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**“We Do Right, We Don't Do Nice”**

Pragmatizing Markers in Rhetoric of Political Leaders in Russia and  
Germany: A Critical Comparative Analysis, 2005-2015

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The phenomenon of pragmatic decisions is widely used by current political leaders to prove their foreign policy actions as the right ones, as illustrated by the discourses of German and Russian officials. But still the 'pragmatic' explanation does not result in the same decisions in these two states. This contradiction suggests that pragmatism is nothing but a rhetorical tool, which might be used differently.

This thesis focuses on the rhetorical tools by means of which leaders of Russia and Germany pragmatize their foreign policy choices. Also the thesis is aimed to figure out the differences in the ways of pragmatization applied by Russian and German actors.

The Aristotelian doctrine of practical syllogism, which is considered here as mechanism of pragmatization, discloses these rhetoric tools that are called 'pragmatizing markers'. The rhetorical analysis revealed five groups of these markers: profit, right and thought, institutionalism, humanism, and ideal speech situation (ISS). Moreover, it showed that the conditions under which the decision is made (cooperation; different point of view; conflict) may affect the choice of pragmatizing markers.

Comparative analysis showed that Russian and German actors have some common spaces as well as difference in applying the pragmatizing markers. Both use all five groups of the markers to some stance. The cases of conflict and different points of view urge the actors to resort to the model of ISS, while the case of cooperation is the most favorable for the marker of profit. In the conditions of conflict, the use of pragmatizing marker of right and thought significantly increases in both countries. As for the differences, Russian political leaders make their rhetoric more variable in cases of cooperation and different point of views and German ones does it in case of conflict. In addition, Russian actors tend to pragmatize with the help of institutional value, while German representatives prefer the value of humanism, which can be traced through the cases of conflict and differing points of view.

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## 1. Introduction

There is an outstanding protagonist in Terry Pratchett's *Discworld* series that is called by the characters as Granny Weatherwax or Mistress Weatherwax. She is presented as an informal leader within the whole magic world. Moreover, she is a self-appointed guardian of her small country. In spite of the fact that this character has enormous magic power, she rarely uses it and prefers to appeal to 'cold mind', act rationally and pragmatically. So it is not surprising that other characters note that she always says: "We do right, we don't do nice", for instance, in Pratchett's novel *I Shall Wear Midnight*.

Such a justification of the actions sounds quite similar to the rhetoric of the real world political leaders, when they appeal to the others to act pragmatically, even if this might not seem nice for the latter. Also, when political leaders gain their points in different situations, they often use some supportive tools to show that their actions are 'right', while they are criticized for not being 'nice'. So, it seems interesting to find out how different political leaders make their foreign policy decisions sound 'right'.

### 1.2 Relevance of the research

This thesis focuses on the rhetoric of political leaders of Russia and Germany, because the representation of these two countries as key actors at the international scale, including the European one, enables them to make claims for pragmatic solutions in various situations.

At the moment there is quite an impressive number of researches devoted to the issue of representing Russia and Germany as influential actors. For instance, it has been investigated by Maria Engström (2014),

Julien Nocetti (2015), Robert Kappel (2014), Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson (2010), Adrian Hyde-Price and Charlie Jeffery (2001), and these are just the most recent works which cover this topic.

Such a positioning can be easily traced through self-perceptions of the states, which are reflected in their foreign policy doctrines: in Russia it is the new Foreign Policy Concept, which was signed by President Vladimir Putin in February 2013; in Germany it is a strategy paper entitled “Shaping Globalization – Expanding Partnerships – Sharing Responsibility” produced by the German Government in 2012.

Furthermore, it is possible to treat these two countries as ‘world powers’ due to a more, let it be called, objective factor of participating in international organizations. In the field of economy, Russia and Germany act through the World Trade Organization, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and such international forums as G20 and G8, although, on the grounds of the Ukrainian crisis Russia was excluded from G8, nevertheless, its representatives claim that they are still ready for further cooperation.

In the field of international security, both states are influential players in the United Nations. Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council with a right of veto. Germany is a non-permanent member, nevertheless, it has been already elected there five times. Besides, Germany is able to contribute to international security due to its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since 1955. In addition, Russia attempts to broaden the notion of international security so that it would cover cyberspace: in 2011 the idea of elaborating an international code of conduct for information security was introduced by the permanent representative of Russian along with ones of China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Meanwhile, focusing on the European scale, it goes without saying that Germany is one of the most significant driving forces of the European integration due to its political and economic weight. The role of Russia cannot be neglected here either, because it is one of the important EU partners. Moreover it is treated as some kind of counterweight with its idea of Eurasian Union, which contributes enough in forming the European identity.

Furthermore, the cases of Nord Stream Pipeline project, the problematics of the Near East in the example of Syrian crisis, and the Ukrainian crisis, which were chosen as time and subject framework for the analysis, highlight the importance of Russia and Germany on the European and world levels, and make this research topical.

Hence, as far as these two states have quite a lot in common, but still their foreign policy decisions do not always coincide, this thesis is tasked to compare the rhetoric of their political leaders.

### **1.3 Research questions and goals**

The aim of this thesis can be determined in two research questions. Firstly, I am going to figure out what rhetorical tools leaders of Russia and Germany apply to pragmatize their foreign policy choices. The second question urges for comparison, because I would like to find out, what are the differences in the ways of pragmatization applied by Russian and German actors.

These question set up the following goals of the research. To start with, it is necessary to introduce the notion of rational choice as a basis of rhetorical strategy of political leaders. This point will be revealed in theoretical chapter with the help of rational choice theory and its critique.

Then it is crucial to determine the Aristotelian doctrine of practical syllogism on the basis of which I have constructed the methodological apparatus of the thesis. Methodology chapter will show how this doctrine can be used as pragmatizing mechanism in political rhetoric.

In addition, I have to demonstrate how these notions work in practice. For this I will analyze the speeches of Russian and German political leaders focusing on three cases: the Nord Stream Pipeline project, the Syrian crisis, and the Ukrainian crisis. I am going to show, by means of rhetorical analysis, how different pragmatizing markers work within the mechanism of practical syllogism and make the actors sound pragmatic.

Finally, I need to figure out the differences in usage of pragmatizing markers used by Russian and German actors, which will be achieved in the chapter devoted to comparative analysis.

#### **1.4 Theoretical and methodological issues**

The theoretical chapter of the thesis focuses on the phenomenon of pragmatic decisions concerning discussions by international relations scholars. When discussing the idea of pragmatic decisions it is inevitable to appeal to the notions of pragmatic and pragmatism, and within this discipline there is the body of scholarship known as IR pragmatism (Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Hellmann 2009; Weber 2013). Nevertheless, I do not concentrate on it explicitly, but draw more attention to rational choice theory.

The proponents of rational choice theory argue that it is recognized as one of the ascendant paradigms in the field of social sciences (Opp 1999; Monroe 2001; Chai 2001; Aguiar & Francisco 2009). However, rational choice theory also faces much criticism both from the advocates (Aguiar &



Francisco 2009; Hausman 2001; Landa 2004; Davidson 1980; Elster 1989; Boudon 2003; Chai 2001) and opponents of it (McCubbins & Thies 1996; Green and Shapiro, 1994; Monroe, 1996; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982; Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Almond, 1991; Barber, 1984; Eckstein, 1991; Mansbridge, 1980; Green & Shapiro 1994; Snidal 2002).

The critique from rational choice theorists leads up to the division of the theory into, at least, two types of interpretations: narrow or explicit version and wide or internal version. Nevertheless, both versions share the same ground, which is concluded in rational optimization model or three basic assumptions. They provide a researcher with the toolkit of decision-making process. Moreover, optimization model defines the idea that each actor pursues the aim of utility maximization. Hence, the proponents of the rational choice theory assume that all the people eventually act pragmatically.

The opponents of this theory, in their turn, insist that actors are not always pragmatic. This allows supposing, that rational choice theory is a basis of political rhetoric, when one actor appeals to another to act pragmatically.

Further on, in the methodology chapter I seek to figure out how the Aristotelian doctrine of practical syllogism can work as mechanism of pragmatization in political rhetoric. The idea of practical syllogism has been already examined by many philosophers (Kelsen 1973; Wright 1986; Broadie 1968; Schiller 1917; Hardie 1968). The understanding of the structure of the syllogism has allowed me to create a model for pragmatic decisions in political rhetoric, which will form the basis of my rhetorical analysis.

The method of rhetorical analysis is thoroughly investigated in different disciplines, including the IR (Gill and Whedbee 1997; Finlayson

2007; Condor et al. 2013), and linguistics (Joseph 2006). This method deals with different figures of speech, and metaphor seems to be one of the most popular one for the researchers (Lakoff and Johnson 2003; Marks 2011; Miller 1979). Nevertheless, my analysis revealed that metaphors are not as widely used for pragmatizing matters as could have been presupposed. So I concentrated on other figures of speech, which I called ‘pragmatizing markers’. I was able to identify five groups of them: profit, right and thought, institutionalism, humanism, and ideal speech situation. In order to prove their pragmatic nature I have to refer not only to rational choice theory, but also some researches in the field of neurosciences (McDermott 2004) and semiotics (Habermas 1984).

### **1.5 Empirical base and analysis**

The choice of cases, as a topical framework of the research, arises from the aim to demonstrate how actors use pragmatizing markers in their rhetoric under different conditions. The cases have been chosen on the basis of that, and the following chapter explicates the rationale for comparing namely Russia and Germany. Hence, the case of the Nord Stream Pipeline project reveals the cooperation between Russia and Germany, the problematics of Syrian crisis presents the differing points of view while seeking for the same solution and, finally, the Ukrainian crisis shows the rhetoric under condition of conflict of two actors.

Thus, the data was collected from official web-sites of the president of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, and The Federal Foreign Office of Germany, in accordance to the topical timeframe. The data includes the transcripts of interviews, press-conferences, and official reports of political leaders of Russia (Putin, Medvedev, Lavrov,

Bogdanov) and Germany (Merkel, Westerwelle, Steinmeier) taken in original languages, Russian and German, and then translated into English (transcriptions can be found in appendix).

I have looked through 186 transcripts out of which 27 statements turned out to contain pragmatizing markers expressed by means of 45 figures of speech. These were then chosen for closer scrutiny. Overall the data can illustrate how Russian and German political leaders make their decisions sound pragmatic.

In the chapter devoted to the rhetorical analysis of pragmatizing markers in the speeches of political leaders of Russia and Germany, I am going to figure out by applying practical syllogism model which of the markers are used by the actors, and how the condition of relations affects this usage.

In the following chapter, taking into account the results of rhetorical analysis, I will reveal the general points and differences in Russian and German usage of pragmatizing markers in their rhetoric.

## **2. Russia and Germany: Basis for Comparison**

For comparative analysis I have chosen pragmatizing figures of speech used by political leaders in Russia and Germany, because these two countries represent key actors in international security and world economy. In order to confirm this standpoint, before examining the theoretical and methodological apparatus, it is thus necessary to have a closer look on positioning of Russia and Germany in these fields.

### **2.1 Russia**

To begin with Russian positioning as a key actor, I would like to draw attention to the new Foreign Policy Concept, which was signed by President Vladimir Putin in February 2013. This concept reflects not only the changes in the world order, official reaction to these changes, state's priorities in solving global problems and regional priorities, and means of realization of foreign policy, but also lets us understand, how the country considers itself on the global stage. Maria Engström, a Swedish researcher, summarized this document noting, that in Russian point of view it is a significant military and economic actor in in the conditions of growing chaos and uncontrollability in international relations. In addition, the Concept includes an image of Russia as a particular civilization, which should share its values by means of 'soft power' (Engström 2014, 362).

Such a self-perception seems to me quite reasonable as far as Russian participation on global scale through authoritative international organizations and regional structures has an immense impact and ambitions. Interestingly enough, European Union also highlights importance of Russia as a key player in geo-political and security terms at both the global and regional level, which was mentioned in the 2003

European Union Security Strategy (European Commission 2003). And there are some reasons for this.

Above all, Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, which lets it use a right of veto along with China, France, the Great Britain, and the United States of America with regard to the Charter of the United Nations, article 27. And Russia has used this right not only once, which can be seen in the following table:

<b>Table 1. Security Council - Veto List</b>	
<b>Data</b>	<b>Agenda Item</b>
11 May 1993	The situation in Cyprus
02 December 1994	The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
21 April 2004	Cyprus
12 January 2007	Myanmar
11 July 2008	Peace and Security - Africa (Zimbabwe)
15 June 2009	Georgia
04 October 2011	Middle East - Syria
04 February 2012	Middle East - Syria
19 July 2012	Middle East - Syria
15 March 2014	Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
22 May 2014	Middle East - Syria

(Dag Hammarskiöld Library 2014).

Another curious moment is Russia's position in cyberspace, which is considered both as a source of new threat and opportunities for resolution of foreign policy issues. In this connection, the state is trying to take a pro-

active stand, so that its role in the field of the Internet governance cannot be neglected.

For instance, in 2011 permanent representatives of Russia, China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan promoted an idea of elaborating International code of conduct for information security in order to come to international agreement "... on international norms and rules guiding the behavior of States in the information space" (Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 2011). This approach to the issue of cybersecurity, as noted by Julien Nocetti, is based on the understanding of cyberspace as part of a territory of a state, where international laws should also work (Nocetti 2015, 112). Consequently, the Internet has become a tool for Russian foreign policy, successfully used by Ministry for Foreign Affairs, whose "security-driven internet governance agenda" approved itself during the World Conference on International Telecommunications summit in Dubai in December 2012 (Nocetti 2015, 119).

Besides, Russia represents itself not only in the field of global security issues, but also in world economy by continuing integration in intergovernmental organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (further WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The 16<sup>th</sup> of December 2011 witnessed the 8<sup>th</sup> WTO Ministerial Conference approved that Russia may accede to the WTO Agreement, (WTO 2011) which was implemented on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of August 2012, when Russia officially joined WTO as its 156th member. This step was highly welcomed by the WTO members: the Director-General Pascal Lamy evaluated it as a great achievement to the rule of trade law, which opens new opportunities for business operators and trade partners. Moreover, he noted

that by joining WTO family Russia attained a WTO “quality label” (Lamy 2011). Working Party Chairman Ambassador Jóhannesson also admitted Russian prospects as strengthening actor of the multilateral trading system which can enhance global economic cooperation (WTO News Items 2011a). Igor Shuvalov, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister, in his turn, assured that Russia promises to make an outstanding contribution to securing international economic stability (WTO News Items 2011b).

Although Russia is not a member of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (further OECD), it also plays a significant role here. According to the information presented on the official web-site of the organization, Russia actively participates through some committees and working groups, in addition, it has an opportunity to join the meetings of the OECD Global Forums and regional activities, which concern issues of non-OECD European countries. Moreover, Ministerial Council Meeting dialogue sessions with non-OECD economies are open for Russian Ministers. This cooperation provides a sustainable platform for policy dialogue with Russia, which again points out a considerable role of the country on the global economy stance (OECD n.d.).

Another representative point here, in my opinion, is Russian Presidency of the G20, which took place in 2013. Summit G20 was highly estimated by the partners; moreover, Ambassador of Australia to the Russian Federation Paul Myler was inspired by the topics promoted by Russia, which included economic growth through quality jobs and investment, trust and transparency, and effective regulation, so he claimed that in 2014 Australia would keep this direction (Russia G20, 2013).

## 2.2 Germany

Undoubtedly, Germany is a key actor in both European and international security and economy, which is clearly represented in a strategy paper “Shaping Globalization – Expanding Partnerships – Sharing Responsibility” produced by the German Government in 2012. This document not only presents the state’s approach to world politics and new partnerships, but also reflects its self-perception on a global scale, likewise Foreign Policy Concept in case with Russia.

According to this strategy of the German government, Germany is represented as reliable partner upholding a reputation for quality products and technological innovation, who is proud of its own democratic system of governance, its social market economy; as a driving force behind European integration; as a reliable partner and ally that shoulders responsibility in the world (Federal Government of Germany 2012, 6-7).

This positioning is based on the actions of the country through the organizations of different levels, among which the most influential for Germany, as it seems to me, is the European Union, as it is claimed that “Germany acts with and through Europe” by promoting European positions and working in international forums together with EU and Council of Europe (Federal Government of Germany 2012, 9). This cooperation means a lot, which was noted by Robert Kappel in his article “Global Power Shifts and Germany’s New Foreign Policy Agenda”, in which he claims that EU is the most powerful trading block, and the biggest single economy in the world, as its share in global Gross Domestic Product and production counts 25 per cent (Kappel 2014, 342-343). And Germany, in fact, plays first violin in this influential union.



Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson note that there are four stages of the policy cycle, when EU may be influenced by member states, among them is agenda-setting, where Germany has a crucial role and usually succeeds in promoting its own interests (Bulmer & Paterson 2010, 1055). Besides, the political weight of Germany also matters a lot due to the largest population within the Union and to being a founding force in the integration process, moreover, it has a unique experience in coalition-building and multilevel governance, which finds a lot of similarities with the EU, and consequently, let the state to promote its domestic issues to the EU level. Surely, economic influence cannot be neglected: by the year 2008 Germany contributed €7.836 billion, staying the largest contributor to the EU budget (Bulmer & Paterson 2010, 1056).

Furthermore, Germany is a dynamic participant in multilateral forums, such as G7/8 and G20, the latter became a platform for negotiations among finance ministers and central bankers due to Germany, as they suggested this initiative in 1999 in response to the Asian crisis of the 1990s (Federal Government of Germany 2012, 13). In addition to that, Germany will host the G7 Summit in June 2015, promoting the agenda, which will cover the key issues of global economy; foreign, security and development policy; energy security; protection of the marine environment, marine governance and resource efficiency; antibiotic resistance, neglected and poverty-related diseases, and Ebola; retail and supply chain standards; empowering self-employed women and women in vocational training.

It should also be mentioned, that G7 members position themselves as “... key actors in international economic relations, and as such they carry great responsibility for creating reliable, sustainable and viable global economic conditions” (German G7 Presidency Agenda 2015). Among other economic forums Germany also highlights the role of OECD, which

member it is, in the field of development of strategies and codes for specific policy areas (Federal Government of Germany 2012, 13).

Essential role of Germany as an international economic actor is assumed by its membership In WTO, which has started since the 1<sup>st</sup> of January in 1995. From German standpoint this organization is a key tool to challenge protectionism and limitations on market access or export restrictions, as well as to open the markets, which suits the requirements of the EU trade strategy. Germany contributes a lot by extending the areas of opening markets, which is presented in WTO+ agreements (Federal Government of Germany 2012, 36).

As for international security issue, unlike Russia, Germany was elected only as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council five times: 1977 – 1978, 1987 – 1988, 1995 – 1996, 2003 – 2004, 2011 – 2012 (United Nations n.d.a), which nevertheless, let the state to approve itself as an important actor. Firstly, Germany is one of the countries, claiming for reform of the UN Security Council, meanwhile admitting its central role for maintaining peace (Federal Government of Germany 2012, 12). Secondly, German contribution is quite impressive: it deploys currently about 5,000 soldiers, police officers and civilian experts as part of peace-keeping missions mandated by the United Nations; besides, it is rated as fourth-largest contributor to the peace-keeping budget (United Nations n.d.b).

Next significant organization, through which Germany can act on a global scale, is North Atlantic Treaty Organization. According to the German Government Strategy, NATO provides an essential basis for their common security policy (Federal Government of Germany 2012, 15). Germany joined the Alliance in 1955, but researchers note that it did not become a serious partner at once: R. Kappel points out, that first claims from NATO allies for more intensive participation in peacekeeping and

stabilization operations appeared in 1991, which lead up to an important exception in German constitution taken in 1994, due to which Germany was permitted to take part in out-of-area operations if they were approved by the Government and got the UN sanction (Kappel 2014, 345). As consequence, the Kosovo crisis in 1999 witnessed the first military operation supported by German combat forces, which by the way became a turning point in the country's approach to military crisis management (Hyde-Price & Jeffery 2001, 705).

## **2.3 Choosing the cases**

For a detailed analysis of pragmatization, I have picked up the cases, which clearly approve the positioning of Russia and Germany as the key actors in international security and economy. Moreover, it seems interesting to me to find out what pragmatizing markers are used in the cases, which are treated differently by both states, by this I mean cooperation, or conflict, or just different points of view towards the state of affairs. This will let me to find out whether different markers are universal tools of pragmatization and can be easily applied in the situation of both cooperation and conflict, and in other cases; or there are some special figures of speech, which are used only in particular cases.

Following this idea I have chosen three cases: Nord Stream Pipelines Project, the problem of the Near East by the example of Syria, and the recent Ukrainian crisis.

### **2.3.1 Cooperation: The Case of Nord Stream Pipelines Project**

The EU's annual demand is growing every year and is expected to reach 450 bcm by 2035 (Nord Stream 2014, 2). In response to this

challenge the Nord Stream Pipeline Project was created, which concerned building a twin-pipeline system, which will provide European consumers in Germany, Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the Czech Republic and other countries with direct access to some of the world's largest gas reserves in Russia (Nord Stream 2013a, 1-3).

The Nord Stream AG is an independent international consortium established in 2005 in Zug, Switzerland, to plan, construct and operate the work of the two 1,224-kilometre natural gas pipelines through the Baltic Sea (Nord Stream 2013a, 1). It consists of five shareholders: OAO Gazprom, Russia, holding 51 percent stake in the joint venture; E.ON SE and BASF SE/Wintershall Holding GmbH, Germany, each holding 15.5 percent; N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie, Netherlands and GDF SUEZ S.A., France, each holding 9 percent (Nord Stream 2014, 1).

For Europe the project became “of European interest”, when in 2006 the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council of Europe put it into Trans-European Network-Energy guidelines (Nord Stream 2014, 2). This decision is not surprising, as the project fits their requirements in terms of energy security and ecological policy. For the former, the Nord Stream Pipeline is going to cover about a third of additional import demand, setting a diversity of gas supply routes. As for Russia, this project provides it with additional northern route for Gazprom (Nord Stream 2013a, 4).

As for ecological impact, additional supplies of gas are essential for EU, where its production is declining, while this fuel plays an important role in tackling the problem of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (Nord Stream 2013a, 3). Furthermore, Nord Stream cares a lot about its impact on the environment, which resulted in fruitful cooperation with different environment protecting experts and organizations. In consequence, The Environmental Impact

Assessments prepared a program of minimizing the impact bio-physical and social environment; in addition, more than 100 million euros was invested in environmental studies and project planning pursuing the same goal for geophysical part; for the stages of construction and operation of the pipelines an environmental and social monitoring program was elaborated, which deals with the physical, chemical, biological and socio-economic environment issues (Nord Stream 2014, 3).

As far as the pipeline runs through the Baltic Sea, it covers territorial waters and exclusive economic zones of Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany. This route became possible only after national permission of all these five countries; moreover, it required environmental consultations of nine Baltic Sea states, which were successfully held on the UNECE Espoo Convention (Nord Stream 2013b, 1). As a result the permission process took only three years, starting with submission of national permit applications in 2008 and finishing in 2010 when authorities of all five countries granted their permissions for Nord Stream Pipeline construction (Nord Stream 2014, 2).

Thus, the construction stage of the project started in April 2010 and was completed on budget and on schedule within 30 months, and the gas transportation in Europe began in November 2011 (Nord Stream 2013a, 2-3).

Although, the Nord Stream Pipeline is a European-Russian project, Germany and Russia faced with lots of criticism from some European countries, which suspected it to turn into German-Russian project. This idea was eagerly refuted by both sides: for instance, Minister of State for Europe, Günter Gloser, emphasized: “the Nord Stream Pipeline is not a German-Russian project” at the economic forum held in Riga in June 2008 (Gloser 2008). A year later foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier also

pointed out in an interview to a Polish newspaper 'Gazeta Wyborcza', that the project is European, not German (Gazeta Wyborcza, 2009). However, it once again highlights that Germany and Russia act as key players in this case, and act in a cooperative way.

### **2.3.2 Difference: The Case of Syria**

Problematics of the Near East is a matter of concern not only for the region but for the whole world community, including Russia and Germany. At the meeting of German foreign Minister Westerwelle with Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide the former noted that there are three great problems that produce potential threat to stability and peace throughout the region, which are the civil war in Syria, Iran nuclear program and the Middle East peace process (Westerwelle 2012). Russia is not reluctant to this problem too: it was reflected in the Foreign Policy Concept, according to which the state promises to make a significant contribution in stabilizing the situation in this region (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2013).

The Syrian crisis is a very complex one, even its observation is a special case for research that is why I would like to make just a brief observations of succession of events referring to the article prepared for the BBC news by Lucy Rodgers, David Gritten, James Offer and Patrick Asare.

The starting point of the crisis lies in the wave of protests claiming for President Assad's resignation which burst in March 2011. Disorders expanded developing into the civil war, and in 2012 scuffles reached Damascus and second city of Aleppo. The conflict became more complicated with implementation of sectarian factor: confrontation between the country's Sunni majority and the president's Shia Alawite sect

added new backgrounds for violence. Strengthening of the jihadist groups, including Islamic State, use of chemical weapons, and humanitarian crisis did not let the world community to shut their eyes to all this. Attempts to stop violence and start negotiations were taken by the Arab League and the United Nations still they showed no practical result (Rodgers et al. 2015).

Throughout the conflict Russia and Germany took different points of view on the terms of resolution: while Russia supports President Assad's regime insisting that external involvement in domestic affairs is impermissible, Germany and its allies claim that violence should be ended by any possible means. This led up to a set of Russian vetoes, which were already mentioned, of the UN Security Council resolutions, concerning external military involvement in Syrian domestic affairs. Nevertheless both are claiming to political solution. Hence, the case will grant pragmatizing markers used by political leaders in Russia and Germany in the conditions of different viewpoints on the issue.

### **2.3.3 Conflict: The Case of Ukrainian Crisis**

In order to make an image of the events which are called 'Ukrainian crisis', I would like to refer to the BBC news website again, as the article "Ukraine crisis in maps" has collected all the necessary events.

Abandoned implementation of an association agreement with the European Union in November 2013 is accepted as the beginning of the crisis, due to the fact, that this decision taken by President Viktor Yanukovich's government arouse a flood of protest known as 'Euromaidan'. As the result, resignation of the current president was achieved, but by that moment clashes between protesters and police had already entailed some casualties, and tension within the society continued to grow. Then, a Crimean referendum held on 16 March 2014 showed

almost 97 percent results in favor of the proposal to join the Russian Federation. EU and the USA interpreted it as annexation, and consequently, sanctions were imposed (BBC 2015). And as it is emphasized by the German newspaper 'Spiegel' led by Martin Hesse: "Germany has taken a leadership role in those efforts - a role that Berlin has sought to claim for itself since the early days of the unrest in Kiev" (Hesse et al. 2014).

Meanwhile, situation on the East of Ukraine became aggravated: on the 11<sup>th</sup> of May 2014 referendums for independence were conducted in Donetsk and Luhansk, which were not recognized by Kiev or the West. Attempts to establish peace were taken by new president Petro Poroshenko, who was elected on the 25<sup>th</sup> of May 2014, but still showed no results, as the conflict continued to escalate. Probably, the most effective steps were taken within the so-called 'Normandy format' meeting held in Minsk, Belarus, on the 12<sup>th</sup> of February 2015, in which participated leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France (BBC 2015).

In my opinion, this case again highlights the leading position of Russia and Germany on the international security scale; however, it brings to the third option of relations, which is the condition of conflict, as far as Russian side is accused of conflict escalation, while both countries are more or less suffering from the consequences of mutually imposed sanctions.



### **3. Theoretical Framework: pragmatic decisions in terms of the rational choice theory**

There is no single opinion about what certainly governs the human mind in decision-making process, why decision-makers prefer to act one way instead of some other. Nevertheless, it goes without saying, that an actor needs some sort of manual when a choice has to be made, especially in the field of politics. This also applies to Russian and German foreign policy decision-makers.

This chapter reviews how IR scholars have attempted to explain or understand decision-making processes. It focuses in particular on how pragmatic decisions have been discussed within the discipline. I first discuss notions of pragmatism in Machiavelli's and Sun Ki-Chai's work and then move on to consider what kind of understandings of 'being pragmatic' rational choice theory provides. Although I operate with the notion of pragmatic and pragmatism, I have made the decision not to explicitly focus on the body of scholarship known as IR pragmatism (Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Hellmann 2009; Weber 2013) which can be considered to share some points of departure with wide interpretations of rational choice theory while relating critically to its narrow and internalist versions.

#### **3.1 Virtù vs. pragmatism, or the clash of communities**

The idea of some sort of a basis for perfect political rule was suggested long ago by Niccolo Machiavelli in the concept of virtù. However, this concept is quite diverse, which brings up some difficulties in its translation and consequently its understanding. This issue was thoroughly observed by Harvey C. Mansfield, who also underlined that

diversity of virtù can be easily traced through Machiavellian works (Mansfield 1996).

As it seems to me, this broadness of the concept allows claiming that there are some specific set of values admitted within each community as virtù, formulated by means of culture, or traditions, or ideology. And a ruler who acts accordingly to these values is treated as a man of virtù, which puts him or her on the top of the hierarchy of this community. Meanwhile, the actors, who neglect these commonly assumed values and are guided with their own interests, are treated as some kind of outsiders, so they occupy the lower niche of the hierarchy of the community.

Nevertheless, it is noted, that this concept of virtù does not refer to some conventional virtues, but as Cary Nederman notes, it may require even completely evil actions. That is, Machiavelli can be interpreted to suggest that instead of being based on ideas and norms, decisions are often pragmatic. Machiavelli insists that the perfect ruler needs to choose between good and evil in terms that “fortune and circumstances dictate” (Machiavelli 1965, 66). Taking this into account, in general outline a person of virtù has to obtain a ‘flexible disposition’, according to Machiavelli’s recommendation (Nederman 2014). Due to this remark, the ‘upper level’ leaders do not lose their reputation when they step down towards pragmatic actions under conditions of clash of communities.

This possibility of betraying the common virtues in favor of pragmatism was also noted by Sun-Ki Chai, whose positive theory of ideology formation claims to explain the phenomenon of internalization of oppositional ideologies in ex-colonial countries. He argues that in a situation of interest disharmony between two groups (communities), the actors have to choose between conflict and peaceful resolution of this disharmony. This is where pragmatism becomes a determinant force in

decision-making process, as far as the actors have to estimate costs and benefits, which are not possible to predict for either choice. Hence, the actors seek to reduce expected regret, which is possible with internalization of a set of values from the oppositional ideology (Chai 2001, 150).

Thus, this decision promotes an appearance of the third niche in the hierarchy of the community. Chai puts it this way (Chai 2001, 151):

For a situation in which members of an indigenous group are engaged in collective action in order to wrest state control of their territory of residence from members of a nonindigenous group, emergent ideologies will therefore prescribe beliefs and preferences that address identity problems linked specially to participation in such action. Such beliefs and preferences clearly correspond with the types of ideologies that are usually referred to as nationalist.

This way, from the perspective of the other community, the hierarchy will look like: the upper level of men and women of their virtue, the middle level of pragmatic actors, and the lower level of those who neither respect the values of this community, nor act pragmatically (nationalists). By contrast, within the community the image of hierarchy is totally diverse. Thus, by claiming for pragmatic actions, the community elevates the opposite one, while for the latter this will be treated as downshifting. Although, this can still result in conflict, nevertheless, pragmatic actions represent, in this interpretation, the golden mean for both communities. Consequently, when one side reciprocates the other's claims, it becomes possible to set the common ground to unify them. Following this idea, the foreign policy rhetoric is based in either prompting the other side to be pragmatic, or persuading the opponents that the actor is pragmatic.

### 3.2 What does it mean 'to be pragmatic'?

The rational choice theory provides a full explanation of 'being pragmatic', as far as it excludes any debates on the issue of values versus rationality, claiming that every decision made by an individual is unconditionally pragmatic. This idea, as it was noted by Kristen Monroe, was first conceived in classical microeconomics by Adam Smith, claiming that an actor's behavior is based on his or her self-interest, subject to information and opportunity costs. In response to Hobbes's argument about self-centered human nature, Smith managed to explain how it is possible to reach a collective welfare when everyone is concentrated on his or her own personal interests, without the help of authoritarian power (Monroe 2001, 152).

Although, Smith limited the significance of his theory to economic approach only, rational choice theory had been developed further, and by the 1970s it was recognized as one of the ascendant paradigm in the field of social sciences (Monroe 2001, 153). At present, while the theory has faced some criticism, which I will review below, it has continued to occupy a central position in the fields of economics, political science, international relations studies, psychology, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, and linguistics (Chai 2001, 1-2).

Such a continuing reputation is enjoyed due to three advantages the theory provides with, which are, according to S. Chai, generality, parsimony, and decisiveness. Concerning generality, meaning a common set of assumptions working as a base of the theory, the whole range of different variants of the rational choice theory are able to resist the criticism about arranging the facts in favor of the results of the research. Moreover, in the case when for analysis "... few systematic empirical data

exist... ”, this base helps to produce mid-range theories and hypotheses (Chai 2001, 9).

Another advantage, from which rational choice theorists benefit, is parsimony. Chai notes, that combination of optimization model along with assumptions of information, commonly shared knowledge of rationality, as well as the self-interest utility function let the rational choice theorists looking at the variety of choices as structural position. In a combination with generality, it thus becomes possible to use the theory in all environments (Chai 2001, 9-10).

Moreover, the core assumptions give a rise for creating decisive interpretations of theory, which significantly restrict the possible set of outcomes, as it takes into account only ‘measurable’ variables (Chai 2001, 10-11).

Nevertheless, this theory has faced much criticism, both from the opponents and from the proponents. The latter have different points of view on which assumptions are possible and which are not. Hence, there are at least two types of interpretations of the theory, both of which have the common background concluded, according to Karl-Dieter Opp in the following propositions (Opp 1999, 173):

- 1) Preference propositions: individual preferences (or goals) are conditions of behaviors which are instrumental in satisfying the respective preferences.
- 2) Constraints propositions: anything that increases or decreases the possibilities of an individual to be able to satisfy her or his preferences by performing certain actions (i.e., opportunities or constraints) is a condition for performing these actions.
- 3) Utility maximization proposition: individuals choose those actions that satisfy their preferences to the greatest extent, taking into account the constraints.

These core propositions have something in common with the ‘rational optimization model’, presented by Chai as a cornerstone of the approach; however, Chai’s assumptions demonstrate a wider understanding of it.

For instance, his first assumption is based on the idea that every actor has some series of logical beliefs (either deterministic or not) about the outcomes of their actions. Thus, specification of the outcomes for each action depends on the type of beliefs: deterministic beliefs define just one single possible outcome conforming to condition of certainty, while nondeterministic ones imply either probabilities of various outcomes corresponding with condition of risk, or only assign some range of possible outcomes referring to condition of uncertainty. In that way, every outcome is a result of chosen actions and the existing state of environment, taking into account that nondeterministic beliefs emerge due to the fact that an actor has not enough knowledge about the environment or the choices of other actors (Chai 2001, 5).

Chai’s second assumption corresponds to Opp’s first proposition about preferences; moreover, Chai adds that these preferences are rated in a certain order which is specified by a utility function (Chai 2001, 6).

The final assumption about utility maximization is mentioned by both researchers, with the proviso by Chai that the type of belief affects on the variants of it: deterministic beliefs lead to choosing the actions which can bring the highest utility, probabilistic ones consequence in actions maximizing the expected utility, in the case of nondeterministic and nonprobabilistic beliefs the preferred action should prevail over all other actions “... that are believed to provide at least as much utility as all other actions under all possible states of the environment, provided such actions exist” (Chai 2001, 6).

Nevertheless, Chai points out that although this optimization model has common assumptions making the foundation for rational choice approach, it is not enough to forecast the actions, as far as supposed preferences can be quite diverse (Chai 2001, 6). Hence, it is necessary to take into account some other assumptions recognized by rational choice theorists, which are different depending on whether it is narrow or wide understanding of the rationality.

### **3.2.1 Narrow or external rational choice theory**

According to K. Opp, there are five additional assumptions (Opp 1999, 173-175):

- First is that proponents of this interpretation of rational choice theory assume that there are only egoistic preferences which should be counted, thus, an individual is interested only in his or her own prosperity.
- Secondly, by limiting possible preferences to explain the actions, the theorists consequently restrict the number of possible constraints up to only tangible ones. That is logical: in case when some preferences are excluded, a researcher, while explaining an action, has to avoid the events which are essential to satisfy these preferences, as far as they are not treated as relevant anymore.
- According to the next assumption, which seems to be idealistic due to the fact that it is not perfectly possible in reality, but still is considered as useful tool in explanation of human behavior, an actor should be fully informed about his or her environment and about his or her own past and future behavior.
- Following that assumption, the fourth one provides new restrictions of constraints, leaving only objective ones as relevant for explanation

of human behavior. Thus, subjective constraints are excluded from the narrow rational choice theory.

- The final assumption here excludes preferences as an explanatory tool, despite the fact that they together with constraints are included due to the first three core assumptions of the rational choice theory. This is justified with the idea that in most cases preferences are stable and difficult to identify.

These assumptions sound quite similar to what Fernando Aguiar and Andrés de Francisco call ‘externalist interpretation’ of rational choice theory. They argue that this approach is not more than descriptive theory when mental issues are not taken into account, and the theory is treated as an instrumental conception of the basic terms used for explanation (Aguiar & Francisco 2009, 550). Emphasizing that reasons for action do not come from an individual, but rather they are external in their nature, the researchers refer to D. Satz and J. Ferejohn, who claim that reasoning is based on the parameters of the social structure within an actor interplays with others, namely the market, the family, the political party, social norms, the state, and so on (Satz and Ferejohn 1994, 77).

### **3.2.2 Wide or internal rational choice theory**

As far as K. Opp noted that assumptions of the narrow interpretation of rational choice theory are more specific, it makes it possible to claim, that the corresponding assumptions of the wide interpretation include the ones of the former. Hence, the assumptions are as follows (Opp 1999, 173-175):

- The proponents of this version admit that it is possible not to limit the preferences to the egoistic ones, thus, they include even altruism



as a possible factor for explanation of human behavior. Due to the different societies and different historical period the diversity of human preferences occurs, hence, in order to explain the whole array of human actions, it is necessary to recognize all kinds of preferences.

- Following the first assumption of the wide interpretation, it becomes necessary to admit that all the constraints also can govern the human behavior.
- As for the assumption about information, the theorists claim that it is not necessarily for an actor to be fully informed; still limited cognitive capabilities must not be neglected, so they are considered explicitly.
- Due to the previous assumption, the advocates of the wide version recognize the relevance of both objective and perceived constraints, because by omitting the latter it increases the probability that the explanation will have some lack.
- And finally, it is argued that human behavior may be explained by means of preferences, or constraints, or even both of them, but this choice depends on empirical data.

These assumptions conceptually correspond to the internalist interpretation, introduced by F. Aguiar & A. Francisco, making rational choice theory not only instrumental, but also normative (Aguiar & Francisco 2009, 549; Hausman 2001, 320; Landa 2004). This becomes possible, because the “internalists” claim that preferences, beliefs, and desires provide reasons for action, thus, referring to the third core assumption of utility maximization, this help to justify the decisions as the most beneficial for the actor (Aguiar & Francisco 2009, 549; Davidson 1980, 21; Elster 1989, 25). Also R. Boudon notes, that reasoning does not

come from the outside, like externalists claim that, but they are formulated in the mind of individuals (Boudon 2003, 3).

Although these two kinds of interpretations of rational choice theory are competitive, it is not rare that both provide the same results, and hence, the critique appeals to the whole theory, highlighting its weak points.

### **3.2.3 Critique of the rational choice theory**

The rational choice theory is criticized from two standpoints: the first one includes debates on the very notion of rationality, while the second one covers issues of explanatory weakness.

The first group of critics fairly insists, that individuals are not always pragmatic in their actions, as M.D. McCubbins and M.F. Thies, M. F. clarify that human behavior is not often aimed in pleasure or ultimate profits (McCubbins & Thies 1996, 3). This can be confirmed with public opinion surveys, experiments, and ethnographies, which affirm that display of altruism, expressive desires, and sense of justice is not rare (Chai 2001, 13). Also political scientists emphasize that explanation from the rational perspective is not effective while applying it to collective political behavior and altruism (Green and Shapiro, 1994; Monroe, 1996).

Another reproof arises from empirical literature in social psychology, which undermines non-emotional nature of preferences: highlighting that decision-making process is not the same as optimization; likewise the evaluation of information turns out to be very diverging from the rational theory understanding putting emotions as an inalienable factor (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982; Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Chai 2001).

From the perspective of cultural scientists, rational choice theory lacks importance of culture and ideology presented in traditions,

institutions, habits, or societally imposed norms, as far as decision-making process based on the actors' beliefs about their environment is lead not only out of information, but also is influenced with the aforementioned factors (Almond, 1991; Barber, 1984; Eckstein, 1991; Mansbridge, 1980).

Finally, rational choice theory is criticized for the assumption that the actors have to be fully informed, which is corrected in the narrow version, according to which the idea of 'bounded rationality' is also recognized. This idea was suggested by Herbert Simon, who argued that cognitive abilities are not infinite, and decisions are often based on random relevant facts and information, hence it is a process, not outcome, is emphasized. Also, it implies search for a satisfactory alternative which may cover only some requirements of an actor. Moreover, it is noted, that in order to predict an actor's behavior, it is necessary to take into account some cognitive factors, which may include cultural aspects as well (Simon 1995, 99-118).

As for the second group of critics, they point out that rational choice theory does not make any empirical contribution in political sciences, as far as its variables are not easy to evaluate or test. Moreover, it is emphasized that methodologically the theory is not strong enough (Green & Shapiro 1994, 247-250). Although, there were some attempts to fill up this drawback, which concluded in growing use of complex mathematical models (Snidal 2002, 77; Chai 2001, 18), this approach did not met much appreciation.

### **3.3 Conclusions to the chapter**

In this chapter the phenomenon of pragmatic decisions was examined from the standpoint of rational choice theory. In spite the fact that there are several interpretations of the theory, it is assumed that every

actor has a set of preferences and constraints, or preferences and beliefs generated from the knowledge about the environment, which are used as instrumental tools in decision making process for maximization of personal utility. Hence, each actor always makes decisions in favor of pragmatic actions, and never to the detriment of him or herself.

Yet, the proponents of different interpretations have some contradictions about what can affect the decision making process: the theorist of the narrow or external version insist that reasoning is purely objective process, while the advocates of the wide or internal version assume that reasoning is a matter of human mind, so some perceived constraints cannot be neglected.

Nevertheless, critics of rational choice theory appeal to both types of theorists claiming that human behavior is not always pragmatic, that people often sacrifice themselves for something out of their interest and for the good of someone else. These remarks allows the political leaders to convict their opponents in being non-pragmatic, so rational choice theory becomes here a basis for political rhetoric, by means of which it becomes possible to claim for acting rationally. Hence, the critique of the empirical emptiness of the theory is not significant in this thesis, as far as critical approach to the rational choice theory shows how it works on the rhetorical level.

## 4. Methodology

The analysis of the research materials unfolded so that I sought to identify pragmatizing markers in them. This had necessitated me to first construct an analytical model with the help of which it was possible to go through the research materials and to recognize instances of pragmatization in them. This chapter explicates what I have in mind with pragmatizing markers and how they are used to identify these pragmatizing markers.

### 4.1 Practical Syllogism as a Mechanism of Pragmatization

Examining actors' rhetoric allows us to understand their perceptions, which in their turn have an impact to their actions, including foreign policy actions. This idea of influence has deep roots in the ancient philosophy, particularly, in Aristotle's works.

His doctrine of practical syllogism has caused pretty much of debate in scientific circles: some researchers criticize it, other seek for new interpretations etc. As for this thesis, it is used as a methodological guideline as it can help to figure out and fill up the gaps of rational choice theory and to identify instances of pragmatization in the research materials.

The structure of practical syllogism was accurately shown by an Austrian philosopher Hans Kelsen in his essay *On Practical Syllogism*, where he compared it to theoretical syllogism, which is a logical inference of statements presented in major and minor premises, and a conclusion. In the case of practical syllogism, one deals with imperatives, when it comes to the major premise and the conclusion, for instance (Kelsen 1973, 257):

The major: Love your enemies;

The minor: Jones is the enemy of Smith;

And the conclusion: Smith is to love Jones

Kelsen has a critical opinion claiming that this syllogism “is not logically possible” due to the fact that imperatives cannot be true or false, unlike the statements, which sets the problem with derivation of validity of individual imperative from the general one (Kelsen 1973, 257-258).

Nevertheless, the solution to this puzzle was found by a Finish philosopher Georg Henric von Wright. He also admits, that practical syllogism cannot be evidential, as he believes that the character of logical consequence is omitted in the connection between the premises and the conclusion. However, in his opinion, only after the action has occurred, the practical thinking becomes logically evident, so this thinking is built in order to understand and confirm this act (Wright 1986, 147).

Following this idea, there is a necessity to find a cause of an action in order to understand it. Scottish historian of philosophy Alexander Broadie put it this way:

... we cannot claim fully to understand an action if we do not know the premises which express its cause. That is, we do not understand an action if we do not know why it was performed-what the agent's motives were, the way he saw his situation, etc. (Broadie 1968, 27).

As researchers, we pursue this very aim; moreover, we analyze the conclusions, which have already become a history. Hence, it seems to be possible to build a structure of practical syllogism for pragmatic foreign policy decisions, which will look like this:

*The major: Be pragmatic!;*

*The minor: This decision sounds rational and pragmatic;*

*And the conclusion: Politicians are to make this decision.*

Thus, practical syllogism can be used as the mechanism of pragmatization: the major premise is installed from the clash of societies, which was mentioned in the theoretical chapter, so one actor appeals to another one claiming ‘be pragmatic!’. As for the minor premise and the conclusion, it is necessary to run a few steps forward. The analysis of empirical materials showed, that the actors apply some rhetorical tools, which I call ‘pragmatizing markers’, I have found five of them: profit, right and thought, institutionalism, humanism, and ideal speech situation; a more detailed explanation will be present further. These markers are realized by actors with different figures of speech, which are based on the concept of its pragmatizing marker.

Hence, practical syllogism is a mechanism, with the help of which pragmatizing markers work. Moreover, they can work differently: implicitly, when they serve as the second premise, or explicitly, when the marker is the action. In the latter case the action is often supported by another pragmatizing marker, which is put as the second premise again.

However, the tricky moment here was highlighted by German-British philosopher Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller: taking into consideration, that actions are the conclusions of practical syllogisms, he points out: “This applies to all acts alike, reflective or impulsive, good, bad, or indifferent” (Schiller 1917, 650). This point contradicts to the rational choice theory, because not every act can be rational and pragmatic, especially when it comes to impulsiveness. On the other hand, we will be faced with some mechanisms of pragmatization, which have a cause of emotional character, but still they are concluded in rational actions.

It seems possible to me that, as Alexander Broadie has explained it,

... any action has an internal and an external aspect. The latter, which is the physical aspect, is the matter of the action, and the former, constituted by the agent's motives, intentions, beliefs, etc.,

which are expressed as the premises of the practical syllogism, is the form of the action. As the form of the action, the premises express the rational structure of the action which is their conclusion. And the matter is that which has this rational structure (Broadie 1968, 27).

This way, it can be claimed, that doctrine of practical syllogism helps to figure out the mechanisms of pragmatization in cases where rational choice theory does not work. As will be discussed further, the syllogism forms a basis for several mechanisms. The hint how to find these mechanisms is also present in the researches on practical syllogism. For instance, a British classicist, philosopher and academic William Francis Ross Hardie mentioned in his book *Aristotle's Ethical Theory*, that it is necessary to use some evaluative ('good', 'useful') or prescriptive words ('should', 'ought') to express the syllogism verbally (Hardie 1968).

This idea pushes towards applying rhetorical analysis, moreover, coming back to Aristotle, in his treatise *Rhetoric* the philosopher points out that the use of language, namely style, is one of three basic points to make a persuasive speech. Interestingly enough, the Greek philosopher alleges that the very function of rhetoric consists in disclosing the accessible tools of persuasion, but not a persuasion itself. There is a perceptible tendency to understand the concept of rhetoric this way in most of the recent researches devoted to this topic, particularly, in the field of Political Studies (Aristotle n.d.).

## **4.2 Rhetorical Political Analysis**

Rhetorical analysis provides a set of tools for the identification of pragmatizing markers. Susan Condor, Cristian Tileagă, and Michael Billig made an immense overview for *The Oxford Handbook of Political*



*Psychology*, where they highlighted recently published works which covered the topic of political rhetoric. Among these works, they mention Gill and Whedbee's contribution claiming that "the essential activities of rhetoric are located on a political stage" (Gill and Whedbee 1997, 157). This makes sense in the context of this research also: owing to the development of mass media and broadening of the target audience the role of political rhetoric becomes more multitask, which makes the topic extremely interesting to researchers.

Hence, it is necessary to designate the basic objectives of rhetorical political analysis. Referring to Alan Finlayson, three basic principles can be figured out, which a researcher should follow while analyzing the rhetoric of politicians. Firstly, the approach considers every single political debate regarding its original rhetorical context, in brief words, texts within 'rhetorical situation' (Finlayson 2007, 554). Second point of concern is argumentative establishment of the topic, which includes the following: whether the case reflects actual state of affairs (conjecture), how it is called (definition), assessment of case (quality), and the boundaries of legitimate argument (place) (Finlayson 2007, 554-555). Thirdly, it is important to analyze the actual essence of political argument, which covers the problem of framing the policy in terms of universal and particular; the formulation by means of metaphors, narrative sequencing, and other figures of speech; appeal to ethos, pathos, or logos; genre; connection with general ideological or party political commitments (Finlayson 2007, 555-559).

However, most of the researchers, who work with empirical analysis, draw a special attention to so-called micro-features of communication, which can be united in a group of figures of speech. In linguistics this interest is explained with the idea, that these figures have a special rhetoric impact. For instance, British linguist John Earl Joseph, who has researched the effect of word choice (such as racial epithets and generally deprecatory

words) in political discourse, points out that there are other ways of making rhetorical effect: "... word order and sentence construction are another powerful means, as are repetition, rhythm, and all the other classic tropes that make for effective style" (Joseph 2006, 112).

As for political science, Condor, Tileagă and Billig note the following issues which have been scrutinized by contemporary researchers: use of metaphors (Ferrari, 2007), proverbs (Orwenjo, 2009), slogans (Kephart & Rafferty, 2009), humor (Dmitriev, 2008 ; Timmerman, Gussman, and King, 2012 ), politeness (Fracchiolla, 2011 ; Shibamoto-Smith, 2011), and appeals to common sense values such as "change" (Roan & White, 2010), "choice" (Gaard, 2010), and "community" (Buckler, 2007) in political talk and texts (Condor et al. 2013, 267).

As far as my research question concerns not the full interpretation of the cases, but figuring out the means of pragmatization the political discourse, I will concentrate here on the figures of speech, which serve this very purpose.

#### **4.2.1 Use of Metaphors in International Relations Studies**

Among figures of speech, the metaphor seems to be the most popular in International Relations studies, as the vast majority of rhetorical analyses are devoted to it. And it is not surprising, because in this field one has to deal with the phenomena of abstract nature, which might provide some problems with understanding, while metaphors can help to give these concepts a concrete form.

This function of the classical trope was thoroughly investigated by American linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who claim that metaphorical definition in conceptual system resolves the problem by

replacing abstract concepts, such as emotions, ideas, or time, with the other ones, which can be clearly understood, like spatial orientations, objects, etc. (Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 116). Moreover, they insist, that metaphors are “...essential to human understanding and as a mechanism for creating new meaning and new realities in our lives” (Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 147). This statement also underlines the possibility of some metaphors to become an objective fact in theoretical framework. For instance, an American professor of politics Michael P. Marks brings the metaphor of ‘anarchy’ as an example, calling it “the most fundamental metaphor in contemporary international relations theory” (Marks 2011, 188).

Touching upon the role of metaphors in International Relations it should be mentioned that the pioneer in this field is Eugene Miller, professor emeritus of political science at the University of Georgia, whose article in the *American Political Science Review* in 1979 set up the approaches for using metaphors in Political Science Analysis. There are three of these approaches: verificationist view, constitutivist view and manifestationist view.

The verificationist view implies, that a metaphor is just a hypothesis, unless it is verified with the actual political events, in other case it would be just useless (Miller 1979, 158). Applying to the constitutivist view, Miller explains:

For the constitutivist metaphors are neither linguistic ornaments to be viewed with suspicion nor heuristic devices to be discarded once objects are known. They are indispensable components of language and - since thought depends on language - indispensable components of thought as well (Miller 1979, 161).

The last approach, which was called the manifestationist view, is considered as a tool of disclosing political reality by manifesting their intelligible structure (Miller 1979, 162).

#### **4.2.2 Other Figures of Speech: Pragmatizing Markers**

Despite the fact that metaphors play an important role in International Relations, analysis of my empirical materials showed that its use is not as widespread as it might seem. That is why I decided to unite together all figures of speech, which make foreign policy decisions sound pragmatic, and call them ‘pragmatizing markers’ for more convenience.

Hence, five groups of pragmatizing markers were found. The first group covers variants of profitable decisions, which suit the requirements of rational choice theory.

The second group reflects the structure of practical syllogism, and covers the figures of the following concepts: right, well-considered, wise and prudent. This means that an actor argues that he or she has weighed all pros and cons, evaluated all possible benefits and losses, put aside emotions, which has resulted in this very decision, which according to the structure of practical syllogism, is performed as pragmatic one.

Nevertheless, there are some cases, which formally do not fit the concept of rationality, but still, the decisions are presented as pragmatic and rational. Hence, it is necessary to also look at the emotional component of rational choice theory, which turned out to be possible. Traditionally rational choice theory skips emotions, in spite of the cases, according to Jon Elster, a Norwegian social and political theorist, when they can bring any pleasure, satisfaction, and utility (Elster 1996, 1386). Thus, is it possible, that idea of ending a bloodshed or reverent attitude towards such

institutional value as legitimacy and obedience of international law can bring some pleasure, satisfaction, or utility to the decision-makers? Still it sounds not persuasive enough, in my opinion. From this standpoint, it is interesting to acquaint oneself with Rose McDermott's research, where she claims that emotion is inseparable constituent of rationality (McDermott 2004, 700).

McDermott (2004, 700-701) has built a model of emotional rationality, which includes ten "cognitive truths":

- 1) Due to emotions an individual acts with regard to an imagined or experienced event.
- 2) A decision maker's expected utility calculation includes his or her expected emotional state.
- 3) Immediate and anticipatory emotion can affect on evaluating a supposed success of decision makers' actions by increasing the perceived discount of future payoffs.
- 4) Emotion allows decision makers to focus on certain important information that may not be otherwise accessible.
- 5) Mood can affect the selection of memory.
- 6) Mood can affect the selection of historical analogies.
- 7) Emotion can affect risk perception.
- 8) Emotional pathways in the brain increase the speed and often the accuracy of judgment and decision making.
- 9) Specific emotions may predictably bias particular decision makers, or bias decision makers toward specific decisions.
- 10) Emotion can form premonition.

McDermott argues that this model will supplement existing models of rational choice with empirical and descriptive value (McDermott 2004, 698), which sounds quite reasonable, although, some points remains

questionable in terms of rational choice theory. Nevertheless, it explains why the foregoing cases can be assessed as pragmatic decisions. In particular, if emotions make decision makers to act concerning an imagined or experienced event, moreover, including affected selection of memory and historical analogies, it is possible to admit, that such decisions are rational and pragmatic. This is because the notorious consequences of certain experience may prevent an actor from possible losses, which have to be minimalized with regard to rational choice theory. Moreover, risk perception, which is stimulated with emotions, will serve the same aim: to avoid losses. In this sense, when an actor prefers to suit the norms of International Law and supports an idea to stop bloodshed on a territory of the potential partner, his or her decisions are, surely, dictated by emotions, but still pursue the goal to minimize losses, which sounds pragmatic. In addition, a belief of saving lives might bring happiness, pleasure, and satisfaction, which also fulfils the requirements of rational choice theory, which has been already mentioned.

Thus, it seems reasonable to define two pragmatizing markers based on emotional rationality. As the variation of these markers is quite wide, I have decided to unite them in two concepts: ‘institutionalism’ for legitimization of power, following norms of International Law and other international agreements; and ‘humanism’ for avoiding human losses, ending bloodshed and violence, and so on.

The last group of pragmatizing markers demands referring to a well-known model of Ideal Speech Situation designed by German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas. According to this model, a rational consensus is brought out of a conversation, or let me call it dialogue, when the participants are equal (meaning that everyone has a chance to speak), they talk sincerely, do not lie, and focused on mutual understanding (Habermas 1984, 264). Of course, this model got much of criticism for

ambiguity of the concept of truth, but my point here is that rationality is impossible without a dialogue. It follows from this, that a side, which claims for a dialogue and negotiations, performs itself as a rational actor seeking pragmatic resolution, while a refusing side is estimated as not rational actor, which fails his or her pragmatic intentions.

Hence, I chose to include a pragmatizing marker of 'Ideal Speech Situation' (further 'ISS'), which includes figures of 'dialogue', or by contrast, showing the fail of the Ideal Speech Situation, such as 'no response'.

Overall, the analysis revealed, that there are five groups of pragmatizing markers, which were used by Russian and German political leaders in three cases. These markers can be called as 'profit', 'right and thought', 'institutionalism', 'humanism', and finally, 'ISS'.

## **5. Analysis of pragmatizing markers in speeches of political leaders in Russia and Germany**

This chapter presents an analysis of the examples of using pragmatizing markers in speeches of Russian and German political leaders. While looking for pragmatizing markers it is necessary to apply the mechanism of practical syllogism, so that it would be clear what figures of speech represent the markers, which make the foreign policy rhetoric sound pragmatic. Before presenting the analysis as such, I will explicate how the research materials were collected and selected.

### **5.1. Time Framing and Data Collecting**

The timeframe for this thesis was set up in accordance with the time period of the chosen cases and data available, as the result, the period for the research covers the years 2005 – 2015.

Data includes interviews, press-conferences, and official reports of political leaders of Russia and Germany during the time period indicated above, which can give a diverse image of pragmatizing markers used in their rhetoric. These data was collected from official web-sites of the president of the Russian Federation (further: the RF President), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (the MFA), The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (the FRG Ch.), and The Federal Foreign Office of Germany (the FFO). I refused the idea of looking for the materials in the sphere of mass media, because the transcripts of the interviews with leading online media publications are presented on the previously mentioned sources, moreover, I believe, this will not undermine the reliability of the information.



As all the sites mentioned has a keyword search tool, I tried to look up for the necessary materials using it, however, it turned out to work properly only on the web-site of the president of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, my idea of searching by keywords, which represent the markers of pragmatization (such as beneficial, or emotional), had failed due to the numerous pages which did not correspond to the cases I was going to analyze, also, this way had omitted variations of the words and phrases, which might signalize pragmatization. So, I changed the keywords replacing them with the names of my cases (such as Nord Stream, Syria/Syrian, and Ukraine/Ukrainian), then diminished the results of the search in accordance with the timeframe, and subsequently I scanned them for the markers of pragmatization, which should consider, as I believe, a concept of benefit, or being well-thought omitting emotions, and so far.

The other sites either showed no results, or gave just one or two of them, which barely suited my topic. So, I had to look up to the reports and transcripts in the archives of the sites, which had made my work easier due to the yearly assortment. Here the materials were chosen also on the basis of the topic and occurrence of potential markers of pragmatization.

Hence, I have looked through 58 transcripts from the RF President's site, 37 – the MFA, 42 – the FRG Ch., and 49 – the FFO, all together – 186 transcripts, but unfortunately, only 27 statements contain pragmatizing markers, which were expressed by means of 45 figures of speech. Overall these data can illustrate how Russian and German political leaders make their decisions sound pragmatic.

## 5.2 Analysis of the Nord Stream Pipeline: Cooperation

### 5.2.1 Russia

The discussions on the high level about the project of Nord Stream Pipeline started from the year when its consortium was established, 2005. At the joint Russian-German statement on energy cooperation made by President Putin and Federal Chancellor Schroeder from the 8<sup>th</sup> of September it was mentioned, that:

1. *On this basis Russia and Germany propose to strengthen their relations in the field of energy in the spirit of long-term strategic energy partnership for the good of both countries and the whole Europe (Putin 2005).*

In this case, President Putin uses the figure ‘for the good’, which suits the group of pragmatizing markers of profit, to confirm the pragmatic nature of the decision to support this project. Interestingly enough, it is highlighted that this cooperation is beneficial not only for Russia, but also for Germany ‘and the whole Europe’. This is a proposition for the other actors also to become a part of this project if they are pursuing pragmatic goals. From the perspective of practical syllogism, thus, this figure of speech works as the second premise, which should be a statement as it is. Hence, the conclusion of the syllogism that is to be an imperative is represented by the claim for strengthening energy relations through participation in the project, which is treated as pragmatic action. This idea is supported by the further claim, that

2. *For both countries it is profitable to cooperate deeply in the field of energy sources upstream and downstream (Putin 2005).*

This example illustrates the use of figure of speech ‘profitable’, which also corresponds directly to the group of profit.

Thus, the process of constructing the pipeline was also followed with political statements. For instance, at the ceremony devoted to the start of

building the maritime part of the gas pipeline Nord Stream which was held on the 9<sup>th</sup> of April 2010, President Medvedev claimed:

3. *And this cooperation has stood the test of time completely. I am sure, it shows very good mutual results, and provide more than a quarter of total volume of the gas consumed by the European Union. This makes approximately 140 billion cubic meters per year (Medvedev 2010a).*

Although this example seems quite vague at the first glance, nevertheless, it also contains the pragmatizing marker of profit, which is reflected in figure ‘very good mutual results’. It is supported by further words and numbers: ‘a quarter of total volume of the gas consumed’ and ‘140 billion cubic meters per year’. Reconstructing this example in terms of retroactive practical syllogism the following is concluded: since the actor supplies the other side of the project with impressive amount of the fuel and avoids possible losses in transit zones, it has received significant benefit from this cooperation, which corresponds with the second premise; hence, this action is assumed to be a pragmatic one. Thus, these figures indicate the profitable meaning of the words ‘very good mutual results’, which allows relating this figure of speech to pragmatizing marker of profit.

Later on, president Medvedev commented in the interview to the Danish broadcast corporation *DR* the following:

4. *This is a sign of good relations, partnership, which our countries have. I would like to remind, that Denmark was the first to agree for pipeline building through their territorial waters. And I think that it is a wise decision. Why? Because the pipeline is not the project, which only the Russian Federation needs, or, let us suppose, some other countries, which stand at the end of the gas pipeline, do. This is our common business, moreover, a profitable one (Medvedev 2010b).*

According to this example an actor, Dmitri Medvedev, uses pragmatizing markers aiming to persuade that the Danish decision to give an agreement for pipeline building through its territorial waters was pragmatic. Hence, the actor uses two figures of speech: ‘wise’ and ‘profitable’. The latter belongs to the group of profit markers, which has been already examined in the second example, while the former is interesting in the sense that it represents the group of right and thought markers. In other words, the Danish decision is represented as a good and right thing to do. As I have mentioned in the methodology chapter, this group reconstructs the model of practical syllogism, which can be analyzed here in detail.

The first premise is the same for all the cases: actors should make pragmatic decisions; conclusion expressed in action is mentioned here: ‘Denmark was the first to agree for pipeline building through their territorial waters’. According to the model, the second premise contains the pragmatizing marker, here it is represented with the figure of speech ‘wise’, which explicitly includes the process of thinking, weighing benefits and losses, and, finally, excluding emotional factor from the decision-making process. As far as these points suit the requirements of rational choice theory, the action is presented here as a pragmatic one, which is further strengthened with the marker of profit.

### **5.2.2 Germany**

Interestingly, the German actors seem to be not very active in using pragmatizing markers in the case of Nord Stream Pipeline. However, a couple of them were found in Chancellor Angela Merkel’s statement on the occasion of Nord Stream Pipeline start-up in Lubmin from the 8<sup>th</sup> of November 2011:

5. *As politicians, we are interested in reliable energy supplies, of course. The Nord Stream Pipeline, the second pipe strand of which will have been built soon, is a good pattern for this* (Merkel 2011).

In this example it is also necessary to apply the model of practical syllogism to find out the marker. The second premise is hidden behind the words ‘interested in reliable energy supplies’, as consequence of which, an action, which is able to find a solution to the issue of reliability, is treated as profitable. The actor points out that this solution is the Nord Stream, underlining it with the figure of speech ‘a good pattern’, which matches up with the profit group of pragmatizing markers.

The following statement also contains an example of pragmatization, which is presented here:

6. *So, it can be said, that both importing countries and Russia profit from the pipeline* (Merkel 2011).

This example demonstrates the use of pragmatizing marker of profit, which is directly put into the figure of speech ‘profit’, similarly to the second example.

To sum up, the case of Nord Stream Pipeline project, which corresponds to the relations of cooperation between Russia and Germany, shows the use of pragmatizing markers of two groups: profit and right and thought. Unfortunately, there are not many examples, which were found, and the reason for that, as it seems to me, lies in the conditions of cooperation the participating actors do not have to persuade each other in rationality of their actions. However, the cooperating actor need to confirm other actors in the pragmatic nature of their decisions, this is where the pragmatizing markers appear.

## 5.3 Problematics of the Near East by Example of Syria: Different Points of View

If only a few cases of the use of pragmatizing markers were found in the speeches relating to the Nord Stream project, the situation is different in speeches on the conflict in Syria. In a condition of differing points of view, it is necessary for actors to sound persuasive, this is why, I suppose, rhetoric tools are used more actively. The example below will show that actors tend to apply a set of different pragmatizing markers at once.

### 5.3.1 Russia

In the Interview with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs S.V. Lavrov by the *Reuters* news agency from the 23<sup>rd</sup> of December 2011 three speech figures are used:

7. *We have pointed it out several times, that it is necessary to keep to a peaceful way to fulfil the legal directing of the people of Near East and Northern Africa by means of broad national dialogue without any foreign interference. This approach fits into the standards of international law* (Lavrov 2011a).

This example presents two groups of markers: institutionalism by means of speech figures ‘legal directing’ and ‘standards of international law’, and ideal speech situation (ISS) embedded in the figure of ‘dialogue’. In the methodology chapter I have mentioned about emotional reasoning, when emotional decision based on some values is presented as rational one. Here the value of institutionalism comes to the first place as Lavrov argues that Russia is opposed to foreign interference into the Syrian conflict, which resulted in veto on the 4th of October 2011 in the UN Security Council. According to the possible pragmatism of institutionalism, the actor uses its pragmatizing markers, pursuing the goal to convince the others of the rationality of this choice.

As for the ISS marker, dialogue is assumed as a pragmatic form of action in any situation. According to this idea, Lavrov uses the figure of speech ‘dialogue’ as the second premise of the syllogism, so in order to settle the conflict, it is necessary to start negotiations, and this action will be treated as pragmatic one.

The idea of the ISS as a pragmatic solution is present in many other statements as well. Sometimes it is mixed with other pragmatizing markers. For instance, in response to the question from *Argumenty I Fakty* newspaper on the subject of Syria, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Lavrov noted:

8. *We do everything possible to stop the bloodshed, to set the sides to negotiate, when the Syrians themselves are to come to an agreement about the future political structure of their country* (Lavrov 2012).

By using the figure of speech ‘to set the sides to negotiate’ the actor appeals to the pragmatizing marker of the ISS, which again underlines that it is necessary to start dialogue in order to reach a pragmatic goal. This example also shows another marker from the group of humanism, which is expressed with the figure of speech ‘to stop the bloodshed’. As far as value of human life is possible to treat as pragmatic, this marker works as the second premise of syllogism, which is concluded in the action of claiming for negotiations.

Another example of using the ISS marker comes from the interview of Special Representative of the Russian President for the Middle East, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia M. L. Bogdanov to *RIA Novosti*. Saying that the Geneva communique is a necessary condition to settle the conflict, he remarks:

9. *We have said that several times to our western partners, but our appeals have had no response yet* (Bogdanov 2012).

The figure of speech ‘no response’ illustrates the crisis of the ISS, according to which the position of other actors who are reluctant to adopt the Geneva communique is considered as non-pragmatic.

As for pragmatizing marker of institutionalism, it is also repeated in other statements of the Russian political leaders. In the interview to the *Interfax* news agency M. Bogdanov condemns the western view on the situation in Syria:

10. *They keep talking obstinately, that regime in Damascus is illegitimate, that President Assad should step down, but we suppose, that such claims have no legal platform and do not advantage the cause* (Bogdanov 2014).

Here the actor, Mr. Bogdanov, underlines the non-pragmatic position of the other actors: firstly, the value of institutionalism, which is considered pragmatic, is undermined, thus the figure of speech ‘no legal platform’ is used; secondly, the idea of a non-pragmatic decision is supported with the marker of profit, which is represented here with the help of figure ‘advantage’.

A similar situation was found in the interview of M. Bogdanov to *RIA Novosti*, which was already mentioned in the example 9.

11. *At this stage it is necessary to get the most useful benefit of existing international legal framework for the settlement of the Syrian issue. It is based on the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, in particular in resolutions 2042 and 2043, as well as in the Geneva document, and contains a set of powerful tools to stop the violence and start peaceful negotiations. Losing this basis would be unwise.* (Bogdanov 2012).

In this statement the idea of institutionalism is supported with two other pragmatizing markers. First, there is a marker of profit enclosed to the figure of speech ‘to get the most useful benefit’. By using this, the model of practical syllogism is restored: the first premise is always the same, which



is imperative ‘be pragmatic’; the second premise contains the pragmatizing marker of benefit, so the statement ‘it is necessary to get the most useful benefit of existing international legal framework for the settlement of the Syrian issue’ indicates that the action, when ‘the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, in particular in resolutions 2042 and 2043, as well as in the Geneva document’ come into force, will be a pragmatic one. Moreover, there is another supporting marker, of right and thought, with the help of which the actor highlights the pragmatism of the decision to appeal to the international legal framework. Mr. Bogdanov uses the figure of speech ‘would be unwise’, emphasizing that the opponents are not pragmatic in their decisions.

One more example of using a pragmatizing marker is performed in the interview with S. Lavrov by *Interfax* agency from the 26<sup>th</sup> of December 2011:

12. *We are ready for further partnership with the states of the region on the basis of equality and mutual benefit with full respect to their traditions, history, and culture* (Lavrov 2011b)

Using the figure of speech ‘mutual benefit’ the actor emphasizes pragmatism of further partnership. Unlike the previous examples, where the pragmatizing marker of profit is used, it is applied solely here. This can be explained with the idea that this example illustrates the Russian position towards the cooperation with the Near East states, in particular with Syria, while the previous examples showed the claim for the other actors to act pragmatically.

### 5.3.2 Germany

My analysis shows that the German point of view on the situation in Syria is totally different from the Russian one, but still the German leaders claim for their opponents to choose pragmatic decisions. In a press release “Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle condemns the violence against the demonstrators in Syria” from the 19<sup>th</sup> of March 2011 it was mentioned that:

13. *In order to avoid further escalation, all the representatives of political power especially the Government should act responsibly and seek for a dialogue* (Westerwelle 2011a).

Claiming for settlement of the conflict, the actor uses the figure of speech ‘seek for dialogue’, which – as was mentioned previously – corresponds to the pragmatizing marker of ISS. It is quite remarkable, that G. Westerwelle appeals to ‘all the representatives of power’ to start negotiations, which suits the requirement of the ISS meaning equality of the actors, so that each can have a word.

Nevertheless, there is another example of using ISS marker marks, with the help of which the actor points out non-pragmatic position of President Assad:

14. *We appeal to President Assad to change his radical course. The problems of the Syrians can be solved only in the way of dialogue and plausible reforms, but not with the help of violence* (Westerwelle 2011b).

Here the actor sets a pragmatic solution using figure of speech ‘dialogue’ against the chosen path of violence. In other words, the path of violence chosen by Assad is designated as radical, as a result of which, it is relegated to the category of non-pragmatic decisions. The juxtaposition of the ISS to violence thus serves to highlight the character of the former as a pragmatic path.

A month later the German Foreign Minister G. Westerwelle claimed the following:

15. *The regime must finally end its brutal course and respond to the legitimate demands of the opposition. Only on this basis a valid national dialogue is possible that must lead to genuine democracy and political participation* (Westerwelle 2011c).

Again the figure ‘dialogue’ is used here with addition of pragmatizing marker of institutionalism. As far as the German position is based on the idea that Assad’s presidency is not legitimate, so they support the opposition, which is considered as pragmatic decision, hence the actor uses the figure of speech ‘legitimate demands’ to emphasize this.

Continuing this idea, the German Foreign Minister claims the following:

16. *The Federal Government demands the president Assad to stop violence against the peaceful demonstrators immediately. Only immediate change and significant dialogue with the will to change can stop the further bloodshed* (Westerwelle 2011d).

In this example the idea of ISS formulated in the figure of ‘dialogue’ is supported with the pragmatizing marker of humanism, as the actor uses the figure ‘stop further bloodshed’. This combination of markers again reminds of the model of practical syllogism, where the action the German government must demand Assad to ‘stop the further bloodshed’ is concluded from the second premise of ‘dialogue’: violence is unacceptable, instead of dialogue Assad is using violence against peaceful demonstrators, the German Government must thus demand Assad to stop bloodshed.

In 2012 Germany expelled its Syrian ambassador, which was followed with this statement:

17. *We are confident that our clear and firm message will not fall on deaf ears in Damascus* (Westerwelle 2011e).

This metaphorical figure ‘will not fall on deaf ears’ used by G. Westerwelle corresponds to the situation of the crisis of ISS, which the actor tries to avoid. Since the ISS is pragmatic, the actor who seeks for a dialogue makes a pragmatic decision, while the ‘deaf’ interlocutor’s actions do not fit this request. This example can be also examined as an attempt to use pragmatization to appeal to the Assad regime: Westerwelle’s utterance follows the logic of “our message is clear and firm, if the Assad government is pragmatic, it will listen to our message”. While the idea of Damascus being pragmatic is not explicitly given in the passage, it is possible to reconstruct it using the syllogism.

## **5.4 Ukrainian Crisis: conflict**

As in the conditions of different points of view, the situation of the Ukrainian conflict pushes the actors to increase the use of pragmatic markers, as far as they have to confirm that their decisions are right, and consequently pragmatic, while the opponent’s position is not.

### **5.4.1 Russia**

The strategy of using rhetorical tools by Russian political leader has changed through the crisis: at the beginning it was expressed with negative use of pragmatizing markers in order to show, that the western position was non-pragmatic. It is clear from the president Putin's response to the journalists' questions on the situation in Ukraine from the 4<sup>th</sup> of March 2014, which turned out to be quite a fruitful source of pragmatizing markers, for instance:

18. *They supported an unconstitutional armed take-over, declared these people legitimate and are trying to support them. By the way, despite*

*all of this we have been patient and even ready to cooperate; we do not want to disrupt our cooperation (Putin 2014a).*

In this example the actor uses three pragmatizing markers: of institutionalism, of right and thought, and of ISS. Firstly, the actor opposes Russian position on take-over against the western one, treating the coup d'état as non-pragmatic action, as it undermines the value of institutionalism, putting it into the figure 'unconstitutional', nevertheless, he notes, that from the Western side it is not like this, because they claim that people at power in Ukraine are 'legitimate', and this figure of speech corresponds to the group of pragmatizing markers of institutionalism.

Emphasizing on the pragmatic nature of the Russian decisions, the following figure 'patient', gives a hint that actions are taken without emotional influence, they are well-considered and mature. And the final confirmation in this statement strengthens it, when the actor uses the figure of speech 'ready to cooperate', which I consider as a claim for ISS, underlining that Russia is open for a dialogue. The cooperative policy is pragmatized with reference to the idea of Russia as a patient and mature political actor in world politics.

Further on, the situation is repeated:

*19. Did our partners in the West and those who call themselves the government in Kiev now not foresee that events would take this turn? I said to them over and over: Why are you whipping the country into a frenzy like this? What are you doing? But they keep on pushing forward (Putin 2014a).*

This is an interesting statement as it represents the crisis of ISS, which, at the same time, is supported with negative use of pragmatizing marker of right and thought. The Russian position is pragmatized by way of contrasting it to the non-pragmatic Western position: the passage suggests that the West is pushing Ukraine to frenzy and as Ukraine should not be

pushed to frenzy, Russia chooses to act differently from the West. Moreover, here President Putin points out that the Western partners are not pragmatic, because they 'did not foresee' the consequences of their decisions. If they were pragmatic, they should have thought more thoroughly about this issue and been more careful in choosing their position. So, this negative use of the pragmatizing marker of right and thought emphasizes the contrast of the Western and Russian decisions, introducing the former as non-pragmatic actor.

President Putin remarks, that the Western position towards the state of affairs in Ukraine is wrong, as far as their actions resulted in something, which brings nothing good, and here he uses the figure of speech 'whipping into a frenzy', which contradicts to the pragmatic nature. Next figure is 'keep on pushing forward', which indicates that the western actors gave no response to the Russian warnings, which also represent them as non-pragmatic actors, as far as ISS did not occur.

A month later the situation has changed, as far as the Russian side stopped accusing the western actors of being non-pragmatic, and took an aim at confirming the others in pragmatism of Russian actions. For instance, on the 11<sup>th</sup> of April 2014 the meeting of the Russian Security Council was held, where the president claimed the following:

*20. Russia is being very careful in its action and is taking a very balanced and respectful line towards all of our partners (Putin 2014b).*

In this example the actor applies pragmatizing markers of right and thought by using figures 'careful in action' and 'balanced line'. This highlights that the decision-making process was long enough to get rid of emotions and

weight all the possible benefits and losses of the actions with the cool mind. The president keeps on this strategy even further.

At the annual big press conference with the Russian president, which was held on the 18<sup>th</sup> of December 2014, V. Putin commented on the state of affairs in Ukraine after Euromaidan, opposing the Europe's position to the Russian one he emphasized:

*21. Therefore I believe, that our position was completely verified and objective from the very beginning (Putin 2014c).*

Again the actor points out that the decisions are based on pragmatic position of well- considering, which is expressed in pragmatizing marker of right and thought, putting it into words 'completely verified and objective'.

#### **5.4.2 Germany**

The German actors also apply pragmatizing markers quite often while appealing to the resolution of conflict in Ukraine. For instance, Foreign Minister Steinmeier in his statement from the 25<sup>th</sup> of April 2014 claiming for prompt settlement points out:

*22. In fact, every day of violence and confrontation put us away from the diplomatic settlement of the conflict. Each side should use some common sense now! (Steinmeier 2014a).*

Here the actor urges that diplomatic solution is the rational way out for the both conflicting sides, and uses the figure of speech 'use some common sense', which corresponds with the group of pragmatizing markers of right and thought.

Further on, at the WDR-Europaforum, which was held on the 8<sup>th</sup> of May 2014, the Federal Chancellor A. Merkel defines concretely, how this

solution can be achieved highlighting that the German position towards the situation in Ukraine is pragmatic:

*23. I believe that it is right at least. Firstly, It is right to continue talks, and secondly, to make it clear that we are supporting Ukraine. I have claimed three points in the German Bundestag: to support Ukraine meaning that people in Ukraine are free to choose how they want to shape their own future, secondly, to keep the conversation channel open and to find the solutions in diplomatic way and thirdly, if all this does not succeed, to continue imposing the sanctions (Merkel 2014).*

In this example the actor justifies the German position and uses the figure of speech ‘it is right’, the pragmatizing marker of right and thought. Moreover, coming up to the solution of the problem, the actor uses the figure ‘to keep the conversation channel open’, which corresponds to the pragmatizing marker of ISS. Thus, the chancellor notes, that the pragmatic actor should continue seeking for dialogue. Later on she emphasizes the following:

*24. It is true that every state has a right to sue for the violence. But it is also true that we should act cleverly. It is essential for every politician in the world. At the same time, it is not easy at all to find a right way (Merkel 2014).*

By using figure of speech ‘act cleverly’, the actor opposes it to the path of violence making it sound as non-pragmatic, as far as it contradicts to the concept of right and thought.

The idea of using dialogue as a pragmatic solution of the conflict, Foreign Minister Steinmeier notes:

*25. We can stop escalation and find a political solution only if both sides discuss directly all the problems and open questions and if they are ready to strive for resolution of conflict together and with mutual respect (Steinmeier 2014b).*



Again the actor claims for pragmatic action, which is possible in terms of ISS, and he uses the figures of speech ‘discuss directly’ and ‘strive together’.

Nevertheless, while the conflict worsened, the use pragmatizing markers showed some changes. At the joint press conference of German Federal Chancellor A. Merkel and French President F. Hollande, which was held on the 20<sup>th</sup> of December 2015, a little bit after the negotiations in the Normandy Format took place in Minsk, it was mentioned:

*26. In my opinion, it is absolutely worthwhile to do everything to end the bloodshed (Merkel 2015).*

Again this example reflects the structure of Practical Syllogism, where the second premise is covered in the figure of speech ‘absolutely worthwhile’, and the action is concluded in the figure ‘to do everything to stop the bloodshed’. Thus, the pragmatizing marker of profit supports the emotional marker of humanism, so any action which considers the value of human life is presented as pragmatic. This idea was repeated in the following statement:

*27. But I still believe, that it is right, that we do everything to avoid human losses and let people, who live who live under extremely difficult conditions (you might have seen the situation in Donetsk and Lugansk on TV), breathe with relief and live further (Merkel 2015).*

The German actions are justified by the markers of right and thought and humanism, put into figures of speech ‘it is right’ and ‘do everything to avoid human losses’ respectively.

## **5.5 Conclusions to the chapter**

I have sought with the help of a rhetorical analysis answers to my first research question: “By means of what rhetorical tools do leaders of

Russia and Germany pragmatize their foreign policy choices?” The tools of rhetoric are pragmatizing markers, and I have managed to identify five groups of them: profit, right and thought, institutionalism, humanism, and ISS. As far as the system of language is very flexible, these groups are realized through the use of various figures of speech, which may differ from the name of the group, nevertheless, these figures concern the use of synonyms and word combinations conceptually suitable to this or that group.


According to the results of the analysis, the conditions of the case are slightly influential on the use of pragmatizing markers. By this I mean, that frequency of applying markers may differ in case of cooperation from the case of conflict, of different points of view.

However, these conditions do not have a strong impact on the choice of pragmatizing markers, as far as some mechanisms were found in the speeches belonging to all three cases.

## 6. Comparative analysis

In order to make a comparison more visible, I made up the following diagram. It shows what groups of pragmatizing markers were applied by Russian and German political leaders in three separate cases, and how often they were used.

Here it can be seen that the overwhelming majority belongs to the pragmatizing markers of right and thought (13) as well as the ISS marker (12). Also the marker of profit is quite well employed (10). As for ‘emotional’ markers of institutionalism and humanism, they are used more rarely: they were applied 6 and 4 times respectively.



Since the comparison implies detecting general points and differences, I would like to start with the former.

## 6.1 Common spaces

According to the diagram, representatives of both countries use all five groups of pragmatizing markers, which makes it possible to claim that these mechanisms of pragmatization are commonly shared, and perhaps they are a universal, rhetoric tool, or at least something that characterizes foreign policy reasoning and rhetoric.

The case of Nord Stream pipeline demonstrates the overwhelming use of pragmatizing group of profit by both states. The condition of cooperation excludes the marker of ISS, because the dialogue has been already found, so there is no need to appeal for it. The ideas of humanism and institutionalism also are absent from this case. This can be explained with the circumstances of the project: it does not affect these values.

By contrast, the case of Syria shows that pragmatizing marker of ISS is the most popular here. Although Russia and Germany have different point of view on the situation, they both claim for the same solution; that is why the marker of ISS is so widely used. Neither of the countries neglects the fact of human losses; hence, the pragmatizing marker of humanism occurs often. Taking into account, that Russia supports regime of the current president, while Germany encourages the opposition, it is not surprising that both apply the marker of institutionalism although they do so for different ends.

Results of analysis of the Ukrainian crisis are quite diverse, which might be explained with condition of conflict. Again, both sides appeal to ISS as a resolution of the current state of affairs. However, the overwhelming majority of the markers are of right and thought, which highlights conflicting positions of the states, as far as each side represents

its actions as the only right and well-considered, accusing the other of lacking these parameters.

## 6.2 Differences

Moving on to differences, it is necessary to make comparisons within each case separately.

In the case of Nord Stream, the Russian actors diversify their rhetoric with pragmatizing markers of right and thought, while the German ones come to nothing more than markers of profit. It is worth mentioning, that the latter marker is always applied when talking about the actor's side (meaning Russian and German decisions, which are beneficial to themselves) adding that the other actors can also profit from this project. The example of using the marker of right and thought corresponds to the decision made by Denmark, not Russia and Germany. The lack of the other markers in German rhetoric can be explained that the idea of the project was initially proposed by the previous Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who belongs to The Social Democratic Party of Germany, while Chancellor Merkel's party is The Christian Democratic Union of Germany. Hence, this opposition of parties may have influenced the way the project is threatened, it is highly probable, that Schröder's rhetoric can illustrate a wider usage of pragmatizing markers. Still, the empirical base of this thesis is restricted with timeframe, so the rhetoric of the previous Chancellor is not included in this analysis.

The case of Syrian crisis shows the full spectrum of pragmatizing markers used by the Russian actors, while the German ones preferred only three groups of them. Unlike Germany, Russia applies markers of right and thought, and profit: both markers mostly support the idea of institutionalism emphasizing its pragmatic nature by standing as the second

premise of practical syllogism. Referring to the German examples, the marker of institutionalism is not the conclusion of the syllogism, but the second premise itself; i.e. that the statement of the syllogism sounds like ‘the Assad’s regime is not legitimate’, it contradicts the pragmatic idea of institutionalism, which allows the German leaders to appeal for Syrian authorities to act pragmatically. Moreover, this opposition of pragmatism/not pragmatism justifies German actions towards Syrian problematics.

As for the case of the Ukrainian crisis, the German rhetoric tools prevail over the Russian due to the spectrum of the pragmatizing markers used, and to the frequency of their occurrence. Interestingly enough, the Russian actors avoid applying markers of humanism, while the German ones are not very keen on markers of institutionalism. Another curious difference is that German political leaders use the marker of profit, which reminds of Russian side in the case of Syria: again, this marker is used in order to support another one and it is set as the second premise of the practical syllogism; in this case, it is humanism. Probably, such a use of pragmatizing marker of profit in the cases of political crisis can be justified with the idea, that they emphasize pragmatic nature of the emotional markers, although, the latter are used successfully even separately. Taking this into account, one may claim, that Russian actors tend to pragmatize the value of institutionalism (like in case of Syria), and German ones are biased with the value of humanism (according to the case of Ukraine).

### **6.3 Conclusions to the chapter**

Comparing the peculiarities of using the pragmatizing markers in the rhetoric of Russian and German political leaders, it was found out, that actors of both countries exploit all five groups of the markers to some stance. The cases of conflict and different points of view urge the actors to

resort to the model of ISS, while the case of cooperation is the most favorable for the marker of profit. In the conditions of conflict, the use of pragmatizing marker of right and thought significantly increases in both countries.

Nevertheless, there are some interesting differences between Russian and German uses of pragmatizing markers. This enables me to answer the second research question of this thesis: “What are the differences in the ways of pragmatization applied by Russian and German actors?” The first point is a diversity of the markers used: Russian political leaders make their rhetoric more variable in cases of cooperation and different point of views and German ones does it in case of conflict. Secondly, Russian actors tend to pragmatize with the help of institutional value, while German representatives prefer the value of humanism, which can be traced through the cases of Syria and Ukraine.

## Conclusions

This thesis has sought to figure out by means of what rhetorical tools leaders of Russia and Germany pragmatize their foreign policy choices, and reveal the differences in the ways of pragmatization applied by Russian and German actors. The analysis of the empirical data has revealed that these rhetorical tools are the pragmatizing markers, which are installed by means of practical syllogism.

Pursuing these aims, I tried to introduce a basis of rhetorical strategy of political leaders with the help of rational choice theory. This theory promotes the idea that each actor pursues the aim of utility maximization, so they always act pragmatically. At the same time, the critique of the rational choice theory highlights that in fact this is not always so. Hence, the critical approach to the rational choice theory provides the opportunity for opposition of pragmatic versus non-pragmatic action, which becomes the basis of political rhetoric, when the actors want to justify their position, or accuse the opponents in making wrong (non-pragmatic) decisions, so it allows the actors claiming for the opponents to act pragmatically.

Then, I managed to prove that Aristotelian doctrine of practical syllogism can work as mechanism of pragmatization in political rhetoric, where the major premise is installed due to the critical approach to rational choice theory, so one actor appeals to another one claiming ‘be pragmatic!’. Pragmatizing markers appear either in minor premise, or in the very conclusion, as far as the markers can work differently: implicitly, when they serve as the second premise, or explicitly, when the marker is the action. In the latter case the action is often supported by another pragmatizing marker, which is put as the second premise again.



With the help of rhetorical analysis, I managed to identify five groups of pragmatizing markers: profit, right and thought, institutionalism, humanism, and ISS. As far as the system of language is very flexible, these groups are realized through the use of various figures of speech, which may differ from the name of the group, nevertheless, these figures concern the use of synonyms and word combinations conceptually suitable to this or that group.

According to the results of the analysis, the conditions of the case (cooperation by example of the Nord Stream Pipeline project; differing points of views by the Syrian crisis; conflict by the Ukrainian crisis) are slightly influential on the use of pragmatizing markers. By this I mean, that frequency of applying markers may differ in case of cooperation from the case of conflict, of different points of view.

However, these conditions do not have a strong impact on the choice of pragmatizing markers, as far as some mechanisms were found in the speeches belonging to all three cases.

The comparative analysis of pragmatizing markers in the rhetoric of Russian and German political leaders has revealed that actors of both countries exploit all five groups of the markers to some stance. The cases of conflict and different points of view urge the actors to resort to the model of ISS, while the case of cooperation is the most favorable for the marker of profit. In the conditions of conflict, the use of pragmatizing marker of right and thought significantly increases in both countries.

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## Appendix 1 – Translations

English	Russian
<p>1. On this basis Russia and Germany propose to strengthen their relations in the field of energy in the spirit of long-term strategic energy partnership for the good of both countries and the whole Europe (Putin 2005).</p>	<p>1. На этой основе Россия и Германия намерены и далее укреплять свои отношения в энергетической сфере в духе долгосрочного стратегического энергетического партнерства на благо обеих стран и Европы в целом.</p>
<p>2. For both countries it is profitable to cooperate deeply in the field of energy sources upstream and downstream (Putin 2005).</p>	<p>2. Углубленное сотрудничество в области разведки и добычи, а также сбыта и переработки энергоресурсов выгодно для обеих сторон.</p>
<p>3. And this cooperation has stood the test of time completely. I am sure, it shows very good mutual results, and provide more than a quarter of total volume of the gas consumed by the European Union. This makes approximately 140 billion cubic meters per year (Medvedev 2010a).</p>	<p>3. И это сотрудничество в полной мере выдержало проверку временем. Я уверен, что оно приносит очень хорошие взаимные результаты, а в наши дни обеспечивает более четверти общего объема газа, который потребляется Европейским союзом. Это около 140 миллиардов кубических метров в год.</p>

4. This is a sign of good relations, partnership, which our countries have. I would like to remind, that Denmark was the first to agree for pipeline building through their territorial waters. And I think that it is a wise decision. Why? Because the pipeline is not the project, which only the Russian Federation needs, or, let us suppose, some other countries, which stand at the end of the gas pipeline, do. This is our common business, moreover, a profitable one (Medvedev 2010b).

7. We have pointed it out several times, that it is necessary to keep to a peaceful way to fulfil the legal directing of the people of Near East and Northern Africa by means of broad national dialogue without any foreign interference. This approach fits into the standards of international law (Lavrov 2011a).

8. We do everything possible to stop the bloodshed, to set the sides to negotiate, when the Syrians

4. Это признак добрых отношений, партнёрства, которые существуют между нашими странами. Хочу напомнить, что Дания первой дала разрешение на прокладку газопровода через свои территориальные воды. И мне представляется, что это было мудрое решение. Почему? Потому что газопровод – это не тот проект, который нужен только для Российской Федерации или, допустим, для каких-то стран, которые стоят на конце газовой трубы. Это наше общее дело, ещё и выгодное дело.

7. Мы неоднократно подчеркивали необходимость придерживаться мирного пути реализации законных устремлений народов Ближнего Востока и Северной Африки посредством широкого национального диалога, без вмешательства извне. Такой подход полностью вписывается в нормы международного права.

8. Делаем все, что в наших силах, чтобы прекратить кровопролитие, усадить стороны за стол

themselves are to come to an agreement about the future political structure of their country (Lavrov 2012).

9. We have said that several times to our western partners, but our appeals have had no response yet (Bogdanov 2012).

10. They keep talking obstinately, that regime in Damascus is illegitimate, that President Assad should step down, but we suppose, that such claims have no legal platform and do not advantage the cause (Bogdanov 2014).

11. At this stage it is necessary to get the most useful benefit of existing international legal framework for the settlement of the Syrian issue. It is based on the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, in particular in resolutions 2042 and 2043, as well as in the Geneva document, and contains a set of powerful tools to stop the violence and start peaceful negotiations. Losing this basis would be unwise. (Bogdanov 2012).

переговоров, в ходе которых сами сирийцы должны согласовать параметры будущего политического устройства своей страны.

9. Об этом мы не раз говорили западным партнерам, но наши призывы пока не находят у них отклика.

10. Они упорно продолжают говорить, что режим в Дамаске нелегитимен, что президент Б.Асад должен уйти, но мы считаем, что подобные заявления не имеют правовой основы и не идут на пользу дела.

11. На данном этапе необходимо извлечь максимум полезного из уже имеющейся международно-правовой базы урегулирования сирийской проблемы. Она основана на соответствующих решениях СБ ООН, в частности резолюциях 2042 и 2043, а также Женевском документе, и содержит набор эффективных инструментов, чтобы положить конец насилию и запустить мирный, переговорный процесс. Терять эту основу было



12. We are ready for further partnership with the states of the region on the basis of equality and mutual benefit with full respect to their traditions, history, and culture (Lavrov 2011b)

18. They supported an unconstitutional armed take-over, declared these people legitimate and are trying to support them. By the way, despite all of this we have been patient and even ready to cooperate; we do not want to disrupt our cooperation (Putin 2014a).

19. Did our partners in the West and those who call themselves the government in Kiev now not foresee that events would take this turn? I said to them over and over: Why are you whipping the country into a frenzy like this? What are you doing? But they keep on pushing forward (Putin 2014a).

20. Russia is being very careful in its action and is taking a very balanced and respectful line towards all of our

бы неразумно.

12. Готовы продолжать развивать с государствами региона партнерство на основе равноправия и взаимной выгоды, при полном уважении их традиций, истории и культуры.

18. Они поддержали антиконституционный переворот и вооружённый захват власти, объявили этих людей легитимными и стараются их поддержать. Кстати говоря, мы и в этом случае полны терпения и даже готовности на какое-то сотрудничество, мы не хотим прерывать сотрудничество.

19. И наши партнёры на Западе, и те, кто называет себя властью сегодня в Киеве, они что, не прогнозировали, что это будет происходить? Я же им тысячу раз сказал уже: зачем вы раскалываете страну, что вы делаете? Нет, всё равно прут буром, что называется.

20. Россия действует очень аккуратно, очень взвешенно и с уважением ко всем нашим

partners (Putin 2014b).

21. Therefore I believe, that our position was completely verified and objective from the very beginning (Putin 2014c).

### **English**

5. As politicians, we are interested in reliable energy supplies, of course.

The Nord Stream Pipeline, the second pipe strand of which will have been built soon, is a good pattern for this (Merkel 2011).

6. So, it can be said, that both importing countries and Russia profit from the pipeline (Merkel 2011).

13. In order to avoid further escalation, all the representatives of political power especially the Government should act responsibly and seek for a dialogue (Westerwelle 2011a).

14. We appeal to President Assad to change his radical course. The problems of the Syrians can be solved only in the way of dialogue and plausible reforms, but not with the help of violence (Westerwelle 2011b).

партнёрам.

21. Поэтому я считаю, наша позиция была изначально абсолютно выверенной и объективной.

### **German**

5. Wir haben als Politiker natürlich Interesse an einer verlässlichen Energieversorgung. Die Nord Stream-Pipeline, deren zweiter Leitungsstrang jetzt ja auch gebaut wird, ist dafür ein Beispiel.

6. So kann man sagen: Die Abnehmerländer und Russland profitieren gleichermaßen von der Pipeline.

13. Alle politischen Kräfte und insbesondere die Regierung müssen verantwortungsvoll handeln und den Dialog suchen, um eine weitere Eskalation zu vermeiden.

14. Präsident Assad ist aufgefordert, einen radikalen Kurswechsel zu vollziehen. Statt mit Gewalt können die Probleme Syriens nur im Weg des Dialogs und glaubwürdiger Reformen gelöst werden.

15. The regime must finally end its brutal course and respond to the legitimate demands of the opposition. Only on this basis a valid national dialogue is possible that must lead to genuine democracy and political participation (Westerwelle 2011c).
15. Das Regime muss endlich seinen brutalen Kurs beenden und auf die legitimen Forderungen der Opposition eingehen. Nur auf dieser Grundlage ist ein glaubhafter nationaler Dialog möglich, der zu Demokratie und echter politischer Teilhabe führen muss.
16. The Federal Government demands the president Assad to stop violence against the peaceful demonstrators immediately. Only immediate change and significant dialogue with the will to change can stop the further bloodshed (Westerwelle 2011d).
16. Die Bundesregierung fordert von Präsident Assad ein unverzügliches Ende der Gewalt gegen friedliche Demonstranten. Nur sofortige Umkehr und ein ernsthafter Dialog mit dem Willen zum Wandel können noch größeres Blutvergießen verhindern.
17. We are confident that our clear and firm message will not fall on deaf ears in Damascus (Westerwelle 2011e).
17. Außenminister Westerwelle: Wir setzen darauf, dass unsere unmißverständliche Botschaft in Damaskus nicht auf taube Ohren stößt.
22. In fact, every day of violence and confrontation put us away from the diplomatic settlement of the conflict. Each side should use some common sense now! (Steinmeier 2014a).
22. Im Gegenteil: Jeder Tag mit Gewalt und Konfrontation entfernt uns weiter von der Möglichkeit einer diplomatischen Entschärfung des Konflikts. Alle Seiten müssen jetzt zur Vernunft kommen!
23. I believe that it is right at least. Firstly, It is right to continue talks,
23. Ich glaube, dass es zumindest richtig ist, einerseits die Gespräche

and secondly, to make it clear that we are supporting Ukraine. I have claimed three points in the German Bundestag: to support Ukraine meaning that people in Ukraine are free to choose how they want to shape their own future, secondly, to keep the conversation channel open and to find the solutions in diplomatic way and thirdly, if all this does not succeed, to continue imposing the sanctions (Merkel 2014).

24. It is true that every state has a right to sue for the violence. But it is also true that we should act cleverly. It is essential for every politician in the world. At the same time, it is not easy at all to find a right way (Merkel 2014).

25. We can stop escalation and find a political solution only if both sides discuss directly all the problems and open questions and if they are ready to strive for resolution of conflict

immer weiterzuführen und zweitens deutlich zu machen, dass wir die Ukraine unterstützen. Ich habe im Deutschen Bundestag einmal drei Dinge genannt: die Ukraine zu unterstützen und zwar in dem Sinne, dass die Menschen in der Ukraine frei entscheiden können, wie sie ihre eigene Zukunft weiter gestalten wollen, zweitens den Gesprächskanal offen zu halten und auf diplomatischem Wege Lösungen zu finden und drittens, wenn das alles keinen Erfolg hat, eben auch immer wieder Sanktionen in den Raum zu stellen.

24. Es ist so, dass jeder Staat das Recht hat, für sich auch das Gewaltmonopol einzuklagen. Es ist zum Zweiten so, dass man klug handeln muss. Das gilt für alle Politiker auf der Welt. Dazwischen immer den richtigen Weg zu finden, ist natürlich auch nicht einfach

25. Nur wenn beide Seiten im direkten Gespräch alle Probleme und offenen Fragen ansprechen und bereit sind, miteinander und mit gegenseitigem Respekt auf eine

together and with mutual respect  
(Steinmeier 2014b).

26. In my opinion, it is absolutely  
worthwhile to do everything to end  
the bloodshed (Merkel 2015).

27. But I still believe, that it is right,  
that we do everything to avoid  
human losses and let people, who  
live who live under extremely  
difficult conditions (you might have  
seen the situation in Donetsk and  
Lugansk on TV), breathe with relief  
and live further (Merkel 2015).

Konfliktlösung hinzuarbeiten, lassen  
sich die Eskalationsspirale stoppen  
und Wege für eine politische Lösung  
finden.

26. Es ist meiner Meinung nach aber  
absolut lohnend, alles zu tun, damit  
weiteres Blutvergießen vermieden  
wird.

27. Ich glaube aber nach wie vor,  
dass es richtig ist, dass wir alles  
daransetzen, dass Menschenleben  
nicht weiter verloren gehen und dass  
die Menschen, die unter  
ausgesprochen schwierigen  
Bedingungen dort leben - man muss  
ja nur einmal die Fernsehbilder von  
Donezk und Lugansk sehen -, wieder  
ein Stück aufatmen können und  
ihrem Leben nachgehen können.