Two Recent
Self-Referential Arguments

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A critical evaluation of two recent discussions of applications of the argument from self-referential consistency (ASRC) will be examined here. In the first paper Patrica Smith Churchland attempts to undermine John Eccles' argument that determinism is self-refuting.[1] In the second paper Nicholas Everitt argues that the position of "straight forward eliminative materialism" (SEM) meets the same fate.[2] Here, I will argue that the arguments of Churchland and Everitt are unsound and that Churchland in particular has seriously mis-stated the position of a non-trivally absurd libertarianism. However, the self-referential arguments against both determinism and eliminative materialism can be met by champions of these positions. The arguments are in fact question begging.

1. What IS ASRC?[3]

A position criticized by an ASRC is taken to imply either its own falsity, its own meaninglessness or indeterminancy of truth-value, although by far the most common strategy is to argue that some position implies its own falsity. Such ASRC arguments can be contrasted to the liar paradox. In the liar paradox we are asked to consider a sentence:

(L) This sentence is false.

The familiar paradox arises through considering the truth-value of (L): (L) is true if and only if it is false, and false if and only if it is true. An ASRC argument against a position P would lead to the conclusion that P is false if it is true, and if false, then it is false. From the perspective of two-valued logic P must be necessarily false. "P" is a conjunction of sentences S1 & S2 & S3 &...& Sn that a champion of a position would assent to as being an adequate description of such a point of view. Such an argument we call a semantic self-referential argument (SSRA).

There are very few examples of SSRA in the literature. Perhaps the most well known argument is one directed against the verificationist theory of meaning

stated by the logical positivist movement in its early days: the principle itself seemed to be condemned to the dark damp domain of the cognitively meaningless, being neither analytically true (nor a contradiction) nor directly confirmed by sensory observations. For the most part most ASRC have been pragmatic self-referential arguments (PSRA). By use of the term "pragmatic" I refer to all those aspects of a language in which explicit reference to a speaker is made.[4] Among the pragmatic concepts of a language we find the following assortment: "Subject S knows that P," "S justifiably believes P," "S argues thesis T", and so on. An example of a popular PSRA is the dogmatists' response to the sceptic who claims that one is not the slightest bit reasonable in believing any proposition[5]: the sceptic by the performance of the speech act of advancing such a thesis within the domain of philosophical discussion is advancing a thesis for our reasoned evaluation. But if this is so, the argument defeats itself.

The dogmatist's argument can be met by the sceptic, by a strategy through which very many PSRA can be met: it in fact begs the question at issue. Our thorough going sceptic would warmly embrace irrationalism and would hardly respect the yoke of rationalism. Scepticism would be seen as a medicine for curing us of our dreaded epistemic diseases, which destroys both itself and the disease in the process. The self-referential arguments against determinism and eliminative materialism will fail, I will argue, for the reason of being question begging.

Before turning to a consideration of Churchland and Everitt's papers, one argument which would seem to rule out this inquiry needs brief consideration. Bertrand Russell's ban upon all self-referential statements because they violate what he called "the vicious circle principle"[6] would, if satisfactory, constitute grounds for rejecting any ASRC. However one of the consequences of Russell's ban is that it leads us directly to the paradox of the non-communicator.[7] So even if we were to regiment language to avoid all self-referential statements we would not escape paradox. Since the paradox of the non-communicator follows from Russell's theory of types together with semantic principles which Russell himself would have accepted, avoiding ASRC by this strategy is quite problematic.[8]

2. A Critique of Churchland's Criticism of Eccles

A champion of a PSRA argument against determinism must assume that the thesis of the compatibility of determinism and freedom of will is false. If compatibilism was true, then the philosophical problem of freedom versus determinism would be solved. John Eccles is an incompatibilist: indeed the act of denying

free will presupposes, he believes, free will to make
this very denial. If determinism was true, then our
very reasoning for determinism is "merely the automatic
response of a nervous system built by genetic coding
and molded by conditioning"[9] and this for Eccles is in-
consistent with the conduct of reasoned argument.

Churchland's counter-argument to Eccles' PSRA con-
sists in the claim that such a PSRA begs the question
at issue. She states:

> If determinism is correct, it does not in the
> least follow that we do not reason, that our
> behaviour is the outcome of compulsion rather
> than ratiocination. On the contrary, what fol-
> lows is that our reasoning and our reasoned
> behaviour is causally produced. So far from de-
> nying that humans are purposeful and reasonable,
> determinism is the thesis that there is a causal
> network which produces such behaviour.[10]

The anti-determinist on the other hand must "show that
acting for a reason is uncaused behaviour."[11] If anti-
determinism is false, then human action must be then
said, in Churchland's opinion, to be "contra-causally
produced."

She compares the PSRA against determinism with a
PSRA which could be made by the vitalist against the
mechanist; and both she and Paul Churchland[12] seem to
consider the argument as being fairly decisive. The
anti-vitalist's PSRA is this: if anti-vitalism was
true, then there would be no vital spirit. But if
there was no vital spirit a necessary condition for en-
gaging in debate cannot be met, since the anti-vitalist
would have to deny that s/he is alive, and this is a
pragmatic contradiction. The argument is a non
sequitur because there exists an alternative non-
vitalist research programme, which challenges an unde-
fended premise of the vitalists' argument; that life
cannot be explained by any theory which does not incor-
porate vital spirit as its generative mechanism in the
understanding of life processes.

Such argument shows that the PSRA has presupposed a
false premise (or at least an undefended one) in the
advancement of the argument. It does not show that the
type of argument in question is invalid. There does in
fact seem to be at least one position which can be
clearly refuted: if a position was committed to af-
firming as true that nothing in the universe existed in
any form of being at all, champions of such a position
would be obviously defeated by a PSRA. It is difficult
to imagine what could lead us to believe that this
world was in actual fact the null-world. However the
position does not seem to be capable of refutation by a
SSRA, unless defenders of the ontological argument for
the necessary existence of God are correct and that a

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null-world is not even rationally contemplatable. So
what is at issue is the truth or falsity of the ASRC
champions' argument. Churchland's vitalism/anti-
vitalism analogy merely serves to draw to our attention
the misconstruction made of the debate by the anti-
vitalist.

Churchland's criticism of Eccles' PSRA must now be
that in some way such an argument misconstructs the
free will-determinism debate. I will argue that
Eccles' PSRA does in fact do this. However, Churchland
has herself misconstructed the free will-determinism
debate. Consequently, both parties have clouded rather
than cleared these issues.

Let us first outline what is incorrect in Church-
land's construction of the free will/determinism
debate. The passages from her essay cited earlier in-
dicate that she believes that determinists hold that
our reasoning is "causally produced." Anti-
determinists must therefore hold that such acts,
perhaps the paradigm example of free and purposive are
"uncaused" and hence "contra-causally produced." Some
anti-determinists may describe themselves as "contra-
causalists," but if they are committed to claiming that
human free action is a mysterious interference in
nature their position will suffer great problems on
many fronts. Would free human action for example be a
miracle? If so, one must now face all the traditional
problems which this proposal involves. Perhaps these
problems could be solved, but it is a price which the
anti-determinist need not pay.

The anti-determinist need not claim that free ac-
tion is uncaused and has no causal antecedents. Indeed
one could as an anti-determinist grant that there is a
set of causally antecedent conditions which are <u>neces-
sary</u> for the performance of an allegedly free act F1.
To be an anti-determinist one must deny that that F1 is
the result of a set of conditions S which are causally
<u>sufficient</u> for it. The universe for the determinist
would appear to be one in which, given the state of the
universe prior to my action F1, I "could not have done
otherwise" than F1. Explicating this phrase is a quite
difficult and controversial matter, but I need not en-
ter this debate to make my point against Churchland.
Determinists do in fact believe that human behaviour is
very strongly under the compulsive sway of natural law,
so strongly that I could not do other than F1 given the
prior state of the universe. However, they need not
embrace the thesis of fatalism: that I will do F1
regardless of my beliefs, and whatever <u>else</u> I do. The
Fatalist would claim that our lives in <u>all</u> respects
resemble Oedipus' pitiful attempts to avoid his fore-
casted doom. But it was true before Oedipus' birth,
and for the vulgar fatalist impossible for him to avoid
his fate by his own actions. The determinist need not
view things so pessimistically: if Oedipus did avoid

his fate, it does not follow that his evasive actions were done freely.

Determinism then might well be true even if fatalism is false.[13] However, whatever answer is given to this question, it does seem that determinists wish to say much more than that human action is causally conditioned, and not all anti-determinists wish to say that free human action is "uncaused." To say what precisely these parties do wish to say and to find out whether their positions are in actual fact inconsistent (which compatiblilists deny) will require entering this debate further. But the point against Churchland has, however, been established: her statement of the freedom/determinism debate is incorrect.

This from a purely logical point of view invalidates Churchland's particular argument against Eccles. However, her point does in fact hold in my opinion against anti-determinists who advance such PSRA. It must be argued, for such an argument to be successful, that the relationship between the act of coming to know the truth of a proposition and causal factors which determine one's belief is "purely accidental." As Jordan puts it, if determinism is true

> . . . whether anyone believes it, i.e., determinism, and what he considers trustworthy evidence and acceptable principles of inference are determined altogether by conditions that have no assured congruence with the proposition's own merits or with criteria of sound argumentation whose validity consists of more than that we accept them.[14]

The argument here not only begs the question at issue but it misconstructs the determinist's position. The determinist would claim anything but that the act of coming to know the truth of a proposition and those causal factors which determine one's belief are merely "accidentally" or "randomly related," if this is meant to deny the very existence of the alleged causal connection. This is indeed self-contradictory, but is the fault of a mistaken argument of the anti-determinist, not of the determinist. The consistent determinist would not deny the brute facts that we do in fact reason philosophically. Rather our processes of reasoning are not free mental acts.

This claim might strike the anti-determinist as being question-begging in turn, and the debate at this point threatens to collapse. However, this is not so. The determinist will need to defend this position by an argument. It makes sense to criticize an argument on the grounds that it begs the question at issue, but not the mere formulation of a position. What needs to be shown here by the anti-determinist, by an independent argument, is that the process of reasoning precludes

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the acceptance of the thesis of determinism by any
rational agent. Current PSRA are extremely problematic
because they assume this from the onset. So while
Churchland's argument itself fails, her criticism of
Eccles is quite correct.

Before passing on to the second task of this paper
some consideration to the PSRA of Boyle, Grisez and
Tollefsen[15] should be given in the light of the follow-
ing objection. They conceded that previous PSRA
against determinism have failed insofar as they have
begged the question against determinism. Determinism
("Nfc") is self-refuting because rational affirmation
of this position requires excluding freedom of will
("Sfc"), but the norms of rationality which we accept
in our philosophical practices does not allow the ex-
clusion of Sfc, so Nfc cannot be rationally affirmed.[16]

Rationality norms include "paradigmatic," "cre-
ative," "logical" and "technical" norms. Paradigmatic
norms provide standards for the evaluation of the nor-
mality of members of a class. Logical norms provide
standards for the evaluation of discourse as consistent
and coherence. Creative norms provide standards for
the evaluation of the components of some work with
respect to their unification in the total project.
Finally, technical norms provide standards for the
evaluation of action as it is a necessary condition for
achieving one's ends. Both kinds of normality are as-
serted to be consistent with Nfc.[17] Hence, neither of
these kinds of normality entail Sfc. However, Boyle,
Grisez and Tollefsen argue at some length that neither
of these kinds of normality can "exclude" Sfc. To take
the logical norm, for example, Sfc would only be exclu-
ded if it was self-contradictory and contingent upon a
successful critique of logical fatalism; Sfc does not
appear to be excluded.

The premiss in this PSRA which is problematic in my
opinion is this:

(P) If Nfc is rationally affirmed, then the condi-
tions obtain where Sfc is rationally excluded.[18]

The defence of this premise is allegedly given in
Chapter Five, section E, of the book. We are told,
then, that for a champion of Nfc to advance Nfc, Nfc
must be asserted as being true, or the most reasonable
proposition to believe in a set of other propositions.
In this sense it is quite correct to state that a cham-
pion of Nfc must rationally exclude Sfc. If this was
not done one would be committed to accepting two propo-
sitions which are mutually contradictory: both are
such that they cannot simultaneously be true. However,
what the Nfc is not committed to, is denying that Sfc
must be excluded because it violates a rationality
norm. The Nfc would accept that Sfc should not be
rejected on such grounds and would welcome Boyle,

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Grisez and Tollefsen's argument to this effect.
However, Sfc is rejected because the position is either
false, or its arguments too weak to warrant rational
assent, and the alleged PSRA collapses. The PSRA com-
mits an equivocation between the grounds upon which a
proposition may be rationally affirmed or excluded, and
whether in fact a proposition violates paradigmatic,
creative, logical or technical norms.

It is concluded that a sound PSRA against determin-
ism has yet to be produced. It seems unlikely that any
such PSRA could be constructed on presently envisagea-
ble grounds. Determinism is a coherent, substantial
and challenging philosophical position. It could be
met by anti-determinists by much ontological work, in
charting out alternative and more plausible views of
mind, causality and space and time than those accepted
by present determinists. Whether determinism is in
fact true, or even a reasonable position cannot be
debated here.

3. A Critique of Everitt's Argument

Nicholas Everitt has attempted to show by means of
a PSRA that the doctrine of "straight-forward elimina-
tive materialism" (SEM) can not be rationally assented
to by any cognitive agent. SEM, a thesis most frequen-
tly associated with Richard Rorty,[19] is the position
that "there are no mental items, just as there are no
unicorns."[20]

The first problem which Everitt notes for the eli-
minative materialist is that he must, if this thesis is
true, cease ascribing mental states, especially belief
states, to himself. Yet to be an SEMist one must
surely believe that one's thesis is true, and if so it
is a necessary condition of an SEMist believing SEM
that the thesis is in fact false.

In reply to this the SEMist might be led down the
path of topic neutrality (TN), and to an easy
slaughter. The TN thesis is the position that there is
nothing about mental items in virtue of which they must
be physical or non-physical. The SEMist TN asserts
that there are no M-beliefs (mentalistic-beliefs) and
TN denies the truth of mentalism and TN believes that
SEM is true. Everitt argues that if the SEMist accepts
the p thesis, that there is something about mental
items in virtue of which they must be physical, the
SEMist has no reason to be an SEMist rather than an
identity theorist. Second, the TN thesis and mentalism
were rival accounts of the referential nature of mental
terms. The problem which Everitt believes to remain
outstanding for the SEMist is to explain an initial ac-
ceptance of mentalism, while one reasons to the accept-
ance of SEM independent of whether the p thesis is ac-
cepted once one has accepted SEM.[21]

Everitt's first reconstruction of the SEM argument takes the SEMist to be presenting a sound argument to this conclusion:

(Cl) SEM is true.

However, the SEMist must assent to this premise:

(1) The SEMist believes that mentalism is true.

The SEMist believes that mentalism is true because if (1) was false, then no SEMist has any more reason to accept SEM than a mind-body identity thesis. Everitt also argues in a far from clear and in a far from satisfactory manner that "if there is to be a reason (as distinct from his mistakenly thinking there is a reason) for denying the existence of the mental, (2) must be true as well,"[22] i.e.,

(2) The mentalism thesis is true.

From (1) and (2) we deduce premise (3):

(3) There is at least one non-physical mental item, this being the SEMist's belief that mentalism is true.

Premise (3) is inconsistent with (Cl) since from (Cl) we can deduce a proposition (Cl*):

(Cl*) There are no non-physical mental items

and (3) and (Cl*) are inconsistent since by the conjunction rule we can deduce a proposition (Cl**):

(Cl**) There is at least one non-physical mental item and there are no non-physical items

which is an outright contradiction. It seems, then, that if Everitt's analysis is correct, he has not shown that SEM is pragmatically self-refuting (PSRA), but has advanced a much stronger thesis, namely that SEM is semantically self-refuting (SSRA). Let us call this argument, Argument A.
    A second argument, Argument B, involves epistemically weakening premise (2) of Argument A:

(2a) The SEMist rationally believes that the mentalism thesis is true.

This leaves open the possibility that mentalism is in fact false. The next premise would also seem acceptable by a SEMist, Everitt alleges, who accepted (2a):

(4) The Semist believes that he holds at least some beliefs.

From (2a) and (4) it is deduced that

(5) It is rational for the SEMist to believe that there are at least some non-physical mental items, these being at least his own beliefs.

From (2a), (4) and (5) it is deduced that

(6) It is not rational for a SEMist to believe SEM.

Argument C is advanced to block a possible rejoinder which could be made to a conception of rational belief presupposed by Argument B: if it is rational for someone S to believe that p, and p is inconsistent with q, it is not rational for S to believe that q: S must reasonably believe that p and q are inconsistent. The SEMist enlightened by Argument B is faced by this argument:

(C) . . . if the SEMist gives up his belief in SEM, then of course he is no longer an SEMist; if he gives up his belief that there are non-physical mental items, then he must also give up either the mentalism thesis or his belief that the holds some beliefs. If we assume that the latter is contingently very improbable, all that is left is for him to abandon the mentalism thesis. But if he abandons the mentalism thesis, there is no reason for his materialism to be eliminative.[23]

Argument C can be stated more explicitly as follows:

(2) The mentalism thesis is true.

(7) I have some beliefs.

Therefore,

(8) There are some non-physical mental items ((2), (7)).

(9) (8) is inconsistent with SEM, by definition of "SEM".

(10) If (8) is false, then either (2), (7) or both (2)) and (7) are false (as (2) and (7) entail (8)).

(11) (7) is true.

Therefore,

(12) If (8) is false, then (2) is false ((10), (11)).

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(13) If (2) is false, then SEM has no adequate
      rationale.

Therefore,

(14) If (8) is false, then SEM has no adequate
      rationale.

(15) If (8) is true,then SEM is false (9).

Therefore,

(16) Either SEM is false or SEM has no adequate
      rationale ((14), (15)).

This trio of arguments presents a _prima facie_
strong challenge to SEM, but it is a challenge which
the SEMist can meet.   My criticism here will centre
upon premises (2) and (2a), and contrary to Everitt,
the SEMist need not accept these premises precisely as
he has stated them. Consequently all three arguments
are unsound.
First let us be clear about what mentalism in fact
is. Mentalism is the thesis, according to Everitt,
which asserts this:

(M1) The mental, if it exists, is non-physical.[24]

The assertion (M1) can be restated, without changing
either its sense or truth value, as (M2):

(M2) If the mental exists then the mental is non-
      physical.

Is it in fact the case that the SEMist accepts (M2)?
Yes, indeed it does seem to be so.   So let us next
review what the SEM thesis is. SEM is the following
claim:

(SEM*) If SEM is true, then there are no mental items
       (just as there are no unicorns).

It seems though that even the mentalist would accept
(SEM*). (SEM*) is in fact a necessary truth, the
source of its necessity deriving from the definition of
the SEMist position itself.   However the mentalist
would argue that there are in fact mental items, while
the eliminative materialist would deny this.   The
SEMist can accept both propositions (M2) and (SEM*)
because they are in fact necessary truths. But this is
consistent with the assertion that "mentalism" is false
insofar as the mental does not exist. Hence the men-
talist position must encompass not only an acceptance
of (M2) but also this claim:

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(M3)   The mental exists.

Everitt's challenge to SEMists is to explain how in
fact one can _initially_ accept "mentalism", yet argue
for SEM. I have pointed out that the SEMist does not
in fact accept mentalism insofar as mentalism is the
claim (M2) and (M3). What I must now do is to outline
how in fact a philosopher might come to believe a the-
sis which is so challenging to our common sense view of
the world as SEM.

The reasoning here is quite simple. The SEMist
does in fact believe that the common sense view of the
world is very seriously flawed. The SEM would argue
that such a world view does not consitute a pre-
theoretical given, because common sense positions con-
tain metaphysical assumptions. Yet philosophy, while
it cannot help but begin with common sense positions
(since the philosopher must grow up in a human
society), has never been content with accepting tradi-
tional cultural wisdom. Philosophers have and should
challenge the wisdom of the status quo. And this is
precisely what has occurred in the history of
philosophy. Zeno attacked such a well entrenched view
that things in fact undergo change in the world, and
that there is plurality at all. Sceptics have denied
that we know anything at all, and eliminative material-
ists have denied both that the mental entities of ordi-
nary language exist, as well as the material objects of
ordinary language.[25]

The SEMist claims that future neurophysiological
research may well lead us to conclude that the
mentalist's mental entities are in fact brain
processes. The relationship of these mental entity
terms to the theoretical entity terms of a future neu-
rophysiology would be the same as that which holds
between a theoretically eliminated term such as
"quantity of caloric fluid" and an at present accepted
term such as "the mean kinetic energy of molecules."
From the perspective of contemporary thermodynamics the
referent of the former term does not exist, and the ob-
servational and explanatory role once played by such a
term is taken over by thermodynamics. Likewise, a lin-
guistic reform may in fact occur whereby the observa-
tional and explanatory role played by mentalistic terms
may be taken over by the SEMist's neurophysiological
language. At this point, it justifiably could be said
by the SEMist that mental items do not exist, just as
it is said that caloric fluid and vital spirits do not
exist.

The SEMist is proposing a quite radical modifica-
tion of our present view of the world. Paul
Churchland[26] imagines a new form of "language" which
"could be learned and used by our innate systems . . .
since it would reflect the underlying structure of our
cognitive activities in greater detail than does nat-

ural language".[27] Compound "strings" of this new mode
of communication (uebersaetzen) are not evaluated as
true or false, and what we at present take as relations
of entailment will no longer hold between uebersaetzen
components. Philosophical argument itself will have
then become a thing of the past. Richard Rorty, in
fact believes that the received view of philosophy is
already not only a degenerating research programme, but
one already decayed.[28] He himself suggests the
replacement of philosophy by hermeneutics; The radical
SEMist would no doubt construct some uebersaetzen ac-
tivity to busy any of today's philosophers whose work-
ing life extends into this social order.

If this sketch of the SEMist programme is accurate,
then Everitt's argument does in fact beg the question
against the SEMist. The SEMist is proposing not only a
conceptual-technological revolution, but a socio-
institutional revolution more radical than that ever
conceived by social theorists. The Anti-SEMist stands
in the same position as for example a liberal theorist
defending the inevitability of capitalist against a
Marxist, on the grounds that the acquisition and pos-
session of private property by individuals is a neces-
sary condition for a flourishing life of the individu-
als as well as for social harmony. The argument in the
latter case presupposes the inevitability of those very
social institutions, and a view of human nature which
the Marxist explicitly rejects. In the former case,
the question is also begged, since a common sense world
view is assumed, and it is the inevitability of this
position which the radical SEM questions.

Perhaps SEM would be incoherent if there was in
fact a transcendental argument demonstrating the ab-
solute necessity of commonsense concepts. But such a
strategy faces two problems. First, the question of
the justification of transcendental modes of argumenta-
tion is an outstanding philosophical controversy.
Second, it must fail against Paul Churchland's scenario
of the abandonment of natural language and its replace-
ment by uebersaetzen, since it seems questions of truth
and falsity and validity will no longer arise, and
questions of argumentation are then necessarily out of
the question. Consequently such a radical SEM pro-
gramme could only be implemented or not implemented; it
could not be argued for. Its acceptance or rejection
is then a political question.

Self-referential arguments are a powerful philo-
sophical weapon of critique. However, there are ways
of escaping such arguments. This is not to say that
determinism and SEM are true or even reasonable. Both
positions can be criticized, but most plausibly from
the perspective of an alternative comprehensive meta-
physical system which would allow a transcendence of
both philosophical problems. Let us audition for such

reconstructions, but not on the basis of self-referential arguments.

FOOTNOTES

[1]P. Smith Churchland, "Is Determinism Self-refuting?", Mind 40 (1981), pp. 99-101.

[2]N. Everitt, "A Problem for the Eliminative Materialist," Mind 40 (1981), pp. 428-434.

[3]For a more detailed discussion of ASRC see J. M. Boyle, "Self-Referential Inconsistency, Inevitable Falsity and Metaphysical Argumentation" Metaphilosophy 3, (1972), pp. 25-42; J. M. Boyle, G. Grisez and O. Tollefsen, Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976).

[4]Cf. R. Carnap, Introduction to Semantics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942), pp. 8-9.

[5]E.g., P. Unger, Ignorance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).

[6]An excellent discussion of this issue is given by C. S. Chihara, Ontology and the Vicious-Circle Principle (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1973).

[7]Cf. T. Drange, "The Paradox of the Non-Communicator," Philosophical Studies 15 (1964), pp. 92-96.

[8]Russell's claim that all self-referential statements are meaningless, is false. As we have seen here ASRC follows closely the liar antinomy argument, but shows that some positions are necessarily false, not true if and only if they are false.

[9] J. C. Eccles, "Brain and Free Will," in G. Globus, G. Maxwell and I. Savodnik (eds.), Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry (New York: Plenum Press, 1976), pp. 101-121. Citation p. 101.

[10]Churchland, "Is Determinism Self-Refuting," op. cit., Note 1, p. 99.

[11]Ibid., p. 100.

[12]P. M. Churchland, "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," _Journal of Philosophy_ 78 (1981), pp. 67-90. Citation, pp. 89-90.

[13]For arguments that it is, see S. Haack, _Deviant Logic_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974) Chp. 4 and R. Routley, _Exploring Meinong's Jungle_ (ANU Monograph No. 3, Canberra, 1980), pp. 405-409.

[14]J. N. Jordan, "Determinism's Dilemma," _Review of Metaphysics_ 23 (1969), pp. 48-66. Citation, p. 54.

[15]Boyle, Grisez and Tollefsen, _Free Choice_, _op. cit._, note 3.

[16]_Ibid._, pp. 154-155.

[17]_Ibid._, p. 158.

[18]_Ibid._, p. 163.

[19]Cf. R. Rorty, "Mind-body, Identity, Privacy and Categories," _Review of Metaphysics_ 19 (1965), pp. 24-54; "In Defense of Eliminative Materialism," _Review of Metaphysics_ 24 (1970), pp. 112-121.

[20]Everitt, "A Problem for the Eliminative Materialist," _op. cit._, note 2, p. 428.

[21]_Ibid._, p. 432.

[22]_Ibid._, p. 432.

[23]_Ibid._, p. 434.

[24]_Ibid._, p. 428.

[25]Cf. T. Guleserian, "On Two Aspects of Eliminative Materialism," _Philosophy of Science_ 38 (1971), pp. 282-289.

[26]P. Churchland, "Eliminative Mateiralism and the Propositional Attitudes," _op. cit._, note 12, pp. 86-88.

[27]_Ibid._, p. 86.

[28]Cf. R. Rorty, _Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature_ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).