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## The Longevity of American Terrorists: Factors Affecting Sustainability

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**Final Summary Overview**

NIJ FY 15 Research and Evaluation on Radicalization to  
Violent Extremism in the United States

**THE LONGEVITY OF AMERICAN TERRORISTS:  
FACTORS AFFECTING SUSTAINABILITY**

Award Number 2015-ZA-BX-0001

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## THE LONGEVITY OF AMERICAN TERRORISTS: FACTORS AFFECTING SUSTAINABILITY

### I. PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT

This project was an outgrowth of two previous NIJ projects being conducted under NIJ's Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism program area. The first of these projects, which ended in 2015, focused upon testing one of the most prominent theoretical models of extremist radicalization -- identity and framing theory.<sup>1</sup> One of the findings from examination of this theoretical model is consistent with the notion that "people want to be associated with a winner." Recruitment and commitment, crucial to the lifespan of any terrorist movement, improve when the movement has been able to commit successful terrorist incidents (Freilich, Chermak, and Caspi, 2009), particularly if the offenders escaped unscathed. In the second project, which focused upon the temporal sequencing of terrorists' precursor behaviors,<sup>2</sup> a somewhat serendipitous finding emerged to crystalize the current issue. A preliminary analysis of the differences between "lone actors" and members of "cells or groups" revealed that lone actors "survived" substantially longer than members of cells or groups before being arrested or indicted. Although we later found this relationship to be spurious, it was worthy of further examination.

It distinctly appeared that *the greater the length of time between the commission of a terrorist incident by an individual terrorist (or cell) and their capture, the greater the attraction to likeminded recruits who are wavering in their commitment to the cause and not yet radicalized to violence. If longevity – the ability to commit acts of terrorism and evade capture –*

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<sup>1</sup> NIJ Grant #2012-ZA-BX-0003, "Identity and Framing Theory, Precursor Activity, and the Radicalization Process."

<sup>2</sup> NIJ Grant # 2013-ZA-BX-0001, "Sequencing Terrorists' Precursor Behaviors: A Crime-Specific Analysis."

has a positive impact on recruiting to radicalization, it becomes critical for law enforcement to resolve terrorism cases as quickly as possible (see Jones and Libicki, 2008). To accomplish this, we needed a better understanding of *the factors that are associated with the survivability and sustainability of individual terrorists and, if affiliated, the manner in which they interact with their associates.*

Unfortunately, it is not an issue that has been frequently discussed. Over the past twenty years, the P.I. has attended and participated in numerous Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) and JTTF meetings, state and local anti-terrorism training sessions, and training for law enforcement personnel on pre-incident indicators of terrorism. The importance of the training provided by these entities is unquestioned. However, *an examination of what terrorists are doing “right” is rarely mentioned.* Instead, we routinely utilize a case study of a successful interdiction to describe the successful tactics that led us to be able to make an arrest and indictment. Our failures -- in this case, what terrorists are doing to successfully avoid capture -- are seldom the topic of discussion. This project was intended to identify factors and behaviors that terrorists had engaged in that significantly improved their chances for avoiding arrest.

Although there has been some discussion of the sustainability of terrorist *groups* in the empirical literature (Freilich, Chermak, and Caspi, 2009; Crenshaw, 1988; Rapoport, 1992; Hoffman, 1998), the focus of most of this research has been on the strategic decision making of terror groups relative to target selection and delivery method rather than the tactical measures taken to avoid capture. More recently, Suttmoeller, Chermak, and Freilich (2017) examined factors associated with longevity relative to the extent of violence utilized among far-right groups. Despite this exceptional work, we found no quantitative examinations of longevity and sustainability at the *individual* level. With the advent of uncoordinated violence models in the

1990s (e.g., leaderless resistance, lone actor terrorism, etc.), understanding the behavior of terrorists not affiliated with terror groups has also become increasingly important.

For this project, we focused on five factors associated with *individual* longevity mentioned either in the literature, as anecdotal information discussed by investigators and prosecutors, or correlates found to be associated with *group* longevity. These included: 1) the possible effects of changes in the Attorney General's Guidelines for terrorism investigations; 2) the impact of ideology, which may have indirectly affected longevity through gender, age, target selection, and mode of operation characteristics; 3) lone actors versus group participation; 4) the extent of participation in preparatory activity; and 5) the sophistication of the terrorism incidents in which the person participated. Incidental to this examination, one additional factor emerged -- the ability of terrorists to cross international boundaries.

## II. METHODOLOGY

Data used in the analysis were compiled from the American Terrorism Study (ATS), an Oracle 11g relational database composed of fifteen tables that includes information on the demographic characteristics of terrorism offenders, federal charges and other legal variables, the geocoded locations of perpetrator's residences, pre-incident activities such as meetings and precursor crimes, terrorism incidents in the United States, and temporal data on many of the precursor activities and plotted incidents. A description of the ATS database, the method and sample used in this project, and the types of analyses conducted are provided in the following subsections.

## Sources of Data

The American Terrorism Study (ATS) is a compilation of data primarily derived from the federal criminal court records of persons indicted for “terrorism or terrorism-related activities” for the period 1980-present. In 1987, the FBI’s Terrorist Research and Analysis Center<sup>3</sup> provided the principal investigator with the names of persons indicted under the FBI’s Counterterrorism (CT) Program. After the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building bombing in 1995, the FBI, NIJ, and the P.I. collaborated with the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime in which the House Subcommittee assumed sponsorship of the ATS. In 2002, the Senate Judiciary Committee assumed this role under Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL). From 2005-2012, the names of international terrorists indicted in federal courts were provided through the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Since that time, the names of domestic terrorists have been extracted primarily from the websites of U.S. Attorneys offices and other public sources. As such, the persons included in the database are indicative of the FBI’s official definition of terrorism (e.g., see FBI, 1998). Since the FBI has exclusive jurisdiction over the investigation of acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens or property, the ATS includes only individuals and cases prosecuted in federal criminal courts.

Over the past fifteen years, the ATS has expanded from approximately 70 variables related to group affiliation, ideology, demographics, and legal and sentencing variables to over 400 variables that include information on the geospatial and temporal distribution of the pre-incident (or precursor) activities of these defendants leading up to a planned or completed terrorism incident. Older cases already in the ATS were revisited to collect data on additional variables.

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<sup>3</sup> Later renamed the Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit.

### Data for the Current Quantitative Analysis

At the time of the current project, the ATS included 1,140 case studies linked to 1,425 federal “terrorism-related” court cases involving 1,922 indictees. Data collection was complete on 605 terrorism incidents in the United States from 1980 to present. Analyses were limited to the 693 indicted individuals in the ATS who were linked to the planning or completion of a terrorist attack in the United States.<sup>4</sup> To determine an individual’s “longevity,” the date of the person’s involvement in their first preparatory activity as well as a “neutralizing” date (usually date of arrest) were required to determine the duration of their “terrorist lifespan.” Sufficient information to establish longevity (a “start” and “stop” date) was available on 346 persons in the dataset, with connected incidents ranging from 1980 to 2015.

(Table 1 here)

A description of the variables and the manner in which they were measured is provided in Table 1. Additional comment on coding of the dependent variable and one of the independent variables is warranted. First, *individual longevity* has not been used in previous research. Therefore, we utilized findings from prior literature on *group* longevity to help determine how *individual* longevity should be categorized. Several studies have noted that the average terrorist *group* lasted for about one year (Rappoport, 1992; LaFree and Dugan, 2009; see also Suttmoeller, Chermak, and Freilich, 2017). The shortest category is six months, half of what “average group longevity” has been estimated in previous research. A second category captures six months less and six months more than the average lifespan of the group. The third category included persons who participated in terroristic events from 18-36 months. The longest category

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<sup>4</sup> Eliminated persons had been indicted on charges related to material support, conspiracy, and other charges not related to a specific planned or completed incident.

is “greater than three years,” which is three times the average group longevity. Furthermore, it appeared that “greater than three years” was significantly distinct from the other categories.

Second, we wanted to ascertain if changes in the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Terrorism Investigations were related to the longevity of individual terrorists. While the FBI’s definition of terrorism has not changed over the past forty years, major changes to the “regulatory” definition, as provided by the AG Guidelines, have taken place on at least four occasions during this period. These changes occurred during Levi, Smith, Ashcroft, and Mukasey tenures as Attorney General. Measurement of this variable involved identifying under which set of Guidelines an individual terrorist committed their first participation in a recorded terrorist incident. These behaviors usually involved the person’s first preparatory behavior recorded in the ATS. This date was then used to assign the person to one of the four Guideline eras from which mean and median values were calculated. More details on this variable are provided in the results and discussion sections.

### III. MAJOR FINDINGS

Longevity was measured with two different indicators of central tendency. The *mean* longevity for terrorists in the sample was 32.4 months. Interestingly, when using the *median* as an indicator, the average longevity of individual terrorists drops to 15.86 months, a figure very consistent with the estimated average lifespan of terrorist *groups* identified in previous research. A summary of the distribution of these offenders across this variable is provided in Table 2. The sample is fairly evenly distributed across our four longevity categories. Nearly one-third of the terrorists 29.8%, 103 of 346) “survived” six months or less before arrest, while at the other



extreme, one-fourth (25.4%, 88 of 346) of the sample was recorded as having longevity in excess of three years. It is this latter group that we were most interested in.

(Table 2 about here)

**Major Finding 1:** *Major changes to the Attorney General Guidelines combatting terrorism have been associated with significant declines in the “lifespan” of individual terrorists.* As previously discussed, major changes to the manner in which terrorists were investigated occurred during the tenures of four Attorneys General: Edward Levi (1975-1977), William F. Smith (1981-1985), John Ashcroft (2001-2005), and Michael Mukasey (2007-2009). Although there were a number of Attorneys General between each of these individuals, the changes these AG’s initiated during their tenures lasted for many years. The era reflecting the effect of the Levi Guidelines, therefore, extends from 1976 when he issued the Guidelines until new guidelines were instituted by William French Smith in 1983. The Smith era extended to the beginning of the Ashcroft guidelines created after the September 11, 2001 attacks. The Ashcroft guidelines remained in effect until new guidelines were created by Michael Mukasey. The Mukasey guidelines basically remain in effect today. Although minor modifications to the guidelines on terrorism investigations may have been implemented by other AG’s between the tenures of these four Attorneys General, the changes were mostly semantic.

(Table 3 here)

Terrorists who began their “careers” during each of these eras have remarkably different longevitys (See Table 3). Terrorists who began during the Levi era had a mean longevity of 2,230 days. The impact of Watergate, COINTELPRO, and the Privacy Act on FBI investigative strategies are demonstrated in the Levi Guidelines and manifested in the ability of terrorists during this era to operate almost with impunity. Introduction of the Smith Guidelines in March

1983 significantly altered the ability and focus of the FBI in responding to terrorism. The median lifespan of terrorists who began operating during the mid-1980s plummeted from 2,230 days to 1,067 days. This downward trend has continued as new guidelines have given law enforcement more discretion in the investigative techniques employed. As of 2015, terrorists who began committing terrorism or terrorism-related activities following introduction of the Mukasey Guidelines have only had a mean longevity of 142 days, and a median longevity of 99 days. This pattern is presented visually in five-year increments in Figures 1 and 2 below.

(Figure 1 and Figure 2 here)

**Major Finding 2:** *The longevity of individual terrorists varies significantly by ideology.* Environmental and Far-Left terrorists sustained themselves for substantially longer periods of time than did Far-Right or Islamic Extremists. As Table 4 reveals, Far-Left and Environmental terrorists averaged 5.4 and 4.3 years, respectively. In contrast, the longevity of Far-Right and Islamic Extremists was, on average, two years or less. These differences reflect a variety of influences. The Far Left, prominent during the Levi Guidelines era, had several terrorists who avoided arrest for nearly a decade before their capture following implementation of the Smith Guidelines. Members of the United Freedom Front are prime examples. The ability of some Far Left and Environmental terrorists to cross international boundaries further contributed to their longevity. Joanne Chesimard (Black Liberation Army), Victor Gerena (Macheteros), and William Morales (FALN) all evaded capture by escaping to a foreign country. The longevity of some Far Left and Environmental terrorists continues to this day, due to their fugitive status. In contrast, the Far-Right and Islamic Extremists emerged at a time when the implementation of new AG guidelines (Smith and Mukasey, respectively), negatively impacted the life course of these terrorists. The most dramatic increases in terrorism indictments and arrests over the past

forty years occurred at two points in our history: 1) immediately after the implementation of the Smith AG Guidelines in 1983 (when the Far-Right declared “War in ‘84”) and 2) in 2002 when implementation of the Ashcroft Guidelines and the PATRIOT Act following the September 11, 2001 attacks resulted in a significant increase in indictments for international terrorists involved in “material support.”

(Table 4 here)

**Major Finding 3:** *Ideology also plays an indirect role in longevity due to its relationship with other variables.* Gender and Educational attainment are significantly related to longevity. As Table 5 reveals, a slightly higher percentage of females than males (38.6% vs 23.5%, respectively) may be categorized as having “very long” longevity (longer than three years), while the percentage of males classified as having “short” longevity (six months or less) is twice as high as that for females (31.8% vs. 15.9%, respectively). To some extent this may be attributed to the roles of women in terrorist groups. Female terrorists have tended toward two types of roles, either leadership roles among Far Left groups or in support roles among Far Right and Islamic Extremist groups. Both of these role types are associated with longer longevity. Males, in contrast, have been more likely to engage in overtly criminal preparatory behavior as well as actual incident participation than females. Both of these types of behaviors are significantly more likely to attract the attention of law enforcement.

(Table 5 here)

Furthermore, the greater one’s educational attainment, the longer terrorists have been able to avoid indictment. This general pattern manifests itself both among groups and lone actors and is also a function of group ideology. Leftist terrorists, who dominated American terrorism statistics during the Levi Guidelines era, were also characterized as having a

substantially larger proportion of females in leadership roles, many of whom were college graduates. The same was true of environmental terrorists during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Even among the Far Right, leaders such as Louis Beam, Richard Butler, and Robert Miles were well educated, and while they did not avoid indictment, they successfully avoided conviction.

**Major Finding 4:** *The type of terrorist incident planned or committed is highly related to longevity in two fundamental ways: 1) as a result of the sophistication of the incident, and 2) as a result of the extent of preparation necessary to carry out the incident.* These findings are summarized in Table 6 below. First, one of the most significant findings involves the sophistication of the terrorist incident committed, albeit efforts to measure sophistication, including ours, can be somewhat arbitrary. Despite this, *the less sophisticated the planned or committed attack, the longer the longevity of the individual terrorists involved in the incident.* There may be a number of reasons for this relationship that we were not able to measure. It may be that more sophisticated incidents result in the greater allocation of law enforcement resources; or it may be that more sophisticated explosive devices provide better forensic evidence to be used in solving the crime. While both of these contentions may be true, we were able to measure two other indicators relative to sophistication that may be associated with the relationship between sophistication and longevity.

(Table 6 here)

It was our contention that the more sophisticated the planned incident: 1) the greater the number of meetings (if it involved multiple offenders) would be required during the planning process; and 2) the greater the number of preparatory activities would be necessary to complete the incident. Both of these types of activities (number of meetings and preparatory activities)

have been found to be negatively related to the successful completion of terrorist incidents,<sup>5</sup> suggesting that early intervention and/or arrest were also linked to these two variables. As expected, both of these relationships were significantly related to longevity in the direction predicted. *The more meetings that were held in advance of the incident and the more preparatory behaviors committed per incident, the shorter the longevity of the individual terrorist.*

Finally, we specifically examined some of the terrorists who were outliers – those who had “survived” the longest without being arrested or captured. These included Joanne Chesimard (Black Liberation Army), Victor Gerena (Macheteros), William Morales (FALN), Elizabeth Duke (May 19<sup>th</sup> Communist Party), and three members of the environmental group known as “the family “—Josephine Overaker, Joseph Dibbee, and Rebecca Rubin. Chesimard (aka Assata Shatur) escaped from prison in 1979 and resurfaced in Cuba. She remains there today. William Morales also escaped from custody in 1979, made his way to Mexico, where he resurfaced in 1983 during a shootout with Mexican authorities. He was convicted in Mexico on charges related to the shooting, but was granted permission to emigrate to Cuba, despite U. S. extradition efforts. The escapes of both of these individuals have been attributed to Marilyn Buck, leader of the May 19<sup>th</sup> Communist Party. She died in 2010, following her release from federal prison the previous month. Also affiliated with this group was Elizabeth Duke, who remains a fugitive, whereabouts unknown. Cuban exile has been a successful strategy to avoid incarceration for Chesimard, Morales, and Victor Gerena, a member of the Macheteros who robbed the Wells Fargo depot in Hartford, Connecticut in 1983. All three remain in Cuba as of this writing.

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<sup>5</sup> See Smith et al., Sequencing Terrorists’ Precursor Behaviors: A Crime Specific Analysis. Final Summer Overview, NIJ Award # 2013-ZA-BX-0001.

Others with extremely long longevity include three members of the environmental group known as “the family,” with ties to both ALF (Animal Liberation Front) and ELF (Earth Liberation Front). These include Josephine Overaker, who was indicted in 2006, but has never been captured. She is believed to be overseas. Rebecca Rubin, also indicted in 2006, was originally from Canada and fled there after her indictment. She turned herself in at the U.S. border in 2012 and was released from prison in 2016. Joseph Dibbee, who had been a fugitive since his indictment in 2004, was arrested in Cuba while on his way to Russia in August, 2018. The most common attribute of these persons with extreme longevity involved a leftist or anarchist ideology and the utilization of international boundaries to evade capture.

#### **IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE**

While the FBI has shied away from domestic intelligence gathering since the Watergate era, more recent iterations of Attorney General Guidelines have provided the FBI with additional tools, allowing them to intervene earlier in suspected terrorism cases. Our findings seem to suggest that strategic changes in policy and practice have resulted in shortening the longevity of terrorists in the United States. In particular, the post-9/11 Ashcroft and Mukasey-era Guidelines cleared some bureaucratic red tape for FBI field offices to follow leads, initiate terrorism investigations, and monitor suspects for longer periods of time. Also since 9/11, the U.S.A. Patriot Act empowered federal investigators to open assessments and secretly surveil terrorism suspects, such as by monitoring private communications and financial transactions. In short, changes in Attorney General Guidelines have seemingly played some role in keeping the American public safe by equipping law enforcement with the ability to more effectively mitigate terrorist threats.

Changes in Attorney General Guidelines over the last several decades have loosely aligned with shifts in the nature of American terrorism and the threats posed by distinct types of groups and lone actors. Our research shows that estimations of how long terrorists survive depends in large part on the ideological movement to which terrorists adhere. We know, for instance, that the average longevity of extreme leftists and environmental terrorists has been elongated in part due to a select number of terrorists traveling overseas and evading arrest. As these terrorists are usually of relatively higher social status, they have the means and social capital for international travel and utilizing protective networks of likeminded extremists. Perhaps the evasion of arrest by suspected terrorists fleeing the country has become more challenging in the modern era of homeland security, helping to explain why the longevity of terrorists has decreased over time. Therefore, we can conclude that the U.S. counterterrorism strategy not only requires closely monitoring suspected terrorists who seek entry to the country, but also to those who seek to flee it. In addition to international travel, left-wing and environmental terrorists may endure increased longevity because of their modus operandi, in particular their historical reluctance to commit lethal, mass casualty attacks which may come with higher risks of detection by authorities. In other words, the approach of left-wing and environmental terrorists are more reflective of guerilla warfare tactics designed to methodically wear down the enemy, unique from other terrorists who stage high-profile terrorist spectacles.

Our study also revealed that terrorists who plan and execute less sophisticated attacks survive longer. One relatively straightforward explanation is that the weapons used in less sophisticated attacks are usually purchased legally and are easily obtainable by terrorists without raising the suspicions of law enforcement or other possible witnesses. More elaborate attacks, such as those involving bombings or the use of CBRN materials, often require research, training,

and testing – all activities that increase risks of detection due to being digitally or physically traceable. While tracking the purchase of some weapons used by terrorists (e.g., paint, hand tools) would be untenable, restricting access to moderately sophisticated weapons like firearms for persons on terrorist watchlists is a viable approach to reducing the longevity of some terrorists. Furthermore, as terrorists’ preparatory activities may occur across jurisdictional boundaries, enhancing federal, state, local, and tribal intelligence sharing capabilities will remain critical to thwarting these less sophisticated plots.

Unfortunately, though perhaps not surprisingly, our findings tell us that terrorists who successfully survive the longest provide law enforcement the fewest opportunities to intervene in their plots. Terrorists who meet with others less frequently and commit fewer preparatory acts are able to carry on longer prior to their eventual arrest and indictment. As such, the public arguably holds some responsibility for reporting suspicious, yet not necessarily criminal, behaviors observed both in-person and online to local law enforcement. Continued efforts to inform the public through informational campaigns, like the well-known “see something, say something” campaign, are necessary to prime the public’s attention and willingness to notify authorities when something seems out place or abnormal. The U.S. has undoubtedly constructed a formidable homeland security apparatus responsible for preventing terrorists attacks since 9/11. However, an alert public and interconnected system of federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies capable of connecting the dots will be needed to curtail the longevity of terrorists operating in the U.S. in years to come.



### Scholarly Products

Smith, B. L., K. D. Damphousse, and J. Gruenewald. *Patterns of American Terrorism*. New York: Routledge Press. Forthcoming, 2018.

Smith, B.L., K. Ratcliff. "An Overview of the American Terrorism Study." Invited presentation to the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts Ozarks Chapter meeting, 9/6/18.

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Brice, M., B. L. Smith, J. Gruenewald, G. Drawve. "Factors Affecting the Longevity of Individual Terrorists." Master's Thesis. May 2018. University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.

Smith, B.L. "Variations in Trends and Patterns among Radicalized Persons." Invited presentation to the Arkansas Fusion Center/DHS Liaison Officers Conference, 4/7/17.

Brice, M. and B.L. Smith. "Measuring Factors Contributing to Longevity in Terrorist Activity." American Society of Criminology. November 16, 2017. Philadelphia, PA.

Brice, M., B. L. Smith, C. A. Shields. "Examining the Longevity of Individuals in Terrorist Groups." Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. Spring 2017. Kansas City, MO.

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Brice, M., B. L. Smith. "Factors Affecting the Longevity of Individual Terrorists." Department of Homeland Security Fellow poster presentation. 2016.

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## Appendix A: Tables

<b>Table 1: Variables</b>		
<b>Variable</b>	<b>Measure</b>	<b>Notes</b>
<i>Education</i>	Highest known education level at career beginning	Coded into three categories: up to a high school education, above high school (e.g. bachelors or some professional/vocational school), and above undergraduate (e.g. some post-graduate education)
<i>Gender</i>	Sex, male or female	
<i>Longevity</i>	Length of time in days from the individual's first known preparatory behavior to the time of their neutralizing arrest	Longevity is grouped into four categories: short (0-6 months), moderate (6-18 months), long (18 months to 3 years), and very long (over 3 years)
<i>Ideology</i>	Individual's ideological category	Categories include Far-left, Far-right, Environmental, and Islamic Extremist
<i>Lone Actor Type</i>	Highest incident level of participatory involvement	Based on individual's involvement across incidents, collapsed into participation as a group or loner – e.g. if an individual participated in one incident alone and another as a group, their lone actor type is coded as group
<i>Preparatory Average</i>	Number of preparatory activities linked to person divided by number of incidents over career	
<i>Meetings Average</i>	Number of preparatory meetings linked to that person divided by number of linked incidents over career	
<i>Sophistication</i>	Highest level of incident sophistication individual linked to over career	Sophistication is coded into least, moderately, and most sophisticated
<i>Guideline Era</i>	Era of Attorney General Guidelines individual's career began in	A.G. guidelines are broken into four eras: Levi (1976-82), Smith (1983-00), Ashcroft (2001-05), and Mukasey (2006-present)

<b>Table 2: Longevity Descriptives</b>				
	N	%	Mean Days (Months)	Median Days (Months)
Short	103	29.8	75 (2.5)	72 (2.4)
Moderate	85	24.6	341 (11.4)	338 (11.3)
Long	70	20.2	790 (26.3)	758 (25.3)
Very Long	88	25.4	2779 (92.6)	1902 (63.4)
Total	346	100.0	973 (32.4)	469 (15.86)

**Table 2 Alternate Chart**

Longevity Descriptives

**25.4% Very Long  
3+ Years**  
Mean: 2779 days  
Median: 1902 days



**29.8% Short  
Up to 6 months**  
Mean: 75 days  
Median: 72 days

**20.2% Long  
1.5-3 Years**  
Mean: 790 days  
Median: 758 days


**24.6% Moderate  
6mos-1.5yrs**  
Mean: 341 days  
Median: 338 days

**Table 3: Guideline Era Descriptives**

	N	Median Days	Mean Days
Levi	22	2888	2230
Smith	244	548	1067
Ashcroft	37	338	561
Mukasey	39	99	142
Total	342	476	981

**Table 3 Alternate Chart**


Longevity by A.G. Guideline Era



**Table 4: Longevity by Ideology**

	N	Median Days	Mean Days
Far-left	46	729	1989
Far-right	159	271	672
Environmental	53	883	1591
Islamic Extremist	88	382	612
<b>Total</b>	<b>346</b>	<b>469</b>	<b>973</b>

**Table 4 Alternate Chart**



<b>Table 5: Perpetrator Characteristics</b>					
	% (n)	% (n)	% (n)	% (n)	
	Short	Moderate	Long	Very Long	<b>Sig.</b>
<b>Gender</b>					<b>.055</b>
Male	31.8 (96)	25.2 (76)	19.5 (59)	23.5 (71)	
Female	15.9 (7)	20.5 (9)	25.0 (11)	38.6 (17)	
<b>Education</b>					<b>.032</b>
High School	40.2 (41)	18.6 (19)	21.6 (22)	19.6 (20)	
College	25.8 (34)	30.3 (40)	22.7 (30)	21.2 (28)	
Post-Graduate	14.3 (3)	19.0 (4)	23.8 (5)	42.9 (9)	
<b>Ideology</b>					<b>.000</b>
Far-left	10.9 (5)	8.7 (4)	43.5 (20)	37.0 (17)	
Far-right	35.8 (57)	25.2 (40)	18.9 (30)	20.1 (32)	
Environmental	20.8 (11)	22.6 (12)	9.4 (5)	47.2 (25)	
Islamic Extremist	34.1 (30)	33.0 (29)	17.0 (15)	15.9 (14)	

<b>Table 6: Incident Characteristics</b>					
	% (n)	% (n)	% (n)	% (n)	
	Short	Moderate	Long	Very Long	<b>Sig.</b>
<b>Lone Actor Type</b>					<b>.987</b>
Loner	36.4 (8)	22.7 (5)	13.6 (3)	27.3 (6)	
Group	35.7 (81)	26.0 (59)	13.7 (31)	24.7 (56)	
<b>Preparatory Average</b>					<b>.037</b>
1 – 8 acts	27.8 (69)	21.8 (54)	20.6 (51)	29.8 (74)	
9 acts	29.9 (23)	32.5 (25)	23.4 (18)	14.3 (11)	
<b>Meetings Average</b>					<b>.014</b>
0	24.5 (35)	25.9 (37)	27.3 (39)	22.4 (32)	
1	30.2 (29)	19.8 (19)	12.5 (12)	37.5 (36)	
2+	34.1 (31)	26.4 (24)	19.8 (18)	19.8 (18)	
<b>Incident Sophistication</b>					<b>.000</b>
Least	28.6 (18)	11.1 (7)	6.3 (4)	54.0 (34)	
Moderately	43.8 (14)	34.4 (11)	9.4 (3)	12.5 (4)	
Most	37.3 (57)	30.1 (46)	17.0 (26)	15.7 (24)	

### Appendix B: Figures

Figure 1: Mean Longevity By 5-Year Intervals




Figure 2: Median Longevity by 5-Year Intervals

