

**Electoral Systems and the Proportionality-Concentration
Trade-off**

Promises and Pitfalls of Mixed Designs

Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophischen Fakultät
der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel

vorgelegt von

Johannes Raabe

Kiel

26.05.2015

Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Eric Linhart

Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Christian Martin

Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 13.11.2015

Durch den zweiten Prodekan Prof. Dr. John Peterson zum Druck genehmigt: 19.11.2015

Danksagung

Diese kumulative Dissertation entstand im Rahmen des von der DFG geförderten Forschungsprojektes „Der funktionale Vergleich von Wahlsystemen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Mischwahlsystemen“ am Institut für Agrarökonomie der Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel.

Mein Dank gebührt in erster Linie meinem Doktorvater Eric Linhart, der mich jederzeit mit Rat und Tat unterstützt und mir gleichzeitig erhebliche Freiräume in der Planung und Gestaltung meines Dissertationsprojektes eingeräumt hat. Ich bedanke mich bei Ihm vor allem auch für das entgegengebrachte Vertrauen sowie die immer freundliche und konstruktive Arbeitsatmosphäre. Weiterhin bedanke ich mich bei Christian Martin, der sich bereit erklärt hat, das Zweitgutachten zu dieser Dissertation anzufertigen und im Hinblick auf diverse Problemstellungen immer ein wichtiger Gesprächspartner gewesen ist.

Für viele Hinweise und eine produktive Arbeitsumgebung an der Universität Kiel danke ich außerdem meinen (ehemaligen) KollegInnen in der Abteilung Agrarpolitik – Ernst Albrecht, Birgit Fleischhauer, Christian Henning, Johannes Hedtrich, Eva Krampe, Svetlana Petri, Laura Seide, Sascha Stark und Nana Zubek. Wesentlich an der Fertigstellung dieser Arbeit beteiligt waren auch die studentischen Hilfskräfte im DFG-Projekt. Ich danke Oke Bahnsen, Anna-Katharina Dhungel, Manuel Franz, Roland Kriffit und Joshua Vogel für die nicht zu unterschätzende Unterstützung bei der Datenerhebung, Erstellung von Datensätzen, Dokumentenanalysen und diversen Formatierungsarbeiten.

Zahlreiche weitere Personen haben wichtige Hinweise und Hilfestellungen gegeben. Hier sind Susumu Shikano und Franz Urban Pappi zu nennen, welche sich im Rahmen verschiedener Konferenzen mit einzelnen Kapiteln der Dissertation auseinandergesetzt haben. Für Tipps zu spezifischen methodischen Problemen danke ich außerdem Derek Beach, Marco Steenbergen und Sergi Pardos Prado. Besonderer Dank gilt außerdem Jasper Schwampe, der sich aus eher qualitativ-orientierter Forschungsperspektive intensiv mit dem Ansatz der Integration Einzelfall-orientierter Forschung in dieser Dissertation auseinandergesetzt hat.

Während der gesamten Promotion konnte ich mich außerdem immer auf meine Freunde und Familie verlassen. Der allergrößte Dank gilt dabei meiner Freundin Lotta, die diese Dissertation schon lange verflucht und mich dennoch in jeder Hinsicht jederzeit voll unterstützt hat.

Kiel, im November 2015

Johannes Raabe

Table of Contents

1	Introduction	1
2	Literature review	5
3	A typology of electoral systems	14
4	Constitutional principles of representation	37
5	Theoretical expectations	52
6	Measurement, methodological approach, and data	61
7	International comparison	76
8	Assessing mixed-member systems in the German states	97
	Addendum: Refining the MMP system – considering the Bavarian option	118
9	Testing the effect of district magnitude on the micro level	122
10	Linking principles to performance	132
11	Conclusion	154
	Appendix	159
	Appendix A	159
	Appendix B	163
	Appendix C	164
	Appendix D	164
	Appendix E	165
	References	216
	Deutsche Zusammenfassung	230
	Lebenslauf	244

List of Tables

3.1	Repräsentationsprinzip und technische Sub-Dimensionen für ausgewählte Fallbeispiele	30
4.1	Constitutional provisions	42
4.2	Overview over different groups of countries	45
6.1	Example calculations of the LSI	63
6.2	Example calculations of the ENP _s	67
6.3	OLS regression results	69
6.4	Descriptive overview of the international dataset	72
7.1	Technical details of electoral systems	82
7.2	General designs and their performance	88
7.3	OLS regression models	91
7.4	Logit regression models	93
7.5	Marginal effects of changes in technical details	95
8.1	Zusammenfassende Statistik nach Wahlsystemen und Regionen	107
8.2	Regressionsmodelle mit PCSE	111
8.3	Mechanischer Effekt von Überhangmandaten – Index-Mittelwerte	114
9.1	Descriptive overview	124
10.1	Case study survey results	140
10.2	The choice context and the presence of an overall goal of successful balance	141
10.3	Exact logistic regression results	143
10.4	Principle and performance – descriptive overview	145
10.5	Logit regression results	149

List of Figures

3.1	Allgemeine Typologie von Wahlsystemen	23
3.2	Technische Sub-Dimensionen	25
5.1	Shapes of the trade-off	58
6.1	ENP _S and ENP _G	70
7.1	Promises and pitfalls of aiming for a superior balance	80
7.2	Performance of system types in separate dimensions	86
7.3	Overall performance of different general designs	87
7.4	Predicted probabilities of performing well in both dimensions	89
8.1	EPZ _S unter verschiedenen Wahlsystemen im Zeitverlauf	109
8.2	Jackknife-Prüfung des Unterschiedes zwischen pV-1S und pV-2S	113
9.1	Effect of district magnitude on the district level	125
9.2	Varying patterns across countries	126
9.3	District magnitude's effect on the worst of both worlds risk	128
9.4	Predicted probabilities taking ethnic heterogeneity into account (Spain)	130
10.1	The effect of principle on performance	147
10.2	Marginal effect of principle-guidance	151

1 Introduction

Holding competitive elections is the most critical defining characteristic of a democratic political system (Riker 1982; Nohlen 2009a). Electoral systems are the core institution responsible for the translation of public opinion into parliamentary representation via an election. Therefore, a well-functioning electoral system is a basic requirement for a well-functioning democracy. Unsurprisingly then, much research effort has been undertaken in order to tackle various questions related to the performance of electoral systems (e.g. Rae 1967; Lijphart 1994; Gallagher & Mitchell 2005a). The main focus is and always has been on the representativeness of election outcomes as well as whether election outcomes made possible the formation of an accountable government (Duverger 1954; Lijphart & Grofman 1984a; Lijphart 1994; Gallagher & Mitchell 2005a; Nohlen 2009a) – the central functional goals of proportional representation and party system concentration. Unfortunately, these two core functions of electoral systems – accurately representing the electorate and fostering the smooth formation of an accountable government – together form the central trade-off and fundamental challenge of electoral system design. Generally, the closer the parliament matches the distribution of public opinion, the more parties or even independent candidates will be involved, and the less likely it is that the emerging party system will allow the swift formation of a stable and accountable government. At the same time, restricting access to parliament in order to ensure swift government formation will likely distort the accuracy of representation in the parliament (e.g. Farrell 2011). Although questions of the level of personal representation of voters and how much choice voters have with respect to the individuals who represent parties in parliament are undoubtedly important, the core issue of electoral system performance and thus design is that of the representativeness-accountability trade-off (Taagepera & Shugart 1989; Powell 2000; Norris 2004; Farrell 2011). A functioning democracy builds on the representation of the people on the parliamentary level but also depends on a functioning, effective government (Powell 2000) – providing for both is the *ne plus ultra* of how electoral institutions can shape the political process (Lijphart 1984). While the field of electoral system research has indeed ‘matured’ (Shugart 2005) and we can therefore rely on profound knowledge about electoral system effects on all sorts of characteristics of the party system – especially its representativeness and level of concentration – this critical challenge of finding ways to fulfill both the competing goals of proportionality and concentration remains to be addressed. And it is exactly with this crucial challenge of getting the best out of an electoral system in terms of representativeness and concentration that this thesis is concerned with.

Electoral systems and the ‘best of both worlds’ – the research question

Given the significance of the two functional goals of proportional (i.e. accurate) representation and party system concentration, it is not surprising that electoral system scholars have started to think about whether and how it would be possible to reach an efficient, optimal performance with respect to the proportionality-concentration trade-off. Pure electoral system types are clearly associated with a good performance in one dimension paired with a bad performance in the other: a pure proportional representation (PR) electoral system maximizes representativeness but typically fails to concentrate the party system and makes government formation cumbersome and

sometimes even impossible as not even a coalition of two or three parties is able to form a parliamentary majority. Plurality electoral systems in which all parliamentary seats are contested in single-member districts and won by those gaining most district votes foster the formation of a single-party government via inducing two-party competition. At the same time, though, they typically lead to many voters casting votes that do not end up affecting the seat distribution in the parliament and are thus considered wasted (Duverger 1954; Lijphart 1994; Nohlen 2009a; Farrell 2011). Lijphart (1984) was the first to suggest that mixing electoral rules from these pure electoral system designs could be the recipe for reaching the 'best of both worlds' in electoral system performance, providing for both accurate representation and party system concentration. After some chastening initial evidence (Lijphart 1984), Shugart and Wattenberg (2001a) focused on mixed-member electoral systems which mix electoral rules holding plurality elections in one electoral tier and PR elections in the other – with mixed evidence. Most recently, Carey and Hix (2011) have advocated PR electoral systems with moderate district magnitudes as optimal in the quest for the best of both worlds.

What is lacking up to this point, however, is a thorough comparative analysis of all types of (mixed) electoral designs with respect to the 'best of both worlds' question. As mixed electoral systems continue to spread all over the world, it has never been more vital to thoroughly assess their potential as well as the associated pitfalls. This thesis aims to provide this comparative analysis, present a thorough evaluation of different electoral systems and derive useful implications for future electoral system design in new as well as in established democracies. This thesis seeks to answer the question of which electoral systems are able to reach the best of both worlds of proportional representation and party system concentration. At the same time, eyeing not only promises but also pitfalls of complex, mixed electoral system designs, the thesis also addresses the question of which electoral systems are likely to produce highly undesirable outcomes with respect to both representativeness and party system concentration and overall produce election outcomes that are more akin to the worst of both worlds.

Accumulating evidence – the scope and structure of the thesis

This is a comprehensive comparative study of all electoral systems worldwide which, with this thesis' focus on maximizing the efficiency of electoral system performance, places mixed electoral designs at the center of attention with pure types of electoral systems and their well-known effects providing important benchmarks. This approach is well in line with existing scholarship that views mixing incentives from pure types of electoral systems as the central means of achieving a superior electoral system performance along the proportionality-concentration trade-off. Yet, and somewhat unlike previous research, this thesis will outright and explicitly consider the pitfalls next to the promises of such mixed electoral designs. The theoretical arguments as well as the empirical investigation will take a look at general scenarios in which mixed electoral designs are probably not only failing to reach the best of both worlds but where they are actually likely to even lead to the worst of both worlds, neither ensuring accurate representation nor fostering the formation of an accountable government. Simply mixing incentives from polar types of electoral systems appears to be a questionable strategy in approaching the challenge of successfully

providing both proportional representation and a concentrated party system if applied as a general mantra – and it certainly does not appear to be a risk free strategy. Investigating electoral system performance with respect to the proportionality-concentration trade-off also means that the empirical analyses will largely focus on the macro (i.e. aggregate) level of election outcomes which shape the political process going forward after an election. Clearly, the fulfillment of the two core functional goals matters especially at the level of the overall election results. Yet, whenever attention to the district level is warranted, this thesis will also consider the micro foundations of the macro effects. The empirical analyses are conducted using international as well as sub-national and within-country datasets in order to increase the robustness and leverage of the practical implications drawn from the empirical results.

The theoretical arguments developed and tested in this thesis are based on concepts directly related to the design of an electoral system, meaning that emphasis is put on those factors which can be influenced (more or less) directly by designers, reformers, politicians, and, potentially, even the public. One set of explanatory factors are the technical elements (i.e. the mathematical rules) forming the overall design of an electoral system. Here, general electoral system designs, specific technical elements, and various combinations of the latter, are considered carefully. The other set of explanatory factors are concerned with the question of whether the design of an electoral system was guided by a general overall goal, a principle of representation, and based on agreement among political elites. Of course controlling for the respective wider sociopolitical context, these genuine electoral system factors will be at the heart of the explanations developed with respect to when and why (mixed) electoral system designs lead to exceptionally good (or, bad) performance.

Before briefly outlining the structure of the thesis, it is important to highlight that this is a cumulative (publication-based) doctoral thesis including several chapters that appear (or, are meant to appear) in political science journals as stand-alone pieces. Since the respective articles or manuscripts appear in this thesis in their original form¹, some minor inconsistencies and redundancies especially in the introductory parts of these chapters were unavoidable. Still, every effort has been taken to keep them at a minimum. Furthermore, the chapter outlining the theoretical arguments is best understood as a basis to which the different chapters in the empirical part will add several details. Otherwise, this thesis may be read as any other book presenting political science research – the datasets used for the empirical analyses and the accompanying codebooks form the appendix material and are discussed in the respective empirical chapters.

Turning to the structure of the thesis, the overall empirical strategy is to try to accumulate evidence with respect to how electoral system design affects performance along the proportionality-concentration trade-off. After a summary of previous research, its core results and the critical gaps in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 presents the typology of electoral systems that forms the basis for the theoretical arguments developed and the empirical tests conducted in this thesis.

¹ Minor changes were made only with respect to formatting and referencing to fit the overall style of the thesis.

The typology presented importantly pays attention to an electoral system's technical design as well as to what is the overall principle (or, goal) of that electoral system. Chapter 4 explores the principle of representation dimension further in an analysis of constitutional texts and focuses on the questions of whether we can infer normative goals for electoral systems based on their technical design and, if we cannot, which technical designs are likely to even have a general guiding principle. Chapter 5 outlines the theoretical arguments: the key expectations are that it is the combination of technical details of electoral systems as well as the conditions under which the electoral systems were chosen and whether their design was guided by an overarching goal – a principle of representation – that decide how well (or, badly) a system is going to perform along the proportionality-concentration trade-off.

Chapter 6 introduces the measures used in the empirical analyses and also outlines clearly the methodological approach behind the different empirical tests. It is worth briefly sketching this approach here: the general plan is to accumulate evidence based on what is a large-n comparative analysis overall. This comparative analysis is composed of different cross-national as well as sub-national and micro level empirical designs. The main goal is to provide a complete picture of how the proportionality-concentration trade-off is handled by different electoral systems and their specific technical elements – this means that promising designs are tested thoroughly with different datasets in order to have a direct robustness test of the empirical findings produced by the international comparison. The empirical part of this thesis includes four individual chapters. Chapter 7 presents an international comparison of the performances of different electoral systems and investigates their potential to reach the best as well as the worst of both worlds. Chapters 8 and 9 then investigate especially promising electoral systems in within-country analyses – Chapter 8 is an empirical investigation of mixed-member electoral systems compared to proportional representation electoral systems on the German state level; Chapter 9 investigates the effect of district magnitude on electoral system performance on the district level in Costa Rica, Portugal, and Spain (as these are three of five countries explicitly touted by Carey & Hix 2011 to have reached a 'sweet spot' in electoral system design by implementing PR electoral systems with moderate district magnitudes). Finally, Chapter 10 investigates the effect of the presence of a principle of representation as an overall guiding goal for the electoral system on the system's performance and potential to do exceptionally well or fail on all accounts. Chapter 11 concludes the thesis by summarizing the key findings and mapping out the implications for the future evaluation and design of electoral systems.

2 Literature review: Electoral systems and the proportionality-concentration trade-off

Shugart (2005) certainly has a point when he describes the field of electoral system research as 'mature' as decades of research have mapped out all the details with respect to the difference between pure PR electoral systems and plurality as well as majority electoral systems. Yet, the now widespread application of mixed electoral systems shifts our focus away from comparing polar cases and paying attention to extreme outcomes and towards investigating whether it is middle-ground solutions that lead to efficient and thus desirable performances. Hence, answering the question of how to reach the best of both worlds along the proportionality-concentration trade-off means tackling a critical, hitherto unanswered challenge. At the same time, this thesis will take advantage of the maturity of the overall field of electoral system research with its rich repository of theoretical as well as empirical work upon which to build the groundwork for the task at hand. Especially as mixed electoral systems have almost uniformly not behaved like the simple compromises between pure electoral systems that they were initially understood to be (see, e.g., Ferrara et al. 2005; Moser & Scheiner 2012), they are worth investigating closely with respect to the proportionality-concentration trade-off in order to expand our electoral system expertise and supply practitioners with much needed advice on what to expect from mixed electoral designs. This overview of the literature on the potential of different electoral systems to simultaneously provide proportional representation and concentrate the party system will summarize what we know up to this point and map out the gaps and challenges this thesis aims to close and overcome.

2.1 Electoral system effects and competing functional goals

The proportionality dimension of electoral systems is concerned with whether an electoral system is able to lead to a parliament which composition accurately reflects public opinion. The concentration dimension, on the other hand, is concerned with whether, based on the election results, swift government formation will be possible, ideally with a single-party government that is the direct result of voters' choices instead of complex and drawn-out coalition bargaining. In a dichotomous world, the choice of an electoral system, at its core, is concerned with whether one prefers a representative parliament where public opinion is accurately (i.e. proportionally) represented or whether one would rather like to foster the creation of a single-party government that is both efficient in its policy-making and directly accountable to the electorate at the next election (Duverger 1954; Lijphart & Grofman 1984a; Norris 2004). In this dichotomous world, considering only polar types of electoral systems, an electoral system may either produce a representative parliament *or* an accountable (single-party) government and designers need to choose one functional goal over the other, opting either for a proportional *or* a majoritarian vision of democracy (Powell 2000; Pinto-Duschinsky 1999; Farrell 2011) when they decide between a proportional representation and a plurality or majority electoral system (Nohlen 1984, 2009; Lijphart 1991, 1999). The former is associated with high levels of representativeness at the cost

of a fragmented party system whereas the latter typically avoids fragmentation and fosters the formation of a single-party government but will strongly distort the reproduction of public opinion in the parliament (Duverger 1954; Rae 1967; Farrell 2011).

Obviously, at least in most cases, both accurate (i.e. proportional) representation and a party system of manageable size with clear government options are desirable features of election outcomes (e.g. Lijphart 1994; Powell 2000; Norris 2004; Farrell 2011). Since both pure types of electoral systems are associated as much with their successful performance with respect to one of the core functional goals as they are associated with the failure with respect to the other, they are hardly likely to provide both proportional representation and concentration of the party system on a regular basis which renders the chances for reaching the best of both worlds slim in such a dichotomous world (Shugart 2001b). Yet, the world of electoral systems has long seized to be dichotomous. Both pure types form only the extremes of the trade-off between proportionality and concentration. It is in the continuous region between these extremes that scholars as well as practitioners saw the potential of mixing electoral rules and designing what we broadly understand as mixed electoral systems in an attempt to maximize the efficiency of electoral system performance.

However, in order to actually lead to efficient outcomes which deserve the label 'best of both worlds', mixed electoral systems need to do more than simply move in-between polar outcomes along the proportionality-concentration trade-off. And indeed, in light of the challenge of providing both proportional representation and party system concentration, electoral system scholars have suggested that we not only live in a continuous world of electoral systems but that, furthermore, this continuous world is not necessarily linear. Mixed electoral designs were and are still expected to be able to trade off proportionality against concentration in a non-linear fashion where gains with respect to one functional goal outweigh the losses with respect to the other. This type of efficiency that would be absent in a scenario where proportionality and concentration are traded off linearly is what lies behind the idea of reaching the best of both worlds of election outcomes that are concentrated sufficiently for a government to form directly based on the election outcomes while also being highly proportional (Lijphart 1984; Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a; Carey & Hix 2011). Clever electoral system design should therefore be able to realize this best of both worlds scenario.

Shapes of the trade-off

Many authors have emphasized – more or less explicitly – that the trade-off between proportionality and concentration does not have to be linear (Lijphart 1984; Taagepera & Shugart 1989; Sartori 1994; Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a; Monroe 2003; Linhart 2009; Carey & Hix 2011). The main implication is that electoral systems mixing incentives of pure, polar system types could be able to reach a superior middle-ground in electoral system performance as outlined above. The way in which mixed electoral systems can shape the trade-off to be non-linear is via supplying the correct coordination incentives (Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a; Carey & Hix 2011). In order to highlight this general point, let us briefly reiterate what it is that electoral systems do: electoral systems organize the process via which public opinion (or, preferences) is turned into

parliamentary representation. In doing so, electoral systems exert both a psychological and a mechanical effect (Cox 1997; also see Schoen 2005). The mechanical effect is exerted when a set of mathematical rules is applied to turn votes cast by the electorate into seats in the parliament. One speaks of a strong mechanical effect if the application of these mathematical rules leads to substantial differences between what the vote level would imply about the distribution of political power (or, representation) and what is the reality of the parliamentary seat distribution. The psychological effect is exerted because parties and voters anticipate how the electoral system will transform votes into parliamentary representation and thus change their behavior strategically – for example, two small parties merge into one in order to be able to pass a threshold of representation. Combined, the mechanical and psychological effects of electoral systems affect the shape of the parliamentary party system and hence, indirectly, how politics will work in a particular country. It is the psychological effect that lies at the very heart of why scholars expect mixed electoral systems to be able to lead to efficient outcomes and a superior middle-ground in electoral system performance. Elections can be understood as huge coordination games where parties and voters have to figure out who is viable and who is not in order to eventually decide for what is in their best interest (Cox 1997, 1999). If a certain level of coordination among parties as well as among voters is reached, the electoral system will usually translate votes into seats in a fairly accurate manner while concentration has already been reached via coordination (Cox 1997). In this way then, coordination incentives are the foundation of a well-performing electoral system that combines proportional outcomes with a concentrated party system. On the contrary, if coordination fails completely and there are many candidates and parties with voters unsure of who is viable and who is not, no electoral system is likely to be able to concentrate such party system without strongly distorting the proportional link between the vote and the seat distribution (Moser & Scheiner 2012). If mixed electoral rules induce voters and parties to coordinate on viable options or merge into blocs/coalitions and at the same time – partly due to this coordination – translate votes into parliamentary representation in a fairly accurate fashion, the election outcomes will see both a representative and concentrated party system (Shugart 2001b; Carey & Hix 2011).

Before moving to the concrete (mixed) electoral system designs investigated so far and discussing the different ways in which these combine coordination incentives with proportional representation, it is essential to additionally emphasize that the non-linearity of the trade-off between proportionality and concentration may also be read in a negative light. Mixed electoral designs could obviously fail to provide the desired concentration of the party system if coordination of parties and voters fails and, not being pure PR systems, at the same time significantly distort the picture of public opinion in the parliament. Several researchers have warned that by mixing electoral rules one could actually bring out the worst of both worlds by combining deficiencies, instead of strengths, of pure electoral systems (Sartori 1994; Monroe 2003; Bawn & Thies 2003).

2.2 Different approaches of reaching an efficient performance

Electoral system research has produced a set of different general propositions of how to achieve an efficient performance along the proportionality-concentration trade-off. First, Shugart and Wattenberg (2001a; also see Lijphart 1984; Birch 2003) suggested that mixed-member electoral systems consisting of two electoral tiers – one electoral tier allocating seats via a proportional representation formula and the other tier consisting of single-member districts (Massicotte & Blais 1999) – could be able to lead to what they termed ‘interparty efficiency’ (Shugart 2001b). Second, it is also possible to mix the incentives of pure electoral systems via using districts of small-to-moderate magnitude in PR electoral systems in order to reach an efficient performance of the electoral system (Carey & Hix 2011).

Whether via mixed-member designs or moderate district magnitudes in PR systems, the central argument behind these propositions is based on setting the best possible coordination incentives within a fairly proportional electoral system. Proponents of mixed-member electoral systems argue that it is the bloc-building coordination incentives which render these types of systems viable solutions for reaching an efficient performance on the proportionality-concentration trade-off. Parties and voters need to coordinate in order to be successful in the single-member districts and this should lead to the formation of alliances which in turn will concentrate the party system into a two-bloc system dominated by two larger parties (Shugart 2001a, 2001b). Since the PR tier will allow for at least some degree of proportionality in the election outcomes and as the aforementioned bloc-competition is largely based on coordination, the party system emerging from a mixed-member electoral system should be both fairly proportional and concentrated (Shugart 2001b; Kostadinova 2002: 25; D’Alimonte et al. 2012). The German mixed-member proportional electoral system is typically mentioned as a role model for this type of effect under mixed-member rules (Scarrow 2001; Nishikawa & Herron 2004: 767; Lundberg 2013) and the surge of newly adopted mixed-member systems in the recent past is often associated with the efficient performance of this German role model (Farrell 2011: 108). Since 1990, mixed-member electoral systems were adopted in New Zealand, Japan, Italy, Venezuela, Bolivia, as well as in multiple other countries in both Eastern Europe and South East Asia (Ferrara et al. 2005: 1-14).

The coordination argument is also behind the proposition of using moderate district magnitudes in a PR electoral system in order to successfully mix the incentives of pure types of electoral systems (Carey & Hix 2011). District magnitudes of roughly between three and nine have the distinct advantage that they retain many of the coordination incentives present in single-member districts while they are already fairly proportional with respect to the overall election outcomes. They induce coordination in so far that parties are pressured to merge (or, disband) if they do not have a substantial backing in the electorate and as voters’ attention is focused on viable options. Districts of moderate magnitude thus provide for substantial gains in proportionality vis-à-vis single-member districts but still induce enough incentives for parties and voters to coordinate on viable candidates as the district magnitude is not so high that such strategic behavior would be too difficult or even in vain (Carey & Hix 2011; also see Cox & Shugart 1996; Cox 1997). Overall, the use of moderate district magnitudes should help PR electoral systems to foster the swift

formation of accountable (single-party or large-party-dominated) governments while still being highly proportional in translating votes into seats (Carey & Hix 2011). In this way they supply both representativeness and accountability and are accordingly expected to reach the best of both worlds in electoral system performance much like mixed-member electoral systems.

Both of the above arguments highlight that reaching the best of both worlds is about pairing a sufficient amount of coordination incentives with an electoral system that is able to grant at least a certain degree of proportionality mechanically – either via a proportional electoral tier or via moderate district magnitude in a PR electoral system. Therefore, inducing coordination is as important as providing a baseline level of proportional representation. This combination is supposedly provided only by mixed electoral designs whereas pure electoral systems either fail to present any coordination incentives beyond the limited coordination that is necessary to make elections workable (pure PR systems) or offer strong coordination incentives but fail to supply any level of guaranteed proportionality (pure plurality or majority systems).

The role of the sociopolitical context

Next to considering the potential of mixed electoral systems for reaching a superior balance of proportionality and concentration, researchers have also pointed to the critical significance of sociopolitical scope conditions for the performance of any electoral system (Moser & Scheiner 2012; Stoll 2013; Ordeshook & Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto & Cox 1997). A country's party system (and therefore its parliament) is shaped not only by institutional rules but also by developments linked to the expansion of democracy as well as the level of social heterogeneity (see especially Moser & Scheiner 2012; Morgenstern & Vázquez-D'Elia 2007). Hence, in order to make correct inferences about electoral system effects, the sociopolitical context and its potential effects need to be taken into account. Reaching or not reaching efficient election outcomes with respect to the proportionality-concentration trade-off can also depend on the sociopolitical scope conditions. For example, in a country with high levels of social heterogeneity (e.g. due to the presence of many different ethnic groups of substantial size), coordination seems more difficult than in a fairly homogenous country (see Cox 1997). Similarly, parties and voters will be less prone to coordinate in transition countries and young democracies because it is not yet clear who are the viable candidates and everybody is biding their time in order to get better estimates of how their future will look (Moser & Scheiner 2012; Birnir 2007). Hence, election outcomes may fail to reach desirable levels of proportionality and/or concentration not because of, but despite the electoral system. In order not to confuse electoral system effects and effects exerted by the sociopolitical context it is thus essential to control for such context effects.

2.3 Incomplete analyses yielding mixed evidence

Overall, the picture with respect to different electoral systems' ability to perform efficiently along the proportionality-concentration trade-off is rather incomplete. Classic studies have viewed the trade-off as linear and focused largely on the difference between pure types of electoral systems (Rae 1967; Sartori 1976; Lijphart 1994). The first study to thoroughly consider the idea of mixed

electoral systems being able to reach the best of both worlds is Shugart and Wattenberg (2001a; also see Lijphart 1984) with their edited volume on the performance of mixed-member systems aptly titled 'The Best of Both Worlds?'. However, their comparative analysis for the most part is a collection of individual case studies under a common theme with the results being sketchy as to whether and under which circumstances mixed-member electoral systems are truly able to reach a superior middle-ground in electoral system performance. Furthermore, Shugart and Wattenberg's (2001a) volume includes other types of electoral systems only by reference and is not a comparative study of electoral systems in general. More studies that examine the effect of mixed-member electoral systems (e.g. Kostadinova 2002; Nishikawa & Herron 2004; Ferrara et al. 2005) investigate only one of the key functional goals of electoral systems and are therefore only of very limited help in assessing the best of both worlds question raised by Shugart and Wattenberg (2001a) as well as Lijphart (1984). Gallagher and Mitchell's (2005a) collection of case studies also includes a number of cases of mixed electoral systems but overall is comparable to Shugart and Wattenberg (2001a) in that conclusions are barely able to differentiate between what are country context and electoral system effects and pay increased attention to describing different countries' experiences with different electoral systems. Finally, Carey and Hix (2011) conduct the first large-n comparative assessment of electoral systems that explicitly deals with the proportionality-concentration (or, representativeness-accountability) trade-off. However, although Carey and Hix (2011) control for other influential technical elements and general designs of electoral systems, their analysis is concerned almost exclusively with the effect of the district magnitude and hence of limited help as we try to compare electoral systems generally. In sum, existing analyses either examine only on a subset of cases and are limited in their ability to disentangle effects when comparing case studies or focus only on a single dimension or a specific technical element when investigating electoral systems' performance. Furthermore, all of these studies include elections only up to the early 2000's and omit a substantial share of elections conducted under mixed-member electoral systems as these came into fashion not until the 1990's. Accordingly, samples typically include at best a few elections under mixed-member electoral rules per country employing such rules.

Turning to the evidence previous research has produced it is not without irony to say that the evidence regarding the potential of mixed electoral systems has been mixed. Among mixed-member electoral systems, it is the compensatory mixed-member proportional (MMP) system that has received a lot of positive acclaim with the mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) variant where electoral tiers operate fully in parallel not being identified as a high potential system with regard to the best of both worlds (Nishikawa & Herron 2004: 767; Bowler et al. 2005; Gallagher 2005b: 575; Farrell 2011: 108). Carey and Hix (2011) find support for their argument that PR electoral systems with moderate district magnitudes are best-suited for an efficient performance – yet, their empirical analysis is concerned almost exclusively with district magnitude and stays relatively blind to the potential of alternative mixes of technical rules and coordination incentives. Overall, sketchy results and mixed evidence leave researchers and especially practitioners at sea when it comes to reaching an efficient performance along the proportionality-concentration trade-off. This mixed evidence with respect to electoral systems' ability to perform efficiently also clearly emphasizes the importance of not only looking for the best of both worlds but also

investigating closely whether and when electoral systems actually fail with regard to both proportional representation and a concentrated party system as feared by Sartori (1994: 75). Existing research neither covers all relevant cases or aspects of electoral systems nor is it sufficiently focused on a full investigation of the chances and risks of mixed electoral designs aiming for a superior middle-ground along the proportionality-concentration trade-off.

2.4 What is being missed?

The existing literature suggests paying close attention to the potential non-linear shape of the proportionality-concentration trade-off and proposes two general design types (mixed-member systems – especially MMP systems – and PR systems with moderate district magnitudes) as viable options for reaching the best of both worlds in electoral system performance. At the same time, previous research on the potential of mixed electoral systems is severely limited in several aspects ranging from theory to sample size and selection as well as methodology. The following is an overview of the challenges left to be dealt with and the approach of this thesis in tackling them.

Most importantly, this thesis will provide a thorough large-n comparative assessment of electoral system performance that systematically investigates different systems' potentials with respect to the proportionality-concentration trade-off. It will use international data as well as within-country samples, include all elections under mixed-member electoral systems,² and focus on all relevant technical elements that electoral system designers have at their disposal. Yet, in-depth comparative testing has to be based on a foundation that is able to fully capture the continuous nature of electoral system design and performance as well as their overall guiding principle and also be open-minded with regard to the exact (non-linear) shape of the key trade-off in electoral system performance. The following paragraphs map out how this foundation will be built and which steps will be taken in order to put it to use.

A typology that takes mixed electoral systems seriously

The increased prominence of mixed electoral systems has led to many problems with standard typologies of electoral systems because they deviate from pure electoral systems not only in their complex technical design but also with respect to what designers associate with their mixed design in terms of an overall goal, an overarching principle of representation that outlines what the electoral system is supposed to achieve at-large (Nohlen 1984, 2009a). The difficulty with mixed electoral systems is that they do not simply form a uniform middle-ground group that can commonly be assumed to lie exactly between the pure types of PR and plurality systems but combine various features of pure systems in often unique ways. Similarly, problems arise when associating technical designs with overall goals for electoral systems and inferring what designers (reformers) had in mind as a general principle for these systems. Assuming deterministically that

² Now that fifteen years have passed since the publication of Shugart and Wattenberg (2001a), the sample of elections under mixed-member electoral systems is sufficiently large to enable us to draw more general inferences based on evidence from over twenty countries employing such systems.

pure plurality systems are based on the principle of concentration at the cost of not being highly representative and pure PR systems are following a principle of proportionality without giving much weight to party system concentration is already difficult. Mixed electoral systems, however, come in so many variations that simply assuming that they all have a common overall goal or principle appears even more problematic. Contrary to what has been suggested by Nohlen (1984, 2009a; also see Sartori 1994) there are both mixed technical designs as well as mixed goals which are based on a continuous perspective on the proportionality-concentration trade-off and not simply fit into a homogenous midway category. A typology that takes the often detail-based variation among mixed electoral systems seriously and shows awareness to the continuous nature also with respect to what electoral systems are meant to achieve as a general normative goal is a necessary basis for further work on the topic. Such a typology is vital especially for nuanced assessments of when mixed electoral systems will be able to perform efficiently.³ The task of devising this typology will be taken up immediately after this literature review in Chapter 3 of this thesis since the typology forms the indispensable basis for the arguments and expectations that are outlined in the subsequent chapters.

Paying close attention to technical details

So far, electoral system scholars have come up with rather general propositions of which electoral system designs are best suited to reach the best of both worlds of proportional representation and party system concentration: mixed-member (proportional) systems as well as PR systems with moderate district magnitudes have been proposed (see above). Not only do the two propositions stand relatively detached from one another in previous research (appearing at best as mere control variables in the study of the respective other general design type), they also make it fairly difficult to turn them into precise advice that is directly applicable to electoral system design. As much as they are desirable, general propositions for electoral system design are problematic because they omit the many details that lie behind the successful specification of electoral institutions. Questions related to the effect of precise specifications cannot be answered based on general propositions. For example, what is the relative size of the different electoral tiers that is optimal when adopting a mixed-member system? Or, what would be the effect of an additional legal threshold in a PR system with moderate district magnitudes? In order to reach a full understanding of electoral systems' potential of reaching the best of both worlds, we need to focus on technical details in addition to general design types. This means that an electoral system ought to be treated as the sum of its parts, paying attention to the effects of specific combinations of technical details instead of inspecting particular individual elements and treating others, at best, as mere control variables.

³ The case of the German electoral system is an example of how attempts to clearly sort an electoral system into a coherent group may end up causing more confusion than guidance as different researchers place the electoral system into different general categories – some researchers consider the German electoral system to be a mixed electoral system (e.g. Massicotte & Blais 2000; Gallagher & Mitchell 2005b; Linhart 2009) while others would categorize it as a PR system (e.g. Lijphart 1994; Norris 2000; Nohlen 2009a). Similar problems arise with neatly pinning down whether the German electoral system can be said to be based on an overall principle that aims at reaching the best of both worlds of proportionality and concentration (see Chapter 3).

Chances and risks – beware of the pitfalls of complex electoral systems

Carey and Hix (2011) were the first to move beyond the theoretical idea of a non-linear trade-off between representativeness and accountability and actually investigated the shape of this trade-off empirically. Since they merely focused on a design option that they (correctly) expected to lead to a superior middle-ground in electoral system performance, their analysis, however, omitted any discussion of the risk attached to mixed electoral rules. As several researchers have pointed out (e.g. Sartori 1994; Monroe 2003; Linhart 2009), electoral system performance might also end up resembling the worst rather than the best of both worlds, with election outcomes that are highly distorting in translating vote distributions into parliamentary representation but still leading to fragmented and hardly governable party systems. Hence, a full analysis of the potential of mixed electoral systems' potential regarding the proportionality-concentration trade-off has to also pay attention to whether and when the choice of mixed electoral rules is probably ill-advised. That one particular electoral system is likely to provide both proportional representation and foster party system concentration does not necessarily imply that the same electoral system is not also prone to more problematic failures than is a pure electoral system. Especially if researchers seek to derive design advice, being wary of the pitfalls of complex electoral systems seems to be an important fundament. In short, a thorough investigation of mixed electoral systems should evaluate not only their chances but also the associated risks.

Context matters twice

So far, the role of the sociopolitical context is considered as a crucial factor of how the party system will look like and it is often suggested that such context-based explanations even overshadow explanations based on differences in electoral systems (Moser & Scheiner 2012; Bowler & Donovan 2013). While this type of context effect is certainly critical and will be considered in the empirical analyses, it is the aim of this thesis to highlight that context in fact matters twice as it concerns the performance of an electoral system. Next to the effect of sociopolitical context conditions when the electoral system is already in place, it is also the context of the initial electoral system choice that will probably affect the system's eventual performance. In a nutshell, we should expect electoral systems designed with commonly agreed upon goals in mind to outperform electoral systems that resulted from convoluted, self-interested bargaining without following any clear-cut overall guiding principle. Especially mixed electoral systems consisting of a myriad of technical details may either result from a principle-guided, careful design process or result from convoluted, solely self-interested bargaining and come without any genuine overall goal of reaching the best of both worlds. By assuming that all technically similar electoral systems are meant to perform alike, one is potentially neglecting a central explanatory factor in the choice context and the (potentially) emerging principle of representation.

3 A typology of electoral systems

This chapter appears as 'Raabe, J. and Linhart, E. (2012) Eine Typologie für die vergleichende Wahlsystemforschung' in the Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 22(4), pp. 493-525, and is written in German language (DOI: 10.5771/1430-6387-2012-4-493).

3.1 Einleitung

„Wahlen bilden die Grundlage des modernen Demokratieverständnisses“ (Nohlen 2009a: 27) und „sind die zentrale Institution der repräsentativen Demokratie“ (Schmitt-Beck 2012: 4). Die Art und Weise, wie sich die Präferenzen der Wähler in Stimmen für verschiedene Parteien beziehungsweise Kandidaten ausdrücken, und wie aus diesen Stimmen die Zusammensetzung des Parlaments zu ermitteln ist, wird maßgeblich durch die Ausgestaltung des Wahlsystems beeinflusst (Gallagher & Mitchell 2005b: 3). Die Wahlsystemforschung sowie die Wahlforschung, die mit der Wahlsystemforschung eng verknüpft ist, sind mittlerweile reich an Beiträgen zu diversen Forschungsfragen, die sich genau mit diesen Zusammenhängen zwischen Präferenzen, Stimmen und Sitzverteilungen befassen. Zu nennen sind hier etwa Arbeiten mit Bezug auf strategische Anreize, die Wahlsysteme Wählern liefern (z. B. Cox 1997), auf die Untersuchung strategischen Wahlverhaltens (z. B. Gschwend 2007) oder auch, welche Strategien Parteien in Wahlkämpfen abhängig vom Wahlsystem entwickeln (z. B. Ferrara et al. 2005). Dieser Reichhaltigkeit an Forschungsbeiträgen steht jedoch ein Mangel eines gemeinsamen typologischen Rahmens gegenüber. Seit Jahrzehnten wird das Bedauern darüber geäußert, dass keine Einigkeit darüber besteht, wie verschiedene Wahlsysteme zu typologisieren sind. Insbesondere die Einordnung sogenannter Mischwahlsysteme sorgt immer wieder für Kontroversen (Kaiser 2002; Nohlen 2009a). So ist gerade aus deutscher Sicht auffällig, dass die personalisierte Verhältniswahl von prominenter Seite als Mischwahlsystem gesehen wird (Massicotte & Blais 1999; Kaiser 2002; Gallagher & Mitchell 2005b; Linhart 2009; Pappi & Herrmann 2010), von ebenso prominenter Seite als Verhältniswahlsystem (Lijphart & Grofman 1984a; Lijphart 1994; Sartori 1997; Norris 2000; Nohlen 2009a; Behnke 2011; Decker 2011).

Nachfolgend versuchen wir, diese Forschungslücke zu füllen und den vielversprechenden einzelnen Forschungsbeiträgen einen solchen gemeinsamen Rahmen zu geben, indem wir eine allgemeine und vollständige Typologie von Wahlsystemen entwerfen. Diese synthetisiert die verschiedenen bisherigen Typologie-Vorschläge und bietet zudem die nötige Flexibilität, um an konkrete Forschungsfragen jeweils gewinnbringend angepasst werden zu können. Zum einen wird berücksichtigt, welches Repräsentationsziel einem Wahlsystem zugrunde liegt (vgl. Nohlen 1984, 2009a für einen Typologie-Ansatz, welcher sich an den Effekten von Wahlsystemen und den damit erreichbaren Zielen orientiert). Zum anderen ist in Betracht zu ziehen, wie ein Wahlsystem technisch aufgebaut ist (vgl. z. B. Massicotte & Blais 1999; Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a; Gallagher & Mitchell 2005a für einen Typologie-Ansatz, welcher sich an den technischen Elementen von Wahlsystemen orientiert). Der Mehrwert des typologischen Rahmens ergibt sich aus 1) der nun gegebenen Inklusion aller theoretisch möglichen wie praktisch vorkommenden Wahlsysteme; 2)

der Ableitung theoretischer Erklärungsansätze für die Ausgestaltung von Mischwahlsystemen; 3) der über den gemeinsamen (Bewertungs-)Rahmen erfolgenden Verbindung von Einzelfallstudien und komparativ-quantitativen Studien; 4) der Möglichkeit, über Erfolg und Misserfolg von Wahlsystemen urteilen zu können, ohne dabei auf normative Prinzipien rekurren zu müssen.

Basierend auf einer Klärung der Grundbegriffe der Wahlsystemtheorie (Abschnitt 3.2) diskutieren und problematisieren wir bestehende Typologie-Ansätze (Abschnitt 3.3). Aus dieser Diskussion leiten wir sowohl inhaltliche als auch methodologische Anforderungen an eine allgemeine Typologie von Wahlsystemen ab (Abschnitt 3.4) und entwickeln eine solche Typologie unter gleichzeitiger Berücksichtigung des Repräsentationsprinzips und der technischen Ausgestaltung (Abschnitt 3.5). In Abschnitt 3.6 nutzen wir eine konkrete Spezifizierung der allgemeinen Typologie und füllen den typologischen Rahmen, indem wir ausgewählte Fallbeispiele einordnen und die Notwendigkeit einer multidimensionalen Betrachtung unterstreichen.

3.2 Grundbegriffe der Wahlsystemforschung

Zunächst ist festzustellen, dass die dichotome Gegenüberstellung von Mehrheits- und Verhältniswahl längst einer differenzierteren Betrachtung gewichen ist, welche die Existenz gradueller Unterschiede berücksichtigt und zu dem Schluss kommt, dass mit Mischwahlsystemen eine dritte Kategorie von Wahlsystemen in Analysen einzubeziehen ist (Shugart 2005). Die Unklarheit der Abgrenzung dieser Mischwahlsysteme von reinen Varianten der Mehrheits- und Verhältniswahl⁴ hat mitunter dazu geführt, dass ein wesentlich grundlegendes Einordnungsproblem übersehen wurde. Nach welcher Regel lässt sich festlegen, welches Wahlsystem nun ein Mehrheits- oder ein Verhältniswahlsystem ist bzw. – im Falle von Mischwahlsystemen – einem dieser Typen zumindest näherkommt? Je nachdem, ob man sich vor allem an einer (erwarteten) Gesamtwirkung eines Wahlsystems oder an dessen technischer Gestaltung orientiert, kann man hier zu verschiedenen Einschätzungen kommen.

Der erstgenannte Ansatz blickt auf das *Repräsentationsprinzip* eines Wahlsystems. Hierbei geht es darum, ob ein Wahlsystem (zunächst unabhängig von seiner exakten technischen Ausgestaltung) primär das politische Ziel der *Konzentration* (also möglichst die Bildung von direkt durch die Verteilung der Wählerstimmen legitimierte Ein-Parteien-Regierungen) oder das der *Proportionalität*⁵ (also einer möglichst genauen Abbildung gesellschaftlicher Interessen im Parlament) verfolgt (Nohlen 2009a: 140 ff.; Farrell 2011: 10 f.).⁶ Das Repräsentationsprinzip

⁴ Nohlen (2009a: 130) etwa sieht Mischwahlsysteme als „Residualkategorie“ an; vgl. auch Behnke 2011.

⁵ Oft wird dieses Ziel mit dem Terminus ‚Repräsentationsfunktion‘ benannt (etwa bei Nohlen 2009a). Dies ist inhaltlich angemessener, da neben dem Ziel der Proportionalität auch weitere Vorstellungen wie etwa das der parlamentarischen Repräsentation von Minderheiten verfolgt werden. Da aus sprachlicher Sicht die Verwendung des Begriffs der Repräsentation als eines der Repräsentationsprinzipien eher verwirrend als hilfreich ist, verwenden wir im Folgenden dennoch den Begriff ‚Proportionalität‘ für dieses Ziel.

⁶ Natürlich sind weitere Zielvorstellungen von Wahlsystemen vorstellbar, etwa eine Einflussnahme der Wähler auf die personelle Zusammensetzung des Parlaments (vgl. Nohlen 2009a für die möglichen Funktionen von Wahlsystemen). Allerdings besteht die grundsätzliche Frage bei der Entscheidung für oder

fungiert somit sowohl als Orientierung für die technische Gestaltung als auch als Bewertungsmaßstab der tatsächlichen Ergebnisse, welche durch das Wahlsystem hervorgerufen werden (Nohlen 1984: 88, 2009a: 143).

Eine direkte Orientierung an der technischen Ausgestaltung eines Wahlsystems stellt weniger grundlegende Fragen, sondern zerlegt Wahlsysteme vielmehr in ihre (technischen) Einzelteile. Basierend auf Arbeiten von Rae (1967) und Nohlen (1978, 2009a) lassen sich nach Schoen (2005) Wahlsysteme im Wesentlichen über deren *Wahlkreisgröße*, die *Form der Kandidatur*, die *Stimmgebung* und den *Stimmverrechnungsmodus* charakterisieren. Die Wahlkreisgröße beschreibt die Anzahl der zu wählenden Abgeordneten in dem Wahlkreis. Ein Wahlsystem kann hierbei durchaus auch Wahlkreise unterschiedlicher Größe beinhalten, die entweder nebeneinander existieren und/oder auf verschiedenen Ebenen miteinander verknüpft sein können (sogenannte *tiers*; Blais & Massicotte 1997). Im Falle mehrerer Ebenen ist die Form der Verknüpfung relevant. So ist ein Wahlsystem, welches Disproportionalitäten zwischen Stimmen- und Sitzanteilen der Parteien in kleinen Wahlkreisen mithilfe größerer Wahlkreise der oberen Ebene ausgleicht, ein kompensatorisches System. Die Kompensation kann hierbei nur anteilig oder auch voll erfolgen (Linhart 2009: 643). Ein Wahlsystem, welches keine solche Kompensation vornimmt, sondern bei dem die Stimmen auf den einzelnen Ebenen unabhängig voneinander verrechnet werden, bezeichnet man als paralleles Wahlsystem oder Grabenwahlsystem.

Bei der Form der Kandidatur sind die Einzel- und die Listenkandidatur zu unterscheiden, bei letzterer zusätzlich verschiedene Listenformen. Die Stimmgebung umfasst zum einen die Frage, wie viele Stimmen pro Wähler vorgesehen sind, zum anderen Details des Stimmgebungsverfahrens wie Möglichkeiten des Stimmensplittings, des Kumulierens, des Panaschierens oder der Übertragbarkeit von Stimmen. Der Verrechnungsmodus der Stimmen lässt sich allgemein unterteilen in Mehrheitswahl und Verhältniswahl (Schoen 2005), wobei diese Oberkategorien dann im Falle der Mehrheitswahl in die relative und absolute Mehrheitswahl und im Falle der Verhältniswahl je nach der verwendeten Methode (z. B. d'Hondtsches Höchstzahlverfahren, Hare-Niemeyer-Verfahren usw.) unterteilt werden können (Lijphart & Grofman 1984b; Shugart & Wattenberg 2001b; Gallagher & Mitchell 2005b). Weitere Stellschrauben bilden Sperr- und Grundmandatsklauseln sowie die Möglichkeit, Wahlkreise insofern unterschiedlich zuzuschneiden, als die Zahl der durch einen Abgeordneten repräsentierten Bürger zwischen den Wahlkreisen variiert (sogenanntes *malapportionment*; ausführlicher Schoen 2005).

Folgt man Nohlens (2009a: 140 ff.) Verständnis, nach dem die technischen Elemente ausschließlich Mittel zum Zweck der Erfüllung eines der Repräsentationsprinzipien darstellen, so lassen sich für die reinen Wahlsystemtypen Kongruenzen der Einteilung nach technischer Ausgestaltung und nach Repräsentationsprinzip feststellen. Das Prinzip der Proportionalität ist

gegen ein Wahlsystem genau aus der Wahl, welches der beiden Repräsentationsprinzipien die zentrale Rolle einnehmen soll. Beide Prinzipien lassen sich nach dieser grundsätzlichen Entscheidung dann mit weiteren Zielen verknüpfen. Die überragende Bedeutung der beiden hier vorgestellten Repräsentationsprinzipien zeigt sich auch in der Expertenumfrage von Bowler et al. (2005: 10 ff.).

mit der reinen Verhältniswahl verbunden, in welcher genau ein landesweiter Wahlkreis existiert, in dem alle n Abgeordneten zu wählen sind (Wahlkreisgröße n), wobei n der Parlamentsgröße entspricht. Die Zuteilungsverfahren der Verhältniswahl zielen dann genau darauf ab, die Verteilung der Wählerschaft proportional in den Sitzverhältnissen des Parlaments abzubilden. In der reinsten Variante der Mehrheitswahl hingegen existiert nicht *ein* Wahlkreis mit n zu vergebenden Mandaten, sondern n Wahlkreise mit je *einem* zu vergebenden Mandat. Hierbei sind Einzelkandidaturen vorgesehen; das Parlament setzt sich zusammen aus allen in den Wahlkreisen gewählten Kandidaten. Ist die Bedingung erfüllt, dass nationale Parteien (nicht viele regionale) jeweils in allen oder zumindest hinreichend vielen Wahlkreisen die aussichtsreichsten Kandidaten stellen, ist zu erwarten, dass ein solches Mehrheitswahlsystem das Repräsentationsprinzip der Konzentration bestmöglich erfüllt, indem es Mehrheiten für eine einzelne Partei generiert und damit Ein-Parteien-Regierungen hervorbringt (Duverger 1984; Kaiser 2002: 1556).

Eine solche *ex ante*-Verbindung von technischen Wahlsystemen und bestimmten Repräsentationsprinzipien ist jedoch auch bei technischer Eindeutigkeit nur sehr bedingt möglich, da Wahlsysteme in ihren Wirkungen stark von den jeweiligen soziopolitischen Rahmenbedingungen abhängen (Cox 1997: 13 ff.; Benoit 2002). Hierbei ist zwischen direkten (mechanischen) Wirkungen – also der rein mathematischen Umrechnung der Stimmen in Sitze – und indirekten (psychologischen) Wirkungen – dem Einfluss des Wahlsystems auf die Erwartungen und dementsprechenden strategischen Handlungsweisen von Wählern und Parteien – zu unterscheiden (Schoen 2005: 584 ff.). Letztere sind demnach auch dafür verantwortlich, dass die Wirkung eines Wahlsystems im Detail schwer zu prognostizieren ist. Je nach beispielsweise der geographischen Verteilung von politischen Präferenzen oder der Anzahl und Überlappung relevanter sozialer Konfliktlinien (Lipset & Rokkan 1967), können die gleichen technischen Regeln andere Anpassungsstrategien der relevanten Akteure hervorrufen (Cox 1997). So führt etwa ein relatives Mehrheitswahlsystem eben nur bedingt zu einer Konzentration des Parteiensystems im Sinne einer Ein-Parteien-Mehrheit, wenn in verschiedenen Wahlkreisen verschiedene (regionale) Parteien gegeneinander antreten (etwa im Fall Kanadas; Massicotte 2005). Gleichfalls kann eine reine Verhältniswahl dieses Ziel erfüllen, wenn die Interessen der Wählerschaft tatsächlich mithilfe zweier großer Parteien abgebildet werden können (hier ist Malta zu nennen, wo zwar keine reine Verhältniswahl vorliegt, allerdings in Mehrpersonenwahlkreisen nach *Single Transferable Vote* gewählt wird und dennoch ein Zwei-Parteiensystem existiert; Hirczy 1995).

Es lässt sich somit also festhalten, dass die technische Ausgestaltung von Wahlsystemen und die Repräsentationsprinzipien, denen sie folgen, miteinander verbunden sind, dass hier aber keinesfalls eine Deckungsgleichheit besteht. Dies gilt schon für reine Wahlsystemtypen und verstärkt sich bei der Betrachtung von Mischwahlsystemen, wie noch zu sehen sein wird. Es lohnt sich aus diesem Grund, bisherige Typologie-Ansätze genauer anzusehen.

3.3 Diskussion und Problematisierung bestehender Typologie-Ansätze

Betrachtet man nun bisherige Versuche, Wahlsysteme zu klassifizieren oder zu typologisieren, so ist André Kaiser zuzustimmen, dass dieses Feld bisher „durch ein erhebliches Maß an Konfusion und Fehlklassifikation gekennzeichnet“ (2002: 1549) ist. Dies liegt zum einen daran, dass unterschiedliche Versuche auf verschiedenen Grundlagen basieren; zum anderen verschärft sich das Problem im Falle asymmetrischer Definitionen, bei denen die Mehrheitswahl nach deren Entscheidungsregel, die Verhältniswahl jedoch nach deren Repräsentationsprinzip eingeordnet wird (Nohlen 2009a: 134). Die bestehenden Typologie-Ansätze, die mit dem letztgenannten Problem nicht konfrontiert sind, haben im Wesentlichen gemeinsam, dass sie sich entweder auf die Dimension des Repräsentationsprinzips eines Wahlsystems oder auf die Dimension der technischen Ausgestaltung beziehen. Diese Ansätze sollen im Folgenden kritisch dargestellt werden.

Nohlen (1984, 2009a: 130 ff.) sieht das Repräsentationsprinzip als zentrales Definitionskriterium an und schlägt eine Einordnung von Wahlsystemen vor, die diese entweder dem Prinzip der Konzentration oder dem der Proportionalität zuordnet. Diese dichotome Sichtweise erlaubt zwar eine zweckgebundene technische Mischung von Wahlsystemen, sieht diese aber nicht als relevant für die Klassifikation von Wahlsystemen an (Nohlen 2009a: 130 ff.). Ein Wahlsystem ist demnach entweder ein Mehrheitswahlsystem, weil es auf Konzentration abzielt, oder ein Verhältniswahlsystem, weil es auf Proportionalität abzielt, egal wie es technisch ausgestaltet ist.⁷ Nohlen (2009a: 134) führt weiter aus, dass die tatsächlichen Wirkungen von Wahlsystemen nicht Teil der Definition von Wahlsystemen sein können. Dies hat neben logischen ebenfalls empirische Gründe: Eine Typologie von Wahlsystemen sollte die Möglichkeit eröffnen, auf deren Basis Wirkungen von Wahlsystemen erklären zu können. Es entsteht ein massives Endogenitätsproblem, sobald die zu erklärenden Wirkungen gleichzeitig zur Klassifikation von Wahlsystemen (also der unabhängigen Variable) dienen (Benoit 2002, 2007).

Obwohl Lijphart und Grofman (1984b: 7) Nohlens Typologie-Ansatz ausdrücklich loben und dessen unbedingte Relevanz betonen, hat sich die englisch-sprachige Literatur nahezu uneingeschränkt der technischen Dimension zugewandt, wenn es um die Klassifikation von Wahlsystemen geht (vgl. etwa Rae 1967; Lijphart 1994; Shugart & Wattenberg 2001b; Gallagher & Mitchell 2005b). Hierbei besteht Einigkeit darüber, dass neben dem Stimmverrechnungsmodus selbst die Wahlkreisgröße (ggf. in Verbindung mit Sperrklauseln) das für den Einfluss auf die Zusammensetzung des Parlaments zentrale technische Element von Wahlsystemen ist. Darüber hinaus ist unumstritten, dass bei der Einordnung und Untersuchung von Wahlsystemen weitere technische Elemente (siehe die Zusammenfassung im vorangegangenen Abschnitt) zu berücksichtigen sind (Lijphart 1994; Carey & Hix 2011). Es fehlt diesen Ansätzen somit eine zentrale Variable, welche die eindimensionale Abbildung der technischen Dimension von Wahlsystemen und somit eine einfache Klassifikation erlauben würde. Trotz des Vorhandenseins mehrerer Elemente sucht man eine Komponente, die sich auf das Repräsentationsprinzip bezieht, allerdings vergeblich. Unbestritten ist, dass sich technische Elemente mischen lassen und

⁷ Eine solche dichotome Sichtweise wird von Sartori (1997: 53) geteilt.

Wahlssysteme sich somit immer auf einem Kontinuum zwischen Mehrheits- und Verhältniswahl bewegen (vgl. auch Rose 1984).

Die Gemeinsamkeit der beiden Ansätze ist also ihre jeweils eindimensionale Sichtweise, entweder auf das Repräsentationsprinzip oder auf die (allerdings in sich multi-dimensionale) technische Ausgestaltung eines Wahlsystems gerichtet. Nohlens Ansatz leidet vor allem darunter, dass er die Mischung von Repräsentationsprinzipien kategorisch ausschließt und demnach zum Beispiel nicht in der Lage ist, eine Reihe osteuropäischer Wahlssysteme eindeutig der Mehrheits- oder der Verhältniswahl zuzuordnen (Nohlen 2009a: 238 ff.). Nohlen führt diese Systeme unter „Kombinierte Wahlssysteme“, wobei sich kombiniert auf die technische Ausgestaltung bezieht; in diesem konkreten Fall ist er Adressat seiner eigenen Kritik (s. o.), da er damit unterschiedliche Wahlssysteme auf verschiedenen Fundamenten einordnet – reine Wahlssysteme auf Grundlage des Repräsentationsprinzips, kombinierte auf Basis der technischen Ausgestaltung. Allgemeiner gesprochen besteht das Problem darin, dass sich nach Nohlen Repräsentationsprinzipien nicht mischen lassen und er dementsprechend zu dem Schluss kommt: „Electoral systems should be classified and judged in accordance with the degree to which they meet the principle of representation that they are supposed to follow. They should not be judged on whether they fulfil any of the functions of the other principle of representation“ (Nohlen 1984: 88).⁸ Kaiser (2002: 1551) weist hingegen darauf hin, dass es „selbstverständlich“ möglich sei, Repräsentationsprinzipien zu mischen. Erst vor diesem Hintergrund ist auch die Debatte um die Frage sinnvoll, ob Mischwahlssysteme das „Beste beider Welten“ darstellen können, indem sie beide Prinzipien zufriedenstellend erfüllen bzw. zumindest darauf abzielen (Lijphart & Grofman 1984b; Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a; Carey & Hix 2011).

Der zweite, technische Typologie-Ansatz lässt sich vor allem in seiner Vernachlässigung der Dimension des Repräsentationsprinzips kritisieren. So erlaubt ein solcher Typologie-Ansatz keine Aussage darüber, ob die Effekte eines Wahlsystems nun dessen Zielsetzung (also dem Repräsentationsprinzip) ent- oder widersprechen. So bleibt die Frage offen, ob gewisse Wahlssysteme überhaupt die Effekte intendieren, die sie verursachen. Kurzum ist eine Bewertung von Wahlssystemen ohne eine Berücksichtigung der Zielsetzung nicht möglich. Aufgrund der Kontingenz der Wirkungen eines Wahlsystems kann nicht a priori gesagt werden, welche technischen Regeln zu welchen Ergebnissen führen werden. Somit ist an dieser Stelle zunächst festzuhalten, dass das Repräsentationsprinzip und die technische Ausgestaltung die zwei verbundenen, sich jedoch keinesfalls gegenseitig determinierenden Dimensionen eines jeden Wahlsystems darstellen.

Kaiser (2002) hat in seinem höchst relevanten Beitrag bereits wegweisend auf die (nicht bloß technische) Multidimensionalität von Wahlssystemen hingewiesen. Dabei unterscheidet er zwischen der Input- und der Output-Dimension von Wahlssystemen, wobei erstere aus den

⁸ Später relativiert Nohlen seine ursprüngliche Sichtweise, wenn er bei der (seiner Logik nach als Verhältniswahlssystem einzuordnenden) personalisierten Verhältniswahl bedauert, dass sie „eine mehrheitsbildende Komponente in Form von Direktmandaten [...] gerade in einer Zeit verliert, wo diese zur Mehrheitsbildung gut würden beitragen können“ (Nohlen 2009c: 195) und Gegnern von Überhangmandaten eine einseitige Fixierung auf Proportionalität vorwirft (Nohlen 2009b, 2009c).

technischen Regeln für die Transformation von Präferenzen in Stimmen und letztere aus den technischen Regeln für die Transformation von Stimmen in Sitze besteht. Kaiser (2002) sieht eine Mischung von Repräsentationsprinzipien insofern als möglich an, als die Regeln für die unterschiedlichen Dimensionen jeweils einem anderen Prinzip folgen können bzw. in beiden Dimensionen selbst eine Mischung vorliegen kann. Allerdings verbindet er dabei ebenfalls technische Elemente mit bestimmten Repräsentationsprinzipien und macht es dadurch schwierig, die Dynamik der Wirkungen von Wahlsystemen bei deren Kategorisierung gerecht zu werden. Insgesamt verbleibt Kaiser (2002) damit eher in der technischen Tradition von Typologie-Ansätzen.

3.4 Anforderungen an eine allgemeine Typologie von Wahlsystemen

Aus der kritischen Diskussion bestehender Typologie-Ansätze ergeben sich konkrete inhaltliche Anforderungen an eine allgemeine Typologie von Wahlsystemen. Die zentrale Anforderung bildet die gleichzeitige Berücksichtigung der Dimensionen des Repräsentationsprinzips sowie der technischen Ausgestaltung und die damit einhergehende Überwindung eindimensionaler Betrachtungen. Diese mehrdimensionale Kategorisierung unterstreicht dabei, dass es eben keine allgemein gültige Verbindung zwischen einem Repräsentationsprinzip und bestimmten technischen Regeln gibt. Erst auf dieser Grundlage können der Gesamtcharakter eines Wahlsystems eingeschätzt und dessen Effekte bewertet werden.

Während eine Erfassung der Merkmale für die technische Dimension kein Problem darstellt, ist es weiterhin nötig, auch das Repräsentationsprinzip eines Wahlsystems a priori festzustellen. Dabei darf die Multidimensionalität der technischen Ausgestaltung eines Wahlsystems nicht unter den Tisch fallen, weil der Fokus nun nicht mehr nur auf einer Zahl von technischen Elementen liegt. Eine allgemeine Typologie von Wahlsystemen muss Spezifikationen ermöglichen, welche gerade auch die Sub-Dimensionen der technischen Dimension berücksichtigen, um Ansätzen mit verschiedenen Ziel- und Schwerpunktsetzungen einen gemeinsamen typologischen Rahmen zu liefern. Nur über eine solche Spezifikationsoption und die daraus resultierende Flexibilität lassen sich die verschiedenen Forschungsergebnisse vor einem gemeinsamen Hintergrund sinnvoll in Zusammenhang bringen (vgl. auch Jacobs & Leyenaar 2011: 508 f.). Will man beispielsweise der Frage nachgehen, welche Wirkungen welche Arten von Wahlsystemen erzielen, so wäre die Subsummierung der technischen Ausgestaltung in eine einzelne Dimension häufig unterkomplex. Parallele Mischwahlsysteme, Wahlsysteme mit einer proportionalen Verrechnungsmethode, aber einer hohen Sperrklausel, und solche mit mittelgroßen Wahlkreisgrößen würden mutmaßlich als sehr ähnlich ausgewiesen werden, bestehen aber aus völlig verschiedenen Zusammenstellungen technischer Optionen und verfolgen gegebenenfalls unterschiedliche Repräsentationsprinzipien. Die Rahmentypologie muss also eine weitere Differenzierung erlauben, ohne selbst bereits den Blick zu stark auf technische Details von Wahlsystemen zu lenken. Hierbei ist es wichtig, klar zwischen dem allgemeinen, komplexitätsreduzierenden typologischen Rahmen und dessen jeweils an eine Forschungsfrage gekoppelte Spezifikation als zwei verschiedenen Arbeitsschritten zu unterscheiden.

Neben diesen zentralen inhaltlichen Anforderungen besteht eine Reihe von methodischen Anforderungen an Typologien. Deren zusätzliche inhaltliche Konsequenzen sollen für die Entwicklung der Typologie gleichfalls leitend sein.⁹ Dabei ist zunächst wichtig festzustellen, dass Typologien sich insbesondere dazu eignen, multidimensionale Phänomene abzubilden (Collier et al. 2012: 227). Dabei sind sie keineswegs direkt mit der Aufgabe der Operationalisierung verbunden und sollten sich gerade nicht von Kriterien der Messbarkeit, sondern von theoretischen Aspekten leiten lassen (Pickel & Pickel 2012: 6 f.).

Das Gerüst einer Typologie bildet eine Matrix, deren Zellen die einzelnen Typen eines übergeordneten Phänomens markieren. Die definitorischen Merkmale der Zellen ergeben sich aus Zeilen- und Spaltenvariablen, den Dimensionen der Typologie.¹⁰ Die einzelnen Dimensionen können selbst als nominale, kategoriale oder kontinuierliche Variablen dargestellt werden und selbst aus mehreren Sub-Dimensionen zusammengesetzt sein (Collier et al. 2008: 223 ff.). Mit Hilfe dieser Sub-Dimensionen lassen sich Typologien dann spezifizieren (vgl. auch Gerring 2012: 724 ff.). Im Falle kontinuierlicher Dimensionen helfen sogenannte *polar* und *intermediate cases*, Zelltypen zu identifizieren, ohne dabei auf willkürliche Abgrenzungen zurückgreifen zu müssen (Collier et al. 2012: 222 f.).

Über die bloße Gestaltung von Typologien hinaus sehen sich zunächst rein deskriptive Herleitungen von Typologien mit der Zielsetzung konfrontiert, einen Erkenntnisfortschritt in einer sozialwissenschaftlichen Welt zu liefern, die vor allem auf das Auffinden kausaler Zusammenhänge ausgerichtet ist. Gerring (2012: 741) führt aus, dass „true innovation in descriptive inference is established only by delineating a fundamentally novel empirical terrain, or by thoroughly revising our sense of an established terrain“. Gleichzeitig muss aber betont werden, dass die Untersuchung kausaler Zusammenhänge existentiell davon abhängt, dass empirische Phänomene adäquat beschrieben beziehungsweise eingeordnet werden: „[C]lassifications remain the requisite, if preliminary, condition for any scientific discourse“ (Sartori 1970: 1040; vgl. auch Collier et al. 2008: 162), was sicher gleichermaßen für Typologien als mehrdimensionale Klassifikationen gilt. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird klar, dass Typologien eine zentrale Rolle im Forschungsprozess einnehmen können beziehungsweise, nach Sartori (1970), sogar müssen. Um diese Rolle einzunehmen, sollte eine Typologie gleichzeitig Grundlage für Erklärungen sein und Hinweise auf zu Erklärendes geben. Dies geschieht im Wesentlichen dadurch, dass die Zelltypen sowohl als abhängige wie auch als unabhängige Variable fungieren können (Collier et al. 2012: 226). Von großer Bedeutung ist schließlich die strukturierende Leistung der Typologie, welche, von konkreter Messung zunächst unabhängig, einen Rahmen schafft, in dem sich etwa Forschungsergebnisse von Einzelfallstudien mit denen von komparativ-quantitativen Studien vergleichen und verbinden lassen (Collier et al. 2008: 162 ff.).

⁹ Für intensive Auseinandersetzungen mit dem methodischen Werkzeug der Typologie siehe Collier et al. 2008, 2012; vgl. auch Sartori 1970.

¹⁰ Mit Blick auf unsere Typologie stellen leere Zellen in diesem Zusammenhang kein Problem dar, da die theoretische Bedeutung der Dimensionen eine zumindest theoretische Relevanz aller Zelltypen bedingt.

Der konzeptionelle Mehrwert der multidimensionalen Betrachtung kann hier bereits anhand zweier zentraler Themen innerhalb der Wahlsystemforschung skizziert werden.

- *Wahlsystemwandel*: Der strukturierende Beitrag der Typologie zur Untersuchung des Wandels bzw. der Genese von Wahlsystemen besteht in erster Linie darin, aufzuzeigen, dass eine Entscheidung für ein bestimmtes Repräsentationsprinzip keinesfalls die technische Ausgestaltung eines Wahlsystems determiniert. Darüber hinaus wird bei der Betrachtung beider Dimensionen deutlich, dass Reformdebatten sowohl das Repräsentationsprinzip in Verbindung mit der technischen Ausgestaltung als auch eine Anpassung der technischen Elemente bei konstantem Repräsentationsprinzip betreffen können. Folglich kann Wandlungsdruck zum einen entstehen, indem technische Regeln Ergebnisse produzieren, die nicht mehr mit dem Repräsentationsprinzip in Einklang stehen. In diesem Fall wäre der potenzielle Wandel in einer technischen Anpassung bei Beibehaltung des Repräsentationsprinzips begründet. Zum anderen kann Wandlungsdruck aus einer Diskrepanz zwischen dem Repräsentationsprinzip des aktuellen Wahlsystems und der Vorstellung relevanter Akteure darüber, was das Wahlsystem zu leisten habe, entstehen. Diese Diskrepanz kann sowohl machtpolitisch als auch durch soziopolitischen Wandel in der Gesellschaft bedingt sein (Massicotte 2005; LeDuc 2011).

- *Mischwahlsysteme*: Die differenzierte Sichtweise verdeutlicht, dass eine Mischung sich auf das Repräsentationsprinzip, auf die technische Gestaltung oder auf beides beziehen kann. Während dies die Diskussion rund um diese Systeme zunächst zu verkomplizieren scheint, ist jedoch genau das Gegenteil der Fall. So werden gerade Diskussionen, bei welchen Mischwahlsysteme auf der einen Seite wegen ihrer Zielsetzung, auf der anderen aber auf Basis ihrer technischen Gestaltung als solche eingeordnet werden, dazu gebracht, sich in den allgemeinen typologischen Rahmen einzuordnen und somit von asymmetrischen Vergleichen Abstand zu nehmen. Über die Betrachtung des typologischen Rahmens kann weiterhin differenziert analysiert werden, ob technisch gemischte Wahlsysteme aus einer Mischung von Repräsentationsprinzipien resultieren oder aber eindeutig mit einem Repräsentationsprinzip verbunden sind und aufgrund soziopolitischer Rahmenbedingungen technisch weit weniger eindeutige Regeln erhalten haben. So geht die mehrdimensionale Betrachtung von Wahlsystemen mit einer Erhöhung der potenziellen Erklärungen nicht nur für bestimmte Wirkungen, sondern auch für bestimmte Gestaltungsentscheidungen einher. Mithilfe der Hinzunahme des Repräsentationsprinzips eines Wahlsystems wird die Debatte, ob Mischwahlsysteme das „Beste beider Welten“ hervorbringen, auch vor die Frage gestellt, inwiefern die Erreichung dieses vermeintlich „Besten beider Welten“ überhaupt ein Ziel des Wahlsystems darstellt.

Generell wird es möglich, zwischen technisch identischen Wahlsystemen zu unterscheiden, sofern diese unterschiedliche Repräsentationsprinzipien verfolgen, sowie festzustellen, inwiefern die unterschiedliche Wirkung technisch ähnlicher Wahlsysteme auf absichtsvolles Design oder auf die unvorhergesehenen Interaktionseffekte zwischen soziopolitischen Rahmenbedingungen und Wahlsystem zurückzuführen sind. Die Zelltypen geben Anlass zur Untersuchung genau solcher Fragestellungen und bieten aus methodologischer Sicht größeres Potenzial als bloß technisch geleitete Einordnungen.

Der vorgeschlagene typologische Rahmen verbindet Einzelfallstudien und vergleichende Studien erstens natürlich insofern, als er beiden eine gemeinsame Grundlage für die Analyse von Wahlsystemen liefert und Forschungsergebnisse damit verknüpfbar macht. Zweitens verbindet die hier vorgenommene zweidimensionale Betrachtung diese sich vor allem in der Fallzahl, weniger in den Fragestellungen unterscheidenden Studien aber auch, indem zwei Forschungsrichtungen zusammengeführt werden. Während komparative Studien häufig quantitativ angelegt sind und sich vor allem in der Herausarbeitung der Wirkungen der technischen Ausgestaltung hervorgetan haben, sind es bisher exklusiv Einzelfallstudien, die gezielt (wenn auch nicht immer explizit) die Frage nach dem Repräsentationsprinzip eines Wahlsystems stellen (vgl. etwa die Arbeiten in Gallagher & Mitchell 2005a; Nohlen 2009a). Insofern besteht der Mehrwert dieses Typologie-Ansatzes nicht bloß in der Rahmung der verschiedenen Ansätze, sondern auch in der Zusammenführung deren inhaltlicher Stärken.

Die Typologie bietet weiterhin die notwendige Flexibilität, indem die Dimensionen je nach Forschungsfrage und theoretischen Implikationen spezifiziert werden können. Hierin besteht genau die komplexitätsreduzierende Rahmungsfunktion, die von einer allgemeinen Typologie erwartet wird. Gerade die technische Multidimensionalität von Wahlsystemen wird dabei keineswegs vernachlässigt, sondern kann mithilfe einer Ausdifferenzierung der technischen Dimension über Sub-Dimensionen abgebildet werden. Wie sich das Kontinuum der technischen Dimension mittels einiger Sub-Dimensionen abbilden lässt, zeigen wir im folgenden Abschnitt. Dort nutzen wir die Rahmungsfunktion der allgemeinen Typologie, erhöhen dabei jedoch den Detailgrad unserer Betrachtung.

3.5.2 Berücksichtigung technischer Multidimensionalität

Wie bereits erläutert, muss die im obigen Rahmen dargestellte technische Dimension als aus diversen technischen Sub-Dimensionen bestehend begriffen werden. Eine Vielzahl technischer Elemente kann dafür sorgen, dass ein Wahlsystem rein technisch eher eine Verhältnis- bzw. eine Mehrheitswahl ist. Elemente, welche für das Kontinuum zwischen technischer Mehrheits- und technischer Verhältniswahl nicht zentral sind, betreffen vor allem die Stimmgebung und die Form der Kandidatur: Stimmen Wähler für einzelne Personen oder Listen? Können sie Listen verändern, verknüpfen oder eigene Listen erstellen? Die Antworten auf diese Fragen unterscheiden Wahlsysteme voneinander und sind grundsätzlich relevant. Für die Einordnung von Wahlsystemen als Verhältnis- oder Mehrheitswahlsystem spielen sie aber keine Rolle und

Dem technischen Element ‚Wahlkreisgröße‘ hat sich insbesondere Lijphart (1994) ausführlich gewidmet. Je kleiner ein Wahlkreis, desto höher ist *ceteris paribus* der Stimmanteil für Wahlbewerber, der nötig ist, um einen Sitz zu erreichen. Lijphart nennt dies den *effective threshold*. Es ist leicht vorstellbar, dass Wahlsysteme mit sehr kleiner Wahlkreisgröße nahe 1 auch unter der Verwendung von Verrechnungsverfahren der Verhältniswahl Mehrheitswahlsystemen näherkommen. Bei einer Wahlkreisgröße von 2 etwa erhalten entweder die beiden stärksten Parteien je einen Sitz oder die stärkste Partei beide. Bei einer Wahlkreisgröße von 1 verschmelzen alle Verrechnungsmodi, egal ob solche der Verhältnis- oder der Mehrheitswahl, in einem reinen Mehrheitswahlsystem. Je nachdem, ob die Wahlkreisgröße k näher bei 1 oder näher bei n liegt, entspricht die technische Ausgestaltung eher der Mehrheits- oder eher der Verhältniswahl. Vorsicht ist allerdings geboten, die Variable ‚Wahlkreisgröße‘ als ‚durchschnittliche Wahlkreisgröße‘ zu verkürzen. Dies kann für bestimmte Studien hilfreich sein; allgemein gilt jedoch, dass für ein System mit 20 Fünfer-Wahlkreisen andere Ergebnisse zu erwarten sind als für ein System mit 19 Einer-Wahlkreisen und einem Wahlkreis der Größe 81. Die Variable ‚Wahlkreisgröße‘ muss daher in ihrer allgemeinsten Form die ganze Struktur der Wahlkreisgrößen beinhalten.

Neben einer effektiven Hürde, die über die Wahlkreisgröße generiert wird, sind auch formal verankerte Hürden in der Praxis von Wahlsystemen relevant. Die Effekte einer formalen Hürde sind vom Grundsatz her die gleichen wie die einer effektiven: Je höher eine solche Hürde ist, desto eher trägt ein Wahlsystem Züge der Mehrheitswahl, je geringer sie ist, desto näher kommt das Wahlsystem einem Verhältniswahlsystem. Ist eine Hürde so niedrig, dass sie keine Auswirkungen besitzt, oder existiert gar keine formale Hürde, so verschmilzt ein Wahlsystem hinsichtlich dieses Aspekts mit der Reinform der Verhältniswahl. Ist die Hürde hingegen so hoch, dass es nur einer oder zwei Parteien gelingt, diese zu überspringen, so verschmilzt das Wahlsystem mit dem Typus der Mehrheitswahl. Dazwischen sind alle möglichen Abstufungen denkbar.

Als letztes zu diskutierendes Element schließlich ist in Abbildung 3.2 das Vorhandensein mehrerer Ebenen der Stimmverrechnung (*tiers*) aufgeführt, die über einen Kompensationsmechanismus verbunden sind. Wenngleich kompensatorische Mischwahlsysteme Grabenwahlsystemen vordergründig stark ähneln, ist hier eine Differenzierung vorzunehmen. Zwar haben beide Typen gemein, dass Stimmen in unterschiedlicher Weise auf mindestens zwei Ebenen verrechnet werden und dass beide Ebenen sich in der Regel hinsichtlich des Modus der Stimmverrechnung unterscheiden. Der zentrale Unterschied besteht allerdings darin, dass sich in Grabenwahlsystem – wie oben beschrieben – durch das Nebeneinander der Ebenen eine Mischung der Stimmverrechnungsverfahren erreichen lässt. Dies ist in kompensatorischen Systemen nicht zwingend der Fall. Sobald die Ebene der technischen Verhältniswahl die Ebene der technischen Mehrheitswahl vollständig kompensiert, verschmilzt ein solches System mit dem System der reinen Verhältniswahl – auch wenn Ebenen der technischen Mehrheitswahl vorhanden sind und anders als in Grabenwahlsystemen. Findet keinerlei Kompensation statt, so ist das Wahlsystem hinsichtlich dieses Elements als Mehrheitswahl einzuordnen; findet eine teilweise Kompensation statt, liegt eine technische Mischung vor.

Während man für jedes einzelne Element losgelöst vom übrigen Wahlsystem dessen Funktion abschätzen kann, ist es jedoch von großer Bedeutung, ein Wahlsystem immer als Zusammenwirken diverser technischer Elemente zu betrachten. So ist die Wahlkreisgröße auf einer unteren Ebene egal, wenn auf der oberen Ebene ohnehin eine Vollkompensation stattfindet; bei einer Teilkompensation hingegen spielt sie eine Rolle. Genauso hat eine relativ niedrige oder auch moderat hohe Sperrklausel in einem Ein-Personen-Wahlkreis keinerlei Effekt, wirkt sich jedoch stark auf Ergebnisse aus, sobald die Größe des Wahlkreises zunimmt. Diese Beispiele des Zusammenspiels verschiedener technischer Elemente verdeutlichen die Notwendigkeit, alle Elemente gemeinsam zu berücksichtigen. Gleichzeitig muss jedoch der Blick auf die wesentlichen Dimensionen eines Wahlsystems gerichtet werden. Der Fokus auf konkrete Fragen braucht beides, die passende Spezifikation der technischen Dimension sowie die Berücksichtigung des Repräsentationsprinzips. Nur auf diesem Wege lassen sich Design-Entscheidungen beurteilen und Wirkungen von Wahlsystemen verstehen. Die im folgenden Abschnitt vorzunehmende empirische Einordnung konkreter Fallbeispiele soll die Sinnhaftigkeit dieses Vorgehens verdeutlichen.

3.6 Einordnung konkreter Fallbeispiele

Verfolgt man nun in einem weiteren Schritt die Absicht, die Typologie durch die Einordnung konkreter Wahlsysteme mit Leben zu füllen, so lassen sich die Wahlsysteme nicht per se, sondern nur im Kontext der Länder, in denen sie Anwendung finden, beurteilen. Dies liegt weniger an der technischen Ausgestaltung als vielmehr am Repräsentationsprinzip, das den Wahlsystemen selbst nicht (oder zumindest nicht direkt) entnommen werden kann. Hierbei zeigt sich eine generelle Schwierigkeit: Obwohl theoretisch von hoher Bedeutung, ist die Einordnung des Repräsentationsprinzips eines Wahlsystems mit einigen Unwägbarkeiten verbunden. In den seltensten Fällen wird offiziell festgehalten, welches Hauptziel ein konkretes Wahlsystem erreichen soll.¹² Dementsprechend orientiert sich unsere Einordnung verschiedener Wahlsysteme im Hinblick auf deren Repräsentationsprinzipien zum einen an den jeweiligen Verfassungstexten (Nohlen 2009a: 145) sowie an Experteneinschätzungen (wie sie etwa in der Form von Einzelfallstudien vorhanden sind; siehe Gallagher & Mitchell 2005a). Konkret stellen wir jeweils die Frage, was die Designer eines Wahlsystems bzw. diejenigen, die es zuletzt einer Reform unterzogen haben, in Bezug auf das Repräsentationsprinzip im Sinn hatten. Dies bedeutet gleichzeitig einen klaren methodischen Fortschritt gegenüber nicht näher spezifizierten Gesamteinschätzungen eines Wahlsystems, allerdings auch die Herausforderung, die relevanten Akteure und deren Intentionen möglichst eindeutig festzustellen.

Die in Tabelle 3.1 aufgelisteten Fallbeispiele bieten eine Auswahl an Wahlsystemen, welche bei der für jedes Land jeweils letzten Wahl Anwendung fanden. Diese ordnen wir, basierend auf der in Abschnitt 3.5.2) vorgestellten Spezifikation, konkret in unsere Typologie ein. Die Fallauswahl

¹² Gegenbeispiele sind etwa Irland oder die Niederlande, die in den Verfassungsartikeln 16 bzw. 50 explizit festlegen, dass das Wahlsystem der Logik proportionaler Repräsentation zu folgen hat.

erfolgt zum einen auf Basis des Vorhandenseins einer hinreichenden Grundlage für die Zuordnung des Repräsentationsprinzips, zum anderen ist sie so angelegt, dass sie sowohl für die Dimension des Repräsentationsprinzips als auch für die technische Ausgestaltung die volle Bandbreite an Möglichkeiten abdeckt. Durch diese Breite kann der Mehrwert der vorgeschlagenen Typologie an den ausgewählten Beispielen verdeutlicht werden.

Großbritannien und Kanada besitzen Wahlsysteme, die jeweils eindeutig mit dem Repräsentationsprinzip der Konzentration verbunden sind (Farrell 2011: 13 ff.; Massicotte 2005). Die Reformdebatten in beiden Ländern zeigen, dass insbesondere die Konzentration des Parteiensystems durch das aktuelle Wahlsystem als gewichtiges Gegenargument gegen Reformvorschläge vorgebracht wird (Dunleavy & Margetts 1995; Jenkins Commission 1998: 53 ff.; Massicotte 2005: 111). Ein Auszug aus einem Gerichtsurteil des obersten Gerichtshofs zum Wahlkreischnitt in der kanadischen Provinz Saskatchewan unterstreicht diese Einschätzung: „Deviations from equality will be permitted where they can be justified as contributing to the better government of the people as a whole“ (Supreme Court 1991). Litauen und Spanien sind Beispielfälle für Wahlsysteme, die mit dem Ziel einer Balance beider Prinzipien entworfen wurden. Hierfür waren jeweils die Verhandlungen und Kompromisse zwischen alten und neuen Eliten verantwortlich. Aus diesen ging hervor, dass das Wahlsystem sowohl eine proportionale als auch eine konzentrierende Funktion erfüllen sollte (Benoit 2007: 380 ff.; Hopkin 2005: 375 ff.). Irland, Israel und die Niederlande haben jeweils Wahlsysteme, denen klar das Repräsentationsprinzip der Proportionalität zugeordnet werden kann – dies ist so einerseits (in den Fällen Irland und Niederlande, siehe Fußnote 12) aus den Verfassungstexten zu entnehmen sowie andererseits klar aus der Entstehungsgeschichte der Wahlsysteme abzulesen (Gallagher 2005a: 512 ff.; Andeweg 2005; Rahat & Hazan 2005: 334 ff.).

Neben diesen klaren Fällen sind Japan, Malta und Deutschland gute Beispiele für Unwägbarkeiten, die bei der Einschätzung des Repräsentationsprinzips auftreten können. In Japan wurde die Reform des Wahlsystems Anfang der neunziger Jahre hauptsächlich durch Korruptionsskandale ausgelöst. Dabei spielten konkrete Zielsetzungen für das Wahlsystem eine zunächst nachgeordnete Rolle. Gleichwohl flossen sowohl die Weigerung der ehemaligen Oppositionsparteien, ein reines Mehrheitswahlsystem zu unterstützen, als auch das Ziel der Generierung eines Zwei-Parteien-Systems in die Entwicklung des neuen Wahlsystems ein (Reed 2005: 281; Sakamoto 1999: 428 ff.). Wir ordnen Japan daher als Fall mit ausbalanciertem Repräsentationsprinzip ein.

Auch aus dem Ausbleiben von Wahlsystemreformen können Schlüsse auf das Repräsentationsprinzip gezogen werden: Das maltesische Wahlsystem wurde 1976 gerade deshalb keiner Reform unterzogen, weil trotz seiner technischen Ausgestaltung mit bedeutenden Verhältniswahlelementen das maltesische Parteiensystem konzentriert war (Proctor 1980: 318 ff.; Hirczy 1995: 260 f.). Da nicht gesichert ist, inwiefern die Proportionalitätsleistung des Wahlsystems in die Entscheidung gegen eine Reform eingeflossen ist, lässt sich im Falle Malts weder eindeutig das Prinzip der Konzentration noch das Ziel einer Balance zuordnen (vgl. Tab. 3.1).

Ebenfalls strittig ist die Einordnung des deutschen Wahlsystems. Während auf der einen Seite das Ziel der Proportionalität hervorgehoben wird (siehe etwa Prittwitz 2011, Strohmeier 2009: 17, Nohlen 2009a oder Schoen 2007: 863), wird auf der anderen Seite gerade mit Blick auf den Entwurf des Wahlsystems auch das Ziel einer gewissen Konzentration des Parteiensystems als einer Lehre aus Zeiten der Weimarer Republik betont (Strohmeier 2009: 14 ff.; Jesse 2009: 114 ff.; Saalfeld 2005: 210 f.). Weiterhin hat das Bundesverfassungsgericht in seinen Entscheidungen zum Wahlsystem und dessen Reformen immer wieder dessen Verhältniswahlcharakter hervorgehoben (Nohlen 2009c), gleichzeitig aber auch auf die wünschenswerte Konzentrationsfunktion eines Wahlsystems hingewiesen (BVerfG 1997). Demnach kann zwar festgehalten werden, dass dem Ziel der Proportionalität ein größeres Gewicht beigemessen wird, jedoch eine Erfüllung beider Repräsentationsprinzipien ausdrücklich erwünscht ist. Hinsichtlich der Dimension des Repräsentationsprinzips weist der Fall des deutschen Wahlsystems klar darauf hin, dass diese kontinuierlich ist und zwischen den Polen Konzentration und Proportionalität verschiedene Gewichtungen dieser Ziele nicht nur theoretisch denkbar, sondern auch praktisch bedeutsam sind.

Die zusätzliche Betrachtung der konkreten technischen Ausgestaltungen der Wahlsysteme unterstreicht die Notwendigkeit einer multidimensionalen Betrachtung. Bei der Darstellung der technischen Ausgestaltung von Wahlsystemen orientieren wir uns an Abbildung 3.2. Hierbei entscheiden wir uns bewusst dagegen, jedes einzelne technische Detail in den vergleichenden Überblick mit aufzunehmen, sind aber präzise genug, um sämtliche Stellschrauben eines *trade-offs* zwischen Verhältnis- und Mehrheitswahl zu erfassen. Tabelle 3.1 listet in diesem Sinne Informationen zu allen relevanten technischen Elementen auf und umfasst neben dem Repräsentationsprinzip die folgenden technischen Sub-Dimensionen: Verrechnungsmodi inklusive der Sitzanteile der verschiedenen Ebenen, Charakteristika der Wahlkreisgröße, Höhe der gesetzlichen Sperrklausel sowie Art und Weise der Kompensationsverbindung zwischen verschiedenen Ebenen. Wir verbleiben bei der Logik kontinuierlicher Dimensionen sowie *intermediate* und *polar cases*, indem wir auf eine willkürliche Festlegung von Schwellenwerten, welche etwa technische Typen voneinander abgrenzen, verzichten. An dieser Stelle geht es vor allem darum, den Mehrwert der Typologie nachzuweisen und nicht darum, eine Diskussion über exakte Schwellenwerte zu führen.

Tabelle 3.1: Repräsentationsprinzip und technische Sub-Dimensionen für ausgewählte Fallbeispiele

Fallbeispiel	Repräsentation sprinzip	Verrechnungsmodus und zu vergebende Sitze (Modus: Sitze)		Wahlkreischarakteristika (Verhältnismwahlebene)				Sperrklausel (Verhältnis- wahlebene)	Kompensa- tion durch Verhältnis- wahlebene	Allgemei- ner Typ gemäß Abbil- dung 3.1
		Mehrheitswahl- ebene	Verhältnismwahl- ebene	Mit- tel- wert	Stan- dard- abwei- chung	Medi- an	Mini- mum			
Großbritannien	Konzentration	Relative Mehrheitswahl: 646	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
Kanada	Konzentration	Rel. MW: 308	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
Malta	Konzentration/ Balance	-	PR-STV: 65	5	0	5	5	0	-	8/5
Japan	Balance	Rel. MW: 300	d'Hondt: 180	16,36	6,99	17	6	0	Nein	5
Litauen	Balance	Rel. MW: 71	Hare-Niemeyer: 70	70	0	70	70	5	Nein	5
Spanien	Balance	-	d'Hondt: 350	6,73	6,12	5	1	3	-	5
Deutschland	Balance/ Proportionalität	Rel. MW: 299	Sainte-Laguë: 299 ^(a)	299	0	299	299	5	Ja	5/2
Israel	Proportionalität	-	d'Hondt: 120	120	0	120	120	2	-	1
Irland	Proportionalität	-	PR-STV: 166	3,86	0,8	4	3	0	-	2
Niederlande	Proportionalität	-	d'Hondt: 150	150	0	150	150	0,67	-	1

Anmerkungen: Wahlkreischarakteristika für die Mehrheitswahlebene wurden ausgespart, da dort jeweils nur Einer-Wahlkreise vorhanden sind; für keinen hier aufgeführten Fall gibt es eine Sperrklausel auf der Mehrheitswahlebene; „-“ = nicht relevant.

PR-STV = Proportional Representation – Single Transferable Vote

^(a) Für den Fall Deutschland könnte man annehmen, dass die Verhältnismwahlebene aus 598 Sitzen bestehen sollte, da sich die Anwendung der Methode Sainte-Laguë auf eben diese 598 Sitze bezieht. Das 2009 gültige Wahlrecht sieht jedoch nur 299 Sitze für die nach Verhältnismwahl zu vergebenden Kompensationssitze vor.

Das Repräsentationsprinzip Konzentration scheint zunächst relativ klar mit einer technisch reinen Mehrheitswahl verbunden zu sein. Großbritannien und Kanada sind Beispiele für diesen Zusammenhang: In den Wahlsystemen beider Staaten gibt es ausschließlich Einer-Wahlkreise, aus deren Siegern sich die Parlamente zusammensetzen. Hinsichtlich der Entscheidungsregel wie auch der Wahlkreisgröße herrscht hier also die reinste Form der technischen Mehrheitswahl vor. Da zudem keine zweite Ebene existiert, ist die Frage nach Kompensationen obsolet, und das Fehlen einer formalen Hürde ist ohne Bedeutung. Beide Staaten können somit als klassische Fälle des allgemeinen Typs 9 gelten, in denen die technische Mehrheitswahl das Repräsentationsprinzip der Konzentration verfolgt. Allerdings zeigen genau diese Beispiele, dass, während in Großbritannien nach nahezu allen Wahlen auf stabilen Mehrheiten beruhende Ein-Parteien-Regierungen zustande gekommen sind, dies für Kanada nicht der Fall ist. Das kanadische Wahlsystem erfüllt das Ziel der Konzentration daher nicht oder nur bedingt, da dort Ein-Parteien-Regierungen typischerweise „auf Zeit spielende“ Minderheitsregierungen sind (Massicotte 2005: 110 ff.). Nur durch eine saubere Trennung zwischen Repräsentationsprinzipien und empirisch beobachtbaren Effekten von Wahlsystemen kann jedoch Fragen nachgegangen werden, die sich mit der Evaluierung von Wahlsystemen befassen. Eine solche Trennung können eindimensionale, entweder allein auf eine Gesamtwirkung des Wahlsystems oder dessen technischen Charakter fokussierte Typologien (siehe Abschnitt 3.3) nicht leisten.

Am Beispiel Malta lässt sich aufzeigen, dass der Wunsch einer konzentrierenden Wirkung des Wahlsystems keinesfalls zwingend mit der technischen Mehrheitswahl verbunden sein muss. Die Entscheidungsregel *Single Transferable Vote* ist eine klassische Stimmverrechnungsmethode der Verhältniswahl. Auch eine gesetzliche Sperrklausel gibt es nicht. Eine konzentrierende Wirkung wird allerdings durch die relativ geringe Wahlkreisgröße (fünf) erzielt, über die landesweit keine Varianz besteht und deren Effekt durch keine zweite Ebene mit größeren Wahlkreisen kompensiert wird. Technisch gesehen ist das maltesische *Single Transferable Vote* somit ein Mischwahlsystem, und Malta ist, da das Repräsentationsprinzip nicht eindeutig bestimmt werden kann, insgesamt als Typ 5 oder 8 einzuordnen. Eindimensionale Typologien scheitern für den Fall Malta entweder an ihrem Indeterminismus (das Wahlsystem wirkt insgesamt sowohl proportional als auch konzentrierend) oder daran, dass eine technische Mischung mit dem Vorhandensein zweier Ebenen verknüpft und Malta somit nicht berücksichtigt wird (Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a).

Der Fall Malta lenkt unseren Blick zudem auf die empirisch nicht vorhandenen allgemeinen Typen 3, 4, 6 und 7 und macht deutlich, dass unter bestimmten soziopolitischen Rahmenbedingungen das Ziel der Konzentration oder zumindest einer Balance der Prinzipien durchaus sinnvollerweise mithilfe einer technischen Verhältniswahl (Typen 4 und 7) erreicht werden kann. Ebenfalls, wenn auch ohne empirisch verwandten Fall, könnten die Typen 3 und 6 (technische Mehrheitswahl mit Repräsentationsprinzip Proportionalität bzw. Balance) erfolgreich dort funktionieren, wo sich etwa in verschiedenen Regionen jeweils nur zwei Parteien gegenüberstehen.

Wahlsysteme, die unter der Prämisse entworfen bzw. reformiert wurden, möglichst beide Repräsentationsprinzipien zu erfüllen, sind etwa Spanien, Japan und Litauen. Technisch sind in

Litauen und Japan Zwei-Ebenen-Mischwahlsysteme vorhanden. Da keine Kompensation zwischen den Ebenen erfolgt, sondern die Entscheidungsregeln relative Mehrheitswahl und d'Hondt bzw. Hare-Niemeyer separat voneinander angewendet werden, handelt es sich konkret um Grabenwahlsysteme. Der Anteil der Verhältniswahlebene beträgt 37,5 (Japan) bzw. rund 50 Prozent (Litauen). Die Verhältniswahlebene selbst unterliegt in beiden Fällen weiteren Einschränkungen. Während das japanische Wahlsystem seine Verhältniswahlebene in Mehrpersonenwahlkreise aufteilt und dadurch die effektive Sperrklausel erhöht wird, besteht das litauische aus einem einzigen nationalen Wahlkreis. Für diesen ist dann jedoch eine relativ hohe Fünf-Prozent-Sperrklausel vorgesehen. Spaniens Wahlsystem hingegen besitzt nur eine einzige Verrechnungsebene, auf der mit d'Hondt eine Stimmverrechnungsmethode der Verhältniswahl angewendet wird. Eine technische Mischung wird durch das Nebeneinander von Mehrpersonenwahlkreisen unterschiedlicher Größe sowie durch eine formale Drei-Prozent-Hürde erreicht. Die durchschnittliche Wahlkreisgröße von 6,7 täuscht auf den ersten Blick darüber hinweg, dass sowohl Einer-Wahlkreise vorhanden sind, in denen faktisch nach Mehrheitswahl gewählt wird, als auch sehr große Wahlkreise mit Größen bis zu 36, in denen die effektive Hürde deutlich geringer ist als in Wahlkreisen der Durchschnittsgröße und auch kleinere Parteien reelle Chancen auf einen Einzug ins Parlament besitzen.

Der Blick auf Japan, Litauen und Spanien verdeutlicht, dass sehr verschiedene technische Elemente genutzt werden können, um erstens Wahlsysteme technisch zu mischen und zweitens damit eine Balance der Repräsentationsprinzipien anzustreben. Eine eindimensionale Einordnung basierend allein auf technischen Merkmalen kann jedoch dazu führen, dass Spaniens Wahlsystem unter der technischen Verhältniswahl geführt wird (Gallagher & Mitchell 2005a) und die Verwandtschaft bezüglich des Repräsentationsprinzips zu den Systemen Japans und Litauens leicht übersieht. Lijpharts (1994) einseitige Ausrichtung am *effective threshold* läuft hingegen Gefahr, substantielle Unterschiede dieser drei Wahlsysteme zu ignorieren. Auch gemäß des typologischen Rahmens (Abbildung 3.1) zu einem Typ gehörende Wahlsysteme können sich also durchaus deutlich voneinander unterscheiden, wie aus Tabelle 3.1 ersichtlich wird. Dies zeigt die Notwendigkeit einer verfeinerten Betrachtung mit Blick auf konkrete Forschungsfragen, welche die technische Dimension in ihre Sub-Dimensionen aufteilt. Neben ihrer Rahmungsfunktion besitzt die allgemeine Typologie jedoch den zusätzlichen Nutzen, dass mit ihrer Hilfe für *most similar cases design*-Studien ähnliche, und zwar gemäß Abbildung 3.1 typologisch zu einem gemeinsamen Typ zugeordnete Fälle identifiziert und deren Effekte im Detail untersucht werden können. Gerade der Vergleich von Wahlsystemen des Typs 5 kann interessant sein, um sich systematischer als bisher der Frage zu nähern, unter welchen Umständen und basierend auf welcher Kombination technischer Elemente Mischwahlsysteme das „Beste beider Welten“ darstellen können (Lijphart 1984).

Betrachtet man die Wahlsysteme, welche dem Repräsentationsprinzip der Proportionalität folgen, lassen sich ebenfalls deutliche Unterschiede in der technischen Ausgestaltung finden. Die Niederlande und Israel sind typische Fälle für Wahlsysteme, bei denen das Repräsentationsprinzip auch technisch mit einer möglichst reinen Verhältniswahl einhergeht (allgemeiner Typ 1): Es gibt nur eine Verrechnungsebene in einem landesweiten Wahlkreis. Die

Wahlkreisgröße ist somit bei gegebener Parlamentsgröße maximal. Eine gesetzliche Sperrklausel spielt entweder faktisch keine Rolle (Niederlande)¹³ oder befindet sich auf sehr geringem Niveau (Israel). Gerade die Zwei-Prozent-Hürde in Israel als sehr geringe Einschränkung der Proportionalität verdeutlicht dabei jedoch, dass die Dimensionen von Wahlsystemen jeweils als kontinuierlich verstanden werden müssen und die Einordnung konkreter Fälle eben unter Berücksichtigung dieses Umstandes mithilfe weiterer Spezifikation erfolgen sollte (vgl. die Diskussion bei Pickel & Pickel 2012). Wir ordnen Israel trotz der Sperrklausel der technischen Verhältniswahl zu, betonen aber auch, dass das Vorhandensein und die Höhe der gesetzlichen Hürde dabei nicht unberücksichtigt bleiben sollten.

Mit Irland gibt es jedoch einen Fall, der auf Proportionalität abzielt und mit *Single Transferable Vote* auch eine entsprechende Methode benutzt, aber Wahlkreise der Größe zwischen drei und fünf besitzt. Technisch gesehen ist dieses Wahlsystem daher als gemischt einzuordnen. Carey und Hix (2011) stellen heraus, dass insbesondere Wahlsysteme mit einer Median-Wahlkreisgröße von etwa fünf bis sieben am besten dazu in der Lage sind, sowohl das Ziel der Konzentration als auch das der Proportionalität gleichzeitig zu einem zufriedenstellenden Grad zu erfüllen. Als konkrete Beispiele nennen die Autoren etwa Spanien und Irland. Während für das erste der beiden Wahlsysteme gesagt werden kann, dass es die Erreichung des „Besten beider Welten“ zum Ziel hat, verdeutlicht der Fall Irland, dass das Repräsentationsprinzip bei der Beurteilung technischer Elemente und ihrer Wirkungen berücksichtigt werden muss. Während das irische Wahlsystem eindeutig mit dem Repräsentationsprinzip Proportionalität in Kraft gesetzt wurde, lässt die geringe durchschnittliche Wahlkreisgröße von 3,9 zum Beispiel Nohlen (2009a: 368) zu der Einschätzung gelangen, dass es sich um das Repräsentationsprinzip der Mehrheitswahl handle. Hier vernachlässigt Nohlen gerade das von ihm hervorgehobene Repräsentationsprinzip des Wahlsystems und begründet seine Zuordnung zur Mehrheitswahl mit der geringen Wahlkreisgröße. So entsteht ein zumindest verkürzter Eindruck vom irischen Wahlsystem. Carey und Hix (2011: 384) bringen Irland indirekt mit der Suche nach einem „sweet spot“ auf der Dimension zwischen Proportionalität und Konzentration in Verbindung. Beide Einschätzungen übersehen Unterschiede, die sich eben konkret auf die Dimension des Repräsentationsprinzips beziehen. Der Inselstaat ist somit ein Fallbeispiel dafür, dass Repräsentationsprinzip und technische Ausgestaltung eines Wahlsystems nicht deterministisch verbunden sein müssen.

Interessant ist an dieser Stelle ebenfalls der Vergleich mit dem oben besprochenen Fall Malta. Technisch gesehen sind beide Wahlsysteme nahezu identisch; aufgrund der leicht niedrigeren durchschnittlichen Wahlkreisgröße ist Malta sogar in technischer Hinsicht marginal proportionaler. In Irland soll aber mit diesem Wahlsystem Proportionalität erreicht werden, in Malta Konzentration bzw. eine Balance beider Prinzipien. An diesen Beispielen ist somit erkennbar, dass nicht nur Wahlsysteme, die dem gleichen Repräsentationsprinzip folgen, sich technisch deutlich unterscheiden können, sondern dass auch umgekehrt technisch sehr ähnliche

¹³ Zwar besitzt das niederländische Wahlsystem eine gesetzliche Sperrklausel. Da diese jedoch dem *effective threshold* gleicht, hat sie keinen Einfluss auf die Wahlergebnisse (Andeweg 2005: 497).

Wahlssysteme durchaus im Hinblick auf verschiedene Ziele konstruiert werden können. Rein technisch orientierte Typologien vernachlässigen solche Unterschiede nahezu vollständig.

Der deutsche Fall ist von seiner technischen Konstruktion vor allem durch das kompensatorische Element interessant. Es ist bereits schwierig, das Repräsentationsprinzip eindeutig festzustellen, was an dieser Stelle eine eindeutige Zuordnung zu einem bestimmten Typ verhindert. Die relativ hohe Fünf-Prozent-Hürde erlaubt es nicht, das Wahlsystem als technisch reines Verhältniswahlsystem im Stile der Niederlande einzuordnen. Spannend ist aber vor allem die Frage, wie die Existenz zweier Verrechnungsebenen und deren Verknüpfung zu bewerten ist. Als kompensatorisches Wahlsystem gleicht die obere Ebene Disproportionalitäten der unteren Ebene soweit wie möglich aus. Das heißt, dass im Gegensatz etwa zu Japan oder Litauen die Existenz einer Mehrheitswahlebene faktisch mitunter keine Rolle spielt. Wenngleich der Anteil der kompensierenden Mandate mit 50 Prozent relativ hoch ist, sah das für die Bundestagswahl 2009 geltende Wahlsystem die Möglichkeit vor, Überhangmandate an Parteien zu vergeben, die mehr Direktmandate gewannen als ihnen nach der Stimmenverteilung auf der oberen Ebene zustanden. Diese Regelung verhinderte oftmals eine vollständige Kompensation (z. B. 2009) und förderte so technisch zusätzlich die Konzentration des Parteiensystems (Nohlen 2009c: 195). Interessant ist an dieser Kompensationsregelung vor allem auch, dass der Grad der Kompensation vom Wahlverhalten abhängt – so fand etwa 1976 vollständige Kompensation statt. Diese variable Konzentrationswirkung der Verbindung der Ebenen verdeutlicht erneut, dass die Dimensionen von Wahlssystemen als kontinuierlich und kontextabhängig begriffen werden müssen und technische Details zu berücksichtigen sind.

3.7 Fazit

Dem Problem, dass die vergleichende Wahlsystemforschung bis dato keine einheitliche typologische Grundlage besitzt, begegnen wir mit der Entwicklung einer allgemeinen Typologie von Wahlssystemen. Die hier vorgestellte Typologie bietet keine Mischung als weitere Alternative, sondern synthetisiert vorhandene Ansätze und bietet damit das benötigte Grundgerüst für die vergleichende Wahlsystemforschung.

Der allgemeine typologische Rahmen (Abb. 3.1) zieht zur Einordnung von Wahlssystemen sowohl die Dimension des Repräsentationsprinzips als auch die Dimension der konkreten technischen Ausgestaltung eines Wahlsystems heran. Er ist hinreichend allgemein und einfach gehalten, um die an Typologien gestellte Anforderung der Komplexitätsreduktion zu erfüllen. Leitend ist dabei, dass das Repräsentationsprinzip bzw. das generelle Ziel eines Wahlsystems nicht deterministisch mit einer bestimmten technischen Ausgestaltung verbunden ist. Diese Einsicht erlaubt die Einordnung aller Wahlssysteme und trägt der zunehmenden Bedeutung von Mischwahlsystemen (hinsichtlich beider Dimensionen) Rechnung. Weiterhin wird erst über eine Berücksichtigung der generellen Zielstellung eines Wahlsystems eine sinnvolle Bewertung der Effekte möglich, indem diese eben als intendiert oder auch nicht-intendiert charakterisiert werden können. Gleichzeitig bietet die allgemeine Typologie die Möglichkeit, diese je nach Forschungsinteresse hinsichtlich

der beiden Hauptdimensionen Repräsentationsprinzip und technischer Ausgestaltung zu spezifizieren.

In einem zweiten Schritt haben wir eine solche Spezifikation mit Blick auf den *trade-off* zwischen technischer Mehrheits- und technischer Verhältniswahl vorgenommen. Die Berücksichtigung technischer Sub-Dimensionen in einer verfeinerten Typologie (Abb. 3.2) unterstreicht dabei, dass die gleichzeitige, nicht-deterministische Berücksichtigung von Repräsentationsprinzip und technischer Ausgestaltung bei der Einordnung und späteren Untersuchung von Wahlsystemen unabdingbar ist. Fallbeispiele wie Irland, Malta und Spanien zeigen deutlich, dass weder ein bestimmtes Repräsentationsprinzip zu einer bestimmten technischen Ausgestaltung führen muss, noch, dass eine bestimmte technische Ausgestaltung ein klares Signal für ein bestimmtes Repräsentationsprinzip darstellt. Weiterhin wird über diese genauere Betrachtung deutlich, wie Interaktionen zwischen technischen Elementen höchst relevant für die Gesamtwirkung von Wahlsystemen sind und es demnach schwierig ist, die technische Dimension bloß über eine einzelne zusammenfassende Variable abzubilden, etwa die technische Entscheidungsregel oder die durchschnittliche Wahlkreisgröße. Trotz der Einfachheit des typologischen Rahmens lassen sich über die Sub-Dimensionen somit die relevanten Details von Wahlsystemen auch für solche Studien erfassen, die auf Feinheiten der Ausgestaltung von Wahlsystemen abheben.

Insbesondere für neue Demokratien ist die gleichzeitige Berücksichtigung von Repräsentationsprinzip und technischer Ausgestaltung zentral. Einerseits ermöglicht diese die Identifizierung erfolgreicher Designs und somit sinnvoller Vorbilder. Andererseits weist die multidimensionale Typologie nachdrücklich darauf hin, dass Repräsentationsprinzipien unter verschiedenen Rahmenbedingungen mithilfe verschiedener technischer Designs besser bzw. schlechter erreicht werden können.

Die multidimensionale Typologie regt darüber hinaus zur Analyse bisher unberücksichtigter Forschungsfragen insbesondere mit Blick auf Mischwahlsysteme an: Welche technischen Mischungen rühren von einer Balance der Prinzipien her, welche sind mit einem polaren Repräsentationsprinzip verknüpft? Wann ist das „Beste beider Welten“ gewollt, wann ist es ein Produkt anderer (soziopolitischer) Einflussfaktoren? Neben diesen inhaltlichen Fragen steht jedoch auch die methodische Herausforderung der möglichst exakten Feststellung des Repräsentationsprinzips. Unsere Analyse hat einen ersten Ansatzpunkt geliefert. Weiterhin ist es aber wichtig, zu versuchen, Repräsentationsprinzipien möglichst exakt festzustellen und nach Möglichkeit über eine kategoriale Einschätzung (wie wir sie vorgenommen haben) hinauszugehen. So ließe sich ebenfalls ein möglicher Wandel des Repräsentationsprinzips pointierter feststellen. Dies könnte unter anderem für die Analyse der deutschen Reformdebatte zentral sein.

An dieser Stelle sei nochmals darauf hingewiesen, wie fruchtbar und notwendig eine enge Zusammenarbeit zwischen eher qualitativ ausgerichteten Forschern, die sich intensiv mit den Entstehungshintergründen von Wahlsystemen und deren intendierten Zielen auseinandersetzen, und quantitativ ausgerichteten Vertretern ist, die die Wirkungen bestimmter technischer Elemente und deren Kombinationen systematisch zu analysieren. Die langfristigen Ziele sind dann

eine komplette empirische Einordnung von Wahlsystemen und die systematische Untersuchung der Auswirkungen von Kombinationen unterschiedlicher technischer Elemente. Nur auf dieser Grundlage können Wahlsystemdesigner – ausgerichtet an konkreten Repräsentationsprinzipien – sinnvoll Vorschläge für technische Regeln unterbreiten, wenn Wahlsysteme zu entwickeln oder zu reformieren sind. Die bisherige einseitige Ausrichtung entweder auf die technische Ausgestaltung oder auf die Repräsentationsprinzipien vermag dies nicht zu leisten.

4 Constitutional principles of representation

This chapter appears as 'Raabe, J. (2015) Principles of representation throughout the world: Constitutional provisions and electoral systems' in the *International Political Science Review* 36(5), pp. 578-592 (DOI: 10.1177/0192512114529985). As the previous chapter has introduced the principle of representation dimension as a critical part of any electoral system, this chapter investigates constitutions as potential sources of principles of representation as a basis for a comparative assessment.

4.1 Introduction

When investigating the role of electoral systems, we are used to detailed analyses of the effects of specific technical elements on outcomes such as the disproportionality between vote and seat shares, minority representation, MP behavior, and government formation. However, much less frequently do we have information about whether a particular electoral system, notwithstanding its exact technical design, is supposed to follow a specific principle and achieve a particular normative goal. Automatically associating specific technical designs (especially pure PR and first-past-the-post) with specific normative goals and deriving design implications based on outcomes might be highly problematic if designers of technically similar systems have followed different normative agendas. So far, mostly case studies (e.g. in Gallagher & Mitchell 2005a) assess whether electoral systems are supposed to follow a principle or whether they rather were the result of diffusion processes or self-interested bargaining lacking a genuine principle. The consideration of this principle dimension of electoral systems could add tremendously to our ability of thoroughly evaluating electoral system performance and, eventually, supplying practical advice (see Gallagher 2005b: 568; Farrell 2011: 188 in this context).

While there is an abundance of detailed and fairly unambiguous information about the technical design of electoral systems, the situation is radically different when it comes to the principle dimension. However, one line of argument suggests a (nearly) universal and rather parsimonious way of learning about an electoral system's overall goal. This argument posits that the choice of an electoral system is a decision of constitutional importance when setting up the institutional framework and that – as a result of this choice – the general principle of an electoral system will be included into a country's constitution (see Nohlen 1984, 2009a; Lijphart 1991, 1999). Specifically, designers ought to be deciding between the accurate (proportional) reflection of citizens' opinions and the production of stable majorities as competing general principles of representation for the electoral system. This principled decision then would imply a clear guideline for the respective electoral system – of whichever technical design – and its evaluation (see especially Nohlen 1984, 2009a) and at the same time provide for a high level of (constitutional) protection to this key institution. A survey of constitutions could thus prove tremendously helpful in closing the gap of the neglected principle dimension in electoral system research.

Therefore, the following pages will explore constitutional documents as a source of principles of representation and offer a first assessment of the potential causes and consequences of constitutional embeddedness. In surveying constitutions, two central tasks are at hand: first, the analysis will assess whether constitutions indeed typically convey information about the electoral system and especially their general guiding principles or whether this function is contingent upon contextual factors. Second, the focus will be on what types of principles are stated, what they demand from election outcomes and what they imply for the technical design of the electoral system. Addressing these questions will then also speak to the general validity of constitutional provisions for measuring overall goals of electoral systems.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, we will revisit the argument of the electoral system as being of constitutional importance for polities, derive expectation as to the content of constitutional provisions, and consider potential causes and consequences of the constitutional embeddedness of the electoral system. Second, the methodological approach of soliciting information about the principle of representation from constitutions is discussed. Third, an empirical overview based on the analysis of the currently valid constitutions of 86 democracies is presented and – in combination with information about the technical design of electoral systems – used to carry out the tasks outlined above. Finally, the conclusion suggests fruitful avenues for future research.

4.2 The constitutional embeddedness of the principle of representation

When defining the *principle of representation*, Dieter Nohlen (1984: 86) poses ‘the question as to the political goals of political representation concerning the aggregate nationwide outcome of elections’ and clarifies that this principle is related to the technical design of an electoral system as an end is to its means – where the latter may differ given the circumstances (see also Katz 1997: 309; Chapter 3). When considering the overall normative goal of an electoral system – ‘what you want your legislature and executive government to look like’ (Reynolds et al. 2005: 9) – we are concerned exactly with this overall principle without assuming it based on the technical design of an electoral system.

For Lijphart (1991, 1999), Nohlen (1984, 2009a), and Powell (2000) the decision for such an overall principle carries great implications for the overall style of democracy practiced in a given country. Generally, a choice has to be made between a majoritarian and a consensus vision of democracy. In this framework, the associated decision for what the electoral system is supposed to produce as an aggregate outcome and how it should shape a country’s political landscape is seen as a landmark decision of political system design (Powell 2000; Birch 2003: 8; Norris 2004: 66-77). Following this logic of competing styles of democracy, an electoral system may either be called upon to foster the formation of accountable (single-party) governments and limit the fragmentation of the party system or to facilitate the accurate (proportional) representation of the different political interests of the citizenry – importantly including various minority groups – within the parliament (see, e.g., Dunleavy & Margetts 1995; Norris 1997; Pinto-Duschinsky 1999;

Przeworski et al. 1999; Farrell 2011: 10-11; Bernauer et al. 2015). These two principles are usually understood as incompatible and thus present system designers with a crucial trade-off decision (Rae 1967; Duverger 1984; Taagepera & Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994: 144; Reynolds et al. 2005: 9-15).¹⁴

Due to the wide-ranging implications associated with the choice of a principle of representation, it is commonly held that this choice is a 'vital element in democratic constitutional design' (Lijphart 1991: 72) leading to the principle of representation's inclusion into a country's constitution (Steiner 1971: 64; Nohlen 1984, 2009a: 145; Lijphart 1991). The choice of the specific technical design is then left to ordinary law (e.g., Reynolds et al. 2005: 20). This expectation also seems reasonable when considering that constitutions are supposed to state and protect the key rules and general guiding principles forming the building blocks of a democratic political system (see Brennan & Hamlin 2008; Elkins 2010). While constitutions lend special attention and, even more importantly, protection to these principles (Benoit 2007: 382; Flinders 2010: 55), the more specific institutional design may then typically be undertaken via ordinary law (Brennan & Casas 1991: 54). Following the above, it may thus be assumed that the principle of representation is defined within any constitution.

However, research on electoral systems as well as on constitutions suggests that the existence of constitutional principles might vary between polities. First, and contrary to what is suggested above, an electoral system may lack a clear-cut principle of representation. This seems especially likely if elite bargaining leads to a compromise without a genuine principle (see Birch 2003: 3-27). Second, the need for flexibility in reforming the electoral system and/or for broad support of the constitution might affect the propensity of a particular principle entering the constitution (Taagepera 1999a: 14; Brennan & Hamlin 2008: 340; Melton et al. 2013: 403). Third – as is the case with constitutions generally (Elkins 2010) and also the technical design of electoral systems (Blais & Massicotte 1997) – patterns of constitutional embeddedness might arise in regional clusters resulting from shared sociopolitical developments as well as diffusion processes. And finally, principles of representation could themselves lead to different patterns of embeddedness. For example, the demand for proportional representation is often tied closely to the process of democratization including the inherently democratic (Elkins 2010: 974) writing of constitutions. The election of representatives from single-member districts, on the other hand, is an older concept not always clearly tied to a general normative principle of constitutional rank. The first part of the empirical analysis will therefore assess *whether the constitutional embeddedness of principles of representation is indeed universal or whether it is contingent upon different contextual factors*.

When it comes to the content of constitutional principles, it is typically claimed that the decision for such principle is dichotomous – one may either go for concentrating the party system or for

¹⁴ Other potential goals (such as personal or territorial/constituency representation) may occasionally be of similar importance but in any case are not necessarily part of an accentuated trade-off. For instance, personal representation in single-member districts may be ensured within a system that produces relatively proportional outcomes via using an additional nationwide electoral district as is the case, for example, in Germany.

proportional representation while meeting halfway is no reasonable option (Nohlen 1984: 85-87, 2009a: 138; Sartori 1997: 53; Colomer 2004: 58). Yet, in light of the surge of mixed electoral systems and their latent promise of reaching a superior middle-ground in electoral system design (see Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a; Carey & Hix 2011), this dichotomy-claim seems unconvincing. The emphasis put on a compromise between different normative goals among political scientists and system designers (see, e.g., Birch 2003: 28-51) points toward a continuous understanding of the principle dimension. Accordingly, the general principle of an electoral system may well be a mixed one – whether or not it is paired with a multi-tier electoral system. Therefore, constitutions will be assessed as to *what types of – pure and mixed – principles are stated and whether a subset of constitutions demand a balance between antithetic pure principles.*

Turning to the implications of constitutional principles of representation, it is essential to consider whether and how constitutional embeddedness affects design and stability of an electoral system, i.e. whether and how constitutional embeddedness matters. The above stated means-end relationship of design and principle might call into question a deterministic association between these dimensions. Given variations in sociopolitical circumstances, different countries may rely on different technical designs to fulfil similar goals or vice versa. For instance, the normative goal of proportional representation may be combined with a mixed-member electoral system – suggesting that neither does the principle of proportional representation necessitate a pure PR system nor does the existence of a mixed system necessarily signal the desire for a balance between different principles. Hence, *it is expected that the same general principles are paired with varying technical designs and vice versa.* Evidence for this would cast doubt on the often implicit assumption that a specific technical design unmistakably signals a specific normative desire. Where the above suggests a certain level of indeterminacy of constitutional principles regarding the actual technical design of an electoral system, it is plausible that such principles affect specific technical elements in the same manner even under varying contextual situations. District magnitude, prompting an ‘effective threshold’ (Lijphart 1994: 27), and the legal threshold stand out as two factors which are most closely linked to the trade-off between proportional representation and the fostering of a legislative majority (Lijphart 1994). A pure constitutional principle (e.g. proportionality), functioning as a focal point for design and lending uplifted legal protection – rendering reform more complicated and making possible an appeal to the constitutional court – should lead to a more pure technical design. Via rendering the adoption of technical rules running counter to the respective principle less likely, *constitutional embeddedness of pure principles can be expected to lead to, in the case of the proportionality principle, lower (legal and effective) thresholds and to higher thresholds in the case of the majority principle.*

Finally, notwithstanding the exact technical design, constitutional embeddedness and the ensuing superior legal protection for the principle of representation should lead to greater stability of an electoral system. This is because constitutional amendments typically require legislative supermajorities – two-thirds majorities are the norm and in the (e.g., Danish) case where an absolute majority is sufficient, a successful popular referendum has to confirm the amendment. Furthermore, constitutional provisions regarding the electoral system supply constitutional

courts with considerable leverage to repeal reform bills. Therefore, *constitutional embeddedness can be expected to lead to greater resilience of an electoral system against electoral reform.*

4.3 Surveying constitutions

The cases under investigation include the currently valid constitutions in 86 democracies according to the 2011 Polity IV index (see Marshall et al. 2012). New Zealand, San Marino and the United Kingdom were excluded from the sample as they neither possess a written constitution nor a clearly identifiable collection of constitutional documents. Constitutional texts were gathered from official sources (governmental or parliamentary institutions) as well as from the Oxford Constitutions of the World archive.¹⁵ The following empirical overview is concerned with electoral systems responsible for the seat distribution in national parliaments.¹⁶ Thus, the data collection has focused exclusively on passages concerning elections to the unicameral legislature or the lower house of a bicameral legislature. Accordingly, the relevant passages referring to the electoral system are usually contained in the sections dealing with the legislative branch of government. Less frequently, the sections dealing with general principles for the political system overall and specific sections concerned with elections or the electoral system included (additional) relevant passages.

As concerns principles of representation, after an initial identification of the relevant passages these were investigated as to whether they conveyed general principle(s) or goal(s) as to what the electoral system is supposed to achieve at large. As regards the substantial content of these passages, it was expected that statements of general principles would circle around the trade-off between concentrating the party system and fostering accurate reflection of public opinion. However, constitutional passages were read in an open-minded way in order to also consider potential other goals not expected to be defined within the constitution (such as personal representation; see Colomer 2011). In order to provide the reader with both the original as well as with more comprehensive, processed information, the appendix (Appendix A) includes the relevant constitutional passages stating a general principle as well as a grouping-variable while more condensed information is presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. According to the expectations derived above, principles were allocated to the following groups: 'proportionality principle' and 'majority principle' (following Steiner 1971) as well as what Nohlen, Sartori and others would probably consider residual categories, 'mixed principle', and 'other principle' (including those principles which cannot be associated clearly with the central proportionality-majority trade-off). For countries whose constitutions do mention the electoral system and where deciding whether the text refers to a general principle was not straightforward and actually went in the direction of 'no principle stated', Appendix A includes explanations as to the coding decision. In order to

¹⁵ The latter can be accessed online at <http://oxcon.ouplaw.com/>.

¹⁶ It should also be noted that constitutional provisions concerning the right to vote (e.g., that the vote is free) are not considered as being part of the electoral system as they do not affect the way in which votes are transferred into seats in the parliament.

investigate the link between principle and technical design, Golder and Bormann’s (2013) dataset on the technical design of electoral systems will be used in addition to the constitution data.

Since, despite all efforts to avoid this, the coding of constitutional texts by a few individuals may not be entirely free of coder-bias, two strategies have been adopted in order to alleviate this problem. First, similar to the strategy employed by the researchers within the Comparative Constitutions Project (see Melton et al. 2013), the identification of relevant text passages and the substantial codings were discussed by two coders who then agreed on a final coding. Second, Appendix A will provide readers with the original text so that readers may scrutinize the coding decisions.

4.4 Assessing constitutional principles of representation

Constitutional embeddedness

Out of 86 countries surveyed 42 countries’ constitutions neither include information about principles of representation nor about the technical procedure used to convert votes into seats (these countries are listed in Appendix A). Thus, while a slight majority of 44 countries at least either specify a guiding principle or a technical procedure, the argument that constitutions typically include a statement about the general normative goal of the electoral system is clearly called into question by the empirical evidence. Clearly, the electoral system is not always included in the constitution of a country and thus constitutional entrenchment has to be considered a contingent phenomenon. Table 4.1 presents the results – listing the countries whose constitutions include provisions about the electoral system by region – and offers a starting point for the assessment of factors which might affect constitutional embeddedness.

Table 4.1: Constitutional provisions

<i>Region</i>	<i>Principle stated</i>	<i>Technical procedure stated</i>	<i>N</i>
Eastern Europe	7 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia)	2 (Albania, Georgia)	19
Western Europe	9 (Austria, Denmark , Finland, Iceland, Ireland , Malta , Norway , Portugal , Sweden)	11 (Belgium, Denmark , Ireland , Luxembourg, Malta , Netherlands, Norway , Portugal , Spain, Sweden , Switzerland)	19
Latin America	6 (Bolivia , Colombia , Costa Rica, Mexico , Peru, Uruguay)	8 (Bolivia , Brazil, Colombia , El Salvador, Mexico , Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay)	16
Other	4 (East Timor, Israel, Kenya , Turkey)	8 (Cape Verde, Comoros, Kenya , Liberia, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand)	32
All	26	29	86

Notes: Countries highlighted bold state both a principle and a technical procedure in their constitution; Regions are based on Golder and Borman (2013).

Table 4.1 includes a majority of the countries surveyed and underlines that constitutional entrenchment of the electoral system occurs frequently (but far from universally). Yet, Table 4.1 also differentiates between statements of genuine principles and of general technical procedures via which votes are to be converted into seats. Including this information ensures that, even if the constitution is not explicit in defining, e.g., majority facilitation as an overall goal, the possibility that defining a technical procedure is also meant to imply a principle of representation is not ignored.¹⁷ Yet, if we fully differentiate between these types of statements, it becomes obvious that actually only a minority of constitutions (26) define genuine principles for the electoral system. We will later revisit this distinction.

Turning to the assessment of the contingency of constitutional embeddedness and regional differences, Table 4.1 clearly shows that the constitutional provisions concerning the electoral system are especially common in Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, Eastern Europe and Latin America. In Western Europe, 14 countries deal with key aspects of the electoral system in their constitution with nine constitutions specifying a genuine principle. In Latin America, six out of 16 countries explicitly state a principle (with four additional constitutions specifying only a technical procedure). In Eastern Europe, those countries leaving electoral system matters to non-constitutional law are in the majority. Here, only seven of 19 constitutions include a principle statement while two additional constitutions state a technical procedure. The regions of Europe and Latin America then account for 22 out of 26 countries stating a principle of representation and 33 out of 44 countries whose constitutions include key provisions about the electoral system. In sum, regional clustering seems (likely based on common historical developments and processes of diffusion) to occur – with Western European countries typically dealing with the electoral system in their constitution – but hardly accounts fully for patterns of constitutional embeddedness. As will become apparent below, the consideration of further parameters even suggests that the correlation between region and constitutional embeddedness is spurious.

Going beyond regional patterns, elite bargaining resulting in compromise electoral systems and the necessity to gather broad support for a constitution seem to affect the constitutional embeddedness of the electoral system. This connection is suggested by the literature on electoral system development in Eastern Europe (e.g., Birch 2003). This literature highlights the co-occurrence of the desire – in part caused by the high level of uncertainty about future election outcomes – to serve collective interests and integrate society (see also Benoit 2007: 381) and the relatively frequent constitutional entrenchment of electoral systems in the region, strikingly often in the form of a principle-statement (see Table 4.1). At the same time, countries such as Bulgaria, Croatia or Hungary – lacking a constitutionally embedded electoral system – experienced intense

¹⁷ The Irish case highlights that distinguishing between the proportionality principle and the use of proportional representation as a technical procedure is not always straightforward. Even though the Irish constitution refers to the ‘system of proportional representation’ it is coded as including a principled statement (which is also in line with the case study literature; see Gallagher 2005a). This is done since the constitution also refers to the technical procedure by which this principle is to be fulfilled – the single transferable vote system (see Table 4.1). In all other cases, the use of the term ‘system’ in association with proportional representation has been coded as to refer to a technical procedure instead of a general principle.

bargaining between new and old elites with the result of compromise systems without a general principle (Shugart & Wattenberg 2001c: 579; Benoit 2005). In Western Europe, Germany (Scarrow 2001) and France (Elgie 2005: 119-121) experienced complex bargaining over the electoral system resulting in a lack of constitutional provisions. In France, different parties finally agreed upon the electoral system but were divided on whether or not to make it constitutional (Wahl 1959: 366-367). In Italy, the desire for continued flexibility in electoral system design seems to have been the key reason for the lack of constitutional entrenchment (Baldini 2011: 645-647). Considering countries whose constitutions include principles of representation, Ireland (Gallagher 2005a: 512), Israel (Rahat & Hazan 2005: 334-336), and Switzerland (Lutz 2004) are examples of how there existed general agreement over the importance of proportional representation and its potential to foster broad (popular and elite) support for the constitution. Thus, pending in-depth assessment of constitutional choices, the above suggests the following: under circumstances in which electoral system choice is not based heavily on strategic partisan interests it is more likely that provisions about the electoral system will be included into the constitution.

Finally, differences between countries and regions might also be caused by electoral systems and principles of representation themselves. The co-evolution of PR and democratization in Europe (see Blais et al. 2005) and the inclusiveness of proportional representation as well as its potential to generate widespread support seem to render the proportionality principle prone to be included into constitutions. On the contrary, as mixed electoral systems often result from bargaining revolving around the antithetic principles of majority and proportionality (Birch 2003; Benoit 2007), they seem less likely to be perceived as following a normative principle deserving of constitutional protection. Furthermore, the case study literature discloses that in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States system designers ‘were hardly aware that they had “chosen” an electoral system’ (Gallagher 2005b: 538-539). Consequently, the respective constitutions would not have to include a principle-statement because there was no awareness of a principled choice to be made. In order to assess the potential consequences of such differences among electoral systems and their principles, the analysis now turns to the content of the constitutional provisions.

What types of principles are proclaimed?

When it comes to the content of constitutional provisions, the proportionality principle is mentioned overwhelmingly often: 22 out of 26 countries stating a principle proclaim the proportionality principle (see Table 4.2; Appendix A for detailed information). At the same time, it is striking that none of the constitutional principles is that of majority.¹⁸ Therefore, on the constitutional level, the proportionality principle is well established whereas its antipode as well as mixed and other principles are rarely, in the case of majority never, featured in the constitution. It thus appears that different principles indeed vary in their propensity to be embedded

¹⁸ It has to be noted, however, that Mexico refers to the ‘majority principle’ for one of the tiers of the electoral system. Furthermore, the constitution of the Czech Republic declares the majority principle for Senate elections (Art. 18(2)).

constitutionally. Comparing these findings with those regarding the constitutional statement of a general technical procedure suggests that the key differences seem to rest with the normative principle dimension. Although still only two constitutions (Comoros and Liberia) clearly state that a plurality system will be used in single-member districts,¹⁹ the overrepresentation of proportionality as a stated principle is not mirrored by a similar overrepresentation among constitutions stating a technical procedure. In the latter category, PR systems account for 60 per cent of the cases. Looking at all electoral systems in the dataset shows how this percentage closely reflects the percentage of PR systems among all electoral systems (see Table 4.2). The most intriguing difference between statements of principles and of technical procedures concerns mixed principles/electoral systems. While genuine mixed principles are rarely stated, mixed technical procedures are relatively often. Does this imply that, although mixed systems are also fairly often embedded constitutionally, they at the same time lack a guiding normative idea? This would be quite contrary to the idea that these systems often aim at providing a superior middle ground and could be part of the reason why institutional features of these systems are strategically exploited by party elites (see, e.g., Bochslers 2012). A closer look at individual countries will disclose whether there also exist mixed principles aiming for a balance between majority and proportionality goals.

Table 4.2: Overview over different groups of countries

Countries with constitutional provisions				All countries
	<i>Principle of representation</i> (N = 26)		<i>Technical procedure</i> (N = 30 ^b)	<i>Technical procedure</i> ^a (N = 86)
Majority	0 (0 per cent)	Plurality/ Majority	2 (7 per cent)	19 (22 per cent)
Mixed	2 (8 per cent)	MMM/MMP	10 (33 per cent)	17 (20 per cent)
Proportionality	22 (84 per cent)	PR (incl. STV)	18 (60 per cent)	50 (58 per cent)
Other	2 (8 per cent)			

Notes: ^aBased on Golder and Bormann (2013);

^bDenmark is counted twice both as MMP and as PR since the constitution allows for both.

Starting with a closer look at the proportionality principle, constitutional provisions typically adhere closely to the associated normative concept, most frequently stating that elections shall be ‘in accordance with the principles of proportional representation’ (e.g., Austria, Czech Republic; see Appendix A). In an alternative, multiple constitutions make explicit that the parliamentary seat distribution has to equal the vote distribution among parties (e.g., Bolivia, Norway, and Sweden). Furthermore, a few constitutions refer to the concept of inclusive representation lying behind the proportionality principle. For example, the Costa Rican constitution states

¹⁹ Other constitutions of countries with majority/plurality elections only speak of single-member districts (e.g., India and Malawi) yet make no mention of the exact technical procedure, leaving – at least theoretically – room for a host of different systems to be implemented.

'representation of minorities' and 'political pluralism' as goals. The Danish constitution demands the electoral system to 'secure equal representation of the various opinions of the electorate'.

From a mixed principle of representation one would expect that the constitutional statement made concessions to the majority principle alongside the proportionality goal, calling for a balance between pure principles. In this regard, four constitutions stand out as they proclaim principles which differ from what a dichotomous choice between proportionality and majority would suggest. The Mexican constitution refers to the 'majority principle' with respect to the single-member district tier of its mixed electoral system and to the 'proportional representation principle' with regard to the PR tier. Mexico's constitution thus explicitly demands a combination of both principles and may thus be read to state a mixture on the dimension between proportionality and majority. Likewise, Turkey's constitution has been coded as conveying a mixed principle. Yet, Turkey's constitution even explicitly refers to the trade-off inherent in electoral system design, clearly aiming at balance as '[t]he electoral laws shall be drawn up in such a way as to reconcile the principles of fair representation and consistency in administration'. While one could debate the Mexican case, the Turkish case clearly highlights how the general normative guideline for an electoral system may well be placed in-between the extremes of proportional representation and majority-facilitating concentration of the party system. Although these cases of mixed principles are exceptional, they still emphasize that a general goal for an electoral system need not derive exclusively from a dichotomous choice between two extremes. These findings show how mixed electoral systems do not necessarily lack a guiding principle, even though overall there are relatively few mixed principles.²⁰

When it comes to the principles of representation in Kenya's and Serbia's constitutions, it is less clear whether they can be placed on the same dimension as the principles discussed above and thus count as mixed principles. These two constitutions were therefore coded conservatively to state an 'other principle'. Kenya's constitution calls for 'fair representation', 'fair representation of persons with disabilities' and requires that at least one-third of the parliament consists of female MPs. The Serbian constitution states similar demands in a slightly less precise fashion in that it calls for the provision of 'equality and representation of different genders and members of national minorities'. As these constitutional provisions demand fair inclusion of specific sociodemographic groups, they may also be understood to constitute mixed principles if we assume that fostering unambiguous government formation is the goal with which these demands have to be reconciled.

Thus, overall, the central trade-off between providing accurate representation of public opinion and concentrating the party system indeed seems to be the key choice to be made within the constitution – bearing in mind that only 26 out of 86 constitutions clearly state a principle for the electoral system. Yet, while proportionality is called for by many constitutions and while other principles present a balance of the antithetic general goals, the majority principle is basically

²⁰ The Venezuelan constitution, which was not part of the sample for this analysis, provides another example of a combination of principles in that both proportionality and personal representation are required (Art. 63 of the Venezuelan constitution; see also Shugart & Wattenberg 2001c: 577).

absent from constitutions throughout the world. Based on the evidence it appears that although the trade-off dimension is identified correctly by electoral system researchers, the idea of the majority principle as a (literally) constitutional goal may be called into question. Potential reasons are that the majority principle is unlikely to generate support by all or most veto players during the constitution making process and that majority electoral systems are seen as the traditional way of choosing representatives not in need of constitutional entrenchment. However, caution is in order with these conclusions for the sample of constitutions including a principle of representation consists largely of European and Latin American countries – even though the East Timorese, Kenyan and Turkish constitutions also fit the overall pattern. The question of whether the absence of majority as a constitutional principle is partly based on this principle being applied mainly in regions in which it is uncommon to state a constitutional goal for the electoral system has to be tackled by future research.

Consequences of constitutional embeddedness

Is it warranted to assume that the same general goal leads to uniform technical design? Assessing the proportionality principle would at first sight suggest that principle choice and technical design are indeed closely associated. Golder and Bormann (2013) classify 21 countries out of 22 which proclaim the proportionality principle as also having a proportional electoral system (Bolivia being the exception in using an MMP electoral system). Yet, a closer look reveals how Malta and Ireland combine the proportionality principle with the STV system with fairly small district magnitudes. Israel votes in a single nation-wide district whereas, for example, Portugal uses multi-member districts. Furthermore, seven out of these 22 countries use national top-up seats to compensate for disproportionalities arising due to the use of multi-member districts of varying sizes (e.g. Austria and Denmark). And finally, legal thresholds of varying height are applied. Thus, the same general normative goal is combined with very different technical designs. Reasons for this may be highly idiosyncratic as in the Irish case where system designers desired proportional results but were unaware of suitable technical options other than STV (Gallagher 2005a: 513). Whereas these nuanced differences might be of minor importance, an investigation of principles other than proportionality underscores that principle clearly does not dictate design and vice versa. While the mixed principle in Mexico's constitution is paired with a mixed (MMM) electoral system using two independent tiers to elect MPs, the Turkish case shows how mixed principles need not indicate the implementation of mixed-member electoral systems. Here, a PR electoral system with multi-member districts is accompanied by a very high legal threshold of ten per cent. That different means may be called upon to achieve the same ends may also be inferred from comparing the electoral systems of Kenya and Serbia: although both call for representation of women and minorities, Kenya uses a rather special mixed system (with a PR-tier ensuring the election of at least one third female MPs and a plurality tier for all other seats²¹), whereas Serbia uses one nationwide PR district and exempts minority parties from the five per cent threshold. Costa Rica also calls for minority representation yet employs PR in multi-member districts

²¹ A similar system has been applied in New Zealand before the introduction of the MMP system, highlighting that minority representation may also be achieved via non-PR means (see Lijphart 1986).

without any legal threshold. In sum, the expectation that the same general principle is paired with varying technical designs and vice versa is borne out especially when looking at technical details. Obviously, it is unlikely that any country would consider a first-past-the-post system to be suitable to fulfil the proportionality principle. Nonetheless, system designers in different countries seem to make use of the many potential ways of reaching the same normative goals with a myriad of technical designs.

After highlighting that technical design is not dictated by constitutional principles, the remainder of the analysis seeks to explore the practical consequences of constitutional provisions. Regarding the expectation that the existence of a constitutional principle will lead to more pure technical design, the evidence is inconclusive. Neither for average district magnitude nor for the height of the legal threshold is there any evidence that constitutionally embedded systems aiming for proportionality are significantly different from their non-embedded counterparts.²² Furthermore, there are no meaningful differences between regions suggesting that the ‘purity’ of proportional electoral systems is generally not enhanced through the existence of constitutional principles. Are constitutional provisions thus more or less meaningless and unable to protect certain normative goals? When it comes to specific technical elements, the answer may very well be ‘it depends’ as, for example, legal thresholds do not seem to be regarded as violating the principle of proportionality by many electoral system designers (for example in Eastern Europe, see Birch 2003: 11). Kostadinova (2002: 31) also concludes that ‘the electoral threshold emerges as a powerful mechanism for reducing fragmentation in the assembly [...] without changing the fundamentals of the system itself’. Comparing Austria and Estonia who each set out the proportionality principle in their constitution and both employ a legal threshold (four per cent in Austria, five in Estonia), this threshold has been contested with reference to the constitutional text heavily in Estonia (Taagepera 1999a: 11-12) while no such reform pressure exists in Austria (Müller 2005: 408). This contrast even carries to the constitutional level: while the Icelandic constitution invokes a legal threshold alongside the proportionality principle (Art. 31), a legal threshold is prohibited by the Portuguese constitution (Art. 152). Whereas the legal threshold does often seem to be viewed as belonging to a standard proportional electoral system, legal thresholds are explicitly used to strike a balance between the majority and proportionality principles in Turkey, and, to a lesser extent, in Spain (see Hopkin 2005). Thus variation in the way that legal thresholds are used not only highlight again that principle choice does not determine technical design, but also that the impact of constitutional embeddedness on the ‘purity’ of the electoral system hinges upon what different societies deem as violating, e.g., the proportionality principle. A similar potential reason for the lack of impact of constitutional embeddedness on district magnitude could be that oftentimes regional boundaries are used to group parliamentary seats into different districts. This distribution of seats to regions itself follows a logic of proportional representation (for example in Costa Rica) which may then lead to relatively low average district magnitude (e.g. in Finland or Switzerland). In this case then, low magnitude is not seen as violating the proportionality principle – Ireland is also a case in point (see Gallagher 2005a: 512-517). Looking at technical details, the above discussion suggests that especially legal

²² The corresponding OLS regression results are included in the appendix (Appendix A).

thresholds may come under attack based on constitutional provisions but that constitutional embeddedness has no uniform impact on such details.

Again revisiting country narratives, it seems that the more clear-cut impact of constitutional principles is on the longevity and stability of the overall electoral system. Countries lacking a constitutional principle experience constant quarrels over and significant changes of the electoral system – for example France and Italy (Elgie 2005; Baldini 2011) – and wide discrepancies between competing reform options (e.g. in Romania 2007; Nikolenyi 2011: 618-620). On the other hand, constitutional embeddedness has led to the stability of the electoral system, protecting it against self-interested proposals by singular parties in many cases (see, e.g., Gallagher 2005a: 514; Benoit 2007: 382; Nikolenyi 2011). Birch (2003: 32) cites constitutional embeddedness as a key explanation of the variation in electoral system stability in Eastern Europe. The case of the Czech Republic highlights how constitutional embeddedness may protect an electoral system in two important ways: first, in 1999 a majoritarian reform of the constitutionally embedded PR system failed as the governing coalition planning the reform lost their three-fifths majority in the Senate necessary for constitutional amendment. Later, a similar reform alternative was largely trumped by the constitutional court with reference to the constitutional principle of proportionality (see Nikolenyi 2011: 617-618). In Slovenia in 1996 even the outcome of a popular referendum was overruled by the constitutional court in favour of the PR electoral system (Birch 2003: 32). Thus, next to the increased legal protection (typically, even a two-thirds majority is needed to amend a constitution), a constitutional principle of representation may function as a point of reference for judges as they evaluate the constitutionality of a reform proposal. In sum, the case study literature appears to echo the expectation that constitutional embeddedness leads to greater resilience of the electoral system against electoral reform.

Finally, in light of these mixed findings, it is essential to address potential issues concerning the validity of inferring general normative goals from constitutional texts. While the empirical evidence suggests that constitutional principles typically emerge where the goal of the electoral system is commonly agreed upon and where uncertainty about future election outcomes is high, this is not to say that constitution drafters would never succeed in strategically placing insincere principles into constitutions. Here, future research will need to investigate individual constitutional choices more closely in search for such insincere normative provisions. Yet, based on the case study literature cited above, the validity of constitutional texts might be questioned more strongly from another perspective: should interpretations of principles vary between countries or constitutional provisions be outdated because normative preferences have changed, the measurement of the principle dimension solely based on constitutional texts would probably be a fallacious strategy. However, the evidence shows that constitutional embeddedness has an impact (even if not consistently so for technical details) and also that the content of constitutional principles can usually be linked to ‘electoral system reality’ in a meaningful way with little to no evidence that constitutional provisions are outdated or of negligible significance.

4.5 Conclusion

The survey of constitutions has disclosed multiple interesting findings which in part call for a reassessment of some common claims in electoral system research. On the one hand, the exploration of constitutional embeddedness highlights that to fully capture the normative principle dimension of electoral systems solely looking at constitutions will not suffice as only an overall minority of 26 constitutions include an overarching normative principle for the electoral system. On the other hand, the analysis has shown that neglecting the principle dimension could lead to serious misconceptions when inferring normative goals from technical design and evaluating electoral systems based on false assumptions. It has also revealed that constitutional embeddedness appears to positively affect the stability of the electoral system. It is thus important to consider constitutional embeddedness for methodological and substantial purposes. Moreover, this analysis emphasizes how the combination of a parsimonious general source and information about individual cases is very fruitful for theory development. In that spirit, the closing paragraphs map out paths for future research as they emerge from the empirical analysis.

Regarding the principle dimension of the electoral system, future research should not only consider the means-ends connection between design and principle, but focus on the dominance of the proportionality principle on the constitutional level. The key question is whether this dominance is due to (idiosyncratic or regional) historic developments or whether the proportionality principle is considered to be more worthy of constitutional entrenchment than other principles. Answering this question would go a long way in explaining patterns of electoral reform and address the hypothesis that, eventually, only PR electoral systems will remain (Colomer 2004; but see Harfst 2013).

Furthermore, mixed electoral systems remain an intriguing topic as, similar to the question of whether they present a superior middle-ground or a poor compromise, the assessment of constitutions suggests that genuinely mixed normative principles exist but are few in number. Hence, other mixed systems may come without any consistent principle upon which they could be evaluated unambiguously. Similarly, specific technical elements such as legal thresholds are not seen as violating the proportionality principle in some countries yet are clearly linked to the majority principle in others. The task of disentangling the principle dimension and the technical design of electoral system calls for research which assesses these seeming inconsistencies.

Finally, a crucial question for future research is that of whether and when constitutional principles make a difference. Does it matter that the electoral system is embedded in the constitution? An initial assessment has shown that the effects for the specifics of any electoral system appear to be contingent upon contextual factors. At the same time, constitutional embeddedness appears to be leading toward greater stability of the overall electoral system. These preliminary findings demand increased theoretical and empirical scrutiny. A closer investigation of the consequences of constitutional embeddedness could also help to assess whether the role of the electoral system is always as consequential as commonly assumed. Especially for new democracies whose founding fathers may be stuck between aiming for institutional stability and a sufficient level of institutional flexibility research on these questions should be of great use.

5 Theoretical expectations

This chapter's task is to map out the general theoretical arguments that will be tested in the individual empirical chapters. The latter will expand on the arguments and ideas discussed here, formulate the respective hypotheses and test them in different ways in order to reach an in-depth understanding of when (mixed) electoral systems are able to provide both proportional representation and party system concentration. Building on the typology developed in Chapter 3, the theoretical arguments presented here – and within the empirical chapters – build explanations that fill the gaps in the electoral system literature as outlined in the literature review in Chapter 2. The first part of this chapter focuses on the two key dimensions of electoral systems – the technical design and the principle of representation dimension – as the building blocks for an efficient overall performance. The second part discusses how the trade-off between proportionality and concentration may take on different shapes and in which way the ingredients outlined in the first part determine the exact shape of this key trade-off and hence the chances for the best compared to the risks of the worst of both worlds.

5.1 Ingredients of a successful performance

This chapter is concerned with mapping out those ingredients of a successful performance of an electoral system that all those involved can actually shape on a short-term basis. The sociopolitical context of a country is typically highly stable and, while important to consider as a potential restriction of what the electoral system can achieve, is not where design advice is likely to be helpful. Hence, the theoretical argument focuses on the two key dimensions of electoral systems, the technical design and the principle of representation as genuine electoral system factors. These two dimensions can be affected directly (obviously barring some restrictions) by politicians and experts. So the ingredients for an overall efficient performance of an electoral system concern the exact technical design and whether the system has an overarching normative goal guiding design as well as eventual behavior under the electoral system. Uniformity assumptions with respect to general design types are potentially misleading – we ought to be wary whether mixed-member or PR electoral systems are paired with legal thresholds, about the size of the respective tiers in mixed-member systems, and about other compensatory arrangements as well as further details. In the same way, it is also essential to move past assumptions which link specific technical designs to certain overall principles in a deterministic fashion and, in consequence, are partially blind to what the technical design of an electoral system is actually meant to achieve. The following is a discussion of the key ingredients of an electoral system and how they (in combination) should relate to a successful balance of proportionality and concentration that represents the best of both worlds in electoral system performance.

Shifting the attention from general propositions to technical details

When it comes to the question of how to reach the best of both worlds, previous research has equipped us with two general propositions as outlined in Chapter 2: PR electoral systems with moderate district magnitudes and mixed-member (proportional) electoral systems. However, as these are very general propositions, practitioners are left without any relevant implications for the design of the various details of electoral systems. As every general design is self-evidently built from the various relevant details (see Chapter 3), the key ingredients of a successful electoral system obviously are the various technical details that have to be fine-tuned when designing an electoral system. It is the specification of the technical detail-level of electoral systems which decides what may roughly be expected from the electoral system. Well-functioning electoral systems are thus likely built on a clever combination of details combining sufficient coordination incentives with proportional representation. Here, it will be important to see whether general design propositions such as those detailed in Chapter 2 are sufficient design advice or whether the more nuanced effects of technical details and their combinations are substantial enough to warrant increased attention to the detail-level of electoral systems. In order to assess this, it is first crucial to consider the different technical elements relevant to the proportionality-concentration trade-off and their individual potential for reaching the best of both worlds.

District magnitude: The district magnitude is typically viewed as the most critical defining element of an electoral system (Lijphart 1994; Carey & Hix 2011). Regarding the proportionality-concentration trade-off, Carey and Hix (2011) argue that at moderate levels of district magnitude (between three and nine) coordination incentives are still fairly high while the vote-seat translation is already very proportional – hence, setting moderate magnitudes is assumed to be the way in which to reach the best of both worlds by specifying the district magnitude. In comparison, single-member districts maximize coordination incentives but also strongly boost disproportionality, whereas PR systems with districts of large magnitude (say, ten and above) do not induce more than a minimum amount of coordination and are therefore akin to pure PR systems in combining a strong performance in the proportionality dimension with a weak one in the concentration dimension.

Legal threshold: The legal threshold and the district magnitude are, in theory, rather similar in their effects on parties and voters. Lijphart (1994) even suggests using the ‘effective threshold’ as a variable in electoral system research that is built on the hurdles presented by natural thresholds due to district magnitude and legal thresholds. The ‘effective threshold’ then is the highest threshold that parties have to pass in order to gain parliamentary representation. Nevertheless, in many studies of electoral system performance the legal threshold is a mere afterthought (e.g. Carey & Hix 2011; cf. Kostadinova 2002). Legal thresholds exert coordination incentives via presenting parties and voters with a hurdle that can only be passed by parties with a substantial amount of support. At the same time, legal thresholds (typically between one and five percent) applied in PR systems only distort proportionality to a limited degree. Hence, there is no reason to expect a priori that legal thresholds are less able to produce best of both worlds outcomes than are moderate district magnitudes. Yet, as most existing legal thresholds amount to five percent or

less and are thus comparable to district magnitudes of twenty and higher, they are (following the argument by Carey & Hix 2011) only a first step in the direction of the best of both worlds. At the same time, legal thresholds typically apply to the aggregate election results and hence are likely to be more powerful in reducing the chances of regional stronghold parties compared to small-to-moderate district magnitudes.

Formula (share of seats allocated in single-member districts): The electoral formula defines how votes are turned into seats.²³ Mixed-member electoral systems see the application of two formulas in different electoral tiers – a plurality or majority formula for the seat allocation in the single-member district tier and a PR allocation method (for example, the D’Hondt method, the Hare-quota or the St. Laguë method²⁴) in the proportional representation tier with district magnitudes (much) larger than one (Massicotte & Blais 1999). In single-tier electoral systems the formula itself does not exert much of an impact on election outcomes and an electoral system’s potential of performing efficiently on the proportionality-concentration trade-off. In mixed-member systems, on the other hand, considering the formula is very relevant in so far as it conveys the shares of seats which are allocated according to different formulas. In almost all cases the share of seats allocated under a plurality or majority formula will equal the share of seats allocated in single-member districts as opposed to multi-member districts – this information is crucial when assessing mixed-member electoral systems. In the argument of mixed-member electoral systems being able to reach the best of both worlds, a fairly balanced mix of formulas appears as the most suitable way of providing both proportionality and concentration (see Shugart 2001a).

Compensation via additional tiers: If an electoral system uses one (or more) electoral tiers in order to compensate disproportionalities arising from the seat allocation in another electoral tier, this may have rather different effects on the probability of reaching the best of both worlds depending on whether the lower tier is already fairly proportional. In mixed-member electoral systems where seats are contested in single-member districts in one electoral tier, these district races can be expected to exert pretty strong coordination effects inducing overall bloc-competition between parties (Shugart 2001b; D’Alimonte et al. 2012). If this coordination effect is similar under parallel (mixed-member majoritarian; MMM) and compensatory (proportional) mixed-member (MMP) rules, a compensatory link between both tiers in an MMP electoral system should be able to increase proportionality quite substantially while leaving party system concentration relatively unaffected in comparison. Hence, given that the coordination incentives arising from the single-member district tier remain strong, MMP systems should be more able than MMM systems to perform efficiently.²⁵ As will be highlighted eventually, it is the combination of the share of single-

²³ Although the formula is related to district magnitude, this relationship is not deterministic as highlighted by block-vote systems – in block-vote systems, the party receiving most votes in a district wins all of the seats in that district (Bormann & Golder 2013).

²⁴ A complete assessment of different PR formulas and their rather nuanced differences is provided by Benoit (2000).

²⁵ When evaluating the viability of the MMP electoral system it should also be important whether in these systems so-called ‘surplus’ or ‘overhang’ seats are actually allowed or whether a mechanical effect of the plurality (or, majority) tier is impossible due to the allocation of additional leveling seats that restore the relative seat distribution implied by the proportional representation tier. This latter provision is common only in the German context and will thus be tested in the German sub-national analysis in Chapter 8.

member districts and compensation rules that is crucial in defining the key characteristics of a mixed-member system.

An additional compensatory tier in the form of ‘national top-up seats’ (Rose 1983: 38) can also be used in PR systems with multi-member districts in order to reduce remaining disproportionalities. For seat allocation in this top-up tier parties’ national vote shares are used, taking seats already won in the main electoral tier into account. Here, the addition of such a compensatory top-up tier could add even more proportionality to the election outcomes. However, as coordination incentives in PR systems are already substantially lower than in single-member district plurality or majority systems, adding top-up seats could also yield little in terms of proportionality while simultaneously erasing the desirable coordination incentives of moderate magnitude districts. Smaller parties could be induced to compete in all districts (even in those where they are not viable at all) in order to maximize their overall vote share and therefore their chances at compensatory top-up seats. If this latter effect occurs, a national top-up tier appears rather likely to be a disturbing factor when aiming for the best of both worlds.

Number of votes in mixed-member electoral systems: As we are not concerned with possibilities of preferential voting here, the number of votes is expected to have an effect on the proportionality-concentration trade-off only in the context of mixed-member electoral systems. The argument is that if voters only have one (fused) vote that counts towards the seat allocation in both the PR tier and the plurality tier, coordination pressure is greater because voters are not able to vote for a viable candidate in the district race and then give their PR vote to a different party. If this effect occurs, it will be based exclusively on voters coordinating on parties that are viable in both electoral tiers and hence should increase the chances of reaching an overall efficient electoral system performance.²⁶

Having discussed the individual technical elements it is already quite obvious how it is their combination that matters for the eventual performance of the electoral system. It also becomes clear that there are chances to improve general electoral system designs by a careful specification of the technical details. For instance, a PR system with a nationwide district could be improved – assuming that efficiency regarding the proportionality-concentration is desired – by decreasing district magnitude or by adding a legal threshold. A PR system with moderate district magnitudes could potentially benefit from an additional (national) legal threshold in order to decrease the incentives for regional parties which fragment the party system while not affecting the electoral fate of nationalized parties. On the contrary, the addition of a compensatory top-up tier within a PR system might cost more in terms of coordination and concentration than it gains in proportionality. The relevance of the combination of details is also especially noticeable when looking at mixed-member electoral systems – the information whether the mixed-member system is a compensatory MMP or a parallel MMM system is only of limited value unless we also know the share of seats allocated in single-member districts. If that share is very large, even a

²⁶ This argument can and will be tested empirically only on the German state level since the fused vote version of mixed-member electoral systems is fairly rare on the international level (see Ferrara 2006 for an overview).

compensatory PR tier may not be able to guarantee even moderate levels of proportionality of the election outcomes. At the same time, a low share of single-member districts could diminish the relevance of the single-member district races and overall coordination incentives. Depending on the shares of single-member districts in different mixed-member systems, MMM systems might perform even more like PR systems than MMP electoral systems. The fine-tuning of the key elements of mixed-member electoral systems thus defines how we expect these systems to actually work in practice – and, of course, district magnitude and the legal threshold can also be varied in order to further complicate these systems, for better or for worse. Instead of discussing an endless number of possible combinations (Lijphart 1994: 1), it is worth repeating the very gist of the argument: details matter when we attempt to optimize electoral system performance.

Taking the choice context into account – the effects of principle-guided design

The principle of representation dimension of electoral systems is typically neglected (Nohlen 1984, 2009a being the exception; see Chapters 2 and 3) but holds significant implications for the functioning of the electoral system. As Nohlen (1984) argues, the technical design of an electoral system is a means to the end of achieving the overall normative goal of the electoral system. It appears more likely that electoral system designers find a proper technical solution if they agree upon the problem this solution is supposed to deal with and a general principle which then guides technical design. Taking the question of the principle of representation into account means to break with the assumption of the technical design clearly implying what the electoral system is supposed to achieve as an overall goal – a decision that seems warranted not only based on theory but also the initial exploration of the principle dimension on the basis of constitutional texts (Chapter 4).

When we think of design choices as attempts of maximizing the probability of reaching an efficient electoral system performance, this does not necessarily imply that this viewpoint was (or, is) shared by those who designed and implemented the respective electoral system. The principle of representation dimension of electoral systems becomes important when similar technical designs are associated with different goals or vice versa. The critical question in light of the maximization problem regarding the proportionality-concentration trade-off then becomes whether an electoral system is actually supposed to provide a superior middle-ground according to its guiding principle. The alternative – as suggested by Chapter 4 – is that an electoral system lacks any guiding overall goal. That this is no trivial question is stressed by the literature on mixed-member electoral systems which mentions both designers' motivations to reach the best of both worlds (Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a; Birch et al. 2002: 88-89) as well as how mixed-member systems are often the result of complex, self-interested bargaining between elites (e.g. Birch 2003: 3-27; Gallagher 2005b; Benoit 2007). Based on the general association between conscious, goal-oriented design and better performance vis-à-vis convoluted compromise bargaining (Elster 1995; Ginsburg et al. 2009), conscious, principle-guided design aiming for a successful balance of proportionality and concentration should improve the chances of achieving this superior middle-ground. Simply put, reaching the best of both worlds ought to be more likely if politicians (or, electoral system designers and reformers in general) actually try.

Agreement and inclusiveness should lead not only to better, more fitting design but also to a higher level of commitment and coordination among parties and candidates (see Brennan & Hamlin 2002 in this context). Overall, sociotropic motives and a principle of representation can be expected to function as a shield for the electoral system against ‘misbehavior’ because the legitimacy of the electoral system is undoubted and violations of the principle detected more clearly and punished accordingly (Renwick 2010: 240; Renwick 2011; Norris 2011). Last but not least, the presence of a guiding principle is likely based on past failures with respect to the proportionality-concentration trade-off (Shugart 2001b; Martin 2009). A conscious principle-guided attempt to get rid of such failures in light of previous experiences appears as a good starting point of improving the efficiency of electoral system performance.


In sum, the focus on the principle of representation (or its absence) implies that context actually matters twice for the performance of an electoral system. Surely, the sociopolitical context to a certain degree sets the limits of what an electoral system can achieve. For example, a very heterogeneous society where parties organize around ethnic or religious cleavages will hardly end up with a two-party system no matter the amount of coordination incentives (see Amorim Neto & Cox 1997). However, the initial context effect occurs at the stage at which the electoral system is chosen and implemented. An inclusive context and an agreed upon overall goal should lead to an electoral system design that more closely fits the requirements of a particular society. Especially this potential effect of conscious and principle-guided design optimizing electoral system performance with respect to and not in spite of the sociopolitical context holds important implications: successful electoral reform could not only depend strongly on technical advice but also on advice regarding the creation of a fruitful choice situation in which the relevant parties devise a new electoral system. Yet, it will also be crucial to check the rather disheartening – but far from unrealistic – hypothesis that politicians (and electoral system experts) are simply unable to anticipate future developments well enough in order to come up with the appropriate electoral system design even if they so desire.

5.2 Shaping the trade-off – chances and risks of mixed designs

Undoubtedly, reaching the best of both worlds is a fairly complex challenge that demands a well-designed electoral system to provide the correct coordination incentives in order to be able to concentrate the party system without strongly distorting the representation of public opinion. Furthermore, while the above arguments have stressed that with the right choice circumstances and careful specification of the technical details it seems quite possible to reach an efficient electoral system performance, aiming for the best of both worlds is a potentially risky business. Figure 5.1 highlights how – using a simple linear trade-off scenario as a benchmark – the proportionality-concentration trade-off may take on very different shapes. So far, the focus has been on the optimistic scenario where mixed electoral systems that combine incentives from pure systems are able to keep disproportionality (i.e. distortions in the translation of votes into seats) as well as party system fragmentation at desirable low levels. Still, different alternative scenarios are conceivable and appear probable as well. Moving away from virtually guaranteeing

proportionality in pure PR systems or extremely strong coordination incentives of plurality or majority electoral systems also means taking a considerable risk: if coordination incentives do not suffice to concentrate the party system and if the concentration effect of the electoral system is somewhere between extremes, the electoral system may well produce election outcomes that are neither fairly proportional nor lead to a concentrated party system fostering swift government formation. This is the pessimistic scenario depicted by the upper curve that sees mixed electoral systems performing badly in both key dimensions.

Figure 5.1: Shapes of the trade-off



Next to the question of whether non-linearity means that election outcomes will lie in the efficient best of both worlds or the inefficient and undesirable worst of both worlds region, the question of how strongly mixed electoral designs can move the trade-off away from perfect linearity is also highly relevant. The dashed curves accordingly depict scenarios where the trade-off does have a non-linear shape but where its optimization (or aggravation in the pessimistic case) does not mean a vast performance improvement (or deterioration) along the trade-off. In these scenarios, taking the risk of a mixed electoral design does not potentially lead to dramatic negative consequences but the gains relative to the linear scenario are also fairly limited. Finally, it is vital to consider two further scenarios which point out that – generally and for each technical element – we ought to be wary of the risk-reward relationship when designing mixed systems. The absolute best of both worlds in terms of electoral system design actually is marked by a system that has the potential to perform in line with the extremely optimistic scenario but which would

not lead to an extremely negative performance along the trade-off in the case that it fails to set the correct incentives. What should be avoided are electoral systems which promise only small gains in terms of efficiency but run the risk of a substantial failure in both dimensions. Essentially, the scenarios described here and depicted in Figure 5.1 emphasize that complex (mixed) electoral system design presents promises *and* pitfalls but also that one may try to reach optimal performance without necessarily taking a huge risk.

The above discussion clarifies how, next to considering chances and risks generally, it is crucial to compare technical details and general designs concerning whether they are non-risky tools or form high risk-high reward type of combinations. The empirical analysis will later demonstrate which tools are best suited for risk-averse designers who aim for small efficiency gains without wanting to run the risk of ending up with the worst of both worlds as well as designs that have great potential regarding reaching high levels of concentration while being almost perfectly proportional. It can be assumed that less risky mixed electoral designs pair fairly high levels of guaranteed (i.e. mechanical) proportionality with increased coordination incentives vis-à-vis pure PR systems – as do MMP and PR systems with moderate district magnitudes. A more risky choice appears to be a MMM system which will – if coordination largely fails – run into trouble since it can neither guarantee higher levels of proportionality nor of concentration. Furthermore, an intuitive argument suggests that the addition of a further technical detail aiming at a superior middle-ground in electoral system performance (e.g. a five percent threshold) increases both the risks and the chances of a complex mixed electoral system. Highly complex mixed systems that rely on a plethora of technical details (e.g. pairing a mixed-member structure with moderate district magnitude and a legal threshold) should be more prone to increase both chances and risks – meaning that more complex designs offer more potential gains and potential losses as indicated by the difference between the dashed curves and the polar (pessimistic and optimistic) curves as shown in Figure 5.1. By providing detailed information about the effects of individual technical elements, the empirical analysis will be able to provide information with respect to which technical details add up to an overall more risky design. In general, it has to be stretched that scholars as well as practitioners need to keep the possible shapes of the trade-off depicted in Figure 5.1 in mind when evaluating an electoral system compared to possible alternatives.

Considering the chances-risks conundrum also for the principle dimension of an electoral system, it will be critical to see how strongly the presence of such a principle impacts electoral system performance and whether the absence of inclusiveness and a guiding principle means a genuine risk for the eventual performance of the electoral system. The failure of a fairly complex, mixed electoral system is a scenario that appears realistic if broad agreement on the rules of the game and the associated commitment to these rules and to a basic level of coordination among parties or political groups are lacking (see Scheiner 2008 in this context).

The empirical analysis of this thesis will focus heavily on the impact of (detailed) technical designs in Chapters 7, 8, and 9 and then move towards investigating the effect that an electoral system's principle of representation exerts on the system's performance in Chapter 10. In doing so, the respective chapters will expand the theoretical arguments discussed here, formulate concrete

hypotheses, and test these based on different datasets. Before this empirical analysis centred on assessing how the defining dimensions of electoral systems affect their performance is presented, however, the next chapter will first discuss how proportionality and concentration are operationalized and describe the general methodological approach that lies behind the different test-designs used in the empirical chapters.

6 Measurement, methodological approach, and data

This chapter will discuss the measurement of the key dimensions of electoral system performance and describe the methodological approach taken – as well as the data used – to investigate how different electoral systems perform along the proportionality-concentration trade-off. In a first part, this chapter will demonstrate that the standard measures of proportionality and concentration are still the most viable options. Yet, additionally, by taking a closer look at the concept of party system concentration, this chapter will also point out that the depth of interpretation regarding the effective number of parties measure of the concentration dimension can be increased substantially. In a second part, the key methodological challenges in electoral system research are laid out and it is described how this thesis will cope with and overcome these challenges.

6.1 Measurement of the key dimensions of electoral system performance

In order to be able to investigate how different electoral systems perform with respect to the proportionality-concentration trade-off, it is essential that both individual dimensions are measured validly via continuous measures which are able to distinguish between polar and intermediate outcomes. The empirical analyses will rely on the two most widely applied measures of the proportionality and concentration of election outcomes – the least squares index (LSI; Gallagher 1991) as a measure of disproportionality and the effective number of parties (ENP; Laakso & Taagepera 1979) as a measure of party system concentration. Their universal application in studies investigating electoral system effects (see, e.g., Lijphart 1994; Norris 2004; Gallagher & Mitchell 2005a; Carey & Hix 2011; Farrell 2011) certainly signals that these measures have stood the test of time and, based on their extensive use, their features (and weaknesses) are very well-known.²⁷ Furthermore, these widely applied measures have also been used as independent variables in studies of different phenomena such as public satisfaction with democracy (e.g. Anderson & Guillory 1997; Anderson 1998) or the formation and duration of coalition governments (e.g. Grofman 1989; Bawn & Rosenbluth 2006). This means that the empirical results based on these measures can be used directly by readers to derive implications about a number of political phenomena which are themselves not considered in this thesis. The following discussion aims at highlighting how these standard measures have remained the most viable options for measuring the key dimensions of electoral system performance. Furthermore, it will be shown how the ENP based on parliamentary seat distributions can be used efficiently to also derive critical information about the cabinet level.

²⁷ Every measure that aims at reducing a fairly complex concept into a single indicator will have some weaknesses. It is an important advantage if for any particular indicator the circumstances under which it will not work perfectly are well-known.

Measuring the proportionality of election outcomes

The basic concept on which the proportionality dimension is built is that of viewing the parliament as a microcosm of the whole society (see Farrell 2011). Within the microcosm concept, the parliament is meant to be representative of the electorate as a whole by mirroring the structure of public opinion. The resulting implication for measurement would be to measure which opinions are present to what degree in the general public and then compare the respective measures with the same measures applied to the parliament. This approach, however, is not only impossible but would also be highly questionable from a methodological perspective. There is unlikely to be an a priori distribution of preferences among the public as preferences are shaped in the political discourse – the political discourse in which both parties and voters engage. Since parties – and especially those represented prominently in the parliament – shape public opinion (Birch 2003: 48-49), it is not advisable to try to measure some set of a priori preferences among the public in order to measure the representativeness of the parliament. Therefore, researchers have turned to a much more practical way of measuring the representativeness of an electoral system based on the ideal of proportional representation. The underlying idea is that '[a] preference for maximizing representation generally means maximizing proportionality' (Benoit 2007: 380) and this idea follows a proportional vision of democracy where it is crucial that voters expressed preferences (i.e. votes) are accurately translated into parliamentary representation (Powell 2000; Powell & Vanberg 2000).

Disproportionality indices compare the vote distribution with the seat distribution within the parliament and thus provide a measure of how closely the parliamentary seat distribution mirrors the voters' desired distribution of political power (see Taagepera & Grofman 2003 for a detailed overview). The most widely used measure is the least squares index (LSI) as devised by Gallagher (1991):

$$LSI = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^N (s_i - v_i)^2};$$

where s_i is the seat share and v_i is the vote share of party i . This index has been tested in many index comparisons and unequivocally emerged as the best option to measure the disproportionality of an electoral system (Gallagher 1991; Lijphart 1994; Monroe 1994; Taagepera & Grofman 2003; Borisjuk et al. 2004; Taagepera 2007). It is also essential for the aims of this thesis that the disproportionality directly applies to the election outcome as a whole as opposed to parties individually (also see Gallagher 1991: 40).²⁸ The LSI is based on the sum of squared differences between parties' seat shares s_i and their vote shares v_i . Before the square root of this sum is taken, the sum is divided by two in order not to count dissimilarities twice – since

²⁸ Rae's index of disproportionality, $R = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N |s_i - v_i|$, divides the sum of absolute differences between parties' vote and seat shares by the number of parties. This index is concerned not with the overall disproportionality of an election outcome but with the disproportionality experienced by the average party. While R undeniably conveys useful information, it is not applicable to assessing the overall disproportionality of an election outcome with which the questions of this thesis are concerned. With R , disproportionality depends not only on the sum of differences but also on the number of parties – yet, the latter should be irrelevant in calculating the disproportionality of an election overall.

one party's advantage leads to the underrepresentation of another party it would be exaggerating to treat both parties' disparities between their vote and seat shares as independent from each other. The use of squared differences means that the LSI is sensitive to the size of individual disproportionalities and considers one disparity of five percentage points as more disproportional overall than five disparities of one percentage point each. In this way the LSI is able to differentiate between cases where many, more or less random disparities occur (due to the fact that the number of parliamentary seats is tiny compared to the number of votes, a certain amount of disparities is almost impossible to avoid) and cases where a couple of larger disparities really suggest that some parties were under- while other parties were overrepresented. In this way, the LSI is sensitive to how the dissimilarity between vote and seat distributions was produced (Gallagher & Mitchell 2005a: 602).²⁹

Table 6.1 offers some example calculations of the LSI with three different scenarios of how seats could be distributed based on the same distribution of vote shares. In the first scenario where there are only very minor disparities between parties' vote and seat shares, the LSI is very close to zero – a score of zero would indicate that every party was represented in the parliament exactly as its vote share would demand it in the proportional vision of democracy. An LSI-score of 100 is the upper limit of possible scores, but is only of limited practical relevance. An LSI-score of 100 would be reached if two parties contested an election with one getting all of the votes and the other receiving all the seats in parliament. Scenarios #2 and #3 provide more realistic cases and show how the LSI behaves for cases of moderate and larger discrepancies between parties' vote and seat shares. In scenario #2 the larger parties A and B are overrepresented substantially at the expense of party C which receives 24 percent of the votes but only 15 percent of the seats. The LSI in this case is already quite substantial (LSI = 8) and signals, compared to scenario #1, that the election results are noticeably disproportional. While scenario #2 could be characterized as a case of moderate disproportionalities, scenario #3 presents a case of large disproportionalities. In scenario #3, the LSI is as high as 21 and signals strongly disproportional results – the extreme underrepresentation of party C, which now is without parliamentary representation despite winning 24 percent of the votes, is thus accurately reflected in the change of the LSI from scenario #2 to scenario #3.

Table 6.1: Example calculations of the LSI

<i>Scenario</i>	<i>Party A Seat percentage (vote percentage)</i>	<i>Party B Seat percentage (vote percentage)</i>	<i>Party C Seat percentage (vote percentage)</i>	<i>LSI</i>
#1	37 (36)	40 (40)	23 (24)	1
#2	40 (36)	45 (40)	15 (24)	7,8
#3	45 (36)	55 (40)	0 (24)	21

²⁹ In cases where the election results are not disaggregated completely (i.e. where some parties are lumped into an 'others' category), it is advisable to use Taagepera's (1997) least components approach to test for a potential bias in the empirical results. Our data are in almost all cases fully disaggregated. For those instances where they are not, we did check for a potential bias in the indices via the least components approach.

Despite the overwhelming support by electoral system scholars for the LSI, it is worth discussing two prominent (and closely related) alternatives in order to map out clearly why the LSI is preferable overall. Birch (2003) suggests using the share of wasted votes instead of the LSI. However, the share of wasted votes is a fairly incomplete measure. The share of wasted votes is calculated by dividing the amount of votes cast for parties or candidates that did not win any seat in the parliament and is therefore blind to over- and underrepresentation of parties in the parliament (for the examples presented in Table 6.1, the share of wasted votes could not distinguish between scenarios #1 and #2). It is therefore a pretty soft standard for accurate representation and especially biased downward in cases where the electoral system is fairly disproportional but where many parties at least win one or a couple of seats – an example would be a plurality electoral system where multiple smaller parties at least win a seat in one district in their regional stronghold but still are vastly underrepresented in general. Hence, wasted votes are but one part of overall disproportionality and the share of wasted votes alone is not a very helpful indicator as it is potentially misleading.

The Loosemore-Hanby index (LHI; Loosemore & Hanby 1971) is the second alternative to be considered. The LHI is based not on squared, but on absolute differences between vote and seat shares and is otherwise identical to the LSI:

$$\text{LHI} = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^N |s_i - v_i| .$$

The LHI incorporates the idea of wasted votes and additionally considers ‘unused’ votes (unused in the sense that in a perfectly proportional world, these votes would have led to additional seat gains in the parliament; Borisjuk et al. 2004: 60) when calculating total disproportionality. However, the LHI treats all disproportionalities alike and does not distinguish between cases where one party wins 60 percent of the seats based on 50 percent of the votes and a second party only gains 40 percent of the seats based on the same vote share (50 percent) and cases where ten parties each experience an absolute difference between vote and seats shares of a mere two percentage points. The LSI, on the contrary, incorporates both wasted and unused votes and then goes on to also differentiate between substantial disproportionalities and minor nuisances. The LSI differentiates between cases where many parties are affected more or less randomly by small disparities between vote and seat shares and cases where particular (typically smaller) parties are systematically hit by substantial underrepresentation. Therefore, the LSI is the most suitable measure of an election’s overall disproportionality as it is truest to the theoretical concept outlined above. Empirically, though, the LSI and LHI are very closely related – the correlation coefficient between the two measures for the international dataset used in this thesis (introduced in section 6.2 of this chapter) is $r = .95$.³⁰

³⁰ The correlation between the LSI and the share of wasted votes is .49 and it is .62 for the LHI and the share of wasted votes.

Finally, a point of critique that has been uttered with respect to disproportionality indices based on vote and seat distributions generally has to be addressed. The critique is that such disproportionality measures are potentially biased downward by the psychological effect of the electoral system (Birch 2003). As the disproportionality index is based on expressed preferences (i.e. votes) instead of a measure of popular preferences (see Birch 2003) and since a subset of voters might strategically choose a party or candidate that is not their first (actual) preference, the index would treat these voters as being represented according to their preferences anyway. Although it is certainly true that disproportionality indices cannot capture the psychological effect of the electoral system, it is important to ask whether – in light of the theoretical concept – they even should. A good performance of an electoral system in the sense that the party system is both proportional and concentrated is necessarily based on coordination on the part of voters and parties (Cox 1997, 1999; see Chapters 2 and 5). Without some degree of coordination, the concept of representation would fail altogether. If this coordination fails and voters vote for candidates and parties that end up with no parliamentary representation, the disproportionality index will capture this. If, conversely, voters and parties are able to coordinate on viable options this implies that they have found representation within the scope of the political system even if their initial differed from their eventual choice. Why should this type of coordination be necessarily understood as – from the vantage point of a proportional vision of democracy – undesirable disproportionality? Essentially, reaching the best of both worlds of proportionality and concentration is only possible if the right coordination incentives are set and if parties and voters are willing to act upon these incentives. While it would certainly be of great interest to learn more about the psychological effects of electoral systems on the representativeness of the election outcomes, the size of the mechanical effect (captured by disproportionality indices) is the correct measure of the distortions of accurate representation that is not based on coordination. In sum, disproportionality indices do not capture the psychological effect of the electoral system, yet, for determining the overall performance of electoral systems along the proportionality-concentration trade-off, they do not have to.

Measuring party system concentration

The concentration dimension is broadly concerned with whether the party system allows for the formation of an accountable government that can work productively during its tenure. Hence, the concept of concentration asks how likely it is that a party system will lead to these desirable results. At its core, the concentration dimension is concerned with the type of government – a single-party government, a coalition government dominated by one party, or a fragmented multiparty government – the election results lead to and whether there exists a direct link between voters' choices and government formation (Farrell, 2011; Lijphart and Grofman, 1984b; Nohlen, 1984, 2009a). In the case of coalition negotiations the direct link would be distorted and government accountability potentially weakened (Powell 2000). Depending on the coalition structure, this distortion can be minor or major. Hence, a measure of party system concentration would ideally convey information about the party system itself but also provide clear implications regarding the possible structure of the government (also see Blau 2008).

A measure of concentration therefore ought to give an idea of how the parliament is structured, whether a single-party government or a senior-junior (small) coalition is possible, and how the coalition government is probably going to look like in terms of the power distribution among coalition members. If a coalition government is necessary, it would be helpful to have an idea of how that coalition will be structured: is it likely to be a senior-junior partnership or a multiparty coalition without an obvious leader? These differences have important implications for how directly voters are able to influence government formation. If a single-party government ensues, the election outcome directly leads to the formation of the government. If coalition negotiations become necessary, the link is distorted. The more complex and convoluted these negotiations become, the weaker is the link between vote choices and government formation – and the complexity of negotiations is closely associated with the fragmentation of the party system (Duverger 1984; Powell 2000). The size-structure of a coalition government also holds relevant implications for how well voters will be able to sensibly assign responsibility to the government and its member-parties and whether they will eventually be able to hold the government accountable at the next election (Banaszak & Doerschler 2012; Hobolt et al. 2013).

The most simple fragmentation measure counts the number of parties holding seats in the parliament, treating all parties as equals (e.g. Sartori 1976: 119-120). As this procedure does not take into account the relative size of different parties and typically becomes useless in cases where there are more than two parliamentary parties, alternative measures of fragmentation were devised. Both Rae's (1967) fractionalization index and Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) effective number of parties (ENP) convey the exact same information about the fragmentation of a party system (see Laakso and Taagepera 1979: 4). Yet, as the ENP has the intuitive interpretation of signaling to the researcher the 'number of hypothetical equal-size parties that would have the same total effect on fractionalization of the system as have the actual parties of unequal size' (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979: 4), it quickly became the most widely used measure of party system concentration (Golosov 2010: 173). ENP takes into consideration the relative size of the parties (via their vote- or, as in this case, seat-share s):

$$ENP_s = \frac{1}{\sum_i^N s_i^2}.$$

The ENP_s gives a straightforward outlook as to how a party system will look like in terms of how many parties really are relevant on the parliamentary level.³¹

Based on disagreements regarding the correct weights and the ways in which the ENP_s should take the skewedness of the parliamentary size distribution into account, alternative measures were devised that consider especially the seat share of the largest party (Dunleavy & Boucek,

³¹ As this thesis is largely concerned with the overall effects of electoral systems and the shape of the parliament, empirical analyses will widely be based on the ENP_s with the effective number of parties on the electoral level being of minor relevance.

2003; Molinar 1991; Golosov 2010).³² The most recent example is Golosov’s (2010) alternative index:

$$N_G = \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{s_i}{s_i + s_1^2 - s_1^2};$$

where s_1 denotes the seat share of the largest party. The main difference with respect to the ENP_s lies in the fact that in N_G the largest party becomes the reference for the assessment of the relative size of all remaining parties. Thus how these latter parties impact N_G depends not only on their seat share but importantly also on their relative seat share compared to the largest party (Golosov, 2010: 183). Due to this computation, N_G does not have quite an intuitive interpretation as the ENP_s in that it provides a measure of the ‘effective’ number of parties with respect to the largest party which counts as one while smaller parties count as fractions of one based on their relative size compared to the largest party. Since the two measures are so closely related conceptually and also empirically (the correlation coefficient based on the international dataset is $r = .96$), it is better to stay with the ENP_s measure which gives a more intuitive account of how the party system looks.

Table 6.2 offers a few examples illustrating how the ENP_s index works: if in a party system with three parties all parties hold an identical share of parliamentary seats (scenario #1), the ENP_s will be exactly three. If, on the other hand, parties vary in their seat shares (scenarios #2 and #3), the ENP_s will deviate from the pure number of parties in the party system since it takes the differences between parties’ seat shares into account. Scenario #2 presents a seat distribution that is closely akin to what one would see under a pure two-party system, however, the critical presence of a third substantially smaller party is still noted by the ENP_s which equals 2.16 for this scenario. In scenario #3 the distribution of seat shares is not uniform but much more balanced than under scenario #2. Hence, the ENP_s for scenario #3 is much higher than for scenario #2 and reflects that the party system is close to being a true three-party system. These examples demonstrate how substantial, meaningful differences between party systems with an identical number of parties are well captured by the ENP_s measure.

Table 6.2: Example calculations of the ENP_s

<i>Scenario</i>	<i>Seat share Party A</i>	<i>Seat share Party B</i>	<i>Seat share Party C</i>	<i>ENP_s</i>
#1	.33	.33	.33	3
#2	.48	.48	.04	2.16
#3	.41	.37	.22	2.83

Yet, does the ENP_s convey useful information about the cabinet level beyond the information of how many effective parties are potential government members? First, the ENP_s clearly signals that a single-party government will be possible once the ENP_s is smaller than two but sometimes fails to identify cases of single-party majorities (Taagepera 1999b). Does the ENP_s hold implications

³² A problem that applies to all summary measure of party system concentration is that for any value of an index there are a host of possible underlying size distributions (Taagepera 2005; Rozenas 2012).

about the structure of the (coalition) government beyond that? Taagepera (1999b) argues that it is useful to consider the seat share of the largest party as an additional indicator of how the government will eventually look like (also see Shugart 2001b: 31). But such an additional measure is not necessary in order to learn something about the government structure based on the ENP_S and it would also lead to the same substantial conclusions since the correlation between the seat share of the largest party and the ENP_S is as high as $r = .94$ (based again on the international dataset used in this thesis).

When we pose the question of how concentrated the government will be (Blau 2008: 168; Carey & Hix 2011: 387-388; Fisher & Hobolt 2010: 364), it is worth exploring the empirical relationship between the ENP_S and the structure of the government that formed in a given country for a given election which is denoted as ENP_G, the effective number of parties within the government. The ENP_G is a good measure of the coalition structure in that it differentiates – like for the parliamentary level – between single-party government, coalitions dominated by one large party, and coalitions that consist of (multiple) parties of similar size. If we are able to establish an empirical pattern between the ENP_S and the ENP_G, this will go a long way towards covering both information regarding the parliament and the cabinet level with the single ENP_S measure.

The parlgov dataset (Döring & Manow 2012) includes parliamentary seat distributions as well as information about the governments that eventually formed after the respective elections for the OECD countries and is a good basis for investigating the empirical patterns in the ENP_S-ENP_G relationship.³³ Table 6.3 presents the results of OLS regressions of the ENP_G of the governments that actually formed on the ENP_S – i.e. regressing government structure on parliamentary structure. Model 1 is estimated based on all elections in the dataset; Model 2 considers only those elections that resulted in minimal winning governments. Inspecting the results, both models highlight that the ENP_S is a great predictor of the structure of the cabinet. For all elections (Model 1), the ENP_S explains almost sixty percent of the variation in government concentration. Only looking at elections that resulted in minimal winning governments (Model 2), the ENP_S explains even more than seventy percent of the variation. Furthermore, both models suggest an empirical association between ENP_S and ENP_G where the expected value of the ENP_G equals half of the ENP_S:

$$E[ENP_G] = \frac{1}{2} * ENP_S.^{34}$$

The coefficient for the ENP_S variable is almost exactly .5 in both models 1 and 2. Based on this strong empirical association, the ENP_S supplies us with a remarkable amount of information that has so far not been acknowledged explicitly: the ENP_S gives a fairly clear signal of how many effective parties there will be in the ensuing government. What the regression results imply is that if there are four effective parties in parliament, two of those are necessary to form a majority government. Since these are hypothetical effective parties, actual size distributions within the

³³ Only those governments were considered that formed directly after an election and not after the break-up of the previous government without new elections.

³⁴ Since this association is not meant as a law but as an empirical pattern, the technical requirement that half of the ENP_S would need one additional seat to form a majority government is ignored as both measures consider what are hypothetical effective parties and not actual parties.

government may obviously vary. Yet, as shown by the R^2 -measures in Table 6.3, the explanatory power of the ENP_S for the size structure of the government is fairly strong and thus carries important information regarding how the government will look like based on the election results. This implication is especially helpful since the relative party sizes within the government are an almost perfect predictor of portfolio allocation (Gamson 1961; Warwick & Druckman 2006) and the ENP_G therefore is a very good measure of the distribution of power within the cabinet. Obviously, for country contexts where minority governments or oversized coalitions are the norm (e.g. in Scandinavia or Switzerland), one needs to be wary that the $E[ENP_G] = \frac{1}{2} * ENP_S$ association is likely to be biased upwards if minority governments are the rule and downwards if oversized coalitions are to be expected. However, since these biases will be rather stable within specific countries, the implications of the ENP_S for the cabinet level can be easily adjusted in those situations.

Table 6.3: OLS regression results

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
	ENP_G	ENP_G
ENP_S	.514*** (.019)	.515*** (.019)
Constant	-.085 (.073)	-.008 (.065)
Observations	530	291
R^2	.58	.71


Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses;

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure 6.1 provides a scatterplot of the ENP_S - ENP_G relationship. It is furthermore noteworthy that the results presented above are robust to the exclusion of outliers as well as individual country clusters. As outlined above, the ENP_S delivers critical and fairly precise information regarding the probable coalition structure of the ensuing government. Whenever one encounters a (predicted) value for the ENP_S one can use the $ENP_G = \frac{1}{2} * ENP_S$ association in order to derive highly useful implications also for the cabinet level. In sum, the ENP_S emerges as a very complete and powerful measure of party system concentration that conveys highly useful information on both the parliamentary *and* the cabinet level.³⁵

³⁵ Even if one could make the argument that, for the cabinet level alone, a measure such as the seat share of the largest party would be additionally helpful (see Taagepera 1999b), it is crucial to note that the correlations between different measures are so high (typically above .9) that changing the measure of the concentration dimension would not lead to any differences in the substantial implications. Yet, the intuitiveness and interpretational depth of the ENP_S is unmatched and the ENP_S thus the preferred measure.

Figure 6.1: ENP_s and ENP_G



In relying on both the ENP_s and the LSI in measuring electoral system performance, the empirical analyses will be able to produce nuanced results with respect to the shape of the trade-off between proportionality and concentration. At the same time these results can directly be compared to previous research on the topic (e.g. Carey & Hix 2011). In order to estimate the potential of different electoral system designs to produce the best (or, worst) of both worlds of proportionality and concentration the empirical chapters will both look at the dimensions individually as well as on jointly good or bad performances in the proportionality and concentration dimensions.

6.2 Methodological approach and data

Electoral system research in its current state has certainly matured (Shugart 2005) but is still far from being flawless. Overall, this thesis is a large-n international comparative analysis of electoral systems. This does not mean, however, that it will only focus on the international level or ignore the small-n literature. On the contrary, the aim from a methodological standpoint is to use the strengths of cross-country and within-country designs as well as incorporate the strengths of small-n research in order to maximize the leverage of the empirical results' substantial implications. In answering the research questions concerning the proportionality-concentration trade-off within the aforementioned general methodological setup, this thesis aims to tackle three methodological challenges in particular. First, electoral system analyses often rely only on a

subset of technical details of electoral systems when assessing their performance and thus these analyses potentially miss out on painting a complete picture of electoral system performance. Second, many studies either rely on cross-country analyses or within-country designs with the former potentially overestimating electoral system effects and the latter potentially putting an overly strong emphasis on the impact of the respective country context (see Bowler & Donovan 2013). And finally, comparative electoral system research rarely takes into account the principle of representation of an electoral system design (i.e. what the electoral system is supposed to achieve, notwithstanding the exact technical design) – the level of agreement regarding and the concreteness of overall goals for electoral systems is usually only covered in small-n case study research. The following paragraphs describe how this thesis seeks to overcome these methodological challenges (or, limitations) and which data will be used in order to do so.³⁶

Lack of attention to technical details

Many comparative studies of electoral systems rely on distinctions of general design types (e.g. PR vs. MMM vs. MMP vs. Plurality/Majority) and, at best, control for a subset of additional technical details such as the legal threshold. The problems with this approach are that results are potentially biased because variations in technical details are obscured and that the substantial implications of the results do not cover all technical details that are typically available to electoral system designers. Especially the latter is problematic as the following example illustrates: if an analysis suggests that a MMM electoral system is suitable for a given country, it remains unclear what the impact of the relative share of single-member districts (i.e. the size of the plurality tier) will be. Is the MMM system still a good choice if designers opt for a very high share of single-member districts? This type of question cannot typically be answered based on the results of empirical comparisons using only general design types as independent variables. The same holds for the legal threshold if no respective variable is included: is a certain PR system really advisable if it comes without any additional threshold of representation? Empirical analyses should be able to answer these more nuanced questions in order to maximize the leverage of the implications derived from empirical tests. It is vital to fully understand that with electoral systems it is the combinations of technical details that matter.

In order to be able to provide such fine-grained substantial answers and implications, the datasets used for the empirical analysis include rich information about the technical details of electoral systems – including the height of the legal threshold, the linkage between electoral tiers (the presence of compensation mechanisms), and the share of different types of seats.³⁷ The international dataset of election outcomes includes 590 elections in 57 countries since 1945. Table 6.4 summarizes the dataset with respect to the technical details of electoral systems that

³⁶ What this thesis will not do is deal with the question of how electoral system performance affects electoral reform and therefore would cause potential endogeneity in statistical models (Benoit 2007: 367-370; Colomer 2004) because it is concerned with the association between electoral system design and performance and not with how this relates to electoral reform. Additionally, past performance is only one of many predictors of electoral reform (Katz 2005) and it is especially unlikely that individual technical details are systematically affected by the endogeneity issue (Carey & Hix 2011: 389).

³⁷ All datasets used in the thesis are described fully in the respective codebooks that are part of the appendix material.

are relevant to the proportionality-concentration trade-off (see Chapter 3). The dataset also includes different characteristics describing the sociopolitical context – these are described in detail in the codebook in the appendix (Appendix B). Table 6.4 shows that the dataset includes many elections under mixed-member electoral systems (21 percent of all elections) and that there is quite a lot of variation in the share of single-member districts among electoral systems as well as regarding the presence of compensation mechanisms (compensation via a PR tier in an MMP electoral system or via a national top-up tier in an otherwise PR system). Similarly, there is a lot of variation with respect to district magnitude and the height of the legal threshold. The empirical analyses will make full use of these variations in estimating electoral system effects.³⁸

Table 6.4: Descriptive overview of the international dataset

<i>Technical detail</i>	<i>Mean (Standard deviation)</i>	<i>Median (Minimum; maximum)</i>
Plurality/Majority formula	.177 (.382)	0 (0; 1)
Mixed formula (MMM or MMP)	.208 (.406)	0 (0; 1)
Average district magnitude	39.078 (96.169)	8 (1; 656)
Legal threshold	1.595 (2.113)	0 (0; 10)
Share of SMDs	.287 (.401)	0 (0; 1)
Compensatory PR tier (MMP)	.08 (.272)	0 (0; 1)
National top-up tier	.235 (.424)	0 (0; 1)

Pairing cross-country and within-country designs

Bowler and Donovan (2013) highlight that part of the reason why many electoral reforms eventually disappoint in their effects is that many comparative studies overestimate the effects of changes in electoral rules. This overestimation is due to a limited ability of controlling for the effects the respective country context exerts on the shape of the party system and hinders an accurate prediction of the effect a different electoral system would have. Therefore, Bowler and Donovan (2013) suggest relying on both cross-country and within-country empirical designs in order to avoid over- or underestimating the impact of electoral systems on matters of representation and party system characteristics (also see Norris 2004: 24).

Next to the empirical chapters investigating the international level (Chapters 7 and 10), the empirical part of the thesis will therefore also include within-country designs in order to derive robust conclusions regarding the performance of different electoral system designs. Chapter 8 will

³⁸ The empirical chapters rely on a host of different statistical models, the relevant details of which will be discussed in the individual chapters.

investigate the performance of different electoral systems with particular attention to the mixed-member proportional electoral system on the German sub-national level. The German state level obviously holds constant the country context and varies with respect to the electoral systems applied for state elections and thus offers a very good basis for assessing electoral system effects in a within-country design (also see Massicotte 2003). Chapter 8 will present the analysis of 215 elections on the German state level.

A second within-country design investigates the district level of election results in three countries using PR electoral systems with varying district magnitudes (Costa Rica, Portugal, and Spain; Chapter 9). The aim is to investigate the effect of the district magnitude not in an international comparison but within each country. This micro level research design relies mostly on within-country variation of district magnitude and, by estimating country-specific effects of district magnitude, does not run the risk of conflating effects of country contexts with electoral system effects. Nonetheless, varying district magnitudes may obviously be associated with different districts and these districts may differ with respect to characteristics such as social heterogeneity (see Amorim Neto & Cox 1997: 168; Geys 2006; Potter 2014). The empirical analysis of Chapter 9 will therefore also partially control for the district context. Both datasets for the within-country analyses will be described in detail in the respective chapters.

These within-country analyses function as robustness tests of some of the findings of the empirical analyses based on cross-country datasets. Yet, they also produce important results in their own right. The analysis of the German sub-national level allows, for example, for a test of the effect of the number of ballots used in a mixed-member proportional system which, due to a lack of meaningful variation in the number of ballots, is not possible in the international comparisons. The analysis of the district level allows for testing the impact of district magnitude instead of investigating what the median or mean district magnitude exerts as an effect on the aggregate performance of the electoral system – in this way, the thesis is able to investigate the effect of district magnitude both on the macro and the micro level. In sum, however, the within-country analyses are meant as an addition to the key empirical chapters which focus on the international comparison of electoral system performance. If some effects are not replicable in a within-country design, this only indicates that a general finding might not hold in one particular country case or for a specific electoral system design and a lack of evidence in within-country studies should not be mistaken as a refutation of a general finding.³⁹

³⁹ This discussion also implies that holding country context constant – which is the key argument for using within-country designs in electoral system research – provides researchers with both advantages and disadvantages in terms of arriving at correct inferences. The key advantage of holding context constant while varying electoral rules in order to cleanly measure electoral system effects can turn into a disadvantage if, in that particular country case, the context is an especially powerful predictor of how voters and parties behave and decide. If one then seeks to draw general inferences from the within-country study of varying electoral rules, it is likely that the effect of electoral system differences is underestimated.

Incorporating the strengths of case study research

In general, there often exists a problematic lack of communication between researchers doing small-n and researchers doing large-n research (Bäck & Dumont 2007). This also holds – to a certain extent – for electoral system research (Benoit 2007). And in electoral system research this lack of communication is particularly problematic because a central aspect of electoral systems is often neglected altogether in large-n studies but figures prominently into small-n case study research (e.g. Nohlen 2009a) – the principle dimension. This principle of representation dimension of electoral systems is concerned with the question of what is behind the technical rules in terms of what the electoral system is actually supposed to achieve. Is there even an agreed upon overall principle or goal or is the specification of the technical design largely based on compromise bargaining or government imputation? If there is a general goal, does it aim at successfully balancing the competing demands of proportionality and concentration and reach for the best of both worlds in electoral system performance? These questions drive case-focused researchers (see, for example, the contributions in Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a) and are potentially critical for understanding why some electoral systems perform successfully while other electoral systems fail. More importantly, considering the principle of representation dimension could help us understand why the same electoral systems (i.e. the same technical designs) lead to starkly different outcomes in different places. The aforementioned questions and implications are typically absent from large-n comparative analyses. The likely reason for this absence is that there exist no easily available data on principles of representation and the characteristics of electoral system choice processes – on the contrary, many such sources exist for the technical details of electoral systems. In order to overcome this blatant deficiency in electoral system research, it is a key goal of this thesis to supply comparative data on the principle of representation dimension and investigate the impact the associated variables have on electoral system performance.

Chapter 4 has already explored the potential of surveying constitutional texts in order to comparatively consider the principle of representation dimension. On the one hand, the analysis of constitutions has led to multiple interesting findings regarding when and why principles of representation become embedded in the constitution and electoral systems thus receive constitutional protection and legitimacy. Nevertheless, the core methodological implication of Chapter 4 was that in order to be able to fully consider principles of representation and their potential impact, electoral system research has to rely on the rich information present⁴⁰ in the case study, small-n literature. The case study literature, due to its attention to the particular details of any case of electoral system design and performance, includes the relevant information regarding the principle dimension and the choice context of an electoral system. In order to investigate the impact of principles of representation on electoral system performance, Chapter 10 relies on comparative data on such principles which are based on a case study survey (see Larsson 1993). This case study survey is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 10 but shall be

⁴⁰ It is tempting to use verbs such as ‘hidden’ or ‘buried’ instead of ‘present’ simply because many case studies deal extensively with the topic but this typically goes unnoticed in the large-n comparative literature.

introduced here briefly. The basic idea is to view individual studies of electoral system choice in individual countries (or regions) as expert accounts of how the electoral system was chosen and implemented, what was the level of inclusiveness of the process, and whether there existed an overall goal as a general principle for the electoral system. This thesis uses this case study survey approach for the investigation of the principle of representation dimension of mixed-member electoral systems because these systems were mostly adopted in the recent past and are almost all covered intensively by electoral system research. After a thorough search of the relevant literature, every individual case study was subjected to the same general questionnaire on the principle of representation dimension and the choice context of electoral systems. The questionnaire and the dataset resulting from the case study survey are presented in Chapter 10 as well as in full detail in Appendix E.

7 International comparison

This chapter is based on the manuscript 'Raabe, J. and Linhart, E. (2015) Which electoral systems succeed at providing proportionality and concentration? An investigation of promising (mixed) designs and risky tools' which is currently under review.

7.1 Introduction

Electoral institutions present the very core of a democratic political system as they affect voter, candidate, and party behavior and eventually transform votes into parliamentary representation (Gallagher & Mitchell 2005b: 3; Farrell 2011: 1). An evaluation of these elementary democratic institutions is therefore a key objective of political science. The focus with improving design typically lies on the question of how to satisfy the competing demands of providing proportional representation and facilitating accountable government via a concentrated party system – the representativeness-accountability trade-off (Carey & Hix, 2011: 385). While plurality systems are typically associated with single-party governments and proportional representation (PR) systems with high representativeness, both typically perform poorly with regard to the respective other dimension. Therefore, a desirable solution is not only to balance these two demands but to provide both of these functions to a satisfactory degree and thereby reach a superior middle-ground in electoral system design (see originally Lijphart 1984). However, even though there are general hopes as well as outright recommendations for general types of systems – mixed-member electoral systems (e.g. Shugart 2001a; Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a; Birch 2003) or PR systems with a moderate district magnitude (Carey & Hix 2011) – a thorough empirical test of such competing claims is still lacking. Existing analyses relevant to the research question either focus only on a subset of electoral systems and the concentration dimension (Kostadinova 2002; Nishikawa & Herron 2004) or on one specific technical element (typically district magnitude; Lijphart 1994; Cox 1997; Carey & Hix 2011), and none directly investigate the role of different combinations of technical details. This chapter seeks to thoroughly contribute to the question of which electoral system designs are best able to reach a superior balance of proportionality and concentration by investigating all types of electoral systems and by understanding them both as general types as well as the sum of their technical features. This holistic approach allows us to reach very specific conclusions about the precise institutional setup of an electoral system and how this setup affects the likelihood of attaining desirable levels of proportionality and concentration. The analysis thus not only helps to answer the pressing question of which electoral system designs appear to be superior to others but also moves our attention to the effects of the combination of various technical details such as district magnitude, legal threshold, tier-linkage, and the level of compensation in multi-tier electoral systems. In this way we may draw general conclusions with respect to types of electoral systems but also analyze likely effects of twisting technical details. Thus we provide a basis for design advice on both the more fundamental level of which type of system to choose and the level of technical details which is as significant in electoral reform processes. This importantly also includes an assessment of which technical features are

safer and which are riskier tools in aiming for a superior middle-ground in electoral system design.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, we will revisit the quest for optimal performance with regard to both proportionality and concentration and map out the different arguments as to which electoral system designs are expected to do well (or, poorly) in aiming for a superior middle-ground. In a next step we will discuss how general types of electoral systems are a starting point but not a sufficient basis for investigating electoral system performance. Subsequently, we highlight the importance of moving from a more general level of different types of systems to the level of technical details, also accounting for the fact that similar general electoral system types might be based on different technical specifications. After a discussion of our data and the variables we use, the empirical analysis of 590 elections in 57 countries will test – controlling for sociopolitical context factors – which electoral system types and details lead to differences in their eventual performance. Finally, the conclusion summarizes results and offers clear implications as to which and how different technical elements can be useful (but sometimes risky) tools to reach an efficient outcome on the trade-off between proportionality and concentration.

7.2 Successfully balancing proportionality and concentration – general design propositions

The biggest challenge for electoral system designers typically is to satisfy demands with respect to the competing general goals of proportionality and concentration (Nohlen 1984; Powell 2000; Chapters 3 and 4). As polar design options, pure PR electoral systems are associated with highly representative parliaments that allow for a more nuanced representation of the electorate, while plurality electoral rules are associated with the creation of accountable single-party governments (Duverger 1954; Rae 1967; Farrell 2011). However, both these pure design options typically either fail to, in the case of PR systems, concentrate the party system in order to enable swift government formation, or, in the case of plurality systems, deliver accurate representation and account for minority interests (Shugart 2001b). Hence it is not surprising that practitioners and electoral system researchers alike have long sought for a design that could provide for both sufficient levels of proportionality and concentration (initially Lijphart 1984; also see Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a; Carey & Hix 2011). The literature has since come up with two general design propositions for achieving a balance of proportionality and concentration – a balance that ideally sees good performance in both dimensions (Carey & Hix 2011).

The first general approach to achieving a good performance regarding both proportionality and concentration is to combine the elements of both pure system types in mixed-member electoral systems (Lijphart 1984: 207; Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a; Birch 2003). Spurred by the success story of the German mixed-member system (Kaase 1984; Nishikawa & Herron 2004: 767; Saalfeld 2005), the desire for these systems to lead to a satisfactory performance regarding the competing goals of electoral system design led to a wave of electoral reforms to such mixed-member electoral systems in the late 1980's and early 1990's (mixed-member systems were adopted, e.g., in New

Zealand, Japan, Italy, Venezuela, and Bolivia, as well as a plethora of Eastern European and South East Asian countries; see Massicotte & Blais 1999; Ferrara et al. 2005: 1-14). The argument for why mixed-member systems will be able to provide for 'interparty efficiency' (i.e. both high levels of proportionality and concentration; see Shugart 2001b) is that the presence of elections in single-member districts focuses party competition on two main parties with which a few smaller parties are associated in political blocs (see Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a; Kostadinova 2002: 25; D'Alimonte et al. 2012). As this is largely a psychological, coordinating effect, election outcomes will still remain fairly proportional in these systems.⁴¹ This basic idea – since it is largely based on the combination of incentives from PR and plurality systems – was initially upheld notwithstanding the specific technical specification of the mixed-member electoral system (Shugart 2001b; Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a). After a first period of empirical evaluations, the mixed-member proportional type (in which disproportionalities arising in the plurality tier are compensated by the PR tier) has received much more acclaim than the mixed-member majoritarian type where both tiers operate independently (see Nishikawa & Herron 2004: 767; Bowler et al. 2005; Gallagher 2005b: 575; Farrell 2011: 108; Larkin 2011: 77). We thus denote the first general proposition as to which design approach should be able to produce election outcomes that are characterized by a superior balance of proportionality and concentration. Following the trend in the literature on mixed-member systems, we also add to this proposition that it is especially the mixed-member proportional variant that is deemed a promising option.

Mixed-member system proposition: Mixed-member electoral systems are best able to successfully provide both proportionality and concentration. Especially mixed-member proportional electoral systems are expected to provide such successful balance.

The second general approach is to apply a PR electoral system but with moderate district magnitudes (Carey & Hix 2011). The argument why this electoral system design should deliver a superior balance of proportionality and concentration is similar to that brought forward in the literature on mixed-member electoral systems: moderate district magnitudes (between three and nine) mark the 'sweet spot' in electoral system design as they allow for a vastly improved degree of representativeness compared to plurality systems in single-member districts but still put pressure on voters and parties to coordinate on the most viable candidates (Carey & Hix 2011; also see Cox & Shugart 1996). Contrary to many of the mixed-member electoral systems, most of the PR systems with these moderate district magnitudes were not explicitly devised to do well with respect to both proportionality and concentration as district magnitudes oftentimes adhere to jurisdictional boundaries and the respective population sizes (see Chapter 4). This is not to say, though, that moderate district magnitudes are normally not linked with the idea of a successful balance – in Spain, for example, electoral system designers perceived many districts of moderate magnitude as the way to balance demands for proportional representation and a certain level of concentration of the party system (Hopkin 2005: 375-379). Overall then, Carey and Hix (2011) focus on the core technical element of district magnitude and its coordination effects (as do

⁴¹ That election outcomes meet somewhere between those under pure PR or plurality systems is also, if somewhat implicitly, suggested by the contamination literature which posits that voter and party behavior in the plurality part of the electoral system is affected by the PR part and vice versa (e.g. Ferrara et al. 2005).


Lijphart 1994 and Cox 1997) but eventually turn their theoretical argument with respect to districts of a certain magnitude into a sweeping general design advice. We therefore denote the second general proposition as to how to reach a superior balance of proportionality and concentration via general design advice.

Moderate magnitude PR proposition: PR electoral systems with moderate district magnitudes are best able to successfully provide both proportionality and concentration.

The above has solely focused on how mixed-member and moderate magnitude PR systems might lead to an improved electoral system performance considering the trade-off between proportionality and concentration. However, several researchers stress that the opposite may well be true in that mixed-member electoral systems trying to combine incentives and functions of pure systems could also lead to perverse effects and a performance that is actually no superior middle-ground but a combination of weaknesses (see Sartori 1997: 74-75; Monroe 2003). The same is possible for PR systems with moderate district magnitudes as these can disturb proportionality to a substantial degree and could at the same time fail to lead to an overall concentration of the party system in cases where party system nationalization is low and different parties compete in different districts (see Cox 1997, 1999; Morgenstern et al. 2009).

Thus, the empirical analysis will not only evaluate the propositions with respect to a superior performance on the proportionality-concentration trade-off but also investigate in how far the adoption of electoral system designs aiming at the fulfilment of competing functional demands might risk undesirable performances with regard to proportionality, concentration, or even both. Figure 7.1 (based on Carey & Hix 2011; Linhart 2009) depicts three possible shapes of the trade-off between reducing party system fragmentation (i.e. concentrating the party system) and disturbing the proportionality of parliamentary representation. The trade-off might be completely linear as there is no real potential for a superior middle-ground in electoral system design and every improvement in one dimension causes a disruption in the other. As suggested by the two general propositions above, the trade-off might be non-linear and follow a concave arc, performing well with regard to both proportionality and concentration for electoral systems combining incentives from pure types (also see Taagepera & Shugart 1989). Yet, as implied by the potential riskiness of adopting such systems, a non-linear trade-off could also work in the opposite way (following a convex arc) indicating sub-par performances in both dimensions. When investigating the performance of different technical designs it is obviously important to also consider the sociopolitical context in the countries applying different electoral systems as contextual scope conditions may also be critical in explaining the shape of the trade-off between the goals of proportionality and concentration (e.g. Moser & Scheiner 2012).

Figure 7.1: Promises and pitfalls of aiming for a superior balance



In a way, the above arguments are as promising as they are problematic. We are running the risk of missing critical differences when relying on performance comparisons based on general types of systems. Obviously, it would be of great help if general types of electoral systems could be categorized as to how they perform along the lines of the proportionality-concentration trade-off and this would then lead to clear-cut implications for electoral reform. However, these sweeping design propositions suggest a design-uniformity that simply is not given in the world of electoral systems. Electoral systems – of whatever general type – are made up of a plethora of technical details. It is the combination of these details that should render a ‘best of both worlds’ performance of an electoral system more or less likely, notwithstanding the general type the electoral system is belonging to. The next section will therefore move from the level of fundamental type differences between electoral systems to that of technical details in order to pave the way for a nuanced analysis of the role played by (a combination of) individual technical elements.

7.3 The underappreciated role of (combinations of) technical details

The proposition of general types of systems is certainly necessary to categorize electoral systems but to a certain degree can block our view on the different combinations of technical components that are subsumed under these general types. Electoral systems are – technically spoken – combinations of different mathematical tools, and variations in the performance of electoral systems might be caused by more subtle differences in their technical setup and technical details than suggested by general type propositions. Table 7.1 presents an overview of those details that are relevant to the proportionality-concentration trade-off.⁴²

First, the district magnitude – arguably the most prominent tool to move electoral systems between the worlds of plurality and PR (Lijphart 1994; Carey & Hix 2011) – allows for nuanced design as lowering district magnitude leads to a lower number of viable parties (Cox 1997). Second, a similar effect might arise from employing a legal threshold that restricts parliamentary representation to those parties accumulating a certain share of the total votes. Third, electoral systems might either use a specific plurality rule or a specific PR (divisor or quota) method for seat allocation in pure systems. It is, however, also possible to allocate a subset of parliamentary seats according to the first and the rest according to the other type of allocation rule in order to affect the electoral system's performance along the proportionality-concentration trade-off. The latter is done in all mixed-member electoral systems with the share of seats allocated under each formula being an important mechanism for steering the electoral system between outcomes closer to those of pure plurality and pure PR systems. Finally, additional tiers may be used to compensate for disproportionalities arising in other tiers. For mixed-member electoral systems, the question of whether the second tier of PR seats is used to compensate for the results in the single-member district tier is critical and sometimes overlooked when mixed-member systems are treated as a coherent group. Mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems have no such compensatory linkage while mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems do as PR seats are used to compensate for disproportionalities arising in the plurality tier (Massicotte & Blais 1999). Furthermore, the degree of compensation that is possible is vital – if there are many PR seats available to compensate for disproportionalities, full compensation may be achieved.

Note that, especially for mixed-member systems, formula and compensation are not one and the same. Deciding how many seats are allocated under which formula is one detail question, another is whether the subset of seats allocated via PR is used to compensate for disproportionalities arising from the seat allocation according to the plurality formula or not. The distinction between formula and compensation is further underlined by the fact that PR systems (using only a PR formula) with multiple districts can have an additional (national) tier of seats that aims at correcting the disproportionalities arising from PR allocation within smaller multi-member districts ('national top-up seats'; Rose 1983: 38).

⁴² Obviously, the question of whether and how voters can choose individual candidates and give preference votes is important for the overall design of the electoral system. But as these specifications concern the intraparty dimension (Shugart 2001b) and are not expected to systematically affect the proportionality-concentration trade-off, we omit a discussion of these additional technical elements.

Table 7.1: Technical details of electoral systems

<i>Technical element</i>	<i>Pure plurality</i>	<i>Mixed rules</i>	<i>Pure PR</i>
District magnitude	1	Multiple districts, at least one district with a magnitude greater one	Equals parliament size
Legal threshold ^a	High	Moderate	None
Formula	Plurality or majority rule	Use of both formulas (mixed-member systems)	PR method (e.g. d'Hondt)
Compensation via additional tiers	No compensation via a PR tier	Partial compensation of disproportionalities via a PR tier	Full compensation of disproportionalities via a PR tier

Notes: Based on Chapter 3, p. 23.

^a Of course, a high legal threshold does not to say that an electoral system is of the pure plurality type, but high thresholds lead to the same type of structural effects favoring the (two) largest parties.

All of these technical elements are thus highly useful in moving an overall design closer to pure plurality or pure PR rules – all of them are continuous in the sense that one may try to achieve different intermediate positions on the proportionality-concentration trade-off. What becomes apparent immediately is that the sorting of electoral systems into different general types appears to build on only one (at best two) technical elements. Mixed-member systems do make use of both plurality/majority and PR formulas. However, they may vary in whether or not they are compensatory mixed-member systems, the height of the legal threshold for the seat allocation in the PR tier, and district magnitudes. Although for mixed-member systems a differentiation between MMM and MMP is now commonplace, this distinction can still mislead. An MMM system with relatively few single-member districts is likely to perform more like a pure PR system than an MMP system where only a few PR seats are available for compensation (see Bochsler, 2012). Similarly, PR systems with moderate district magnitudes might also additionally employ a legal threshold or a compensatory tier.

By only looking at general types researchers run the risk of neglecting other technical elements which may point to an overall technical design that is not described properly by the type variable. For example, mixed-member proportional systems with full compensation and no legal threshold seem to be part of a different overall design concept than mixed-member proportional systems with limited compensation and a substantial legal threshold for PR seat allocation. Similarly, the legal threshold is seen as a ‘powerful mechanism for reducing fragmentation in the assembly [...] without changing the fundamentals of the system itself’ (Kostadinova 2002: 31) and its importance might often go unnoticed due to its relative independence from general system types. For instance, it remains unclear why exactly it is that experts favor the mixed-member proportional system type (Bowler et al. 2005) – potentially because the reason is not so much type- as it is detail-related and experts prefer an MMP system with a five percent legal threshold as applied in Germany and New Zealand (Bowler & Farrell 2006: 450). Clearly, the combinations

of technical details that make up electoral systems have to be considered with the single technical details treated as being, at least a priori, of equal relevance in our empirical investigation in order to avoid the pitfall of treating a subset of technical elements as control variables typically ignored at the stage of deriving practical implications for practitioners desiring election outcomes characterized by good performances in both key dimensions. We thus propose to take all relevant technical details into account and assess general propositions and design advice based on different possible technical specifications on the detail-level.

Technical details proposition: We expect that the share of single-member districts, the district magnitude, the legal threshold, and the level of compensation each exert individual effects on the propensity of an electoral system to successfully provide both proportionality and concentration.

Taking this proposition of paying close attention to the detail-level seriously leads to multiple benefits: first, unlike with general type propositions, this perspective does not unnecessarily narrow the scope of possibly attractive design options by focusing too heavily on one particular technical element that is fundamental to the respective type-definition. This should also lead to less noisy results caused by the potentially unwarranted inclusion of fairly different systems into the same general type category. Second, the detail-level approach ought to lead to more clear-cut implications by allowing for inferences regarding very specific design options. And finally, as concerns shaping the trade-off between proportionality and concentration into a desirable direction, it will be crucial to differentiate between those technical details that are safer and those that are riskier tools for doing so.

7.4 Data and variables

The dataset we use to evaluate the propositions about electoral system design introduced above consists of 590 elections in 57 countries after 1945. Relying on existing data sources such as Dawn Brancati's Global Elections Database (Brancati 2015), Adam Carr's Election Archive (Carr 2015), and different volumes (co-)edited by Dieter Nohlen (Nohlen & Stöver 2010; Nohlen 1999, 2005) as well as official election statistics from the respective national institutions (typically the Electoral Commission or the Ministry of the Interior) we compiled complete election results for a large number of competitive elections.⁴³ In terms of electoral systems, the dataset includes all mixed-member electoral systems for which we could find reliable data as well as the vast majority of countries employing a PR electoral system with moderate and small district magnitudes. As benchmark cases, pure PR systems as well as systems applying plurality (First Past the Post) or majority rules in single-member districts were added. Information about the precise technical design of these systems partly come from Bormann and Golder (2013) but were updated substantially in order to also cover the legal threshold and the exact share of seats allocated in single-member districts. Based on these data we are able to sort electoral systems into general

⁴³ We did not include election results for which we found starkly conflicting statistics or for elections where the association of many candidates to political parties could not be determined.

types and in a second step to disaggregate them into their technical details as listed in Table 7.1. In order to be able to control for sociopolitical scope conditions we added several variables relating to the overall political system such as the level of presidential power (Doyle & Elgie 2015), ethnic heterogeneity (Fearon 2003), and whether a country is politically decentralized, providing elected sub-national governments with policy-making authority (Brancati 2008; Hooghe et al. 2010). More context variables relating to the level and age of democracy come from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al. 2014). Finally, additional characteristics of a country's overall institutional setup are added from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001).

Turning to the dependent variables – the level of proportionality and the degree of concentration of the party system – we use the two most widely applied measures in electoral system research in order to be able to directly compare our conclusions regarding the usefulness of type-based electoral system evaluations vis-à-vis detail-based evaluations with the conclusions of existing studies based on these measures (e.g. Lijphart 1994; Kostadinova 2002; Nishikawa & Herron 2004; Gallagher & Mitchell 2005a; Carey & Hix 2011). We measure the level of proportionality with the least squares index (LSI; Gallagher 1991) that provides a measure of how disproportional the distribution of parliamentary seats is compared to the distribution of vote shares: $LSI = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^N (s_i - v_i)^2}$ (i.e. the sum of the squared difference between parties' seat shares s_i and their vote shares v_i).⁴⁴

When it comes to the concentration of the party system we apply the 'effective number of parties' measure based on parliamentary seat distributions (ENP_s ; Laakso & Taagepera 1979): $ENP_s = \frac{1}{\sum_i s_i^2}$ (i.e. one divided by the sum of the squares of parties' seat shares s_i). This measure gives an intuitive account of the fragmentation of the party system in displaying the number of hypothetical equal-sized parties, implies the likely size of governing coalitions, and signals when a single-party government is possible (cases where $ENP_s < 2$). We compute both these indices for all elections based on complete results and will rely on the index scores in order to investigate the ability of different specifications of electoral systems to successfully balance proportionality and concentration.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ In the case of mixed-member systems in which voters cast two separate votes (one in the single-member district tier and one in the PR tier) we use parties' vote shares in the PR tier for calculating the disproportionality index since the distribution in the PR tier – basically by definition – is more reflecting of what voters would like the parliamentary seat distribution to look like if there were no restrictions put in place by electoral rules. The disproportionality between vote and seat shares is only reflecting the mechanical effects of an electoral system and neglects that voters and parties are subjected to psychological pressures when deciding to run for office or for whom to vote.

⁴⁵ For the vote level there are a few observations in our dataset where the vote data could not be fully disaggregated – usually this was the case when many independent candidates were present and official election statistics only reported the sum of all votes cast for independent candidates. We tested all our empirical models for robustness regarding this slight inaccuracy and did not encounter any meaningful differences in the results.

7.5 Empirical analysis

Our empirical assessment of the propositions introduced above will rely on two types of tests: first, we will investigate the impact of different electoral system designs on both dimensions – proportionality and concentration – separately. Second, we will use logit regression models to predict whether an electoral system will perform well (better than the median outcome; also see Carey & Hix 2011: 393) in both dimensions simultaneously. We will begin by testing the general type propositions and then move on to the level of technical details.

7.5.1 *The general design propositions*

If we simply compared PR electoral systems with mixed-member systems and systems where all seats are contested in single-member districts, it would seem as if mixed-member systems simply marked the intermediate solution of a linear trade-off: For PR systems the average ENP_s is 4 with the LSI also being 4; in mixed-member systems the ENP_s is 3.2 while the LSI is 8.3; and in plurality (including majority) systems the ENP_s is as low as 2.5 with a pronounced disproportionality (LSI) of 11.5.


However, the general design propositions demands that the PR category should be split according to district magnitude and mixed-member systems according to the linkage between electoral tiers. Therefore, Figure 7.2 splits electoral systems into five general categories: PR with high mean district magnitude (ten or above), PR with moderate district magnitudes (below ten)⁴⁶, mixed-member proportional and mixed-member majoritarian systems, and plurality/majority systems where all seats are contested in single-member districts (SMDs). Figure 7.2 presents boxplots for all general designs with regard to the ENP_s and the LSI. The horizontal lines represent the respective median outcomes considering all observations in the dataset. The results confirm and refine the rougher findings presented above. Although PR systems are still usually associated with the lowest LSI and highest ENP_s values, we see differences between PR systems with moderate and high district magnitudes. These discrepancies are more striking for party system concentration which could be a first hint that there could be a better trade-off between the two dimensions in moderate district magnitude PR systems.

Turning to the two design options of the mixed-member proposition, we further clearly see how the two different types of mixed-member electoral systems differ starkly with regard to their level of proportionality – with MMP systems, as expected, leading to much more proportional outcomes. MMM systems, however, are connected with lower levels of party system fragmentation. Yet, the latter difference in the concentration dimension is less pronounced. Thus, Figure 7.2 suggests that – in line with the more recent findings regarding mixed-member systems – the MMP design could very well be able to provide for both proportional representation and a

⁴⁶ We follow Carey and Hix (2011: 393) in defining what is low-to-moderate district magnitude PR system. Yet, the results presented below are not sensitive to the exact cut-off point for demarcating different types of PR systems.

sufficiently concentrated party system. MMP is the only general system type for which the median outcomes in both dimensions lie below the overall median outcomes.⁴⁷ The MMM variant, on the other hand, seems more akin to the pure plurality design in how it shapes the party system. Although PR electoral systems with moderate district magnitudes do also show the potential of combining good performances in both dimensions, they just differ slightly from PR systems with high district magnitude according to Figure 7.2.

Figure 7.2: Performance of system types in separate dimensions



Considering the performance in both dimensions simultaneously, the scatterplots in Figure 7.3 help us get a better idea of whether the general differences shown by Figure 7.2 hold up.⁴⁸ The graph shows how pure systems indeed typically perform well with regard to one dimension while providing sub-par results with respect to the other. The cross hairs is based on the overall medians in both dimensions and functions as a benchmark with which to distinguish between doubly good performance (lower-left quadrant), especially weak performance (upper-right quadrant) and one-sided performance (remaining quadrants). Corroborating the results

⁴⁷ It should be mentioned that the two (surprisingly) extreme cases of disproportionality under MMP rules can be explained by a manipulation strategy aimed at circumventing the compensation mechanism in MMP systems as discussed in-depth by Bochsler (2012; also see Elklit 2008). This strategy – relying on voters splitting their votes or parties running separate lists in different tiers – was applied by the two largest parties in Albania in 2005 and in Lesotho in 2007.

⁴⁸ The scatterplots exclude outliers (ENPs > 10; LSI > 20) in order to enable the reader to interpret the scatterplots already dense with many observations.

presented in Figure 7.2, MMP systems as well as PR systems with moderate district magnitudes do appear to often combine desirable results in both dimensions (they appear fairly often in the lower-left quadrant and the regions close to it). Elections under MMM rules are scattered all over, implying that MMM systems are unlikely to deliver a successful balance of proportionality and concentration on a consistent basis.

Figure 7.3: Overall performance of different general designs




Table 7.2 provides an overview of how often doubly good, doubly bad performances, or good performance in one and bad performance in the other dimension are reached under different general designs. It is not surprising that most of the plurality/majority system fall into the ‘concentrated but disproportional’ category, and PR systems – in particular those with high district magnitudes – often are ‘proportional but fragmented’. For mixed systems, it is most striking how only PR systems with moderate district magnitudes as well as MMP systems lead to doubly good performance above-average and more often than to doubly bad performance. Remembering the different trade-off shapes stylized in Figure 7.1, Table 7.2 suggests that both aforementioned general designs (moderate magnitude PR and MMP) are able to realize a non-linear trade-off that sees good performance in both dimensions. At the same time, however, the results with respect to the MMM system are rather suggestive of a non-linear trade-off that leads to outcomes that appear to be the worst of both worlds. Surprisingly, PR systems with high district magnitudes are also frequently found to perform badly in both dimensions – a result that can only be explained sensibly by considering technical details such as legal thresholds. Overall, especially

for mixed designs there are substantial numbers of doubly good as well as doubly bad performances – clearly it is important not only to consider different electoral systems’ ability to provide proportional representation and foster swift government formation, but also the associated risk of achieving neither.

Table 7.2: General designs and their performance

<i>Electoral system</i>	<i>Doubly good performance</i>	<i>Doubly bad performance</i>	<i>Proportional but fragmented</i>	<i>Concentrated but disproportional</i>	<i>N</i>
PR (high dm)	18 (11%)	31 (19%)	94 (58%)	18 (11%)	161
PR (moderate dm)	45 (23%)	28 (15%)	91 (46%)	35 (18%)	199
MMP	16 (34%)	7 (15%)	9 (19%)	15 (32%)	47
MMM	9 (12%)	17 (23%)	3 (4%)	46 (61%)	75
Plurality/Majority	5 (5%)	10 (10%)	3 (3%)	86 (83%)	104
All	93 (16%)	93 (16%)	200 (34%)	200 (34%)	586

Notes: Percentages given in parentheses are row percentages rounded to the nearest whole number.


In order to confirm the above results we use a logit regression with a dependent dummy variable equaling one if an election is both more proportional and more concentrated than the median election. Controlling for the level and age of democracy, the level of presidential power, political decentralization, and ethnic heterogeneity, the propensity of different general types to successfully combine proportional representation and concentration of the party system is estimated as expected by the general propositions. The logit results are provided in the appendix (Appendix B); Figure 7.4 summarizes the results by presenting predicted probabilities of a doubly good performance, comparing them for all five design types. MMP and PR with moderate district magnitude are the two systems most likely to perform well in both dimensions, while plurality/majority, PR with large district magnitudes as well as MMM systems are extremely unlikely to perform well in both dimensions. It is remarkable that the MMM system performs so badly since it, arguably, represents the most clear-cut combination of both pure types of electoral systems.

These results are robust with respect to using means instead of medians as benchmarks for good performance as well as to the exclusion of the context variables.⁴⁹ Considering the apprehension of Sartori (1997: 74-75; also see Monroe 2003) that mixed systems could combine deficits of pure systems instead of their advantages (i.e. include the worst instead of the best of both worlds), we run the same logit model for a dummy variable signaling whether an election outcome is both more disproportional and more fragmented than the median election (see Appendix B). Interestingly, no significant differences between design types appear. Here, only context variables such as the age of democracy (exerting a negative effect, implying that established democracies are less likely to experience an especially bad performance of the electoral system) and the level

⁴⁹ We also ran a regression model using the normalized distance from the normatively ideal outcome of $ENP_5 = 2$ and $LSI = 0$ as a dependent variable. This model leads to the same substantial conclusions as the more straightforward logit model with PR systems performing slightly better in the former model.

of ethnic heterogeneity (making doubly bad performance much more likely) are important predictors. Thus, the design-based differentiation of electoral systems yields little information regarding how to avoid the undesirable event of an election outcome that is both highly disproportional and renders swift government formation almost impossible – this information, however, is in high demand and we will assess the riskiness of different designs further based on the technical details of an electoral system. In sum, our results suggest that some designs (MMP and PR with moderate district magnitudes) are more likely to produce the best of both worlds and at the same time are not more risky in the sense that they are more likely to produce doubly bad results.

Figure 7.4: Predicted probabilities of performing well in both dimensions



While there are clear tendencies with respect to the performance of different general design types, Figures 7.2 and 7.3 as well as the failure to identify electoral system designs that are prone to failure in both dimensions also reveal that there is a lot of variation that remains unexplained by differences between general types. This is especially visible in Figure 7.3 where different trade-off patterns are suggested but where the scattering of observations also shows that much remains to be understood regarding the effect of electoral system design on performance. Furthermore, Figure 7.4 shows a clear picture of which systems are or are not able to reach a successful balance. Here, too, however, the design-based analysis might be flawed and praising (or, thrashing) general types of systems based on the results presented above could accordingly be misleading.

7.5.2 *The role of technical details*

As we move on to investigate the technical details that affect how an electoral system performs with regard to the proportionality-concentration trade-off, Table 7.3 presents the results of regressions for the performance in the different dimensions. Due to the problem of electoral rules being largely constant over time, our time series cross-section dataset renders the estimation of multilevel models and country fixed effects problematic (Greene 2011). We thus try to incorporate country differences based on several variables pertaining to the sociopolitical context (level and age of democracy, the amount of presidential power, whether the country is politically decentralized, and – although not included in Table 7.3 – the level of ethnic heterogeneity; see Carey & Hix 2011 for a similar approach). Table 7.3 highlights how the addition of context variables does improve model fit, but also that there are no substantial changes in the estimated coefficients of the electoral system variables.⁵⁰ As for the technical details, six variables enter the models: the mean district magnitude of an electoral system as well as the squared mean district magnitude (following the argument in Carey & Hix 2011; also see Lijphart 1994),⁵¹ the height of the legal threshold, the share of seats contested in SMDs, and two dummy variables signaling the level of compensation, with one indicating whether there is a compensatory PR tier in a mixed-member system and a second indicating whether there is a small-sized tier of national top-up (PR) seats that is meant to compensate for remaining disproportionalities arising in PR or mixed-member systems after the allocation in the main tiers has occurred.⁵² Importantly, using all these technical details as independent variables is not meant to dispute the relevance of general designs as reference points but includes these general designs into a more flexible framework of technical details that allows for carefully assessing the effects of single elements and various detail-combinations. Our detail-based models thus include general design types as specific combinations of technical details.

⁵⁰ The same is true for applying fixed effects regression, although we cannot say with certainty which effects are really picked up by the respective coefficients in these models. In order to further test robustness, we also ran random effects models and different jackknife models. Although many variables seized to be statistically significant in the jackknife models – where whole country clusters were dropped one at a time – the substantial effects importantly remained stable.

⁵¹ Relying on the average district magnitude means that we neglect variation in district magnitude in an electoral system, which, in theory, is problematic (see Chapter 3). However, since the distribution of district magnitudes rarely is lopsided and as mean district magnitude has repeatedly been found to be a remarkably robust predictor of party system characteristics notwithstanding the disregard of variance (Taagepera & Shugart 1993; Lijphart 1994), we decide to use it without adding a variable that captures the variance of district magnitude. In an additional robustness check, using the median district magnitude (from Carey & Hix 2011) leads to the same results. This is not to say that variance has no effect (see Monroe & Rose 2002), but that the effect seemingly does not pertain the overall characteristics of a party system – and it is those characteristics which concern us here.

⁵² We also tested models where we entered an interaction term between the presence of a compensatory PR tier and the share of SMDs in order to be more precise about the level of compensation that is possible. However, as the inclusion of such an interaction did not improve the fit of any of the models in this chapter, we decided to present leaner models without interaction terms. Using a dummy variable for the national top-up tier is warranted since the size of this additional tier is typically relatively small and similar for most countries employing such an additional tier (a typical share of seats allocated in a national top-up tier is about ten percent; see the dataset by Bormann & Golder 2013).

Table 7.3: OLS regression models

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>
	LSI	LSI	ENP _s	ENP _s
Mean district magnitude	-0.0193*** (0.0052)	-0.0229*** (0.0054)	0.0135*** (0.0027)	0.0136*** (0.0027)
Squared mean district magnitude	1.81e-05* (1.05e-05)	2.62e-05** (1.03e-05)	-2.34e-05*** (4.68e-06)	-2.47e-05*** (4.59e-06)
Legal threshold	0.332*** (0.118)	0.266** (0.130)	-0.105*** (0.0331)	-0.0835** (0.0413)
Share of SMD seats	7.206*** (0.579)	7.387*** (0.623)	-1.265*** (0.143)	-1.543*** (0.178)
Compensatory PR tier	-1.114 (1.148)	-0.918 (1.131)	-0.0766 (0.276)	-0.0834 (0.273)
National top-up tier	-1.393*** (0.368)	-1.287*** (0.399)	0.484*** (0.163)	0.317* (0.170)
Level of democracy		-0.123 (0.145)		-0.0109 (0.0366)
Age of democracy		-0.00425 (0.0090)		0.00729** (0.0031)
Presidential power		-0.165 (1.654)		0.408 (0.567)
Political decentralization		-0.971** (0.428)		0.447*** (0.147)
Constant	4.619*** (0.196)	6.440*** (1.565)	3.700*** (0.117)	3.458*** (0.447)
Observations	585	561	585	561
R ²	0.37	0.39	0.22	0.25

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Turning to the results, the effects of different technical variables on disproportionality (LSI) and concentration (ENP_s) are as would be expected. First, increasing district magnitude means lowering disproportionality while increasing the effective number of parties – yet, both effects are diminishing as district magnitude grows larger.⁵³ Second, raising the legal threshold increases disproportionality and has a reductive impact on party system fragmentation. Third, as the share of single-seat districts increases, so does disproportionality, while the ENP_s shrinks. Fourth, the presence of a compensatory PR tier does not exert significant effects on either dimension. And finally, the presence of a small tier of national top-up seats reduces disproportionality and at the

⁵³ If we also include ethnic heterogeneity into the models, there is a significant interaction between ethnic heterogeneity and district magnitude as suggested by the literature (see Ordeshook & Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto & Cox 1997; Clark & Golder 2006), yet the structure of the effect of district magnitude remains unchanged.

same time increases the effective number of parties. While all these individual effects are hardly surprising, the key message of Table 7.3 is that all technical details, except for the presence of a compensatory PR tier, are significant factors in explaining both disproportionality and concentration – a simple type differentiation of electoral systems thus runs the risk of neglecting critical technical details. Furthermore, although the dummy variable indicating that a compensatory PR tier is being used is not statistically significant, it is the only variable whose estimates suggest an effect that is in line with a doubly good performance regarding proportionality and concentration – the presence of a compensatory PR tier is estimated to have a negative effect on both the LSI and the ENPs. The other technical details trade off proportionality and concentration in the commonly expected way. In the following, it will be critical to further assess the technical details to see whether these potentially function as useful tools in fulfilling competing demands successfully, for example because they exert a strong positive impact on one dimension but merely a small negative effect in the other.

Table 7.4 presents the results of logit regressions that highlight the different technical elements' effects on the probability of a successful balance (below-median performance in both dimensions; models 1 and 2) and on a doubly bad performance (above-median performance in both dimensions; models 3 and 4).⁵⁴ Turning first to good performance in both dimensions, models 1 and 2 show that while the presence of a compensatory PR tier did not exert significant effects on the individual dimensions, it does make a doubly good performance more likely and thus stands out as one technical element prone to provide for high levels of both proportionality and concentration. However, and this is where one should consider the combinations of technical details, this positive effect could be negated in a mixed-member electoral system employing a large share of SMDs, since increasing the latter makes a doubly good performance less likely by boosting disproportionality. The same negative effect is estimated for the presence of an additional tier with national top-up seats, likely because – for the overall election outcome – the additional proportionality comes with the cost of increased levels of party system fragmentation as small parties are encouraged to contest all districts in order to gain votes for the top-up allocation.

The negative linear effect of district magnitude needs to be understood alongside the effect of the share of SMDs which signals which types of districts are at all possible: assuming we are in a PR or mixed-member system, it is thus best to go with small-to-moderate districts as increasing district magnitude would render reaching the best of both worlds less likely (as suggested by Carey & Hix 2011). But if district magnitude was to be lowered so far that a plurality electoral system would have to be used, there would actually be a strong overall decrease of the probability of a doubly good performance due to the related change from zero (or, say, fifty percent) SMDs to a share of one-hundred percent SMDs. We will further discuss such combination-based effects below. The – unexpected when it comes to the direction – significant curvilinear effect that kicks

⁵⁴ The same technical problems, our respective solutions and robustness checks that were discussed with respect to the linear regressions presented in Table 7.3 also apply for the logit regressions presented in Table 7.4. We also ran the same models based on overall means as performance benchmarks and retained the same substantial results.

in at very high mean district magnitudes (above 300) should be neglected as it derives solely from the inclusion of German elections into the dataset.⁵⁵ Finally, the legal threshold exerts a positive effect on the probability of a doubly good performance.

Table 7.4: Logit regression models

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>
	Doubly good	Doubly good	Doubly bad	Doubly bad
Mean district magnitude	-0.0120*** (0.00373)	-0.0100*** (0.00388)	0.00159 (0.00389)	0.00202 (0.00403)
Squared mean district magnitude	2.56e-05*** (8.28e-06)	2.20e-05*** (8.29e-06)	-1.08e-05 (7.83e-06)	-1.06e-05 (8.35e-06)
Legal threshold	0.109** (0.0483)	0.0906 (0.0608)	0.207*** (0.0596)	0.132** (0.0591)
Share of SMD seats	-1.300*** (0.400)	-1.610*** (0.473)	-0.889** (0.374)	-0.968** (0.447)
Compensatory PR tier	1.048** (0.443)	1.159** (0.469)	0.172 (0.603)	0.254 (0.540)
National top-up tier	-0.652** (0.297)	-0.506* (0.290)	-0.896*** (0.326)	-0.907*** (0.341)
Level of democracy		-0.0455 (0.0715)		0.00586 (0.0439)
Age of democracy		-0.0200*** (0.00755)		-0.0133* (0.00769)
Presidential power		-1.430 (0.962)		1.047 (0.789)
Political decentralization		0.602** (0.271)		-0.0737 (0.293)
Constant	-1.353*** (0.218)	-0.564 (0.728)	-1.632*** (0.235)	-1.247** (0.585)
Observations	585	561	585	561
Pseudo R ²	0.08	0.12	0.06	0.08

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

⁵⁵ Taking into consideration the coefficient for the squared district magnitude suggests that extremely high district magnitudes are also able to fulfill the best of both worlds promise – however, the curvilinear effect is an artefact mainly picking up the good overall performance of the German system which happens to have no company of systems with a similarly high mean district magnitude. Once we either exclude the German cases from the model or treat all mean district magnitudes above 100 as all being of the same magnitude, the squared term ceases to be anywhere close to statistical significance. If, next to the German cases, the share of SMDs is excluded, the effect of district magnitude picks up the effect of plurality/majority systems and is estimated to be curvilinear in that single-member districts and districts of especially high magnitude are less likely to perform well in both dimensions compared to moderate district magnitudes (as in Carey & Hix 2011).

Moving our attention to models 3 and 4 which estimate the effects of different elements on the probability of an especially bad performance, we can see that while the legal threshold improves the chances of a good performance in both dimensions, increasing it also means a higher risk of the electoral system failing both to provide sufficient proportionality *and* to foster sufficient concentration. The legal threshold thus emerges as a useful but risky tool when aiming for a superior balance. The addition of a compensatory PR tier as well as increasing district magnitude, on the contrary, do not appear to be risky tools since they do not render a bad performance more likely.⁵⁶ The addition of a small tier of national top-up seats as well as an increase in the share of SMDs both decrease the likelihood of a doubly bad performance, most likely because they move electoral system design closer to pure PR or plurality and thus almost guarantee the electoral system performing well either with respect to proportionality or concentration. For both dependent variables, the addition of the context variables does improve model fit but leaves the estimated coefficients for the technical variables basically unchanged (the same is true for a model also including the level of ethnic heterogeneity). An interesting finding for the context variables is that the older (i.e. more experienced) the political system, the less likely are extremely good or extremely bad performances notwithstanding the design of the electoral system.⁵⁷ The positive effect of political decentralization is not robust as the effect completely vanishes (the sign changes, too) once we apply country (or even region) fixed effects.

Table 7.5 presents how meaningful changes in the technical details of an electoral system affect the predicted probability of performing well as well as of performing badly in both dimensions.⁵⁸ Here, the difference between safer and riskier tools for reaching the best of both worlds as well as the impact of the combination of different details is clearly visible. One of the safer tools is district magnitude – lowering district magnitude from 100 to 5 leads to a clear increase in the likelihood of successfully achieving desirable levels of both proportionality and concentration, while the likelihood of a particularly bad overall performance is even decreased slightly. Thus, a moderate district magnitude indeed seems to constitute a ‘sweet spot’ in electoral system design (Carey & Hix 2011). Another fairly safe tool is the addition of a compensatory PR tier which boosts the probability of a doubly good performance by 17 percentage points, while increasing the risk of a doubly bad performance by a comparatively meager 4 percentage points. However, although both these elements appear as safe tools to reach a superior balance, the combination of technical elements is critical to consider. Countries like Denmark, Estonia or Norway do each pair moderate district magnitudes with a small top-up tier of additional PR seats and all never reach a doubly good performance. While the presence of such an additional top-up tier does render failure in both dimensions very unlikely, it also clearly lowers the chances of performing well with respect to

⁵⁶ However, it should be mentioned that the presence of a compensatory PR tier can induce electoral system failure in the sense that disproportionality is uncommonly high due to the manipulation strategy discussed in footnote 47.

⁵⁷ This moderating effect of experience with democracy is robust to excluding elections conducted under MMM electoral systems which were predominantly adopted in transitioning countries.

⁵⁸ The marginal effects of specific technical changes presented here would look very similar – differing only due to minor compression effects (see Berry et al. 2010) – if computed at other values of the respective independent variables (e.g. lowering the share of SMDs, for example, from 80 to 60 percent or raising a legal threshold from 2 to 7 percent).

both proportionality and concentration. Similarly, mixed-member proportional systems may still have a fairly small likelihood of reaching a superior balance if they come with a very high share of SMDs, the latter having a negative impact on the probability of a successful performance in both dimensions. These results also partly vindicate mixed-member majoritarian systems which, while preventing a superior balance, render a total performance failure unlikely via employing fairly high proportions of SMDs without having a compensatory PR tier. Finally, Table 7.5 highlights the risky nature of the legal threshold – employing a legal threshold of five percent does raise the probability of a doubly good performance by five percentage points but at the same time also adds nine percentage points to the probability of a doubly bad performance. Therefore, even if an electoral system has the ‘right’ district magnitude and mixed-member structure, a high legal threshold may tip the system’s performance in an undesirable direction.

Table 7.5: Marginal effects of changes in technical details

<i>Technical change</i>	<i>Doubly good performance</i>	<i>Doubly bad performance</i>
Lowering district magnitude from 100 to 5	+7	-1
Raising the legal threshold from 0 to 5	+5	+9
Lowering the percentage of SMDs from 60 to 40 percent	+3	+2
Addition of a compensatory PR tier	+17	+4
Adding national top-up seats	-5	-10

Notes: Differences in predicted probabilities were calculated based on models 2 and 4 in Table 7.4; other variables were held at their means.

The detail-level analysis has clearly mapped out design specifications that are risky in terms of leading to undesirable outcomes in both dimensions – no such differentiation is possible based on the sorting of electoral systems into general types as has been shown earlier. Thus, the key lesson with respect to the *technical details proposition* is that details, and especially the combination of these details, do in fact make a crucial difference. Reaching the best of both worlds with respect to proportionality and concentration appears not only to be a question of general system type but one of careful design and the right combination of electoral hurdles as well as compensation mechanisms.

7.6 Conclusion

Which electoral systems are able to successfully provide for proportional representation as well as for party system concentration? If we solely look to general design types, the moderate magnitude PR as well as the mixed-member proportional system both appear as good choices, whereas pure systems and the mixed-member majoritarian system are unlikely to achieve aforementioned goals at the same time. While moving to the level of technical details confirms

these general propositions, it also becomes evident how nuanced changes in the technical design of electoral systems have rather different implications for performance. Technical elements fulfill various different roles not only for achieving a good performance in both dimensions but also with respect to the so far largely neglected risk of a bad performance in both dimensions. The addition of a compensatory PR tier in a mixed-member system and the lowering of the district magnitude in a PR system are both tools with which to make a good performance in both dimensions more likely without (substantially) increasing the risk of actually achieving neither of both goals. A riskier tool (often heralded as being responsible for sufficient levels of concentration in MMP or PR systems; e.g. Kostadinova 2002: 31) is the legal threshold, increasing which makes extreme – positive or negative – performances more likely. Finally, there are tools suitable for avoiding extreme performances altogether – a small tier of national top-up seats and increasing the share of SMDs. It is the combination of these details that renders a successful performance regarding both proportionality and concentration more or less likely. The implication for electoral system design is thus to consider the role of (combinations of) technical details and, next to considering the promises of different design options, to be aware of the risks associated with different choices of electoral institutions. Design complexity is as much a way to reach the best of both worlds as it constitutes a risk of instead bringing out the worst of both worlds in election outcomes – a lesson that seems especially crucial for those deciding over the electoral system in transition countries.

Future research should pay closer attention not only to technical details but to the fact that they not only differ in their propensity to produce desirable outcomes but also in how they affect the probability of an especially undesirable performance. What has to be investigated in order to map out the more wide-ranging impact of different performances is in how far the success and failure of specific design combinations in particular countries function as examples for other countries or even whole regions (see Martin & Steiner 2015). These analyses may then assess whether best or worst of both worlds performances lead to a corresponding diffusion of electoral system designs – the spread of the German MMP system seems to be one particularly striking example. Furthermore, empirical analyses such as ours are limited in so far as we have to rely on investigating the performance of electoral system designs that actually exist in practice. However, it would be highly important to investigate how higher legal thresholds or especially low or high (but not full) shares of SMDs affect the propensity to perform well or badly in both dimensions. Here, careful simulation studies could be of use in order to derive more nuanced advice for technical details that lie out of the range of what we see applied in the worlds' electoral systems.

8 Assessing mixed-member systems in the German states

This chapter appears as 'Raabe, J., Krifft, R., Vogel, J., and Linhart, E. (2014) Verdientes Vorbild oder Mythos? Eine vergleichende Analyse der personalisierten Verhältniswahl auf Länderebene' in the *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 8(3-4), pp. 283-305 (DOI: 10.1007/s12286-014-0214-9). It takes a close look at the heralded MMP electoral system (in Germany termed 'personalisierte Verhältniswahl') by investigating the German state level. The chapter is written in German language.

8.1 Einleitung

Das Wahlsystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – die personalisierte Verhältniswahl – erfreut sich international breiter Akzeptanz und wird gemeinhin als besonders gelungenes (Misch-)Wahlsystem gelobt (z.B. Diamond & Plattner 2006: xxvi; Farrell 2011: 117). Häufig hervorgehoben wird neben der Verbindung von Listen- und Einzelkandidatenwahl vor allem auch die Gleichzeitigkeit von (nahezu) proportionaler Abbildung der Wählerschaft im Parlament und dem Zustandekommen von vergleichsweise klaren und stabilen Regierungsmehrheiten (Klingemann & Weßels 2001; Saalfeld 2005; Pappi & Herrmann 2010). Folglich kombiniert die personalisierte Verhältniswahl die Stärken reiner Wahlsysteme und scheint beim Blick in die einschlägige internationale Literatur somit tatsächlich das „Beste beider Welten“ aus Mehrheitswahl und Verhältniswahl in sich zu vereinen (vgl. Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a). Auf dieser Grundlage diente das Wahlsystem zum deutschen Bundestag bereits verschiedenen Ländern als Vorbild für Wahlsystemreformen (Ferrara et al. 2005: 25). Die zunehmende Fragmentierung des bundesdeutschen Parteiensystems (vgl. Niedermayer 2010) und die damit verbundene, neuerlich problematischer gewordene Bildung von Koalitionsregierungen (bei den Bundestagswahlen 2005 und 2013) lassen jedoch Zweifel aufkommen, ob die personalisierte Verhältniswahl tatsächlich ein verdientes Vorbild ist oder ob ihre überaus positive Bewertung anhand der jüngsten Entwicklung revidiert werden muss (vgl. etwa Strohmeier 2007; Grotz 2009). Noch genereller stellt sich die Frage, ob für diese Bewertung nicht soziopolitische Faktoren unterschätzt und die Rolle des Wahlsystems überschätzt wurden (vgl. Moser & Scheiner 2012). Die Beantwortung dieser Frage ist neben der allgemeinen Relevanz für die Analyse von (Misch-)Wahlsystemen insbesondere auch für die Reformdebatte rund um das Bundestagswahlsystem – etwa mit Bezug auf Überhangmandate (vgl. Behnke & Grotz 2011) – von Bedeutung.

Die Tatsache, dass die Beurteilung eines generellen Wahlsystems eng mit der Entwicklung auf der deutschen Bundesebene verbunden ist, legt dabei auch offen, dass die Analyse der personalisierten Verhältniswahl bisher kaum vergleichend erfolgt ist. Nebeneinander erfolgen Debatten um die grundsätzliche hohe Eignung der personalisierten Verhältniswahl im Universum aller Wahlsysteme sowie (im Wesentlichen innerhalb Deutschlands) um die Wirkung bestimmter technischer Details der personalisierten Verhältniswahl. Der Fokus auf das bundesdeutsche Wahlsystem geht einher mit einer geringen Fallzahl sowie geringer Variation bezüglich des Wahlsystems, sodass es äußerst schwierig ist, Wahlsystemeinflüsse von durch den

soziopolitischen Kontext bedingten Entwicklungen zu trennen. Gerade hinsichtlich der Konsequenzen möglicher Reformen fehlt es also an einer vergleichenden Analyse der personalisierten Verhältniswahl. Es ist vor diesem Hintergrund fast schon verwunderlich, dass die Länderebene der Bundesrepublik noch nicht intensiver untersucht worden ist, da diese die wünschenswerte Varianz der Fälle vergrößert – sowohl mit Blick auf einen generellen Systemvergleich als auch auf die Analyse technischer Details im Speziellen. Die Untersuchung der Länderebene erscheint zur Klärung der oben beschriebenen Debatten äußerst vielversprechend. Gerade auch vor dem Hintergrund der Reformdiskussion um das Bundeswahlssystem bieten die Bundesländer und deren Wahlsysteme sehr nützliche Vergleichsfälle, da – im Gegensatz zum internationalen Vergleich – die soziopolitischen Rahmenbedingungen relativ geringen Variationen unterliegen. Eine solche vergleichende Analyse profitiert dabei stark von der Tatsache, dass zumindest auf beschreibender Ebene in den letzten Jahren eine stärkere Beschäftigung mit den verschiedenen Landeswahlsystemen erfolgt ist (aktuell etwa Massicotte 2003; Mielke & Reutter 2004; Eder & Magin 2008; Trefs 2008).

Dieses Kapitel zielt darauf ab, mit Hilfe einer vergleichenden Analyse der Wahlsysteme der deutschen Bundesländer zu untersuchen, inwieweit die personalisierte Verhältniswahl bezüglich der genauen Abbildung gesellschaftlicher Interessen sowie der gleichzeitigen Förderung klarer Regierungsmehrheiten tatsächlich das „Beste beider Welten“ darstellt und welche Rolle dabei spezifischen technischen Details zukommt. Dazu zeigen wir im nächsten Abschnitt zunächst auf, inwiefern Mischwahlsysteme die Stärken reiner Wahlsysteme kombinieren können. Es folgen die Beschreibung der personalisierten Verhältniswahl und ihre Einordnung als Mischwahlsystem. Im Zuge dieser Einordnung formulieren wir vor dem Hintergrund der Literatur zu Mischwahlsystemen Erwartungen bezüglich der generellen sowie detailabhängigen Wirkungsweise der personalisierten Verhältniswahl. Der Beschreibung der Datengrundlage und der Operationalisierung wesentlicher Variablen folgt die empirische Analyse – mit Blick sowohl auf den generellen Systemvergleich als auch auf technische Details. Im Fazit schließlich diskutieren wir die Implikationen der Ergebnisse für mögliche Wahlsystemreformen sowie die Wahlsystemforschung generell.

8.2 Mischwahlsysteme als das „Beste beider Welten“?

8.2.1 Mischwahlsysteme und gesteigerte Koordinationsanreize

Technisch betrachtet sorgen Wahlsysteme dafür, dass Wählerstimmen zu Sitzverteilungen transformiert werden. Diese Transformation kann auf sehr unterschiedlichen Wegen geschehen und sehr unterschiedlichen Vorstellungen von Repräsentation folgen. So hebt Nohlen (2009a) hervor, dass ein Wahlsystem entweder das generelle Ziel der Herbeiführung klarer Regierungsmehrheiten (Konzentrationsfunktion) oder das der proportionalen Abbildung gesellschaftlicher Interessen (Repräsentationsfunktion) verfolgen kann. Eine Entscheidung für ein bestimmtes Wahlsystem ist demnach eine Entscheidung für eines dieser Repräsentationsprinzipien (Nohlen 2009a: 140-145). Basierend auf dieser normativen

Grundentscheidung fungiert die technische Ausgestaltung dann als Instrument der Erfüllung des Repräsentationsprinzips (vgl. auch Kapitel 3).

Lange Zeit hat die dichotome Betrachtung der Repräsentationsprinzipien zu einer ähnlich dichotomen Einschätzung der Wahlsysteme geführt: Die Mehrheitswahl in Einerwahlkreisen wurde typischerweise als förderlich für Konzentration gesehen, während sie dabei häufig zu starken Verzerrungen zwischen Stimmen- und Sitzverhältnissen verschiedener Parteien führt, da Stimmen für erfolglose Wahlkreiskandidaten keinen Einfluss auf die Parlamentszusammensetzung nehmen. Die Verhältniswahl in einem nationalen bzw. mehreren großen Wahlkreisen wird genau mit der gegenteiligen Wirkung verbunden (vgl. etwa Duverger 1959). Mittlerweile wurde diese dichotome Betrachtung sowohl mit Blick auf das Repräsentationsprinzip als auch auf die technische Ausgestaltung durch eine differenziertere, kontinuierliche Perspektive ergänzt (vgl. Kaiser 2002; Farrell 2011; Kapitel 3). So stellten bereits mehrere Autoren die Frage, inwiefern über eine technische Mischung der reinen Wahlsystemtypen – etwa mittels der Anwendung mittlerer Wahlkreisgrößen oder der Einführung von gesetzlichen Sperrklauseln – eine Kombination der Stärken von reiner Mehrheitswahl und reiner Verhältniswahl, also eine Balance der Repräsentationsprinzipien, erreichbar ist (Lijphart 1984; Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a).

Besondere Aufmerksamkeit haben dabei Mischwahlsysteme erhalten, die gleichzeitig die Mehrheits- als auch die Verhältniswahl auf verschiedenen Ebenen anwenden. Dabei können diese Ebenen entweder in Grabenwahlsystemen nebeneinander existieren oder wie bei kompensatorischen Mischwahlsystemen miteinander verknüpft sein (vgl. Massicotte & Blais 1999). Von solchen Wahlsystemen wird erwartet, dass diese eindeutige Verbindung der Mehrheits- und der Verhältniswahl das „Beste beider Welten“ ergeben könnte (Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a). Betrachtet man die aus Wahlen resultierenden Parteiensysteme, stellt sich konkret die Frage, ob Mischwahlsysteme in der Lage sind, sowohl deren überbordende Fragmentierung zu vermeiden und somit die Regierungsbildung zu erleichtern als auch für die möglichst genaue Abbildung der Interessen der Wählerschaft im Parlament zu sorgen. Das Erreichen des „Besten beider Welten“ verlangt mit Blick auf das Parteiensystem also die gleichzeitige Erfüllung des Konzentrationsziels sowie proportionaler Repräsentation und damit die Kombination der Stärken von Mehrheits- und Verhältniswahl. Konkret wird erwartet, dass die Koordinationsanreize, welche sich durch das Vorhandensein einer Mehrheitswahlebene ergeben, für eine Konzentration des Parteiensystems etwa über die Formierung politischer Blöcke sorgen (Shugart 2001b: 26; Shugart & Wattenberg 2001c: 583-584; Gallagher 2005b: 548-549).⁵⁹ Die Anreize zur Koordination rühren daher, dass in den Einerwahlkreisen der Mehrheitswahlebene für gewöhnlich nur zwei Kandidaten (bzw. zwei Parteien) aussichtsreiche Chancen auf einen

⁵⁹ Dieser Effekt wird dabei allerdings insbesondere für solche Mischwahlsysteme vermutet, welche die Sitze in Mehrheits- und Verhältniswahlebene unabhängig voneinander vergeben (Gallagher 2005b: 548-549). Die Literatur zur Kontamination in Mischwahlsystemen (etwa Cox & Schoppa 2002; Ferrara et al. 2005) weist jedoch auch auf den Effekt hin, dass das Vorhandensein einer Verhältniswahlebene den Parteienwettbewerb in der Mehrheitswahlebene insofern beeinflusst, als dort in Mischwahlsystemen mehr Parteien antreten und vergleichsweise größere Streuung der Stimmen erfolgt als bei reinen Mehrheitswahlsystemen.

Parlamentssitz haben (vgl. Duverger 1959; Cox 1997). Gleichzeitig sorgt das Vorhandensein der Verhältniswahlebene für ein vergleichsweise hohes Maß an Proportionalität zwischen Stimmen- und Sitzverhältnis. Eine erfolgreiche Balance der Repräsentationsprinzipien im Sinne des „Besten beider Welten“ ist das Resultat.

8.2.2 Die personalisierte Verhältniswahl als Mischwahlsystem

Die personalisierte Verhältniswahl⁶⁰ (im Folgenden: pV) verbindet die Wahl von Abgeordneten in Einerwahlkreisen nach relativer Mehrheitswahl mit der Wahl von Parteilisten nach Verhältniswahl. Wähler haben hierbei zwei Stimmen: die Erststimme für die Wahl des Wahlkreiskandidaten und die Zweitstimme für die Wahl der Parteiliste. Die Sitzzuteilung erfolgt dabei in vier Schritten. Zunächst erhalten alle erfolgreichen Wahlkreisgewinner einen Sitz, womit 299 der 598 Abgeordneten gewählt sind. Anschließend wird die Anzahl an Sitzen ermittelt, die jeder Partei bundesweit gemäß ihrem Zweitstimmenergebnis nach der Methode Sainte-Laguë zusteht. Grundlage hierfür ist die Gesamtzahl an Abgeordneten, 598. Berücksichtigt werden hierbei nur Parteien, die mindestens fünf Prozent der Zweitstimmen erhalten haben oder drei Wahlkreissieger stellen. Drittens wird – ebenfalls nach der Methode Sainte-Laguë – für jede der Parteien ermittelt, wie viele ihrer Sitze auf welche Landeslisten entfallen. Diese Kontingente werden für jede Partei und jedes Bundesland mit der Anzahl ihrer erfolgreichen Direktkandidaten verglichen. Ist das Kontingent größer als die Anzahl erfolgreicher Direktkandidaten, so sind weitere Kandidaten der Landesliste gewählt, bis das Kontingent erfüllt ist. Gewinnt eine Partei hingegen mehr Sitze in Einerwahlkreisen als dieser nach den Ergebnissen der Verhältniswahlebene zustehen, verbleiben diese als Überhangmandate bei der Partei.

Die beiden Ebenen sind also kompensatorisch miteinander verbunden, da die in Einerwahlkreisen gewonnenen Sitze bei der Vergabe der Listensitze berücksichtigt werden und die Verhältniswahlebene Disproportionalitäten der Mehrheitswahlebene somit ausgleicht. Überhangmandate können in diesem Sinne als nicht kompensierte Disproportionalität verstanden werden. Die gleichzeitige Verwendung einer Mehrheits- sowie einer Verhältniswahlebene machen die personalisierte Verhältniswahl zu einem gemischten Wahlsystem – sowohl mit Blick auf die verschiedenen Arten der Selektion von Abgeordneten via Parteilisten oder Einzelkandidaturen im Wahlkreis (vgl. Kaiser 2002) als auch auf den potentiellen Einfluss der Mehrheitswahlebene auf die Sitzverteilung im Parlament (vgl. Kapitel 3). Es ist genau das gemeinsame Wirken der verschiedenen Ebenen, welches die pV von der reinen Verhältniswahl (im Folgenden: rV) abgrenzt (vgl. auch Massicotte & Blais 1999; Pappi & Herrmann 2010). Insgesamt ist diese Einordnung der pV nicht unumstritten (vgl. dazu Strohmeier 2009): Die kompensatorische Ausgestaltung der pV lässt diverse Autoren zu der Einschätzung kommen, dass die pV ein Verhältniswahlsystem ist (etwa Lijphart 1994; Nohlen 2009a; Decker 2011, im Gegensatz zu Massicotte & Blais 1999; Kaiser 2002; Gallagher & Mitchell 2005b; Linhart

⁶⁰ Im Folgenden beschreiben wir die personalisierte Verhältniswahl, wie sie bei den Bundestagswahlen 2009 angewendet wurde. Variationen dieses Wahlsystems diskutieren wir im Anschluss.

2009; Pappi & Herrmann 2010). Diese Einschätzung verbleibt damit jedoch zum einen in einer die exakte technische Ausgestaltung von Wahlsystemen ignorierenden und damit problematischen Typologisierung (vgl. Kapitel 3) und ignoriert zum anderen die aus dem Nebeneinander von Verhältnis- und Mehrheitswahlebene möglicherweise entstehenden Effekte. Genau diese Effekte, hauptsächlich resultierend aus der Orientierung von Wählern und Parteien an der Mehrheitswahlebene sowie der Möglichkeit von Überhangmandaten, sind im nächsten Abschnitt näher zu betrachten.

Selbst wenn man trotz obiger Argumentation an der Einschätzung der pV als einem reinen Verhältniswahlsystem festhält, ist der folgende empirische Vergleich sinnvoll, um deren tatsächliche Wirkungsweise vergleichend zu überprüfen. Dieser Vergleich konzentriert sich dabei auf das Zusammenwirken von Mehrheits- und Verhältniswahlebene, was bedeutet, dass die Rolle der gesetzlichen Sperrklausel in dieser Untersuchung nicht weiter behandelt wird. Dies geschieht einerseits, weil sich eine (Fünfprozent-)Sperrklausel grundsätzlich zu beiden Systemtypen (rV und pV) hinzufügen lässt und damit nicht kausal für die auf dem Zusammenwirken verschiedener Wahlebenen basierenden Effekte (vgl. Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a) sein kann.⁶¹ Andererseits verhindert auch die flächendeckende Anwendung von Sperrklauseln in den deutschen Ländern (Linhart 2009: 645) deren vergleichende Untersuchung. Will man die personalisierte Verhältniswahl als Wahlsystemtyp bewerten, ist aus Sicht der Frage nach dem „Besten beider Welten“ also der Effekt der Mehrheitswahlebene auf die Wahlergebnisse näher zu betrachten.

8.3 Hypothesen

8.3.1 Gesteigerte Koordination unter der personalisierten Verhältniswahl

Zunächst ist – wie oben bereits allgemein skizziert – von einem generellen, von der Mehrheitswahlebene ausgehenden Koordinierungsanreiz der pV auszugehen, welcher die Konkurrenz zweier ideologischer Blöcke fördert (Pappi & Herrmann 2010). Gleichzeitig ist durch die kompensatorisch wirkende Verhältniswahlebene gewährleistet, dass das Stimmenbild vergleichsweise akkurat in die Sitzverteilung im Parlament umgewandelt wird. Demnach wäre das „Beste beider Welten“ insofern erreicht, als die pV proportionale Repräsentation genauso ermöglicht wie die rV, dabei aber mittels der durch die Mehrheitswahlebene entstehenden Koordinationsanreize (als psychologische Effekte in Antizipation der Wirkung des Wahlsystems) eine höhere Konzentrationsleistung erbringt. Das „Beste beider Welten“ wird demnach durch die pV grundsätzlich erreicht, indem psychologische Effekte über die gesteigerte Koordination von Parteien und Wählern für eine stärkere Konzentration des Parteiensystems sorgen, während die

⁶¹ Wenn wir im Folgenden den Begriff ‚reine Verhältniswahl‘ nutzen, dann impliziert dies Reinheit in dem Sinne, dass es bloß eine Verhältniswahlebene gibt. Damit wird nicht impliziert, dass keine Sperrklausel vorhanden ist. Vor dem Hintergrund einer generellen Analyse der personalisierten Verhältniswahl mit Fokus auf das Zusammenspiel von Mehrheits- und Verhältniswahlebene halten wir diese Terminologie für angemessen.

mechanischen Effekte der Verteilung der Sitze an die Parteien weitgehend gleich bleiben und das Wahlergebnis nicht verzerren.

H₁: Die personalisierte Verhältniswahl (pV) erzielt im Vergleich zur reinen Verhältniswahl (rV) eine höhere Konzentration des Parteiensystems, ohne dabei disproportionaler zu wirken.

8.3.2 Der Effekt unterschiedlicher Stimmensysteme der personalisierten Verhältniswahl

Über diesen generellen Effekt des Mischwahlsystem-Charakters hinaus sind vor allem zwei technische Stellschrauben dafür verantwortlich, inwieweit die Mehrheitswahlebene eine konzentrierende Wirkung auf das Parteiensystem entwickeln kann. Die erste dieser Stellschrauben betrifft die Stimmabgabe. Der Einfluss der Mehrheitswahlebene auf das Stärkenverhältnis im Parlament kann dabei indirekt gesteigert werden, wenn Wähler statt zwei separater Stimmen mit nur einer Stimme gleichzeitig für Mehrheits- und Verhältniswahlebenen abstimmen müssen. Eine solche Einstimmen-Version der pV existiert heute nur noch in Baden-Württemberg, hat jedoch insgesamt bei 64 Landtagswahlen sowie der ersten Bundestagswahl 1949 Anwendung gefunden.⁶²

Für jenen Schritt vom Zwei- zum Einstimmensystem erscheint eine psychologische Wirkung plausibel: Im oben beschriebenen Sinne sollten sich die Koordinationsanreize für Parteien und Wähler im Einstimmensystem verstärken und folglich zu einer höheren Konzentration des Parteiensystems führen. Während Wähler mit Hilfe der Option des Stimmensplittings im Zweistimmensystem die Möglichkeit haben, einer Parteiliste ihre Stimme zu geben und den Wahlkreiskandidaten einer anderen Partei zu unterstützen, wenn der favorisierte Kandidat keine Siegchance hat, fehlt diese Option im Einstimmensystem (Huber 2012: 278-279). In letzterem müsste sich beschriebener Wähler entscheiden, inwieweit er bereit ist, auf seinen Einfluss auf das Wahlkreis-Ergebnis zu verzichten. Der verbreitete Wunsch, keine Stimme zu verschwenden (Cox 1997) sollte demnach größere Parteien bevorteilen, die einen Erfolg der Stimme eben auch innerhalb des Wahlkreises wahrscheinlich machen. Im Einstimmensystem vermischen sich also die mit der Wahlkreisgröße zusammenhängenden Anreize ganz konkret bei der Stimmenabgabe, während das Zweistimmensystem nicht zwingend zu dieser Vermischung führt. Im Einstimmensystem besteht demnach ein stärkerer Anreiz zur Unterstützung von Parteien, welche aussichtsreiche Wahlkreiskandidaten stellen. Gleichzeitig wird das Wahlergebnis insofern zumindest mit Blick auf Stimmenabgabe und Sitzverteilung nicht disproportionaler, als der Unterschied zwischen dem Ein- und dem Zweistimmensystem der pV sich auf psychologischer

⁶² Mit Verweis auf die gesteigerte Einfachheit des Wahlsystems haben mehrere Autoren eine Rückkehr zum Einstimmensystem innerhalb der personalisierten Verhältniswahl angeregt (Decker 2011: 8; Prittwitz 2011; Trefs 2003; Weinmann 2013: 731)

Ebene abspielt und ein Mehr an Konzentration nur durch die höhere Koordinationsleistung von Parteien und Wählern erfolgen kann.⁶³

H₂: Die personalisierte Verhältniswahl (pV) wirkt konzentrierender auf das Parteiensystem, wenn statt eines Zwei- ein Einstimmensystem verwendet wird.

8.3.3 Der Effekt des Umgangs mit Überhangmandaten

Die zweite Stellschraube betrifft den Umgang mit Überhangmandaten. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Entstehung von Überhangmandaten hängt wesentlich einerseits mit dem Verhältnis der nach Mehrheitswahl vergebenen Sitze zu den nach Verhältniswahl vergebenen Sitzen und andererseits mit der Diskrepanz zwischen den Stimmanteilen der Parteien in den beiden Wahlebenen ab (vgl. Behnke 2010; Manow 2010). Grundlegender stellt sich jedoch die Frage, ob diese faktisch nach Mehrheitswahl vergebenen Überhangmandate im Sinne der Wahrung der auf den Zweitstimmen basierenden Stärkenverhältnisse ausgeglichen werden sollen oder nicht. Erfolgt ein solcher Ausgleich (wie etwa für die Bundestagswahl 2013 der Fall), kann die Mehrheitswahlebene kaum einen Einfluss auf die Stärkenverhältnisse im Parlament nehmen.⁶⁴ Erfolgt kein Ausgleich (wie etwa bei den Landtagswahlen in Schleswig-Holstein bis 1992), können Überhangmandate, welche typischerweise von großen Parteien gewonnen werden, eine konzentrierende Wirkung entwickeln, indem sie auf diese Weise einer kleinen Koalition zu einer Mehrheit verhelfen oder sogar eine Ein-Parteien-Regierung ermöglichen (Nohlen 2009c: 195).⁶⁵ Gleichzeitig bedeutet ein solcher mechanischer (durch die technische Anwendung des Wahlsystems bedingter) Effekt des Auftretens von Überhangmandaten jedoch, dass die Disproportionalität der Sitzverteilung ebenfalls zunimmt. Pappi und Herrmann (2010: 271-272) heben darüber hinaus hervor, dass die Möglichkeit des Auftretens von Überhangmandaten weitere Koordinationsanreize setzt, welche die Bildung konkurrierender Blöcke bzw. Koalitionen und damit die Einfachheit der Regierungsbildung fördern. Sollte sich ein solcher psychologisch wirkender Koordinationseffekt einstellen, ginge die zusätzliche Konzentration nicht auf Kosten der proportionalen Repräsentation.

⁶³ Ein (indirekter) mechanischer Effekt kann allerdings eintreten, wenn das Ausbleiben von Stimmensplitting die Zahl der Überhangmandate verringert (solange diese nicht ausgeglichen werden). Allerdings spielt Stimmensplitting für die Entstehung von Überhangmandaten „nur eine sehr untergeordnete Rolle“ (Behnke 2010: 543; vgl. auch Behnke 2007). Dennoch wird dieser potentielle Effekt bei der empirischen Analyse berücksichtigt.

⁶⁴ Allein nach Mehrheitswahl vergebene Mandate können auch entstehen, wenn Parteien Wahlkreissieger stellen, aber über die Verhältniswahlebene keinen Zugang zur Sitzverteilung erhalten (wie etwa die PDS bei der Bundestagswahl 2002). Dieses Phänomen hat bisher auf Länderebene keine Rolle gespielt und wird daher an dieser Stelle nicht weiter betrachtet.

⁶⁵ Hierbei sei jedoch erwähnt, dass es theoretisch auch denkbar ist, dass Wähler großer Parteien deren Stärke in der Mehrheitswahlebene antizipieren und ihre Zweitstimme – so sie denn über eine solche verfügen – an einen kleineren potentiellen Koalitionspartner vergeben, dessen Mandatsanteil sich dadurch potentiell erhöht (vgl. auch Behnke & Bader 2013). Bei diesem Wahlverhalten hätte die Möglichkeit von Überhangmandaten auch einen gegenläufigen, fragmentierenden Effekt.

H₃: Die personalisierte Verhältniswahl (pV) wirkt konzentrierender auf das Parteiensystem, wenn Überhangmandate nicht ausgeglichen werden.

Neben der Überprüfung dieser potentiellen Steigerungen der Konzentrationswirkung der pV wird die empirische Analyse gleichzeitig die damit möglicherweise einhergehenden Kosten mit Blick auf die Proportionalität der Wahlergebnisse berücksichtigen, um eine Einschätzung zu geben, inwiefern die diskutierten Detailvariationen das Erreichen des „Besten beider Welten“ wahrscheinlicher machen. Auf den ersten Blick zeigen die entwickelten Hypothesen bereits, dass die pV mit Einstimmensystem und ohne Ausgleich der Überhangmandate theoretisch größeres Potential zur gleichzeitigen Erfüllung von Konzentrations- und Repräsentationsfunktion besitzt, indem sie stärker ausgeprägte Koordinationsanreize für Parteien und Wähler bereithält. Insbesondere für Überhangmandate ist zu überprüfen, ob diese über eine weitgehend mechanische Wirkung ohne weitere Koordinationsleistung tatsächlich in der Lage sind, die pV in Richtung des „Besten beider Welten“ zu bewegen.

8.3.4 Soziopolitische Rahmenbedingungen als alternative Erklärung

In der Wahlsystemforschung wird mit Blick auf die Entwicklung des Parteiensystems jeweils auch der soziopolitische Kontext als entscheidender Faktor hervorgehoben (Gallagher 2005b: 542; Grotz 2009; Morgenstern & Vázquez-D'Elía 2007; Nohlen 2009a: 128), welcher mitunter die von einem Wahlsystem grundsätzlich erwarteten Tendenzen unterminiert (wie etwa in Kanada) und damit auch dazu führen kann, dass sowohl Repräsentations- als auch Konzentrationsfunktion erfüllt sind (wie etwa in Malta). Dementsprechend ist eine gesunde Skepsis angebracht, wann auch immer ein Wahlsystem weitgehend aufgrund einer Einzelfallanalyse grundsätzlich bewertet wird (selbst wenn diese über mehrere Zeitpunkte hinweg erfolgt), während nicht systematisch berücksichtigt werden kann, inwiefern die Erfüllung der genannten Ziele auf das Wahlsystem zurückzuführen ist. So zweifelt etwa Linhart (2009: 644-645) an, dass die pV, basierend auf der Existenz einer Mehrheitswahlebene, einen zusätzlich konzentrierenden Effekt besitzt. Die (zumindest näherungsweise) Trennung zwischen dem Einfluss von Wahlsystem und soziopolitischem Kontext lässt sich schließlich nur über eine vergleichende, multivariate Analyse vollziehen (Schoen 2005: 599). Für den deutschen Kontext und unsere vergleichende Analyse bedeutet dies, dass wir die generelle Ähnlichkeit der soziopolitischen Rahmenbedingungen in den Bundesländern als Grundlage nutzen, um die Erfüllung von Konzentrations- und Repräsentationsfunktion durch die pV mit deren Erfüllung durch andere auf Länderebene verwendete Wahlsysteme (insbesondere rV) zu vergleichen, ohne dabei starke Annahmen bezüglich der Konstanz wesentlicher struktureller Merkmale zu machen. Gleichzeitig werden die bestehenden regionalen Besonderheiten (wie etwa die Entwicklung der Parteiensysteme in den neuen Bundesländern) berücksichtigt, um umfassend zu prüfen, inwiefern Unterschiede in Wahlergebnissen auf regionen- bzw. länderspezifische Faktoren sowie generelle zeitliche Trends und nicht auf Unterschiede in Wahlsystemen zurückzuführen sind. Aus diesen Überlegungen folgt die Gegen- bzw. Null-Hypothese, die (zumindest kleinere) Wahlsystemvariationen als unbedeutend ansieht.

H₀: Nicht wahlssystemische, sondern sozialstrukturelle Unterschiede und Entwicklungen sind für Veränderungen des Parteiensystems verantwortlich.

8.4 Daten und Variablen

Die empirische Analyse basiert auf den Ergebnissen der Landtagswahlen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1946 bis zur ersten Jahreshälfte 2013. Verwendet wurden jeweils die für die Verteilung der Parlamentssitze in der Verhältniswahlebene zuständigen Stimmen – bei Anwendung der pV mit zwei Stimmen also entsprechend die Zweitstimmen. Hierbei wurden die (Zweit)Stimmen vollständig – ohne die Sammelkategorie „Sonstige“ – erhoben, um entsprechende Indizes verzerrungsfrei berechnen zu können.⁶⁶ Die verwendeten Daten und das dazugehörige Codebook werden vom Autor auf Wunsch zur Verfügung gestellt. Um die Vergleichbarkeit der Fälle für den Vergleich genereller Wahlsystemtypen zu gewährleisten, bleiben sieben Wahlen, bei denen innerhalb der rV oder der pV keine Sperrklausel Anwendung gefunden hat, bei der empirischen Analyse unberücksichtigt. Wie eingangs beschrieben bietet die Analyse der Länderebene die Möglichkeit, die pV vergleichend zu analysieren. Auf Seiten der erklärenden Variablen stehen sich dabei die Ausgestaltung des jeweiligen Wahlsystems und der Einfluss des soziopolitischen Kontexts gegenüber. Letzterer wird in der empirischen Analyse berücksichtigt, indem Unterschiede zwischen Regionen kontrolliert werden, welche sich nicht durch Unterschiede in den Wahlsystemen erklären lassen, sowie über die Berücksichtigung zeitlicher Trends im Hinblick auf die Entwicklung der Parteiensysteme in den Ländern. Hierfür nutzen wir eine Dummy-Variable zur Unterscheidung zwischen alten und neuen Bundesländern sowie eine Zeittrendvariable. Indem die Zeittrendvariable (operationalisiert als das Jahr, in dem eine Wahl stattgefunden hat) mit einer Dummy-Variable, welche mit 1 codiert ist, sobald die Wahl später als 1978 stattgefunden hat, interagiert wird, wird der Tatsache Rechnung getragen, dass bis ca. Ende der 1970er Jahre die Fragmentierung der Landesparteiensysteme – bei Ausbleiben substantieller Reformen der Wahlsysteme – stetig ab- und danach stetig zugenommen hat (vgl. Detterbeck & Renzsch 2008).⁶⁷

Die Wahlsysteme, welche in den deutschen Ländern Anwendung finden bzw. gefunden haben, wurden in drei Systemtypen unterschieden (vgl. Massicotte 2003; Eder & Magin 2008): Neben der am weitesten verbreiteten pV (139 Wahlen) fanden 62 Wahlen unter rV statt (60 davon verteilen sich auf Bremen, Hamburg, Rheinland-Pfalz und das Saarland). Weitere sieben Wahlen wurden

⁶⁶ Die Analyse der Zweitstimmen innerhalb der pV ist auch insofern sinnvoll, als sich die auf den Einfluss der Mehrheitswahlebene zurückgehenden Koordinationseffekte in der Zweitstimmenverteilung manifestieren sollten (vgl. zu dieser Vorgehensweise etwa Saalfeld 2005; Gallagher 2005b). In Bayern wurden die Gesamtstimmen (Summe aus Erst- und Zweitstimmen) erhoben, da diese für die Sitzvergabe in der Verhältniswahlebene maßgeblich sind (Trefs 2008: 339).

⁶⁷ Die Wahl des Jahres 1978 bzw. 1979 als Wendepunkt für die generelle Entwicklung der deutschen Parteienlandschaft erfolgte aufgrund eines statistischen Vergleichs der Güte von Modellen mit verschiedenen Trend-Wendepunkten. Die Ergebnisse hängen jedoch nicht davon ab, welches spezifische Jahr aus dem angesprochenen Zeitraum als Wendepunkt gewählt wird. Der gewählte Wendepunkt ist jedoch auch inhaltlich plausibel, da die Grünen in dieser Zeit zum ersten Mal den Sprung in ein Landesparlament (Bremen) schafften und sich im deutschen Parteiensystem etablierten.

unter dem System der Loser-Surplus-Methode (LSM; Massicotte 2003) abgehalten. Dieses System zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dass ein Großteil (ca. 80 Prozent) der Parlamentssitze nach Mehrheitswahl in Einerwahlkreisen vergeben werden und daraufhin diejenigen Stimmen, welche nicht zu einem Sitzgewinn eines Abgeordneten beigetragen haben, zur Vergabe eines Restkontingentes von Parlamentssitzen nach Verhältniswahlregeln herangezogen werden (Massicotte 2003: 3-4). Die LSM hebt sich demnach in dieser Ausgestaltung wesentlich deutlicher von der rV ab als es die pV tut, indem deutlich mehr als die Hälfte der Sitze nach Mehrheitswahl vergeben werden. Aufgrund der niedrigen Fallzahl und der Anwendung nur in einem bestimmten Zeitraum (zwischen 1946 und 1956) sei jedoch bereits jetzt darauf hingewiesen, dass eine fundierte Einschätzung dieses Systems im Vergleich zu rV und pV im weiteren Verlauf dieser Analyse nicht möglich ist. Nichtsdestotrotz werden die empirischen Ergebnisse zumindest ein erstes Bild vermitteln, inwieweit dieses stärker mehrheitsorientiertes Mischwahlsystem sich vor dem Hintergrund der Frage nach dem „Besten beider Welten“ einordnen lässt. Mit Blick auf Detailvariationen innerhalb der pV und die damit verbundenen Hypothesen wird zudem zwischen der pV mit Einstimmensystem (pV-1S) und der pV mit Zweistimmensystem (pV-2S) unterschieden sowie in Betracht gezogen, ob Überhangmandate ausgeglichen werden oder nicht. Dem Spezialfall der pV in Bayern (siehe Fußnote 66) wird über die Hinzunahme einer entsprechenden Dummy-Variablen Rechnung getragen.

Auf der Seite der zu erklärenden Variablen gilt es, sowohl die Konzentrations- als auch die Repräsentationsfunktion basierend auf den Wahlergebnissen zu messen. Hierbei wenden wir in erster Linie die gängigen Indikatoren an. Um die Konzentration des Parteiensystems zu erfassen, berechnen wir sowohl für die Stimmen- als auch die Sitzverteilung jeder Wahl die effektive Parteienzahl (*effective number of parties*; Laakso & Taagepera 1979) $EPZ_s = \frac{1}{\sum_i^N s_i^2}$. Diese zählt die

Parteien i unter Gewichtung ihrer quadrierten Stimm- (v_i ; EPZ_v) bzw. Sitzanteile (s_i ; EPZ_s) und summiert über alle N Parteien auf. So misst EPZ die Konzentration des Parteiensystems auf elektoraler bzw. parlamentarischer Ebene. Zur Messung der Disproportionalität nutzen wir den

Gallagher-Index $GI = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^N (s_i - v_i)^2}$ (Gallagher 1991). Dieser Index misst die auftretende Disproportionalität – hervorgerufen durch Abweichungen der Sitzanteile (s_i) von den Stimmanteilen (v_i) der Parteien – einer Wahl, wobei durch die Quadrierung auch hier eine Gewichtung stattfindet, die dafür sorgt, dass größere Disproportionalitäten stärkeren Einfluss auf den Index-Wert nehmen als kleinere Abweichungen.⁶⁸ Bei der Messung der Repräsentationsfunktion mittels der Disproportionalität der Sitzverteilung im Verhältnis zur Stimmenverteilung sei darauf hingewiesen, dass sich so gut zwischen zwei Situationen unterscheiden lässt, welche mit Blick auf die Frage nach dem „Besten beider Welten“ stark unterschiedlich zu deuten sind. Zu unterscheiden ist zwischen Situationen, in denen zusätzliche Konzentration des Parteiensystems durch zunehmende Koordination von Wählern und Parteien und damit ohne gleichzeitiges Auftreten disproportionaler Ergebnisse auftritt, und jenen

⁶⁸ Die Anwendung alternativer Disproportionalitätsmaße wie etwa des Loosemore-Hanby-Indexes (Loosemore & Hanby 1971) verändert die später gezeigten Ergebnisse nicht strukturell.

Situationen, in welchen zusätzliche Konzentration mechanisch erfolgt und dabei Disproportionalität entsteht. Gleichzeitig lässt sich nur schwierig messen, inwieweit Wähler sich tatsächlich im Sinne stärkerer Koordination auf bestimmte Parteien festlegen oder ob diese sich vielmehr – und in starkem Widerspruch zum Konzept der Repräsentation – gezwungen sehen, eine nicht präferierte Partei zu wählen. Diese Problematik erscheint beim Vergleich der personalisierten mit der reinen Verhältniswahl insofern nicht allzu relevant, als beide Wahlsysteme, verglichen etwa mit der reinen Mehrheitswahl, relativ große Chancen für kleinere Parteien und deren Wähler bieten.

8.5 Ergebnisse

8.5.1 Deskriptiver Überblick

Wirft man zunächst einen Blick auf die deskriptiven Ergebnisse in Tabelle 8.1, so zeigen sich im Mittel nur minimale Unterschiede zwischen den verschiedenen Wahlsystemen. Besonders auffällig ist jedoch, dass die rV mit durchschnittlich konzentrierteren Parteiensystemen verbunden ist als die pV – 2,63 effektive Parteien bei der rV stehen 2,75 bei der pV entgegen. Gleichzeitig ist der Disproportionalitätswert für die rV leicht höher. Ein t-Test weist jedoch weder für die effektive Parteienzahl noch für die Disproportionalität einen statistisch signifikanten Unterschied aus. Zumindest auf den ersten Blick zeigt sich also keine empirische Grundlage, welche für H_1 (pV wirkt konzentrierender als rV) spricht. Die LSM sticht insofern heraus, als diese durch die Vergabe der meisten Parlamentssitze nach Mehrheitswahl in Einerwahlkreisen große Abweichungen von einer proportionalen Sitzverteilung hervorruft. Gleichzeitig weisen Wahlen unter diesem System auch die durchschnittlich geringste effektive Parteienzahl auf, wenngleich der Unterschied zu den anderen Systemen hier deutlich geringer ausfällt als bei der Disproportionalität.

Tabelle 8.1: Zusammenfassende Statistik nach Wahlsystemen und Regionen

Wahlsystem	EPZ _s		GI		N
	Mittelwert	St. Abw. (Min; Max)	Mittelwert	St. Abw. (Min, Max)	
Alle	2,70	0,59 (1,68; 4,9)	4,2	2,66 (0,24; 26,27)	208
rV	2,63	0,55 (1,96; 4,42)	4,11	1,86 (0,49; 9,85)	62
pV	2,75	0,58 (1,83; 4,31)	3,85	1,88 (0,24; 8,77)	139
LSM	2,52	1,08 (1,68; 4,9)	11,85	7,48 (3,47; 26,27)	7
pV-1S	2,53	0,39 (1,92; 3,42)	3,15	1,71 (0,24; 6,92)	64
pV-2S	2,94	0,64 (1,83; 4,31)	4,45	1,83 (1,11; 8,77)	75
pV West (ohne Bayern)	2,7	0,54 (1,92; 4,31)	3,28	1,72 (0,24; 7,42)	97
pV Ost	3,1	0,53 (2,1; 4)	5,13	1,5 (2,98; 8,77)	27
pV Bund	2,72	0,44 (2,24; 3,96)	3,05	2,05 (0,5; 8,39)	17

Anmerkungen: Bundesebene ohne 1949.


Tabelle 8.1 unterscheidet im unteren Teil bereits in die zwei Varianten der pV. Hier zeigen sich relativ deutliche (mit $p < 0,01$ statistisch signifikante) Unterschiede in den Mittelwerten, wobei pV-1S nicht nur konzentrierender, sondern auch proportionaler als pV-2S zu wirken scheint – diese Unterschiede sprechen zumindest auf den ersten Blick für H_2 (pV-1S wirkt konzentrierender als pV-2S). Nicht ganz so deutlich, aber dennoch erkennbar, hebt sich pV-1S auch von der rV ab. Zumindest basierend auf diesem deskriptiven Überblick erscheint die pV-1S durchaus erfolgreich im Sinne des Erreichens des „Besten beider Welten“ zu sein. Auch im Vergleich zur Bundesebene zeigt sich das hohe Maß an Konzentration für unter pV-1S zustande gekommene Parteiensysteme. Ein erstes, naives Fazit könnte also lauten, dass die Einstimmenversion der pV in der Lage ist, das Parteiensystem stärker zu konzentrieren als die rV – sogar bei gleichzeitig besserer Erfüllung der Repräsentationsfunktion. Nimmt man die hier vorkommenden Mittelwerte für EPZ_s (2,7) und GI (4,2) als Vergleichsgrundlage, lässt sich feststellen, wie häufig Wahlen unter bestimmten Systemen mit Blick auf Fragmentierung und Disproportionalität doppelt über- bzw. unterdurchschnittlich gut abschneiden. Während sich auch hier pV (35% der Wahlen schnitten doppelt gut ab) und rV (38%) kaum unterscheiden, zeigt sich ein deutlicher Unterschied zwischen pV-1S (58%) und pV-2S (16%). Dieser Unterschied suggeriert, dass die pV-1S insbesondere im Gegensatz zur pV-2S mit Blick auf Konzentration und Proportionalität stark abschneidet.

Die hier skizzierten Schlussfolgerungen sind jedoch nur haltbar, wenn die Ergebnisse tatsächlich durch die Nutzung unterschiedlicher Wahlsysteme und nicht durch die Variation der soziopolitischen Rahmenbedingungen hervorgerufen wurden. Hierbei sind sowohl Unterschiede zwischen Bundesländern als auch die allgemeine Entwicklung der Parteienlandschaft in Deutschland nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg zu berücksichtigen. Insbesondere der Unterschied zwischen den fragmentierteren Parteiensystemen der neuen Bundesländer (in denen ausschließlich nach pV-2S gewählt wird) und den alten Bundesländern, die beide Formen der pV anwenden, ist über einen Mittelwertvergleich in Tabelle 8.1 offensichtlich und zeigt, dass monokausale Erklärungen alleine durch das Wahlsystem zu kurz greifen. Darüber hinaus ist der Sonderfall der pV in Bayern zu berücksichtigen.

Bindet man den Zeitfaktor mit ein, so zeigt Abbildung 8.1 deutlich, wie die Fragmentierung der Parteiensysteme der Länder nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg zunächst stark abnimmt, um ab Ende der 1980er Jahre wieder kontinuierlich zuzunehmen – die durch die Punktwolke führende Kurve entstammt einer Polynom-Regression, in der das Wahljahr der einzige Prädiktor von EPZ_s ist. Mit Ausnahme der LSM-Systeme ist dieser generelle Trend auch für die einzelnen Wahlsystemtypen beobachtbar und verdeutlicht, dass eine Auswertung von Tabelle 8.1 ohne Berücksichtigung des Zeitfaktors zu Fehlschlüssen führen kann, da dieser ein entscheidender Faktor zu sein scheint und gleichzeitig das Vorkommen der einzelnen Wahlsysteme über die Zeit hinweg stark variiert.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Für die Entwicklung der Disproportionalität (hier nicht dargestellt) zeichnet sich ab Anfang der 1980er Jahre ein schwach zunehmender Trend ab – für das multivariate Regressionsmodell für den GI lässt sich daher vermuten, dass erst für diesen Zeitraum ein signifikanter Einfluss des Wahljahrs auf die Disproportionalität erfolgt.

Abbildung 8.1: EPZ_s unter verschiedenen Wahlsystemen im Zeitverlauf



Insgesamt verdeutlicht die Betrachtung solcher Kontexteffekte, dass insbesondere die auf den ersten Blick herausgehobene Stellung der pV-1S nicht zwangsläufig auf ihre technische Ausgestaltung zurückzuführen ist, sondern dadurch erklärt wird, dass sie vor allem in einem Zeitraum Anwendung gefunden hat, welcher durchweg von relativ hoch konzentrierten Landesparteiensystemen geprägt war. Mit Blick auf Unterschiede zwischen den Bundesländern suggerieren die Regionen-spezifischen Werte in Tabelle 8.1, dass das unerwartet schwache Abschneiden der pV-2S vor allem durch die Tatsache getrieben wird, dass alle Wahlen in den neuen Bundesländern exklusiv dieses System verwenden. Um tatsächliche Wahlsystemeffekte von solchen Kontexteffekten zu trennen, testen wir im nächsten Abschnitt die Effekte multivariat.

8.5.2 Multivariate Analyse

Eine solche Prüfung erleichtert es, die Effekte von Kontext und Wahlsystem auseinanderzuhalten und ermöglicht damit eine verlässlichere Überprüfung der Hypothesen. Um dem Panel-Charakter der Daten gerecht zu werden und dementsprechend Kontext-Effekte bereits in der grundsätzlichen Modellspezifikation zu berücksichtigen, verwenden wir Regressionsmodelle mit *panel-corrected standard errors* (PCSE; vgl. Beck & Katz 1995) und erlauben Panel- (hier also Länder-) spezifische autoregressive (AR1) Prozesse.⁷⁰ Tabelle 8.2 berichtet die Ergebnisse dieser

⁷⁰ Hiermit folgen wir weitgehend der Vorgehensweise von Carey & Hix (2011). Die Verwendung eines *fixed effects* Modells ist insofern schwierig, als die Wahlsysteme sich innerhalb der Bundesländer kaum

Regressionsmodelle. Die oben angesprochenen Kontexteffekte werden mit Hilfe konkreter Variablen berücksichtigt, indem wir sowohl das Wahljahr (mit dem oben beschriebenen Interaktionseffekt) als auch die Unterschiede zwischen alten und neuen Bundesländern berücksichtigen. Die geschätzte Veränderung der verschiedenen Indizes durch die Anwendung eines alternativen Wahlsystems (pV, pV-1S, pV-2S, LSM) ist immer in Relation zu dem Basiswahlsystem der rV zu sehen – so impliziert etwa ein positives Vorzeichen im Regressionsmodell mit der abhängigen Variable EPZ_s, dass das alternative Wahlsystem zu einer stärkeren Fragmentierung des Parteiensystems führt als rV.

Zunächst unterstreichen die Regressionsmodelle, wie wichtig es ist, Zeittrends und generelle Unterschiede zwischen Ländern bzw. Regionen zu berücksichtigen – alle in diesem Zusammenhang geschätzten Variablen erweisen sich in nahezu allen Modellen als signifikante Einflussfaktoren.⁷¹ Diese Kontexteffekte sind auch hauptverantwortlich für die relativ hohe Prognosegüte der verschiedenen Modelle. Über die schon weiter oben besprochenen Kontexteffekte hinaus, beinhalten die Regressionsmodelle eine Dummy-Variable *Erste Wahl* welche die Effekte der ersten Wahl nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg berücksichtigt – dies geschieht vor allem deshalb, weil die Zahl der antretenden Parteien für diese Wahlen von den Besatzungsmächten stark eingeschränkt wurde (vgl. Lange 1975). Somit ist der negative Effekt dieser Variablen auf die effektive Parteienzahl (nach Stimmen sowie Sitzen) schlüssig. Ebenfalls nachvollziehbar ist der disproportionalitätssteigernde Effekt, da es Wählern bei den ersten Wahlen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg vergleichsweise schwerer gefallen sein dürfte, die Erfolgchancen verschiedener Parteien einzuschätzen. Wie über die folgende Analyse der Wahlsystemvariablen deutlich werden wird, erscheinen diese Kontexteffekte im Sinne von H_0 tatsächlich als allein verantwortlich für die Entwicklung des Parteiensystems – zumindest mit Blick auf die Unterschiede zwischen pV und rV. Der Sonderfall der pV in Bayern wird nicht weiter analysiert, da es hier nicht möglich ist, Wahlsystem- und landesspezifische Effekte zu unterscheiden.

Betrachtet man die verschiedenen Wahlsysteme innerhalb des multivariaten Modells zunächst mit Blick auf die Konzentration des Parteiensystems, so finden sich keine Hinweise auf signifikante Unterschiede zwischen rV und pV (sowie deren Ein- und Zweistimmen-Variationen) – die entsprechenden Koeffizienten sind nicht nur insignifikant, sondern auch marginal in ihrer Größe. H_1 erhält somit keinerlei Unterstützung, es finden sich keine Hinweise auf den von dem Mischwahlsystem pV erwarteten Koordinationseffekt. Im Vergleich mit der rV ist es tatsächlich nur die LSM, welche gemäß unserer Analyse zu einer signifikant größeren Konzentration des Parteiensystems auf parlamentarischer Ebene führt.

verändern und die Verwendung von entsprechenden Länder-Dummies eine Analyse von Wahlsystemeffekten somit schwierig gestalten würde.

⁷¹ Wie erwartet, zeigt sich für die Entwicklung der Disproportionalität nur ein leicht positiver Zeittrend nach 1978; davor besteht kein signifikanter Trend.

Tabelle 8.2: Regressionsmodelle mit PCSE

Variablen	EPZ _V		EPZ _S		GI	
	Modell 1 pV	Modell 2 pV aufgeteilt	Modell 3 pV	Modell 4 pV aufgeteilt	Modell 5 pV	Modell 6 pV aufgeteilt
pV	-0,020 (0,130)		0,039 (0,107)		-0,896** (0,439)	
pV-1S		-0,036 (0,138)		0,008 (0,116)		-0,786* (0,473)
pV-2S		0,052 (0,166)		0,128 (0,136)		-1,13** (0,577)
LSM	-0,193 (0,187)	-0,216 (0,185)	-0,451** (0,221)	-0,490** (0,215)	6,44*** (1,17)	6,47*** (1,17)
Post-1978 (Dummy)	-212,51*** (18,55)	- 213,56*** (19,82)	-161,72*** (16,20)	-162,14*** (17,72)	-127,67** (59,11)	-137,78** (62,07)
Wahljahr	-0,059*** (0,007)	-0,060*** (0,007)	-0,047*** (0,006)	-0,047*** (0,007)	-0,027 (0,024)	-0,028 (0,024)
Wahljahr* Post-1978	0,107*** (0,009)	0,108*** (0,010)	0,082*** (0,008)	0,082*** (0,009)	0,065** (0,030)	0,070** (0,031)
Erste Wahl (West)	-0,537*** (0,151)	-0,520*** (0,153)	-0,671*** (0,171)	-0,650*** (0,172)	3,11*** (0,705)	3,09*** (0,707)
Neues Bundesland	0,521*** (0,126)	0,464*** (0,168)	0,225** (0,112)	0,154 (0,148)	1,47*** (0,330)	1,65*** (0,429)
Sonderfall der pV in Bayern	-0,137 (0,128)	-0,221 (0,158)	-0,239* (0,139)	-0,345** (0,160)	2,21*** (0,595)	2,44*** (0,705)
Konstante	119,63*** (13,56)	121,21*** (14,10)	94,17*** (12,52)	95,76*** (13,09)	57,52 (47,65)	58,70 (47,99)
N	208	208	208	208	208	208
R ²	0,88	0,89	0,83	0,83	0,53	0,53


Anmerkungen: * p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01; Länderspezifische autoregressive Koeffizienten nicht ausgewiesen.

Die Unterteilung der pV-Systeme in pV-1S und pV-2S erlaubt die Überprüfung von H₂. Hierfür haben wir jeweils auf Basis der Modellergebnisse mit einem Chi²-Test überprüft, ob der Unterschied zwischen den Koeffizienten von pV-1S und pV-2S signifikant größer als null ist. Diese Tests weisen weder für EPZ_V (Modell 2), noch für EPZ_S (Modell 4) signifikante Ergebnisse aus. Auch die kaum vorhandene Zunahme der Prognosegüte der Modelle (R²) spricht gegen einen

systematischen Unterschied zwischen pV-1S und pV-2S. Da die Differenzen zwischen pV-1S und pV-2S zumindest das erwartete Vorzeichen besitzen und die Schätzung der Standardfehler im PCSE-Modell eher konservativ erfolgt, ist es sinnvoll, den Effekt dennoch näher zu untersuchen. Um zu überprüfen, inwiefern der Unterschied zwischen den Wahlsystemen etwa durch bestimmte Bundesländer getragen wird und demnach nicht als Wahlsystemeffekt identifiziert werden kann, verwenden wir eine Jackknife-Robustheitsprüfung (vgl. z.B. Shikano 2006). Abbildung 8.2 zeigt 17 Koeffizientenpaare bestehend jeweils aus den Koeffizienten für pV-1S und pV-2S aus auf dem Modell in Tabelle 8.2 basierenden Regressionsschätzungen mit der abhängigen Variable EPZ_s . Bis auf das erste Paar (dieses ist aus Tabelle 8.2 übernommen) stammen alle anderen Paare aus Regressionen bei denen das jeweils ausgewiesene Bundesland bei der Modellschätzung nicht berücksichtigt wurde. Die Referenzlinie zeigt den Koeffizienten der pV an, wie er in Modell 3 geschätzt wurde. Über diese Analyse wird deutlich, dass die Exklusion von Berlin oder Schleswig-Holstein dafür sorgt, dass der Unterschied zwischen pV-1S und pV-2S nahezu vollständig verschwindet – der Unterschied ist also keineswegs allgemein, sondern nur durch die Inklusion bestimmter Fälle bedingt. In beiden Fällen fand eine dermaßen große Veränderung der Fragmentierung statt, dass diese nicht durch die vergleichsweise marginale Veränderung des Wahlsystems erklärt werden könnte (in Berlin traten die Grünen 1981 als neue Kraft ins Parlament, in Schleswig-Holstein nahm der Stimmanteil von Grünen, SSW und FDP ab 1996 stark zu). Somit verschwindet bei genauerer Betrachtung auch der kleine Unterschied zwischen pV-1S und pV-2S, und es verbleibt kein Hinweis auf Unterschiede zwischen rV, pV-1S und pV-2S hinsichtlich der Konzentrationsfunktion. Der aus Tabelle 8.1 hervorgehende Eindruck, dass die pV-1S das „Beste beider Welten“ in sich vereint, kann demnach nicht bestätigt werden.

Während sich die rV und pV also in puncto Konzentration nicht unterscheiden, zeigen sich unerwartete Unterschiede für die Modelle 5 und 6 hinsichtlich der Disproportionalität. Während die LSM wenig überraschend deutlich disproportionaler wirkt als die anderen Wahlsysteme und die Repräsentationsfunktion somit wesentlich schlechter erfüllt, deuten die Koeffizienten auf niedrigere Disproportionalität unter pV (bzw. pV-1S und pV-2S) hin. Dies ist auch insofern überraschend, als Überhangmandate zwar nur in sechs Fällen auftreten, aber dennoch tendenziell dafür sorgen sollten, dass die pV mit Blick auf Proportionalität schlechter abschneidet. Die erneute Anwendung der Jackknife-Prüfung zeigt zwar eine relative Stabilität dieses Effekts, allerdings ist dieser nicht mehr statistisch signifikant ($p = 0,21$), wenn der Fall Bremen ausgeschlossen wird. Es erscheint dennoch wichtig, dieses unerwartete Ergebnis in zukünftiger Forschung im Detail zu untersuchen.

Abbildung 8.2: Jackknife-Prüfung des Unterschiedes zwischen pV-1S und pV-2S



Insgesamt fehlt es für den generellen Vergleich von rV, pV und LSM an Beweislast für das Vorhandensein eines Wahlsystems, welches mit Blick auf Repräsentations- und Konzentrationsfunktion das „Beste beider Welten“ erreicht. Bis auf den überraschenden, allerdings kleinen Unterschied bezüglich der Disproportionalität unterscheiden sich rV und pV nicht systematisch voneinander, wohingegen die LSM gesteigerte Konzentration mit stark zunehmender Disproportionalität paart. Vielmehr haben die multivariate Analyse sowie damit verbundene Robustheitstests deutlich gemacht, dass die Entwicklungen der Parteiensysteme im Wesentlichen von soziopolitischen Kontextfaktoren (hier als Zeittrends und regionale Unterschiede modelliert) abhängen und nur größere Unterschiede zwischen Wahlsystemen (etwa LSM vs. rV und pV) einen statistisch merkbaren Einfluss ausüben.

Es verbleibt im Hinblick auf das Erreichen des „Besten beider Welten“ allerdings noch die Überprüfung des Effektes des Nicht-Ausgleichs von Überhangmandaten in der pV (H₃). Da nicht ausgeglichene Überhangmandate in dem Länderdatensatz insgesamt nur bei sechs Wahlen auftraten, ist es kaum möglich, basierend auf dieser kleinen Fallzahl abgesichert festzustellen, welcher Effekt tatsächlich auf den Nicht-Ausgleich von Überhangmandaten zurückzuführen ist, da eine entsprechende Dummy-Variable auch die Auswirkung aller anderen (im Modell nicht beachteten) Gemeinsamkeiten dieser wenigen Wahlen auffängt.⁷² Deshalb wählen wir im

⁷² So ist es leider auch nicht möglich, den von Pappi und Herrmann (2010: 271-272) vermuteten Koordinationseffekt des Nicht-Ausgleichs von Überhangmandaten empirisch zu überprüfen.

Folgenden eine alternative Methode, die Wirkung des Nicht-Ausgleichs und damit H_3 zu überprüfen.

8.5.3 Der mechanische Effekt von Überhangmandaten

Zunächst ist hervorzuheben, dass für den Umgang mit Überhangmandaten die Überprüfung eines rein mechanischen Effektes bereits aufschlussreich ist mit Blick auf die Gesamtwirkung dieses Wahlsystemeffektes. Zwar entfällt durch die Nicht-Anrechnung bzw. den Ausgleich der Überhangmandate der Anreiz für große Parteien (im Wesentlichen CDU, CSU und SPD), ihre Anhänger zum Stimmensplitting aufzurufen, allerdings besteht allenfalls ein nachrangiger Zusammenhang zwischen dem Ausmaß des Stimmensplittings und dem Entstehen von Überhangmandaten (Behnke 2010: 543, 2007). Dementsprechend ist es für Wähler und Parteien schwer, strategisch auf die Entstehung von Überhangmandaten hinzuwirken. Folglich ist nicht zu erwarten, dass sich ein psychologischer Effekt durch den technischen Umgang mit Überhangmandaten einstellt.⁷³ Um den mechanischen Effekt einzuschätzen, nutzen wir alle 48 Landtagswahlen, in denen Überhangmandate entstanden sind. Für unser Basisszenario nehmen wir an, dass die entstandenen Überhangmandate an die entsprechenden Parteien gehen und keine Ausgleichsmandate vergeben werden. Das Vergleichsszenario verwendet dieselben Wahlen, nimmt allerdings an, dass keine Überhangmandate vergeben werden⁷⁴ (vgl. Tab. 8.3). Für das Szenario „keine Überhangmandate“ haben wir den jeweiligen Parteien sowohl deren Überhangmandate als auch eventuell auftretende Ausgleichsmandate entzogen. Der Vergleich dieser Szenarien erlaubt es uns, den (mechanischen) Effekt des Zulassens von Überhangmandaten auf Konzentration und Disproportionalität des Parteiensystems genauer zu untersuchen. Tabelle 8.3 zeigt die Mittelwerte für EPZ_S und GI und stellt dabei jeweils die oben beschriebenen Szenarien gegenüber.

Tabelle 8.3: Mechanischer Effekt von Überhangmandaten – Index-Mittelwerte

Index	EPZ_S	GI
Keine Überhangmandate	3,17	3,45
Überhangmandate zugelassen	3,04	4,87

Anmerkungen: N = 48; alle Differenzen sind statistisch signifikant (t-Test)

H_3 wird gestützt, da sich die Konzentration des Parteiensystems durch Überhangmandate signifikant erhöht, wie der im Mittel um 0,13 kleinere Wert der EPZ_S signalisiert. Gleichzeitig hebt die (in beiden Szenarien) relativ hohe EPZ_S noch einmal hervor, dass Überhangmandate vor allem dann auftreten, wenn das Parteiensystem insgesamt höher fragmentiert ist. Der stärkste Konzentrationseffekt entsteht, sobald nicht ausgeglichene Überhangmandate nicht nur die

⁷³ Für Spezialfälle wie Nachwahlen in einzelnen Wahlkreisen (etwa in Dresden bei der Bundestagswahl 2005) bestehen jedoch genau solche Einflussmöglichkeiten und der Nicht-Ausgleich von Überhangmandaten sollte sich maßgeblich auf das Verhalten von Parteien und Wählern auswirken.

⁷⁴ Inhaltlich bedeutet dies dasselbe wie ein vollständiger Ausgleich auftretender Überhangmandate, sieht man von dem geringfügigen Vorteil des letzten Mandats ab.

generellen Kräfteverhältnisse unter den Parteien verändern, sondern darüber hinaus für eine Veränderung der Regierungsoptionen sorgen – dies geschieht in 11 der 48 Fälle. Für drei Fälle (Baden-Württemberg 2006; Niedersachsen 2003; Nordrhein-Westfalen 1995) hätten nicht ausgeglichene Überhangmandate sogar für das Zustandekommen von Ein-Parteien-Regierungen gesorgt. Wenngleich Überhangmandate also für zusätzliche Konzentration sorgen, entwickeln diese nur in einer Minderheit der Fälle einen substantiellen Einfluss auf die Mehrheitsverhältnisse. Darüber hinaus – und folgerichtig, da es hier nur um den mechanischen Effekt des Ausgleichs geht – entstehen durch Überhangmandate nicht unerhebliche Einbußen in der Proportionalität. Der GI zeigt eine deutliche Erhöhung der Disproportionalität an, welche auch mit Blick auf die Unterschiede in Tabelle 8.1 als klare Verzerrung der Repräsentation interpretiert werden muss.

Demnach zeigt die Detailanalyse zu Überhangmandaten, dass diese in einzelnen Fällen tatsächlich eine strukturverändernde, konzentrierende Wirkung haben können. Im Durchschnitt jedoch wirken Überhangmandate in den deutschen Ländern mit Blick auf zusätzliche Konzentration des Parteiensystems nicht strukturverändernd und werden von entsprechenden Proportionalitätsverlusten begleitet. Ein Blick auf ausgewählte Fälle bestätigt diese *trade-off*-Sichtweise und hebt hervor, dass der Effekt von Überhangmandaten darüber hinaus kaum generell planbar ist. Der Fall Baden-Württemberg 2006 zeigt, wie nicht ausgeglichene Überhangmandate zu einer Alleinregierung führen könnten – die CDU hätte 2006 elf Überhangmandate und damit ein Plus von 4,4 Prozentpunkten der Parlamentssitze gegenüber der Situation ohne Überhangmandate (bzw. mit Ausgleich) erhalten, was ihr eine Alleinregierung ermöglicht hätte. Die Index-Werte suggerieren hier sogar einen Effekt im Sinne des „Besten beider Welten“ insofern, als die Abnahme der Proportionalität deutlich geringer ist verglichen mit der Zunahme an Konzentration – gemessen jeweils im Verhältnis zur Standardabweichung der entsprechenden Indizes. Tatsächlich von Überhangmandaten profitieren konnte 2009 die CDU-FDP Koalition in Schleswig-Holstein, deren Mehrheit ohne Überhangmandate nicht zustande gekommen wäre. Gegenteiliges – also eine starke Zunahme der Disproportionalität bei vergleichsweise geringer Zunahme der Konzentration – zeigt sich für den Fall Schleswig-Holstein 2000, wo die SPD im Basisszenario sieben Überhangmandate erhält. Hier sorgen die Überhangmandate für keine Änderung der Regierungsoptionen während die Disproportionalität stark zunimmt. Dieser negativ zu bewertende Effekt bestätigt sich auch über den Vergleich der Index-Differenzen mit den jeweiligen Standardabweichungen. Schließlich verdeutlicht die Wahl in Berlin 1990, wie Überhangmandate auch überwiegend an die zweistärkste Partei (in diesem Fall die SPD) gehen und somit sogar – entgegen H_3 – fragmentierend wirken können. So erhöht sich in diesem Fall die Anzahl der effektiven Parteien (EPZ_5) von 3,36 auf 3,47, während die Disproportionalität ebenfalls zunimmt (der entsprechende GI-Wert steigt von 2,66 auf 3,78). Für einen solchen Fall wirkt der Nicht-Ausgleich von Überhangmandaten also sogar im Sinne des „Schlechtesten beider Welten“.

8.6 Fazit

Insgesamt fällt das Fazit zu einer möglichen herausgehobenen Rolle der personalisierten Verhältniswahl zumindest mit Bezug auf die gleichzeitige Erfüllung von Repräsentations- und Konzentrationsfunktion ernüchternd aus. Eine minimal bessere Performanz der pV hinsichtlich der Repräsentationsfunktion ist ein überraschendes Ergebnis dieser Analyse und bedarf weiterer Untersuchung. Dennoch bleibt kein klarer Hinweis dafür, dass sich das pV-System in den deutschen Bundesländern von der reinen Verhältniswahl signifikant abheben würde. Darüber hinaus führen Überhangmandate unter pV zwar typischerweise zu zunehmender Konzentration, bringen allerdings auch entsprechende Disproportionalitäten mit sich und können unter Umständen sogar Fragmentierung und Disproportionalität gleichzeitig erhöhen. Die Hypothese, dass die personalisierte Verhältniswahl das „Beste der beiden Welten“ aus Mehrheits- und Verhältniswahl in sich vereint, lässt sich bei einer vergleichenden Untersuchung der deutschen Bundesländer nicht bestätigen. Eine zusätzliche, von der Mehrheitswahlebene der pV ausgehende Koordination von Parteien sowie Wählern scheint sich nicht einzustellen. Das einzige in den deutschen Bundesländern angewandte Wahlsystem, das sich eindeutig von anderen dort angewendeten Wahlsystemen abhebt, ist das LSM-System, welches deutlich näher bei der reinen Mehrheitswahl zu verorten ist als die übrigen untersuchten Systeme und entsprechende Charakteristika (höhere Konzentration, geringere Proportionalität) aufweist.

Für weitere Unterschiede scheinen vor allem allgemeine Trends und soziopolitische Kontextfaktoren verantwortlich zu sein. Dieses Ergebnis hebt dabei hervor, dass die Analyse von Wahlsystemen unter vorsichtiger Spezifikation eines statistischen Modells erfolgen sollte. Ein rein deskriptiver Überblick hatte noch auf vergleichsweise große Unterschiede zwischen den Wahlsystemen hingewiesen. Auch die statistischen Modelle sind dann einer Robustheitsprüfung zu unterziehen, um scheinbar allgemeine Zusammenhänge nicht mit durch Einzelfälle getriebenen Ergebnissen zu verwechseln. Eingeschränkt werden müssen unsere Ergebnisse dadurch, dass sowohl die untersuchten pV- als auch die rV-Systeme im Datensatz mit einer Fünf-Prozent-Hürde ausgestattet sind. Ob sich real vorkommende pV- von rV-Systemen jeweils ohne Sperrklausel auf andere Weise voneinander unterscheiden würde, kann mit Hilfe einer empirischen Untersuchung der deutschen Länder nicht beantwortet werden.

Für die Debatte rund um die Reform des Bundeswahlsystems unterstreichen die Ergebnisse des Wahlsystemvergleichs auf Länderebene, dass die Frage zukünftiger Reformen eng an die Frage nach dem normativen Grundcharakter des Wahlsystems geknüpft werden sollte. Dies liegt vor allem daran, dass – zumindest im deutschen Kontext – Detailvariationen immer einen direkten *trade-off* zwischen verschiedenen Zielen bedeuten. Die Kernfrage bleibt damit bestehen: Ist das Repräsentationsprinzip der personalisierten Verhältniswahl nun das der Proportionalität oder einer Balance aus Proportionalität und Konzentration (vgl. Kapitel 3)? Was die Wirkungsweise anbetrifft, deutet der Blick auf die Länderebene darauf hin, dass die Reform in Richtung eines reinen Verhältniswahlsystems (mit Fünfprozent-Hürde) gegenüber der pV keinen Konzentrationsverlust bedeuten würde. Während die Anzahl der Stimmen innerhalb der pV keinen Unterschied bezüglich der Konzentrationsfunktion bewirken, können Überhangmandate

zwar grundsätzlich zugunsten stärkerer Konzentration anfallen. Allerdings zeigt die Empirie gleichzeitig, dass der oftmals erhoffte konzentrierende Effekt mit Blick auf verschiedene Regierungsoptionen keinesfalls zwingend ist und Überhangmandate in Einzelfällen sogar einer klaren Regierungsbildung im Weg stehen können. Dementsprechend – basierend auf den hier vorgestellten Ergebnissen – sind für Detailveränderungen in der Ausgestaltung der pV keine substantiellen Wirkungsänderungen zu erwarten.

Für die Wahlsystemforschung insgesamt bedeuten die hier dargestellten Ergebnisse nicht, dass die Hoffnung auf das „Beste beider Welten“ aufgegeben werden muss. Allerdings werfen diese zumindest einen Schatten auf die Strahlkraft der personalisierten Verhältniswahl als das Vorbild für das „Beste beider Welten“ anstrebende Mischwahlsysteme schlechthin. Sollte der oftmals gelobte Konzentrationseffekt der pV tatsächlich ausschließlich auf die gesetzliche Sperrklausel und/oder soziopolitisch günstige Rahmenbedingungen zurückgehen, dient die pV an sich kaum als Paradebeispiel für ein das „Beste beider Welten“ erreichendes Mischwahlsystem. Im Kontext der deutschen Bundesländer scheint sich kein zusätzlich konzentrierender Effekt des Wahlsystemtyps pV einzustellen.

Addendum: Refining the MMP system – considering the Bavarian option

The previous analyses have provided clear evidence for the potential of the mixed-member proportional system to reach the best of both worlds on the international level but not on the German sub-national level. However, next to these mixed results, especially one finding casts doubt on whether MMP is always a desirable design option: as highlighted in the international comparison (Chapter 7), the MMP system does tend to perform in an extreme and undesirable fashion if the compensation mechanism is circumvented via a manipulation strategy based on vote-splitting. In transition countries MMP has actually brought out something more akin to the worst of both worlds in terms of electoral system performance – with limited gains in concentration accompanied by massive disproportionality and serious damage to the legitimacy of the election outcomes (see Bochsler 2012; Elklit 2008). The German sub-national level analysis has briefly hinted at the unique version of the MMP system that is used for Bavarian state elections. The following will demonstrate how this Bavarian version of the MMP system is an intriguing option to alleviate the strategic manipulation problem while retaining most of the desirable features of the mixed-member proportional electoral system.

The problem of strategic manipulation under the MMP electoral system

In the standard MMP system where voters cast two ballots – one for the single-member district and one for the compensational PR tier – and where parties can win surplus seats when they win more single-member district seats than they would be allocated per the PR formula, parties can apply a simple strategy to circumvent the compensational linkage between electoral tiers (see Bochsler 2012; Elklit 2008). A party can circumvent the compensation mechanism of the MMP system in the following way: parties can either contest elections under a different party label in each electoral tier, or instruct their supporters to give their PR vote to a political ally who will win no single-member district seats. The consequence of this collective strategic vote-splitting is that, for the party or coalition applying the manipulation strategy, MMP essentially works like a parallel MMM electoral system where there is no discount for seats won in the plurality tier. This phenomenon undermines the fundamental logic of the MMP system and favours parties exploiting the MMP-loophole at the cost of those who contest both electoral tiers (Bochsler 2012: 402-405). The overall consequence of this type of strategic manipulation is that MMP systems may yield highly disproportional election results that are perceived as illegitimate by large parts of the public (Bochsler 2012; Elklit 2008). This manipulation strategy has led to legitimacy crises and played a critical role in the electoral reform of the MMP electoral system in Albania, Lesotho, and Venezuela (Bochsler 2012).⁷⁵ In light of these drastic consequences, it becomes apparent that

⁷⁵ Although it was not part of a general manipulation strategy, even in the highly stable German democracy the fact that a party could gain seats overall by receiving fewer votes in the PR tier led to the eventual reform of the MMP electoral system (see Behnke 2008; Hesse 2013). Instead of adopting a fused ballot, though, German politicians agreed to allocate levelling seats to all other parties if a party should win more seats in the plurality tier than the PR tier allocation would provide. Now any attempt to win surplus seats via collective vote-splitting is futile but any mechanical effect of the plurality tier is also eradicated.

decreasing the incentives for strategic manipulation is a critical task for designers of MMP electoral systems if this system is to remain a viable general option for reaching optimal performance.

In response to the problem, next to the exit option (i.e. getting rid of the MMP system altogether⁷⁶), especially one design approach aiming at avoiding the manipulation strategy has been at the center of attention – the reduction of the number of votes to just one (see Elklit 2008; Bochsler 2012; Bochsler 2014). The basic idea is that if voters only had one vote, they obviously would not be able to split their votes and parties could not make use of the manipulation strategy. Lesotho – the only country that retained the MMP system after the manipulation strategy had caused a legitimacy crisis – went this route and now uses a MMP system where voters cast a fused ballot that is used both for the plurality and the PR tier. This fused ballot variant of the MMP system has also been applied widely on the German state level (see Chapter 8) as well as in the Italian Senate (see Ferrara 2006). What makes this fused ballot design undesirable is that it robs voters of the opportunity to express different preferences in different electoral tiers or vote strategically (Bochsler 2012: 410).⁷⁷ Not being able to split their votes, voters who prefer a district candidate who does not belong to their preferred party are forced to forego their opportunity to support their preferred option in one electoral tier. Hence, it would be important to avoid strategic manipulation via collective vote-splitting but still allow voters to individually split their votes according to their preferences, providing them with as many options of influencing the composition of the parliament as possible.

The Bavarian MMP electoral system as an alternative

Although the exceptionalism of the Bavarian electoral system has been noted (see, e.g., James 1988; Trefs 2008), it has not yet been discussed in light of the strategic manipulation problem of the MMP system. The Bavarian MMP system is exceptional in that it allows for preferential voting in the PR tier via open lists and differs from, for example, the German MMP system used for federal elections in a number of details. But the difference that is critical regarding the incentives for the manipulation strategy is related to which votes are used in order to allocate PR seats. In Bavaria, as in the standard version of MMP, voters cast two votes – one for the single-member district and one for the PR tier. Yet, opposed to the standard version of MMP, the PR tier allocation of seats is based not just on the PR votes (the ‘Zweitstimmen’) but on the sum total of votes from both electoral tiers (the ‘Gesamtstimmen’). Voters thus have two votes: one vote is a fused vote that counts towards both the single-member district and the PR tier allocation and the other is a (pure) PR vote that only counts towards the allocation of PR seats. This is the design twist which holds the potential of largely solving the problem of the incentives for strategic manipulation without forcing voters to abandon vote-splitting altogether. The following discussion will therefore

⁷⁶ This general change also includes the Italian solution (also applied in Greece) of giving the largest party a seat bonus in an otherwise PR electoral system.

⁷⁷ Note that the non-desirability of a general manipulation strategy does not imply that strategic voting by individual voters is problematic.

discuss the implications of this unique technical provision generally and not dwell on further details of the Bavarian MMP system as the latter are simply a combination of technical provisions that are also applied elsewhere.

Avoiding strategic manipulation

It is important to note outright that basing PR allocation on total votes from both electoral tiers will not make strategic manipulation impossible, only less likely. However, as Raabe (2015) shows, any mixed-member electoral system that links electoral tiers in a non-trivial fashion – whether based on one or many votes – will always retain some potential for strategic manipulation. In consequence, the focus of electoral system designers needs to be on setting the correct incentives to invoke desirable behavior. So how do incentives for strategically circumventing the compensation mechanism differ between standard and Bavarian MMP rules? The first difference is that the seat-bonus a party can gain from applying the manipulation strategy is only half as large under Bavarian MMP compared to standard MMP rules. If voters support party A in the single-member district tier, they automatically also provide them with one vote in the PR tier. Hence, party A would not be able to avoid the compensation mechanism altogether. Whereas under standard MMP rules a party could simply urge its voters to give all their PR votes to a decoy-list or a coalition partner, the fused vote in the Bavarian MMP system guarantees that if a party wants all votes in the plurality tier, it will also receive at least half of its potential PR votes itself. This means that a party willing to circumvent the compensation mechanism will only be able to use fifty percent of its PR vote potential to do so – the other fifty percent cannot be detached from the party that will win many seats in the single-member district tier and thus will be discounted without, under typical circumstances, any additional gains of PR seats.

The second significant difference is that smaller parties are unlikely to take part in such a strategy under Bavarian MMP because now, for them, giving single-member district votes to their larger partners also means giving up valuable PR votes due to the fused vote. Unlike under standard MMP rules where they could only gain (assuming that for the small party gaining any seats in the plurality tier is unrealistic), smaller parties now would have to take the risk of ending up in worse shape than without their larger partner. Their situation would be especially ugly if the strategy of collective vote-splitting was to fail and many of the supporters of the larger party refused to give their PR vote to the smaller partner. Hence, smaller partners will either shy away from this type of arrangement completely or demand a much higher price for their cooperation which in turn should lower the incentives of larger parties to engage in the manipulation strategy. Overall then the incentives to take part in strategic manipulation are clearly reduced by applying Bavarian MMP rules. At the same time, voters are still able to split their votes.

An intriguing compromise of compromises

As is typical for electoral system design, simultaneously reducing the incentives to engage in manipulation tactics and retaining the option of vote-splitting is not possible without side-effects. The fused vote reduces the incentives for strategic manipulation tactics and additionally provides incentives for parties to compete hard for votes in all single-member districts (potentially revitalizing political competition in districts where one party is almost certain to win the seat) as well as for district candidates and parties to keep tabs on each other. The additional PR vote allows voters to still split their votes in order to support coalitions strategically or simply reward a convincing district candidate of another party. However, at the same time the presence of the PR vote means that strategic manipulation is still possible and the presence of the fused vote means that some voters are forced to decide whether they would rather vote for their preferred district candidate or support their favourite party list at least for the fused vote. Bavarian MMP therefore is a compromise between the single, fused ballot MMP system and the standard two-ballot MMP system. Yet, the hitherto overlooked Bavarian MMP variant appears as an intriguing design option as one tries to strongly reduce the potential for strategic manipulation without robbing voters of their ability to split votes altogether. This compromise of different MMP variants could function as a preserver of the system's best of both worlds qualities especially in places where not all parties are fully committed to the compensational nature of the MMP system.

9 Testing the effect of district magnitude on the micro level

The international comparison (Chapter 7) has solidified the proposition that PR electoral systems with moderate district magnitudes are indeed often able to achieve the best of both worlds in providing both proportional outcomes and a concentrated party system (Carey & Hix 2011). What is still missing is an analysis of the district level making use of the variation within PR electoral systems with multiple multi-member districts. This micro level analysis has two advantages which relate to the two key goals of this chapter: first, going to the district level of elections allows for investigating the effects of an electoral system's exact technical design while holding constant the country context. In this way, the potential overestimation of electoral system effects in cross-country studies can be avoided (see Bowler & Donovan 2013; also see Chapter 8). Second, since Carey & Hix' (2011) argument uses a micro level explanation related to within-district coordination in order to explain the superiority of moderate district magnitude, this argument and the general design proposition should be validated empirically on the district level (see Singer & Stephenson 2009; Moser & Scheiner 2012 for the requirement of testing micro level theories on the district level of elections).

9.1 Moderate district magnitude – merely a macro level yardstick?

Let us briefly revisit the argument behind the *moderate district magnitude proposition* (or, hypothesis; also see Chapters 2, 5, and 7). Carey and Hix (2011) argue that districts of moderate magnitude (roughly between three and ten) provide ample opportunity for various societal groups and opinions to be represented in parliament but at the same time keep coordination incentives high among voters and parties. Once district magnitude increases above moderate levels, parties and voters will be unable to make reliable strategic calculations and the coordination on viable candidates will fail. At the same time, such additional increase in district magnitude has only a very limited additional effect on the proportionality of election outcomes (Carey & Hix 2011: 384-386). In sum, a focus on a few viable candidates paired with a respectable level of proportionality lead to optimal performance of an electoral system in maximizing the trade-off between representativeness and accountability. This theoretical argument applies to an individual electoral district, but so far has been tested (Carey & Hix 2011; Chapter 7) solely on the macro level – which is reasonable given that an improved balance of proportionality and concentration largely matters at the macro, not the micro level. Politicians and the public are rarely troubled by individual district outcomes but more concerned about matters of government accountability and coalition complexity as well as the proportionality of representation overall. Yet still, going to the micro level is necessary in order to corroborate the macro level evidence and – equally important – delve deeper into the district magnitude's potential to strike a superior balance between competing functional goals of electoral systems.

The slight paradox present in Carey and Hix' (2011) otherwise highly convincing study is that they test a micro level theory based on macro level outcomes but nevertheless go on to deriving micro level implications with respect to the proportionality and concentration goals as they conclude

'that practitioners who seek to design an electoral system that maximizes these competing objectives are best served by choosing multi-member districts of moderate magnitudes' (Carey & Hix 2011: 395). What their results actually – taken at face value – suggest is that electoral systems with a moderate *median* district magnitude perform very well regarding the representativeness-accountability trade-off. Although it seems very plausible that this finding translates to the micro level, this is in no way a given as the especially successful balance could theoretically also result from a combination of districts of small size with districts of large magnitude. In that case the result with respect to median district magnitude would not necessarily imply that it is actually moderate magnitude districts that lead to what is an overall highly efficient performance of an electoral system. In fact, taking the results at face value implies that moderate district magnitude functions more or less as a yardstick to be applied to the electoral system at large, stating that if the median (or mean for that matter) district magnitude is moderate, one should be fine notwithstanding the exact composition of the district level.

Challenging the general yardstick-like use of macro level results, the following empirical analysis aims at showing how district magnitude actually performs on the district level. This investigation will then reveal whether aiming at a central tendency (i.e. moderate median district magnitude) is enough or whether careful micro level design has a role to play, too. In addition, we will look at whether the effect of district magnitude varies between different countries and derive performance and design implications accordingly.

9.2 Investigating the effect of district magnitude in three 'sweet spot' countries

Carey and Hix (2011: 384) specifically name Costa Rica, Hungary, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland as those countries that have 'discovered a "sweet spot" in the design of electoral systems' by holding elections in multi-member PR districts of moderate magnitude 'in the range of three to eight'. In the following, the cases of Costa Rica, Portugal, and Spain will be used as a basis for the micro foundation of the *moderate district magnitude proposition*. Ireland is not considered because there is only a very limited variation in district magnitude (which varies between three and five). Furthermore, the Hungarian case is not taken into account because here the multi-member districts are part of a complex multi-tier mixed-member electoral system with an additional legal threshold which renders it overly complex for an exploration of the micro level with respect to the effect of – and only the effect of – district magnitude. Especially the Irish case, however, indirectly highlights the implicit macro yardstick-mentality of the design advice given by Carey and Hix (2011) since Ireland and, e.g., Spain are treated as essentially identical designs although they arrive at a moderate median district magnitude in very different ways.

The three countries under consideration form a highly useful basis for a brief empirical assessment of the moderate magnitude effect since all these countries have districts of widely varying magnitude and no additional complexities of the electoral system could distort inferences

with respect to the goals of this chapter.⁷⁸ Table 9.1 summarizes the information on the three ‘sweet spot’ countries’ electoral systems and shows how similar the three systems perform. Overall, the following micro level analysis is based on 40 elections made up of 963 individual district election outcomes.

Table 9.1: Descriptive overview

<i>Country</i>	<i>Median district magnitude</i>	<i>Mean district magnitude</i>	<i>Minimum; Maximum</i>	<i>Total number of district elections (number of elections)</i>	<i>Mean LSI</i>	<i>Mean ENP_s</i>
Costa Rica	6	7.91 (5.44)	2; 21	105 (15)	9.93 (5.64)	2.44 (0.7)
Portugal	7	11.61 (12.09)	1; 58	286 (14)	9.98 (6.13)	2.32 (0.64)
Spain	5	6.73 (5.89)	1; 36	572 (11)	12.6 (7.86)	2.14 (0.6)
All	6	8.31 (8.45)	1; 58	963 (40)	11.53 (7.27)	2.23 (0.63)

Notes: Parentheses include standard deviations unless indicated otherwise.

In order to investigate the propensity of different district magnitudes to provide both high levels of proportionality and concentration, a dummy variable indicating such doubly good performance is used. This indicator equals one if the election outcome in a district is both more proportional (based on the LSI) and more concentrated (based on the ENP_s) than the median district of the whole sample.⁷⁹ As the following empirical analysis is largely meant to explore micro level tendencies, the results will be presented in easily accessible figures – typically without displaying confidence bounds in order to maximize the interpretability of the findings.⁸⁰ Note, though, that all figures present predictions based on logit models with standard errors clustered for each election and including at least the district magnitude as well as the squared district magnitude as independent variables – both variables covering the district magnitude are statistically significant at least on the .1 level in all of these models.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Spain does employ a legal threshold of three percent in each electoral district. However, as district magnitude is never greater than 36, this legal threshold largely is a mere technicality when it comes to its practical relevance.


⁷⁹ The empirical results would be the same if, instead of an overall median, country or election medians were used. As already highlighted by Table 9.1, the general patterns are very similar across countries and elections. Twelve percent of all district election outcomes reach the best of both worlds.

⁸⁰ In the figures, predicted probabilities are smoothed via fitting a polynomial regression of the predicted probabilities from the logit models on district magnitude. This does not in any way alter the inferences – which would be the same if they were based on a simple scatterplot of the predicted probabilities emerging from the logit models. Additionally, the figures show predicted probabilities for district magnitudes between one and thirty-five as the effects at very high levels of district magnitude do not add anything in terms of substantial implications but would decrease interpretability concerning the effect of small changes in district magnitude at lower levels.

⁸¹ The appendix to this chapter (Appendix D) provides the district level dataset as well as a do file that may be used to estimate all logit models and reproduce the graphs presented here.

Figure 9.1 presents predicted probabilities for reaching the best of both worlds with respect to the proportionality-concentration trade-off based on a logit model only including district magnitude and its squared term as independent variables, using all district level election outcomes as a sample. We immediately see that the data fit the micro level theoretical argument in that moderate district magnitudes (roughly between six and ten) are indeed best in terms of maximizing the probability of providing both proportional representation and party system concentration. Hence, the macro level results that see an increased potential for reaching a superior balance in PR electoral system with a moderate district magnitude are clearly corroborated on the district level. This is not surprising, given the plausible theoretical argument and macro level evidence, but reassuring also because the effect on the district level is even more pronounced compared to the macro level. The analysis in chapter seven suggests that lowering district magnitude from high levels (say, 50) to around five will increase the chance to reach a doubly good performance by about seven percent. According to the district analysis the micro effect of such a change in district magnitude is almost twice as high (plus thirteen percent) – this more pronounced effect is likely caused by the fact that, on the district level, there are fewer distortions to the effect of this change in the technical details of the electoral system.

Figure 9.1: Effect of district magnitude on the district level




Notes: The shaded area represents the 95 percent confidence interval.

There are thus meaningful differences on the micro level that need to be accounted for. The *moderate district magnitude proposition* is not merely a yardstick for the macro level but holds

critical implications for district level party systems. Therefore it is important to further investigate variation on the district level by assessing differences between countries and by providing first evidence as to the cross-country robustness of the micro level patterns. Figure 9.2 is based on a logit model that allows the effect of district magnitude to vary between the three countries, Costa Rica, Portugal, and Spain.⁸² When we look at the effect of district magnitude in the three ‘sweet spot’ countries, two central implications become apparent: first, while the general finding that districts of moderate magnitude work best is supported in all three countries, the exact span of what exactly is the optimal range within which to choose moderate district magnitude varies. And second, the size of the effect of varying district magnitude on the chances of a doubly good performance also differs between countries. The latter implies that electoral system performance is more sensitive to district magnitude in some countries than in others. For this analysis, Costa Rica stands out with a marked difference between district magnitudes of around seven vis-à-vis smaller (below five) as well as compared to larger (above ten) magnitudes. For Spain and Portugal the effect of varying district magnitude is clearly visible but less pronounced than in the case of Costa Rica. In terms of practical implications, electoral system designers should be aware of this type of sensitivity on the district level.

Figure 9.2: Varying patterns across countries



⁸² Due to the small number of countries a multilevel model could not be fit. However, via using interaction terms between the district magnitude variables and country-dummies, the logit model – the results of which are presented in Figure 9.2 – essentially functions like a multilevel model with country fixed effects and country-specific slopes for the district magnitude variables.

As regards the variation in what exactly is the ‘sweet spot’, both Costa Rica and Portugal are well in line with the proposition by Carey and Hix (2011) – the ‘sweet spot’ on the district level appears to be a district magnitude of seven-to-eight. However, the Spanish case highlights that the exact location of the ‘sweet spot’ may vary according to the country context. The Spanish district level data suggest that slightly larger districts of a magnitude around ten are actually most likely to reach a superior middle ground in electoral system performance. Hence, while the general proposition to choose PR systems with moderate magnitudes stands, it is also useful to map out exactly what is the ideal district magnitude for an individual country case. Overall, the analysis of country differences emphasizes the importance of considering the micro level effects of district magnitude.

Chances and risks of moderate district magnitude


Next to increasing the potential of reaching a superior balance, moderate district magnitude could also run into trouble by providing neither a desirable level of proportionality nor fostering coordination and concentration. This associated risk becomes especially apparent on the micro level where very large districts more or less guarantee proportionality (in the district) and therefore are at least safe in terms of not falling to the worst of both worlds. Figure 9.3 presents predicted probabilities of district level outcomes neither reaching higher levels of proportionality nor of concentration.⁸³ Where the macro level results have recommended a moderate magnitude PR design is a fairly risk free tool for reaching the best of both worlds, the district level looks different in that moderate magnitudes appear risky in terms of also making a worst of both worlds performance more likely. Whereas these problems might average out on the aggregate level and the *moderate district magnitude proposition* being risk free remain a valid finding, the results depicted in Figure 9.3 at least imply that for individual districts moderate magnitude might be a fairly risky choice.

Yet, comparing Figure 9.3 with Figure 9.2 emphasizes how a careful choice of district magnitude on the district level should help avoiding the worst of both worlds while still providing ample opportunity for reaching the best. For Costa Rica and Portugal Figure 9.3 shows how especially district magnitudes below six are likely to lead to doubly bad performance. Taking into account the results presented in Figure 9.2, both these countries are fairly well off with moderate district magnitudes of between seven and ten as these are most likely to provide doubly good performance while already substantially reducing the risk of ending up with the worst of both worlds. The Spanish case stresses even more strongly that a blind adherence to the yardstick of moderate district magnitudes around five can be problematic. The Spanish district level data suggest that district magnitudes between five and ten maximize the probability of a district level party system being neither fairly proportional nor sufficiently concentrated. However, as discussed above, in Spain district magnitudes between ten and fifteen are better suited to maximize the chances for reaching the best of both worlds.

⁸³ The underlying logit model is based on a dummy variable equalling one if a district’s party system is less proportional and less concentrated than the respective median district.

In sum, in terms of design advice, it is encouraging that for all three countries there appear to be significant differences as to which district magnitudes maximize the risk of a worst of both worlds performance and which magnitudes are most likely to perform well in both dimensions – but, as is visible from the high similarity between Figures 9.2 and 9.3, careful design is needed to achieve a good performance. Such careful design also of the district level of an electoral system based on elections in multi-member districts should thus be able to circumvent the pitfalls of inadequate design and help reap the benefits of a well-tuned electoral system. For all three countries investigated here, the design ‘sweet spot’ is located very close to what could be called an electoral ‘rough patch’ increasing the probability of an undesirable performance – in all cases the ‘sweet spot’ magnitude is slightly higher than the magnitude that is more likely to lead to the worst of both worlds.

Figure 9.3: District magnitude’s effect on the worst of both worlds risk



9.3 When larger district magnitudes could be preferable

As the Spanish case suggests something slightly different from what the initial argument by Carey and Hix (2011) implies, it will be fruitful to explore potential explanations for this deviation. The following are *possible* explanations of why, instead of choosing moderate district magnitudes, it could be advisable to rely on districts of a high magnitude in order to optimize electoral system performance.

When additional proportionality is costless

One potential explanation is based on the idea that a country's party system has a certain limit as to how many (effective) parties would emerge even under the most permissive electoral rules. If that limit is fairly low (e.g. only three effective parties), increasing district magnitude from moderate to larger levels will not lead to an increase of party system fragmentation because the limit has already been reached in the fairly proportional moderate magnitude districts. In this case, raising district magnitude would not lead to a decrease in concentration but still provide proportionality gains – especially on the micro level where disproportionalities do not average out across districts. Hence, if the maximum party system fragmentation is more or less fixed already at moderate levels of district magnitude, an increase of district magnitude could be beneficial due to a further improvement of proportionality. If this condition – related to the 'natural' limit of party system fragmentation – holds, adding proportionality with larger district magnitudes is costless in terms of party system concentration, and there is no reason not to go with larger-than-moderate district magnitudes.

When cross-district coordination failure is a challenge


When thinking of macro outcomes the desirable features of certain district magnitudes might be entirely futile if different parties contest different districts (i.e. if party system linkage or nationalization is low; see Cox 1997, 1999; Powell & Vanberg 2000). If – and this certainly is only an 'if' at this point – districts of moderate magnitude were to increase the incentives for regional entrants and independent candidates to contest elections so much that party system fragmentation were to increase substantially, it could be a mistake to go for districts of moderate magnitude despite their optimal within-district effects. Put more generally, electoral system designers would potentially face the choice between good within-district and good cross-district performance of an electoral system. How can districts of high magnitude alleviate the problem of cross-district coordination among parties? Morgenstern et al. (2009; also see Brancati 2008; Moser & Scheiner 2012; Stoll 2013) argue that different electoral districts become more alike (akin to the electorate as a whole) as district magnitude increases because within-district heterogeneity grows, rendering a district-specific party platform undesirable. In this way, high magnitude districts could outperform districts of moderate magnitude when it comes to avoiding a regionalized party system and thus do a better job with respect to the overall performance regarding the representativeness-accountability trade-off. No one is helped if efficient and desirable district outcomes do not translate into efficient aggregate outcomes of an election. This explanation emphasizes the importance of taking micro-macro connections in electoral systems into account. Countries that have problems with party system linkage could benefit from larger districts if these bolster incentives for parties to appeal to the whole electorate as opposed to particular districts or regions (also see Raabe 2014).

9.4 Controlling for district characteristics

Finally, the findings with respect to the district level could be due to the omission of context variables. The data availability on district characteristics unfortunately is low and often it is not possible to control for context in micro level analyses. However, for the Spanish case, at least information about the ethnic heterogeneity in each electoral district is available from Rashkova (2014) and will be used here to conduct a first robustness test of the effect of district magnitude at the Spanish district level.⁸⁴ Figure 9.4 presents predicted probabilities both of reaching the best and the worst of both worlds given district magnitude using the Spanish district election results – predictions are based on logit models that, next to the district magnitude variables, include a district’s ethnic heterogeneity as well as interactions between district magnitude and ethnic heterogeneity (see Ordeshook & Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto & Cox 1997).

Taking district characteristics into account leads to roughly the same conclusions as the previous analysis for the Spanish case. Figure 9.4 even suggests that districts of magnitudes as high as 20 are preferable to moderate district magnitudes in the Spanish case. This certainly calls for further research on the Spanish case and the nuanced, district level effects of district magnitude generally. Future research should aim to take different district characteristics into account in order to scrutinize the results presented here.

Figure 9.4: Predicted probabilities taking ethnic heterogeneity into account (Spain)



⁸⁴ Ethnic heterogeneity is measured via Fearon’s fractionalization index (see Fearon 2003; Rashkova 2014).
130

9.5 Implications

The above exploration of the district level in three ‘sweet spot’ countries with a moderate median district magnitude clearly supports the idea that districts of moderate magnitude are useful means to reach both high levels of representativeness and accountability in electoral system performance. Instead of disclosing a spurious finding, the within-country district level analysis estimates the impact district magnitude exerts on the probability of a superior balance of proportionality and concentration to be even stronger than expected based on macro level studies. However, the district level data – and especially the Spanish case – also emphasize that nuanced analyses are needed in order to be able to perfect electoral system design within the PR design family. Investigating the district level yields very specific implications as to which magnitudes are best not only for reaching a doubly good performance but at the same time for minimizing the risk of eventually ending up with a disappointing and destabilizing performance that is more reflective of the worst of both worlds.

As regards design advice, this analysis shows that macro yardsticks do largely work also when applied to the district level but it has also become very clear that a uniform effect on the macro level could in some cases conceal deviating patterns on the micro level. In light of these results, electoral system research in general should articulate unambiguously what is a micro level as opposed to a macro level theory and be very careful in choosing the respective empirical tests (also see Potter 2014). Especially when studies end with concrete design advice it is important that this design advice is actually based directly on what the empirical results imply – more or less heroic assumptions about the macro level mirroring the micro level could be problematic. Opposed to additional electoral tiers, mixed-member rules, and legal thresholds which are all typically constant across districts or directly apply to the aggregate level, district magnitude most of the time varies across a country and, consequentially, nuanced implications considering the district level are needed. Electoral system researchers and practitioners have to be fully aware of the potential consequences not only of altering central tendencies but also of changing the technical details on the district level. Good electoral system design essentially hinges on both getting it right on the macro *and* the micro level – with chances and risks present on both levels.

10 Linking principles to performances

This chapter is based on the manuscript 'Raabe, J. (2015) Principled success? Do inclusive, principle-guided choice processes improve the performance of mixed electoral systems?' which is a conference paper prepared for the European Political Science Association General Conference 2015 in Vienna, Austria, and currently under review.

10.1 Introduction

The initially great hopes associated with mixed-member electoral systems have been followed by successful as well as unfortunate experiments with these electoral institutions. Mixed-member systems were hoped to strike a superior balance between proportional and majoritarian designs (Lijphart 1984; Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a). Next to successfully balancing demands and providing both proportionality (representativeness) and concentration (governability) of party systems (Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a; Gallagher 2005b), however, mixed-member systems have also often been found to be leading to unexpected, extreme, and ultimately undesirable outcomes (e.g. Ferrara et al. 2005; Lundberg 2009; Bochsler 2012). Explanations of varying performances of these systems are typically based on the systems' exact technical designs and/or the sociopolitical scope conditions under which they operate. What has been neglected is the key question of whether the mixed-member electoral systems implemented throughout the world are actually meant to achieve any sort of superior middle-ground or general balance between different functional goals. Does a mixed electoral system actually aim at fulfilling the competing principles of proportional representation and concentration or has it been the compromise outcome of intense bargaining, lacking any guiding normative goal? Did parties agree on a design or was the design imposed by a self-serving government? These questions refer to the principle of representation dimension of electoral systems which asks whether the electoral system is supposed to achieve any general normative goal and which goal this is (see Chapters 3 and 4). Answering them will give us a basis to evaluate in how far mixed-member electoral systems really typically aim at successfully balancing competing principles of concentration and proportionality with respect to the election outcomes. The implication for the performance of mixed-member systems developed in this chapter is straightforward: consciously designed mixed-member systems aiming at a good performance with respect to both proportionality and concentration should be more likely to achieve this superior balance than mixed-member systems merely functioning as strategic tools or deriving from convoluted bargaining – holding constant the specific technical design.

This chapter deals with two key tasks in establishing the link between the principle of representation (or lack thereof) of an electoral system and its eventual performance: first, a comparative dataset regarding the principle of representation of mixed-member electoral systems is needed. And second, based on this dataset, the effect on electoral system performance has to be tested empirically. Fulfilling the first task, a case study survey is undertaken in order to retain reliable answers to the questions about the process of implementing a mixed-member

electoral system. Contrary to the technical design of electoral systems, one must carefully look at the case study literature in order to derive information regarding the principle of representation dimension. In doing so, this chapter also aims at integrating large-n and small-n analyses in the field of electoral system research. In order to deal with the second task, all elections under mixed-member electoral rules will be used to investigate whether the characteristics of the choice process affect the performance of the electoral system. The results will then not only speak to the question of whether the wide variation in mixed-member system performance can partly be explained by taking the principle of representation dimension into account, but also more broadly to the question of whether more inclusive, principle-guided design will ultimately improve the functioning of democratic institutions.

The chapter is structured as follows: section 10.2 discusses with which general goals mixed-member systems are typically associated and in how far these associations are reasonable. Section 10.3 then goes on to argue that a more inclusive, principle-oriented electoral system design ought to be performing successfully as the design should be more appropriate to the scope conditions and parties have a higher more commitment to the rules of the game. In section 10.4, the case study survey approach is introduced and the dataset with respect to the principle dimension of mixed-member electoral systems is presented. Furthermore, a first exploration looks into which factors are likely to lead to an inclusive, principle-oriented choice. Section 10.5 then contains the empirical analysis, assessing the link between the (lack of a) principle of representation and the performance of the electoral system along the proportionality-concentration trade-off. Finally, the conclusion maps out the implications for electoral system research and research on institutional performance in general.

10.2 Mixed electoral systems and their (lacking) principle of representation

The principle of representation refers to ‘the political goals of political representation concerning the aggregate nation-wide outcome of elections’ (Nohlen 1984: 86) – in other words, the principle of representation is the general normative aim for the electoral system and almost always concerned with the trade-off between proportional representation and concentration of the party system (Chapters 3 and 4; also see Lijphart 1991; Powell 2000; Reynolds et al. 2005: 9; Martin 2009: 182). Is the electoral system supposed to maximize (minority) representation or foster the formation of single-party or small coalition governments via concentrating the party system (Duverger 1954; Rae 1967; Taagepera & Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994)? Or is the overall principle a balance of both goals (Chapter 3)? Notwithstanding its technical design, it is important to ask what an electoral system is supposed to achieve in a given country – is there any genuine overall goal or is the system merely a compromise outcome?

These latter questions are especially critical for judging the performance of mixed-member electoral systems. On the one hand, it is assumed that the adoption of such systems generally signals the designers’ desire to achieve a superior balance of proportionality and concentration by mixing elements of pure (PR and majoritarian) electoral systems (Lijphart 1984; Shugart

2001a). On the other hand, it is also very common to refer to mixed-member electoral systems as typically arising from hard-nosed bargaining and being compromised, last resort solutions to the difficult challenge of electoral system design (Elklit 1992; Birch 2003: 3-27; Gallagher 2005b; Benoit 2007). In light of the principle dimension of electoral systems, these two assertions hold very different implications. The former suggests that we should typically find mixed-member electoral systems that have a genuine general normative goal of reaching a successful balance of proportionality and concentration, whereas the latter implies that mixed-member systems either lack a guiding principle or be crafted simply to suit the needs of particular parties regardless of the overall functioning of the system. Chapter 4 (also see Chapter 3; Katz 2005) puts forward that genuine principles may very well be absent for a subset of electoral systems. For mixed-member systems this implies that some of them might indeed be designed to provide a superior balance based on providing both proportional representation and party system concentration – aiming for the ‘best of both worlds’ – while others are lacking such overarching goal.

This potential variation is typically neglected in performance assessments because studies work under the problematic assumption that a similar technical design implies that systems have a common general principle of representation. The significance of general democratic values and normative considerations for the process of electoral system choice is often noted (e.g. Katz 2005: 74), but at the same time rarely figures into comparative empirical investigations (see Scheiner 2008: 171; Renwick 2010 is an important exception in so far as four different country cases are considered). Similarly, more narrow rational choice accounts of electoral system choice usually work under the assumption of fully self-interested parties (e.g. Persson & Tabellini 2003; Benoit 2004) and thus cannot integrate a possible effect of sociotropic, altruistic considerations and general normative goals. In order to close this gap in the literature, the next section will map out what the choice context and a design based on an overall guiding principle imply for eventual electoral system performance.

10.3 Choice context, principle, and performance

Generally put, we can expect institutions designed to achieve a particular goal to be more likely to actually achieve it than similar institutions that arose from compromise bargaining or were tailored to cater to particularistic short-term needs (Elster 1995; Ginsburg et al. 2009). The widespread failure of electoral reform (Scheiner 2008; Bowler & Donovan 2013) might stem not only from misguided expectations and problematic sociopolitical scope conditions but already be grounded in the very process of choosing new institutional arrangements. The following argument posits that mixed electoral systems crafted in an inclusive fashion and aiming at achieving an overall balance of the principles of proportionality and concentration (detached from particularistic partisan goals) should be more likely to lead to the efficient performance on the proportionality-concentration trade-off that is often hoped for under mixed electoral rules. Next to the widely acknowledged importance of the sociopolitical context in terms of how it interacts with electoral rules (Ordeshook & Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto & Cox 1997; Morgenstern & Vázquez-D’Elía 2009; Moser & Scheiner 2012; Stoll 2013), this argument seeks to show how

context already matters at the stage of choosing an electoral system. Technically similar mixed electoral systems may perform differently not only due to differences in the sociopolitical surroundings but also due to stark differences in how far these systems were actually designed to achieve the same ends.

There are multiple reasons to expect the principle of representation to affect electoral system performance. First, mixed systems that were devised in an inclusive fashion – considering the opinions of different opposition parties and, potentially, external experts – and based on agreement regarding the goal of a successful balance between proportionality and concentration should lead to more thorough attempts to devise technical rules that resonate well with the given sociopolitical scope conditions in order to achieve this general goal (see Ginsburg et al. 2009). While parties' motivations are probably always a mixed bag of self-interested and sociotropic considerations (Bowler et al. 2005; Benoit 2007: 380; Bol 2013), especially the involvement of external experts and international organizations is likely to shift the focus away from partisan considerations towards general principles (see Renwick 2010). Second, the existence of a commonly agreed upon principle of representation ought to lead to a higher level of commitment to the electoral rules by the parties that are directly affected by them (see Brennan & Hamlin 2002: 309). Third, also leading to a higher commitment to the rules of the (electoral) game, shirking and manipulation of the electoral rules will likely provoke a more fierce response by other parties and the public since these types of behavior can directly be marked as violating a broadly agreed upon principle for the electoral system (see Renwick 2010: 240; Renwick 2011; Norris 2011; Donno 2013 in this context). Finally, the choice of a guiding principle often emerges based on systemic failures (e.g. extreme disproportionality) of electoral systems in the past (Shugart 2001a; Martin 2009) leading to a strong determination to correct these failures with an improved design.

If the choice process is characterized by low levels of inclusiveness and if an overall principle guiding the design of the electoral system is absent, the above developments are unlikely to occur. Under these circumstances, election outcomes should be more prone to deviate from a balance towards extreme outcomes under mixed electoral rules (see Scheiner 2008: 171-172). For example, if a government imposes a mixed system solely to suit its own needs, opposition parties might withdraw from the electoral game by boycotting elections, leading to extreme election outcomes possibly also spurring public discomfort with the current institutional setup (see Chernykh 2014). Instead of a superior balance, such systems could spur the widespread exclusion of minor parties from representation, leading to similar outcomes as under majoritarian electoral rules. Similarly, hard-nosed bargaining leading to a compromise mixed system without any agreed upon principle might urge parties to seek ways of evading the balancing incentives of mixed rules and try to implicitly change how the electoral system will translate votes into seats via tampering with the rules (see Elklit 2008; Bochsler 2012).

The above argument leads to the following core hypothesis linking the principle dimension of mixed electoral systems to their performance. Further characteristics of the choice situation will be introduced explicitly in the next section and investigated concerning their role in the relationship between principle and performance in the empirical analysis.

H₁: Mixed electoral systems are more likely to successfully balance proportionality and concentration if they were devised with the overall goal (principle) of fulfilling both these demands.

As electoral reform rarely turns out to be a full-fledged success story (Scheiner 2008; Bowler & Donovan 2013), it needs to be clarified that it would not be shocking if the presence of a principle of representation did not improve the mixed electoral system's performance. The null hypothesis thus somewhat pessimistically posits that (for better or for worse) electoral system design is such a complicated matter that even with inclusive choice situations and widely agreed upon general goals a best of both worlds performance will not become more likely. The literature on self-interested partisan alterations of electoral rules would certainly suggest that designers often have great trouble to practically see through what they desire from the electoral system (e.g. Katz 2005). Uncertainty and miscalculations may not only stop 'strategic fools' (Andrews & Jackman 2005), but also hinder sociotropic designers from delivering an appropriate institutional solution. The empirical analysis will furthermore assess whether sociopolitical context factors as well as the technical design of the electoral system – especially the difference between mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems – are so dominant that there will be no additional effect of conscious, principle-oriented design.

H₀: The presence of a principle of representation guiding the choice process of an electoral system has no effect on the system's eventual performance.

Before moving on to the empirical investigation of the link between principle and performance, the following section will present a method of deriving reliable information about the choice context as well as the principle of representation of an electoral system and deliver the comparative data needed for the empirical analysis.

10.4 Collecting comparable information about the principle of representation – a case study survey

The fact that the choice context and the resulting outcome with regard to an electoral system's principle of representation does seldom figure into comparative performance analyses likely stems from the difficulty to retain the respective data on a larger number of countries. Whereas there is an abundance of information about electoral systems' technical specificities and, to a lesser degree, about the sociopolitical scope conditions they will later operate in, the situation is starkly different for the choice context. Here, the necessary information lies within the rich case and area studies literature but is not readily available in the form of comparable values of different variables referring to choice context and principle dimension. The lack of inclusion of these results from the vast literature examining single country cases is thus a major shortcoming in comparative electoral system research.

This chapter uses a case study survey to translate the information provided in case and area studies into a comparative dataset on the choice situation of mixed-member electoral systems in

order to bridge the gap between – and combine the strengths of – large-n comparative and small-n, case-oriented research (see Rahat 2011; Chapter 4).⁸⁵ This case study survey is based on the idea that each case or area study concerned with the choice of a mixed-member electoral system will at least implicitly cover the topics of principle-guidance and inclusiveness discussed earlier and hence may be subjected to a survey questionnaire pertaining to these topics. The methodology has been used prominently in Business and Management research (Larsson 1993; Larsson & Finkelstein 1999) and aims at making idiosyncratic case study results comparable for cross-sectional empirical analysis. Codings according to the questions introduced below were only made if there was no significant disagreement among the analyses of country experts. Furthermore, a sub-sample of codings were validated by the codings of a second researcher (similar to the approaches taken in Melton et al. 2013 and Chapter 4). A complete overview of coding decisions for all countries including notes about the specific developments as well as coding difficulties is available in the appendix (Appendix E). After a thorough search of the English language literature⁸⁶ on 22 countries and 25 adoptions of mixed-member electoral systems overall, the case and area studies dealing with the respective electoral system choices (reforms) were used to fill out a questionnaire posing several questions about the design context and, most importantly, the principle of representation.⁸⁷ For details regarding the choice of source materials as well as a detailed description of the case study survey approach please refer to Appendix E.

The main question refers to the principle of representation and asks whether the mixed-member system is supposed to aim for a successful balance of proportionality and concentration as a general goal or whether such principle is absent due to self-interested behavior and/or convoluted bargaining without principled design. The absence of a principle can also imply that designers were concerned mainly with the question of how to combine PR elections with district representation – this, however, is the case only for Bolivia's adoption of an MMP system, suggesting that the principle dimension is typically dominated by the goals of proportionality and concentration as has been expected (see Chapter 4). No mixed-member system in the dataset was designed based on a polar principle of representation (i.e. full proportionality or concentration).⁸⁸

A second core question is how inclusive the choice process has been. To answer this question a score system was used: if the government imposed the system without significant consideration

⁸⁵ A further option would be to directly assess politicians' statements instead of going the indirect route via case and area studies. However, in the case of electoral reform the cheap talk problem with respect to the goals of and reasons for the reform is so pronounced (Benoit 2007: 381) that this option was dismissed as an alternative approach.

⁸⁶ Another desirable feature of surveying case studies is that the authors of these are typically versed in the respective native language and thus have covered the literature in that language, which is something comparative researchers seldom are able to do in a widespread fashion.

⁸⁷ All current and historical multi-tier electoral systems using both proportional and majoritarian formulae were considered in all countries that experienced at least a period of democracy according to the Polity IV index (Marshall et al. 2014). Due to a lack of sufficient case study material the cases of Croatia, Guinea, Madagascar, and the Seychelles could not be included into the survey. This also holds for recent reforms in Russia, Thailand, and Ukraine. For these latter countries only the first adoptions of mixed-member electoral systems are covered.

⁸⁸ The general goal of raising or retaining democratic legitimacy is typically present for every (at least partly democratic) electoral reform and hardly suggests any particular performance of the electoral system. Therefore this aspect is not considered in the case study survey.

of any other party or external expert (see Renwick 2010), the inclusiveness-score is zero. If at least one opposition party or group of external experts was involved in the drafting process, the score is one. If at least all parliamentary parties were involved, the score is two. The score is three if the full opposition and external experts were involved or if there was a public referendum. As outlined in section 10.3, we should expect mixed electoral systems with a genuine principle of representation to emerge from rather inclusive choice processes, but this is not a given. It is at least theoretically possible that a subset of parties tries to implement an electoral system aiming for the fulfillment of more general normative aims. The empirical investigation will therefore also assess the relationship between the presence of a principle and the inclusiveness of the choice process.

Further questions cover important concepts preceding or surrounding the choice of the electoral system:

- Did the previous electoral system experience systemic failure with respect to proportionality and/or concentration (i.e. a disproportional effect far larger than expected; see Shugart 2001b)?
- Was public pressure expressed more generally, directed explicitly at the electoral system, or non-existent?
- Was the electoral reform part of a wider, cohesive institutional reform (e.g. a majoritarian shift in institutional design)?
- Did the designers refer extensively to foreign examples when designing the electoral system?

10.4.1 Data on the choice context and principles of representation

Table 10.1 presents the results of the case study survey and provides information regarding the choice context and the principle of representation for 25 mixed-member electoral systems. Table 10.1 furthermore shows which type of mixed-member system was adopted – a compensatory MMP or a parallel MMM system. Hungary and Italy – for whom the electoral system is denoted as MMP*, both employed a system where the compensation was based on votes in the proportional tier as well as the unused votes in the majoritarian tier (positive or negative vote transfer; see Bochsler 2014). The table also includes a country's level of democracy according to the Polity IV index which ranges from minus ten to ten and classifies a country as democratic if it receives a value of six or higher (see Marshall et al. 2014). Systemic failure is coded as missing if the previous electoral system operated under fully authoritarian, non-competitive conditions. Missing values also appear for the survey question of whether foreign examples were cited prominently during the choice process as for some cases there was no sufficient amount of case study material addressing this question. For all yes-or-no questions, the variables were obviously coded as dummy variables with the value 1 implying the answer 'yes'. For public pressure, 0 implies the absence of such pressure, 1 signals that there was general pressure for institutional reform, and 2 implies that public pressure was directed explicitly at electoral reform.

A first overview of the data shows that there exist both mixed-member systems adopted with the overall goal of achieving a successful – best of both worlds – balance of proportional representation and the concentration of the party system and mixed-member electoral systems that lack a general principle. We also see high levels of variation between countries with regard to the level of inclusiveness, public pressure, systemic failure of the previous system, and other characteristics. The adoption of mixed-member systems also frequently occurs in transition countries, or, in the cases of Mexico, Senegal, and Venezuela, under authoritarian regimes. The wave of new mixed-member systems in the 1990s is also apparent from a glance at Table 10.1.

Before moving to the assessment of whether the presence of an overall goal that aims at providing both proportional representation and fostering party system concentration has an effect on an electoral system's performance, we will make use of the data in Table 10.1 in order to explore which choice contexts seem more prone to result in principle-guided design of a mixed electoral system. This will lead to a deeper understanding of what the presence of a principle of representation as a general goal implies for the eventual performance of an electoral system.

Table 10.1: Case study survey results

<i>Country</i>	<i>Year of adoption</i>	<i>Level of democracy</i>	<i>Mixed-member system adopted</i>	<i>Balanced principle of representation</i>	<i>Level of inclusiveness</i>	<i>Systemic failure</i>	<i>Public pressure</i>	<i>Wider institutional reform</i>	<i>Foreign examples</i>
Albania	1996	0	MMM	0	0	0	0	0	0
Albania	2001	5	MMP	1	2	1	0	0	0
Bolivia	1994	9	MMP	0	2	1	2	1	1
Bulgaria	1990		MMM	0	1		0	0	0
Bulgaria	2009	9	MMM	0	1	0	0	0	0
Georgia	1990	4	MMM	0	1		0	0	
Germany	1949	10	MMP	0	2	1	0	1	0
Hungary	1989	10	MMP*	0	2		0	0	1
Italy	1993	10	MMP*	0	3	1	1	0	0
Japan	1994	10	MMM	0	2	1	1	0	0
Lesotho	2002	8	MMP	1	2	1	2	0	1
Lithuania	1992	10	MMM	1	3		0	0	0
Macedonia	1998	6	MMM	1	3	1	0	0	
Mexico	1977	-3	MMM	0	1	1	0	1	0
Mongolia	2011	10	MMM	1	3	0	2	0	
Nepal	2007	6	MMM	1	1	1	1	1	
New Zealand	1993	10	MMP	1	3	1	2	0	1
Russia	1993		MMM	1	1		0	0	1
Senegal	1983	-1	MMM	0	0		2	0	
South Korea	1988	6	MMM	0	0		0	0	
Taiwan	2008	10	MMM	0	1	0	1	1	
Thailand	1997	9	MMM	1	3	0	1	1	
Ukraine	1998	7	MMM	1	2	1	0	0	1
Venezuela	1989	8	MMP	0	1	0	1	0	1
Venezuela	2009	-3	MMM	0	0	1	0	0	0

10.4.2 Characteristics of electoral system choice and the principle dimension

The first central thing to note is that there clearly is variation as regards the principle dimension and the choice context of mixed-member electoral systems – 10 out of 25 systems were adopted with a principle aiming for a superior balance of proportionality and concentration as the guiding goal. Hence, mixed systems are neither always principle-guided design solutions nor are they always the result of compromise bargaining or strategic government imposition. Therefore we are in a position to evaluate the impact of principle-guided design on electoral system performance based on the categorical information emerging from the case study survey. First, however, the survey results offer a basis for exploring how different choice situation characteristics are related to the presence of a principle of representation by using the typological setup (see Mahoney 2007) and the associated outcomes presented in Table 10.1. Table 10.2 contrasts mean values for the group of mixed-member systems with an overall goal with those for the group of mixed-member systems without a principle.

Table 10.2: The choice context and the presence of an overall goal of successful balance

	<i>Goal of a successful balance</i>	<i>Compromise or government imposition</i>	<i>All</i>
<i>Year</i>	1998	1990	1994
<i>Level of democracy</i>	7.89	5.64	6.52
<i>Level of inclusiveness</i>	2.3	1.13	1.6
<i>Systemic failure</i>	.75	.6	.67
<i>Public pressure</i>	.8	.53	.64
<i>Wider institutional reform</i>	.2	.27	.24
<i>Foreign examples</i>	.67	.27	.41
<i>Share of MMM systems</i>	.7	.68	.68
<i>N</i>	10	15	25

Notes: the table presents means for all variables except two – for the variable ‘year’ the median value is reported instead of the mean due to the outlier of Germany (1949), and the variable ‘share of MMM systems’ is an aggregate, constant measure.

That mixed systems with a genuine principle of aiming for successful balance stem from choice processes with far higher levels of inclusiveness is as unsurprising as it is reassuring – the correlation between the two variables is $r = .56$ and highly significant ($p\text{-value} = .00$). The inclusion of opposition parties as well as – potentially – external experts and foreign advisors appears to lead to the adoption of mixed-member systems guided by an overall normative goal of balancing proportionality and concentration. Furthermore, the level of democracy is higher among the adoption of principled mixed electoral systems by ca. two points. Importantly, the average polity index score in the group of mixed-member systems imposed strategically by the government or emerging from compromise bargaining is below the threshold set for a country to

be deemed democratic – the correlation between the two variables, though, is only moderate ($r = .26$) and not statistically significant (p -value = .23).⁸⁹

It is furthermore striking that the principle-guided choice of mixed electoral systems seems to be a phenomenon of the more recent past whereas earlier systems were indeed compromise solutions without their own genuine overall goal (for example in Germany or Mexico) – the correlation between ‘year’ and the presence of a balanced principle is $r = .34$ (p -value = .09). This, together with the fact that principle-guided choices are characterized by the citation of foreign examples much more strongly than those without a principle, suggests that the idea of balancing polar principles has emerged alongside the development of the initial experiments with mixed electoral rules. Especially the German MMP system is heavily cited as a positive example of a strong performance regard to both proportionality and concentration. In sum, these findings with respect to the role of past experiences with mixed-member systems resemble the trend in the academic literature where mixing principles of proportionality and concentration was initially seen as inappropriate (e.g. Nohlen 1984; Sartori 1997) but now has been established as an alternative to polar principles (e.g. Shugart & Wattenberg 2001a; Ferrara et al. 2005; Chapter 4).

A systemic failure with regard to proportionality and/or concentration as well as the existence of public pressure are both positively associated with the presence of an overarching principle (both associations, however, are not statistically significant). These associations appear sensible as a systemic failure of the old electoral system directly marks what needs to be rectified via the future design of electoral rules and as an interested public should have parties shy away from overtly self-interested, strategic behavior. Electoral reform being part of a wider institutional reform package is a rare phenomenon and there appears to be no marked difference between groups of principle-guided mixed systems and others. None of these relationships are statistically significant in a correlation analysis.⁹⁰

In order to offer a multivariate analysis of the relationship between choice situation characteristics and the emergence of a principle of representation an exact logistic regression is used. This regression model avoids the problem of bias in small sample logistic regressions and is based on conditional probabilities (Hand et al. 1994; Hirji et al. 1987; Hirji 2005). This type of model – in cases of very small sample size such as this one – works best with discrete (ideally dichotomous) explanatory variables. The analysis will thus use a ‘post 1994’ dummy that equals 1 if the year of adoption is 1995 or later, and a ‘democracy’ dummy that equals 1 if a country is considered as a democracy according to the Polity IV index (see above). Next to the seemingly central context characteristic of inclusiveness, a public pressure dummy variable is included. Further context characteristics are not considered due to the lack of evidence for their impact on

⁸⁹ The level of democracy and the level of inclusiveness of the choice situation are correlated ($r = .68$; p -value = .00), thus the effect of the level of democracy on the presence of a principle of balance might run through the inclusiveness of the choice process.

⁹⁰ The presence of a principle is only weakly (and not significantly) correlated with systematic failure ($r = .16$, p -value = .53), public pressure (.16, .43), and the electoral reform being part of a wider reform package (-.08, .72).

the presence of an overall goal of balancing proportionality and concentration as well as problems of missing values.⁹¹

Table 10.3: Exact logistic regression results

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Model 1</i> Presence of a guiding principle
Post 1994	2.38* (.1.19)
Democracy	.63 (.1.76)
Level of inclusiveness	1.53** (.76)
Public pressure	-.64 (.1.14)
Observations	25

Notes: As the exact logistic regression conditions out the intercept, the model includes no constant term; the table reports coefficients and standard errors in parentheses.

The exact logistic regression confirms what Table 10.2 has already suggested. The level of inclusiveness is the key predictor for the presence of a principle of successfully providing both proportionality and concentration. Holding the other predictors at value 1, an increase of inclusiveness from 0 (government imposition) to 3 (full opposition involvement and consultation of external experts) will boost the probability of a balanced principle by plus 78 percent. The other significant predictor is whether the mixed system was adopted after 1994 and confirms that the presence of a principle of representation has become more likely in recent decades, notwithstanding other characteristics of the choice process. The level of democracy and the extent of public pressure do not significantly affect the probability of the mixed-member system being principle-guided.

As regards the technical design of the mixed electoral systems, there is no clear connection between the presence of an overall principle and the type of mixed-member system. The share of MMM systems is almost identical in the two groups compared in Table 10.2 (there is virtually no correlation between the presence of a principle of representation and the adoption of an MMM

⁹¹ The variable ‘systemic failure’ was not included as those countries without competitive elections prior to the adoption of the mixed system are missing observations and render the estimation of the model impossible – the same problem prevents the inclusion of the ‘foreign example’ variable (see Table 10.1). The variable ‘wider institutional reform’ was not considered due to the lack of any relationship to the presence of a principle of representation (see Table 10.2). The same model was also run as a jackknife logistic regression within an unconditional logit specification as well as with the Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation method (see Firth 1993; Heinze & Schemper 2002). Both these alternative estimation approaches confirm the results of the exact logistic regression reported in Table 10.3 but the unconditional logit method is unable to detect significant predictors.

system). Furthermore, the average share of single-member districts is also indistinguishably similar between the two groups (58 percent for the systems with a principle, 61 percent for those without). Only the effective threshold (the hurdle to gain representation in parliament given district magnitude and legal threshold; see Lijphart 1994) in the proportional representation tier is slightly higher in the group of systems without a guiding principle (9 percent compared to 3 percent). An overall goal of successfully balancing proportionality and concentration thus does not suggest any particular design of the mixed-member electoral system, confirming the idea that principle and technical design are two separate dimensions of electoral systems (see Chapters 3 and 4). As could be expected (Colomer 2005), it is the level of inclusiveness (presumably through the involvement, or lack thereof, of smaller parties) that appears to lead to the adoption of MMM systems (the correlation between the adoption of an MMM system and the level of inclusiveness is $r = -.35$; $p\text{-value} = .08$).

What this section has revealed regarding the link between characteristics of the choice process and the presence of a principle of representation reinforces the theoretical argument above in so far that inclusiveness and agreement as well as relying on past experiences (foreign examples) with mixed-member electoral rules make a principled choice of an electoral system more likely. Choice contexts with these characteristics appear to be more apt to lead to focused design based on an overall normative goal that will eventually result in the electoral system performing well. New Zealand's experience is an example of such a design process – even if the reform process was more or less started without any major party desiring electoral reform, the eventual choice process involved all parties, external experts and was finally decided upon via a public referendum (Nagel 2004; Vowles 2005). The Royal Commission on the Electoral System that devised the electoral system based their choice on general principles and functional demands as opposed to narrow partisan interests (Nagel 2004: 542). The following analysis seeks to answer the key question of whether this type of principle-guided design leads to a good performance of the mixed electoral system.

10.5 Empirical analysis of the principle-performance link

In order to estimate the effect of principle-guided design on performance a dataset including 103 elections under mixed-member electoral systems in 21 countries covered by the case study survey is used.⁹² To measure performance along the proportionality-concentration trade-off, the two most widely applied indices are used: the least squares index (LSI; Gallagher 1991) measures the discrepancy between parties' vote and seat shares and offers a measure of how disproportional the election results are:

$$LSI = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^N (s_i - v_i)^2}$$

⁹² Dataset and codebook are part of the appendix (Appendix E). Russian elections were excluded due to the difficulty of detecting the party affiliations of many candidates.

where s_i is the seat share of party i and v_i is its vote share. In order to calculate the LSI, votes from the PR tier of the mixed-member systems are used. The ‘effective number of parties’ (ENP_s ; Laakso & Taagepera 1979) gives an intuitive account of how many ‘hypothetical equal-sized’ parties there are, how concentrated the party system is, and how likely a single-party or small coalition government becomes:

$$ENP_s = \frac{1}{\sum_i^N s_i^2}.$$

This analysis will use the effective number of parties according to parties’ seat shares in the parliament in order to consider both the mechanical and psychological effect of the electoral system as the consideration of (and expectations regarding) both figure into the choice process. Measuring proportionality and representativeness based on a comparison of vote and seat data – compared to using data on voter preferences as a basis – in this case is actually desirable since the designers of electoral reform will base their choices not on some more or less unknown set of voter preferences but on the experiences with the party system in place.

A first glance at the data (Table 10.4) suggests that, on average, there is no difference between the disproportionality of election outcomes under mixed systems with a principle aiming at a successful balance of proportionality and concentration compared to those mixed systems without such guiding principle. There is, however, a striking difference in the ENP_s – on average, there exists one effective party more in parliaments resulting from elections under principled mixed systems (a t-test of this difference is highly significant). Therefore there is no initial evidence that principle-guided design of mixed electoral systems leads to more balanced outcomes or even to best of both worlds like outcomes regarding the trade-off between proportionality and concentration.⁹³

Table 10.4: Principle and performance – descriptive overview

	<i>Goal of a successful balance</i>	<i>Compromise or government imposition</i>	<i>Overall</i>
<i>LSI</i>	8.78 (6.22)	8.53 (5.83)	8.55 (6.12)
<i>ENP_s</i>	4.01 (1.74)	2.98 (2.16)	3.24 (2.1)
<i>N</i>	26	77	103

Notes: Means with standard deviations in parentheses.

As regards disproportionality a possible explanation could be that technical rules are so dominant in determining the level of proportionality that the question of whether the mixed system features an overall normative goal does not affect eventual outcomes. One potential explanation for the striking difference in party system concentration could be that the presence of a principle signals inclusiveness of the choice process and thus that the political system is more open to smaller (new) parties and hence prone to higher levels of fragmentation. These alternative explanations will be scrutinized in further, multivariate testing.

⁹³ Looking at medians instead of means would lead to the exact same conclusions.



Yet, there is a third potential explanation for the lack of a general finding in accordance with H₁: the principle of representation simply might come with an expiration date as the principle dimension undergoes change over time (see Chapters 3 and 4). Specifically, the first post-reform election directly following the choice process could reasonably be expected to be affected strongly by this process. On the contrary, subsequent election outcomes are determined largely by the technical rules and the sociopolitical scope conditions such as the level of democracy. Furthermore, the effect of a principle aiming for successful performance regarding both proportionality and concentration might fade away quickly. The experiences in Albania and Lesotho hint at this potential development: after fairly successful initial post-reform elections – governing parties later adopted manipulation tactics resulting in extremely disproportional election results far away from the best of both worlds (see Elklit 2008; Bochsler 2012). The principle-effect might thus fade away as time passes since parties' commitment to the rules of the game weakens and since the initial public pressure has disappeared after a successful first election under the reformed system. Especially parties favored by pre-reform rules might be unhappy with the more balanced results of the first post-reform election and resort to strategies of returning to election outcomes more akin to what they were used to before the reform.

Figure 10.1 presents two scatterplots that cast some light on this contingency hypothesis – the cross hairs is based on the sample medians of the LSI and the ENP_s.⁹⁴ The first scatterplot shows all elections grouped by whether they were conducted under mixed-member electoral systems that were designed based on an overarching normative goal of a successful balance. The plot first highlights that outliers might have biased the first overview presented in Table 10.1 and need to be accounted for in the multivariate analysis, but it also becomes apparent that there is no striking difference between elections under principled mixed rules and other elections. For both groups there are more balanced and more extreme outcomes, as well as outcomes that see a doubly good performance (lower-left quadrant marked by the cross hairs). While the multivariate analysis will importantly control for technical design and sociopolitical scope conditions, the second plot including only the first post-reform elections does suggest an impact of principled design and corroborates the idea of a short-term effect of principled-guidance. A clear majority of election outcomes under principled mixed systems are close to a balance of both dimensions or even combine good performance with respect to proportionality with high levels of concentration. This picture is markedly different for first post-reform elections in mixed systems without an overall principle – these are more often extreme in one or even both dimensions than they are balanced.⁹⁵ The following multivariate analysis will therefore not only assess the general positive effect of the presence of a guiding principle (H₁), but also investigate whether there is only a short-term effect of principled design.

⁹⁴ Precisely, the median values of the 21 country means. This approach was taken in order to avoid that different countries receive different weights.

⁹⁵ The only case of a non-principle-guided system performing very well in both dimensions can probably be attributed not to a high level of coordination among parties and voters but to what was only a partial opening of political competition for the Mexican 1979 election.

Figure 10.1: The effect of principle on performance



The following multivariate analysis will test H_1 as well as the argument and initial evidence for a short-term effect against the null-hypothesis that principle-guided design does not affect the performance of a mixed-member electoral system. In order to estimate the effect of principled design, two dummy variables are used as the dependent variables for the logit regression models (see Table 10.5). For the computation of these dummy variables the median values (see footnote 94) for the sample of mixed-member systems were used with the aim of avoiding the impact of outliers.⁹⁶ The first two models use dummy variables that aim at measuring whether election outcomes are balanced in terms of avoiding extreme outcomes (lying above the 75th percentile for both the LSI and the ENP_s) based on all election outcomes for the LSI and the ENP_s respectively. This will help to evaluate whether the election outcomes at least are able to perform moderately well in both dimensions simultaneously. In a second step, Models 3 and 4 use a dummy variable that signals whether an election outcome is performing better than the sample median for both proportionality and concentration, indicating a doubly good, best of both worlds performance (also see Carey & Hix 2011: 593; Chapter 7).

Next to a balanced principle dummy variable, a first post-reform election dummy variable, and the interaction term of the two, all models include control variables covering in detail the electoral system's technical design as well as the sociopolitical context. Technical variables include whether the system is an MMP system with a compensatory PR tier, the share of single-member districts, the mean district magnitude, and the height of the legal threshold. Sociopolitical variables include the level and age of democracy, the level of presidential power as a continuous proxy of regime type (see Doyle & Elgie 2015), and whether the country is politically decentralized.⁹⁷ The latter set of sociopolitical context variables are also meant to capture between-country variation that is unrelated to electoral system principle or design since the application of a fixed effects model is problematic due to the within-country stability of electoral rules (also see Carey & Hix 2011). Reported are models with robust standard errors in order to account for serial correlation.⁹⁸ A very useful feature of logit models is that they take into account the interaction between variables (e.g. the level of democracy and the presence of a principle) as well as non-linear effects of variables to a considerable degree when estimating the coefficients. Hence, interactions and non-linear effects are accounted for even if they are not explicitly modeled as such (see Berry et al. 2010).

⁹⁶ The substantial robustness of the results presented in Table 10.5 was confirmed by using means instead of medians as well as by using benchmarks based on a sample of all electoral systems.

⁹⁷ Further sociopolitical context variables (e.g. ethnic fractionalization) were included into the models at an earlier stage to see whether their inclusion would alter the estimated effects of the variables of substantial interest in this study. As this was not the case and as the inclusion of further context variables would have led to the exclusion of a substantial amount of observations due to problems of missing data, these variables were not included into the models presented in Table 10.5.

⁹⁸ The robustness of the results was assessed by also running the same models with jackknife robust standard errors as well as jackknife cluster robust standard errors in order to account for potential outlier-related problems, as well as random effects models. Panel-corrected standard errors could not be used due to the strongly unbalanced nature of the panel data.

Table 10.5: Logit regression results

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>
	No extremes	No extremes	Doubly good	Doubly good
Guiding principle	-0.0269 (0.692)	-0.948 (0.773)	0.193 (0.781)	-1.167 (0.868)
Principle*First election		2.904* (1.558)		3.946*** (1.484)
First post-reform election	-0.447 (0.745)	-1.505 (1.049)	-0.789 (0.743)	-2.301*** (0.880)
Compensatory PR tier	0.930 (0.694)	1.021 (0.796)	2.529*** (0.837)	2.700*** (0.867)
Share of SMD seats	1.906 (3.059)	1.982 (3.789)	2.503 (2.325)	3.220 (2.552)
Mean district magnitude	0.00315* (0.00191)	0.00261 (0.00213)	0.00380* (0.00196)	0.00286 (0.00203)
Legal threshold	0.386** (0.169)	0.394** (0.182)	0.469*** (0.179)	0.469** (0.183)
Level of democracy	-0.224** (0.0935)	-0.240*** (0.0909)	-0.361*** (0.109)	-0.407*** (0.114)
Age of democracy	0.0254 (0.0181)	0.0298 (0.0193)	-0.0294 (0.0193)	-0.0185 (0.0216)
Presidential power	1.247 (1.977)	0.954 (2.107)	2.084 (2.282)	1.467 (2.143)
Political decentralization	0.951 (0.821)	0.865 (0.865)	1.120 (0.808)	1.010 (0.790)
Constant	-1.892 (2.318)	-1.594 (2.712)	-3.021 (2.103)	-2.843 (2.224)
Observations	101	101	101	101
Pseudo R ²	0.27	0.30	0.31	0.35

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.


H₁, positing an unconditional effect of the principle variable, has to be rejected resoundingly: Not including an interaction term, the presence of a balanced principle has no significant effect on an electoral system being able to avoid extreme performance (Model 1) or on the likelihood of a doubly good, best of both worlds performance (Model 3). However, Table 10.5 suggests that discarding the idea of an effect of principle-guided design on performance altogether would be premature. Controlling for technical design and sociopolitical scope conditions, the presence of a principle aiming for a successful balance does exert the hypothesized effect as its presence leads to a lower probability of experiencing extreme outcomes (Model 2) and even makes a good

performance in both dimensions more likely (Model 4) – but only for the first post-reform election. Summing the coefficients for the ‘Guiding principle’ and ‘Principle*First election’ variables leads to positive effects in both Models 2 and 4. On the contrary, after the first post-reform election the presence of a principle actually has a negative effect on the dependent variables, yet, these effects are not statistically significant.

Hence, there is a pronounced difference for first post-reform elections but no significant difference between principle-guided and other mixed systems in subsequent elections. In the long run, there is no evidence that a principle-guided choice leads to more balanced or even generally good performance. Comparing the Pseudo R^2 values of Models 2 and 4 with those in Models 1 and 3 also highlights the importance of taking the contingent effect of the principle into account. The effect of principled design for first elections is striking especially when looking at the coefficients for the ‘First post-reform election’ dummy: these elections typically are unlikely to experience moderate, let alone all around good performances. The presence of a guiding principle – likely based on an inclusive choice process – clearly counterbalances these problems at the start.

Figure 10.2 visualizes the results, presenting – for the different dependent variables – the changes in predicted probabilities based on the presence of an overall guiding principle of representation. For the first post-reform election, Figure 10.2 shows how the marginal effect of principle-guidance is positive and as high as about 45 percentage points for both reaching moderate outcomes in both dimensions as well as doubly good performance (left-hand side of the graph). After the first post-reform election (right-hand side of the graph) these positive effects disappear and even become negative. However, for the elections following the initial post-reform election the difference between principled-guided and other systems is much smaller and far from being statistically significant (also see Table 10.5). Figure 10.2 thus reinforces the idea that there is only a short-term effect of principle-guided design. This lack of a long-term effect of principle-guidance might not necessarily stem from governing parties resorting to strategic behavior in order to return election outcomes to pre-reform patterns. Party competition might simply become more open to smaller competitors thus increasing party system fragmentation and making higher levels of party system concentration unlikely. In consequence, the inclusiveness typically associated with a principle-guided choice process appears to be able to induce what is a short-term equilibrium that sees a successful balance of the competing goals of proportionality and concentration.

Figure 10.2: Marginal effect of principle-guidance



Notes: Dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Going back to Table 10.5, it is worth noting that the exact technical design of an electoral system evidently does matter also within the family of multi-tier mixed electoral systems as all technical variables except the share of SMD seats are significant predictors at least in some of the models. The MMP system paired with a legal threshold emerges as the best technical specification of a mixed-member system when aiming for achieving both proportional representation and party system concentration. Among the variables capturing the sociopolitical context only the level of democracy emerges as a significant predictor. This negative effect on the probability of both avoidance of extreme outcomes and doubly good performance is somewhat surprising but could be based on the fact that political competition is much more open in full-fledged democracies leading to a fairly high number of parties competing and winning seats in these countries' mixed-member systems. This potential explanation also highlights that avoiding extreme outcomes or aiming for both high levels of proportionality and concentration are not necessarily always the best choices on the way to a democratic political process. Overall, the presence of these sets of control variables in the models presented in Table 10.5 clearly emphasizes that the principle dimension of an electoral system has an impact on its performance even if controlling for technical design and sociopolitical context conditions.

10.6 Conclusion

This chapter has taken a new approach – namely a case study survey – in order to use the strengths of case-oriented research in mapping out the key characteristics of electoral system choice processes for the comparative analysis of mixed electoral systems. Two key results emerge: first, there undoubtedly is variation in terms of whether mixed-member electoral systems are designed with a general goal of successfully combining proportionality and concentration in mind. More inclusive choice situations based on the knowledge of how mixed systems have worked in other countries are much more likely to lead to a mixed electoral design that genuinely aims at balancing competing normative goals. Second, the presence of a guiding principle does indeed increase the likelihood of a balanced and even best of both worlds type of performance of the electoral system in a particular country. Thus there is a link between the principle dimension of an electoral system and its performance – notwithstanding the exact technical design of the system as well as the sociopolitical scope conditions. Yet, this positive effect is only present for the first post-reform election, for subsequent elections principle-based electoral systems perform similar to their counterparts lacking an overarching principle.

Exploring whether what is only a short-term effect of a principle aiming for successful balance is a problem, it is worth looking at the experiences of countries with such guiding principle. Here it is critical to note that five of six countries that at some point employed a principled-guided mixed-member system later changed the electoral system to a PR system (Thailand being the exception by going back to a majoritarian block vote system). Reforms of mixed-member systems without a guiding principle have seen moves within the mixed multi-tier family towards compensatory and parallel mixed systems, to PR systems, and, in the case of Italy, to PR systems with a majority bonus. Furthermore, the principled moves to a mixed-member system in Albania and Macedonia are associated with significant increases in the Polity IV score (this also corroborates the argument that the adoption of mixed electoral systems played a central role in the democratization of Eastern Europe; see Birch et al. 2002; Birch 2003). Thus the lack of a more sustained effect of a principle of representation that aims at balance on retaining both moderate or higher levels of proportionality and concentration does not necessarily indicate that these systems take longer to fail (although they obviously did in some cases, for example in Ukraine). On the contrary, these systems may pave the way to a party system and an electoral system focusing more heavily on considerations of proportionality and representativeness, the latter being correlated with higher levels of democracy (Blais & Massicotte 1997; Colomer 2004).

What do the results imply for electoral system design? Simply put, it seems worth fostering choice processes that eventually lead up to principle-guided design. While this analysis has only shown an effect for first post-reform elections, there are more phenomena – most notably democratic legitimacy, coping with uncertainty (see Birch 2003; Sgouraki Kinsey & Shvetsova 2008), and fostering the development of a stable democracy – we might reasonably expect to be positively associated with the presence of a principle of representation. But what is most crucial and reassuring for the future of electoral system design and institutional design in general is the fact that there is a difference between strategic fools and principle-guided designers in terms of how

electoral systems will eventually perform. Especially for the stage of transition from autocracy to democracy, the contingency of electoral system performance on the design process is critical to consider. Obviously, a principle-guided design process is not a sweeping panacea as the compromise choice in the German case compared with principle-guided designs in Ukraine or Thailand shows: scope conditions and the interplay of technical variables and these scope conditions are still key in explaining whether electoral reform will eventually succeed. At the same time, the principle-guided electoral reform in New Zealand is one of the very few true success stories of electoral reform in the recent past.

Future research would do well in expanding this analysis to all electoral systems – moving beyond mixed multi-tier systems and the question of whether these were designed with a successful balance of the competing principles of proportionality and concentration in mind. This analysis has suggested a theoretical argument and established an empirical link between principle and performance. What remains to be done is an in-depth study of the causal mechanism(s) leading from principle-guided design to eventual performance. For this latter task, case-oriented, qualitative research is probably well-suited, underlining the importance of a continued cooperation and integration of the case-oriented and the more broadly comparative literatures in electoral system research.

11 Conclusion

This thesis set out to answer the question of whether and which mixed electoral systems are able to perform efficiently along the proportionality-concentration trade-off based on a multi-faceted international comparison. Simultaneously, it also addressed the question of whether (and which) mixed electoral systems are actually more prone to reach the worst instead of the best of both worlds of electoral system performance. Starting from a typology that takes seriously the idea of mixed electoral systems being complex combinations of various technical details and being potentially linked to different overall principles of representation, the empirical analysis has focused on genuine electoral system factors in explaining differences in electoral system performance. In sum, both the technical design and the principle of representation dimension clearly affect the chances of an electoral system to deliver a successful balance of proportionality and concentration. Yet, complex, mixed electoral system designs hold promises as well as pitfalls. On the down side, reaching the best of both worlds is certainly not an easy task and there are quite a few problems which can easily lead to the worst of both worlds where election outcomes neither facilitate the formation of an accountable government nor are representative in the sense that they accurately reflect vote choices in parliament. On the plus side, however, the presence of a well-functioning, efficient electoral system is not randomly scattered across the world but relates to genuine electoral system factors which designers, reformers, politicians, and even the public can directly influence.⁹⁹ Specific technical designs as well as a consensus-oriented and principle-guided choice context evidently help yielding efficient outcomes. In light of the presence of both chances and risks and with mixed electoral systems spreading all over the world and becoming increasingly popular with reformers, clear-cut implications with regard to the various variables of electoral system design and choice context are indispensable. The following paragraphs summarize the empirical results of this thesis and the implications for avoiding the worst and reaching the best of both worlds.

Reaching the best of both worlds

Next to showing that the proportionality-concentration trade-off indeed takes on non-linear shapes, the empirical analyses have also emphasized that there are safer and riskier tools in the chase of optimal electoral system performance. Pure PR or plurality/majority electoral systems are unlikely to provide proportional representation and a concentrated party system simultaneously but they are also unlikely to fail with respect to both these functional goals –

⁹⁹ While the general sociopolitical (country) context (e.g. the level and age of democracy) does exert substantial effects on the chances of obtaining election outcomes that are characterized by good performances in both key dimensions, the story here is about genuine electoral system variables which can be affected by those involved in the choice and evaluation of the electoral system. Take the sociopolitical context factor of social heterogeneity: the empirical chapters have highlighted how reaching the best of both worlds is especially difficult in a country that is socially heterogeneous and the worst of both worlds likely as coordination is difficult to achieve across social (ethnic) divides. This knowledge is important but hardly helpful in terms of what may be done in such a society in order to improve with respect to the proportionality-concentration trade-off. Focusing on genuine electoral system variables importantly means to pay attention to those variables which are more easily changed compared to highly stable sociopolitical context factors like social heterogeneity.

Chapters 7 and 9 have produced respective evidence on the macro as well as the micro level. Mixed electoral systems – via combining increased coordination incentives with a fair amount of proportional representation – are thus the way to go if one wishes to have the best of both worlds of proportionality and concentration in election outcomes. However, mixed electoral systems may rely on a plethora of different combinations of technical elements in order to mix the electoral rules associated with pure electoral systems (see Chapter 2). Based on different combinations, the crucial question becomes which of these combinations maximize the chances of a best of both worlds performance while ideally presenting only a very limited risk of actually ending up with undesirable performances with respect to electoral system’s core functional goals.

The empirical results validate the general propositions of relying on mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral systems or PR systems with moderate district magnitudes in order to reach the best of both worlds via combining coordination incentives with high levels of proportional representation. While these design types are able to perform efficiently, they at the same time both are not more likely than other electoral systems to end up failing with respect to both functional goals. Hence, as general design types, PR systems with moderate district magnitudes and MMP systems emerge as very good options for electoral system designers who aim for the best of both worlds but would like to keep the risk of the worst of both worlds at a minimum. As a general type, the mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system is found to offer a rather linear trade-off of the functional goals in the international comparison in Chapter 7. Nevertheless, the empirical analysis also stresses that moving the attention to the technical details of mixed electoral systems is absolutely vital for avoiding the pitfalls and realizing the promises of mixed designs. This is highlighted, for example, by the empirical analysis of the German state level (Chapter 8) where the finding of the MMP system performing efficiently is not replicated. The deviation from the results of the international comparison may in part be driven by the fact that the MMP system typically applied in the German states does not allow the plurality tier to exert a mechanical effect on election outcomes and, compared to other MMP systems, is closely akin to a pure PR electoral system in its technical design. Such more nuanced differences among, for example, different MMP electoral systems are cloaked by a focus on general design types. Since general design types may be based on various combinations of technical details, it is critical to assess the chances and risks of these individual technical elements.

Turning to said technical details, and in accordance with the evidence for general design types, changing the district magnitude of an electoral system to moderate levels and adding a compensatory PR tier to a mixed-member system are both fairly safe tools of reaching the best of both worlds as shown in Chapter 7. Yet, both tools are not entirely without problems as the general design propositions would suggest. The compensation in mixed-member systems can be avoided by strategic behavior based on collective vote-splitting as outlined in Chapters 7 and 8 and specifying district magnitude on the district level is not as straightforward as the macro yardstick of moderate district magnitude would have us believe (see Chapter 9) – the district level might require a careful specification of the exact district magnitudes. These potential problems even with the safer tools for reaching the best of both worlds accentuate the importance of paying attention to (technical) details and fully understanding the relationship among the technical

elements of an electoral system. Moving to other technical details not directly associated with any general design proposition, applying a legal threshold is a promising but risky tool in aiming for an efficient performance along the proportionality-concentration trade-off. Comparing the closely related technical elements of district magnitude and legal threshold, an important implication of the empirical results is that although legal thresholds are used within many PR systems, a reduction of district magnitude might actually be the preferable design choice when aiming for electoral system efficiency without risk. Moderate district magnitudes appear as less risky compared to a legal threshold of substantial height while both substantially increase the probability of a doubly good performance. Finally, there are technical elements which are most likely to lead to a fairly linear trade-off between proportionality and concentration and are hence completely risk free in terms of the worst of both worlds but also offer little as regards the chance of an efficient overall performance. Using top-up tiers to compensate for disproportionalities arising in what already are fairly proportional PR electoral systems will move the functioning of the electoral system very close to a pure PR system and almost guarantee proportional outcomes while – at the same time – shrinking coordination incentives strongly so that party system concentration becomes unlikely. Similarly, but with high levels of concentration and increased disproportionality, a high share of single-member districts in mixed-member electoral systems will render best and worst of both worlds performances unlikely. Overall, different technical details have very distinct ways of shaping the proportionality-concentration trade-off and affect the chances and risks of mixed electoral rules differently. Hence, simply tossing technical specifications together in an attempt to reach a superior middle-ground in electoral system performance based on mixing electoral rules is a very naïve and inadvisable strategy.

Next to a careful, detail-oriented arrangement of the technical design, attention also needs to be paid to the circumstances under which an electoral system is devised and implemented and to whether the choice process has been guided by a principle of representation. Chapter 10 highlights that, for mixed-member electoral systems, a consensus-oriented and principle-guided choice process at least leads to a higher chance of actually reaching desirable levels of both proportionality and concentration in the short run. If designers actually agree on a general goal of a successful balance of proportionality and concentration they seem to do better in designing a well-performing electoral system. Hence, the implication for the successful design of efficient mixed electoral systems is that next to giving precise advice regarding the likely effects of combinations of technical details, providing for a principle-guided choice process should also substantially contribute towards reaching the best of both worlds. The finding that the effect of a principle of representation aiming for a superior middle-ground appears to be limited to first post-reform elections at the same time emphasizes how efficient election outcomes are based on coordination which, if it is to be sustained, requires a certain level of sustained cooperation and commitment among parties and voters.

In sum, an ideal scenario of electoral system design would start with a choice process that results in a widely agreed upon principle of representation functioning as a guiding overall goal for the electoral system. The technical design would then see a use of different technical tools – depending on their appropriateness within the respective sociopolitical context – relying mainly

on those tools promising a safer path to the best of both worlds. Here, the most viable candidates are the district magnitude and compensation mechanisms between plurality and PR tiers. On the contrary, a worst case scenario is described by a convoluted choice process without any guidance provided by a principle of representation. The technical design will thus hardly fit the requirements of the respective polity and it is also likely that complex bargaining will lead to compromise outcomes that see the application of various tools in a combination that has no particular overall aim. Hence, the application of risky tools in a difficult design or reform environment is prone to lead to the worst instead of the best of both worlds. The key lesson of this thesis is that efficient outcomes can be achieved with different technical designs, leaving much-needed wiggle room for electoral system designers to also adapt the technical design to the respective scope conditions without being restricted to one particular design type. However, one has to be aware that careful design is the key to a successful performance and that adding more technical details usually also means increasing the risk of election outcomes that are more akin to the worst of both worlds.

Implications and remaining tasks for future research

This thesis has closed the gap of fully considering the mixed nature – with respect to design *and* principle of representation – of electoral systems in an encompassing analysis of how different systems perform along the proportionality-concentration trade-off. The emphasis has been on how to achieve efficient outcomes and a nuanced perspective on how (even minor) changes to electoral systems can affect key functional demands. Now that such a nuanced evaluation of the potential of different electoral system designs' ability to perform efficiently along the proportionality-concentration trade-off has been delivered, future research may turn its attention to the more distal effects (Sartori 1976) of a best of both worlds performance. Based on this thesis' contributions, future research on the topic of electoral systems may address several questions that aim at understanding the long-term effects of election outcomes that are both proportional and concentrated or fulfill neither functional goal. First, it should be investigated whether efficient performance leads to long-term stability of an electoral system and a polity as a whole as it appears to be the case for Germany. At the same time, it is vital to analyze whether a worst of both worlds performance has negative consequences for a democracy (e.g. due to decreased legitimacy of election outcomes) as was the case for countries in which the MMP electoral system was circumvented strategically. Second, future research ought to continue to investigate which and how electoral systems spread within regions and all over the world. Will best practice examples be taken up by other countries with similar characteristics and overall goals while especially bad performances lead politicians to abandon particular design propositions? The analysis in Chapter 10 has already suggested that the experience of other countries with specific electoral systems figures into the electoral reform process. Finally, it is important to carefully assess whether the adoption of a successful mixed electoral design is only a mid-way step towards the adoption of a fully proportional electoral system as argued, for example, by Colomer (2004). The fact that especially the principle of proportionality is embedded in the constitution and thus receives increased protection (see Chapter 4) is also a clear hint that the association between democracy and the adoption of PR electoral systems might stem from proportionality being a more generally

acceptable principle for a democratic polity. Future research needs to investigate whether the best of both worlds in electoral system performance is contagious and whether it also exerts the desirable long-term effects on government and political stability.

Furthermore, it is essential to consider the often neglected principle of representation dimension of electoral systems more fully in electoral system research. Chapters 4 and 10 deliver significant evidence that principle-guidance and constitutional protection of principles of representation make a difference. Future studies of electoral system effects may especially focus on mapping out the exact causal mechanisms which link principles to performance. Considering the principle of representation dimension of electoral systems also holds implications for research on institutions more broadly: although difficult to come by, comparative data on what is associated with different institutional designs in different places in terms of what these institutions are meant to achieve at-large should yield fruitful insights and reduce omitted variable bias. The analysis of constitutional texts has been a first attempt to get at these overall principles, however, as highlighted by the case study survey conducted for the analysis in Chapter 10, a stronger integration of the results from small-n, case-oriented research constitutes a fundamental step in moving forward in this direction in future research. Certainly, recommending mixed methods approaches is often running the danger of being mere lip-service, yet, this thesis has suggested a universally applicable way of actually integrating small-n and large-n comparative research in order to answer a generally important research question.

Appendix

Appendix A

Appendix A.1: Constitutions and electoral systems

<i>Country</i>	<i>Constitutional text</i>	<i>Principle of representation</i>	<i>Technical procedure^a</i>
Albania	-	-	PR (Art. 64)
Austria	The National Council is elected by the nation in accordance with the principles of proportional representation [...]. (Art. 26 (1))	Proportionality	-
Belgium	-	-	PR (Art. 62)
Bolivia	The number of Deputies must reflect the proportional vote obtained by each party, citizen group or indigenous people. (Art. 146 IV)	Proportionality	MMP (Art. 146 III)
Brazil	-	-	PR (Art. 45)
Cape Verde	-	-	PR (Art. 112 (1)) ^b
Colombia	To assure the proportional representation of the parties [...]. (Art. 263)	Proportionality	PR (Art. 263)
Comoros	-	-	M/P (Art. 20)
Costa Rica	The law regulates the exercise of suffrage, in accordance with the following principles: [...] 6. Guarantees for representation of minorities; 7. Guarantees of political pluralism [...]. (Art. 95)	Proportionality	-
Czech Republic	Elections to the Chamber of Deputies shall be held [...] under the principles of proportional representation. (Art. 18 (1))	Proportionality	-
Denmark	Rules for the exercise of the suffrage shall be laid down by the Election Act, which, to secure equal representation of the various opinions of the electorate, shall prescribe the manner of election [...]. (§ 31)	Proportionality	MMP or PR (§ 31)
East Timor	Conversion of the votes into mandates shall observe the principle of proportional representation. (Section 65 (4))	Proportionality	-
El Salvador	-	-	PR (Art. 79)
Estonia	Members of the Riigikogu shall be elected in free elections on the principle of proportionality. (§ 60)	Proportionality	-
Finland	The Representatives shall be elected by a direct, proportional and secret vote. (Section 25)	Proportionality	-
Georgia	-	-	MMM (Art. 49)
Iceland	Althingi shall be composed of 63 members elected [...] on the basis of proportional representation [...]. (Art. 31)	Proportionality	-

<i>Country</i>	<i>Constitutional text</i>	<i>Principle of representation</i>	<i>Technical procedure^a</i>
Ireland	The members shall be elected on the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote. (Art. 16 (2(5)))	Proportionality	STV (Art. 16 (2(5)))
Israel	The Knesset shall be elected by general, national, direct, equal, secret and proportional elections [...]. (Basic Law: The Knesset; § 4)	Proportionality	-
Kenya	The electoral system shall comply with the following principles - [...] not more than two-thirds of the members of elective public bodies shall be of the same gender; (c) fair representation of persons with disabilities; (d) universal suffrage based on the aspiration for fair representation and equality of vote [...]. (Art. 81)	Other	MMM (Art. 90; Art. 97)
Kyrgyzstan	The Jogorku Kenesh shall consist of 120 deputies elected [...] on the basis of proportional representation. (Art. 70 (2))	Proportionality	-
Latvia	The Saeima shall be elected [...] based on proportional representation.	Proportionality	-
Liberia	-	-	M/P (Art. 83 (b))
Luxembourg	-	-	PR (Art. 51 (5))
Malta	The members of the House of Representatives shall be elected upon the principle of proportional representation [...]. (Art. 56 (1))	Proportionality	STV (Art. 56 (1))
Mexico	Each State shall have at least two Deputies elected under the majority principle. In order to elect 200 Deputies under [...] the proportional representation principle [...]. (Art. 53)	Mixed	MMM (Art. 52)
Netherlands	-	-	PR (Art. 53) ^c
Nicaragua	-	-	PR (Art. 132)
Norway	The seats at large are distributed among the parties [...] in order to achieve the highest possible degree of proportionality among the parties. (Art. 59).	Proportionality	PR (Art. 59)
Pakistan	-	-	MMM (Art. 51 (6))
Panama	-	-	MMM (Art. 147) ^b
Peru	In case of pluripersonal elections, there is proportional representation, in accordance with the system provided for in the law. (Art. 187)	Proportionality	-
Poland	Elections to the Sejm shall be universal, equal, direct and proportional [...]. (Art. 96)	Proportionality	-
Portugal	Votes cast shall be converted into seats in accordance with the principle of proportional representation. (Art. 113)	Proportionality	PR (Art. 149)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Constitutional text</i>	<i>Principle of representation</i>	<i>Technical procedure^a</i>
Serbia	In the National Assembly, equality and representation of different genders and members of national minorities shall be provided [...]. (Art. 100)	Other	-
Slovenia	Deputies [...] are elected according to the principle of proportional representation [...]. (Art. 80)	Proportionality	
South Korea	-	-	MMM or MMP (Art. 41 (3))
Spain	-	-	PR (Section 68 (3)) ^b
Sweden	[T]he distribution of all the seats in the Riksdag [...] is in proportion to the total number of votes cast throughout the Realm for the respective parties participating in the distribution of seats.	Proportionality	PR (Chapter 3, Art. 8)
Switzerland	-	-	PR (Art. 149)
Taiwan	-	-	MMM (Additional Articles, Art. 4)
Thailand	-	-	MMM or MMP (Section 93)
Turkey	The electoral laws shall be drawn up in such a way as to reconcile the principles of fair representation and consistency in administration. (Art. 67)	Mixed	-
Uruguay	Suffrage shall be exercised in the manner determined by law, but on the following bases: [...] Integral proportional representation. (Art 77)	Proportionality	PR (Art. 88)

Notes: ^a System abbreviations: PR = Proportional Representation; M/P = Single-member plurality/Single-member majority; MMM = Mixed-member Majority; MMP = Mixed-member Proportional; STV = Single Transferable Vote.

^b Cape Verde's, Panama's and Spain's constitutions could be read to refer to the proportionality principle. However, all constitutions have this principle apply only to the district level or only to multi-member districts (Panama). As the principle of representation is focused on aggregate results, these constitutions were coded as not stating such principle;

^c The Dutch constitution states that MPs 'shall be elected by proportional representation within the limits to be laid down by Act of Parliament' – even though the text could be read as calling for proportional representation and leaving technical design to ordinary law, this seemed to be a far reach and thus the Dutch constitution was coded not to declare a general principle.

Countries whose constitutions did neither specify a general principle nor a technical procedure (beyond, in some cases, supplying district sizes) for the electoral system: Argentina, Australia, Benin, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Niger, Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, United States of America.

Appendix A.2: OLS regression models for technical details in PR systems

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
	Average district magnitude	Height of legal threshold
Proportionality principle embedded constitutionally	-19.07 (22.31)	-0.14 (0.53)
Assembly size	0.068 (0.071)	0.006*** (0.002)
National top-up seats exist	-28.16 (32.23)	0.84 (0.77)
Western Europe	10.65 (32.21)	-0.96 (0.77)
Eastern Europe	73.45** (32.27)	1.97** (0.77)
Latin America	-16.5 (31.99)	-1.90** (0.76)
Constant	-0.45 (37.27)	0.00 (.66)
Observations	51	51
R ²	0.25	0.56

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the height of the legal threshold equals the height of the legal threshold on the district level if no national threshold exists.

Appendix B

The dataset used for the analyses presented in Chapter 7 as well as the accompanying codebook and do-file will be made available by the author upon request. Appendix B.1 presents the logit regression results discussed in Chapter 7.

Appendix B.1: Logit regression models with general design types

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Model 1</i> Doubly good	<i>Model 2</i> Doubly good	<i>Model 3</i> Doubly bad	<i>Model 4</i> Doubly bad
PR (high dm)	1.122** (0.561)	0.958* (0.575)	0.412 (0.408)	0.360 (0.578)
PR (moderate dm)	1.845*** (0.524)	1.760*** (0.537)	0.0870 (0.429)	0.144 (0.568)
MMP	2.281*** (0.589)	2.083*** (0.604)	0.146 (0.533)	0.287 (0.449)
MMM	0.360 (0.617)	0.134 (0.635)	0.416 (0.539)	0.239 (0.438)
Level of democracy	-0.0518 (0.0702)	-0.105 (0.0707)	0.0148 (0.0453)	0.0619 (0.0490)
Age of democracy	-0.0233*** (0.00634)	-0.0198*** (0.00653)	-0.0144 (0.00751)	-0.0216*** (0.00828)
Presidential power	-1.563* (0.921)	-0.608 (1.007)	1.075 (0.812)	0.934 (0.851)
Political decentralization	0.728*** (0.277)	0.753*** (0.279)	-0.357 (0.280)	-0.318 (0.287)
Ethnic heterogeneity		-2.389*** (0.674)		1.566** (0.638)
Constant	-2.092*** (0.761)	-1.094 (0.766)	-1.593*** (0.612)	-2.311*** (0.762)
Observations	563	534	563	534
Pseudo R ²	0.10	0.12	0.04	0.07

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix C

The dataset used for the analyses presented in Chapter 8 as well as the accompanying codebook and do-file will be made available by the author upon request.

Appendix D

The dataset used for the analyses presented in Chapter 9 as well as the accompanying do-file will be made available by the author upon request (performance indicators and ethnic fractionalization are computed as described in the codebook in Appendix B).

Appendix E

The datasets used for the analyses presented in Chapter 10 as well as the accompanying do-files may be found on the CD-ROM attached to this thesis (for the meanings of the different variables please refer to the codebook in Appendix B as well as to Appendix E.1). The detailed description and results of the case study survey are presented below in Appendix E.1.

Appendix E.1: The system choice context in 22 countries applying mixed-member electoral systems – a case study survey

The survey: This survey makes use of the case study (area study) literature on mixed-member electoral systems covering 22 different countries in order to answer questions concerning the choice situation and the (presence or absence of) guiding normative goals in the process of designing the respective mixed-member electoral system. The case study survey is thus concerned with the principle of representation dimension of electoral systems. Every adoption of a mixed-member electoral system (also including switches from mixed-member proportional [MMP] to mixed-member majoritarian [MMM] rules and vice versa) is treated as a single case, meaning that one particular country may contribute multiple cases to the dataset. Insufficient source material prevented Croatia (MMM 1992-1999), Guinea (MMM), Madagascar (MMM), and the Seychelles (MMM) from being included in this survey. There was also not enough information on the recent electoral system changes in Thailand (adoption of MMM in 2011), Ukraine (adoption of MMM in 2011), and Russia (adoption of MMM in 2014).

General methodological approach: The general idea of the case study survey is roughly similar to that of a meta-analysis in that it is supposed to function as a quasi-collaboration of different researchers (see Imbeau et al. 2001, Geys 2006; Smets & van Ham 2013 for political science meta-analyses applications). The case study survey method has been developed and used extensively in business and management research (Larsson 1993; Larsson & Finkelstein 1999). The case study survey builds on the idea that case/area studies dealing with mixed-member electoral system choice concern themselves – implicitly or explicitly – with questions regarding the choice context and overall guiding principles of representation. This information is supposed to be extracted systematically from the small-n literature in order to make it applicable to a comparative analysis. Furthermore, the case study survey approach helps us to overcome barriers presented by different languages. Here, the case study researchers bridge this gap by producing English language publications based on their assessment of the respective research in the language of a particular country. All case/area studies surveyed here were written in the English language. The goal of the case study survey is to gain reliable information about the choice process leading to the adoption of a mixed-member electoral system. Surveying all the relevant case/area studies enables us to draw important inferences regarding the absence/presence of specific factors in the design process of an electoral system and end up with reliable characterizations of the choice situations. In an effort to avoid a subjective coder bias, the codings were validated by having a second researcher code a sample of case/area studies (similar to the strategy used by

Melton et al. 2013 and in Chapter 4 of this thesis). This double-validation strategy – consisting of multiple case/area studies and, in a second step, their assessment by different coders – helps to reduce measurement error to a minimum.

The methodological approach and its value in electoral system research: Electoral system research typically suffers from a lack of communication between case/area study researchers and their colleagues investigating large-n comparative datasets. Especially as one seeks to incorporate rich contextual information (beyond general sociopolitical characteristics of the countries) it is problematic that the fertile ground that is the case study literature is not put to use intensively. By systematically incorporating the rich information provided in the case/area study literature, this case study survey aims at bridging the qualitative-quantitative divide, combining the strengths of the different methodological approaches. Characteristics of the choice situation are typically fairly well covered by case studies but do not enter large-n analysis because there is no general source for these types of variables (in stark contrast to the widely available technical details of electoral systems as well as general institutional variables). This case study survey provides such a general assessment of the small-n case and area study literature with respect to the choice situation and the principle of representation dimension of electoral systems.

Choice of case study material: The research contributions surveyed were gathered by a thorough search for monographs, edited volumes¹⁰⁰ and chapters therein, journal articles as well as other sources (official documents from hearings, advisory boards etc. as well as general information collections on electoral systems, such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the ACE Electoral Knowledge Project, and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). Keywords used for the search were ‘mixed-member electoral system’, ‘mixed electoral system’, ‘electoral reform’, and ‘electoral system choice’, each paired with the name of the respective country. In addition, the sources turning up in the initial literature survey were then checked for further relevant contributions on the choice of the mixed-member electoral system in a given country. If there was a vast abundance of relevant material, a sample of this material was used with a focus on peer-reviewed articles and book chapters.

Survey questionnaire and coding approach: The source materials are surveyed in order to answer the questions presented below (similar to the approach taken in the Comparative Constitutions Project; see Melton et al. 2013). Each of these questions relates to important concepts of the system choice situation (further information below). The ‘Notes and sources’ column includes details with regard to the general coding decision and is also the place where disagreement among sources will be noted. All questions (except the question regarding system longevity) refer to the time during which the new mixed-member system was being chosen and designed. Substantial codings were made only in cases where there was no significant disagreement. If no source material mentions anything related to a particular question and this cannot be interpreted as indicating the absence of a factor (e.g. not talking of public pressure implies that there was no

¹⁰⁰ The most critical contributions in terms of edited volumes were Shugart & Wattenberg 2001; Birch et al. 2002; Colomer 2004; Gallagher & Mitchell 2005; Renwick 2010; Nohlen & Stöver 2010; Nohlen 1999, 2005; Hassall & Saunders 1997.

public pressure, while not talking about the level of agreement is not indicative of the actual level of agreement), the question is answered with 'missing information'. All case/area studies surveyed are listed for each country separately. References to the clearest/most representative sources in the 'Notes and sources' section are only given in cases of codings where some actor or factor is present (for the absence of public pressure, one may refer to the source material as a whole). The following is the survey questionnaire, the respective survey questions are discussed below:

Survey questionnaire		
<i>Question</i>	<i>Answer (coding)</i>	<i>Notes and sources</i>
Year		
Previous system		
Mixed system adopted (technical details)		
Longevity of the mixed system (years)		
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?		
Public pressure?		
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?		
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice		
Foreign examples cited (which)?		
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?		
Replaced by		

Coding procedures for individual questions:

Systemic failure of the old system?

Systemic failure refers to an electoral system being unable to deliver what was initially expected of it or what is expected of it based on the general experience with this electoral system around the world (Shugart 2001). We are interested here whether the electoral system is considered to have failed with respect to proportionality and/or concentration in the past (1) or whether no such systemic failure occurred (0).

Public pressure?

Is public pressure cited as being part of the process of adopting a new, mixed electoral system (see Renwick 2010)? (0) No public pressure, (1) public pressure aiming at institutional reform in general, (2) public pressure directed at electoral system reform.

Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?

Electoral reform can be a singular event in the institutional landscape (0) or part of a large-scale reform process concerning the polity as a whole (1).

Level of inclusiveness of electoral system choice (i.e. how many different parties/participants were involved in the choice process?)

In order to measure the level of inclusiveness of the electoral system choice process the following score-index is used: (0) if the government acted alone and adopted the electoral system despite opposition disagreement (government imposition; Renwick 2010), (1) if at least one opposition party was involved, (2) if all parliamentary parties were involved, (3) if full opposition and external experts were involved or if a referendum was held.

Foreign examples of mixed systems cited?

Were the (mixed-member) electoral systems of other countries cited extensively as (good or bad) examples during the choice process? (0) No (1) Yes.

Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s) (with respect to the interparty dimension)?

Was the adoption and design of the mixed electoral system led by an overarching normative goal, a principle of representation? (0) No clear-cut normative principle as the focus was either on the intraparty dimension or on many considerations simultaneously or since the system derived from a compromise based on fully self-interested bargaining, (1) guiding principle aiming for a (superior) balance of proportionality/representativeness and concentration.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ Next to goals referring to the intraparty dimension, bolstering democratic legitimacy is typically a goal of every institutional reform that is not fully in the self-interest of the implementing parties, it does not indicate what is expected from the electoral system in terms of its functional performance. Therefore this goal is not considered as a genuine guiding principle for the functioning of the electoral system even though it is often a key reason for reform.

Applying the questionnaire to 22 countries (25 cases of mixed-member system adoptions)

Albania

Albania 1 (MMM)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Notes and sources
Year	1996	
Previous system	PVT/LSM	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (single ballot; 82% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	5 years	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(0) No	
Public pressure?	(0) No	
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(0) Government imposition	The government imposed the new electoral system without consulting the opposition (Elbasani 2008: 80; Dawisha & Deets 2006: 705; Ceka 2012: 533; Salamun & Hallunaj 2009; Bielasiak 2002: 203)
Foreign examples cited (which)?	(0) No	
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(0) No	The government acted strategically without trying to reach any systemic goal (Elbasani 2008: 80; Dawisha & Deets 2006: 705)
Replaced by	MMP	

Albania 2 (MMP)

Survey questionnaire		
<i>Question</i>	<i>Answer (coding)</i>	<i>Notes and sources</i>
Year	2001	
Previous system	MMM	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMP (two ballots; 71% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	7 years	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(1) Yes	Widely perceived that the highly disproportional results were unacceptable (Elbasani 2008: 81; Bochsler 2012: 406)
Public pressure?	(0) No	
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(2) All parliamentary parties	All parliamentary parties agreed on a change towards a more proportional system (Elbasani 2008: 83; Dawisha & Deets 2006: 706-707)
Foreign examples cited (which)?	(0) No	
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(1) Greater fairness/openness via greater proportionality	The goal of proportionality was embedded in the new constitution (Elbasani 2008: 83; Dawisha & Deets 2006: 706-707)
Replaced by	PR	

Bibliography

Bielasiak, J. (2002) The institutionalization of electoral and party systems in postcommunist states, *Comparative Politics* 34(2): 189-210.

Birch, S. (2001) Electoral systems and party systems in Europe East and West, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 2(3): 355-377.

Bochsler, D. (2012) A quasi-proportional electoral system 'only for honest men'? The hidden potential for manipulating mixed compensatory electoral systems, *International Political Science Review* 33(4): 401-420.

Çeka, B. (2012) Electoral systems in Albania as a result of political wills, *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 3(1): 529-534.

Dawisha, K. and Deets, S. (2006) Political learning in post-communist elections, *East European Politics and Societies* 20(4): 691-728.

Elbasani, A. (2008) Mixed member electoral systems in transition contexts: How has the system worked in Albania?, *CEU Political Science Journal* 3(1): 72-92.

Lundberg, T.C. (2009) Post-communism and the abandonment of mixed-member electoral systems, *Representation* 45(1): 15-27.

Salamun, M. and Hallunaj, Z. (2009) *European Integration, Party Governance and Electoral System in Albania*. Center for Southeast Europe Working Paper Series #2.

Shvetsova, O. (1999) A survey of post-communist electoral institutions: 1990-1998, *Electoral Studies* 18(3): 397-409.

Bolivia (MMP)

Survey questionnaire		
<i>Question</i>	<i>Answer (coding)</i>	<i>Notes and sources</i>
Year	1994	
Previous system	PR	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMP (two ballots; fused vote with the presidential election; 52% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	Still in use	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(1) Yes	Highly fragmented party system and low personal accountability of MPs/powerful party elites; legitimacy crisis based on large party dominance in the electoral commission (Mayorga 1997; Mayorga 2001: 195-201)
Public pressure?	(2) Directed at electoral reform	Public pressure was focused on electoral institutions based on their lack of legitimacy (Mayorga 2001: 203-205)
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(1) Yes	Linked to political decentralization in general, aimed at infusing local accountability (Eaton 2007; Centellas 2009)
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(2) All parliamentary parties	Widespread agreement was seen as a key to successful reform; consensus solution (Mayorga 2001: 203; Ace project 2015)
Foreign examples cited (which)?	(1) Yes (German MMP)	Mayorga 2001: 205
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(0) No clear-cut principle	Focus on intraparty dimension: personalization, personal accountability, geographic representation (Mayorga 2001: 203; Ace project 2015)
Replaced by	-	

Bibliography

- Ace project (2015) *Bolivia: Electoral Reform in Latin America*. Website: http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esy/esy_bo.
- Alpert, A., Centellas, M., and Singer, M.M. (2010) The 2009 presidential and legislative elections in Bolivia, *Electoral Studies* 29(4): 757-761.
- Barr, R.R. (2005) Bolivia: Another uncompleted revolution, *Latin American Politics and Society* 47(3): 69-90.
- Centellas, M. (2009) Electoral reform, regional cleavages, and party system stability in Bolivia, *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2(1): 115-131.
- Eaton, K. (2007) Backlash in Bolivia: Regional autonomy as a reaction against indigenous mobilization, *Politics & Society* 35(1): 71-102.
- Jones, M.P. (1995) A guide to the electoral systems of the Americas, *Electoral Studies* 14(1): 5-21.
- Jones, M.P. (1997) A guide to the electoral systems of the Americas: An update, *Electoral Studies* 16(1): 13-15.
- Lehoucq, F. (2008) Bolivia's constitutional breakdown, *Journal of Democracy* 19(4): 110-124.
- Mähler, A. and Pierskalla, J.H. (2015) Indigenous identity, natural resources, and contentious politics in Bolivia: A disaggregated conflict analysis, 2000-2011, *Comparative Political Studies* 48(3): 301-332.
- Mayorga, R.A. (1997) Bolivia's silent revolution, *Journal of Democracy* 8(1): 142-156.
- Mayorga, R.A. (2001a) Electoral reform in Bolivia: Origins of the mixed-member proportional system, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 194-208.
- Mayorga, R.A. (2001b) The mixed-member proportional system and its consequences in Bolivia, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 432-446.
- Singer, M.M. (2007) The presidential and parliamentary elections in Bolivia, December 2005, *Electoral Studies* 26(1): 200-205.
- Singer, M.M. and Morrison, K.M. (2004) The 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections in Bolivia, *Electoral Studies* 23(1): 172-182.
- Van Cott, D.L. (2000) Party system development and indigenous populations in Latin America: The Bolivian case, *Party Politics* 6(2): 155-174.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria 1 (MMM)

Survey questionnaire		
<i>Question</i>	<i>Answer (coding)</i>	<i>Notes and sources</i>
Year	1990	
Previous system	FPTP	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (two ballots; 50% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	1 year	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(0) No (autocracy)	
Public pressure?	(0) No	
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(1) Only one major opposition party involved	Ishiyama 1997: 109; Juberías 2004: 317
Foreign examples cited (which)?	(0) No	First MMM system ever adopted; without reference to foreign examples (Birch et al. 2002: 115-116, 127)
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(0) No	Compromise based on strategic calculations and long roundtable negotiations, system viewed as merely an interim solution (Birch et al. 2002: 110-111; Juberías 2004: 317; Barzachka 2009)
Replaced by	PR	

Bulgaria 2 (MMM)

Survey questionnaire		
<i>Question</i>	<i>Answer (coding)</i>	<i>Notes and sources</i>
Year	2009	
Previous system	PR	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (two ballots; 13% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	2	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(0) No	Intraparty dimension: lack of personal accountability (Spirova 2010)
Public pressure?	(0) No	
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(1) Limited involvement of the opposition	Barzachka 2009: 4
Foreign examples cited (which)?	(0) No	
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(0) No clear-cut principle	Focus on the intraparty dimension: greater personal accountability (Barzachka 2009: 4; Spirova 2010)
Replaced by	PR	

Bibliography

Barzachka, N. (2009) *Mechanisms of Electoral System Choice: Bulgaria 1990, 1991, 2009*. IREX Research Brief. Website: <http://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/Barzachka.pdf>.

Bielasiak, J. (2002) The institutionalization of electoral and party systems in postcommunist states, *Comparative Politics* 34(2): 189-210.

Birch, S. (2003) *Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Birch, S., Millard, F., Popescu, M., and Williams, K. (2002) *Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post-Communist Europe*. New York: Palgrave.

Crampton, R. (1995) The Bulgarian elections of December 1994, *Electoral Studies* 14(2): 236-240.

Elster, J. (1991) Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An introduction, *University of Chicago Law Review* 58(2): 447-482.

Grzymala-Busse, A. (2006) Authoritarian determinants of democratic party competition: The communist successor parties in East Central Europe, *Party Politics* 12(3): 415-437.

Hardman, H. (2015) *Electoral System Change in Europe since 1945: Bulgaria. ESCE Report*. Website: http://www.electoralsystemchanges.eu/Files/media/MEDIA_123/FILE/Bulgaria_summary.pdf.

Ishiyama, J.T. (1997) Transitional electoral systems in post-communist Eastern Europe, *Political Science Quarterly* 112(1): 95-115.

Juberías, C.F. (2004) Eastern Europe: General overview, in Colomer, J.M. (ed.), *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*, New York: Palgrave, 309-331.

Karasimeonov, G. and Lyubenov, M. (2013) Bulgaria, in Berglund, S., Ekman, J., Deegan-Krause, K., and Knutsen, T. (eds.), *Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 407-442.

Spirova, M. (2010) The 2009 parliamentary elections in Bulgaria, *Electoral Studies* 29(2): 276-278.

Georgia (MMM)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Notes and sources
Year	1990	
Previous system	FPTP	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (50% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	Still in use	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(0) No (autocracy)	
Public pressure?	(0) No	
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(1) Only one major opposition party	Communist successor party and new main opposition (Nodia & Pinto Scholtbach 2006: 51-52; Shavtvaladze 2013)
Foreign examples cited (which)?	MISSING INFORMATION	
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(0) No	Compromise based on strategic calculations (Nodia & Pinto Scholtbach 2006: 51-52; Shavtvaladze 2013)
Replaced by	-	

Bibliography

Berglund, C. (2013) Georgia, in Berglund, S., Ekman, J., Deegan-Krause, K., and Knutsen, T. (eds.), *Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 775-821.

Birch, S. (2005) *Lessons from Eastern Europe: Electoral Reform Following the Collapse of Communism*. Conference paper. Website: <http://elibraria.org/assets/2005-Birch-CausesOfElectReformInCEE.pdf>.

Jones, S. (2005) Presidential and parliamentary elections in Georgia, 2004, *Electoral Studies* 24(2): 303-311.

Mierzejewski-Voznyak, M.G. (2014) Party politics after the colour revolutions: Party institutionalisation and democratisation in Ukraine and Georgia, *East European Politics* 30(1): 86-104.

Mueller, S. (2014) The parliamentary and executive elections in the Republic of Georgia, 2012, *Electoral Studies* 34: 342-346.

Nodia, G. and Pinto Scholtbach, A. (2006) *The Political Landscape of Georgia. Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects*. Delft: Eburon.

Shavtvaladze, M. (2013) Electoral reform in a post-soviet republic: The case of Georgia, *Politikon* 18(1): 21-33.

Germany (MMP)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Notes and sources
Year	1949	
Previous system	PR	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMP (single ballot; 60% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	Still in use	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(1) Yes	Excessive fragmentation and depersonalization in Weimar (Scarrows 2001: 62; Kreuzer 2004: 222)
Public pressure?	(0) No	
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(1) Yes	Jesse 1987
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(2) All parties	All parties in the parliamentary council (Scarrows 2001: 57-64)
Foreign examples cited (which)?	(0) No	System built around avoiding Weimar failures (Scarrows 2001: 61)
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(0) No	Focus on compromise and stability; electoral system (like the whole Basic Law) viewed as merely an interim solution (Scarrows 2001; Kreuzer 2004; Saalfeld 2005)
Replaced by	-	

Bibliography

Bawn, K. (1993) The logic of institutional preferences: German electoral law as a social choice outcome, *American Journal of Political Science* 37(4): 965-989.

Carstairs, A.M. (1980) *A Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe*. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Jesse, E. (1987) The West German electoral system: The case for reform, 1949-87, *West European Politics* 10(3): 434-448.

Klingemann, H.D. and Weßels, B. (2001) The political consequences of Germany's mixed-member system: Personalization at the grass roots?, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 279-296.

Kreuzer, M. (2004) Germany: Partisan engineering of personalized proportional representation, in Colomer, J.M. (ed.), *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*, New York: Palgrave, 222-236.

Saalfeld, T. (2005) Germany: Stability and strategy in a mixed-member proportional system, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 209-229.

Scarrow, S.E. (2001) Germany: The mixed-member system as a compromise, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 55-69.

Hungary (MMM with PVT)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Notes and sources
Year	1989	
Previous system	FPTP	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM with PVT (two ballots; 46% SMDs)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	Still in use	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(0) No (autocracy)	
Public pressure?	(0) No	
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	Part of the new constitution but not part of any focused institutional reform project
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(2) All parties	Roundtable negotiations (old elites and new parties) (Juberías 2004; Schiemann 2001: 234)
Foreign examples cited (which)?	(1) Yes (Germany cited for the 5% threshold)	Schiemann 2001: 232-233, 251; Benoit 2005: 234
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(0) No	Self-interested bargaining; hard-fought compromise (Schiemann 2001: 240-248, 253; Benoit 2005: 234-235)
Replaced by	-	

Bibliography

Benoit, K. (2001) Evaluating Hungary's mixed-member electoral system, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 477-493.

Benoit, K. (2005) Hungary: Holding back the tigers, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 231-252.

Benoit, K. and Schiemann, J.W. (2001) Institutional choice in new democracies: Bargaining over Hungary's 1989 electoral law, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13(2): 159-188.

Birch, S., Millard, F., Popescu, M., and Williams, K. (2002) *Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post-Communist Europe*. New York: Palgrave, Chapter 3.

Juberías, C.F. (2004) Eastern Europe: General overview, in Colomer, J.M. (ed.), *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 309-331.

Schiemann, J.W. (2001) Hedging against uncertainty: Regime change and the origins of Hungary's mixed-member system, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 231-254.

Italy (MMM with PVT)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Notes and sources
Year	1993	
Previous system	PR	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (with PVT; two ballots; 75% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	12	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(1) Yes	High levels of party system fragmentation and no alternation in government; low personal accountability and high levels of corruption (Katz 2001: 103; Baldini 2011)
Public pressure?	(1) Yes (directed at institutional reform in general)	Katz 2001; D'Alimonte 2001: 254-257
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(3) All parties and a referendum	Gambetta & Warner 2004: 240
Foreign examples cited (which)?	(0) No	
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(0) No	Objectives of the reform not necessarily privately shared by all parties; parties pressured into making the changes (D'Alimonte 2005: 255; Katz 2001: 102; Katz 1997: 37; Gambetta & Warner 2004: 242-243)
Replaced by	PR with majority bonus	

Bibliography

Baldini, G. (2011) The different trajectories of Italian electoral reforms, *West European Politics* 34(3): 644-663.

D'Alimonte, R. (2001) Mixed electoral rules, partisan realignment, and party system change in Italy, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 323-350.

D'Alimonte, R. (2005) Italy: A case of fragmented bipolarism, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 253-276.

- D'Alimonte, R., Grofman, B., De Sio, L. (2012) *Extending Duverger's Law When Parties become Blocs: Evidence from Italy Under Three Different Electoral Systems, 1945-2010*. Unpublished manuscript.
- Donovan, M. (1995) The politics of electoral reform in Italy, *International Political Science Review* 16(1): 47-64.
- Gambetta, D. and Warner, S. (1996) The rhetoric of reform revealed (or if you bite the ballot it may bite back), *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 1(3): 357-376.
- Gambetta, D. and Warner, S. (2004) Italy: Lofty ambitions and unintended consequences, in Colomer, J.M. (ed.), *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 237-253.
- Katz, R.S. (1996) Electoral reform and the transformation of party politics in Italy, *Party Politics* 2(1): 31-53.
- Katz, R.S. (2001) Reforming the Italian electoral law, 1993, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 96-122.
- Renwick, A. (2010) *The Politics of Electoral Reform. Changing the Rules of Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sakamoto, T. (1999) Explaining electoral reform. Japan versus Italy and New Zealand, *Party Politics* 5(4): 419-438.
- Scheiner, E. (2008) Does electoral system reform work? Electoral system lessons from reforms of the 1990s, *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 161-181.

Japan (MMM)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Sources
Year	1994	
Previous system	SNTV	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (two ballots; 60% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	Still in use	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(1) Yes	Single-party dominance, high levels of corruption, clientelistic/pork barrel politics (Reilly 2007a: 189)
Public pressure?	(1) Yes (directed at institutional reform in general)	Politicians, not voters, put the focus on the electoral system (Reed & Thies 2001a: 154)
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(2) All parties	Reed & Thies 2001a: 154-156; Wada 2004
Foreign examples cited (which)?	(0) No	
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(0) No	Complex, interest-based bargaining, pressured by public; 1991 Kaifu plan: MMM system simply as a compromise/fallback option (Reed & Thies 2001a: 154-157, 168; Reed 2005: 281)
Replaced by	-	

Bibliography

Christensen, R.V. (1994) Electoral reform in Japan: How it was enacted and change it may bring, *Asian Survey* 34(7): 589-605.

Christensen, R.V. (1996) The new Japanese election system, *Pacific Affairs* 69(1): 49-70.

Gallagher, M. (1998) The political impact of electoral system change in Japan and New Zealand, 1996, *Party Politics* 4(2): 203-228.

Jou, W. (2009) Electoral reform and party system development in Japan and Taiwan: A comparative study, *Asian Survey* 49(5): 759-785.

Kawato, S. (2000) Strategic contexts of the vote on political reform bills, *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 1(1): 23-51.

- Lin, J.W. (2011) The endogenous change in electoral systems: The case of SNTV, *Party Politics* 17(3): 365-384.
- McKean, M. and Scheiner, E. (2000) Japan's new electoral system: La plus ça change, *Electoral Studies* 19(4): 447-477.
- Pekkanen, R., Nyblade, B., and Krauss, E.S. (2006) Electoral incentives in mixed-member systems: Party, posts, and zombie politicians in Japan, *American Political Science Review* 100(2): 183-193.
- Reed, S.R. (2005) Japan: Haltingly toward a two-party system, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 277-293.
- Reed, S.R. and Thies, M.F. (2001a) The causes of electoral reform in Japan, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 152-172.
- Reed, S.R. and Thies, M.F. (2001b) The consequences of electoral reform in Japan, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 380-403.
- Reilly, B. (2007a) Electoral systems and party systems in East Asia, *Journal of East Asian Studies* 7(2): 185-202.
- Reilly, B. (2007b) Political engineering in the Asia-Pacific, *Journal of Democracy* 18(1): 58-72.
- Sakamoto, T. (1999) Explaining electoral reform. Japan versus Italy and New Zealand, *Party Politics* 5(4): 419-438.
- Shiratori, R. (1995) The politics of electoral reform in Japan, *International Political Science Review* 16(1): 79-94.
- Wada, J. (2004) Japan: Manipulating multi-member districts – from SNTV to a mixed system, in Colomer, J.M. (ed.), *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 512-529.
- Woodall, B. (1999) The politics of reform in Japan's Lower House electoral system, in Grofman, B., Lee, S.C., Winckler, E.A., and Woodall, B. (eds.), *Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote*, Michigan: Michigan University Press, 23-50.

Lesotho (MMP)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Notes and sources
Year	2002	
Previous system	FPTP	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMP (two ballots; 67% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	Still in use	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(1) Yes	Huge disproportionality leading to election violence (Elklit 2005, 2008; Cho & Bratton 2006; Rosenberg & Weisfelder 2013: 13)
Public pressure?	(2) Yes (directed at election outcomes, but rather in the form of violence than clear-cut demands)	See above
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(2) All parties	All parliamentary parties (11) were part of the Interim Political Authority, but the single-party government would have to pass the law (Southall 2003)
Foreign examples cited (which)?	(1) Yes (German MMP)	Elklit 2005, 2008
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(1) Increase representativeness, proportionality	Obvious disagreements regarding exact technical design (MMM vs. MMP) (Rich et al. 2014: 643; Matlosa 2008; Southall 2003: 275; Elklit 2005)
Replaced by	-	

Bibliography

Cho, W. and Bratton, M. (2006) Electoral institutions, partisan status, and political support in Lesotho, *Electoral Studies* 25(4): 731-750.

Elklit, J. (2002) Lesotho 2002: Africa's first MMP elections, *Journal of African Elections* 1(2): 1-10.

- Elklit, J. (2005) Lesotho: Africa's first MMP electoral system, in Reynolds, A., Reilly, B., and Ellis, A. (eds.) *Electoral System Design. The New International IDEA Handbook*, Stockholm: International IDEA, 92-94.
- Elklit, J. (2008) The 2007 general election in Lesotho: Abuse of the MMP system?, *Journal of African Elections* 7(1): 10-19.
- Fox, R. and Southall, R. (2003) Adapting to electoral system change: Voters in Lesotho, 2002, *Journal of African Elections* 2(2): 86-96.
- Hartmann, C. (2007) Paths of electoral reform in Africa, in Basedau, M., Erdmann, G., and Mehler, A. (eds.), *Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika Institutet, 144-167.
- Likoti, F.J. (2009) The 2007 general election in Lesotho: The application and the challenges of the electoral system, *African Studies Quarterly* 10(4): 57-69.
- Kapa, M.A. and Shale, V. (2014) Alliances, coalitions and the political system in Lesotho 2007-2012, *Journal of African Elections* 13(1): 93-114.
- Kapa, M.A. (2008) The politics of coalition formation and democracy in Lesotho, *South African Journal of Political Studies* 35(3): 339-356.
- Makoa, F.K. (2008) Party alliances and political coalitions during the 2007 general election in Lesotho, *Journal of African Elections* 7(1): 50-65.
- Matlosa, K. (2006) Electoral system design and conflict mitigation: The case of Lesotho, in Large, J. and Sisk, T.D. (eds.), *Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Pursuing Peace in the 21st Century*, Stockholm: International IDEA, 94-110.
- Matlosa, K. (2008) The 2007 general election in Lesotho: Managing the post-election conflict, *Journal of African Elections* 7(1): 20-49.
- Mwangi, O.G. (2013) Regime dynamics and democratic consolidation in Lesotho, in Amutabi, M.N. and Nasong'o, S.W. (eds.), *Regime Change and Succession Politics in Africa. Five Decades of Misrule*, New York: Routledge, 98-109.
- Olaleye, W. (2003) *Democratic consolidation and political parties in Lesotho*. EISA Working Paper.
- Rich, T.S., Banerjee, V., and Recker, S. (2014) Identifying the institutional effects of mixed systems in new democracies: The case of Lesotho, *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 49(6): 637-653.
- Rosenberg, S. and Weisfelder, R.F. (2013) *Historical Dictionary of Lesotho*. Second Edition. Rowman: Lanham.
- Southall, R. (2003) An unlikely success: South Africa and Lesotho's election of 2002, *Journal of Modern African Studies* 41(2): 269-296.
- Weisfelder, R. (2013) *Lesotho's Landmark 2012 Election and Experiment with Coalition Government*. African Studies Association 2013 Annual Meeting Paper.

Lithuania (MMM)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Sources
Year	1992	
Previous system	FPTP	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (two ballots; 51% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	Still in use	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(0) No (autocracy)	
Public pressure?	(0) No	
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(3) All parties and international advisors	Constituent parliament (members of all parties) (Krupavicius 1998: 473; Benoit 2007: 373)
Foreign examples cited (which)?	MISSING INFORMATION	
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(1) Balance of representativeness and concentration	Agreement on the basic aim, but hard-fought compromise regarding the final design (Mikkil & Pettai 2004: 338; Krupavicius 1997; Krupavicius 1998: 478)
Replaced by	-	

Bibliography

Benoit, K. (2007) Electoral laws as political consequences: Explaining the origins and change of electoral institutions, *Annual Review of Political Science* 10(1): 363-390.

Birch, S., Millard, F., Popescu, M., and Williams, K. (2002) *Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post-Communist Europe*. New York: Palgrave.

Clark, T. and Martinaitis, Z. (2008) *Electoral Reform and Electoral System Effects in Lithuania*. EPOP Conference paper.

Gelazis, N. (2001) Institutional engineering in Lithuania: Stability through compromise, in Zielonka, J. (ed.), *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Volume 1: Institutional Engineering*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 165-185.

Ishiyama, J.T. (1997) Transitional electoral systems in post-communist Eastern Europe, *Political Science Quarterly* 112(1): 95-115.

Krupavicius, A. (1997) The Lithuanian parliamentary elections of 1996, *Electoral Studies* 16(4): 541-549.

Krupavicius, A. (1998) The post-communist transition and institutionalization of Lithuania's parties, *Political Studies* 46(3): 465-491.

Mikkel, E. and Pettai, V. (2004) The Baltics: Independence with divergent electoral systems, in Colomer, J.M. (ed.), *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 332-346.

Shvetsova, O. (1999) A survey of post-communist electoral institutions: 1990-1998, *Electoral Studies* 18(3): 397-409.

Taagepera, R. (1990) The Baltic states, *Electoral Studies* 9(4): 303-311.

Macedonia (MMM)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Sources
Year	1998	
Previous system	Two-round majority run-off	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (two ballots; 71% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	4	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(1) Yes	Huge disproportionality leading to opposition boycott in 1994 (Juberías 2004: 322)
Public pressure?	(0) No	Pressure from international organizations (Chytilek & Sedo 2007; Birch 2003: 164)
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(3) Government, opposition members, and foreign powers/international organizations	Chytilek & Sedo 2007; Birch 2003: 164; Szajkowski 1999: 59-60
Foreign examples cited (which)?	MISSING INFORMATION	
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(1) Balance of representativeness and concentration	Force parties to work together (consensus politics), but at the same time keep fragmentation at bay and foster strong parties (Juberías 2004: 322; Szajkowski 1999: 59-60); five percent threshold seen as the design key to achieve this goal (Szajkowski 1999: 59-60)
Replaced by	PR	Move to PR a demand by International organizations (Lundberg 2009: 12)

Bibliography

Chytilek, R. and Šedo, J. (2007) How the Tailor of Marrakesh suit has been altered: Advantage ratio as a tool in post-communist electoral reforms research, *European Electoral Studies* 2(1): 30-62.

Juberías, C.F. (2004) Eastern Europe: General overview, in Colomer, J.M. (ed.), *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 309-331.

Kostadinova, T. (2002) Do mixed electoral systems matter? A cross-national analysis of their effects in Eastern Europe, *Electoral Studies* 21(1): 23-34.

Lundberg, T.C. (2009) Post-communism and the abandonment of mixed-member electoral systems, *Representation* 45(1): 15-27.

Shvetsova, O. (1999) A survey of post-communist electoral institutions: 1990-1998, *Electoral Studies* 18(3): 397-409.

Szajkowski, B. (1999) *Elections and Electoral Politics in Macedonia*. Website: http://dev.ulb.ac.be/cevipol/dossiers_fichiers/szajkowski-1999-1-2.pdf.

Wagner, W. (2014) The overstated merits of proportional representation: The Republic of Macedonia as a natural experiment for assessing the impact of electoral systems on descriptive representation, *Ethnopolitics* 13(5): 483-500.

Mexico (MMM with PVT)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Sources
Year	1977	
Previous system	FPTP/PVT	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (two ballots; at least 75% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	Still in use	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(1) Yes	Massive disproportionality; no opposition representation (Molinar Horcasitas & Weldon 2001; Díaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2004)
Public pressure?	(0) No	
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(1) Yes	General party system openness: party registration was also liberalized (Molinar Horcasitas & Weldon 2001)
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(1) Government with limited consultation of the opposition	Molinar Horcasitas & Weldon 2001: 212; Díaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2004
Foreign examples cited (which)?	(0) No	
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(0) Self-interested design by the government	Window-dressing: proportionality only to a limited degree without threatening a government majority (Molinar Horcasitas & Weldon 2001: 212; Díaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2004: 145-147)
Replaced by	-	

Bibliography

Calvo, E. and Abal Median, J.M. (2002) Institutional gamblers: Majoritarian representation, electoral uncertainty, and the coalitional costs of Mexico's hybrid electoral system, *Electoral Studies* 21(3): 453-471.

Cantú, F. and Desposato, S. (2012) The new federalism in Mexico's party system, *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 4(2): 3-38.

Díaz-Cayeros, A. and Magaloni, B. (2001) Party dominance and the logic of electoral design in Mexico's transition to democracy, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13(3): 271-293.

- Díaz-Cayeros, A. and Magaloni, B. (2004) Mexico: Designing electoral rules by a dominant party, in Colomer, J.M. (ed.), *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 145-154.
- Kerevel, Y. (2010) The legislative consequences of Mexico's mixed-member electoral system, 2000-2009, *Electoral Studies* 29(4): 691-703.
- Klesner, J.L. (2005) Electoral competition and the new party system in Mexico, *Latin American Politics and Society* 47(2): 103-142.
- McDonald, R.H. (1967) Electoral systems, party representation, and political change in Latin America, *Western Political Quarterly* 20(3): 694-708.
- Molinar Horcasitas, J. and Weldon, J.A. (2001) Reforming electoral systems in Mexico, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 209-230.
- Remmer, K.L. (2008) The politics of institutional change: Electoral reform in Latin America, 1978-2002, *Party Politics* 14(1): 5-30.
- Weldon, J.A. (2001) The consequences of Mexico's mixed-member electoral system, 1988-1997, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 447-476.

Mongolia (MMM)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Notes and sources
Year	2011	
Previous system	Block Vote	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (two ballots; 63% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	Still in use	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(1) Yes	Disproportionality and corruption (Maskarinec 2014: 186-187)
Public pressure?	(2) Yes (directed at election results)	Riots
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(3) All parties aided by international advisors	Reilly 2012
Foreign examples cited (which)?	MISSING INFORMATION	
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(1) Increase representativeness	Widespread consensus regarding the need for reform and some degree of proportionality, little agreement beyond that (Reilly 2012: 24; Maskarinec 2014)
Replaced by	-	

Bibliography

Bielasiak, J. and Hulsey, J.W. (2013) Party system determinants of electoral reform in post-communist states, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 46(1): 1-12.

Maskarinec, P. (2014) Parliamentary and presidential elections in Mongolia, 2012 and 2013, *Electoral Studies* 36: 186-191.

Reilly, B. (2007) Electoral systems and party systems in East Asia, *Journal of East Asian Studies* 7(2): 185-202.

Reilly, B. (2012) *Electoral System Options for Mongolia – UNDP Consultancy Report*. Website: http://www.undp.mn/publications/Ben%20Reilly%27s%20Report_UNDP%20Mongolia.pdf.

United Nations Development Programme (2013) *Lessons Learned from Electoral Support to Mongolia 2008-2012*.

Website:

http://www.mn.undp.org/content/dam/mongolia/Publications/DemGov/Lessons%20Learned%20from%20Electoral%20Support%20to%20Mongolia_EN.pdf.

Nepal (MMM)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Notes and sources
Year	2007	
Previous system	FPTP	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (two ballots; 42% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	Still in use	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(1) Yes	Wasted votes, lack of minority representation
Public pressure?	(1) Yes (directed at institutional reform in general)	Maoist insurgency/royal coup (Adhikari 2014)
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(1) Yes	Overthrowing of the monarchy (Adhikari 2014; Lawoti 2014)
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(1) Government and Maoist opposition	Sharma et al. 2008: 516-517; Volla 2011
Foreign examples cited (which)?	MISSING INFORMATION	
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(1) Increased inclusiveness and minority representation	Agreement on increased inclusiveness and minority representation (Volla 2011: 5; Sharma et al. 2008); two interpretations of PR: proportionality according to vote share vs. population share; disagreement about the level of representativeness (Volla 2011; Reynolds 2010: 512)
Replaced by	-	

Bibliography

Adhikari, A. (2014) *The Bullet and the Ballot Box: The Story of Nepal's Maoist Revolution*. London: Verso.

Gellner, D.N. (2014) The 2013 elections in Nepal, *Asian Affairs* 45(2): 243-261.

Hachethu, K. and Gellner, D.N. (2010) Nepal: Trajectories of democracy and restructuring of the state, in Brass, P. (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics*, New York: Routledge, 131-146.

Hangen, S.I. (2010) *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Nepal. Democracy in the Margins*. London: Routledge.

Lawoti, M. (2014) Reform and resistance in Nepal, *Journal of Democracy* 25(2): 131-145.

Lohani, B. (2012) The political crisis and the fall of monarchy in Nepal, *Nepal Council of World Affairs Annual Journal* 5: 33-44.

Reynolds, A. (2010) Electoral democratisation in Nepal, *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 40(3): 509-519.

Sharma, B., Stevens, B., and Weller, P. (2008) Nepal – a revolution through the ballot box, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 62(4): 513-528.

Vollan, K. (2011) *Group Representation and the System of Representation in the Constituent Assembly and Future Parliaments of Nepal*.

Website: <http://follesdal.net/projects/ratify/nepal/Vollan-2011-The-development-of-an-electoral-system.pdf>.

New Zealand (MMP)

Survey questionnaire		
<i>Question</i>	<i>Answer (coding)</i>	<i>Notes and sources</i>
Year	1993	
Previous system	FPTP	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMP (two ballots; 51% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	Still in use	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(1) Yes	Disproportionality leading to minor party underrepresentation, low responsiveness, majority reversals, and 'elective dictatorship' (Denemark 2001: 71; Renwick 2010: 195-198)
Public pressure?	(2) Yes (eventually directed at electoral reform)	First general reform demands, then focus on the electoral system; indicative referendum in 1992, binding referendum in 1993 (Denemark 2001: 81-89; Renwick 2010: 204-205)
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(3) All parties and the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, referenda	Royal Commission consulted experts and the public (Renwick 2010: 198-203)
Foreign examples cited (which)?	(1) Yes (multiple, including German MMP system)	Renwick 2010: 198-199
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(1) Improving minority representation, fairness	Goal for the system sociotropically devised by the commission, major parties stumbled into the referendum accidentally, MMP then became the focal alternative (Denemark 2001; Nagel 2004: 533; Renwick 2010: 195-205); Threshold seen as tool for concentration (Denemark 2001: 86-88)
Replaced by	-	

Bibliography

Barker, F. and McLeay, E. (2000) How much change? An analysis of the initial impact of proportional representation on the New Zealand parliamentary party system, *Party Politics* 6(2): 131-154.

Barker, F., Boston, J., Levine, S., McLeay, E., and Roberts, N.S. (2001) An initial assessment of the consequences of MMP in New Zealand, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 297-322.

Denemark, D. (2001) Choosing MMP in New Zealand: Explaining the 1993 Electoral Reform, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 70-95.

Geddis, A. and Morris, C. (2004) 'All is changed, changed utterly'? – The causes and consequences of New Zealand's adoption of MMP, *Federal Law Review* 32(3): 451-478.

Jackson, K. and McRobie, A. (1998) *New Zealand Adopts Proportional Representation. Accident? Design? Evolution?* Aldershot: Ashgate.

Nagel, J.H. (2004) New Zealand: Reform by (nearly) immaculate design, in Colomer, J.M. (ed.), *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 222-236.

Renwick, A. (2010) *The Politics of Electoral Reform. Changing the Rules of Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vowles, J. (1995) The politics of electoral reform in New Zealand, *International Political Science Review* 16(1): 95-116.

Vowles, J. (2005) New Zealand: The consolidation of reform?, in Gallagher, M. Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 295-312.

Vowles, J. (2008) Systemic failure, coordination, and contingencies: Understanding electoral system change in New Zealand, in Blais, A. (ed.), *To Keep or To Change First Past the Post? The Politics of Electoral Reform*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 163-183.

Russia (MMM)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Notes and sources
Year	1993	
Previous system	FPTP	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (two ballots; 50% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	12	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(0) No (autocracy)	
Public pressure?	(0) No	
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(1) Government imposition aided by external experts	External experts were consulted (Moser & Thames 2001: 255; Remington & Smith 1996)
Foreign examples cited (which)?	(1) Yes (German MMP)	German MMP system as a paragon model for managing the transition to democracy (Moser & Thames 2001: 258, 266)
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(1) Establishment of national political parties and district representation by national parties or local notables; facilitate majority government (multiple principles)	Mixed system seen as 'grand compromise' (Moser & Thames 2001: 255-265; White et al. 1997: 109; Golosov 2014)
Replaced by	PR	

Bibliography

Andrews, J.T. and Jackman, R.W. (2005) Strategic fools: electoral rule choice under extreme uncertainty, *Electoral Studies* 24(1): 65-84.

Bacon, E. (2012) Electoral manipulation and the development of Russia's political system, *East European Politics* 28(2): 105-118.

Birch, S., Millard, F., Popescu, M., and Williams, K. (2002) *Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post-Communist Europe*. New York: Palgrave.

Golosov, G.V. (2014) The idiosyncratic dynamics of party system nationalization in Russia, *Post-Soviet Affairs*, DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2014.926633.

- Lundberg, T.C. (2009) Post-communism and the abandonment of mixed-member electoral systems, *Representation* 45(1): 15-27.
- Moraski, B. (2007) Electoral system reform in democracy's grey zone: Lessons from Putin's Russia, *Government and Opposition* 42(4): 536-563.
- Moser, R.G. (2001a) *Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in Russia*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.
- Moser, R.G. (2001b) The consequences of Russia's mixed-member electoral system, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 494-518.
- Moser, R.G. (2008) *Electoral systems and the representation of ethnic minorities: Evidence from Russia*, *Comparative Politics* 40(3): 273-292.
- Moser, R.G. and Thames, F.C. (2001) Compromise amidst political conflict: The origins of Russia's mixed-member system, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 255-275.
- Remington, T.F. Smith, S.S. (1995) The development of parliamentary parties in Russia, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 20(4): 457-489.
- Remington, T.F. Smith, S.S. (1996) Political goals, institutional contest, and the choice of an electoral system: The Russian parliamentary election law, *American Journal of Political Science* 40(4): 1253-1279.
- Shvetsova, O. (2004) Russia: Compromising a long-lasting transitional formula, in Colomer, J.M. (ed.), *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*, New York: Palgrave, 382-397.
- White, Stephen (2005) Russia: the authoritarian adaption of an electoral system, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 313-330.
- White, S., Rose, R., and McAllister, I. (1997) *How Russia Votes*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.

Senegal (MMM)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Notes and sources
Year	1983	
Previous system	PR	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (one ballot; 50% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	Still in use	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(0) No (autocracy)	
Public pressure?	(2) Yes, directed at the electoral system	Indirect via the opposition parties threatening to leave the election game (Mozaffar & Vengroff 2002)
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(0) Government imposition	
Foreign examples cited (which)?	MISSING INFORMATION	
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(0) No	Strategic move to split the opposition and legitimize dominant party rule; opposition accepted a compromise deal that saw more openness of the party system in general (Ka & van de Walle 1994; Mozaffar & Vengroff 2002: 607)
Replaced by	-	

Bibliography

Bendel, P. (1999) Senegal, in Nohlen, D. (ed.), *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 755-774.

Coulon, C. (1990) Senegal: The development and fragility of a semi-democracy, in Diamond, L. (ed.), *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 411-448.

Creevey, L., Ngomo, P., and Vengroff, R. (2005) Party politics and different paths to democratic transitions: A comparison of Benin and Senegal, *Party Politics* 11(4): 471-493.

Hartmann, C. (2010) Senegal's party system: The limits of formal regulation, *Democratization* 17(4): 769-786.

Ka, S. and van de Walle, N. (1994) Senegal: Stalled reform in a dominant party system, in Haggard, S. and Webb, S.B. (eds.), *Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 290-359.

Kante, B. (1994) Senegal's empty elections, *Journal of Democracy* 5(1), 96-108.

Mozaffar, S. and Vengroff, R. (2002) A 'whole system' approach to the choice of electoral rules in democratizing countries: Senegal in comparative perspective, *Electoral Studies* 21(4): 601-616.

Thomas, M.A. and Sissokho, O. (2005) Liaison legislature: The role of the National Assembly in Senegal, *Journal of Modern Africa Studies* 43(1): 97-117.

Villalon, L. (1994) Democratizing a (quasi-)democracy: The Senegalese elections of 1993, *African Affairs* 93(1), 163-193.

South Korea (Republic of Korea) (MMM with majority bonus)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Notes and sources
Year	1988	
Previous system	SNTV (mixed version)	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (one ballot; 75% SMD seats; strong majority bonus)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	Still in use	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(0) No (autocracy)	
Public pressure?	(0) No	
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(0) Government imposition	Opposition with clearly diverging wishes (Shin 2011; Croissant 2002)
Foreign examples cited (which)?	MISSING INFORMATION	
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(0) No	Fully strategic move by the governing party trying to split the opposition into regional parties (Shin 2011; Croissant 2002: 257; Brady & Mo 1992)
Replaced by	-	

Bibliography

Brady, D. and Mo, J. (1992) Electoral systems and institutional choice: A case study of the 1988 Korean elections, *Comparative Political Studies* 24(4): 405-429.

Choi, D.K. (1997) The choosing of representatives in Korea, in Hassall, G. and Saunders, C. (eds.), *The People's Representatives: Electoral Systems in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 77-86.

Chung-si, A. and Hoon, J. (1999) South Korea, in Marsh, I., Blondel, J., and Inoguchi, T. (eds.), *Democracy, Governance and Economic Performance*, Tokyo: UN University Press.

Croissant, A. (1998) *Politischer Systemwechsel in Südkorea (1985-1997)*. Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde.

Croissant, A. (2002) Electoral politics in South Korea, in Croissant, A., Bruns, G., and John, M. (eds.), *Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia*, Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 233-276.

Diamond, L. and Shin, D.C. (2000) *Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.

Heo, U. and Stockton, H. (2005) The impact of democratic transition on elections and parties in South Korea, *Party Politics* 11(6): 674-688.

Hicken, A. and Kasuya, Y. (2003) A guide to the constitutional structures and electoral systems of East, South and Southeast Asia, *Electoral Studies* 22(1): 121-151.

Nam, K.W. (1989) *South Korean Politics: The Search for Political Consensus and Stability*. Lanham: University Press of America.

Reilly, B. (2007) Electoral systems and party systems in East Asia, *Journal of East Asian Studies* 7(2): 185-202.

Shin, J.H. (2011) The choice of electoral systems in new democracies: A case study of South Korea in 1988, *Democratization* 18(6): 1246-1269.

Taiwan (Republic of China) (MMM)

Survey questionnaire		
<i>Question</i>	<i>Answer (coding)</i>	<i>Notes and sources</i>
Year	2008	
Previous system	SNTV (mixed version)	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (two ballots; 65% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	Still in use	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(0) No	Intraparty dimension: factionalism, localism, corruption, low party institutionalization, low personal accountability (Hsu 2006; Stockton 2010: 23; Rigger 2011: 10)
Public pressure?	(1) Yes (general)	Focused on changing individual legislators' behavior (O'Neill 2013: 163)
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(1) Yes	Smaller parliament, higher hurdles for constitutional changes; this made a package deal between the government and several small parties possible (Lin 2011)
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(1) Government and part of the opposition (forced)	The government exploited public pressure for reform in forcing opposition parties to support its bills (Stockton 2010: 24; Lin 2011: 379-380)
Foreign examples cited (which)?	MISSING INFORMATION	
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(0) No (Largely a strategic move)	Only generally shared goal was to facilitate interparty, not intraparty, competition; strengthen parties (Stockton 2010: 24; Lin 2011: 379-380; Rigger 2011)
Replaced by	-	

Bibliography

- Chi, H. (2013) Knowledge of the electoral system and voting: Taiwan's 2008 and 2012 legislative elections, *Issues & Studies* 49(4): 1-45.
- Fell, D. (2013) Impact of candidate selection systems on election results: Evidence from Taiwan before and after the change in electoral systems, *China Quarterly* 213: 152-171.
- Göbel, C. (2012) The impact of electoral system reform on Taiwan's local factions, *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 3/2012: 69-92.
- Grofman, B., Lee, S.C., Winckler, E.A., and Woodall, B. (eds.) (1999) *Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote*. Michigan: Michigan University Press.
- Hsu, Y. (2006) Splitting and making parties: Analysis of party reconfiguration in Taiwan, *East Asia* 23(1): 7-26.
- Jou, W. (2009) Electoral reform and party system development in Japan and Taiwan: A comparative study, *Asian Survey* 49(5): 759-785.
- Lin, J. (2006) The politics of reform in Japan and Taiwan, *Journal of Democracy* 17(2): 113-131.
- Lin, J. (2011) The endogenous change in electoral systems: The case of SNTV, *Party Politics* 17(3): 365-384.
- Lin, L. (2012) *A Perspective on Taiwan's 2012 Legislative Elections*. ICFET Occasional Paper 1.
- O'Neill, D.C. (2013) Electoral rules and the Democratic Progressive Party's performance in the 2004 and 2008 legislative elections in Taiwan, *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 48(2): 161-179.
- Reilly, B. (2007) Electoral systems and party systems in East Asia, *Journal of East Asian Studies* 7(2): 185-202.
- Rich, T.S. (2009) Can democratic consolidation make a country less secure? The case of Taiwan, *Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia* 8(1): 1-14.
- Rigger, S. (2011) *Electoral Reform, Issue Cleavages and the Consolidation of a Two-Party System in Taiwan*. APSA Conference paper.
- Stockton, H. (2010) How rules matter: Electoral reform in Taiwan, *Social Science Quarterly* 91(1): 21-41.
- Tan, A. (2009) The 2008 Taiwan elections: Forward to the past?, *Electoral Studies* 28(3): 502-505.
- Tsai, C.H. (2005) Policy-making, local factions, and candidate coordination in single non-transferable voting. A case study of Taiwan, *Party Politics* 11(1): 59-77.

Thailand (MMM)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Notes and sources
Year	1997	
Previous system	Block Vote	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (two ballots; 80% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	9	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(0) No	Intraparty dimension: massive intraparty competition, personalistic campaigns, vote buying, low party institutionalization/nationalization (Murray 1998: 526)
Public pressure?	(1) Yes (directed at general reform)	Reform movement (Pongsudhirak 2008)
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(1) Yes	Complete new constitution (Croissant 2002: 324); High levels of legitimacy among the public (procedural legitimacy) (Pongsudhirak 2008: 141)
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(3) Constitutional Drafting Assembly	Provincial candidates and academic experts nominated by universities, parties only with limited nominating power (Murray 1998: 527)
Foreign examples cited (which)?	MISSING INFORMATION	
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(1) Reduce the number of parties, produce more stable governments, institutionalize and nationalize party competition (multiple principles: inter- and intraparty dimensions)	Kuhonta 2008: 382; Murray 1998: 533
Replaced by	Block Vote	

Bibliography

Croissant, A. and Polar, D.J. (2006) The parliamentary election in Thailand, February 2005, *Electoral Studies* 25(1): 184-191.

Croissant, A. and Dosch, J. (2003) Parliamentary elections in Thailand, March 2000 and January 2001, *Electoral Studies* 22(1): 153-160.

- Ginsburg, T. (2009) Constitutional afterlife: The continuing impact of Thailand's postpolitical constitution, *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 7(1): 83-105.
- Hicken, A. (2005) Thailand: Combating corruption through electoral reform, in Reynolds, A., Reilly, B., and Ellis, A. (eds.) *Electoral System Design. The New International IDEA Handbook*, Stockholm: International IDEA, 105-107.
- Hicken, A. (2006) Party fabrication: Constitutional reform and the rise of Thai Rak Thai, *Journal of East Asian Studies* 6(3): 381-407.
- Hicken, A. and Selway, J.S. (2012) Forcing the genie back in the bottle: Sociological change, institutional reform, and health policy in Thailand, *Journal of East Asian Studies* 12(1): 57-88.
- Kokpol, O. (2002) Electoral politics in Thailand, in Croissant, A., Bruns, G., and John, M. (eds.), *Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia*, Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 277-297.
- Kuhonta, E.M. (2008) The paradox of Thailand's 1997 "People's Constitution": Be careful what you wish for, *Asian Survey* 48(3): 373-392.
- McCargo, D. (2002) Democracy under stress in Thaksin's Thailand, *Journal of Democracy* 13(4): 112-126.
- Murray, D. (1998) Thailand's recent electoral reforms, *Electoral Studies* 17(4): 525-536.
- Nogsuan, S. (2005) The 2005 general elections in Thailand: Toward a one-party government, *Philippine Journal of Third World Studies* 20(1): 48-71.
- Ockey, J. (2003) Change and continuity in the Thai political party system, *Asian Survey* 43(4): 663-680.
- Pongsudhirak, T. (2008) Thailand since the coup, *Journal of Democracy* 19(4): 140-153.
- Reilly, B. (2007) Electoral systems and party systems in East Asia, *Journal of East Asian Studies* 7(2): 185-202.
- Reilly, B. (2011) Political reform and the demise of consociationalism in Southeast Asia, in Croissant, A. and Bünte, M. (eds.), *The Crisis of Democratic Governance in Southeast Asia*, New York: Palgrave, 114-130.
- Thalang, C. (2012) Parliamentary elections in Thailand, July 2011, *Electoral Studies* 31(3): 633-636.

Ukraine (MMM)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Notes and sources
Year	1998	
Previous system	2RMR	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (single ballot; 50% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	8	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(1) Yes	High number of independents, low party institutionalization (Birch et al. 2002: 153-154; Lundberg 2009)
Public pressure?	(0) No	
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(2) Working group on electoral law aided by foreign (IFES) advisors; all parties except the president's supporters	Fairly widespread agreement (barring parties supporting the president) (Birch et al. 2002)
Foreign examples cited (which)?	(3) Yes (Russian MMM and others)	Russian experience with an MMM system where SMDs actually were more fragmenting and PR fostered party institutionalization; other states in the region (Birch et al. 2002: 150-154)
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(1) Increased proportionality (to structure the party system and become stronger vis-à-vis the strong president) (interparty dimension)	PR elections were linked with a concentrating effect on the party system (Birch et al. 2002: 147-153; Lundberg 2009)
Replaced by	PR	

Bibliography

Bielasiak, J. (2002) The institutionalization of electoral and party systems in postcommunist states, *Comparative Politics* 34(2): 189-210.

Birch, S. (2003) The parliamentary elections in Ukraine, March 2002, *Electoral Studies* 22(3): 524-531.

- Birch, S. and Wilson, A. (1999) The Ukrainian parliamentary elections of 1998, *Electoral Studies* 18(2): 276-282.
- Birch, S., Millard, F., Popescu, M., and Williams, K. (2002) *Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post-Communist Europe*. New York: Palgrave.
- Herron, E.S. (2007) State institutions, political context and parliamentary election legislation in Ukraine 2000-2006, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 23(1): 57-76.
- Herron, E.S. (2014) The parliamentary elections in Ukraine, October 2012, *Electoral Studies* 33: 353-356.
- Hesli, V.L. (2007) The 2006 Parliamentary Election in Ukraine, *Electoral Studies* 26(2): 507-511.
- Lundberg, T.C. (2009) Post-communism and the abandonment of mixed-member electoral systems, *Representation* 45(1): 15-27.
- Shvetsova, O. (1999) A survey of post-communist electoral institutions: 1990-1998, *Electoral Studies* 18(3): 397-409.

Venezuela

Venezuela 1 (MMP)

Survey questionnaire		
<i>Question</i>	<i>Answer (coding)</i>	<i>Notes and sources</i>
Year	1989	
Previous system	PR	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMP (two ballots; 50% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	20	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(0) No	Intraparty dimension: Limited personal and geographic accountability (Landman 1995; Crisp & Rey 2001: 179)
Public pressure?	(1) Yes (directed at reform in general)	Crisp & Rey 2001
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(1) Large parties only	Crisp & Rey 2001: 174
Foreign examples cited (which)?	(1) Yes (German MMP system)	Crisp & Rey 2001: 185
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(0) No (Strategic move)	Ensure legitimacy but otherwise keep the advantage of large parties (Crisp & Rey 2001: 191-192; Mainwaring 2012)
Replaced by	MMM	

Venezuela 2 (MMM)

Survey questionnaire		
Question	Answer (coding)	Notes and sources
Year	2009	
Previous system	MMP	
Mixed system adopted (technical details)	MMM (two ballots; 68% SMD seats)	
Longevity of the mixed system (years)	Still in use	
Systemic failure of the old system (in which dimension/s)?	(1) Yes	Strong disproportionality due to strategic manipulation of the MMP system (Hidalgo 2011)
Public pressure?	(0) No	
Electoral reform part of wider institutional change?	(0) No	
Level of inclusiveness/agreement of electoral system choice	(0) Government imposition	Hidalgo 2011; Mainwaring 2012
Foreign examples cited (which)?	(0) No	
Guiding principle(s)/overall goal(s)?	(0) No (fully strategic move in order to hurt the opposition)	Hidalgo 2011: 872-873; Mainwaring 2012
Replaced by	-	

Bibliography

Canache, D. and Kulisheck, M.R. (eds.) (1998) *Reinventing Legitimacy: Democracy and Political Change in Venezuela*. Westport: Greenwood.

Crisp, B.F. and Rey, J.C. (2001) The sources of electoral reform in Venezuela, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 172-193.

Ellner, S. (1994) The deepening of democracy in a crisis setting: Political reform and the electoral process in Venezuela, *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 35(4): 1-42.

Escobar-Lemmon, M. (2003) Political support for decentralization: An analysis of the Colombian and Venezuelan legislatures, *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4): 683-697.

Hidalgo, M. (2011) The 2010 legislative elections in Venezuela, *Electoral Studies* 30(4): 872-875.

Jones, M.P. (1997) A guide to the electoral systems of the Americas: An update, *Electoral Studies* 16(1): 13-15.

Kulisheck, M.R. and Crisp, B.F. (2001) The legislative consequences of MMP electoral rules in Venezuela, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 404-431.

Landman, T. (1995) 'El Chiripero' wins: The Venezuelan elections of 1993, *Electoral Studies* 14(1): 100-104.

Mainwaring, S. (2012) From representative democracy to participatory competitive authoritarianism: Hugo Chávez and Venezuelan Politics, *Perspectives on Politics* 10(4): 955-967.

McCoy, J.L. (1999) Chavez and the end of "partyarchy" in Venezuela, *Journal of Democracy* 10(3): 64-77.

Molina, J. and Thibaut, B. (2005) Venezuela, in Nohlen, D. (ed.), *Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 535-592.

General bibliography

- Birch, S., Millard, F., Popescu, M., and Williams, K. (2002) *Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post-Communist Europe*. New York: Palgrave.
- Colomer, J.M. (ed.) (2004) *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.) (2005). *The Politics of Electoral Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Geys, B. (2006) Explaining voter turnout: A review of aggregate-level research, *Electoral Studies* 25(4): 637-663.
- Hassall, G. and Saunders, C. (eds.) (1997), *The People's Representatives: Electoral Systems in the Asia-Pacific Region*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Imbeau, L.M., Pétry, F., and Lamari, M. (2001) Left-right party ideology and government policies: A meta-analysis, *European Journal of Political Research* 40(1): 1-29.
- Larsson, R. (1993) Case survey methodology: Quantitative analysis of patterns across case studies, *The Academy of Management Journal* 36(6): 1515-1546.
- Larsson, R. and Finkelstein, S. (1999) Integrating strategic, organizational, and human resource perspectives on mergers and acquisitions: A case survey of synergy realization, *Organization Science* 10(1): 1-26.
- Melton, J., Elkins, Z., Ginsburg, T., and Leetanu, K. (2013) On the interpretability of law: Lessons from the decoding of national constitutions, *British Journal of Political Science* 43(2): 399-423.
- Nohlen, D. (ed.) (1999) *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nohlen, D. (ed.) (2005) *Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nohlen, D. and Stöver, P. (eds.) (2010) *Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Renwick, A. (2010) *The Politics of Electoral Reform. Changing the Rules of Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.) (2001) *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smets, K. and van Ham, C. (2013) The embarrassment of riches? A meta-analysis of individual-level research on voter turnout, *Electoral Studies* 32(2): 344-359.

References

- Amorim Neto, O. and Cox, G.W. (1997) Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties, *American Journal of Political Science* 41(1): 149-174.
- Anderson, C.J. (1998) Parties, party systems, and satisfaction with democratic performance in the new Europe, *Political Studies* 46(3): 572-588.
- Anderson, C.J. and Guillory, C.A. (1997) Political institutions and satisfaction with democracy: A cross-national analysis of consensus and majoritarian systems, *American Political Science Review* 91(1): 66-81.
- Andeweg, R.B. (2005) The Netherlands: the sanctity of proportionality, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 491-510.
- Andrews, J.T. and Jackman, R.W. (2005) Strategic fools: electoral rule choice under extreme uncertainty, *Electoral Studies* 24(1): 65-84.
- Bäck, H. and Dumont, P. (2007) Combining large-n and small-n strategies: The way forward in coalition research, *West European Politics* 30(3): 467-501.
- Baldini, G. (2011) The different trajectories of Italian electoral reforms, *West European Politics* 34(3): 644-663.
- Banaszak, L.A. and Doerschler, P. (2012) Coalition type and voter support for parties: Grand coalitions in German elections, *Electoral Studies* 31(1): 46-59.
- Bawn, K. and Rosenbluth, F. (2006) Short versus long coalitions: Electoral accountability and the size of the public sector, *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2): 251-265.
- Bawn, K. and Thies, M.F. (2003) A comparative theory of electoral incentives: Representing the unorganized under PR, Plurality and Mixed-Member electoral systems, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15(1): 5-32.
- Beck, N. and Katz, J.N. (1995) What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section data, *American Political Science Review* 89(3): 634-664.
- Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., and Walsh, P. (2001) New tools in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions, *World Bank Economic Review* 15(1): 165-176.
- Behnke, J. (2007) The strange phenomenon of surplus seats in the German electoral system, *German Politics* 16(4): 496-517.
- Behnke, J. (2008) Strategisches Wählen bei der Nachwahl in Dresden zur Bundestagswahl 2005, *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 49(4): 695-720.
- Behnke, J. (2010) Überhangmandate bei der Bundestagswahl 2009 – das ewige Menetekel, *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 51(3): 531-552.
- Behnke, J. (2011) Grundsätzliches zur Wahlreformdebatte, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 4/2011: 14-21.

- Behnke, J. and Bader, F. (2013) Sophistiziertes Wählen bei der Bundestagswahl 2009 – gibt es diesbezügliche Anzeichen für Lerneffekte?, in Weißels, B., Schoen, H., and Gabriel, O.W. (eds.), *Wahlen und Wähler. Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 2009*, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 249-268.
- Behnke, J. and Grotz, F. (2011) Das Wahlsystem zwischen normativer Begründung, empirischer Evidenz und politischen Interessen. Ein Kommentar zu Gerd Strohmeier sowie Franz Urban Pappi und Michael Herrmann, *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 42(2): 419-425.
- Benoit, K. (2000) Which electoral formula is the most proportional? A new look with new evidence, *Political Analysis* 8(4): 381-388.
- Benoit, K. (2002) The endogeneity problem in electoral studies: A critical re-examination of Duverger's mechanical effect, *Electoral Studies* 21(1): 35-46.
- Benoit, K. (2004) Models of electoral system change, *Electoral Studies* 23(3): 363-389.
- Benoit, K. (2005) Hungary: Holding back the tiers, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 231-252.
- Benoit, K. (2007) Electoral laws as political consequences: Explaining the origins and change of electoral institutions, *Annual Review of Political Science* 10(1): 363-390.
- Bernauer, J., Giger, N., and Rosset, J. (2015) Mind the gap: Do proportional electoral systems foster a more equal representation of women and men, poor and rich? *International Political Science Review* 36(1): 78-98.
- Berry, W.D., DeMeritt, J.H.R., and Esarey, J. (2010) Testing for interaction in binary logit and probit models: Is a product term essential?, *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1): 248-266.
- Birch, S. (2003) *Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Birch, S., Millard, F., Popescu, M., and Williams, K. (2002) *Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post-Communist Europe*. New York: Palgrave.
- Birnir, J.K. (2007) Divergence in diversity? The dissimilar effects of cleavages on electoral politics in new democracies, *American Journal of Political Science* 51(3): 602-619.
- Blais, A. and Massicotte, L. (1997) Electoral formulas: A macroscopic perspective, *European Journal of Political Research* 32(1): 107-129.
- Blau, A. (2008) The effective number of parties at four scales: Votes, seats, legislative power and cabinet power, *Party Politics* 14(2): 167-187.
- Bochsler, D. (2012) A quasi-proportional electoral system 'only for honest men'? The hidden potential for manipulating mixed compensatory electoral systems, *International Political Science Review* 33(4): 401-420.
- Bochsler, D. (2014) Which mixed-member proportional electoral formula fits you best? Assessing the proportionality principle of positive vote transfer systems, *Representation*, 50(1): 113-127.

- Bol, D. (2013) Electoral reform, values and party self-interest, *Party Politics*, DOI: 10.1177/1354068813511590.
- Borisyuk, G., Rallings, C., and Thrasher, M. (2004) Selecting indexes of electoral proportionality: General properties and relationships, *Quality and Quantity* 38(1): 51-74.
- Bormann, N.C. and Golder, M. (2013) Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2011, *Electoral Studies* 32(2): 360-369.
- Bowler, S. and Donovan, T. (2013) *The Limits of Electoral Reform*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bowler, S. and Farrell, D.M. (2006) We know which one we prefer but we don't really know why: The curious case of mixed member electoral systems, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 8(3): 445-60.
- Bowler, S., Farrell, D.M., and Pettitt, R.T. (2005) Expert opinion on electoral systems: So which electoral system is "best"?, *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties* 15(1): 3-19.
- Brancati, D. (2008) The origins and strengths of regional parties, *British Journal of Political Science* 38(1): 135-159.
- Brancati, D. (2015) *Global Elections Database* [computer file]. New York: Global Elections Database [distributor], Date accessed 05/01/2015.
Website: <http://www.globalelectionsdatabase.com>.
- Brennan, G. and Hamlin, A. (2002) Expressive constitutionalism, *Constitutional Political Economy* 6(4): 299-311.
- Brennan, G. and Hamlin, A. (2008) Constitutions as expressive documents, in Wittman, D. and Weingast, B.R. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 329-341.
- Brennan, G. and Pardo, J.C. (1991) A reading of the Spanish Constitution (1978), *Constitutional Political Economy* 2(1): 53-79.
- Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) (1997) *Zur Verfassungsmäßigkeit von Überhangmandaten, die ohne Verrechnung anfallen oder ohne Ausgleichsmandate zugeteilt werden*. Urteil (2 BvF 1/95) des Bundesverfassungsgerichts.
- Carey, J.M. and Hix, S. (2011) The electoral sweet spot: Low-magnitude proportional electoral systems, *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2): 383-397.
- Carr, A. (2015) *Adam Carr's Election Archive* [computer file]. Date accessed 05/01/2015. Website: <http://psephos.adam-carr.net/>.
- Chernykh, S. (2014) When do political parties protest election results?, *Comparative Political Studies* 47(10): 1359-1383.
- Clark, W.R. and Golder, M. (2006) Rehabilitating Duverger's theory: Testing the mechanical and strategic effects of electoral laws, *Comparative Political Studies* 39(6): 679-708.

- Collier, D., Laporte, J., and Seawright, J. (2008) Typologies: Forming concepts and creating categorial variables, in Box-Steffensmeier, J.M., Brady, H.E., and Collier, D. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 152-173.
- Collier, D., Laporte, J., and Seawright, J. (2012) Putting typologies to work: Concept formation, measurement, and analytic rigor, *Political Research Quarterly* 65(1): 217-232.
- Colomer, J.M. (2004). The strategy and history of electoral system choice, in Colomer, J.M. (ed.), *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 3-78.
- Colomer, J.M. (2005) It's parties that choose electoral systems (or, Duverger's laws upside down), *Political Studies* 53(1): 1-21.
- Colomer, J.M. (ed.) (2011). *Personal Representation. The Neglected Dimension of Electoral Systems*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Cox, G.W. (1997) *Making Votes Count. Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cox, G.W. (1999) Electoral rules and electoral coordination, *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 145-161.
- Cox, G.W. and Shugart, M.S. (1996) Strategic voting under proportional representation, *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 12(2): 299-324.
- Cox, K.E. and Schoppa, L.J. (2002) Interaction effects in mixed-member electoral systems: Theory and evidence from Germany, Japan and Italy, *Comparative Political Studies* 35(9): 1027-1053.
- D'Alimonte, R., Grofman, B., De Sio, L. (2012) *Extending Duverger's Law When Parties become Blocs: Evidence from Italy Under Three Different Electoral Systems, 1945-2010*. Unpublished manuscript.
- Decker, F. (2011) Brauchen wir ein neues Wahlrecht?, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 4/2011: 3-9.
- Detterbeck, K. and Renzsch, W. (2008) Symmetrien und Asymmetrien im bundesstaatlichen Parteienwettbewerb, in Jun, U., Haas, M., and Niedermayer, O. (eds.), *Parteien und Parteiensysteme in den deutschen Ländern*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 39-55.
- Diamond, L.J. and Plattner, M.F. (2006) Introduction, in Diamond, L.J. and Plattner, M.F. (eds.), *Electoral Systems and Democracy*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, ix-xxvi.
- Donno, D. (2013) Elections and democratization in authoritarian regimes, *American Journal of Political Science* 57(3): 703-716.
- Döring, H. and Manow, P. (2012) *Parliament and Government Composition Database (ParlGov): An Infrastructure for Empirical Information on Parties, Elections and Governments in Modern Democracies*. Version 12/10 – 15 October 2012 [computer file]. Date accessed 05/01/2015. Website: <http://parlgov.org/>.
- Doyle, D. and Elgie, R. (2015) Maximizing the reliability of cross-national measures of presidential power, *British Journal of Political Science*, DOI: 10.1017/S0007123414000465.
- Dunleavy, P. and Boucek, F. (2003) Constructing the number of parties, *Party Politics* 9(3): 291-315.

- Dunleavy, P. and Margetts, H. (1995) Understanding the dynamics of electoral reform, *International Political Science Review* 16(1): 9-29.
- Duverger, M. (1954) *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. London: Methuen.
- Duverger, M. (1959) *Die politischen Parteien*. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Duverger, M. (1984) Which is the best electoral system?, in Lijphart, A. and Grofman, B. (eds.), *Choosing an Electoral System. Issues and Alternatives*, New York: Praeger, 31-39.
- Eder, C. and Magin, R. (2008) Wahlsysteme, in Freitag, M. and Vatter, A. (eds.), *Die Demokratien der deutschen Bundesländer. Politische Institutionen im Vergleich*, Opladen: Budrich, 33-62.
- Elgie, R. (2005) France: Stacking the deck, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 119-136.
- Elkins, Z. (2010) Diffusion and the constitutionalization of Europe, *Comparative Political Studies* 43(8-9): 969-999.
- Elklit, J. (1992) The best of both worlds? The Danish electoral system 1915-20 in a comparative perspective, *Electoral Studies* 11(3): 189-205.
- Elklit, J. (2008) The 2007 general election in Lesotho: Abuse of the MMP system?, *Journal of African Elections* 7(1): 10-19.
- Elster, J. (1995) Forces and mechanisms in the constitution-making process, *Duke Law Journal* 45(2): 364-396.
- Farrell, D.M. (2011) *Electoral Systems. A Comparative Introduction*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fearon, J.D. (2003) Ethnic and cultural diversity by country, *Journal of Economic Growth* 8(2): 195-222.
- Ferrara, F. (2006) Two in one: Party competition in the Italian single ballot mixed system, *Electoral Studies* 25(2): 329-350.
- Ferrara, F., Herron, E.S., and Nishikawa, M. (2005) *Mixed Electoral Systems. Contamination and its Consequences*. New York: Palgrave.
- Firth, D. (1993) Bias reduction of maximum likelihood estimates, *Biometrika* 80(1): 27-38.
- Fisher, S.D. and Hobolt, S.B. (2010) Coalition government and electoral accountability, *Electoral Studies* 29(3): 358-369.
- Flinders, M. (2010) Explaining majoritarian modification: The politics of electoral reform in the United Kingdom and British Columbia, *International Political Science Review* 31(1): 41-58.
- Gallagher, M. (1991) Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems, *Electoral Studies* 10(1): 33-51.
- Gallagher, M. (2005a). Ireland: The discrete charm of PR-STV, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 511-532.

- Gallagher, M. (2005b). Conclusion, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 535-578.
- Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.) (2005a). *The Politics of Electoral Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (2005b) Introduction to electoral systems, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3-23.
- Gamson, W.A. (1961) A theory of coalition formation, *American Sociological Review* 26(3): 373-382.
- Gerring, J. (2012) Mere description, *British Journal of Political Science* 42(4): 721-746.
- Geys, B. (2006) District magnitude, social heterogeneity and local party system fragmentation, *Party Politics* 12(2): 281-297.
- Ginsburg, T., Elkins, Z., and Blount, J. (2009) Does the process of constitution-making matter?, *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 5: 201-223.
- Golosov, G.V. (2010) The effective number of parties: A new approach, *Party Politics* 16(2): 171-192.
- Greene, W. (2011) Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition: A magical solution to the problem of time-invariant variables in fixed effects models?, *Political Analysis* 19(2): 135-146.
- Grofman, B. (1989) The comparative analysis of coalition formation and duration: Distinguishing between-country and within-country effect, *British Journal of Political Science* 19(2): 291-302.
- Grotz, F. (2009) Verhältniswahl und Regierbarkeit. Das deutsche Wahlsystem auf dem Prüfstand, *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 19 (Sonderheft Wahlsystemreform): 155-181.
- Gschwend, T. (2007) Ticket-splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules. Evidence from Germany, *European Journal of Political Research* 46(1): 1-23.
- Hand, D.J., Daly, F., McConway, K., Lunn, D., and Ostrowski, E. (1994) *A Handbook of Small Data Sets*. London: Chapman & Hall.
- Harfst, P. (2013) Changing the rules of the game: Determinants of successful electoral system change in Central and Eastern Europe, *International Political Science Review* 34(4): 427-443.
- Hesse, C. (2013) Wahlrecht 2013 mit Schattenseiten, *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 44(1): 177-200.
- Heinze, G. and Schemper, M. (2002) A solution to the problem of separation in logistic regression, *Statistics in Medicine* 21(16): 2409-2419.
- Hirczy, W. (1995) Explaining near-universal turnout: The case of Malta, *European Journal of Political Research* 27(2): 255-272.
- Hirji, K.F. (2005) *Exact Analysis of Discrete Data*. Boca Raton: Chapman and Hall.
- Hirji, K.F., Mehta, C.R., and Patel, N.R. (1987) Computing distributions for exact logistic regression, *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 82(400): 1110-1117.

- Hobolt, S., Tilley, J., and Banducci, S. (2013) Clarity of responsibility: How government cohesion conditions performance voting, *European Journal of Political Research* 52(2): 164-187.
- Hooghe, L., Marks, G., and Schakel, A.H. (2010) *The Rise of Regional Authority: A Comparative Study of 42 Countries*. London: Routledge.
- Hopkin, J. (2005) Spain: Proportional representation with majoritarian outcomes, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 375-394.
- Huber, S. (2012) *Strukturen des politischen Kontexts und die demokratische Kompetenz der Wähler: Experimentelle Studien zur Urteils- und Entscheidungsbildung*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Jacobs, K., and Leyenaar, M. (2011) A conceptual framework for major, minor, and technical electoral reform, *West European Politics* 34(3), 495-513.
- James, P. (1988) The Bavarian electoral system, *Electoral Studies* 7(1): 33-39.
- Jenkins Commission (1998) *Voting Systems: The Jenkins Report*. Research Paper 98/112. London: House of Commons Library.
- Jesse, E. (2009) Verhältniswahl und Gerechtigkeit, *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 19 (Sonderheft Wahlsystemreform): 105-131.
- Kaase, M. (1984) Personalized proportional representation: The "model" of the West German electoral system, in Lijphart, A. and Grofman, B. (eds.), *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives*, New York: Praeger, 155-164.
- Kaiser, A. (2002) Gemischte Wahlsysteme. Ein Vorschlag zur typologischen Einordnung, *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 12(4): 1545-1571.
- Katz, R.S. (1997) *Democracy and Elections*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Katz, R.S. (2005) Why are there so many (or so few) electoral reforms?, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 57-76.
- Klingemann, H.D. and Weßels, B. (2001) The political consequences of Germany's mixed-member system: Personalization at the grass roots?, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 279-296.
- Kostadinova, T. (2002) Do mixed electoral systems matter? A cross-national analysis of their effects in Eastern Europe, *Electoral Studies* 21(1): 23-34.
- Laakso, M. and Taagepera, R. (1979) "Effective" number of parties: A measure with application to West Europe, *Comparative Political Studies* 12(1): 3-27.
- Lange, E.H.M. (1975) *Wahlrecht und Innenpolitik: Entstehungsgeschichte und Analyse der Wahlgesetzgebung und Wahlrechtsdiskussion im westlichen Nachkriegsdeutschland 1945-1956*. Meisenheim am Glan: Hain.
- Larkin, P. (2011) The politics of coalition in Scotland, *Political Science* 63(1): 61-78.
- Larsson, R. (1993) Case survey methodology: Quantitative analysis of patterns across case studies, *The Academy of Management Journal* 36(6): 1515-1546.

- Larsson, R. and Finkelstein, S. (1999) Integrating strategic, organizational, and human resource perspectives on mergers and acquisitions: A case survey of synergy realization, *Organization Science* 10(1): 1-26.
- LeDuc, L. (2011) Electoral reforms and direct democracy in Canada: When citizens become involved, *West European Politics* 34(3): 551-567.
- Lijphart, A. (1984) Trying to have the best of both worlds: Semi-proportional and mixed systems, in Lijphart, A. and Grofman, B. (eds.), *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives*, New York: Praeger, 207-213.
- Lijphart, A. (1986) Proportionality by non-PR methods: Ethnic representation in Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, New Zealand, West Germany, and Zimbabwe, in Grofman, B. and Lijphart, A. (eds.), *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences*, New York: Agathon, 113-123.
- Lijphart, A. (1991) Constitutional choices for new democracies, *Journal of Democracy* 2(1): 72-84.
- Lijphart, A. (1994) *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lijphart, A. (1999) *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lijphart, A. and Grofman, B. (eds.) (1984a) *Choosing an Electoral System. Issues and Alternatives*. New York: Praeger.
- Lijphart, A. and Grofman, B. (1984b) Choosing an electoral system, in Lijphart, A. and Grofman, B. (eds.), *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives*, New York: Praeger, 3-12.
- Linhart, E. (2009) Mögliche Auswirkungen von Grabenwahlsystemen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Theoretische Überlegungen und Simulationen, *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 40(3): 637-660.
- Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. (eds.) (1967) *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: Free Press.
- Loosemore, J. and Hanby, V.J. (1971) The theoretical limits of maximum distortion: Some analytic expressions for electoral systems, *British Journal of Political Science* 1(4): 467-477.
- Lundberg, T.C. (2009) Post-communism and the abandonment of mixed-member electoral systems, *Representation* 45(1): 15-27.
- Lundberg, T.C. (2013) Politics is still an adversarial business: Minority government and mixed-member proportional representation in Scotland and in New Zealand, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 15(4): 609-25.
- Lutz, G. (2004) Switzerland: Introducing proportional representation from below, in Colomer, J.M. (ed.), *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 279-293.
- Mahoney, J. (2007) Qualitative methodology and comparative politics, *Comparative Political Studies* 40(2): 122-144.

- Manow, P. (2010) Dimensionen der Disproportionalität – Erststimmen und Direktmandate in den Bundestagswahlen von 1953 bis 2009, *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 51(3): 433-455.
- Marshall, M.G., Gurr, T.R., and Jagers, K. (2012) *Polity IV Project. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012*. Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace.
- Marshall, M.G., Gurr, T.R., and Jagers, K. (2014) *Polity IV Project. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013*. Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace.
- Martin, C.W. (2009) Towards an explanation of electoral rules change, *CEU Political Science Journal* 4(2): 162-191.
- Martin, C.W. and Steiner, N.D. (2015) Economic globalization and the change of electoral rules, *Constitutional Political Economy*: forthcoming.
- Massicotte, L. (2003) To create or to copy? Electoral systems in the German Länder, *German Politics* 12(1): 1-22.
- Massicotte, L. (2005) Canada: Sticking to first-past-the-post, for the time being, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 99-118.
- Massicotte, L., and Blais, A. (1999) Mixed electoral systems: A conceptual and empirical survey, *Electoral Studies* 18(3): 341-66.
- Massicotte, L. and Blais, A. (2000) Mixed electoral systems, in Rose, Richard (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of Elections*, London: Macmillan, 165-171.
- Melton, J., Elkins, Z., Ginsburg, T., and Leetanu, K. (2013) On the interpretability of law: Lessons from the decoding of national constitutions, *British Journal of Political Science* 43(2): 399-423.
- Mielke, S. and Reutter, W. (eds.) (2004) *Länderparlamentarismus in Deutschland. Geschichte - Struktur - Funktionen*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.
- Molinar, J. (1991) Counting the number of parties: An alternative index, *American Political Science Review* 85(4): 1383-1391.
- Monroe, B.L. (1994) Disproportionality and malapportionment: Measuring electoral inequity, *Electoral Studies* 13(2): 132-149.
- Monroe, B.L. (2003) Mixed-member electoral systems: The best of both worlds? Edited by Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg, *Perspectives on Politics* 1(2): 442-443.
- Monroe, B.L. and Rose, A.G. (2002) Electoral systems and unimagined consequences: Partisan effects of districted proportional representation, *American Journal of Political Science* 46(1): 67-89.
- Morgenstern, S. and Vázquez-D'Elía, J. (2007) Electoral laws, parties, and party systems in Latin America, *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 143-168.
- Morgenstern, S., Swindle, S.M., and Castagnola, A. (2009) Party nationalization and institutions, *Journal of Politics* 71(4): 1322-1341.
- Moser, R.G. and Scheiner, E. (2012) *Electoral Systems and Political Context. How the Effects of Rules Vary Across New and Established Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Müller, W.C. (2005) Austria: A complex electoral system with subtle effects, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 397-416.
- Nagel, J.H. (2004) New Zealand: Reform by (nearly) immaculate design, in Colomer, J.M. (ed.), *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 222-236.
- Niedermayer, O. (2010) Von der Zweiparteiendominanz zum Pluralismus: Die Entwicklung des deutschen Parteiensystems im westeuropäischen Vergleich, *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 51(1): 1-13.
- Nikolenyi, C. (2011) When electoral reform fails: The stability of proportional representation in post-communist democracies, *West European Politics* 34(3): 607-625.
- Nishikawa, M. and Herron, E. S. (2004) Mixed electoral rules' impact on party systems, *Electoral Studies* 23(4): 753-768.
- Nohlen, D. (1978) *Wahlssysteme der Welt: Daten und Analysen*. München: Piper.
- Nohlen, D. (1984) Two incompatible principles of representation, in Lijphart, A. and Grofman, B. (eds.), *Choosing an Electoral System. Issues and Alternatives*, New York: Praeger, 83-89.
- Nohlen, D. (ed.) (1999) *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nohlen, D. (ed.) (2005) *Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nohlen, D. (2009a) *Wahlrecht und Parteiensystem. Zur Theorie und Empirie der Wahlssysteme*. Opladen: Budrich.
- Nohlen, D. (2009b) Wahlssysteme in Reformprozessen, *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 19 (Sonderheft Wahlssystemreform): 45-80.
- Nohlen, D. (2009c) Erfolgswertgleichheit als fixe Idee oder: Zurück zu Weimar? Zum Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts über das Bundeswahlgesetz vom 3. Juli 2008, *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 40(1): 179-195.
- Nohlen, D. and Stöver, P. (eds.) (2010) *Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Norris, P. (1997) Choosing electoral systems: Proportional, majoritarian and mixed systems, *International Political Science Review* 18(3): 297-312.
- Norris, P. (2000) Women: Representation and electoral systems, in Rose, R. (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of Elections*, London: Macmillan, 348-351.
- Norris, P. (2004) *Electoral Engineering. Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, P. (2011) Cultural explanations of electoral reform: A policy cycle model, *West European Politics* 34(3): 531-550.
- Ordeshook, P.C. and Shvetsova, O.V. (1994) Ethnic heterogeneity, district magnitude, and the number of parties, *American Journal of Political Science* 38(1): 100-123.

- Pappi, F.U. and Herrmann, M. (2010) Überhangmandate ohne negatives Stimmgewicht: Machbarkeit, Wirkungen, Beurteilung, *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 41(2): 260-278.
- Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2003) *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Pickel, S. and Pickel, G. (2012) Die Messung von Indizes in der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft – methodologische Spitzfindigkeit oder substantielle Notwendigkeit, *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 6(1 Supplement): 1-17.
- Pinto-Duschinsky, M. (1999) Send the rascals packing: Defects of proportional representation and the virtues of the Westminster model, *Representation* 36(2): 117-126.
- Potter, J.D. (2014) Demographic diversity and district-level party systems, *Comparative Political Studies* 47(13): 1801-1829.
- Powell, G. Bingham (2000) *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Powell, G.B. and Vanberg, G.S. (2000) Election laws, disproportionality and median correspondence: Implications for two visions of democracy, *British Journal of Political Science* 30(3): 383-411.
- Przeworski, A., Stokes, S.C., and Manin, B. (1999) *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Prittwitz, V. (2011) Hat Deutschland ein demokratisches Wahlsystem?, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 4/2011: 9-14.
- Proctor, J.H. (1980) The acceptance of proportional representation in Malta, *Parliamentary Affairs* 33(1): 308-321.
- Raabe, J. (2014) *PR Electoral Systems and Party System Linkage – how larger Districts Alleviate the Regionalization and Inflation of the Party System in Decentralized Polities*. IPSA Conference Paper (IPSA World Congress 2014, Montréal).
- Raabe, J. (2015) When it pays to lose: The fundamental flaw of the positive vote transfer electoral system. A comment on 'Daniel Bochler. 2014. Which mixed-member proportional electoral formula fits you best? Assessing the proportionality principle of positive vote transfer systems. *Representation* 50(1): 113-127.', *Representation*: forthcoming.
- Rae, D.W. (1967) *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Rahat, G. (2011) The politics of electoral reform: The state of research, *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties* 21(4): 523-543.
- Rahat, G. and Hazan, R.Y. (2005) Israel: The politics of an extreme electoral system, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 333-351.
- Rashkova, E.R. (2014) Ethnic heterogeneity and party system size: A district-level analysis, *Comparative European Politics* 12(3): 249-278.

- Reed, S.R. (2005) Japan: Haltingly towards a two-party system, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 277-293.
- Renwick, A. (2010) *The Politics of Electoral Reform. Changing the Rules of Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Renwick, A. (2011) Electoral reform in Europe since 1945, *West European Politics* 34(3): 456-477.
- Reynolds, A., Reilly, B., and Ellis, A. (2005) *Electoral System Design. The New International IDEA Handbook*. Stockholm: International IDEA.
- Riker, W.H. (1982) *Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice*. San Francisco: Freeman.
- Rose, R. (1983) Elections and electoral systems: Choices and alternatives, in Bogdanor, V. and Butler, D. (eds.), *Democracy and Elections. Electoral Systems and their Political Consequences*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20-45.
- Rose, R. (1984) Electoral systems: A question of degree or principle?, in Lijphart, A. and Grofman, B. (eds.), *Choosing an Electoral System. Issues and Alternatives*, New York: Praeger, 73-81.
- Rozenas, A. (2012) A statistical model for party-systems analysis, *Political Analysis* 20(2): 235-247.
- Saalfeld, T. (2005) Germany: Stability and strategy in a mixed-member proportional system, Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 209-229.
- Sakamoto, T. (1999) Explaining electoral reform. Japan versus Italy and New Zealand, *Party Politics* 5(4): 419-438.
- Sartori, G. (1970) Concept misformation in comparative politics, *American Political Science Review* 64(4): 1033-1053.
- Sartori, G. (1976) *Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sartori, G. (1994) *Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes*. New York: New York University Press.
- Sartori, G. (1997) *Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry Into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes (Second Edition)*. New York: New York University Press.
- Scarrow, S.E. (2001) Germany: The mixed-member system as a compromise, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 55-69.
- Scheiner, E. (2008) Does electoral system reform work? Electoral system lessons from reforms of the 1990s, *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 161-181.
- Schmitt-Beck, R. (2012) Empirische Wahlforschung in Deutschland: Stand und Perspektiven zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts, *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 45 (Sonderheft Wählen in Deutschland): 2-38.

- Schoen, H. (2005) Wahlsystemforschung, in Falter, J.W. and Schoen, H. (eds.), *Handbuch Wahlforschung*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag: 573-607.
- Schoen, H. (2007) Eine optimale Lösung? Eine Replik auf Gerd Strohmeier in Heft 3/2007 der Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 38(4): 862-865.
- Sgouraki Kinsey, B. and Shvetsova, O. (2008) Applying the methodology of mechanism design to the choice of electoral systems, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 20(3): 303-327.
- Shikano, S. (2006) Bootstrap und Jackknife, in Behnke, J., Gschwend, T., Schindler, D., and Schnapp, K.U. (eds.), *Methoden der Politikwissenschaft*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 69-79.
- Shugart, M.S. (2001a) Electoral “efficiency” and the move to mixed-member systems, *Electoral Studies* 20(2): 173-193.
- Shugart, M.S. (2001b) “Extreme” electoral systems and the appeal of the mixed-member alternative, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 25-51.
- Shugart, M.S. (2005) Comparative electoral systems research: The maturation of a field and new challenges ahead, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 25-55.
- Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.) (2001a) *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (2001b) Mixed-member electoral systems: A definition and typology, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 9-24.
- Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (2001c). Conclusion: Are mixed-member systems the best of both worlds?, in Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 571-596.
- Singer, M.M. and Stephenson, L.B. (2009) The political context and Duverger's theory: Evidence at the district level, *Electoral Studies* 28(3): 480-491.
- Steiner, J. (1971) The principles of majority and proportionality, *British Journal of Political Science* 1(1): 63-70.
- Stoll, H. (2013) *Changing Societies, Changing Party Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Strohmeier, G. (2007) Ein Plädoyer für die „gemäßigte Mehrheitswahl“: Optimale Lösung für Deutschland, Vorbild für Österreich und andere Demokratien, *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 38(3): 578-590.
- Strohmeier, G. (2009) Vergangene und zukünftige Reformen des deutschen Wahlsystems, *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 19 (Sonderheft Wahlsystemreform): 11-44.
- Supreme Court (1991) *Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.)*. Judgment ([1991] 2 S.C.R. 158) of the Supreme Court of Canada.

- Taagepera, R. (1997) Effective number of parties for incomplete data, *Electoral Studies* 16(2): 145-151.
- Taagepera, R. (1999a) *Designing Electoral Rules and Waiting for an Electoral System to Evolve*. Paper prepared for the international conference on "Constitutional Design 2000", University of Notre Dame.
- Taagepera, R. (1999b) Supplementing the effective number of parties, *Electoral Studies* 18(4): 497-504.
- Taagepera, R. (2005) Conservation of balance in the size of parties, *Party Politics* 11(3): 283-298.
- Taagepera, R. (2007) *Predicting Party Sizes. The Logic of Simple Electoral Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Taagepera, R. and Grofman, B. (2003) Mapping the indices of seats-votes disproportionality and inter-election volatility, *Party Politics* 9(6): 659-677.
- Taagepera, R. and Shugart, M.S. (1989) *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Taagepera, R. and Shugart, M.S. (1993) Predicting the number of parties: A quantitative model of Duverger's mechanical effect, *American Political Science Review* 87(2): 455-464.
- Trefs, M. (2003) Voter confusion in German federal elections: The Baden-Württemberg electoral system as a possible alternative, *German Politics* 12(3): 82-106.
- Trefs, M. (2008) Die Wahlsysteme der Länder, in Hildebrandt, D. and Wolf, F. (eds.), *Die Politik der Bundesländer. Staatstätigkeit im Vergleich*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 331-344.
- Vowles, J. (2005) New Zealand: The consolidation of reform?, in Gallagher, M. Mitchell, P. (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 295-312.
- Wahl, N. (1959) The French constitution of 1958: II. The initial draft and its origins, *American Political Science Review* 53(2): 358-382.
- Warwick, P.V. and Druckman, J.N. (2006) The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship, *European Journal of Political Research* 45(4): 635-665.
- Weinmann, P. (2013) Führt das Wahlrecht zur „Aufblähung“ des Bundestages? Simulationsrechnungen auf Basis des neuen Bundeswahlgesetzes, *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 44(4): 719-741.

Deutsche Zusammenfassung

Wahlen sind der zentrale Mechanismus über den in einer Demokratie der Wählerwille in das Parlament übertragen wird. Zentral verantwortlich für diese Umwandlung von Wählerpräferenzen in parlamentarische Kräfteverhältnisse ist das Wahlsystem, welches Stimmenverteilungen in Sitzverteilungen transformiert. Wegen dieser zentralen Aufgabe ist ein gutes Funktionieren des Wahlsystems eine wesentliche Voraussetzung für das Funktionieren eines demokratischen politischen Systems insgesamt. Mit Blick auf die Funktionalität eines Wahlsystems stehen zwei Kernfunktionen im Fokus. Zum einen die Repräsentationsfunktion und die Frage, inwiefern das Wahlsystem dafür sorgt, dass der Wählerwille angemessen im Parlament abgebildet wird; zum anderen die Konzentrationsfunktion und die Frage, ob auf Basis der Sitzverteilung im Parlament eine klare und direkt auf das Wahlergebnis folgende Regierungsbildung ermöglicht wird. Die Erfüllung der Repräsentations- und der Konzentrationsfunktion stehen jedoch in einem Zielkonflikt, dessen erfolgreiche Auflösung die zentrale Herausforderung für das Design von Wahlsystemen bedeutet. Der Zielkonflikt besteht deshalb, weil eine zunehmende Repräsentativität des Parlaments typischerweise die Anwesenheit einer größeren Zahl verschiedener Parteien und Kandidaten erfordert, was wiederum die Regierungsbildung erschwert. Gleichzeitig sorgen restriktive Wahlsysteme, welche – zur Erfüllung der Konzentrationsfunktion – hohe Hürden für die parlamentarische Repräsentation vorsehen, oft dafür, dass der Wählerwille verzerrt bzw. teilweise völlig ignoriert wird. Wegen der Wichtigkeit sowohl der Repräsentations- als auch der Konzentrationsfunktion für das Funktionieren einer Demokratie sollte ein optimales Wahlsystem in der Lage sein, den Zielkonflikt möglichst weitgehend zu entschärfen, indem es beide zentralen Funktionen zu einem hohen Grad erfüllt. Die vorliegende Dissertation befasst sich mit der Frage, ob – und vor allem welche – Wahlsysteme in der Lage sind, für eine genaue Abbildung der Wählerinteressen im Parlament zu sorgen und dabei gleichzeitig klare Regierungsmehrheiten durch eine Konzentration des Parteiensystems zu fördern.

Reine Wahlsystemtypen werden jeweils einseitig mit der erfolgreichen Erfüllung einer Funktion aber schwacher Erfüllung der jeweils anderen verbunden. Reine Verhältniswahlsysteme sorgen für hohe Repräsentativität, erschweren aber häufig die Regierungsbildung. Reine Mehrheitswahlsysteme konzentrieren das Parteiensystem, jedoch basierend auf starken Verzerrungen des Wählerwillens. Was den zentralen Zielkonflikt zwischen Repräsentations- und Konzentrationsfunktion angeht, wird hier erwartet, dass Mischwahlsysteme – welche Elemente der reinen Wahlsystemtypen kombinieren – in der Lage sind, diesen erfolgreich zu bewältigen. Indem entweder Mehrheitswahl und Verhältniswahl in verschiedenen Ebenen desselben Wahlsystems oder kleinere Wahlkreisgrößen genutzt werden, können nach dieser Erwartung im Idealfall Repräsentations- und Konzentrationsfunktion gleichzeitig erfüllt werden. Auch weil Mischwahlsysteme sich bei Reformern weltweit immer größerer Beliebtheit erfreuen, ist eine ausführliche Untersuchung deren Potenzials in dieser Hinsicht dringend erforderlich. Diese Dissertation liefert hierzu eine umfassende, international vergleichende Analyse. Diese Analyse wird neben der Frage, ob und wann Mischwahlsysteme tatsächlich das „Beste beider Welten“ erreichen auch berücksichtigen, inwiefern die Verwendung von Mischwahlsystemen ein Risiko

bedeutet, indem diese auch die Gefahr erhöhen, keine der zentralen Funktionen erfolgreich zu erfüllen.

Kapitel 2 – Literaturüberblick

Während die Wahlsystemforschung insgesamt definitiv weit fortgeschritten ist, was die Untersuchung von reinen Wahlsystemen und deren Erfüllung der Repräsentations- und Konzentrationsfunktion anbetrifft, kann selbiges nicht für Mischwahlsysteme und insbesondere nicht für die Frage nach der gleichzeitigen Erfüllung beider Funktionen behauptet werden. Eine dezidierte Auseinandersetzung mit dieser Frage scheint vor allem auch deshalb angebracht, weil die bisherige Forschung zu Mischwahlsystemen deutlich gezeigt hat, dass diese – entgegen ursprünglicher Erwartungen – in den seltensten Fällen wie simple Kompromisse zwischen reinen Wahlsystemtypen funktionieren.

Der erste wichtige Schritt, den die bisherige Forschung unternommen hat, bestand darin, die dichotome Sichtweise auf Wahlsysteme aufzubrechen und zu berücksichtigen, dass sowohl die Repräsentations- als auch die Konzentrationsfunktion jeweils nicht nur absolut, sondern zu einem gewissen Grad erfüllt werden können. Diese Abweichung von einer dichotomen Weltsicht, in der die Entscheidung für ein bestimmtes Wahlsystem auch eine Entscheidung für die Erfüllung einer der beiden Funktionen auf Kosten der jeweils anderen bedeutet, hat den Blick für die mögliche Überlegenheit gemischter Wahlsysteme geöffnet. Letztere sollten in der Lage sein, das „Beste beider Welten“ zu erreichen, indem sie von einem einfachen linearen Zielkonflikt zwischen Repräsentations- und Konzentrationsfunktion abweichen. Gleichzeitig warnen diverse Autoren jedoch auch davor, dass das Abweichen von einem linearen Zielkonflikt ebenfalls bedeuten kann, dass Mischwahlsysteme besonders schlecht geeignet sind, um als Kerninstitution einer Demokratie zu fungieren. Diese könnten Gefahr laufen, weder die Repräsentations- noch die Konzentrationsfunktion zufriedenstellend zu erfüllen und damit sogar hinter die einseitige Funktionalität von reinen Wahlsystemtypen zurückfallen.

Ein effizientes Funktionieren von Mischwahlsystemen erfolgt laut bestehender Theorien durch die Stärkung von Koordinationsanreizen in ansonsten weitgehend proportionalen Wahlsystemen. Durch das Vorhandensein einer Mehrheitswahlebene in einem gemischten Wahlsystem oder moderate Wahlkreisgrößen werden Parteien dazu angehalten, sich in Blöcken bzw. Koalitionen zu formieren und Wähler darauf fokussiert, nur aussichtsreichste Optionen zu wählen. So erfolgt eine Konzentration des Parteiensystems während – befördert auch durch die Koordination unter Wählern und Parteien – Stimmen in relativ akkurater Weise in parlamentarische Stärkeverhältnisse übertragen werden. Konkrete Vorschläge aus der Literatur sind dabei Mischwahlsysteme, welche Mehrheits- und Verhältniswahl in verschiedenen (kompensatorisch verbundenen oder unverbundenen bzw. parallelen) Ebenen anwenden sowie die Anwendung von Verhältniswahlregeln in Wahlkreisen moderater Größe (ca. drei bis neun Sitze pro Wahlkreis). Unter den Wahlsystemen, die Mehrheits- und Verhältniswahl in verschiedenen Ebenen einsetzen, wurden insbesondere diejenigen als besonders geeignet hervorgehoben, in welchen die

Verhältniswahlebene durch die Mehrheitswahlebene hervorgerufene Verzerrungen zum Teil kompensiert (etwa das deutsche Wahlsystem).

Der Literaturüberblick zeigt neben den bisherigen zentralen Erkenntnissen jedoch auch mehrere große Lücken auf, die durch diese Dissertation geschlossen werden sollen. Erstens fehlt es bis jetzt an einem breit angelegten, internationalen Vergleich aller Wahlsystemtypen mit Blick auf die gleichzeitige Erfüllung von Repräsentations- und Konzentrationsfunktion – die bisherige Forschung verbleibt zu oft bei Einzelfallanalysen bzw. betrachtet nur bestimmte Wahlsystemtypen. Zweitens fehlt es an einer Typologie, welche berücksichtigt, dass Mischwahlsysteme aus einer Vielzahl von technischen Kombinationen bestehen können sowie dass diese Wahlsysteme mit verschiedenen Repräsentationsprinzipien bzw. übergeordneten Zielen verbunden sein können. Drittens verbleibt die bisherige Forschung weitgehend bei der Analyse allgemeiner Typen von Wahlsystemen und ignoriert häufig die Relevanz spezifischer technischer Details (z.B. gesetzliche Sperrklauseln) und deren genauer Kombination. Viertens müssen neben den Chancen von Mischwahlsystemen, das „Beste beider Welten“ zu erreichen, auch explizit die Risiken berücksichtigt werden, tatsächlich gerade das Gegenteil zu bewirken. Und zuletzt werden bisher zwar bereits Einflüsse soziopolitischer Rahmenbedingungen – etwa der Sozialstruktur eines Landes – auf die verschiedenen Funktionen eines Wahlsystems berücksichtigt, dabei aber ignoriert, dass bereits der Entstehungskontext eines Wahlsystems für dessen späteres Wirken entscheidend ist. Der Frage, ob das Wahlsystem ein allgemein akzeptiertes Repräsentationsprinzip besitzt und mit Blick auf dieses entworfen wurde, wird bis jetzt zu Unrecht nur wenig Bedeutung beigemessen.

Kapitel 3 – Eine Typologie

Das Problem bestehender Typologien von Wahlsystemen besteht darin, dass diese sich entweder einseitig an der technischen Ausgestaltung oder dem Repräsentationsprinzip eines Wahlsystems orientieren. Erstere nutzen dabei ausgewählte technische Elemente (in der Regel das Vorhandensein verschiedener Ebenen, die Wahlkreisgröße und den Verrechnungmodus), um zwischen Wahlsystemen zu unterscheiden und Mischwahlsysteme zu identifizieren. Problematisch ist hier, dass verschiedene Typologien ein und dasselbe Wahlsystem teilweise als Mischwahlsystem und teilweise als reines Wahlsystem einstufen und so als Grundlage für eine vergleichende Analyse aller Wahlsysteme wenig geeignet sind. Typologien, welche sich am Repräsentationsprinzip – also am von der technischen Ausgestaltung zumindest theoretisch unabhängigen Gesamtziel eines Wahlsystems – orientieren, verbleiben bis jetzt bei einem überholten, dichotomen Verständnis, indem das Repräsentationsprinzip entweder das der proportionalen Abbildung der Interessen der Wählerschaft oder die Konzentration des Parteiensystems sein kann. Diese dichotome Sichtweise verbleibt blind gegenüber Wahlsystemen, die etwa eine gleichzeitige Erfüllung bzw. eine Balance beider Funktionen anstreben. Es fehlt insgesamt also an einer Typologie, die sowohl die technische Ausgestaltung als auch das Repräsentationsprinzip eines Wahlsystems berücksichtigt und dabei diese beiden Dimensionen jeweils als kontinuierlich begreift.

Die hier entwickelte Typologie bildet eine Synthese aus den bisherigen, oben skizzierten Ansätzen und kann flexibel an verschiedene spezifische Forschungsfragen angepasst werden. Die Typologie begreift Wahlsysteme als multi-dimensionale Konstrukte, die sich in der technischen Dimension zwischen den Regeln der reinen Verhältniswahl und denen der reinen Mehrheitswahl und in der Dimension des Repräsentationsprinzips zwischen den Polen Proportionalität und Konzentration bewegen können. Dabei können polare technische Ausgestaltungen theoretisch mit gemischten Prinzipien kombiniert werden und umgekehrt – es erfolgt keine deterministische Verbindung zwischen beiden Dimensionen. Dieser allgemeine typologische Rahmen wird vor dem Hintergrund der Fragestellung der Dissertation in der technischen Dimension spezifiziert, indem die technischen Sub-Dimensionen des Verrechnungsmodus (z.B. relative bzw. absolute Mehrheit der Stimmen im Wahlkreis; proportionale Methoden wie etwa d'Hondt), der Wahlkreisgröße, der gesetzlichen Sperrklausel und der Kompensation durch zusätzliche Wahlebenen für die genaue Einstufung von Wahlsystemen genutzt werden. So kann jedes Wahlsystem als technisches Gesamtkonstrukt eingeschätzt werden, ohne den Blick für die Kombination technischer Details zu verlieren.

Die Einordnung verschiedener Fallbeispiele zeigt, dass die multi-dimensionale Typologie von Wahlsystemen eine fruchtbare Basis für weitere Analysen bietet und insbesondere das Repräsentationsprinzip zusätzlich zur technischen Ausgestaltung berücksichtigt werden sollte, um Wahlsysteme umfassend einschätzen zu können. Die Fallbeispiele Japan, Litauen und Spanien machen etwa deutlich, dass dasselbe Repräsentationsprinzip einer Balance von Proportionalität und Konzentration mit verschiedensten technischen Ausgestaltungen zu erreichen versucht wird. Die Typologie erlaubt es also, alle praktisch vorkommenden sowie theoretisch möglichen Wahlsysteme detailgetreu abzubilden und über die Betrachtung deren Repräsentationsprinzips differenziert zu beschreiben. Die Typologie liefert damit die benötigte Grundlage für einen umfassenden Vergleich von Wahlsystemen, der Mischwahlsysteme in den Mittelpunkt stellt. Insbesondere ist hervorzuheben, dass die Typologie über die gleichzeitige Berücksichtigung der Dimensionen der technischen Ausgestaltung, die vor allem in komparativen Studien mit großer Fallzahl im Fokus steht, und des Repräsentationsprinzips, dessen Betrachtung vor allem in Einzelfallstudien stattfindet, einen gemeinsamen Bezugsrahmen für quantitativ- und qualitativ-orientierte Forschungsansätze bietet.

Kapitel 4 – Verfassungen und Repräsentationsprinzipien

Während die Relevanz des Repräsentationsprinzips für ein jedes Wahlsystem deutlich ist, mangelt es jedoch an geeigneten Quellen, um das Repräsentationsprinzip eines Wahlsystems ohne größeren Aufwand festzustellen – dies hat auch die Einordnung der Fallbeispiele im vorherigen Kapitel gezeigt. Daher wird in diesem Kapitel untersucht, was Verfassungen über das Repräsentationsprinzip eines Wahlsystems aussagen und ob sich Verfassungen als allgemeine Quelle für die Erfassung von Repräsentationsprinzipien eignen.

Da die Entscheidung für ein Repräsentationsprinzip, also ein übergeordnetes, generelles Ziel für das Wahlsystem, eine wegweisende Stellung für den institutionellen Aufbau eines politischen Systems insgesamt einnimmt, gehen diverse Autoren davon aus, dass dieses Repräsentationsprinzip entsprechend in der Verfassung verankert ist. Die empirische Analyse untersucht dabei die im Jahr 2013 gültigen Verfassungen von 86 Demokratien auf Passagen, welche über die generellen Ziele bzw. Prinzipien des jeweiligen Wahlsystems Auskunft geben.

Die Ergebnisse zeigen in erster Linie, dass Verfassungen keineswegs typischerweise Informationen zum Wahlsystem, geschweige denn zum dazugehörigen Repräsentationsprinzip enthalten : Nur in 26 der 86 untersuchten Verfassungen ist ein solches normatives Ziel für das Wahlsystem festgehalten. Für die Verfassungen, welche ein Repräsentationsprinzip enthalten, zeigt sich, dass vor allem das Ziel der proportionalen Abbildung von Wählerinteressen (sowie die Inklusion von Minderheiten) in die Verfassung aufgenommen wird. Weiterhin wird deutlich, dass es ebenfalls gemischte Repräsentationsprinzipien gibt, welche auf eine Balance der Ziele Proportionalität und Konzentration abzielen. Auch die Verbindung unterschiedlicher technischer Ausgestaltungen mit demselben Repräsentationsprinzip weist auf die Relevanz der Dimension des Repräsentationsprinzips und dessen kontinuierliche Natur hin. Mit Blick auf den Einfluss der Präsenz eines Repräsentationsprinzips innerhalb der Verfassung sorgt diese für eine größere Resistenz des Wahlsystems gegenüber Reformen.

Die empirische Analyse hebt außerdem hervor, dass das Vorhandensein eines Repräsentationsprinzips insbesondere dann wahrscheinlich ist, wenn Parteien und sonstige an der Reform des Wahlsystems beteiligte Akteure auf generelle Ziele fokussiert und an einer Konsenslösung interessiert sind. Im Umkehrschluss bedeutet dies, dass Repräsentationsprinzipien durchaus vollkommen abwesend sein können, insbesondere dort, wo Parteien in komplexen Verhandlungen zu Kompromissentwürfen kommen, die kein bestimmtes Ziel besitzen (wie etwa der Fall in diversen osteuropäischen Ländern nach der Auflösung der Sowjetunion). Diese Unterscheidung ist insbesondere für Mischwahlsysteme relevant, die in einigen Fällen nicht etwa auf eine erfolgreiche Balance der polaren Repräsentationsprinzipien abzielen, sondern gar kein genuines Leitprinzip besitzen. Um solche Unterschiede im Hinblick auf das Repräsentationsprinzip trennscharf feststellen zu können ist eine Analyse von Verfassungstexten allerdings nur ein Anfang. Für eine weitergehende Betrachtung der Dimension des Repräsentationsprinzips und dessen potentielle Abwesenheit ist eine umfassende Berücksichtigung der Fallstudien notwendig, welche sich direkt mit der Entstehung des jeweiligen Wahlsystems auseinandersetzen.

Kapitel 5 – Theoretische Erwartungen

Ausgehend von der in Kapitel 3 entwickelten Typologie hängt die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Wahlsystems, sowohl die Repräsentations- als auch die Konzentrationsfunktion erfolgreich zu erfüllen von dessen technischer Ausgestaltung und, damit zusammenhängend, dem Repräsentationsprinzip ab.

Was die technische Ausgestaltung eines Wahlsystems anbetrifft ist es wichtig, nicht bloß generelle Design-Vorschläge zu untersuchen, sondern den Fokus auf einzelne technische Details und deren Kombination zu legen. Nur auf diese Weise können Implikationen für das Design von Wahlsystemen geliefert werden, die die ganze Bandbreite an Ausgestaltungsmöglichkeiten eines Wahlsystems berücksichtigen. Die für ein effizientes Funktionieren des Wahlsystems nötige Kombination aus Koordinationsanreizen und proportionalen Elementen kann so etwa nicht nur mittels moderater Wahlkreisgrößen erreicht werden, sondern ebenfalls mit Hilfe einer gesetzlichen Sperrklausel, welche theoretisch ähnlich wirkt wie die aus der Wahlkreisgröße resultierende natürliche Hürde. Wie moderate Wahlkreisgrößen liefern gesetzliche Hürden klare Anreize zur Koordination, bedeuten dabei jedoch typischerweise keine massiven Verzerrungen des Wählerwillens. Genauso greift für Mischwahlsysteme mit Mehrheits- und Verhältniswahlebene eine Unterteilung in parallele und kompensatorische Mischwahlsysteme zu kurz. Je nachdem, wie hoch der Anteil der in den verschiedenen Ebenen vergebenen Sitze ist, kann ein kompensatorisches Mischwahlsystem deutlich näher an der reinen Mehrheitswahl liegen als ein paralleles Mischwahlsystem. Gleichzeitig ist davon auszugehen, dass kompensatorische Mischwahlsysteme eher geeignet sind, das „Beste beider Welten“ zu erreichen, wenn das bloße Vorhandensein einer Mehrheitswahlebene bereits einen starken Koordinationseffekt ausübt und das Parteiensystem ausreichend konzentriert. Weiterhin zu berücksichtigen sind technische Details wie die Anzahl der Stimmen in Wahlsystemen mit mehreren Ebenen. Insbesondere eine zielgerichtete Kombination (Mischung) der verschiedenen geeigneten technischen Elemente verspricht eine erhöhte Chance, gleichzeitig sowohl für hohe Proportionalität und ein konzentriertes Parteiensystem zu sorgen.

Der Einfluss des Repräsentationsprinzips und des Entstehungskontextes eines Wahlsystems ist etwas subtiler, aber gleichfalls zentral. Grundsätzlich ist davon auszugehen, dass ein Wahlsystem, welches unter inklusiven Bedingungen unter Berücksichtigung aller wesentlichen Herausforderungen mit dem Ziel einer erfolgreichen Balance von Repräsentations- und Konzentrationsfunktion entworfen wurde, dieses Ziel eher erreichen kann als ein Wahlsystem, welches als Kompromisslösung ohne klaren Fokus entstanden ist. Wahlsystem-Designer, die unter Inbetrachtung der spezifischen Anforderungen eines Landes dessen Wahlsystem unter einer leitenden allgemeinen Zielstellung entwerfen, sollten dessen Funktionalität klar erhöhen. Dieser zentrale Unterschied mit Blick auf das Repräsentationsprinzip kann nicht berücksichtigt werden, wenn Repräsentationsprinzipien basierend auf der technischen Ausgestaltung von Wahlsystemen einfach deterministisch angenommen werden. Die Präsenz eines Repräsentationsprinzips ist dabei bereits Ausdruck erhöhter Koordinationsbereitschaft und einer allgemeinen Verbundenheit der politischen Akteure zu den politischen Spielregeln – und diese sind wesentliche Voraussetzungen für ein gut funktionierendes Wahlsystem.

Zuletzt ist bei allem Optimismus hervorzuheben, dass die Nicht-Linearität des Zielkonfliktes zwischen Repräsentations- und Konzentrationsfunktion ebenfalls bedeuten kann, dass Mischwahlsysteme im Sinne des „Schlechtesten beider Welten“ versagen können. Dies heißt, dass gemischte Designs neben Chancen auch Risiken mit sich bringen. Die empirische Analyse wird versuchen, besonders geeignete Wahlsystem-Designs zu identifizieren, welche hohe Chancen

haben, das „Beste beider Welten“ zu erreichen, ohne ein großes Risiko einzugehen. Speziell auf breit akzeptierten Prinzipien basierende Wahlsystemdesigns sowie Mischwahlsysteme, welche einen hohen Grad an Proportionalität erzielen, scheinen geeignet, geringes Risiko mit hohem Potenzial zu verbinden. Gleichzeitig ist zu erwarten, dass insbesondere eine kompromissbasierte (ziellose) Anhäufung verschiedener technischer Details risikobehaftet ist, indem sie keine klaren Koordinationsanreize liefert und dabei dennoch relativ stark verzerrend wirkt, was die Umwandlung von Stimmen in Sitze angeht.

Kapitel 6 – Messinstrumente und methodischer Ansatz

Um zu untersuchen, ob und wann Mischwahlsysteme sowohl für einen hohen Grad an Repräsentativität als auch für eine hohe Konzentration des Parteiensystems sorgen, ist es erforderlich die Erfüllung der entsprechenden Funktionen mit validen Messinstrumenten zu erfassen. Diese Messinstrumente müssen außerdem in der Lage sein, extreme wie moderate Fälle klar zu differenzieren, indem sie die Dimensionen der Proportionalität bzw. Konzentration kontinuierlich abbilden. Diese Anforderung wird für die Kernfunktionen von Wahlsystemen weiterhin von den in der Literatur standardmäßig verwendeten Maßen erfüllt; diese sind außerdem bereits intensiv überprüft und mit diversen anderen politischen Phänomenen in Verbindung gebracht worden, so dass ihre Verwendung sich auf einen großen Erfahrungsschatz und eine Verknüpfung zu anderen relevanten Fragestellungen stützt.

Für die Messung der Repräsentativität von Wahlergebnissen wird auf Basis des Konzeptes der proportionalen Abbildung von Wählerwünschen der *least squares index* von Gallagher verwendet:

$LSI = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^N (s_i - v_i)^2}$ wobei s_i der Sitzanteil und v_i der Stimmenanteil von Partei i ist. Dieser Disproportionalitätsindex misst, wie stark Sitz- und Stimmanteile der Parteien voneinander abweichen und gewichtet dabei größere Abweichungen stärker als kleinere. Damit berücksichtigt der LSI sowohl Verzerrungen, welche durch sogenannte *wasted votes* (Stimmen, die an Parteien oder Kandidaten gehen, die keinen Sitz im Parlament erhalten) entstehen, als auch substantielle Verzerrungen unter den im Parlament repräsentierten Parteien. Diese differenzierte Berücksichtigung von Verzerrungen erlaubt es, zwischen Fällen geringer, moderater und extremer Disproportionalität zu unterscheiden und diese in einem Aggregatindex abzubilden, der direkt für die Messung der Repräsentationsfunktion eines Wahlsystems verwendet werden kann.

Das Konzept der Konzentration eines Parteiensystems beschäftigt sich im Kern mit der Frage, ob die Zusammensetzung des Parlaments eine klare und direkte Regierungsbildung ermöglicht (idealerweise in Form einer Ein-Parteien-Regierung). Bei der Messung dieses Konzepts sollte klar auch zwischen verschiedenen Schwierigkeitsgraden der Regierungsbildung – hervorgerufen durch notwendig werdende Koalitionsverhandlungen – unterschieden werden. Die Maßzahl, die zur Erfüllung dieser Anforderungen am ehesten geeignet ist, ist die effektive Parteienzahl im Parlament von Laakso und Taagepera: $EPZ_s = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^N s_i^2}$ wobei s_i der Sitzanteil von Partei i ist. Diese

Maßzahl berücksichtigt die relative Größe verschiedener Parteien, gibt an, wie fragmentiert das Parlament ist und erlaubt so eindeutige Schlüsse auf die resultierende Komplexität der Regierungsbildung. Eine empirische Analyse tatsächlich gebildeter Regierungen zeigt, dass der Erwartungswert für die effektive Parteienzahl innerhalb der Regierung nahezu exakt der Hälfte der EPZ_s im Parlament entspricht – also lässt sich mittels der EPZ_s auch auf die Stärkenverhältnisse in der aus der Wahl hervorgehenden Regierung schließen.

Die Dissertation stellt sich aus methodischer Perspektive insgesamt drei wesentlichen Herausforderungen. Erstens wird über die Anreicherung bestehender sowie die Erstellung neuer Datensätze der Detailgrad maximiert, welcher bei der Analyse von Wahlsystemen berücksichtigt wird. Zweitens wird dem Problem begegnet, dass international vergleichende Studien dazu tendieren, Wahlsystem-Effekte zu überschätzen und Analysen von Wahlsystemwechseln innerhalb eines einzelnen Landes dazu neigen, dem soziopolitischen Kontext größere Erklärungskraft zuzusprechen. In dieser Dissertation werden sowohl internationale Vergleiche als auch Analysen innerhalb einzelner Staaten durchgeführt, um zu möglichst robusten Ergebnissen zu gelangen. Zuletzt soll die Dimension des Repräsentationsprinzips stärker in quantitative Analysen von Wahlsystemeffekten eingebunden werden. Hierfür muss eine solide Datenbasis geschaffen werden, welche sich auf die Einzelfall-orientierte Forschung stützt und deren Expertise in vergleichende Studien integriert.

Kapitel 7 – Internationaler Vergleich

Dieses Kapitel analysiert in einem breiten internationalen Vergleich von 590 Wahlen in 57 Ländern (nach 1945) in einem ersten Schritt verschiedene generelle Wahlsystemtypen sowie in einem zweiten Schritt die technischen Details aus denen die verschiedenen Wahlsystemtypen aufgebaut sind.

Bei den generellen Wahlsystemtypen zeigt sich, dass insbesondere kompensatorische Mischwahlsysteme und Verhältniswahlsysteme mit moderaten Wahlkreisgrößen geeignet sind, das „Beste beider Welten“ zu erreichen, indem diese vergleichsweise hohe Proportionalität der Wahlergebnisse mit einer moderaten bis starken Konzentration des Parteiensystems verbinden und somit die Regierungsbildung fördern – diese Systeme verbinden erfolgreich proportionale Elemente mit funktionierenden Koordinationsanreizen. Reine Wahlsystemtypen und auch parallele Mischwahlsysteme erscheinen als generelle Design-Typen ungeeignet, um eine solche effiziente Wirkung zu erzielen. Damit bestätigen sich die wesentlichen aus der Literatur abgeleiteten Erwartungen bezüglich der generellen Design-Vorschläge. Ein Blick auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit, das „Schlechteste beider Welten“ zu erreichen, zeigt keinen Unterschied zwischen den generellen Design-Typen und hebt somit hervor, dass kompensatorische Mischwahlsysteme und Verhältniswahlsysteme mit moderaten Wahlkreisgrößen eine erhöhte Chance auf das „Beste beider Welten“ nicht mit einem erhöhten Risiko verbinden, weder Repräsentations- noch Konzentrationsfunktion zufriedenstellen zu erfüllen.

Bei der Betrachtung der technischen Details von Wahlsystemen bestätigt sich das Bild aus der Analyse genereller Typen, allerdings muss dieses gleichzeitig um differenziertere Einschätzungen bestimmter technischer Elemente ergänzt werden. So sind kompensatorische Verhältniswahlebenen in Mischwahlsystemen tatsächlich gut geeignet, beide Kernfunktionen von Wahlsystemen zu erfüllen, ohne dabei ein großes Risiko einer insgesamt schlechten Funktionalität einzugehen. Allerdings sind zusätzliche kompensatorische Sitze in Verhältniswahlsystemen eher dazu geeignet, sowohl eine besonders hohe als auch eine besonders niedrige Funktionalität eines Wahlsystems zu vermeiden und tragen nicht zum Erreichen des „Besten beider Welten“ bei. Neben den relativ risikoarmen technischen Spezifikationen moderater Wahlkreisgrößen und kompensatorischer Ebenen eignen sich auch die Einführung bzw. Erhöhung einer gesetzlichen Hürde sowie das Senken des Anteils an nach Mehrheitswahl vergebenen Sitzen in Mischwahlsystemen, um die Wahrscheinlichkeit, das „Beste beider Welten“ zu erreichen, zu erhöhen. Diese beiden Detailspezifikationen bedeuten dabei allerdings auch ein beträchtliches Risiko, dass das Wahlsystem im Endeffekt schlecht abschneidet. Insbesondere gesetzliche Sperrklauseln erhöhen das entsprechende Risiko mehr als sie die Chancen auf doppelt gutes Abschneiden stärken. Insgesamt zeigt sich deutlich, dass die Wahlsystem-Forschung neben den Chancen von Mischwahlsystemen bzw. technischen Variationen bestimmter Details auch die entsprechenden Risiken berücksichtigen muss, um zu sinnvollen Design-Hinweisen zu gelangen.

Kapitel 8 – Mischwahlsysteme in den deutschen Ländern

Um die Wirkungsweise von Mischwahlsystemen auch in einer sub-nationalen Analyse zu überprüfen und speziell die hoch gelobte deutsche Version des kompensatorischen Mischwahlsystems – die personalisierte Verhältniswahl – eingehend zu testen, wird in diesem Kapitel die deutsche Länderebene mit Blick auf die Wirkung verschiedener Wahlsysteme untersucht. Hierbei ist es hilfreich, dass der soziopolitische (deutsche) Kontext über die Länder hinweg relativ stabil ist während gleichzeitig verschiedene (Misch-)Wahlsysteme Anwendung finden bzw. gefunden haben.

Untersucht werden insgesamt 208 Landtagswahlen zwischen 1946 und 2013, bei denen – jeweils verbunden mit einer gesetzlichen Sperrklausel – die reine Verhältniswahl oder die personalisierte Verhältniswahl Anwendung gefunden haben (sieben weitere Landtagswahlen fanden unter dem sogenannten *Losser-Surplus-Method* System statt, welches eine Hybrid-Lösung aus parallelem und kompensatorischem Mischwahlsystem darstellt). Die Analyse der deutschen Bundesländer zeigt dabei keine Effizienzsteigerung durch die Anwendung der personalisierten Verhältniswahl im Vergleich zur reinen Verhältniswahl. Ebenfalls erfolgt keine zusätzliche Konzentration des Parteiensystems basierend auf der Verwendung einer gemeinsamen Stimme für beide Ebenen der personalisierten Verhältniswahl. Die vor allem im deutschen Kontext relevante Analyse des Effektes von Überhangmandaten auf die Funktionalität des Wahlsystems zeigt zwar, dass die Zulassung von Überhangmandaten im Mittel zu einer stärkeren Konzentration des Parteiensystems führt, gleichzeitig ist diese jedoch linear mit zunehmender Disproportionalität verbunden und es besteht ebenfalls die Möglichkeit, dass Überhangmandate die Konzentration

des Parteiensystems bei zunehmender Disproportionalität sogar schwächt. Hier werden erneut Chancen und Risiken gemischter Wahlsysteme deutlich.

Insgesamt sind allgemeine sozialstrukturelle Entwicklungen und damit verbundene Trends deutlich relevanter für die Entwicklung des Parteiensystems in den deutschen Bundesländern als Wahlsystemunterschiede. Dabei ist jedoch auch zu berücksichtigen, dass der Effekt von zusätzlichen technischen Details wie der gesetzlichen Sperrklausel auf der deutschen Länderebene empirisch nicht untersucht werden können. Weiterhin ist die personalisierte Verhältniswahl unter den kompensatorischen Mischwahlsystemen vergleichsweise nah an der reinen Verhältniswahl, da der in der personalisierten Verhältniswahl auf Länderebene typische Ausgleich von Überhangmandaten einen mechanischen Effekt der Mehrheitswahlebene auf die Wahlergebnisse komplett verhindert.

Die deutsche Länderebene beinhaltet mit dem bayrischen Wahlsystem außerdem einen Sonderfall, welcher für die Verteilung der Sitze nach Verhältniswahl die Summe der Stimmen aus Mehrheits- und Verhältniswahlebene verwendet. Diese einzigartige Ausgestaltung des Wahlsystems birgt das Potenzial, ein wesentliches Problem von kompensatorischen Mischwahlsystemen zu beheben, ohne Wählern die Option des Stimmen-Splittings zu verwehren. In der Standard-Variante des kompensatorischen Mischwahlsystems können Parteien den Kompensationsmechanismus durch strategisches Stimmen-Splitting umgehen und sich so einen auf starker Disproportionalität basierenden Vorteil verschaffen. Diese Taktik wird deutlich unattraktiver, wenn die Stimmen in der Mehrheitswahlebene auch einen Einfluss auf die Sitzverteilung in der Verhältniswahlebene nehmen – wie es in Bayern der Fall ist.

Kapitel 9 – Der Effekt der Wahlkreisgröße auf der Mikro-Ebene

Der internationale Vergleich hat die Wahlkreisgröße bereits als Makro-Kennzahl berücksichtigt und den optimierenden Effekt moderater Wahlkreisgrößen bestätigen können. Da das theoretische Argument, dass Wahlkreise moderater Größe Parteien und Wähler zu starker Koordination anregen und dabei gleichzeitig für hohe Proportionalität sorgen, allerdings ein Mikro-Argument ist und Wahlsystem-Designer in der Regel die Wahlkreisgröße für verschiedene Regionen individuell festlegen, ist eine empirische Überprüfung auf der Distrikt-Ebene dringend notwendig. Indem diese Analyse des Effekts der Wahlkreisgröße auf der Mikro-Ebene die Variation der Wahlkreisgröße innerhalb einzelner Länder nutzt wird in diesem Kapitel gleichzeitig getestet, ob die Ergebnisse des internationalen Vergleichs auch auf der Mikro-Ebene innerhalb einzelner Länder bestätigt werden.

Analysiert wird die Distrikt-Ebene der Verhältniswahlsysteme in Costa Rica, Portugal und Spanien. Alle drei Länder zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass sie im Mittel eine moderate Wahlkreisgröße aufweisen, die Wahlkreisgröße tatsächlich aber relativ stark variiert. Gleichzeitig finden in keinem der Länder potentiell verzerrende andere technische Elemente Anwendung, sodass der Effekt der Wahlkreisgröße auf das Erreichen des „Besten beider Welten“ vergleichsweise unkompliziert geschätzt werden kann. Die Analyse von insgesamt 963 Distrikt-

Parteiensystemen bzw. Wahlergebnissen in 40 Wahlen bestätigen dabei eindeutig die Hypothese, dass moderate Wahlkreisgrößen die Wahrscheinlichkeit von gleichzeitig überdurchschnittlich proportionalen und konzentrierten Wahlergebnissen maximieren. Die Überlegenheit moderater Wahlkreisgrößen auch auf der Distrikt-Ebene hebt dabei jedoch auch klar hervor, dass die bloße Behandlung moderater Wahlkreisgröße als Makro-Kennzahl ein unvollständiger Design-Vorschlag ist – die genaue Ausgestaltung der Wahlkreise auf Mikro-Ebene ist hochgradig relevant. Dies zeigt sich insbesondere am Beispiel Spanien, wo die optimale Wahlkreisgröße eher knapp über zehn liegt (nicht zwischen drei und neun).

Deutlich wird durch die Distrikt-Analyse auch, dass die Wahl moderater Wahlkreisgrößen zumindest auf Mikro-Ebene eindeutig risikobehaftet ist. Hier ist eine genaue Spezifikation notwendig, um nicht durch einen Mangel an Detail-Orientierung Wahlkreisgrößen so zu gestalten, dass sie eher das Risiko einer schlechten Funktionalität als die Chance auf das „Beste beider Welten“ erhöhen. Unter bestimmten Rahmenbedingungen – bei ohnehin hoher Konzentration des Parteiensystems z.B. durch soziopolitische Kontextfaktoren sowie bei hoher Gefahr einer Regionalisierung des Parteiensystems – kann die Funktionalität von Wahlsystemen sogar eindeutig von der Wahl höherer Wahlkreisgrößen profitieren.

Kapitel 10 – Der Einfluss von Repräsentationsprinzipien auf den Erfolg des Wahlsystems

Dieses letzte empirische Kapitel widmet sich der Dimension des Repräsentationsprinzips und überprüft dessen Einfluss auf die Funktionalität des Wahlsystems. Überprüft wird genauer, inwiefern (kompensatorische oder parallele) Mischwahlsysteme eher in der Lage sind, extreme Ergebnisse zu vermeiden und sogar das „Beste beider Welten“ aus Proportionalität und Konzentration herbeizuführen, wenn diese auf einem Prinzipien-orientierten, inklusiven Design-Prozess beruhen. Ein solcher Prozess sollte dafür sorgen, dass die technische Ausgestaltung von Wahlsystemdesignern unter einer allgemein akzeptierten Zielsetzung optimal an die Bedürfnisse eines jeweiligen Landes angepasst wird und die für das erfolgreiche Wirken von Wahlsystemen notwendige Bereitschaft zu Koordination und Kooperation besteht. Eine solche Wirkung ist hingegen nicht zu erwarten, wenn das Wahlsystem eine ziellose Zusammenstellung von technischen Spezifikationen ist, welche als Kompromiss aus einem von Eigeninteresse dominierten Verhandlungsprozess hervorgeht.

Um diesen Effekt des Repräsentationsprinzips und des Entstehungskontexts eines Wahlsystems auf dessen Funktionalität zu überprüfen werden zunächst mit Hilfe einer *case study survey* die nötigen Daten erhoben – hierbei wird ein standardisierter Fragebogen verwendet, um die entsprechende Einzelfall-orientierte Literatur zur Entstehung von Mischwahlsystemen auszuwerten und vergleichbare Daten zu gewinnen. Für nahezu alle parallelen und kompensatorischen Mischwahlsysteme wird untersucht, ob diese ein Repräsentationsprinzip besitzen, welches auf eine erfolgreiche Balance von Proportionalität und Konzentration abzielt, oder ob kein übergeordnetes Leitprinzip existiert. Weiterhin werden diverse Charakteristika des Entstehungsprozesses (z.B. dessen Inklusivität) abgefragt. Die Auswertung dieser Daten zeigt eine

klare Variation unter Mischwahlsystemen was die Dimension des Repräsentationsprinzips und den Entstehungskontext anbelangt. Eine explorative Analyse der Daten fördert dabei bereits zutage, dass Mischwahlsysteme insbesondere dann auf das „Beste beider Welten“ abzielende Repräsentationsprinzipien besitzen, wenn diese in einem inklusiven Entscheidungsprozess als Konsens-Lösungen ausgehandelt wurden. Darüber hinaus spielt die Orientierung an positiven Beispielfällen (wie etwa dem deutschen Wahlsystem) eine zentrale Rolle für die Prinzipien-geleitete Entstehung eines Mischwahlsystems.

Die Analyse von 103 Wahlen in kompensatorischen und parallelen Mischwahlsystemen in 21 Ländern zeigt, dass das Vorhandensein eines Repräsentationsprinzips in der Tat einen positiven Effekt auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Wahlsystems – unabhängig von dessen exakter technischer Ausgestaltung – ausübt, extreme Ergebnisse zu verhindern und das „Beste beider Welten“ zu erreichen. Dieser Effekt zeigt sich jedoch nur für die jeweils erste Wahl nach der Reform des Wahlsystems; danach unterscheiden sich Prinzipien-geleitete Wahlsysteme in ihrer Wirkung nicht mehr von Wahlsystemen, welche ohne ein genuines Repräsentationsprinzip sind. Eine eher negative Interpretation dieser Ergebnisse ist, dass die Koordination und Kooperationsbereitschaft der Parteien nicht lang genug anhält, um die fortwährend gute Funktionalität des Mischwahlsystems zu ermöglichen. Eine positivere Interpretation ist, dass insbesondere in Transitionsländern Inklusivität und Prinzipien-Orientierung zu einer Öffnung des politischen Wettbewerbs führen, welche die überdurchschnittliche Konzentration des Parteiensystems mittelfristig schwieriger macht. In jedem Fall zeigt sich ein signifikanter (und positiver) Effekt des Vorhandenseins eines Repräsentationsprinzips – dieser sollte in zukünftiger Forschung unbedingt stärker berücksichtigt und weiter untersucht werden.

Kapitel 11 – Fazit

Die Frage, ob Mischwahlsysteme in der Lage sind, das „Beste beider Welten“ zu erreichen, indem sie hohe Repräsentativität mit einer die klare Regierungsbildung fördernden Konzentration des Parteiensystems verbinden, kann mit ja beantwortet werden. Allerdings eignen sich Mischwahlsysteme nicht allgemein, sondern sowohl ihre technische Ausgestaltung als auch die Frage, ob ein leitendes Repräsentationsprinzip vorhanden ist, nehmen entscheidenden Einfluss auf die Eignung spezifischer Wahlsystem-Designs. Nur über eine auch auf Detail-Ebene fokussierte Gestaltung eines Mischwahlsystems lassen sich die Chancen auf das „Beste beider Welten“ nutzen, während das Risiko, tatsächlich das „Schlechteste“ zu erreichen, minimiert wird.

Besonders geeignet, um das „Beste beider Welten“ zu erreichen, sind moderate Wahlkreisgrößen und kompensatorische Mischwahlsysteme (im Gegensatz zu parallelen Mischwahlsystemen). Gesetzliche Sperrklauseln erhöhen zwar ebenfalls deutlich die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer solchen positiven Wirkung, bewirken aber einen noch stärkeren Anstieg der Wahrscheinlichkeit eines insgesamt doppelt schlechten Abschneidens des Wahlsystems. Immer sind aber die exakten Kombinationen technischer Details zu berücksichtigen, um die Chancen und Risiken eines bestimmten Wahlsystems akkurat einschätzen zu können. Neben den Effekten der technischen

Ausgestaltung ist mit Blick auf die Dimension des Repräsentationsprinzips ein inklusiver, Prinzipien-orientierter Prozess der Wahlsystemreform eine gute Basis für das Design eines effizient funktionierenden Mischwahlsystems. Als zentrale Implikation für das Design zukünftiger Wahlsysteme ist festzuhalten, dass mehrere Wege (und Stellschrauben) zu einem gut funktionierenden Wahlsystem führen, ohne dabei ein erhöhtes Risiko einer besonders schlechten Funktionalität einzugehen. Diese Dissertation hat klar aufgezeigt, welche Mischungen entsprechend geeignet sind und welche zu ungewünschten Ergebnissen führen können.

Lebenslauf Johannes Raabe

Personalien

Geburtsdatum	27.05.1988
Geburtsort	Preetz
Nationalität	Deutsch

Akademischer Werdegang

11/2015	Promotion zum Dr. phil. im Fach Politikwissenschaft an der Philosophischen Fakultät der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel
10/2012 – 11/2015	Promotionsstudium an der Philosophischen Fakultät der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, betreut durch Prof. Dr. Eric Linhart
10/2011 – 09/2012	M.Sc. Political Economy University of Essex, Vereinigtes Königreich
10/2008 – 09/2011	B.A. Politikwissenschaft und Soziologie Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel

Berufliche Tätigkeit

10/2012 – 09/2015	Wiss. Mitarbeiter, Institut für Agrarökonomie, Universität Kiel
10/2013 – 03/2015	Lehrbeauftragter, Universitäten Göttingen und Kiel
04/2010 – 07/2011	Stud. Hilfskraft, Institut für Agrarökonomie, Universität Kiel

Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen

- 2015 „Principles of representation throughout the world: Constitutional provisions and electoral systems.“ *International Political Science Review* 36(5): 578-592.
- 2015 „Does substance matter? A model of qualitative portfolio allocation and application to German state governments between 1990 and 2010.“ Mit E. Linhart. *Party Politics* 21(3): 481-492.
- 2015 „Ungleiche Erfolgsbedingungen, verzerrte Repräsentation.“ In M. Kaeding und N. Switek (Hrsg.), *Die Europawahl 2014*, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 79-88.
- 2015 „Die Ministerienaufteilung in Koalitionsregierungen – eine modelltheoretische Näherung mit Hilfe von Divisor-Verfahren.“ In A. Bächtiger, E. Linhart und S. Shikano (Hrsg.), *Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie Band 9*, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 159-191.
- 2014 „Verdientes Vorbild oder Mythos? Eine vergleichende Analyse der personalisierten Verhältniswahl auf Länderebene.“ Mit R. Kriffit, J. Vogel und E. Linhart. *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 8(3-4): 283-305.
- 2014 „Disentangling the value of a ministry: Party leaders' evaluations of German state ministries.“ Mit E. Linhart. *West European Politics* 37(5): 1065-1086.
- 2012 „Eine Typologie für die vergleichende Wahlsystemforschung.“ Mit E. Linhart. *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 22(4): 493-525.