



Using COTS at the LHC: Building on Space Experience

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Presentation Outline



- Introductory Remarks
- Environment Comparison
- Basic Effects in COTS
- COTS Issues
- Hardness Assurance
- Mitigation Strategies

What is COTS?



Competing Definitions

- Anything you can buy from a catalog
 - If it has a part number and a data sheet, it's COTS
 - No special requirements or added specifications
- Systems and components not specifically designed for mil/aero applications
 - Emphasizes high volume manufacturing and commercial electronics or automotive use
 - COTS are those things we couldn't use before

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COTS In This Talk



COTS are:

- Standard items available from a manufacturer
- Not designed for radiation environment, but may have some specified tolerance
- Usually “black boxes” to the user
- Not tweaked or modified for the user

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Space Experience



Marketplace Changes

- Spacecraft are becoming commodities
- Emphasis is reducing cost
 - More science
 - Stimulate space business ventures
- Cost savings from:
 - Cheaper vehicles
 - Smaller, more capable systems
 - Simpler operations

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Space Experience



Dilemma:

- Demand for spacecraft components is flat
- Consumer electronics market offers higher profit per man-year of labor
- Result is fewer devices available which are designed for the space market

Yet the need for high performance systems in space is higher than ever!

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Space Experience



COTS Cases

- Choice between hard part and related unhardened commercial device
 - Survivability vs. performance
- COTS sometimes provide mission-enabling performance
 - Usually no radiation tolerant alternative
- COTS vs. equivalent mil/aero part
 - Traditional hard military part often cheaper when qualification costs are considered

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Space Experience



Example: Microprocessors in space

- COTS processors usually 3 generations or so ahead of “rad-hard” mil-aero technology
 - Clones of existing commercial processors usually aren't exact copies
- Advanced commercial tools usually not available for hardened technology
- SEE mitigation for COTS is complex
 - EDAC, watchdog circuits, triple voting, etc.

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Space Experience



Risk Elimination

- “No risk is acceptable”
- Usually managed at the lowest level
 - Example: environmental risk in ICs
- Often driven to proven technology
 - Demands technology demonstration flights
- Can be mission or capability limiting
- Upside - systems generally work

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Space Experience



Risk Management

- “Mission must not fail - all else is negotiable”
- Low levels may be risky, but risks are mitigated at next higher level
- Often provides mission enabling technology
- Reality: not a new idea
 - We can never eliminate risk, and so these ideas have been used in every piece of engineering

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Space Experience



Risk Management Methodology

- State the problem and proposed solutions
- Quantify the risk, if possible
- Know the impact of the risk
- Decide if the risk is acceptable
 - Mitigate?
 - Eliminate?
- Implement the optimum solution

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LHC Experience



COTS Use

- Many of the same problems
 - Small market
 - Specialized needs, especially radiation
 - Need for high performance
- Unique Issues:
 - Many different independent groups
 - Wide variety of parts and subsystems
 - No equivalent of a prime contractor?

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Environment Comparison



Space

Radiation

- Charged particles
- TID, SEE, Displacement

Physical Char.

- -55 to 125 C
- Launch vibration

Repair/Upgrade

- Usually, none

Aircraft

Radiation

- Neutrons
- Neutron SEE

Physical Char.

- Controlled, 0-70C
- Some vibration

Repair/Upgrade

- Cost driven

LHC

Radiation

- Neutrons, gamma
- TID, Neutron SEE, Displacement

Physical Char.

- Controlled, 0 - 70 C
- No Vibration

Repair/Upgrade

- Undesirable

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LHC Radiation



Total Ionizing Dose

- 10 krad - 10 Mrad, depending on location
- Mostly gamma dose

Neutron Exposure

- 10^{11} - 10^{12} n/cm²
- Single event effects
- Displacement damage


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Basic Mechanisms and Macroscopic Effects

Total Dose in COTS



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Total Dose in COTS




ELDRS Effect

- Hardness is dose rate dependent
 - Lateral PNP transistors are more sensitive than others at low dose rate
 - At space rates, lateral PNPs are softer than at test chamber rates
 - Temperature confounds the effect
- Serious implications for test fidelity in space applications

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Total Dose in COTS



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Total Dose in COTS



Microscopic Effects

- Slower gate switching speeds
- Increased leakage currents
- Threshold voltage shifts

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Total Dose in COTS



Macroscopic Effects

- Analog and Mixed-Signal Parts
 - Supply current, leakage currents increase
 - Offset voltage increases
 - Gain decreases
 - Converter non-linearity increases
 - PSRR, CMRR increases
 - Reference voltages change

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Total Dose in COTS



Macroscopic Effects

- Digital Parts
 - Supply currents, input leakage increase
 - Timing slows down
 - DRAM data retention time decreases
 - Charge pumps fail
 - Transistor threshold voltages shift, so logic gates get stuck in one state

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Total Dose in COTS



Macroscopic Effects

- Digital CMOS
 - Typically 1 - 50 krad
- Analog MOS
 - 1- 30 krad (depending on application)
- Bipolar
 - 10 - 100 krad
 - ELDRS effect may not be an LHC issue

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Total Dose in COTS




Macroscopic Effects

- Boards and Systems
 - Strongly dependent on board design
 - Often observe increased supply current
 - In many cases, board works until it just quits
 - May be possible to find reduced operation that continues to work at higher doses.

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Displacement in COTS



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Displacement in COTS



Microscopic Effects

- Neutron interacts with silicon nucleus
- Dislocates atom
- Formation of a Frenkel Pair which can be thought of as a recombination center
- Vacancy and interstitial cause unwanted quantum states in band gap
- Changes carrier flow

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Displacement in COTS



Macroscopic Effects

- Mostly an issue for photonic or optoelectronics
 - Lasers, LEDs
 - Opto-isolators, including DC-DC converters
 - CCDs, similar detectors
 - Bipolar electronics
- Decreases output power of light sources
- Reduces charge collection in receivers
- Increases leakage (or “dark” current)

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Displacement in COTS



Damage Equivalence

- Test data usually taken with mono-energetic, unidirectional beams
- We need a way to convert a spectrum into a single equivalent fluence of a “standard” particle


$$\Psi_e = \int K(E)\Psi(E)dE$$

Displacement in COTS



Damage Equivalence Factors in Si


Omnidirectional Proton to Unidirection 10 MeV Proton



Displacement in COTS



Neutron Irradiation of LEDs




SEE in COTS



Microscopic Effects

- Neutron interacts with silicon nucleus
- Charged secondaries deposit charge
- Collected charge pulse causes effect
- Fundamentally a statistical process



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SEE in COTS



Macroscopic Effects

- Destructive Effects
 - Latchup, gate rupture, burnout
 - Neutrons do not generally cause these
- Non-Destructive Effects
 - Upset, functional interrupt, transient
 - Most likely neutron effects

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SEE in COTS



Single Event Upset

- Change in state of a memory element
- System-level manifestations depend on application

Single Event Functional Interrupt

- Upset places device in an ill-defined condition
- Sometimes requires power cycle to clear

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SEE in COTS



Example: DRAM

- Upset Modes
 - Cell upset
 - Address error
 - Data latch error
- Functional Interrupt Modes
 - Spare memory area
 - Built-in test mode

SEE in COTS



Example: Microprocessor

- Upset Modes
 - Data error
 - Program error
- Functional Interrupt Modes
 - Built-in self test
 - Invalid instruction
 - Bad memory fetch

SEE in COTS



Example: Field Programmable Gate Array

- Non-SRAM Device
 - Dielectric rupture
 - Data errors
- SRAM-Based Device
 - Data errors
 - Inadvertent reprogramming
 - Functional interrupt in state machine

SEE in COTS



Boards and Systems

- Several (sometimes many) devices may be sensitive to effects
- Unpredictable results
 - Depends on type of error and system design
 - Very little visibility to diagnose problems
 - Can't depend on a system to completely police itself



COTS-Specific Issues

COTS Issues



Lot-to-lot Variation

- Parameters which determine total dose hardness aren't closely controlled by manufacturers
 - Hardness can vary widely across wafers and manufacturing runs
 - Example: LM108 OpAmp - tested devices hard to as little as 5 krad and as hard as 80 krad
- SEE sensitivity determined by architecture, and so less variable across lots

COTS Issues



Architecture Changes

- SEE susceptibility determined by architecture
- Manufacturers revise die without warning
- Usually invalidates past SEE testing
- Related issue - product obsolescence
 - By the time you find a product you can use, the manufacturer has replaced it with something you can't use!

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COTS Issues



Boards and Systems

- Manufacturers change components frequently
 - Cheaper product
 - Performance improvement
 - Obsolescence
- Especially difficult with hybrids
 - No part numbers to check!

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Testing and Procurement



Hardness Assurance


Steps To Hardness Assurance

- Determine requirements
 - Mostly determined by position
- Test components of interest
- Mitigate or circumvent damage effects
- Manage the supply of chosen parts




Total Dose Effects

Total Dose Test Methodology



ELDRS Effect

ELDRS Effect Test Methodology



SEE Effects



Event Rate Requirements

- From performance requirements
 - Highly application dependent
- Determination process is iterative
 - Requirements are given at system level
 - More sensitive devices can be used with mitigation if overall rate meets requirement

SEE Effects



Testing Issues

- Purpose: to measure the event cross-section and study external effects
 - Characterization of what happens to a device is necessary for mitigation design
- Quality of test impacts uncertainty
 - Dead time, beam measurement, etc.
 - Number of events detected
 - Fidelity of test

Displacement Effects



Testing Issues

- Data similar to TID Testing
 - Cumulative changes in device behavior as a function of fluence
- Execution similar to SEE testing
 - Beam issues of primary concern
 - Should simulate application as closely as possible

Procurement Issues



Common Buys

- “Frequently Used Parts”
 - Saves on qualification costs
 - Requires high degree of co-ordination
 - Need a centralized distribution system
 - May not help for systems

Procurement Issues



Data Sharing

- Database entries are often incomplete, making it difficult to apply results
 - Record as much info about the test as possible
 - Agree beforehand on how to do tests
- TID
 - Bias circuit, dose rate, anneal times
- SEE
 - Circuit, full cross-section curve, external effects

Mitigation Strategies



Total Dose Mitigation



Three Schemes

- Reduce the dose
 - External shielding
 - Advanced packaging
- Reduce the damage
 - Cold sparing
 - Intentional annealing
- Accommodate the effects
 - Design for end-of-life behavior

Displacement Mitigation



Two Schemes

- Reduce the fluence
 - Shielding
 - Advanced packaging
- Accommodate the effects
 - Design for end-of-life behavior

Displacement in COTS



Example: DC-DC Converters

- Often use optocouplers for isolation
- Mitigation
 - Use least sensitive components
 - Shielding or advanced packaging to reduce fluence
 - Accommodate power MOSFET threshold voltage shifts in design

SEE Mitigation



EDAC Method	Capability
Parity	Single bit detect
CRC	Any errors in given structure
Hamming Code	Single bit correct, double bit detect
Reed-Solomon	Errors within symbol
Convolutional Encoding	Burst noise in data stream
Overlying Protocol	System designed to correct errors (i.e., data packet retransmission)

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SEE Mitigation



Method	Description
Watchdog Timer	If not reset within some time interval, reset system
Redundancy	Equivalent systems operate on data.
Lockstep	Two devices are clocked simultaneously.
Voting	Three or more device provide function, which must agree
Repetition	System provides same data more than once
Scrubbing	Rewrite critical memory locations at regular intervals

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Resources

Resources



Device Data

JPL	nppp.jpl.nasa.gov	TID/SEE
GSFC	flick.gsfc.nasa.gov	SEE
ERRIC	erric.dasiac.com	Variety
ESA	www.spurelec.demon.co.uk	TID/SEE
NRL	redex.nrl.navy.mil	TID/SEE
Data Workshop	IEEE NSREC	Variety

Resources



General Info

- IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science
- Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets
- Conferences/Seminars
 - NSREC
 - NSS
 - RADECS
 - Space Parts Working Group
 - GOMAC/HEART