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Police Corruption, Radicalization and Terrorist Attacks in Mogadishu

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Master of Science in International Relations

CREDIT PAGE

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DECLARATION

I, Adam Yusuf Egal, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my mother Waraaqo Yarow Adow and my father Yusuf Egal Ahmed.

Acknowledgement

Praise is due to Allah who made it possible for this thesis to be completed. I would like to thank Dr. Stig Jarle Hansen, my research supervisor who has been a great source of encouragement all throughout. Dr. Stig was always helpful whenever I needed him. I appreciate all your contributions of time and ideas.

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Abstract

Recently, the emergence of al Shabaab combined with weak state structures has created a challenging environment dazed by a rampant police corruption, radicalization, and terrorism. Much so, most of these issues has been more apparent in Mogadishu than elsewhere in Somalia. This study was carried out: to discover the relationship between police corruption, radicalization and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu, reasons behind police corruption, the influence of salary on corruption and contributing factors of radicalization and al Shabaab recruitment.

The study found that police corruption plays a major role in facilitating terrorist attacks in Mogadishu through bribing the police, al Shabaab can easily launch attacks in well-secured places where government security including the police are present.

In the same way, police corruption turns people to become radicalized in the sense that police use excessive force, abuse, and physical violence, humiliation against publics and minority clans, which creates a situation of feeling injustice, discrimination and marginalization, which in turn leads to search for revenge. Through revenge, seeking minorities end up by joining al Shabaab, which seems to be the only power that can confront the government and its allies. Irregular/low payments for police officers was also found exposing police officers to slip in corruption acts. Among factors that push people to radicalization and Shabaab recruitment comprise socio-economic, youth political grievance, economic and social grievances.

Finally, the study proposes that social movement together with relative deprivation/oppression and humiliation-revenge theory can contribute understanding the process of radicalization and recruitment in Somalia. While organizational theory of police corruption has, a significant advantage over the psychological, sociological theories of police corruption presented and discussed in this study.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Somalia has gone through several stages of conflict that made the country one of the most unstable and insecure country in the world. After the collapse of the central government, the country has experienced a severe civil war clan conflicts, factional conflicts and ideology conflicts between the Somali federal government and its allies and Islamist groups of Islamic courts and now a war on al Shabaab (Hesse, 2013; Kimunguyi, 2011; Lyman, 2013).

Since 2006 there has been many national, regional and international efforts directed at fighting al Shabaab in Somalia (Dualeh, 2000). However, recently, there has been realization of that defeating al Shabaab is only possible with the establishment of a Somalia security forces that are effective and efficient. Despite this, Somalia, the security forces including the police has been irregularly paid, this has affected the police itself to slip into corruption and turn a blind eye to terrorist attacks (Jorgic, 2015).

Numerous studies describing the link between police corruption and insecurity including terrorism agreed that corruption and insecurity are inextricably linked (Boukhars, 2012; Menkhaus, 2013; Okorie, 2014). Especially, police corruption, which is, regarded the most dangerous type of corruption that undermines security, and facilitates radicalization and criminality to flourish.

Mogadishu, which is the area of focus for this study, suffers extensively with Shabaab radicalization and recruitment, frequently terrorist attacks, lack of effective law enforcement institutions fueled by corruption. Evidence indicate that weapons sent to the Somali police force to defend the country have seen in Bakara market for sale where al Shabaab armies buy and fight back to the government (Bruton, 2014). This damages the security of the country and gives al Shabaab the chance to acquire better weapons to fulfill their brutal attacks in Mogadishu.

This study will therefore focus on the perception of the community on police corruption, radicalization and terrorism; the reasons behind police corruption in Somalia, the influence of salary policy on police corruption and the relationship between police corruption, radicalization and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu. The findings of this study will make an important contribution to the field of security in Mogadishu.

Accordingly, the study seeks to explore the above-mentioned topic by answering the following questions:

1. How do the police and the community at large conceptualize police corruption, radicalization and terrorism?
2. What are the reasons behind police corruption in Mogadishu?
3. How does the salary policy influence police corruption in Mogadishu?
4. What are the relationship between police corruption, radicalization and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu?
5. What are the contributing factors of al Shabaab radicalization and recruitment in Mogadishu?

Even though al Shabaab removed from Mogadishu four years ago, security remains serious for Mogadishu residents, government officials, aid workers and official foreigners. Despite series of deadly attacks carried out on the presidential palace (villa Somalia), Mogadishu Parliament house, Mogadishu international airport and several hotels in Mogadishu by al Shabaab, no single researcher has scholarly addressed the relationship between police corruption, radicalization and terrorism attacks in Mogadishu. In order to address the above-mentioned problems, a qualitative research is necessary to explore the relationship between police corruption, radicalizations and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu, reasons of police corruption and how public define radicalization, terrorism and police corruption.

1.1 Definition of key terms

Before the study proceeds to the outlining of the structure of how the remaining chapters are organized, it is necessary to clarify and define the terms and concepts used in topic as well as the formulated research questions.

To start with, corruption, many competing definitions exist and little agreement on how to define it (Lascoumes & Tomescu-Hatto, 2008). According to World Bank, corruption is defined as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (Bank, 2010, para. 2). While Transparency International adopted same definition but little bit different, “Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (TI, 2016, para.1).

Another general definition states, “corruption is a broad term covering a wide range of misuse of entrusted funds and power for private gain: theft, fraud, nepotism, abuse of power etc.” (Sammi,. n.d., para.1).

On the other hand, there is no universally agreed definition of police corruption. In the literature, different studies offer their own suggestions and one can find many contending definitions of police corruption that encompasses wider as well as narrower definitions. One

of the broader definitions is 'deviant, dishonest, improper, unethical or criminal behavior by a police officer' (Newburn & Webb, 1999, p. 5). Bayley and Perito (2011) defines police corruption narrowly as the police officers that use their position and power for personal gain instead of public advantage. This definition has a problem because it articulates that the end of the corrupt activity goes only to the police officer who is directly involved in the corrupt activity. Newburn and Webb (1999) argues that the end of corrupt action might be committed for the benefit of the whole police organization inclusively but need not necessarily involve personal gain. Summing up their point, officers can commit corruption for personal gain as well as organizational gain. Moreover, they draw a conclusion that most researchers in the field agree that police corruption embroils an abuse of position.

Scaramella, Cox, and McCamey (2010) points out that it is not an easy task to measure police corruption, if not impossible. Newham (2000) highlights that defining corruption is problematic; fighting it is even more difficult. However, defining police corruption, one needs first to inquire the question of what are the activities regarded as corruption. Researchers often list various activities that might be regarded as corrupt activity.

Roebuck and Barker (1974) summarizes and delineates the best typology of corruption in eight types of police corruption (as cited in Newburn & Webb, 1999) "(1) Corruption of Authority, (2) Kickbacks, (3) Opportunistic Theft, (4) Shakedowns, (5) Protection of Illegal Activities, (6) The Fix, (7) Direct Criminal Activities, and (8) Internal Payoffs (Newburn & Webb, 1999, p.4).

Again, the problem is that what is perceived in one country, or one place, as corruption is not perceived as the other place depending on social, political and cultural tradition (Juntunen, Käyhkö, & Rotterdam, 2008). However, this study will adopt the all inclusion broad functional definition that Hope Sr (2015) applied in his book "*Police Corruption and Police Reforms in Developing Societies*".

He defined police corruption,

"any action or omission, a promise of any action or omission, or any attempt of action or omission, committed by a police officer or a group of police officers, characterized by the police officer's misuse of the official position and motivated in significant part with the achievement of personal/private or organizational gain or advantage"(p. 5).

Since this definition serves as wide-ranging that touches upon of all aspects of police corruption, the study favored adopting and applying it.

Conversely, there are more than 200 definitions of terrorism exists in the literature. Jeffrey (1994) points out that there are 212 definitions of terrorism that governments and other institutions use (Jeffrey, 1994). Despite hundreds of definitions, the term suffers as the most disputed term in social sciences because of the problem arises differentiating the term from other violent crimes such as guerrilla warfare, crime or mad serial killers. Again the popular phrase 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter', makes the term even more complex (Spencer, 2006).

In the literature, there are variety of definitions of the term terrorism that have been suggested by many scholars, countries and institutions.

Conte (2010) notes that definition of terrorism in the European Union level as,

Any offence committed by individuals or groups resorting to violence or threatening to use violence against a country, its institutions, its population in general or specific individuals which, being motivated by separatist aspirations, extremist ideological conceptions, fanaticism or irrational and subjective factors, is intended to create a climate of terrors among official authorities, certain individuals or groups in society, or the general public. (p. 21)

The State Department defines terrorism as "politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (Tilly, 2004, p. 7).

After critical examining several scholarly definitions terrorism Jongman (1988) tried to accommodate the component of those definition in one long definition which is,

"Terrorism is an anxiety-inspired method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi)clandestine individuals, groups, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and the main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought" (p. 28).

Finally, when it comes to define radicalization, it is also a contested term due to the "many positive or non-harmful connotations that 'radical' and 'radicalism' have" (Von Behr, 2013, p. 2). In the literature, there are variety of definitions of the term radicalization that

have been suggested by many scholars in the field. One of the suggested definition describes radicalization as: “the process by which ‘individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views’”(Bartlett, Birdwell, & King, 2010, p. 18).

Neumann (2013) argues that there is no widely agreed definition of radicalization among researchers. Problem arises in two major areas of disputation and vagueness: the first one involves to the ‘end-points’ of radicalization; the second one is about context and normative issues. The only thing they agreed on is that, radicalization is a process; not something happened overnight. Furthermore, the end-point of radicalization process is extremism, which is an ambiguous term that can have several meaning. Extremism is nothing but the refusal of a certain liberal values (Kundnani, 2015). Accordingly, “extremism does not have a universal, objective and undisputed definition” (Kilp, 2011, p. 11). In this context, the term extremism or the end-point of radicalization makes very difficult to define radicalization. However, There is an interesting description of radicalization that one scholar described as “what goes on before the bomb goes off” (Schmid, 2013, p. 6).

Based on the above definitions of corruption and for the purpose of this study, corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted power, authority, and responsibility for personal, group and clan gain. It should be noted that this is extending the Transparency International definition of corruption. Similarly, based on the purpose of this study, the British government’s definition of radicalization will be adopted, which says, “The process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to participate in terrorist groups” Finally, for terrorism definition, the study adopts the Jongman (1988) definition of terrorism. ‘

Having defined the key terms and concepts, the study will now move on outlining the structure/organization of the thesis.

In chapter one, the study presented the introduction and definition of the key concepts of this study. In chapter two, the study presents a review literature as well as theoretical framework. In chapter three, the study demonstrates the research methodology employed in this study, data collection method, sampling approach, analyzing method, ethical considerations as well as study’s limitations and delimitations.

In chapter four, is the findings and discussion chapter where the study presents the summary of the main findings of the study and interprets it. It is the most important chapter, where the study answers the research questions, discusses the emerged themes and relates to

the theories discussed in the theoretical framework chapter, provides sufficient evidence from the collected data to support the study conclusions.

The final chapter is the conclusion and recommendation chapter where the study presents conclusions, summarizes the findings and proposes some recommendations based on the findings. The study calls for further research in this chapter.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In chapter one, apart from the introduction, the study discussed the concepts of police corruption, radicalization and terrorism briefly. The paper argued that these concepts are contested terms when it comes to define. However, in this chapter, the study reviews and remarks briefly some of the theories chosen for this research study.

In the literature, several theories have been proposed to explain the process of radicalization and factors that leads to join radical groups like al Shabaab. Similarly, great effort has been devoted to the study of why police officers commit corruption. However, the research study discusses first theories of radicalization or factors that lead people to become radicals and later in this chapter, the study presents and discusses theories of police misconduct.

The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy identifies ‘conducive conditions’ to terrorism. These ‘push factors’ or enabling circumstances include political circumstances, including poor governance, political exclusion, lack of civil liberties and human rights abuses; economic circumstances; sociological circumstances, e.g. religious and ethnic discrimination; counter terrorism operations and their impact; and perceived injustice and international circumstances (Botha & Abdile, 2014)

Similarly, scholars make a significant distinction between push and pull factors that leads people to turn out to a terrorist (Davis et al.; Hassan, 2012). Push factors are forces that drive an individual to become isolated and reject mainstream society. Negative social experiences of an individual like relative deprivation, abuse, discrimination are examples of push factors (Volintiru, 2010). Pull factors, on the other hand, are the positive features that have a direct inspiration on individual level radicalization and recruitment. Access to economic resources, social status; a sense of belonging and personal empowerment are examples of pull factors (Policy, 2011).

Social scientists and security expertize agree that terrorists progress through dynamic process called radicalization. In order to comprehend root causes of terrorism acts it is first necessary to understand this dynamic process. Kundnani (2012) argues, “Since 2004, the term ‘radicalization’ has become central to terrorism studies and counterterrorism policy-making” (p. 3).

Schmid (2013) categorizes the root causes of radicalization into three levels micro, meso and macro-levels. Micro-level ranks the lowest level of individual that involves

“identity problems, failed integration, feelings of alienation, marginalization, discrimination, relative deprivation, humiliation (direct or by proxy), stigmatization and rejection, often combined with moral outrage and feelings of (vicarious) revenge”. Meso-level focuses on the role organizational level that radicalizes parts of a youth group and lead to the formation of terrorist organizations. Finally, Macro-level is societal and governmental role at home and abroad such as “tense majority – minority relationships and the role of lacking socio-economic opportunities for whole sectors of society which leads to mobilization and radicalization of the discontented, some of which might take the form of terrorism” (Schmid, 2013, p. 4).

Likewise, NYPD (New York City Police Department) identified and argued four stages of radicalization that an individual progress through before she/he ends up violent extremism. These four stages are pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination and jihadization (Kumar, 2012; Yannakogeorgos, 2009).

The pre-radicalization phase, describes an ordinary individual’s daily life before she/he accepts or tries to explore radical ideas and religion at the leave-taking point towards radicalization. Self-Identification stage refer to how the individual starts to explore new identity and begins to run away from his/her former identity. It is at this phase when an individual conducts research on the internet and seeks radical Islam. The Indoctrination stage is when “individual wholly adopts ‘Jihadi-Salafi ideology’ and concludes that militant Jihad is required against all that contradicts the extremist agenda” (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009, p. 15). Jihadization phase is the final stage of committing violence extremism such as planning and execution of violent jihad or terrorist attacks (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

Yet, the idea of four phases of radicalization has been devastatingly critiqued by Kumar (2012), who argues that the process of radicalization cannot be generalized into four stages. She states that the pre-radicalization stage gathers completely young Muslim males from middle-class from immigrant families, which means, “Being a member of this group places one on a conveyer belt aimed towards radicalization.

By way of illustration, Kumar (2012) argues that, if circumstantially a young Muslim male change his behavior of socialization and appearance quits his habits smoking, drinking and gambling, begins to dress traditional Islamic clothing, and grows up a beard then he is on the pathway toward gaining “Jihadi-Salafist ideology”. Acquiring “Jihadi-Salafist ideology” puts him a place to progress to the next stage “self-identification” which is nothing but the

familiarity with politics and community activism. The third phase as Kumar argues is indoctrination while the person retreated from mosque learns and fully accepts the ideas, opinions, and beliefs that leads him to the fourth stage of jihadization. At this stage, the person is prepared to plan and implement terrorist attacks (Kumar, 2012).

According to Veldhuis and Staun (2009), the model of NYPD of four stages of radicalization suffers from major methodological and practical limitations. They argue that the model looks simple and straightforward and simple models make a methodological error referred to as 'selection on the dependent variable' that biases on the conclusion. They illustrated the fact that "it is impossible to explain the outbreak of revolutions by studying only revolutions, or to explain why books become bestsellers by examining only bestsellers, it is impossible to explain radicalization only by cases of radicalization" (T. Veldhuis & Staun, 2009, p. 17). Another shortcoming that they found was that the stages models leads to the risk of applying 'statistical discrimination'. According to them "statistical discrimination occurs in this context when general traits are used as a signal of other unobserved traits that relate to radicalization" (T. Veldhuis & Staun, 2009, p. 18). Accordingly, it results to target anyone who falls on the first stages of the model even though s/he is radicalizing but not towards violent radicalization.

Empirical research done by ARTIS found that most of the young people involved in violent radicalization have not a strong ideological basis for their actions (Sageman, 2009). Thus, only ideology cannot be used to explain the process of radicalization. Moreover, finding out a single profile that fits everyone going through a radicalization process is almost impossible. Among terrorist, we can find people with all ages, people with both sexes, poor people, rich people, educated ones, uneducated ones, mad people, and normal or healthy people. In addition, terrorism happens every corner in the world, in all countries, deprived countries, rich countries, developed and industrialized countries; least developed countries, democratic countries as well as authoritarian countries. Thus, explaining terrorism cannot be generalized in one theory due to the diversity of terrorists and terrorism acts (Brynjar & Skjølberg, 2000)

Omayio (2014) argued that religion could be employed both to stimulate conflict and peace equally because it provides people an identity. It can also be used to reenergize, find legitimacy and even economic support from the public.

2.1 Radicalization theories

It is worth noting differentiating radicalization into radical view and radicalization into terrorism. Borum (2011) discusses when directing radicalization it has two connotations, which are radicalization buying radical beliefs and radicalization into terrorism. He further states that in general, individuals with radical view do not involve in terrorism. He draws a conclusion that “radicalizing by developing or adopting extremist beliefs that justify violence is one possible pathway into terrorism involvement, but it is certainly not the only one” (Borum, 2011, p. 8). Based on the above, to hold radical views does not mean as though radicalized into terrorism through the intent to harm. For the purpose of this study, radicalization refers pathway into terrorism.

Social movement theory, relative deprivation theory/ oppression theory, social Identity theory and humiliation-revenge theory are among the radicalization that this study employs.

One of the most promising theoretical frameworks applied to understanding radicalization processes and violent extremism is Social Movement theory (Beck, 2008; Neumann, Rogers, Alonso, & Martinez, 2007). Zald and McCarthy define a social movement as "A set of opinions and beliefs in a population, which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society." To realize social movement, certain conditions are necessary to be met. These conditions include individuals having grievances, individuals recognizing others that share the same grievances, mobilizing sufficient resources, and creating political environment to the form a network or organization (Simpson, 2014).

Beck (2008) argues that social movement theory is very useful to explain the process of terrorism. It contributes a lot because of the fact that terrorist groups have collective identities in a network form, which can explain commitment and recruitment. Radicals regularly participate in framing to justify their actions and articulate their goals.

Social movement literature might contribute to the analysis of radicalization in Somalia where al Shabaab represents bridging networks among members of the public, especially those with common grievances and concerns in an attempt to find both political and economic security, a gap that Al-Shabaab claims to be fixing. This group thinking has played a major role in radicalization in Somalia, a concept this research will seek to ascertain.

The theory might also help explain radicalization process in the case of Somalia where we have clan seniority, which brings unequal distribution of state benefits in Somalia (Osman, 2008). The clan division is very important elements in Somali society; it is a source of solidarity, protection and access to political and economic power. Consequently, majority-minority plays a key role in applying this theory into Somali radicalization process.

Huge number of jobless youth live in a desperate situation and their misery life provided the competing greed-driven elites and other agents with readily available human resources with grievances in a collapsed state context might also organize movement. Eventually, these elites exploited the situation of the youth and organized the young men in a way that interested to them (Elmi & Barise, 2006).

The second model explaining the process of radicalization is relative deprivation theory. Essentially relative deprivation theory states that the huge economic gap causes violent political behavior (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010). The theory argues that, such increasing gap between expectations and satisfaction is the root cause of acting individuals in a violent way. Historically, people in the ancient time have recognized the link between human frustration and political violence (Brynjar & Skjølberg, 2000).

According to Gurr (1970), relative deprivation is the gap between expectations and satisfactions. This gap might be caused by political reasons, economic reasons or social reasons. When the causes are political, there is always the aspect of frustration and aggression towards the perpetrator of the same, the governing body, at all levels of the society. This theory therefore connects individual mobilization of aggression and political violence to social, economic and political circumstances. Any disequilibrium among individuals along various socio-political dimensions of status can therefore provoke aggressive behavior (Gurr, 1970).

Relative deprivation theory is suitable in explaining socio-political, economic, and organizational problems by focusing on the feelings and actions of an individual or group of people. As an illustration, one might compare his status on the society and found that he is deprived in relation to the society he is party of (Flynn, 2008). It is these feelings of underprivileged in terms of employment, education and poverty that drove many Somali youth to join al Shabaab. It is this social disequilibrium between expectations and satisfactions that al-Shabaab has been exploiting to radicalize people to join the outlawed group in Somalia.

There has been economic growth retardation coupled with insecurity and the physical environment in Somalia causing high rates of unemployment. This leaves inhabitants with little choices of livelihoods and therefore easily exploited by those in revolutionary movements like al-Shabaab (Rabasa, 2009). This state of helplessness that has also been significantly influenced by clan politics has left young unemployed youth with no option but to join al-Shabaab who promise both political and economic security. It seems that Richardson's (2011) conclusion that "terrorists tend to be highly educated and from wealthier families than average" (p. 1) is not true in the context of Somalia.

Richardson (2011) found that there is a strong link between an increase in unemployment and an increase in terrorist attacks. The Richardson's findings supports in the case of Somalia where we have one of the highest rates of youth unemployment in the world 67 percent (UNDP, 2012) on the one hand, on the other hand we have al Shabaab who offers youth employment opportunities with \$50-\$150 monthly payment (Hassan, 2012).

The third explanatory model is the humiliation-revenge theory. This theory states that feelings of humiliation of mistreatment leads to the desire of revenge. According to the theory, humiliation, revenge, and altruism are very significant at the organizational and individual levels in determining the subculture that encourages suicide bombings. This notion states, "the killing of any member of the in-group is considered a group offense and can be avenged by the killing of any member of the offender's out-group" (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010, p. 38). Humiliation is a source of generating an intense anger that leads the humiliated individuals to have revenge appetite against individuals or other the group believed responsible for the humiliation (Moghadam & Eubank, 2006; T. M. Veldhuis, Gordijn, Veenstra, & Lindenberg, 2014).

Feeling marginalized by some clans, a corrupt police system unable to protect the people, poor economy and the injustices has produced hundreds of humiliated people. These emotions has earned al-Shabaab a fresh ground to radicalize and recruit more member. In his article "A week in the life of Michael Keating", the UN special representative for Somalia articulated, "The population has low expectations of and little faith in government. In many areas, Al Shabaab is more effective in providing security and rule of law – albeit their own brutal version – than government" (Nations, 2016, para.8).

This theory is therefore very significant in the radicalization of people in Somalia, a point this research will also seek to test. According to one interviewee in a research by ISS on

al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia said, “Preachers delivered sermons for hours about destiny and the sweetness of the holy war. They distributed leaflets on Islam, showed video recordings from other jihadist in the world and how AMISOM [the African Union Mission in Somalia] or the Christian crusaders invaded our beloved country and were converting our children to Christianity (Botha & Abdile, 2014).

Literature confirms that some members of the marginalized communities voluntarily join al-Shabaab an indicator of the extent of humiliation among members of these communities. Many people joined the al-Shabaab voluntarily and became a loyal member of the group. The Somali-Bantu and minority clans are examples of those freely joined the militant group because they feel they have been marginalized since the collapse of the Somali state. They perceive recruitment to al-Shabaab as an opportunity to take revenge and empower themselves against majority tribes who grabbed their farming areas and (to some extent) property, (Botha & Abdile, 2014)

Making this theory relevant to my research study, clan division is a key element again. As mentioned previously, Somalia people is based on clan system where majority dominates the minority in the distribution of political power, economic as well social. Today al Shabaab represents many a mixture of majority and minority Somali-clan. Several marginalized minority groups and politically/militarily weak clans belongs to al Shabaab today (LANDINFO, 2011).

The fourth and last model that the study uses to explain the process of radicalization is social identity. A theory that states being membership in a group helps individuals to define a person’s self-identity and offer self-confidence. People have various different social identities including family identity, sports team identity, ethnic group etc., all these identities help define who he or she is in relation to the society and give a certain sense of self-esteem.

In social identity theory, there are three assumptions. These assumptions are: Individuals struggle to achieve or keep self-esteem or self-confidence, their membership in social groups are connected with particular value of connotations, and the assessment of one’s in-group is determined with reference to others through social comparison (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010)

Crossett and Spitaletta (2010) note,

“From these underlying assumptions, three principals were determined: Individuals strive to achieve or maintain positive social identity; positive social identity is based on favorable comparisons to other groups; and when social identity is unsatisfactory,

individuals will strive to either exit the group and join another group or strive to make their existing group more positively distinct” (p. 26)

Social identity theory and Turner’s theory of self-categorization are very useful in the explanation of identity formation and transformation in the radicalization process.

Applying this theory into radicalization, the process of forming and transforming collective identity is very important in comprehending the radicalization process. The theory also suggests that radicalization originates from a population that has experienced damage to its self-esteem. As an individual or group, they might think that they lose in attaining their preferred place in the society and see themselves as losers. This leads to more frustration and the underlying need to belong, which drives them to associate with a radical group (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010)

The need for group identity and sense of belonging is an important factor that contributed many Somalis to join al Shabaab. It is also worth noting that an empirical study done by Both & Abdile (2014) indicated that 98% of the respondents joined al-Shabaab because of their religion Islam was under threat.

Rabasa’s study of Radical Islam in East Africa found that most missionary groups funded by Saudi charities have been engaged in active propagation of a fundamentalist, Salafi interpretation of Islam that, while not necessarily violent, function as a gateway to terrorism. In addition, teachers and journalists have been reported to have also been beneficiaries of Saudi funding as rewards for adhering to the Salafi – Wahhabi ideology (Ali, 2008).

This has played a major role in radicalization and recruitment of Somalis by al-Shabaab. Despite more 50% of the African population is youth, they are marginalized through political and social structures, and they are ignored and overlooked (Twum-Danso, 2005). Through collective grievances and seeking identity, youth became vulnerable to join terrorist organization in Africa such as Boko Haram and al Shabaab.

2.2 Police Corruption theories

Police misconduct is a global problem not only for the weak states but also for the strong powerful states. To explain the causes of police corruption, one should focus on the nature, the working environment and the context of the police work (Newburn & Webb, 1999). Empirical study “[*Rotten apples or rotten barrels?*](#)” done by Gottschalk (2012) comparing whether corruption in police sector is due to the system failure or the individual police officer failure, found that misconduct of the police sector is because of individual failure rather than systems failure. Likewise, police themselves regularly favors the

individualistic explanatory model that is the corrupt officer committing crime contaminates the other essentially decent officers. Yet, in the research literature contradicting notion can be found that police corruption is due to the system failure should not be forgotten (Gottschalk, 2012).

A study done by Sabet (2012) on “the role of citizens in perpetuating the problems of corruption” found that the public should be blamed for fostering corruption more than the police does. In a survey questionnaire the study found that 49 percent agreed that corruption should be accused both police as well as the public whereas 42 percent put the blame on the public and only 6 percent blamed the police (Sabet, 2012).

Police corruption creates a situation of distrust and is a source of anger to fuel an insurgency that hinders effective and efficiency policing (Perito, 2006). Many young Somalis joined al-Shabaab because of the distrust of the Somali government and because of feeling injustice (Botha & Abdile, 2014). This is a good example of system failure as opposed to individual failure. It takes more than authorization of an individual from the police force for weapons meant for the government to be retailed in an open-air market.

Despite more than fifty thousand security forces containing African peacekeepers, Somali police and military soldiers and other government-affiliated militiamen, al Shabaab remains undefeated, as it can be able to launch high profile attacks. This is due to the rampant corruption within the security forces including the police (Aid, 2016).

A shocking example, which shows that corruption in the police sector, is serving al Shabaab, is the recent failed suicide terror attack on Daallo airline plane, which was, accused government official from National Intelligence and Security Agency of Somalia (NISA). Abdiweli the NISA was among 14 members accused for the involvement and facilitating the attack (shabellenews, 2016). Sources indicate that the NISA member was a friend of a Hassan Aato, a man who was facilitated the attack in Daallo. Hassan was later killed by Abdiweli as sources say. Hassan Aato worked four hotels in Mogadishu including Sahafi Hotel, Jazeera Hotel, SYL Hotel and Central Hotel which al Shabaab later attacked these hotels. Reports say that Hassan Aato involved these hotel attacks directly or indirectly (Jubalandnews 24, n.d.). This shows the link between police corruption and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu and how al Shabaab can gain access to everywhere in Mogadishu to perform attacks.

In the police corruption literature, no single factor that leads police officers to commit corruption. However, Newburn and Webb (1999) summarizes the causes of police corruption into ‘constant’ and ‘variable factors’. The constant factors include (Discretion) which focuses

on the nature of the police work that grants enormous freedom to exercise of freedom that have both legitimate and illegitimate bases. The second constant factors is (Low managerial visibility) which refers to police officer's actions that are far from being seen by the police management. The third factor being (Low public visibility) which emphasizes police actions that are always far from being witnessed by the public. The fourth constant factor is (Peer group secrecy) which emphasizes on police officer's culture that is considered having high degree of internal unity and secrecy. The fifth factor being (Status problems) which focuses on police officers salary and other benefits that poor compared to their hard work and their powers. The last constant factors is (Association with lawbreakers/contact variety of people who have an interest in police not doing with temptation) which indicates the relationship between police officers and organized criminal interests who cannot run their business without having good relations with police. By bribing the police these criminal have a lot to gain and very little to lose.

For the variable factors discussed include (Community structure) which refers to the context that police officers work influenced by culture, norms and even politics. Example of this could be community tolerance/support for police corruption that leads the police officers or the whole department to become corrupt. The second variable factors being (Organizational characteristics) which refers on police unity subcultures among police officers, occupational moral stages, and the perception of legitimate opportunities. The third and fourth factors being (Legal opportunities for corruption and Corruption controls) refers to how the police themselves policed and the arise of corruption from victimless crimes such as prostitution, alcohol, gambling, and, narcotics. The fifth and sixth variable factors that Newburn and Webb listed are (Social organization of corruption and Moral cynicism) which denotes to the "police corruption activities are socially organized in two basic forms: 'arrangements' and 'events'. All corrupt acts are events. When they are duplicated, generally on a regularized basis, they become arrangements" (Newburn & Webb, 1999, p. 23). The Moral cynicism refers to police officers engagement into several different people who are dishonest and corrupt and that corruption is not limited only to criminals but also other individual with good status and reputation that leads the officer moral cynicism.

Lersch and Mieczkowski (2005) grouped police corruption theories into three main categories: psychological, sociological and organizational

For the first psychological one, rotten apples theory is the most widely cited when examining police corruption. This theory assumes that it is the agency or the individual's police officers who are responsible for the deviant behavior rather than the organization. The

theory explicitly states that a few bad officers are corrupt and are responsible for their deviant activities. The corruption is limited to small group of police officers not the whole organization (Dempsey & Forst, 2011; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2005; Newburn & Webb, 1999).

In the case of Mogadishu, al Shabaab managed to access well-secured buildings to execute attacks. It is clear not all police officers are compromised but just a few. For example, the Mogadishu court attack in April 2013 police said they could not distinguish who was their colleague or enemy because even al Shabaab were dressed in Somali military uniform. Moreover, the police force articulates that \$100 per moth salary was not sufficient to encourage loyalty. A junior officers named Hussein while being interviewed by freelance journalist Feisal Omar, said, “Shoe shiners have a better life.” for they are not the targets of al Shabaab and they get a well pay than us (Lough & Abdi, 2013).

It is these narratives and gaps that rotten apples (bad officers) uses to manipulate other officers into believing they will have better lives under al-Shabaab. Getting some extra pay from al-Shabaab is attractive offer to some officers. An officer called Omar remarked that if the Somali government could pay us \$500 a month, we would stand in the passages day and night and target al Shabaab, and then al-Shabaab would be vanished in a limited of days (Lough & Sheikh, 2013).

Yet, this conventional theory faced several criticism for example Newburn and Webb (1999) critically stated that this theory would not work any longer because corrupt police are not naturally born but they are made. If there are only few bad officers in the department, it is simply to arrest and fire those rotten officers (Dempsey & Forst, 2011).

The second theoretical explanation of police corruption is sociological theories (the subculture of policing). Policing is hard job that is typified by a close-knit subculture (Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). Subculture theory focuses on the values, norms, expectations and regulatory principles of the police officer’s work environment. Subculture denotes that a group of people that have distinctive culture, which differs the mainstream society’s culture. The theory states that young police officers perceive themselves as different in terms of lifestyle. They see themselves as low seniority that lack experience and they must work at night shift when their counterparts are having fun, developing friendship and socializing. This distinctive subculture leads to conflict and isolation from the community in which they are recruited to protect. The distinct culture together with discretion nature of the police work give young police officers to commit corruption (Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2005).

While this theory seems logical, it has confronted criticism of that it lacks elaboration of why not all officers are engaged in misbehavior against their citizens. It does not give a full explanation of why one police officer react violently while others do not.

The sociological theory focuses on the silent code of police corruption, which will be discussed below. Generally, among officers there exist rule between them, which is not to report against a fellow officer if s/he commits corruption.

The third and last explanatory model is organizational theories (the work environment). This theory states the lack of supervision of the police work environment gives the police officers opportunity to do whatever they want. The theory focuses on leadership role, administrative policymaking and other aspects of the nature of the police officer's working environment. Police officers work alone or in pairs with having considerable freedom to impose particular law under particular situation. With this discretion, officers tend to enforce particular laws for personal gain rather than professional judgement.

Generally, the police-citizen interactions happens in a low visibility environment outside the eye of public in passageways, private residences, or other isolated places which gives the officers freedom of choice (Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2005; Newburn & Webb, 1999).

Ivković and Haberfeld (2015) organizational theory of police corruption emerged as an alternative theoretical point of view that rejects the "rotten apple" or "bad apple" theory. Unlike to the rotten apple theory that puts the corruption blame on the individual police officers, the organizational theory of police corruption provides deep explanation of police corruption beyond the individual police officer's explanation. This theory emphasizes four dimensions being organizational rules, techniques of controlling police misconduct, curtailing the code of silence and influence of social and political environment.

In organizational rules dimension, Ivković and Haberfeld (2015) states that it concentrates on "the way a police agency's organizational rules are established by the administration, how they are communicated to the police officers, and the way in which they are understood by the police officers"(Ivković & Haberfeld, 2015, p. 5). They further elaborate that behaviors of police officers is generally regulated by state's constitution that limits and restricts the police officers' powers through founding definite fundamental rights and assures that these rights adheres to human rights followed by discrete laws that consists of clearly defined norms for further regulating police officer's work such as the restrictions on the use of force and prohibitions of corrupt conduct.

The second dimension that organizational theory of police corruption addresses is the techniques of controlling police misconduct which is nothing but various techniques employed to identify and investigate police corruption by the police agency. The techniques of controlling police misconduct for instance include “be they reactive, such as investigations of misconduct and discipline of police officers who violated the official rules, or more proactive, such as education in ethics, integrity testing, and proactive investigations”(Ivković & Haberfeld, 2015, p. 6).

Curtailling the code of silence is the third dimension of the organizational theory of police misconduct which focuses on the code of silence that Ivković and Haberfeld (2015) termed as “the unwritten rule that an officer never give incriminating information against a fellow officer,” perceived as the main barrier to effective corruption control.

The fourth and final dimension of the police corruption theory that Ivković and Haberfeld (2015) discussed focuses on the influence of social, economic, and political environment on the level of honesty in the police organization.

Ivković and Haberfeld (2015) states that:

Societies shape the level of misconduct of their public servants by establishing and nurturing a culture intolerant of misconduct, promulgating governing rules for ethical behavior of its employees, and by teaching and enforcing these rules (or, conversely, failing to do so).(p. 10).

Hope Sr (2015) brings up the significance of recruitment and selection procedures for protecting the corruption in the police agency. He found that officers that has gone through strong background checks with lowest incidence of corruption while officers that has not gone through strong background checks and screening with highest incidence of corruption. Using strong background checks while staffing new officers is a form of vetting. By background checks Hope (2015) decribed as going through personal history provided by the applicant or personal history acquired from legitimate sources and assigning these information to a committee to assess the applicant’s integrity and reliability (Hope Sr, 2015).

The organizational theory of police corruption seems to give insight into the police corruption in Somalia who lack strong organizational leadership, supervision, together with clanism loyalty. Police have been accused for illegal checkpoints, brutality and human rights violations. Similarly, lack of background checks allowed criminals to be part of the police in Somalia where they abuse the entrusted power to gain personal and clan interests.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

This study was a qualitative exploratory, and descriptive research that pursues to discover and explain the relationship between police corruption, radicalization and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu, reasons behind police corruption, how the public and police operationalize the terms of police corruption, radicalization and terrorism and factors that contribute to Shabaab radicalization and recruitment. In this chapter, the study discusses the research approach, research design, sampling strategy, data collection and analysis and finally, the limitations of the study and ethical considerations.

3.1 Qualitative approach


This study employed qualitative research method. One has the choice to adopt either qualitative or quantitative research approach and the question arises is here is why qualitative not quantitative in this thesis. To answer this question lets go back to my research questions. The overall objective of this study is to collect enough evidences to answer the initial research questions in the introduction chapter. To collect relevant information for this study, qualitative approach perceived as appropriate strategy to employ for qualitative research method focuses on answering the questions like ‘how’, ‘what’ and ‘why’ rather than ‘how many’ or ‘how much’. Which means that it is a descriptive, explanatory and exploratory (Blanche, Durrheim, & Painter, 2006).

As mentioned in the introduction section, no single researcher has scholarly addressed this issue of police corruption, radicalization and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu and very little is known for this issue and it is very difficult to explore as it involves discovering meaning and interpretations from people. Qualitative research is also useful for conducting studies that are difficult to explore or a phenomenon where little is known (Ritchie, Lewis, Nicholls, & Ormston, 2013).

The choice was also made because of the nature of the research problem depends on human perceptions and demands an in-depth study. In qualitative research, the researcher gains better understanding through exploring interpretations that attach people’s lives and experiences, through understanding the relationship between meaning, language and the world in which these interpretations exists (Holloway, 2005).

3.2 Research Design

In utilizing Berg's (1995) discussion in modeling research design, this study adopts spiraling model, which encompasses both theory-before-research and research-before-theory and it is diagrammed as follows:



Source: (Berg, 1995)

Spiraling research design was chosen because it has a degree of flexibility. Spiraling model is also useful as it provides the researcher the opportunity to do the research in iterative process. This process enables to move back and forth movements between the research idea, theoretical framework, research method and design, data collection method, data analysis as well as the findings and discussion (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2015).

3.3 Sampling

Generally, in qualitative research, samples size is relatively smaller than quantitative research. Sampling in qualitative research are more likely to be non-probability as opposed to quantitative research, which is likely to be probability sampling (Ritchie et al., 2013).

This study employed purposive sampling strategy; a sampling strategy where the target population are chosen due to their specific characteristics that allows exhaustive exploration and comprehension of the essential themes and questions under the investigation (Ritchie et al., 2013). Purposive involves selection where the researcher interviews participants that are relevant to the research question (Bryman, 2012). The selection of the population in this study was made due to their knowledge on issue under study that allows to study in an in-depth investigation and understanding of the subject matter.

The study was conducted in Mogadishu and the target population of this study was community members, Mogadishu police officers, civil society members as well as former al Shabaab fighters who are living in Serendi Rehabilitation Center in Mogadishu. The selection of the population and setting should be relevant to the research questions. In this regard, the study have tried to accommodate and interview all the relevant actors as mentioned above.

The selection criterion was based on participants that has been lived in Mogadishu for the last ten years, have at least secondary education level, older than 25 years old. These criterions make the participant to have necessary knowledge on issue under study that allows to study in an in-depth investigation and understanding of the subject matter. Thus, the study chose these people for their information-richness. Focusing both the police with different ranks and community including students, businesspersons, teachers, civil society worker, and health workers would offer different perspectives that have the necessary knowledge to answer the research questions.

The study planned to interview 40 participants to explore different perspectives from public members, police members, civil society members as well as former al Shabaab members. However, due to the sensitivity of the study and due to the security issues the civil society members and those who are in charge the Serendi Rehabilitation Center where former al Shabaab fighters are based refused to be interviewed. Therefore, the study ended up interviewing only twenty participants, ten people from the Mogadishu residents that have been on the ground for the last decade and ten from different police ranks from lower to senior ranks. Focusing both the police and community allows the study to collect the relevant data from different perspectives that have the necessary knowledge to answer the research questions. Participants were recruited by contacting through email, calling them through their direct cellphones and contacting them through their friends and family. Some also found through opportunistic ways.

3.4 Data collection method

This study used triangulating primary as well as secondary sources for its data collection method. The primary data was collected through semi-structured interview by phone. Twenty participants were interviewed ten from the public and ten from the police in Mogadishu. The secondary was collected from the countless Somali websites news articles including al Shabaab's official website Radio Andalus. The study utilized huge data material available in the Somali webpages where police forces convicted in court because of assisting al Shabaab to release from the prison, to facilitate an attack and give information that is useful for al Shabaab to launch an attack or execute an officials. Al Shabaab official website, which posts videos, texts, news and audio files in Somali language and very little Arabic were also exploited to collect useful data.

3.4.1 Semi-structured interview

A qualitative semi-structural phone interviews was conducted between April and June 2016. The researcher had beforehand prepared series of questions, which was the interview guide. In semi structured interviews the interviewer has the opportunity to probe follow-up questions that would have been missed in survey questionnaire and had the chance to explain the meaning of the question if the participants find it difficult (Bryman, 2012).

Each interview started by re-informing the participants to the overall purpose of the study and asked them to give verbal consent after being told them about the anonymity of the research, the confidentiality, and any other issues that is important for the participants to know before s/he participates the interview. The participant were also made aware of that there is tape recording for the interview session. All the interviews was conducted in Somali language. Due to the researcher's prior information about the matter under study, being a native of Mogadishu

The participants were found through the researcher's massive network contacts in the study settings. Initial contacts with the participants over the telephone and email asking which date and time fits them for the interview. All participants were sent to the interview guide through email. The telephone interviews was conducted From April to June 2016 by the researcher. Each telephone interview was tape-recorded and extensive notes were also taken during each interview. The interviews lasted from 45 minutes to one hour. The interview data from the tapes were transcribed verbatim.

3.5 Data analysis

The aim of analyzing qualitative data is "to make sense out of text and image data" (Creswell, 2013, p. 195). Therefore, coding is key for reducing the large amounts of data that have collected during the interview. Bryman (2012) defines coding as "the process whereby data are broken into component parts, which are given names" (Bryman, 2012, p. 710).

This study, in utilizing Braun and Clarke's 6-phase guide to doing thematic analysis, followed these six stages being familiarizing yourself with the data, generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes and finally, reporting your analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

The study transcribed the recorded interview and then coded manually. While transcribing the data, the researcher familiarized with the data and thought already some key words that could be used as a themes, and subthemes. However, the process of coding the

data started when the data transcription were completed. The researcher read the transcribed data several times and extract some keyword that later used to categorize into main themes that had subthemes. Then the extracted data was analyzed and interpreted by detecting any reoccurring themes, which captures something important about the data in relation to the initial research questions. Then the study used these themes to report its findings.

As the main goal of analyzing the data is to come up with some evidences that help answering the research questions, the study used triangulating multiple sources of data. The study used evidence from interview with two different perspectives, and evidences from the secondary literature including the Somali website news articles.

Responses from the participant to the interview that arose during the interview were put together as complete excerpts and filled according to the topic or issue addressed. That is, the evidences were organized into categories. Participants selected excerpts were analyzed thematically with emergent themes organized by how repeatedly they were mentioned. The thematic analysis of the interview data was completed manually and systematically organized into main themes in relation to the research questions.

3.6 Reliability and Validity

There is a huge debate of how to demonstrate qualitative research trustworthiness. In other words how rigor or goodness in qualitative research can be achieved. Brink (1993) points out that validity deals with the accuracy and truthfulness of scientific results while reliability deals with the “consistency, stability and repeatability of the informant’s accounts as well as the investigators’ ability to collect and record information accurate” (Brink, 1993, p. 36). There is also a debate whether reliability and validity is applicable in qualitative research since are commonly used quantative research (Golafshani, 2003). However, Speziale, Streubert, & Carpenter (2011) discusses four principles for adjudging rigor in qualitative research credibility, dependability, transferability and confirmability. Credibility is the likelihood of producing credible findings and can be proven by the commitment the subject matter for long period. Credibility is related to internal validity, that is, how research findings match reality. Dependability can only be achieved once the findings met the credibility criterion and it is asking the question of how dependable these findings or results are? Transferability raises the question of: is the study finding can make sense to others in the same situation and it is considered fittingness of the study. Which means that whether the study findings fit and are handy to the outsiders not the researchers only. Confirmability is assigning the study findings to audit trail, which can go through all the recorded documents during the study period (Speziale, Streubert, & Carpenter, 2011).

Some participants might have their own biases and interests in responding the interview questions, which influences the findings of the study. Moreover, as the researcher is native having special knowledge of the population and the setting under study, might have impact on the reliability and validity of this study.

Accordingly, to mitigate these biases and achieve trustworthiness the study used triangulation. Triangulation is defined as “mixing of data or methods so that diverse viewpoints or standpoints cast light upon a topic” (Olsen, 2004, p. 3). By triangulating multiple evidence from different kinds of data sources including both primary and secondary; semi structured interview, and evidences from the numerous of the Somali websites that uses local languages to post. Moreover, the study uses theory triangulation that is using many theories of radicalization and police corruption to interpret and support the collected evidences.

3.7 Limitations, delimitations and ethical considerations

Every research study has its own limitations and challenges. Collecting information in a city like Mogadishu that has been more than two decades of war was one of the major challenge. Further limitation was that the fact that the study was entirely depended on the information obtained during the interview and the nature of this information was limited to participants own viewpoints and lived experiences. Therefore, the findings of this study cannot be applied to similar contexts.

Another limitation was the study itself, which was complex and sensitive when it comes to be investigated. It concerns the rivalry power in Somalia al Shabaab and Somalia federal government’s police force. This has had a major consequence for interviewing the public because it was kind of nowhere to run if you give information against al Shabaab and even the police. In case of al Shabaab, it is known as to execute anyone they suspect as a spy (Hansen, 2013). Similarly, the Somali police is also known as its violence against minority and journalists (NOAS, 2014). For that reason, participants were so skeptical to give information and most of them were demanding that the researcher was to prove that he is not working to either al Shabaab or the Somali federal government.

Although the researcher explicitly stated that, the information collected through the interviews will be used for research purpose yet some of the participants demanded to be paid for giving information.

Another major limitation of this study was interviewing police officer. Obviously, it is difficult to make the police officers talk gladly and openly about the topic corruption and the

researcher was expecting that the police would be reluctant for giving information implicating themselves or their colleagues in criminal activity.

Of course, security, financial and time constraints was one the major limitations. Due to these limitations, the researcher had to conduct telephone interview, which has an effect in the findings as one misses body language of the interviewee and observation that would have been part of the data interpretation. As the researcher is a Somali that aware of the situation of Somalia, might possibly have led to unconscious biases.

Finally, the fact that the study was conducted only few participants in Mogadishu as opposed millions of people living in the city, the sample size of this study would be relatively small, and therefore the findings cannot be generalized.

Considering ethics issues such as the rules of informed consent, confidentiality, and anonymity was very significant in this study. Klenke (2008) points out that qualitative researchers has to follow ethical principles and the most significant one among these ethical guidelines are “informed consent, voluntary participation, confidentiality, protection from harm, and maintenance of the well-being of the participants” (Klenke, 2008, p. 50).

In this study, there was no written informed consent obtained from the participants to interview them but there was an oral consent obtained from each participants before the interview. Participants were told that the information collected through the interview will be used for research purpose and that all of their responses will be kept confidential. Similarly, the researcher confirmed that he would not associate participant’s names with anything they say during the interview to avoid putting them in risk and not even use any of their names in the final report. Participants were told that their participation was voluntary.

When it comes to data storage and anonymity, it was given a particular importance due to sensitivity of this study. Participants were told that all information collected would be anonymized and the data would be destroyed after the final report to avoid harm.

CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents the study's findings in relation to the five research questions asked in chapter one using the collected data and supports by representative quotations from the participants. Then the study explains and interprets these results by putting into the larger context of the wider body of literature on the topic, meaning that relating these findings with previous research literature and the theoretical framework in chapter two.

The purpose was carried out to answer the following questions:

1. How do the police and the community at large conceptualize police corruption, radicalization and terrorism?
2. What are the reasons behind police corruption in Mogadishu?
3. How does the salary policy influence police corruption in Mogadishu?
4. What are the relationship between police corruption, radicalization and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu?
5. What are the contributing factors of al Shabaab radicalization and recruitment in Mogadishu?

For brief overview of each participants, refer to the appendix (1). Although all participants requested not to mention their names in the study for that reason, the study call them participants as their names followed by a particular number for each such as participant 1, 2, 3 and so on. The study devoted the first ten participants for Mogadishu residents and the rest will police officers.

After coding and analyzing the data, several themes emerged from the data. These themes comprise themes that are related to police corruption, themes related to radicalization and themes that focus on terrorist attacks in Mogadishu. Those themes are organized in relation to the research questions that they are addressing and the rest was named as some other interesting findings.

4.1 How do the police and the community at large conceptualize police corruption, radicalization and terrorism?

During the interview, participants were asked to operationalize police corruption, radicalization and terrorism from their own perspectives. Few participants answered this question as majority of the participants replied part of it or as they do not know. However, most of their definitions was a general one. Here are some of the participant's point of view:

Participant four defined police corruption as “when police officers take bribes or act illegal way” (participant 4, 2016).

While participant two defined police corruption, as “police misusing his/her own power to achieve economic gain”

Yet, some other participants have conceptualized in this way: “Well, I can define police corruption as the act of exploiting police power to violate the rules for reaching personal interests” (participant 14, 2016).

Police participants defined as “violating the rules by abusing police power for personal gain” (participant 19, 2016).

As mentioned in chapter one there is no universally agreed definition of police corruption. Defining police corruption is a problematic and it has been loosely defined generally as well as narrowly. Nevertheless, the participant’s definitions captures significant parts of the scholarly definitions such power abuse, personal gain and some of the corruption activities that like bribe that (Bayley & Perito, 2011, Newburn & Webb, 1999) discussed in chapter one.

On the other hand, some of the participants tried to come up some definition about terrorism. According to participants, terrorism was defined as the following:

“Killing innocent people for the sake of political, economic and religion” (participant 4, 2016)

Another police participant defined terrorism as “Threatening people and killing their lives and the life of their families through shooting, suicide bomb and beheading them” (participant 14, 2016).

Meanwhile another participant commented as, “Well defining terrorism is not an easy task but I can say few words about it. It involves using violence to reach certain goals and the aim is to frighten the society” (Participant 6, 2016).

Senior police officer defined terrorism as: “Killing, hurting, and threatening people because of their different point of view, their religion, and their racial ethnic origin and the aim is to reach political agenda”

One more participant defined it as “I can say terrorism is nothing but killing threatening people to achieve political goals. Because al Shabaab is fighting for political goals but they say that they are fighting for to make the word “La ilaha illallah” superior and that is not true. The truth is that they have political agenda in their mind” (Participant 9, 2016).

One more interesting excerpts from the participants defines the term terrorism as follows:

“I think it is difficult to define terrorism. Everybody understands it what terrorism means but again it is hard when one asks you to define. I can say that the pursuit of certain goals through threatening, frightening and killing people. Political and economic goals must be important goals that terrorist try to reach” (Participant 4, 2016).

Comments from the participants again captures some important parts of the scholarly adopted definition of terrorism for this study that Jongman (1988) came up through reviewing and examining the existing definition and accommodating all the components of the existing definitions. Some of these components include violent which some of the participants raised during their trial to come up some definition of terrorism.

Finally, radicalization was defined as follows, “Well, I think it is not easy to define it but to try it, it is brainwashing young people to become terrorists” (Participant 7, 2016).

Another participant defined radicalization as “becoming isolated from mainstream public and adopting extreme radical views that turns you to see your people as your enemy” (Participant 10, 2016).

While another participants put it in this way “well, to define radicalization one must understand that people are radicalized into two ways. One is called self-radicalization and someone else radicalizes the other one. Self-radicalization is like one understanding and interpreting the religion and the world in a wrong way and adopting radical views that turns him to act in a violent way. The other one is brainwashing” (Participant 13, 2016).

One participant defined radicalization, as “well radicalization is a complex process that individuals go through from becoming extreme from mainstream, isolating from family friends and society at large and searching identity and belonging. It is not necessarily that radicalized people to become terrorist but each terrorist has gone through the process of radicalization” (Participant 20, 2016).

Again, one can find that these definitions touches upon important parts of scholarly definitions of radicalization such that these scholars discussed (Bartlett et al., 2010; Neumann, 2013; Reinares et al., 2008). For instance that radicalization involves a process, extremism, isolation, rejecting mainstream, radical views are some of the components touched upon by the participants.

4.2 What are the reasons behind police corruption in Mogadishu?

4.2.1 Blame on the public

One of the important themes for the reasons behind police corruption in Somalia that interviewees addressed was that the public was also fueling police corruption by offering bribe. More than half of the participants revealed that civilians offering money to the police was one of the leading factors behind police corruption in Somalia.

One of the participants strongly blamed the public saying that:

“As long as we are offering money to the police we have to know that we are corrupting the police” (Participant 9, 2016).

Another participant addressing the same issue put in this way:

“Yes, the police as well as public should be blamed equally. I do not believe only police is responsible for the corruption acts. We have to stop offering money to the police” (participant 4,2016)

Several other respondents stated repeatedly for the same message that civilians are playing a key role by making even the newly recruited or the honest police corrupted. Participant seven emphasizing the dangerousness of the public corrupting the police officers said that:

“We understand sometimes that the police force us to bribe them but in several occasions it is us who are offering the money. We should stop this, otherwise the corruption will be part of our daily life and we will not get a service from the government institution unless we pay money” (Participant 7, 2016)

Conversely, one participant disagreed with majority of participants in terms of blaming the public. This study identified this participant as an outlier by having different perspectives than the mainstream have. This participant noted that:

“It is easy to blame the public but the fact is that nobody can confront the police because they have got the power to even criminalize you by false evidences. We have seen in many occasions, police arresting some of the public just because they refused to pay money in the illegal check-points and these public ended up by paying several hundreds of dollars to get out from the prison”

The findings presented above provided insights into various aspects of blaming the public and consistent with Sabet (2012) findings on “the role of citizens in perpetuating the problems of corruption”. Sabet (2012) identified in a survey questionnaire asked both police as well as citizens about who is blamed for fostering corruption majority of them 49 percent agreed that it should be blamed both while 42 percent blamed the publics and only 6 percent blamed the police (Sabet, 2012).

Similarly, on March 2016 the Capital FM wrote an article named “*Don’t blame police, stop bribing them*” by citing the Kenyan Interior Cabinet Secretary Joseph Nkaissery which blames for the corrupt acts to the police as well as the society. The minister expressed, “I can also say without any fear of contradiction that it is the society which is corrupt because there is no time a policeman can come to your pocket and remove money from you so it is actually you who is corrupting the police. So it is the society which is doing this and it is wrong. I want to ask the public not to compromise the police otherwise we will deal with you,” (NDONGA, 2016, para.2).

4.2.2 Unwillingness to report police corrupt acts

People not reporting police corrupt acts was one of the major themes emerged from the interview data. This theme was identified as one of the reasons behind police corruption that relates directly research question two. However, when asked for the public if they would report police breaking the law by committing corruption acts, the study found different perspectives from the different people interviewed. Here are some of the opinions found:

“I think it is the same if I report or not because there is no strong punishment against these corrupt acts” (participant 5, 2016)

Participants 3, 7, and 6 strongly agree with participant 5 that the police misconduct consequences are minimal. There is no strong independent commission that investigate and take official actions against the corrupt officers if one reports them.

Yet contrasting perspectives arises here with participants one, four, and eight regarding why public are unwilling to report police corrupt activities. For example, participant four noted that:

“I think people are not willing to report police misconducts because of fear of revenge. Again you cannot trust the one you are giving the complaint reports and he/she will have all your personal information” (participant 4, 2016)

Supporting with the same participant four viewpoints participant one stated that:

“Most of the police corruption illegal action are left unreported because of fear that they will revenge you afterwards. People do not dare to report police committing crime” (participant 1, 2016).

Unlike both different viewpoints presented above, some other participants have a different point of view concerning reporting police corrupt acts. For example participant ten stated that: “people are unwilling to report police corrupt deeds because they do not know where and how to report the police misconduct behavior. This participant raised the importance of public education about reporting the corruption activities” (participant 10, 2016).

This arguments was supported by several other participants when asked the question of, If they saw police taking bribe from citizens, is there specific institutions to contact in order to report the corrupt act? I do not know was the most repeatedly answer for more than half of the participants.

While some police officer’s interviews agrees partially the above public perception’s results when it comes to the reporting corruption incidents. For example, one police participants confessing indicated that:

“I think it is not common among the police officers reporting another colleague who is committing corruption acts” (Participant 13, 2016).

Another officer stated that, “People do not trust the police because of the situation of the chaos Somalia for more than two decades. People have witnessed some bad/corrupt officers using force, beating people, robbing and in some occasions killing them, was common in the city. Now there is a strong rule against police robbing, killing and beating people. If a police officer kills ordinary citizen then he will be killed by the police” (Participant 17, 2016).

While some of the present findings seem to be consistent with the organizational theory of police misconduct in curtailing the code of silence measurement that Ivković and Haberfeld (2015) stated that there is unwritten rules between police officers which is not to incriminate or give incriminating information against a colleague officer. Meanwhile participant thirteen agreed with the above statement and said, “I think it is not common among the police officers reporting another colleague who is committing corruption acts” (Participant 13, 2016).

Similarly, participant seventeen raised the issue of bad apples versus rotten apple theory and he put the blame on some bad officers.

4.2.3 Police staffing process

Staffing process was one of the most significant themes emerged as one main the reasons of police corruption. More than half of the participants strongly agreed that staffing was not enough to screen the background of the individuals joining the police force. They pointed out that individuals already had a criminal record such as Mogadishu warlord’s militias, civil war soldiers and others with criminal background are today part of the police force.

One of the participants stated, “Majority of our police force are recruited from different clan militias, warlord’s militias, Islamic courts militias and young people that grew up during the civil war. They have accustomed robbing, killing and asking bribe to innocent people. And we know that if an individual accustom something he/she will continue to do so” (Participant 6, 2016).

Another participant emphasized the same issue as participant six, however, acknowledges the situation of Somalia, which leaves you with no option but having criminals in the police. “For me I can say that many criminals joined the police force as alternative livelihood. And the situation of Somalia makes inevitable to recruit these people having criminal background because in Somalia almost everyone involved criminal acts in one way or another and the

government cannot ignore all its people and recruit from outside. I think extensive ethical training will help to mitigate the act of police corruption” (participant 4, 2016).

Amazingly, some of the police participants admitted that this issue of screening the background for those joining the police is an important tool for protecting corruption in the police force. One of the police participants commented, “Yes it is true that staffing process is a significant technique to protect police corruption activities. We accepted several young people who were soldiers of Mogadishu warlords, street gangs because we were not have enough resources to screen their background, there were no government that registered their criminal record, no enough time to search clean people because the country desperately needed some police, military forces to fight against al Shabaab and stabilize the security. Therefore we were not left any other choice than accepting those youngsters” (Participant 16, 2016).

The above findings raised important issue recruitment and selection procedures, which we have discussed in chapter two. Recruitment and selection procedures is used as a significant tool for protecting the corruption in the police agency(Hope Sr, 2015). Furthermore he found that there is a negative relationship with background check and corruption incidence, strong background check results with low incidence of corruption, while non-strong background check results with high corruption incidence. Despite the fact that some of the above participants claimed that there is no strong full background checks in the staffing process in the police agency, resulted recruiting already criminal background people in the agency that will take advantage of the police power to gain their personal and clan interests.

4.3 How does the salary policy influence police corruption in Mogadishu?

4.3.1 Police salary and remuneration

Salary for the police officer was the most predominant theme that almost all of the respondents touched upon as a main cause of police corruption. Somali police get one hundred American dollar as a salary per month. Moreover, the government does not pay the salary regularly to the police (Mills, Pham, & Kilcullen, 2013). This has made police officer extremely vulnerable for corrupt act. On the other hand, al Shabaab is sitting on the side of the corner looking for corrupt officers. One of the public participant stated that:

“In Somalia police does not get enough regular salary and the government depend on donors for the police and other civil servant’s salaries. This a one of the biggest factors that lead police officers to commit corruption” (Participant 4, 2016).

Similarly, Mogadishu resident participants 1, 3, 8, and 9 strongly agreed that salary for the police officer is the leading factor that makes officers to slip in corrupt acts. Here are some of their quotations:

“The government of Somalia will only be able to defeat al Shabaab once they pay the police and armies regular enough remuneration. Sometimes you see a police officer that badly wounded while fighting al Shabaab and he does not get the necessary treatment inside Somalia, he needs to be taken to the in a foreign country to get necessary treatment but the government will never help him to be taken to the abroad for treatment. This even depresses the other officer’s loyalty and they know that if they get injured during the fight against al Shabaab that they will never get the necessary health care that they need” (Participant 9, 2016)

Another participants indicated that the government will become legitimate government once they able to pay its police salary. While stating the salary issue he said that:

“Without police is like without government. The government of Somalia does not pay their police officers salary constantly. The Somali police salary is \$100 while Amisom police get ten times more than that amount. You see the gap. I think no one become loyal for \$100. This makes the police corrupted” (Participant 3, 2016).

One more participants noted that:

“If the government wants to defeat al Shabaab and become powerful government they should care their police and armies. Salary for the police officer in Somalia is not enough for one person for the whole month. And in fact we know that most of the officers are married and have kids. If the officers cannot manage his bills and children school’s fees how can he become strong and honest officer” (Participant 1, 2016).

Having seen Mogadishu resident’s excerpts about Somali police’s salaries. Now the study will present of the officers thoughts about their salaries and remunerations. One of the senior officers when asked about a general question regarding the salary of the police officers while amused stated that:

“You know that nobody in the police gets enough salary. We are the ones who are dying in the frontlines, we are the ones who are confronting al Shabaab, and yet we are the ones who get the least salary when you compare the other institutions in the government. Is

that fair? No that's not. We have tried several times to persuade our heads but nobody is listening to us" (Participant 11, 2016).

Meanwhile another junior officer when asked about the police salary mention that:

"We are poorly paid and not paid regularly. If I could get better job than this I would have gladly taken it but unfortunately, we do not have a choice. And yes this causes that some of the officers become corrupted and even if al Shabaab offered to them" (Participant 15, 2016).

Likewise, almost all of the police participants strongly agreed that with participant 11 and 15 that they are not paid well and constantly.

The results presented here are consistent with the some of the theories presented in the theoretical framework chapter as well as the news articles literature about Somali police salaries. These findings strongly supports with Newburn and Webb (1999) summary of the constant and variable leading factors that causes of police officers to commit corruption. For the fifth constant factors was (*Status problems*) on police officers remuneration and other compensations that are deprived compared to their hard work and their powers. As participants eleven, senior Somali police officers argued that they are the ones who are fighting against al Shabaab; taking risk for their lives and their work cannot be comparable to their salaries.

Similarly, in the literature such as the news articles one can found similar findings that are consistent to these findings on the police salary. The "Lack of Somali public service salaries makes life difficult for all" news article written in hiiraan.com in Thursday, July 2, 2015 demonstrates that the Somali finance ministry confesses publicly that some of the government civil servants including the police have not paid for the last four months. Some of the police officers complaining about the issues told the journalists while sitting in a restaurant that due to the lack of salary for the four months they are facing many problems including evictions from the house they used to live. Here are some of the direct passages of the police:

"We have not had salaries since January and yesterday the shop I borrowed food from for my family stopped lending to me," said one police officer.

Another officer while blaming the Somali government said that:

“I am sure both the Government of Somalia and the international community are equally to blame but since we don’t work for the international community we can only hold our government responsible,”

Meanwhile another police officer complaining about eviction said:

“It is very sad that we are working so hard to help our people and we are becoming homeless,”

Correspondingly, Reuters news article “Somalia's security forces hamstrung by corruption, infiltrators” written in reuters.com in Friday May 3, 2013 by Richard Lough and Abdi Sheikh. By addressing corruption issue they interviewed some police officers regarding the salary issues. Here are some of the interviewed police quotations:

Omar is one of these officers complaining the salary while emphasizing the significant impact of salary on combating violent extremism said:

“If only we could get \$500 a month, al Shabaab would be extinct ... We would stand in the alleyways day and night and pick them off like ripe bananas”

Another officer interviewed by these journalists grumbled that: “Shoe shiners have a better life... They are not targets and they get a better income”

All the above findings from the police interview, the Mogadishu residents public interviews, agreed that low payment for the police in Somalia was one of the major factors that exposed police to become corrupted.

4.4 What are the relationship between police corruption, radicalization and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu?

During the interview, participants were asked if there is a relationship between police corruption, radicalization and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu. As follow-up question, the study asked participants to mention any example they have to support their excerpts. Surprisingly, more than half of the participants agreed that police corruption is helping al Shabaab for their attacks but few of the participants came up with examples of incidents that clearly supports their claims and those who came these examples were the public participants not the police participants.

Here are some of the comments that participants point out during the interview. One participant commented that: “Yes there is a relationship between police corruption and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu. I would not say all police officers are corrupt however; some police officers that helped al Shabaab to give useful security information that enabled them to attack the government building such as the parliament building and Villa Somalia. Examples of these incidents are a lot more than people thought. The repeatedly attacks on the Somali presidential palace Villa Somalia from 2014 is one example. It is clear that bribery act that helped al Shabaab members to enter this well-secured presidential palace where one must pass through three security checks before entering inside the palace (Participant 3, 2016).

Similarly participant five have the same point of view that how could be possible for al Shabaab to enter a high security buildings like intelligence headquarters, presidential palace where the president, the prime minister and parliament speaker resides. There must be corrupt officers, government official employees that works with/for al Shabaab. Participant eight, took the Daallo airline attack as an illustration of incidents. On 2 February 2016, a man called Abdullahi Abdisalam Borleh with explosive device built into a laptop computer managed to pass the security checks in the airport and tried to kill the 74 passenger on board but ended killing his self. The same question arises here how could he managed to pass the security check having explosive devices.

Another participant criticized the Somali government by saying that: “The attacks against the government building, hotels, and restaurants happened repeatedly and there was no enough investigation to capture those involved the attack and facilitated the attacks. Each and every time we hear attacks happen here and there and we never heard the arrest of those involved the attacks. It is undoubtedly that some corrupt police officers are part of the problem. Yes, they are not paid regularly but that is not enough justification to take bribe and put risk for the lives of their colleagues, their community as well as their leaders” (participant 9, 2016).

One more participant stated that, “It is unquestionable that there is a link between police corruption and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu. We have seen several times al Shabaab launching an attack in Mogadishu hotels restaurants where government officials, diplomats and publics often meet. Most of the target places are well-secured where the Somali police

and army have a full control. So if you think about these attacks carefully you will find that there are some people facilitating the attacks in one way or another” (Participant 1, 2016).

Most of the above participant’s comments addressed the same issue of police officers or other government official taking bribe from al Shabaab, which damages the whole security system and anti-terror efforts.

Out of participant’s excerpts, the study summarizes that police corruption facilitates terrorist attacks in Mogadishu in one way or another.

When it comes the link between police corruption and radicalization, very few participants touched upon the issue. For instance, participant three stated, “police corruption can cause people to become radicalized in the sense that it involves using of excessive force, beating and physical violence, humiliation against politics or even killing family member which makes people become angry, of felt injustice, discriminated and marginalized and that leads search for revenge and join al Shabaab”. Another participant agreed and told that he knows an example of people joined al Shabaab just for revenge because of police arrested family member and accused as being member of al Shabaab and asked to pay thousands of dollars for his releasement from the prison.

The above quotation shows police corruption leads people to become self-radicalized and join al Shabaab for search of retaliation.

Likewise, being aware of that all radicalization process not necessarily leads to violent extremism, the study asked participants if there are links between radicalization and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu.

Here are some of the comments that participants gave: “yes, radicalization leads to commit terrorist attacks because when you join al Shabaab you have to accept whatever they order you, otherwise you will be killed” (participants 20, 2016).

Participant eight commented, “ in several case radicalization and terrorist attacks are interlinked because if you are radicalized by someone else then it is easier for that person to help you join by al Shabaab and once you join them you do not have an option”

Similarly, participants one, five, fifteen and nineteen agreed that radicalization leads to join al Shabaab and when you join al Shabaab, you are likely to execute terror attacks against your people.

However, two participants had different viewpoints and they put it in this way: “yes radicalization might lead to violent extremism but not all radicalized people end up to committing terrorist attacks” (participant 19, 2016). This shows how this participant is well informed about the two connotation that radicalization can have.

Participant two agreed with participants nineteen that “Not all radicalized people become terrorist and I have my own example of that. In 2007 when the Ethiopian launch airstrike in Mogadishu, I still remember, I was a student at one of universities in Mogadishu and one of our class leaders stood up and read several verses of Quran and encouraged us to join the jihad even just help our mujahidin brothers and sisters to donate our bloods. I was radicalized in a way but never joined al Shabaab and committed terrorist attacks”.

Overall, based on the participant’s claims that there exists a relationship between police corruption and terrorist attacks, police corruption and radicalization and radicalization and terrorist attacks.

Evidences support the participant’s claims seem to be consistent. Many incidents have happened in Mogadishu for the last decade that points out police corruption pushing people towards al Shabaab recruitment and radicalization.

One example of these incidents include clan conflict in Marka Lower Shabelle between Habar-gidir sub-clan of Hawiye and Biyamal sub-clan of Dir over control of territory which began late 2013. Reports indicate that Somali security forces were fighting alongside Habar-gidir militia, which produced hundreds of civilians killing, and displacement. Some reports confirm that it was Habar-gidir militia together with Somali government commit massacre against Lower Shabelle inhabitants where homes and farms have been burned, houses were looted, women raped and mass killing ensued. General Mohamed Roble Jim ‘ale “Gobale”, General Mohamed Hassan Qaafow, soldiers from the 3rd and 5th Brigade, were among the Somali security forces involved the clan conflict in Lower Shabelle (UN, 2014, Shacabka Media, 2014).

The above example clearly indicates that Somali national army including the police abusing power to gain clan interest. Misusing the government resources including arm weapon, soldiers to clan conflict will eventually bring political grievances which is one of the significant “explanatory factors driving radicalization” (Christmann, 2012, p. 26). According to LANDINFO (2011) clan conflict fuels radicalization in the sense that radical groups takes


advantage to exert influence to minority clans. Source indicate minority clans including Biyamal transferred weapons and armed forces to al Shabaab (Halganka, 2010). Al Shabaab, on the other hand, vowed that they would use these weapons to protect the religion and will not be used for any other purpose. A possible explanation for this might be that these clans supported al Shabaab because of distrust to the Somali government. Another explanation might be that they supported al Shabaab so that al Shabaab will support them and defend them in case one of majority clans backed by the Somali government security forces attack them.

Similarly, police corruption facilitates terrorist attacks in Mogadishu where al Shabaab pays bribe to the security forces to get access to well-secured building, roadblocks to commit suicide attacks or assassination. Al Shabaab also pays bribe to security forces to release its captured members from the prison.

Notable example of these incidents is the act of some police officers who assisted an al Shabaab member to escape from the prison. This incident happened on 10th of September 2013. The chief of the Central prison in Mogadishu and other soldiers were arrested on allegations of abating the escape. As reported, close relatives visited the al Shabaab man in the prison and conspired with the police officers who facilitated the escape by dressing the man like a typical Somali woman in Jalbaab iyo Indha shareer, which covers the entire body and they placed a baby on his back. A few days later the prisoners told the officers in charge that the man was missing (Hagi, 2013, Mohamed, 2013).

Another example is the former Brigadier General Abdi Mohamed Ismail was accused and proven by secretly working with al Shabaab. As stated, he used to release Shabaab fighters from the prison when the security forces capture and jail them. Before he escaped from the prison, Mr. Abdi was being sentenced to life imprisonment. While hiding in a house in Mogadishu, the security forces captured and arrested him again (SomaliSwiss Media, 2013).

Asking critical question such as, how al Shabaab have been able to access well-secured buildings and execute their attacks. How they have been able to plan high-level attacks with full knowledge of the building plans and the schedule of security personnel in the building including the human population in the building at any one point in time? One will find that the abovementioned incidents and many more signals how police corruption is serving for al Shabaab to launch attacks as well as recruit more people. The figure shows the connections between police corruption, radicalization and terrorist attacks that the participants mentioned.



The study model.

This model looks simple and very straightforward but based into the above examples the model makes sense as it shows the relation between police corruption and terrorism attacks. Simply, by bribing the police al Shabaab get access to well-secured places where police and security forces are present and have security checks and roadblocks.

Similarly, the model shows that there is relationship between police corruption and radicalization in the sense that Mogadishu police use/ and have used excessive force, abuse, physical violence, humiliation against publics and minority clans that creates a situation of feeling injustice, discrimination and marginalization, which in turn leads to search for revenge. Simply, by searching revenge minorities end up by joining al Shabaab, which seems to be the only power that can confront the government and its allies.

4.5 What are the contributing factors of radicalization in Mogadishu?

4.5.1 Socio-economic factors

Unemployment, lack of education and poverty are among the socioeconomic factors that drives Somali youth to radicalization.

According to participant Seven Somali youth is severely vulnerable to be recruited by al Shabaab because they are uneducated, unemployed. He added that education prevents brainwashing and employment helps to be part of the society not isolated and idle.

Police participant eleven commented that socioeconomic factors are one of the major factors that leads youth to join al Shabaab and become antagonistic to the society:

“It is unfortunate that al Shabaab is taking advantage of our youth that are sitting at the corner of the streets doing nothing, they are jobless, unable to go to school because their families cannot afford the school fees. Therefore, they become annoyed with their living situation and join al Shabaab. Once they join al Shabaab, they exclude themselves from the entire society and see them as their first enemy as they tend to blame their predicament on the society.”

Another participant stated that al Shabaab is selfish towards youth because just by giving them little money, they can use them for their gorilla war attacks, suicide bombings as well as risk missions to kill government officials and foreign diplomats and the society (participant 4, 2016).

The perception of the majority of participants expressed that they believe lack of education together with unemployment and poverty have made Somali youth to be exploited by al Shabaab.

For example, participants two, three, ten, fourteen, eighteen and fifteen have the same point of view that the status quo in Somalia supported al Shabaab for their existence. Lack of central powerful government that can provide youth alternative livelihood opportunities, poor education and poverty, clan politics are the current situation in Somalia that supported al Shabaab. While seventeen out of the 20 participants interviewed expressed that the socioeconomic factors has contributed push factors to terrorist organizations.

The present findings seem to be partially consistent with the relative deprivation theory that has been presented in chapter two. According to Flynn (2008), relative deprivation theory is useful in explaining socio-political, economic, and organizational problems. The theory concentrates on the feelings and actions of an individual or group of people. For example, one might compare his status on the society and found that he is deprived in relation to the society (Flynn, 2008). It is these feelings of underprivileged in terms of employment, education and poverty that drove many Somali youth to join al Shabaab.

The findings of the current study are also partially in agreement with those of Richardson (2011) who found that there is a strong connection between an increase in unemployment and an increase in terrorist attacks. The Richardson findings supports in the case of Somalia where we have one of the highest rates of youth unemployment in the world 67 percent (UNDP, 2012) on the one hand, on the other hand we have al Shabaab who offers youth employment opportunities with \$50-\$150 monthly payment (Hassan, 2012).

Finally, most of the participant’s comments sheds light on that being unemployed, uneducated leads to frustration, victimization and humiliation that enables terrorist

organizations like al Shabaab to gain the attention of those perceived injustice and eventually recruit them for their cause (Grothaus, 2011).

It should be noteworthy to mention here that the findings of this study contradicts the main stream popular belief that “terrorists tend to be highly educated and from wealthier families than average” (Richardson, 2011, p. 1).

4.5.2 Religion

Religion was another significant theme that was collectively highlighted by all participants. They indicated that Islamic religion was used to justify many terrorist attacks in Mogadishu and the killing of hundreds of innocent people. All participants agreed that al Shabaab used the religion for justification of their terror attacks, for recruitment purpose and for motivation of their militias. In explaining what role Islam play in violent radicalization in Somalia, participant seven said:

“Islam does not promote violent terrorism. Islam is a religion of peace but unfortunately, it has been used as justification of killing even another Muslim person. If you look at the Qur’anic verses you will find a verse that says whoever kills innocent person it is as though he has killed all mankind for that reason Islam is rejecting killing innocent people. Islam was also used to brainwash our youth and convince them to join al Shabaab.” (participant 7, 2016).

One police participant stated that al Shabaab took advantage of the vulnerable unemployed young people who are sitting at the corner of Mogadishu streets doing nothing. They approached them by twisting some Qur’anic verses and convinced these young group to join them and implement terror attacks against their Muslim fellows (participant 15, 2016).

Interestingly, another participant officer stated that Somali people are weak in two sides the religion side and the clan one. Whenever one wants to enthuse the public, he uses either clan or religion. Moreover, he reinforced with the arguments of the majority participants who mentioned that al Shabaab indoctrinated thousands of Somali youth with the help of religious imams and sheikhs (participant 19, 2016)

One more participant commented, “To radicalize people were told that Christian crusaders invaded our country and they are humiliating our wives and Muslim sisters, killing our children and they want to occupy our country. Jihad is must for every Muslim and they showed some videos that Muslims being humiliated by none Muslims. Therefore Islam and Muslims were used to indoctrinate and recruit people” (participant 3, 2016).

To sum up, almost all participants agreed that Islam does not encourage violent extremism however, al Shabaab has twisted some Holy Qur'anic verses to radicalized thousands of Somalis to join and fight for their cause.

The findings accords with social identity theory in the sense that group identity and sense of belonging was one of the major factors that pushed many Somalis to join al Shabaab and execute terrorist attacks. Being Muslim is being part of the Islamic world and the fact that these youth joined al Shabaab because Islam was under threat enlightens that social identity theory together with Islamic religion supports the violent radicalization in Somalia.

These results are consistent with the one Omayio (2014) found that religion can be used to stimulate conflict and peace equally because it provides people an identity. It can also be used to reenergize, find legitimacy and even economic support from the public.

Interestingly, some of the participants clearly supported Omayio's (2014) findings that al Shabaab used Islam for recruitment purpose, for getting support from the public as well as encouraging their militias.

4.5.3 Clan politics and youth grievances

Surprisingly clan politics was one of themes that emerged from the participant interviews. Majority of the participants pointed out the fact that Somalia is clan-based; youth have very limited opportunities to participate political decision-making process because clan elders are the barriers between youth and political participation. For example, clan elders are the ones who elect parliament members through 4.5 clan based political system where each clan is devoted number of members that represent them.

One of the participants stated, "It is very unfortunate that youth are excluded from political participation because of the Somali cultural believes that youth are not mature enough and cannot take responsibility to lead a community. For that reason youth became vulnerable for the Shabaab recruitment" (Participant 2, 2016)

Another participant commented that youth became totally abandoned by their clans, the government and the society at large when it comes to their political inclusion. Youth are not allowed to lead their clans, to participate formal meetings that concerns and influences their future all that because of they are young and unexperienced. The Somali culture is a barrier to the youth (participant 9, 2016).

Meanwhile another participant put it in this way by saying, "Somali youth face multiple forms of discrimination from their societies. They are not allowed to participate political decisions that affect their future. Their clans would never recommend to represent

them in the political arena. All because of the cultural perception that youth are not reliable to lead the society that is why youth are joining al Shabaab” (participant 14, 2016).

Another participant pointed out that Somali youth are more likely to be exposed to social, economic and political marginalization than older age. They are discriminated by their society and culture that believe that youth are incompetent to become leaders of a community because they are inexperienced. The issue turn out to be worse when it comes to talk about female youth’s social, economic and political participation, which becomes out of question (participant 6, 2016).

Another participant commented the youth’s power to transform a political system in a country, to destroy a regime and to build a destroyed country such as Somalia commented, “Youth have the power to destroy the whole political system in Somalia. In fact, it was the youth who were used to destroy the former dictatorship regime in 1991. They are capable of building the country by transforming the corrupted clan based political system that clan leaders represent the whole society. If the youth realize their power one day and become united, I am sure the country will prosper. The competing clan, government and al Shabaab are all taking advantage of youth. Their power is youth” (participant 9, 2016).

These claims made by these participants are seems to be allegations and not proof that youth have been marginalized and discriminated by their clans, government and mainstream society.

Similarly, in the literature such as the news articles one can found parallel findings that are consistent to these findings on youth and clan politics. For example on April 2015 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/> wrote an article *named “Somali youth speaks - formative findings from the different regions”* the context of the article was that despite youth represent the biggest segment of the Somali population, “they are marginalized and excluded from decision making on family, community and national issues. This combined with high unemployment rates and low school enrolment rates means that Somalia has an extremely high proportion of disenfranchised youth” (BBC, 2015, para.1).

The above findings are consistent some the theories proposed in the theoretical framework in chapter two. Relative deprivation theory and humiliation theory provides some insight into motives of the Somali youth for joining al Shabaab. As participants cited youth are encountering high level of discrimination when it comes to political, economic and social participation because of the cultural and elders.

However, the findings support those with Twum-Danso (2005) that claims despite more 50% of the African population is youth, they are marginalized through political and

social structures, and they are ignored and overlooked. If youth given the opportunities to take part of social, political and economic development of the society it will help the whole continent to prosper. However, if youth is excluded they will reverberate across the continent. Twum-Danso (2005) concluded that once the youth given the opportunity to lead it is significant that they kept in mind not to discriminate the next generation on the basis of age, gender, class or disability and that they are ready to relinquish power to the next generation when their term ends. “Failure to do so will lead to the persistence of ‘elder power’ and ‘youth rebellion’, which has been a central element in the vicious cycle of conflicts in Africa” (Twum-Danso, 2005, p. 26).

The findings concur with those of Elmi and Barise (2006) who found that the huge number of jobless youth contributed to the conflict of Somalia. Youngsters live in a desperate situation and their misery life provided the competing greed-driven elites and other agents with readily available human resources with grievances in a collapsed state context. Eventually, these elites exploited the situation of the youth and organized the young men in a way that interested to them (Elmi & Barise, 2006).

4.6 Other interesting findings

4.6.1 Clan loyalties

According to some participants, Clan loyalties play a major role in police corruption and terrorist in Mogadishu. The most interesting finding that arose from the participant interview was police loyalty to clan and sub clan rather than national loyalty. Almost ten participants raised this issue as one of the major problems hindering the defeat of al Shabaab. Those participants agreed that it was one of the major obstacles that exist in the police force in Mogadishu. Although the way they put it was different from one participants to another. Here some of the excerpts from the participant perspectives:

One participant commented, “We know that clannism sits deeply into our people’s heart. Even the police are loyal to their clans rather than government. Unless we understand the problem of clannism, we will never defeat al Shabaab and our country will remain undeveloped” (participant 5, 2016)

Yet on the other hand, another participant put it on this way addressing the current political system as injustice discriminating some of the minority clans while favoring the majority clans that reinforces the problem of clannism. He stated, “As long as the government is based on clan based 4.5 political system clan loyalty will exist even in the police force

because it is injustice in the sense that it supports the majority clans and eventually minority clans perceive themselves that they are excluded from the political arena. This will damage even if the Somali government recruited officers from the minority clans, these officers will always loyal to their minority clans” (participant 8, 2016).

Similarly, another officer condemning the 4.5 clan based political system in Somalia cited, “The 4.5 system rejects some citizen from even becoming candidates in the high positions such as presidential or prime minister level for that negative intention many police officers think that they are just defending other clan interests rather than theirs (participant 19, 2016).

The findings here highlights important political challenges that Somalia governments needs to be tackled. Clan loyalty damages the fight against terrorism for the police officer is unlikely to fight and perceive himself as an instrument of certain clan interests rather than as representing the Somali state for the benefit of all clans and citizens (Williams, 2014).

On the other hand, some clan misconceived the elimination of al-Shabaab from certain areas as an occupying war against their clans and see the Somalia national army representing certain clans’ interests that seeking territorial expansion (Williams, 2014).

CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

The present study was designed to explore: the relationship between police corruption, radicalization and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu, how Mogadishu police as well as the community at large conceptualize police corruption, radicalization and terrorism, reasons behind police corruption in Mogadishu, the influence of salary policy on police corruption in Mogadishu and find out contributing factors of Shabaab radicalization and recruitment in Mogadishu.

The findings of this study indicated potential link between police corruption, radicalization and terrorist attacks in one way or another. The study found that police corruption facilitates terrorist attacks and police corruption turns people to become radicalized in the sense that Mogadishu police use of excessive force, physical violence including torturing, raping, slapping against public individuals and their families.

Despite the fact that there is no universally agreed definition of police corruption, radicalization and terrorism as mentioned in chapter one, the study also identified that participants have touched upon important components for the definition of the terms of police corruption, radicalization and terrorism. For police corruptions, the participant's definitions captured significant elements of the scholarly definitions such power abuse, personal gain and some of the corruption activities that like bribe. For radicalization, participants picked up important parts of scholarly definitions of the term for instance that radicalization involves a process, extremism, isolation, rejecting mainstream, radical views. Finally, for terrorism participants mentioned some important parts of the scholarly definitions of terrorism that terrorism involves violent, threat, political agenda and etc.

Moreover, the study found that irregular low payment to the police, public offering bribe to the police (blame on the public), lack of full background checking for individuals joining the police agency(police staffing process), and public unwillingness to report police corrupt acts as are the reasons behind police corruption in Mogadishu. While discovering the reasons behind police corruption, this study found that blames for the public plays a major role by being the givers of the bribes. Corruption only survives when there is a giver and a taker of the bribes. The unwillingness to report acts of corruption by the public has also been confirmed to be a key contributor to increased incidences of corruption. Staffing process has also been highlighted by the study to have created gaps within the force for easy infiltration

by people with past criminal records as recruits as there is no enough background investigation for applicants willing to join the police. This study also confirm that salary policy is a key contributor to police corruption. Poor remuneration according to the study pushes officers to look for alternative sources of income sometimes allowing themselves to be spies for the al Shabaab as a way of getting some extra money. This has widened the network of al Shabaab creating more insecurity in Mogadishu. With a salary of one hundred US dollars in a month for a person who is always in front line protecting citizens was made the police officers vulnerable to corruption, which has now derailed the fight against al Shabaab very significantly.

Similarly, the finding of this study exposed that socioeconomic factors such as unemployment, lack of education together with religion and clan politics and youth grievances are among the contributing factors that drive Somali youth to radicalization and Shabaab recruitment. This study highlighted that despite the fact that Islam as a religion does not support violence against innocent people; al Shabaab fighters use it as justification for their attacks. The study also highlighted the plight of idle unemployed youths as a target for recruitment. According to this study, addressing socio-economic issues among youths and acknowledging their input as key members of the society will stop them from seeking a voice within al Shabaab. Likewise, clan politics led youth grievances, which made them became vulnerable for the Shabaab recruitment. Youth encountering several forms of discrimination including exclusion of political participation, humiliation that they are incapable of leading was also perceived as one of the factors the drive youth to join al Shabaab.

Finally, the study found that clan loyalty even affects the war on terrorism against al Shabaab, as officers do not fight with the same zeal as they do when they are fighting for their clans. Police in Mogadishu are loyal to their clans instead of being loyal to the state and the community.

5.1 Recommendations

To address police corruption, radicalization and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu, the study suggests the following recommendations:

Police hiring should be done without any bias. Full background screening of all candidates must be done before hiring the police to ensure individuals with criminal background do not become police officers. Correspondingly, the government should improve the working conditions of the police and introduce a salary policy that meets the needs of the officers and which is commensurate to the work they do on the ground protecting the citizens of Mogadishu. This will reduce their vulnerability to corruption especially by al Shabaab.

On the other hand, public awareness must be raised, as it is vital to preventing corruption and radicalization. The public awareness can be raised through media by educating the people the seriousness of corruption and radicalization to their lives. The public should take up responsibility and stop bribing the police. They should also report any corrupt dealings to the authorities. The government should therefore create an oversight body for the police to handle any complaints against the police.

The government should address education, unemployment and political grievances among the youths of Mogadishu. Barriers to education should be eliminated and free education should be given to the youth, as they/their parents cannot afford to pay private school fees. Alternative ways to obtain basic skills for employment is also necessary to protect youth joining al Shabaab.

As merely conducting military operations against Al Shabaab is not enough, it is needed to address the root causes of terrorism. Collective action must be undertaken to tackle against police corruption, Shabaab radicalization and recruitment by the religious leaders, clan elders, business group, civil society members, Somali federal government, and international community.

Finally, the study will propose for further research on this topic for it concerns the lives of millions of people in Somalia as well as the region. A further empirical research will help Somali federal governments and its international allies to identify the root causes of corruption, radicalization and terrorist attacks.

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7. Appendices

7.1 Appendix 1: Participant characteristics

Participant 1: is a Mogadishu resident businessman who is 29 years old with married with four kids. His educational level is secondary school. He has never been out of Somalia.

Participant 2: is Mogadishu resident man who is 32 years old. He is not married and his profession is teacher. He has been in Mogadishu for the last ten years moved from Galkaio. He is a university graduate with bachelor in arts.

Participant 3: is 25 years old Mogadishu resident girl. She is not married but she has two kids. She has never been out of Mogadishu. His educational level is secondary.

Participant 4: is a NGO worker living in Mogadishu more 15 years now. He has moved Baidao and came to Mogadishu for educational purpose. He is 35 years old married with one kid. He is a university graduate with bachelor in economics.

Participant 5: is a Mogadishu resident man with secondary educational level. He has never been abroad out of Mogadishu. He is working with a construction company in Mogadishu. He is not married.

Participant 6: is postgraduate-level girl with master of development studies from one of the Ugandan universities. She is 33 years old and working a lecturer in one of the Mogadishu institutes. She has never been out of Mogadishu except 3 years for educational purpose.

Participant 7: is 45 years old Mogadishu resident man. He has been living in Mogadishu almost his whole life. He is running his own business and married with 5 kids. His educational level is secondary

Participant 8: is third year undergraduate university student in Mogadishu. He has never been out of Mogadishu. He is 28 years old and not married. He is working part time as a teacher.

Participant 9: is 35 years old women living in Mogadishu. She has been living in Mogadishu for the last ten years. She is a nurse and has a bachelor in nurse. She is working one of the city's hospitals.

Participant 10: is a Mogadishu civil society worker. He has been living in the city for the last 20 years. His educational level is secondary and he is 35 years old.

Participant 11: is Senior Officer who has been serving in the Somali police 13 years before 1991 and 5 years after the collapse of the Somali government. He is a colonel know as in Somali (gaashaanle). He is 60 years old and experienced colonel. He a university graduate in Somali National University.

Participant 12: Sergeants police officer known as (Saddex Alifle in Somalia). He has been serving for the Somali police for the last 10 years. He is 40 years old. He has never been attended formal police education but had some trainings.

Participant 13: is junior police officer know as in Somalia (Dhamme). He is 45 years old and has served as police officer for the last 7 years. He has degree of law but not have police education though he attended some trainings.

Participant 14: is a police inspector known as (kormeere). He is 38 years old with no police education. He has served for the country as a police officer almost all the governments before 1991. He is a secondary school graduate with some police trainings.

Participant 15: a Somali police officer with Corporals rank known as (Laba Alifle). He is 29 years old with 7 years experience in the police. He secondary graduate with 6 months police training.

Participant 16: Senior Officer who has served for the former Somali government before 1991. He is known as in Somalia (Gaashaanle Sare) with long experience in policing sector. He is 58 years old.

Participant 17: is an officer in the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). He was one of the commandos force trained by the United States to fight against terrorism in Somalia. He is 37 years old with a bachelor degree.

Participant 18: is also one of the NISA officers. He is also a graduate in one of the university in Somalia. He is 40 years old.

Participant 19: is Junior Officers (Captain) in the Somali police. He is 35 years old with secondary education level. He has been serving for the police force for the last ten years.

Participant 20: is one of NISA officers trained to combat against violent extremism. He is 42 years old with university degree. He is an expert for neutralizing the bomb threats from al Shabaab.

7.2 Appendix 2: Interview Guide

Welcome and thank you for your participation in this interview. My name is Adam Egal and I am a graduate student at Norwegian University of life sciences. I am conducting my partial fulfillment study of the requirements for the degree of Master of International Relations. The purpose of this research is to: explore the link between police corruption and radicalization and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu; find out how Mogadishu police as well as the community at large conceptualize police corruption, radicalization and terrorism; investigate reasons behind police corruption in Mogadishu, examine the influence of salary policy on police corruption in Mogadishu and discover contributing factors of Shabaab radicalization and recruitment in Mogadishu.

I would hereby confirm you that the information collected through this interview will be used for research purpose and that all of your responses are confidential. I also confirm you that I will not associate your name with anything you say in this interview to avoid putting you in risk. Not even, use your name in my final report. Your participation in this interview is voluntary, if at any time during the interview, you wish to withdraw, please feel free to do so without any consequences.

Remember there are no right or wrong answers, but only differing points of view.

Before I begin, if you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to ask.

Then with your permission, let us begin the interview.

Interview questions

1. In your opinion, what does radicalization and terrorism mean to you?
2. What is police corruption mean to you?
3. Does police commit corruption? If yes, what are the factors that leads police to commit corruption?
4. Are Somali police officers get paid regular enough salary?
5. How police corruption plays a role in radicalization and recruitment for al Shabaab in Mogadishu?
6. In your opinion, does Islam play role radicalization and recruitment in Somalia?
7. How does al-Shabaab recruit their members in Somalia?
8. What in your opinion are the factors that push people to join the al-Shabaab?
9. What role does clan politics play in radicalization and terrorism attacks in Mogadishu?

10. If you had information about al-Shabaab, would you report to the police and how? (for public participants)
11. According to you, what are the connection between police corruption and terrorism attacks in Mogadishu?
12. How would you react if you were offered to take a bribe and asked for to do service? (For police officers)
13. If you saw your colleague (another police officer) taking bribe from citizens, would you report? (For police officers)
14. Is there anything else you would like to say before we finish the interview?

Now I will close the interview thank you very much once again for participating the interview.