 population total of 4,257,907, over a million people less than Rhône-Alpes (INSEE Première, No 82, Juin, 1990).

Rhône-Alpes is not only the second largest region in France in terms of sheer numbers but also has one of the highest annual growth rates of any French region both today and since 1962. During the last inter-censal period, the Rhône-Alpes Région enjoyed an annual growth rate of 0.8%, well above the 0.5% national average (Figure 3.1). Rhône-Alpes was the third fastest growing region behind the sunbelt regions of Languedoc-Roussillon with a 1.14% annual growth rate and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur with a 0.9% annual growth rate (Jones, 1991). Such positive demographic dynamism is one of the criteria stressed as mandatory by every study on regional potential. This places Rhône-Alpes in a strong position vis-à-vis the most dynamic European regions with which Rhône-Alpes hopes to participate as a partner in the future post-1993 Europe.

Since 1936 only seven out of the twenty two regions have increased their overall percentage of the national population. In that time Rhône-Alpes has increased its share of the national population from 8.63% to 9.45%. Although this is substantially behind the massive 18.83% of the population claimed by Ile-de-France it still

FIGURE 3.1
RÉGION POPULATION
CHANGE - 1982-1990



Table 3.1
Régional Demographic Trends, 1982-1990.

RÉGIONS	Percentage Change Nat	Mig	Total	Net change Nat	Mig	Total	Total 1990
Languedoc-Rousillon	0.07	1.10	1.17	12	176	188	2.115
P.A.C.A.	0.22	0.67	0.89	71	222	293	4.258
Rhône-Alpes	0.52	0.29	0.81	217	118	335	5.351
Ile-de-France	0.77	-0.06	0.71	636	-49	587	10.661
Aquitaine	0.05	0.59	0.64	10	129	139	2.796
Haute-Normandie	0.63	-0.03	0.60	86	-4	82	1.737
Centre	0.27	0.31	0.58	49	58	107	2.371
Midi-Pyrenees	0.01	0.55	0.56	2	103	105	2.431
Pays-de-la-Loire	0.49	0.05	0.54	117	12	129	3.059
Picardie	0.52	-0.02	0.50	73	-3	70	1.811
Corse	0.08	0.41	0.49	2	8	10	.250
Alsace	0.46	0.00	0.46	58	0	58	1.624
Bretagne	0.22	0.18	0.40	48	40	88	2.796
Basse-Normandie	0.45	-0.08	0.37	50	-10	40	1.391
Poitou-Charentes	0.12	0.09	0.21	15	12	27	1.595
Franche-Comté	0.48	-0.33	0.15	42	-29	13	1.097
Bourgogne	0.13	-0.02	0.11	17	-3	14	1.610
Nord-Pas-de-Calais	0.64	-0.54	0.10	202	-170	32	3.965
Champagne-Ardenne	0.48	-0.46	0.02	52	-50	2	1.348
Lorraine	0.50	-0.58	-0.08	93	-107	-14	2.306
Auvergne	-0.07	-0.04	-0.11	-7	-4	-11	1.321
Limousin	-0.39	0.15	-0.24	-23	9	-14	.723

Source: INSEE, Recensement, 1990.

TABLE 3.2
RÉGIONAL ANNUAL POPULATION CHANGE BY PERCENTAGE

RÉGIONS	1982-90	1975-82	1968-75	1962-68
Languedoc-Rousillon	1.14	1.05	0.69	1.57
P.A.C.A.	0.90	1.08	1.58	2.67
Rhône-Alpes	0.79	0.69	1.12	1.62
Ile-de-France	0.70	0.28	0.95	1.48
Aquitaine	0.63	0.58	0.52	1.04
Haute-Normandie	0.60	0.52	0.92	1.16
Centre	0.57	0.72	1.13	1.15
Midi-Pyrenees	0.54	0.35	0.54	0.98
Pays-de-la-Loire	0.53	0.82	0.99	0.80
Picardie	0.49	0.51	0.89	1.07
Alsace	0.44	0.45	1.03	1.16
Bretagne	0.39	0.60	0.72	0.49
Basse-Normandie	0.36	0.48	0.52	0.71
Poitou-Charentes	0.21	0.37	0.45	0.34
Franche-Comté	0.15	0.32	0.95	1.12
Bourgogne	0.10	0.23	0.64	0.72
Nord-Pas-de-Calais	0.09	0.07	0.36	0.70
Champagne-Ardenne	0.00	0.10	0.63	0.99
Lorraine	-0.09	-0.07	0.35	0.60
Auvergne	-0.14	0.02	0.20	0.50
Limousin	-0.23	-0.03	0.05	0.05

Source: INSEE, Recensement, 1990.

ranks Rhône-Alpes as the second most populous region in France in overall percentage ahead of the 7.52% of the population claimed by Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur (INSEE Première, No 82, Juin, 1990).

Through examining the regional population trends (Tables 3.1 and 3.2) one finds that the Massif Central regions of Auvergne and Limousin are still the weakest regions demographically. Both lost population again during the 1982-1990 period and between the two constitute only 3.61% of the national population. The north east industrial regions of Lorraine, Champagne-Ardenne, and Nord-Pas-de-Calais also show poor demographic trends with Lorraine losing 14,000 people between 1982 and 1990. All three have substantially reduced their share of the national population with Nord-Pas-de-Calais showing the greatest decline since 1962 dropping from 7.88% to 7.0% of the national population (INSEE Première, No 82, Juin, 1990). These older heavily industrialized regions are experiencing serious problems in restructuring their economies away from large scale industries such as coal and steel production to the smaller more technologically advanced industries (Tuppen, 1983). These regions are losing population to the rapidly expanding regions of the south of which Rhône-Alpes is a major component (Scargill, 1991).

Overall, the Rhône-Alpes Région accounted for 15% of the total population growth in France between 1982 and 1990. This is divided into an annual natural growth of 0.5% and an annual positive migration rate of 0.3%. Thus, Rhône-Alpes is the second most populous region in France and one of the fastest growing. This is an important basis for the region's, and Lyon's, ambitious plans for a European future. However, Rhône-Alpes still has a significantly smaller population than some rival European regions. Lombardy and Baden-Württemberg both have populations in excess of nine million and all of the inherent strengths and critical mass that accompany such a significant population. Rhône-Alpes must therefore make full use of its other resources and advantages in order to compete in the European regional framework.

3.2 POPULATION TRENDS AT THE DÉPARTEMENT LEVEL

Examination of the population trends in the Rhône-Alpes Région at the département level reveals that all eight départements (Ain, Ardèche, Drôme, Isère, Loire, Rhône, Savoie, and Haute-Savoie) have experienced a population increase between 1982 and 1990 (Figure 3.2). The strongest growth is seen in the Haute-Savoie and the Ain départements, especially in the cantons closest to Geneva. The weakest département demographically over the past fifteen years has been the Loire which has experienced a net population gain of only 3,900 since 1975 (INSEE, Points d'appui pour l'économie Rhône-Alpes, No 61-62, Mars, 1991).

The Haute-Savoie and the Ain départements have recently enjoyed the highest rate of population growth in the Rhône-Alpes Région. Between 1975 and 1990 the Haute-Savoie increased its population from 446,000 to 568,000, an increase of 122,000 or 27% over those fifteen years (INSEE, Points d'appui pour l'économie Rhône-Alpes, No 61-62, Mars, 1991). Since 1982, the Haute-Savoie has enjoyed an annual growth rate of 1.7% and the Ain a 1.5% increase (Figure 3.3). A major impetus for such high annual growth rates has been the proximity of the Swiss city/canton of Geneva. Geneva is indisputably the economic driving force in this area and exerts a much greater economic influence in this section of the Rhône-Alpes than does Lyon, as will be discussed later.

The Département of Rhône, of which Lyon is the capital, had a 0.5% annual growth rate between 1982 and 1990 corresponding to the national average. Examination of Figure 3.4 illustrates basic population trends at the département level in the region. The three western départements of Rhône, Ardèche, and Loire have the region's lowest growth totals of under 0.6% annually. The three départements to the southeast - Drôme, Isère, and Savoie - have a stronger population growth rate, between 0.6% and 1.0% annually. The northern départements of Ain and Haute-Savoie have, as shown, the strongest demographic growth with annual increases of over 1.5%. The fastest growing cantons in these départements, those closest to

FIGURE 3.2
POPULATION OF DÉPARTEMENTS IN TOTAL NUMBERS



SOURCE: INSEE, RECENSEMENT-1990.

FIGURE 3.3
DEMOGRAPHIC EVOLUTION BY PERCENTAGE
IN RHONE-ALPES DÉPARTEMENTS



SOURCE: INSEE, RECENSEMENT-1990.

FIGURE 3.4
DÉPARTEMENT POPULATION
CHANGE - 1982 - 1990



Geneva, have a growth rate of over 3.5% (INSEE, Points d'appui pour l'économie Rhône-Alpes, No 61-62, Mars, 1991).

The eight départements of the Rhône-Alpes have experienced vastly different population evolutions due to different levels of natural growth and migration. Rhône, Haute-Savoie, and Isère exhibited the strongest natural growth trends during the past census (Figure 3.5). Ardèche, which lost population between 1975 and 1982 due to natural causes, (the only département in the region to have a negative natural growth rate during this time), improved during the past census period to break even in natural population evolution. The rest of the region's départements have experienced modest natural growth during the last census period (INSEE, Recensements, 1990).

Looking at the evolution of the département's population due to migration shows a number of interesting trends, (Figure 3.6). Both Rhône and Loire exhibited negative migratory trends over the past two census periods. The rate of loss was less during the 1982-1990 period than it was during the 1975-1982 period. This reflects an overall improvement in national demographic trends in addition to the reduced effects of counter-urbanization. Haute-Savoie and Ain showed the greatest population gains through migration during the past census with Haute-Savoie registering gains of over 1% annually. This confirms that these two départements are the most attractive in the region with the bulk of this migration focused, yet again, on those cantons closest to Geneva (INSEE, Points d'appui pour l'économie Rhône-Alpes, No 61-62, Mars, 1991).

3.3 POPULATION TRENDS IN THE MAJOR AGGLOMERATIONS

The six major agglomerations of the Rhône-Alpes Région that encompass over 100,000 inhabitants are, in demographic order, Lyon, Grenoble, St. Etienne, Annecy, Valence, and Chambéry (Figure 3.7). These six agglomerations, consisting of 164 communes, account for 43% of the region's population. These agglomerations, however, have not shared the same demographic experience over the past fifteen years (Figure 3.8).

FIGURE 3.5
DÉPARTEMENT ANNUAL PERCENTAGE
POPULATION CHANGE BY NATURAL GROWTH



FIGURE 3.6
DÉPARTEMENT ANNUAL PERCENTAGE
POPULATION CHANGE BY MIGRATION



FIGURE 3.7
AGGLOMERATIONS OF THE
RHONE-ALPES



Source: A. Jouve *et al*, La France des Regions, 1992.

FIGURE 3.8
AGGLOMERATION POPULATION TOTALS-1990



SOURCE: INSEE, RECENSEMENT-1990.

FIGURE 3.9
PERCENTAGE POPULATION
CHANGE IN AGGLOMERATIONS



SOURCE: INSEE, RECENSEMENT-1990.

As in the previous census, Annecy (Haute-Savoie) and Chambéry (Savoie) were the fastest growing agglomerations in the Rhône-Alpes. Annecy experienced an annual growth rate of 1.1% during the years 1982 to 1990. This was far and away the strongest growth rate in the region. Chambéry, whose growth rate has slowed, still enjoyed a strong 0.7% annual population increase between 1982 and 1990. These two medium-sized savoyard agglomerations remain among the fastest growing agglomerations in France (Figure 3.9).

An examination of the difference between natural and migratory population evolution over the past fifteen years is instructive (Figure 3.10). Every major agglomeration in the region showed, as expected, a natural population gain over the past two census periods. Annecy and Chambéry are the only regional agglomerations to also show a population increase due to migration. This further illustrates the high level of attractivity of these two savoyard agglomerations. Very few agglomerations in France actually increased their population through migration over the past census period thus making the gains of these two agglomerations even more impressive (Scargill, 1991).

FIGURE 3.10
COMPARATIVE ANNUAL POPULATION CHANGE IN AGGLOMERATIONS THROUGH MIGRATION AND NATURAL CAUSES



SOURCE: INSEE, RECENSEMENT-1990.

Grenoble and St. Etienne are the second tier agglomerations in the Rhône-Alpes Région with populations of 400,000 and 314,000 respectively. These cities may be of comparable size but are profoundly different and have been heading in opposite directions. These two agglomerations form the second tier of the region's urban hierarchy behind Lyon and ahead of the fast growing medium-sized savoyard agglomerations of Annecy, Chambéry, and Annemasse. Valence is the final medium sized agglomeration in the region's hierarchy and continues to show modest population gains (INSEE, Recensements, 1990).

The agglomeration of Grenoble saw an annual population increase of 0.3% during the previous inter-censal period (INSEE Première, No 111, Novembre, 1990). This added 8,000 people to France's tenth largest agglomeration. Grenoble, the historical capital of the Dauphiné area, has been the single fastest growing agglomeration in France since 1806. Grenoble has grown from the 29th largest agglomeration in France in 1806 to the 10th most populated one in 1990. The population has grown from 22,100 to 400,000. It's combination of an attractive location, high technology industries and a large university sector has made Grenoble a young, educated and successful agglomeration which continues to attract numerous migrants (Boyer, 1987).

St. Etienne, despite having lost over 3,000 people since 1982 has grounds for optimism. Between 1975 and 1982 St. Etienne had an annual population loss of -0.8%, a total loss of 17,500 people. Between 1982 and 1990 the loss of population slowed to a loss of -0.1% per year so that in 1990, St Etienne had a population of 314,000 (INSEE Première, No 111, Novembre 1990). This is a hopeful sign that the capital of the Loire has seen the worst of its demographic problems. St. Etienne is an industrial city that enjoyed its boom years during France's industrial revolution. Coal mining, ore and steel production were the backbone of its economy. In recent decades, much like North Eastern France, St. Etienne has been in the midst of a major economic slump and demographic loss owing to the redundancy of its major industries.

In discussing the population of Lyon one must distinguish between the city itself and the agglomeration as a whole. The city of Lyon grew at a modest annual rate of 0.1% between 1982 and 1990 to a total of 415,000 residents. This modest increase is a welcome change from the -1.4% annual demographic loss experienced by the city between 1975 and 1982 (INSEE Première, No 111, Novembre 1990). This is reflective of a national trend of a slower exodus if not minor growth in major urban centres. With certain exceptions such as Marseille, the massive urban flights of the seventies and early eighties has been, at least temporarily, slowed if not stopped (Scargill, 1991).

The agglomeration of Lyon has shown a strong 0.4% annual increase during the current census to attain a population of 1,262,000. After stagnating with a zero growth rate between 1975 and 1982 the addition of almost 40,000 residents to the agglomeration since 1982 is an encouraging trend. For the first time in recent memory the Lyon agglomeration grew at a faster annual rate than did the agglomeration of Grenoble. Examining the population growth of the various spatial units that make up the greater Lyon agglomeration; The City of Lyon, The Communauté Urbaine de Lyon (COURLY), The Rhône Département, and The Région Urbaine de Lyon (RUL), illustrate the exact nature of Lyon's recent demograpic situation (Figure 3.11).

The 1990 census showed for all of these four spatial units an overall population growth. The evolution of the total population (Figure 3.12) shows a distinct pattern. The population grew at a faster rate with distance from the city centre of Lyon. The City of Lyon showed the least favourable demographic trends followed by the COURLY, the Département of Rhône, and the RUL. All four of these spatial areas showed an improvement in demographic growth from the 1975-1982 census to the recent 1982-1990 census. During the 1975-1982 census both the City of Lyon and the COURLY had an annual population decline (Figure 3.13). Both have recovered to record positive demographic gains during the eighties. The département of Rhône and the RUL both substantially increased their demographic growth during the years 1982-1990 as compared with

FIGURE 3.11
ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS.



FIGURE 3.12
EVOLUTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE LYON AGGLOMERATION IN TOTAL NUMBERS



FIGURE 3.13
THE LYON AGGLOMERATION'S POPULATION EVOLUTION BY PERCENT



the years 1975-1982 (Repères et Tendances Économiques, Janvier, 1991).

These demographic figures need to be broken down into natural demographic change and migratory demographic change (Figure 3.14). All four of these spatial areas showed positive natural demographic gains over the past two census readings and all improved their natural gains during the most recent census period. However, all showed a negative migratory demographic change between 1982 and 1990 except for the RUL which registered a 1.3% annual growth for immigration. The central urban zones of the agglomeration are still losing population due to migration. The rate of decline in the City of Lyon has slowed from -1.73 per year between 1975 -1982 to -0.38 during the recent census. This is a positive sign concerning the health and dynamism of the centre of the agglomeration. That the overall RUL gained people in both natural and migratory terms is another positive demographic factor in Lyon's bid for international status.

FIGURE 3.14
EVOLUTION OF NATURAL AND MIGRATORY POPULATION TRENDS IN THE LYON AGGLOMERATION BY PERCENTAGE



After examining the six Rhône-Alpes agglomerations of over 100,000 the case of Geneva and the French section of the Geneva conurbation need consideration. The agglomeration of Geneva in

Switzerland is comprised of 45 communes with a population of 391,000 (Service Cantonal de Statistique, Janvier 1, 1990). The French section of what is referred to as the Geneva-Annemasse agglomeration has a population of 98,800 and was the fastest growing agglomeration in the region with a 4.0% annual growth rate during the 1982-1990 census (INSEE, Point d'appui pour l'économie Rhône-Alpes, No 61-62, Mars, 1991). With a total population of almost 500,000, the combined Geneva-Annemasse agglomeration is the second largest agglomeration in the region and the fastest growing.

This strong growth around Geneva is significant for Lyon. This illustrates the economic dynamism and attractiveness of this competing pole. The area around Lyon is not growing as quickly nor is it attracting the same calibre of professional residents. This is of concern to Lyon especially in its quest to enhance its image as the regional capital and strongest urban pole. Also, as will be discussed, this reduces Lyon's economic influence over a large and productive section of the region

The largest problem that Lyon faces in its attempt to become a true regional capital and "Eurocity" is Paris. The rank size indicator graph of the population of French agglomerations in 1990 shows the extent of Parisian dominance in population (Figure 3.15). Even though Lyon occupies the second position on this chart, it is well behind Paris. Lyon and the other French agglomerations must use the decentralization laws, their regions, urban networks and the increasing integration of the European Community as a lever to distance themselves from Paris. The historic Jacobin dominance of Paris in every sphere of the State's activity needs to be reduced as France and Europe face the next century.

FIGURE 3.15
RANK SIZE POPULATION GRAPH
OF FRENCH AGGLOMERATIONS-1990



3.4 SUMMARY

This chapter has considered the strength and position of Lyon's demographic situation in the Rhône-Alpes Région, France and the European Community. The demographic strength of the Rhône-Alpes Région has also been considered being an important component of Lyon's ambitions for "International City" status. By analysing population totals and demographic growth, Lyon can be placed within the demographic context of the Soldatos model. Total population is one indicator of a city's ability to create the critical mass needed to achieve "International City" status (Soldatos, 1989). Without a sufficient population base, a city cannot hope to achieve this critical mass. These population statistics illustrate that Lyon, though large for a French city, is demographically small in comparison with other major European non-capital cities (the Milan agglomeration has, for example a population of 4 million), that are striving for "International City" status.

The size of a city's population, or more strictly that of the contiguous agglomeration, is a critical factor in the attainment of European status. Population size measures a potential in terms of labour force, market size, economic strength and external influence. It could be argued that at present Lyon has not achieved a "demographic critical mass" as compared with most other major non-capital European cities. The agglomeration is, on the evidence of the 1990 census, still growing and thus the demographic evolution is proceeding in the right direction. However, several qualifications need to be made. Demographic expansion, though positive, is at a rate which will not permit Lyon to close the population gap vis-à-vis other major European cities in the immediate future, but merely ensure that the gap does not continue to widen. Secondly, the rate of demographic expansion of Lyon is lower than some of its regional neighbours (Annecy and Chambéry) and not significantly higher than that of its most powerful rival, Grenoble. In this sense, the recent population growth of Lyon has not resulted in an emphatic enhancement of its demographic weight within Rhône-Alpes. Finally, population size and growth rate, another key indicator, do not of themselves measure effective strength. Geneva, with a population in its international conurbation only half that of the Lyon agglomeration, is clearly ranked in the DATAR/RECLUS study as having higher international functions and prestige than Lyon. This leads to the conclusion that political, infrastructural and economic considerations may carry as much, if not more, weight as population size. This theme will be discussed in the following chapters beginning with the political framework of Lyon in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

A city, of whatever size, operates within a regional setting. In turn this setting consists of two spatial references, which may, but commonly do not, coincide. The first of these is a legal and administrative framework within which the city exercises defined powers. The second is a functional sphere, brought about by the polarizing strength of a city within a sphere of influence roughly proportionate in extent to the economic strength of the city but within which competition with neighbouring cities will define the effective limits. The administrative framework may be sub-divided between the formal administrative framework which forms part of the national, regional and local government system and more ad-hoc frameworks employed for planning purposes but which do not conform to a consistent national system. This chapter seeks to define the various political-administrative systems within which Lyon operates and to compare these with the extent of Lyon's functional polarized region.

The analysis of Lyon's political framework will be studied in a number of contexts. Initially, attention is focused on the formal administrative framework, especially the regions and their relationship to the constituent dėpartements. Secondly, the role of semi-official agencies will be considered, as exemplified by the Chambre de Commerce et Industrie de Lyon (C.C.I.L.) and the S.E.P.A.L. strategic planning agency. Thirdly, a review of the history of post-war urban and regional planning in France is needed to place Lyon's political development plan to achieve international status in perspective. Next, an analysis of two recent French elections in which the European issue should have been prominent, will be made. These were the Regional Elections of March 22, 1992, and the Referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht held on September 20, 1992.

4.1 THE ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY

In examining the political situation of Lyon one must first touch upon the history and political framework of not only Lyon but of

France. On January 1, 1990, Metropolitan France was politically comprised of 22 regions, 96 départements, and an incredible 36,763 communes (Rapport Fabre, 1991). These three forms of local administration constitute the major formal administrative units in France. The form and function of these three are often ill-defined and their responsibilities often overlap in daily operations. One of the difficulties facing Lyon is winning the cooperation of numerous local political administrative units to devise and implement strategy. An examination of each of these three formal administrative units will provide a better understanding of the challenges of logistics and cooperation facing Lyon as it pursues its international ambitions.

4.11 THE REGIONS

The regions were formally established in 1955 but only gained significant authority in 1982 under the package of decentralization laws passed by the then new Socialist régime. In 1986, the regions were further empowered when the Regional Councils were chosen in direct elections rather than being an appointed body, lending greater credibility to the Regional Councils (Dawkins, 1991). The regions were created to assume some of the overall planning responsibility that had previously been the sole preserve of the national government in Paris. Regions were viewed as an ideal size to replace the national government on certain levels and to compete with the other better-established regions in fellow European Community member states.

In the increasingly poly-nuclear European Community where many member states have powerful regions, France decided that the creation of French regions would serve three important functions. The first would be to decentralize certain administrative functions from the State to the Region. These include territorial planning and development, the location and construction of secondary schools, the oversight of adult training programs and the development of a regional plan to include industrial site location assistance and financial assistance to companies contributing to regional development (The Economist, 23-11-1991). This would also constitute another step forward in the long battle against the dominance of Paris and the State in the everyday affairs of the regions (Benko, 1987).

The second function of the newly-created regions was to construct a regional political infrastructure to compete with those already successfully in place in other European Community member states. This political infrastructure includes planning, coordinating social and economic issues with other national and European regions, lobbying the European Community, and generally creating the political institutions and connections needed to operate in a more independent fashion from Paris (Rapport Fabre, 1991). The French regions need to establish miniature copies of the National government with economic development councils, international awareness, connections and the ability to raise and distribute monies in an independent fashion. In short, the regions that will be most successful will be those that are able to assume greater responsibilities from the State in all sectors of government (Barbet, 1992).

Thirdly, decentralization was an economic decision as well as a political one (Tuppen, 1988). The Socialist government viewed, in quite a non-socialist manner, local authorities as being better positioned than the National government to improve and reshape their economies during the recession of 1981-1986. Also, decentralization eased the financial burden of the state by transferring certain costly responsibilities to the lower levels of government without necessarily granting these levels of government the needed powers to raise the capital required to cover these programs. These programs, consisting largely of social welfare and retraining/adult education, were viewed as a mixed blessing by the regions. Instead of being able to assert more independence through financial means, many regions found that the costs of these programs prohibited them from instituting any long range planning schemes.

Finances are the major problem of the French regions. The regions have limited means of directly raising capital. The regions are authorized to collect money through limited taxation on professional services and specific property taxes. The regions are also permitted to raise indirect revenues through fees charged for drivers' licensing and automobile registration. In total, these avenues for raising capital are quite limited and the regional budgets are correspondingly small (Jouve et. al., 1992).

The regions depend upon the State for the majority of their revenue. In 1988, the State budget was set at 1081 billion francs. The budget allocated to the collective territories of the regions, départements and communes was 52% of this total or 565 billion francs. Of this 565 billion francs, 348 billion francs was allocated to the communes, 138 billion francs was allocated to the départements and a mere 30 billion francs was allocated to the regions. In 1991, this total had increased to 50 billion francs but was still proportionatly much smaller than that allocated to the other official administrative units (Jouve et. al., 1992). This lack of financial resources restricts the effectiveness of the regions. Without significant revenue, the regions have achieved limited success, especially in light of the fact that the départements are substantially better financed than the regions.

Additionally, the annual contract between the State and the Region, negotiated and implemented in five year plans, is another source of revenue for the regions. These contracts include an agreed upon contribution by both the State and the Region to be spent upon specific projects. The five year contract between the State and the Rhône-Alpes Région for 1989 - 1994 was divided into four major categories: Employment and Development, Non-material Investments, Infrastructure and Social Management (Table 4.1). These four categories were further divided into 18 subcategories. The 1989 - 1994 contract between the State and the Rhône-Alpes Région was financed by 3,807.1 million francs by the State and 2,590.7 million francs by the Rhône-Alpes Région (Contrat entre L'Etat et la Région Rhône-Alpes, 1989).

As illustrated in Table 4.1, the major recipients of this contract were education and the agricultural industries. Other social and infrastructural projects received smaller amounts of money from this contract. This is not the total extent of either the region's budget nor the contributions by the State. This contract represents areas where both administrative bodies agree to pursue specific projects that are

TABLE 4.1
STATE/REGION CONTRACT-1989:
FINANCIAL BREAKDOWN BY TOPIC

THOUSAND FRANCS

		STATE	REGION
		3,807.1	2,590.7
I	*Emploi & Développment*		
1	Compétitivité des entreprises	116.25	116.50
2	Agriculture et Agro-alimentaire	269.10	326.50
3	Filière Bois	40.30	34.30
4	Développement Touristique	63.50	76.10
5	Artisanat	4.00	5.50
6	Initiatives locales	25.00	25.00
II	*Investissements immatériels*		
7	Formation	270.50	303.30
8	Enseignement supérieur	160.70	81.20
9	Recherche	101.90	83.40
10	Développement technologique	41.65	43.10
III	*Infrastructure*		
11	Aménagements routiers	1,833.00	1,063.80
IV	*Aménagement et Solidarite*		
12	Zones rurales en situation critique	59.70	60.00
13	Zones de mutation industrielle	65.00	65.00
14	Développement social des quartiers	380.00	50.00
15	Massifs de montagne	181.50	184.50
16	Humanisation des hospices	145.00	72.50
17	Réseau des villes	0	0
18	Zones frontalières	0	0

Source: Contrat entre L'Etat et la Region Rhône-Alpes, 21-4-1989.

best served by mutual coordination and financing. The total budget for the Rhône-Alpes Région in 1991 was 4.075 million francs.

A brief comparison with the budgets of the other major European regions illustrates the extremely poor financial condition of the Rhône-Alpes Région's administration. The 1988 budget for the Rhône-Alpes Région was 2 billion francs, the regional budgets for selected other European regions, translated into 1988 francs, were; Lombardy - 46 billion francs, Catalonia - 33 billion francs and Baden-Württemburg - 140 billion francs (Science et Vie Économie, 5-92). This comparison clearly indicates that the Rhône-Alpes Région, as an administrative unit, is not comparable to those other major regions in Europe with whom the leaders of Rhône-Alpes wish to compete.

The limited financial resources of the region are primarily committed to education. The regions are thus devoting the majority of their limited resources to a single area of interest that was decentralized from the State to the regions (La Tribune de l'Expansion, 1990). The State is effectively paying the regions to administer one of the State's former responsibilities with State money leaving precious little financial resources for the region to mount any other projects. None of the other major European regions have such limited financial or administrative powers.

To further compound the problems for the Rhône-Alpes Région, this region has the lowest per capita budget of any region in France. Rhône-Alpes, according to the calculations of the Tenth National Plan for the years 1989-1993, will receive 610 francs per capita each year during this plan (Jouve et. al., 1992). The national average stands at almost 900 francs per capita on an annual basis. This reflects Rhône-Alpes position as a populated and prosperous region. However, having the lowest regional budget per capita is a severe limitation to the effectiveness of the Rhône-Alpes Région's official administrative unit at the same time when this body is attempting to implement ambitious plans both within the region and throughout Europe.

The regions to date have had a limited success in achieving the objectives set forth in both 1982 and again in 1986. The regions have not succeeded in obtaining any real power or financial independence from Paris. Neither have the French regions set themselves up as true competitors with comparable regions in Germany, Italy, Spain or others in the European Community. The limited success of the second objective is a direct consequence of the results of the first objective, in that without adequate financial resources, the French regions cannot hope to compete on equal terms with their European partners in either economic development or political influence.

Economically, a number of problems have now become evident concerning decentralization and devolution from Paris and the National government to the regions. During the recession of 1981-1986 and subsequently, there were limited numbers of jobs to decentralize from Paris to the outlying areas of France (La Tribune de l'Expansion, 1990). Unemployment has become a larger priority issue then decentralization to the French government, and the French voter. Those jobs that were able to be decentralized were mostly low-skilled blue collar jobs. Many of these jobs were decentralized within the Paris Basin thus doing little to improve employment outside of the capital's hinterland. Also, high-level service jobs generally failed to follow any industrial decentralization and are, in fact, becoming further concentrated in Paris. The net result is that Paris has essentially become stronger through the consolidation of its position as the unrivalled centre of higher services in France (La Tribune de l' Expansion, 1990).

However, that such ambitious decentralization goals were not achieved in a mere ten years is not a complete condemnation of the French regions. After a decade, the French regions have evolved into an integral and popular political institution in France. The regional elections of March, 1992, with 70% voter participation, national debate, prominent candidates and intense media publicity illustrate both the importance and acceptance of the regions as another tier in the French political administration. The results and major campaign themes of these regional elections will be examined in detail later in this chapter in an effort to determine the importance of the idea of "Europe" to Rhône-Alpes voters and the distinction between national and regional/local issues.

The regions are becoming an increasingly important and viable political institution in France. Lyon is in the advantageous position of being the largest city and administrative capital of the second most important region in France; Rhône-Alpes. Lyon is attempting to take political advantage of this situation by strengthening its urban connections within the region. Increasing formal linkages between Lyon and St. Etienne (to be examined in Part Three) are but one example of this policy. Also, Lyon is attempting to use the size and economic power of the region as a whole to enhance and promote its image outside of France. This is critical to Lyon's plans to achieve "International City" status. The Soldatos model states that to be a true "International City", a city must sit atop its own regional urban system and have strong economic and political linkages with the second tier and smaller urban centres within its region.

4.12 THE DÉPARTEMENTS

The Rhône-Alpes is comprised of eight départements; Ain, Ardeche, Drôme, Isère, Loire, Rhône, Savoie, and Haute-Savoie (Figure 4.1). Lyon, in addition to being the regional capital, is also the capital of the Rhône Département. The départements date back to the Napoleonic era of the early nineteenth century. The idea, almost two centuries ago, was that the département capital would be no more then one days' travel by horse from any point in the département. In Napoleon's day this had its advantages for it enabled Paris to firmly control the outlying areas of France through the Préfects who were appointed by the national government to administer the départements. In 1993, some rethinking of this Jacobin institution is being debated.

The decentralization laws of 1982 and 1986 expanded the authority and role of the départements as well as those of the regions (L'Activité Économique, 3-1990). The executive powers of the Conseil Général of the Départements have been increased to help the départements handle their expanded mandate. The départements are responsible for the site and construction of "Colléges", schools for students between the ages of 11-14 (though the curriculum is still set

FIGURE 4.1
DÉPARTEMENTS OF THE RHONE-ALPES RÉGION



in Paris). The départements are also responsible for certain health and social services, public libraries and the operation of fishing and trading ports along with the development of a départemental transport plan. Other département responsibilities include rural planning, social and public health services, payment of benefits and other social welfare issues (Lebuy, 1989).

To enable the départements to finance such responsibilities, the ability of the départements to raise capital has been expanded as has their overall budget. The budgets of the départements are much greater than those of the regions (Tuppen, 1988). Frequently, the budget of a major agglomeration is also larger than those of the regions. For example, Nice had a budget of 4.7 billion francs in 1989 while the entire budget of the Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur Région was 3.6 billion francs. This serves to emphasizes the relative weakness of the regions in both a national and European wide context. These new powers along with the increased budgets have served to increase the power of the départements.

Unfortunately, these decentralization laws refused to choose one level of local government over the others. Therefore, the départements were strengthened through increased executive powers at the same time that the regions were created (La Tribune de l'Expansion, 1990). Decentralization legislation also failed to provide any supervision between the three local levels of government: regions, départements and communes. This has led to a situation where all three levels of local government are exploring and attempting to increase their mandates and powers. This has the predictable results of political manoeuvering, infighting, and power plays by individuals and groups as well as a great deal of oversight and overspending (Keating, 1986).

Certain urban and regional planners are calling for the elimination or restructuring of the départements (L'Activité Économique, 3-1990). This would be advantageous for the regions in that it would truly empower the regions in the political and financial areas in which they are currently weak. Also, this would greatly boost the image of the regions. Eliminating the départements would reduce by one the layers of French government and would constitute a major overhaul of the French political system. This will not happen soon if indeed it ever happens. However, this question is crucial to some of the most heated political debates in and around the Lyon area. We shall examine the specific problems and current debate later in this chapter.

4.13 THE COMMUNES

France has 36,763 communes; a truly remarkable figure. To better visualize the dimensions of this number consider that Italy has 8,074 communes and Spain has 8,027. The current European Community of twelve has 70,000 communes, of which over half are French. To approach this from another angle, France has almost 1,500 people per commune. Denmark has 18,000 and West Germany, before unification, had 7,200 people per commune. (Dawkins, 1991). For every 1,500 French to have their own layer of government seems, and is, excessive and unwieldy.

The commune system causes great problems and confusion in the urban agglomerations of France. The administrative concept of a city does not exist in France. Instead, a number of communes, and in certain cases arrondissements (Paris, Lyon and Marseille), constitute the administration of a city. This, as in the case of Lyon, causes confusion, delay and conflict. Only the term "Agglomération", which currently has no political jurisdiction, accurately represents a functional political boundary. Without such a political boundary, lack of direction will continue to plague all cities including Lyon. Planning and administration is hindered, responsibility easily evaded and the division of financial resources becomes difficult. Having numerous communes and local layers of official and semi-official government is a serious hindrance when planning a cohesive strategy in a major agglomeration (Kesselman, 1985).

4.14 SEMI-OFFICIAL AGENCIES

Examining the various political entities that are not part of the national territorial administrative system that directly impact the agglomeration of Lyon is critical to understanding the operational nature of local politics. The layers of local government begin with the nine arrondissements that constitute the City of Lyon proper. These nine arrondissements are a part of the official government administrative system and are found only in Paris, Lyon and Marseille (Benko, 1987). The next official layer of administration in the Lyon areas is La Communauté Urbaine de Lyon (COURLY) which consists of the 55 communes of Lyon and the immediate surrounding area. The COURLY is an important success in local organization being an officially constituted body comprised of a number of local political administrative units. The COURLY operates a wide variety of needed local infrastructure such as trash collection, bus routes and various aspects of long-range local planning and cooperation. The COURLY enables the Lyon agglomeration to operate in a relatively cohesive fashion which, as will be discussed, is the exception rather than the rule in the other major agglomerations of the region.

The next layers of local administration consist of various official government administrative units cooperating in conjunction with each other in semi-official agencies. Therefore, they have no true government mandate; but since their members are official the point is largely moot. The next semi-official layers is the Schéma Directeur de l'Agglomération Lyonnaise (SDAL) which consists of the 55 communes of COURLY along with an additional 15 adjacent communes. Finally, there exists the larger Region Urbaine de Lyon (RUL) which incorporates a total of 442 communes in four départements; Rhône, Isère, Ain, and Loire (Gras, 1990).

Coordinating 442 communes, 4 départements, and a large handful of minor/major urban planning agencies, semi-official administrative bodies and a host of conflicting boundaries and mandates is not a recipe for clarity. The logical boundary of the Lyon Agglomeration is in direct conflict with a tremendous number of official and semi-official governmental administrative layers. The Rhône-Alpes Région might claim to be the only local official political entity capable of any coordinated activity in this situation; however, the local rules and regulations of each commune and département put this idea to rest. Likewise, the supporters of a larger official Lyon agglomeration consisting of the present RUL are finding that attempting to alter official jurisdictions remains a daunting task (L'Activité Économique, 3-1990).

Additional decentralization laws of January 7, 1983 passed various responsibilities of urbanization from the State to the commune. This has politically handcuffed the larger agglomerations whose political manoeuvering room has been drastically reduced. The major agglomerations are now more dependent upon the départements and communes then before 1982. This has reduced the effectiveness of the agglomerations' leaders to pursue a set agenda. To be effective these major agglomerations need a larger degree of political autonomy and a defined, well-integrated administrative boundary (Tesse, 1990). Local leaders are beginning to argue that decentralization laws have actually increased their dependence upon Paris through the fact that local government is increasingly fragmented and paralysed. Therefore, local governments in certain areas have a habit of abdicating real decisions to the State government just to ensure action.

To complicate issues for the major agglomerations, the communes, départements, and regions have all increased their powers and responsibilities. Therefore, all three local layers of government have direct political and financial input into the managing of the agglomeration. Agglomerations must now deal effectively with all layers of government instead of only with the State. This has proved a mixed blessing to the large agglomerations and has complicated even the most basic decision-making at the local level. The basic problem facing the Lyon and other agglomerations concerning local government is that there exist too many layers of government to effectively pursue long range objectives of any significance.

4.2 OPERATIONAL AND PLANNING AGENCIES

The Soldatos model argues the need for public and private organizations to promote and market the city. Much of the making of an "International City" is the crafting of the proper image (Soldatos, 1989). Therefore, the marketing and promotion of a city is critical in its quest to achieve international recognition. Private agencies (often with semi-official status) must play a substantial role in promoting the city's image. These agencies are also important in tackling such issues as long range planning, attracting foreign investment, lobbying for the city's benefit and providing a solid and dependable level of urban support and promotion.

A number of agencies in Lyon stand out as leaders in promoting the future agenda of Lyon. These agencies are the Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Lyon (C.C.I.L)., Le Syndicat d'Études et de Programmation de l'Agglomération Lyonnaise (S.E.P.A.L)., l'Agénce de Développement de la Region Lyonnais (ADERLY) and l'Agénce d'Urbanisme de Lyon. These agencies are responsible for the promotion of Lyon as an "International City" around the agglomeration, the region, throughout Europe and indeed the world. These agencies are also working to establish strong links between each other and other various secondary promotional groups.

4.21 THE C.C.I.L.

The C.C.I.L. is not a formal governmental administrative organization. Rather, the C.C.I.L. is officially and legally recognized as a functioning administrative organization whose responsibilities include the operation of the agglomeration's airports, numerous port facilities, certain education establishments and other smaller entities such as bonded warehouses that serve to promote the financial interests of the Lyon agglomeration.

The C.C.I.L. employed 905 people in 1990 and had an annual budget of 792.4 million francs in 1991. This represents a relatively large and well-financed operation. The C.C.I.L. dispenses the majority of its budget to three areas: education, airports and support to enterprises. In 1991, 44.51% of the C.C.I.L.'s annual budget went towards teaching and education. The majority of this sum went to the operation of the École Superieure de Commerce de Lyon, (ESC). This prestigious graduate business college, located in Ecully, is one of the highest rated in France. The ESC is active in promoting international exchanges between graduate business students, especially those in the

"Four Motors" regions of Europe. These exchanges have also broadened to include institutions in North America, specifically York University in Toronto, Canada. This is valuable in promoting not only the ESC but Lyon as a whole.

A further 30.56% of the C.C.I.L.'s annual budget in 1991 was allocated to the airports of the Lyon agglomeration, primarily to Lyon-Satolas International Airport. The C.C.I.L. operates Lyon-Satolas and played a major role in establishing the separate funding structures needed to proceed with the major expansion project currently under construction at Lyon-Satolas. As a result of this program of massive improvement at Lyon-Satolas, 84.71% of the 1991 annual investment of the C.C.I.L. went to the airport development project. The indicates the importance that the C.C.I.L. attaches to the development of Lyon-Satolas as an international multi-modal transportation hub. The C.C.I.L., being a commercially oriented operation, understands the importance of first-class physical transportation infrastructure in attracting and retaining investment and enterprises.

A total of 20.75% of the C.C.I.L.'s 1991 budget went to supporting enterprises. This support ranged from financial incentives for locating an enterprise in Lyon to helping construct certain infrastructures to promote the cities téchnopôles. The 123.7 million francs allocated to support enterprises in 1991 is not inconsequential when helping to attract, establish and coordinate local enterprises. The C.C.I.L. also encourages local commerce in a number of smaller measures such as publishing a monthly magazine, L'Activité Économique, which covers the local economic situation.

ADERLY, an affiliate of the C.C.I.L, is a nomially independent organization in charge of attracting and promoting business investment in the Lyon agglomeration. ADERLY is the organization that operates international trade missions and offices outside of France. ADERLY has an office in the World Trade Centre in New York and another mission in Brussels. ADERLY attempts to market and promote Lyon as an attractive location to establish a commercial enterprise. This is an important role in promoting and developing the international image of Lyon. The C.C.I.L., and its affiliate ADERLY, clearly typify the semi-official promotional agency that is mentioned in the Soldatos model. It is mandatory for Lyon to actively and aggressively promote and market its strengths to the international community. Organizations such as the C.C.I.L. and ADERLY are fulfiling to a significant degree this criteria of the Soldatos model.

4.22 URBAN PLANNING AGENCIES

In addition to the semi-official commercially oriented organizations such as the C.C.I.L. and ADERLY, the Soldatos model discusses the importance of semi-official urban planning and coordinating agencies. The S.E.P.A.L. was created in June, 1985 by agreement of the 55 communes of the COURLY and 16 adjacent communes. The mandate for S.E.P.A.L. was to revive and update the Schéma Directeur de l'Aménagement Urbaine (SDAU) planning scheme for Lyon. The community leaders wanted to establish an urban planning agency similar to the SDAU to create a long term plan for the Lyon agglomeration.

The S.E.P.A.L. was given the task of creating a long range urban plan which evolved into the document; LYON 2010: Un Projet d'Agglomération pour une Métropôle Européenne. Aside from providing a detailed plan for the future of the agglomeration of Lyon, one of the primary tasks of the S.E.P.A.L. was to coordinate with the mosaic of organizations, government agencies and academic consultants that contributed to the LYON 2010 plan.

Lyon has a wide array of various semi-official planning and promotional agencies. In the context of the Soldatos model, Lyon has established the linkages required between the public and private agencies to provide Lyon with a strong promotional and planning infrastructure. Lyon is well served in this criteria of the Soldatos model and this will help Lyon to improve its international status both politically and economically.

4.3 POST WAR REGIONAL PLANNING

Urban planning in France has been important, active and centralized since the end of the Second World War. Just after the war, in 1947, J.F. Gravier published his classic book entitled Paris et le Désert Français. This book had a profound influence on France and contributed to the formation of DATAR in 1963. Gravier illustrated that France was ill-balanced, especially in economic terms. Paris completely dominated France in every aspect possible from population to culture, economics to newspapers. Paris was France and the rest of the nation was rapidly losing ground (Gravier, 1947).

To address this situation a new policy of "Aménagement du Territoire" was begun in France in 1950 under Claudius Petit, the Minister of Construction. M. Petit realized that human factors needed to be considered along with economic ones in the post war reconstruction of France. The Third Development Plan, (Decree of June 30, 1955), established 21 economic planning regions. Each region, and especially the larger agglomerations, were urged to take the lead in helping to propose and develop the economies of the region (Beaujeu-Garnier, 1974). Although final approval and financing was still determined from Paris, this was viewed as the first step in easing the monopoly of power in Paris and promoting local initiatives.

This same theme is echoed today. A recent government report (Avis du Conseil Économique et Social du 20 Juin 1990 sur rapport de M. Raymond) recommended increasing the powers and responsibilities of the Regional Préfet to propose and develop the economies of the region. This report also stressed that the mayors of the larger agglomerations needed to determine the scope, speed and objectives of the region both economically and in terms of potential "Internationalization".

In the 35 years between 1955 and 1990 time did not stand still as one might suspect. DATAR conceived of the policy of "Les Métropôles d'Equilibre" at the beginning of the fifth national plan and this was approved in 1964. This policy was designed to encourage eight major agglomerations, or combinations of agglomerations, to take an active leadership role in their section of France. This would also theoretically help balance the country vis-à-vis the dominance of Paris (Beaujeu-Garnier, 1974). The eight "Métropôles d'Equilibre", decided after great and often heated debate pitting regional rivals against one another, were; Lyon-Grenoble-St. Etienne, Marseille-Aix-Fos, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Strasbourg, Nancy-Metz-Thionville, Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, and Nantes-St. Nazaire.

The political concessions that led to such artificial couplings made success difficult from the start. Combining two or three regional rivals into a single planning unit hindered the effectiveness of this idea as did the economic and demographic trends that appeared in the seventies. The policy of "Les Métropôles d'Equilibre" was short-lived, being quietly forgotten by the early seventies. However, this policy was the beginning of an active campaign to combat the total urban dominance of Paris.

By 1972 the emphasis had shifted away from the major agglomerations to the "Medium-Sized Cities". This corresponded with the demographic trends of the seventies and early eighties, including counterurbanization and a continued rural exodus. The most rapid population growth, and therefore the greatest increase in demand for services, shifted to the medium-sized towns and away from the largest agglomerations (Scargill, 1983). Again, this trend was chronologically limited and the focus of urban/regional planning shifted again in the eighties due to an increasingly fluid demographic situation and the spatial changes dictated by increasing communication technology and the rise of European integration.

Currently the focus has shifted to "Regional Urban Networks" and increased decentralization to enhance regional and urban strength to compete with other European regions. This is a combination of the previous policies and reflects the need to focus on all cities, irrespective of their population size and to concentrate on interaction between cities within fluid and changing networks of different spatial size rather than individual points (Punter, 1989). Lyon's challenge is to establish itself as the head of the Rhône-Alpes regional urban network as well as to establish its position and linkages within the greater European urban network.

Despite forty years of regional planning by DATAR in an effort to break, or at least reduce the power monopoly of Paris, success has been slim. Paris remains a World City and continues to dominate France in all aspects of national life. Examination of a number of relevant statistics concerning Paris in 1988 is instructive (Table 4.2). The high percentage of the university population, upper managerial staff, government funded research workers and percentage of the overall national population show Paris to enjoy a veritable monopoly of influence in France.

TABLE 4.2
The Monopoly of the Paris Agglomeration, 1988.

2.2% of the National Land Area
15.6% of the Energy Consumption
18.5% of the Total Population
18.6% of the Nation's Housing
20.9% of the National Exports
22.0% of the Employed Population
23.5% of the Civil Servants
25.9% of all Household Income
26.9% of all Tax Revenue
27.0% of National Added Value
30.8% of the University Population
36.1% of the Resident Foreign Population
38.2% of all Upper Managerial Staff
41.9% of all Overseas Students
50.3% of Government Funded Research Workers

Source: I.N.S.E.E., 1989.

These are but a few of the statistics available that depict the overwhelming dominance of Paris. Paris, like Lyon, has grand plans for its future within the European Community and the world. Paris plans to compete vigorously for the position of Euro-capital within the

European Community against London and, in future, against Berlin. The State plans to "Massify" Roissy/Charles de Gaulle International Airport including the addition of a TGV station in the airport terminal similar to the one at Lyon-Satolas International Airport. A new TGV station has opened in Massy, a southern suburbs of Paris, and another new TGV station has opened at the gigantic new Euro-Disney amusement park in the eastern Parisian suburbs (Reynauld, 1991). These are but some of the largest and most visible physical projects currently under construction in Paris.

Paris is also working hard to retain and improve its position as the fifth most attractive city in Europe for investors. Paris is currently behind London, Brussels, Frankfurt, and Zurich. One step in this direction was the consolidation of all regional bourses, including the one in Lyon, into a single national bourse centred in Paris in January 1991 (Le Monde, 4-1-91). This has served to further monopolize such financial services in Paris. This ambition also inhibits the diffusion of top ranking service professionals to smaller cities such as Lyon. France considers it vital to maintain Paris as a major world city. The French government feels that this can be achieved while simultaneously improving the second and third tier cities in the provinces. However, doubts exist whether or not cities outside of Paris will actually receive the attention and financial commitment to significantly improve their position while Paris continues to consume the majority of resources and major visible/attractive projects. With a continuing focus on Paris, the prospects for Lyon and other French cities to fulfil their lofty ambitions look less assured.

The increasing degree of European integration and the opening of the single market will benefit the expansion of power by both the large agglomerations and the regions. These are the two political entities that have been historically weak in France due to the overt centralization and dominance of Paris both during the Ancien Régime and after the Revolution. The government's official report concerning the state of the French urban system, (Rapport Guichard, 1986), highlighted the urban weakness of France vis-à-vis the rest of the European Community. The Rapport Guichard concluded that the agglomerations and secondary cities of France lacked the size, infrastructure and services of their European Community counterparts. Additionally, the internal urban networks remain poorly developed. In a Europe dominated by major agglomerations, France has determined that it must improve its urban systems and networks to remain competitive.

The French government introduced a number of policies designed to address and correct this situation. The opening of Europe has many French cities looking to establish points in common with each other despite historical, political and personal prejudices. Conflict between the major agglomerations of the Rhône-Alpes is becoming increasingly dated, though remaining a very real obstacle to progress (Le Monde, 10-6-1991). The recent agreement between Lyon and St Etienne to establish closer ties is a good example (that of Montpélier and Nîmes is another). This networking of cities is currently being encouraged by the state in order to establish multi-polar urban areas that would be in a position to establish the "Critical Mass" needed to improve their status. The state, in a *volte-face* from its pre-1945 attitude of divide and rule, now views these urban linkages as critical if France is to compete successfully within the European Community (Rapport Guichard, 1986).

Urban management is considered crucial to the success of an agglomeration. The State is therefore decentralizing certain planning powers to the agglomerations and encouraging certain competitive policies. The major agglomerations are being encouraged to present a stated international ambition and have been granted the authority to conduct limited international functions and negotiation. This is a small gain for the agglomerations in that they can now conduct certain negotiations with other European Community and Swiss agglomerations. Lyon can now conduct negotiations with Geneva directly though the final decisions still are resolved in Paris. This is a small though significant step in the proper direction.

Domestically the focus is on increased action and cooperation between the mayors of the major agglomerations and the regional préfets. DATAR and Le Conseil Économique et Social suggest that all agglomerations should create a detailed fifteen year long range urban development plan. The need also exists for better political linkages and a precise geographic and economic definition of the metropolitan area that corresponds with its immediate zone of influence (Rapport Carrière, 1988). Lyon has developed a 20 year plan; the S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010 strategic plan is exactly the form of long range urban planning being encouraged by the state. The increase in linkages between Lyon and St. Etienne is but one example of the increase in local linkages pursued by Lyon. These linkages will be examined in detail in Chapter Nine.

The state has planned a number of large far-reaching projects to help achieve these goals. "Le Comité Interministériél d'Aménagement du Territoire du 5 Novembre, 1990" decided to pursue seven strategic projects on a larger geographic scale than the region to promote "European Competitive Zones". DATAR was directed to examine and implement these projects, one of which concerns the Saône-Rhône area. This project area includes all of the Rhône-Alpes Région, parts of Auvergne, Bourgogne, Franche-Comté, and opens onto Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur. The area in question has an approximate population of over seven million persons. The government's goals in this project area are threefold; to give the sector a new identity, to build an image of an International Métropôle (Lyon), and to establish a hinterland for Marseille. This would require the development of Lyon as a major financial centre, the completion of all transport and telecommunication infrastructure projects and the promotion of urban networks and development. The two cornerstones of the national agenda to making France more competitive in both the regional and the urban level within the modern European Community are the growth of certain European Métropôles in a complimentary fashion with Paris and the building and strengthening of the domestic urban network (Rapport Fabre, 1991). Lyon is a critical component of both plans.

Lyon remains a fine illustration of the inherent problems of the national agenda in France. Overlapping layers of official government authority restrict the ability of the agglomerations and regions to pursue their respective programmes. The continuing dominance of

Paris, their European competitor's head start and the lack of direction are major problems. Lyon wishes to be a "Eurocity" on a scale with Milan, Barcelona, Frankfurt and Amsterdam. To achieve this status, Lyon must overcome or deflect these problems and focus its political will on this task. An examination of how both Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région are politically preparing to fulfil their ambitions is now necessary.

Politically, the European Community is the natural ally of the French regions. The member state's national governments are surrendering certain powers to the European Community which in turn, theoretically, loosens the national government's grip upon the regions. In France this is of particular importance in that the French regions are constitutionally weaker than their European counterparts. The regions in Germany, Italy, Spain, and other European Community countries have far greater political and financial decision-making capabilities then do the French regions. A useful illustration of this point is the lack of participation by regional institutions in France in the central structures of the state. Their are no regional representatives in the nationally-elected legislative bodies as there are in Spain and Italy. Also, unlike other European regions, French regions have no normative powers such as security (as in Germany) but function strictly as a management authority over a budget the fraction of the size of many regions within the European Community (Rhône-Alpes dans l'Espace Européen, No. 5, 1990).

The Rhône-Alpes Région has pursued numerous European alliances. Most notable is the accord signed in June 1983 with the regions of Baden-Württemberg, Lombardy, and Catalonia dubbed the "Four Motors of Europe" (Rhône-Alpes dans l'Espace Européen No. 5, 1990). This alliance is politically significant in that it links Rhône-Alpes with three other prosperous and high profile regions in the European Community. This alliance also increases linkages in other areas; higher education links between regional graduate business schools and joint international lobbying efforts in North America and Asia are but two examples. The larger advantages are economic and will therefore be discussed in the appropriate section, however, it is instructive to understand the numerous non-economic advantages that such high level associations can provide.

Rhône-Alpes has recently opened an office in Brussels to lobby the European Community bureaucracy. The increasing control of the European Community in many areas makes it advantageous to establish a regional office in Brussels to promote the interests of the Rhône-Alpes Région. Notably, the other members of the "Four Motors of Europe" also have large regional lobbying offices in Brussels to promote their interests. However, not only are these international actions almost entirely political to date, but are also of dubious legality. Article 65 of the decentralization law of March 2, 1982 authorizes the regional councils, with State approval, to establish trans-frontier contacts. This is a vague and inherently limiting legal statement in direct contrast to articles 20 and 52 of the Constitution. Article 20 states that the National government determines and conducts the politics of the nation. Article 52 states that The President of the Republic negotiates all international treaties (Rhône-Alpes dans l'Espace Européen, No. 5, 1990). Legally, this leaves the regions in an impotent legal position especially since the regions, unlike the départements and communes, are not even a legally recognized administrative unit in the Constitution.

Despite its precarious legal position, Rhône-Alpes is vigorously pursuing a European agenda. Many supporters of Europe, including Jacques Delors, (President of the E.C.) argue that the regions are the optimum size for effective government within the framework the European Community (Interrégions, No 101, 4-1988). For Rhône-Alpes to achieve any real success as a European actor, the region must present a unified and cohesive face towards Europe and be able to negotiate as needed with other regions and organizations without the approval of Paris or other layers of official government.

4.4 LYON'S POLITICAL BLUEPRINT

After an examination of the official and non-official agencies whose mandates include government, administration, planning and other functions vital to the daily and long-term functioning of Lyon, along with an overview of the history of urban planning in France since the Second World War, a study of the political planning currently happening in Lyon is required. This will enable an examination of the present and future direction of Lyon's urban plan and help establish whether or not Lyon has the necessary political cohesion, strength and vision to qualify for "International City" status according to the Soldatos model.

Within the Rhône-Alpes a common front is needed by the agglomerations of the urban network to develop and promote the "critical mass" needed to place Rhône-Alpes and its agglomerations in a competitive position vis-à-vis the larger regions within the European Community. Above all else, to successfully construct and improve the Rhône-Alpes Région, voluntary political integration and cooperation is needed among the major urban centres to create a new regional identity (Rapport Carrière, 1988). The formation by the region of "Un Conseil des Villes de Rhône-Alpes" is a positive step as is the recent Lyon-St Etienne alliance. However, much remains to be accomplished at the local political level to ensure any substantial degree of urban cooperation in Rhône-Alpes.

4.41 LOCAL ISSUES AND COHESION

One of the problems effecting the cohesion of the region is the historical east-west split within the Rhône-Alpes. Competition between the Rhône Axis (Lyon, St Etienne, Vienne) and the Alpine Axis (Grenoble, Annecy, Chambéry, and Geneva) fuels fears of a divided multi-polar region. Lyon, while envisioning itself as the capital of the "Grand Sud-Est Français", must first establish itself as the true regional capital. Subsequently, Lyon must develop as a European-sized agglomeration that is prepared to lead Rhône-Alpes into Europe with the assistance of, not competition from, the Alpine Agglomerations (Rhône-Alpes dans l'Espace Européen, No. 5, 1990). In the poly-nuclear Europe of post 1993, Lyon and Rhône-Alpes have the best chance of any French City/Region outside Paris/Ile-de-France of playing a major role. However, this will require a greater degree of regional cooperation than currently exists.

Cooperation is a critical commodity for Lyon as it enters the future. On a European scale, the Mayor of Lyon, Michel Noir, stresses that the mayors of the major "Eurocities" need to increase the exchange of ideas and information on such topics as traffic circulation, urban planning, pollution, security and economic development (L'Expansion, 12-1990). In a Europe increasingly dominated by the major agglomerations, this form of communication and interaction will become increasingly important. On a local scale, cooperation between the local multi-layered political system is mandatory if Lyon is going to have any future success in controlling its own destiny.

The attitude of Maurice Charrier, the Communist Mayor of Vaulx-en-Velin, a suburb to the north of Lyon, is illustrative of the cooperation needed to advance the agenda of Lyon. M. Charrier is politically opposed to Michel Noir and critical of the S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010 project, (to be discussed later), yet he voted in favour of adopting the project on April 2, 1990. M. Charrier had three good reasons to vote for the S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010 project. The first and best reason was that M. Charrier understands that the plan offers the opportunity for creating jobs in his area. This is a particularily important concern to a communist mayor in a depressed suburb. Secondly, the project included concrete proposals with visible advantages for Vaulx-en-Velin; specifically a new industrial park that is badly needed. Thirdly, M. Charrier and other mayors of smaller or weaker communes can understand the advantage of the agglomeration speaking in one unified voice in planning and economic matters, especially when trying to attract outside or government investment (Le Progrés, 28-4-90).

The S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010 plan was passed by a vote of 15 in favour and 2 opposed along with abstentions through absence by the representatives of the communes of Venissieux and Decines. Only the Socialist mayors of Villeurbanne and Francheville voted against the plan and this can be viewed as a purely partisan vote since Mayor Michel Noir of Lyon was a member of Chirac's RPR rightist party at the time of this vote. This level of local political cooperation is an example of what is needed if the Lyon Agglomeration is going to successfully plan and execute its ambitious agenda. It is essential that there be coordinated and coherent political direction in addressing and correcting the shortcomings in Lyon as illustrated in the DATAR/RECLUS study and to implement the S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010 urban planning scheme. The local political initiatives and their attention to the specific problem areas as highlighted in the DATAR/RECLUS study will now be examined to determine their vision and cohesion.

4.42 POLITICAL AGENDA OF THE C.C.I.L.

The C.C.I.L., as explained earlier, is a semi-official appointed body charged with, among other mandates, the promotion of the financial and industrial sectors of Lyon's growth. The C.C.I.L. has chosen four specific areas in which Lyon must take political action in order to better implement the S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010 plan. These four steps are as follows. First, the political leaders must actively lead in the development of industry. Second, commercial equipment and facilities must be improved. Third, the communication infrastructure must be improved. Finally, the Rhône Département must be expanded to include the entire Lyon Agglomeration (L'Activité Économique, 3-1990).

To help implement the first point Michel Noir created, in late 1990, the International Council of Lyon. M. Noir appointed Philippe Demarescaux, the President of Rhône-Poulenc-Argochimie, and Henri Moulard, President de la Lyonnaise de Banque as co-chairmen of this council. The members of this council are all local leaders of industry and commerce whose goals are to help promote Lyon's international image and industrial development (L'Expansion, 12-1990). This is one well-proven strategy to help promote an agglomeration. This increase in public-private linkages is a powerful and needed combination as Soldatos has argued.

Another strategy is more direct, and it is easier to quantify the ensuing results. The local political leaders are investing large sums of capital into renovating or constructing new téchnopoles and industrial areas such as Gerland. The COURLY alone invested 70 million francs on these large scale projects in 1987. Another consequence of the decentralization laws is that individual cities can now set their own spending limits and priorities. They are also allowed to raise capital through private lenders. In the case of Montpellier and St Etienne this has led to an overall deficit of over ff12,000 per inhabitant. The mayors of these cities believe that the increase in tax revenue brought about as a direct result of these massive investments will pay off these debts (The Economist, 23-11-1991). This has produced, however, a very troubling possible second scenario.

This has produced the very real possibility of financial disaster at the local government level. It is feared that in the later half of this decade that numerous local governments could declare bankruptcy, forfeit on their interest payments and cause a crisis that the State would be forced to correct. Ironically, this would defeat one of the major aims of decentralizations, not to mention the dramatic possible results of massive bankruptcy among local governments. Currently, Lyon has shown admirable restraint and has a reasonable per capita indebtedness of around ff7,000 in 1990, though the total amount of debt is higher than most cities due to population size. However, the pressure to keep pace with other French cities on a spending spree is seeing a yearly increase in Lyon's indebtedness. Lyon risks severely jeopardizing the future of its S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010 plan by overspending in the short term. Lyon, and all other agglomerations, can ill afford poor political financial management at this crucial juncture.

The second area which the C.C.I.L. has determined that Lyon must take significant political action is the improvement of equipment and facilities. This also is split into the physical and political realms. The physical improvements are detailed in Chapter Five. However, physically building a bank or insurance office has a limited effect on the overall commercial abilities and capabilities of Lyon. The crucial objective is the transfer of serious decision- making powers and financial controls from Parisian or foreign-based headquarters to an established regional control centre in Lyon. The C.C.I.L., ADERLY, The International Council of Lyon and numerous other public and private institutions, in addition to prominent local individuals, are pushing for this form of significant decentralization from Paris (L'Activité

Économique, 3-1990). Unfortunately this is a much slower and more difficult project than physically constructing banks and téchnopôles to satisfy the physical demands of a modern "Eurocity". Without such control of information, power, and other critical flows, Lyon will continue to be a passive French provincial outpost to Paris. Achieving the ability to exercise true control over directional flows of finances and decision-making is the most significant battle that the politicians and local business executives will face to establish Lyon as a competitive agglomeration within modern Europe.

The third priority addressed by the C.C.I.L. concerns improvement of the communication infrastructure. Communication infrastructure is, on the one hand, the physical transportation variety such as airports, ports, autoroutes and other essentially transport-related entities which Lyon is significantly improving (Chapter Five). Lyon is still, however, lagging behind such smaller agglomerations as Montpellier and Toulouse in such important communication infrastructure as fiber-optic and satellite communication capacity (L'Activité Économique, 3-1990). These forms of high-tech communication are vital in the modern work space and are integral in attracting business.

Integrating Lyon into the top tier of advanced communication technology is a project of large dimensions that will require a substantial degree of State and/or regional funding. It is mandatory, though, that Lyon be in a position to offer a first class computer-driven communication system to compete with other major and minor European agglomerations in attracting and maintaining traditional and newer high-growth technological industries (Urbanismes & Architecture, 11-1990). This advanced communication capacity is one area of an agglomeration's infrastructure that is mandatory in the current marketplace. The Soldatos model states that such high-technology in the computer/information infrastructure is important in linking a city to the rest of the modern world and in attracting corporations with international functions (Soldatos, 1989).

The fourth point presented by the C.C.I.L. is doubtless the most politically delicate and challenging. Changing département boundaries is as explosive a topic as one could wish to face. The C.C.I.L. and other planning agencies in Lyon argue that the départements are obsolete and should be eliminated or at least altered, especially around the Lyon area. The départements are too small to be an effective national or European level of government and too large for effective local representation. Also, France already has too many official layers of government, which has led to a sense of disenfranchisement among the populace and bureaucratic paralysis in operational matters (Ballingrand, 1990). The old State-Département paradigm should be replaced by a European Community-Region relationship. This, in theory, would eliminate many nationalistic problems, reduce bureaucracy and enable greater and fairer popular participation. This, however, does not impress the département leaders, bureaucrats, traditionalists and many others with a claim to some title or financial authority within the structure of the département.

The C.C.I.L. proposal does not argue for the immediate elimination of the local départements but rather for the entire Lyon Agglomeration to be included within a single département: Rhône (L'Activité Économique, 3-1990). An example of this need to redraw administrative borders at the département level is evident in the north-east of the Lyon Agglomeration. One of the major zones of development concerning the Lyon Agglomeration is situated in the Ain Département. Yet, because of the current département and planning borders this area to the east of Lyon, and the new-town of l'Isle d'Abeau to the south-east, are not officially incorporated in the S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010 plan (L'Activité Économique, 3-1990). Obviously these areas are within Lyon's immediate zone of influence and enjoy the benefits of such an association while contributing little financially and remaining divorced from the overall planning agenda of Lyon.

These administrative changes are not going to occur in the short-term. In this new era of European integration it seems both trivial and irrational on a large scale that such parochial political battles remain to be fought within the same member state, much less the same agglomeration. However, this gulf in theory (idealism) and practice (reality) remains vast. It will prove difficult for France to operate competitively in a community of regions and agglomerations if the départements and the large numbers of communes continue to prove such an obstacle.

4.43 S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010 PLAN FOR THE FUTURE

For Soldatos, one of the key criteria for an "International" City concerns its level of conscious political effort to improve upon the other criteria needed to achieve critical mass. Soldatos discusses the importance of urban marketing, urban networks, the horizontal and vertical linkages between the public and private sector and the importance of a long-term urban plan. These forms of local political action are critical if a city is to implement and achieve the coherent mobilization of its resources to attain a rise in status and long term goals (Soldatos, 1989).

In Lyon, a long range urban plan has been recently implemented. LYON 2010: Schéma Directeur de l'Agglomération Lyonnaise was developed by S.E.P.A.L. (Syndicat d'Études et de Programmation de l'Agglomération Lyonnaise) and ratified by the COURLY in its final form in April 1990. This document is the official blueprint of Lyon's urban planning for the next twenty years. If implemented in all of its phases, Lyon in the year 2010 will be an agglomeration of increased European stature. This 293 page document, being the defining article of Lyon's plans and ambition, deserves serious consideration in this study.

Each of the nine chapters will be briefly examined along with the conclusion and aspirations voiced at the end of each section. Such a review of LYON 2010 is needed at this juncture to give an exact representation of Lyon's ambitions and to study and evaluate the potential feasibility and consequences of essential projects.

The first chapter, "L'agglomération aujourd-hui, ses forces et faiblesses" discusses the actual physical location of the city and its overall economic and demographic position, strengths and weaknesses, in 1990. This discussion touches upon Lyon's central position as a European crossroads along with a spatial explanation of Lyon's poly-nuclear CBD and various ports of entrance. These physical attributes are viewed as advantageous. However, the east-west economic division of the agglomeration is regretfully noted. Even with the addition of Lyon-Satolas International Airport and the Eurexpo exposition centre, the eastern section of Lyon remains economically and socially disadvantaged when compared to the Prêsqu'ile and the western communities of the Lyon agglomeration.

As with most urban plans, a statement of geographic position and spatial problems to be solved are the logical starting points. How an urban plan acts upon these fundamentals is a basic reason of such a plan's success or failure. Lyon realizes it must take optimum advantage of its prime geographic position between Northern and Mediterranean Europe. Equally, Lyon must overcome the debilitating east-west dichotomy that has haunted previous development in Lyon to avoid creating a Lyon of two speeds.

The final sections of the first chapter discuss the economic and demographic realities of Lyon. The Lyon agglomeration's demographic growth has increased during the eighties (Chapter Three) as has the evolution and diversity of its industrial and service sector employment, (Chapter Eight). Lyon claims to be far ahead of other French agglomerations on the road to achieving international stature, with the overwhelming exception of Paris. This relative strength of Lyon within the national urban network is seen as a major positive factor for Lyon. France will play an important role in the post-1993 Europe and as the second city of France, that enjoys a crossroads position, Lyon can look forward with cautious optimism.

The Second Chapter, "Des atouts pour rélever les défis de l'avenir" moves into discussing specifics of how Lyon is going to meet the future challenges. These are the extraordinary challenges ranging from social mutations to regional harmony and from economic development to local ecology. Every agglomeration of any size is dealing with an increasingly vast and complicated range of such responsibilities each requiring political oversight and financial contributions. The importance of the LYON 2010 plan is that it is attempting to provide an all-encompassing plan of action to deal with each and every challenge facing Lyon both today and in the decades to follow.

An essential element of this chapter is that the planners at every level in Lyon must think today of a Lyon, France, and Europe in twenty years time while simultaneously and effectively handling the complex urban problems of today. What will be the social needs, transport necessities, environmental, political, economic and communication requirements and concerns of a modern European metropolis in the early decades of the next century? These are the questions raised and dealt with in this plan.

Aside from outlining the prospective future of Lyon in twenty years this chapter also points out some of the current weaknesses in Lyon both politically and in terms of infrastructure. The primary concern is Lyon's limited control of and influence within the Rhône-Alpes Région. With the Massif Central directly to the west, Geneva and Grenoble within an hours' drive and Paris two hours north via the TGV, Lyon is squeezed. Lyon, though the nominal head of the Rhône-Alpes urban structure and second city of France, currently has an incomplete role. The city planners realize the tenuous position of Lyon and of its inequality with the top tier of European non-capital cities. Infrastructurally, Lyon's planners understand that there are serious problems that need to be addressed. The weaknesses in the hotel and conference industry, financial services, image and other criteria of international status are described and addressed. After this final descriptive chapter, the LYON 2010 plan proceeds to state the specific actions that Lyon plans to take during the next twenty years to improve its position and address its major problems.

The third chapter is entitled "L'ambition pour Lyon: Une Métropole Européenne, une ville agréable á vivre." The title sums up succinctly the salient points of this third and briefest chapter. Lyon wishes to become a leading European Metropole while maintaining the pleasant quality of life that the inhabitants of Lyon currently enjoy. To achieve the first of these ambitions Lyon has decided that it must find a specific niche within the European urban hierarchy that it alone occupies. A defining identity or image is what is needed for Lyon.

This point is well taken; however, the suggested niches of Noeud de Communication, Pôle d'Excellence or Poids Économique are vague and ill-defined, not to mention that every potential "Eurocity" is striving to fill the same niche. This defeats the entire purpose presented. Lyon will be no closer to establishing a personal image or personality if it pursues the same niches as every other European agglomeration. Lyon needs these attributes to compete on a European scale but they fail to define the city or provide a motive for others to choose Lyon over another European scale city.

Secondly, Lyon realizes that it must become the accepted and functional capital of the Rhône-Alpes Région. If Lyon were able to bring the other regional agglomerations into a cooperative orbit (unlike the competitive/dependant orbit of Paris) a "critical mass" could be achieved that Lyon can never hope to duplicate alone.

Aside from the obvious enhancements of the quality of life (métro, new parking facilities, parks, etc) Lyon is determined not to become a city advancing at two speeds: one sprinting towards the goal of being an European Métropôle and the other caught in a slow dance of poverty. The concept of such a "Métropôle Equilibrée" is admirable. However, considering the current trend world-wide of an increasing gulf between peoples resulting from economics, education, communication and other socio-economic factors, a twin track growth will be difficult to avoid. For example, the métro line to Les Minguettes, a deprived peripheral suburb, was postponed (Tuppen, 1988) until the State included its completion in the current City-State contract (Le Progrès, 5-3-1991). It will be equally difficult to prevent this split from occurring spatially, specifically along the east-west fault line that we have already discussed. Unfortunately, Lyon must realize that difficult decisions due to financial constraints will have to be faced. This will strain the best laid plans concerning social equality.

The second section entitled "Les Orientations du Project de l'Agglomération" is split into two chapters. Chapter Four has already been examined in the opening chapter of this thesis, ("Une Stratégie Internationale pour Lyon"). Chapter Five: "Les Politiques Prioritaires de Dévelopement" is by far the largest and most significant chapter in the context of the Soldatos model. The priorities of developing Lyon in a political context over the next twenty years are set forward. This illustrates exactly what Lyon will commit to improve upon over the duration of the LYON 2010 plan to meet its objectives. The spatial application of these political objectives will be pursued in the following two chapters of the LYON 2010 plan. This chapter is divided into thirteen subcategories, each a major political objective. These thirteen subcategories are as follows:

1. Economic Development
2. University and Research Networks
3. Urban Transport Systems
4. Energy Transport
5. Electronic Communication
6. Housing and Social Life
7. Culture
8. Tourism
9. Commercial Services and Equipment
10. Sport and Leisure
11. Countryside and Natural Spaces Management
12. Agricultural Land: Economic and Environmental
13. Active Political Management of Risks, Problems, and Natural Resources

It is clear, and no surprise, that these thirteen political priorities touch upon almost every major aspect of urban management and are nearly identical with those points presented by Soldatos. These points are examined in detail throughout this thesis and it will therefore only be noted here that Lyon does in fact have a comprehensive political objective goal for the areas stated. This fulfils one of the main priorities of the Soldatos model of what an "International City" must possess. It also is an example of the French Government's desire that all major agglomerations have a comprehensive fifteen year strategy. The effectiveness and/or competence of these political priorities is not as immediately important as the fact that these objects exist on paper in an official planning document passed by the COURLY.

The third section of LYON 2010, "Le Parti d'Aménagement" is subdivided into two chapters. Chapter Six is entitled "Les Principes Généraux du Parti d'Aménagement". This chapter discusses the strategy of applying the political priorities to spatial action. In brief, this chapter discusses every possible way in which Lyon can maximize its advantageous position as a European crossroads. Chapter Seven, "Application aux Differents Territoires des Principes Généraux du Parti d'Aménagement" reveals the six privileged sites in the Lyon Agglomeration that will receive the benefit of major specific projects. These are:

1. Le Centre Ville
2. Le Plaine de l'Est
3. Les Plateaux et Coteaux Ouest
4. Le Rhône Amont
5. Le Rhône Aval et Plateau Sud-Est
6. Le Val de Saône

These areas are dealt with in detail as the spatial priorities of Lyon. The political decisions are to be primarily implemented in these locations. Therefore, Lyon has a master political game-plan with the exact locations where it will execute these ambitions.

The eighth and final chapter is "Les voies et les moyens de mise en oeuvre du Schéma Directeur". This chapter discusses the implementation of the political priorities upon the chosen spatial locales. An example of this would be the major redevelopment project being undertaken at Gerland (Chapter Six). This addresses the question of what specific actions need to be taken to achieve a goal at a particular site? These projects provide concrete results and can be monitored and quantified in a manner that is imposible with changing perceptions and human/economic flows. When these physical projects are completed, they will drastically improve the infrastructure of Lyon. The difficult problem remains the ability of the political and industrial leaders to devolve any true financial and political power from Paris and establish an integrated Rhône-Alpes Région within Europe.

This project was not an overnight event. It was begun in 1985 as a revision by S.E.P.A.L. of an older SDAU urban plan for Lyon. This project passed through many forms and titles before its completion and debut in the spring of 1990. This five year plus project included the participation of numerous official organizations and private consultations including a battalion of academics, leaders of industry and commerce, and numerous other relevant institutions. This was a long debated meticulously-prepared plan that qualifies under Soldatos' criteria in every sense of the concept of promoting conscious long-term urban planning which links both the public and private sectors.

4.44 THE "NICE" REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS

As discussed in Chapter One, Panayotis Soldatos has established a research group to study the "New International Cities Era" (NICE). One of the cities studied in this project is Lyon. A team of researchers from l'Institut d'Urbanisme, l'Université Lumière Lyon II, la Laboratoire d'Économie des Transports, l'Institut de Recherche Économique, Production, Développement, and l'Université P. Mendès-France Grenoble II was assembled to produce a report for the NICE project on the "International City" status of Lyon.

Among other research done by the Lyon NICE research team, a panel of experts was consulted concerning the "International City" status of Lyon. These experts were queried on the importance of local politics in enabling a city to attain "International Status". These experts stressed a number of interesting points that need to be recognized by the political leaders of Lyon. The first point was that the city, not the region, had the responsibility to act and create a positive image. Lyon can not expect to use the successful image of the Rhône-Alpes Région as a replacement for its own lack of a positive image. Lyon, the city, is responsible for crafting its own image and plan of action.

This inability of the Rhône-Alpes Région's image to be transferred to Lyon, according to these experts, provides a mixed blessing for Lyon. An advantage to this theory is that the city must pursue a vigorous agenda to establish its own credentials instead of relying upon the region's. The disadvantage is that the Rhône-Alpes Région has a substantially superior image and sense of internationality than does Lyon, especially around the agglomerations of Geneva and Grenoble (Kukawka, 1989). Lyon will doubtless continue in its effort to unite the region under the influence of Lyon but these experts are in agreement that Lyon, not the region, must present the vision and image of internationality needed to achieve its stated objective; to become an international "Eurocity". However, it is clear that the optimal scenario remains a cohesive and integrated linkage between Lyon and the entire region to promote the international ambitions of both Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes.

4.5 ELECTIONS OF 1992

During the course of 1992 there were two major national political events. The first, the regional elections held on March 22, 1992, was to elect members to the 22 regional councils in France. The second, the national referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht, asked the French voters to state "Oui" if they supported the Treaty concerning closer European integration or "Non" if they opposed the Treaty. These two sets of elections proved quite volatile, sparking national debates on important and emotional issues. The high voter participation rate was reflective of the popular interest in these issues.

4.51 REGIONAL ELECTIONS

Within the context of Lyon as a European or "International City", the regional elections of March 22, 1992 proved disappointing in that this issue was conspicuously absent. The political leaders of Lyon along with the regional authorities consistently stress the importance of "Europe" to the further development of Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région, however, this topic was never raised as a campaign issue during the regional elections.

This regional election, to establish the 156 members of the Rhône-Alpes Régional Assembly, might well have been expected to focus on issues of importance to the region's future; closer institutional links with the European Community and other major European regions, the importance of expanding intra-regional cooperation, the status of major infrastructural projects, redefining the region's relationship with Paris and other French regions or examining and debating long range regional strategy such as the S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010 plan. However, these topics of profound interest to the political leaders of both Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région during normal operating conditions were invisible issues during the regional election campaign

The regional election campaign was dominated by national political issues. The dominant issues in this election were immigration and the increasing strength of the Front National (F.N., an extreme right political party headed by Jean-Marie Le Pen), unemployment, the rise of the environmental parties and the increasing unpopularity of the governing Parti Socialiste (P.S.). Underlying these issues was a strong anti-government attitude by the French populace as a whole. These national issues led to a much larger campaign than had been anticipated and much higher voter turnout than predicted. Voter participation was 68.71% in the 1992 regional elections as opposed to the regional elections of 1986 where barely 50% of the voters cast a ballot.

The regional elections of March 22, 1992 were essentially a national campaign fought over the few major issues stated. This election was a preview of the national legislative election of March 1993. A closer examination of certain voting trends and exit polls will illustrate a complete lack of regional focus in this campaign. Regional issues that regional leaders discuss and prioritise during the rest of the year have absolutely no interest or consequence to local voters during an election.

The results of these regional elections were dramatic. There were major electoral shifts as compared with the regional elections of

FIGURE 4.2
COMPOSITION OF THE RHONE-ALPES REGIONAL ASSEMBLY AFTER THE 1986 ELECTIONS



Source: Le Monde Rhône-Alpes March 23, 1992

FIGURE 4.3
COMPOSITION OF THE RHONE-ALPES REGIONAL ASSEMBLY AFTER THE 1992 ELECTIONS



Source: Le Monde Rhône-Alpes March 23, 1992

1986. The composition of the Rhône-Alpes Régional Assembly has been greatly altered (Figures 4.2 & 4.3). The largest party in the new Regional Assembly is La Union Pour la France (U.P.F). headed by the past president of the Regional Assembly, Charles Millon (U.D.F.-P.R.). The U.P.F. is a coalition of the three major centre-right parties in the Rhône-Alpes Région; La Union de Défense de la France (U.D.F.), La Rassemblement Pour la Républic (R.P.R.) and the Lyon based La Nouvelle Démocracie (N.D.) headed by Michel Noir. These three parties were proportionally represented on the U.P.F. list and will collaborate (in theory) as the major party of the new Regional Assembly. However, this centre-right governing coalition lost 7 seats from its total in the previous Regional Assembly reflecting the overall decline of the mainstream political parties during this election. With 65 seats in the new Regional Assembly the U.P.F. falls far short of the 79 votes needed for an absolute majority. Various compromises and coalitions with other parties, notably the environmental parties, will be needed if any meaningful business is to be conducted.

Le Parti Socialiste (P.S.) lost substantial ground in the Rhône-Alpes Région, and in France as a whole. The Rhône-Alpes list, headed by Gilbert Chabroux, Mayor of Villeurbanne, lost 12 seats in the Regional Assembly dropping from 39 seats in the previous Regional Assembly to 27 in the current Regional Assembly. This was indicative of the collapse throughout France of popular support for the P.S. Nationally, the party of President Mitterrand attracted a mere 16.42% of the vote, its lowest total since its creation at Epinay in 1961. This was a forceful statement of the unpopularity of the government and of politicians in general. This turn around currently leaves the P.S. as the third largest party in the Rhône-Alpes Régional Assembly behind both the U.P.F. and the F.N. Also of note on the left was the continued decline of Le Parti Communiste Français (P.C.F.) which lost two seats (13 to 11) in the Regional Assembly.

The older more established mainstream political parties all registered losses in these regional elections, particularly evident in the huge decline of the P.S. This is reflective of the general anger and distrust of the populace of politicians and the political process. An exit poll of 4,000 voters compiled by Ifop-Europe 1-Le Figaro during the regional elections showed that 47% of the respondents did not have confidence in their politicians (Table 4.3). These percentages were even higher (56%-67%) among those who voted for non-traditional parties (N.B. Non-traditional parties include the F.N., Les Verts and La Génération Écologie). This large number of dissatisfied voters were attracted in large numbers to these non-traditional parties as the final election counts indicated.

Table 4.3
Voter lack of confidence

Question: Generally speaking, are you confident or not that French politicians can solve the problems of the country?

	Total	PCF	PS/ DVG	GE	VERT	RPR/ UDF	FN
Yes, I have confidence	33%	31	56	29	20	36	15
No, I don't have confidence	47%	48	24	56	63	43	67
No comment	20%	21	20	15	17	21	18

Question: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy in France?

	Total	PCF	PS/ DVG	GE	VERT	RPR/ UDF	FN
Satisfied	33%	30	57	49	37	28	11
Dissatisfied	49%	56	25	39	49	52	73
No comment	18%	14	18	12	14	20	16

Source: Ifop-Europe 1-Le Figaro, 23 Mars, 1992.

Not only are the French voters lacking confidence in their politicians but they are dissatisfied with the functions of democracy in France (Table 4.3). Of the voters questioned in this same Ifop-Europe 1-Le Figaro exit poll, 49% stated that they were not satisfied with the functions of democracy in France while a mere 33% expressed satisfaction. The dissatisfaction of the French electorate transcends a lack of faith in politicians (no trivial matter) but calls into question the fundamental manner in which democracy functions in France. This is indeed a serious issue which is particularly documented by the 73% of F.N. supporters who registered dissatisfaction with the functions of democracy. This is a powerful vein of political malcontent that has been exposed and effectively exploited by the F.N.

The substantial gains of these three non-traditional parties needs to be explained in greater detail to understand why local and regional issues were viewed as wholly irrelevant during this campaign. Nationwide, as well as in the Rhône-Alpes Région, the F.N. and the two environmental parties made the largest gains. Nationwide the F.N. polled 14% of the vote and the two environmental parties split 15% of the vote. This 29% of the national vote represents a significant number of voters who are prepared to abandon mainstream political parties to support essentially single issue parties: immigration and the environment respectively.

In the Rhône-Alpes, the F.N. polled better than the party did on the national level. Led by Bruno Gollinisch, the European Member of Parliament for the Rhône Département, the F.N. Rhône-Alpes managed to become, arguably, the largest party in the Rhône Département. This includes most of the Lyon agglomeration. In the Rhône Département the F.N. won 20.87% of the vote which placed it well ahead of the P.S. (12.93%) and behind only the centre-right U.P.F. coalition of three parties that polled a combined 33.05% of the vote. This strong showing included a number of outright victories in the blue collar suburbs of the south and south-east including Saint-Priest (F.N.-31.22%), Vaulx-en-Velin (F.N.-30.95%), Vénissieux (F.N.-24.54%) and a virtual draw with the P.S. (23.79%) and U.P.F. (22.97%) in Villeurbanne (F.N.-22.35%). These working suburbs of Lyon, with a heavy immigrant population, high unemployment and low living standards were fertile ground for the F.N. to capitalize with its anti-foreigner, anti-Europe message. Even in Lyon proper, the F.N. placed second behind the U.P.F. with 20.21% of the vote.

The success of the F.N. in this regional election was the dominating topic both before and after the vote. The F.N. linked immigration with unemployment thereby mixing the two most volatile issues in France. Except for the two environmental parties, which will be discussed next, both the P.S. and the centre-right coalition defined their campaigns around their position vis-à-vis the F.N. The P.S. alleged that the centre-right would cooperate with the F.N. once in power and that the P.S. was the only party capable of defending France from the evils of the F.N. The centre-right campaigned on a platform of no cooperation with the F.N. linked with a threat that only the centre right could hope to hold the F.N. at bay (The centre-right also incorporated its own veiled anti-foreigner bias into the campaign to attract F.N. supporters).

Having the F.N. dictate the tone and agenda of the campaign not only gave the F.N. a huge amount of publicity but narrowed considerably the focus of the campaign. The F.N. is opposed to greater European integration which led the other parties to ignore the whole question of Europe for fear of further alienating an already disgruntled populace. The issue of European integration is also one that provokes a hostile response among rural and blue collar voters whose support the mainstream parties deemed crucial if they were going to avert an election day disaster. The whole issue of European integration, regional linkages and other grand multi-national plans were therefore completely absent from the political debate during the regional elections.

The other non-traditional political movement that made significant gains was the environmentalists. This movement is divided, almost equally, between Les Verts and La Génération Écologie (G.E).. Between them, these two environmental parties won 14.37% of the national vote. This represents the third largest national political party if the voting totals of these similar single issue party's are combined. This places the environmentalists a mere 2% (16,42% vs. 14.37%) behind the P.S. The gains produced by the environmentalists were also substantially greater than those registered by the F.N. regardless of the medias focus on the F.N. The F.N. nationwide gained 4% of the vote over the 1986 regional elections. The environmentalists increased their share of the electorate from 2.6% in the 1986 regional elections to 14.37% during the 1992 regional election. This provides another indication of the dissatisfaction among many French voters with the mainstream political parties.

In the Rhône-Alpes Régional Assembly the environmentalists transformed their electoral success into 21 seats. After the 1986 regional elections they held a single seat on the Regional Assembly. This represents enough seats to provide a voting majority along with the U.P.F. thus giving the environmentalists tremendous influence. This 19 seat gain is the largest in the Rhône-Alpes Regional Assembly though the 17 seat gain produced by the F.N. is similarly striking. These two non-traditional parties were able to transform their popularity into seats in the Regional Assembly because the regional elections were determined by Proportional Representation. However, the national Elections of March 1993 were not determined by Proportional Representation and neither the F.N. nor the environmental parties won a single seat in the National Assembly.

With the main focus of this regional election being the dissatisfaction of the French voters and the rise of non-traditional political parties, the issues and questions that actually concern the Rhône-Alpes Région and discussions of "Europe" were virtually ignored. In Lyon, Le Parti Libéral Européen was all but ignored and gained only 1% of the vote. An Ifop-Europe 1-Le Figaro exit poll on the day of the regional elections asked the voter to choose the two problems on this list that most influenced their vote. The results (Table 4.4) show a preoccupation with internal national affairs though it must be noted that no regional issue questions were included in the exit poll (Is this symbolic of the dominance of national issues during the regional elections or just another Parisian oversight?)

Only 8% of the 4,000 voters polled listed the construction of Europe as one of their two major priorities during the election. The highest support for the construction of Europe, 11% each, was from the two major mainstream political parties, the P.S. and the centre-right coalition. The non-traditional political parties showed negligible interest in the concept of Europe. Among the problems of concern to the voters, only the position of France in the world (8%) and Insecurity (7%, but 22% by F.N. voters) ranked as low on the voter priority scale as did the construction of Europe.

Table 4.4
Voter's concerns

Question: Of the following problems, which are the two that most influenced your vote during today's régional elections?

	Total	PCF	PS/ DVG	GE	VERT	RPR/ UDF	FN
Protecting the environment	21%	8	18	69	68	10	6
Level of purchasing power	13%	25	12	6	8	15	7
Immigration	15%	2	5	3	4	11	60
Education	15%	16	19	11	9	18	5
Social inequalities	12%	31	19	7	12	7	8
Unemployment	24%	35	29	15	14	25	22
The construction of "Europe"	8%	1	11	9	7	11	2
Insecurity	7%	5	3	3	1	8	22
The rise of the extreme right	14%	25	25	20	19	9	--
Government scandals	41%	33	35	34	36	46	41
The place of France in the world	8%	2	7	5	6	13	6
No comment	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Source: Ifop-Europe 1-Le Figaro, 23 Mars, 1992.

The most important issue to the voters (41%) was the political scandals and affairs that have rocked French politics recently; another clear indication of widespread voter dissatisfaction with politicians. This issue commanded tremendous attention from all political parties and cut across all party lines. Unemployment, a perennial concern to French voters, was the second most significant (24%) problem in the mind of the French voter.

The specialised issues, or those clearly represented by a single issue party, also ranked highly due to their overwhelming specialised support. The problem of protecting the environment was extremely significant to those voting for the environmental parties (69% and 68% respectively). Not surprisingly, 60% of the followers of the F.N. listed immigration as a major problem thus elevating its overall status in the survey.

Such issues as education, spending power, social equality and the rise of the extreme right concerned the average voter to a much greater extent than did the construction of Europe or any other regional issue. Within the Rhône-Alpes, the construction of Europe, regional linkages, infrastructural projects and other major stated ambitions that will consume the time of the Regional Assembly were entirely ignored. One could make an argument that this is yet another example of the domination of Paris over the regions; even regional elections are overshadowed by national issues from the capital.

The 1992 regional elections were dominated by the increasing popularity of the F.N., the environmental parties and national issues that were later rehashed during the national legislative elections of March 1993. It is unfortunate that the local and regional voters were unable to voice an opinion as to what course the agenda of their Regional Assembly will take over the next six years. Nor is it clear that the elections have produced a Regional Assembly with a priority commitment to regional affairs. Having been elected on the basis of national issues, the new regional councillors have stated no specific regional agenda. This could prove detrimental to the progress of the Rhône-Alpes over the next six years.

4.52 NATIONAL REFERENDUM ON MAASTRICHT

The second major political event in France in 1992 was the national referendum on the Maastricht Treaty for greater European integration. The French voters were asked to vote "Oui" or "Non" on whether France should ratify the Maastricht Treaty. This turned out to be a much closer referendum than anticipated by the government and led to an aggressive campaign by both sides and a 70% voter turnout. In the context of Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes, this referendum provided an excellent opportunity to examine the region's support for the concept of "Europe". Lyon's political leaders argued that the city's future is dependent upon closer integration with Europe; this referendum provided a unique opportunity to determine whether the people of Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région agreed with the leaders of local government on this issue.

Other major political factors became significant during the referendum campaign: would people vote against the Treaty in the hope that President Mitterrand would resign as did President DeGaulle in 1969? Would the farmers and unemployed fear the effects of greater European integration? Would the call of the F.N. to reject the Treaty for nationalistic reasons sway many voters? However, the vote essentially remained grounded in the issue of closer European integration. In Lyon, the local authorities actively campaigned for approval of the referendum on the grounds that Lyon was a "Eurocity" and that it was critical to the city's future that the referendum be passed. A brief examination of the national results is needed before a more detailed examination can be conducted of the results at both the regional level and within the Lyon agglomeration.

Nationally, the Maastricht referendum passed by a narrow margin with 51.04% of the vote in favour of the referendum and 48.95% of the vote opposed with a higher than expected 70% voter participation rate. This is not an overwhelming endorsement of the Maastricht Treaty by the French and reflected deep divisions within the population. Regions with above average unemployment voted overwhelmingly against the Treaty as did rural France. The Treaty won its broadest support from white collar workers and the residents of the major urban agglomerations.

Politically, there were distinct voting trends visible among the major national parties. The parties in the middle of the political spectrum provided strong support for the Treaty while those parties on both the far left and the far right voted overwhelmingly against the Treaty. An exit poll conducted by Le Point of 1531 voters gives a broad perspective of the voting habits of the larger parties (Table 4.5). The P.S. (82% support) and U.D.F. (64% support) strongly supported the Treaty, reflecting the mainstream view that closer European integration was beneficial to France. On the extremes, both the P.C.F. (76% against) and the F.N. (87% against) were vehemently opposed to the Treaty for reasons of unemployment and nationalism respectively. As with the regional elections of March 1992, these two highly charged issues were quite visible during the referendum campaign and served as an effective rallying point against the Treaty.

Table 4.5
Voting trends of the major French political parties
on the referendum of September 20, 1992.

OUI		NON
24%	P.C.F.	76%
82%	P.S.	18%
68%	G.E.	32%
50%	VERTS	50%
64%	U.D.F.	36%
42%	R.P.R.	58%
13%	F.N.	87%

Source: Le Point, 19 Septembre-1992, No. 1044.

On the regional level, Rhône-Alpes was one of only nine regions that voted in support of the Treaty while thirteen regions opposed. This is one indication of the support that the voters of Rhône-Alpes have towards the concept of a closer integration between themselves and Europe. Rhône-Alpes voted 54.42% in favour of the Treaty and 45.57% opposed. This was one of the strongest regional results in favour of the Treaty in all of France. Upon closer examination of voter returns, of the eight départements in the region only Drôme, a predominantly rural département, voted against the Treaty (50.45% against).

Table 4.6

Urban support for the referendum within the Rhône-Alpes

AGGLOMERATION	OUI	NON
LYON	60.20%	39.80%
GRENOBLE	63.44%	36.56%
ST. ETIENNE	54.06%	45.94%
CHAMBÉRY	58.73%	41.27%
ANNECY	64.46%	35.54%
VIENNE	56.12%	43.88%

Source: Lyon Libération, 21 Septembre, 1992.

The Département of Rhône voted strongly in support of the Treaty with 55.91% of the vote as "Oui". Within the city of Lyon the figures were even more in favour of European integration, as they were in all major cities in the region (Table 4.6) The blue collar suburbs typified by Venissieux and Vaulx-En-Velin were exceptions to this voting trend as is to be expected from areas that strongly support the P.C.F. and the F.N. On the whole, these numbers illustrate the level of popular support attached to the concept of Europe within Lyon and the other major agglomerations of the Rhône-Alpes Région. The desire by Lyon's leaders to build for Lyon a greater European role is to some degree shared by the general population. An overwhelming defeat of the referendum on closer European integration by the residents of Lyon would have severely damaged the credibility of local leaders and seriously inhibited the city's many future plans to increase its links with Europe.

This level of support among the populace is critical to Lyon if it wishes to become a "Eurocity". This popular support is another of the criteria in the Soldatos model of an "International City". Soldatos argues that it is vital that a city not only have political leaders with the vision and will-power to promote and develop an "International City" but the populace must also be aware and supportive of the overall concept and the specifics needed to achieve that goal.

4.6 SUMMARY

The political situation in Lyon in the context of the agglomeration's international ambitions is, not surprisingly, confused. The problems are rooted in two specific aspects of the French political system. The first problem is the large range of official and semi-official administrative and planning units that control a certain spatial area or mandate that is related to Lyon's overall international plan. The overlapping responsibilities, political fiefdoms and habitual maze of regulators all with a specific agenda make it difficult to formulate a coherent and effective policy to promote Lyon's international ambitions.

The second historical political problem in France that affects the authority of Lyon to pursue its international agenda is the centrism of the French State. The concentration of political power and decision-making power in Paris and the national government places Lyon in a dependent situation, unable to take effective decisions regarding its future without being effected by Paris. The resolution of these two fundamental problems would require a major overhaul of the French political system that would decentralize numerous responsibilities to the local level while establishing the agglomeration as a political unit with substantial administrative powers. In the short to medium-term, this appears unrealistic. Lyon must continue to pursue its international agenda within the limiting confines of the French political system.

Within the context of the Soldatos model of an "International City", Lyon has succeeded in fulfiling the basic requirements. Lyon, through COURLY, has established a greater degree of political cooperation within the agglomeration than most other French agglomerations. This is especially relevant because of the failure by

Grenoble and St. Etienne to establish a similar political structure. COURLY, and its extension, the RUL, enable the Lyon agglomeration to plot a relatively cohesive urban strategy within the wider agglomeration which is mandatory for Lyon to effectively pursue its international ambitions.

Lyon has also effectively established semi-official agencies whose mandate is to promote Lyon's international agenda. The C.C.I.L. and its international promotional arm, ADERLY, have succeeded in effectively managing and promoting Lyon's economic growth and image both in the Lyon area and abroad. This fulfils the requirement in the Soldatos model that stipulates that a city must possess such organizational and promotional agencies to achieve true international status.

Additionally, Lyon can justifiably claim the support of the majority of the population in its attempts at internationalizing the agglomeration. The support of the local business leaders towards Lyon's international ambitions is critical for financial and promotional support. The strong local support for the Maastricht Treaty is another indication that the populace as a whole broadly supports the agenda to promote Lyon as an "Eurocity".

Politically, Lyon is successfully pursuing its international ambitions within the constricting parameters of the French political system. Lyon has met the political objectives stated in the Soldatos model to a significant degree and is successfully pursuing an international agenda.

PART TWO
THE FACILITATORS OF EUROPEAN STATUS

The potential of Lyon to interact in a trans-frontier manner is a function of spontaneous and structured factors. Spontaneous factors might include, for example, research collaboration and student exchanges with European Universities. This may emanate from European Community programs, but the initiative rests with individuals and their institutions to respond in a spontaneous manner. At the other extreme, the opening of new air links is based on hard commercial decisions within the structured context of prevailing route licensing arrangements. Whether spontaneous or structured, it may be argued that for Lyon to achieve a greater European role, certain "facilitators" must exist, whether they be human, financial, corporate, or physical (in the sense of fixed infrastructure). This section seeks to explore the "facilitators" that may promote a greater European role for Lyon, their strengths and weaknesses.

The strategic plan, LYON 2010, can only be regarded as a political policy statement if its aspirations are underpinned by facilitating mechanisms. By far the most obvious manifestation of trans-national inter-action is the transport infrastructure (including telecommunication). This, in the broadest sense, includes the capacity to interchange people, goods and information across European frontiers. This chapter thus commences by analyzing the logistical capacity of the transportation infrastructure focusing on and radiating from Lyon. In particular the question must be answered as to whether Lyon is simply a well positioned crossroads or whether it has a function as a European node: a place of transit or a point of origin and destination. Historically Lyon has acted as a crossroads for road and rail routes, but the technology of these modes of transport has evolved rapidly; motorways and high speed trains have transformed surface travel arguably to a greater degree than has occurred in air travel.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE

Transportation is one of the critical functions of modern society. Every study conducted to rank cities in some hierarchical order stresses the spatial location and transportation infrastructure of the city in question. The ability of a city to handle large amounts of goods and people is one of the most important indicators in both the Soldatos and the DATAR/RECLUS models. The accessibility of a city by route, rail, air and water is a prime determinant of the attractiveness of a city and its ability to function as a major international centre.

At a European Community sponsored conference in October, 1991, representatives from 30 European countries discussed the future of European transport. The conference estimated that route traffic could increase by 40% over the next 10 years. Some routes servicing the recently restructured Eastern Europe could see an increase of 1,000% over the same period. The conference called for a policy to integrate all forms of transportation (road, rail, river and air) within Europe and to study the environmental impact of such expansion (International Herald Tribune, 1-11-1991). Effectively handling the increased pressure on the transport infrastructure and intelligently planning for the future will be one criteria that separates the dynamic "Eurocities" from the passive cities. A close study of Lyon's current infrastructure and the projects either under construction or being planned over the next twenty years will offer a good indication of the future position of Lyon within a more integrated European transport network (Plassard, 1989).

5.1 THE AUTOROUTE SYSTEM

France currently operates 8,590 kilometres of autoroute and has committed to build a further 2,740 kilometres of autoroute by the end of the century (Bernadet, 1988). This, along with the Spanish national plan for the nineties, is the most ambitious autoroute building project in the European Community. Currently the Rhône-Alpes Région has 903 kilometres of autoroutes which represents 10.5% of the national total (Figure 5.1). This leaves the region as one of the better served in

FIGURE 5.1
AUTOROUTE SYSTEM OF THE
RHONE-ALPES



France with 170 kilometres of autoroute per million inhabitants. The new national autoroute plan calls for an additional 504 kilometres of autoroutes to be constructed in the region. This represents 18.4% of all new autoroute construction in France and will give the region 270 kilometres of autoroute per million inhabitants (Chassande1991). This ratio is quite high by French standards and is a definite addition to the region's physical transportation infrastructure.

More than with any other form of transport, the favourable geographic position of Lyon assures the city a substantial amount of international route traffic. Examination of international freight traffic via road reveals that over 7.4 million tons of exports and 9.45 million tons of imports are trucked in the region annually (Repères et Tendances Économiques, Janvier 1991). Table 5.1 shows the major distribution of trucked imports and exports concerning the Rhône-Alpes and the rest of the European Community. Italy and Germany are the major trading partners of the Rhône-Alpes Région and this is reflected in the truck traffic numbers.

TABLE 5.1
Flows of Truck Traffic in the Rhône-Alpes Région, 1989

Country	Export Tons	Import Tons
Italy	2,297,000	1,762,000
Germany	971,000	1,256,000
United Kingdom	380,000	556,000
Netherlands	207,000	419,000
Spain	302,000	386,000
Total	7,418,341	9,449,378

Domestic truck traffic tonnage entering the region - 18,096,793
Domestic truck traffic tonnage leaving the region - 18,319,612
Total tonnage of internal circulation in the region - 134,366,543

Source: Directeur Regionale de l'Equipement Rhône-Alpes, 1991.

Through the two tunnels of Mont Blanc and Fréjus that link the Rhône-Alpes with Italy, 40% of the traffic is heavy truck traffic and these numbers are increasing annually. In 1985, 714 trucks used the Fréjus Tunnel on a daily basis, adding up to 260,000 trucks per year. In 1990, 1,480 trucks per day, or 540,084 truck per year used the Fréjus Tunnel. This represents a 21% increase in annual truck traffic through the Fréjus Tunnel. The Mont Blanc Tunnel recorded a more modest 12% annual increase over this same period but handles more total traffic. In 1990, 2,130 trucks per day, or 777,426 trucks per year passed through the Mont Blanc Tunnel. Total traffic through the Mont Blanc Tunnel in 1990 was 1,895,061 vehicles (Directeur Regionale de l'Equipement Rhône-Alpes, 1991.). These two tunnels are reaching saturation point, causing long traffic delays and heavy pressure upon local resources and the environment.

National truck transport numbers are even larger. Over 18 million tons of goods were trucked in or out of the region in 1989. A further 134 million tons were shipped by truck within the region. Domestically, Rhône-Alpes' major regional trading partners are, in order, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, Ile-de-France, and Nord-Pas-de-Calais (Tableaux de l'Économie Rhône-Alpes, 1991). All three of these regions utilize the major north-south autoroute passages that are currently so crowded. On the A43, 25% of all traffic is heavy trucks. On the A6-A7 through central Lyon 9% of all traffic consists of heavy trucks and these numbers are increasing. Adding to Lyon's traffic congestion is the additional 82,000 heavy trucks that circulate within the city on a daily basis (Rhône-Alpes dans l'espace européen, No 1, Octobre 1990). This amount of truck traffic in and around Lyon is potentially paralysing.

There are two forms of traffic that Lyon must handle. The first is local traffic. An estimated 1.5 million cars per day circulate in Lyon. The second is transit traffic; those vehicles that are just passing through the city. It is estimated that 300,000 cars per day pass through Lyon (Morelon, 1989). The main explanation for this high volume of traffic is that currently, the A6-A7 autoroute is the only north-south autoroute linkage through Eastern France. The majority of all autoroute traffic that travels from Northern Europe to Southern

Europe passes through Lyon, literally through the middle of the city. Since the eastern by-pass was recently opened in April 1993, this will help reduce traffic congestion in central Lyon and the Fourvière Tunnel. The Fourvière tunnel is infamous for its lengthy traffic jams at all hours of the day and night. This is not surprising considering that 100,000 cars per day passed through the Fourvière Tunnel in 1988, with another 72,000 cars per day using the Croix-Rouge Tunnel (Morelon, 1989).

The Rhône corridor autoroute has reached saturation levels and the French national autoroute plan is a direct reflection of this fact. Outside the Rhône-Alpes Région, the A9 autoroute (to follow the route of RN9) is planned to run north-south between Clermont-Ferrand and the A9 east of Beziers. This, in conjunction with the current A71 autoroute between Clermont-Ferrand and Orléans, will complete a badly needed north-south autoroute connection between the Paris Basin and the Mediterranean coast (Bethemont, 1990). The planned expansion of the N20 from Vierzon to Toulouse through Limoges to a four lane autoroute will also help spread the north-south traffic in France and facilitate intra-urban connections. These additions will help reduce the traffic pressure on Lyon, especially during the peak travel seasons.

In the Lyon area itself a number of autoroute projects are planned or under construction. The A6 through the Saône Valley and the A7 down the Rhône Valley are being widened from two lanes to three in each direction. The eastern by-pass is a new autoroute comprised of three sections. The A46 North is a 25 kilometre stretch of autoroute that links the A6 with the A42 to the north of Lyon. The second section, the former CD300, is a 15 kilometre autoroute link between the A42 and the A43 to the east of Lyon. The final section, the A46 South, opened in April 1993, completes the eastern by-pass with a 22 kilometre autoroute link between the A43 and the A7 to the south of Lyon at the intersection of the A46 to St. Etienne (Bethemont, 1990). This 62 kilometre eastern by-pass is intended to ease both the local and transit traffic that currently passes through central Lyon.

Lyon-Satolas International Airport now has direct autoroute access from the north with the A46 now connected with the A42. This will greatly improve access to Lyon-Satolas for those people in the north of the region, particularly those living in Ain and the Savoyard Départements (Rhône-Alpes dans l'espace européen, No 1, Octobre 1990). This will also provide these areas access to the TGV without having to access central Lyon when the TGV station at Lyon-Satolas opens in 1993. The A46 not only opens the transport hub at Lyon-Satolas to the northern half of the region but will also provide another north-south autoroute link through the area that by-passes Lyon. Lyon-Satolas is also directly connected with the A43 autoroute to the south of the airport. The completion of these autoroute connections to Lyon-Satolas ensures that the airport is easily accessible to the whole region.

The one project that is conspicuous by its absence is the long awaited western by-pass around Lyon. There is universal agreement that the western by-pass is badly needed but nobody wants this autoroute running through their community. The western by-pass does not yet have an agreed route and no construction has begun. One could not even hazard a completion date at this moment. This is unfortunate in planning terms for the western by-pass is the logical route to handle the north-south transit traffic, being shorter and more direct than the eastern by-pass.

Looking at the rest of the Rhône-Alpes Région a number of other important autoroute projects are either recently finished or under construction. The completion of the A40 from Maçon to the Mont Blanc Tunnel and the completion of the autoroute project to link the six major agglomerations in the region and Geneva has greatly improved intra-regional transport and reduced the time/distance relationship between these agglomerations.

The completion of these new autoroute projects will make the Rhône-Alpes one of the best served region's in France. The recently completed A49 project links Grenoble (on the A48) and Valence (on the A7). This will not only serve to link these two regional agglomeration's but will enable travellers from the south to by-pass completely the Lyon urban area on the way to the Alps (Chassande, 1991). Additionally, the proposed extension of the A51 from Grenoble to Aix-en-Provence would connect and facilitate access to the major tourist areas of France; the Alps, Provence and the Côte d'Azur. This autoroute would also ease traffic considerably on the saturated A7 through the Rhône Valley. The A51 is complete from Aix-en-Provence to Manosque and is under construction between Manosque and Sisteron. Construction on the Grenoble to Sisteron section is expected to begin in 1994 (Bethemont, 1990). This, another north-south autoroute that by-passes the Lyon area, promises to be well travelled because of the attractiveness of the route. Whether this will ease traffic around Lyon or merely succeed in overcrowding and spoiling a beautiful section of Provence, as the environmentalits argue, remains to be seen.

The extension of the A43 (Lyon-Chambéry) to reach Albertville was a direct result of the 1992 Winter Olympic Games being hosted by Albertville and the surrounding communities. After the glow of the Olympic spotlight fades, Albertville and this section of the French Alps will have a direct autoroute link to Lyon and beyond. This is advantageous to all skiers who rightfully dread the traffic congestion associated with the French Alps. This A43 extension is also projected to form the basis of enlarging the N6 to an autoroute that would connect with the Fréjus Tunnel and the Italian autostrada to Turin (Baleste, 1991). This would establish the autoroute link between Lyon and Turin which would facilitate increasing trade between these two cities, regions, and countries. This would add in solid terms to Lyon's position as a European crossroads.

The proposed autoroute from Babigny through Tarare to Anse, which will also connect via the four lane RN 82 to Roanne, will connect the A6 north of Lyon with the A72 creating a direct link with Clermont-Ferrand and eventually with Bordeaux. This will place Lyon directly on a major east-west autoroute system and provide another direct Paris-Lyon link via the A71 north from Clermont-Ferrand (Bethemont, 1990). This will enable Lyon to access West Central France and the Atlantic seaboard along with easing the Paris-Lyon traffic on the A6 autoroute.

Also under discussion is an autoroute between Bourg-en-Bresse and Dôle which would link in directly with both the A31 and the A36. These are two major trade access routes into Germany. This would connect Dôle with Valence (via the A48-A49), the Fréjus Tunnel, the Mont Blanc tunnel and eventually Southern France via the new A51. This would link Germany, Southern France, and Northern Italy through the Rhône-Alpes Région without using either the A6 or A7 nor coming within 50 kilometres of Lyon (Baleste, 1991). It would also benefit Lyon by improving its autoroute access to Germany.

Two other autoroute projects are under consideration but have yet to receive funding or approval. A proposed autoroute link between the A42 and the A43 well to the east of Lyon would serve as a useful link between the northern and southern sections of the Rhône-Alpes Région. It would, for example, allow direct autoroute passage between Bourg-en-Bresse and Grenoble. The second projected autoroute would be through the Northern Haute-Savioe. This would run south of Annemasse, through Thonon and Evian and link up with the Swiss N9 (Rhône-Alpes dans l'Espace Européen, No 1, Octobre 1990). This would complete an autoroute link around Lake Geneva and help accommodate the increasing traffic in the rapidly growing Northern Haute-Savoie.

Clearly these autoroute projects will greatly increase both Lyon's and the region's infrastructure. For Lyon the advantages are numerous. First, these new autoroutes will ease the acute traffic problems in and around the central city. Secondly, Lyon will be further established as an important east-west crossroads to complement it's already strong north-south position. Therefore, Lyon will improve it's position as a European crossroad while at the same time expanding it's intra-regional autoroute links and liberating central Lyon from the burdens of substantial amounts of through traffic. By committing to construct over 18% of all new national autoroutes in the Rhône-Alpes Région, France is clearly recognizing and encouraging the importance and needed development of Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région in a European context.

5.2 RAILWAY SYSTEMS

5.21 TGV CONNECTIONS

Lyon is in a privileged position geographically in respect to the French TGV (Train à Grande Vitesse) rail network and the future European-wide high speed train system. In September 1981 France launched it's first TGV passenger train. In 1983 the Paris-Lyon route was completed, reducing the travel time between the two cities from over four hours to two hours (Walsh, 1991). In September 1991 the TGV began direct service between Lyon and both Rennes and Nantes in Brittany (International Herald Tribune, September 30, 1991). This route runs through the major new TGV station at Massy in the southern Parisian suburbs. Massy is served by the RER and is thereby connected with the entire capital. This essentially increases the number of Paris-Lyon TGV connections as well as opening up high-speed rail access to the Brittany Region. This is the first section to be completed in the revised plan for the expansion of the French TGV network (Figure 5.2)

On May 14, 1991, a "Comité Intérministériel pour l'Aménagement du Territoire " (CIAT) chaired by then Prime Minister Michel Rocard passed final modifications on the Schéma Directeur National des Liaisons Ferroviaires à Grands Vitesse. This latest plan for the future TGV network in France replaces and updates the plan which was proposed in June 1990 (Le Progrés, 16 Mai, 1991). This ambitious expansion of the TGV network to include 16 new TGV lines will increase the TGV network by 4,700 kilometres. The price of this expansion is enormous, 210 billion francs in 1989 francs (Le Progrés, 15 Mai, 1991). The French are heavily investing in the TGV network to enable rapid transit between all areas of France, ensure that France will be an integral part of the future European high speed rail network and to promote the French TGV as the superior model of high-speed train and therefore to enjoy the cumulative economic and technological effects of being the leader in such a commercially high-tech field.

FIGURE 5.2
THE FRENCH TGV SYSTEM - 1993



One example of this positive cumulative effect is that the Texas high-speed-rail authority chose the French TGV system over the German Inter-City system for a 600 mile high-speed rail route connecting Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio. The overall value of this contract is $5.8 billion (in 1990 dollars) and is planned to be operational by 1998 (Rademaekers, 1991). This is a substantial project and is anticipated as a profitable beginning to other such cooperative and profitable international projects. The French have also won a bid from South Korea to construct a high-speed rail link from Seoul to Pusan. Though the initial investments are heavy, the various payoffs in these three areas are numerous and cannot be calculated in straight monetary terms.

Future high speed rail plans that directly affect Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région are numerous and highly significant. They include the Mediterranean TGV, which will be split into three separate projects: the TGV-Provence, a 219 kilometre section between Valence and Marseille, the TGV-Côte d'Azur, a 132 kilometre linkage between Fréjus and Aix-en-Provence, and the TGV-Languedoc-Roussillon, a 290 kilometre connection between Avignon and the Spanish border via Perpignan. The TGV-Rhin-Rhône, the TGV-Trans-Alpine and a Geneva-Chambéry spur will complete the current round of TGV additions that directly effect Lyon (Le Progrés, 16 Mai, 1991). These four projects represent a massive state financed improvement in the local infrastructure that will give a large boost to Lyon's international ambitions.

The TGV spur between Geneva and Chambéry is a mixed blessing to Lyon. The positive factors are that this spur will slightly ease rail access between Lyon and Geneva. Direct access from Geneva to the main south-east TGV line is currently in abeyance. Among the various problems is the amount of Swiss financial contribution to this project. The Swiss are not willing to contribute financially to a large scale project unless it is manifestly in their best interests. The negative effect for Lyon is that this potential Geneva-Chambéry line will further integrate the Savoyard départements of the Rhône-Alpes with Geneva. At this time, an exact route has not been established nor has the completion date been discussed. The politics of including

Geneva with a French TGV project continue to cause delays and mutual apprehension.

The Trans-Alpes TGV is a projected linkage of Lyon and Turin, through Chambéry and Suse, by high speed trains (French TGV's and Italian ETR-450's). This 261 kilometre route will reduce the overland travel time between these two cities to 1:25 hours. Running a high speed rail line through the Alps is an ambitious project (Daziano, 1991). Among other ideas, a two track 50 kilometre tunnel/corridor between St Jean-de-Maurienne and Suse is being studied. Despite the obvious physical difficulties of the task, the rail authorities and governments from both countries are politically and financially committed to this linkage. This is also viewed as the major reason why Geneva wishes to pursue a TGV spur to Chambéry. This TGV spur would link Geneva with the Trans-Alpine TGV and therefore with Turin and the rest of Italy.

The Trans-Alpes TGV is considered vital to Northern Italy. This would provide substantially easier and faster land access to France and subsequently to the rest of Northern Europe. Italy has historically been economically hampered by the difficulties of land transport over the Alps. The Trans-Alpes TGV will go a long way to solving this problem for Northern Italy. Lyon is also anxious to enjoy the advantages of being 1:25 hours from the industrial centres of Northern Italy. Not only will Lyon have direct access to Turin but it will also link Lyon in with the entire Italian national rail system with connections to such centres as Milan and the rest of the economically dynamic Po Valley. This high-speed rail link will enhance Lyon's position as the gateway between Northern and Southern Europe and as a true European crossroads.

The Mediterranean TGV calls for an extension of the TGV line to Valence (due for completion in late 1994) and then further south to Avignon where it will then divide. One route will go to Marseille and then on to Toulon. There is vigorous opposition to any proposed TGV route along this line by the inhabitants living between Marseille and Avignon, especially in the agricultural areas. Marseille city leaders are desperate for their city to be interlinked with the TGV network.

The leaders of Marseille fear that without the image and advantages of the TGV that their position will further decline and that they will become further isolated both in France and in a greater Europe. The national government is also loath to leave its largest port and third largest agglomeration outside the TGV system. Currently there is no set route or construction date on this section of the Mediterranean TGV and major political battles loom in the future to establish the exact TGV route for Marseille (SNCF, La Lettre du Voyageur, Novembre 1990). When the 219 kilometre stretch between Valence and Marseille is completed it will reduce the rail travel time between Lyon and Marseille from 2:45 to 1:25 hours and place Marseille a mere 3:00 hours from Paris.

The other eastern section of the Mediterranean TGV, entitled TGV-Côte d'Azur, will span the 132 kilometres between Fréjus and Aix-en-Provence and will serve St. Raphäel and Nice. This will place Nice 2:30 hours from Lyon and 4:00 hours from Paris via the TGV when all phases are completed (SNCF, La Lettre du Voyageur, Novembre 1990). Linking the major southern tourist resorts onto the national TGV grid will greatly facilitate vacationers throughout the year and in theory reduce the traffic on the A7 south of Lyon through the Rhône Valley. Plans to continue this line to the east into Italy are being resisted by the Italian government at this time.

The Italian government is unconvinced that the construction of a high-speed line over such difficult terrain is needed given the costs involved. Italy is concentrating more on opening it's northern sections into Austria and Switzerland along with the Turin-Lyon connection than it is on the coastal route. Also, the Italian government, unlike the French government, does not want to add extra pressure to the coastal tourist area of the Italian Riviera. In France, many residents of the Côte d'Azur see the TGV line as a way in which to bring more tourists into the area and are therefore against this TGV expansion. With the Italians resisting this project it will become a dead end spur with no international function. This line will also have some major political battles to overcome before any construction is initiated.

The western section of the Mediterranean TGV, the TGV Languedoc-Roussillon, will cover the 290 kilometre section between Avignon and the Spanish border. This line will pass through Nîmes, Montpellier, Béziers, Narbonne and Perpignan continuing south into Spain (Le Progrés, 16 Mai, 1991). A link up at the border with a Spanish high-speed train to connect with Barcelona is envisaged. Spain is pushing forward with its own high speed rail network and on April 19, 1992 the first high-speed train ran between Madrid and Seville at speeds up to 300 kmh. This reduced the travel time between these two cities from 6:00 to 3:30 hours (International Herald Tribune, November 3, 1991). By linking the French and Spanish high-speed rail systems, the Iberian Peninsula will become directly linked to Northern Europe. Similarly to Italy, this will help alleviate the land based isolation from urban-industrial Northern Europe and the rest of the European Community that Spain and Portugal have historically endured. Again, the advantage is also Lyon's. Being the major agglomeration between the two halves of Europe on the high speed rail line will be of tremendous benefit for Lyon in it's bid for international status by improving it's international crossroads position.

The third major European high-speed rail extension will help complete Lyon's access to the rest of Europe and finalize it's role as a European crossroads. The TGV-Rhin-Rhône will, by 1994, place Lyon 3:00 hours from Lille, under 4:00 hours from Brussels and, via the channel tunnel, in direct contact with London. This 425 kilometre link between Southern Alsace and the main south-east TGV line will tie in with the new German high speed Inter-City rail system, and in theory, on into parts of Eastern Europe in the future (Rhône-Alpes dans l'Espace Européen, No 1, Octobre 1990). This linkage with the core economic centres of Europe will serve Lyon well in the future.

A note concerning the linkage with London is needed. The British Rail situation is quite a different matter from the SNCF. In theory Paris-London will be a three hour train journey. The French side of the Channel Tunnel will be complete by 1994. However, in October 1991, the British Transport Minister changed the proposed route of the new rail service and stated that existing facilities could handle the rail traffic until 2005 (The Guardian, October 14, 1991). That the existing facilities are adequate to the task is debatable. What is incontestable, however, is that until at least 2005 there will be no high-speed rail link with Britain. This will keep travel times to London prohibitive by train for the continental business traveller.

The TGV and other high speed rail systems are competitive with airlines over a time span of 3:30 to 4:00 hours. Anything over a four hour journey is generally faster by air. The advantages of the TGV are that it connects city centre to city centre, rail service is seldom disturbed by weather and is overall less inconvenient than flying (lost luggage, advanced check in, security, etc). This 3:30 to 4:00 hour time span places Lyon in an advantageous position. Barcelona, Brussels, Turin-Milan, Paris and many cities in Western Germany will all be accessible from Lyon by TGV in under 4:00 hours. This illustrates the importance of the TGV for businessmen and travellers from Lyon. It also shows that Lyon is well positioned as a potential central hub and meeting place for Europe as a whole. When all of these TGV projects are completed, travel times between Lyon and the rest of Europe will be drastically reduced thereby greatly shrinking the size of Europe, encouraging closer contacts and increasing the attractiveness of Lyon as a "Eurocity" (Plassard 1987).

5.22 BASIC RAIL LINES

It is important to realize that, despite it's high profile and evident success, the TGV's have supplemented rather than replaced Rapide and Regional rail services. An examination of the number of passengers that pass through Perrache and Part-Dieu rail stations in Lyon on a daily basis show the importance of the non-TGV rail networks (Table 5.2). At Lyon Perrache over half of all passengers are utilizing the regional services. Only 4,900 of the 31,950 daily passengers at Perrache are TGV passengers. Lyon Part-Dieu is, by nature, orientated towards the business traveller and the 12,900 daily TGV passengers is a reflection of this fact (Région Urbaine de Lyon, Janvier 1991). Out of 35,000 daily passengers at Lyon Part-Dieu, only 6,900 were on regional passenger service. Also, the SNCF calculates that 20% of all TGV passengers either begin or end their journey on a

Regional train thus adding to the significance of the Regional rail system (SNCF, La Lettre du Voyageur, Novembre 1990).

TABLE 5.2
PASSENGER VOLUME BY CATEGORY, LYON 1989

TRANSPORT TYPE	DAILY PASSENGERS AT LYON PART-DIEU-1989	DAILY PASSENGERS AT LYON PERRACHE -1989
REGIONAL	6,900	17,750
RAPIDE +	15,500	9,300
EXPRESS TGV	12,900	4,900
GRAND TOTAL	35,300	31,950
PERCENTAGE CHANGE 88 TO 89	+5.6%	+7.4%

SOURCE: Region Urbaine de Lyon, 1991.

The regional rail networks are also important in that they form linkages between Lyon and its hinterland. Regional lines serve to re-enforce the linkages between Lyon and the other major and minor urban centres in the Rhône-Alpes Région. Maintaining and expanding (a current project is to re-open old unused lines) the regional rail network is important in solidifying and increasing the linkages between the urban centres within the Rhône-Alpes Région.

5.23 RAIL FREIGHT TRAFFIC

The SNCF Lyon Region[1] is a primary passageway for European rail freight. In 1989 a total of 9.23 million tons of freight was carried by rail in the SNCF Lyon Region. This figure is divided into 5.32

[1] The SNCF Lyon Region consists of the départements of Rhône, Loire, Drôme and Ardeche along with portions of Isère, Ain and Haute-Loire.

million tons arriving in the region and 3.91 million tons being dispatched from the region (Daziano, 1991). The two major rail freight stations in this region are Venissieux, handling 1.4 million tons, and Siblein, handling 0.9 million tons, both of which are in the Lyon agglomeration (Morelon, 1989). Examining the rail freight figures for both Lyon and the COURLY during the later half of the eighties (Figure 5.3) reveals that the overall figures are static. Neither Lyon's nor the COURLY's rail freight numbers have significantly changed in recent years. As expected, the Lyon agglomeration receives substantially more rail freight than it disperses.

FIGURE 5.3
RAIL FREIGHT 1985-1989
LYON AND COURLY



The SNCF has introduced a new freight transport system that consists of placing the complete truck (cabs included) on the train. This "Route Roulante" system facilitates quick loading and unloading saving both time and money (<u>Le Monde</u>, 10 Juin, 1991). The SNCF hopes that this new system will lead to a rise in rail freight traffic in the coming years. Also, the establishment of TGV freight lines has increased the attraction of rail freight transportation in recent years and has strengthened Lyon's position as a European entrepôt. Planners hope that these new systems will reduce the number of long-haul trucks on the European road network. These new rail freight transportation systems could have the double advantage for Lyon of increasing rail freight in the area while reducing the number of trucks driven through the agglomeration.

A large amount of international rail freight traffic passes through Lyon. The "INTERDELTA" is a direct high speed (120 kmh) freight service linking the Rhône and Rhine deltas that passes through Lyon daily. The "TRES" (Train Rapide et Sur), is another high speed freight link, this one between Northern Italy and the Lyon. These are but two examples of the special rail freight services that use Lyon because of it's advantageous geographic position and it's large rail freight capacity. Lyon also has daily point-to-point express freight lines to Paris, Lille, Rouen, Le Havre and Dunkirk along with a vast array of other slower services to the rest of France (Rhône-Alpes dans l'Espace Européen, No 1, Octobre 1990).

The combination of these three TGV projects in conjunction with the existing networks and freight capabilities leaves Lyon in the enviable geographic position of a true European "carrefour". Lyon is positioned between the rapidly growing Mediterranean countries and the more developed northern nations. Lyon must use the advantage of it's prime location to capitalize on the flow of goods and resources that pass through the Lyon agglomeration. Lyon must begin to control the commercial flows through the city rather than be relegated to a role as a mere staging post.

5.3 INTRA-CITY TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

Transport inside the agglomeration of Lyon is managed by the Syndicat Mixte des Transports pour le Rhône et l'Agglomération Lyonnaise (SYTRAL). SYTRAL's area of responsibility includes the 55 communes of the COURLY and seven neighbouring communes. SYTRAL controls over 1,100 kilometres of routes including métros, bus lines and the cable car services in the city (Les Dossiers Communauté Urbaine de Lyon, Juin 1990). In addition, SYTRAL is revitalizing urban and suburban rail lines and linking them with other modes of public transportation to increase the scope and service of Lyon's public transportation.

The métro is the pride of Lyon's urban transportation network; a thoroughly modern system that is large, clean, comfortable, fast and convenient. In 1991 a fourth métro line was opened. Line 'D' services 13 stations between Venissieux and Gorge de Loup in twenty minutes and connects with two métro lines "A" and "B". This new 12 kilometre line brings the total network to 26.2 kilometres (Les Dossiers Communauté Urbaine de Lyon, Juin 1990). Line 'D' also connects with two suburban rail stations. This is a large step in the plan to connect the métro directly to the suburbs by using existing rail lines. This will facilitate access to central Lyon and reduce vehicle traffic in the central city.

In the future, Lyon plans to increase the length and density of its métro system. Included in the scope of this ambitious project are the vitally needed métro connections to Lyon-Satolas International Airport, Eurexpo Exhibition Centre, Gerland Téchnopôle and other outlying areas of importance. Without connecting these areas by métro they will remain isolated from the city centre and under-utilized. Currently the only transport to either Lyon-Satolas or Eurexpo is a long shuttle bus ride from either train station at a cost of 30-40 francs in each direction. Unfortunately these métro lines will not grow overnight. The métro will improve line by line over the next 20 years but the current weakness of limited length and density of the system will hamper Lyon's inter-city transport in the immediate future.

5.4 INLAND NAVIGATION

Pierre Savey, Directeur Général of the Compagnie Nationale du Rhône (CNR), visualizes river and canal transport recovering the position as a major form of commercial transport that it has lost in the last twenty five years (Savy, 1991). River transport was ill-suited to change in the past not only because of fixed routes but also because of a visible lack of flexibility by the maritime managers and professionals. Recently this has been changing and a number of technological and infrastructural improvements have led to a modest revival in fluvial transport (Figure 5.4). This revival is not confined to the traditional customers of water transport: sand and gravel, coal and hydrocarbons. The transport of chemical and metal products, agricultural goods and dangerous wastes are also increasing. However, the single most important addition to water transport has been the advent and use of container transport and roll on-roll off technology. These easy to load and transfer containers can transport any item that a heavy truck can with the advantage of being able to be loaded directly onto a truck in port.

In Lyon, three systems of port authorities exist. One type is owned outright by the local Chamber of Commerce and Industry (C.C.I.L.), such as Port Rambaud in Lyon. Another type is owned by private companies such as the large petroleum ports of Feyzin and Givors. Finally there are those ports owned by the CNR which then grants concessions to the local C.C.I.L. such as at Port Edouard-Herriot in Lyon (Baleste, 1991). Both the C.C.I.L. and the private petroleum concerns (i.e. Elf) are actively promoting and expanding the fluvial ports of Lyon. This attitude by the owners and operators of Lyon's ports will help them gain greater prominence in the future.

Lyon, with its strategic position at the confluence of the Rhône and the Saône rivers, was the ninth busiest inland river port in France in 1990 handling 1.5 million metric tons of cargo (Figure 5.5). Port Edouard-Herriot is by far the largest and most important of Lyon's ports covering 109 ha, including 2.2 kilometres of quays (Morelon, 1989). Port Edouard-Herriot has had it's position as a major port and transport hub reinforced by expanding and upgrading the infrastructure to include substantial container traffic capabilities and the handling of direct international cargos.

The Rhône River has been widened, deepened, and canalized throughout the 310 kilometres from Lyon to the Mediterranean Sea and is able to handle 4,500 ton river barges from Fos to Lyon and now through to Châlon-sur-Saône. (The by-pass in Maçon to save a medieval bridge has been completed). By 1995 a canal for 900 ton river barges will be complete from the Greater Rhône to Séte and

FIGURE 5.4
EVOLUTION OF FRENCH RIVER TRAFFIC



SOURCE: VOIES NAVIGABLES DE FRANCE, 1990.

FIGURE 5.5
TOP TEN FRENCH RIVER PORTS 1990



SOURCE: VOIES NAVIGABLES DE FRANCE, 1991.

north to St-Jean-de-Losne on the Saône which will link with other smaller canals (250 ton river barges) to the Paris Basin and the Rhine through Mulhouse (Région Urbaine de Lyon, Janvier 1992).

Lyon has direct maritime linkages with Tunis, Istanbul, Athens, Haifa and other Mediterranean ports. This direct international traffic, begun in 1979, has been expanding rapidly in recent years. Although international ocean/river barges are only 1,500 tons instead of the 4,500 ton river barge convoys, a rapid increase in these direct international contacts is apparent. For example, Port Edouard-Herriot ships cables for suspension bridges made in Bourg-en-Bresse directly to Norway. Also, Port St-Romain-en-Gal unloads fresh fruits from Israel shipped in containers and transfers them directly to trucks for transport into Germany (Savy, 1991).

In 1988 direct international traffic accounted for 166,000 tons, in 1990 it was 320,000 tons (Transport de Marchandises en Région Rhône Alpes, 1991). Though the numbers are small they are increasing rapidly. The fact that both Marseille and Séte are better suited to handling ocean going vessels than they are river barges will add to Lyon's share of direct international maritime traffic. Also, Lyon is actively increasing it's container capacity which will help encourage a steady rise in direct international fluvial and maritime trade (Lyon Matin, 14 Mai, 1991). Most ports in and around Lyon also have the advantage that they have land onto which they can expand. The fluvial port system of the Lyon is not concentrated within the city limits of Lyon.

The ports in the entire RUL handled significantly more freight than those ports located within the city limits of Lyon (Figure 5.6). The RUL ports handled 3.5 million tons of cargo in 1989. This gives a truer representation of Lyon's overall port freight traffic. This figure has been increasing since 1986 to reach its highest level since the late seventies. The overall amount of fluvial freight traffic has been steadily increasing within the region as a whole.

FIGURE 5.6
RIVER TRAFFIC GROWTH 1984-1989



SOURCE: SERVICE DE LA NAVIGATION RHONE SAONE, 1990.

Regional ports handled 12.5 million tons of goods in 1990 and this figure has been expanding at a 2% annual rate. However, these ports are still under-used. The CNR submits that fluvial transport, especially international, will increase substantially in the coming years because of two factors. First that the Rhône corridor is saturated with land transport and that the existing yet under-utilized ports of Lyon will be able to increase their share of the market. Secondly, the great increase in container traffic linked with the improved and modernized container facilities at Port Edouard-Herriot will attract greater traffic, especially the smaller sea/river vessels with international cargo (Lyon Matin, 14 Mai, 1991). This is debatable considering the massive autoroute expansion, the doubling of Lyon-Satolas International Airport, the increased rail services being offered and the general battle over cargo handling. However, with the overall increase in international trade and cargo, the Lyon ports are primed to gather the rewards for their infrastructural improvements.

Another major sign of optimism for the fluvial ports of Lyon is that the French Government is again taking an active interest in fluvial traffic after almost twenty years of neglect. The Chassagne Report, first published in 1989, reaffirms after many years that the government is committed to realizing the long awaited Rhône-Rhine link via the Saône. This link would be 229 kilometres long and would require 24 locks (Baleste, 1991). The Chassagne Report envisages this grand fluvial link to be completed around 2005 and has already assigned 20 billion francs to this project. The rest of the cost is to be collected through local water taxes.

The existence of the Rhône-Rhine link would offer numerous advantages to Lyon. The Northern European ports are the busiest on the continent. Rotterdam, the largest port in the world, handled 300 million metric tons of sea-borne cargo in 1989 and expects that figure to increase to almost 400 million metric tons by 2010. Antwerp, the second busiest port in Europe handled 95.4 million metric tons and Marseille handled 94.6 million metric tons in 1989 (International Herald Tribune, May 30, 1991). The advantage for Lyon, being on the major fluvial connection between the North Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, would be a prime geographic position and the ability to function as a major commercial crossroads between Northern and Southern Europe. This Rhône-Rhine link has been discussed for two centuries and even today would still provide a important European fluvial linkage that would prove beneficial to Lyon (Jeffries, 1982).

5.5 AIR TRAFFIC

The strength and size of a city's airport is another important factor in determining International status (Soldatos, 1988). As discussed in Chapter One, Lyon is viewed as having a weak airport, ranked in the fourth of six tiers in the DATAR/RECLUS study. This places Lyon in the same category as Naples and Aberdeen (Brunet, 1989). To compare Lyon's 3.7 million passengers in 1989 with the 60 million passengers that went through London or the 40 million that travelled through Paris would be unreasonable. Unfortunately for Lyon, comparing itself with other non-capital European cities such as Frankfurt, Milan, Barcelona, or Geneva shows it to be substantially smaller and much less important (Figure 5.7).

FIGURE 5.7
"EUROCITY" AIRPORT TRAFFIC - 1989



SOURCE: C.C.I.L. - 1990.

FIGURE 5.8
PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN AIR PASSENGER TRAFFIC FOR "EUROCITIES" 1988-1989



SOURCE: C.C.I.L.-1990.

Lyon-Satolas International Airport was ranked only 28th in terms of total passenger traffic among European airports in 1988 (Brunet, 1988). This is an obvious weakness in Lyon's future plans to become a major European city. However, Lyon-Satolas has been one of the fastest growing airports among the "Eurocities" (Figure 5.8). A 15.1% annual increase is impressive, yet in overall numbers this is far less than the single digit percentage gains of the major Eurocities airports (Aéroports Magasine, 1990). To redress this situation Lyon does have in progress an ambitious project designed to bring Lyon-Satolas into a competitive position with its European rivals.

Lyon-Satolas International Airport was initially opened in 1975 and is located 20 kilometres from central Lyon on 3,000 ha of land (Figure 5.9). Lyon-Satolas, managed by the C.C.I.L. which has aggressively promoted the interests of the airport, has been expanding since it opened. This effort has been rewarded with a steady increase in passenger traffic. In the first half of the decade there was a slight reduction in the number of passengers using Lyon-Satolas, down from 2.8 million in 1981, to 2.76 million in 1985 (Figure 5.10). This was largely attributed to the successful opening of the TGV line between Paris and Lyon thus effectively reducing the number of air travellers to Paris via Lyon-Satolas from 760,000 in 1983 to 520,000 in 1984 (Région Urbaine de Lyon, Janvier 1991).

The second half of the decade has seen a steady rise in travellers using Lyon-Satolas International Airport. In overall numbers within France, Lyon-Satolas is the fourth largest domestic airport. In 1990, Lyon-Satolas handled 3.854 million passengers, trailing Marseille (4.983 million), Nice (5.726 million), and Paris (46.836 million) domestically (Figure 5.11). This illustrates the large disparity between Paris and the rest of France in air passenger traffic, as in all criteria. The small size of air traffic utilizing the second tier French cities is evident. Lyon, behind even the Southern French airports, is currently relatively unimportant on the continental scale.

In 1989, 3.75 million passengers used Lyon-Satolas, a million more than the 2.76 million in 1985. This strong growth is a positive

FIGURE 5.9
LOCATION OF
LYON-SATOLAS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT



FIGURE 5.10
GROWTH IN PASSENGER TRAFFIC AT
LYON-SATOLAS IN THE 1980'S



SOURCE:
C.C.I.L. - 1991.

FIGURE 5.11
FRENCH AIRPORT PASSENGER TRAFFIC 1990



SOURCE: AEROPORTS MAGASINE + ADP, 1991.

factor in the development of Lyon's air traffic functions. The 15.1% rise in passenger traffic between 1988 and 1989 was one of the strongest registered both domestically and in Europe, as illustrated in Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.12. In 1990, however, the growth of passenger traffic dropped to 2.1% with a total of 3.84 million passengers. This, combined with the disastrous first four months of 1991, due in large part to the War in the Persian Gulf, has greatly slowed the momentum of growth that Lyon-Satolas and the airline/airport industry as a whole had enjoyed at the end of the eighties (Interlignes Statistiques de Trafic, Avril 1991).

Through April 1991, total air passenger traffic at Lyon-Satolas for the first four months of 1991 was down 14.6%. This is completely accounted for by the 29.1% drop in international traffic since domestic numbers have remained constant. Another negative sign was the 37% decrease in international charter traffic during this period (Interlignes Statistiques de Trafic, Avril 1991). To show the extent of the impact of the Gulf War of 1991 on Lyon, airport passenger traffic from North America was down 91.4%, down 97% from the Middle East, down 58% from North Africa and down 29% from the rest of Europe (Interlignes Statistiques de Trafic, Avril 1991). During the first half of 1991, international passenger traffic was down 16% at JFK airport in New York City (International Herald Tribune, October 21, 1991). This trend was consistant for most major airports due to the drastic drop in international air travel during the Gulf War.

For the year 1991, the Paris airports (Roissy/Charles De Gaulle and Orly) registered a 3.3% decrease in passenger air traffic and a 2.2% drop in air freight traffic. During the same year, both London and Frankfurt airports posted over 5% increases in passenger air traffic. However, the beginning of 1992 saw a return to pre-Gulf War levels of passenger air traffic around the world. The International Air Traffic Association reported that international air traffic world-wide was up 14% in January 1992 versus January of 1991. International freight was up 10% over the same time period. This helps bolster the argument that the drastic passenger air traffic drops during the Gulf

FIGURE 5.12
PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN FRENCH AIRPORT PASENGER TRAFFIC 1988-1989



SOURCE: AEROPORTS MAGASINE + ADP, 1990.

FIGURE 5.13
PASSENGER DESTINATIONS FROM LYON-SATOLAS BY PERCENTAGE



SOURCE: C.C.I.L. - 1989.

War were only temporary. This is a positive sign not only for Lyon-Satolas but for the entire airline/airport industry.

To help determine the strength and international nature of an airport, a breakdown of the destinations of the travellers is important. In 1990, of the 3.84 million passengers using Lyon-Satolas 1.98 million, or 51.5% were on domestic flights. There were 567,288 on Paris flights and the other 1.41 million were on other domestic flights. Of the 1.75 million international travellers the majority were on European flights (Figure 5.13). These figures illustrate that Lyon-Satolas is primarily a Euro-Mediterranean airport. Apart from a few flights to the DOM-TOM's and Black African capitals in the Franc Zone, Lyon-Satolas is not utilized for long range intercontinental flights. American Airlines cancelled its New York to Lyon service in 1990 and shows little enthusiasm for resuming such a service. Air Canada is examining a Montreal to Lyon service and Air France runs twice weekly New York to Lyon flights from March to October. This does not however, constitute an intercontinental service. Lyon has no direct flights to Asia, the Pacific Rim, or South America.

Another indication of the level of internationality of an airport is the amount and importance of duty-free sales. LAX International Airport in Los Angeles earns more from its duty free shops then from all of the rest of its shops, restaurants, bars and boutiques combined. JFK International Airport in New York City alone accounted for $28 million in duty-free sales as the United States led the world with $1.750 billion in duty-free sales in 1990. France totalled $580 million in sales from its duty-free airport shops, the vast majority being at Roissy/Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris. Nice and Cannes were the other major benefactors of airport duty-free sales profits in 1990 (International Herald Tribune, October 21, 1991). Lyon-Satolas needs to upgrade the level of its existing duty free shops which are, to be generous, poor. The profits and prestige that are linked to airport duty-free sales are a small but visible representation of the city's stature in the international urban community and cannot be overlooked.

Sheer numbers, be they population figures or numbers of passengers using an airport, seldom tell the whole story. Not only is Lyon-Satolas a small airport in terms of total passenger traffic but it is also an unattractive and overall dependent airport in the European airport hierarchy. A study by Nadine Cattan, entitled "Une image du reseau des métropôles européennes par le trafic aérien" was recently published in L'Espace Géographique (Cattan, 1990). Cattan contends that airport traffic patterns are a viable indicator in judging a city's position in the national and international urban system. This study undertook to determine the accessibility and attractiveness of the major European airports. This study also followed the air traffic patterns to determine which airports were dominant and which were dependent in the European airport network. The results show which European cities are in a superior position in the European urban hierarchy as a result of their respective airports. This study revealed the weakness, at the European and international level, of Lyon-Satolas.

Considering the actual physical accessibility of airports is a simple matter of determining distances between airports as the bird flies. The three major Swiss airports, being located in the middle of Europe, are in a superior physical position than Glasgow or Lisbon. In terms of physical position in Europe, Lyon-Satolas is highly ranked, being located close to the centre of Western Europe. The second measure of accessibility is "functional accessibility". This is a standard time-distance relationship equation put forward by L'Équipe de Strasbourg (Cattan, 1990). This "functional accessibility" takes into account such variables as distance and mode of transport from city centre to the airport, frequency of flights, delays and other such time-consuming facts of life for the frequent European air traveller (Cattan, 1990).

Lyon-Satolas is placed into the middle category of the "functional accessibility" criteria for two primary reasons: distance and ease from city centre to airport and limited flight availability within Europe. The first difficulty, the distance and difficulty in transferring from the city centre to the airport, is a problem that will be eventually solved by the proposed "Satorail" link. "Satorail" will be a specific rail link between central Lyon and the airport and is currently scheduled for completion in 1995, though this time-frame is looking doubtful (Satolas; Pôle International de Communication, Fevrier, 1990). The second factor limiting Lyon's "functional accessibility" is the limited number of flights from Lyon-Satolas to the rest of Europe. This problem cannot be easily solved at the local level as will be discussed later in this chapter.

The second section of this ranking is concerned with the concept of attractiveness. This section is split between passenger and freight traffic. In both sections Lyon-Satolas ranks in the last category of minimal to no attractiveness. It is interesting to note that in France, Paris is ranked on the top level of each category; however, every other airport in the country is ranked in the last category along with Lyon (Cattan, 1990). This is yet another indication of the huge disparity between Paris and the rest of the French agglomerations in important international functions.

With its lack of power and attractiveness, Lyon-Satolas fits the category of a dependent, not a dominant, airport. Interestingly though, Lyon-Satolas is not dependent upon the Parisian airports. In terms of passenger traffic, Lyon-Satolas is dominated by London. The major flux of Lyon-Satolas international passenger traffic travels through London. This dependence on London is the case for most airports in South-Western Europe. This exemplifies the power of the airlines and their system of using "Hubs" to gather and disperse traffic thereby determining the status and routes of any given airport (Humphries, 1991). Regardless of the fact that Lyon-Satolas wishes to become a major international airport, it is the airlines that ultimately make this decision. The fear at Lyon-Satolas concerning international passenger traffic is that the airlines will continue to use Geneva-Cointrin Airport with it's 92 direct international destinations, versus 21 for Lyon-Satolas, as the long-haul international airport for the area and relegate Lyon-Satolas to a regional airport with limited links to North African and European destinations (Bethemont, 1990).

In terms of air freight traffic Lyon-Satolas is dominated by Frankfurt along with the cities of Northern Italy, Austria, and

Southern Scandinavia (Cattan, 1990). Frankfurt handles the most freight (1,115,000 tons in 1990) of any airport in Western Europe and its higher order services in this field are unmatched, especially among the smaller airports like Lyon-Satolas (17,065 tons in 1990). Domestically, Paris is the centre of the air freight industry ranking just behind Frankfurt and London in terms of volume. Paris handled 872,392 tons in 1990 (Figure 5.14). Air France and Air Inter both use Paris as their hub city as do the major trucking companies in France. The trucking companies use the superior customs and loading facilities in Paris, thus virtually assuring that Paris will remain the major air freight destination in France (Bonnet, 1987). Lyon-Satolas has no direct voice in the matter, this being an economic decision taken by airlines and trucking companies.

Lyon-Satolas ranks sixth domestically in terms of air freight handled (in 1990). However, Lyon-Satolas is experiencing a rapid percentage growth. Lyon-Satolas expanded its air freight traffic by 25.6% between 1988 and 1989 (Figure 5.15). Only Bâle-Mulhouse experienced a higher percentage of growth, a 26.5% increase during the same period. Interestingly enough, three French airports experienced a decline in air freight traffic. Strasbourg (-0.4) and Nantes (-2.8) registered minor losses while Montpellier experienced a radical drop of -22% in air freight traffic in one year (Aéroport Magasine, 1990). Overall, these percentage gains are encouraging for Lyon-Satolas, but the overall volume of freight traffic needs to be dramatically increased in the future.

Lyon-Satolas is thus a dependent airport with minimal attractiveness. Lyon-Satolas also failed to handle enough passenger and freight traffic to be considered an airport of any real significance in this study (Cattan 1990). However, Lyon-Satolas is currently under siege by builders to expand, improve and upgrade it as a viable airport of the future. Lyon-Satolas is currently the second largest public works project in France behind the Channel Tunnel. This is an ambitious project that will transform Lyon-Satolas in size and potential (Aéroport International de Lyon-Satolas, Mai 1991).

FIGURE 5.14
FRENCH AIRPORT FREIGHT TRAFFIC 1990



SOURCE: AEROPORTS MAGASINE + ADP, 1991.

FIGURE 5.15
EVOLUTION OF FRENCH AIR FREIGHT TRAFFIC IN PERCENTAGE 1988-1989



SOURCE: AEROPORTS MAGASINE + ADP, 1990.

One of the main features of the improved Lyon-Satolas International Airport will be the 16 platform TGV station located in the airport terminal (Chassande, 1991). This new TGV/train station will link Lyon-Satolas directly into the main north-south TGV line making the airport a mere two hours from central Paris and Roissy/De Gaulle airport. This will also allow additional train lines to directly access the airport thus allowing better access to regional customers. At first this will be a limited service. For example, two trains per day round-trip from Chambéry will marginally increase the accessibility of the airport to that agglomeration. Lyon-Satolas will not be running the 22 TGVs per day as will Roissy/De Gaulle upon completion of its TGV station. However, this will add an important dimension to Lyon-Satolas that will enhance both its immediate present and long-range future (Morelon, 1989).

In addition to constructing the TGV station and rail lines, a second runway is being added to the airport. Lyon-Satolas does have the advantage that it has room to expand yet again with a third runway sometime in the future if traffic necessitates. This second runway will almost double the capacity of the airport so that it will be capable of handling seven million passengers per year in 1993. This second runway will increase flight movements per hour from a current maximum of 37/38 during peak hours to over 50 flight movements per hour (Morelon, 1989). Since most flights are scheduled during peak hours, this vast increase in flight movement capacity will greatly increase the number of commercially viable flights using Lyon and the number of destinations can be increased accordingly. La SEDLYS, (Société d'Études pour la Développement de Lyon-Satolas) has also included four additional construction projects at the airport.

The first of these projects is a 90,000m2 "Pôle d'Affaires" office building. This will include an additional 2,000 parking places and employ approximately 3,000 people. This Pôle d'Affaires is envisioned as being the anchor of an office/industrial park that will draw numerous enterprises and people to Lyon-Satolas making it an economic pole to complement the airport and surrounding area. The second project, the construction of an activity park on the southern fringe of the airport is intended to produce the same result. A number of high quality hotels and restaurants are also being added to the Lyon-Satolas complex along with an expanded parking facility. It is anticipated that these projects will provide the impetus to develop the critical mass needed to turn Lyon-Satolas into a regional economic pole.

The other two SEDLYS' projects relate directly to the operational functions of the airport. A 22,000m2 office complex to house both the airport and airline officials will enable Lyon-Satolas to upgrade the level of its services offered so as to become more attractive to the airlines. The final project, a 50ha freight zone to be built southeast of the airport, is designed to help attract more freight traffic to Lyon-Satolas. This freight zone will be linked directly to both the autoroute and the rail lines for maximum utility (Presentation de l'Aéroport International de Lyon-Satolas, Mai 1991).

The success of the Lyon-Satolas project is vital not only for the airport but for Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région. The geographic location of the airport, 20 kilometres east of Lyon, enables it to look out on the alpine agglomerations of Grenoble, Annecy and Chambéry to the east of the airport. Lyon-Satolas is capable of acting as a regional pole not only for transport but also for locating new enterprises. Turning this into an airport complex for the region and not simply Lyon enables the project to take on larger political and economic significance. A new neutral regional hub could help ease local political tensions and rivalries while increasing inter-urban cooperation. This ambitiously optimistic follow-on effect linked to the airport expansion will be a topic of interest well into the future and will be discussed in detail in Chapter Nine (Satolas; Pôle International de Communications, Fevrier 1990).

Finally, Bron Airport needs examination. Bron Airport was the major airport serving Lyon until the opening of Lyon-Satolas International Airport in 1975. Bron Airport is located in eastern Lyon and is almost adjacent to the massive new Eurexpo conference facility. Bron is used primarily as an airport for small business planes, package delivery companies and some freight. With only a 1,800 metre runway Bron will never handle the larger planes; however, having a small airport close to the centre-city and the Eurexpo complex to handle business planes and minor cargo is very useful to Lyon. This should not be neglected when assessing Lyon's transport infrastructure and facilities.

5.6 TRANSPORT SUMMARY

Every study undertaken to determine the international status of a city utilizes data from the city's airport to help determine a city's relative position: numbers of passengers, international flights and destinations, access to the CBD, freight tonnage, duty-free shops and higher services are some of the most visible indicators of a city's international status. The Cattan study, an empirical study that argues that an airport's attractiveness, power and status can directly influence a city's international ranking, placed Lyon-Satolas at the bottom level possible of European airports. From this study one can conclude that Lyon-Satolas is doing little to enhance the position of Lyon within the context of its international ambitions. Politically, this has been understood; thus the large scale construction projects at Lyon-Satolas to upgrade, expand and improve the airport. Lyon-Satolas must become a positive asset for Lyon in its push to realize true European and international status. Lyon-Satolas could also prove to be a regional stimulus for intra-urban cooperation within the Rhône-Alpes Région on both a political and economic level (Chapter Nine).

Transportation is the single most important and tangible form of urban infrastructure. Careful exploration of Lyon's position in the regional, national and continental transportation network concludes that Lyon's advantageous geographic location is being under-utilized, especially in the sphere of air transit. Lyon is also not capitalizing on its location as a transport node to control the various flows that pass through the agglomeration. Lyon is, rather, in a passive/acceptance mode being dominated by larger more powerful transport hubs. This is related to Lyon's poor higher service infrastructure, political influence and overall dynamism.

There are other forms of infrastructure that are important to an agglomeration's urban ranking. Such facilitators as tourism, hotel and conference facilities, higher education, press and media, urban redevelopment and foreign population are important criteria in both the Soldatos model and the DATAR/RECLUS project. The next chapters in Part Two will therefore examine in turn each of these additional infrastructural criteria, the current state of Lyon's facilities and plans for the future.

CHAPTER SIX
THE VISITOR ATTRACTION AND RECEPTION INFRASTRUCTURE

6.1 THE CULTURAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Culture is a broad and often misused term. Judging the amount and comparative rank or "worth" of a city's culture is problematic. However, all studies on evaluating what constitutes an "International City" stress the importance of a strong cultural presence. This often goes hand in glove with tourism, as in Florence whose large tourism industry is primarily driven by its substantial cultural attractions. The term "culture" will in future, for our purposes, encompass all that is possibly related to culture and can in theory be quantified.

Culture, or lack of major cultural institutions, is another one of the relative weaknesses of Lyon. On a European scale Lyon is ranked in the third of five tiers. This is one full tier below Geneva, Barcelona, and Turin, and two full tiers below Milan, Frankfurt, and Paris, which are all on the top tier. Nationally, only Paris is in the first tier of European cities and no French city ranks in the second tier (Brunet, 1988). This substantial cultural gap between Paris and the provinces is no surprise. Lyon ranks behind Paris, Strasbourg, Toulouse, and Lille but ahead of Montpellier, Grenoble and Marseille.

Lyon's ranking is not impressive. Ranking marginally above that of its smaller regional neighbour Grenoble does not enhance Lyon's image nor its desire to establish itself as the undisputed regional capital. Lyon's dilemma is that it lacks the presence of an internationally renowned attraction. No famous museums, world class operas or theatres, major historic sites or monuments act as a magnet to draw the crowds and acclaim needed for international status. It would be unfair to state that Lyon is lacking culture but it is accurate to argue that Lyon has no cultural attractions at the international scale.

Lyon does possess some cultural infrastructure in the art arena including a new centre for the preforming arts. Also represented are a respected opera that entertained over 80,000 spectators in 1990 and a symphony orchestra of 97 musicians conducted by E. Krivine. The well respected French National Popular Theatre (T.N.P.) is based in Villeurbanne and another 30 minor theatres operate in the area giving Lyon an active stage life (Agence d'Urbanisme de la Communauté Urbaine de Lyon, 1991). Lyon also plays host to a number of international festivals every year. The summer Jazz festival in Vienne (south of Lyon) and the International Berlioz Festival, which attracts 30,000 spectators, are the two most popular. These festivals are small in comparison to the numerous festivals staged throughout France and the rest of Europe during the summer months. This lack of international artistic attractions is a serious impediment in Lyon's quest to achieve international status.

The Natural History Museum is by far the most popular museum in Lyon, attracting over 300,000 people in 1990. This is twice as many visitors as the Museum of Fine Art or the Gallo-Roman Museum attracted during the same year. On another cultural front Lyon has the most important municipal library in France. The Municipal Library of Lyon in the Part-Dieu was opened in the early 1980's in conjunction with moving the National School of Librarianship from Paris to Lyon; a minor yet welcome devolution.

6.2 THE TOURIST SECTOR

Tourism is an important indicator in helping determine both a city's image and its position within the European urban hierarchy. Both the Soldatos model and the DATAR/RECLUS project point to the importance of tourism to a city. Lyon is not known as a major tourist centre, a point illustrated by its poor ranking in this category in the DATAR/RECLUS study (Brunet, 1988). In the following section the merits of Lyon and what Lyon does present in the way of tourism will be examined, including the public and private agencies that are responsible for tourism in Lyon. Additionally, an examination of the future of tourism in Lyon in the context of the city's drive for international status will be presented.

In 1979, the newly revitalized Office of Tourism produced the first real study of tourism in Lyon; <u>Régards sur le Tourisme Lyonnais</u>.

This report contained a basic blueprint for promoting Lyon on an international level and increasing the city's tourism. This included, for example, accords with Air France to promote Lyon in its foreign offices through posters, and distribution of promotional literature. In 1985, Le Livre Blanc sur le Tourisme Lyonnais was published by the Office of Tourism as the definitive report and future blueprint for tourism in Lyon. To be able to promote this ambitious "white paper" on tourism the Office of Tourism has seen its budget grow from 2.5 million francs in 1980 to a budget of over 10 million francs in 1990 (Renucci, 1988). This is a large increase in operating revenue but still constitutes a limiting budget with which to promote the second largest agglomeration in France.

In promoting tourism in Lyon, the Office of Tourism and the major local tour companies of Hexatour, Pégase, Rhônalp Tours, MTC Voyages, and Lyon Ballade, who contribute a large percent of the private funding for promoting Lyon, have promoted Lyon more as a staging post for the surrounding area rather than promoting the actual city of Lyon. The Vineyard tours of the surrounding area, especially the Beaujolais region, are quite popular. "L'Immersion Beaujolaise" (Pégase) and the November tours by Hexatour and MTC Voyages entitled "Rendez-vous avec le Beaujolais Nouveau" are but examples of these popular Beaujolais tours (Renucci, 1988). The Côtes du Rhône vineyards also promote a number of tours every year. These vineyard tours begin and end in Lyon usually including a morning or afternoon reserved for a bus tour of the sights of Lyon.

Often, the vineyard tours are expanded to include the cuisine of Lyon. The Lyonnaise cuisine, made famous by such illustrious chefs as Paul Bocuse, Jean Vettard and Alain Chapel, is often considered to be the best in France. A combination of a vineyard tour with lunch chez Bocuse (quite popular with the Japanese as a day tour from Paris) makes for a unique gastronomic experience. However, it must be kept in mind that the tourists are in Lyon to enjoy the fine food and explore the surrounding region rather than actually to visit Lyon proper.

Another popular tour theme promotes Lyon as the "Gateway to the Alps". Train and bus excursions leave Lyon for a grand tour of the Alps during both the summer and winter seasons (Atout Rhône, No 27, Juin 1991). These tours, as with the vineyard tours, use Lyon for a logistical base of operations but focus little or no attention on the city itself. Once again this proves true for the popular river cruises on both the Rhône and the Saône rivers. Tours with such titles as "Lyon et le Pays des Ducs de Bourgogne" or "Lyon, Avignon et la Provence" are also popular and inflate hotel statistics in Lyon but do little to actually promote Lyon in and of itself as a tourist attraction (Renucci, 1988).

Lyon is blessed with a location in the middle of a territory filled with tourist attractions. However, Lyon receives little actual tourism as previously illustrated. A glance at the average length of stay in a Lyon hotel provides a good case in point. The average guest length of stay in a Lyon hotel is 1.6 days. In Paris the average stay is 2.6 days and is even higher in Milan (2.7 days), Berlin (2.7 days) and Budapest (2.8 days). Also, business travellers account for close to 75% of the hotel occupants in Lyon. Three in four hotel residents in Lyon are there for business reasons. In Paris the figure is almost reversed with 70% of all hotel rooms being occupied by "classical tourists" and only 30% by business travellers (Renucci, 1988).

Another sobering hotel statistic for Lyon's Office of Tourism is the hotel occupancy rate on weekends. During the business season of October, a Lyon hotel will average around 90% occupancy on a Thursday night. During a Saturday or Sunday this rate of occupancy will drop below 40%. Also, during the prime vacation month of August, Lyon's hotels show a moribund occupancy rate of 41% for the month. These numbers indicate that Lyon is neither a popular weekend retreat nor is it a prime vacation spot during the summer season. Figure 6.1 illustrates that all classes of hotels in Lyon increased their occupancy rates during the last half of the eighties. The top of the line four star hotels continue to have the highest overall occupancy rate. This adds to the incentive for major luxury hotel chains to open in Lyon. Taken as a whole, these numbers illustrate that Lyon, despite good hotel occupancy rates attributable to

FIGURE 6.1
RUL HOTEL OCCUPATION RATES
BY CLASS. 1985-1989



SOURCE:
C.C.I.L., 1990.

FIGURE 6.2
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE
DAILY SALES IN 1987



SOURCE:
ADERLY-P.L.I.,
1988.

business travellers, has a feeble tourist industry attracting very small numbers of tourists to see Lyon for its own sake at any point during the year.

The Office of Tourism views this lack of viable tourism in Lyon as a direct result of Lyon's lack of a specific image. Even those tourists who did visit Lyon and responded to a survey by the Office of Tourism cited the atmosphere and ambiance of Lyon as its greatest assets. This is excellent for the residents of Lyon who have known this for years, yet is a mixed blessing to the promoters of tourism in Lyon. On a beautiful day in June, a comparison of the Place Bellacour in Lyon and the lakefront in Geneva or the main square in Florence serves as a forceful reminder of how quiet, peaceful and totally French the city of Lyon remains. There are no crowds of international tourists waiting to get into museums or prime café spots. Nor are there many people speaking a foreign language. Even a comparison of International Herald Tribune readership, the major American newspaper in Europe, in various "Eurocities" illustrates the provincial nature of Lyon (Figure 6.2). Though millions of tourists crawl through Lyon on the A6 and A7 very few stop to see and enjoy this major French metropolis (Lyon, Ville Internationale, 1988).

6.3 HOTEL AND CONVENTION CAPABILITIES

In direct relationship with Lyon's poor cultural and tourist ranking is Lyon's very limited hotel and conference industry. The DATAR/RECLUS report Lyon ranked in the fifth out of six tiers, next to last. This is Lyon's lowest ranking in the project (Brunet, 1988). Once again Paris is the dominant city in France and is, in fact, the single leading city in the world in terms of hosting conferences. This fact alone accounts for the fact that France recently surpassed Britain as second only to the United States in the number of conferences hosted per year. After Paris, there is a significant decline in the nation's conference industry with Strasbourg (EC Parliament), and Nice (Côte d'Azur and Téchnopôles), constituting the provincial leaders in this field.

In 1990, Lyon appeared for the first time in the UAI (Union Nationale des Associations International in Brussels) rankings. This is the international body that rates the size and calibre of an agglomeration's conference industry. Lyon edged past Toulouse (Aérospace) in 1990 to become the fourth-rated French city in the conference industry (L'Activité économique, Septembre 1990). This underlines the fact that Lyon is moving in the right direction to establish itself as at least competitive in this crucial criteria. There are a number of major infrastrucutral projects that will further enhance Lyon's hotel and conference industry.

Lyon realizes the importance of the conference industry both in terms of image and finances. The convention industry is booming in Europe with a 12% annual increase. Europe as a whole hosted 60% of the world's conferences in 1990. The average participant spent 1,000 to 1,500 francs per day (L'Activité économique, Septembre 1990). A continual supply of major conferences can provide a major economic boost to the city. Conventions also offer a great opportunity to promote a city. Drawing conventioneers on a large scale from around the world would help boost Lyon's image both domestically and internationally.

Lyon is focusing on exploiting its well known medical facilities, especially in cancer research, to carve out a niche as a city of medical conferences. The medical field alone accounts for 19% of all international conferences. Specializing in such a profitable and respected area would help both in defining an image for Lyon's conference industry and in targeting promotional campaigns.

There are a number of important gaps in Lyon's infrastructure that need to be filled before Lyon can seriously expect to enter the convention business on a large scale. First and foremost is the lack of convention centres. Secondly, and closely inter-related, is the lack of high-quality hotels and hotel rooms (SEPAL, 1990). Comparing the hotel infrastructure of Lyon with other major "Eurocities" (Figure 6.3) illustrates that not only does Lyon lack overall hotel space, but that this need is especially acute in the all important four star/luxury classification. An examination at the total number of hotels in the

FIGURE 6.3
4 STAR HOTEL BEDS VERSUS TOTAL HOTEL BEDS



SOURCE: ADERLY - P.I.L, 1987

FIGURE 6.4
HOTELS BY CLASS IN THE LYON AGGLOMERATION: 1/1/1990



SOURCE:
C.C.I.L., 1990.

area (Figure 6.4) reveals a total of only six four star luxury hotels in the entire RUL and only eighteen four star hotels (Lyon, Ville Internationale, 1988). This evident lack of four star hotels and known "name brand" hotels to the international business traveller such as Hyatt, Sheraton, Hilton or Marriott reduce the number of business travellers that chose to stay in Lyon as well as adversely affecting the convention industry.

In the hotel/conference centre categories, Paris has once again shown its dominance. More disturbing for Lyon is that Geneva has one of the strongest hotel/convention industries in Europe, ranked fifth overall. Figure 6.3 illustrates the percentage of luxury hotels in various Eurocities and the massive disparity that exists between Lyon and Geneva. This also illustrates that Lyon has the lowest percentage of luxury hotels of any city in this study. Lyon clearly has an uphill battle to achieve mere respectability in this important infrastructure and is disadvantaged by the prominence of its regional rival, Geneva.

Lyon does have ambitious plans to improve its much maligned hotel/convention industry. Plans call for a new four star hotel with 150 rooms to open at Lyon-Satolas International Airport in conjunction with the expansion of the main terminal and the opening of the new TGV station (Satolas; Pôle International de Communications, Fevrier 1990). This will join the existing but smaller four star Sofitel at the airport. Additionally, two other large scale projects are under construction which will greatly improve Lyon's convention image and capacity.

6.4 THE GERLAND REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT

When examining the facilitators and infrastructural projects undertaken by Lyon to help establish itself as a competitive “Eurocity”, one must consider the Gerland redevelopment project. The reconversion and development project in Gerland is designed to boost the overall status of Lyon while simultaneously addressing some of the major shortcomings in Lyon’s current infrastructure identified by the DATAR/RECLUS project and the SEPAL LYON 2010 plan. The objective at Gerland is to create a city within a city that combines the high-technology employment base, quality of life and superior infrastructural support on a scale “appropriate to a “Eurocity” of the 21st century" (Brun, 1990). Gerland is an appropriate case study to examine a major urban renewal project designed to boost Lyon’s “Eurocity” status.

Gerland, located at the confluence of the Rhône and Saône rivers in southern Lyon is well situated for renovation and development. Gerland is further spatially advantaged in that it has clearly-defined physical boundaries. To the north and east Gerland is borded by railroad tracks and freight yards which have isolated Gerland from the neighbouring districts of Lyon for over a century. To the south and west Gerland is bounded by the Rhône river. Being an easily defined spatial unit enables Gerland to be planned and renovated as a self-contained unit (Quartier de Gerland 1983-1989, 1989).

In the early 1980’s, the COURLY and l’Agence d’Urbanisme through the Zone d'Aménagement Concerté (ZAC) des Berges du Rhône, (the agency responsible for the development zone of the banks of the Rhône), began exploring the possibility of improving and renovating the Gerland district. The Maison d'Aménagement de Gerland was established soon after and the actual restructuring of Gerland began in 1987 with the installation of l’École Normale Supérieur (ENS) in Gerland (Montes, 1992). To move the prestigious ENS from Paris, as was decided in 1985, to the new redevelopment project at Gerland not only solidified the basis of the whole project but indicated a strong degree of State support. This was a major success for Lyon’s development and status. The ENS was installed in a modern purpose-made building near the former slaughterhouse in the middle of Gerland to serve as the foundation for this project. Since the successful installation of ENS, the planning authorities have concentrated on three elements of development to insure that Gerland’s future development proceeds as planned in four distinct areas (Lyon Greland, 1991).

6.41 ELEMENTS OF DEVELOPMENT

The first element adhered to by the Gerland planning authorities is that a true and complete urban landscape must be developed. Gerland must strive to construct it's own distinct urban identity and establish itself as a functional city within a city. By 2010, 50,000 inhabitants and 40,000 jobs are predicted for Gerland. The majority of these jobs to be created will be in high-technology (bio-tech) and service industries. To support this population and ensure an urban identity Gerland plans to provide the shops, restaurants, living accommodation, recreational facilities and the entire infrastructure needed to develop Gerland into a functioning "quartier" and positive addition to modern Lyon (COURLY, 1989).

In conjunction with creating a true urban landscape the second element to ensure the planned development of Gerland is that the city's main activities must be incorporated into the Gerland district. Gerland must become an integral part of Lyon's economic and social life to develop properly. Gerland will not be considered a success if it fails to become one of the major focal points of Lyon. The strength of Gerland is within the context of adding to the existing elements of greater Lyon rather than becoming an isolated "quartier" of a few specialized functions. This would fail to enhance the overall functions of Lyon. Gerland must be well-integrated into the social and economic fabric of Lyon in order to contribute to the city's future "Eurocity" ambitions as planned.

The final element that the Gerland planning authorities concentrate upon is the successful development of Gerland's physical linkages and communications with Lyon. Currently, Gerland is relatively isolated from the rest of Lyon because of the physical barriers of the Rhône river and the freight yards. Gerland must become physically linked to Lyon if it is to develop in any meaningful fashion and to integrate its functions with those of Lyon. To solve this problem a number of major infrastructural projects are planned. First, the extension of Lyon's modern métro (lines A and B) to Gerland is scheduled for completion by 1994/95. This will leave Gerland merely 10 minutes from both C.B.D.'s: La Part-Dieu and Le Presqu'ile.

This will also connect Gerland to the rest of the public transportation system and thereby to the rest of the agglomeration (Montes, 1992).

Secondly, two new bridges across the Rhône river are planned. The first bridge is a planned continuation of the "Cours des Girondins", a future east-west main axis road through Gerland. This bridge will link Gerland with the southern tip of the Presqu'ile. The second bridge, the future Pont de Pierre-Bénite, will cross the Rhône river further south and link Gerland directly with the A7 autoroute, the ring-road and the major overland routes. This will provide easier commercial and private overland transport access to Gerland and encourage further development. The physical linking of Gerland to the Presqu'ile and the west bank of the Rhône is vital in opening and expanding the flow of people and goods through Gerland.

Finally, footbridges and minor roads will be constructed over and through the freight yards/train tracks on the north and east boundaries of Gerland. This will improve movement between Gerland and it's immediate neighbours; la Guillotière (with it's major universities) to the north and the 8th arrondissement to the east. This will ensure greater public transport and pedestrian access to Gerland from the surrounding areas of Lyon. The improvement of Gerland's physical communication and transport infrastructure will help ensure that Gerland in 2010 will be well integrated into Lyon and possess the facilities needed to help play a role in Lyon's European plans (Maison d'Aménagement de Gerland, 1991).

6.42 MAJOR DEVELOPMENT AREAS

The three elements of Gerland's development are the broad structural requirements needed to create Gerland as a viable community. The actual development of Gerland is proceeding through four spatial stages. The first stage concerns the area around the ENS. This area's development is centred around l'Allée d'Italie, one of two major east-west access roads in Gerland. This is the area of Gerland that was begun first and is nearing completion. The first stage of development in this area will include 1000 apartments, 55 commercial services including a 1700 sq metre supermarket, 2 office complexes, 23,000 sq metres of public squares and parks and a 2 star hotel. This section will constitute the foundation of the new Gerland district. This area is also the host of the large (chemical-pharmaceutical) Rhône-Mérieux complex. Along with ENS, this has provided the critical mass needed to launch the successful new Tony Garnier Science Park (Maison d'Aménagement de Gerland, 1991).

The Tony Garnier Science Park has been a successful téchnopôle since it's opening in 1987. Since it's establishment 110 enterprises have been located at this Science Park. These 110 new enterprises employ 6,500 people, mostly in the fields of high-technology and services. The Tony Garnier Science Park is succeeding in establishing the critical mass needed to further facilitate the growth of this area as a high-technology development pole. To date, this Science Park is fulfilling it's mandate of attracting high-technology jobs and critical mass around which to develop this new district of Lyon.

L'Allée d'Italie development area also includes the Grande Halle Tony Garnier. This uniquely designed (transparent and without pillars) former industrial estate was completely restored by the city in 1988. Now, with a seating capacity of 20,000, the Grande Halle plays host to numerous musical, athletic and cultural events. This distinctive architectural building anchors one end of l'Allée d'Italie helping to establish its focal position as a major development axis for Gerland. L'Allée d'Italie area is the first cornerstone to the Gerland project and has, so far, met expectations and is a cause for cautious optimism regarding the district's future (Maison d'Aménagement de Gerland, 1991).

The second major development area revolves around the future marina and 22 hectares along the left bank of the Rhône river. This area will provide the second major focal point of the new Gerland district. and will include: 1000 apartments, 7 hectares of recreational land, a marina port designed to accommodate 200 small and medium sized (5 to 18 metre) boats, a four star hotel and convention centre complete with a 600 space parking lot and numerous shops and restaurants. Additionally, the new International School complex is located in this area.

The proposed four-star Sheraton (a major American hotel and convention centre corporation), to be constructed around the future marina would be a major boost for Lyon. The lack of four-star hotel and convention facilities was one of Lyon's shortcomings in the DATAR/RECLUS report and Lyon's own LYON 2010 plan. This four-star Sheraton will, according to preliminary plans, have 450 bedrooms, a conference centre to accommodate 1,000 delegates. An assortment of upscale boutiques and restaurants and 600 parking places will complete this major addition to Lyon's infrastructure. This four-star complex will also serve as an impressive cornerstone for the whole marina development project (Maison d'Aménagement de Gerland, 1991).

The new International School complex in the marina development area also directly addresses one of Lyon's weak areas. In both the DATAR/RECLUS report and in it's own LYON 2010 plan, the lack of an International School was viewed as impeding Lyon's international image and ambitions. This new International School on the left bank of the Rhône is a modern snake-like architectural statement. This futuristic complex provides 2000 French and foreign students the option of taking French exams, international options or foreign qualifications. This new International School complex is part of a greater higher education framework envisioned for Gerland. Currently, the vast majority of the students at the International School are local French children being sent to this school for reasons of prestige and language. However, this does not negate the fact that the International School does now exist and fills one of the holes in Lyon's international infrastructure.

The third spatial area for development is smaller in scale but is the largest in physical size. Le Parc du Confluent incorporates 80 hectares of athletic facilities including 35 tennis courts, 20 playing fields (soccer and rugby), an olympic-sized swimming pool, a climbing wall and two major sporting venues; a 50,000 seat outdoor stadium and a 15,000 seat indoor arena. On the north end of the Parc, centred around the head offices of the Mérieux Institut, will be a 320 room hotel complex, 100 apartments and a river port. Additionally there will be a footbridge constructed to link the park at the south point of the Presqu'ile with Gerland (Maison d'Aménagement de Gerland, 1991).

The final area of development will be centred around the future east-west axis road; Cours des Girondins. The development area, in north Gerland, will constitute a second urban centre area in addition to l'Allée d'Italie. An area of shops, restaurants and services surrounded by transitional and residential zones will complete this current phase of development. Cours des Girondins will help to physically spread the Gerland development into a multi-pole urban centre. The Cours des Girondins will be the area of Gerland closest to the rest of the city of Lyon with direct links into the university district to the north of Gerland. This will aid in the development of the planned educational infrastructure of the district.

6.43 THE IMPORTANCE OF GERLAND

The redevelopment of the Gerland district is of strategic importance to Lyon's future international ambitions. First, this redevelopment of the old industrial Gerland district into a major urban pole will help redress the traditional economic east-west divide in Lyon. By redeveloping Gerland, in the south-east sector of Lyon, the municipal authorities are sending a strong signal that the integration of Lyon is vital to the city's future. Lyon cannot hope to achieve its international ambitions by becoming a divided city growing at two speeds.

Secondly, the Gerland project addresses a number of Lyon's infrastructural weak points. The four-star Sheraton hotel and conference centre facility and the International School are both needed. The Grande Halle Tony Garnier, with it's 20,000 seat capacity and ability to accommodate major events, is a needed attraction for an international city. These projects serve to fill holes in Lyon's infrastructure that would, if left unresolved, have seriously retarded Lyon's international ambitions.

Thirdly, the successful development of the Tony Garnier Science Park is an early indication of the economic vitality of this new development. Through the development of a major new téchnopôle centred around ENS and the Rhône-Mérieux complex, the future economic strength, diversity and potential driving force for the whole district has been established. The Gerland redevelopment project, similar to the Part-Dieu project of the 1970's (Tuppen, 1977.), is intended not only to redevelop a section of the city in need of reconversion but to develop a "European" scale project.

6.5 CITÊ INTERNATIONALE

The second major project is at the Achille-Lignon wharf on the east bank of the Saône. In a beautiful park setting near the new Interpol world headquarters, a 200 room four star hotel and a 250 room three star hotel are being constructed in tandem with the "Centre International des Congrés". Many well known international hotel chains have expressed an interest in participating in this project. The large American hotel chains of Hilton, Hyatt, and Marriott are being considered as are Intercontinental and Trusthouse Forte et Loew (L'Activité économique, Septembre 1990). The addition of these world class hotels with their advanced appeal, international reservation system, and image will go a long way towards solving the current problem of having no real "marque" hotels. Also another major modern conference facility will enable Lyon to attract numerous conferences and congresses in the future.

Currently though, the Cité Internationale project is in the process of being scaled down to a smaller size. A lack of funds and interest by the major hotel/convention corporations, and the lack of suitable access such as the métro have dealt a potentially fatal blow to this development. This serves as a reminder that regardless of a political planning document, the economic realities are what will produce construction and growth. In this time of economic recession not all projects will become reality. Lyon must take this into account when planning future developments designed to enhance its international image and react accordingly.

6.6 EUREXPO EXHIBITION CENTRE

Eurexpo, Lyon's major exhibition centre, was opened in September 1984 at a cost of 650,000,000 francs. Eurexpo is located in Chassien in the eastern sector of the Lyon Agglomeration next to Bron Airport. Eurexpo is the seventh largest exhibition centre in Europe in overall size with 85,000m2 of covered space and a further 130,000m2 of open air facilities set on a 108 hectares site with 5,000 parking spaces. Eurexpo is considered one of the superior exhibition halls on the continent and is often compared with the facility in Milan. In 1989, Eurexpo hosted 250 exhibitions catering to 1.2 million visitors and covering everything from Autoshows to Nuclear Research (SEPAL, 1990). Despite the first-class facility, Eurexpo does need to attract larger and less localized exhibitions to be considered a top European venue. Seldom is the entire facility used and most of the exhibitions are hosted by local companies or agencies.

6.7 SUMMARY

The infrastructure needed to attract tourists and business travellers is currently one of Lyon's weaker attributes in its drive to achieve International status. The cultural infrastructure in Lyon is adequate for local purposes. However, it is not of a scale or quality to attract visitors to Lyon. This lack of a proven international attraction is detrimental to Lyon's international image. This is reflected in Lyon's small scale tourist industry. Lyon is well positioned as a staging post for tours of the Alpes or famous vineyards. Lyon itself though, is not a tourist attraction in its own right.

For the business traveller, Lyon lacks the necessary physical infrastruture of luxury/business class hotels and conference facilities. The advantages both financially and in terms of international image that are associated with this infrastruture is mandatory for Lyon in its drive for greater international position. The scaling back of the ambitious Cité Internationale is a blow to Lyon's plan to redress this infrastrutural problem. Currently, the Gerland redevelopment project is the only initiative in progress to address this problem and it is therefore very impotant that the Gerland project goes forward and succeeds in filling these infrastructual gaps.

The Gerland redevelopment project is increasingly important to Lyon's international ambitions. The new International School, the Sheraton hotel/conference centre on the new marina, the successful new Science Park and the other areas of development planned for Gerland will establish this section of Lyon as a pivotal section of the city. When these projects are finished, if they remain on schedule, they will succeed in addressing Lyon's major infrastructural needs in these categories.

One of the current drawbacks is that none of these locations, (Gerland, Achille-Lignon, Lyon-Satolas, Eurexpo), are currently served by the métro. The long range city plans call for the métro to be extended to these locations but it is not known whether they will all be achieved during the span of the LYON 2010 plan (SEPAL, 1990). The métro link to Cité Internationale/Achille-Lignon has already been indefinately postponed. This is a critical point because the Lyon métro system is the best form of intra-urban travel in Lyon connecting all central locations. To have the major hotel and convention centres isolated from the city as a whole will not only limit the number of conventions in Lyon but will also limit the financial advantages and image building effects for the rest of the city.

The general overview of Lyon's position in the context of these categories is that it lacks a major international attraction and needs the Gerland project to improve its physical infrastruture. In addition to transport and hospitality infrastructure the International status of a city is, according to the Soldatos model, also judged upon such criteria as its higher educational facilities, the independence and quality of its press and media, and the number of foreign residents living in the city. The DATAR-RECLUS report and the Soldatos model specify these three criteria as important to the potential of a city that has international ambitions. These three criteria will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN
THE EDUCATIONAL, MEDIA AND DIPLOMATIC INFRASTRUCTURE

7.1 HIGHER EDUCATION

A city's higher education capacity is another one of the major indicators used in ranking and comparing cities. The Soldatos model emphasizes the importance of higher education services and the development of links between institutions of higher education and the high-technology industries. Paris was ranked by the DATAR/RECLUS team as the single largest university city in Europe. With over 350,000 university students, Paris accounts for over 30% of the French university population. Not only is Paris dominant in sheer numbers of students but also contains the vast majority of the prestigious Grandes Écoles and 42% of all international students. Lyon is the second major university centre in France with 76,500 total university students in all institutes of higher learning during the 1988-89 academic year. The three state universities of Lyon had a 1990-1991 student enrollment of 57,450 which ranks Lyon fourth nationally in this category (Figure 7.1).

In Lyon there are three state universities. These three accounted for 57,450 students during the 1990-91 academic year, (Lyon I - 22,800, Lyon II - 19,250, Lyon III - 15,400). Of these students 88% are from France. 70% of the students are from the Rhône-Alpes Region, a further 19% are from other regions of France and the remaining 11% are from outside France (Figure 7.2). Looking first at the foreign students, this 11% is composed of 47% from the Middle East and North Africa, 23% from Black Africa, 12% from Europe, 8% from Asia, 3% from the Americas and 3% from other places (Figure 7.3). These numbers show a heavy tilt towards France's former North African and Black African colonies in contrast with very few Asians or Americans.

Examining the percentage of students at the three state universities from the départements in the region illustrates the areas which are within Lyon's academic zone of influence and those which

FIGURE 7.1
STUDENTS IN STATE UNIVERSITIES
1990-1991



SOURCE: MINISTERE DE L'EDUCATION NATIONALE, 1991.

FIGURE 7.2
COMPOSITION OF STUDENTS AT LYON'S STATE UNIVERSITIES IN 1988-1989



SOURCE:
RECTORAT, 1990.

FIGURE 7.3
BREAKDOWN OF FOREIGN STUDENTS



SOURCE: RECTORAT, 1990.

FIGURE 7.4
BREAKDOWN OF STUDENTS
BY DEPARTEMENT



SOURCE:
RECTORAT, 1990.

are outside of this zone (Figure 7.4). The majority of these students, 59%, come from the Rhône département. Neighbouring Ain accounts for a further 10% of the student population. The other six départements in the region contribute very few students to the Lyon state universities. The savoyard départements along with Ardéche and Drôme are well outside Lyon's academic zone of influence.

Lyon is the largest university city in the region but is by no means the exclusive university centre of the region. Grenoble prides itself on having a strong academic reputation especially in the "prestigious" high technology areas of nuclear energy, computers, hydro energy and a range of other applied science fields. These specialties attract prominent students and scholars to Grenoble thus forming an academic critical mass in certain high-technology sciences at Grenoble. Lyon and Grenoble are ranked on the same tier in the European wide survey along with Bordeaux, Toulouse and Montpellier (Brunet, 1988). The Rhône-Alpes Region also has smaller universities in St Etienne and Chambéry. Geneva also possess a strong university tradition and substantial academic population. Geneva shares with Grenoble a much greater percentage of students vis-à-vis the population as a whole thereby giving these agglomerations more of a university aura. Both Geneva and Grenoble also have central university locations which help spatially define an academic population. Geneva also shares with Grenoble the advantage of having certain prestigious programs, in Geneva's case these are related to the city's international institutions.

Lyon again finds itself in a familiar yet unwanted position. Paris dominates university life in France and claims 42% of all international students. Lyon may be the second largest university city in France but within its own region it must compete with both Grenoble and Geneva. Lyon is not in a position to claim the academic leadership role in the Rhône-Alpes Region and indeed the superior academic image in certain high-profile fields of both Grenoble and Geneva places Lyon's academic image at a disadvantage.

Lyon realizes that it does not have an international reputation as a strong university city. The SEPAL LYON 2010 plan proposes future changes aimed at increasing the image of Lyon as a university city and academic pole. There is little constructive communication between the universities in Lyon and the rest of the region. The relationship between the universities within Lyon is competitive and there is a noticeably chilly relationship with the university in Grenoble. The optimum solution rests in the fact that the universities in question do not share similar strengths and could therefore be considered complimentary instead of competitive (Gras, 1990). Lyon II, for example, is not focusing on building a world class nuclear science programme to compete with Grenoble. Similar to the need for better and closer political integration in the region between the major urban centres, there is a need for such integration between the region's academic institutions.

Lyon has also decided to take an active hand in upgrading its academic institutions and image. The addition of l'École Normale Superieure from Paris to Gerland to be integrated with the new téchnopôle is a blessing for the city and helps solve two major problems. L'Ecole Normale Superieure is one of the best known in France. This will enhance Lyon's academic image and attract not just international students but some of the better French students as well. Secondly, this will link ENS with the high technology companies in the téchnopôle at Gerland. This will help address one of the central problems of the local university system which is the lack of links between academic and private institutions. This combination of "grey matter" will help both the academics and private enterprises involved attract better companies and better students, and to improve the research and development elements of the téchnopole at Gerland.

Lyon has decided that it must spatially concentrate its academic institutions and personnel along with improving transport between its universities. Currently there is no true student quarter in Lyon which adds to its poor academic image. On July 30, 1990, COURLY purchased the abandoned Manufacture des Tabacs building with the purpose of installing a major new university site with a projected capacity of 14,000 students. This massive building is located on the 'D' line of the Métro on the Boulevard de l'Europe on the edge of central Lyon within walking distance of La Part-Dieu. This major university facility will, it is hoped, create a central university location around which an academic "quartier" will be formed (Lyon Agence d'Urbanisme de la Communauté Urbaine de Lyon, 1991).

To add to the university ambiance of the city, Lyon is planning to greatly increase the number of students at its three state universities. Lyon produced a 15 year plan for its universities that began in 1988. This plan predicts that over 40,000 more university students will be attending one of Lyon's state universities by the year 2003. This would boost the state university student body in Lyon to almost 100,000. This is a huge increase in numbers and the universities' acquisition of needed staff, space, facilities and money poses enormous financial and institutional problems.

Lyon plans to drastically increase its student body, improve upon the linkages between universities in Lyon and the rest of the region, increase international enrollment, bind the universities closer to the private sector, attract further Grandes Écoles and create a university quarter. It is felt that this will give Lyon the needed academic critical mass to seriously boost its position in the academic world. This is indeed an ambitious task which would doubtless increase Lyon's academic standing if successful. Adding another 40,000 students to the state universities and creating a new university district by 2003 seems an ambitious task. However, if totally or even partially successful, this will provide Lyon with a vastly improved and enlarged higher education infrastructure. This will help in Lyon's bid for "International City" status.

7.2 PRESS AND MEDIA SERVICES

Another important infrastructural criterion is the size and strength of an agglomeration's press and media. A controlling agglomeration will support numerous national newspapers and magazines along with various radio and television stations of national and regional importance (Soldatos, 1988). Taking a closer look at the press and media of Lyon one finds a familiar situation: dominance from Paris and stiff regional competition.

Lyon has two major daily newspapers, Le Progrés and Lyon Matin. Le Progrés, established in 1859, is by far the larger of the two with a 1990 daily circulation of 342,000. This placed Le Progrés as the fourth largest regional (as opposed to national) daily newspaper in France. The fifth largest French regional is Le Dauphiné Libéré of Grenoble with a daily circulation of 296,000 in 1990 (Science & Vie Économique, 1992). Le Progrés and Le Dauphiné Libéré have been competing for years to establish themselves as the dominant daily in the region and their history is bitter and inter-related.

Since the middle of the sixties there has been a national trend in France which has witnessed a dramatic decline in the readership of regional dailies despite the significant population increase during these same years. Le Progrés had a peak circulation in 1964 of 500,000 papers per day. Since 1964, Le Progrés has seen a steady decline in circulation and began to suffer severe financial losses in the early eighties. In 1986, Le Progrés was bought by the Hersant Group. Ironically, the Hersant Group bought Le Dauphiné Libéré in 1983 because it too was suffering financial losses due to reduced circulation.

In 1984, Le Dauphiné Libéré had a daily circulation of 427,000. The circulation figure of 296,000 in 1990 is a substantial drop in only six years. During the same six years Le Progrés has improved its circulation from 244,000 to 342,000. This is a handsome turn-around for Le Progrés. True to form though, each paper is totally dominant within its city zone of influence. Neither can lay claim to the title of the paper of the Rhône-Alpes. Also, both are losing market shares to the Parisian national papers that have installed regional offices in Lyon. In 1986 both Le Monde and Libération installed regional offices in Lyon (joining Le Figaro and L'Humanité). These nationals then began producing a regional paper; e.g. Le Monde Rhône-Alpes. Because of constant bickering between the two largest regional papers the Parisian national papers were able to penetrate the regional market and establish true Rhône-Alpes regional dailies at the expense of the local regional dailies. This has only increased the control by Paris of the local media on all levels.

Currently Lyon hosts only one international press agency. In addition to the French Agence Presse, the Associated Press has an office in Lyon which services all of the other English speaking press agencies (UPI, Reuters etc.). However, on February 17, 1992, Lyon was chosen as the site for the headquarters of "Euronews". Lyon was chosen from among a field of 17 "Eurocities" (International Herald Tribune, February 18, 1992). Euronews is designed to become the European version of the highly acclaimed Atlanta based American Cable News Network (CNN). This is a major coup for Lyon. Not only will this add 50 international journalists to Lyon along with numerous editors and other news staff but will place Lyon in the middle of a major European-wide news project.

Euronews is scheduled to be on the air in 1993 broadcasting in five languages (English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish) to an audience of around 23 million. With an initial annual budget of $50 million, Euronews will receive one quarter of its budget from the European Community, one quarter from advertising and sponsorship, and half from participating television stations in France (Antenne 2 and FR3), Germany (ARD & ZDF), Italy (RAI), Spain (RTVE) and state owned television stations in Greece, Belgium, Monaco, Finland and Egypt. The 39 member stations of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) is supporting the project and is providing technical assistance, images and library footage to help launch this initiative.

Euronews will greatly improve the international news and media profile of Lyon. This will attract numerous other international press agencies, journalists and various technical support facilities. Lyon argued that it was vital for the city's interests to attract Euronews to Lyon. Lyon, along with Valencia, Spain, were the only two cities to offer a financial incentive to Euronews to locate in their city. Lyon has given Euronews the former Hewlett-Packard headquarters in Ecully free of rent as its base of operations. Lyon paid Hewlett-Packard to move to a new headquarters in Bron both to keep Hewlett-Packard in the Lyon area and to open up this building for Euronews. Lyon has also granted Euronews an undisclosed sum of money to assist with the start-up costs of the venture (Le Progrés, 19-2-1992).

Another point in favour of Lyon's selection as the operational base of Euronews is that the directors of the Euronews project are located in Geneva. The proximity of Lyon to Geneva is considered advantageous in this instance. The irony of having a smaller regional competitor directing the placement and operations of Euronews to Lyon has not been lost on the officials in Lyon, but the implantation of Euronews to Lyon is viewed overall as a positive boost for the international status of Lyon.

7.3 THE FOREIGN POPULATION

FIGURE 7.5
PERCENT OF FOREIGN POPULATION



SOURCE: EQUIPE DE RECHERCHE-NICE-RHONE-ALPES, 1991.

An agglomeration's foreign population is another indicator used to determine international status. The Soldatos model includes this among its criteria (Soldatos, 1989). Lyon has a foreign population that consists of 13% of its total population (Figure 7.5). Two points must first be made regarding foreign populations. First, different countries have different criteria as to who, by official definition, constitutes a foreigner. Different immigration and assimilation laws make for profound distinctions in the term "foreigner" among European nations.

Secondly, the role played by the foreign population of a European city is complex and ambiguous, thus making it difficult to draw generalized conclusions on a city's international status based upon the number of foreign residents. One of the problems in quantifying the impact of the foreign population on a European city is that the foreign residents themselves are widely different in ethnic and economic composition. However, the number of foreign residents in a city does add to the international composition, connections and flavour of a large city and can therefore be used cautiously as another indicator in helping determine the international status of a city.

On one end of the spectrum of foreign residents are the international business leaders. These highly paid executives of multinational companies are actively recruited by all major cities because these international business executives are the leaders of international corporations that provide the leadership for many international organizations. European cities are expanding certain infrastructures to appeal directly to these executives. Lyon, for example, constructed an International School in the Gerland district to educate the children of such executives in either French or another European language. Social clubs, welcoming committees and other family oriented groups are being established to increase Lyon's level of attractiveness to these important foreign executives and their families.

Another group of foreign residents to consider are the immigrants (legal and not) from poorer nations. These economic immigrants move to the European cities in search of employment and a higher standard of living than available in their areas of origin. Directly after the Second World War such immigration was welcome. The booming industrial economies of the 1950's and 1960's needed the extra work force and was able to absorb these immigrants with little trouble. Also, these early immigrants were mostly Southern Europeans (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese) who shared common religious and social beliefs along with similar physical features thereby easing their integration into French society.

However, following the first oil crisis in the early 1970's, the industrial sector of the economy began shrinking. Simultaneously, the post colonial movement of immigrants to France from its former colonies in North and Black Africa added more immigrants to urban areas of France. As these new immigrants originated in different cultures they often did not share the same religious and social beliefs as the French. These immigrants were also physically distinctive from the French and often spoke poor or fractured French. This wave of immigrants were more obviously "non-French" than the previous immigrants. This combination of increased numbers of immigrants who exhibit a higher degree of visibility in a nation with increasing unemployment has led to a tangible degree of social unrest within the large cities.

Lyon has not been exempt from the problems of racism and unemployment. In October 1990, in Vaulx-en-Velin, the death of a youth at the hands of the police in this poor, predominantly immigrant housing project touched off a riot (Webster, 1990). This riot left many injured, burned down numerous retail outlets and generally outraged the whole nation. This darker side of a city's foreign population is being experienced throughout Western Europe and strengthening immigration policies is a prime concern of the European Community at this time.

The amalgamation of Foreign residents from business executives to economic immigrants; including students, teachers, small business owners and others, undoubtedly adds to the cosmopolitan nature of a large city. The proliferation of ethnic restaurants and shops in certain sections of Lyon and other large cities often produces a popular and colourful area both for locals and visitors. This cosmopolitan nature is one of the areas in which a significant foreign population can be used to improve a city's international status.

Among the major "Eurocities" that are comparable to Lyon, the Italian and Spanish cities of Milan, Turin, and Barcelona have the lowest percentage of foreign residents (Figure 7.5). The major Northern European cities of Frankfurt, Amsterdam and Liège have the largest influx of foreigners. The majority of the foreigners in these cities are Turkish and Balkan "guest workers". Lyon itself considers 13% of its population as foreign with well over half of that number originating in Africa. There are large communities in Lyon of Maghrebins and Black Africans that continue to attract immigration from these areas. The second largest bloc of foreign residents in Lyon are the Southern Europeans who migrated to Lyon in the 1950's and 1960's. The vast majority of Lyon's foreign population are economic immigrants who moved to Lyon to find employment. In 1990, there were 158,648 foreign residents in the Lyon agglomeration. Of these, only 400 were from North America and 2,843 from Northern Europe.

Lyon would like to increase the number of foreign residents from North America and Northern Europe. These foreign residents represent, to a greater degree, the international business executives and the international status that is linked to them and their employers. Unfortunately, the figures show that the number of European Community foreign nationals in Lyon decreased by 16% between 1982 and 1990 while the number of non-European Community nationals, primarily North and Black Africans, increased by 7% over the same period (INSEE, 1991). This is also representative of the number of foreign consulates and organizations that are located in a city. The number of consulates, and nations represented at the diplomatic level in a particular city is another criteria in ranking the International status of a city.

Lyon is the best served French city outside of Paris in terms of foreign consulates. Lyon has a total of 41 foreign consulates of one rank or another including a consulate from the United States. Strasbourg has 25 foreign consulates, being the seat of the European Parliament, and no other French city has more than twenty. Marseille has lost the consulate from the United States that had been located there along with numerous other foreign consulates. Lille has 20 foreign consulates and Toulouse has 15. This strong number of foreign consulates in Lyon compared to its domestic rivals is a positive sign for Lyon.

On a European wide scale, Lyon's numbers look less impressive. Geneva with 67 consulates, Milan with 73, Barcelona with 62 and

Frankfurt with 64 are far and away the best served "Eurocities" in this category. Turin, Amsterdam and Rotterdam rank in the same category as Lyon in numbers of foreign consulates. Lyon's position is strong but, again, substantially behind the major European Cities and its nearest geographical rival, Geneva.

Overall, in terms of foreign population and official governmental offices and consulates, Lyon places in the middle tier of "Eurocities". The weakness in Lyon's number of international business executives within its foreign population is a reflection of the weakness of certain white collar service sectors of Lyon's economy. Lyon's position vis-à-vis the other major "Eurocities" in terms of the Soldatos model's criteria of foreign population in the context of "International City" status is competitive though not first rate.

7.4 SUMMARY

Lyon, within the context of a provincial French city, has a solid foundation of higher education and media infrastructure as well as a significant foreign population. However, Lyon does not distinguish itself as a national or even regional leader. Grenoble is comparable to Lyon in these categories and both trail Paris by a substantial margin. On a European scale, and according to the Soldatos model, Lyon is lacking the appropriate strength to claim "International City" status in these categories.

Lyon is cogniscent of this fact and has establsihed long-range plans to address this problem. The plan to greatly expand the size of the higher-education community in Lyon is one example. In these categories, however, urban planners cannot effectively change such factors as press and media dependency on Paris, the high-technology educational facilities in Grenoble nor the type of foreign residents in Lyon. These are issues essentially out of Lyon's control and will continue to place obstacles in Lyon's drive towards International status.

The past chapters in Part Two have attempted to describe and analyse the physical facilitators of Lyon's effort to become an

"International City". The Soldatos model has been used as the yardstick with which to measure Lyon's position and potential. None of these criteria are absolutely quantifiable, rather, this has attempted to serve as an illustration of Lyon's current position and its actions and plans to upscale its image through the improvement of these facilitators. The final facilitator is the economy of Lyon. This is arguably the most important facilitator and will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER EIGHT
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LYON'S ECONOMY

All models of an "International City" must consider a wide range of criteria to determine the actual ranking of a particular city. One of the most significant determining criteria concerns evaluating the economic strength of a city. Status, be it global or regional, rests first on the economic strength of a city. A dynamic, growing, high technology-driven economy accompanied by a first class financial centre with numerous specialized service professionals is a positive foundation and indicator of a city's status. The function of this chapter is to restate the economic criteria of the Soldatos model and to examine those elements of Lyon's economic and financial infrastructure. This will determine Lyon's economic strengths and weaknesses in the context of achieving "International City" status. This study will in turn provide a basis for judging not only Lyon's position within the Soldatos model but also whether Lyon's ambitions are realistic and attainable. This will help determine Lyon's economic position vis-à-vis the other "Eurocities".

This chapter will divide the study of Lyon's economic foundation into six major categories. Each of these categories will in turn discuss the broader regional and international dimensions associated with each function and link these results back into the Soldatos model in order to evaluate the economic position of Lyon. The first three categories correspond to the three major sectors of the economy: the service sector, the industrial sector and the high technology sector. These three sectors of the economy provide the majority of revenue, employment and economic strength of a city and are thus significant in determining Lyon's position.

The next category to be examined concerns the international trade of Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région. Direct international commercial contact is needed to assert a significant international economy. International trade provides expanded contacts and image on an international scale and is therefore an important element in the internationalization process. Also, international trade patterns are valuable in examining certain economic flows and functions regarding a city, thereby contributing to the evaluation of its relative economic importance. The fifth category to be studied concerns the location and number of corporate headquarters located in Lyon. According to the Soldatos model, an "International City" must possess numerous corporate headquarters of companies that have international functions. This helps determine whether a city has significant economic control of functions and flows or rather is merely an economic relay station. An "International City" will host the headquarters of a number of multi-national companies with global concerns.

The final category of this examination of the economic infrastructure of Lyon concerns the economic "image" of Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région. A number of national and international polls of top business executives are used to determine how the leaders of the business community, both within France and internationally, view Lyon in a number of vital economic categories. The economic image of a city is important in the Soldatos model in that it affects a city's ability to attract and maintain investment thus affecting the levels of critical mass needed to achieve "International City" status (Soldatos, 1989).

This chapter will then examine Lyon's bid to host the future Central European Bank (EuroFed). This examination will be used to highlight certain economic assets and drawbacks of Lyon as well as the importance of Lyon's attempt to secure a significant and prestigious European financial institution. Analysis of the points in this chapter will position Lyon, in an economic context, within the European urban hierarchy and within the Soldatos model, thereby providing a foundation to determine the viability of the concept of Lyon: "International City".

8.1 THE ECONOMIC CRITERIA FOR "INTERNATIONALITY"

It is important to remember that the primary concern of this chapter is not to explore in detail the overall economy of Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région. The objective of this chapter is to illustrate the internationality of Lyon's economy within the context of the Soldatos model. The working hypothesis of this objective is that Lyon must fulfil, to some degree, the economic criteria established by the Soldatos model in order to achieve its ambition of "International City" status. This chapter will examine Lyon's economic structure in the context of these specific economic criteria spelled-out in the Soldatos model.

The Soldatos model discussed the importance of an "International City" providing strategic support service of a superior level. The strength of a city's higher support services reflect directly upon the city's ability to control the financial flows within its region. Such higher support services include banking, insurance and financial services. Soldatos, in his model, also illustrated the importance of the presence of corporate headquarters and multi-national corporations in a city. Finally, Soldatos argued that an "International City" must establish the proper image and local/global links required to create the critical mass necessary to attain "International" status.

The DATAR/RECLUS ranking of the top 165 Western European cities incorporated a number of economic indicators within its model. The DATAR/RECLUS project included among its 16 criteria: Financial Functions, Multi-Nationals and "Infrastructure Téchnopôlitaires". In the category of Financial Functions Lyon was placed in the third tier among major European cities. Lyon ranked well behind such "Eurocities" as Frankfurt, Milan, Amsterdam, Zurich and a number of capital cities. In the category of Multi-Nationals, Lyon again ranked in the third tier of European cities behind 12 major cities and on the same tier as 10 other cities of Western Europe. In both of these categories Lyon ranked in the third tier of European cities behind the major cities of Western Europe. However, Lyon's position was far superior to that of any other French provincial city and on a par with such competitors as Turin, Barcelona, Dusseldorf and Manchester (Brunet, 1988).

In the context of "Infrastructure-Téchnopôlitaires" Lyon ranked in the top tier (Along with Paris and Grenoble in France). In theory, this category indicates the level of high-level research and development functions, high-technology corporations, and the city's level of high-technology infrastructure (digital fibre-optic communications for example). Lyon and other French cities did well in this category due to the current popularity of téchnopôles in France and the success of the State in constructing such technologically-advanced infrastructure as the TGV and digital telecommunications.

An examination of Lyon's economic infrastructure vis-à-vis the Soldatos model will help in determining the "International" status of Lyon. Examining the economic infrastructure of Lyon in the context of this model will help illustrate whether Lyon has the economic strength and linkages needed to carry the city to "International City" status. Without the economic motor to drive the other criteria and functions of internationality Lyon will never achieve its "International" ambitions.

8.2 THE SERVICE SECTOR

The service sector has been the fastest growing sector of the economy in Lyon, and France in general, over the past twenty five years. Today the service sector employs more people in Lyon than does the industrial sector. The service sector employed 43% of the workforce in the Lyon Agglomeration in 1990 (l'Emploi dans Rhône -Alpes, 1992). In this section on the service sector of the economy the prime concern rests with Lyon's position and internationality in four critical service sector enterprises: banking, insurance, financial services and information services. These four service sector industries form the core of the new age "International City's" ability to compete on the international stage.

8.21 BANKING

Banking is one of the basic foundations of any financial community. A true "International City" must possess numerous international banks, the headquarters of large local banks, and conduct business with a diverse and international clientele. This allows the city to retain the profits of such commerce and to ensure the local employment of high-calibre white collar employees. Also, this helps develop a relationship between local business and local banks whose cooperation can help establish some form of critical mass. Major bank headquarters and international bank branch offices also serve as a magnet to other banks, clients and higher level financial services thus attracting more higher services and their advantages to the city.

Lyon is the headquarters of three Banques des Depôts, (Deposit Banks), Banque Morin Pons, S.L.B., and Crédit Lyonnais which has returned the headquarters of its Depôt operations to Lyon (though the corporate headquarters remain at La Défense in Paris). All of these Banques des Depôts have a local function but their national functions remain limited except for Crédit Lyonnais. None of the three has an international function as a Banque des Depôts and none employs over one thousand people (Bonnet, 1989).

Lyon is also the headquarters for three smaller banks: Banque Populaire de Lyon, Crédit Mutuel Sud-Est, and Crédit Agricole du Rhône. The three banks have a national function limited primarily to the south-east section of France. None employs over 400 people, indeed Crédit Agricole du Rhône employs less than 15 persons. A reflection of the limited banking facilities of Lyon is that neither Crédit Lyonnais nor Banque de Rhône-Alpes, banks which originated in Lyon, currently have their headquarters in Lyon.

Lyon, being the second ranking French agglomeration, hosts branch offices of all the other major French banks. The main Lyon office of the powerful Banque National de Paris (B.N.P). also serves as the regional headquarters for the B.N.P. throughout the Rhône-Alpes and Auvergne regions. Lyon realistically acknowledges that the major French banks with headquarters in Paris are not going to move their corporate headquarters to Lyon. Lyon is instead attempting to establish itself as the regional financial centre of "Le Grand Sud-Est". The establishment of the regional headquarters of the B.N.P. and Société-Générale in Lyon is one visible example of this strategy (Tuppen, 1988).

The first step is to convince important financial institutions similar to B.N.P. to establish regional headquarters in Lyon. These institutions must be responsible for not only the whole Rhône-Alpes Région but also for South-East France. The second necessity is to increase the authority of such regional offices. The French financial sector is as centralized as the French political system. Though there are many regional offices in Lyon most have a limited mandate. The Lyon director of La Société Générale currently has the same powers as the local director in Carcassone for example (Bonnet, 1989). Important decisions, and those involving significant sums of capital, are handled in Paris. Lyon's ambitions to become a regional banking hub for South-East France would elevate Lyon's financial functions and ability to control capital flows and investments.

The number of international banks that maintain offices in Lyon is another important indicator of Lyon's position in the international financial world. In Lyon there were 18 international banks represented in 1992. Many of these banks are Spanish and Italian including: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, Banco Popular Espagnol, Banco di Roma and Banco di Sicilia. These were originally established to serve the needs of the Spanish and Italian immigrants that moved into the Lyon area after the Second World War. The major function of these banks was to allow the migrant workers to send money home to their families. In the last decade these banks have admittedly expanded their services but remain in Lyon primarily to serve a specific national community and have little impact on the international interests of Lyon (C.C.I.L. Annuaire, No 33, 1990). Currently, the Banque d'Algérie and Banque de Maroc provide the same service to the immigrant populations of these countries that their southern European counterparts provided to their citizens after the Second World War. Again, these are international banks but with limited functions for a limited consumer base.

The remaining international bank branch offices in Lyon are primarily the major banks of European Community nations. Barclays, Midlands, Grindlays and Lloyds of the United Kingdom, along with Banque Worms, (Germany), and Caixabank (Italy) are a sampling of the European banks with minor branch offices in Lyon. Citibank, the largest bank in the United States, established a regional headquarters in Lyon to serve South-Eastern France that employs 20 persons

(Mayère et Bonamy, 1988). This is not a branch bank open to the public but is rather in Lyon to serve the business community and the financial interests of Citibank. This minor office is the only representation in Lyon by a United States bank. No Asian or Middle Eastern Banks are represented in Lyon.

To contrast the 18 international bank branches in Lyon with the 237 in Frankfurt or the 77 in Geneva is but one illustration of the weakness of Lyon's international banking community. Not only are there many more international banks (and domestic bank headquarters) in these Eurocities, but these banks command far more resources, capital and prestige than do the ones in Lyon (Bonnet, 1989). Frankfurt and Geneva each have the advantage of having established an image as an international banking centre. This international image, prominent in the Soldatos model, has helped in the acquisition of the critical mass needed in this field to solidify their international positions in the banking industry. Lyon has neither the history, image nor critical mass required to compete at the same level with these "Eurocities".

This lack of international and domestic influential banking operations has numerous negative implications for Lyon. Having to consult corporate headquarters in Paris to resolve matters of importance imposes a definite negative association on Lyon's image as an international financial centre. For, if Lyon is just another provincial office to the Parisian banks, then it has no hope of establishing its own financial independence. Secondly, since the national financial power remains concentrated in Paris, future international expansion will be accomplished through offices in the capital and not in Lyon. Also, there is a core-periphery relationship that exists within France that drains many of the best and brightest executives away from Lyon and the provinces to work in Paris. Most corporate executives wish to end their provincial stint and return to the company's headquarters in Paris as soon as possible. This has a negative impact upon Lyon and retards the city's progress towards any degree of financial prominence within France and the European Community.

8.22 INSURANCE

Insurance is another critically important higher service that needs to be competitively available in any "International City" (Soldatos, 1989). The high level corporate insurance sector in Lyon is comparable in size and importance to Lyon's banking industry. Lyon's insurance offices offer general insurance services but most detailed transactions, such as complex industrial risk actions, are usually handled by the corporate headquarters in Paris. (Bonamy et. al., 1989). A specialist, when needed on the spot, is dispatched to Lyon via the TGV. This specialist is then able to return to Paris at the end of the business day with the specialized job completed. The increase in technology has increased the financial zone of influence of Paris to include Lyon. The express TGV and instantaneous telecommunication equipment allows the talented trained specialists to operate out of Paris thus reducing the number of such high level service professionals in the secondary cities of France.

A telling example of the weakness of the corporate insurance sector in Lyon is that not a single mutual insurance company with any national function has its headquarters in Lyon, or even in the Rhône Département. Le Union Prévoyance Entreprise SUD is the only mutual insurance company with headquarters in Lyon and has no function outside the city. Three of the mutual insurance offices in Lyon are regional headquarters of companies with headquarters in Paris, but none has the authority or expertise to be considered an actor in the international market. All of the domestic mutual insurance offices located in Lyon have their corporate headquarters in Paris. Another example of the stranglehold that Paris has on the French corporate insurance sector is that the large UAP insurance company has 1500 agents in the field throughout France and an additional 3,000 at the company's headquarters in La Défense to control the field agents and all other aspects of the company (L'Entreprise, No 78, Mars 1992).

A ranking of corporate insurance offices on a variety of criteria showed the dominance of Paris and the weakness of Lyon. This ranking had a maximum possible score of +2 and a maximum negative score of -2. Paris led the nation with a total score of +1.05. The second ranked city was Marseille with a total score of +.50, (due in part to the important marine insurance companies in Marseille). Lyon, in this ranking of corporate insurance offices, had a total score of -.72 (L'Entreprise, No 78, Mars 1992). This negative rating reinforces the argument that Lyon is badly lacking in this higher service sector of the economy and that it is dominated by Paris. This represents another area of the Soldatos model where Lyon is lacking the necessary attributes to attain "International City" status.

8.23 FINANCIAL SERVICES

Lyon is equally impoverished in the major financial services area of the higher services sector of the economy. Of the 106 such financial services corporate organizations in Lyon, only three with any form of national function had headquarters there in 1987. Of these three, Caisse d'Epargne de Lyon with almost 500 employees is significantly larger than the others and the only specialized financial services corporation with any international identity in Lyon. The other two, SOFIDEX and SAFIGEC each employ approximately 50 people and limit their functions to Lyon. One-half of the remaining 106 financial service corporations in Lyon have their headquarters outside of the Département of Rhône. The other half of these financial services institutions are located in Lyon or are controlled by a local company (Bonnet, 1989). As noted, however, only Caisse d'Epargne de Lyon is of a significant size and national function to be considered a major financial services institution. It must also be noted, however, that many major French cities do not have even a single locally-based financial institution with the size and function of Caisse d'Epargne de Lyon.

Another indicator is the percentage of the active workforce employed in these fields. Only 2.9% of Lyon's active workforce was employed in these three service sectors (banking, insurance and financial services) in 1987 In contrast, 18.7% of the active workforce in Geneva was engaged in these activities during the same year (Bonnet, 1989). This is a substantial difference and reflects the status of these two neighbours in the international financial world. Geneva is a major international financial centre that provides the highest level of services in the financial sector and is home to numerous international financial institutions and important branch offices. In contrast, Lyon is not an international financial centre and is only a minor national one. Other major Eurocities employ between 4.7% (Barcelona) to 14.6% (Amsterdam) of their active workforce in the financial services sector. (Lyon, Ville Internationale, 1988). Significantly, all of the cities with which Lyon is competing for "Eurocity" status employ a greater number of their active workforce in these vital service sectors than does Lyon.

8.24 INFORMATION SERVICES

The information services sector is the final higher services industry to be examined. The Rhône-Alpes Région was ranked sixth in France out of the 21 metropolitan regions in terms of information services infrastructure in 1991. This ranking was derived using 20 criteria in the following four categories: labour, equipment, investment, and contractors (L'Atlas Informatique, 1992).

Information and information technology are critical components of the modern global economy. The movement, organization and effective use of information is currently as important as any other service sector function. Information technology in France is often centred around the larger téchnopôles. Outside the major concentration of information-telecommunication research and development industries around Paris, the téchnopôles at Sophia-Antiopolis (Nice), ZIRST de Meylan (Grenoble) and the telecommunications centre at Lannion in Brittany constitute the major centres of research and development in this important field in France.

The dominance of Paris in the Information-Telecommunications field is well-documented. Two-thirds of the managers in information services were working in the Ile-de-France Region in 1991. This represents 64,205 information managers as compared with the 7,014 information managers in the Rhône-Alpes Région in 1991, many of whom work in Grenoble. To further consolidate this sector of the service economy, over one-half of all new enterprises in information services created in France in 1991 were created in the Ile-de-France

Region. In 1991 alone, a total of 2,379 new information services enterprises were formed in the Ile-de-France Region as compared with 460 in Rhône-Alpes Région, which was the second-ranking region in France (L'Atlas Informatique, 1992).

The positive factors for Lyon in the information services sector of the economy is that the Rhône-Alpes Région is the second-ranking region in France in the creation of information services enterprises and the employment of professional information managers. The negative factor for Lyon is that the Rhône-Alpes Région is a distant second behind the Ile-de-France Region. Also, many of the information services enterprises are located in Grenoble. Significantly for the long term, the Ile-de-France Region has developed the critical mass synergy needed in the field of information-telecommunication that will increasingly attract the top professionals and the majority of the research and development investment to the Paris Basin and away from Lyon and the rest of France. Over time this will only reduce Lyon's already minor position in this important and expanding international sector of the economy.

8.25 STATUS OF THE SERVICE SECTOR

The overall picture of the service industry in Lyon is mixed. The positive points are that Lyon is attracting and creating new service companies. In 1987, 72 new service sector establishments were created in Lyon. Lyon is also the most attractive location in the Rhône-Alpes to establish a new service sector enterprise. 48.5% of all new service enterprises established in the Rhône-Alpes by companies outside the region were established in Lyon (Bonnet, 1989).

Examining the location of the headquarters of these new service enterprises in Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes illustrates similar results for Lyon. Of the 72 new service enterprises created in Lyon in 1987, 27 have headquarters in Paris, 26 in the Rhône Département, 10 in the rest of the Rhône-Alpes, and 9 in the rest of France (Chambre Regionale de Commerce et d'Industrie Rhône-Alpes, Janvier 1991). The positive factor was that 26 were locally-controlled; the negative element was that 27 were controlled from Paris. Also, none of these new service enterprises was international, all had their headquarters in France. An "International City" needs international companies to locate new enterprises within its sphere of influence to be considered "International". Unfortunately for Lyon's international ambitions, multi-national service companies are not locating a large number of such new enterprises in Lyon.

Lyon has few headquarters of national importance in the banking, insurance or other higher service industries (Bonnet, 1987) This lack of economic decision-making is clearly visible when examining the location of the headquarters of the 500 largest French companies in 1987. Only 19 of the top 500 companies had their headquarters in Lyon, and of these 19, 10 were subsidiaries of larger groups with headquarters in Paris (For example, R.V.I. is controlled by the State-run Renault Group).

Examining the creation of service industries shows more mixed blessings for Lyon. The location of the headquarters of the 171 new service enterprises created in the Rhône-Alpes Région in 1987 shows that 55 of these new service enterprises have headquarters in Paris while 54 have headquarters in Lyon. (C.C.I.L., 1989). This illustrated that Lyon is able to exert its position as regional capital to a limited degree. Lyon is seen as expanding its complementary role within the region vis-à-vis Paris, by increasingly becoming the location of regional headquarters of higher services corporations (Bonnet, 1989).

There are 72 major service sector enterprises in the Rhône-Alpes Région that employ over 50 people and that are owned by non-French companies. The United States is the major foreign influence in the region accounting for 28 (32%) of the foreign service sector enterprises in the region that employ over 50 people. The 28 American-owned companies had an absolute value of almost 3 billion francs in 1990 (INSEE-Rhône-Alpes, 1991). The other leading foreign owners of service sector enterprises in the region are, in order, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy. Of these 72 foreign- owned service sector enterprises in the region that employ over 50 persons, 49 (69%) are located in the Département of Rhône and 9 (13%) are located in the Département of Isère. Lyon is clearly the prefered regional location for foreign-owned service sector enterprises in the region.

The importance of the banking, insurance, and financial services industries in Lyon is well below the standard of an "International City" as defined by Soldatos and by Brunet. This is indicated by Lyon's lack of national and international headquarters of corporations in these important service sectors as well as the small number of actual branch offices of international companies in Lyon. Lyon also lacks a serious regional presence in these higher services. Other regional urban centres are also dependent upon Paris for these services instead of being able to turn to Lyon, the regional capital, for these important services. The importance of money cannot be understated. To lack top level financial functions is a severe hindrance to Lyon. Being unable to control the flows of capital and resources that affects its activities leaves Lyon as a dependent city in financial terms. This situation needs to be addressed if Lyon is to achieve a greater degree of financial critical mass and "International" status.

8.3 THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

Any city with “International” ambitions must have a successful industrial sector to effectively drive its economy. Without the economic driving force of a strong industrial sector the power and position of a city will quickly erode and decline. Therefore, a city must maintain a strong local industrial base upon which to develop the necessities of “International” status such as infrastructure, political strength and an effective service and high technology economy. A strong industrial sector of a city’s economy provides the framework upon which a city’s “International” status is constructed. This sector cannot be underestimated in favour of the currently more popular service and high-technology driven enterprises.

In addition to providing the framework for building “International” status, the industrial sector of a city’s economy must be international in its own regard. When attempting to examine and determine the internationality of a city’s industrial sector a number of parameters must be established. First, one must acknowledge the advent of the local/global industrial economy. The distinction between which sectors are local and which are global is becoming increasingly blurred. The increase in mergers, buyouts and joint projects along with technology rapidly shrinking the relative size of the globe have all added to the difficulty in distinguishing between local and global economies (Soldatos, 1989). Second, no city can be absolutely judged on its own merits alone. One needs to include the wider economic region so as to avoid judging Lyon's industrial data in a vacuum. One cannot divorce the industrial sector of Lyon completely from the industrial sector of the surrounding area. With this understanding, certain broad criteria can be used to determine the strength and internationality of the local industrial sector.

An examination of the industrial sector of Lyon's economy and that of the entire Rhône-Alpes Région will be divided into two sections. The first section will examine the actual size and strength of Lyon's industrial sector to determine its ability to support Lyon's international ambitions. This section will then continue by focussing on the internationality of Lyon's industrial sector. This will include levels of foreign investment, foreign penetration and the number of local companies that function in an international context. The second section will determine the strength and internationality of the industrial structure or framework of Lyon. The size and influence of local companies will be considered along with an examination of the industrial linkages and networks within the Rhône-Alpes Région. This will help determine if Lyon's industries are competitive with other European industries and if the regional linkages and networks defined by the Soldatos model are in place and functional within the Rhône-Alpes Région.

Lyon has traditionally been a centre for trade and industry. Lyon was a major trading post and the capital of Roman Gaul two thousand years ago. Since that time Lyon has continued to take advantage of its favourable location on the confluence of the Rhône and Saône rivers to become a prosperous commercial centre. Lyon has a diversified economy including a well-balanced industrial sector. Stretching south from Lyon along the Rhône river are major industries ranging from oil refineries and petro-chemicals to major vehicle assembly plants. These heavy industries are the backbone of the manufacturing economy of Lyon. These industries must be of a size capable of driving the overall economy of Lyon to international status.

Within the greater Lyon agglomeration 164,000 persons are employed in the industrial sector of the economy. The industrial base of Lyon is 90% comprised of companies that employ less than 50 persons (Enjeux internationaux de l'industrie de Rhône-Alpes, 1990). This industrial sector is diverse and dependent upon this large number of small operations. However, it is the handful of large companies that have the greater international presence. These major companies are concentrated in five major industries: chemicals and pharmaceuticals, mechanical construction, electrical goods, metal works and textiles.

8.31 CHEMICAL-BASED INDUSTRIES

The chemical (including petro-chemical) and pharmaceutical industry is one of Lyon's strongest and most international. This sector employs 14.5% of the industrial workforce in the Rhône-Alpes Région and is globally competitive (Bonneville et. al., 1991). World leaders in this industrial sector that are located in Lyon include Rhône-Poulenc, Mérieux and l'Institut Mérieux. Rhône-Poulenc, which employs 5000 persons, is the Lyon company with the greatest number of international functions. Rhône-Poulenc has 96 international offices throughout the globe including a strong presence in North America. Rhône-Poulenc has by far the greatest number of international offices of any Lyon-based company. Mérieux and l'Institut Mérieux have less of an international function (Mérieux has 11 international offices) except for the world-wide distribution of the vaccines and serums produced by l'Institut Mérieux (Bonneville et.al., 1991).

The heavy chemical or petro-chemical industry of Lyon is centred around the Elf-Aquitaine oil refinery at Feyzin. This refinery is the fifth largest in France and has the capacity to handle 9 million tons per year. It is important to both local industries and the economy as a whole that a major refinery is located in the Lyon agglomeration.

This provides numerous jobs and the gas and oil needed to run other industries in the area. The refinery at Feyzin is also responsible for the development of a number of important research centres near Feyzin (Bonnet, 1987).

The Institut Français du Pétrole (IFP) which employs 200 persons, and the ELF-France centre de recherche, which employs 300 persons, are two major research centres that are directly associated with the refinery at Feyzin. This is an example of the industrial sector of the economy providing the impetus for high-technology research centres. Without the refinery at Feyzin there would be no high-technology spin-off industries in this field near Lyon. Also, the ELF-CFP and IFP mini-refinery project at Solaise is a major research project that is developing the next-generation refinery technology. This mini-refinery processes only 20,000 tons per year but its primary function is improving refinery technology and methods (Bonnet, 1987). The critical mass associated with Feyzin in this field helped persuade AGIP, the Italian national oil company, to locate its French headquarters in Feyzin. This was a major coup for the area and illustrates the advantages inherent with the development of sufficient critical mass centred around a major industry. These are the projects that Lyon needs to enhance its reputation and image as a high-technology centre that can attract top researchers to prestigious projects.

The pharmaceutical concerns around Lyon are mostly controlled by non-French companies; Hoechst (Germany), Duphar (Netherlands) and Dow Corning (USA) are three major multi-national companies that manufacture pharmaceutical product in and around Lyon. Having Lyon as an attractive location for major international pharmaceutical companies to establish manufacturing concerns is a strong statement of Lyon's strength and internationality within this industrial field. The critical mass to support the pharmaceutical industry is already in place in Lyon and should continue to attract such major companies as well as smaller local concerns such as Boiron located in Sainte-Foy-lés-Lyon (Bonnet, 1987).

8.32 METAL WORKS

The second major industrial area of importance in the Lyon area is the metal works industry. In Lyon this is dominated by Renault Véhicules Industriels (RVI), a subsidiary of the State owned Renault Group. RVI has its headquarters in Lyon and is the single largest industrial employer (23,000 in 1990) in the Rhône-Alpes Région. Though RVI has its headquarters in Lyon it has plants throughout the region. Through RVI, the Rhône-Alpes Région constructs 53% of all heavy vehicles in France over 12 tonnes, 42% of all 6-12 tonnes trucks and over 90% of all buses (Rhône-Alpes dans l'Espace Européen, No 2, 1990). RVI is also directly responsible for the economic survival of a number of smaller companies. These subcontractors that depend upon the success of RVI produce components ranging from tyres to dashboards. The successful knock-on affects of a company the size of RVI has large implications to the local industrial sector. Such major companies are needed to ensure the strength and vitality of all levels of the local industrial sector.

A final note of interest concerning RVI is that even though its headquarters are in Lyon, the financial and international divisions of RVI were moved to Paris in 1977, where they have remained. That the major industrial company with its headquarters in Lyon maintains its financial and international divisions in Paris is illustrative of the financial weakness and lack of international image associated with Lyon. Until Lyon is in a position to retain these functions of RVI it is difficult to envisage Lyon attracting such high-level services from other companies.

The other major metal works companies in the Lyon area include Roux in Méyzieu (200 employed), Florence et Peillon in Vaulx-en-Velin (572 employed), Duranton-Sicfond in Vénisseux (330 employed) and Leleu in Vaise (400 employed) (Tableaux de l'Économie Rhône-Alpes, 1991). These companies, along with RVI, help account for the fact that the Rhône-Alpes Région employs 16.5% of all persons employed in metal works in France. This local strength in this major industrial field helps provide Lyon with the strong industrial sector of employment and output that is required to succeed in the future.

8.33 FOREIGN PENETRATION AND INVESTMENT

The importance of foreign penetration and foreign investment to the local economy is growing and provides another indicator of the increasing lack of distinction between a local and global economy. The local economy of any region is becoming increasingly dependent upon external influences, particularly investment. For a local economy to thrive it must in turn be successful on a global scale in terms of attracting foreign investment. Foreign market penetration and foreign investment are also crucial elements of the Soldatos model, being viewed as necessary to establishing not only international connections but also the global dimension required to enhance the local industrial sector of the economy.

The rate of foreign penetration into a regional economy is not a precise statistic. However, by using the same base indicators and applying them to all regions, a number of general conclusions are possible. The overall foreign penetration of Rhône-Alpes industries was 18.4% in 1989. This is significantly less than the national average of 21.6%. The French regions with the highest levels of foreign penetration in 1989 were Alsace (38.2%), Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur (22.6%) and Lorraine (22.0%) (Bonneveille et. al., 1991). All three of these regions share a frontier with a major trading partner to the east; Germany, Switzerland or Italy. Rhône-Alpes Région shares to a degree the advantages of a frontier location (<u>Rhône-Alpes dans l'Espace Européen</u>, No 2, 1990).

The rate of foreign penetration in Rhône-Alpes is also slower than these other three regions as well as Ile-de-France. The Swiss and Germans are concentrating the bulk of their interest in France to the frontier areas of Alsace. The reason for such a high level of attractivity by Alsace is that it shares a frontier with both Germany and Switzerland and is well-positioned on the main northern European axis. The foreign penetration by the Swiss in the Rhône-Alpes Région is essentially limited to the area around Geneva and is therefore not focused on Lyon (<u>Rhône-Alpes dans l'Espace Européen</u>, No 2, 1990).

A final reason for the lack of foreign penetration in the Rhône-Alpes is that the many of the region's industries are viewed as vulnerable to European Community competition. This point will be discussed in the next section of this chapter in relation to the industrial linkages and cohesion of the region's economy. These reasons also help account for the low level of foreign investment in the Rhône-Alpes Région. Foreign investment represents 26% of total investment in France. Paris and the Ile-de-France Region are the most attractive investments to foreigners, Paris is in fact the fifth most attractive city in Europe to foreign investors, behind London, Brussels, Frankfurt and Zurich. The Rhône-Alpes Région attracts only 18% of its overall investment from foreign sources (Rhône-Alpes dans l'Espace Européen, No 2, 1990). This is 8% below the national average of foreign investment. This low level of foreign investment is another obstacle in Lyon's ambitions to construct an "International" economic image. If Rhône-Alpes cannot attract international investment one can argue that the region is either unattractive, uncompetitive or both. This argument is cause for concern among the leaders of the region and Lyon (Entreprise Rhône-Alpes Internationale:, 1989).

Overall, the relatively low level of foreign penetration and investment in the Rhône-Alpes Région is a considerable negative factor for the increasing internationalization of the region's economy. To attain a greater international status a city or region must be able to attract foreign investment. This is also mandatory for the health of the local industrial economy which is the foundation of the whole internationalization project. Without attracting foreign capital, Lyon will not be able to achieve either the industrial strength or internationality of industry to establish the foundations of an "International City".

8.34 COMPETITIVENESS AND REGIONAL LINKAGES

The local and global competitiveness of the industrial sector of Lyon's and the region's economy is important in positioning Lyon within the economic framework of the Soldatos model. Without a competitive industrial sector, the international ambitions of Lyon will remain a mirage. In evaluating industrial competitiveness for this purpose a generalized overview rather than a detailed sector-by-sector approach is warranted. All sectors of Lyon's industrial base are not equally competitive on either a local or global scale but a broad comparative examination will serve to position Lyon within the appropriate context and parameters of the Soldatos model.

A DATAR study released in 1988 concluded that Lyon's and the region's competitive position in industry vis-à-vis the European Community was poor in most areas. Many sectors of local industry were judged not competitive with those sectors in other European Community countries. Specifically, such manufacturing companies as RVI were considered vulnerable to open competition with German vehicle manufacturers. Spatially, the heavy industry sector south of Lyon including St. Etienne were considered particularly vulnerable to the European Community single market competition after 1993. The areas close to Lyon, and the alpine agglomerations of Grenoble and Annecy were considered the most industrially-competitive in the region.

Another gauge of the region's industrial competitiveness concerns the actual size, structure and linkages of the industrial sector of the region. The first concern for the Rhône-Alpes Région is that in the current local/global economy, the success of local small and medium-sized enterprises is critical. The backbone of this economy is comprised of the small and medium-sized enterprises that employ between 100 and 499 persons. In the Rhône-Alpes, only 4.1% of the industrial establishments fit into this category. In comparison, Baden-Württemburg, a member with Rhône-Alpes of the "Four Motors of Europe", boasts that 23.9% of its industrial enterprises employ between 100 and 499 persons. This lack of competitively-sized small and medium enterprises in the Rhône-Alpes restricts the industrial flexibility and growth of the region as well as its overall attractiveness since this sized company is habitually the most attractive to investors (Rhône-Alpes dans l'Espace Européen, No 2, 1990).

The small and medium-sized industries are also those more effectively aided by the political administration of the region. The

Rhône-Alpes as a political authority can best help and influence the small and medium-sized companies to succeed and to adhere to the region's integrated economic goals. This can be achieved through tax incentives, constructing physical infrastructure such as office buildings and téchnopôles, along with encouraging cooperation with other enterprises or academic institutions. The region can impact the small and medium-sized enterprises to a greater degree than a company the size of RVI. Despite the region's administrative desire to assist small and medium-sized industries become competitive, there remain an insufficient number of such enterprises to impact substantially the local economy. This is one large structural problem in the industrial sector of the region's economy.

A second structural problem in the industrial structure of the Rhône-Alpes is the lack of effective linkages between the various enterprises either through the regional administrative structure or through private self-interest (Figure 8.1) In comparing the regional industrial linkages of the Rhône-Alpes with the other major regions of Europe, including the "Four Motors of Europe", one can distinguish the lack of cohesion in the Rhône-Alpes. A closer examination of Figure 8.1 illustrates that the other major regions in Europe might not share the same structure (vertical, horizontal or some combination of the two) of linkages between various industrial sectors but they all share some form of organized structural linkages except for the Rhône-Alpes (La Région Rhône-Alpes dans l'espace européen, 1990).

This lack of either vertical or horizontal industrial integration is a serious impediment to the industrial development and competitiveness of the Rhône-Alpes Région. This is especially harmful when considering the fact that the major competing regions of Europe all have a greater degree of industrial linkages to spur growth and development. Within the Rhône-Alpes a number of localized attempts at industrial linkages are being considered in such locations as Oyonnax and Annonay but on a regional scale such vital links are missing. This lack of linkages is detrimental in that a local economy operating on a global scale must have some form of cooperation and cohesion to enhance the overall performance and competitive nature of local level industries. The Rhône-Alpes, with an essentially "every

Figure 8.1
Regional Industrial
Linkages



Cohesive Relations
Example: Baden Württenberg

Industrial Districts
Examples: Lombardy
Catalonia





Hierarchical Relations. Example: Piedmont



Lack of Cohesion. Example: Rhône-Alpes

SOURCE: La Région Rhône-Alpes dans l'espace européen, 1990.

man for himself" industrial system, will remain at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the other better-organized European regions.

There were 287 industrial enterprises of over 50 persons with foreign capitalization in 1990 in the Rhône-Alpes Région. Of these, 86 were from the United States, 42 from Germany, 37 from the United Kingdom and 33 from Switzerland with the rest divided mostly among other European countries. The United States was the largest investor in industrial enterprises in the region accounting for 22% of all investment, 32% of wage-earners and 39% of value added among foreign investors in the industrial sector.

Of these 287 foreign owned industrial enterprises, 31% are located in the Département of Rhône. Isère with 21% of such enterprises ranks second in the region. However, none of these foreign-owned industrial enterprises has headquarters in the Rhône Département. Caterpillar France, the French subsidiary of Caterpillar USA has its headquarters in Grenoble and employs 2207 people. This is the only American subsidiary with headquarters in the Rhône-Alpes Région (La Région Rhône-Alpes dans l'espace européen, 1990). This reflects the centralization of such foreign subsidiary's headquarters in Paris as opposed to Lyon or the other second tier French cities.

8.35 SUMMARY OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

The overall conclusion regarding the industrial sector of Lyon's economy in the context of the Soldatos model pivots on a number of generalizations. First, divorcing the local industrial economy of Lyon from that of the region as a whole is unrealistic. The industrial sector on a local scale does not operate in a vacuum, rather it is dependent upon regional and global forces. Therefore, the greatest problem that exists for the local industrial sector of the economy is the lack of regional linkages and cohesion. This must be addressed if Lyon is to function as a regional centre and "International City". Secondly, the relative lack of industrial size, foreign penetration and foreign investment indicate that Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région is not competitive with such regions as Baden-Württemberg or Lombardy.

The evident lack of small and medium-sized enterprises is another competitive disadvantage in the increasingly competitive local/global economic equation.

Attempting to judge the industrial sector of a local economy in the context of its "internationality", how it applies to the Soldatos model and its regional significance in a wider European competitive sphere, is problematic at best. No local economy is isolated, coherent or capable of independent action. However, within the basic parameters mentioned earlier in this section, the results of these studies on the local and regional industrial sector can to some degree place Lyon in a specific position vis-à-vis its European competitors and in a relative position vis-à-vis the Soldatos model. The overall picture one finds is that Lyon has a sufficient industrial base to warrant international aspirations and to construct the infrastructure needed to achieve some success. However, there remain problems of size, structure and international image that must be addressed for Lyon to improve its overall position in either a specific or relative fashion.

8.4 THE HIGH-TECHNOLOGY SECTOR

The third major sector of the economy consists of rapidly-expanding high-technology industries. These high-technology industries are often heavily committed to research and development, employ a limited number of well-educated staff and focus on a very narrow product range. Such industries are considered the industries of the future and are incorporated into the Soldatos model as an important necessity in the overall infrastructure of any "International City".

As with the service sector and industrial sector of Lyon's economy, it is impossible to completely divorce the city's high-technology sector of the economy from that of the region. However, since the high-technology enterprises are usually smaller and more spatially dependent upon the local environment it is possible to separate the Lyon high-technology sector from that of the region to a greater extent than was possible with the service and industrial sectors.

The single largest industry in the Rhône-Alpes Région is the nuclear power industry. The distribution of electricity is the single largest facet of the region's economy. The nuclear power industries accounted for 10% of the region's total production income in 1990 with a total production value of 16.5 billion francs (Bonneville et.al., 1991). The nuclear industry is by definition one of high-technology that is dependent upon a high level of research and development and well-skilled scientists for its success. The numerous research and development enterprises dependent upon the nuclear industry both in the public and private domains are centred around Grenoble, not Lyon.

Grenoble has developed a strong tradition for nuclear research since the end of the Second World War. The first nuclear research centres in France were developed in Grenoble in the late 1940's. The major international research centres located in Grenoble include: la Laboratoire Européene du Rayonnement Synchrotron (ESRF), l'Institut de Radioastronomie Millimétrique (IRAM), la Laboratoire de Champs Interisés and l'Institut Laue et Langevin (ILL). These four major international research centres form the core of the high-technology critical mass that is the strength of Grenoble's economy and reputation (Perrat, 1989).

Grenoble has neither the service sector strength nor industrial sector base of Lyon. However, the size and prestige of its high-technology industries and research centres allows Grenoble certain luxuries. Due to the nature of high-technology industries Grenoble has been able to secure a certain economic independence from Paris and establish a position that enables it to pursue European and international connections in the high-technology field. In Part Three, a detailed exploration of the region's urban relations will be undertaken; in this context the point remains that it is Grenoble and not Lyon that enjoys the superior high-technology industries and position (Bonnet, 1987).

Lyon is not, however, without a high-technology sector. Lyon is a major hospital and biological technologies (bio-tech) centre. Lyon is host to the Centre Internationale de Recherche sur le Cancer (CIRC) which is one of the world's leading cancer research laboratories. Lyon has also used its traditionally strong medical reputation to persuade the Hospal Institut to move its headquarters from Paris to Lyon. The attraction of these publicly funded research centres is in conjunction with the numerous private medical/bio-tech research centres developed by subsidiaries of the chemical/pharmaceutical industries. Bio-Mérieux is a research and development company associated with the large Mérieux corporation. Bio-Mérieux and such new bio-tech companies as Danto-Rogéat and Pyro-Contrôle in Vaulx-en-Velin are helping to establish the critical mass needed to develop Lyon as a foremost research and development centre in this lucrative and expanding section of the high-technology sector (Perrat, 1989).

Another manner in which Lyon is attempting to expand its high-technology sector is through the creation of "téchnopôles". A téchnopôle, in theory, is the grouping of a number of small and medium-sized research and development companies on a common site. A téchnopôle should also attract the involvement of local academic institutions in an effort to combine the best resources in both the private and academic sectors to achieve maximum results. The concept behind a téchnopôle is that of critical mass. By developing numerous research and development enterprises in one area, more such enterprises and individuals will be similarly attracted to that téchnopôle.

Lyon has been actively establishing such centres during the past decade. Téchnopôles are dependent upon a local administrative unit to supply the infrastructure and incentives to establish the needed enterprises. Lyon's city administration (along with the COURLY) have emphasized the development of such téchnopôles with positive results. The C.C.I.L. is also an active participant in the development of local téchnopôles and describes them as such: "La nouvelle indentité des pepinières d'enterprises innovatives de la téchnopôle lyonnaise." Three such nurseries of innovation have been established; "Novacité

Alpha" in Villeurbanne, "Novacité Delta" in Ecully, and "Novacité Omega" in the recently renovated Gerland district in Lyon.

Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région have a relatively strong high-technology sector of the economy, especially when Grenoble is considered. However, one must examine the dominance of Paris and the Ile-de-France Region in this important economic sector. Paris is the primary centre of high-technology companies and research and development in France. 75% of all high-technology companies in France have their headquarters in Paris including 400 of the top 500. This includes all of the largest 20 such companies. In addition, 75% of all research laboratories are located in the Paris agglomeration (Bonnet, 1989). This has clearly established Paris as the focal point of the French high-technology industry and has manifestly attained the critical mass needed for attracting the majority of new high-technology industries and merging with those smaller non-Parisian enterprises which would move more headquarters to Paris. This will continue to have a negative effect on Lyon's high-technology industry's and its bid to establish an international high-technology function.

8.5 INTERNATIONAL TRADE

International trade is another valid indicator of the international dimensions of a local economy. International trade, divided into imports and exports, is useful in judging both the strength of a local economy and its international flows and linkages. These are important factors in determining whether a local economy assists in providing "International" status for the local spatial area. The Soldatos model uses international trade as one of the leading indicators in determining the "International" status of a city economy because it is an international process by definition (Soldatos, 1989).

International trade statistics are difficult to reduce effectively below the level of the region without losing the big picture of an integrated economic unit. In this examination of international trade, the Rhône-Alpes Région is the smallest spatial unit of significant size to be studied in any coherent fashion. Therefore, the region's international trade numbers will be used to determine approximately the relative position of Lyon's international trade dimensions within certain parameters.

Additionally, international trade statistics must be treated with caution and utilized primarily for relative analysis. International trade statistics can be divided in a number of fashions, some of greater comparative value than others. One can use total tonnage, absolute value, or value per tonne when examining international trade statistics. All have a certain merit but must be taken within the overall context of determining the relative position of the local economy in an international context. In this study of the Rhône-Alpes Région's international trade, and how that trade affects Lyon's "International" status, all three types of trade statistics will be utilized to illustrate broad strengths and weaknesses.

Another difficulty in using international trade statistics is the inconsistent determination of which products appear on which region's ledgers. For example, all of the automobiles imported from Italy into France clear customs in either Ambérieu or Corbas, both are in the Rhône-Alpes Région. Therefore, all Italian automobiles imported into France appear on the import statistics for the Rhône-Alpes Région even though these automobiles are dispersed throughout France for purchase. This falsely inflates the region's import numbers, specifically from Italy and specifically in this category thus skewing the true nature of the figures (Commerece extérieur de Rhône-Alpes en 1990, 1991).

Another problem concerning international trade statistics that should be noted is that products made in other regions of France that are exported through the Rhône-Alpes are often incorporated into the Rhône-Alpes export statistics. The opposite holds true in that products from the Rhône-Alpes that are exported through other regions or through company headquarters outside of the Rhône-Alpes are not always credited to the Rhône-Alpes' export totals.

These problems represent some of the difficulties in accurately assessing the level of local participation in international trade. With these problems in mind it would appear more useful to emphasize relative comparisons rather than absolute values. On assuming that all international trade statistics for local economies are imperfect, basic comparisons such as the overall percentage of French trade attributed to the Rhône-Alpes Région and comparisons between Rhône-Alpes and other French and European regions can still prove valuable on a relative scale.

In examining the international trade of the Rhône-Alpes Région, the focus will be on the percentage of national trade attributed to the Rhône-Alpes and on determining the major trading partners of the region to help establish a basic geographic flow. This will enable the Rhône-Alpes, including Lyon, to be relatively positioned within the context of the Soldatos model. An assessment will be possible as to whether Lyon, and the Rhône-Alpes, have the international trade and linkages needed to establish the required international functions and status that are demanded of an "International City".

8.51 INTERNATIONAL TRADE TOTALS

The Rhône-Alpes Région accounted for only 5.66% of the total tonnage imported into France in 1988. However, this was equivalent to 8.31% of the total value of all imports into France in 1988 (an increase from 6.24% in 1974), ranking the Rhône-Alpes as the third largest importer in total value among French regions. Ile-de-France and Nord-Pas-de-Calais (British imports) were the largest total value importers in France in 1988. The value-per-tonne of imports into the Rhône-Alpes in 1988 was 5990 francs, higher than the national average of 4080 franc per tonne yet still behind seven other regions in France (l'Interregion des Douanes de Rhône-Alpes/Auvergne, 1990).

The Rhône-Alpes Région accounted for a mere 3.74% of the total tonnage exported from France in 1988. This was equal to 10.8% (115 billion francs) of the total export value of France. This places Rhône-Alpes as the second ranking region in France in terms of total export value behind Ile-de-France. The value-per-tonne exported by Rhône-Alpes in 1988 was 11,985 francs, well above the national average of

6369 francs per tonne yet less than half of the 25,824 franc per tonne value of exports from the Ile-de-France (Francexport Rhône-Alpes, 1991).

It is possible to reduce these international trade figures to the département level in certain contexts. Within Rhône-Alpes, the Département du Rhône was the leader in total import value accounting for 41.55% of the region's import value, well ahead of the Département of Isère which accounted for 18.08% of the regions total import value. The Département of Rhône was also the region's leader in total export value, but by a significantly smaller amount; the Département of Rhône accounted for 31.28% of the export value of the region while the Département of Isère accounted for 23.69% of the region's total export value (Francexport Rhône-Alpes, 1991).

A number of limited conclusions can be drawn from this basic data on local international trade. The first conclusion is that in a broad sense, Rhône-Alpes is the second most important region in France in international trade based upon its overall performance in all categories and its second place performance in the important category of total export value. This indicates that Rhône-Alpes enjoys a strong level of high value-added export. This reflects a strong high-technology and finished goods export industry.

The second conclusion concerns the position of Lyon within the region. Rhône is the leading département in the region in terms of international trade, especially in imports. However, it is significant that Isère (Grenoble) enjoys a high level of total export value reflecting the high-technology exports produced around Grenoble. Rhône is the leading but not dominant département in the region in international trade. Lyon is the leading city in this successful region in the context of international trade which assists Lyon in its bid for "International" status; however, Grenoble is a strong regional competitor in international trade. This relationship must exist on a cooperative scale if Lyon is truly to maximize its position at the head of the region's international trading linkages.

Another criteria of "International" status is the number of local companies with a major international economic presence. The Rhône-Alpes Région has over 5000 corporations engaged in international trade at one level or another. The 21 largest exporters in the region were responsible for 40% of the region's total export value in 1988 (Francexport Rhône-Alpes, 1991). This is a paradox for the region in that it illustrates that Rhône-Alpes has 21 corporations that can compete internationally and have developed the significant international presence and linkages needed. However, that a mere 21 companies account for 40% of the region's export value reflects the limited number of major international companies in the region and the region's dependence on these companies.

8.52 INTERNATIONAL TRADE FLOWS & ORGANIZATIONS

Another significant factor of international trade concerns the geographic flow of goods and materials. Rhône-Alpes, like France, is heavily dependent on trade with its nearest European neighbours. Table 8.1 illustrates that, except for the United States, the top trading partners of the Rhône-Alpes are all close European neighbours and represent approximately 60% of the region's exports in total value. Germany (16.45%) and Italy (14.92%) together represent over 31% of the regions exports in total value. The increased international functions and linkages created through international trade are valuable and important in helping establish the international basis required to fulfil the criteria of the Soldatos model.

TABLE 8.1

RHONE-ALPES EXPORT PARTNERS IN TOTAL VALUE, 1988.

GERMANY	16.45%
ITALY	14.92%
U.S.A.	8.48%
BEL-LUX	8.40%
UNITED KINGDOM	8.39%
SWITZERLAND	6.24%
SPAIN	4.31%

Source: EXPORTA, 1990.

In recent years, in an effort to improve its international trade and connections, the Rhône-Alpes Région has joined and created a number of organizations aimed at improving the region's international trade and linkages. One of these organizations is the Communauté de Travail des Alpes Occidentales (COTRAO). COTRAO consists of the Rhône-Alpes Région, the Italian regions of Piedmont, Val d'Aosta and Liguire along with the Swiss cantons of Vaud, Valais and Geneva. This trans-alpine trading organization is designed to help facilitate inter-regional trade between members with a special emphasis on helping the non-European Community member Swiss cantons improve linkages with their European Community neighbours (Rhône-Alpes dans l'Espace Européen No 2, 1990).

Another inter-regional organization developed to facilitate international trade within Europe is EXPORA. EXPORA is an association that establishes regional structures for international trade and dialogue between major European regions and the Rhône-Alpes. EXPORA is responsible for developing and coordinating international linkages involving Rhône-Alpes corporations (Rhône-Alpes dans l'Espace Européen No 2, 1990). This organization assists in expanding the scope of the region's linkages with public and private investors.

The Rhône-Alpes Région has also created the Enterprise Rhône-Alpes Internationale (ERAI). ERAI has established offices in Barcelona, Milan, Turin and Stuttgart in order to improve economic relations between Lyon and these "Eurocities". ERAI pursues an agenda designed to maximize all forms of economic contact between Lyon and these cities with particular attention to Lyon's value-added exports. Lyon has also established offices at the World Trade Centre in New York City and the European Commission in Brussels to improve its international linkages and lobbying ability. These international linkages, structured around international trade, help fulfil the criteria of international economic linkages spelled out in the Soldatos model. This also assists in promoting Lyon's international image and increases its visibility within the economic markets.

These organizations are recent additions to the region's efforts to expand its international markets, linkages and image. The strong commitment by both the political and economic sectors of Lyon to promote this international dimension is important. Without such commitment, Lyon would have little hope of achieving International status. Such efforts and coordination do not assure Lyon of achieving its ambitions but it does illustrate that Lyon is making a concerted effort to establish the international economic base needed to compete with other “Eurocities”. Even in 1977 the need to enhance inter-regional cooperation was noted by Eduardo Martinengo, then Secretary General of the Committee for Cooperation between regions in the Alpine Arc, who stated that: “It is absurd to proceed "Chacun pour soi" at a time when there is a strenuous effort to build a United Europe: if Europe is to be united, the process must start at the bottom at the local level, between regions which have something in common.” (Le Monde, Novembre 7, 1977). Lyon has adhered to this strategy by actively promoting greater cooperation between neighbouring regions and other economically advanced regions in Europe.

8.6 PARENT HEADQUARTERS

The number of Parent Company Headquarters[1] located in a city is another indicator of the “International” scale of a city in the Soldatos model. Examining the number of Parent Company Headquarters in Lyon is a straight-forward process and shows Lyon to be in an unimpressive situation. In 1988 only 19 Parent Companies had headquarters located in Lyon. This represented only 2% of the national total of Parent Company Headquarters. On a national scale this was comparable with Marseille which had 20 Parent Company Headquarters in 1988 (2.1% of the national total), and superior to Lille which only had 5 Parent Company Headquarters in 1988 (0.5% of the national total) (Dun and Bradstreet, 1990). This is a vivid representation of the economic weaknesses in decision-making power of the second tier French cities. That Lyon, the second ranking city in France, hosts only 2% of the national total of Parent Company Headquarters is a strong indicator that Lyon is lacking control over its economic flows and is not a major economic or financial centre on a national scale much less a European scale.

---

[1] N.B. “Parent Company” is defined as a company which has subsidiaries and/or associates which are not controlled by any other company.

Another telling point is that all three of these major French provincial cities have lost Parent Company Headquarters in the past decade. In 1979, Lille hosted 9 (0.8%), Marseille hosted 39 (3.3%) and Lyon hosted 31 (2.6%) of the nation's Parent Company Headquarters (Dun and Bradstreet, 1990). These numbers were relatively insignificant in 1979. However, that these cities have lost Parent Company Headquarters during the 1980's poses larger problems. The idea that France is undergoing a degree of devolution and decentralization is in this case contradicted. In fact, the opposite is happening. The Parent Company Headquarters of France, and thereby the real decision-making power, is becoming increasingly centralized in Paris. This trend is partially explained by the combination of corporate mergers and buy-outs, but the fact remains that Lyon is losing its few Parent Company Headquarters. This increasing lack of decision-makers in Lyon impedes Lyon's economic strength and status, and seriously hampers its potential international position.

Examining the number of Parent Company Headquarters in other major "Eurocities" shows a wide discrepancy between particular cities and countries. Milan had 73 Parent Company Headquarters in 1989 representing 28.1% of the Italian total. Barcelona had 38 Parent Company Headquarters representing 22.8% of the Spanish total. However, Glasgow had 140 Parent Company Headquarters but this amounts to only 2.3% of the British total and the 170 Parent Company Headquarters in Hambourg represented only 5.2% of the German total, (before reunification) (Dun and Bradstreet, 1990). Therefore, not all countries have the same definition of what constitutes a Parent Company, but by using the percentage rather than the total amount one can make relative distinctions between the various "Eurocities".

Milan (28.1%) and Barcelona (22.8%) are far above the rest of the "Eurocities" in this survey[2] in regards to the number of Parent Company Headquarters hosted. Lyon would appear at the bottom of this survey along with Valencia, Bremen, Manchester and Glasgow, not the first tier of "Eurocities". This survey also showed that all of these

[2] This Dun and Bradstreet survey consisted of Bremen (1.9%), Hamburg (5.2%), Barcelona (22.8%), Valencia (1.8%), Milan (28.1%), Turin (6.5%), Manchester (2.0%) and Glasgow (2.3%)

"Eurocities" have witnessed a decline in the percentage of Parent Companies with headquarters in their city's over the past decade (except for Valencia which increased from 2 to 3 its number of Parent Company Headquarters). This is yet another indication of the consolidation of economic power in the Primate cities throughout Europe. This trend will make it increasingly difficult for second tier cities to expand their economic position and influence in the current local/global economy.

8.7 LYON'S ECONOMIC IMAGE

Perception or image is an important commodity when attempting to sell a product. Lyon, in trying to market itself as an "International City", is working to polish and improve its image both domestically and abroad. The term "image" has a number of connotations, but for the purposes of this section, "image" will denote the various outside perceptions of Lyon as a city in regard to its economic and infrastructural capability along with its comparative positioning vis-à-vis other domestic and European cities.

Any attempt to analyse Lyon's image cannot be considered valid except as a broad and relative comparison for two reasons. First, image is by definition comparison; an image cannot be conceived in a vacuum but instead is a tool with which to view one item in the context of one or many other items; relative and contextual. Second, the methods in discerning a group's overall image of a city are limited at best through the restrictions inherent in any survey questionnaire; small numbers, precise questions and numerous variables. For the purpose of placing this necessarily vague and relative concept of a city's image into the broad framework of the Soldatos model's definitions of what a city's image must be to achieve "International City" status, this section will rely on a number of comparative survey studies and rankings of Lyon's image.

Since one cannot completely divorce Lyon's image from that of the Rhône-Alpes Région it is necessary to include a study of the French regions before turning to examine five different surveys ranking Lyon's image against domestic and European cities on different issues. These surveys will help provide a basis for analysing the relative position of Lyon's outside image vis-à-vis other competing cities in different contexts. This will assist in determining Lyon's position in this category of the Soldatos model.

8.71 REGIONAL SURVEY

First, an examination of a comparative survey carried out to determine the relative image of the French regions on a variety of topics. This telephone survey conducted between January 13, 1992 and February 7, 1992 asked 1688 top French business leaders to share how they viewed the image of their home region on a number of issues. The results of this survey showed Rhône-Alpes to be the French region with the highest overall image with a score of +44.8, (on a scale of -100 to +100). Rhône-Alpes placed ahead of Ile-de-France and Alsace in overall image in this poll.

In the following categories the questions were posed in the context of greater European integration; "To compete in the Europe of 1993, do you think that your region is:"

1) well prepared
2) somewhat prepared
3) poorly prepared
4) not prepared

Rhône-Alpes ranked first in the categories of Education and Research, and Economic Dynamism. Rhône-Alpes ranked in the top three regions in all other categories, including: image, employment, quality of life, industrial base and political competence at the regional level.

Rhône-Alpes ranked first in this survey of French regions (with its overall score of +44.8) followed closely by the regions of Ile-de-France (+42.2) and Alsace (+39.6). These three regions were well above the rest of the French regions with Bourgogne (+23.0) being well back in the fourth position. That the Rhône-Alpes ranks so well in a comparative survey of French regions by business leaders is a positive reflection on Lyon. The future position of Lyon is closely linked to that of the region. That Lyon is the capital of this well-regarded region will only enhance Lyon's image and international ambitions.

8.72 CITY SURVEYS

Another annual poll ranking the cities of France is "Le Palmarés des Villes" (L'Entreprise, No 78, Mars 1992). In this ranking, the cities of France are divided into groups based upon population. There are 28 cities with a population over 200,000, 27 cities with a population between 100,000 and 200,000, 50 cities with a population between 50,000 and 100,000 and 37 cities with a population under 50,000. Lyon fits into the category of cities with a population over 200,000 and was ranked fourth in this category. The top six cities in this survey were Toulouse, Montpellier, Nantes, Lyon, Strasbourg, and Grenoble. Of these top cities only Toulouse, Lyon and Strasbourg rate as a "four star" city, representing the superior physical and human infrastructure offered by these cities.

Within this same category, cities with a population over 200,000, St. Etienne ranks 25th, near the bottom with a mere two star ranking. St. Etienne also has witnessed a decrease of 13% of its active workforce between 1975 and 1990. This is a telling statistic especially when compared with the other leading French cities. Of the top six ranked French cities in this category Lyon had the lowest increase in active population between 1975 and 1990; a 1.3% increase. This signifies that Lyon has not been a rapidly expanding city over the past 15 years (as was noted in Chapter Three) but is none-the-less showing slight growth in this sector. The other two "millionaire" cities in France, Marseille-Aix (-1.3%) and Lille (-5.1%) experienced an overall decrease in their active populations during this fifteen year period.

The astronomical increases in Toulouse (26.2%) and Montpellier (21.2%) graphically illustrate the rapid increase in demographic and economic importance of these two cities and the southern area of France. The single largest increase is the 33.3% increase in the active population recorded in Grasse-Cannes-Antibes over the same 1975-1990 period. The explosion in the active workforce in these sunbelt cities adds to the growing image of these rapidly expanding cities. Attraction leads to further attraction leading to a situation of critical mass and the needed synergy and image to compete as a city on a greater scale.

Among the cities with a population of 100,000 to 200,000 the Rhône-Alpes cities of Annecy and Chambéry ranked first and second in France. Annecy was the top-rated city in this population category and the only one to receive a "four stars" rating for superior infrastructure. Annecy has experienced a rapid 23.7% increase in the active population between 1975-1990 showing the growing economic and demographic strength of the capital of the Haute-Savoie. Chambéry, the capital of Savoie, is ranked second in France in this category with a three star rating. Chambéry has also shown a remarkably strong economic and demographic increase since 1975 adding 17.6% to its active workforce (L'Entreprise, No 78, Mars 1992). The attractiveness of these medium-sized savoyard cities illustrates not only the positive transformation of these cities into significant urban areas with an increasing image but also adds to the lustre of the region's image.

These rankings confirm that Lyon is the highest-ranked city in the Rhône-Alpes Région but is not the dominant city in the region. The strong showing by Grenoble, Annecy and Chambéry give the impression of a dynamic multi-pole region. The image of Lyon among the leaders of French enterprises is positive. These business leaders have confidence that Lyon and the region are economically dynamic and well-positioned to meet the challenges of closer European integration. What Lyon needs to accomplish to supplement this confidence is to translate it into ways to expand and improve its international image.

Another survey conducted by BVA-l'Entreprise of French business leaders centred around the perceived economic dynamism of the major French cities excluding Paris. The rankings of this survey placed Lyon well on top of the French urban hierarchy with a 79% approval rating. This was significantly better than the second rated Toulouse (63% approval) and far ahead of fifth rated Grenoble (37%).

The reasons attributed to Lyon's favourable rating were its strong economic base, industrial diversity, its relatively well-developed higher service sector (compared to other provincial cities) and the large number of research and higher education facilities. The new "European aura" of Lyon was also mentioned as a positive factor affecting Lyon's favourable rating (Le Progrés, Mars 4, 1992).

L'Expansion, a well-respected business magazine, conducted a survey designed to rank the "International Dimension" of the major French cities, again, excluding Paris. This survey was divided in to two sections which were than added together to indicate a final score. The first section, "International Economy and Trade", was comprised of seven categories: International Telecommunications, Exports, Foreign Corporation Hosted, Foreign Marketing, International Relations, Economic Strength and International Air Traffic. In this section Lyon ranked first with a score of 118 points out of a total of 140 points. (20 points per category). The subsequent ranked cities were Toulouse (103 points), Bordeaux (101 points), Lille (97 points) and Grenoble (96 points). St Etienne ranked 24th nationally with 57 points, well behind the leading cities (L'Expansion, 6/19 Décembre 1990).

The second section, "Daily life and education", was divided into five categories: Facilities for Foreigners, Sporting and Cultural Events, International Press and Presentations, International Cooperation in Research and Development and International Education at all levels. In this section Grenoble ranked first with 84 points (100 points possible) ahead of second-ranked Lyon with 79 points. Montpellier (77 points), Marseille (73 points) and Toulouse (70 points) were the other top cities in this second section. St Etienne finished tied for 18th in this section with 40 points (L'Expansion, 6/19 Décembre 1990).

The overall ranking (sections one and two) of the International Dimension of the major French cities was: (240 points possible).

1) Lyon	(197 pts)
2) Grenoble	(180 pts)
3) Toulouse	(173 pts)
4) Bordeaux	(166 pts)
5) Marseille	(166 pts)

(L'Expansion, 6/19 Décembre 1990).

In a survey to determine the International Dimension of the major French cities Lyon ranked first but was closely followed by its regional neighbour/rival Grenoble. This again reflects the overall strength and internationality of the Rhône-Alpes Région. This also reflects that, again, Lyon is the leading yet not the dominant city of the region. Another indicator that Lyon may further enhance its own international and regional position if it were able to establish a common agenda based on cooperation with Grenoble. This concept will comprise a central theme of Part Three.

The Wall Street Journal-Europe conducted a survey to rank the image of the major cities in France, (excluding Paris). The Wall Street Journal-Europe polled 2000 of its readers (15% or 300 responded so this is a limited survey) in Western Europe (including those outside France) to solicit opinions on the image of leading French cities. The sampling is small yet interesting in that it presents a different ranking than those studies confined to French respondents. In this survey, Bordeaux ranked first with an 81% approval rating followed by Strasbourg (76%), Lyon (75%), Grenoble (72%), Montpellier (55%) and Dijon (51%) (Affaires économiques, No 18, Avril 1991). The inclusion of Bordeaux on top and Dijon as sixth should teach all a lesson about underestimating the importance of gastronomic good living in enhancing a city's image, (and quality of life!). Apart from this surprise, the familiar cities of Strasbourg, Lyon and Grenoble are clustered at the top of the ranking with a large gap between themselves and Montpellier and the other French cities.

A final survey concerns the image of the leading European cities and was undertaken by Harris Research in the United States and Europe on behalf of real estate consultants Healey and Baker in the

United Kingdom and Cushman and Wakefield in the United States. This survey examined the opinions of senior managers in 506 companies selected from Europe's 15,000 largest firms. This survey also solicited the opinions of leading American managers towards "business in Europe" (Northwest Airline's Magazine, March 1991). This survey examined leading European cities on such criteria as the cost of office space, the government-created business climate, manufacturing and financial services, linguistic facilities, short and long term growth potential and overall image. Table 8.2 illustrates the overall ranking of the image of the top twenty five cities in Europe based on this survey.

TABLE 8.2
HARRIS RESEARCH SURVEY RANKINGS

#	CITY	#	CITY
1	LONDON	14	HAMBURG
2	PARIS	15	BERLIN
3	FRANKFURT	16	LISBON
4	BRUSSELS	17	MADRID
5	AMSTERDAM	18	LYON
6	DUSSELDORF	19	STOCKHOLM
7	ZURICH	20	VIENNA
8	GENEVA	21	BUDAPEST
9	MILAN	22	ATHENS
10	GLASGOW	23	PRAGUE
11	BARCELONA	24	MOSCOW
12	MUNICH	25	WARSAW
13	MANCHESTER		

Source: Northwest Airline's Magazine, March 1991.

This Harris Research survey shows the usual "Eurocities" on top of the rankings led by London and Paris. Lyon's position in this survey at number 18 illustrates the habitual dichotomy of Lyon's situation. Lyon is the only French city outside Paris included in a survey of leading "Eurocities" but places towards the bottom of the survey.

Lyon is perceived as deserving to be included in such surveys but needs to improve on its position to achieve the true International status it desires.

Another survey asked 1800 European business leaders in France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and the Benelux countries to prioritize their most important criteria in determining where to locate a new plant site (Table 8.3). This survey listed nine criteria and asked the respondents to rate the importance of each on a scale of one to ten (Affaires économiques, No 18-Avril, 1991).

TABLE 8.3
SITE LOCATION CRITERIA

	CRITERIA	SCORE
1	COMMUNICATION/TRANSPORT	9.3
2	CALIBRE OF THE WORKFORCE	8.5
3	PRESENCE OF DYNAMIC AND INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES	7.7
4	RESEARCH AND UNIVERSITY FUNCTIONS	7.2
5	CLIMATE AND PHYSICAL LOCATION	6.4
6	COOPERATION BETWEEN THE LOCAL URBAN NETWORK	6.0
7	CENTRE OF POLITICAL DECSIONS	6.0
8	IMAGE, CULTURE, LOCAL LEADERS	5.2
9	CULTURAL EVENTS	4.9

The importance of a superior communication and transport infrastructure is where Lyon can attract the most positive attention. Lyon's communication and transport infrastructure in conjunction with its central location is one of the city's best assets. The political dimension is rated as significantly less important. The important criteria to these business leaders is whether or not the location will prove profitable. Politicians have a limited direct impact on the profitability of any enterprise. This survey would indicate that local politicians would be best served by concentrating on constructing the higher level infrastructure that is most attractive to the business leaders. Lyon's leaders are, to their credit, emphasizing the improvement of the physical infrastructure of Lyon in their bid to increase the international awareness and image of Lyon.

After examining these surveys one realizes that there are a multitude of variables that directly or indirectly impact the creation and evolution of a city's "image". Within a relative context, Lyon's image is the strongest in economic terms of all cities in France with the obvious exception of Paris. Lyon has the relative size, infrastructure, workforce and location in a strong region on a major European north-south axis. The results of these surveys corresponds to a significant degree with the results of the DATAR/RECLUS study examined in Chapter One. Lyon is the second city of France and a second tier "Eurocity". These surveys also illustrate the strong image projected by Grenoble. Lyon and Grenoble together anchor the urban system of the top-rated region in France. It is becoming increasingly clear that for either city to achieve true "International" or "European" status a cooperative relationship must replace the current competitive independent dialogue that exists between the two. This topic will be the focal theme of Part Three.

8.8 THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

After the success in attracting Euronews (Chapter Six) to Lyon, where Lyon was the early favourite, the city is now ambitiously attempting to attract the future European Central Bank headquarters. Despite recent setbacks to the concept of a single currency and fixed exchange rates, plans for the new European Central Bank are currently still proceeding. The European Central Bank (dubbed EuroFed) will employ approximately 50 persons by 1994 and over 300 persons by the year 2000 (Le Progrès, Mars 16, 1992). The employment of 300 bank officials is only the beginning of the economic and public relation's rewards that would accompany EuroFed to Lyon.

EuroFed will, in theory, represent the third pole in a global financial triangle that also includes Tokyo and Washington D.C. The city that successfully attracts EuroFed will be well positioned to expand into the global financial capital of Europe. This would create an enormous number of positive knock-on affects. EuroFed would, in one stroke, eliminate Lyon's lack of higher level services, second tier economic status and image as a second level European city. The potential advantages of attracting EuroFed compelled Lyon's leaders to enter officially the competition to host this institution.

The eight cities that are officially competing for the privilege of hosting EuroFed are, in alphabetical order, Amsterdam, Barcelona, Frankfurt, London, Luxembourg, Lyon, Manchester, and Valencia. An examination of Lyon's self-promoted advantages and the actions that Lyon is undertaking in its effort to attract EuroFed may be made. Then a study of Lyon's competitors and a realistic appraisal of Lyon's chances will be discussed.

Raymond Barre, a former Prime Minister under President Giscard d'Estaing and a prominent local resident leads the team that is actively promoting Lyon's EuroFed bid. There are a number of important local and national business leaders on this team which also includes two distinguished members who are not French. Giovanni Agnelli, the Chairman of FIAT and Raymond Kendall, the head of Interpol (which is now headquartered in Lyon) provide an international dimension to this team designed to bring EuroFed to Lyon. ADERLY (the promotional branch of the C.C.I.L)., has also set up a task force (including Banque de France Lyon regional director Etienne Subra) to assist in presenting Lyon in the best possible manner in its hope of attracting EuroFed (Le Progrès, Mars 16, 1992).

Lyon presents a number of arguments to support its bid to host EuroFed. First, Lyon stresses its central location within Western Europe and the modern transportation infrastructure which includes new autoroutes, TGV lines and an expanded international airport/multi-modal transportation platform at Lyon-Satolas (Chapter Five). Lyon also points out the superior communication and transport organization that operated so successfully during the 1992 Winter

Olympiad in Albertville, a major international event. Secondly, Lyon argues that it has no other European Community institutions and would therefore help provide an equitable dispersion of European Community power. Third, Lyon argues that by locating EuroFed in Lyon it would help direct the focus of the European Community more towards Southern Europe, a region traditionally disadvantaged in financial power and representation within the European Community. Giovanni Agnelli is, in part, supporting Lyon's bid to host EuroFed because of his conviction that Southern Europe is habitually ignored and over-shadowed by the economically stronger Northern European countries and that a greater southern focus is needed, especially in financial matters, to redress this disparity (Le Progrès, Mars 16, 1992).

Conventional wisdom suggests that either London or Frankfurt are the leading candidates to be selected as the future site of EuroFed. These two cities are the largest financial centres in Europe and have already established the infrastructure (both physical and human) to accommodate such an important financial institution. However, each of these two leading cities has a serious flaw. London is hampered by the fact that the British people and government are commonly perceived as the least enthusiastic of any European nation concerning matters of closer European integration, especially financially. The unceremonious withdrawal of Sterling from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the subsequent public arguments concerning blame and future financial direction leave the capital of Britain in a relatively weak political position to pursue its bid to host EuroFed. Despite the current mood, British Prime Minister John Major has stated that his government would anticipate that EuroFed will be located in London regardless of current economic and political problems because of London's global position in the financial community (Wall Street Journal-Europe, March 23, 1992). It remains to be seen whether or not such serious political problems will be overcome and the rest of Europe chooses to trust Britain with its new Central Bank.

Frankfurt is in many ways a more logical choice since the German Central Bank has traditionally been the strongest and the most stable in Europe and sets the rate for ERM based on its own figures. Because of proximity to the already powerful German Central Bank, however, many Europeans wonder if the EuroFed would control the Bundesbank or the other way around. Also, Germany has current economic and social problems of its own as it merges former East Germany into a greater Germany. Germans are becoming increasingly concerned with the cost of closer European integration and are becoming ever more attached to the Deutchmark. Nonetheless, Frankfurt is to many the leading candidate because it is the leading financial centre on the continent (International Herald Tribune, March 18, 1992).

Manchester and Valencia have the twin disadvantage of being smaller cities in economically weaker states with a limited infrastructure. Also, both cities are competing directly with larger cities within their own country. Additionally, Manchester suffers from the same political burdens as London in addition to lacking the British Government's official support, and a central location. Manchester and Valencia have to be considered long-shots at best to host EuroFed.

Barcelona, Amsterdam, and Luxembourg are viewed as viable second level choices if political and economic factors rule out both London and Frankfurt. Luxembourg, it is thought, has the advantage among the second level cities based on its central location to the financial centres of Northern Europe and almost equal proximity to Brussels (The European Community Offices) and Frankfurt (The Bundesbank). Luxembourg also has a history of fiscal responsibility and is a consistently strong supporter of closer European integration. Barcelona, the candidate of many southern Europeans, presents a strong case based upon its geographical location and southern regional links. Barcelona is a more credible candidate than Amsterdam but worries many northern Europeans. The northern Europeans have sufficient reservations concerning the money that they pay annually to support the southern community members without placing EuroFed in the south.

The future location of EuroFed will be decided by a vote of the twelve heads of state of the European Community countries, each leader getting one vote. Under such a format the selection process will be a highly political affair and doubtless part of a greater compromise. President Mitterrand has yet to publicly endorse Lyon's bid, (Le Progrès, Mars 16, 1992), much to the anger of the Lyonais. President Mitterrand has been employing his political capital within the European Community in an attempt to retain the European Parliament in Strasbourg. This runs counter to the wishes of the rest of the European Community leaders that want to move the European Parliament to Brussels to effectively consolidate the political functions of the European Community.

This political manouvering will doubtless hurt Lyon's chances as will the fact that Lyon is economically less important than the three second tier candidates, Barcelona, Amsterdam, and Luxembourg. Lyon manifestly does not have the human infrastructure in high level international finances to attract EuroFed on its merits alone. As Andreas von Schober, the Mayor of Frankfurt noted, installing EuroFed in Lyon would be the same as installing it in Wurzburg (a small Bavarian town). Lyon, according to von Schober, is not an important financial centre in Europe and is therefore obviously unqualified to host EuroFed.

The advantages to this whole episode is that, indeed, Lyon does have an outside chance of attracting EuroFed and becoming a major international financial centre. There are certain political combinations that could allow Lyon to emerge as a compromise candidate. More realistically, this is a first class marketing strategy to establish Lyon as a Eurocity, the French choice after Paris, and a city to consider in the future for European projects both large and small. This EuroFed campaign also enabled Lyon to illustrate to the rest of Europe its fine transportation and communication facilities, reinforce its image of central location, and keep Lyon in the public eye as being an up-and-coming Eurocity. Therefore, Lyon's campaign to attract EuroFed is a no-lose scenario showing astute local political skill and helping to place the name and image of Lyon on a greater European scale.

8.9 ECONOMIC CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has attempted to examine the economic infrastructure of Lyon within the context of its international functions. Through utilizing the economic criteria of the Soldatos model and applying them to Lyon it is possible to analyze the broad strengths and weaknesses of Lyon in an international context. Lyon, as noted, needs to fulfil the economic criteria set forth in the Soldatos model to achieve "International City" status. This examination of the internationalization of Lyon's economy does not establish any firm quantitative answers nor does it find that all sectors of Lyon's economy operate equally. Rather, this examination is intended to provide a general basis for analyzing the overall internationalization of Lyon's economy in the context of the theoretical Soldatos model with which Lyon is being studied.

Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région have highlighted four areas of economic concern. These areas are directly related to the region's concerns over the opening of the single European market in 1993. The first concern is that the Rhône-Alpes maintain a competitive advantage in those industries of specialization that are currently strong in the region. RVI and other mechanical manufacturing industries are seen as particularly vulnerable to greater European competition. These industries cannot be eliminated from the region's industrial base if Rhône-Alpes is to continue to enjoy a successful economy. The strong chemical/petro-chemical and pharmaceutical industries must continue to perform at an international level and provide Lyon with a strong industrial base in this sector upon which Lyon can continue to construct high-technology spin-off industries and physical infrastructure (Perrat, 1989).

The second issue is that there be a mobilization of other concerned industries in the region to enhance these industries vis-à-vis their European competitors. The region hopes to encourage and promote better cooperation between industries within the region to ensure future competitiveness. This will be in conjunction with the third goal of the region which is to promote a greater global vision.

The economy of the region needs to expand its horizons to remain competitive in the new era of local/global economies.

The final issue of concern to the region is the need to preserve, sectorally and spatially, the industrial equilibrium of the region. The Rhône-Alpes Région is economically unbalanced in that the peripheral sections to the south and west of the region are economically disadvantaged in comparison to the prosperous areas around Lyon and the alpine agglomerations, including Geneva. This regional inequality reduces the economic influence of Lyon within the region and the overall economic power of Rhône-Alpes.

The evident lack of an effective and cooperative economic urban network effectively reduces the economic power and services of the urban centre at the head of the urban network; in this case, Lyon. Improved economic integration within the Rhône-Alpes would decrease regional imbalances and permit superior distributional flows resulting in "auto-development". Auto-development occurs economically in a structured and defined urban system where a tight network of urban areas easily diffuses the service capability of the major agglomeration which receives economic benefits and a regional leadership role in return. With an unstructured and ill-defined urban hierarchy such as found in the Rhône-Alpes, the financial capabilities of Lyon are diluted and unable to reach and impact other urban areas within the region. Consequently, the lesser urban areas continue to focus on other agglomerations such as Paris, Geneva and Grenoble for financial and economic services and support. This further reduces Lyon's economic role and influence within the region.

This lack of regional economic cohesion has been further exaggerated by the effects of a prolonged recession. The recession has provoked an "every man for himself" attitude both among corporations and the urban centres in the region. Rising unemployment, especially in the economically disadvantaged areas of the region, has further eroded the desire to prioritize such concepts as cohesion and cooperation. A recession is a poor time to advance such concepts as inter-regional cooperation or global visions.

Lyon's position is unique and complex, yet, within the context of the Soldatos model, can provide limited optimism for Lyon's international ambitions. The major economic weakness of Lyon is in the high-level financial services sector. The evident lack of control over banking, insurance and other financial services seriously retards Lyon's ability to act independently. This lack of decision-making ability is directly reflected by the monopoly of Parent Company Headquarters in Paris. This lack of control over financial flows is not going to change in the near future given the central position of Paris in all matters concerning France. If the Nation-State paradigm evolves into a Regional/European Community reality, Lyon might have some success in breaking the monopoly of Paris on economic matters. However, the short term reality is that Lyon will continue to lack any significant financial functions or control over economic flows.

Lyon must instead concentrate upon the strengths of its economic infrastructure. The strong diversified industrial and manufacturing sector of Lyon's economy is of a sufficient size and dynamism to enable Lyon to develop high-technology centres and promote infrastructural projects of a European scale. Lyon, along with the Rhône-Alpes Région, envisions three potential scenarios for the local economy in the future. The first scenario is that the recession continues to divide the region into competing economic zones. This will isolate Lyon from the rest of the region and retard the international ambitions of both.

The second scenario envisions Lyon and the region as an economic relay zone capitalizing on its advantageous crossroads position. This would leave Lyon with no actual control over the flows of goods, resources and capital that pass through the agglomeration. This will not help Lyon in achieving its international ambitions. The third and most optimistic scenario is that the regional agglomerations construct an economically complementary and cooperative region.

The short term reality will doubtless consist of a combination of the three proposed scenarios. The recession will hinder all efforts to promote a cooperative and coordinated regional economic policy. However, through greater regional awareness, aggressive political promotion of a regional identity and the economic reality that there are more profits to be made in cooperation than conflict in the post-1993 Europe, the regional economy will evolve into some form of closer cooperation. Lyon and the region will continue to serve as an economic relay zone based upon their advantageous location. The challenge is to utilize the increased infrastructure and local economic strength to assert more control over the flow of goods and capital through Lyon and the region.

In the context of the Soldatos model, Lyon lacks sufficient control over its economic functions to be considered a true "International City". The economic base of Lyon is suitably strong and diverse to enable Lyon to realistically strive for greater control of its economic functions and thus improve its international status. A cooperative economic system within the region would significantly improve Lyon's critical mass and potential to improve its economic and international functions and image and is therefore worth a concentrated effort.

Throughout Part Two, the examination of Lyon's infrastructure has illustrated a number of central themes. The first over-riding negative theme is the dominance of Paris in all spheres of French infrastructure from education to the economy, from transportation functions to research and development facilities. The prime inhibitor of Lyon's international ambitions is the centralism of the French State around Paris. Having stated this, Lyon does have reasonable cause for cautious optimism due to its status as the second city of France, its advantageous location linked to its high-level transportation infrastructure and a well diversified economy. However, much of the future success of Lyon will be linked to its future relationship with the other agglomerations in the Rhône-Alpes Région. Part Three will therefore examine the relationship of Lyon with its neighbouring agglomerations and with the Rhône-Alpes Région as a unit.

PART THREE
THE URBAN AND REGIONAL SYSTEM

Part Two has illustrated that Lyon has not achieved the criteria necessary to be a European City. The Soldatos model indicates that in some circumstances where a city lacks the critical mass and synergy within the agglomeration, a functional association with other agglomerations within the same geographic orbit might provide a means to achieve international status. This poly-nuclear structure would require three elements to be credible: that a consensus and political will to share identity exists, that transport connections are sufficient to overcome friction of distance between the centres and that the central city in the system be universally regarded as the "capital". In the present case, the poly-nuclear structure centred on Lyon would include St. Etienne, Grenoble, the towns of the Alpine furrow and, to some degree, Geneva (Billet, 1988).

Secondly, in view of the inevitable difficulties when vested political, social and economic interests are involved in the case of neighbouring cities, a complementary or alternative approach may be to seek partnerships abroad, outside the immediate urban system. This can be accomplished through the Rhône-Alpes Région by forging links with other regions both inside the European Community and throughout the world. This can also be achieved through Lyon establishing independent relationships with other non-capital European cities and promoting its own agenda to various international bodies.

Accordingly, it is the purpose of Part Three to evaluate the attempt by Lyon to enhance its international status by forging links on two scales; that of the extended city region (encompassing the major urban agglomerations of the Rhône-Alpes Région and Geneva) and that of the international scale at the urban and regional level through extended linkages with other agglomerations and regions outside of France. Chapters nine and ten are devoted respectively to the examination of Lyon's pursuit of international status through both regional and international linkages.

CHAPTER NINE
LYON'S REGIONAL LINKAGES

Chapter Nine is divided into two major sections. The first section examines the recently published official Rhône-Alpes Régional plan, its publically-oriented summary and a number of academic/technical working papers that helped influence the final regional plan. These will provide a solid basis for determining whether or not the region officially shares and supports Lyon's international ambitions. This official support by the region is critical if Lyon is to achieve the poly-nuclear critical mass referred to in the Soldatos model that would help Lyon overcome various weaknesses and become a prominent "Eurocity".

The second section of this chapter considers the relationships between Lyon and the other major agglomerations in the region, including Geneva. This section examines four spatially-oriented urban linkages: La Voie Dauphine, L'Axe Alpin, ROVALTAIN and La Region Urbaine de Lyon (RUL). These four spatially-oriented urban linkages are attempts to further integrate the urban network of the region.

Finally, this chapter considers a variety of future scenarios concerning the urban network and regional integration of the Rhône-Alpes and their effects on Lyon. The growing economic disparity within the region, the continuing rural/urban split and the current condition of the region's urban linkages will also be discussed in the context of Lyon's position and future international ambitions.

9.1 LYON AS REGIONAL CAPITAL

The notion of a multi-nodal European city is only likely to be achieved if it forms part of a wider regional strategy. The resources and political impulses involved in such an inter-urban partnership are only likely to occur in the context of an agreed long-range agenda legitimized by the authority of the regional planning council.

The latest revision of the regional plan was recently published, (<u>Schéma de Développement et d'Aménagement Regional</u>, Conseil

Économique et Social Rhône-Alpes, May 25, 1992). The full report presented by the Conseil Économique et Social Rhône-Alpes (CES) to the Regional Council includes Regional Council discussion, voting, amendments and the views of various interest groups. This is the official basis of the Rhône-Alpes Région's long-range policy and planning agenda. Additionally, a summary volume with illustrative maps indicates the main decisions of the regional plan and was published in order to educate and persuade the public to accept and support the objectives and values of the regional plan, (Rhône-Alpes demain, "Réinventons la proximité", Région Rhône-Alpes, 1992). Similarly, technical research reports which provided an intellectual input into the planning process are also of value. By analyzing these three sources, it is possible to infer what, if any, weight was given to Lyon's international role and if any consideration was given to closer integration of the region's urban system with Lyon as the dominant pole.

9.11 THE OFFICIAL REGIONAL PLAN

Schéma de Développement et d'Aménagement Regional, the official regional planning document, was put forward by the Conseil Économique et Social Rhône-Alpes. This plan was passed in its final form on May 25, 1992 by a vote of 78 in favour of the plan and 18 abstentions; there were no votes against the plan. This plan is envisaged by the Regional Council as an overall planning scheme to guide the development and administration of the region until the year 2010. This plan, therefore, does not provide detailed documentation on specific works-projects but rather provides a framework for prioritizing the long-range agenda for the region.

The major themes echoed in the regional plan are those concerned with the economic and social problems facing the region both today and in the future. Unemployment is viewed as the single largest threat to the region. The social impact of wide-spread long-term unemployment of 10% along with the continuing problems of regional economic disparity are the major issues of concern voiced in the regional plan.

The increasing threat to the region's industrial and manufacturing base in the context of a borderless Europe will, it is feared, exaggerate both of these problems in addition to accentuating the growing urban/rural divide in the region. The challenge of Europe is also viewed as a potential opportunity for the regions of Europe to increase their role and prestige. This is especially true in France where decentralization still lags well behind the majority of the other European Community nations. The Rhône-Alpes Région views the challenge of post-1993 Europe as an opportunity to increase and legitimize its authority and establish a greater and more autonomous European role. However, the question concerning Lyon is what role the Rhône-Alpes Région projects for Lyon in its official long-range strategy.

The official regional plan is straightforward and to the point in its support for Lyon's international ambitions and the importance of Lyon to the long-range plans of the region. The regional plan states that "l'enjeu de Rhône-Alpes est l'enjeu de Lyon" (p. 14). The regional plan affirms the importance of Lyon achieving a comparable status to the other "métropoles européennes". The regional authorities recognize that for the region to succeed, the regional capital, Lyon, must also succeed in improving its international status.

The regional authorities have officially committed to help Lyon achieve a greater international role: "Mais les acteurs de Rhône-Alpes doivent aider au renforcement des fonctions nationales et internationales de Lyon." (p. 14). The region is especially committed to helping Lyon improve its position in the financial services sector of the economy. The region recognizes that the whole Rhône-Alpes will benefit if the regional capital, Lyon, is able to improve the status of its important financial services sector. The regional plan officially confirms that the region must "...hisser Lyon en particulier au niveau d'une place financière internationale." (p. 19).

This official recognition of Lyon's central role in the future of the Rhône-Alpes and the regional authorities commitment to help Lyon attain greater "Eurocity" status is very important to Lyon. This official support signifies that Lyon's international ambitions are more than just political talk and planners fantasies. Rather, Lyon is viewed as the cornerstone of the region's future in Europe and can expect the region's full support in its desire to achieve international status.

9.12 THE SUMMARY VOLUME

The summary volume of the official regional plan; Rhône-Alpes demain. "Réinventons la proximité", also emphasizes the important role of Lyon in the region's future. This summary states that: "Le rôle que Lyon est appelé à jouer au coeur de ce dispositif est tout à fait clair: la métropole doit constituer un élément d'organisation et de dynamisme pour le réseau regional." (p. 81). Lyon must, with the help of the region, establish itself as a Eurocity and contribute in that capacity to the further development of the region.

This summary suggests, however, that for Lyon to achieve true Eurocity status it must be with the cooperation of the other major agglomerations of the region; Grenoble and St. Etienne. "Lyon ne peut jouer un grand rôle européen que si elle intègre ses fonctions urbaines et son niveau de services à un réseau rassemblant les autres grandes agglomérations de Rhône-Alpes." (p. 81). Lyon must promote further integration with the other regional agglomerations through economic, political and social cooperation. The establishment of a major regional pole centred around Satolas/l'Isle d'Abeau is a prime example cited in the summary of potential urban cooperation and recentring of the region that would benefit both the Rhône-Alpes Région and the agglomerations.

The support for the new development pole centred around Satolas/l'Isle d'Abeau is gaining strength and credibility. This can be attributed to three major advantages enjoyed by this new development pole; a prime location, advanced infrastructure and a favourable political climate.

The development pole of Satolas/l'Isle d'Abeau is strategically located on the A48 autoroute 25 kilometres east of Lyon. The first advantage of this development pole is that it is located on La Voie Dauphine, the major axis between Lyon and Grenoble along the A48 autoroute (Figure 9.1). This new development pole is centrally located in that it faces the agglomerations of the alpine furrow yet is accessible via autoroute to the rest of the Rhône-Alpes. The Satolas/l'Isle d'Abeau development pole seeks to utilize the same advantages of location as Lyon and the region on a regional scale; a central crossroads location with superior transportation infrastructure to attract economic and political growth.

The infrastructure of the Satolas/l'Isle d'Abeau development pole is impressive. The cornerstone of this areas infrastructure is the multi-modal international transportation platform centred around Lyon-Satolas International Airport (Chapter Five). Lyon-Satolas International Airport is expanding its capacity and upgrading its facilitites to better function as an international transportation platform. The addition of a TGV station at the airport is a second major infrastructural benefit to the Satolas/l'Isle d'Abeau development pole. Finally, the autoroute network that connects Satolas/l'Isle d'Abeau with the region, the major autoroute axis of France, Geneva and, in the near future, Turin. The highly developed nature of the Satolas/l'Isle d'Abeau transportation infrastruture will help establish this development pole as a focal point of the Rhône-Alpes (<u>Enquette sur l'Impact Régional de Projet de Satolas</u>, 1989).

Additionally, the newtown of l'Isle d'Abeau offers numerous infrastructural advantages in addition to its prime location. In the early 1970's, l'Isle d'Abeau was one of the newtowns designated by DATAR for future development. Over the past twenty years, l'Isle d'Abeau has not achieved its initial promise or expectations. However, that could change in the near future. Being a newtown, l'Isle d'Abeau was designed to accomodate the modern infrastruture and economic needs of today. This newtown was originally planned for structured expansion to include 50,000 people and numerous enterprises (Chatin, 1975). Today, this leaves l'Isle d'Abeau with properly zoned space onto which it can economically and demographically expand (INUDEL Rhône-Alpes, 1989).

Politically, the Rhône-Alpes Région and the region's secondary agglomerations view the Satolas/l'Isle d'Abeau development pole as a neutral site on which to recentre the region. The current headquarters for the administrative offices of the Rhône-Alpes Région is in Charbonnières-les-Bains, a western suburb of Lyon, that is in the COURLY. This location gives Lyon certain advantages and prestige that it is loathe to relinquish. However, the region and the other agglomerations would like to see a neutral site, specifically l'Isle d'Abeau, as the site of the new headquarters for the region.

This should not be viewed by Lyon as a slight by the region, especially in light of the fact that the region has officially committed to assist Lyon in furthering its international ambitions. The region views this as an opportunity to promote La Voie Dauphine, the logical axis in the region between Lyon and Grenoble. The development of this axis is a stated ambition of the region. Also' l'Isle d'Abeau is only 25 kilometres from Lyon via the A48 autoroute and is located within the Region Urbaine de Lyon (Le Nir et al., 1989).

9.13 TECHNICAL RESEARCH REPORTS

The CES solicited numerous technical and academic studies on specific planning topics to help in finalizing the official regional plan. Le Centre de Recherche sur la Politique, l'Administration et le Territoire (CERAT) located in the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Grenoble which is attached to l'Université Pierre Mendès France in Grenoble, contributed a number of academic policy documents that were pertinent to the regional plan.

One of the papers prepared by CERAT is entitled <u>Les Inégalities Regionales en France: Le Cas de Rhône-Alpes</u> (Kukawka, 1992). This paper touches upon themes similar to the official regional plan. Discussions on regional economic disparity, unemployment, the role of Rhône-Alpes in both France and Europe, La Voie Dauphine, L'Axe Alpin and the role of Geneva are all examined. The views in this document are similar in tone and context to the outlines of the official regional plan.

CERAT also published a paper entitled Les Relations entre la Region Rhône-Alpes et Genève" (Kukawka, 1989). This paper dealt exclusively with Geneva and its relationship with Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes as a whole. Topics such as the competitive nature between the two airports, Geneva's driving role in the Annemasse area's economy and the lack of any true contact between Geneva and Lyon were discussed.

The majority of the technical papers consulted from CERAT and other academic/professional institutions agree that, for Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes to achieve their respective ambitions, certain historic compromises need to be forged between the region's agglomerations. "Or, si la region Rhône-Alpes veut exister véritablement, il faut que Lyon et Grenoble signent un *compromis historique*, a la fois économique, culturel et politique." (Kukawka, 1992).

These papers by CERAT are but examples of the numerous academic/professional papers dealing with the topic of the future of the Rhône-Alpes that were consulted by the CES in its formation of the official regional plan. The prevailing attitude that Lyon must fulfil the role of the regional capital and establish closer links with the other regional agglomerations is similar to Lyon's own ambitions. It is increasingly clear that Lyon, in a cooperative relationship with Grenoble and St. Etienne, must provide the region with strong leadership and infrastructure in the future (Denais, 1991).

9.2 URBAN LINKAGES WITHIN THE RHONE-ALPES

The urban areas within the Rhône-Alpes share a long tradition of individualism. These urban centres share no common history or geography. Each agglomeration has its own local cultural identity and historic rivalries with neighbouring urban areas. The rivalries between Savoie and Dauphine, Haute-Savoie and Savoie, and the alpine cities with those on the Rhône corridor date back centuries. The past relative geographic isolation of the alpine cities reinforced the communal sense of local independence and parochialism. Today such individualistic traits are viewed as detrimental to the establishment and promotion of an operational urban network within the region. This section will examine four efforts at overcoming this local individualism through the establishment of spatially-oriented linkages between specific cities. These linkages are "La Voie Dauphine", "l'Axe Alpin", ROVALTAIN and La Region Urbaine de Lyon (RUL).

9.21 LA VOIE DAUPHINE

La Voie Dauphine refers to the development between the two major agglomerations in the region: Lyon and Grenoble (Figure 9.1). These two agglomerations are connected by 110 kilometres of the A48 autoroute. These historical rivals, with no history of cooperation or common cause, need to establish a "historic compromise" (Rapport Carrière, 1988.) for their mutual benefit and that of the region as a whole. La Voie Dauphine is an axis of high-technology and light industrial development along the A48 autoroute between Lyon and Grenoble. This axis, it is postulated, will serve to link the important research and educational functions of these agglomerations and help develop the political and economic contacts needed to establish a working and cooperative relationship.

Currently La Voie Dauphine is comprised of two development sites along the A48 autoroute. South-east of Lyon is the Bourgoin-Satolas-l'Isle d'Abeau development zone. This pole includes the multi-modal transport platform of Satolas (TGV Station, autoroute hub and International Airport), and the newtown development of l'Isle d'Abeau. This constitutes an attractive development pole with a potential regional role as noted earlier in this chapter. North-west of Grenoble on the same A48 autoroute is the Voreppe-Moirans development zone of similar high-technology and light industry.

The area between these two development poles is one of the least populated in the region with a population density well under 100 per sq km. However, because these enterprise zones fail to physically touch and are separated by a low population density area does not automatically infer that La Voie Dauphine is not a potential functioning axis of importance. The distance between the two enterprise zones can be traversed in 15 minutes along the A48 autoroute. This does not impose a limitation on this development axis. Rather, having a green-belt between the two development poles with

FIGURE 9.1
LA VOIE DAUPHINE



potential room for structured expansion could be constructed as a positive attribute.

La Voie Dauphine is a logical axis linking the two major regional agglomerations. However, this is an imposed axis rather than a spontaneous or integrated one. Politicians and planners rather than economic forces have decided that La Voie Dauphine is a mandatory major regional axis. A number of potential problems are uncovered when this axis is examined in detail. First, these development poles also share autoroute access with other regional agglomerations. The Bourgoin-Satolas-l'Isle d'Abeau development is located on the direct Lyon-Chambéry autoroute link (via the A43). Conversely, the Voreppe-Moirans pole west of Grenoble is centred on the intersection of the A43 and the newly opened A40 autoroute to Valence. This suggests that other orientations beside Lyon-Grenoble are possible. However, such secondary orientations are not necessarily at the expense of La Voie Dauphine nor is it clear that these expanded orientations will not be considered as a positive factor in the near future (Bonnafus et al., 1989).

Secondly, La Voie Dauphine suffers from not being on a physical corridor that opens onto Europe. The Lyon-Chambéry-Turin axis and the Grenoble-Chambéry-Geneva axis both have the advantage of direct European connections. La Voie Dauphine is restricted in that it remains a limited linkage between two French cities and can thus be considered less attractive as an investment corridor to certain enterprises with international functions. These first two problems are not necessarily major disadvantages and could be viewed as potential positive factors in certain spatial contexts.

The third problem facing La Voie Dauphine is that the axis is not yet well integrated economically or politically. La Voie Dauphine is politically split between two separate agglomerations (Lyon and Grenoble), two separate départements (Rhône and Isère) and a number of communes. This political situation leads to numerous problems when attempting to plan a coherent development strategy. The region, the only administrative authority for the whole axis, lacks the political power and financial resources to impose this axis. The region is left in a position to encourage its development but cannot directly effect its development.

La Voie Dauphine is currently more of a transport axis then a functionally integrated economic axis. However, La Voie Dauphine is a positive linkage for a number of current and future reasons. First, La Voie Dauphine links the two largest agglomerations in the region. For the Rhône-Alpes Région and the agglomerations of Lyon and Grenoble to optimize their potential in the future, Lyon and Grenoble must establish better cooperation and superior integration on all levels. The progressing development of La Voie Dauphine along the linking A48 autoroute provides a solid first step in establishing a cooperative relationship between these agglomerations.

La Voie Dauphine cannot be dismissed as a mere political fantasy. The Lyon-Grenoble linkage is critical for the future development of the region. This linkage is also important for each agglomeration to help establish the critical mass and synergy together that they cannot currently generate as independent entities. La Voie Dauphine currently exists and has an important role to play in the future as the main economic and transport axis between the major agglomerations in the region.

9.22 LYON - ST ETIENNE

The relationship between Lyon and St. Etienne has evolved into one of uncomfortable dependency. St. Etienne has suffered the loss of 80,000 manufacturing jobs between 1962 and 1992. This has changed St. Etienne from a prosperous industrial town to one facing perpetual recession and difficult reconversion prospects. St. Etienne is also the only major agglomeration in the region not pursuing an aggressive political agenda to improve its regional or European position. Some of this can be attributed to the lack of drive displayed by the current mayor and his ruling cadre. Some can also be attributed to St. Etienne's increasing dependence on Lyon.

The combination of difficult economic conditions, traditional style political leadership and the rise in political ambition and economic strength of Lyon have succeeded in pulling St. Etienne into Lyon's functional political/economic orbit. The stronger economy of Lyon employs a substantial number of St. Etienne residents and the increasing infrastructural dependency on transportation, health and cultural resources binds St. Etienne to Lyon in an ever increasing manner (Kukawka, 1992).

The capital of the Loire Département none the less remains a major agglomeration; the third largest in the region with a population of 314,000 in 1990. St. Etienne is also slowing slight signs of economic and demographic recovery. The effective inclusion of St. Etienne into Lyon's functional orbit adds to Lyon's critical mass, overall size and strength and, therefore, its international status. This closer linkage, exemplified by the "Protocol de Concertation et de Coopération" signed by the mayors of Lyon and St. Etienne on May 23, 1989, reinforces Lyon's position as regional capital and its influence over the relatively peripheral and poorly-integrated southern portion of the region. This closer integration helps enhance Lyon's functional size and credibility in its pursuit of international status.

9.23 L'AXE ALPIN

L'Axe Alpin is an envisioned north-south linkage of Grenoble-Chambéry-Annecy-Geneva (Figure 9.2). The supporters of this Alpine Axis argue that these mountain agglomerations share a basic history and common cause for development. Each has experienced rapid economic and demographic growth during the past decades and are emphasizing developing relationships with neighbouring European regions in Switzerland and Italy. The promotional literature for this Alpine Axis also describes the Lyon area as a neighbouring region thus highlighting the perceived separation of these agglomerations from Lyon. This is based on the fear of Lyon dominating these agglomerations as regional capital. This fear of domination by Lyon is one of the reasons cited for establishing, at least on paper, this Alpine Axis.

One of the concrete results of the Alpine Axis, according to its supporters, is the 2,000 hectares technology development site on the

FIGURE 9.2
L'AXE ALPIN & ROVALTAIN



Savoie-Isère border at Montmélian-Pontcharra (Laurencin, 1991). This site is designed to improve political and economic contact between these two départements and to help illustrate that the Alpine Axis is more than a policy document. However, these alpine areas have no history of cooperation in designing a coherent economic space. The Montmélian-Pontcharra project is a useful addition to the economy of this area but is not the beginning of a major coordinated alpine economic space. The Alpine Axis is a secondary one and is little more than individual urban enclaves linked by an autoroute. This does not constitute an axis nor a coordinated economic space. It is not possible to manipulate economic development and social identities like images regardless of the political ambition involved. The Alpine Axis represents neither true economic nor cultural linkages. These are individual cities with individual mandates and identities, and these cities look towards Lyon, and Paris, for higher level economic and cultural functions (Kukawka, 1992).

Linkages between Lyon and each individual alpine agglomeration, Grenoble, Annecy and Chambéry, are stronger than the linkages between the individual alpine agglomerations. For example, Chambéry is substantially more dependent on Lyon politically, culturally and economically than it is on its alpine neighbours. These alpine cities control only the space that corresponds with their administrative functions; there is no greater spatial influence nor political control as opposed to Lyon which does in fact have a regional function outside of its immediate administrative area. Lyon has greater linkages with these cities than they have with each other, but these agglomerations also maintain strong ties with Paris.

Lyon, being the region's industrial, cultural and communication capital, has major linkages with all cities in the region. Lyon's influence is strongest in the Rhône corridor, but this influence also extends to the Alpine Axis and to the cities to the south and west. Within the greater context of Europe, the communication axis of the Rhône/Saône corridors are far more important than that of the Alpine Axis and thus provides more advantage to Lyon than the Alpine Axis provides to the alpine agglomerations.

L'Axe Alpin is not a credible rival to Lyon or La Voie Dauphine as the major axis of the region. L'Axe Alpin has limited functional integration on both the economic and political levels. The fact that each member of l'Axe Alpine has closer ties with Lyon than with each other, the palpable lack of interest by Geneva and the priority given to La Voie Dauphine by Grenoble and the region leave l'Axe Alpine as more of a planners fantasy than a functional axis. Also, the premise that Lyon is a threat to these alpine agglomerations is a centrifugal force on the region and will therefore gain little support by any official government or regional authority.

9.24 GENEVA

The issue of Geneva must be examined when discussing the urban relationships of the Rhône-Alpes Région. Geneva is the driving economic force behind the above average demographic growth of the French-Geneva area centred around Annemasse. Geneva also shares 150 kilometres of frontier with the Rhône-Alpes and only 6 kilometres with the rest of Switzerland. This long frontier and economic relationship provides the basis for linkages and cooperation. However, these linkages and cooperation extend only to those areas of interest to Geneva, specifically the status of the 26,000 transfrontier workers (Kukawka, 1989).

However, Geneva still remains a polarized space which is relatively isolated from the Rhône-Alpes. The rejection by Swiss voters for proceeding towards eventual membership in the European Community has the potential to strain the traditional frontier relationship between the two regions. The split between European Community countries and those not in the European Community could pose problems in the transfrontier movement of goods, services and perhaps even workers. This would seriously retard economic growth on both sides of this frontier.

Geneva enjoys direct autoroute access with the towns of the Alpine Axis and the Lyon-Geneva autoroute has now been fully completed. Historically, it is of interest that the Lyon-Geneva autoroute was completed years after the Alpine autoroute linking

Geneva with Grenoble via Annecy and Chambéry. This is another example of the lack of contact and relations between Geneva and Lyon. Geneva is also relatively isolated from the major French rail lines. There is an incredible lack of even slow commuter trains between the Rhône-Alpes and Geneva as compared with the numerous links that exist between Geneva and the rest of Switzerland or between the cities of the Rhône-Alpes. For example, there is no train from Geneva to Annecy, Chambéry or Grenoble after 5pm during weekdays. Nor are there more than four trains daily between Lyon and Geneva. The Lyon-Geneva train takes almost as long as the Lyon-Paris TGV. Geneva is interested in a TGV line to Paris but shows little enthusiasm for one into the Rhône-Alpes except as a linking spur with the future Lyon-Turin line; probably connecting at Chambéry. The contact between Lyon and Geneva remains physically and economically limited even with the completion of the autoroute link.

Geneva, being already an "International City" and outside of France, looks more towards Paris than to any regional city, especially those smaller ones in the Alpine furrow. Geneva is positioned outside the surrounding French area by an international frontier as well as a different history and culture. There has been more rivalry between the Haute-Savoie/French and Geneva than there has been cooperation. Lyon has some limited economic common cause with Geneva but the contact is limited (Kukawka, 1992).

The relationship between Lyon and Geneva is further complicated by the proximity and competition that exists between Lyon-Satolas and Geneva-Cointrin International Airports. Geneva-Cointrin is, without doubt, more of an international airport than Lyon-Satolas, with numerous direct connections throughout Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. Geneva-Cointrin handles twice the number of passengers a year as Lyon-Satolas and four times the amount of cargo traffic.

Having competing international airports within 100 kilometres of one another leads to certain tensions. Certain French government planners (Rapport Carrière, 1988.) assert that Geneva-Cointrin and Lyon-Satolas should combine resources to produce a single international air platform. However, contrary to French opinion, Geneva-Cointrin has not yet reached saturation and, if it does in future, the Swiss authorities are showing a stronger preference to form a linkage with Bâle-Mulhouse Airport which is directly on the Swiss/French frontier and well served by Swiss rail and autoroutes. The fact that Geneva-Cointrin airport overshadows Lyon-Satolas cannot be allowed to dictate the tone or focus of the relationship between Lyon and Geneva.

The relationship between Lyon and Geneva is relatively dormant. Lyon's varied industrial and manufacturing base along with Geneva's financial higher services should provide for a complementary relationship. Currently, the relationship between the two agglomerations is neither complementary nor competitive, rather it does not exist to any real extent. Geneva is focused on Paris and the international arena rather than on its immediate urban neighbour.

9.25 ROVALTAIN

Within the context of smaller towns and communes it is possible to achieve a limited degree of cooperation under favourable circumstances. This is possible provided these smaller towns and communes limit their scope of operation to specific and limited objectives on issues where they share similar and vested interests. One example of this initiative designed to promote local economic and political cooperation is ROVALTAIN (Figure 9.2).

In 1989, Romans, Valence, Tain l'Hermitage and 20 other minor communes joined together and formed ROVALTAIN. This association is charged with organizing and coordinating major projects such as University development, future TGV routes and industrial construction. There have been encouraging signs of successful cooperation such as agreement on the future route of the TGV line through Valence and the establishment of a University centre for the area in Valence. Much of the success of ROVALTAIN stems from the simple nature of the association in that its mandate covers only major projects of mutual interest (Kukakwa, 1989).

ROVALTAIN, on a small scale, illustrates that it is possible to build non-political networks at first that are designed to increase the linkages and coordination between cities. University networks, téchnopôles, hospitals, industrial construction and cultural events all help in establishing the foundation for further cooperation and the possibility of constructing a political urban network. On a larger scale outside Rhône-Alpes, the cities of Montpellier and Nîmes buried historical differences and have shown remarkable success in cooperating on social, cultural, economic and even some political affairs. Rhône-Alpes needs a similar functioning network of cities on a larger regional scale to avoid the serious handicap of overlapping functions, lack of cooperation and general mutual apathy if the region and Lyon are to attain their international ambitions.

9.26 LA REGION URBAINE DE LYON

La Region Urbaine de Lyon (RUL) is the true representation of the limits of the Lyon agglomeration according to the politicians and planners of Lyon (Chapter Four). RUL is an established semi-official agency that provides certain planning and administrative functions. The spatial dimensions of the RUL are large and thereby provide another example of an expanded urban linkage that would facilitate inter-urban cooperation. The RUL extends almost to St. Etienne in the south and includes the Saône valley north to the regional boundary. The RUL also includes the industrial Plaine de l'Ain and the newtown development pole of Satolas/l'Isle d'Abeau. This area has a population of almost two million and includes the majority of the economically dynamic areas in the region (Laurencin, 1990).

One problem with the RUL is that in spans four départements (Rhône, Isère, Loire and Ain) and would place substantial control of portions of these départements in the hands of the planners in Lyon. It would greatly benefit Lyon to be in a position to directly impact the RUL; however, the other political entities involved are reluctant to cede any sovereignty to Lyon. The RUL is a logical recognition of Lyon's official zone of influence and would greatly facilitate planning matters. In the short term the RUL will continue to play a minor organizational role but the potential for the RUL in the medium to long-term is substantial. The gathering of this large and important area under a single administrative umbrella is attractive and could in time become more of a reality.

9.3 REGIONAL INTEGRATION

The question of internal integration of the Rhône-Alpes urban network is a critical one. The problems of cooperation and cohesion between the major agglomerations of the region have been examined. A brief discussion on two other problems effecting regional integration need to be considered to complete the examination. First, the problems of cooperation within an agglomeration threaten to divide and weaken the agglomeration and compromise its ambitions. Second, the economic disparity between areas within the region threaten to undermine the whole process of regional integration and future development. These problems need to be examined to effectively analyze the true potential for regional cooperation that will help Lyon in its ambitions and provide the region with a foundation to compete in the post-1993 Europe (Laurencin, 1990).

9.31 INTRA-URBAN COOPERATION

The COURLY is a good example of municipal cooperation. The COURLY, the 55 communes of Lyon and its immediate hinterland, enables Lyon to form a relatively cohesive and coordinated strategy. The LYON 2010 plan would be an example of the level of cooperation that such a municipal organization can help establish. The COURLY is also active in attempting to reduce or reverse the habitual east-west economic split within the Lyon agglomeration. This form of greater municipal cooperation at an official level is mandatory for a city such as Lyon to establish international status.

Unfortunately, both Grenoble (with 32 communes) and St. Etienne (with 15 communes) were forced to abandon projects designed to forge closer municipal links, along the same lines as the COURLY, in 1990. One of the reasons for the collapse of these projects were the vast differences in tax rates. For example, in Grenoble, habitation tax varied from 3% to 16% and professional taxes varied from 8% to 21% depending on the commune. This difference in revenue-gathering was a major cause in the failure of these agglomerations to reach a municipal agreement. Other reasons included different political agendas, egos and the usual difficulties associated with coordinating numerous overlapping administrative authorities. Even without notable political cleavages, the different objectives between suburbs and city centres, and different communes within agglomerations, help construct serious barriers to future inter-urban cooperation within the region. This represents a serious danger, if communes within the same agglomeration cannot find common cause to cooperate, the greater concept of inter-regional urban cooperation would appear remote.

This is one of the unfortunate results of decentralization within the framework of overlapping administrative units. An increase in local conflicts, rivalries and lack of direction and cooperation are visible in many agglomerations. The mosaic of overlapping projects, administrative functions, egos and financial controls has led to serious intra-urban difficulties. This, in the context of the Rhône-Alpes Région, places large obstacles in the path of the urban cooperation at the regional level needed to effectively integrate the region and help promote both the region's and Lyon's international ambitions.

9.32 REGIONAL ECONOMIC DISPARITY

The risk of the Rhône-Alpes Région becoming fractured along spatial/economic fault lines is serious. This would produce severe negative consequences for the region as a whole and retard Lyon's international ambitions. One example of this potential fracture is the division of the region's unemployment rate. The three départements of Loire, Drôme and Ardèche are not only the départements facing the greatest demographic and spatial challenges, being located in the region's peripheral south-west area, but also suffer substantially higher unemployment rates than the other départements in the region (Figure 9.3).

FIGURE 9.3
DÉPARTEMENT UNEMPLOYMENT
PERCENTAGES - 1992



In 1992, the unemployment rate was 11.9% in Drôme, 11.3% in Loire and 9.6% in Ardèche. These unemployment rates are substantially higher than those in the north-east of the region. The 1992 unemployment rate was 7.2% in Ain, 8.2% in Haute-Savoie and 8.9% in Savoie. These unemployment figures reflect the economic split in the region between the north-east and the south-west. It is some small consolation for the départements in the south-west that the unemployment rate is currently rising faster in the north-east but the sustained double digit unemployment figures in the south-west will cause long-term social and economic problems for the region as a whole if left unresolved.

This form of spatial economic division in the region is a threat to the future of the whole region. To compete effectively in the future the Rhône-Alpes cannot afford to be split between the prosperous north-east and the backwards south-west. This would place a serious social and economic strain on the region. This split will deflect attention and finances from the development of Lyon and the region, especially during the current difficult economic climate. This could stall or seriously retard needed infrastructural and economic investment.

9.4 FUTURE SCENARIOS

There are a limitless number of scenarios for the future of inter-regional urban cooperation in the Rhône-Alpes. However, most arguments centre around either the centrifugal scenario or the centripetal scenario. The first, with the greatest negative potential for the region's urban agglomerations, envisages the major agglomerations forming independent links with other agglomerations outside the region at the expense of internal relationships. Examples would be Grenoble with Turin or a further strengthening of the Annecy-Geneva relationship. Lyon would then, with St. Etienne, attempt to forge an international identity independent of the region and its rival agglomerations.

The second scenario, the centripetal one, optimistically envisages a greater degree of regional urban integration. In this scenario, the agglomerations of the region acknowledge that they have more to gain from cooperation than competition. Lyon would be accepted as the regional capital within a cooperative framework with the other agglomerations. This would promote the synergy and critical mass needed to create a beneficial and international environment as advanced in the Soldatos model.

A third scenario, potentially more realistic, combines elements from the first two. Lyon becomes the functional capital of the Rhône-Alpes but lacks the critical mass of high-level services and specialized infrastructure needed to promote Lyon's drive for regional and international status. Paris, at the same time, by increasing its monopoly on such higher services, reinforces its role as a competing functional capital of the region. This advantageously masks the excessive internal regional differences between agglomerations. However, the dominance of Paris links the regions agglomerations to Paris instead of permitting Lyon to develop as the functional capital of the region.

The most likely scenario in the short to medium-time frame is a combination of the previous three. Lyon, despite being deprived of various high-level service functions by Paris, will continue to consolidate its position as regional capital through its central location and economic, political and cultural weight. A closer degree of inter-urban cooperation will be established within the region but will not completely overcome the historical political and economic independence of the various regional agglomerations nor will it overcome the current economic problems faced by the country as a whole.

9.5 SUMMARY

The poly-nuclear urban structure requires three elements to be credible as a functional association: a consensus and political will to share identity, that transport connections are sufficient to overcome the friction of distance between the centres and that the central city in the system be universally regarded as the "capital". These three elements exist to a significant degree in the context of Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région (Tesse, 1989).

The official regional plan signifies a consensus and political will to increase the integration between Lyon and the other major agglomerations in the region, especially Grenoble. This coincides with Lyon's desire to use the other agglomerations in the region to increase its critical mass and international status. The transport connections between Lyon and the other agglomerations in the region are exceptional. Lyon is connected to the region's other agglomerations by autoroute which places these agglomerations within close functional proximity to Lyon. This proximity and transport infrastructure constitute sufficient transport connections to overcome any friction of distance.

Finally, it is becoming increasingly clear that Lyon is the accepted capital of Rhône-Alpes. The only true competitor for that position is Paris. The infrastructure of Lyon coupled with its economic, political and cultural weight combine to provide Lyon the necessary strength to establish itself as the central city in the region. The problems that remain are the national dominance of Paris and the remaining fear of the alpine cities of being dominated by Lyon. These two problems are hindering the implementation of closer urban linkages in Rhône-Alpes.

The regional plan advocates, as a cornerstone of its official policy, an enhancement of Lyon's position as regional capital and a closer integration of Lyon with the region's other major agglomerations. This provides two major advantages. As an explicit political objective expressed at the level of government immediately below the State, it may help overcome political rivalries that exist at the lower tiers of département, commune and city government. Secondly, this objective may help unlock the large amount of public funding necessary to achieve greater regional integration. Specifically, it could underpin the region's efforts in the negotiation of funding under the "Plan Contrat" arrangements with the State.

This chapter has examined exclusively internal dynamics which might contribute towards raising Lyon's international status. This internal dynamic and its affects can now be compared with external international initiatives which have been taken by Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région.

CHAPTER TEN
LYON'S INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES

Chapter Nine examined the role of Lyon within the urban network of the Rhône-Alpes, the attempts to promote various urban linkages and the ability of Lyon to utilize its position within the regional urban network to promote its international ambitions and increase its critical mass. Chapter Nine discussed the internal dynamic of Lyon's attempt to expand its status through exercising its role as regional capital and position at the top of the Rhône-Alpes urban hierarchy. Chapter Ten will therefore focus more upon the Rhône-Alpes Région and its links with other regions and organizations outside France. This chapter will discuss the status of regions within the framework of the European Community, their position concerning decentralization, federalism and their relationship vis-à-vis major urban centres. Additionally, Lyon's international agenda, in conjunction with the Rhône-Alpes, connected with other European regions through such organizations as the "4 Motors policy" and the "Médiane Alpine" super-region is examined. Finally, the results of a small scale questionnaire concerning the importance of "Europe" and Lyon's current and future status as a “Eurocity” will be detailed and discussed.

This chapter remains relatively brief reflecting the limited number of official and direct international linkages of Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes Région. Despite their international ambitions, neither have sufficient official and direct international linkages that reflect important international status. These links need to be expanded and improved if Lyon is to achieve "International City" status.

10.1 A EUROPE OF REGIONS

There is currently much discussion surrounding the concept of a "Europe of Regions" (Dunford, 1991; Ardagh, 1990; Beckouche, 1991). This is especially popular in the context of the European single market, established on January 1, 1993, because of the potential emphasis away from national governments towards more European and regional responsibilities. Regions are currently viewed as the optimum administrative size to effectively restructure local economic space to enable improved coordination and linkages on a larger European and international scale (Commission of the European Community ("Rapid Reports" (Regions), volume 2, 1990). Regions can be considered the smallest economic unit that is viable in the global/local economic structure of the European Community due to the increase in trans-national economic functions (Chapter Eight).

The Rhône-Alpes is the second most populated, largest and economically-advantaged region in France, situated on an important north-south transportation corridor and sharing international borders with Switzerland and Italy. Rhône-Alpes has justifiable European ambitions that pivot around its central commercial location, increasing trade with other European regions and formal linkages with such regions. These, and other factors previously discussed, as developed, will help strengthen the economic position and European visibility of Lyon ("Regions et l'Europe (Les), l'obligation régionale." Interrégions No 146, Janvier 1992).

Despite the current discussions surrounding the status of the region in Europe, the regions have no form of official representation at the European Community in Brussels; only the twelve member states have official representation. The major problem that the French regions have when attempting to deal directly with the European Community is the centralism of the French government. One example of this occurred on May 14, 1984, when the European Community passed a directive stating that the regions of the community needed to associate directly with the European Community offices. France established a mission headed by a Prefect under the national minister of Plan et de l'Aménagement du Territoire to handle these direct relations between French regions and the European Community. The centralism of the French State successfully defeated the whole concept of direct regional contact with the European Community by placing such contact in the hands of a national government ministry.

The European Community formed the Conseil Consultatif des Collectivités Regionales on June 24, 1988. This body was established to provide the European Community with the views and opinions of the regions on pertinent matters. Realistically though, this is only a consultative body, one among many such consultative organizations and lobby groups in Brussels, and has no formal authority. If the future is truly to be a "Europe of Regions", major transformations in the political landscape of the national governments and the European Community are needed. This would essentially involve a federal structure for the regions in a European Community with far greater administrative powers. Both of these objectives would be accomplished at the political expense of the nation-state. This is not a short or medium-range reality and therefore the international political mandate of the regions, especially in centralized France, will remain limited (Drevet, 1991).

One of the major obstacles that the Rhône-Alpes Région needs to overcome is the region's lack of political decision-making power and economic independence. Internationalization and decentralization must proceed hand-in-hand to produce tangible results. The history of centralism in France focused on Paris is centuries old, being a logical development of the formulative nation-state/balance of power era prior to the recent phenomenon of European integration. Today, the advantage lies away from central economic and political control towards those countries whose political and economic strengths have been dispersed away from a single capital pole to a more regional and often federal structure as evidenced by Germany, and now Spain. This along with the time-space modifications provided through advanced technology (TGV, digital telecommunications etc.) have served not only to shrink effectively the continent (and individual nations) but also provide for greater international regional scale linkages.

It has been argued that Europe is departing from the model of centralized national bureaucracy and that society, both economically and politically, will become increasingly grouped into smaller regional spheres with multiple international connections (Drevet, 1991; Labasse, 1991). Within this new practical framework, a region would need a capital/metropole as a unifying force and counter-balance vis-à-vis other regional capitals/metropoles. In Rhône-Alpes, this urban centre must be Lyon and it must be accomplished with the active cooperation of the region's other agglomerations (Chapters 4 and 9).

Comparing regions from different nations is a difficult task. Problems arise when comparing the different relationships between a French region, a German länd, a Swiss canton and other regional structures throughout Western Europe with their national governments. The French regions have a much greater dependency on the French government than either the German länder or Swiss cantons have upon their respective governments. The federal structures of Germany and Switzerland provide for far greater regional legislative, administrative and judicial powers than are found in any French region. Additionally, comparing the financial strength of regions from different nations reveals that the French regions possess a far smaller budget than those of other European Community regions (Chapter 4).

The role of history and tradition is also important in determining the operation role of a region. In France, certain regions have a strong history of regional identity, including Brittany, Normandy, Alsace, Lorraine and Corsica. However, other regions such as the Rhône-Alpes have no common history, common tradition or background of cooperation. Swiss cantons, many Italian and Spanish regions, or British regions such as Scotland and Wales, enjoy a strong sense of identity and history that facilitates internal cooperation (Kukakwa, 1992).

The problems facing regions in France such as Rhône-Alpes is an absence of historical identity and a severe lack of political and economic independence from Paris. The Rhône-Alpes requires increased autonomy in administrative and financial affairs to be able to function alongside other European regions. The French State could play a major role in restructuring the political landscape to the greater advantage of the regions. However, the grasp of Jacobinism is easing slowly if at all. With the return of a conservative government in April 1993, the role of the French State will remain pervasive in France.

10.2 THE FOUR MOTORS

One of the cornerstones of the Rhône-Alpes Région's international agenda is the "4 Motors of Europe" organization. Rhône-Alpes signed an agreement of protocol and cooperation on September 9, 1988 with Baden-Württemburg, Lombardy and Catalonia (Figure 10.1). These four economically prosperous and dynamic European regions agreed to increase linkages on a number of levels designed to improve their economies and international images (Kukakwa, 1990).

Regional links within the field of higher education have been successful because this is one of the few areas where the French regions have a political mandate and effective economic resources. Therefore, the Rhône-Alpes Région is actively pursuing higher education links with its 4 Motors partners. One such example of these educational links is the "Multi-regional International Business Programme" (MIBP) which includes graduate business programmes in the 4 Motors regions together with Wales and Ontario. The overall ambition of MIBP is to "...foster closer educational links, promote exchanges, academic and research networks, as well as technology transfers and industrial co-operation" (MIBP, 1993).

The MIBP consists of an introductory four week seminar held every September. The location of this seminar rotates among participating institutions and will be held in Lyon in 1993. The focus of this seminar is on the relationships between industry and regions, the growing role of the regions and the importance of regional policy. After this four week seminar the students undertake a one-year period of study in a partner institution abroad (MIBP, 1993). Such higher educational links are popular in that expenses are relatively limited, the regions do not require the government's approval and it produces positive exposure on an international scale. Such programmes also help establish links between higher education and the commercial sector. Commerce and economic development are the foundations of the 4 Motors organization and the promotion of such useful linkages is an important component of 4 Motors policy.

FIGURE 10.1
"THE 4 MOTORS OF EUROPE"

A brief examination of certain basic comparative statistics of the 4 Motors regions will help place Rhône-Alpes, and thus Lyon, in a clearer context relative to the other regions.

TABLE 10.1
COMPARISON OF THE 4 MOTORS REGIONS IN 1990

	Rhône-Alpes	Bad-Würt	Catalonia	Lombardy
Capital	Lyon	Stuttgart	Barcelona	Milan
Area-sq km	43,700	35,750	31,930	23,850
Population	5.20	9.25	6.00	8.90
Pop Density	117.0	260.0	188.5	372.6
PIB/Person (100 base)	118	122	92	120
Unemployed	8.2%	4.1%	21.6%	6.7%
%< 25 years	37.8%	33.8%	39.1%	34.2%
% Employed Agriculture	5.5%	5.0%	7.0%	3.9%
Urban Structure	************	************	*************	***********
+1 million	1	0	1	1
100k-1mil	4	7	3	2
50k-100k	5	13	12	15
10k-50k	36	177	128	62

Source: Dunford, 1991.

Table 10.1 illustrates that although Rhône-Alpes is physically the largest region it has the smallest overall population and is at a particular disadvantage with regard to population density. Rhône-Alpes PIB per capita is on a par with Baden-Württemburg and Lombardy and all three are well ahead of Catalonia. Currently, all four regions are suffering economically; unemployment is rising and companies large and small are being squeezed and face the prospects of the 1993 single market with some trepidation. Negative economic conditions such as 21.6% unemployment in Catalonia are of greater concern to the regional authorities and electorate than the development of regional links at the European level. Such difficult economic conditions deflate enthusiasm and deflect the concentration needed to increase significantly such regional links as represented by the 4 Motors organization (Kukakwa, 1988).

One of the major limitations of Rhône-Alpes compared with its 4 Motors partners is the limited size of its urban structure and the previously discussed lack of political and financial decision-making powers that are enjoyed by the other regions. Overall however, Rhône-Alpes fits well with the other regions of the "4 Motors of Europe" and, despite certain disadvantages, belongs in such a grouping.

The "4 Motors of Europe" is not the only regional linkage organization in Europe. Another example of such a regional linkage within the European Community is entitled "Ouverture". Ouverture is funded by the European Community Commission for Regional Policy and is responsible for establishing linkages between regions in the European Community and Europe as a whole (The Strathclyder, March 1993).

Ouverture was established in 1991 and is managed by four European Community regions: Asturias, Piedmont, Saarland and Strathclyde. Ouverture is one of two European Community-sponsored programmes on international development that has headquarters outside Brussels. The headquarters for Ouverture is in Glasgow, the capital of the Strathclyde region in Scotland (Ouverture, The Strathclyder, March 1993).

There are two important differences between Ouverture and the 4 Motors organizations. First, Ouverture is financially supported by the European Community Commission for Regional Policy thus providing an official European framework for its operations. Secondly, Ouverture has a physical headquarters in Glasgow as opposed to the 4 Motors which has no official independent headquarters. The 4 Motors organization is important in that it establishes broad linkages between four important regions within the European Community. However, the 4 Motors lacks the official

European Community connection and the presence of a full-time office and headquarters devoted to its agenda.

The 4 Motors policy, although still in the early stages of development, has succeeded in developing three significant elements that will help Lyon's international ambitions. The first of these is the symbolism of the 4 Motors organization. If the French government fails to foster further regional international linkages then the Rhône-Alpes has illustrated both the will and ability to promote its own regional international linkages without the aid or participation of the French government.

The second element, closely linked to the first, is that the 4 Motors is a spontaneous organization. The 4 Motors was not inspired or created by the national government but rather through spontaneous forces within the Rhône-Alpes and its partners. This illustrates the internal international aspirations of Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes as opposed to these aspirations being created outside the region by the national government. Significantly, this internal international aspiration is driven by the private commercial sector of the region through the C.C.I.L. and the regional Chamber of Commerce. The major function of such international linkages is greater economic opportunity therefore the active participation of such commercially orientated organizations is crucial.

Finally, the lack of official government bureaucracy at both the State and European Community level could have a positive influence. This could allow the 4 Motors organization to develop without certain bureaucratic constraints. The 4 Motors will posses its own dynamism provided by groups and organizations that operate in the real commercial world. This provides the 4 Motors with greater flexibility and opportunity while allowing it to remain unconstrained by political dogma and the ebbs and flows of changes in national governments as currently being witnessed in both France and, to a dramatic degree, in Italy. Significantly, the 4 Motors provides a direct opportunity for the private sector to participate in an international structure of cooperation.

Currently, it is too early to comment on the success of the 4 Motors organization. However, this is a new model of economic and political international linkages at the regional level that directly impacts both Lyon's and the region's drive towards a greater European role and therefore cannot be dismissed as irrelevant.

An additional point of interest is that the Rhône-Alpes Région has established this relationship with other major European regions but has yet to establish any formal relationship with the Canton of Geneva. Spatially, it would be logical for the Rhône-Alpes and Geneva to establish a formal relationship, but this has not happened. This is yet another indication of the apparent indifference in the relationship between these two neighbours.

10.3 EUROPE MÉDIANE ALPINE

Another European spatial concept is the "Europe Médiane Alpine" (Figure 10.2). This area stretches from Lyon to Vienna and includes Geneva, Bern, Zurich, Munich, Innsbruck and Salzburg to the north and Turin, Milan, Venice and Trieste to the south (Zagreb currently has more pressing problems). There is no formal protocol or organization to represent this spatial concept, rather, it is considered one of the five "Super-Regions" of Europe: the Europe of Capitals and Conurbations of the North-West, the Atlantic Arc, Mediterranean Europe, East and South East Europe and the centrally located Médiane Alpine (Kukakwa, 1992).

The zone Médiane Alpine is at present a theoretical construct. Unlike the 4 Motors, there is no organization basis to the zone Médiane Alpine and such organization would prove difficult given the size of the area and the number of countries involved both within and outside the European Community. Therefore, this is a very long range concept in political terms yet significant in economic terms. The Médiane Alpine identifies a zone which is growing in importance and Lyon is well positioned as a connector between the Médiane Alpine and the other "Super-Regions". Given its position at the edge of the Médiane Alpine it is doubtful that Lyon would play a directional role in this zone, however, as the only major French city integrated within

FIGURE 10.2
EUROPE MÉDIANE ALPINE

this zone and given its connector position, Lyon has the potential to become a significant actor in the Médiane Alpine. Over time, this could reinforce Lyon's eastward connections and help compensate for Lyon's lack of hinterland to the west while complementing Lyon's traditionally strong north-south role.

Other external connections pursued by the Rhône-Alpes Région include the establishment of a delegation at the European Community Headquarters in Brussels on June 6, 1990. The mission of this delegation is to lobby and promote the interests of the region. Additionally, ADERLY with its mandate to promote Lyon as a European business centre and "International City", has established an office in Lyon and at the World Trade Centre in New York. Lyon is also linked with the city of St. Louis in the United States but this "twinning" provides little more than limited exchanges and good press for both cities.

The Rhône-Alpes Région currently has few official links with other regions and official organizations outside France. If the regions are indeed to play an increasing role of importance in Europe, the Rhône-Alpes must enhance its visibility and connections outside France. The "4 Motors of Europe" regional affiliation is a strong beginning for the Rhône-Alpes. Though the 4 Motors is in its early stages, the current exchanges and commercial potential for greater cooperation in all fields in the future is significant.

Lyon, as regional capital, has an important role to play in the future development of the region's external connections. This will in turn help bolster Lyon's own international ambitions through the vehicle of the region. At present, the Rhône-Alpes needs to expand its official and informal connections with other regions and organizations in Europe. This will not only help enhance its international image but will economically promote commerce and corporate cooperation in a trans-frontier manner. This will allow both the region and Lyon to participate on the European and international stage to a greater extent and help fulfil their international ambitions.

10.4 ATTITUDES TO LYON'S INTERNATIONAL STATUS - A STUDENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Chapters Nine and Ten have attempted to explore Lyon's formal regional and international connections. In both instances it was clear that these processes are at an early stage of development. For such linkages to develop it is obvious that there should exist public awareness of such efforts and general endorsement of Lyon's ambition to enhance its European status. Ideally, the strength of this awareness would have been tested by a wide-ranging survey of opinion. In practice, to attempt a significant opinion survey would be an undertaking well beyond the logistical possibilities of this project. Moreover, it is clear from earlier chapters that in certain key sectors; industry, transport, business and university research for example, the leaders of decision-making are acutely aware of the importance of Europe to Lyon's future. Additionally, reference to the results of the Maastricht Referendum indicated that a strong majority (60%) of the electorate of Lyon share this opinion. A critical element, given the long-range scale of European construction, is the view of young well-educated persons who will constitute the decision-makers and opinion-formers of the near-future. Accordingly, fieldwork in Lyon was completed by a small scale questionnaire of attitudes to Lyon's international status on the part of two distinct groups of students chosen from the École Superieur de Commerce de Lyon (ESC) and from the Université de Lyon III.

The former institution was selected as being representative of young persons being trained for employment as "cadres" in the fields of business, industry and administration. Moreover, through its predominantly private sector "Grand École" status, the ESC attracts students from a national and international catchment, most of whom will eventually find employment away from Lyon. In the case of the Université de Lyon III, the catchment is more specifically local and regional. Most of these students will aspire to gain employment in the local area in a wide range of occupations with the liberal professions predominating. A class of geography students was selected in the belief that a solid local knowledge and spatial awareness might exist. Both questionnaires were administered in classroom conditions with a contextual introduction but no other prompting. The questionnaire used (Appendix 1) varied only slightly, to suit the specific nature of the group. It is emphasised that the results represent simply a snapshot picture and not a rigorous survey. Nevertheless, the questionnaire proved illuminating and some of the more salient results merit further discussion.

In this section, responses to the 20 questions will be briefly examined to demonstrate some broad and general opinions derived from these different groups. The first two questions were asked to determine the permanent residence of the respondent and the reason that they chose to matriculate at that particular institution. This placed the respondents in a basic context of background and ambition.

Question 3 asked: *All things being equal (salary, job interest etc.) would you consider working in Lyon? Why or why not?* This question attempted to determine the overall level of attraction of Lyon. The overwhelming majority of the local students from the Université de Lyon II stated that they would remain in Lyon. The non-local ESC students also displayed an attraction to Lyon with a clear majority stating that, given certain conditions, they could envision themselves working in Lyon. Most cited the proximity to the Alps and Paris, along with the quality of life as the most compelling reasons to remain in Lyon.

Question 18 asked the opposite question: *Excluding personal reasons (family etc.) what would you see as the main reason for NOT working in Lyon?* The responses from both groups included the usual complaints of big city living: pollution, traffic, peripheral housing estates and the daily stress of urban existence. Question 16; *What aspects of Lyon's "image" do you see as being detrimental at a European scale?* provoked a similar variety of answers on the problems of the urban environment. It is debatable if these negative responses can be fairly directed at only Lyon or whether they represent an inescapable part of urban living.

Question 4 asked: *How important to you is European integration in: 1) career terms and 2) in principle.* The responses were evenly divided between "Very" and "Somewhat" with a stronger approval of the principle of European integration. Only a handful viewed European integration as "Not at all" important. For a city that has strong European objectives, having a general level of personal support from the respondents concerning the concept of European integration is an encouraging indication.

Question 5 asked: *Name the cities in France which you consider close to attaining "Eurocity" status, (excluding Paris).* In both groups Lyon and Strasbourg were near unanimous selections. After these two cities, there was a substantial mix of opinions with no one city being clearly established as a potential "Eurocity" in the same class as Lyon and Strasbourg.

Questions 6,7,8 and 9 were designed to discern the respondents views on what Lyon's strengths and weaknesses are on a European scale. Not surprisingly the picture gathered from these questions is that Lyon possesses a first class location and transportation infrastructure but remains a provincial city dominated by Paris with few European scale institutions with the exception of Interpol. There was little difference in the responses between the two groups.

Question 10 asked: *Do you consider Geneva to have a higher ranking as a "Eurocity" than Lyon? Why?* The respondents at ESC were near unanimous in declaring Geneva a higher ranking "Eurocity" than Lyon. The financial service sector and international organizations were the most frequently cited reasons. However, the local students at Lyon III were more impressed with Lyon's relative position. Approximately 30% cited Lyon as being more of a "Eurocity" stating that Lyon's size, industrial strength and E.C. membership counterbalanced Geneva's other advantages. Still, the majority judged Geneva to have a higher ranking as a "Eurocity" than Lyon.

Question 11 asked: *Do you consider Grenoble as a rival to Lyon or complementary to Lyon?* The responses to this question were almost evenly divided in both groups. Answers ranged from distinct rival to regional partner. In some small way this accurately represents the opinions of the relevant civic leaders: dichotomous.

Question 12 asked: *Are you aware of the "Quarte Moteurs" policy? Explain.* At ESC, 4 students had some idea of the 4 Motors policy but none could effectively explain its function nor identify all four members. Considering that the 4 Motors is heavily promoted by the C.C.I.L., which operates ESC, this is an indication that the 4 Motors policy is not receiving widespread exposure among the students who could be most expected to encounter this programme. None of the 35 respondents at Lyon III had the faintest idea of what the 4 Motors policy represented. This is a serious problem for this policy and illustrates that Lyon and the region are not effectively promoting the policy to even an educated audience that will be responsible for supporting and pursuing this policy in the future.

Question 13 asked: *Do you consider that the TGV has improved Lyon's status as a "Eurocity" or made Lyon more dependent on Paris?* Regardless of how this question was answered the meaning was identical. Either the TGV has improved Lyon's status because it is closer to Paris or has increased Lyon's dependence on Paris for the exact same reasons. Regardless, the unanimous consensus is that the TGV has increased Lyon's dependence on Paris, which was perceived by some as positive.

Questions 14, 15 and 19 were designed to discern the awareness of the respondents on a number of local issues concerning Lyon's European status. Nobody in either group could name a local (Rhône) European Member of Parliament (Question 14) and very few respondents in either group, especially the local students, could accurately name two international/multi-national corporations located in Lyon (Question 19).

Question 17 asked: *How important do you consider it is that Lyon should aspire to "Eurocity" status.* The response options were, similar to question 5, "Very", "Somewhat" or "Not at all". The responses of both groups were almost even divided between "Very' and "Somewhat" with only two respondents stating "Not at all". Overall, this response is positive for Lyon in that there is not a negative or lethargic attitude to the question of its European ambitions. This represents a degree of public support among these students for Lyon's European agenda.

The last question to be examined, question 20 asked: *Finally, do you consider Lyon to be:*

1) an existing "Eurocity".
2) a potential "Eurocity".
3) a purely French city.

The clear majority placed Lyon in the second category, that of a potential "Eurocity". An even number placed Lyon in either the first or the third category but overall, unsurprisingly, Lyon is considered by these respondents to be a potential "Eurocity".

The questionnaire, though small in survey size, did illustrate interesting perceptions. Lyon and Strasbourg were clearly the French cities judged closest to having attained "Eurocity" status. Geneva was viewed as more of a "Eurocity" but the local students also found reasons to rank Lyon over Geneva, most of whom also agreed that Lyon was a potential "Eurocity". The degree of personal and professional support for the concept of European integration is another short and long-term positive indicator for Lyon's European ambitions.

A survey sample of this size cannot draw any definite conclusions, nor should it make the effort. However, that these students in higher education broadly support Lyon's European ambitions and the overall concept of European integration bodes well for Lyon in the future. It would be of great concern if the young and educated of Lyon displayed a negative attitude towards Lyon's future European agenda and the concept of "Europe".

10.5 SUMMARY

The advantages to Lyon of greater direct international linkages, either on its own or through the region, are commercial and political. Greater direct international linkages will facilitate trade, research and development links, foster a degree of political autonomy and allow Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes to expand their functions at both the domestic and trans-national scale. The extension of Lyon and the region through these direct international linkages also serves to enhance the critical mass of Lyon which will further improve its European position and economic situation.

The ultimate objective of these direct international linkages is improved commercial activity between the participating cities/regions. The support of the C.C.I.L. and private industry in the 4 Motors organization is indicative of the economic desirability of such links. Lyon and Rhône-Alpes need to expand their direct international links at both the formal and informal level to establish a true network of such conections. This will, if realized in the near future, greatly enhance Lyon's international position.

CONCLUSION

"The primacy of Paris inhibits the regional sphere of activity of second-ranking French cities. Lyon is particularly disadvantaged in that to the west lies the low population density Massif Central, to the south is the city-port of Marseille with direct international maritime connections, to the east, Grenoble is a dynamic and, to some extent, rival pole while to the north-east Geneva has a well-established international role. To combat the primacy of Paris, and the competition of neighbouring cities, Lyon is justifiably attempting to develop an international and trans-national role to enhance its economic, political and demographic base".

The objective of this thesis, as stated in the introduction, is to test the above hypothesis through reference to objective empirical data and subjective qualitative methods. Therefore, restating the summaries of the previous ten chapters would be of little relevance at this juncture. It is preferable to re-evaluate the effectiveness of the Soldatos model, the DATAR/RECLUS project and the LYON 2010 urban planning scheme in determining the nature of the current situation of Lyon. This will establish their utility as tools to influence and predict Lyon's future and establish possible relevant applications to other agglomerations. This leads to general conclusions including some issues unresolved by this thesis but which merit further research.

C.1 THE SOLDATOS MODEL

This thesis has utilized the Soldatos model as the theoretical framework upon which to discuss the concept of an "International City" and to ascertain where Lyon ranks vis-à-vis specific criteria. However, this theoretical model needs to be seriously examined. One of the biggest single factors in determining Lyon's status is that it is a French city. The historical, economic and social forces that have shaped France have substantially determined Lyon's current situation. The dominance of Paris, the centralisation of the French state and the system of local administration are all unique to France and therefore to Lyon. The significance of the current economic slowdown is also important in that it will impact the speed and effectiveness of Lyon's efforts. The Soldatos model fails to reflect the implications of changing economic conditions, which perpetually exist, especially in the context of the current global economy. Similarly, the impact of current events, be they local politics or the restructuring of Eastern Europe, cannot be accurately represented in the Soldatos model nor in fact are they considered.

The Soldatos model is descriptive of a generic World City. World Cities such as London, Paris, New York and Tokyo share the criteria used by the Soldatos model to an advanced degree. However, the cities of Tokyo and Paris are vastly different. These differences cannot be accurately reflected in a model such as that espoused by Soldatos. The focus of this model, being on specific semi-qualitative criteria, ignores the important social and cultural realities of the situation.

Additionally, the criteria associated with a World City and those applicable to a regional or European-scale city are significantly different. It is impossible to apply the same criteria, regardless of minor differences in degree, to a city in the position of Lyon as compared with Paris. Every city, by definition, possesses certain more sophisticated services and provides specific services to its inhabitants both in the city and the immediate hinterland. The degree and scale of these services vary depending on a vast number of factors.

The concept of critical mass remains useful and of undeniable importance to the status and success of any city. The problem is to define at what points thresholds of critical mass are situated on the scale from regional to national to international city.

The Soldatos model, though flawed, provides the fundamental concepts of what a city requires and operates as a measuring stick against which Lyon and any other city can be broadly judged. The Soldatos analysis is perhaps better applied post hoc, i.e. descriptive of what a given city has achieved, rather than as a model pathway to the achievement of international status at some undefined point in the future. Nevertheless, the Soldatos model has had value to this study in a nominative sense. It is preferable to have ideas of "expectations" of the term "International City" than to operate in a conceptual vacuum and in this sense the Soldatos model has proven valuable.

C-2 THE DATAR/RECLUS PROJECT

The DATAR/RECLUS project shares similar dangers of arbitrary quantification and lack of flexibility concerning the forces of history, location and current events. However, as a working tool, this project has certain utility. Through choosing a limited number of criteria in a comparative manner between cities, it is able to provide a basic ranking in overall terms according to the specific criteria.

Lyon and Geneva are ranked 20th and 21st respectively in this project. Geneva is a city with more international functions than Lyon but, in terms of overall rankings, Lyon has strength in industry and demographics that Geneva cannot match.

The DATAR/RECLUS project remains a useful tool in that it is an applied study rather than theoretical conjecture. However imperfect, specific results and rankings are offered within a generalized empirical framework that can subsequently be used as a benchmark by other researchers to explore comparisons between specific European cities. In this sense the project was useful in defining the gaps in Lyon's credentials and was intellectually valuable as a "half-way" position between the theoretical basis of Soldatos and the specific action prescribed in the LYON 2010 plan.

C.3 THE LYON 2010 PLAN

The LYON 2010 plan, the third cornerstone of the operational basis of this thesis, is the most effective. This official planning document best reflects the current situation of Lyon. The advantage is that this plan was conceived by local planners who have an appreciation for the individuality of Lyon's situation. These planners could accurately place Lyon in the context of its history in regards to Paris, local debates, and the strength of its location and industrial legacy. The LYON 2010 plan also reflects the city's orientation towards a future where the European Community and European linkages play an expanded and important role. Additionally, the place of the city in the regional and global economic and political planning schema is critical and can only be effectively discussed in a local and individualistic fashion.

The LYON 2010 plan demonstrates the operational priorities of the City of Lyon. These priorities range from the redevelopment of the Gerland district to the expansion of Lyon's regional role. The rationale behind the operational priorities is also discussed and is valuable in illustrating the logic behind the pursuit of specific objectives, including Lyon's future European ambitions.

The Lyon planners also make direct comparisons between other similarly positioned European cities and Lyon in an effort to determine Lyon's strengths and weaknesses. Additionally, these comparisons provide a current and updated status report on Lyon vis-à-vis other "Eurocities" on criteria of importance to the city of Lyon. The massive expansion project at Lyon-Satolas is one example of the utility of the LYON 2010 plan in accurately reflecting the operational priorities of Lyon.

The LYON 2010 plan is useful as a tool in that it can be tested and examined today and in the future. In the short-term one can assess the progress of this plan. Which priorities remain strong, which fade, what gets created and whether or not it is on schedule are all avenues of future study in the context of the LYON 2010 plan. In 2010, a critical review of Lyon will reveal the effectiveness of this plan and the persons charged with implementing various stages of the plan. Whether or not Lyon in the year 2010 resembles the LYON 2010 planned in 1990 will provide further indications. From the author's point of view, the LYON 2010 plan provided a clear indication of the institutional framework of Lyon's ambitions and thus an opportunity to evaluate the extent to which administrative, legal and budgetary powers were in place to achieve Lyon's ambitions.

None of the three approaches - the theoretical, empirical and applied - cited above was in itself a sufficient basis on which to arrive at conclusions. Rather each approach contributed intellectually at various stages of the research to structure a very broad and potentially unmanageable research topic. With the benefit of hindsight, the LYON 2010 plan would have provided the most effective corpus around which to construct the thesis but with the consequence of severely constraining intellectual freedom to explore wider issues. This would have potentially produced a technocratic rather than academic thesis, more appropriate to a graduate in planning than a geographer.

Having acknowledged the contribution made to this thesis of each of the three approaches which structured the research, an assessment of Lyon's current status as a Eurocity can now be discussed.

C.4 LYON'S CURRENT STATUS

Lyon is attempting to establish and increase its trans-national functions to combat the primacy of Paris and to further position itself for the anticipated economic and political configuration of Europe. The national government, in the current European and global economy, can no longer protect and provide for the economic prosperity of Lyon. Rather, the Europe-wide economy forces every city and region to position itself in a competitive fashion.

Lyon can never hope to combat the primacy of Paris in the French urban hierarchy nor will Lyon succeed in prising away important political or economic decision-making functions from the capital. Rather, Lyon must establish itself as the undisputed second city of France, as a functional regional capital, and as an important European city with numerous trans-national functions. This is Lyon's current challenge as recognized by its political leaders and planners. From this conviction, the LYON 2010 plan was framed.

Lyon will never establish "International City" status in the context of the Soldatos model. The shadow of Paris looms too large over Lyon and the rest of the French urban hierarchy for any French city to establish itself as an "International City". However, the advantages that Lyon does possess are numerous and fundamental to its continued success. Lyon's geographic position will ensure Lyon a large future role in the transportation plans of France and Europe. Lyon has correctly understood that its location and transportation infrastructure will be crucial to its future. The massive investment and improvement in Lyon's physical transportation infrastructure will pay large dividends in both the short and long-term future of Lyon.

Another advantage that Lyon currently enjoys is an active and focused political will to establish Lyon as a major European city. This political will is illustrated by the LYON 2010 plan, the success of COURLY in uniting disparate political administrative units behind a common cause and the active role of the C.C.I.L. and other semi-official agencies operating with the blessing of the official administrative units. There is no guarantee that this political direction and focus will continue until 2010 but having an official planning document, along with the French record for completing major projects regardless of political affiliation (TGV, nuclear plants etc.), argues well for Lyon following through on its European ambitions in the short to medium-term. Additionally, Lyon can convincingly claim that the majority of its population supports the concept of Europe and of Lyon pursuing a European agenda (Chapters 4, 9, and 10).

The major problem currently facing Lyon in all areas is the oft-stated primacy of Paris. Lyon's lack of decision-making powers in the higher services, lack of parent company headquarters, research and development laboratories, and other criteria. Nor is Lyon going to develop a reputation as a world class tourist attraction in the near future. However, Lyon's outlook for the short and medium-term is optimistic. Lyon will continue to upgrade its transportation infrastructure, redevelop the Gerland district, increase its regional and European role and enjoy a healthy demographic and a competitive industrial base.

At the same time, it is obviously impossible to predict the effects of the current economic recession in France and the rest of Europe, the effects of the restructuring of Eastern Europe, and the expansion and potential deepening of the EC. These are but a short-list of major external influences on the dynamic of Lyon's growth and ambition. Lyon, Europe and the world will be vastly changed by 2010 in ways unanticipated by even the most visionary of contemporary observers.

Lyon does not exist in a vacuum and therefore cannot commit a high level of resources, either physical or financial, to its pursuit of international status. The daily operations of a major metropolis consume the vast majority of the time and resources of any city. The financial problems posed by the current recession, problems in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), trade agreements (GATT specifically) and the dramatic increase in the French national debt all cast a black shadow and have a dampening effect on such concepts as "International City" ambitions. The political uncertainty in Europe at this moment: Italy in chaos, France radically altering the National Assembly, the strains of German reunification, the horrors of former Yugoslavia, Russian instability and a host of other issues will inevitably affect Lyon's plans and prospects. Throughout the turbulence of Europe in 1993, the commercial and business leaders continue to advance towards a European economy, local political leaders pursue their agendas and the electorate remain concerned with unemployment, economic conditions, immigration and unpopular politicians. Within the complexity of these events, Lyon will continue to pursue its European agenda with whatever resources remain available; but to accurately predict the medium to long-term results is difficult in the extreme.

This project has, at this juncture, raised more questions and ambiguities than it has answered. There are no definitive answers to these questions since the fact that the European ambitions of Lyon and its potential "International City" status are topics that remain both fluid and complex. What this study does provide is a portrait of Lyon in 1993, its current situation and plans for the future. This can then be examined in the context of official projections, statements, future decisions and accomplishments.

C.5 APPROACH AND POTENTIAL FUTURE PROJECTS

The scale of this project was that of the city of Lyon. The scale could have been larger ("Eurocities") or smaller (Lyon's economic infrastructure), however, the scale was determined by a desire to examine the complete picture of the city of Lyon. The synthesis of this "big picture" view of Lyon would have been lost if the project had concentrated solely on one aspect of Lyon's situation. The desire was to avoid breaking the topic down to such a small level that the cohesiveness and interactions would be lost. (Wharf, 1990.)

The behaviouralist approach represents the philosophical persuasion of the author. Any attempt to quantify such a topic would have omitted elements of analytical interpretation which were deemed to represent the foundation of this thesis. Having trained as a political scientist, it was the author's concern to clarify the political objectives of the search for enhanced European status, to identify the actors involved in pursuing these objectives and the outcomes achieved thus far. The originality of the task from the author's point of view was that by working in a geography department it was possible to view these questions in spatial terms rather than purely in non-spatial sectoral (economic) or institutional (legal) terms.

An essential aspect of research is to be sensitive to its deficiencies and also to be aware of future research agendas. It is in the nature of research that it is only on its completion that the gaps and deficiencies become evident. Given the author's background of an academic training in the United States some of the limitations of the thesis might be related to this non-European origin. This operates at two levels; the necessity to expunge pre-conceptions based on North American experience of the operation of cities and regions and secondly, to come to terms rapidly with unfamiliar and highly-complex institutional and legal structures operating in a foreign country. In this sense, much of the author's previously acquired experience was "non-transferable" except in general terms and the research was initiated from a position of tabla rasa. Similarily, apart from supervision meetings, the research was conducted almost entirely in a foreign language. This was not an insuperable problem but did impose penalties in the form of the time taken to master specialised and technical French and in the time taken to evaluate the utility of particular sources which could only be achieved by painstaking translation rather than the rapid scanning of one's native language. Rather than excuse limitations, it is more productive to identify them and to propose further research which resolves them.

First and foremost, it must be stressed that this research was conducted during a period of political and economic instability both within France and more widely in Europe. This was not, and could not be anticipated at the stage of research design. To take but one example, the arrival in France of a right wing Government dedicated to reducing public sector budget defecits and reducing unemployment is likely to influence the attitude to investment in such nebulous notions as Eurocity status, at least in the short term.

Secondly, for reasons of time and cost constraints, two vital aspects have not been examined in the depth that they merit. The question of the degree of solidarity in the Rhône-Alpes Région behind Lyon's ambitions has been examined largely in terms of officially-stated objectives in the most recent regional plan. It would have been instructive to have probed in more detail the degree of consensus at an operational level (local authorities, universities, individual firms) that a "European" Lyon is viewed as a critical element to the region's future and one to which it is worth devoting significant regional resources. Additionally, the relationship between Lyon and Geneva has only been touched on by inference. This is a thesis topic in itself but it is inescapable that the two cities are in a real sense rivals and fall within two separate political entities and thus are not amenable to the forms of brokerage that might apply within a single national state.

The decision to limit discussion of Geneva to instances of direct impact (the erosion of Lyon's influence in the frontier zone of Annemasse, the competition of Geneva Cointrin airport, for example), was deliberate. It would have required gaining an understanding of yet another foreign planning and administrative structure, complicated in this instance by a federal structure. To have included a substantial treatment of Geneva would have transformed the thesis into a comparative study, which was not one of the central objectives of the thesis. Moreover, from preliminary work it appeared clear that the notion of Lyon and Geneva promoting their European status in tandem was a fanciful one expressed only in vague, inconclusive terms rather than as a solid plank in the political agenda of either city. Nevertheless, the extent to which Lyon's aspirations could be undermined by a smaller but very influencial neighbour is an obvious avenue for future research.

A third area which merits further research is the attitude of the populace at large. Lyon has the reputation of being a rather introverted society as far as its elite is concerned. Can a city, reputedly "provincial" within its own country, credibly espouse a European role? Evidence for this has been adduced in this thesis by surrogate methods, notably election results. This evidence suggests support for an enhanced role in Europe, however, public concern over employment, housing and social issues is greater and more tangible than support for abstract notions of European roles. This poses the question as to whether more immediately visible local issues will continue to have more electoral appeal than long-term issues at a European scale.

A fourth aspect which will merit future research attention concerns the question of timing. The present pattern of economic retrenchment following a prolonged recession may have taken place too late to halt Lyon's progress towards European status. This thesis has drawn attention to transport infrastructure developments which have already either been achieved (eastern motorway by-pass, development of Satolas airport) or will very shortly be achieved (Satolas TGV station, extension of the TGV line to Valence). Similarly, the political will for a greater European role has been enshrined in the regional and city plans. In this sense, infrastructure developments and political options have already been foreclosed and it may be assumed that the recession may defer but not reverse the impetus towards Lyon's European role. It will be a major research theme to monitor the impact of the economic condition on the progress toward the objectives of LYON 2010.

Finally, the whole question of regional decentralization is again under scrutiny. With a new, and unchallengeable right wing government in power, and with macro-economic problems (budget defecit, unemployment) at the top of the political agenda, it is tempting to assume, at this point in time, that the attention of the government will focus on national economic issues rather than on rapid progress towards further regional devolution. The question is thus posed as to whether or not Lyon has gained sufficient strength and impetus to press ahead with its own aspirations regardless of national economic preoccupations. In this sense, the Soldatos notion of "critical mass" assumes significance; has Lyon passed the crucial threshold of self-sustaining importance or is the city still too weak vis-à-vis the central power of Paris to exert an independent role in pursuing its prefered agenda? The evidence adduced in this thesis suggests that in spite of much progress, Lyon has yet to achieve the critical mass necessary to develop independently of performance in the national economy or free from the tutelage of the national government. In this sense we come to the conclusion that Lyon's aspirations as an international city will depend on the speed of the recovery in the French economy as a whole, and in the wider sense the pace of economic recovery of Western Europe.

In reference to the original hypothesis, therefore, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Lyon's ambitions are logical and realistic in the long-term, but the present economic circumstances are unlikely to provide a conducive atmosphere for rapid progress. This thesis therefore closes on a note of ambiguity, but in a positive sense. It is unlikely that the progress made by Lyon will be lost. It is more likely that the city will forge ahead in areas where it has established strength, for example as a transport node, as a centre of medical research, and as a centre of technological innovation in industry, all at a European scale, but where the achievement of a critical mass must await a general economic recovery in France and the European Community, an event Lyon is powerless to influence.

GLOSSARY

ADERLY:	l'Agence de Développement de la Région Lyonnaise
CES:	Council Economique et Social Rhône-Alpes
C.C.I.L.:	Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Lyon
CDRE:	Centre de Documentation et de Recherche Européenne
CERAT:	Centre de Recherche sur la Politique, l'Administration et le Territoire
CIRC:	Centre International de Recherche sur le Cancer
COTRAO:	Communauté de Travail des Alpes Occidentales
COURLY:	Communauté Urbaine de Lyon
CUREI:	Centre Universitaire de Recherche Européenne et Internationale
DATAR:	Délégation à l'Aménagement du Territoire
ENS:	l'École Normale Supérieure
ERAI:	l'Entreprise Rhône-Alpes Internationale
ESC:	l'École Supérieure de Commerce de Lyon
ESRF:	le Laboratoire Européen du Rayonnement Synchrotron
ILL:	l'Institut Laue et Langevin
INSEE:	l'Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques
INUDEL:	Association Rhône-Alpes pour l'Innovation Urbaine et le Développement Local
IRAM:	l'Institut de Radioastronomie Millimétrique
LET:	le Laboratoire d'Économie des Transports
NICE:	New International Cities Era
RUL:	La Région Urbaine de Lyon
SDAL:	Schéma Directeur de l'Aménagement Lyonnais
SDAU:	Schéma Directeur de l'Aménagement Urbain
SEDLYS:	Société d'Études pour le Développement de Lyon-Satolas
SEPAL:	Syndicat d'Études et de Programmation de l'Agglomération Lyonnaise
SYTRAL:	Syndicat Mixte des Transports pour le Rhône et l'Agglomération Lyonnaise
ZAC:	Zone d'Aménagement Concerté

BIBLIOGRAPHY

L'Activité économique. Lyon: Septembre, 1990.

Aeroports, 6-1990.

Affairs économiques. No. 18, Avril, 1991.

Agence d'Urbanisme de la COURLY. Lyon: 1991.

Ardagh, John. France Today. London: Penguin Books, 1990 edition.

L'Atlas Informatique. Paris: 1992.

Atout Rhône. No, 27, Juin, 1991.

Audirac, Pierre-Alain et Jean-Paul Faur. "La Population des Régions." INSEE Premiere No. 82 (Juin 1990).

Baleste, Marcel. L'Économie Française - 11ème édition. Paris: Masson, 1991.

Ballingrand, J.P. et D. Maquart. La Fin du Territoire Jacobin. Paris: Albin Michel, 1990.

Barbet, M. Les Régions et l'Intégration Européenne; le Rôle des Organisations Interrégionales. Mémoire IEP, Grenoble, Septembre 1992.

Beaujeu-Garnier, Jacqueline. "Towards a New Equilibrium in France? Annals of the Association of American Geographers. Vol. 64 No. 1 (March 1974); 113-125.

Beckouche, P. "French high-tech and space: a double cleavage". in Benko, G and M. Dunford (eds.) Industrial change and regional development. London: Belhaven, 1991.

Benko, G.B. "French Regional Policy in the early 1980's." International Social Science Journal 112 (1987): 233-254.

Benko, George et Alain Lipietz. Les régions qui gagnent. Paris: PUF, 1992.

Bernadet, M., et al. Les Transports à l'Horizon 2000. Lyon: L.E.T.,1988.

Bethemont, Jacques. "Le Problème des Infrastructures Autoroutières dans Rhône-Alpes." Élan Rhône-Alpes No. 1 (1990).

________. "Les Échanges Internationaux de Rhône-Alpes". Élan Rhône-Alpes No. 2 (1990).

________. "Rhône-Alpes et l'Echelle Européenne." Élan Rhône-Alpes No. 1 (1990).

Billet, Jean. "Développement cohérent des villes de Rhône-Alpes à travers leurs ambitions et le rôle des communications". Report presented to the Comité Économique et Sociale Rhône-Alpes, Novembre, 1988.

_________. Schéma d'aménagement régional. Comité Économique et Social Rhône-Alpes, document renéoté, 7 Août, 1990.

Bonamy, J., J. Bonnet et A. Mayère. Internationalisation des Services: Logiques, Processus et Structures en Réseaux. Lyon: CEDES - Économie et Humanisme, et Laboratoire d'Études Rhôdaniennes 260 - Lyon III, Novembre 1989.

Bonnafous, Alain. Le développement économique et les besoins de traversée. Union Internationale des Transports Routiers, Geneve, 1990.

Bonnafous, A., P. Bossin, M.A. Buisson, L. Diaz Olivera, et D. Plat. A quoi reconnait-on une ville internationale? Tentative de réponse par consultation d'experts. (Méthode Delphi) Lyon: Rapport L.E.T., 1991.

Bonnafous, A., M. Le Nir, J.L. Routhier, et S. Thibaud. Le Transport Régional Inter-Cités en Rhône-Alpes. Lyon: L.E.T., 1989.

Bonnet, Jacques. "Limites Administratives et Développement Local". Élan Rhône-Alpes No. 2 (1990): 2.

________. Lyon Place Tertiaire: Contribution à une géographie des affaires. Lille: EDISUD/Atelier national de reproduction de thèses, Université de Lille III, 1988.

Bonneville, M., M.A. Buisson, N. Commerçon, et N. Rousier. Villes Européennes et Internationalisation. Lyon: Equipe de Recherche, N.I.C.E., - Rhône-Alpes - M.R.A.S.H., 1991.

Boyer, Paul. Population Grenobloise: Perspectives 2000. Grenoble: Université de Grenoble II, 1987.

Brun, S., et al. "Gerland: des abattoirs du passé aux laboratoires du future". Maîtres des Sciences Économiques, Université Lyon II, 1990.

Brunet, Roger. Les Villes "Européennes". Paris: DATAR/RECLUS - La Documentation Française, 1989.

Carrière, Jean. Rhône-Alpes, Une Prospective. Lyon: Publication du SGAR, 1988.

Cattan, Nadine. "Une image du réseau des métropôles européennes par le trafic aérien" L'Espace Géographique, 1990.

C.C.I. de Lyon. Annuaire. No 18, 1989.

C.C.I. de Lyon. Annuaire. No 33, 1990.

C.C.I. de Lyon et le Projet de SDAU (La): "Oui, Mais..." L'Activité Économique (Mars 1990).

Chassande, Pierre. "Les Infrastructures de Transport: De la Concurrence à un Défi Commun". Projections No. 10 (Mars 1991): 2-5.

Chatin, Catherine. 9 Villes Nouvelles: Une expérience française d'urbanisme. Paris: Dunod, 1975.

Cheshire, P.C., and D.G. Hay. "The Urban Region of Lyon: A unique case in France." Urban Problems in Western Europe, INTA (1990): 7-21.

Commerce extérieur de Rhône-Alpes en 1990. Chambre régionale de commerce et d'industrie Rhône-Alpes, direction interrégionale des douanes de Lyon, Juin 1991.

Commission of the European Communities. "Rapid Reports" (Regions), volume 2. Office of Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1990.

Contrat entre l'Etat et la Région Rhône-Alpes, 21-4-1989.

Dawkins, William. "Rhône-Alpes-Financial Times Survey", The Financial Times, February 19, 1993.

Daziano, Christian. "TGV Lyon-Turin: Mobilisation Générale au Piémont". Projections No. 10 (Mars 1991): 12-13.

Delebarre, Michel. En Europe, des villes en réseaux. Paris: DATAR - La Documentation Française, 1991.

"Déplacements Urbains (Les)". Les Dossiers Communauté Urbaine de Lyon No. 1 (Juin 1990).

Denais, Jean et Bernard Perrut. Tout savoir sur la Région. Lyon: Synopse, 1991.

Directeur Régionale de l'Equipment Rhône-Alpes, 1991.

Drevet, Jean-François. 1992-2000, Les Régions Françaises Entre l'Europe et le Declin. Paris: Souffles, 1988.

______. La France et l'Europe des Régions. Paris: Syros, 1991.

"Dun and Bradstreet. Parent Company Headquarters in Europe." Northwest Airlines Magazine, March, 1991.

Dunford, Mick. "The Rhône-Alpes Région." The Economist Intelligence Report, London: 1991.

Economist, The. November 23, 1991.

"l'Emploi dans Rhône Alpes." INSEE Rhône-Alpes, Notes et Documents No 99, avril, 1992.

"Enjeux internationaux de l'industrie de Rhône-Alpes (Les)." Préfecture de la Région Rhône-Alpes et Service d'Études du SGAR, Lyon: 1990.

"Enquête sur l'Impact Régional du Projet de Satolas". L'INUDEL, Mars 1989.

L'Entreprise. No 78, Mars 1992.

"Entreprise Rhône-Alpes Internationale: élaboration d'une stratégie internationale pour Rhône-Alpes." SEMA Group Management Consultants, Lyon: 1989.

L'Expansion, 6/19 Decembre, 1990.

EXPORTA. Paris: 1990.

Fabre, Jacques. Le Développement des Villes Françaises de Dimension Européenne et les Réseaux de Villes. Conseil Économique et Social, 12 et 13 février, 1991.

Francexport Rhône-Alpes. Lyon: 1991.

Grands Projets: Aéroport International de Lyon-Satolas. Aéroport International de Lyon-Satolas, 1990.

Gras, Pierre. LYON 2010: Une Ville Pour Vivre et Pour Réver. Paris: Syros-Alternatives, 1990.

Gravier, J.F. Paris et le Désert Français. Paris: Flammarion, 1947.

Guardian, The. October 14, 1991.

House, J.W. France: An Applied Geography. London: Methuen, 1978.

Humphries, Stan. "E.C. Goal: Fully Liberalized Air Industry". Europe (December 1991); 8-10.

Ifop - Europe 1 - Le Figaro. 23 Mars, 1992.

INSEE Premiere, No 111, Novembre, 1990.

INSEE Rhône-Alpes, Lyon: 1991.

Interlignes: Statistiques de Trafic. Aéroport International de Lyon. Numerous dates.

International Herald Tribune
January 11, 1991.
May 30, 1991.
September 30, 1991.
October 21, 1991.
November 3, 1991.
February 18, 1992.
March 18, 1992

INUDEL Rhône-Alpes, La désserte intérville en région Rhône-Alpes. Décembre,1989.

Jeffries, T. "The Rhône-Rhine Link in Perspective." Geography 67 (1982): 56-59.

Jones, Philip. "The French Census 1990: The Southward Drift Continues." Geography (1991): 358-361.

Jouve, A., et Stragiotti, P. La France des Régions. Paris, Bréal, 1992.

Keating, M., and P. Hainsworth. Decentralisation and Change in Contemporary France. Hampshire: GOWER Publishing Company LTD, 1986.

Kesselman, M. "The End of Jacobinism? The Socialist Regieme and Decentralisation". Journal of Regional Policy 5 (1985): 179-193.

Kukawka, Pierre. "Formation et coopération entre quatre régions non frontalières". Sous la direction de Jean-Paul de Gaudeman. in Formation et développement régional en Europe. Paris: DATAR - La Documentation Française, 1990.

_______. Les inégalities régionales en France: le cas de Rhône-Alpes. 3ème Séminaire Interdisciplinaire, acteurs internationaux, institutions, enjeux, politiques." Université Laval, Quebec, Canada. 14-20 Juin, 1992

________. Les rélations entre la région Rhône-Alpes et Genève. Clermont-Ferrand: La Suisse et l'echeance européenne de 1992, 16-17 Mars 1989.

________. Le quadrige européen, Rhône-Alpes et les grandes régions en Europe. Grenoble: CERAT, 1989.

________. Le quadrige européen, Rhône-Alpes et ses partenaires en Europe. Grenoble: CERAT, 1988.

Labasse, Jean. "L'Évolution de l'idée de Région en France." In Régions Geographiques et Régions d'Aménagements, eds. John I. Clarke et Jean Pelletier, 45-50. Lyon: L'Hermes, 1978.

________. L'Europe des Régions. Paris: Flammarion, 1991.

Laurencin, J-P. La Région Rhône-Alpes face ou marché unique européen. (Université des sciences sociales de Grenoble, IREP-Développement Grenoble), 1990.

Lebuy, Jean-Luc. "Le Pouvoir Départemental- Sept Ans aprés la Mise en Oeuvre de la Décentralisation." Etudes (Julliet-Août 1989): 41-49.

Le Nir, M., J.L. Routhier et S. Thibaud. Le transport régional intercités en Rhône-Alpes. L.E.T., Conseil Régional Rhône-Alpes, 1989.

Lyon Liberation,. 21 Septembre, 1992.

Lyon Matin. 14 Mai, 1991.

Lyon Ville Internationale: Étude Comparative de Lyon avec 9 Eurocités (Villes Européennes Non Capitales). ADERLY - AGURCO et P.L.I., 1988.

"Lyon Gerland." Maison d'Aménagement de Gerland and COURLY, Lyon: 1991.

"Lyon Gerland. La nouvelle rive gauche." COURLY, Lyon: Janvier, 1987.

Maison d'Amenagement de Gerland. COURLY, Lyon: 1991.

Martinengo, Eduardo. Le Monde, Novembre 7, 1977.

Mayère, Anne, et Joel Bonamy. Services Nouveaux et Créations d'Entreprises de Service: Emergence d'une Offre Nouvelle? Lyon: Programme Rhône-Alpes Recherches en Sciences Humaines, 1988.

McDonald, James R. "Labor Immigration in France, 1946-65." Annals Association of American Geographers 59 (1969): 116-134.

MIBP: Multi-Regional Business Program. ESC Lyon, Lyon: 1993.

Ministre de l'Education Nationale, Paris: 1991.

Monde, Le. 10 Juin, 1991.

Monde Rhône-Alpes, Le. 23 Mars, 1992.

Montes, Christian. Système de transport et système économique en milieu urbain: réflexions sur l'aménagement de l'agglomération lyonnaise de 1960 à 1992. Thèse pour le Doctorat de l'Université Lumière-Lyon II en Géographie, Aménagement et Urbanisme. L.E.T. et l'Université Lumière-Lyon II. Lyon: 13 Novembre, 1992.

Morelon, Jean Pierre. "Lyon, Pôle de Communication." In Les Couloirs Rhin-Rhône dans l'espace européen, 319-346. Lyon: Laboratoire d'Economie des Transports, 1989.

"Ouverture comes to Glasgow." The Strathclyder, March 1993.

Pellerin, Christian. Rapport du Groupe de Mobilisation Europe 1993 sur les Régions. Paris; Syros, 1990.

Perrat, J. Pôles d'excellence et technopôles en Rhône-Alpes: l'innovation pour-quoi faire? (Association pour le développement des études économiques et sociales en Rhône-Alpes-ADEES, Lyon.) 1989.

"Plan de référence du quartier de Gerland. Rapport d'options." COURLY, Lyon: Mars, 1989.

Plassard, François, et al. Réflexion sur les conséquences en Matière d'Aménagement des principaux projets d'infrastructures de transport réalisable en Rhône-Alpes à l'Horizon 95. Lyon: L.E.T., 1987.

________, (dir.) "Lyon, noeud de communications européen". Lyon, L.E.T., Mars 1989.

Point, Le No 1044, 19-9-1992.

Points d'Appui Pour l'Économie Rhône-Alpes: Spécial Recensement. No. 61-62 Mars 1991, INSEE.

Présentation de L'Aéroport International de Lyon-Satolas. Aéroport International de Lyon-Satolas, Mai 1991.

Progrés, Le

28-4-1990.
5-3-1991.
15-5-1991.
16-5-1991.
19-2-1992.
4-3-1992.
16-3-1992.

Punter, J. "Decentralisation of the Planning System in France." The Planner 75 (1989): 12-15.

"Quartier de Gerland 1983-1989 (Le): une étape décisive." COURLY-Groupe Opérationnel Lyon Gerland, Lyon: Fevrier, 1989.

Rademaekers, William. "Ambitions on a Grand Scale." Time (July 22, 1991): 38-39.

Région Urbaine de Lyon: Repères et Tendances Economiques. Lyon: Agence d'Urbanisme - Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Lyon, Janvier, 1991.

Région Urbaine de Lyon: Repères et Tendances Economiques. Lyon: Agence d'Urbanisme - Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Lyon, Janvier, 1992.

"Régions et l'Europe, l'obligation régionale (Les)." Interrégions No 146, Janvier, 1992. 20-35

Renucci, J. "Tourisme et Produit Touristique à Lyon." Revue de Géographie de Lyon Vol 63-4 (1988): 191-205.

Reynauld, Christian. "Les réseaux à grande vitesse et les conditions de leur développement." Transports 350, (Décembre 1991): 359-381.

Rhône-Alpes dans l'Espace Européen. Rapports Particuliers Nos. 1-5. Grenoble, PPSH 17 - Louis Reboud et al. 1990.

"Rhône-Alpes demain: *Réinventons la proximité.*" Schéma d'aménagement et de développement de Rhône-Alpes, Région Rhône-Alpes,1992.

"Rhône-Alpes d'un recensement à l'autre". INSEE Rhône-Alpes, 1991.

Satolas: Pôle International de Communications. Eléments Pour une Stratégie Globale. L'Agence d'Urbanisme de la Communauté de Lyon, Fevrier 1990.

Savey, Pierre. "Les Ports de Rhône-Alpes: Une Chance à Saisir." Projections No. 10 (Mars 1991): 16-17.

Scargill, D.I. "The Ville Moyenne: A French Strategy for Town Expansion." The Expanding City. London: Academic Press Inc, 1983.

Scargill, Ian. "Regional Inequality in France: Persistence and Change." Geography (1991).

________. Urban France. London: Croom Helm LTD, 1983.

"Schéma de Développement et d'Aménagement Régional" Proposition du Conseil Économique et Social du Région Rhône-Alpes, 1992.

Science & Vie, 6-1992.

Service Cantonal des Statistiques, Geneve, Janvier 1, 1990.

Service de la Navigation Rhône - Saône, 1990.

Soldatos, P. Lyon, Ville Internationale à Géometrie Variable: Pour une Planification Strategique de sa Croissance Internationale. Montréal: Institut d'Étude des Villes Internationales, 1989.

________. La Nouvelle Génération des Villes Internationales dans un monde Transnationalisé. Montréal: Institut d'Étude des Villes Internationales, 1989.

S.N.C.F. La Lettre du Voyageur. Paris: S.N.C.F., Novembre 1990.

Syndicat d'Etudes et de Programmation de l'Agglomération Lyonnaise (S.E.P.A.L.). "LYON 2010: Un Projet d'Agglomération pour une métropôle Europeénne". Lyon, 1991.

Tableaux de l'Économie Rhône-Alpes. édition 1991. Lyon: INSEE - OERA, 1991.

Tesse, P.Y. "Lyon: les conditions du décollage." in Dommergues, Pierre et Nanon Gerdin (eds.) Les stratégies internationale des Métropôles Régionales." Groupe Ten. Paris: Syros, 1989.

________.. Lyon Ville Internationale: Premiers Eléments d'Evaluation. Lyon: Institute d'Études des Villes Internationales, 1990.

________. Lyon Ville Internationale: Réflexions et Premières Propositions. Lyon: ADERLY, 1983.

"Transport Aérien: Les Vertus de la Concurrence". Science & Vie Économie Hor Serie (1991/1992): 119-120.

Transport de marchandises en Région Rhône-Alpes. Directeur régional de l'équipment Rhône-Alpes, 1991.

Tuppen, John N. The Economic Geography of France. London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1983.

_________. "Redevelopment of the City Centre: The Case of Lyon - La Part Dieu." Scottish Geographical Magazine 93-3 (December 1977): 151-158.

Urbanismes & Architecture, 11-1990.

Voies navigables de France, 1990-1991.

Wall Street Journal - Europe. March 23, 1992.

Walsh, James. "The New France." Time (July 22, 1991): 30-38.

Warf, Barney. "Can the Region Survive Post-Modernism." Urban Geography 11 (November-December 1990): 586.

Webster, P. "Intifada Comes To Lyon." The Guardian, 19 October 1990: 21.

FURTHER SOURCES THAT WERE CONSULTED

Adonis, Andrew, and William Dawkins. "Vision - and a tale of two cities." Financial Times, 12 February 1992.

Aldrich, Robert, and John Connell, eds. France in World Politics. London: Routledge, 1989.

Anderson, Malcolm, ed. Frontier Regions in Western Europe. London: Frank Cass and Co. LTD, 1983.

Ashford, Douglas. "The Socialist Reorganization of French Local Government, Another Jacobin Reform." Government and Policy Vol.1 (1983): 29-44.

Atlas Industrial Rhône-Alpes 1991. INSEE Rhône-Alpes et Prefecture de la Région Rhône-Alpes, 1992.

Aydalot, P. "The Location of New Firm Creation: The French Case." D. Keeble and E. Wever eds. New Firms and Regional Development in Europe. London: Croom Helm, 1986: 105-123.

Baleste, M. et al. La France: 22 régions de programme. Paris: Masson 1993: 163-181.

Bamford, C.G., and H. Robinson. Geography of the EEC. Harlow: Longman Scientific & Technical, 1983.

Barbier, B. and D.G. Pearce. "The Geography of Tourism in France." GeoJournal 9 (1984).

Bastié, J., et B. Dézert. L'Espace Urbain. Paris: Masson, 1980.

________. "Rhône-Alpes et l'Echelle Européenne." Élan Rhône-Alpes No. 1 (1990).

Billet, Jean. Schéma d'aménagement régional. Comité Économique et Social Rhône-Alpes, document renéoté, 7 Août, 1990.

Bobbio, Valentino. The Liguria-Lyons Project: A Positive Experience of Cooperation Between Regions of the European Economic Community. Berlin: CEDEFOP (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training); Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Community, 1989.

Bonnafous, Alain. "Rhône-Alpes, capitale Paris. Les effects prévisibles du TGV." Revue de Géographie de Lyon 3 (1980): 233-240.

_______. Le développement économique et les besoins de traversée. Union Internationale des Transports Routiers, Geneve, 1990.

Bonnet, Jacques. "Charles Millon." Figaro Rhône-Alpes 7 Mars 1992: 5-7.

________. "Limites Administratives et Développement Local". Élan Rhône-Alpes No. 2 (1990): 2.

Bonnet, Jacques, éd. Lyon, Ville Internationale? Etude de ses relations avec les Etas-Unis. Lyon: Université Jean Moulin Maîtrise d'Aménagement, 1990.

Bonneville, Marc. "Revue de *Rhône-Alpes, Une Prospective*". Revue de Géographie de Lyon Vol. 64 No 1 (1989): 40-42.

Boudeville, J.R. Les Espaces Économiques. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961.

________. Problems of Regional Economic Planning. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966.

Braudel, F. The Identity of France. Volume 1, History and Environment. Translated by S. Reynolds. New York: Harper and Row, 1988.

Brocard, Madeleine. La Science et les Régions. Paris: DATAR/RECLUS - La Documentation Française, 1991.

Brunet, Roger. La France dans l'espace européen. Montpellier: RECLUS, 1989.

Brunet, Roger, et Jacques Sallois. France: Les Dynamiques du Territoire. Montpellier: DATAR/RECLUS, 1986.

Carrez, J-F. Le développement des fonctions tértiaires supérieures internationales à Paris et dans les métropôles régionales. La Documentation Française, Paris: 1991.

Cerny, P. and M. Schain eds. Socialism, the State, and Public Policy in France. London: Frances Pinter, 1985.

Cheshire, P.C. "Explaining the recent preformance of the European Community's major urban regions." Urban Studies 27-3 (1990): 311-333.

Cheshire, P.C., G. Carbonaro, and D.G. Hay. "Problems of urban decline and growth in EEC countries: Or measuring degrees of elephantness." Urban Studies 23 (1990): 131-149.

Chesnais, Michel. Transports et Espace Français. Paris: Masson, 1981.

Chiffres-Clés de l'Industrie dans les Régions (Les). Ministère de l'Industrie et de l'Aménagement du Territoire, Paris: SESSI, 1989.

Clarke, John I., et Pelletier, Jean. Régions Géographiques et Régions d'Aménagements. Lyon: L'Hermes, 1978.

Claudius, Deriol. Lyon: Ville Mondiale. Paris: Stock, 1971.

Clout, Hugh D. "French Geography in the 1980's." Progress in Human Geography 9 (1985): 473-490.

________. The Geography of Post War France: A social and economic approach. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1972.

Costa, Jean-Paul, et Yves Jegouzo. L'administration française face aux défis de la décentralisation. Paris: Les Editions S.T.H., 1988.

Cottrell, Robert. "Baron plots battle for the throne." The Independent on Sunday, 12 December 1990, p. 14.

Courtois, G. Les régions entraînées par l'Europe. Le Monde, 7 Décembre, 1989.

Damier, C., D. Sabine, et A. Schwichterberg. Réflexions sur une forme de répartition des étudiants à Lyon: Un Quartier Universitaire. Lyon: Faculté de sciences économiques et du gestion, Université Lyon II, 1991.

Daniels, P.W. Service Industries: A geographical appraisal. London: Methuen, 1985.

Delebarre, Michel. En Europe, des villes en réseaux. Paris: DATAR - La Documentation Française, 1991.

Demotz, P. "L'évaluation des déplacements professionnels à partir des trafics ferroviaires "Grandes Lignes" au départ de Lyon." Revue de Géographie de Lyon, Vol 62, No 1, 1987.

Elie, B. "Lyon: Plantification libérale et enjeux européens." Le Monde, 21 November 1989, p. 22.

"Entreprises industrielles de plus de 50 salariés à capitaux étranger." Chambre Régionale de Commerce et d'Industrie Rhône-Alpes, 1991.

Estrin, Saul and Peter Holmes. French Planning in Theory and Practice. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983.

"Étude de la Desserte Routière". SERALP, Mars 1989.

Findlay, Allen, and Paul White. West European Population Change. London: Croom Helm LTD, 1986.

Fontain, François. "Les Métropôles Régionales à la récherche de leurs points Forts." Économie et Statistique No. 230 (Mai 1990): 17-30, 81, 83.

France et ses Régions (La), édition 1986. Paris: INSEE, 1986.

France et ses Régions (La), édition 1990. Paris: INSEE, 1990.

France et ses Régions (La), édition 1993. Paris: INSEE, 1992.

Froment, A., et S. Lerat. La France au Milieu des Années 80. 5ème édition, Tome 2. Montreuil: Bréal Éditions, 1989.

Froment, E., et M. Karlin. Fonctions Financiaires, Comparaisons Régionales. Lyon: 1988.

Gages, R. "Lyon Métropôle, Le Confluent Espace International". Piquou sur Rue No. 60 (1985): 11-15.

Gassot, L., C. Voglimacci et J-P Jeandon. "Schéma régional de la communication Rhône-Alpes." Étude pour la Préfecture de la Région Rhône-Alpes, IDATE, Montpellier: 1989.

Gault, Michel. Villes Intermédiaires pour l'Europe. Paris: Syros,1989.

Gilly, J-P. "Téchnopoles et Développement: Mythes et Réalités." Revue Géographique des Pyrénées et du Sud-Ouest 6 (1989): 115-124.

Grandjeat, Pierre, et Yves Détraigne. Les Chambres régionales des comptes: Analyse d'une practique. Paris: La Documentation Française Notes et Etudes No 4826 1987- 1987.

Gravier, J.F. Paris et le Désert Français en 1972. Paris: Flammarion, 1972.

Grillo, R.D. Ideologies and Institutions in Urban France: The Representation of Immigrants. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Guérin-Pace, F. et D. Pumain. "150 ans de Croissance Urbaine". Économie et Statistique No. 230 (Mai 1990): 5-16.

Guichard, O. Aménager La France. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1965.

Hall, Peter, and Dennis Hay. Growth Centres in the European Urban System. London: Heinemann Educational Books LTD, 1980.

Hautreux, J., et M. Rochefort. La Fonction Régionale dans l'Armature Urbaine Française. Paris: Minist. de la Constr., 1964.

Hayward, Jack. The State of the Market Economy: Industrial Patriotism and Economic Intervention in France. Brighton: Wheatshelf Books LTD, 1986.

Hough, J.R. The French Economy. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982.

Ilbery, Brian W. Western Europe: A Systematic Human Geography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Jafflin-Vergnaud, C. L'integration de Rhône-Alpes dans l'Europe: quelles infrastructures de transport? Lyon: L.E.T., 1990.

Jayet, H. L'Espace Économique Française. Paris: INSEE, 1988.

Joly, Jacques. Grenoble et son Agglomération. Paris; La Documentation Française Notes et Études No. 4769, 1985.

Jones, P.C. The Segregration and Integration of Provincial and International Migrants in Lyon, France, 1962-75. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sheffield, 1982.

Klein, Jacques-Sylvain. L'explosion des impôts locaux. Paris: La Documentation Française Notes et Études No. 4802, 1986.

Kliot, Nurit, and Stanley Waterman, eds. Pluralism and Political Geography: People, Territory, and State. London: Croom Helm LTD, 1983.

Knox, P.L. The Geography of Western Europe: A Socio-Economic Survey. Kent: Croom Helm LTD, 1984.

Knox, P. and A. Scarth. "The Quality of Life in France." Geography 62 (1977): 9-16.

Kofman, F. "Regional Autonomy and the one and Indivisible French Republic." Government and Policy 3 (1985).

Krause, Axel. "A Europe of Regions Becoming Reality." Europe, April 1994: 22-23.

Labasse, Jean. "Lyon Métropôle?" Revue de la Géographie de Lyon No. 57 (1982): 145-153.

________. "La Tension Paris - Province." Études Offertes à Madeleine Grawitz. Paris: Dalloz, 1982.

________. "Réseau Urbain et Flux Téléphoniques: L'Example de Rhône-Alpes." Révue de Géographie de Lyon, Vol 64-1 (1989): 49-53.

________. "Sièges Sociaux et Villes Dominantes." Traveaux de l'institut de Géographie de Reims, 43-44 (1988): 3-14.

________. "L'Urbanisation de la France." Geographia Polonica 39 (1978): 65-74.

Labasse, Jean, et M. Laferrère. La Région Lyonnaise. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966.

Lacoste, Yves. (ed.) Géopolitiques des régions françaises: Tome III. Paris: Fayard, 1986.

Lafferére, M. "Lyon et son Rôle Régional." In La France des Villes: Centre-Est, 29-69. Paris: La Documentation Française, 1980.

Law, Christopher M., and others. The Uncertain Future of the Urban Core. London: Rouledge, 1988.

Lebeau, R. Atlas et Géographie de la Région Lyonnaise. Paris: Flammarion, 1976.

Le Nir, Michel et Jean-Louis Routhier. "Les échanges intercités de personnes". Élan-Rhône-Alpes, No 8, 1992.

Lever, Robert. "Train Travel". Europe (December 1991): 15-16.

"Lufthansa Croit en Lyon." Le Progrès (6 Mai, 1991): p.7.

Lyon, Noeud de Communications Européen. Lyon: L.E.T., Mars 1989.

"Lyon-Ville Européenne." Le Monde (28 Fevrier, 1975).

Masser, I., and P. Foley. "Delphi Revisited: Expert opinion in Urban Analysis." Urban Studies 24 (1987): 217-255.

Mazataud, Pierre. "Brain Drain: D'où Viennent les Ingénieurs et Cadres Supérieurs Travaillant en Rhône-Alpes." Élan Rhône-Alpes No. 1 (1990): 2.

McCarthy, Patrick, ed. The French Socialists in Power, 1981-1986. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987

McDonald, J.R. The European Scene: A Geographic Perspective. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992.

Meny, Yves. "Decentralisation in Socialist France: The Policy of Pragmatism." West European Politics Vol. VII,I (January 1984): 65-79.

Michelmann, Hans J., and Panayotis Soldatos. Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

Michelot, Jean-Louis. "Les conflits pour l'aménagement de l'espace au confluent Ain-Rhône." Annales de Géographie 555 (Septembre et Octobre 1990): 513-530.

Mingret, Paul. "Chances et difficultés pour les grandes métropôles du sud européen: Géographie comparée de Milan, Barcelone, et Lyon." Bulletin de la Societé Géographique de Liége 26 (1990): 25-32.

Monnier, Alain. La Population de la France: Mutations et Perspectives. Paris: Messidor/Éditions Sociales, 1990.

Noin, Daniel. L'Espace Français. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1976.

Norcliffe, G. From Fordism to Flexible Production in the Technopôle of Gerland, Lyon. Paper presented at the IBG conference, January 1992.

Ogden, P.E. "Counterurbanization in France: The 1982 Population Census." Geography 70 (1985): 24-35.

Ogden, P.E., and P. White, eds. Migrants in Modern France. London: Unwin-Hyman, 1989.

Paterson, K. "Lyon's New City Centre." Town and Country Planning 46 (1978): 357-360.

Picasso, Alain. Lyon, place financiere de proximité. Analyse récent de sa bourse aux valeurs. Lyon: Mémoire de Maîtrise de Géographie, Lyon III, 1988.

Pinchemel, P. France: A Geographical, Social and Economic Survey. Translated by D. Elkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Pinder, David. Regional Economic Development Policy: Theory and Practice in the European Community. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983.

Plassard, Francois. Èlèments de Synthese sur le Sud-Est. Lyon: L.E.T., 1991.

________. "Le Train à Grand Vitesse: Trafic, Activités et Centralité." Cahiers Économiques de Bretagne. No. 3 (1989).

Pumain, Dènise et Thérèse Saint-Julien. Atlas des Villes de France. Paris-Montpellier: RECLUS - La Documentation Française, 1989.

________. "Evolving Structure of the French Urban System." Urban Geography 5 (1984): 326-336.

Région Urbaine de Lyon: Repères et Tendances Economiques. Lyon: Agence d'Urbanisme - Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Lyon, Fevrier, 1991.

Rhône-Alpes en 1991. Points d'appui pour l'économie Rhône-Alpes. No 66, INSEE Rhône-Alpes, Juin, 1992.

Richardot, Jean-Pierre. Rhône-Alpes: Clef pour l'Europe. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1971.

Rodger, Ian. "Co-operation is the Key", Financial Times Survey of the Leman Region. The Financial Times, October 22, 1992.

Romus, P. L'Europe Régionale. Collection Europe, éditions Labor, Bruxelles, 1991.

Ross, George, Stanley Hoffmann and Sylvia Malzacher, eds. The Mitterrand Experiment. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.

Saint-Julien, Thérèse. Croissance Industrielle et Système Urbain. Paris: Économica, 1982.

Scargill, Ian. "Local Government - the French three-tier experience." Town and Country Planning. February, 1994: 61-63.

Schmitt, Dominique, ed. La Région à l'heure de la Décentralisation. Paris: La Documentation Française Notes et Etudes No. 4772, 1984.

Schuler, M., et M. Bassand. La Suisse, Une Métropôle Mondiale? Lausanne: EPFL-IREC, 1985.

Soldatos, P. La Nouvelle Génération des Villes Internationales dans un Contexte Euratlantique: Cadre d'Analyse. Montréal: Document Ronéoté, 1987.

________. "Treize critères pour une ville Internationale." in Dommergues, Pierre et Nanon Gerdin (eds.) Les stratégies internationale des Métropôles Régionales." Groupe Ten. Paris: Syros, 1989.

Soja, Edward W. Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory. London: Verso, 1989.

Tableaux de l'Économie Française. édition 1990. Paris: INSEE, 1990.

Tableaux de l'Économie Française. édition 1992-93. Paris: INSEE, 1992.

Tableaux de l'Économie Rhône-Alpes. édition 1989. Lyon: INSEE - OERA, 1989.

Taylor, P.J. "A Theory and Practice of Regions: The Case of Europe." Environment and Planning 9 (1991): 183-195.

Tenzer, Nicolas. La Région en Quète d'Avenir: Compétences et Moyens. Paris: La Documentation Française Notes et Études No 4816, 1986.

Tesse, P.Y. Lyon Ville Internationale: Réflexions et Premières Propositions. Lyon: ADERLY, 1983.

Thompson, Ian B. "A new kind of location decision - where to build high-speed railway stations: the French case." Scottish Geographical Magazine, September, 1993.

Thompson, Ian B. Modern France. London: Butterworths, 1970.

Todd, Emmanuel. La Nouvelle France. Paris: Seuil, 1988.

Tuppen, John N. Chirac's France, 1986-88: Contemporary Issues in French Society. New York: St Martin's Press, 1991.

________. "Contempory Urban Issues in France: The Problem Suburbs." Contemporary French Civilization Vol.15 No.2 (Summer 1991): 287.

________. "Core Periphery in Metropolitan Development and Planning: Socio-Economic Change in Lyon since 1960." Geoforum 17 (1986): 1-37.

________. France: An Industrial Geography. Folkstone: Dawson & Sons Ltd., 1980.

________. "France's Train à Grande Vitesse: Its Development and Implications." Geography 343-344.

________. France Under Recession 1981-86. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988.

________. Lyon: Patterns and Problems of Socio-Economic Develpoment in the Post War Period. Salford: University of Salford, Department of Geography Comparative Study of Conurbations Project Working Paper No. 4, May 1984.

________. Studies in Industrial Geography: France. Folkstone, Dawson, 1980.

"Villes et Régions au Rendez-Vous de l'Europe." Population & Sociétés No. 257. Paris: L'Institut National d'Études Démographiques, Mai 1991.

White, Paul. The West European City. London: Longman, 1984.

La zone frontalière rhônalpine d'un recensement à l'autre. INSEE Rhône-Alpes #EB/OD 91078, 1992.

QUESTIONNAIRE - LYON EUROCITÉ

1. Résidez vous en permanence:
   á Lyon -
   en Rhône-Alpes -
   autre (précisez)

2. Pourquoi avez-vous choisi l'Université de Lyon II?

3. Toutes choses étant égales (salarie, satisfaction dans votre travail etc.) envisageriez-vous de travailler á Lyon?

4. Quelle importance attachez-vous á l'intégration européenne?
   a. en terms de carrière:
      beaucoup	un peu	aucune
   b. en principe:
      beaucoup	un peu	aucune

5. Citez les villes de France qui, selon vous, se sont pas loin d'atteindre le status d'Eurocité (sauf Paris).
   1.
   2.
   3.

6. Citez des villes de l'Europe de l'Ouest que vous estimez étre des Eurocités (sauf les capitales nationales).

   1.

   2.

   3.

7. Quelles infrastructures (transport, financières, culturelles) pensez-vous que Lyon possède á une échelle européenne?

8. Quelle est, selon vous, la principale faiblesse de Lyon lorsqu'elle aspire au statut d'Eurocité?

9. Lyon possède-t-elle des institutions á l'echelle européenne? Precisez.

10. Pensez-vous que Genevé se place avant Lyon en tant qu'Eurocité? Pourquoi?

11. Considerez-vous Grenoble comme une ville rivale ou complémentaire de Lyon?

12. Etes-vous au courant de la politique des "Quatre Moteurs"? Expliquez.

13. Considerez-vous que le TGV a amélioré le statut de Lyon en tant qu'Eurocité ou renforcé la dependance de Lyon vis-á-vis de Paris?

14. Pouvez-vous nommer un Membre du Parlement Européen pour Lyon?

15. Quels aspects de "'image" de Lyon vous semble attrayanté á une échelle européenne?

16. Quels aspects de "l'image" de Lyon considerez-vous comme négatifs á une échelle européenne?

17. Selon vous, est il important que Lyon aspire au statut d'Eurocité?

très un peu pas du tout

18. Toutes raisons personnelles mises á part (famille, etc.) quelle serait pour vous la principale raison de ne pas travailler á Lyon?

19. Citéz 2 sociétés internationales/multi-nationales implantées á Lyon.

1.
2.

20. Pensez-vous que Lyon soit:

1. une Eurocité deja en existence.
2. une Eurocité en puissance.
3. une ville purement française.

Merci.