

UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE  
School of Management

**STAKEHOLDER OPPOSITION  
IN A FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:  
CASE BOTNIA'S PULP MILL IN URUGUAY**

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## ABSTRACT

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Firms frequently decide to invest in foreign countries and projects. These international projects involve various actors called stakeholders, who can have a positive or a negative influence on the firm. The aim of this research is to examine the opposition that arises in international projects and how this resistance is practiced, analyzing the firm-stakeholder and stakeholder-stakeholder relationships that emerge during a conflict in a foreign direct investment.

The theoretical framework is based on stakeholder theory. In previous literature, only few studies have examined the behavior and the existing relationships among stakeholder groups. In addition, opposition has been analyzed as exerted against the firm, and there is lack of exploration on how resistance can be shown against other stakeholder groups, leading to complex relationships during a conflict.

The research is conducted through the analysis of Botnia case. Data consists of newspaper articles, and they are analyzed using qualitative content analysis as a method. Results show that stakeholders can develop supportive or opposing relationships with other groups, and that these relationships are usually dynamic and changeable. Besides, the analysis identifies several opposition tactics, which can be utilized at both direct and indirect levels. These tactics are further examined utilizing Den Hond and De Bakker's (2007) classification of tactics.

The study contributes to stakeholder literature by showing how previous research on opposition can be utilized to understand resistance among stakeholders, and how stakeholder relationships can emerge as a method to show resistance. In addition, it highlights the importance of understanding stakeholder behaviors in international projects, so managers can learn how to identify and anticipate opposition tactics in order to ensure the project success.

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# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 The importance of stakeholders in international projects

Nowadays, it is common for big companies to locate their subsidiaries and factories abroad, in order to expand their markets and obtain competitive advantage. However, the internationalization of companies' activities and projects is not an easy task. Firstly, globalization has increased the concerns about the effects of the international projects and activities of global companies on the host countries, particularly regarding social and environmental consequences. Thus, the firm performance will be carefully controlled, analyzed, scrutinized and criticized by the firm environment (Kolk & Fortanier, 2013; Hendry, 2005). Yaziji and Doh (2009) already affirmed that the internationalization and the expansion of big corporations to different countries have consequently boosted an increment in the number of non-governmental organizations (referred to as NGOs) analyzing their activities. Secondly, when organizations make the decision of going international, in turn, it implies that their projects will need to face different cultures in different countries with multiple institutional environments (Aaltonen, 2013). In addition, international projects include numerous different actors, called stakeholders (Hendry, 2005). These groups may have different values, interests and stakes regarding the organization and its projects, and also different socio-economic backgrounds. In many occasions, they differ to the stakeholders the company is related to in the home country (Aaltonen, Kujala, Lehtonen & Ruuska, 2010). Thus, these international projects are usually the main targets for these stakeholder groups, which try to persuade foreign organizations to act in a sustainable way (Kolk & Fortanier, 2013) and try to ensure that companies protect and respect the stakeholders' own interests.

Organizations carrying out international projects are likely to be affected by these stakeholders, which can use different strategies and tactics to influence and put pressure on the company, and to force the firm to respond to stakeholders' request (Esley & Lenox, 2006). Thus, understanding and managing the multiplicity of existing stakeholders implies several benefits, but it might also represent a complex task for the organization, and in turn, difficulties for the international project success.

On the one hand, as advantages, these new actors might mean an opportunity for the company and its success, as they have knowledge about the host country that, in hands of the firm, might help the project to succeed (Aaltonen et al., 2010). In addition, if the company manages to successfully engage and establish relationships with new local stakeholders, consequently, these relationships also lead to project success due to more project support and legitimization (Aaltonen et al., 2010; Aaltonen, 2013). Companies need to strive to influence stakeholders' perceptions and get acceptance of the project by the surrounding environment and actors. In other words, organizations need to establish project legitimacy inside the environment and network of the project (Aaltonen, 2013). Besides, the acceptance of an international project leads, in turn, to the acceptance of the organization involved in the project (Aaltonen, 2013).

However, on the other hand, these actors might also mean an important handicap for the project, especially when they show high levels of opposition and perform actions against the firm's operations and practices. Stakeholders can create conflicts and harm projects through numerous different tactics carried out in order to show opposition against the firm and its practices, affecting critically its projects and activities. In other words, international projects and their related surrounding stakeholders may mean a source of problems for multinational enterprises (Aaltonen et al., 2010). Therefore, it is of paramount importance for organizations to learn how to identify and understand these groups, establishing effective relationships with them to anticipate their behaviors, and avoid and solve possible conflicts. Consequently, this will enhance the possibilities of project acceptance and success, and it will improve the company performance (Yaziji & Doh, 2009; Bourne & Walker, 2008).

Even though previous studies recognized the importance of understanding stakeholders, there is scarcity of research oriented and focused on stakeholder opposition. Previous literature has traditionally been firm-oriented and based on stakeholder-organization dyadic relationships (Rowley, 1997). On the one side, studies have addressed how companies can identify, manage and develop engagement strategies with stakeholders (Laplume, Sonpar & Litz, 2008); and on the other side, how these actors can affect these companies and their activities (Laplume et al., 2008). Nevertheless, recently, some studies have addressed the topic of stakeholder behavior. For instance, Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) identified interest and identity as drivers of stakeholder mobilization. Other researches have addressed the topic of how stakeholder groups behave, demonstrating that stakeholders do not relate only to the company, but also to other stakeholders, creating collaborative groups (Bunn, Savage & Holloway; 2002) and networks

(Rowley, 1997) with different linkages and relationships affecting the organization. These relationships are mainly based on the premise that stakeholder groups tend to collaborate together in order to influence and improve their salience and alter their attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency towards the firm (Neville & Menguc, 2006; Aaltonen, Kujala & Oijala, 2008; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). Therefore, it would be important to deeply analyse and understand the interactions between the multiple stakeholders inside those stakeholder networks (Neville & Menguc, 2006), especially in the framework of international projects, where these stakeholder networks may present more complexity. It would be useful to examine how stakeholders behave and why stakeholders relate and establish positive and negative relationships with each other (De Bakker & Den Hond, 2008), especially in groups creating strong opposition against the firm's international projects and the surrounding environment. However, just few studies refer to stakeholder interactions and how stakeholders relate together (Neville & Menguc, 2006), and these researches barely mention the possibility of stakeholder interactions and relationships with the objective of showing opposition and resistance. In addition, the topic of stakeholder opposition tactics has not been examined frequently, and there is lack of understanding on all the different strategies that stakeholder groups can utilize to show opposition and influence not only the firm, but also other actors (De Bakker & Den Hond, 2008). Therefore, a niche in stakeholder theory has been identified, and as a result, this study will further address and examine the following: opposition in stakeholder relationships.

## **1.2. Research objective and research question**

There is scarcity of research based on opposition in stakeholder relationships. This study will address this interesting phenomenon by examining stakeholder relationships and interaction, in the specific framework of a foreign direct investment project (referred to as FDI) and its ensuing conflict. The research will analyse and explore the Metsä-Botnia case (from now on referred to as Botnia case). The study will provide new insight on this topic and will contribute to the field of stakeholder theory.

The overall aim of this research is to examine stakeholder opposition in a foreign direct investment environment. Especially, the focus is on the relationships that emerge between stakeholders when opposing and showing resistance against other stakeholder groups, and how this opposition is practiced during the escalation of a conflict.



This research will answer and investigate the following research question and sub-questions through the analysis of the Botnia case.

**R.Q:** How is opposition practiced by different stakeholder groups during a conflict in an international foreign direct investment?

*R.Q.1:* Which are the stakeholders' relationships that emerge during an international conflict when showing opposition, both against the firm and against other stakeholder groups?

*R.Q.2:* Which are the tactics utilized by stakeholders in order to show resistance and opposition during an international conflict, both against the firm and against other stakeholder groups?

Regarding the case, Botnia decided to establish a new pulp mill in Uruguay, close to the Uruguay River, which is the frontier between this country and Argentina. While Uruguay soon supported the decision, Argentina opposed this project fearing negative environmental consequences on the Uruguay River, and in turn, on the tourism and economy of the country. Consequently, a conflict started around the project. Even though at the beginning the conflict only involved Uruguay and Argentina, soon other actors were included too, becoming a politicized and mediatized conflict and attracting several and diverse stakeholders.

The study will follow two different approaches: stakeholder-firm opposition and stakeholder-stakeholder opposition. Firstly, the research focus will be on analysing relationships between stakeholders during the conflict, especially those addressed to show opposition. Secondly, the research will identify all the tactics utilized to show that opposition, especially through stakeholder collaboration. Therefore, the key focus of this research will be on examining and classifying the different strategies and actions developed in order to show discontent and dissatisfaction in a conflict caused by an international project; especially focusing on stakeholder relationships and collaboration emerged as a method to show opposition.

Firstly, after analyzing all data available, a description of the Botnia case will be provided. A list with the key stakeholders involved in the international project of Botnia will be created, together with their particular interests during the escalation of the FDI conflict. Key stakeholders relevant for this study will be chosen as a next step. Later, these groups will be categorized as opponents, supporters or as showing neutral positions with regard to the international project during the conflict; and additionally, their relationships with other groups

of stakeholders will be examined. Secondly, the research will focus on the stakeholders showing opposition during the FDI conflict. The study will analyze the possible tactics and strategies used by those actors with the objective of showing resistance against the firm, and also against other stakeholder groups. In addition, the stakeholder opposition will be compared and applied to previous existing literature on the topic. To finalize the research, the study will try to identify differences between the specific tactics chosen and utilized by every stakeholder group during the conflict.

Thus, the study will deeply examine opponent stakeholders. The paper has been designed to provide better understanding on stakeholder opposition in international conflicts and environments, together with a better insight on stakeholders' relationships and behaviors with the objective of showing opposition towards different actors. By answering the research questions mentioned above, the thesis will explain how stakeholders mobilize and decide to show resistance, and how stakeholders decide to relate and behave in a context of an international project and a conflict.

However, in this research, it is important to take into account the fact that data will consist of newspaper articles, so all the conclusions will be based on the articles found in media. Therefore, the findings will depend on how media presents all the information collected during the escalation of this FDI conflict in Uruguay.

## **1.3 Botnia case**

### **1.3.1 Botnia case background**

This study examines an interesting case of a real FDI project of a Finnish company; the Botnia case. Even though the case started as a simple FDI project in Uruguay, it soon developed into a mediatized and politicized conflict. Therefore, this case attracted numerous and diverse stakeholders (for instance, Botnia, the Uruguayan and the Argentinean Government, Argentinean and Uruguayan local people, NGOs in both countries, and other higher institutions), all of them with different interests and attitudes towards the project, and relating to each other within the frame of a FDI conflict with different purposes (Kujala, Heikkinen & Lehtimäki, 2012). Due to all these characteristics, this Botnia case is quite valuable and

provides a perfect, diverse and complex environment to be investigated in this research, allowing a focus on various different stakeholders involved at the same time in the same conflict and reacting in different ways.

The case has been previously studied through various perspectives and approaches, and being analyzed through the points of view of companys' corporate social responsibility (CSR), stakeholder theory, and the roles of dialogue and media in conflicts. Previous research covered issues such as corporate responsibility activities and commitments of the company (Lotila, 2009; Lehtimäki, Kujala & Heikkinen, 2011a); stakeholder salience analysis and classification (Kujala, et al., 2012); stakeholder salience strategies (Aaltonen, Kujala & Oijala, 2008); stakeholder relationships (Lehtimäki & Kujala, 2015; Kujala, et al., 2012); stakeholder dialogue (Laasonen, 2010; Lehtimäki & Kujala, 2015; Heikkinen, Kujala & Lehtimäki, 2013); project legitimation (Joutsenvirta & Vaara, 2009); the role of media in international FDI conflicts (Pakkasvirta, 2008); the role of media in CSR (Kujala, Toikka & Heikkinen, 2009) and the relationships between multinational enterprises, host governments and NGOs (Skippari & Pajunen, 2010).

Table 1 shows a summary of previous studies developed around Botnia case and their key contributions.

Table 1. Summary of previous studies on Botnia case

AUTHORS	TITLE	FOCUS	METHODOLOGY	DATA	FINDINGS
Johanna Kujala, Tiina Toikka, Anna Heikkinen (2009)	Communicating Corporate Responsibility Through Media	Comparing how corporate responsibility activities are communicated both by media and by the firm.	Qualitative content analysis	Botnia's press releases. Newspaper articles from Helsingin Sanomat related to Botnia.	Firms usually present information about corporate responsibility in terms of financial, environmental and social issues; while media focuses on stakeholder relations and opposition.
Johanna Kujala, Anna Heikkinen, Hanna Lehtimäki (2012)	Understanding The Nature Of Stakeholder Relationships: An Empirical Examination Of A Conflict Situation	Understanding stakeholder relationships as both ethical and strategic; and analyzing how stakeholder interests are justified.	Qualitative content analysis	Newspaper articles from Helsingin Sanomat.	Stakeholder interests and salience are dynamic and context dependent. Additionally, stakeholder interests were justified by arguing for or against other stakeholder interests.
Anna Heikkinen, Johanna Kujala, Hanna Lehtimäki (2013)	Managing Stakeholder Dialogue: The Case Of Botnia In Uruguay	Understanding the importance of dialogue as a method to avoid and solve stakeholder disputes.	Single case study: Botnia case.	Secondary data from reports and information from the firm website.	Stakeholder dialogue should be included as a process in the relationship management strategy of the firm, so the company and its stakeholders learn to cooperate.
Hanna Lehtimäki, Johanna Kujala, Anna Heikkinen (2011)	Corporate Responsibility In Communication: Empirical Analysis Of Press Releases In A Conflict	Understanding how conflicts in FDI situations are described in press releases, and how the language utilized in the information disclosed by the firm can address several demands of both media and stakeholders.	Textual analysis	Botnia press releases	The use of language in press releases serves to mobilize certain stakeholders while reassuring others. Press releases represent mainly references to three ways of articulation: industrial, market and civil world. Information created value-neutral communication, ignoring controversial topics relate to stakeholders, and building better corporate identity.
Kirsi Aaltonen, Kujala Jaakko, Ojjala Tuomas (2008)	Stakeholder Salience In Global Projects	Analyzing the salience shaping strategies used by project stakeholders.	Single case study: Botnia case	Botnia related articles from Finnish financial periodicals, the World Bank cumulative impact study, and Internet sources such as Botnia and stakeholder websites.	Direct withholding strategy, indirect withholding strategy, resource building strategy, coalition building strategy, conflict escalation strategy, credibility building strategy, communication strategy and direct action strategy.
Hanna Lehtimäki and Johanna Kujala (2015)	Framing Dynamically Changing Firm-Stakeholder Relationships In An International Dispute Over A Foreign Investment: A Discursive Analysis Approach	Examining how stakeholder relationships are discursively constituted through framing (investment frame, conflict frame, and political frame).	Qualitative content analysis and inductive frame analysis	Press releases in Botnia and Helsingin Sanomat newspaper articles.	Stakeholder dynamics and relations can be reproduced and constructed through language and understood by frames.
Pia Lotila (2009)	Corporate Responsiveness To Social Pressure: An International – Based Model	Identifying factors affecting the management of corporate relations with society, by developing a model integrating concepts from business-society and public relations management.	Qualitative methods through a single case study: Botnia case	Press releases, corporate website and external sources: international and Finnish newspapers, magazines and documentaries.	The management of corporate relations with society affects and is affected by social pressure. The firm can respond to social pressure, but the effect depends on how the management approach succeeds in coinciding with the dynamics of social pressure.
Jussi Pakkasvirta (2008)	From Pulp To Fiction? Fray Bentos Pulp Investment Conflict Through The Finnish Media	Exploring the characteristics of the conflict as explained in Finnish media so as to examine the effects of stereotypes on conflict resolution.	Rhetorical analysis	Helsingin Sanomat articles, interviews and documentaries related to the case.	Finnish media created stereotypes that hardened the conflict resolution, thus, showing lack of democratic multicultural learning culture. Corporate social responsibility could be understood as a method to conflict resolution, to avoid cultural stereotypes, and to promote better understanding.
Maria Joutsenvirta and Eero Vaara (2009)	Discursive (de) legitimization Of A Contested Finnish Greenfield Investment Project In Latin America	Examining the discursive strategies through which various actors construct a sense of (ii) legitimacy in sociopolitical conflicts involving firms.	Critical discursive analysis	Finnish media articles from Helsingin Sanomat	Three (de) legitimating discourses: legal, factual and political discourse. Three discursive struggles to (de) legitimize the project: legalistic, truth and political.
Salla Laasonen (2010)	The Role Of Stakeholder Dialogue: NGOs And Foreign Direct Investments	Analyzing the role of stakeholder dialogue with non-governmental organizations in FDI, focusing on the NGO's perspective on dialogue processes.	Dialogue process analysis	Press releases, follow-up documentation, presentations, letters and other campaign material.	As the degree of preparation of the investment increases and the room for alteration decreases, the possibility of achieving meaningful dialogue diminishes. With limited room for choice, dialogue occurs as conflict resolution and bargaining, which causes lack of trust and increases the problem of non-participation. The study emphasizes the role of non-participative NGO as a key challenge in dialogue.
Mika Skippari and Kalle Pajunen (2010)	MNE – NGO – Host Government Relationships In The Escalation Of A FDI Conflict	Examining how specific characteristics of the relationships between MNE, NGOs and host governments contribute to the escalation of FDI conflicts.	Process – tracing approach of a longitudinal case study: Botnia case	Magazines, newspapers, documents, press releases, and annual reports; from both Finnish media and Argentinean media.	The study highlights the importance of accurate responses to NGO demands, and warning against considering the host government as the only source of external legitimacy. The three actors are interrelated; and they need to find a balance among their relationships.
Hanna Lehtimäki, Johanna Kujala, Anna Heikkinen (2011)	Global dispute On Sustainable Business: Analyzing MNE-Stakeholder Relationships In Local Media Texts	Understanding the pluralism related to sustainable business by analyzing MNE-stakeholder relationships as presented in media.	Qualitative content analysis	Local media articles from EL Clarin.	Opposing stakeholders argued for environmental sustainability, and supporting stakeholders for social and economic sustainability. Global stakeholders were neutral and local stakeholders both opposing and supporting.

The previous literature on the case may be divided on two different approaches: a realistic approach, based on the study of strategies, relationships, interests and roles of the actors involved in the conflict; and a discursive approach, addressing communication strategies and the roles of dialogue and language used by the actors involved during the conflict. In addition, previous articles have analyzed the conflict under the perspective of the two main actors participating in the conflict: on the one hand, Botnia; and on the other hand, stakeholders involved in the project (Lehtimäki & Kujala, 2015).

### **1.3.2 Main events on Botnia case**

#### *The investment decision (March 2003–March 2005)*

Forest industry has traditionally been one of the most important and beneficial sectors for the Finnish economy. However, during past years, this sector has been suffering difficulties due to lower sales and higher production costs in the country (Heikkinen et al., 2013). This is the main reason why the Finnish forest industry group Botnia decided to relocate its activities in Latin America. In 2003, Botnia started to develop studies on the possibility to build up a pulp mill in Fray Bentos, Uruguay (Lehtimäki et al., 2011a). The company officially decided to locate a pulp mill in Fray Bentos in 2005. During that year, Uruguay immediately accepted the project, mainly due to the many future advantages and benefits of the project on the economy of the country: the project meant creating 8.000 jobs and a growth of 1.6% in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country. Soon, the country tried to ensure the investment and the Uruguayan government granted an environmental permit to the project (Lehtimäki & Kujala, 2015).

#### *The beginning of the conflict (May 2005–December 2005)*

However, the pulp mill was designed to be built close to the Uruguay River, which represents the border between Uruguay and Argentina (Di Martino, 2009; Lehtimäki et al., 2011b). Soon, Argentina started to fear future negative effects on the environment (Skippari & Pajunen, 2010), especially on the river, and in turn on the tourism of the country. As a consequence, it was during 2005 when the first protests appeared in Argentina against the construction of the pulp mill. Environmental activists and local people started demonstrations and roadblocks in bridges

connecting both countries (Di Martino, 2009), and the Argentinean government claimed that Uruguay had not asked for permission to build the plant, as stated in the bilateral agreement signed between both countries on the use of the river (Lehtimäki et al., 2011a). All demonstrations claimed that the pulp mill should be relocated.

At the same time, during the same year, the World Bank's International Financial Corporation (referred to as IFC) started its Cumulative Impact Study (referred to as CIS) about the project (Lehtimäki et al., 2011a). Argentina requested the World Bank to suspend the funding for the project until this CIS was done, and consequently, Uruguay cancelled the bilateral negotiations between both countries (Kujala et al., 2012). At the end of the year 2005, the World Bank's IFC concluded through its Cumulative Impact Study that the pulp mill did not mean any harm to the environment (Lehtimäki et al., 2011a). However, the Argentinean government declared that the report was incomplete and inadequate (Lehtimäki et al., 2011a), as they feared that Uruguay had not provided all the existing information on waste treatment and air pollution. Consequently, permanent long-term roadblocks were established on the border bridge between both countries.

#### *A politicized and mediatized conflict (January 2006–September 2006)*

The conflict soon escalated into a politicized and mediatized public conflict between two countries: Uruguay and Argentina. In 2006, Argentina finally brought the case to The Hague International Court of Justice (referred to as The Hague ICJ), stating that Uruguay had not respected the bilateral agreement signed by both countries in the past, and thus, the pulp mill project violated the bilateral pact and should be cancelled and relocated (Kujala et al., 2012). Uruguay defended the project claiming that initial negotiations between both countries on the construction had been held without opposition from Argentina. Therefore, in order to calm down the situation and solve the dispute, presidents from both countries urged Botnia to stop the construction work for 90 days, until an independent environmental impact study could be developed, with the compromise from Argentina to consequently stop the roadblocks (Lehtimäki et al., 2011b). However, Botnia only agreed on stopping the construction work only for 10 days instead, and relationships and negotiations between the Argentinean and the Uruguayan government were definitely broken off. Consequently, the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú (referred to as CEAG), a local group consisting of

citizens of the city of Gualeguaychú, established roadblocks again on the key bridges connecting the countries (Di Martino, 2009; Lehtimäki et al., 2011b).

*The Hague ICJ resolution (October 2006–July 2009)*

The Hague ICJ definitely voted against Argentinean request of suspending the construction work and supported Botnia project to continue. The IFC and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (referred to as MIGA) released the final Cumulative Impact Study on the project (Lehtimäki et al., 2011b), claiming that the pulp mill was following the existing environmental standards and generating real benefits for the economy of Uruguay. Finally, at the end of this year, the World Bank approved a loan to Botnia, and MIGA approved a political risk insurance for the project (Kujala et al., 2012).

As the conflict continued, in 2007, the Argentinean and the Uruguayan governments tried to negotiate to solve this dispute supported by the King of Spain and his representatives, but this intent was unsuccessful, and more demonstrations were organized (Kujala et al., 2012). Consequently, the Uruguayan government installed a fence and set police around the pulp mill to protect the project. Additionally, as a way to support the project, Uruguay built the ONTUR harbor in Nueva Palmira City, in charge of Botnia pulp deliveries. This harbor meant a great strategic advantage to Botnia. Finally, in October 2007, the investment project was finalized, and in November 2007, the pulp mill started to operate with the permission and close cooperation of the Uruguayan authorities (Lehtimäki & Kujala, 2015).

During the next years, the activists continued the protests, even though with lower intensity. However, the pulp mill was soon in full operation. In addition, the IFC published a first environmental monitoring report of the pulp mill, stating that the company was correctly following the necessary environmental air and water standards (Heikkinen et al., 2013). In 2009, Botnia changed its ownership structure, and Botnia's Uruguay-based operations were transferred to UPM-Kymmene Corporation (Lehtimäki et al., 2011b).

## 1.4 Structure of the thesis

The research will be organized in several chapters. The first chapter identifies a gap on stakeholder literature, and briefly introduces the phenomenon being analyzed in this study: stakeholder opposition. This chapter also presents the research objective and questions, and provides a short description of the Botnia case based on previous studies. Chapter 2 summarizes previous literature on stakeholder theory, presenting and comparing both early and recent studies on the topic. It also presents the theoretical framework that will be used during the research. Chapter 3 includes the research methodology and a brief description of the data analysis process. Chapter 4 focuses on the main findings obtained during the analysis of the available data. The chapter describes the Botnia case in detail, and identifies the key stakeholder relationships and opposition tactics emerged during the conflict. A summary of the findings will be included at the end of the chapter. Finally, chapter 5 provides a discussion on the key findings, and highlights the main contributions of this research to stakeholder literature. Additionally, the research will be evaluated and further research on stakeholder opposition will be proposed.




Figure 1. Research structure.

Figure 1 shows the structure of the thesis by briefly summarizing the content of every chapter in this study, from the introduction until the final conclusions.



## **2. STAKEHOLDER THEORY**

### **2.1 Foreign direct investment projects and stakeholders**

A Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is “an international venture in which an investor residing in the home economy acquires a long-term influence in the management of an affiliate firm in the host economy” (Contessi & Weinberger, 2009, p. 64). These FDI projects have increased considerably during the last few years, especially due to globalization; and today, more and more companies decide to develop internationalization strategies and start activities abroad. However, internationalization also implies some risks due to the levels of uncertainty inherent in projects, usually originated by unanticipated influence coming from the international projects’ environment and network, based on the diversity of different actors coexisting together (Aaltonen et al., 2010). International projects mean dealing not only with the host country where the project is developed, but also with all the new local stakeholders involved in the project; and all these new actors may differ not only one to each other, but also to the stakeholders existing in the company’s home country.

In a FDI project, different and “contradicting interests of participants from the business-government-society interface meet” (Laasonen, 2010, p.528). These international projects are developed in challenging, complex, and dynamic environments, involving numerous stakeholders, each with their own “institutionalized values, norms, practices, expectations, socio-cultural backgrounds and demands”, which may differ from those of the project-based company and its home country (Aaltonen et al., 2010, p. 567). The company developing the project needs to interact and face external influence coming from the host country and the project environment, usually through local stakeholders’ actions and relationships, which are a major source of unexpected events. These unexpected events can be defined as those situations not originally planned and expected during the project, and that represent alterations from the original project plans (Aaltonen et al., 2010). In addition, the host country and its local actors present cultural differences compared with the project-based company’s culture, which increases the likelihood of these unforeseen events occurring, and possible future conflicts. The higher the cultural differences are between the company and its stakeholders and the project actors in the host country, the more challenges the company needs to face, and the higher probability of unexpected events happening (Aaltonen et al., 2010). Aaltonen et al. (2010) reviewed the concept of “cultural distance”, which is “the degree to which the norms and values

of two companies differ due to their place of origin” (p. 568). However, some other distances were identified too affecting the relationships between the company-host country-stakeholders, which are cognitive distance, social distance, technological distance and temporal distance. According to Foss (1999), cognitive distance includes business culture and language differences (Aaltonen et al., 2010, p. 568). Social distance is related to different “organization’s ways of thinking and working” (Aaltonen et al., 2010, p. 568); technological distance refers to differences between technological activities (Aaltonen et al., 2010, p. 569); and finally, Holmström et al. (2006) define temporal distance as the “dislocation in time experienced by two actors” (Aaltonen et al., 2010, p. 569). All these differences show how complex international projects are and how distant and distinct the host country and its environment can be for a multinational enterprise during the performance of an international project.

Therefore, the foreign company developing the project needs to find out how to integrate in the host country, and how to get adapted to the new project environment and its actors, in order to reduce all the existing differences and distances between the firm and the host country. Establishing relationships with stakeholders and understanding these actors help the company to get adapted into the new project environment. It is of paramount importance for the organization to establish effective and collaborative relationships with all local stakeholders in order to ensure the success of the project in the new country (Bourne & Walker; 2005). In order to do that, it is essential for the company to first analyze all the existing and possible relationships between these stakeholders to better understand stakeholders’ behaviors, avoid and anticipate future actions, and be able to develop and maintain long-term organizational relationships with the project participants. Besides, these actors might mean at the same time a source of advantages for the company, as they own knowledge about the host country that might be useful for the focal organization, and they can help legitimate the international project once they finally support and accept it (Aaltonen et al., 2010). Suchman (1995) describes the concept of project legitimacy as a generalized perception that the project of a company is appropriate within some “constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Aaltonen, 2013, p. 14) and it is related to the legitimacy of the company involved in the project too. When it comes to ensure the project success, ensuring project legitimacy is an essential challenge that means obtaining social acceptability of the project through engaging with the several actors surrounding the (Aaltonen, 2013)

As a conclusion, foreign direct investment projects do not only involve exclusively the focal organization (multinational enterprise or MNE) and the host country, but they also include stakeholders such as community groups, activist groups and non-governmental organizations (Skippari & Pajunen, 2010). Consequently, it is of paramount importance for companies to understand these stakeholders' behaviors and relationships when it comes to develop successful valuable projects. It is crucial for the managers of the company to understand and pay attention to the structure of the stakeholder network of the firm and its likelihood to provoke unexpected events during the international project, in order to avoid and anticipate these possible inconveniences and ensure the success of the project (Aaltonen et al., 2010)

## **2.2 Stakeholder theory: traditional firm-orientation**

### **2.2.1 Stakeholders and stakeholder classification**

Traditionally, stakeholder literature has been firm-oriented, meaning that research was addressed and developed under the lenses of the organization, and it was focused on firms' interests and objectives. After the concept of stakeholder appeared for the first time, stakeholder theory has studied mainly firm-stakeholder relationships, which were presented as dyadic, and it has investigated the issue of stakeholder management in organizations.

Stakeholder theory supports the idea that firms should take into account the interests of all its stakeholders, instead of focusing only on the shareholders of the organization, as stated in early researches (Vinten, 2000). Regarding previous literature based on stakeholders, it is essential to mention that the concept of "stakeholder" was defined for the first time by Freeman (1984), who offered the most widely accepted definition of stakeholders, as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm's objective" (Pesqueux & Damak-Ayadi, 2005, p. 6). Hill and Jones (1992) defined stakeholders as those "who have a legitimate claim on the firm" (Rowley, 1997, p. 899), and stakeholder theory is mainly based on the concept of stakeholders' stakes or interests (Freeman, 1984). Organizations are surrounded by internal and external groups, such as shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, NGOs and communities (Jones, Felps & Bigley, 2007), which own intrinsic specific interests, claims, positions or stakes towards a company and its operations. Freeman (1984) differentiated three types of stakes: equity stakes of stakeholders who have some ownership of the organization, economic stakes of those groups who have economic interest in the firm (such as customers,

suppliers and competitors), and influencer stakes (Wolfe & Putler, 2002). Freeman (1984) also stated that firms need to take into account the interests of these stakeholders when taking strategic decisions for the company (Mainardes et al., 2012).

An important aspect of stakeholder theory is related to its frameworks. Stakeholder theory can be studied and be analyzed under different approaches: the empirical stakeholder theory, divided into descriptive stakeholder theory and instrumental stakeholder theory; and the normative stakeholder theory (Pesqueux & Damak-Ayadi, 2005). For one, Donaldson and Preston (1995) described descriptive stakeholder theory, and how it supports organization's centrality. It shows the organization as a focal point, a centrum. It is focused on how the organization behaves when managing stakeholders (Mainardes et al., 2012), but it does not relate stakeholder management with business objectives and performance. For second, Jones (1995) supported instrumental stakeholder theory, and it links stakeholder management with better performance within the company. Thus, the objectives of the organization are related and dependent on stakeholder management (Mainardes et al., 2012), and relating and engaging with these groups have influence on the firm outcomes (Jones et al., 2007). For third, Donaldson and Preston (1995) discussed normative stakeholder theory. This perspective states that stakeholders have their own interests, and that the company has moral and ethical obligations related to stakeholders' positions, together with its own interest in the firm economic success (Pesqueux & Damak-Ayadi, 2005). Every stakeholder of the firm has an intrinsic value in their claims, and therefore, stakeholders should not be considered only as a means to achieve better performance inside the organization: firms have the moral obligation of taking into account stakeholder interests (Mainardes et al., 2012).

As defined before, stakeholders are actors and groups who have a claim, right or interests in an organization and its activities (Clarkson, 1995). However, this definition of stakeholder was considered too wide (Boesso & Kumar, 2009), and stakeholder theory evolved in order to narrow this term by developing stakeholder classifications. Stakeholders with similar interests might belong to the same group or classification. Many researchers have developed different stakeholder classification. For instance, Clarkson (1995) distinguished the following groups of stakeholders: primary and secondary. Primary stakeholders are those groups "without whose continuing participation, the corporation cannot survive" (Clarkson, 1995, p. 106) and will be seriously damaged. In this group, shareholders, investors, employees, customers, suppliers and governments might be included. The firm success highly depends on these primary

stakeholders, and thus, it is important to engage and keep constant and satisfying relationships with these actors. Clarkson (1995) defined the organization as a “system of primary stakeholder groups” (p. 107). Secondary stakeholders are those actors that “influence or affect, or are influenced or affected” by the firm, but on the contrary, they are “not essential for its survival” (Clarkson, 1995, p. 107; Hult, Mena, Ferrell & Ferrell, 2011, p. 50). This group includes media and interest groups with special interests in the company. However, even though the firm success does not depend on them, they can seriously damage the organization as they can mobilize public opinion regarding the company operations, and in many cases, delegitimize the firm and its projects.

As a different example, Culpin (1998) separated stakeholders into institutional stakeholders, economic stakeholders and ethical stakeholders (Pesqueux & Damak-Ayadi, 2005, p. 6). Firstly, institutional stakeholders are those related to laws, regulations and inter-organizational entities. Secondly, economic stakeholders are those groups operating inside the market of a company. Finally, ethical stakeholders are those actors belonging to pressure groups, both ethical and political. Another classification, for instance, was developed by Lépineux (2003), who classified stakeholders as shareholders; internal stakeholders, such as employees and labor unions; operational partners, such as customers, suppliers and insurance companies; and social community, such as the state authorities, trade unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society (Pesqueux & Damak-Ayadi, 2005, p. 7).

Finally, Mitchell et al. (1997) developed the most important classification of stakeholders, closely related to stakeholder management, based on their attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency. This classification allows managers not only to identify but also to prioritize which stakeholders are more important and key for the organization, or in other words, the stakeholders with more salience. As the definition of stakeholder is quite wide, it is necessary to identify the key stakeholders for the company and to whom the company should pay more attention, as firm managers cannot focus on all stakeholders' claims (Mitchell et al., 1997). Mitchell et al. (1997) proposed a model to identify key stakeholders through the evaluation of stakeholder-manager relationships, both actual and potential, in order to identify the following attributes: power, legitimacy and urgency; defined as follows by Mitchell et al. (1997):

- Power to influence the firm, defined as “the ability of those who possess power to bring about the outcomes they desire” (p. 865).
- Legitimacy of the relationship stakeholder-firm, defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (p. 866). Legitimacy combined with power can create authority.
- Urgency of the stakeholders’ claim on the firm, defined as “the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention” (p. 867). This concept is based on the following attributes: time sensitivity, or “the degree to which managerial delay in attending to the claim or relationship is unacceptable to the stakeholder” (p. 867); and criticality, or “the importance of the claim or the relationship to the stakeholder” (p. 867).

In addition, these attributes own some specific characteristics (Mitchell et al., 1997). Firstly, they are variable and likely to change. One group of stakeholders might have one attribute and lose it in future, or change to a different attribute (Mitchell et al., 1997). Besides, they depend on perceptions, more specifically, managers’ perceptions; and a stakeholder group possessing one attribute might not be conscious of that possession (Mitchell et al., 1997). The more attributes a stakeholder presents, the more salience the stakeholder has, and thus, the group represents a key actor for the company (Mitchell et al., 1997). However, stakeholders’ attributes identification depends on managerial perceptions, and managers are the ones who perceive and decide the attributes the stakeholders have, and in turn, their salience (Mitchell et al., 1997). Therefore, managers have an important role, as their perceptions should not differ from reality, so they can really identify and engage with the key stakeholders of the company.

Depending on the attributes that the different stakeholder groups present, the model identifies some stakeholder categories (Mitchell et al., 1997). First, latent stakeholders are those groups with low salience and owning only one attribute (dormant, discretionary, demanding stakeholders). Second, expectant stakeholders are those actors with moderate salience and owning two attributes (dominant, dependent and dangerous stakeholders). Finally, definitive stakeholders are those with high salience and owning all the attributes, and thus, representing the key stakeholders for the company as perceived by managers (Mitchell et al., 1997). However, stakeholders do not belong to one of these categories forever, but they might change, as stakeholders’ stakes and managers’ perceptions might vary over time (Mitchell et al., 1997).

Thus, through this model, Mitchell et al. (1997) include and show two main characteristics of stakeholders: they are dynamic and likely to change, and they present dyadic firm-stakeholder relationships with the company.




Figure 2. Stakeholder typology based on attributes (Mitchell et al, 1997, p. 874)

Figure 2 shows the stakeholder typology created by Mitchell et al. (1997) based on the three previously mentioned stakeholder attributes of urgency, power and legitimacy. This classification allows managers to identify and focus on the key stakeholders for the organization, or in other words, those groups presenting higher salience.

### 2.2.2 Stakeholder management

Stakeholder research continued evolving, leading to the concept of “stakeholder management”. Stakeholders react towards firm operations and projects, and managers need to learn how to approach and address those groups that own the power of influencing the organization. Thus, stakeholders and firm show a dyadic dependent relationship, relating together in different positive or negative ways, and managers need to learn how to manage and influence these

relationships in order to ensure the firm success. Many studies showed the importance of managing stakeholders, as it allows managers to address stakeholders' interest so as to maximize stakeholders' positive influence and minimize the negative influence (Bourne & Walker; 2005), leading to improvements in the company performance and more chances of success in projects (Bourne & Walker; 2008). Stakeholder management might be defined as partnering between the firm and the firm's stakeholders, involving different actions such as "identifying, assessing, prioritizing, communicating, negotiating, contracting and managing relationships" with relevant actors for the firm (Boesso and Kumar, 2009, p. 65). The stakeholder management process requires the identification of key stakeholders and their interests and needs (Solaimani and Bouwman, 2012). Stakeholder management also implies building relationships with these groups, in order to engage with them, and understand and reconcile their interests, meeting stakeholders' needs and expectations with corporate priorities (Bunn, Savage and Holloway, 2002). However, the decision on which management and engagement strategy is more appropriate depends on the existing stakeholders' interests on the company and the firm-stakeholder existing relationship; and the ultimate decision on which strategy to be used relies on the managers of the company (Mainardes et al., 2012).

Some researchers have tried to identify some specific steps in the process of managing stakeholders, for instance, identifying stakeholders, differentiating and categorizing stakeholders according to their interests, and investigating relationships between stakeholders (Wang, Ge & Lu, 2012). Bunn et al. (2002) further investigated this process. They suggested a 5-step process consisting on: identify key relevant stakeholders, describe the characteristics and claims of every stakeholder group, analyse and classify the stakeholders according to their singular attributes (Mitchell et al., 1997), examine the dynamic relationships among stakeholders, and finally, develop appropriate stakeholder management strategies related to the claims for every stakeholder group. Analysing and classifying stakeholders according to their attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997) is one of the more important steps, as it allows the managers of the company to prioritize and focus on key stakeholders, in turn, better allocating resources to cope with key stakeholders. It is important to identify the groups that can supply the firm or project with critical resources, bear additional risks, or have the power to affect the success of the project and firm performance directly (Ayuso, Rodriguez, Garcia & Ariño, 2007). The next step is also of paramount importance, as it is related to the dynamic nature of stakeholders' relationships: stakeholders' attributes may vary over the time (Solaimani & Bouwman, 2012). Besides, the firm's influence through engagement strategies



might also change stakeholders' claims and positions; and at the same time, stakeholders relate to other stakeholders to improve their influence over the firm (Solaimani & Bouwman, 2012). Therefore, it is necessary to take into account and anticipate these changes over time when managing and engaging with stakeholders by trying to predict those changes, or updating the stakeholder analysis previously performed (Bunn et al., 2002). Bourne (2005) emphasized the importance of the dynamic nature of stakeholders in the process of stakeholder management and engagement by stating that it is necessary to update, monitor and assess the firm–stakeholder relationships over the time as they may vary, in order to engage appropriately with keys stakeholders in every life cycle of the company or firm's project.

Researchers have also tried to list some generally accepted engagement strategies that managers can use to manage and influence key stakeholders' positions and relationships, depending on their specific claims, the firm-stakeholder relationships, and trying to meet the interests and include their claims in the business. Freeman (1984) suggested a strategy matrix based on the stakeholders' ability to cooperate or threaten the organization. This strategy matrix was also supported by other authors, such as Savage et al. (1991), Kimery and Rinehart (1998) and Polonsky (1996) (Polonsky & Scott, 2005). In addition, for instance, Bunn et al. (2002) suggested the following general management actions with stakeholders: lead, collaborate, involve, defend, educate and monitor stakeholders.

At the same time, in order to relate and engage with stakeholders, stakeholder communication and dialogue gained attention too. Different interests of stakeholders suggest different communication styles, adapted to specific stakeholders' stakes and interests in the company (Johansen & Nielsen, 2011). In addition, communication in firm-stakeholder relationships stopped being a one-way process to become a two-way symmetrical communication, where these groups and the organization interact together (Johansen & Nielsen, 2011). Stakeholders have specific interests in the company, and the organization needs to respond and adapt the company operations to the social environment, in order to ensure firm success, engaging with these stakeholders in fruitful relationships. The way these relationships exist is via dialogue between the firm and its stakeholders, where the firm influences and involves stakeholders in the business, but also learns from them at the same time. Thus, stakeholders are no passive but active participants in the dialogue and the communication strategies of the company, and they feel a part of the company (Johansen & Nielsen, 2011). Stakeholder-firm dialogue is successful when the firm is able to understand and adapt the dialogue and communication to the

stakeholders' interests, and at the same time, these stakeholders become participants in the business and relate with the company (Johansen & Nielsen, 2011). In addition, active and continuous communication with stakeholders is crucial for managers as it allows them to identify possible changes in firm-stakeholder relationships and positions, and thus, react in time. Thus, it works as a monitoring and "early-warning system" to anticipate and avoid changes and conflicts with stakeholders (Bourne & Walker, 2005, p. 657).

However, communication and other engagement strategies are decided by managers of the organization, so in turn, stakeholder management depends mainly on managerial perceptions on how they perceive, prioritize, and understand salient stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). The more salience they attach to a specific stakeholder group; the more effort they will make to engage with that group. Managers have an essential role in stakeholder management, as they need to decide the appropriate engagement strategies that meet stakeholders' interests (Boesso & Kumar, 2009). Therefore, the way the firm responds to social pressure is dependent on managerial competence, skills, practices and values, and the firm's management ability to perceive and identify key stakeholders, and influence and engage with them correctly (Lotila, 2009; Bourne & Walker, 2005).

## **2.3 Stakeholder theory: towards a stakeholder-orientation**

### **2.3.1 Stakeholder relationships**

After the first research and years of investigation on stakeholder theory, literature experienced a shift towards a stakeholder-orientation. Studies started to be developed under the stakeholders' perspective, and a new trend emerged examining stakeholders' behaviors and relationships with each other. However, the importance of the firm as an influencer and as an actor relating with stakeholders was still considered.

Later stakeholder literature pointed out the fact that stakeholders do not only relate with the organization, but also with other different stakeholders (Solaimani & Bouwman, 2012). Stakeholders are not separated actors, as they interact with other stakeholder groups, cooperating and creating coalitions and alliances over time through the establishment of diverse complex relationships (Neville & Menguc, 2006). Therefore, they present a dynamic nature in their relationships, which may change and update over the time (Solaimani & Bouwman, 2012;

Aaltonen, Kujaala & Havela, 2013). Freeman (1984) already suggested that stakeholders with similar interests or rights might form a group (Mainardes et al., 2012). Waddock and Boyle (1995) identified a shift from a single community of stakeholders towards complex relationships within multiple different communities, which in turn, also relate with the company (Pesqueux & Damak-Ayadi, 2005); and Bourne (2005) stated that there is a stakeholder structure that impacts the company rather than individual stakeholders' influences. Therefore, stakeholders have influence and relate with other stakeholder groups at the same time they do with the company (Bunn et al., 2002).

In order to analyse the interactions that simultaneously emerge in stakeholder environments between the existing actors, Rowley (1997) developed a social network perspective by applying concepts of the social network analysis in the examination of the stakeholders affecting an organization. He stated that firms do not respond to each stakeholder individually, but they respond to the "interaction of multiple influences from the entire stakeholder set" (Rowley, 1997, p. 890). It is important to point out that every company faces a different set of stakeholders with unique patterns of influences (Lotila, 2010), and their stakeholder management strategies depend on an analysis of the complex group of multiple and interdependent relationships existing between the diverse stakeholder environment of the firm (Solaimani & Bouwman, 2012; Rowley, 1997). Rowley's (1997) research moved beyond the analysis of dyadic individual firm-stakeholder relationships, and claimed that networks examine "systems of dyadic interactions, capturing the influence of multiple and interdependent stakeholder relationships on organizations' behaviours" (p. 894). Rowley's (1997) model also suggests that the focal organization is not the centre of the network formed by its own set of stakeholders, and on the contrary, the organization's position in the network is determined by its own behaviour. This means that the organization is considered as a network of stakeholders, each one with its own set of stakeholders, creating a wide complex network around the focal organization (Lozano, 2005). Consequently, the centrality of the firm in the network means efficient communication with stakeholders (Rowley, 1997). Rowley (1997) supports the theory that network density and the focal organization's centrality influence the focal organization's degree of resistance to stakeholders' pressures. As a result, this produces different types of firm behaviours towards stakeholders and against stakeholders' influences, distinguishing between the following roles: "compromiser, subordinate, commander and solitarian" (Rowley, 1997, p. 888).

Stakeholder literature, therefore, goes beyond the dyadic stakeholder-firm relationship. Studies show that the company interacts with several and diverse external groups at the same time, and in addition, these groups will relate with other stakeholders, creating different complex relationships and interactions in the stakeholder networks that Neville and Menguc (2006) recognized as “stakeholder multiplicity” (p. 377). Stakeholders influence the company directly, but also indirectly, as all those groups can collaborate and create alliances with others to increase their influence on the company and the salience of their claims; or compete against each other in case they own opposite claims and interests, for instance, shareholders and NGOs (Neville and Menguc, 2006). According to Savage, Bunn, Gray, Xiao, Wang, Wilson and Williams (2010), collaboration between stakeholders emerges and is facilitated due to the existence of some factors: appreciative linkages or shared goals, structural features of the collaboration and processual issues, or in other words, the level of trust between stakeholders. One situation where stakeholders tend to collaborate is when showing opposition towards the company, as the combined resulting salience after collaboration will better influence and help mobilize against the company. In these occasions, smaller stakeholders seek to collaborate with salient powerful similar stakeholders, so as to create synergistic relationships with the objective of increasing the legitimacy of their interests, accumulate power or increase the urgency of their demands, and in turn, improving the salience of their claims (Neville & Menguc, 2006). Besides, in a situation of conflict, stakeholders might seek to relate with other different actors, bringing more new stakeholders into the conflicting scenario (Ferrary, 2009).

However, when stakeholders relate with other similar groups, these relationships are not always positive or satisfactory, and unsuccessful collaboration between stakeholders might happen. According to Gray (2004), the success of stakeholder relationships depends on how those groups frame and perceive what is happening around them. Therefore, if some stakeholder groups have the same perceptions during a conflict, it might be easier for them to engage in satisfactory relationships and agree on a joint solution. On the contrary, if stakeholders understand the conflict in different ways and their perceptions are contradictory, then, collaboration between those stakeholders might fail, as they might consider the other group as a threat. However, Gray (2004) also highlighted the possibility of “reframing” (p. 168), which means changing the way a stakeholder perceives the conflict to understand other perspectives and engage in collaborative partnerships with other actors. More often, reframing requires the participation of an external neutral agent as mediator (Gray, 2004).

Understanding stakeholder networks and structures and stakeholder relationships is of essential for the organization, as in turn, it means anticipating and avoiding conflicts between the organization and the set of stakeholders surrounding the firm, and facilitates collaboration and support inside the network, creating positive strong relationships (Troshani & Doolin, 2007). Recently, stakeholder literature has been related to value creation within the company (Myllykangas, Kujala and Lehtimäki; 2010). Organizations need to create value for all their existing stakeholders, and the means to value creation is through the establishment of successful and effective relationships with those groups, satisfying their needs and interests (Myllykangas et al., 2010). However, firstly, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of stakeholder-stakeholder relationships, analysing how they change and how their salience evolves over time (Myllykangas et al., 2010). The authors identified six characteristics of stakeholder-stakeholder relationships, which are in turn closely linked to business value creation: history of the relationship, objectives of the stakeholder, interaction in the relationship, information sharing in the relationship, trust between stakeholders and the potential of a stakeholder to learn. They highlighted the need and encouraged further research on relationships between stakeholders (Myllykangas et al., 2010, p. 70).

To sum up, stakeholder management is not related to individual dyadic firm-stakeholder relationships that need to be managed by the company anymore. Now, organizations belong to complex stakeholder networks, where all actors have relationships of interdependency and co-responsibility, which may evolve and change over time. Each stakeholder depends on the other sets of stakeholders, and the company is not the centre anymore, but only another actor within its network that needs to establish and build relationships with its own wide and diverse set of stakeholders (Lozano, 2005). Lozano (2005) proposed that organizations cannot be considered as “a manager of stakeholder relations, but as a builder of stakeholder relations” (p. 72).

### **2.3.2 Stakeholder opposition**

Organizations carrying out international projects are likely to be affected by external groups, which can use different strategies and tactics to influence and put pressure on the company, in order to force the firm to respond to stakeholders' request (Esley & Lenox, 2006; Hendry, 2005). Stakeholders may sometimes oppose to international projects, and they might try to change managerial decisions and alter and influence organizations' international plans, especially to reduce their negative social and environmental consequences (Hendry, 2005). As

an example of the importance of opponent stakeholders, Winch (2004) classifies stakeholders simply as those actors supporting or opposing the project (Aaltonen et al., 2013). Additionally, McElroy and Mills (2003) classified stakeholders according to their positions towards a firm project, recognizing: active opposition, passive opposition, noncommittal, passive support and active support (Aaltonen et al., 2013)

These influence actors have numerous strategies to put pressure on the company: from cooperation and alliances with other stakeholders to increase their protest and claim salience (Lotila, 2010) to more specific tactics such as protests, brand bashing, letter-writing campaigns, lobbying, boycotts, and civil suits (Esley & Lenox, 2006; Yaziji & Doh, 2009). These actions are used to incentive organizations to meet stakeholders' interests, as they can create various disadvantages for companies, for instance, operational costs and loss of reputation (Esley & Lenox, 2006). So far, not much research has been developed with the objective of understanding how stakeholders decide to choose and act through specific tactics and strategies (Hendry, 2005).

Frooman (1999) focused his studies on stakeholders' influencing tactics, examining how stakeholders can put pressure on organizations and why these groups decide to act through some specific tactics (Hendry, 2005). Hendry (2005) reviewed Frooman's (1999) framework based on resource dependence theory, and whose theory supported that stakeholders' decisions on influence strategies depend on the power and interdependency relationships between the firm and the stakeholder. Frooman (1999) suggested several strategies: direct / indirect tactics, and withholding / usage strategies (p. 191). On the one hand, according to Frooman (1999), direct strategies imply that the stakeholder manipulates the resources of the firm, while through indirect strategies the stakeholder will utilize an ally to influence the organizational resources (Hendry, 2005, p. 80). On the other hand, he defined withholding tactics as those where the key resource is withheld from the firm, and usage tactics as those where the firm is allowed to have access to key resources, but only through negotiation processes with the stakeholder or its allies (Hendry, 2005, p. 80). However, Hendry (2005) argues that a more complex framework is required, as Frooman's model (1999) is too parsimonious. He points out that in many occasions, power and interdependence are not always determinant, as stakeholders might also try to influence the firm through collaboration with non-powerful allies due to other different reasons, for instance, if those groups are close and partner with the organization. In addition, the model does not cover the use of several influence strategies at the same time (Hendry, 2005).

Table 2 shows the different influence strategies identified by Hendry (2005), whose study was mainly based on Frooman's (1999) findings.

Table 2. Typology of influence strategies, (Hendry, 2005, p. 80), adapted from Frooman (1999)

		Is the stakeholder dependent on the firm?	
		Yes-Usage	No-Withholding
Is the firm dependent on the stakeholder?	Yes-Direct	Direct/usage (high interdependence)	Direct/withholding (stakeholder power)
	No-Indirect	Indirect/usage (firm power)	Indirect/withholding (low interdependence)

Aaltonen et al. (2008) improved Frooman (1999) typology of influence strategies, and they identified the following resistance strategies: “direct withholding strategy, indirect withholding strategy, coalition building strategy, resource building strategy, conflict escalation strategy, credibility building strategy, communication strategy and direct action strategy” (Aaltonen et al., 2013, p.4).

Zietsma and Winn (2007) also addressed the topic of stakeholders' influence strategies, but also offering a firm's perspective by adding possible firm responses to those tactics. They identified four strategies of mutual influence between stakeholders and the firm during the escalation of a conflict: “issue raising, issue suppressing, positioning and solution seeking” (Zietsma & Winn, 2007, p. 2). They also found “three dynamic processes of influence” that both stakeholders and firms can use to shift from one influence strategy to another: “building influence chains, directing influence flows, and shifting influence chains”, which quite frequently requires establishing relationships, alliances or coalitions between groups (Zietsma & Winn, 2007, p. 2).

Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) also paid special attention to activist stakeholders, and they focused their research on the drivers of stakeholder actions, explaining when and why these groups will pressure the company. They identified two different motivations: interest-based motivations and identity-based motivations. On the one hand, regarding interest-related motivations, it is necessary to point out that stakeholders are those actors having a stake or interest in the company's activities and plans, as they are affected by the firm behavior, projects, and decisions (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Therefore, stakeholders will act in order to

protect their specific interests (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). The stakeholder group's degree of dissatisfaction is related to the likelihood of those actors mobilizing resources to protect its interests. This means that interests are a purpose behind a stakeholder's actions. On the other hand, regarding identity-related motivations, it is essential to mention the fact that stakeholder groups may act even though their members realize that they are pursuing a lost cause (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). This occurs due to collective identity, as it creates individual commitment and solidarity when actors value their membership in a specific group. Through that group membership, individuals associate themselves with the group's social identity, and with the valuable and unique characteristics that distinguish them from non-members of that particular group (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Besides, it is important to remember that as stakeholders relate to other stakeholder groups too, they might own diverse interests and identities that overlap, as they can belong to multiple stakeholder groups at the same time. Furthermore, this diversity of interest and identities also determine which group they might choose to ally with or oppose (Ferrary, 2009). In addition, De Bakker and Den Hond (2008) also mentioned Rowley and Berman's (2000) research on stakeholder mobilization. They supported that some conditions are necessary to boost stakeholders' mobilization, such as the specific characteristics of the firm, the issues surrounding the firm operations, the industry characteristics and the existing stakeholders surrounding the organization's activities (De Bakker & Den Hond, 2008).

Later, Den Hond and De Bakker (2007) stated that secondary stakeholder mobilization and the tactic choice depend on the stakeholder ideological position, and not on interest-based motivations and identity-based motivations (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Den Hond and De Bakker (2007) especially focused their research on activist stakeholders, meaning those secondary groups showing opposition, representing a social movement, and demanding changes to organizations. They defined ideology as "an interconnected set of beliefs and attitudes relating to problematic aspects of social and political topics that are shared and used by members of a group, and that inform and justify choice and behavior" (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007, p. 903). This concept becomes more complex and specific due to the circumstances and experiences in the stakeholder group history, and it develops over time and through interactions with other groups. In addition, De Bakker and Den Hond (2008) also highlighted Tilly's (1978) contribution explaining that stakeholders choose some specific tactics based and depending on the strategies that they had learned and utilized in the past.



Besides, Den Hond and De Bakker (2007) also classified opposition tactics into logic of material damage and logic of numbers (p. 909). This framework will be later utilized in the analysis performed in this research, as it provides an interesting classification of opposition tactics that might be applied in the resistance shown during Botnia case. Logic of material damage means increasing the cost of managerial decisions in the company (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007), so that in the long term, those decisions will not imply benefits anymore. The authors provide as an example of this strategy the opposition exerted against nuclear energy plants in Germany, where activists chained themselves to the railways, consequently, increasing the costs of transport in the material needed. This perspective can be understood not only as material damage, but also as symbolic damage (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007), mainly affecting and harming the firm reputation. For instance, activists can alter companies' logos in order to influence the customers' perceptions of the organization. Most frequently, symbolic damage is followed by material damage to the firm (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007). Logic of damage can be addressed also in a positive way through the concept of material or symbolic gain (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007), understood as a method to reward a firm due to its decisions, changes or practices that are supported by the surrounding stakeholders when considered as beneficial. The most common tactic is through boycotts, situations when customers decide to purchase goods in a specific company as a method to reward the firm for its good practices. Logic of numbers means participatory forms of actions (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007), affecting the legitimacy of the decisions made by the firm and decreasing in turn the level of support on the firm practices. The more mass participation against the firm, the more effective the strategy will be, leading to negative consequences on the firm. For instance, the main tactics included in this strategy are marches, petitions and signature collection. However, it is necessary to highlight that not all tactics require high participation. In many occasions, only collaboration with few key actors, or "elite participation" (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007, p. 911), is enough to perform effective strategies and achieve great influence on the firm. Therefore, this strategy requires the involvement of the key stakeholders who have enough power to influence the organization. As an example, the authors described the access to actors who possess high-quality information on the firm, or the access and use of media or court procedures.

Table 3. Typology of tactics between secondary stakeholders and the firm (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007, p. 911)

Intended outcome of Use of Tactics	Dependence on Participatory Forms of Actions is High (Mass Participation)	Dependence on Participatory Forms of Actions is Low (Elite Participation)
Material damage	Boycott	Blocking of gates, sabotage, occupation of premises, internet activism (hacktivism), lawsuits
Material gain	Buycott	Cooperation
Symbolic damage	Writing letters/emails, petitions, marches, rallies	Shareholder activism, street theater, negative publicity, research
Symbolic gain	Voluntary action	Positive publicity, cooperation

Table 3 summarizes the typology of tactics available to be utilized by secondary stakeholders against the firm, according to Den Hond and De Bakker (2007). They classified the tactics based on two different aspects: the final goal of the chosen tactic and its dependence on participation (Den Hond and De Bakker, 2007).

## 2.4 Summary of previous literature on stakeholder theory

In conclusion, previous research on stakeholders can be classified as follows: literature reviews, firm-oriented articles and stakeholder-oriented articles. Traditionally, first studies presented firm-centricity and were based on dyadic stakeholder-firm relationships. Later, research evolved towards a stakeholder-orientation with the study of stakeholders and their behavior, and towards reviews of previous studies in order to set and summarize existing concepts precisely. However, there are still many issues to clarify and improve, and much more to be studied in stakeholder literature. Mainly, researches are too theoretical and they show that there is lack and thus great need for empirical research and testing the of existing theory, in order to prove the validity and utility of the frameworks and provide managerial application. In addition, and as suggested and shown in the recent shift towards a stakeholder-orientation, stakeholder literature is in need for further study on the area of stakeholder interactions, opposition, and stakeholder-stakeholder relationships (Myllykangas et al., 2010).

Therefore, nowadays, stakeholder theory is stuck in theoretical frameworks and approaches, and there is lack of empirical studies on the field. This blockage needs to be overcome, and as a solution, four different future approaches for research are suggested:

- ➔ Research based on reviewing all the concepts and literature studied so far, in order to stop and set existing concepts clear, and examine deeper those concepts and frameworks in order to generalize and provide real applications for managers.
- ➔ Research based on empirical testing of existing concepts and frameworks, in order to prove their validity and provide useful examples for managers.
- ➔ Research based on combining stakeholder theory with other streams of literature, in order to evolve towards new different approaches and perspectives.
- ➔ Research based on stakeholder behavior and interaction, in order to continue the recent trend using a stakeholder-orientation. However, it is important to remember the role and influence of the company on stakeholders even in stakeholder-oriented studies.

Figure 3 shows and summarizes the different orientations on stakeholder theory, and the future recommended steps to overcome the blockage that this field of study experiences.




Figure 3. Suggested approaches to overcome the blockage in stakeholder theory

This study will provide a significant progress on stakeholder theory as it will follow some of these different approaches. Firstly, it will provide empirical testing through the analysis of a real case study: Botnia case in Uruguay; and secondly, it will focus on studying stakeholder theory under the perspective of stakeholder-orientation.

### **3. RESEARCH METHODS**

#### **3.1 Qualitative approach**

This research utilizes a qualitative approach to analyze the Botnia case. Qualitative research is mostly utilized to analyze and understand culture, society and behavior through the examination and synthesis of people's words and actions (Hogan, Dolan & Donnelly; 2011). According to Marshall and Rossman (2006), qualitative research is a "broad approach to the study of social phenomena" (Hogan et al., 2011, p.4). It focuses on social and personal interactions, relations, links and processes between people (Hogan et al., 2011). Thus, all these characteristics make qualitative analysis especially interesting and suitable for this research on the study of stakeholder-stakeholder relationships and opposition.

Contrary to quantitative research, the qualitative approach does not deal and work through numbers, but analyzes mainly non-quantitative data and words (Saldana, 2011), allowing the researcher to focus on qualities and features that a quantitative approach might fail to recognize and quantify (Hogan et al., 2011). In addition, qualitative research involves the researchers in the research process, as they are in charge of collecting the data, and they have the possibility to interpret the data by using previous theoretical frameworks and also by including their own reflections on the research actions, influencing the way they depict and understand data (Hogan et al., 2011). Besides, and as stated by Flick (1998), as the study is not focused on single variables or numbers, the issue under examination can be studied in all its complexity, including the possibility of further exploration in the future (Hogan et al., 2011). In conclusion, and due to all these above-mentioned reasons, a qualitative approach seems to be more adequate when addressing this study on stakeholder-stakeholder relationships.

#### **3.2 Data collection**

In a qualitative research, the following data collection means can be utilized: observation, interviews, case studies, personal experiences, and documents; the last ones being presented in a traditional written way or in technology devices and online media (Hogan et al., 2011). According to Merriam (2009), documents can be defined as a "wide range of written, visual, digital, and physical material relevant to the study" (p. 139). Media and mass communication

are good sources that provide appropriate documents when studying and analyzing society, groups and culture (Merriam, 2009). Documents do not only depict social reality, but they also contribute to shaping and portraying the practices, behaviors and relations between people (Hogan et al., 2011), and therefore, they seem to be a good data source for this research.

In this study, data were collected from media, and it consists of documents and texts from newspapers. Observation and interviews were not utilized, as the study addresses a past event where multiple and diverse actors were involved, and those data collection methods seemed too complex for this case. This material was easily accessible (Merriam, 2009), saving time when collecting all the information on the case presented in this study. The data were not created specifically for the research and it existed independently and before the moment of conducting this study. As a result, these documentary data are more objective, as the researcher can barely influence the already existing material, which positively for this study, is a product of the context in which they were originated (Merriam, 2009). However, documents present also some limitations. As they already exist and were not created for study purposes, some important information relevant to the study might be missing. In addition, as data consist of newspaper articles, it might be difficult to determine their accuracy and they might contain biased information provided by the writer that unintentionally might affect the study (Merriam, 2009).

The documentary data utilized in this research consists of articles and news from the Argentinean newspaper “El Clarín”, collected from the year 2005 to 2009 and related to this Botnia case. However, the initial sample was too wide, consisting in 509 articles, and it was reduced to a sample of 96 articles, containing the most relevant articles identified every month from January 2005 until December 2009.

### **3.2.1 Data reduction**

A final sample containing the most relevant articles for this research was obtained after going through a data reduction process. A list presenting all the articles included in the final sample can be found in the Appendix 1 of this study.

The selection of the most relevant articles was made as follows: the most relevant articles of every month are those where the key stakeholders (Botnia, Uruguay, Fray Bentos, Argentina and Gualeguaychú) appear more frequently. It might not seem erroneous to believe that those

articles where all the key stakeholders appear more often are going to explain better and in more detail their behaviors; especially, how they relate with each other.

The selection of the key stakeholders was made after reading and analyzing previous studies regarding this international conflict surrounding Botnia project, by choosing the most frequently mentioned stakeholders. Besides, the choice was mainly based and supported by two academic articles analyzing Botnia case: “Managing Stakeholder Dialogue: The Case of Botnia in Uruguay” (Heikkinen et al., 2013) and “Global Dispute on Sustainable Business: Analyzing MNE-Stakeholder Relationships in Local Media Text” (Lehtimäki et al., 2011b). In the first article, following stakeholders are identified: Botnia, Uruguayan Government, Argentinean Government and the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú (CEAG) as the main opponent organization. In the second article, key stakeholders are identified according to their salience and involvement in the case (supporters, opponents and neutral stakeholders). The stakeholders with highest levels of salience (definitive and expectant) and supporting and opposing positions were chosen, as they can be considered as the most important stakeholders showing or facing and resisting opposition. Therefore, Fray Bentos was also included as a key stakeholder for this research.

This selection of the key stakeholders might be considered as a risk, as some important actors might have been ignored or not included. However, this obstacle was solved through an exhaustive study and thorough analysis of all the previous studies performed around Botnia so as to develop a profound and complete understanding on the case. Similar to this research, previous studies on Botnia case have also been done by examining in detail the conflict around these selected stakeholders, as they were also chosen as key actors previously. Therefore, it does not seem erroneous to consider them as key stakeholders for this case too, and consequently, proceed to a data reduction based on the frequency of appearance of those actors.

Therefore, every article was carefully analyzed in order to count how many times each of those key stakeholders was mentioned. The appearance of every stakeholder was recorded and listed in all the articles, and in every month, during the period being analyzed: January 2005—December 2009. The appendix 2 of this research shows the tables where the appearance of every stakeholder was counted and recorded every month. The articles where all these key stakeholders appear more frequently in every month were chosen and considered relevant, and thus, included in the final sample. The selection of the most important articles was done

according to the following rule: in months containing less than three articles, only one key article was chosen. In months containing between 4–20 articles, the two articles repeating more frequently the key stakeholders were chosen. In months presenting between 21–30 articles, three key articles were chosen; and finally, in months consisting of more than 31 articles, the four most important articles were chosen. Table 4 summarizes the rule applied in the process of data reduction.

Table 4. Rule followed in data reduction

<b>NUMBER OF ARTICLES PER MONTH</b>	<b>NUMBER OF ARTICLES CHOSEN</b>
Less than 3 articles	1 key article chosen
4-20 articles	2 key articles chosen
21 – 30 articles	3 key articles chosen
More than 31 articles	4 key articles chosen

Additionally, in cases where several articles seemed to be relevant at the same time, as they were presenting the same high amount of key stakeholders, the articles where all the main stakeholders appeared were chosen, ignoring the equals where some stakeholders were absent. If this rule did not apply, as all the key stakeholders were included in all the articles, the decision was made after a lecture of the conflicting texts and according to their content, choosing the article which seems to be more focused on opposition and stakeholder relationships in the information provided, and thus, more useful for this research.

Table 5 shows how many relevant articles were chosen in every year. As a result, the final sample consists of 96 articles collected between 2005 and 2009.

Table 5. Comparison between the original sample and final sample

<b>YEAR</b>	<b>NUMBER OF ARTICLES IN THE ORIGINAL SAMPLE</b>	<b>NUMBER OF ARTICLES CHOSEN IN FINAL SAMPLE</b>
2005	35	11
2006	156	23
2007	170	26
2008	80	18
2009	68	18
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>509</b>	<b>96</b>

As observed in table 5, the years 2006 and 2007 include more relevant articles in comparison with the other years being studied, as they were key important years during the conflict. It is important to highlight the absent of articles during the first months in 2005, which shows that the conflict started to capture the Argentinean media attention during April 2005. In addition, it seems also interesting to point out the fact that months such as June, July and August usually include no articles about the conflict, or a less amount of collected articles compared with other months. The Appendix 3 of this research presents a summary of the articles chosen in the final sample and the appearance of every key stakeholder in those articles.

### **3.2.2 The role of media**

As previously mentioned, data for this research were collected from media texts available in the Argentinean newspaper “El Clarín”. Media is a powerful communication means, accessible and available for everybody, and with an important influence on the audience (Kujala et al., 2009). It might be considered as a connection and a bridge between the public and companies, as media provides and offers information about organizations and their behaviors and actions (Kujala et al., 2009). However, and as supported by Crane and Livesey (2003) media articles are developed and written by humans, who have the power to decide which topics are worth to be presented or not (Kujala et al., 2009). In addition, media also decides how the issues will be presented, and it might happen that some important information can be ignored, lost, or presented under the writer’s perspective (Kujala et al., 2009). Even though media is supposed to be an impartial means of communication, it is developed by humans, and there is always a risk that they might have inherent biases (Hogan et al., 2011) as they can be interested only in certain perspectives and points of view (LeCompte, 2000). Li (2009) stated that frequently newspapers articles present a national bias, thus, positioning their opinions to support the country (Lehtimäki et al., 2011b).

To sum up, even though media offers and reproduce reality and describe different situations and contexts, providing wide coverage, it also presents some disadvantages. As media articles are written by humans, they might contain biased information and omit other important content, depending on the decisions of the writer, who can also alter the information offered to move the audience’s opinions. In this research, data from “El Clarín” may not be exactly objective, as the content might support the Argentinean side during the conflict, and some information negatively affecting the reputation of the country might have been omitted, affecting as a



consequence the impartiality of the results. Therefore, in order to overcome this difficulty, further studies on this topic are suggested through the analysis of data from other newspapers in different countries, especially on the Finnish and Uruguayan sides. Besides, it might be interesting to complete this study using additional and different sources of data, for instance, through interviews with some of the actors involved in the conflict.

### **3.3 Analysis process**

#### **3.3.1 Qualitative content analysis**

Different approaches can be identified on how to develop qualitative research, for instance, case study research, phenomenological research, ethnographic research, grounded theory research, narrative research, content analysis research and discourse theoretical research (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2015; Bengtsson, 2016; Vaismoradi, Turunen & Bondas, 2013; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). In this research, and given the documentary data available, the qualitative research will be conducted through qualitative content analysis, which seems to be the most appropriate option when analyzing existing available texts (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008).

As defined by Krippendorff (2004), qualitative content analysis is a “research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts to their context” (Bengtsson, 2016, p. 9), or more specifically, as explained by Downe-Wambolt (1992), “from verbal, visual, or written data in order to describe and quantify specific phenomena” (Bengtsson, 2016, p. 9). The main objective is to reduce the amount of material in a way that key contents and concepts remain (Iffland, Berner, Dekker & Briken, 2015; Stemler, 2001; Elo, Käänäinen, Kanste, Pölkki, Utriainen & Kyngäs, 2014). This allows the researcher to better analyze and go through the data, in order to describe and provide understanding of the phenomenon being studied (Elo et al., 2008; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).

Three different approaches of qualitative content analysis have been identified: conventional, directed and summative (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This study will be conducted under a conventional content analysis, approaching an inductive perspective instead of deduction or abduction during a first order analysis of the available data (Gioia, Carley & Hamilton, 2012). This means that the research process will not be started from theoretical propositions, and the

theoretical results will be obtained after analyzing and going through the empirical material (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2015), starting with the specific or particular and moving to the general (Elo et al., 2008; Saldana, 2011).

However, in order to ensure rigor in the inductive data examination, additionally, a second order analysis will be performed too (Gioia et al., 2012). It will follow a deductive approach, and a theoretical framework will be applied to the available empirical material of this study. Through the utilization of a first and a second order analysis, data would be more carefully scrutinized. In addition, it facilitates the creation of a data structure, where data results can be visually represented more easily (Gioia et al., 2012). Gioia et al. (2012) defined and described this data structure as “the anatomy of the coming theory” (p. 24). This means that data structure, consequently, allows and enhances a data examination and a presentation of the results more theoretically oriented (Gioia et al., 2012).

Even though qualitative content analysis seems to be the adequate analysis method for this research, it is important to point out that it might present some limitations. Firstly, as the analysis depends mainly on the researcher in charge of the study and the researcher’s perceptions and understanding, the results might be unintentionally biased. Secondly, the analysis must focus only on the written available data. As a consequence, if some important relevant information is not mentioned in the material, then it cannot be included and analyzed (Brewerton & Millward, 2001).

### **3.3.2 Data analysis**

The data will be analyzed through a qualitative content analysis, therefore, following some specific steps and characteristics common to this qualitative method. Content analysis attempts to decrease the amount of data, going through the available texts and words and reducing them into specific categories based on codes (Stemler, 2001). Krippendorff (1989) identified six main steps in this process: design, unitizing, sampling, coding, drawing inferences, and validation. Firstly, it is necessary to get familiar with the context of the research and especially the data, so some units of analysis can be identified inside the available data. Those units can be classified into specific codes that can be easily interpreted and related to the object of study, finding patterns and categorizing data. As a result, the phenomena can be described and

understood, and some new knowledge and results are produced. As last step, the study needs to be validated in order to prove its trustworthiness (Bengtsson, 2016; Vaismoradi et al., 2013).

Hence, qualitative content analysis consists mainly on coding and categorizing data. Saldana (2011) defines codes as words or small phrases labeling units of analysis that capture the essence and relevant information of those specific pieces of data and allow later re-organization into categories for further analysis. Stemler (2001) presents Weber's (1990) definition of category as "a group of words with similar meaning or connotations" (p. 3), and argues that categories must be "mutually exclusive and exhaustive" (p. 3). It is important to always take into account that coding and categorizing processes must be developed in accordance with the research objective and phenomena being studied (Merriam, 2009; Bengtsson, 2016); and it would be advisable to keep memos with thoughts and notes emerged during the analysis process (Merriam, 2009).

Data analysis will start with a first order analysis, which follows an inductive approach. Emergent open coding will be utilized, and codes will be determined after previous examination of the data and not before (Stemler, 2001). Next, these codes will be classified into categories according to how they are connected, developing meaningful groups that need to be defined and, subsequently, examined in order to better understand their relationships and describe the phenomena studied and generate knowledge (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Elo et al, 2008).

More concretely, the first order analysis will start with an initial reading of the documentary available data, in order to familiarize with the context (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) and develop a case study overview as presented in the articles of the newspaper. Next, all the stakeholders involved in the case study will be identified from data, together with and their positions and interests. These stakeholders will be classified as opponent, supporter or neutral actors during the dispute.

After listing all the stakeholders involved in Botnia case, the next step will be identifying the proper key stakeholders for this research, in order to answer the research objective through data analysis: examine stakeholder relationships and opposition. On the one hand, during the selection of the final sample, the key stakeholders were chosen based on those actors considered essential in the conflict in other previous studies on Botnia case. However, as the study will examine both stakeholder relationships and opposition, it might seem coherent to think that data



Therefore, the study will focus only on the key stakeholders who frequently showed or faced opposition, and those who frequently related together during the bilateral conflict. These main actors are Botnia, the Uruguayan government, local people from Fray Bentos, the Argentinean government, and the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú (CEAG). Therefore, the following sections focused on analyzing stakeholder relationships and opposition will be based on those specific stakeholders. Even though the stakeholder ENCE also suffered some opposition during the conflict, it will not be considered as key stakeholder for this study, as the main objective is to analyze only the conflict around Botnia. In the case of the European Union, it will not be included as key stakeholder in the research as it only showed little support towards Botnia, but did not show further opposition or related to any of the other actors involved in the conflict.

Furthermore, this chart also demonstrates that the first stakeholder election utilized to reduce and narrow data was appropriate for this study, as the stakeholders who were categorized as important in previous studies are the same as those actors actively participating in the conflict by relating, showing and facing opposition. Thus, the stakeholders selected to reduce the initial data are the same as the stakeholders chosen to be analyzed in the following sections of this study.

Additionally, the next step during the first order inductive analysis will be identifying the existing relationships between the key stakeholders and firm, and among all the key stakeholder groups too. The relationships will be categorized into neutral, supporting and opposing relationships; and they will be further examined and discussed.

A second order analysis will be performed to study stakeholder opposition, following a deductive approach. Thus, a previous theoretical framework will be applied to the data. This framework was created by Den Hond and De Bakker (2007) and consists of a classification of opposition tactics utilized by secondary stakeholders with the objective of showing influence and resistance against the firm, categorized into “logic of numbers” and “logic of gain/damage”, both “symbolic” or “material”. The objective of this second order analysis is to approach the data under a more theoretical perspective.

The main goal of the second order deductive analysis will be examining stakeholder opposition. Thus, this analysis will start by describing which tactics were utilized by stakeholders in order

to show opposition during the conflict. Next, the analysis will compare how these tactics might differ when stakeholders use them in different situations: first, showing resistance against the firm and the project; and second, showing resistance against other stakeholder groups. Simultaneously, Den Hond and De Bakker's (2007) study on stakeholder opposition tactics will be applied while analyzing the data, in order to further study opposition under theoretical lenses through the application of a previous existing theoretical framework. Finally, differences between the tactic choices of every stakeholder will be examined.




Figure 4. Data analysis process

To summarize how data analysis will be approached, figure 4 shows the data analysis process, including both the first and second order analysis.

## **4. STAKEHOLDER RELATIONSHIPS AND OPPOSITION IN BOTNIA CASE**

### **4.1 Main events of the case (2005—2009)**

#### **4.1.1 Year 2005: The pulp mill establishment**

After years of negotiations addressed to obtain the authorization from the Uruguayan government, the Spanish company ENCE and the Finnish company Botnia decided to locate their pulp mills in the city of Fray Bentos, located close to the Uruguay River, which is the border between Argentina and Uruguay. As a result, the projects soon needed to face protests and demonstrations from environmental organizations and activists in the neighbor country Argentina, and also from some local organizations in the Uruguayan city of Fray Bentos at the beginning of the project. Therefore, even though the companies promised several benefits to Uruguay, such as an improvement in the economy and the creation of new jobs, the projects were still seen as a huge environmental risk by some actors.

Mainly, the demonstrators denounced the following possible negative impacts: water pollution in the Uruguay River, acid rain, and health problems due to bad smell. Consequently, Uruguayan local people and organizations from Fray Bentos, together with other Argentinean local people and Argentinean organizations, decided to start to protest and demonstrate against the construction of the pulp mills. They decided to block the San Martín Bridge that connects Uruguay-Fray Bentos and Argentina-Gualeguaychú, as a strategy for opposing against the pulp mill projects that will consequently “murder” the Uruguay River. This protest was mainly organized by the environmental group CEAG “Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú” in Gualeguaychú, the area mainly affected by the new projects, together with the Argentinean region of Entre Ríos. The CEAG also denounced that during the negotiations for these construction projects, the Uruguayan government did not respect the Uruguay River Agreement on the joint use and protection of the water, signed in 1975 by Uruguay and Argentina. The Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú stated that, according to the Agreement, any projects that might imply negative consequences in the river water and environment should be discussed and approved by both countries: Argentina and

Uruguay. Therefore, as Argentina had not been consulted, the country considered those projects as illegal, and demanded the relocation of the pulp mills to the Uruguayan government. The government of Uruguay firmly refused to modify the projects and supported both companies, Botnia and ENCE, as they fulfilled all the legal requirements needed to ensure the safety of the river and its environment in both regions. In addition, the Uruguayan chancellor reminded the fact that in Argentinean territory there were already four pulp mills operating.

In July, and due to the Argentinean request, the World Bank announced that the companies would not receive the funding needed for the continuation of their projects until the elaboration of a Cumulative Impact Study (CIS) by the World Bank's International Financial Corporation (IFC). This loan cancellation, thus, paralyzed both projects, which were already under construction but suddenly without access to financing.

Consequently, Uruguay decided to cancel its participation in the joint committee created together with Argentina with the intention of studying the environmental impact of the activity of the projects on the river water and its environment. As a result, the bilateral relations between both countries were within the limit. In addition, this conflict became a "national issue" in Argentina, as stated by the President Kirchner and high representatives of the government. The Argentinean government decided to join forces and collaborate with local people in order to take appropriate actions against the companies and demand suspension of the construction projects until the Cumulative Impact Study could be finished and released.

The World Bank and its subsidiary the International Financial Corporation decided to visit Argentina, its affected region of Entre Ríos, and the companies involved in the conflict, in order to evaluate the environmental impact of those projects. Meanwhile, the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú prepared a massive protest in Gualeguaychú with high levels of participation. In addition, in October, the Finnish Company Stora Enso announced its intention to locate another pulp mill in Uruguay, also close to the Uruguay River. Uruguay soon showed its optimism towards the project, as Finland was considered as one of the most environmentally friendly countries in Uruguay, and the project will bring new jobs and benefits to the economy of the country.

While the World Bank and the IFC representatives were investigating the projects and their environmental impacts in Gualeguaychú and Fray Bentos, the Uruguayan President Tabaré



Vázquez decided to join and coordinate actions with Botnia to face jointly all the upcoming demands from Argentina. Additionally, Entre Ríos government decided to organize new demonstrations and start legal actions involving The Hague ICJ. Besides, the bilateral relations between both countries deteriorated, as in Argentina, the Argentina Custom House paralyzed key exports to Fray Bentos which were essential to continue with the pulp mill construction.

Later this year, the IFC announced that the Cumulative Impact Study (CIS) results would be published in December, and both countries defended their positions: Argentina wanted the construction projects to be paused until the CIS results were published, and Uruguay supported that the construction projects should continue. However, the Argentinean government, as a way to ease up the bilateral conflict, stated that its position might change and instead of denying the pulp mills, they might accept them with the condition of a firm's assurance that the Uruguay River will suffer no harm. In Gualeguaychú, the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú started partial and total roadblocks as a tactic to protest in the main border bridges connecting the Argentinean cities of Gualeguaychú and Colon with Uruguay. Uruguay showed immediately its opposition against this method, as the roadblocks might damage the tourism and economic sector of the country. According to the Uruguayan government, they represented a violation of the Mercosur Agreement that allows and ensures free circulation and movement in Mercosur countries.

Table 7 presents all the key events happened during Botnia case in 2005, based on the analysis of the final sample.

Table 7. Key events during Botnia case, year 2005

QUARTER	MONTH	KEY EVENTS
2005 1Q	Jan.	No articles available
	Feb.	No articles available
	March	No articles available
2005 2Q	April	- Argentinean local people and organizations, together with some local people from Fray Bentos, protest against the “murder” of the Uruguay River by ENCE and Botnia.
	May	- CEAG reports a breach in the Uruguay River Agreement and negligence of the Uruguayan government.
	June	No articles available
2005 3Q	July	- Due to the Argentinean request, the World Bank cancels loans to the projects until a CIS is performed by the IFC. - As consequence, Uruguay refuses to participate in a joint committee with Argentina to study the impact of the projects.
	Aug.	- The conflict becomes a “national issue” for the Argentinean government, who decides to join efforts with local people and try to cancel the projects until the CIS is finished.
	Sept.	- The World Bank and IFC will visit the Argentinean region affected by the pulp mill projects and the companies involved. - In Gualeguaychú, the CEAG prepares a massive protest.
2005 4Q	Oct.	- Stora Enso might plan to locate a new pulp mill in Uruguay. - President Tabaré will collaborate with Botnia to face all demands, and Entre Ríos prepares protests and legal actions in The Hague ICJ.
	Nov.	- Argentina Custom House paralyzes exports heading to Uruguay, which were needed to continue the construction projects.
	Dec.	- The Argentinean government states that the pulp mills will be accepted only if no environmental negative impact is ensured. - Roadblocks in bridges connecting Uruguay and Argentina begin, considered as a violation of the Mercosur Agreement by Uruguay.

#### 4.1.2 Year 2006: The beginning of the conflict

In Argentina, the CEAG intensified the roadblocks in the Argentinean cities of Gualeguaychú, Colón and Concordia during summer days, which were considered important for tourism. The objective was to prevent circulation between both countries as a tourism boycott against Uruguay. Meanwhile, Greenpeace Argentina also supported that the pulp mills might have negative impact on the surrounding environment. On the contrary, Uruguay firmly supported the companies, claiming that the projects will be carried out under the most responsible measures and methods to prevent negative environmental impact.

In addition, the Argentinean and the Uruguayan chancellors discussed their positions in a meeting. Uruguay showed its commitment and support towards the projects and its concerns about the roadblocks, stating that the Argentinean government should start actions to stop the activists and prevent more possible roadblocks; and Argentina wanted the projects to stop until no negative environmental impact could be demonstrated. In Uruguay, the government decided to create a committee involving all the existing political parties in the country with the objective

of coordinating and joining forces in order to solve the bilateral conflict with the neighbor country Argentina.

The roadblocks continued in Gualeguaychú during important summer days, and consequently, the bilateral relations between Argentina and Uruguay fully deteriorated, so all the efforts made by the Argentinean and the Uruguayan governments to ease up the conflict were in vain. From Argentina, only trucks with a court order were allowed to cross the border bridges to Uruguay. Uruguay claimed that, as a result, tourism had decreased around 50% in the country and the economy was really suffering the consequences of the roadblocks and the demonstrations. However, the construction of Botnia pulp mill continued without any complications, and in Fray Bentos, the project was definitely accepted and supported due to the new available jobs created by the firm. As the bilateral relations deteriorated, the conflict continued: on the one side, Argentina decided to appeal to The Hague ICJ; and on the other side, Uruguay complained in the Organization of American States (OAS) about the roadblocks.

As a method to ease up the bilateral conflict, Botnia declared that the firm might be willing to negotiate with Uruguay and stop the construction for a short period. Therefore, the presidents of both countries, after a meeting, agreed on the suspension of the construction project and the roadblocks during 90 days in order to negotiate and solve the conflict during the break period. However, Uruguay stated that the country might still ask for a compensation regarding the roadblocks and their negative economic consequences to the country. As a result, Botnia definitely agreed on the suspension of the construction projects for a maximum of 90 days in order to encourage dialogue between both countries, and the governments agreed on the creation of a bilateral joint committee to cooperate and closely study the environmental impact of the projects in the surrounding environment. However, Botnia suddenly decided not to stop the construction project for 90 days, and as a result, Uruguay decided to cancel the negotiation processes with Argentina. Consequently, and according to Argentina, the only approach to solve the bilateral conflict between the countries seemed to be in The Hague ICJ. The Argentinean government also denounced that the firm had not presented sufficient information about the specific operations of the pulp mill and their possible impact on the environment. Contrary to the Argentinean perspective in the bilateral conflict, The European Union expressed its support towards Botnia, which was considered an innocent victim in the conflict, criticizing at the same time the Argentinean opposition and showing trust in the Finnish company due to

its past positive records. The European Union also highlighted that this bilateral conflict might prevent other foreign countries from investing in Uruguay or Argentina in the future.

Argentina definitely appealed in The Hague ICJ, demanding suspension in the construction of both pulp mills until The Hague ICJ's final resolution; a resolution that might take years. The country denounced that Uruguay had not respected the Uruguay River Agreement, that the information provided by the firms was not sufficient, and that the pulp mills might have negative fatal consequences in the river environment. The country denounced that Uruguay had authorized both projects without consulting Argentina as agreed in the Uruguay River Agreement, and that the government had even authorized the construction of a harbor specifically oriented to Botnia use in a unilateral decision. At the same time, Botnia made its position clear: the bilateral conflict was between Argentina and Uruguay so the company was not willing to intervene, and the construction of the pulp mill would not be paused due to the difficulties of a suspension, as a great amount of stakeholders were involved. However, the company also declared its willingness to provide more information about its operations and impacts if needed, even though, according to Botnia, the best way to show that the pulp mill was not going to affect negatively the environment was demonstrating in situ the safety of the pulp mill once the company started its operations.

During the trial, on the one hand, Argentina tried to convince The Hague ICJ that both Botnia and ENCE projects might harm the environment, and they were considered an assault to the Human Right of living in healthy conditions. Therefore, the country demanded a suspension in the construction projects until The Hague ICJ's final resolution. On the other hand, Uruguay defended against those accusations saying that both projects were carried out following environmentally friendly standards and without negative impact on the environment, and consequently, there were no reasons to stop the projects and the construction would not be paused. At this moment, the bilateral relations between Argentina and Uruguay were totally broken.

With nonexistent relationships between Argentina and Uruguay, Argentina stated that as a way to re-open dialogue between the countries, they might accept suspension in the construction projects for only 30 days together with more complete and accurate information about the firms' operations. Uruguay claimed for a compensation for the losses the country suffered due to the Argentinean roadblocks, and Argentina had to face a plaint presented by Uruguay in Mercosur

due to the roadblocks and their negative economic consequences. Uruguay accused Argentina of passivity, as the Argentinean government did not act accordingly to prevent and solve the roadblocks. Finally, The Hague ICJ stated that there was no need for suspending the construction projects, as there were no negative consequences in the environment.

The Spanish company ENCE finally announced that its pulp mill would be relocated in a different place in Uruguay instead of Fray Bentos, therefore, easing up the conflicting situation between Argentina and Uruguay. However, the company stated that the decision was not related to the existing bilateral conflict between the countries, and the relocation was determined as two large firms presenting those great dimensions together might not be viable. Both Argentinean and Uruguayan governments supported this decision, and Uruguay immediately decided to help the firm in all the procedures and formalities for the relocation of the pulp mill. Because of this decision, Argentina, and especially the CEAG, declared that the pressure exerted on ENCE had been effective and thus, more pressure might be exerted to force Botnia to relocate its pulp mill too. The CEAG also threatened with new roadblocks in the border bridges, as a symbol to protest against the passivity of the Argentinean government, the World Bank, Botnia and the Uruguayan government. In addition, they also threatened with river-blocks, to protest against the harbor built to support Botnia operations in Fray Bentos, with the objective of paralyzing all the shipments from Argentina to the firm.

Finally, The World Bank accepted to give funding to Botnia for its project, as the final Cumulative Impact Study definitely showed that the pulp mill would not affect negatively on Gualeguaychú and would bring positive benefits for the economy in Uruguay. In Argentina, they feared that this decision might also influence The Hague ICJ's final resolution. Therefore, the Argentinean government tried to delay the loan sending a letter to the World Bank and suggested that The Spanish King Juan Carlos and his representative could act as mediators to solve the bilateral conflict between both countries. During the mediation process leaded by The Spanish King, Uruguay continued blaming the Argentinean government in The Hague ICJ for its passivity regarding the roadblocks and demanded some solutions to the problem. In addition, the Uruguayan government decided to remove all the soldiers controlling Botnia facilities, as it might harm the firm reputation, and it might also work as a symbol to ease up the bilateral conflict, hoping that the Argentinean government might fight against the roadblocks too.

Table 8 shows all the key events happened during Botnia case in the year 2006, based on the information collected in the final sample.

Table 8. Key events during Botnia case, year 2006

QUARTER	MONTH	KEY EVENTS
2006 1Q	Jan.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Roadblocks organized by CEAG continue, supported by Greenpeace Argentina, while Uruguay supports the projects.</li> <li>- Uruguay shows its concerns about the roadblocks, requesting Argentina to stop them and create a committee to solve conflict.</li> </ul>
	Feb.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Roadblocks continue, and only trucks with court order will be allowed to cross the bridges, reducing tourism in Uruguay in 50%.</li> <li>- Fray Bentos supports the construction of the pulp mills due to the creation of new jobs. Thus, Argentina plans to appeal to The Hague ICJ while Uruguay criticizes the roadblocks in key bridges.</li> </ul>
	March	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Both countries agree on stopping the projects and roadblocks for 90 days to negotiate a solution to the bilateral conflict</li> <li>- Botnia will stop the construction during max. 90 days. Both countries agree on a bilateral committee to study the impact of the projects and ensure use of environmentally friendly measures.</li> </ul>
2006 2Q	April	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Botnia will not stop the project, so Uruguay stops negotiations. Argentina appeals to The Hague ICJ as a way to solve the conflict.</li> <li>- Botnia recognizes that Finnish government is part of the project.</li> <li>- EU supports Botnia due to the company positive past records and its environmentally friendly methods and measures.</li> </ul>
	May	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Argentina appeals in The Hague ICJ: Uruguay did not respect the Uruguay River Agreement and there is lack of information on the environmental impact of the projects.</li> <li>- Botnia will stay neutral in the conflict, but will provide more information if needed to Argentina to show no negative impact.</li> </ul>
	June	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Argentina requests in The Hague ICJ a stop in the projects; Uruguay refuses. Both countries show no willingness to find solution.</li> </ul>
2006 3Q	July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Argentina will accept as successful resolution a 30-day stop on the construction projects and more information about their impact.</li> <li>- Argentina faces a plaint in Mercosur from Uruguay due to the roadblocks, as the government did not mobilize to prevent them.</li> </ul>
	Aug.	No articles available.
	Sept.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ENCE will be relocated in Uruguay. The countries support the decision.</li> <li>- Argentina states that its pressure in ENCE was effective and will increase the pressure in Botnia project.</li> </ul>
2006 4Q	Oct.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CEAG threatens with river-blocks due to passivity in governments, firms and the World Bank. They complain that the harbor was built for Botnia's use under a unilateral decision by Uruguay.</li> <li>- The World Bank approves the loan to Botnia. Argentina fears this decision will influence The Hague ICJ's final resolution.</li> </ul>
	Nov.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Argentina tries to delay the loan from the World Bank to Botnia. The King of Spain acts as a mediator in the bilateral conflict.</li> <li>- Argentinean president Kirchner sends letter to World Bank, but the loan will be approved as the CIS shows no impact in Gualeguaychú.</li> </ul>
	Dec.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Uruguay appeals in The Hague the passivity of Argentinean government during the roadblocks. Argentina fears the resolution, as The Hague denied in July the stop of the construction projects.</li> <li>- Uruguay removes the soldiers around Botnia, as the firm said it damages its reputation, as a symbol to solve the conflict.</li> </ul>

### **4.1.3 Year 2007: The bilateral conflict**

During the mediation process leaded by The Spanish King, one suggestion was proposed as a solution to the conflict: a forestry theme park built in the middle of the river, between Gualeguaychú and Fray Bentos, including a great variety of different trees. This theme park would hide the sight of Botnia pulp mill, and especially its chimney, from Gualeguaychú and its local people. Besides, the theme park would act as protection from pollution in the environment. In addition, at the beginning of the year, The Hague ICJ rejected to intervene after the Uruguayan request to start actions and stop the roadblocks in Argentina.

Botnia definitely announced that the pulp mill would not be relocated as there were no threats or signs of pollution in the environment. This decision brought several consequences on the positions of each country. On the one hand, Argentina considered the firm as inflexible and uncompromising. On the other hand, Uruguay and some sectors of the Argentinean government considered the CEAG as obstinate and intransigent as the firm, as roadblocks continued in spite of the Uruguayan request: negotiations and dialogue between the countries might continue only if the roadblocks were stopped. In addition, Botnia announced that the Finnish government, as the firm, would stay neutral and not participate or intervene in the negotiations. In Gualeguaychú, all businesspersons also showed their opposition against the roadblocks organized by the CEAG, as it was firmly thought that the most effective solution to the conflict should be through a meeting between both presidents and through diplomacy. However, they also showed their opposition towards Botnia, as they believed that there might be sulfur pollution in the long term, and estate business and food companies might suffer negative consequences and abandon the city due to soil pollution.

The Argentinean president visited Fray Bentos with the intention of easing up the conflict, but Uruguay also made its position in the bilateral conflict clear: the country would not be willing to negotiate if the roadblocks continued, and they only offered as a possible solution a committee for the joint monitoring on the environment to control the pulp mill effects. El Clarín Newspaper also visited Botnia facilities, where the pulp mill would soon start to operate. Botnia managers declared that the firm was willing to provide all the information required to show that the pulp mill operations followed environmentally friendly standards and they protected the environment using high quality technologies. The firm ensured that the water returning to the Uruguay River was not polluted, and highlighted all the benefits of the project in Uruguay, such

as more jobs and better life quality in Fray Bentos, and an improvement in the Uruguayan economy.

In addition, the Argentinean government requested a renegotiation of the Uruguay River Agreement together with Uruguay to set some production limits to Botnia, as the country feared higher production levels in the pulp mill in the future. This was considered as a step towards dialogue between the countries, as it meant that Argentina had finally recognized and accepted that the pulp mill was not going to be relocated. However, the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú did not agree on the government's decision and decided to continue with the roadblocks in the border bridges. The conflict was seriously aggravated when Botnia stated that Uruguay had never officially requested the company to pause the construction for 90 days, as the country had agreed one year ago with Argentina with the objective of negotiating and stopping the roadblocks. In addition, the president of the company declared that the existing Committee in the Uruguay River (CARU), where both countries are involved, should be provided with the needed resources for a joint monitoring of the impact of the project on the river by Uruguay and Argentina. However, the firm recognized one mistake: the lack of communication with Gualeguaychú and the areas of Argentina affected by the pulp mill at the beginning of the project. Nevertheless, even though the firm understood that now the communication efforts were late, they showed willingness to start dialogue with all the affected areas.

Later in 2007, The Secretary of State in Spain for Latin America visited Argentina and met President Kirchner to enhance the mediation efforts of Spain. In addition, and as an important step towards dialogue, both the Uruguayan and Argentinean presidents had a meeting in New York, where again Argentina demanded the relocation of the pulp mill and Uruguay urged Argentina to stop the roadblocks as a condition to negotiate. In addition, Argentina also covered the issue of the creation of a joint committee to control pollution in the river waters and the renegotiation of the Uruguay River Agreement. Uruguay declared that Botnia should start operating to demonstrate that there is no pollution threat. Meanwhile, the CEAG started a protest against the Argentinean president, threatening with more roadblocks. The roadblocks were also affecting tourism in Argentina, and traffic and movement inside the country.

Regarding The Hague ICJ process, Uruguay counterclaimed the Argentinean plaint in The Hague ICJ affirming that the Uruguay River Agreement had been respected, and responding



that Jorge Batlle, the Argentinean president when Uruguay first started to negotiate the authorization for Botnia project, was aware of all the process. With these arguments, the country ensured that the Agreement had not been broken, and in addition, Uruguay reaffirmed the lack of negative environmental impact of the projects. Later, diplomats from both countries met in New York to cover all the issues included in the Madrid Declaration: the relocation of Botnia pulp mill, the stop in the roadblocks, the violation of the Uruguay River Agreement and the joint assessment of the project impact. Uruguay also declared that the sooner Botnia could start its operations, the sooner they could demonstrate there was no environmental negative impact.

Meanwhile, the CEAG organized a roadblock in the bridge connecting Gualeguaychú–Fray Bentos to protest against the Argentinean government due to its passivity in the bilateral conflict, followed by other roadblocks in the Argentinean cities of Colon and Concordia. The Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú demanded a blockage in the shipments to Botnia coming from Argentina, as the CEAG considered that the harbor was built illegally under a Uruguayan unilateral decision. The Argentinean government claimed that the roadblocks were simply damaging Argentina, without affecting Botnia. At the same time, the Uruguayan President Tabaré inaugurated the harbor built to support Botnia operations, while several organizations from Gualeguaychú and still a Uruguayan minority protested against the harbor.

With the objective of easing up the conflict, the government of Uruguay allowed a demonstration in Fray Bentos involving participants such as the CEAG and other organizations from Entre Rios. However, the country prepared a fence surrounding Botnia and a control operation to separate the demonstrators from the pulp mill. In Fray Bentos, citizens tried to differentiate themselves from the Argentinean activists by showing Uruguayan flags. During that demonstration, the passive attitudes of the Argentinean and Uruguayan presidents were criticized, together with the severe and strict controls performed by Uruguay on the demonstrators. At the same time, the Argentinean government finally accepted that Botnia was going to stay in Fray Bentos, and declared that the pulp mill might not harm the environment as much as stated by the country at the beginning of the conflict. With the bilateral conflict still affecting the relations between Argentina and Uruguay, both countries definitely accepted that the conflict could be solved only by accepting The Hague ICJ's final resolution, as diplomacy might not work due to the irreconcilable positions of every country. However, the resolution might be delayed due to changes in some of the current members of the Courts. In addition,

even though some of the roadblocks continued, this movement was not supported by the Argentinean government anymore, and they feared that actions to stop the roadblocks might increase the intensity of the protests. As a result, the CEAG requested the Argentinean president to visit the city to discuss possible solutions.

Finally, Uruguay authorized Botnia to start its operations after presenting all the required documents, and Botnia started to operate immediately. At the same time, and because of the authorization, Uruguay decided to close the border and block the main entrance Gualeguaychú-Fray Bentos and Colón-Fray Bentos in order to prevent protests against the pulp mill. Therefore, both the Uruguayan government and other activists protesting against Botnia suddenly blocked almost all the entrances connecting both countries. Consequently, the relations between both countries were definitely broken, and the mediation led by The King of Spain was unsuccessful. Due to the continuing protests, Uruguay decided to close all borders with Argentina and let the pulp mill show its innocence through its own activities. Meanwhile, in Argentina, Cristina Kirchner was elected new president, and the country tried to find new evidences to fight against Uruguay in The Hague ICJ while waiting for the final resolution. In addition, Cristina Kirchner strongly criticized the Uruguayan decision of allowing the start Botnia operations during a meeting with The Spanish King Juan Carlos. In December, Uruguay re-opened the borders, and in Fray Bentos the first reports about bad smells coming from Botnia appeared. Roadblocks continue in Gualeguaychú, Colon and Concordia organized by the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú. In Gualeguaychú, the CEAG also sent a letter to the Argentinean government to block all shipments from Argentina to Botnia, and the Uruguayan citizens living in Gualeguaychú started to demand more information about the pulp mill operations and their possible environmental impact.

Table 9 shows the key events happened during Botnia case in the year 2007, based on the information of the final sample.

Table 9. Key events during Botnia case, year 2007

QUARTER	MONTH	KEY EVENTS
2007 1Q	Jan.	- During the mediation process, one suggestion is offered: a forestry theme park in river, between Fray Bentos and Gualeguaychú. The Hague will not intervene in the roadblock conflict.
	Feb.	- Botnia will not be relocated and Finnish government will not intervene. Botnia and CEAG seen as inflexible actors increasing tension. - Businessmen from Gualeguaychú oppose to both roadblocks and Botnia. They fear soil pollution and companies leaving the region.
	March	- Uruguay will not negotiate if roadblocks continue. It offers as solution a joint monitoring to control the environmental impact. - El Clarín visits Botnia. The firm will provide information that proves no negative impact and it explains its benefits in Fray Bentos.
2007 2Q	April	- Argentina suggests a renegotiation of the River Agreement to set production limits to Botnia, accepting that the pulp mill will not be relocated. - Botnia claims that Uruguay never asked a stop in the construction. The firm is open to dialogue. They recognize no engagement with Gualeguaychú in the beginning.
	May	- The Secretary of State in Spain for Latin America visits Argentina as a way to enhance the mediation of Spain in the bilateral conflict. - Meeting: the relocation of Botnia, renegotiation of the Uruguay River Agreement and joint monitoring of the river. Uruguay sets as a condition to negotiate the stop of roadblocks.
	June	- CEAG protests against the Argentinean president, threatening with more roadblocks. It will also affect Argentinean tourism and traffic.
2007 3Q	July	- Uruguay claims in The Hague the Agreement was not violated, as Argentina was aware of Botnia since the beginning of the project. - Diplomats of both countries meet to discuss the Madrid Declaration: relocation of the pulp mill, roadblocks, violation of the Uruguay River Agreement, and joint monitoring of the impact.
	Aug.	- CEAG protests against President Kirchner's passivity in the conflict, and demands blocks in shipments heading to Botnia harbor. - President Tabaré inaugurates the harbor built for Botnia operations, while organizations from Gualeguaychú protest.
	Sept.	- A protest from Gualeguaychú and Entre Ríos will be allowed in Fray Bentos under a control operation to protect the pulp mill. - The protest in Fray Bentos criticized both presidents due to passive attitudes during the conflict. The roadblock was opened to allow the protest cross the bridge, and Uruguay kept controls on the demonstrators. - Botnia is ready to operate. The countries face the consequences of the conflict: Argentina recognizes that Botnia will stay and might not pollute as claimed before, and Uruguay faces roadblocks and a joint monitoring with Argentina on the river environment.
2007 4Q	Oct.	- The solution to the conflict is The Hague resolution, as diplomacy does not work due to irreconcilable positions in each country. - Uruguay authorizes Botnia to start operations and they will not negotiate if roadblocks continue. CEAG requires Kirchner a visit to discuss about the conflict and the possible solutions.
	Nov.	- Argentina criticizes Uruguayan decision to allow the start of Botnia operations in a meeting with the Spanish King - Botnia starts to operate. Uruguay closes connections between Gualeguaychú and Fray Bentos to prevent conflicts. Argentina tries to find new evidences to present in Hague. The bilateral relations are definitely broken. - Uruguay closes Colón Bridge to avoid CEAG to cross to Fray Bentos. Thus, two of the three bridges connecting the countries remain blocked. - Uruguay closes all accesses from Argentina to Fray Bentos to prevent demonstrations in front of the pulp mill.
	Dec.	- Uruguay opens accesses when the protests begin to disappear, and in Fray Bentos there are reports of bad smells from Botnia. - Roadblocks continue, also trying to prevent shipments from Argentina to Botnia. Uruguayan citizens living in Gualeguaychú demand more information about the operations of the pulp mill.

#### **4.1.4 Year 2008: Soothing the conflict**

At the beginning of the year 2008, Botnia invited some Argentinean journalists to visit the pulp mill with the objective of demonstrating that, even though the operations were at full capacity, there was no negative impact on the environment and the operations met all the environmental requirements. The firm also regretted that, due to the conflict, Argentina could not benefit from Botnia, for instance, through shipments of machinery and creation of jobs in the country. At the same time, Argentina presented more evidences in The Hague ICJ showing how Uruguay had definitely broken the Uruguay River Agreement when authorizing both projects, when building the Botnia harbor, and by using huge amounts of water from the river.

In Gualeguaychú, the roadblocks and demonstrations continued even with the opposition from the Argentinean government and some local people of the city, as the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú claimed that the pollution, if not now, might appear in the long term. The CEAG demanded a meeting with the Argentinean President Cristina Kirchner, who had opposed against the roadblocks and supported that the conflict should be solved through The Hague ICJ's final resolution. In Uruguay, the President Tabaré organized some political changes by naming Gonzalo Fernández as the new chancellor, who always criticized Botnia's neutral perspective and the roadblocks. At the same time, both countries needed to face specific challenges: in Uruguay, Botnia experienced some incidents without providing further accurate information; and in Argentina, the government's priority consisted on preventing the CEAG's power and its roadblocks.

Later, during the festival organized by Botnia in Fray Bentos, Uruguay prepared strong safety and control measures fearing conflicts and protests. However, the border bridges were controlled, but not blocked. In Argentina, the President of Botnia and some managers were supposed to testify in the Argentinean Court due to an environmental pollution attempt, but in Botnia it was declared the firm was not aware of the plaint. In April, the CEAG organized a protest in the bridge connecting San Martín and Fray Bentos demanding the relocation of Botnia, but as a main difference, this time the bridge was not completely blocked and movement was allowed. Even though the demonstration mobilized less people than at the beginning of the conflict, it still was a success. However, in Argentina, Cristina Kirchner again claimed that the conflict should be solved after The Hague ICJ's resolution.

It was in this year when, for the first time since the roadblocks started, a judge ordered the opening of a blocked bridge for a particular case. In Gualeguaychú, the citizens' opinions on the roadblocks started to divide: some people opposed to the roadblocks as they considered this tactic useless, and others were firmly supporters as the tactic represented a symbol of the fight against pollution and Botnia. In addition, the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú started to organize tours addressed to tourists who were interested in visiting the blocked bridge and knowing more about the conflict around the pulp mill. At that moment, the bridge seemed to be abandoned and was fully controlled by the CEAG, and only some cars were allowed to cross the bridge. The Argentinean President, after a meeting with the Uruguayan Chancellor, agreed on trying to stop the roadblocks in the bridge connecting Gualeguaychú and Fray Bentos. In addition, Mercosur refused the Uruguayan claim and denied that Uruguay had suffered severe fatal negative economic consequences due to the roadblocks, even though the organization showed its completely opposition against the roadblocks, considered as illegal. After the Argentinean government expressed its intention to stop the roadblocks, the Uruguayan President Tabaré felt optimistic about finding a solution for the conflict. Furthermore, a study from the University of Buenos Aires confirmed that Botnia operations were not polluting the air quality. However, the study did not analyze water quality yet, and more complete studies might be needed in the future.

In November, Botnia was finally operating at full capacity in Fray Bentos without suffering any consequence from the roadblocks. In Argentina, the operations of the company were said to be higher than the joint operations of all the pulp mills existing in the country. Regarding the roadblocks, even though they had continued for two years, they lost the government support and were hardly criticized by Mercosur. In addition, Gualeguaychú and even the CEAG started to be divided into those who supported that the roadblocks should end or at least become more flexible, and those who fully supported that the roadblocks should continue as a symbol of the environmental fight. Besides, the governor of Entre Rios publicly expressed his opposition against the roadblocks and recognized no current pollution caused by the pulp mill, while the CEAG stated that pollution might appear over time. In December, as the Argentinean ex-president Néstor Kirchner was the candidate as General Secretary in the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), Uruguay totally refused to accept his presence and threatened to leave the organization.

Table 10 shows the key events happened during Botnia case in the year 2008, based on the information of the final sample.

Table 10. Key events during Botnia case, year 2008

QUARTER	MONTH	KEY EVENTS
2008 1Q	Jan.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Botnia meets Argentinean journalists to show that it operates with no negative impact and meets all environmental requirements.</li> <li>- Argentina shows more evidences in The Hague ICJ about the Uruguayan breach on the Uruguay River Bilateral Agreement.</li> </ul>
	Feb.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CEAG demands to meet Cristina Kirchner, who supports the conflict ends with The Hague ICJ resolution and repulses roadblocks.</li> <li>- There are political changes in Uruguay to soothe the conflict. The power in Botnia and the CEAG, together with tension, increase.</li> </ul>
	March	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Uruguay prepares safety measures in Botnia Festival in Fray Bentos. The border bridges will be controlled, but no blocked.</li> <li>- The President of Botnia and some managers are supposed to testify in the Argentinean Court due to an environmental pollution attempt, but in Botnia they are not aware of this issue.</li> </ul>
2008 2Q	April	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CEAG organizes a demonstration in the bridge connecting San Martin and Fray Bentos demanding the relocation of Botnia: the bridge will not be blocked and movement is allowed.</li> <li>- The demonstration, with less participation, was still a success.</li> </ul>
	May	- Finland plans more investments in the forest industry in Uruguay.
	June	No articles available
2008 3Q	July	No articles available
	Aug.	- In Gualeguaychú, local people are divided into opponents of roadblocks and supporters, as they are seen as a protest symbol.
	Sept.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CEAG prepares tours for tourists to visit the bridge and see the pulp mill.</li> <li>- Cristina Kirchner might agree on stopping roadblocks, and Mercosur resolves that Uruguay did not suffer negative impact after roadblocks, even though it condemns those actions.</li> </ul>
2008 4Q	Oct.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Tabaré feels optimistic as Kirchner will try to stop roadblocks.</li> <li>- The University of Buenos Aires presents a study showing that Botnia does not pollute air. Water quality was not analyzed yet.</li> </ul>
	Nov.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Botnia operates at full capacity in Uruguay, not affected by roadblocks.</li> <li>- After 2 years of roadblocks, the CEAG movement definitely loses government's support. Even though environmental awareness is supported, roadblocks should end or become more flexible.</li> </ul>
	Dec.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Uruguay threatens with abandoning USAN if ex Argentinean President Nestor Kirchner is elected General Secretary.</li> <li>- Entre Rios Governor shows opposition against the roadblocks. CEAG claims there will be cumulative pollution in long term.</li> </ul>

#### 4.1.5 Year 2009: Seeking a diplomatic solution

At the beginning of the year, the Uruguayan Environmental Minister claimed that the country would be able to accept more pulp mills in the Uruguay River, as he found no negative consequences in Botnia activities, adding that no more monitoring on the river conditions is needed. In addition, the governor of Entre Rios finally agreed on meeting the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú. During this meeting, he discussed his contradictory opinion with the CEAG: he supported the pause of the roadblocks as they were affecting the Argentinean economy and tourism, while the Argentinean Citizens Environmental

Assembly of Gualeguaychú refused to cease the key symbol of their fight against pollution: the roadblocks. In addition, Uruguay asked the Argentinean government for actions to prevent the roadblocks and not only words, as the General San Martín bridge connecting Gualeguaychú and Fray Bentos had been blocked for two years, even though studies showed that air and water quality remained acceptable after the pulp mill had started to operate.

During this year 2009, some stains in the Uruguay River became Argentina's main concern, even though Botnia and Uruguay said that they were only seaweeds. However, after some water analysis, the results clarified that the stains were definitely seaweeds. This issue raised some awareness about the current state of the Uruguay River, which had been forgotten for long time, as Argentina had no plans, studies or policies to protect, analyze and improve the quality of the water. The only responsible body was the Committee of the Uruguay River (CARU), which was always dependent on both countries' request. Therefore, the legislation over the waters of the river had been forgotten, and fertilizers and sewage waste had always polluted the river without any kind of control and prevention. As a result, the NGO Green Cross decided to perform some studies on the quality of the waters close to Botnia in both sides of the river: Argentina and Uruguay.

For the first time, and after more than two years of roadblocks, there was a fatal accident where a motorbike rider died after crashing into the trailer blocking the entrance to the bridge controlled by the CEAG. The Finnish researcher Jussi Pakkasvirta decided to express his opinion, and analyzed and presented the consequences of the bilateral conflict in each country in an academic article. According to his opinion, on the one side, Uruguay's mistake was mainly forgetting about the neighbor country at the beginning of the project. However, on the other side, even though the project experienced some minor opposition in Fray Bentos, the country successfully managed to obtain absolutely support to the project due to the various economic benefits to the country. Regarding Botnia, its main mistake was only analyzing legal and technical issues, but not the political or cultural aspects of the project, ignoring possible emotional responses towards the project. In addition, there was lack of open discussion and communication with Argentina at the beginning of the project, where the excellent environmental standards of the company were not enough to convince the Argentinean side. Jussi Pakkasvirta also highlighted the fact that Argentina showed an attitude of fear towards foreign companies, and the main mistake of this country was that the government chose the easy approach for the conflict of supporting the popular and local feelings against the project.

Finally, Finland also suffered some criticism, as its strategy was even considered as pure neocolonialism. The country suffered the consequences of loss of jobs in the forest industry in the country. Besides, the country experienced a loss of self-confidence, as they were not seen in Argentina by its typical stereotype of being a rational, smart, honest and innovative country. Furthermore, the conflict also brought nationalistic feelings in the country.

In Argentina, the CEAG decided not to open the border bridge for the elections in Uruguay, even though some demonstrators supported the idea of showing some mercy to avoid being considered as extremists. Consequently, some Uruguayan people living in Argentina were not allowed to cross to vote in the elections, even though the CEAG had allowed some citizens to cross the bridge some days ago to attend a football match.

During the second round in The Hague ICJ's trial, Argentina tried to defend the presented evidences, complained about bad smell coming from Botnia, and denounced a bad location of the pulp mill in an important area for tourism in the country. Uruguay also defended its position by assuring that they had consulted Argentina when the country decided to start the project and collaborate with Botnia, and therefore, the country had not broken the Uruguay River Agreement. Uruguay also highlighted that the pulp mill had no negative consequences on the river, and denounced that the existing current pollution that the river was suffering was the result of the agriculture activities in Argentina. As usual, the country also criticized the Argentinean government passivity on the issue of the roadblocks.

In October, the CEAG definitely agreed on not opening the bridge for the elections happening in Uruguay, supporting the decision with the following arguments: firstly, the Uruguayan residents in Argentina were able to use other alternative open bridges; and secondly, the CEAG did not support any of the candidates of the Uruguayan elections, as they fully supported Botnia. In addition, Uruguay complained in The Hague ICJ by declaring that Argentina had intentionally misunderstood and used some environmental studies for its own benefit to fake the results and show pollution in the river, which actually was non-existent, by using in purpose wrong terms during the speech in front of The Hague ICJ.

At the end of this year, Botnia finally exported to Argentina for the first time, to the Argentinean Company Celupaper. In addition, the candidate to the Uruguayan elections Mujica stated that his first trip as president would be to Argentina to solve conflict. Argentina also claimed to be



willing to find a solution to the bilateral conflict, instead of only waiting for The Hague ICJ's resolution, even though roadblocks continued in Gualeguaychú. With Mujica as new President of Uruguay, the government confirmed that its main priorities would be stopping the roadblocks and finally trying to solve the conflict.

Table 11 summarizes the key events happened during Botnia case in the year 2009, based on the information collected in the final sample.

Table 11. Key events during Botnia case, year 2009

QUARTER	MONTH	KEY EVENTS
2009 1Q	Jan.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Uruguayan Environment minister claims that the country would be able to accept more pulp mills in the Uruguay River.</li> <li>- Governor of Entre Rios meets CEAG to discuss about roadblocks. CEAG considers those as a symbol of the fight against pollution.</li> <li>- Uruguayan government demands Argentinean government to start actions to stop the roadblocks.</li> </ul>
	Feb.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Stains appear in the Uruguay River, but Botnia and Uruguay support they are seaweeds. Water analysis will give answers.</li> <li>- Argentina, Uruguay and Botnia, after water analysis, agree that the stain was just seaweed.</li> </ul>
	March	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Uruguay River has been forgotten for long time: there are no studies to control and improve its water, and it is highly polluted by sewage waste and fertilizers.</li> <li>- Green Cross will analyze water quality in the Uruguayan and Argentinean sides of the river close to Botnia.</li> </ul>
2009 2Q	April	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Motorcyclist dies after crashing into a trailer blocking the bridge.</li> </ul>
	May	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Finnish researcher analyzes the consequences of the conflict: it has affected the self-esteem and nationalism feelings of Finland.</li> </ul>
	June	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CEAG will not open the roadblocks during the Uruguayan elections, even though some of demonstrators in CEAG were in favor.</li> </ul>
2009 3Q	July	No articles available
	Aug.	No articles available
	Sept.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Argentina defends its position during the second round in The Hague ICJ, focusing on bad smell and bad location of Botnia in an area for tourism.</li> <li>- Uruguay defends its position claiming that they did not break the Agreement, that there is no existing current pollution, and they blame Argentina for not preventing the roadblocks.</li> </ul>
2009 4Q	Oct.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CEAG will not open the bridge for the Uruguayans citizens with the intention to vote in the upcoming Uruguayan elections.</li> <li>- Uruguay reports an intentional misuse of environmental impact studies by Argentina to fake and show pollution in the river.</li> </ul>
	Nov.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Botnia's first export to the Argentinean company Celupaper.</li> <li>- Mujica, candidate in the upcoming Uruguayan elections, promises to visit Argentina if he wins the elections as his first official trip.</li> </ul>
	Dec.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- After Mujica's success in elections, the stop of the roadblocks is the government's priority, and countries will try to solve the conflict.</li> </ul>

## **4.2 Stakeholders and relationships of Botnia case**

### **4.2.1 Identification of stakeholders**

During the first order analysis of data, the following 12 stakeholders were identified as participants during Botnia case. This list includes the key stakeholders for the study, together with other actors that appeared frequently during the project of Botnia and the consequent bilateral conflict created between Argentina and Uruguay.

#### **Botnia:**

The Finnish company decided to invest in Uruguay and start a construction project of a pulp mill in the City of Fray Bentos, in Uruguay. The main priority of the firm during the escalation of the conflict was the completion of the construction project to start to operate the pulp mill in Uruguay as soon as possible. Thus, the company firmly supported the project, as they affirmed that the best technologies and environmentally friendly methods were being used in order to prevent negative impact in the Uruguay River and its surroundings. However, the firm needed to face strong opposition against the project from several stakeholders for long time.

Botnia had neutral relationships with the external stakeholders involved in the project and the conflict. However, the company presented closer relationships with the Uruguayan government, as they were necessary in order to start the pulp mill operations. In addition, the company received the funding for the project from the World Bank after a cumulative impact study of the project, even though the relationships were simply professional and neutral. The company also made great efforts trying to relate and engage with Argentina after the pulp mill started to operate, especially in Gualaguaychú, in order to demonstrate that the project was environmentally friendly and careful with the environment.

#### **The Uruguayan government:**

The government of the country firmly accepted, facilitated and supported the construction of two pulp mills in the Uruguayan city of Fray: Botnia and ENCE. Thus, Uruguay kept a supporting position towards Botnia project. This supportive position was based on several

reasons: the economic benefits that the projects would bring to the country and the creation of new jobs in Fray Bentos, with a consequent improvement in the life quality of the city.

In addition, on the one hand, the Uruguayan government kept unsuccessful and negative conflicting relationships with the Argentinean government and the CEAG, mainly due to their contradictory points of view during the conflict. On the other hand, the government supported the local people of Fray Bentos when facing the opposition exerted by the neighbor country Argentina. The Uruguayan government had neutral relationships with The Hague ICJ after the Argentinean plaint to defend its position, and it was the responsible for the participation of Mercosur in the conflict after denouncing the roadblocks in Gualeguaychú, even though their relationship presented mainly neutral nature.

### **Local people of Fray Bentos:**

A great part of this stakeholder group showed some doubts about the projects at the beginning of the conflict, fearing negative impact on the environment, but soon they accepted Botnia pulp mill due to the several benefits for the city. Consequently, later, they needed to face strong opposition from Argentina, and especially, from Gualeguaychú. Thus, this actor presented two different positions towards Botnia project, first as opponent and later as supporter. Even though some minor groups opposed to the pulp mills at the beginning of the projects, they soon realized of the several benefits that the projects could bring to the city and decided to support definitely the construction of the pulp mills.

Fray Bentos had great support from the Uruguayan government, as they needed to face jointly the opposition from the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú. Even though at the beginning of the project some local people from Fray Bentos joined and collaborated with the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú's protests, later, the city showed its opposition against this movement.

### **The Argentinean government:**

The government of the country always showed resistance and opposition against the projects in the neighbor country of Uruguay, as negative environmental effects were feared, especially in the Uruguay River. Included within this stakeholder group, the Entre Rios government should be especially mentioned and highlighted. Including the conflicting areas of Concordia, San Salvador, Gualeguaychú and Colón; the government of Entre Ríos maintained a similar position

than the Argentinean national government during the dispute, even though it showed a stronger opposition against Botnia project at the beginning of the conflict.

Thus, the Argentinean government firmly showed its rejection and non-acceptance of the projects, fearing negative impact on the environment and the Uruguay River and demanding a relocation of the pulp mill and a suspension of the construction projects. Even though the government later accepted that Botnia was not going to be relocated and would stay in Fray Bentos and they decided to focus on solving the bilateral conflict with Uruguay, they still showed some resistance and distrust towards the company.

The Argentinean government presented conflictive relationships with the Uruguayan government, characterized by distrust and incompatible positions during the conflict. In addition, the government was the responsible of the participation of several external actors in the bilateral conflict, such as The Hague ICJ and The World Bank and the IFC, in order to support its opposition against the pulp mills. On the one side, Argentina tried to freeze the funding to projects until no pollution consequences were demonstrated; and on the other side, the country denounced Uruguay in The Hague ICJ. Besides, the Argentinean government decided to collaborate and support the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú's protests and roadblocks at the beginning of the project, even though later the country showed its opposition against the CEAG and its radical protest tactics.

#### **Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú (CEAG):**

This activist group appeared as the main opponent of the construction projects as they claimed they will bring negative environmental consequences in the long term, and they always showed hostility during the bilateral conflict between Argentina and Uruguay. Thus, this group represented the main opposition in Botnia project, organizing several protests and roadblocks against the company and the pulp mill, and asking for the relocation of the pulp mill even at the end of the conflict, when the firm was already operating at full capacity.

In addition, the CEAG maintained conflictive relationships with both the Uruguayan government and the local people of Fray Bentos due to their contradictory positions and opinions during the conflict around Botnia. Besides, at the beginning of the conflict, the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú was supported by the Argentinean government, who decided to collaborate with the organization. However, after

Botnia started its operations and the countries struggled to find a solution to the conflict; the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú lost the government support and was criticized by its obstinacy and inflexibility. In Argentina, the CEAG was also supported during the duration of the conflict by other activist organizations and NGOs existing in the region of Entre Ríos and opposing to the pulp mill. The CEAG was supported by some local people in Fray Bentos, but only at the beginning of the construction projects.

### **The Finnish government:**

Finland showed a neutral position during all the construction project of Botnia, in spite of the fact that the bilateral conflict had been created between two close countries as Argentina and Uruguay due to the decisions of the Finnish company Botnia. Thus, even though the Finnish government defended the innocence of Botnia and expressed their trust in the firm, Finland decided to stay in a neutral position towards other actors during the project and the later escalation of the bilateral conflict between Argentina and Uruguay.

Additionally, Finland had no relationships with other stakeholders involved in Botnia project and the bilateral conflict between Argentina and Uruguay.

### **Spanish company ENCE:**

The Spanish company ENCE decided to locate a pulp mill in the Uruguayan city of Fray Bentos. However, later and during the escalation of the conflict, they decided to relocate the pulp mill in a different city.

The Spanish company ENCE kept a neutral position and showed no opposition or support towards Botnia project. However, they firmly supported their own project as it was considered environmentally friendly. Later, the firm decided to relocate its pulp mill in a different city of Uruguay instead of Fray Bentos, where Botnia was being constructed, and they stated that the decision was not made or influenced by the bilateral conflict between Argentina and Uruguay. The company explained this decision by claiming that two companies with similar size could not co-exist together.

As Botnia, ENCE enjoyed the support of the Uruguayan government, who helped and authorized its construction project, which was financed by the World Bank. However, the firm

needed to face opposition from the Argentinean government and the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú until its decision to relocate the pulp mill.

### **King of Spain:**

The Spanish King and his representative acted as mediators, facilitating negotiations between Argentina and Uruguay during the bilateral conflict. However, the mediation process resulted unsuccessful to solve the dispute.

Despite the efforts to solve the conflict, The King of Spain showed no specific position towards the project of the company, as his main priority was trying to solve the bilateral conflict between Uruguay and Argentina. Thus, the King of Spain only related to Uruguay and Argentina, trying to enhance negotiations and dialogue between both countries in order to solve the existing bilateral conflict. However, The King always kept a neutral position as mediator and facilitator, without taking sides, and he did not relate with any other stakeholders.

### **The World Bank and its International Finance Corporation (IFC):**

The World Bank acted as an external actor during the escalation of the conflict, and its participation in the conflict was requested by Argentina. The organism was responsible for funding both construction projects, and in charge of analyzing and studying the cumulative impact of the projects through its subsidiary the International Finance Corporation.

However, even though The World Bank and the IFC were in charge of funding the projects, they showed no specific support towards the pulp mills. Only due to rational and existing evidences after a cumulative impact study (CIS) about the projects, both organisms agreed on financing the pulp mills and declared that there will be no negative consequences on the environment caused by the firm's operations.

The World Banks and its subsidiary IFC had no specific relations with others stakeholders involved in the project, excepting Argentina when the country tried to freeze the funding addressed to the pulp mill and demanded the CIS. Thus, the World Bank kept neutral position and always acted following rational decisions based on existing evidences.

**The Hague ICJ (International Court of Justice):**

This external actor was forced to participate in the bilateral conflict due to the Argentinean plaint against Uruguay regarding the construction projects. Later, also Uruguay presented charges against Argentina due to the roadblocks organized in Gualeguaychú and defended the country against the accusations made by the neighbor country.

The Hague ICJ kept a neutral position during the construction project and the bilateral dispute, and its main tasks were only analyzing the conflict and finding a final resolution. However, and due to the existing evidence after the CIS, The Hague ICJ declared that there were no negative consequences on the environment caused by the firm's operations.

The Hague ICJ related only with both countries Argentina and Uruguay, but always showing a neutral professional and rational position. The Hague ICJ considered that the process in the court was simply a means to solve the conflict. However, The Hague ICJ's resolutions had great influence on each country's actions and positions. Regarding Argentina, The Hague ICJ denied its first petition of suspension of the construction projects, as there was no environmental negative impact. Regarding Uruguay, The Hague ICJ resolved not to intervene in the conflict about the roadblocks.

**Mercosur:**

This external actor entered into the conflict due to the Uruguayan request to solve the problem of the roadblocks organized by the Argentinean Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú in Gualeguaychú.

Mercosur kept always a neutral position during the projects and was focused only on the bilateral conflict between Argentina and Uruguay existing at that moment. Thus, Mercosur had only close relationships with the Uruguayan government, as the country denounced the roadblocks being organized in Gualeguaychú as a protest against the project. However, it always maintained a neutral position and decided not to intervene, as there were not severe consequences in the Uruguayan economy, even though the roadblocks were considered illegal.

**European Union (EU):**

Even though no intervention was requested by any of the countries involved in the bilateral conflict caused by the pulp mill projects, the European Union showed its support towards Botnia and criticized the conflict between Argentina and Uruguay. The European Union considered Botnia as an innocent victim trapped in the bilateral dispute between Argentina and Uruguay, and additionally, it highlighted the excellent past historical records of the firm.

The European Union had no close relationships with the stakeholders involved in the project and the bilateral conflict, even though the bilateral conflict between Argentina and Uruguay was criticized and was considered as a limitation towards future investments in the countries.

Table 12 summarizes the 12 stakeholders described in this section 4.2.1, focusing on their interests, their position towards Botnia project. The table also includes the main arguments utilized by each stakeholder group and the actions they used during the conflict.



Table 12. Stakeholder interests during Botnia case.

STAKEHOLDER	INTEREST	POSITION TOWARDS FIRM	MAIN ARGUMENTS	ACTIVITIES
BOTNIA	Start operations. Keep a positive neutral reputation	-	Demonstrate no environmental impact through operations.	No actions at the beginning. Visits and interviews at the end of the conflict with opponents.
URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT	End bilateral conflict, but keeping the project in Fray Bentos.	Support	Project authorization followed legal procedures. Argentina accepted the project.	Collaboration with Botnia: providing authorization and building a harbor. Dialogue and diplomatic meetings with Argentina.
FRAY BENTOS	First: relocation of project. Later: keep project in the city.	First: Opposition Later: support	First: fear of negative environmental impact. Later: support economic benefits of project.	First: demonstrations against pulp mill. Later: positioned as opposing against demonstrators.
ARGENTINEAN GOVERNMENT	End of bilateral conflict and relocation of project. Reduce environmental impact.	Opposition	Fear of negative environmental impact of the project. Violation of River Bilateral Agreement by Uruguay.	Support demonstrations against project. Dialogue and diplomatic meetings during dispute with Uruguay.
CEAG	Cancellation or relocation of the project.	Opposition	Refuse to accept project due to negative environmental impact.	Roadblocks and demonstrations.
FINNISH GOVERNMENT	Not taking sides in the bilateral conflict.	Neutral	Keep positive reputation: countries do not take side in firms' issues.	Avoid any type of actions or comments.
ENCE	Start firm operations.	Neutral	Relocation of the firm in a better place for the company success.	Keep neutral during bilateral dispute. Relocation of the firm.
KING OF SPAIN	End bilateral dispute with Argentina and Uruguay.	-	End dispute through mediation and a diplomatic solution.	Mediation process through meetings and diplomatic dialogue.
WORLD BANK	Allow loan to project if there is no negative environmental impact found.	Neutral	Acceptance/ cancellation of loan until its cumulative impact study results are shown.	Study and clear up the situation in a beneficial way for the World Bank. No negative impact found, so they accept loan to the project.
THE HAGUE ICJ	End bilateral dispute through legal formal methods, and being impartial.	Neutral	Need for being impartial. No taking sides on petition to stop construction or roadblocks	Analyze the arguments to prepare a final resolution to end dispute.
MERCOSUR	End bilateral dispute. Analyze the roadblocks.	-	Analyze negative economic consequences of roadblocks in Uruguay.	Analyze roadblocks. They were declared illegal.
EUROPEAN UNION	End bilateral dispute. Support the European partner.	Support	Botnia seen as a victim of a conflict between two countries. Support excellent previous records of the firm.	Dialogue.

#### **4.2.2 Stakeholder relationships during the conflict**

The analysis of stakeholder relationships will be based on the stakeholders identified as key actors for the research in the section 3.3.2, which are Botnia, the Argentinean government, the Uruguayan government, Fray Bentos, and the CEAG.

The following relationships between the key stakeholders were identified: support through positive relationships, opposition through negative relationships; and neutral, characteristic in stakeholders that decided not to take sides during the conflict.

Regarding stakeholders linked by supporting relationships, an example can be found in data on the relations between Argentinean government and the CEAG at the beginning of the conflict, when the president raised the conflict around the construction of the pulp mill in Uruguay as a “national issue” (article 5, 23/08/2005). The Argentinean president stated that the government would “coordinate actions with municipalities, regional governments and civil society” (article 5, 23/08/2005), allowing the CEAG to protest and start the roadblocks without any obstacles. Another example can be identified in the relationships between the Uruguayan government and Botnia, as at the beginning of the conflict the president announced that Uruguay will “coordinate actions with Botnia to overcome the demands and complaints from Argentina” (article 8, 19/10/2005). As the focus of this study is opposition, supporting relationships emerged with the objective of exerting higher opposition will be further examined in the following chapters.

Within opposing stakeholder groups, data provides a clear example in the controversial and conflicting relationships between the governments of Argentina and Uruguay, described in some occasions in data as “diplomatic tension” (article 5, 23/08/2005) and even as the “lowest status in the relationships between Argentina and Uruguay in 200 years” (article 56, 10/11/2007). As the focus of this study is on opposition, these relationships will be presented in detail in the following chapters.

Regarding neutral relationships between stakeholders, only those actors who decided not to take sides during the conflict were neutral, and this position can be identified in Botnia. A clear example of this relationship is shown in data, when the president of the company stated that “Botnia is not a part of this dispute” (article 22, 21/05/2006). He mentioned that “a private

company can only discuss with the government of the country where the firm is located, and in other cases, governments should be the ones discussing with each other during the conflict” (article 5, 23/08/2005).

Figure 5 represents the stakeholder relationships of Botnia case through a stakeholder map.




Figure 5. Stakeholder map of Botnia case

When analyzing the relationships existing between the firm and its stakeholders, data shows that the company kept the same neutral position over time, even after the year 2007, when Botnia tried to develop slightly closer relationships with its opponent stakeholders. As an explanation of this stable relationship, it can be observed that the firm maintained the same goals during the dispute: the end of the construction work and the start of the pulp mill operations. Besides, the ultimate interest of the company is to operate and keep a good reputation despite the conflict, without taking sides and focusing on the firm’s most convenient position: neutrality.

However, regarding the relationships of the stakeholder groups involved in the dispute with the firm, relationships based on opposition and support are identified. On the one hand, in the case

of supporting stakeholders, it is possible to mention the example of Uruguay and its direct supporting relationships with Botnia, as a way to oppose simultaneously indirectly against the Argentinean government and the CEAG. On the other hand, opposing relationships were mainly identified in Argentinean government and the CEAG opposing indirectly against the firm. However, Argentinean key priority changed during the conflict from protesting against the pulp mill and demanding a relocation to finding a solution to the bilateral conflict that emerged during the project. Thus, the country forgot the dispute around the firm, and gave more importance to the bilateral conflict emerged with Uruguay.

When focusing on the perspective of relationships among the main stakeholder groups, one of the key differences with the previous analysis of firm – stakeholder relationships is the absence of neutral links, as stakeholder groups related only through opposing and supporting linkages. On the one hand, regarding opposing relationships, they mainly emerged due to different conflicting interests between actors. In the case of Argentina and Uruguay, the first actor wanted to stop the construction work and the relocation of the pulp mill, while the second actor supported the location of Botnia in Fray Bentos. Even though the groups tried to find solutions to its different points of view, the positions were so conflicting that the opposing relationships lasted almost all the dispute without any changes. On the other hand, regarding supporting relationships between stakeholders, they emerged due to similar interests and goals, as the example of the Argentinean government and the CEAG, and Fray Bentos local people and the CEAG, while they collaborated together to oppose against the project and its negative environmental consequences, demanding a relocation of the pulp mill. In previous literature, Freeman (1984) already suggested that stakeholders with similar interests might form a group.

In addition, most frequently, not all these relationships stayed stable over time, but they presented some changes during the escalation of the conflict. The turning point was identified during 2007, as that is the moment when several stakeholders change their positions, interests and relationships with other actors. As an example, the Argentinean position in the conflict changed radically during 2007. At the beginning of the conflict Argentina decided to support civil society actions addressed to stop Botnia, allowing the CEAG to perform roadblocks in the bridges connecting both countries as a protest. Even though Argentina did not publically offer support to the roadblocks, the passivity and little interest shown to stop this method could be understood as the country adopting an assistant and accomplice role (article 26, 23/07/2006).

However, as during this year and after Mercosur declared the roadblocks “illegal” (article 33, 10/12/2006), Argentina started to show discomfort towards the roadblocks, and data even states that “roadblocks started to lose participation on the Argentinean side of the river” (article 63, 02/02/2008). The government claimed that “the roadblocks divide Argentina and do not harm Botnia; the fight should be different” (article 48, 21/08/2007). In addition, the activists are described as “intransigent people who do not participate in the main plot” (article 37, 02/02/2007) and it was thought that the roadblocks used by CEAG might negatively influence The Hague ICJ resolution and hinder negotiations to find a solution to the dispute. The opposition towards the CEAG methods became stronger during the following years, especially after the changes in the Argentinean government with the election of Cristina Kirchner as president. She firmly agreed on a bilateral solution through The Hague ICJ and on the “need for stopping the roadblocks to solve the dispute” (article 73, 03/10/2008), as the method was considered irrational and used by a group of “angry environmentalists” (article 60, 30/12/2007). According to the Argentinean president, those methods “were not the solution to the conflict” (article 83, 06/02/2009). Consequently, the CEAG firmly criticized this change, stating that the Argentinean government seemed to be “deaf and mute” (article 29, 17/10/2006).

Additionally, at the beginning of the conflict, some Fray Bentos local people opposed the pulp mill construction in the city, joining forces with Argentina in its fight against the project as they shared the same fear of negative environmental impact caused by the firm’s operations. However, they soon realized about all the positive economic impact of the project in the city and suffered the negative consequences derived from the roadblocks. Thus, they began to criticize the opposition methods being used by the CEAG and decided to support Botnia project instead. Data reflect this change perfectly by stating first that “Argentinean and Uruguayan people hugged and joint forces in a protest against the construction of the pulp mill” (article 1, 29/04/2005). Later, data present that “nowadays, it is difficult to find in Fray Bentos someone who does not criticize their historical neighbors in Gualeguaychú, as the roadblocks have continued now for three weeks” (article 15, 26/02/2006).

Another change can be identified within the CEAG itself, as the members’ positions started to be divided, especially during 2008, between supporters of the roadblocks and supporters of using “different methods” (article 70, 23/08/2008) or “making the roadblocks more flexible” (article 76, 23/11/2008). A last change can be identified in Botnia. Even though the firm always kept the same neutral position and distance towards the actors participating in the conflict, the

company later tried to calm down the situation through few small “interviews” (article 5, 23/08/2005) and “visits to the pulp mill” (article 61, 23/01/2008), already working in that year. The President also expressed his willingness to “dialogue” and to communicate “all the required information” to convey a feeling of “tranquility” in Argentina (article 40, 30/03/2007).

However, some actors kept the same position during the escalation of the conflict. This is the case of the Uruguayan government, who supported Botnia during the dispute, and claimed that negotiations with the neighbor country of Argentina would not be possible if the roadblocks continued existing in the bridges connecting both countries. Uruguay always supported Botnia through different actions over time, for instance, by “authorizing Botnia to start operations easily” (article 2, 15/05/2005) and by the “construction of a Harbor for Botnia” (article 49, 30/08/2007). In addition, data repeated several times the Uruguayan decision of “not negotiating with Argentina while the roadblocks in the international bridges continue” during all the duration of the conflict (article 39, 23/03/2007).

Another good example might be found on those members of the CEAG who supported to keep the roadblocks as a protest during all the conflict, even though they knew that the tactic was not supported by government anymore (article 48, 21/08/2007) or was not affecting the firm (article 15, 26/02/2006). In data, when one of the members is asked about a pause or change in the roadblocks, the answer is “stopping the roadblocks would mean demobilizing the Assembly” (article 14, 01/02/2006)”, showing how determined they were to continue with this tactic even though they realized they were pursuing a lost cause. This can be explained as members had a commitment towards the group, and additionally, they started to associate themselves with the group’s identity; therefore, supporting and feeling bounded to the group and their actions.

## **4.3 Stakeholder opposition**

### **4.3.1 Stakeholder opposition tactics**

The analysis of stakeholder opposition will be based on the stakeholders identified as key actors for the research in the Section 3.3.2, which are Botnia, the Argentinean government, the Uruguayan government, Fray Bentos, and the CEAG.

Opposition in stakeholder relationships was analyzed following a theoretical framework. This framework was developed by Den Hond and De Bakker (2007) and it examines and classifies opposition tactics of secondary stakeholders. The authors divided the tactics into the following strategies: “logic of numbers” and “logic of gain/damage” (Den Hond and De Bakker, 2007, p. 909). “Logic of numbers” includes mass participation tactics, where high levels of participation are needed; and elite participation, meaning collaboration with few actors which are key for the firm, and thus, powerful enough to affect the company and its projects. “Logic of damage” involves both material and symbolic damage, including those tactics that have physical negative impact in the firm or harm the company’s reputation. Finally, “logic of gain” can be divided into material gain and symbolic gain, and they represent those tactics that stakeholder utilized with the objective of rewarding the firm and to encourage the company to keep a specific supported behavior. This tactic does not represent opposition itself, but the practice is considered a method to influence the firm behavior and activities.

The main opposition tactics identified during the escalation of the conflict were demonstrations, meetings, dialogue, roadblocks, stakeholder collaboration and the involvement of other stakeholders in the conflict. These opposition tactics identified from data can be classified according to Den Hond and De Bakker’s (2007) framework on stakeholder opposition.

Table 13 presents a summary of the tactics used by the key stakeholders during Botnia case, also classified according to Den Hond and De Bakker’s framework (2007).

Table 13. Stakeholder opposition tactics based on data and Den Hond and De Bakker’s classification (2007)

STRATEGY (DE HOND & DE BAKKER, 2007)		TACTIC IDENTIFIED IN THE RESEARCH
LOGIC OF NUMBERS	MASS PARTICIPATION	Demonstrations and protests
	ELITE PARTICIPATION	Stakeholder involvement
LOGIC OF DAMAGE	LOGIC OF MATERIAL DAMAGE	Roadblocks
	LOGIC OF SYMBOLIC DAMAGE	Meetings Dialogue Stakeholder support & collaboration
LOGIC OF GAIN	LOGIC OF MATERIAL GAIN	Not identified
	LOGIC OF SYMBOLIC GAIN	Stakeholder support & collaboration

The demonstrations and protests can be categorized as “logic of numbers” through mass participation, as high levels of participation were required for the success of those tactics. Usually, the more people and participation the tactic can attract, the more effective it will be. These demonstrations are shown in data through protests developed mostly by the CEAG, where demonstrators arranged peaceful multitudinous and symbolic actions such as massive marches, singing anthems, reading manifestos, water protests and signature collection (article 1, 29/04/2005).

“Logic of numbers” through elite participation can be identified in the involvement of other stakeholders in the dispute, for instance, actors such as The Hague ICJ and Mercosur. Even though these actors were not participants of the conflict, they were required to participate due to their reputation and their power to influence. The objective was to better protect the stakeholders’ interests when opposing against other actors. An example can be found in the effort made by the Argentinean government to involve The Hague ICJ in the dispute to “encapsulate the conflict” and its clarification through The Hague ICJ’s future resolution (article 53, 03/10/2007). Additionally, this tactic can be found on the efforts made by Uruguay to involve Mercosur and its members in the dispute due to the roadblocks (article 20, 22/04/2006). Besides, data described the involvement of the World Bank in the dispute due to the Argentinean petition for a freeze on the loan for the project. Argentina wanted to involve a powerful actor which was not related to the project (article 3, 12/07/2005), seeking its support and participation, in order to stop the roadblocks.

The roadblocks were a clear example of “logic of material damage”, as these tactics had clear impact on the Uruguayan economy, and a negative impact that could be measured. This method was the key opposition tactic utilized by the CEAG, by “cutting access to the key bridges connecting both countries: Argentina and Uruguay” (article 1, 29/04/2005). It was considered as an effective “peaceful” strategy by the CEAG (article 48, 21/08/2007), but raised huge opposition and criticism in governments due to its aggressiveness and the negative economic consequences of this method in the long term (article 26, 23/07/2006).

In contrast, meetings and dialogue can be classified as “logic of symbolic damage”, as they were formal, official and diplomatic tactics whose main goal was to affect in a symbolic way to other actors’ reputation. Meetings are described as tactics utilized to discuss and agree on different solutions and terms during the dispute, and used mainly by governments. For instance,



data showed a meeting where representatives of the Uruguayan and the Argentinean government were participating, and another meeting involving the presidents of both countries in New York (article 43, 15/05/2007). In addition, dialogue was widely used too, and in many occasions with the objective of protecting stakeholders' interest and defend against other actors' arguments and accusations. Data shows clear examples, for instance, when the Uruguayan government complained about the roadblocks by comparing them with the "commercial blockade used by EEUU against Cuba" (article 16, 16/03/2006). Dialogue was also used as a key strategy during the process in The Hague ICJ, where countries tried to convince the parts involved in the conflict by using several arguments. For instance, Argentina denounced a "violation in the Agreement of the Uruguay River by Uruguay" (article 21, 05/05/2006); and Uruguay counterattacked stating that Argentina had "once accepted the Botnia project" and was therefore aware of the consequences of the project (article 46, 19/07/2007). Additionally, the stakeholders' supporting relationships emerged with the objective of showing opposition can be also classified as "logic of symbolic damage". This collaboration can be understood as a symbolic way to exert opposition against other actors, and therefore, it can be also interpreted as "logic of symbolic damage". The objective was to obtain some extra support during the escalation of the conflict, and in turn, become stronger when indirectly opposing against the firm or other actors. For example, the collaboration between Argentina and CEAG at the beginning of the conflict emerged in order to oppose against the project (article 5, 23/08/2005), and even though Argentina did not participate actively in the CEAG opposition tactics, the supporting relationships between both actors acted as an opposition strategy to harm other stakeholders' reputation and decisions. Thus, this collaboration is not considered as logic of numbers through "elite participation", as the government did not participate in the CEAG aggressive methods of protest and their joint efforts were merely symbolic.

Regarding "logic of material gain", this strategy cannot be identified in Botnia case. Contrarily, "logic of symbolic gain" was utilized during the escalation of the conflict. This strategy can be illustrated in the support showed by Uruguay towards Botnia. Uruguay always firmly supported the firm towards all the accusations made by Argentina (article 8, 19/10/2005). Even though at the same time the Uruguayan government was opposing indirectly against the Argentinean accusations through this collaboration, this relationship can be also understood as a method used by the Uruguayan government to support Botnia, thus, influencing the firm to continue with the project.

### 4.3.2 Stakeholder–firm opposition

The firm decided to keep a neutral position towards its stakeholder, and therefore, opposition tactics were rarely utilized. However, at the end of the project, Botnia tried to show the opponents that there was no negative impact in the firm operations through few visits and interviews, always with the objective of keeping a good reputation in the company (article 61, 23/01/2008). Therefore, the firm used tactics such as meetings and dialogue, categorized as “logic of symbolic damage” according to Den Hond and De Bakker’s (2007) framework.

However, stakeholders utilized multiple opposition tactics against the firm. These tactics were: demonstrations and protests (logic of numbers through mass participation: Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007); roadblocks (logic of material damage: Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007); the involvement of other actors in the dispute (logic of numbers through elite participation: Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007); and the supporting relationships and collaboration with other stakeholder groups participating in the conflict (logic of symbolic damage: Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007). It can be identified from data that the stakeholders’ decision on using these actions was made based on the high impact and consequences emerging from these methods, both material and symbolic effects, and also by the possibility of attracting people’s attention, especially media, on the case.

Protests and demonstrations were oriented indirectly to the firm, and they were addressed and involved the government at the same time. In other words, stakeholders could oppose indirectly against the firm’s project through protests, which were directly oriented against governments. Similarly, roadblocks were utilized against the firm only in an indirect way, as they were mainly addressed to oppose governments, the actor who suffered the negative consequences directly. Stakeholder support and collaboration was also a tactic exerted indirectly against the firm, as this strategy required initially supporting relationships emerged among stakeholders in order to exert a joint opposition. Stakeholder involvement was utilized as a tactic too, and it can be considered an indirect opposition against the firm, as the participation and influence exerted by external actors was required. Finally, the relationships between Uruguay and Botnia, categorized as “logic of symbolic gain”, emerged and were practiced in a direct way. Even though these relationships do not represent opposition, they were a method to directly and positively influence the firm.

Consequently, all the opposition strategies seemed to be oriented indirectly against the firm, mostly using government as an intermediary, who was the main receiver and they key affected by those tactics. In other words, opposition was always exerted indirectly against the company through direct protests against the government. Additionally, the company stated that the operations were barely influenced by any of the tactics being used (article 15, 26/02/2006; article 75, 10/11/2008). Only the supporting relationships between Uruguay and Botnia were direct, even though they do not represent opposition but only positive influence towards the firm.

Table 14. Stakeholder-firm opposition, Botnia case

STRATEGY (DE HOND & DE BAKKER, 2007)		TACTIC IDENTIFIED IN THE RESEARCH	FIRM – STAKEHOLDER OPPOSITION	STAKEHOLDER – FIRM OPPOSITION
LOGIC OF NUMBERS	MASS PARTICIPATION	Demonstrations and protests	-	Indirect
	ELITE PARTICIPATION	Stakeholder involvement	-	Indirect
LOGIC OF DAMAGE	LOGIC OF MATERIAL DAMAGE	Roadblocks	-	Indirect
	LOGIC OF SYMBOLIC DAMAGE	Meetings	Direct	
		Dialogue	Direct	
		Stakeholder support & collaboration	-	Indirect
LOGIC OF GAIN	LOGIC OF MATERIAL GAIN	Not identified	-	
	LOGIC OF SYMBOLIC GAIN	Stakeholder support & collaboration	-	Direct

Table 14 summarizes the opposition tactics used under a firm-stakeholder perspective, identifying if those strategies were exerted directly or indirectly against the firm.

#### 4.3.3 Stakeholder-stakeholder opposition

Regarding opposition tactics used among the key stakeholder groups, all the previously identified tactics were utilized when opposing against other actors: demonstrations and protests (logic of numbers through mass participation: Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007); roadblocks

(logic of material damage: Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007); meetings and dialogue (logic of symbolic damage: Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007); the involvement of other actors in the dispute (logic of numbers through elite participation: Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007); and the supporting relationships and collaboration with other stakeholder groups participating in the conflict (logic of symbolic damage: Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007).

On the one side, demonstrations and protests were utilized by environmental organizations and local people to complain directly against the Uruguayan government. As the Uruguayan government was considered responsible for accepting and authorizing the pulp mill construction, this actor was also seen as responsible for stopping the project. Thus, all the protests addressed against the project were mainly oriented against the Uruguayan government first, who suffered the most all the consequences of these opposition tactics. Roadblocks were used by environmentalists and local people too, and they were addressed directly against Uruguayan government, the actor who most suffered the negative economic impact from the roadblocks. On the other side, meetings and dialogues were utilized directly, only by governments, in order to oppose against each other during the escalation of the conflict and try to solve the dispute. Finally, while supporting and collaboration tactics were used by local people and environmental organizations, the tactic of the involvement of other actors were mainly used by governments in order to oppose against each other. However, both perspectives were used in an indirect way: seeking support from intermediaries and other actors, both related or not related to the conflict, in order to oppose a third part.

Focusing on the reasons behind the stakeholders' choice on the strategy to use, it can be determined that demonstrations and protests were chosen by local people and environmental organizations due to their high impact and capability for attracting everybody's attention to the conflict. In the case of dialogue and meetings, they were mainly used by governments as a way to seek for solutions to the conflict and defend every actors' positions against accusations. Regarding the roadblocks, local people and environmentalists decided to apply them due to their fast and high material impact, which can be seen and visually assessed. Finally, regarding the involvement and collaboration with other actors, this was chosen because of their ability to attract important actors to the conflict, and especially, obtain support from other powerful stakeholders to improve the salience of their claims and have greater impact.

In the particular case of aggressive strategies, it seems interesting to highlight the differences on the perceptions around the roadblocks. Even though it was considered as an aggressive strategy by Uruguay due to its high impact on the economy, the Assembly using the method considered this tactic as peaceful instead, as direct violence was not employed, and every complaint was seen as an overreaction.

All the strategies and tactics mentioned above were utilized directly against other actors and stakeholders, with the exception of the collaboration and involvement of other actors. These last tactics were utilized indirectly against stakeholders, as they require using other actors and the participation of intermediaries in the process.

Table 15. Stakeholder-stakeholder opposition, Botnia case

STRATEGY (DE HOND & DE BAKKER, 2007)		TACTIC IDENTIFIED IN THE RESEARCH	STAKEHOLDER-STAKEHOLDER OPPOSITION
LOGIC OF NUMBERS	MASS PARTICIPATION	Demonstrations and protests	Direct
	ELITE PARTICIPATION	Stakeholder involvement	Indirect
LOGIC OF DAMAGE	LOGIC OF MATERIAL DAMAGE	Roadblocks	Direct
	LOGIC OF SYMBOLIC DAMAGE	Meetings	Direct
		Dialogue	Direct
		Stakeholder support & collaboration	Indirect
LOGIC OF GAIN	LOGIC OF MATERIAL GAIN	Not identified	-
	LOGIC OF SYMBOLIC GAIN	Not identified	-

Table 15 summarizes the tactics used by stakeholders in order to oppose against other stakeholder groups, and shows whether they were utilized in an indirect or direct way.

#### **4.4 Summary of stakeholder relationships and opposition**

During Botnia case and the escalation of the bilateral conflict around the construction of the pulp mill, 12 stakeholders were identified as main participants: Botnia, the Uruguayan government, Fray Bentos, the Argentinean government, the CEAG, Finnish government, ENCE, King of Spain, World Bank, The Hague ICJ, Mercosur, and the European Union. From these different groups, and after analyzing their position towards the firm, as well as their interests and their relationships, some key stakeholders were selected for further analysis of their relationships and opposition tactics. These key actors were Botnia, the Uruguayan government, Fray Bentos, the Argentinean government, and the CEAG.

The stakeholder relationships were analyzed and the following types were identified: supporting relationships, opposing relationships and neutral relationships. More specifically, the only actor who keeps a neutral position is the firm, due to the importance of maintaining a good reputation and image in front of its surrounding environment, and barely changing its position over time. Other stakeholder groups present relationships based on opposition and support. Supporting relationships emerge in groups presenting similar interests or with the objective of exerting joint opposition. Opposing relationships appear when stakeholders have different and conflicting stakes and interests.

In addition, while the firm keeps a stable position during the duration of the conflict, the other stakeholder groups maintain more complex and dynamic relationships that vary over time. These changes are consequence of variations in the stakeholder groups' interests and goals, or variations in the context, understood as the environment surrounding the actors. These changes occur more frequently in stakeholder-stakeholder relationships. This highlights and shows clearly the dynamic nature existing in stakeholder relationships (Kujala et al., 2012; Mitchell et al., 1997, Aaltonen et al., 2013). However, not all stakeholders suffered changes during the dispute. Some groups kept the same position over time, and even the protection of their interests became a way of life.

Stakeholder opposition was analyzed next. The main opposition tactics identified as used by the key stakeholders were: demonstrations and protests, meetings, dialogue, roadblocks, involvement of other actors in the dispute, and supporting relationships and collaboration

among stakeholders. These tactics were further analyzed through the framework provided by Den Hond and De Bakker (2007), categorizing opposition tactics into “logic of numbers” through mass participation or elite participation, and “logic of gain/damage”, both symbolic and material (p. 909).

Except for meetings and dialogue, which were not utilized, the other tactics were used indirectly by stakeholders in order to show opposition to the firm, with the governments appearing as mediators during these tactics. Only the positive influence of Uruguay towards Botnia was exerted directly. Additionally, even though the firm kept a neutral position, Botnia used meetings and dialogue directly as a method to attract their opponents and turning them into supporters.

Regarding stakeholder-stakeholder opposition, while governments decided to use meetings, dialogue and the involvement of other actors; local people and environmental groups chose roadblocks, demonstrations and collaboration with other groups as main tactics. This is explained as the key goal of governments was to solve the dispute and keep a good reputation, while local people and environmental groups were focused on attracting people to the protests against the project, and seeking high negative impact on the firm as consequence of the tactics. Finally, local people and NGOs were the actors exerting higher opposition against the firm, even to irrational extent, and governments and official authorities maintained a more rational neutral position in spite of the fact that they presented higher levels of power and influence on the firm than locals or small environmental organizations. This can be explained as governments usually are more afraid of a possible loss of reputation, while local people and activists have no concerns on reputation losses, even fighting to win lost causes (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Additionally, opposition among stakeholder groups was exerted in a direct way, excepting those strategies that specifically required the participation of additional actors, such as collaboration and the involvement of other stakeholders in the dispute.

Table 16. Summary of stakeholder opposition

STRATEGY	FIRM-STAKEHOLDER		STAKEHOLDER-FIRM		STAKEHOLDER-STAKEHOLDER	
	TACTIC	OPPOSITION	TACTIC	OPPOSITION	TACTIC	OPPOSITION
Logic of numbers: mass participation	Not utilized	-	Protests	Indirect	Protests	Direct
Logic of numbers: Elite participation	Not utilized	-	Stakeholder involvement	Indirect	Stakeholder involvement	Indirect
Logic of material damage	Not utilized	-	Roadblocks	Indirect	Roadblocks	Direct
Logic of symbolic damage	Meetings	Direct	Not utilized	-	Meetings	Direct
	Dialogue	Direct	Not utilized	-	Dialogue	Direct
	Not utilized	-	Stakeholder collaboration	Indirect	Stakeholder collaboration	Indirect
Logic of material gain	Not utilized	-	Not utilized	-	Not utilized	-
Logic of symbolic gain	Not utilized	-	Stakeholder collaboration	Direct	Not utilized	-

Table 16 presents a summary of the tactics utilized by stakeholders in the Botnia case, categorizing opposition as direct or indirect, according to Den Hond and De Bakker's (2007) classification of influence strategies.



## 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

### 5.1 Development of opposition and contributions to theory

The stakeholder relationship scenario is a complex issue during the development of the Botnia case. The stakeholder relationships can be mainly classified as opposing, supporting or neutral relationships. However, stakeholders' interests change and evolve over time, and stakeholder relationships emerge and are used in different contexts with different goals.

The opposition showed by stakeholders during the conflict also varies over time. In addition, different opposition tactics are utilized by different stakeholder groups and with different objectives. The main opposition tactics identified are demonstrations, meetings, dialogue, roadblocks, stakeholder collaboration and the involvement of other stakeholders in the conflict.

However, *these tactics can be identified as performed at two different levels: indirectly and directly*, depending on who is the final receiver of the tactics and how they affect the final recipient. On the one hand, direct strategies affect straight to the actor they are opposing to. For examples, this can be seen in the protests organized by CEAG against both the Uruguayan and the Argentinean governments. On the other hand, indirect strategies are used to show resistance against one actor through a protest addressing a different stakeholder or participant in the conflict. For instance, CEAG used protests addressed to the Uruguayan and Argentinean government as a method to oppose against the Botnia project. Data stated that the Assembly asked the Argentinean president to “develop a stronger policy in the bilateral conflict around the pulp mill construction” (article 48, 21/08/2007) and to “prohibit access of ships heading the illegal harbor built for Botnia through Argentinean water” (article 48, 21/08/2007), demanding the government to take actions against the firm. Additionally, Uruguay claimed and complained in Mercosur that the roadblocks used by the CEAG caused severe “economic losses” (article 26, 23/07/2006).

Most frequently, opposition strategies are utilized directly against other stakeholders. However, the involvement of other actors in the dispute and collaboration tactics are used indirectly against stakeholders too, as they first required support with other actors. In contrast, opposition tactics are utilized indirectly against the firm and its project, as local people and environmental

groups might not have enough power to oppose directly against the firm. Thus, they showed their resistance and opposition by using governments as mediators. Neville and Menguc (2006) already recognized how stakeholders can influence the firm directly or indirectly, through alliances among stakeholders with the objective of becoming stronger when showing resistance towards the firm. However, data shows how stakeholders can also influence other stakeholders directly or indirectly through alliances and collaboration. For instance, the Uruguayan government utilized Mercosur to oppose against the CEAG's roadblocks. Therefore, Neville and Menguc's (2006) claim can be extended to opposition between stakeholder groups too.

Additionally, Neville and Menguc (2006) identified that opposition can be exerted directly or indirectly through alliances between groups. This research addresses the utilization of supporting and cooperative relationships as an opposition tactic, thus, drawing close connections between the two main topics being covered in this study: stakeholder relationships and opposition. Stakeholders can engage in positive supporting relationships, that later can be used as an opposition tactic. Therefore, positive relationships based on collaboration between stakeholders can be maintained with the objective of showing opposition; and more concretely, by joining forces, stakeholders can exert a more intense and effective resistance towards the firm project, and also against other stakeholder actors. Hence, there is a *significant association between supporting relationships and joint opposition*.

Finally, *the main contribution of this research is the demonstration of how previous literature focused on stakeholder-firm opposition and certain frameworks can be also applied to better understand stakeholder-stakeholder opposition*. Previous studies on stakeholder resistance and influence had addressed the topic of stakeholder opposition towards the firm (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003; Aaltonen, 2013; Aaltonen et al., 2013). This research further examines that issue, and moreover, it contributes to stakeholder literature by providing further insights on the topic of stakeholder opposition against other stakeholder groups. Some of the previous studies following a firm-stakeholder approach can be extended and applied into a stakeholder-stakeholder opposition perspective, as demonstrated in this research through the application of Den Hond and De Bakker's (2007) classification of opposition tactics. Den Hond and De Bakker's (2007) framework was designed to be applied in opposition tactics used by stakeholders against the firm. However, as demonstrated in the study, this framework can also be applied under a stakeholder-stakeholder perspective, and be utilized to categorize the strategies utilized by stakeholders to show opposition against other stakeholder groups.

Additionally, Neville and Menguc's (2006) study supporting that stakeholder might influence the firm through direct or indirect methods can also be extended towards a stakeholder-stakeholder perspective. As demonstrated in this research, stakeholders also oppose against other actors in both direct and indirect ways.

Finally, Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) and their study on secondary stakeholder mobilization based on identity can also be applied to Botnia case and stakeholder-stakeholder opposition. Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) recognized identity as a driver of mobilization against the firm. However, in Botnia case, the CEAG continued with the protests to oppose the firm, but additionally, to oppose against government's passivity during the conflict (article 29, 17/10/2006), even though they knew that all support from the authorities was lost and their actions would not have consequences or changes in the government's attitude. Nevertheless, the CEAG continued opposing and criticizing the Argentinean government through several demonstrations. Consequently, the theory developed by Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) could be expanded, and identity might be a driver of mobilization not only against the company, but also against other stakeholder groups too.

Therefore, this study shows *how previous theories developed on the field of stakeholder-firm opposition can be extended and practiced also under a stakeholder-stakeholder opposition and perspective, especially in the area of resistance tactics*. Therefore, this research provides a significant contribution and extend the understanding on the field of stakeholder opposition, that might be further analyzed and supported in future research through the application of different studies and frameworks to study and understand stakeholder-stakeholder relationships and opposition.

## **5.2 Managerial implications**

Mainly, this study shows how foreign direct investment might easily lead to conflicts, which might evolve and become real wars not only against the company but also against other actors. These international projects do not only bring fear and distrust in the stakeholder set of the firm, but they also raise emotional responses that need to be taken into account. Botnia accepted that one of its mistakes was not engaging in time with all the stakeholders of the project. Therefore, the case might represent a great example to show the importance of managing, communicating

and engaging with all the stakeholders of the firm since the beginning, in order to avoid and anticipate future conflicts. As Jussi Pakkasvirta (article 87, 10/05/2009) highlighted, stakeholders need to be identified before the project, and it is necessary to engage in an open discussion with them in order to avoid problems due to lack of information.

In addition, the research identified some opposition tactics, especially focusing on cooperation between stakeholders as a resistance strategy. The study also highlighted that opposition tactics can be exerted directly or indirectly against other actors. This might encourage managers to further analyze these tactics and tried to identify stakeholder relationships at early stages of the project. This way, managers can try to anticipate the utilization of these tactics and prevent possible problematic situations that might negatively affect the project, thus, ensuring the project success

### **5.3 Evaluation**

Firstly, in order to ensure the trustworthiness of the research, it is necessary to be honest and recognize all the limitations that the study implies through self-criticism (Elo et al., 2014). However, even though the research presents some limitations, all the obstacles have been overcome as far as possible in order to ensure its scientific nature, its quality and its trustworthiness (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). According to Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008), a framework including the concepts of reliability, validity and generalizability can be used to assess the quality of a qualitative research. Reliability can be ensured when the research seems consistent. This can be demonstrated as data was analyzed not only through an inductive approach, but also by applying successfully other existing theories, and always analyzing data under an objective perspective to provide impartial results that can be extended and used in further studies. Validity was ensured as results were reflected and approached under both an inductive and a theoretical perspective, as well as providing examples from data and previous studies. Besides, the findings answer precisely the research questions formulated in the study. Finally, regarding a generalization of the results, further research is encouraged on the topic by applying different existing frameworks and analyzing similar cases.

Regarding the limitations of this research, firstly, it is important to highlight that the available data consisted of newspaper articles from Argentina. Therefore, the information described

might be biased, and it might offer mainly the Argentinean perspective on the conflict. One example that shows this limitation is the utilization of generalizations in data. For instance, El Clarín presented Fray Bentos local people as a whole group opposing towards the project at the beginning of the project. However, as read in other articles and as presented in the Finnish data used in other studies on Botnia case, only a small part of the local people living in the city were opposing against the pulp mill construction, while the rest recognized immediately the positive economic impact on the city since the beginning of the project. This obstacle was overcome by keeping an impartial perspective of the project during data analysis, avoiding taking sides with any of the actors involved, and maintaining a neutral and objective attitude and position. There is no conflict of interests in the research or support to any of the actors involved in the case study, and the analysis will be as accurate and impartial as possible.

Secondly, the procedure used to reduce the amount of data available and the decision of focusing mainly on key stakeholders might influence negatively the relevance of the results obtained. When reducing data, some important information significant for the project might have been left behind; and when focusing only on key stakeholders, some important actors during the dispute might have been ignored. This obstacle was overcome by developing an initial knowledge around the conflict through the analysis and review of previous studies and articles around the dispute, in order to familiarize with the case in advance.

In addition, the results of this research are mainly based on this specific case, and they are an outcome of analyzing the specific data collected around this conflict. Consequently, the results might not be generalizable to other cases or contexts. However, this obstacle might be overcome through analyzing the topic of stakeholder opposition in different cases and by applying other different previous frameworks on this phenomenon in future studies and research. This way, results can be compared and it might be possible to ensure a generalization.

Finally, it is important to highlight that data might have been altered slightly due to translation issues (El et al., 2014). As initial data were presented and were collected in Spanish, some information might have been missed during the translation into English. However, this obstacle was overcome by translating meticulously all the information provided in this research, and by presenting excellent Spanish language skills as a mother tongue.

In addition, plagiarism will be avoided and credibility will be ensured by citing every reference utilized in the research (Saldana, 2011; Bengtsson, 2016; Elo et al., 2008, Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2015).

#### **5.4 Further research**

After the development of this study, it is interesting to encourage researchers to further investigate on the topic of stakeholder relationships and opposition tactics through a stakeholder perspective. Besides, it is recommended a closer examination on the connections and link between these two areas: stakeholder relationships and stakeholder opposition. More case studies and examples are needed on this field in order to provide results that are generalizable and representative.

Besides, the research identified multiple changes in stakeholder relationships and opposition, showing the dynamic nature of stakeholders. This issue was not fully covered in this study, and it might represent a topic worth to be explored in future research.

Finally, during this research, other previous studies were successfully extended and were applied to this particular case of stakeholder-stakeholder relationships and opposition. This confirms that some previous frameworks on stakeholder-firm opposition might be well applicable under a stakeholder approach. Consequently, it might be interesting to apply other theories and frameworks developed on the field of stakeholder-firm relationships and opposition under a full stakeholder perspective and under a stakeholder-stakeholder approach, in order to support the relevance of this contribution through different examples.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1: List of articles included in the final sample

Article 1: 29/04/2005 – Argentinos y uruguayos, unidos en un abrazo contra la instalación de papeleras.

Article 2: 15/05/2005 – Uruguay no dará marcha atrás contra la instalación de plantas celulósicas.

Article 3: 12/07/2005 – No habrá dinero para las papeleras sobre el Uruguay.

Article 4: 15/07/2005 – Tensión diplomática por las papeleras sobre el Uruguay.

Article 5: 23/08/2005 – El Gobierno pidió que Uruguay frene la construcción de las papeleras.

Article 6: 26/09/2005 – El Banco Mundial va a inspeccionar las papeleras en el río Uruguay.

Article 7: 09/10/2005 – Anuncian la posible instalación de otra papelera en Uruguay.

Article 8: 19/10/2005 – Tabaré Vázquez pondrá la piedra fundamental de una de las papeleras.

Article 9: 11/11/2005 – Frenan un envío a una de las papeleras.

Article 10: 27/12/2005 – Papeleras: el Gobierno insiste con la suspensión de las obras.

Article 11: 30/12/2005 – Cortes por las papeleras: demoras de hasta 3 horas para cruzar a Uruguay.

Article 12: 14/01/2006 – Caos en los puentes internacionales en el primer recambio turístico del verano.

Article 13: 17/01/2006 – Tensión diplomática: tras la reunión del consejo de ministros.

Article 14: 01/02/2006 – Conflicto en Uruguay: otro capítulo de la disputa por las plantas en Fray Bentos.

Article 15: 26/02/2006 – El conflicto con Uruguay: la situación de las plantas de celulosa en Fray Bentos.

Article 16: 16/03/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: contactos en Montevideo y la papelera finlandesa.

Article 17: 27/03/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: antes de la cumbre presidencial.

Article 18: 09/04/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: entrevista exclusiva con el canciller Jorge Taiana.

Article 19: 21/04/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: características de una de las plantas en Fray Bentos.

- Article 20: 22/04/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: advierten sobre el impacto en futuras inversiones en la región
- Article 21: 05/05/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: presentaciones por las papeleras ante la Corte Internacional de Justicia.
- Article 22: 21/05/2006 – Entrevista a Erkki Varis, presidente de la papelería Botnia.
- Article 23: 09/06/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: la demanda contra Uruguay en la Corte Internacional de Justicia de La Haya.
- Article 24: 11/06/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: la demanda para detener la construcción de las papeleras.
- Article 25: 07/07/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: primera etapa del juicio ante la Corte Internacional de Justicia
- Article 26: 23/07/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: después del revés en el Tribunal Internacional de La Haya.
- Article 27: 22/09/2006 – Clarín había anticipado que se iba de Fray Bentos.
- Article 28: 24/09/2006 – El conflicto con las pasteras.
- Article 29: 17/10/2006 – Proponen hacer un corte fluvial para bloquear el Puerto de Botnia.
- Article 30: 18/10/2006 – Fuerte aval a la instalación de las pasteras.
- Article 31: 15/11/2006 – Financiamiento clave para la planta de la pastera finlandesa en Uruguay.
- Article 32: 18/11/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay por las papeleras: Kirchner había enviado una carta al Banco Mundial pidiendo su postergación.
- Article 33: 10/12/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: Clarín accedió al adelanto de la presentación que hará el lunes 18 ante la Corte de Justicia.
- Article 34: 18/12/2006 - El conflicto con Uruguay: Hoy comienza una audiencia en La Haya por los cortes de ruta.
- Article 35: 07/01/2007 - El conflicto con Uruguay: el proyecto de levantar una isla para que no se vea la chimenea de Fray Bentos.
- Article 36: 23/01/2007 - El conflicto con Uruguay: más de 4 años de puja por las papeleras uruguayas.
- Article 37: 02/02/2007 - El conflicto con Uruguay: declaraciones desde Finlandia a una radio argentina.
- Article 38: 05/02/2007 – Por primera vez desde que estalló el conflicto con Uruguay hablan los hombres de negocios.
- Article 39: 23/03/2007 – El frente externo: visita del presidente uruguayo a Fray Bentos.

Article 40: 30/03/2007 – Clarín recorrió las instalaciones de la empresa finlandesa en Fray Bentos.

Article 41: 11/04/2007 – Una iniciativa que el gobierno llevará la semana que viene a la mesa de dialogo en España.

Article 42: 17/04/2007 - El conflicto con Uruguay: entrevista a Erkki Varis, presidente de la empresa finlandesa.

Article 43: 15/05/2007 – Luego de entrevistarse con el canciller Jorge Taiana.

Article 44: 31/05/2007 – No hay apuro argentino por forzar una definición antes de octubre.

Article 45: 19/06/2007 – Ambientalistas.

Article 46: 19/07/2007 – Lo aseguró ante el Tribunal de La Haya, como respuesta al reclamo argentino.

Article 47: 31/07/2007 – Buenos oficios de España en el conflicto argentino – uruguayo.

Article 48: 21/08/2007 – Interrupción de una vía clave para la economía del Mercosur.

Article 49: 30/08/2007 – El conflicto por las papeleras: a pesar del enérgico planteo de la cancillería argentina.

Article 50: 02/09/2007 - El conflicto con Uruguay: tensión por el reclamo de entrerrianos en Fray Bentos.

Article 51: 03/09/2007 – El conflicto con Uruguay: unas 850 personas cruzaron de Gualeguaychú a Fray Bentos para pedir la relocalización de la planta.

Article 52: 26/09/2007 – En foco: el tema internacional que más preocupa a Cristina Kirchner.

Article 53: 03/10/2007 – ¿Una nueva salida para el conflicto entre la Argentina y Uruguay?

Article 54: 04/10/2007 – La pastera pondrá en marcha entonces su producción.

Article 55: 10/11/2007 – Reunión antes del inicio de la cumbre.

Article 56: 10/11/2007 – Se agravó la crisis con Uruguay: cerró frontera y arrancó Botnia.

Article 57: 25/11/2007 – El gobierno argentino transmitió su “preocupación y desagrado”.

Article 58: 26/11/2007 – Crece la tensión en el conflicto bilateral.

Article 59: 02/12/2007 – ¿Azúcar o sacarina?

Article 60: 30/12/2007 – El conflicto por Botnia.

Article 61: 23/01/2008 – Botnia: “Argentina perdió de ganar muchísimo dinero con nosotros”.

Article 62: 28/01/2008 – El conflicto con Uruguay por la pastera Botnia.

Article 63: 02/02/2008 – Al asumir, Cristina Kirchner prometió respetar lo que resuelva el Tribunal Internacional.



- Article 64: 13/02/2008 – Buenos Aires y Montevideo esperarán el fallo de la Corte de La Haya.
- Article 65: 01/03/2008 – Frente al boicot de los assembleístas de Gualeguaychú.
- Article 66: 22/03/2008 – La Justicia argentina espera escuchar esta semana a los directivos de Botnia.
- Article 67: 24/04/2008 - En marcha.
- Article 68: 27/04/2008 – Gualeguaychú: una multitud marchó contra la papelera.
- Article 69: 15/05/2008 – Finlandia proyecta más inversiones en Uruguay.
- Article 70: 23/08/2008 – Gualeguaychú: una jueza ordenó que dejen cruzar el puente a un argentino.
- Article 71: 21/09/2008 – El interés por observar a la pastera finlandesa desde la ciudad entrerriana.
- Article 72: 28/09/2008 – Cristina estaría intentando levantar el corte de ruta en Gualeguaychú.
- Article 73: 03/10/2008 – El conflicto por las papeleras.
- Article 74: 19/10/2008 – El conflicto con Uruguay por la papelera finlandesa.
- Article 75: 10/11/2008 – Botnia ya produce tanta celulosa como 30 papeleras argentinas.
- Article 76: 23/11/2008 – El bloqueo del puente internacional produjo un conflicto con Uruguay.
- Article 77: 15/12/2008 – Reunión del Mercosur, Unasur, Calc y el Grupo Río.
- Article 78: 15/12/2008 – Dió a entender que no se permiten piquetes de “baja adhesión”.
- Article 79: 02/01/2009 – Papelera: Urribarri recibirá a los assembleístas, pero sigue el corte.
- Article 80: 08/01/2009 – Uruguay pidió al Gobierno que “traduzca en hechos” su rechazo a los cortes.
- Article 81: 29/01/2009 – El conflicto por la papelera Botnia.
- Article 82: 05/02/2009 – El conflicto por la pastera fina.
- Article 83: 06/02/2009 – Había sospechas de contaminación por la presencia de la pastera Botnia.
- Article 84: 08/03/2009 – Tema de domingo, primera nota: la otra cara del conflicto por la pastera.
- Article 85: 23/03/2009 – El conflicto con Uruguay por la pastera fina.
- Article 86: 27/04/2009 – Primer accidente mortal en el escenario de la protesta entrerriana.
- Article 87: 10/05/2009 – Jussi Pakkasvirta politólogo e historiador finlandés.
- Article 88: 19/06/2009 – Decisión de los ambientalistas.
- Article 89: 16/09/2009 – Segunda jornada de presentaciones en el Tribunal de La Haya.

Article 90: 22/09/2009 – Presentación en el Tribunal de La Haya.

Article 91: 20/10/2009 – Nueva polémica por el corte de la ruta 136, de cara a las elecciones del domingo.

Article 92: 31/10/2009 – La cancillería rechazó la acusación y asegura que la pastera ya contamina.

Article 93: 19/11/2009 – Conflicto bilateral: Botnia cierra su primera exportación a Argentina.

Article 94: 27/11/2009 – Declaraciones del candidato oficialista al semanario “Búsqueda” de Montevideo.

Article 95: 01/12/2009 – Buscan distender las relaciones bilaterales.

Article 96: 09/12/2009 – Botnia: ahora de busca minimizar los roces con Tabaré por Botnia.

**APPENDIX 2: Data reduction – tables to select the final sample.****YEAR 2005: 35 articles**  
**(11 articles chosen)**

- ***December: 9 articles - Choose 2 key articles***

ARTICLES	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHU	TOTAL
<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>29</b>
2	1	10	2	3	3	19
<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>21</b>
4	2	6	3	2	6	19
5	1	3	1	0	2	7
6	3	4	2	1	6	16
7	1	6	1	5	1	14
8	1	2	3	1	5	12
9	3	9	1	2	2	17

- ***November: 3 articles - Choose 1 key article***

ARTICLES	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHU	TOTAL
10	1	3	0	1	6	11
11	1	2	1	0	4	8
<b>12</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>14</b>

- ***October: 7 articles - Choose 2 key articles***

ARTICLES	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHU	TOTAL
13	4	10	0	3	1	18
14	2	5	2	2	2	13
<b>15</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>18</b>
16	1	1	1	0	3	6
17	1	3	3	0	4	11
<b>18</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>27</b>
19	1	2	0	1	4	8

- ***September: 3 articles - Choose 1 key article***

ARTICLES	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHU	TOTAL
20	1	5	0	1	7	14
<b>21</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>16</b>
21	6	8	1	1	0	16

- **August: 3 articles - Choose 1 key article**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHU	TOTAL
<b>22</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>21</b>
23	2	4	3	1	10	20
24	2	5	1	5	3	16

- **July: 6 articles - Choose 2 key articles**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHU	TOTAL
25	1	3	1	3	3	11
26	5	4	3	1	0	13
<b>27</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>20</b>
28	1	5	3	2	5	16
29	1	11	0	1	4	17
<b>30</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>17</b>

- **June: 0 articles**
- **May: 2 articles - Choose 1 key article**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHU	TOTAL
<b>31</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>21</b>
31	1	11	2	2	5	21

- **April: 2 articles - Choose 1 key article**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHU	TOTAL
32	1	1	1	0	2	5
<b>32</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>22</b>

- **March: 0 articles**
- **February: 0 articles**
- **January: 0 articles**

YEAR 2006: 156 ARTICLES  
(23 articles chosen)

• *December: 20 articles - 2 key articles:*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
33	2	6	0	5	3	16
34	1	1	0	0	1	3
35	1	3	2	3	5	14
36	3	8	1	2	6	20
37	1	2	1	1	5	10
38	1	6	0	4	5	16
39	1	11	0	9	0	21
40	2	13	1	8	0	24
<b>41</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>24</b>
42	1	9	0	7	0	17
43	2	10	0	8	2	22
44	1	12	1	5	0	19
45	5	6	1	0	1	13
46	3	1	1	0	1	6
<b>47</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>30</b>
48	1	8	1	2	5	17
49	5	7	1	3	1	17
50	5	10	1	1	0	17
51	5	4	3	3	0	15
52	1	4	2	1	0	8

• *November: 14 articles - 2 key articles*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
53	2	9	2	4	1	18
54	2	4	1	4	0	11
55	2	4	0	1	0	7
56	2	3	0	7	0	12
57	4	5	2	6	1	18
58	2	2	1	0	1	6
59	3	3	2	3	1	12
<b>60</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>61</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>30</b>
62	1	4	1	6	0	12
63	1	7	0	2	0	10
64	1	5	1	3	0	10
65	1	9	1	8	1	20
66	1	10	0	3	0	14

- **October: 8 articles - 2 key articles**

ARTICLES	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
67	1	2	0	3	1	7
68	3	6	0	3	2	14
<b>69</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>20</b>
70	1	4	1	3	3	12
71	2	2	2	2	0	8
72	2	7	0	4	0	13
73	3	3	0	0	1	7
<b>74</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>23</b>

- **September: 5 articles - 2 key articles**

ARTICLES	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
<b>75</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>20</b>
76	1	4	0	4	1	10
<b>77</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>19</b>
78	1	6	2	2	1	12
79	1	7	0	7	2	17

- **August: 0 articles**

- **July: 17 articles - 2 key articles**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
80	1	2	2	1	0	6
<b>81</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>29</b>
82	1	3	1	4	0	9
83	1	5	1	9	0	16
84	3	12	0	5	1	21
84	1	2	2	4	1	10
84	2	8	1	10	2	23
85	1	5	0	7	1	14
86	1	6	1	9	1	18
87	2	4	0	7	1	14
88	1	1	0	2	0	4
89	2	6	1	8	1	18
90	2	6	2	1	0	11
91	2	9	1	7	2	21
<b>92</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>27</b>
93	2	8	1	9	1	21
94	1	5	1	3	1	11

- *June: 9 articles - 2 key articles*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
95	1	7	3	4	0	15
96	2	7	3	1	0	13
97	3	1	1	1	7	13
98	1	13	1	7	1	23
99	1	1	0	5	1	8
<b>100</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>101</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>32</b>
102	2	8	2	10	1	23
103	1	5	1	8	0	15

- *May: 18 articles - 2 key articles*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
104	2	9	1	8	2	22
105	4	2	1	0	0	7
<b>106</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>29</b>
107	8	2	2	2	0	14
108	6	9	2	2	0	19
109	2	2	2	0	3	9
110	6	9	2	2	0	19
111	4	6	5	7	1	23
112	9	5	2	3	1	20
113	1	3	0	1	2	7
114	1	10	2	11	0	24
115	7	3	0	1	0	11
116	5	7	2	5	0	19
117	3	7	2	8	2	22
118	4	1	1	1	0	7
119	2	7	1	5	1	16
<b>120</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>41</b>
121	4	6	1	1	2	14

- *April: 21 articles - 3 key articles*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
122	1	5	1	11	0	18
123	1	8	1	6	2	18
124	1	2	0	2	0	5
125	4	5	2	11	1	23
<b>126</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>127</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>25</b>
128	2	5	0	5	0	12
129	3	8	0	7	0	18
130	3	3	0	0	3	9
131	3	2	1	0	0	6
132	1	9	1	5	1	17
133	2	2	1	1	2	8
134	1	5	1	1	0	8
135	2	13	1	4	0	20
136	4	10	1	4	0	19
137	1	11	1	6	2	21
136	1	8	1	2	9	21
<b>137</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>39</b>
138	3	6	1	3	3	16
139	1	3	0	3	0	7
140	7	2	1	7	2	19

- *March: 17 articles - 2 key articles*

ARTICLES	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
141	2	8	1	6	1	18
142	1	7	0	6	1	15
<b>143</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>30</b>
144	3	12	3	2	2	22
145	2	8	1	3	2	16
146	3	9	1	3	1	17
147	1	9	2	3	3	18
148	1	4	1	0	3	9
<b>149</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>30</b>
150	5	6	2	2	4	19
151	1	9	1	5	0	16
152	2	6	2	3	3	16
153	1	5	0	4	0	10
154	3	7	1	2	1	14
155	1	6	1	1	0	9
155	3	7	1	3	2	16
156	2	11	1	4	4	22



- **February: 15 articles - 2 key articles**

ARTICLES	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
157	1	4	1	0	0	6
158	1	5	3	4	3	16
<b>159</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>27</b>
160	1	8	2	2	2	15
161	3	12	3	2	2	22
162	1	7	2	1	0	11
163	1	10	2	2	6	21
164	1	9	2	3	8	23
165	2	13	2	6	1	24
166	2	2	1	2	5	12
167	2	6	1	4	6	19
169	2	10	2	4	0	18
170	3	4	0	1	1	9
171	1	5	1	2	8	17
<b>172</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>29</b>

- **January: 12 articles - 2 key articles**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
173	4	3	1	3	6	17
174	1	8	5	1	6	21
175	1	11	0	8	1	21
176	2	8	2	2	1	15
177	1	7	0	1	1	10
<b>178</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>27</b>
179	1	9	1	9	2	22
<b>180</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>32</b>
181	3	4	3	3	6	19
182	1	8	2	5	1	17
183	1	4	0	2	1	8
184	1	9	3	0	8	21

**YEAR 2007: 170 ARTICLES**

(26 articles chosen)

- ***December: 12 articles - 2 key articles***

<b>ARTICLE</b>	<b>BOTNIA</b>	<b>URUGUAY</b>	<b>FRAY BENTOS</b>	<b>ARGENTINA</b>	<b>GUALEGUAYCHÚ</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>185</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>22</b>
186	1	1	0	1	1	4
187	2	2	0	0	1	5
187	2	3	0	4	1	10
188	1	8	1	2	4	16
189	2	5	0	2	3	12
190	3	8	0	4	0	15
191	3	2	2	1	0	8
192	2	5	0	3	1	11
193	1	3	2	1	2	9
<b>194</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>20</b>
195	2	1	0	1	0	4

- **November: 35 articles – 4 key articles**

ARTICLES	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
196	2	1	1	0	3	7
197	5	9	2	4	2	22
198	3	11	2	6	4	26
199	1	12	2	5	9	29
<b>200</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>41</b>
201	3	2	1	3	1	10
<b>202</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>31</b>
203	6	7	3	2	1	19
204	6	5	3	0	1	15
205	3	5	1	1	3	13
206	1	7	2	1	1	12
207	7	6	3	2	1	19
208	1	10	0	10	1	22
209	6	5	3	3	0	17
210	5	5	2	2	2	16
211	4	3	5	0	2	14
212	2	5	0	0	4	11
213	5	10	2	2	4	23
214	5	4	0	3	1	13
215	1	2	0	1	0	4
<b>216</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>40</b>
217	2	6	0	5	1	14
<b>217</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>31</b>
218	4	4	0	0	3	11
219	3	3	1	1	0	8
220	5	11	0	12	0	28
221	5	6	0	5	0	16
222	4	5	0	3	4	16
223	4	5	0	4	0	13
224	4	6	3	3	0	16
225	1	2	1	7	0	11
226	6	4	0	1	0	11
227	3	2	2	2	5	14
228	4	9	0	6	0	19
229	9	6	1	2	0	18

- **October: 10 articles - 2 key articles**

ARTICLES	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
230	1	3	0	1	1	6
231	4	2	0	1	2	9
232	2	6	5	2	1	16
233	2	5	2	4	4	17
234	3	10	3	2	1	19
<b>235</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>236</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>22</b>
237	6	7	0	1	4	18
238	4	6	1	0	0	11
239	3	3	1	0	5	12

- **September: 22 articles - 3 articles**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
240	3	11	0	9	3	26
241	3	4	1	1	6	15
242	5	4	1	0	0	10
243	6	10	1	6	4	27
244	2	6	1	5	0	14
<b>245</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>35</b>
246	1	4	0	5	0	10
247	5	9	0	8	0	22
248	2	3	1	2	0	8
249	2	5	0	0	0	7
250	2	5	0	0	0	7
251	4	7	0	4	1	16
252	3	7	2	5	0	17
253	2	9	1	7	0	19
254	8	7	0	4	0	19
255	3	4	1	1	1	10
256	6	10	2	7	0	25
<b>257</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>27</b>
258	3	7	0	4	3	17
<b>259</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>31</b>
260	3	5	4	1	2	15
261	4	4	4	1	5	18

- *August: 14 articles – 2 key articles*

ARTICLES	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
<b>262</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>24</b>
263	4	6	1	1	1	13
264	5	4	1	0	1	11
<b>265</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>26</b>
266	1	4	1	0	5	11
267	1	1	2	0	0	4
268	5	9	0	5	2	21
269	2	4	1	5	1	13
270	1	3	1	3	3	11
271	3	6	2	1	2	14
272	1	3	1	2	2	9
273	2	1	3	1	0	7
274	3	10	1	6	0	20
275	5	3	1	3	3	15

- *July: 7 articles – 2 key articles*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
276	1	2	0	3	4	10
<b>277</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>278</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>21</b>
279	1	4	2	3	1	11
280	2	1	1	1	3	8
281	2	1	0	3	1	7
282	3	2	1	1	5	12

- *June: 1 article – 1 key article*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
<b>283</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>11</b>

- *May: 9 articles – 2 key articles*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
<b>284</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>25</b>
285	2	3	0	5	0	10
286	3	5	1	3	0	12
287	1	2	1	1	0	5
288	1	1	1	1	2	6
<b>289</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>13</b>
290	1	1	0	0	4	6
291	1	5	1	4	0	11
292	5	4	1	2	0	12

- *April: 16 articles – 2 key articles*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
293	2	4	1	2	3	12
294	3	5	2	5	4	19
295	2	4	0	1	2	9
296	3	4	1	3	0	11
297	5	12	0	5	0	22
298	4	6	2	5	0	17
299	2	2	0	2	1	7
300	1	8	0	8	0	17
301	7	8	0	4	0	19
302	1	5	1	4	0	11
303	5	6	0	4	0	15
<b>304</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>27</b>
305	4	6	0	10	2	22
<b>306</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>26</b>
307	1	1	3	0	2	7
308	10	4	4	2	0	20

- **March: 12 articles - 2 key articles**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
309	5	4	4	4	6	23
<b>310</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>24</b>
311	3	3	0	0	1	7
312	2	5	1	5	0	13
313	5	3	0	2	3	13
314	2	4	1	1	1	9
<b>315</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>28</b>
316	2	5	2	1	2	12
317	1	4	0	1	2	8
318	1	3	0	1	0	5
319	6	5	1	3	0	15
320	1	8	1	5	1	16

- **February: 12 articles - 2 key articles**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
321	5	11	2	5	0	23
322	2	8	0	3	1	14
323	1	3	0	3	3	10
324	9	8	1	1	2	21
325	5	7	0	0	1	13
326	2	7	2	3	1	15
<b>327</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>23</b>
328	2	8	0	4	0	14
329	5	7	1	2	3	18
<b>330</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>29</b>
331	3	9	1	7	1	21
332	2	7	2	2	6	19

- *January: 20 articles - 2 key articles*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
333	1	7	0	2	0	10
334	2	3	1	2	0	8
335	1	5	0	8	1	15
336	7	6	1	3	2	19
337	3	7	1	4	0	15
<b>338</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>38</b>
339	1	6	1	3	1	12
340	1	7	0	4	1	13
341	2	3	1	3	5	14
342	1	4	2	0	3	10
343	1	9	0	3	3	16
344	5	2	4	0	1	12
345	7	2	2	0	2	13
346	3	6	3	4	3	19
347	1	5	0	2	4	12
348	3	3	1	0	0	7
349	2	7	2	7	0	18
<b>350</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>20</b>
351	6	6	1	2	1	16
352	1	2	0	1	5	9

## YEAR 2008: 80 ARTICLES

(18 articles chosen)

- *December: 8 articles - 2 key articles*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
353	1	1	1	1	4	8
354	6	3	0	1	1	11
355	3	3	1	2	3	12
356	5	3	1	0	4	13
<b>357</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>358</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>16</b>
359	2	5	2	1	3	13
360	3	1	0	1	1	6



- **November: 5 articles - 2 key articles**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
<b>361</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>23</b>
362	2	3	2	1	4	12
363	5	2	2	1	3	13
<b>364</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>31</b>
365	5	1	0	0	3	9

- **October: 9 articles - 2 key articles**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
366	2	4	0	0	5	11
367	4	5	3	1	2	15
<b>368</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>19</b>
369	1	3	0	1	4	9
370	2	4	0	2	5	13
371	2	3	2	1	2	10
372	3	3	1	2	2	11
373	2	4	1	1	5	13
<b>374</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>21</b>

- **September: 4 articles - 2 key articles**

ARTICLE	Botnia	Uruguay	Fray Bentos	Argentina	Gualeguaychú	TOTAL
375	4	6	1	3	4	18
<b>376</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>29</b>
377	1	7	1	3	2	14
<b>378</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>21</b>

- **August: 2 articles - 1 key article**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
379	2	1	1	1	5	10
<b>380</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>14</b>

- **July: 0 articles**

- **June: 0 articles**

- **May: 1 article - 1 key article**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
<b>381</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9</b>

- *April: 4 articles – 2 key articles*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
<b>382</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>381</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>16</b>
382	1	5	2	2	4	14
383	1	3	0	0	1	5

- *March: 10 articles – 2 key articles*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
384	2	2	0	0	0	4
385	1	1	0	0	0	2
386	1	5	2	2	4	14
<b>387</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>20</b>
388	3	6	0	1	5	15
389	2	4	0	1	1	8
390	3	6	0	1	0	10
391	4	3	2	1	3	13
392	4	3	4	1	5	17
<b>393</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>21</b>

- *February: 19 articles – 2 key articles*

ARTICLE	Botnia	Uruguay	Fray Bentos	Argentina	Gualeguaychú	TOTAL
394	8	8	2	1	0	19
395	5	4	2	1	2	14
396	4	2	0	2	3	11
397	2	7	2	8	0	19
398	5	4	1	2	5	17
399	1	3	0	2	3	9
400	5	6	0	4	0	15
401	4	1	1	4	4	14
<b>402</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>25</b>
403	7	5	2	1	2	17
404	2	6	0	3	0	11
405	5	3	1	3	2	14
406	2	2	0	2	4	10
407	5	2	1	4	4	16
408	3	3	0	2	2	10
409	1	1	0	0	0	2
410	4	6	0	0	3	13
411	3	3	0	0	2	8
<b>412</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>25</b>

- *January: 18 articles - 2 key articles*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUAYCHÚ	TOTAL
413	3	3	1	0	0	7
414	2	7	1	4	3	17
415	2	3	1	3	1	10
416	0	7	2	3	4	16
417	1	6	0	4	0	11
<b>418</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>419</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>21</b>
420	4	2	2	1	3	12
421	2	2	1	0	1	6
422	2	5	0	2	2	11
423	1	5	0	0	2	8
424	2	4	2	1	3	12
425	1	4	0	1	1	7
426	2	7	1	4	3	17
427	2	4	1	1	1	9
428	2	1	2	1	2	8
429	6	0	2	0	4	12
430	1	2	1	1	5	10

## YEAR 2009: 68 ARTICLES

(18 articles chosen)

- *December: 8 articles - 2 key articles*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUACHÚ	TOTAL
431	1	2	3	0	0	6
432	3	4	4	2	0	13
433	1	7	3	1	5	17
<b>434</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>19</b>
435	2	3	0	2	0	7
436	3	7	0	4	1	15
437	3	7	2	4	1	17
<b>438</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>27</b>

- **November: 8 articles - 2 key articles**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUACHÚ	TOTAL
439	1	4	0	3	3	11
440	4	4	0	11	0	19
<b>441</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>22</b>
442	4	1	2	3	3	13
<b>443</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>25</b>
444	1	2	1	1	2	7
445	3	1	0	1	3	8
446	4	1	0	0	3	8

- **October: 9 articles - 2 key articles**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUACHÚ	TOTAL
447	2	9	0	3	1	15
<b>448</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>35</b>
449	3	5	0	1	0	9
450	2	5	0	5	0	12
451	3	4	1	1	0	9
<b>452</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>22</b>
453	1	10	1	5	4	21
454	2	3	1	8	3	17
455	3	2	1	1	2	9

- **September: 6 articles - 2 key articles**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUACHÚ	TOTAL
<b>456</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>457</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>27</b>
458	7	7	0	8	1	23
459	2	4	0	3	0	9
460	5	8	0	10	0	23
461	3	3	1	2	3	12

- **August: 0 articles**

- **July: 0 articles**

- **June: 2 articles - 1 key article**

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUACHÚ	TOTAL
462	2	3	2	1	1	9
<b>463</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>19</b>

- *May: 2 articles - 1 key article*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUACHÚ	TOTAL
464	3	2	1	1	1	8
<b>465</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>41</b>

- *April: 2 articles - 1 key article*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUACHÚ	TOTAL
466	2	2	1	0	2	7
<b>467</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>9</b>

- *March: 5 articles - 2 key articles*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUACHÚ	TOTAL
<b>468</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>15</b>
469	2	4	2	1	2	11
<b>470</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>57</b>
471	3	2	0	1	1	7
472	1	1	1	0	0	3

- *February: 4 articles - 2 key article*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUACHÚ	TOTAL
473	4	2	3	1	1	11
474	1	7	1	0	0	9
<b>475</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>476</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>20</b>

- *January: 22 articles - 3 key articles*

ARTICLE	BOTNIA	URUGUAY	FRAY BENTOS	ARGENTINA	GUALEGUACHÚ	TOTAL
477	4	2	1	0	4	11
<b>478</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>17</b>
479	4	6	0	0	3	13
480	4	2	1	1	3	11
481	3	5	0	2	1	11
482	5	2	0	0	4	11
483	4	2	0	1	0	7
484	1	2	1	0	6	10
485	1	2	2	0	1	6
486	1	5	0	1	1	8
487	3	3	1	0	4	11
488	4	2	0	1	1	8
489	0	4	0	0	0	4
490	1	3	1	0	2	7
491	2	3	0	0	2	7
492	1	3	2	1	3	10
493	5	3	1	0	4	13
494	1	3	1	1	4	10
<b>495</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>21</b>
496	2	4	0	1	2	9
497	3	2	2	4	5	16
<b>498</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>21</b>

### APPENDIX 3. The final sample and the key stakeholders

YEAR	MONTH	ARTICLES	STAKEHOLDERS				
			Botnia	Uruguay	Fray Bentos	Argentina	Gualeguaychú
2005	January	0	0	0	0	0	0
	February	0	0	0	0	0	0
	March	0	0	0	0	0	0
	April	1	2	13	0	4	3
	May	1	1	12	3	4	1
	June	0	0	0	0	0	0
	July	2	2	19	3	10	3
	August	1	2	5	1	8	5
	September	1	1	8	1	0	6
	October	2	3	22	4	6	10
	November	1	1	7	1	5	0
	December	2	2	23	3	8	14
	<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>42</b>
2006	January	2	3	29	6	11	10
	February	2	11	18	10	9	8
	March	2	13	27	3	14	3
	April	3	30	38	4	15	3
	May	2	6	36	4	21	3
	June	2	4	26	4	23	3
	July	2	4	23	3	23	3
	August	0	0	0	0	0	0
	September	2	2	17	4	14	2
	October	2	14	12	2	11	4
	November	2	6	24	4	21	1
	December	2	8	29	3	12	2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>42</b>
2007	January	2	12	23	4	14	5
	February	2	15	17	5	8	7
	March	2	12	19	10	7	4
	April	2	14	21	3	11	4
	May	2	5	17	3	13	0
	June	1	1	4	1	3	2
	July	2	6	33	4	16	0
	August	2	12	17	3	9	9
	September	3	18	37	5	22	11
	October	2	12	15	1	7	7
	November	4	16	59	15	35	18
	December	2	8	17	3	5	9
	<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>76</b>
2008	January	2	10	15	2	14	3
	February	2	16	16	3	8	7
	March	2	15	11	3	9	3
	April	2	5	9	2	5	9
	May	1	2	4	1	2	0
	June	0	0	0	0	0	0
	July	0	0	0	0	0	0
	August	1	2	3	0	2	7
	September	2	7	19	4	10	10
	October	2	6	16	2	10	6
	November	2	13	18	4	11	8
	December	2	6	15	1	8	3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>56</b>

<b>2009</b>	<i>January</i>	3	11	25	6	7	10
	<i>February</i>	2	10	13	2	4	6
	<i>March</i>	2	7	38	4	18	5
	<i>April</i>	1	1	5	1	0	2
	<i>May</i>	1	10	14	3	12	2
	<i>June</i>	1	2	8	2	1	6
	<i>July</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0
	<i>August</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0
	<i>September</i>	2	10	25	3	16	3
	<i>October</i>	2	6	24	1	20	6
	<i>November</i>	2	12	14	2	17	2
	<i>December</i>	2	14	14	1	15	2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>411</b>	<b>973</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>558</b>	<b>260</b>	