

APPLICATION OF FUNCTIONAL SAFETY STANDARDS IN A PARTICLE ACCELERATOR ENVIRONMENT

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Abstract

Many systems used by the CERN accelerators and the technical infrastructure have to respect stringent requirements in terms of reliability, availability, maintainability and safety either for operation, security, or legal aspects such as the one required by French Regulatory Authority (Installations Nucléaires de Base - INB). The functional safety approach provides a structured method for achieving these requirements. In particular, the new IEC 61508 standards give guidance for system design and an effective and safe system exploitation. When designing new systems, it also sets out a generic approach for all the safety lifecycle activities: requirements, design, realisation, installation, operation, maintenance and even the decommissioning. The standards consider the functional safety from three different, but related, perspectives: technology, procedures and human interventions on the systems. This paper gives the results of the first attempts made at the CERN Technical Service division to use these standards and gives some suggestions on how to improve functional safety in a particle accelerator environment.

1. INTRODUCTION

As computer control becomes usual for many CERN accelerators and technical infrastructure applications, it becomes apparent that the failure of these systems is likely to have an impact on the operation and/or on the safety of the people and the equipment. The risk of a failure with its consequences has given rise to stringent requirements in terms of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS). Moreover, CERN must also comply with the safety requirements set out by the French Regulatory Authority: the INB (*Installations Nucléaires de Base*).

To increase the RAMS performance of a particle accelerator environment is a big challenge because it involves the management of the opposite requirements of safety and flexibility. The other challenging aspect is to organise the work processes to cope with the reduction of resources, the dynamics of the new computer control technologies and the CERN outsourcing policy.

The functional safety standard for Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronics (E/E/PE) systems IEC 61508 [1] has been used as a management guideline to structure the work on safety-related control systems. An overview of this approach and the IEC 61508 is given in Section 2.

The benefits and the pitfalls of the practical application of this approach in the Technical Sector (ST) division are presented in Section 3.

2. FUNCTIONAL SAFETY

2.1 Description of functional safety

The definition of functional safety, or dependability, has been expressed by the J-C Laprie [2] as:

‘The notion of functional safety (dependability) is defined as the trustworthiness of a computing system which allows reliance to be justifiably placed on the service it delivers.’

Consistent with this definition, functional safety has a two-fold objective: guaranteeing that systems work and that they work safely. Therefore, functional safety can be seen as a method for developing a system that attains the proprieties of reliability, availability, maintainability and safety. In addition, the application of an overall safety lifecycle guarantees that these proprieties are maintained from conception to decommissioning. Functional safety is based on three major axes: people, procedures and methods. And the results of a recent study by the UK Health and Safety Executive on the causes of accidents, shown in Fig. 1, support this strategy that people, procedures and methods are capital for the reduction of faults and accidents.




Fig. 1: HSE statistics on causes of accidents

In the field of computer controlled systems, the functional safety standard IEC 61508 defines a generic approach and a technical framework for dealing systematically with safety related activities. This methodology enables us to minimise system failures and optimise performance. It is particularly interesting because it defines the skills needed to deal with safety, the required procedures to be defined and carried out, as well as the kind of development methodologies to be used. The standard also provides an overall safety lifecycle that focuses the attention on the safety aspects of each phase of the development process.

2.2 Functional safety, quality and the standards

The functional safety approach addresses the issues of awareness, responsibility and commitment in the organisation (or a project). In this mindset, special attention is given to the understanding and the evaluation of the real needs/expectations in terms of functional and safety requirements.

The IEC 61508 provides all the processes to build the understanding of the real needs/expectations in order to meet them. In addition, the standard explicitly addresses the issue of continuous process improvement (as found in the Capability Maturity Model developed by the Software Engineering Institute [3]). This mindset, with the processes for achieving it, is the basis for a total quality in safety-related control systems. And quality is of fundamental importance to safety because it relates to the ability of a system to meet its requirements.

On the other hand, in addition to providing the answer to the question ‘how much safety is enough?’ in terms of Safety Integrity Levels (SIL), the IEC 61508 also provides a way to answering to the question ‘how much quality is enough?’ Therefore, there is a multiple result by adopting a functional safety approach: the achievement of the required RAMS and the assignment of the sufficient effort in terms of design, realisation, installation, operation and maintenance, management and quality.

3. FUNCTIONAL SAFETY IN THE ST DIVISION

3.1 Why?

In order to face the issues of quality, project management, operation & maintenance, safety and cost optimisation for the concept phase of the CERN Safety Alarm Monitoring (CSAM) [5], the ST/MO group formed a team for functional safety. After a positive experience, functional safety is being extended to other safety-related or critical control systems.

Quality: As largely explained in this paper, the issue of quality is solved by adopting the overall safety lifecycle of the IEC 61508 with the adherence to the requirements for the management of the functional safety.

Project Management: Safety-related projects must cover additional management tasks. These also include the management of the safety requirements and their allocation, functional safety assessment and functional safety audits.

Operation and Maintenance: The standards provide an organisational framework for identifying and managing the operation and maintenance of safety-related systems. These include specific procedures for reducing the risk of accidents. The application of a systematic analysis of the operational constraints during maintenance and the definition of the preventive maintenance based on the required RAMS imply a maintenance plan with an overall cost estimation.

Safety and cost optimisation: The functional safety approach brings to an overall estimation and optimisation of the total life costs of a safety-related system because it implies the justification of the proposed solutions against measurable required safety performance and the optimisation of the operation and maintenance procedures.

3.2 How?

People are an essential element in the organisation of functional safety. Therefore, special training was organised in order to increase the knowledge of the team, to raise the awareness of the risks associated to safety-related control systems, to create a common base of knowledge and to have a feedback from industrial experts.

The training objectives have been attained and the results have been applied during the preparation of the functional and safety requirements for the CSAM technical specifications [6].

The process of knowledge acquisition/sharing has continued by actively participating to specialist conferences and seminars and by making presentations at CERN working groups and workshops.

3.3 Where?

The functional safety approach is being applied in different areas and problems as described in the following paragraphs:

Overall projects: For the CSAM project [5], functional safety has been set-up from the very beginning. The IEC 61508 has been used as a canvas for the concept phase and for structuring the system lifecycle. The standards have eased the preparation of the technical specifications and the performance requirements for the CSAM invitation to tender. In particular, it has helped in the drawn up of clear and concise performance requirements for a result oriented contract; it has also been useful for the cost estimation of the system itself and of the long-term operation and maintenance services.

Re-engineering: The execution of a systematic analysis for the SPS smoke removal control system is providing an essential overall understanding of the main safety functions executed by the system. The analysis has indicated functional priority and critical elements. The first phase has provided technical recommendations to guarantee that sufficient effort is invested in these functions.

Dependability analysis: As a quality commitment to continuous improvement, a functional safety approach was used for the dependability analysis of the Technical Data Server [7]. Even in this case, the execution of a systematic analysis has uncovered potential for improvement and has also identified and quantified the weak points of the current system.

Functional safety support: To add value to a project, a functional safety engineer must be fully involved in the design team. Functional safety support was provided for the Water 2000 monitoring project. The main contributions have been an insight to the control system risks and a set of recommendations to mitigate or eliminate them.

4. CONCLUSION

This paper gives the results of the first attempts made at the CERN Technical Service division (ST) to use the IEC 61508 functional safety standards. It is shown that functional safety can be applied in different fields and under different perspectives. After an initial investment in training and coaching, the functional safety approach is producing the expected confidence in the concerned projects and systems. In particular, the collaborative effort for the CSAM project has produced robust specifications and precise cost estimations. The use of systematic and methodical analysis has also helped to identify other systems' deficiencies and inefficiencies and has provided means to avoid or eliminate them.

5. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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