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#PRÉSIDENTIELLE2017

A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE 2017 FRENCH

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ON TWITTER

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A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE 2017 FRENCH

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by

Fanny Macé

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Dedication

To the memory of my father,

Pascal Macé (1957-1997)

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#PRÉSIDENTIELLE2017
A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE 2017 FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ON TWITTER

Fanny Macé, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2019

Supervisor: Carl S. Blyth

In the context of the 2017 French presidential election, this dissertation examines political discourse on Twitter from a socio-semiotic perspective. Specifically, it focuses on campaign tweets as a unique genre of discourse that plays a pivotal role in the dissemination and amplification of political discourse. This study uses an innovative framework which combines two approaches to discourse analysis: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). CDA and SFL are socially-oriented approaches to discourse which share a dialectical view of text-in-context whereby discourse shapes and is shaped by the social and cultural context in which it occurs (Fairclough, 2003; Hasan, 2014). I draw on Norman Fairclough's concept of 'order of discourse', which refers to a unique configuration of genres, discourses and styles constitutive of a social practice or structure (Fairclough, 1993). I suggest that digital campaigning constitutes a growing social practice with its own order of discourse, and I examine how the 2017 presidential candidates mobilized particular discursive mechanisms to realize a variety of discourses (ideologies) and styles (identities). In addition,

I analyze how they exploited the generic affordances and constraints of tweets to their advantage. To this end, I collected a total of 208 tweets from six main actors of the 2017 election: outgoing president François Hollande and candidates Emmanuel Macron, Marine Le Pen, François Fillon, Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Benoît Hamon. All tweets were posted in reaction to three events of significance for the election. This dissertation provides an in-depth, multifunctional analysis that focuses on ideational, interpersonal and textual ways of meaning-making: (1) transitivity and social actor representation, (2) modality and engagement and (3) texture and generic structure. I argue that the 2017 election was above all characterized by an effort of the candidates to distance themselves from the political class. I suggest that this anti-establishment sentiment was realized by two 'styles of politics': the populist style and the centrist style. Finally, I argue that the structural constraints of tweets amplify these populist appeals through the combination of decontextualization and semantic condensation.

Key words: *French, Critical Discourse Analysis, Systemic Functional Linguistics, social semiotics, political discourse, social media, Twitter*.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

Rhetoric is the art of ruling the minds of men.
Plato.

Paris. May 7, 2017. Thousands of women and men of all ages are gathered next to the majestic glass pyramid on the Louvre's plaza. Cheers erupt as a triumphant Emmanuel Macron enters the esplanade to the sound of Beethoven's Ode to Joy, the anthem of the European Union. In his victory speech against far-right leader Marine Le Pen, the 39 year-old president-elect thanks the French nation: "You have chosen audacity."[1] Fast forward to December 9, 2018. A crowd of protesters in fluorescent yellow vests stand in front of the Louvre's heavy metal gates. Sirens can be heard in the background and the air is filled with thick plumes of tear gas. For the fourth consecutive weekend, the Gilets Jaunes are chanting what has become their rallying cry: *Macron, démission!* ('Macron, resignation!'). The next day, a somber, haggard-looking Macron issues a televised apology in a bid to appease the tensions that led to the worst street unrest since 1968: "I might have given you the impression that I did not share your concerns, that my priorities were

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[1] "Vous avez choisi l'audace."

elsewhere. I know that I have hurt some of you with my words."[2] Yet, this humbling admission did little to quell the anger of the protesters, who dismissed it as "crumbs" from *le président des riches* - a label Macron has acquired since he took office. Now several months into 2019, the Gilets Jaunes remain bound and determined, and Macron's approval ratings continue to nosedive. While there are multiple and complex factors behind the spectacular rise of candidate-Macron and his equally remarkable fall as president, the concept of 'discursive identity' can shed light on this apparent mystery. Modern elections are very much centered around the notion of performance (Goffman, 1959), and on the necessity to craft an identity that will appeal to a wide array of voters. Accordingly, a successful presidential bid relies primarily on the strategic use of discourse for self-promoting purposes. As we will see throughout this dissertation, numerous discursive strategies contribute to this crafting process.

A former investment banker, Macron ran on the catchphrase *ni de droite, ni de gauche* ('neither right nor left') and vowed to usher a new political era that would transcend the traditional left-right divide. On the campaign trail, he took the part of a televangelist preaching the gospel of a united and rejuvenated nation. We may argue that Macron's 2017 campaign epitomizes

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[2] "J'ai pu donner le sentiment que ce n'était pas mon souci, que j'avais d'autres priorités. Je sais qu'il m'est arrivé de blesser certains d'entre vous par mes propos."

the triumph of form over substance; He was *en marche* ('going forward') but his path remained unclear, he claimed that he had a *projet* for France but he never quite revealed its nature (Gaboulaud & Lechevallier, 2018).Yet, his undying optimism led many to entertain the hope that he was *l'homme providentiel* at a time when an overwhelming majority of voters were dissatisfied with mainstream politics. In the spring of 2017, the French political climate was indeed defined by political fragmentation, public apathy and lack of engagement in politics. A nationwide survey released in January 2017[3] revealed that 89% of participants (n = 2044) did not trust their political leaders. In such a deeply demoralized and divided country. Macron's positive vision appealed particularly to young voters. In a jab at outgoing president François Hollande, Macron promised that he would not "pretend to be a normal president". Instead, he aspired for exceptionalism and strong leadership. As he sat on the throne of the Elysée in the summer of 2017, Macron traded his 'catch-all' campaign persona for that of a Republican monarch. His most recent predecessors – Chirac, Sarkozy and Hollande – attempted to increase their proximity to the French people by addressing them in a simple, accessible manner. In contrast, Macron reckoned that what he perceives as linguistic superiority, such as his frequent use of archaic and erudite words, would assert his superiority as a political leader (Gaboulaud & Lechevallier, 2018). Yet

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[3] Cevipof (Sciences Po), January 2017: <u>Political Trust Barometer</u>.

instead of gaining the respect and the legitimacy he craved, Macron has built a reputation for arrogance and imperiousness. Importantly, the public's frustration and feeling of alienation towards a political class they perceive as deceitful and out-of-touch has contributed to the rise of populism across western democracies (Wodak, 2015). With his boastful yet simplistic rhetoric, Donald Trump is the archetype of the 'antipolitician'. Simple phrasing and basic lexicon make his short, to-the-point statements portray assertiveness in addition to being easy to grasp by the audience (Kreis, 2017). Above all, Trump embodies an utter rejection of the political establishment. In recent years, populist movements – including Trump's MAGA movement – have been exploiting social media to their advantage. Twitter stands out due to its character limit, which requires users to compress their messages into short 'microposts'. Because of this concision constraint, tweets are convenient vehicles for sound bites, buzzwords and empty catchphrases (Longhi, 2013). Moreover, the instantaneity and ubiquity of social media means that any message can be widely distributed with infinitesimal delay (Zappavigna, 2012).

This dissertation examines the impact of Twitter on political discourse in the context of the 2017 French presidential election. Specifically, it focuses on campaign tweets as a unique genre of discourse that plays a pivotal role in the dissemination and amplification of political discourse. In the remainder of this chapter, I establish the context and rationale for the development of this study.

After providing a short description of the 2017 election and of the concept of 'Twitter politics', I introduce my conceptual framework as well as the main goals of the analysis. I then present the research questions that have guided my analysis and conclude with a brief outline of each chapter.

Context of the study

The 2017 French presidential election

Under the current voting system established in the 1960's, presidential elections are conducted in two rounds, or *tours*. The first round (*premier tour*) is open to any candidate with 500 signatures of support from elected officials. Some of these candidates are nominated by political parties, while others run as independents. A run-off (*second tour*) between the two leading candidates is then held two weeks after the first ballot. In the last election, the first round took place on April 23, 2017 and included eleven candidates. On May 7, a run-off opposed centrist independent Emmanuel Macron and National Front leader Marine Le Pen, which Macron won by a comfortable margin (66%).

The 2017 election was unique in many respects, and a cascade of events led to a highly unpredictable campaign that ultimately redefined the French political landscape. First, the tense political climate provided a fertile ground for populist movements and political outsiders, and resulted in the dislocation

of France's traditional left-right axis, which opposed the center-left Parti Socialiste and the center-right Républicains. Widespread distrust and dissatisfaction with mainstream parties led the 2017 electorate to privilege outsiders rather than the traditional party heavyweights. On November 27, 2016, François Fillon defied every poll with a landslide victory in the Republican primary election. Former president Nicolas Sarkozy, who had been yearning for a comeback, retired from political life shortly after his defeat. A few days later, President François Hollande announced that he would not seek reelection amidst dismal approval ratings. Benoît Hamon won the subsequent Socialist primary, but he failed to gain any momentum during the general election. As a result, a portion of Republican and Socialist voters defected to so-called 'anti-establishment' candidates, namely far-right National Front leader Marine Le Pen and far-left independent Jean-Luc Mélenchon. The two populist contestants found an unforeseen rival in Emmanuel Macron, who launched his independent platform *En Marche!* ('Forward!') only a year prior to the election. Macron and Le Pen took the lead after the first round, which resulted into an unprecedented runoff from which both traditional blocks had been excluded.

Moreover, the campaign was laden with scandals and allegations of corruption, which contributed to its unpredictability. After winning the primary, Republican nominee François Fillon quickly established himself as

one of the election's frontrunners. Little did he predict that a financial scandal would soon rattle his political career. On January 25, 2017, the French tabloid *Le Canard Enchaîné* published shocking allegations that Fillon's wife, Penelope Fillon, received nearly €500,000 as parliamentary assistant to her husband – a position she never actually occupied. The scandal, which became known as 'Fillongate' or 'Penelopegate', led to Fillon being put under criminal investigation just a few months before the first round of the election. Despite damning evidence and a sharp drop in opinion polls, Fillon adamantly refused to step down and continued to paint himself as the innocent victim of a political assassination. Fillongate was not the only scandal to rock the election, however. Like Fillon, Marine Le Pen faced several allegations of misused European funds, even though the affair did not appear to deter her supporters. On the opposite side of the political aisle, internal divisions added turmoil to an already fragile Socialist Party. Indeed, several prominent Socialists broke their vow to support the party's nominee, and former prime minister Manuel Valls was dubbed a traitor after his public endorsement of Emmanuel Macron.

Finally, the threat of terrorism loomed over the 2017 campaign, which took place during a state of emergency (*état d'urgence*) following an attack on the Champs Elysées just three days before the first round of the election. Once a pariah, the National Front experienced a surge in popularity after the 2015 Paris attack and the 2016 Nice attack, amidst heightened anxiety and ethnic

tensions. Since Marine Le Pen won its leadership in 2011, the far-right party has progressively established itself as a substantial political and electoral player within France's partisan landscape.

The age of Twitter Politics

There is perhaps no better illustration of the impact of social media on contemporary politics than Donald Trump. The U.S. President uses his Twitter handle @realdonaldtrump as an official channel of communication, and his relentless 'tweeting' has become a running feature of American news cycles (Kreis, 2017; Oates & Moe, 2017). Because they provide increased visibility and proximity to the electorate, social networks have become an essential part of modern political campaigns (Parmelee & Bichard, 2012). Fundamentally, the advent of the participatory web has rendered the online/offline separation obsolete, as most of what transpires in the cyberspace now bleeds onto the "real world" (Bouvier, 2015). A case in point is former French president François Hollande, who took offense when a journalist suggested that his lack of participation on social media had contributed to his poor approval ratings (Larrouturou, 2013).

Created in 2006, Twitter has grown from a minimalist microblogging service to a popular social network offering wide interactive functionality (Dayter, 2014). In its early days, Twitter was heralded as an egalitarian

platform with the potential to bridge the gap between the public and their political leaders and to broaden political dialogue (Marwick, 2013; KhosraviNik, 2018). A decade later, most of these utopian hopes have vanished as the public feels increasingly alienated and disengaged from political life (Cevipof, 2017). Research suggests that most politicians view Twitter as a unidirectional form of communication rather than as an opportunity to interact with the public (Cunningham, 2013). As such, they use their Twitter accounts mainly for self-promotion and for broadcasting their opinions (Page, 2012; Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). Moreover, Twitter allows electoral candidates to post real-time campaign updates and thus to increase their visibility rather than relying solely on traditional media outlets. During elections, campaign interventions are often shared synchronously on social media, relaying interviews, rallies and debates (De Cock & Roginsky, 2014). Finally, because it provides visibility independently from traditional mass media, Twitter can assist political outsiders in building a following outside of mainstream parties (KhosraviNik, 2018).

Research focus and methodology

This dissertation examines the 2017 French presidential election with a focus on discourse, and on how discourse relates to other social elements, such as ideologies, institutions, and identities. Specifically, it provides an in-depth,

multi-layered analysis of 208 campaign tweets and of the linguistic mechanisms invested in their production. The tweets were posted in reaction to three real-world events symptomatic of the trends discussed in the previous section: (a) President Hollande's announcement that he would not seek reelection, (b) the Fillongate scandal and (c) the Champs Elysées terror attack which occurred days before the election. The analysis centers on the main five 2017 presidential candidates (Emmanuel Macron, Marine Le Pen, François Fillon, Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Benoît Hamon) and on their reactions to these particular events. Moreover, the tweets of outgoing president François Hollande are also included in the study due to his status as the official 'presidential voice' during the 2017 election. The purpose of this analysis is to investigate how each candidate frames (i.e., reports, evaluates and contextualizes) events according to the context of situation and to their own ideological motivations. I examine the discursive strategies involved in this framing process and how they relate to particular ideological discourses. In this context, I approach ideology not as a set of personal beliefs, but as a dynamic dimension of social practices, including discursive practices.

My framework is anchored in the field of social semiotics, i.e., in a conceptualization of language as social practice and of text as "life mediated through the symbolic system of language." (Eggins, 2004, p. 352). I draw from two socially-oriented approaches to discourse analysis: Norman Fairclough's

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dialectical-relational approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and

Michael Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL)[4]. CDA is concerned

with the relationship between discourse, power and ideology. One of the

founders of the discipline, Norman Fairclough, describes the aims of CDA as

follows:

> to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and
> determination between (a) discursive practices and (b) wider social and
> cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such
> practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by
> relations of power and struggles over power. (Fairclough, 1995, p.132).

As such, a critical approach to discourse analysis focuses on the means by

which power is exerted in discourse. CDA researchers share an understanding

of ideology as "ideas, discourse, or signifying practices in the service of the

struggle to acquire or maintain power" (Woolard, 1998, p.7). They suggest that

most ideological beliefs are not consciously held and are manifested as

"common-sense assumptions" (Fairclough, 1989, p.2). Accordingly, CDA seeks

to provide a framework for uncovering latent or hidden ideological content

through close textual analysis (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p. 8). Fairclough has a

'dialectical-relational' approach to discourse, meaning that he believes that

"any discursive practice is defined by its relations with others, and draws upon

others in complex ways" (Fairclough, 1992, p.55). Key to this approach is the

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[4] I discuss this framework in more detail in chapter 4.

concept of 'orders of discourse', which posits that discourse permeates social structures through unique configurations of (a) *genres*, (b) *discourses* and (c) *styles*. First, discourse can be structured into recognizable genres (such as church sermons or job interviews). Second, it represents reality as shaped by particular ideologies and value systems. For instance, the reality of abortion is represented differently in 'pro-life' and in 'pro-choice' discourses. Finally, discourse contributes to speaker identification and group affiliation in the form of styles (Fairclough, 1992, 2003).

This dissertation looks at orders of discourse through the methodological lens of Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). SFL conceptualizes language as "a grammatical system that interrelates with its surrounding discourse" (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p.27). Halliday's systemic-functional grammar is based on the premise that texts 'realize' meanings through the medium of 'lexicogrammar' (Halliday, 1994). These elements (social meanings, texts and lexicogrammar) form a semiotic system interacting with the demands of social functions (Halliday, 1992). Indeed, Halliday (1978) argues that the clause is a realization of three major strands of meanings, or 'metafunctions': *ideational*, *interpersonal* and *textual*. The ideational metafunction is involved in the representation of the speaker's experience, while the interpersonal metafunction contributes to creating and maintaining social relationships. Finally, the textual metafunction relates to the

organization of the text in a cohesive and coherent way. Most importantly, these three meanings are fused together in all linguistic units (Eggins, 2004). In this respect, they relate closely to Fairclough's orders of discourse:

> Particular semantic relations or grammatical categories and relations will be seen as primarily associated with either genres, or discourses, or styles. 'Primarily', because there is not a simple one-to-one relation – so for instance modality will be seen as primarily associated with styles, but also germane to genres and discourses. (Fairclough, 2003, p.67)

In other words, the elements of orders of discourse are dialectically related as they work *together* to realize meaning. As such, considering all three ways of meaning-making can help uncover a more comprehensive picture of the discursive practices that permeate social structures (Fairclough, 2003). In the context of this study, I posit that campaign tweets are part of a unique order of discourse within the growing social practice that is digital campaigning. I make use of systemic-functional methodology in light of Fairclough's dialectical-relational approach rather than as a separate method. Accordingly, my analysis centers on lexicogrammatical categories that link the text (campaign tweets) to its socio-cultural context (the 2017 French election): (a) transitivity and representation, (b) modality and engagement and (c) texture and generic structure. SFL seeks to explain how grammar realizes meanings while CDA asks how these meanings can be used to exert influence over others, and how they reflect unbalanced relationships between powerful and weaker groups (Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 1993). A combination of both approaches

can thus highlight how speakers construe ideology through the foregrounding of particular patterns of linguistic choices. My decision to focus on three specific events rather than on the election as a whole is contingent on the argument that all discourse is designed for a particular time, place, and audience (Halliday, 1976; Bell, 1984). Indeed, CDA views social processes as historically situated and therefore as relative to the socio-cultural context within which they unfold (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). As such, each event analyzed in this study constitutes a unique 'context of situation' (Martin, 2000) that contributes to the 2017 election's broader narrative.

Relevance and contribution to the field

Political discourse is in constant evolution with the emergence of new modes and forms of communication. As more of human existence is being catalogued online, there is a growing need to adapt existing methodological tools to digital environments (Herring, 2013). In this context, the role of social media in political elections has become a popular research topic over recent years (Chadwick & Howard, 2009). This is especially true of sentiment analysis, which has been applied to a vast array of studies for political forecasting or assessing candidate popularity (Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, & Welpe, 2010). While it can offer valuable insights, automated analysis is not designed to handle idiosyncrasies of political opinion or linguistic

incongruence. Because they rely on tweet volume and on all-purpose sentiment lexicons, probabilistic models are indeed geared towards capturing overall mood or sentiment rather than ideological content:

> [T]he extreme affective conceptualization shies away from notions such as critique, ideology and shades of social constructivism to the advantage of a de-politicalized, super-localized analysis. This is not to cast away the potential of affective analysis in attempting to understand how people are moved, and what attracts them. (KhosraviNik, 2018, p.432).

To improve our understanding of Twitter as a strategic tool for political communication, it is necessary to extend the analytical depth of social media research (Unger et al., 2016). Critical approaches to discourse locate the impetus for discursive change in socio-cultural conditions, and are concerned with the broader social ramifications that lie within particular instances of discursive practice (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). CDA is a fitting approach to political discourse at it aims to show how ideologies and relations of power shape discourse through particular discursive strategies (Fairclough, 1992). To this end, it merges both discourse analysis and critical social theory:

> [D]iscourse analysis specifically aims to show how the cognitive, social, historical, cultural, or political contexts of language use and communication impinge on the contents, meanings, structures, or strategies of text or dialogue, and vice versa, how discourse itself is an integral part of and contributes to the structures of these contexts. (van Dijk, 1991, p.45)

CDA and SFL are both concerned with exploring the mediating links between social forms and forms of talk, and can be combined into a systematic study of linguistic structures within their socio-cultural context of production. While both approaches have been used in multiple contexts, very few studies have attempted to apply them to social media. Indeed, the majority of studies employing CDA still focus on texts in traditional settings, such as official speeches or newspaper articles. Moreover, there has been little application of either approach to French data, and existing research on French political discourse typically favors lexicometric and logometric approaches (Mayaffre, 2004; Longhi, 2013).

This dissertation makes use of an innovative methodology for the qualitative analysis of French online data. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first extensive study to undertake a multi-functional analysis of French political discourse on social media. Hence, I hope to provide a reusable framework that can be operationalized and extended to future research. This study acknowledges the limitations of qualitative analysis but seeks to show that CDA can provide valuable social and political insights when combined with systemic-functional analysis. My goal is not to infer broad generalizations on digital campaigning, but rather to unmask some of the most salient discursive strategies used by French politicians to exploit Twitter for political and electoral gain. I argue that a critical approach to online discourse can

provide useful insights not obtainable with big data. Finally, it has been suggested that integrating SFL methods into CDA research can reduce researcher bias by allowing greater sensitivity to texts and thus resulting in more precise, transparent analysis (Young & Fitzgerald, 2006, p.53).

Research Questions

My analysis was guided by the following Research Questions:

(a) How do the 2017 candidates mobilize discursive strategies to represent social actors and events in particular ways? How do these representations reflect and realize particular discourses and ideologies?

(b) Which lexicogrammatical resources do the candidates draw from to express their personal attitudes and stances? How are these discursive strategies mobilized in the construction of distinctive 'styles of politics'?

(c) What discursive and techno-discursive features characterize campaign tweets as a unique genre of discourse? How do these features benefit or hinder political communication?

Based on previous research, I set forth a series of hypotheses. Because of Twitter's imposed character limit[5], I hypothesized that campaign tweets would

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[5] The original 140 character-limit was expanded to 280 characters on November 7, 2017.

contain few evidentials or mitigators for the sake of concision. Next, it has been posited that Twitter is a 'hybrid medium' which shares both spoken and written characteristics (Zappavigna, 2012; Paveau, 2013). However, because of the official nature of presidential elections, I expected campaign tweets to favor standard French and to avoid playful features such as neologisms or non-standard orthography and punctuation. Additionally, I hypothesized that the candidates would use hashtags in order to add context and to increase the reach of their tweets, rather than for creative purposes. However, I predicted that candidates who brand themselves as 'anti-establishment' would be more likely to transgress linguistic norms in an attempt to distance themselves from mainstream politicians. Finally, I also expected some variation from one event to the next, as each event constitutes its own context of situation. The Champs Elysées attack, for instance, calls for more formality than the Fillon affair, which turned Fillon into an object of ridicule.

Organization of the dissertation

Chapter 2 provides a review of the scholarship on the relationship between discourse, power and ideology. Moreover, it discusses modern trends in political discourse, such as personalization, conversationalization and marketization.

Chapter 3 discusses past and current research on Twitter and its role in present-day politics. Furthermore, it explores the techno-discursive dimension of Twitter and its application to political discourse.

Chapter 4 describes the theoretical framework underlying this study, and outlines the methods used to collect the data and to conduct the analysis.

Chapter 5 introduces and describes the findings for each phase of analysis (i.e., transitivity, modality and generic structure).

Chapter 6 provides a general discussion of these findings and reframes them within the concept of 'orders of discourse'. It concludes the study with a summary of the main findings and lays out avenues for further research.

Chapter 2
Background: A Socio-semiotic Approach to Political Discourse

Le politique fait moins le discours que le discours ne fait le politique.
Christian Le Bart.

Introduction

The King's Speech, a 2009 film based on historical events, portrays the trials and tribulations of George VI of England as he struggles to assert his legitimate authority due to his speech impediment. The critically acclaimed film reminds us that successful politicians are primarily skilled public speakers and, crucially, that language is a vehicle for power. This first review chapter explores the relationship between discourse, power and ideology. The first section centers on the notion of discourse as a social practice and introduces Norman Fairclough's concept of 'orders of discourse', which refer to unique combinations of genres, discourses and styles that circulate within a given social field (Fairclough, 1992, 2001, 2003). I then discuss the conceptualization(s) of discourses as 'frames' through which speakers construe the social world, as well as the distinction between ideological frames and rhetorical frames (Chilton, 1996; Lakoff, 1996). Finally, the last section explores the concept of 'presidential ethos' through two interrelated phenomena in modern political discourse: personalization (Karnoven, 2009)

and narrativization. Due to elections becoming more personalized (i.e. focused on individual political actors rather than collective parties), candidates must indeed convince their electorate of their legitimacy with compelling narratives (Gupta-Carlson, 2016).

Discourse as social practice

Genres, discourses, and styles

The core premise of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is that discourse is a social endeavor. As such, CDA is a "social-semiotic approach to discourse analysis" (Slade & Eggins, 1997, p.24) which approaches texts as social instances of meaning-making (Fairclough, 2003, p.11). CDA is partially rooted in social constructionism, which posits that all aspects of reality are social constructs. This constructionist approach to social reality is at the core of Michel Foucault's discourse theory. Foucault (1969) argues that discourse cannot be reduced to language and signs, and that language always coincides with a set of ideologies. As such, discourse is a manifestation of power relations and creates social realities that form the basis for a culture's epistemology. This epistemology is disseminated (or 'naturalized') through institutions and organized into networks of social practices. CDA draws heavily from Foucault's approach to the role of discourse in social construction and regulation.

Nonetheless, Norman Fairclough criticizes the deterministic 'idealism' of most constructionist approaches and argues that they fail to acknowledge the factors which may affect or limit the construction process (Fairclough, 2003). Fairclough suggests instead that discourses are 'social construals' (i.e., representations of the social world) rather than social constructs:

> We may textually construe (represent, imagine, etc.) the social world in particular ways, but whether our representations or construals have the effect of changing its construction depends upon various contextual factors – including the way social reality already is, who is construing it, and so forth. (Fairclough, 2003, p.8)

Seeking to operationalize the socially-constitutive properties of discourse, Fairclough (1992) created a multidimensional analytical framework contingent on his argument that semiosis (i.e., the production of meaning) occurs at three hierarchical levels: social structures, social practices, and social events. Social practices, which Fairclough (2001) defines as "relatively stabilized form[s] of social activity" (p.6), articulate a variety of social elements (e.g. activities, subjects, objects, values) in relation to discourse. Social practices integrate discourse in three interrelated ways; First, discourse is part of the social activity within the practice, as we adapt our language use to fit specific activities (e.g. everyday conversations, job interviews, organizational meetings). Second, discourse figures in the representation (or construal) of social practices, which includes both representations of other practices and the 'reflexive' self-representation of our own practice. Third, discourse figures in

the constitution of identities within social practices, as patterns of language use index particular 'ways of being' within the practice. Together, these ways of incorporating discourse into social practices form a semiotic order Fairclough calls an 'order of discourse'. An order of discourse is a combination of three semiotic elements (Fairclough, 2001, p.7):

- *Genres* are 'ways of acting' within social practices.

- *Discourses* are 'ways of representing' social practices.

- *Styles* are 'ways of being' within social practices.

Orders of discourse are "intermediate organizational entities" (Fairclough, 2003, p.24) which connect the micro-level of concrete social events (e.g. specific texts) to the macro-level of social structures (e.g. fields, institutions and organizations). Indeed, social structures are constituted by networks of social practices, and the semiotic dimension of each network is an order of discourse (Fairclough 2000). Interdiscursive analysis consists in "seeing texts in terms of the different discourses, genres and styles they draw upon and articulate together" (Fairclough, 2003, p.3), which signals a characterization of discourse as "an element of social life which is closely interrelated with other elements" (Fairclough, 2003, p.3).

Power relations and dominant discourses

Politics itself is a social field constituted by a network of social practices associated with activities within the government, political parties, elections, and public spheres (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p.83). This network of practices includes various genres (e.g. debates, official speeches, interviews), styles and discourses which index different positions within the political system. Here, it is useful to distinguish two distinct but often confused understandings of the term 'discourse'. In its most abstract sense, discourse can simply refer to semiosis, i.e. the social process of meaning-making. As elements of orders of discourse, however, discourses are ways of construing aspects of the world that are associated with particular beliefs, perspectives or orientations (Fairclough, 1992, p.128). Thus, we may speak about 'anti-immigration discourse', 'nationalist discourse', or 'pro-life discourse'. James Paul Gee (2004) uses the terms 'big-D-Discourse' and 'small-d-discourse' to distinguish between the abstract conceptualization of discourse as semiosis and the more concrete definition of discourse as a specific instance of language use. As such, Gee defines Discourse (with a big 'D') as a system of meaning-making practices that generate discourses (with a small 'd'), which are specific ways of talking about social realities (Gee, 2004, p.17).

These discourses are 'frames' in the sense that they can offer multiple representations of the same social event. For instance, the terms *crise des*

migrants and *accueil des réfugiés* both refer to the same reality, but the first term indexes an anti-immigration stance by framing the issue as a crisis whereas the second puts forth a representation of France as a welcoming refuge. Discourses are also associated with particular ways of representing social actors (van Dijk, 1993); For example, the French neologisms "gauchiasse" and "FHaine" are referential choices which index two opposite political inclinations.

Fairclough and Wodak (1997) argue that discourses do not all have the same 'productivity' i.e., the same impact within social structures. As a result, they contribute to producing unequal power relations between social groups (e.g., social classes, genders, ethnic minorities). For Foucault (1969), discourse is intrinsically linked to both power and knowledge. Indeed, the production of discourse is at once controlled, organized and redistributed by those who have the power and means of communication. Discourses thus determine not only what can be said but also who can speak, when, and with what authority (Foucault, 1969). As such, dominant discourses have the power to displace former social arrangements and to talk new areas of knowledge into existence. The productivity of discourses relates to Pierre Bourdieu's concept of *linguistic market*. Bourdieu (1977) compares linguistic exchanges to economic transactions by arguing that some discourses have a higher 'currency' than others. Moreover, Bourdieu posits that individuals with a high social, cultural

and/or symbolic capital (such as political leaders) are more likely to have access to dominant discourses/markets. Their voices are "louder" and therefore they have a greater influence on social structures:

> Discourse always owes its most important characteristics to the linguistic production relations within which it is produced. […] All particular linguistic transactions depend on the structure of the linguistic field, which is itself a particular expression of the structure of the power relations between the groups possessing the corresponding competences. (Bourdieu, 1977, p.647)

In other words, discourses always operate in relation to power, and determine how power circulates within society (Hall, 1992, p.295). This power-as-domination paradigm, which conceptualizes power as the oppression of the masses via the exercise of 'cultural hegemony' (Gramsci, 1971), underlies most CDA approaches. Fairclough (2003) argues that the ideological effects of texts, i.e., the effects of texts in establishing, maintaining, or changing power relations, can be uncovered through interdiscursive analysis:

> Ideologies can have a durability and stability which transcends individual texts or bodies of texts – they can be associated with discourses (as representations), with genres (as enactments), and with styles (as inculcations). (Fairclough, 2003, p.9)

In other words, ideologies can be found in all three elements of orders of discourse; they may be enacted in genres, represented in discourses, and inculcated in styles (Fairclough, 2003).

Framing the presidential election

Ideologies as sociocognitive frames

The conceptualization of ideologies as 'representations' (Hall, 1992; Fairclough, 2003), 'constructs' (Foucault, 1969; van Dijk, 1995) or 'frames' (Lakoff, 1996) suggests that they are actively involved in the process of construing social reality, which primarily takes place through the production and the interpretation of discourse(s). Teun A. van Dijk (1995) argues that ideologies are sociocognitive frameworks shared by members of social groups, and that they "reflect speakers' internalized beliefs about the society's organization and function" (van Dijk, 1995, p.243). Our linguistic choices can therefore mirror the fundamental values and principles (e.g. individualism vs. collectivism) of the society we live in. Moreover, van Dijk suggests that abstract grammatical features (such as voice and transitivity) are most representative of ideological effects. Unlike lexical choices, such grammatical features are not as accessible to introspection; they are therefore more likely to be "a spontaneous reflection of social reality mediated by ideologies of language users" (van Dijk, 1995, p.226) rather than deliberate linguistic choices. Lexical features, however, can not only reflect a speaker's attitude towards particular social actors (such as referring to François Fillon as "Fifi" or to Nicolas Sarkozy as "Sarko") but can also reveal socially-conditioned biases towards certain groups (Fowler, 1991). For instance, referential choices that

reduce women to animals (e.g. *une vache*, *un thon*, *une poulette*), inanimate objects (e.g. *un cageot*, *une planche à repasser*) or even to their sexual function (e.g. *un bon coup*, *une mal-baisée*) are all indicative of a misogynistic attitude. In other words, both grammatical and lexical features contribute to constituting 'frames' through which speakers can impose their beliefs on social reality.

Metaphors and political affiliation

In his book *Moral Politics*, George Lakoff (1996) explores the function of metaphors as cognitive frames which directly (but not consciously) influence our political views. Specifically, Lakoff argues that the metaphorical understanding that NATION IS FAMILY underlies the moral division between conservatives and progressives in American political life (Lakoff, 1996, 2006). In French politics, evidence of a similar conceptualization can be found in the national hymn - which refers to the French people as *enfants de la patrie* ('children of the fatherland') - and in the national tripartite motto - which includes *fraternité* ('fraternity') as a core value of the French Republic. In Lakoff's model, NATION IS FAMILY is an overarching 'conceptual metaphor' with a shared understanding of the country as the home, citizens as siblings, and the government as the parent. Where conservatives and progressives diverge,

Lakoff argues, is in their expectations as to the 'parental role' of the government (Lakoff, 1996).   On the one hand, progressives believe the government should act like a Nurturant Parent who protects citizens and assists them in achieving their potential.   On the other hand, conservatives liken the role of the government to that of a Strict Father.   As the moral authority of the family, the Strict Father teaches his children to be self-reliant and self-disciplined through 'tough love' (i.e. rewards and punishment).   From each 'family model' derives a set of core values and principles which form the basis of policies and programs (Lakoff, 2006, p.54).   Lakoff argues that progressive morality is based on empathy and responsibility (both for oneself and for others).   Empathy leads to an ethic of diversity and to the recognition of basic human dignity.   Paying taxes is a moral responsibility as it contributes to the common good (i.e. public services), which in turn protects citizens against discrimination and promotes the expansion of freedom.   In contrast, conservative morality centers on issues of authority and control. Conservatives believe that morality comes from obeying legitimate 'moral authorities' (God, the law, parents, etc.) but that we are all individually responsible for our own destiny: with enough self-discipline, everyone can pull themselves by the 'bootstraps'.   Individual discipline is rewarded by the free market, which promotes wealth and efficiency through the profit motive.

Lakoff (2006) claims that these core principles explain how and why conservatives and progressives can have radically different understandings of the same fundamental concepts, such as fairness or freedom. For example, while progressives believe that welfare programs can increase freedom by providing a social safety net for the less fortunate, conservatives see the same programs as interfering with the freedom of both welfare recipients (by trapping them into dependency) and taxpayers (by taking their hard-earned money) (Lakoff, 2006, pp.89-90). In other words, semiosis is a dynamic social process as speakers attach meanings to words based on their worldviews, in agreement with Freeden's conceptualization of ideology as the effort to "impose specific meanings onto the indeterminate range of meanings" (Freeden, 2006, p.19). As Lakoff puts it:

> Words don't have meanings in isolation. Words are defined relative to a conceptual system. If liberals are to understand how conservatives use their words, they will have to understand the conservative conceptual system. (Lakoff, 1996, p.29)

The ability to understand (and exploit) conceptual systems plays a decisive role during presidential elections, as candidates need to convince voters that fall beyond their party lines. Lakoff stresses the Strict Father and Nurturant Parent models are "*idealized* models of family" (Lakoff, 2006, p.50; emphasis added). In reality, few people are 'pure conservatives' or 'pure progressives' – most are 'biconceptuals' of various sorts, meaning they apply both family

models to different areas of their social and political lives (for instance, someone may be economically progressive but socially conservative). In order for presidential candidates to win the "majority", their discourse must thus resonate with a wide range of voters who do not fall neatly into ideological categories.

Metaphors are not mere poetic devices: They can be powerful tools of persuasion, especially in the mouths of politicians. Political discourse itself is framed according to the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor: arguments can be "won" or "lost", and candidates can "shoot down" or even "crush" their "opponents" during heated debates. Metaphorical arguments are analogical, meaning they can help us understand new concepts in terms of situations or ideas we are familiar with. Indeed, Chilton and Ilyin note that metaphors "develop in discourse [...] in the lexicalization of abstract or innovatory concepts on the basis of mapping from the more concrete or better understood domains of experience" (Chilton & Ilyin, 1993, p.9). Lakoff (1996) argues that conservative politicians rely more on metaphorical appeals than their progressive counterparts do. In the United States, Republicans pride themselves on being the party of 'family values' - an emotional appeal which gained prominence with Ronald Reagan and remains at the core of American conservative discourse. Besides NATION IS FAMILY, another prominent conservative metaphor is that COUNTRIES ARE CONTAINERS (Chilton, 1996), which is often

found in anti-immigration discourse and underlies Donald Trump's 'build the wall' discourse, wherein the "wall" would prevent undesirables from "pouring into" the United States:

> *(1) The Wall is a very important tool in stopping drugs from pouring into our country and poisoning our youth (and many others)!*
>
> (@realDonaldTrump)

Because metaphors play a systemic structural role in shaping how we think – as we saw with the NATION IS FAMILY metaphor - they enable candidates to 'frame' their appeals based on deep-seated yet active values (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).

Globalization and the technicalization of political discourse

To which extent, then, do conservative and progressive discourses differ? French discourse analyst Damon Mayaffre analyzed the left-right divide in French politics across two time frames: the interwar period (1928-1939) and the Fifth Republic from 1958 to 2002. In both studies, he adopted a logometric approach– a quantitative, computer-assisted method of discourse analysis which can detect both lexical and grammatical patterns across large amounts of text. Mayaffre (2003) first compared the speeches of four 1930s politicians and found that their political orientations could be determined from the linguistic features they used. For example, the two left-wing politicians -

Maurice Thorez and Léon Blum – appealed to the collectivity with the subject pronoun *nous*, while their right-wing opponents - Pierre-Etienne Flandin and André Tardieu - favored the use of the singular *je* and the impersonal *on* (Mayaffre, 2003, p.254). Moreover, Flandin and Tardieu's heavy use of *passé composé* (referring to completed past actions) and deictic markers suggested strong ties to history and tradition. In contrast, Thorez and Blum's reliance on present and future tenses seemed to reflect the Left's ideal of social progress (Mayaffre, 2003, p.251). In a separate study, Mayaffre (2004) analyzed 565 presidential speeches spanning from the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958 to 2002. Over time, he observed a shift from nominal to verbal discourse, with increases in both verbal processes (verbs of 'saying' such *dire, répéter or affirmer*) and modal verbs (e.g. *pouvoir, falloir* and *devoir*). For Mayaffre, these patterns denote a glorification of productivity at the expense of ideology, with managers and practitioners replacing theorists and thinkers (Mayaffre, 2004, p.246).

Echoing Jürgen Habermas (1988)'s concerns about the degradation of the public sphere, numerous scholars have attributed this 'marketization' of political life to globalization and to the rise of neoliberal capitalism (Giddens, 1990; Bourdieu, 1991; Freeden, 2000; Le Bart, 2010). For Bourdieu, these trends have resulted in a restructuring of discourse based on a market model where commodities are bought and sold (Bourdieu, 1991). This metaphorical

conceptualization of STATES ARE BUSINESSES reframes politicians as businessmen, policies and campaigns as products, and voters as consumers:

> Political life can be described in terms of the logic of supply and demand: the political field is the site in which, through the competition between the agents involved in it, political products, issues, programs, analyses, commentaries, concepts and events are created – products between which ordinary citizens, reduced to the status of "consumers", have to choose, thereby running a risk of misunderstanding that is all the greater the further they are from the place of production. (Bourdieu, 1991, pp.171-172)

Through new media channels, ideological narratives "are taken over by wider social circles not as mere consumers but as opinion formers, programmatic entrepreneurs and originators of new political messages" (Freeden, 2000, p.11). As a result, ideological markers are fading, and political discourse is increasingly technocratic (Lemke, 1995). Young and Fitzgerald (2006) define this 'technicalization' as "the introduction of technical language and the language of experts into the social policy domain" (p.263). Politicians seek legitimacy and credibility through 'appeals to authority'; they accumulate statistics, quote field experts, and even pose as inspectors in factories (Lemke, 1995; Le Bart, 2010). Lemke (1995) suggests that technical language gives the policies an "air of legitimacy" (p.58) but also prevents the non-expert audience from fully comprehending the discourse. He indeed argues that technicalization is a 'monologic' trend which favors first-person references and abstract processes (such as agentless passives and nominalizations). This non-

interactive discourse prevents the public from entering the dialogue and, by extension, from questioning the policy (Lemke, 1995). For Le Bart (2010), however, the inclusion of expert knowledge into the discourse of politicians does not herald a 'scientific turn' in modern politics. As in advertising, information is presented for strategic rather communicative purposes, and Le Bart suggests that appeals to authority are the political equivalent of the realist literary device Roland Barthes calls *l'effet de réel*, wherein an overabundance of small descriptive details is key to creating a 'reality effect' in texts (Barthes, 1968).

Personalization and the marketization of the self

Moreover, the omnipresent *je* ('I') in modern French politics (Mayaffre, 2004) signals a 'personalization' of political power, which refers to the notion that "individual political actors have become more prominent at the expense of parties and collective identities" (Karvonen, 2009, p.4). In the era of marketization, campaigning is an act of self-promotion; In order to sell their 'brand of presidency', candidates must first and foremost be skilled advertisers. For Mayaffre (2004), the credibility of the speaker (*ethos*) and the emotional engagement of the audience (*pathos*) have supplanted the arguments (*logos*) themselves (p.246).

Max Weber (1978) coined the term 'charismatic authority' to refer to leaders of totalitarian or authoritarian regimes around whom devout followers develop a 'cult of personality'. In a cult of personality, the charismatic leader is "considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities." (Weber, 1978, p.242). Most recently, numerous media scholars have turned their attention to U.S. President Donald J. Trump (Oates & Moe, 2017; Kreis, 2017). Trump has become known for his *ad hominem* attacks on various political and media actors (and associated nicknames such as "Crooked Hillary" Clinton, "Lyin' Ted" Cruz or "Sloppy Steve" Bannon)[6]. By repeatedly attacking the character of his opponents, Trump framed his campaign (and subsequent presidency) in terms of a battle of personalities rather than a battle of ideas.

As private lives grow increasingly public, the character of political actors – their *ethos* – has come to play a central role in modern elections (Amossy, 1999), to the extent that it can determine a candidate's fate regardless of their party affiliation (Alduy, 2017). In 1968, Canadian voters were so enthused with the youthful charm of Pierre Elliott Trudeau that their excitement became known as 'Trudeaumania' (McAllister, 2007). Nearly fifty years later, his son Justin Trudeau became an international heartthrob, and his good looks have

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[6] A Wikipedia page references all the nicknames used by Donald Trump: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nicknames_used_by_Donald_Trump

garnered media attention from news headlines (Ryan, 2018) to internet memes (Cruz, 2016). In fact, a distinctive ethos may eventually be conceptualized into a 'style of politics' (e.g. Thatcherism) that transcends the politician and his or her individual mandate:

    (2) Du villepinisme au sarkozysme, du copéisme au sarkozysme, du sarkozysme au macronisme.

<div align="right">(@AdrienDLPBR)</div>

Party affiliation is no longer enough: presidential candidates must promote their *présidentiabilité* ('presidential ability') with a 'presidential ethos' that will not only increase their credibility but also distinguish them from other candidates (Amossy, 1999).

Rhetorical framing: the populist example

Although some researchers use the terms interchangeably, styles of politics and ideologies refer to two types of discursive frames. Indeed, the conceptual systems described by Lakoff (1996) are *ideological frames* i.e., representations of ideologies that speakers usually project unconsciously. In contrast, styles of politics are *rhetorical frames* that are used strategically to support an underlying ideology (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014).

One rhetorical frame which has garnered considerable media attention in recent years in populism. Despite its frequent association with far-right

nationalism, the populist label has been applied to candidates belonging to both extremes of the political spectrum (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). For example, Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen are classic examples of 'right populism', while Bernie Sanders and Jean-Luc Mélenchon align with a different branch of 'left populism'. Bart Bonikowski defines populism as "a discursive strategy selectively employed by political outsiders on both the left and right extremes of the political spectrum to challenge the political status quo" (Bonikowski, 2017, p.10). Bonikowski argues that unlike conservatism or liberalism, populism cannot be associated with a fully-fledged set of values and has few direct policy implications. Instead, populist candidates recite a simple, unidimensional message: the virtuous and sovereign people are at the mercy of corrupt elites and must reclaim their rights. This capitalization on public fear of the 'other' and widespread resentment towards the 'establishment' can serve a wide range of political agendas. Indeed, while populism always involves a binary moral classification, the identities of both 'the people' and the vilified vary according to the candidate's underlying ideology (such as nationalism or socialism). For instance, Trump and Le Pen routinely claim that immigrants are precipitating the country's downfall, while Sanders and Mélenchon center their discourse on the greedy elite who enrich themselves at the expense of the people. In both cases, the candidates are projecting an *ethos* of outsider by adopting the point of view of the people and distancing themselves from the

establishment they are berating. For Ernesto Laclau (2005), this involves forming a common 'we' which presupposes not only an equivalence between the candidates and his voters but also an imagined other ('them').

Approaching populism as a style rather than ideology allows researchers to analyze how politicians can slip in and out of the populist style (based on a variety of factors including audience, medium, sociopolitical context, and outsider status). This last point introduces the notion of *performance*, with candidates adapting and modulating their public image to fit voter expectations:

> Le discours ne semble plus destiné à véhiculer un message (…) mais seulement à organiser une médiation entre le président et les Français, et à *mettre en scène un président* disant ce qu'il dit. (Mayaffre, 2004, p.243; emphasis added).

Here, Damon Mayaffre (2004) refers to the *mise-en-scène* ('staging') of the presidency by denouncing not only the personalization of political life but also its *dramatization*.

Elections as theatrical performances

Performance and performativity

As Shakespeare might have said if he had lived in the 21st century, "All the political world's a stage, and all its men and women merely players."[7] In the era of political personalization and mediatization (Hjarvard, 2008), electoral campaigns have come to resemble carefully orchestrated spectacles. Presidential candidates are judged as much by their individual identities as by the policies they propose, and leading a successful campaign requires staging a compelling performance (Nimmo, 1985; Chou et al., 2016). In 2017, this *bataille de l'image* manifested into several memorable stunts, from Mélenchon's hologram holding rallies all over the country (Nikolaeva & Lagrange, 2017) to Marine Le Pen's controversial selfie session at a Whirlpool factory (Vinocur, 2017).

The theatrical dimension of modern politics resonates with Erving Goffman's argument that self-presentation is analogous to a stage performance (Goffman, 1959). In Goffman's metaphorical theater, the public 'front stage' is where we present (or 'perform') a controlled, often idealized version of ourselves to an audience, through both verbal and nonverbal cues (e.g. clothing, gestures, facial expressions). In contrast, the private 'back stage' is

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[7] The original lines, "All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players", are delivered by the character <u>Jaques</u> in Act II, Scene VII, of Shakespeare's *As You Like It*.

where our masks come off, and where we can reveal our more authentic selves. However, self-presentation is not necessarily a conscious process, and Goffman suggests instead that all performances are on a continuum which stretches from 'sincere' to 'cynical', with cynical performers exhibiting the highest degree of awareness (Goffman, 1959, p.19). Indeed, some performers sincerely believe that they are projecting a 'true', unfabricated version of themselves on the front stage. On the opposite end of the spectrum, we find performers who are fully aware of their 'routines' and who might even find some enjoyment in the realization that they can toy with a trusting audience (Goffman, 1959, p.18). Yet, not all cynical performers are ill-intentioned, and there are numerous motives for impression management such as gaining employment, following workplace etiquette or, evidently, winning an election. Finally, Goffman makes the important point that regardless of the *intentions* we project into our performances, we can never fully control or even predict how they will be *perceived* by our audience:

> By virtue of the same sign-accepting tendency, the audience may misunderstand the meaning that a cue was designed to convey, or may read an embarrassing meaning into gestures or events that were accidental, inadvertent, or incidental and not meant by the performer to carry any meaning whatsoever. (Goffman, 1959, p.51)

Regarding political discourse, Cécile Alduy (2017) underlines the dual meaning of performativity.[8] Indeed, discourse can be 'performative' in the Austinian sense of words performing actions, such as a judge saying, "the court is now in session" or "I sentence you to life imprisonment" (Austin, 1962). In his analysis of presidential speeches, Mayaffre (2004) has observed a gradual increase in the use of performative verbs between 1958 and 2002.[9] Since 1980, he notes an omnipresence of self-referencing performatives used to describe the act of speaking itself (e.g., *je dis*, *je répète*, *j'affirme*). Mayaffre suggests that this 'metadiscursive narcissism' (Mayaffre, 2004, p.245) is a symptom of the personalization of contemporary politics discussed in the previous section. Additionally, performative expressions can be used as a discursive strategy by presidential candidates; By adopting a 'presidential style', they can demonstrate their ability to 'talk like a president' (Alduy 2017). In this sense, *performative* speech acts are part of the *performance* of presidential identity. Moreover, Cécile Alduy's comparison of the presidential styles of François Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy supports Goffman's argument that speakers exhibit different degrees of control over their performances. In fact, Alduy

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[8] "La communication politique est performative non seulement au sens strictement linguistique des actes de langage qui sont accomplis ('je m'engage', 'je promets', 'je jure') mais au sens où la performance est censée prouver par l'exemple les qualités du candidat, révéler son être profond, alors qu'il ne donne à voir, toujours, qu'un personnage" (Alduy, 2017, p.42).

[9] "Entre 1958 et 2002, les *je dis que…'*, les *je vous répète que…'* prennent sur le contenu objectif du discours: matériellement, dans une allocation, le temps consacré à la mise en scène du dire est directement retranché au temps accordé à l'épaisseur du dit." (Mayaffre, 2004, p.246).

suggests that François Hollande unwillingly performed the role of a diffident 'backstage president' (Alduy, 2017). Through his use of agentless structures (e.g., passive verbs and impersonal expressions) and his favoring of the collective *nous* over the presidential *je*, Hollande removed himself from his own presidency. His subdued style stood in stark contrast to his predecessor's *hyperpresidency* (Alduy, 2017, p.59). Indeed, Nicolas Sarkozy performed the role of the Strict Father described by Lakoff (1996) by adopting a discursive style that reflected his authority: he positioned himself as the agent (*je*) of his actions (i.e., material processes) which he situated in the concrete, immediate present (as opposed to Hollande's hypothetical future; Alduy, 2017, p.60).

Narrativization and storytelling

In any election, it is every candidate's nightmare to remain stuck in the role of a supporting character, or worse, of an invisible cameo. Yet, even a skilled performance can be overlooked unless it is included in an engaging storyline. To remain on the electoral stage, the candidates must write their own 'electoral narratives' and cast themselves in the protagonist role (Nimmo, 1985). As Chou, Bleiker and Premaratna (2016) put it:

> Like any compelling theatrical production, good campaigns hinge on a compelling plotline. Without it, actors will just become another face in the crowd and any proposed policies, whatever their merits, will simply

remain empty symbols without the power to capture the public's imagination and support. (Chou et al., 2016, p.44)

Several authors have approached the concept of narrative by proposing sets of criteria that make up coherent, bounded stories (Bruner, 1990; Gergen, 1994; Edwards, 1997). Jerome Bruner (1990) argues that well-formed stories include five elements: Action, Scene, Actor, Instrument, and Goal (Bruner, 1990; Cited in Edwards, 1997, p.214). These five elements describe the 'narrativization' process i.e., the imposition of a narrative frame upon an event. In other words, narrativization rationalizes and frames an event by offering an account of *what* happened (Action), *when* and *where* it happened (Scene), *who* was involved (Actor), *how* it happened (Instrument) and *why* it happened (Goal). Bruner further argues that narratives require several "crucial grammatical components" in order to be carried out: the expression of human *agentivity*, the *linearization* of events and states in a consistent way, and finally the inclusion of the narrator's *perspective* or *voice* (Bruner, 1990, p.77)

An electoral narrative consists in a candidate 'narrativizing' an election from a perspective that will benefit his or her campaign (Alduy, 2017; Polletta, 2008). For instance, the 2017 French candidates established themselves as protagonists (or 'heroes') in their narratives by adopting a 'core style': Emmanuel Macron presented himself as the only candidate able to breach the left-right divide, Marine Le Pen as the only candidate able to vanquish Islamic

terrorism, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon as the only candidate able to bring down the corrupt 1%:

> (3) *Il est temps de cesser le tic tac incessant de la droite et de la gauche depuis plus de 20 ans et de construire une véritable alternance.*
> [It is time to stop the tick-tock of the Left and of the Right that has been relentless for more than 20 years and to build a genuine alternative.]
>
> (@EmmanuelMacron)
>
> (4) *Je serai le Chef des Armées qui mènera la guerre au terrorisme islamiste, avec la détermination d'éradiquer cette idéologie.*
> [I will be the Commander-in-Chief who will declare war on Islamic terrorism, with the determination to eradicate this ideology.]
>
> (@MLP_Officiel)
>
> (5) *Je veux rendre la France au peuple français en la reprenant des mains de l'oligarchie.*
> [I want to return France to the French people by taking her back from the hands of the oligarchy.]
>
> (@JLMelenchon)

Dan Nimmo argues that presidential candidates tend to draw from five basic styles: the 'army rally', the 'advertiser', the 'missionary', the 'crusade', or the 'counter-crusade' (Nimmo, 1985, p.33). However, Goffman (1959) warns against blatantly misrepresenting oneself; the higher the discrepancy, the higher the risk of being exposed as an impostor:

> When we think of those who present a fake front or "only" a front, of those who dissemble, deceive and defraud, we think of a discrepancy between fostered appearances and reality. We also think of the precarious position in which these performers place themselves, for at any moment in their performance an event might occur to catch them out and baldly contradict what they have openly avowed, bringing them

immediate humiliation and sometimes permanent loss of reputation. (Goffman, 1959, p.59)

The downfall of François Fillon throughout the 2017 election is a prime example. An early favorite, Fillon built his campaign around the image of a devout family man who adhered to Christian morality and lived by his slogan, *Le courage de la vérité*. When the news broke that he had been lying and stealing large sums from the government for decades, his campaign quickly plummeted, as many of his supporters could not condone the discrepancy between the 'impostor' they had seen on stage and the 'real' Fillon who was unmasked during the Fillongate scandal (Chrisafis, 2017).

Yet, campaigns are not one-man shows. The quest to the higher office is a fierce competition, and its narrativization also involves representing other 'players' strategically. Dan Nimmo (1985) argues that in elections as in theater, there are "heroes, villains, fools, victims, and assorted supporting parts be they good guys or bad, winners or losers" (Nimmo, 1985, p.32). These 'roles' or 'parts' are representational strategies (van Dijk, 1995) designed to arouse the audience in different ways; While some will unite, others will divide (Chou et al., 2016). For instance, Trump's use of derogatory nicknames contributes to his casting his detractors in the roles of fools and villains (Kreis, 2017, p.614). As such, a crucial ingredient in successful electoral tales is *dramatization,* in both senses of the word (Alduy, 2017). Whether they

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exaggerate the vices of an opponent or the severity of an event, the candidates seek to earn the public's approval by tapping into their emotions. This last point requires that the candidates set a scene that will resonate with their target electorate. In his analysis of populism, Bonikowski suggests that "populist actors are able to capitalize on public dissatisfaction, fear, and resentment in order to serve their own wide-ranging political agendas" (Bonikowski, 2017, p.13). He argues that left-wing populism focuses on growing economic injustice, whereas right-wing populism appeals primarily to white, native-born voters by "tapping into their grievances with demographic and cultural change" (p.10). In other words, right-wing and left-wing populists rely on the same strategy (fear-mongering) to support different narratives and seduce different audiences (Bonikowski, 2017; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014).

Furthermore, several scholars have investigated the use of storytelling in political discourse (Couldry, 2008; Polletta, 2008; Gupta-Carlson, 2016). Like populism, 'storytelling' is a discursive strategy which relies on emotional appeals; But while populism seeks to vilify the 'other', storytelling "humanizes" the politician by making him or her more relatable to the audience. Indeed, political storytelling consists in using personal stories and anecdotes to increase 'voter identification' (i.e., the ability of voters to identify with a candidate and his ideas). Polletta (2008) explains that voters are only likely to change their opinions if they have a personal stake in the issue. Because

narratives have the ability to 'immerse' or 'transport' the audience, they can potentially lead to lasting changes of opinion (Polletta, 2008, p.27). Narrativization is therefore a form of rhetorical framing, which Bonikowski defines as "the practice of presenting an issue from a particular perspective in order to maximize its resonance with a given audience" (Bonikowski, 2017, p.14). Indeed, Polletta argues that "what matters is not so much the stories you tell as the extent to which [they] resonate with the stories your audience already knows" (Polletta, 2008, p.29). A politician seeking to persuade an audience can do so by 'narrativizing' events i.e., by recounting the events from a perspective that will resonate with the voters and with the politician's agenda (Couldry, 2008; Alduy, 2017).

Narratology and intertextuality

Above all, narrativization is a semiotic strategy which articulates events and roles into meaningful configurations. This semiotic function is the subject of narratology, a structuralist approach to narrative influenced by several French Structuralists (including Lévi-Strauss, Greimas, Benveniste, and Barthes) and Russian Formalists (namely Todorov and Bakhtin). Narratology distinguishes *histoire* (i.e., events) and *discours* (i.e., the representation of events in a narrative), and posits that events only acquire meaning as they are articulated, or 'narrativized', into discourse (Fludernick, 2007). This theory

relates to Foucault's argument that an event is always understood within its larger historical context:

> History does not consider an event without defining the series to which it belongs, (…) a series of rather converging, and sometimes divergent, but never autonomous events that enable us to circumscribe the locus of a particular event and the conditions of its emergence. (Foucault, 1982, p. 230)

In other words, narrativization is inherently 'intertextual', as it implies "the insertion of a text into history (society) and of this text into history" (Kristeva, 1986; Cited in Fairclough, 1992, p.279). *Intertextuality* (also referred to as *dialogism* (Bakhtin, 1981) and *heteroglossia*) refers to the bond which unites texts and social contexts through a dialogue with past, present, and future texts. Therefore, any text is at once a response to what has been said before, and an anticipation of what will be said in the future (Kristeva, 1986; Fairclough, 1992, 2003)

When combined with a theory of power relations, intertextuality supports the idea that ideology emerges as a product of language: "the ideological becoming of a human being (…) is the process of selectively assimilating the words of others" (Bakhtin, 1981, p.341). Our discursive identities, or 'styles', are the products of intertextual (and interdiscursive) *bricolage*; a concept first theorized by Lévi-Strauss (1962) and extended to discourse by Jacques Derrida (1967). Essentially, styles emerge and evolve as a result of being 'in dialogue' with other styles and with other elements of

orders of discourse. For Fairclough (1992), it is indeed the dynamicity of interdiscursivity which enables texts to lead social and cultural change as they "transform prior texts and restructure existing conventions (genres, discourses) to generate new ones" (p. 270). In discourse, there are no 'engineers'; We are all 'bricoleurs' who combine old parts to create new meaning. Novelty is always rooted in history, and as Derrida (1967) famously said, "*Il n'y a pas de hors texte.*" (p.158).

To conclude, the staging of a presidential campaign is akin to an elaborate, large-scale theatrical performance. On the electoral stage, politicians are simultaneously the writers, directors, and actors of their campaigns. For Jeffrey C. Alexander (2010), the best political performers are those who are able to "create meaning by looking back to the past from the present and by projecting the plot's next act into the future, all at the same time" (p.64).

Chapter 3
Background: Anatomy of a Twitter Campaign

*Today we are all witnesses, all members of
a crowd that is watching and listening in real
time.*
Mark Thompson.

Introduction

Since its launch in 2006, Twitter has established itself as a legitimate platform for political communication and has come to play a pivotal role in electoral campaigning. This review chapter discusses the impact of Twitter on contemporary political discourse and the popular appeal of 'social media campaigns'. The first section begins with an introduction to social microblogging and a description of its defining features. It then addresses interactional dynamics and power relations on Twitter through two rhetorical strategies: 'marketization' (Fairclough, 1993) and 'conversationalisation' (Fairclough, 2003). The second section focuses on several approaches to genre and modality on Twitter. First, it discusses the relationship between discourse and technology in Web 2.0 genres and describes the concept of techno-discursivity wherein technology is constitutive of online discourse (Paveau, 2013). Next, it reviews Julien Longhi's characterization of political tweets as a discourse genre and discusses epiphenomena such as decontextualization and

semantic condensation (Longhi, 2013). Finally, the conclusion provides a brief summary of the chapter and addresses some of the main challenges in current Twitter research.

The era of Twitter politics

Over the last decade, Twitter has quickly become an indispensable PR tool during electoral campaigns, and governments have gradually embraced the social microblogging platform as a legitimate channel for political leaders. Indeed, according to a 2017 report by the Digital Policy Council (DPC), 83 percent of world leaders had active Twitter accounts in 2016. In the same report, it is argued that political elites can use Twitter not only for self-promotion but also as a means of direct communication with the people:

> Today, Twitter is not just a bulletin board where a campaign staffer can relay political manifesto with the sole aim of garnering votes. It is a platform for political leaders to showcase their individuality, commitment to their country, to advocate the causes they believe in and to connect with real people, as real person would, spelling mistakes et al. (Digital Policy Council, 2016, p.17)

Alice Marwick argues that Twitter campaigns are part of the "democratization" of politics whereby long-awaited speeches have been replaced by frequent and often less formal interventions (Marwick, 2013, p.24). In the United States, Donald Trump's Twitter habit has received considerable media and scholarly attention (Kreis, 2017; Oates & Moe, 2017; Cillizza, 2017; Collins, 2018). The

hyper-visibility afforded by Twitter is indeed a defining characteristic of the Trump presidency; During his first year in the Oval Office, the American President sent out a staggering 2,568 tweets[10]. As a candidate in the 2016 U.S. election, Trump used his handle @realDonaldTrump to strengthen his populist appeal, vilify his opponents, and criticize traditional media outlets (Kreis, 2017):

> *(1) How do you fight millions of dollars of fraudulent commercials pushing for crooked politicians? I will be using Facebook & Twitter. Watch!*
> (@realDonaldTrump)

Yet, this 'weaponization' of social media to serve political ambitions (Lakoff, 2017) is not unique to Donald Trump. Marine Le Pen's director of digital campaigning, Gaëtan Bertrand, argued that Le Pen uses Twitter to protect her image from dishonest press coverage and to maintain a "direct relationship" with her supporters (quoted in Cieslinki, 2017)[11]. For Ramona McNeal and Lisa Bryan (2018), Twitter has revolutionized the impact and prevalence of personal appeals in presidential campaigns. The 'ground war', which used to rely on painstaking phone calls and house-to-house canvassing, can now be

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[10] This number was compiled via the search engine *Trump Twitter Archive* (http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com/). It includes all original tweets posted by @realDonaldTrump from January 20, 2017 to January 20, 2018.

[11] Original quote: "Twitter, comme d'autres réseaux sociaux, permet à Marine Le Pen d'entretenir un lien direct, sans filtre et de rétablir la vérité sur des possibles déformations de son discours ou de ses expressions." (quoted in Cieslinki, 2017, para. 9)

fought with the quick swipe of a thumb on a smartphone screen. Conversely, the 'air war' (i.e. mass media such as radio or television) might soon become obsolete as candidates rely increasingly on new technologies to win over the electorate (McNeal & Bryan, 2018, p. 3612).

Participation and affiliation on Twitter

Twitter is a product of Web 2.0, which has shifted the internet's focus from the static consumption of information to the dynamic involvement of individual users (Herring, 2013). In this new 'participatory culture' (Jenkins et al., 2009), user-generated content rivals traditional media sources. Indeed, Twitter is advertised as a network where users can find, share, and comment on global news:

> Twitter is what's happening in the world and what people are talking about right now. (Twitter, 2018a)

This ability to share and access information with great immediacy is the result of Twitter's unique design and network structure. Every day, an average of 500 million tweets get sorted and aggregated in dynamic feeds (Twitter, 2018a). Tweets can include references to other users ('@mentions' and '@replies'), copies of other tweets ('retweets'), searchable hashtags, and multimodal content (mainly links to other websites, pictures and videos). Amidst these

affordances, an imposed character limit[12] encourages brevity and keeps the stream of conversations flowing.

Another distinctive feature of the Twitter network is that it is public by default. However, Rossi and Magnani (2012) suggest that there are two levels of networking on Twitter: (1) personalized communication addressed to a known list of followers, and (2) global conversations that bring together multiple yet undefined audiences:

> Twitter-based communication exists on two almost autonomous levels: The Twitter network made of followers and friends that shows a certain level of stability and the topical network, characterized by a high level of contingency, that appears and disappears following the rhythm of a worldwide conversation. (Rossi & Magnani, 2012, p.563)

The stability of this 'follower network' is questionable, as Twitter does not have a reciprocal following system and public profiles are accessible to invisible lurkers. Due to potential diversity of readership, users tailor their tweets to an 'imagined audience' i.e. a mental representation of their potential readers (Marwick & boyd, 2011). Nonetheless, Rossi and Magnani (2012) highlight Twitter's far-reaching influence by pointing out that single tweets can spark "worldwide conversation[s]" (p.563). Indeed, Twitter's interactive format allows news to spread rapidly and to potentially become global topics of discussion, both within and beyond the Twitter network. A noteworthy

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[12] On November 7, 2017, Twitter doubled its character limit from 140 to 280 characters.

example is the #MeToo movement[13], wherein a hashtag sparked a global reaction and went on to become a rallying cry against sexual assault (Thorpe, 2017). These topical conversations create a 'context collapse' (Marwick & boyd, 2011) wherein multiple audiences co-exist in a single social context and form ephemeral 'affinity spaces' (Gee, 2005). Gee (2005) uses the term 'affinity space' as an alternative to the notion of 'community of practice' (Wenger, 1998). Communities frame participants in terms of membership and carry potentially problematic connotations of belongingness and personal ties. In contrast, affinity spaces are temporally-bound semiotic spaces where users interact and bond around evolving topics of interest (Gee, 2005). Hence, Gee's approach focuses on the social construal of meaning within a shared space (which may be physical or virtual) rather than on membership in a community (Gee, 2005, p.214).

On Twitter, affinity spaces are populated by 'familiar strangers' (Agarwal et al., 2009) who share interests and values yet have never met. Furthermore, even if they do not engage in direct exchanges, users are connected through communal performances such as retweeting and hashtagging (Zappavigna, 2011, 2012). Michele Zappavigna's model of

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[13] In October 2017, American actress Alyssa Milano encouraged victims of sexual assault and harassment to help spread awareness with the hashtag #MeToo. On October 15, Milano (@Alyssa_Milano) tweeted "If you've been sexually harassed or assaulted write 'me too' as a reply to this tweet." By the end of November 2017, the hashtag had been shared 1.7 million times (Thorpe, 2017).

affiliation on Twitter relies on an approach to discourse analysis informed by Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), social semantics and corpus linguistics (Zappavigna, 2012). Zappavigna argues that tweets do not simply share information or express opinions; They also create affiliation between like-minded users. In other words, they perform an interpersonal function as well as an ideational function (Zappavigna, 2012, p.11). Evaluative language i.e., "language [that] is used to express attitudes and to adopt stances about other texts" (p.51) can indeed construe interpersonal meaning by indexing particular values around which users can affiliate. Furthermore, Zappavigna suggests that affiliation on Twitter is primarily achieved through 'searchable talk' (p.95) i.e., discourse that is tagged in order to be easily accessed by users who share the same values. As a collaborative practice, hashtagging encourages 'ambient affiliation' by inviting users to bond over a topic through a stream of interrelated tweets (Zappavigna, 2012, p.192). For instance, campaign hashtags such as #MAGA, #ImWithHer and #FeelTheBern were used during the 2016 U.S. election not only for campaign promotion but also for identification and affiliation between users rooting for the same candidate (Kuznekoff, Spencer & Burt, 2017).

Power relations and the fallacy of digital exceptionalism

The predominant discourse in early Twitter research was that the technological affordances of the participatory web (Jenkins et al., 2009) provided an impetus for citizen involvement in the political process (Zappavigna, 2012). Twitter was heralded as a revolutionary platform for digital democracy, with promises of empowerment of ordinary citizens, grassroot mobilization, and reconnection with politics (Gillmor, 2006). Majid KhosraviNik comments that:

> The post-ideological, post-politics ethos is a dominant trend in Social Media research and theorization. Notions like participation, democratization, and individualism are appropriated, perhaps not even deliberately, to discuss a utopian context of communication brought about by digital affordances. (KhosraviNik, 2018, p. 7)

This romanticized approach portrays Twitter as the new frontier for democratic participation, where the voiceless are given a voice and where grassroot journalists have the power to challenge the mass media monopoly on news production and dissemination (Gillmor, 2006; Houndshell, 2011). The 'techno-optimism' of early Web 2.0 research contrasts with the 'techno-pessimism' central to a growing number of popular books (Marwick, 2013). Numerous bestselling authors have indeed issued warnings about the dangers of social networks, such as decreased attention span (Carr, 2010), lynch mob mentality (Ronson, 2015) and loss of privacy under panoptical surveillance (Tucker, 2014). For Marwick, neither bleak technophobia nor blind optimism

are constructive approaches to new technologies: "Rather than drawing from empirical data, both techno-optimists and techno-pessimists extrapolate grand, singular theories about technology" (Marwick, 2013, p.27).

Digital exceptionalism is based on the fallacious belief that cyberspace exists independently from everyday life (Marwick, 2013). This disembodiment hypothesis suggests that, unlike other forms of communication, the internet is not bound by the same social and market forces, and can transcend power relations:

> Web 2.0 suggests that technology can be used to bring about positive political changes and new relationships between citizens and governments, individuals and movements, and customers and businesses. (Marwick, 2013, p.7)

In reality, technology use depends on a variety of political, economic and social factors (social and economic background, age, gender, race, education, availability of technological infrastructure, etc.). Ilana Gershon coined the term 'media ideology' to describe a particular way of perceiving and using social media (Gershon, 2010). Media ideologies can be shared by groups and associated with 'idioms of practice', wherein group members learn to use a medium together and agree on specific codes or rules (Gershon, 2010). The myth of egalitarianism on Twitter is partially rooted in the idea that regardless of status, all users must obey the rules set by the network (Marwick & boyd, 2011). In other words, they share an idiom of practice. French writer Bernard

Pivot for instance points out that even though Donald Trump is omnipresent on Twitter, he cannot bypass the platform's constraints (namely its character limit):

> (2) *La seule limite que Donald Trump ne peut ni mépriser, ni enjamber, ni effacer, c'est celle de Twitter. 140 signes, même pour lui!*
> [The only constraint that Donald Trump cannot snub nor bypass nor delete is the one set by Twitter. 140 characters, even for him!]
> <div align="right">(@bernardpivot)</div>

In truth, political figures do receive preferential treatment on Twitter – such as the blue 'verified badge'[14] – which can contribute to reproducing and sustaining uneven power relations between users (Marwick & boyd, 2011). Moreover, while regular accounts can be banned or suspended for misconduct (e.g. abusive behavior, hate speech or harassment), political leaders benefit from what could be described as moderation immunity. In a blog post published in January 2018, Twitter stated that:

> Twitter is here to serve and help advance the global, public conversation. Elected world leaders play a critical role in that conversation because of their outsized impact on our society. Blocking a world leader from Twitter or removing their controversial Tweets would hide important information people should be able to see and debate. It would also not silence that leader, but it would certainly hamper necessary discussion around their words and actions. (Twitter, 2018b)

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[14] Twitter states that "[a]n account may be verified if it is determined to be an account of public interest. Typically, this includes accounts maintained by users in music, acting, fashion, government, politics, religion, journalism, media, sports, business, and other key interest areas." (Twitter, 2018b)

Above all, Twitter communication often lacks a key element of public sphere dialogue: reciprocity. Fairclough (2003) indeed argues that for public sphere dialogue to be effective – and yield palpable results such as policy changes - all participants must have equal opportunities to contribute. In other words, participation requires mutual recognition (Wenger, 1998). Yet, political figures rarely interact directly with their followers (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013), and contribute to a wide 'status gap' between verified celebrity accounts and regular accounts on Twitter (Marwick, 2013). While their tweets generate a high number of replies, celebrity users tend to ignore comments posted by non-verified accounts (Marwick & boyd, 2011). Moreover, Twitter's nonreciprocal following system allows political actors to boast thousands or even millions of followers with no obligation to follow them in return (Zappavigna, 2012). This affordance leads to largely disproportionate 'follower to following' ratios; For instance, Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump) boasted 54 million followers in August 2018 but was only following 47 accounts.

In sum, participatory politics remains a seductive but distant ideal. Because they share a social platform with world leaders, ordinary users can be led to believe that they are more than mere spectators within the political sphere (Parmelee & Bichard, 2012). But while Twitter does provide opportunities for political activism and organized action, its impact on power relations remains questionable (Marwick, 2013; Mercier, 2016). Research

indeed suggests that political figures use Twitter mainly for self-promotion and increased visibility (Page, 2012), and that they seldom engage in dialogue with the electorate (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). In other words, they seek to broadcast rather than to interact.

New practices, new genres

The marketization of identity

Media ideologies directly affect self-representation, which Carolyn Cunningham defines as "the strategic negotiation of how one presents one's self to audiences" (Cunningham, 2013, p.3). On Twitter, displays of identity often takes the form of self-promotion, or even self-branding as users attempt to 'sell' their particular 'brand' of identity (Marwick & boyd, 2011; Page, 2012). Fairclough defines strategic discourse as designed to obtain something from the audience (such as votes and campaign donations) whereas communicative discourse simply conveys information (Fairclough, 1992). While politicians often claim to use social media for connecting with voters, studies suggest that their primary motive is self-promotion (Page, 2012; Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). The current flare-up of 'social media campaigns' reflects Marwick's concern that Web 2.0 has become "a neoliberal technology of subjectivity" (p.14) which promotes "an individualistic, competitive notion of identity that prioritizes

individual status-seeking over collective action or openness" (Marwick, 2013, pp.17-18).

Fairclough argues that the infiltration of neoliberal ideology in public discourse is exemplified by two rhetorical strategies: marketization (Fairclough, 1993) and conversationalisation (Fairclough, 1992). Both are instances of 'recontextualization' (i.e., the incorporation of elements of one social practice within another) and reflect a shift "from a distant, impersonal, formal public discourse toward conversation and personalized discourse" (Fairclough & Mauranen, 1997, p.117). Marketization refers to the incorporation of discursive elements of the commodities market - where items are bought and sold - into other domains such as politics and education (Fairclough, 1993; Young & Fitzgerald, 2006). In other words, it is the ideological representation of institutions as entrepreneurial entities and of the audience as "members of consumption communities" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 203). Conversationalisation is a concomitant strategy which consists in emulating conversational language in a public context. This trend is widespread in advertising and consumerist discourse, where advertisers use elements of casual conversation to feign intimacy with the consumer – a phenomenon Fairclough calls 'synthetic personalization' (Fairclough, 1992, p.52). The mass media often relies on second-person pronouns to create the illusion of treating each member of a mass audience as an individual (e.g., "See you after the

break!"). Other features of conversationalisation include anecdotes and personal observations, the frequent use of singular and plural first-person pronouns, colloquialisms and short sentences, and rhetorical questions meant to involve the audience (Fairclough & Mauranen, 1997).

There is a wide gap between the sophistication of official speeches – either prompted or rehearsed - and the apparent spontaneity of social networks, which are perceived as wilder linguistic territories (even world leaders are not immune to typos and spelling mistakes). Twitter is a hybrid medium: users often try to emulate informal spoken language even though they have the ability to reflect and to carefully craft their messages – a deliberate stylization which Caroline Tagg describes as 'speech-like performativity' (Tagg, 2012, p.176). The 140-character format lends itself to conversational language and catchy slogans, and by extension to advertising discourse. It is thus an effective format for self-promoting and personalized campaigning (Longhi, 2013; Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). Fundamentally, Twitter makes political discourse more visible, more accessible (especially through the 'livetweeting' of interviews or speeches), and above all constant. Indeed, digital campaigning is not as regulated as institutionalized political communication, such as TV debates where candidates may only speak during allotted times (KhosraviNik, 2018). For Gautier Guignard, lead manager of François Fillon's digital campaign during the 2017 election, Twitter is more than an echo

chamber; it is an amplifier where candidates can reach millions of potential voters in a matter of seconds (Cieslinki, 2017)[15]. Therefore, politicians conveying their ideas through informal tweets should not be interpreted as a leveling of power relations in favor of ordinary citizens. Instead, it is more indicative of a restructuring of political discourse according to global market principles and to new capitalist ideology (Fairclough, 1992; Marwick, 2013). On Twitter, politicians use language strategically to create a synthetic relation of intimacy with their electorate; The primary purpose of their tweets is, however, to persuade. In other words, Twitter politics prioritizes affective appeals over rational argumentation, and seeks legitimacy through popularity and visibility (KhosraviNik, 2018).

Genre 2.0: emergence and techno-discursivity

The conceptualization of 'genre of discourse' is still highly debated among scholars. Maingueneau (2004) argues that approaches to genre tend to be too narrow or too broad – most focus on either linguistic phenomena (e.g. structuralism) or on social context (e.g. interactionism) but few manage to reconcile both dimensions (Maingueneau, 2004, p.107). As a socio-semiotic approach, Critical Discourse Analysis places discourse in a dialogical

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[15] Original quote in French: "[Twitter] bien plus qu'une caisse de résonance. […] Un tweet peut démultiplier par 10 ou 20 une audience de meeting."

relationship with its social context wherein it is both socially shaped and socially constitutive (Fairclough, 2003). In the case of computer-mediated discourse (CMD), technology constitutes an essential part of this social ecosystem. Indeed, Marie-Anne Paveau (2013) argues that online discourse is 'techno-discursive', in the sense that technology (e.g. screen, keyboard, avatars, links) is fully integrated into discourse practices and directly involved in verbal production (Paveau, 2013, p.13). She defends a constitutive and ecological approach to online discourse analysis, in contrast with logocentrism which tends to focus on the verbal aspect – the *logos* - of discourse:

> L'écriture numérique native possède des traits particuliers qui lui sont donnés par le dispositif technologique. Mais ces traits ne sont pas des traits « en plus », qui laisseraient le logos et le logocentrisme intacts. Ces traits affectent la nature même du langage, qui se métisse de technologie. (Paveau, 2013, p.13)

Paveau coined the term 'techno-genre' to refer to digital native genres which are made of both technological and verbal material (Paveau, 2013, p.12). For example, retweeting is an inherently technological practice: clicking on an icon is a requirement of the genre. Tweets have been compared to a wide array of phenomena such as epigrams, aphorisms, and haikus. However, Paveau argues that defining a techno-genre in terms of pre-existing genres is problematic because it ignores the cognitive, social, and cultural context of production (Paveau, 2013). For Michele Zappavigna, cross-genre comparison is indeed "unlikely to illuminate the complex and meaningful permutations

generated by shifting between semiotic modes" (Zappavigna, 2012, p.172). The tweet genre is a product of the Twitter ecosystem and can itself produce other techno-practices and 'microgenres' endemic to Twitter (Paveau, 2013). For instance, citizen journalism has engendered microgenres of news reporting, such as live eyewitness reportage (Zappavigna, 2012).

Norman Fairclough argues that change in genres is a critical aspect of technological change (Fairclough, 2003). New technologies lead not only to the emergence of new genres but also to the mixing of existing genres. Moreover, Fairclough (2003) warns against assuming simple correspondences between particular genres and actual texts or interactions. Indeed, texts can be innovative by 'mixing' several genres in novel ways:

> Actual events (texts, interactions) are not 'in' a particular genre, they do not instantiate a particular genre – rather they draw upon the socially available resource of genres in potentially quite complex and creative ways. The genres associated with a particular network of social practices constitute a *potential* which is *variably* drawn upon in *actual* texts and interactions. (Fairclough, 2003, p.69).

Websites are a prime example of genre mixing as they bring together genres from other technologies (e.g., print) and genres that have developed as a result of technological change (e.g., online chat).

Novelty also stems from 'multimodality', which refers to the interplay between different semiotic modes, such as visual imagery, video, or music (Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996). Each semiotic mode contributes to creating a

unified text by adding meaning to the communicative event (Young & Fitzgerald, 2006, p. 174). Kress and van Leeuwen suggest that technological change is leading to a greater reliance on visual modes, and that few modern texts involve only one mode of communication (Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996). Twitter itself emerged in 2006 as a product of the participatory web, or Web 2.0, which Susan Herring defines as follows:

> Web-based platforms that emerged as popular in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and that incorporate user-generated content and social interaction, often alongside or in response to structures or (multimedia) content provided by the sites themselves. (Herring, 2013, p.4).

These platforms have brought in new technological affordances, new contexts of communication, and therefore new genres. Susan Herring (2013) suggests that Web 2.0 can be classified into three categories: *familiar*, *reconfigured*, and *emergent*. Familiar genres result from "the incorporation of new media affordances into familiar text types" (Herring, 2013, p.7) and retain many features of early CMC. Examples include weblogs, wikis, and discussion forums. Familiar genres are primarily textual but have integrated CMC features such as nonstandard orthography, emoticons, and internet slang. Some studies refer to familiar genres as 'reproduced genres' but Herring favors the term 'familiar' because it suggests continuity in discourse phenomena, rather than mere replication. In contrast, reconfigured genres are the product of the structural reshaping, or reconfiguration, of online discourse within 2.0

environments. They "might on the surface appear new but have traceable online antecedents" (Herring, 2013, p.10) and include interactive and participatory phenomena such as turn-taking, threading, and intertextuality. Retweeting is an example of an older practice (namely, quoting in asynchronous messages) which has evolved – and is still evolving – within a social platform. When Twitter first launched, retweets were mostly textual and followed the structure [RT + original author's username + quoted tweet + optional comment]. Today, retweets resemble shared posts on Facebook and allow users to share a clickable tweet on their profile with all its original information (media content, replies, etc.). They may also add a commentary, in which case the 'quoted' tweet is embedded within a new tweet. Retweets are inherently intertextual as they incorporate the words of others into a new message. Moreover, the ability to retweet replies or even other retweets creates multiple levels of embedding. Finally, Herring describes new Web 2.0 genres as 'emergent'. Emergent genres develop through "the use of channels other than text, and semiotic systems other than verbal language, to carry on conversational exchanges" (Herring, 2013, p.14). They include collaborative, multimodal practices such as synchronous and asynchronous video exchanges (e.g., vines), and conversational exchanges via images or gifs (e.g., image-quotes, memes, snapchats). In the case of image-quotes, a picture posted by a previous contributor is re-used in a reply, often with modification (e.g.,

superimposed text, photoshopping, speech balloons). This dynamic process of transformation through group collaboration creates a conversational exchange. Image-quotes become 'memes' when they spread virally beyond a single exchange to be utilized in various contexts (Herring, 2013, p.16).

Political tweeting as a genre of discourse

In response to new technological affordances, the notion of 'political genre' has rapidly expanded beyond the institutional setting (Fairclough, 2003). A first wave of democratization occurred in the 1950s as the golden age of television brought in political talk shows, campaign ads, and media interviews (Oates & Moe, 2017). The internet, specifically Web 2.0, once again reshaped political communication: political actors quickly embraced the participatory web and have since adapted to a variety of innovative social platforms (Negrine, 2008; Parmelee & Bichard, 2012).

Julien Longhi (2013) argues that the political tweet[16] is not just an additional communication channel for politicians: it constitutes a genre, or *genre de discours*, in its own right. Indeed, political tweets are shaped by affordances and constraints that modify not only the pragmatic aspect of messages (e.g. interactional dynamics) but also the grammar itself (Longhi,

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[16] The term 'political tweet' is sometimes applied to any tweet about politics, regardless of its author. Here, we focus specifically on the tweets of political actors and candidates.

2013, p.25). The overall structure of tweets is characterized by a combination of linguistic and technological features, including (a) a character limit, (b) grammatical transgressions and constraints, (c) typographic adjustments and (d) the insertion of hypertextual elements (e.g., links, hashtags and @mentions) resulting in de-linearized utterances. Longhi describes two resulting discourse phenomena, *semantic condensation* and *decontextualization* (Longhi, 2013, p.28). First, due to the character constraint, information ought to be condensed and communicated as concisely as possible. This semantic condensation requires creativity and strategic word selection. While textese and abbreviations are uncommon among politicians, there are other creative ways to circumvent the character constraint, such as splitting a message into a 'thread' of numbered tweets (1/3, 2/3, etc.). However, concision can also make political communication more effective and more accessible. Politicians are indeed more likely to retain their audience's attention if they condense their ideas into short, digestible tidbits, as opposed to long, drawn-out speeches. Furthermore, a prevalent feature of Twitter campaigns is 'self-quoting' – candidates share quotes from rallies or debates on Twitter where they can reach a wider audience (Longhi, 2013). These direct quotes have been decontextualized i.e., separated from the context in which they were originally produced (Longhi, 2013, p.28). Hashtags can however function as contextual markers by relating isolated quotes to specific themes or events, as well as to

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other media (such as TV debates, radio shows or blog posts). Longhi describes this tagging process as 'techno-contextualization' (Longhi, 2013, p.29). The combination of semantic condensation and decontextualization can increase the impact of a tweet by formatting it like a universal truth rather than an individual opinion (Longhi, 2013). Indeed, the tweet is no longer surrounded by the "noise" of its original context while hedges and softening markers are often removed for the sake of concision. The most impactful tweets are formulated as *petites phrases* i.e. short, attention-grabbing catchphrases (Longhi, 2013, p.26). Alice Krieg-Planque and Caroline Ollivier-Yaniv define *petites phrases* as decontextualized fragments of discourse which manage to attract mass media attention because of their polemical undertones (Krieg-Planque & Ollivier-Yaniv, 2011, p.18). Similar to punchlines, they embody a new age of politics dominated by dramatic appeals (Kreis, 2017) and conversationalized rhetoric (Fairclough, 1992).

In sum, politicians have adopted Twitter not just as a network but also as a genre of discourse through which they can disseminate ideas and ideologies. Longhi (2013) for instance points out that proverbs and fixed sayings are commonplace in the tweets of the National Front, befitting the party's emphasis on tradition and national roots. Likewise, because populism typically rejects nuanced arguments in favor of moral outrage, Twitter appears to be the ideal platform for populist discourse (Bartlett, 2014). Indeed, it allows

populist candidates to share simple, unidimensional messages with followers who have grown tired of the cold style of 'office politics' (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). In this regard, Bartlett states that:

> Social media is in many ways the ideal medium for populist parties. It is distributed, non-hierarchical and democratic. It is an alternative to the mainstream media, which many supporters of populist parties strongly distrust. It is therefore not controlled by the elites: the content is generated by us – the honest, hard-working, ordinary citizens – exactly those people who the populists are defending. (Bartlett, 2014, p.106)

Negrine (2008) argues that contemporary political communication in characterized by constant adaptation to new discursive and social contexts. However, adaptation is not a passive process; it is a strategic response to a rapidly evolving sociopolitical landscape (Negrine, 2008). In recent elections, candidates have exploited the technological affordances of Twitter to promote and amplify their campaigns (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013; Coesemans & De Cock, 2017). Multimodality enables cross-platform promotion through links to official campaign websites, campaign ads, blog posts, and video recordings (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). Over time, this reconfiguration of political discourse leads to the emergence and development of "institutionalized microgenres" (Zappavigna, 2012, p.190). Fairclough suggests that genre analysis can contribute to understanding the relationship between technological advance and political change by shedding light on how technology gets integrated into modern social practices through new techno-genres (Fairclough, 2003, p.77).

Chapter 4
Framework and Methodology

At issue in all linguistic analysis is the process by which
lived or imagined experience is turned into text.
Suzanne Eggins.

Introduction

The present study makes use of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in conjunction with a systemic-functional (SF) approach to text analysis. This methodology chapter first outlines the scope and aims of CDA, specifically Norman Fairclough's dialectical-relational approach (Fairclough, 2003, 2009). For Fairclough, the power dynamics and hidden ideologies that underlie political texts can be uncovered using interdiscursive analysis, i.e., analyzing texts in terms of the different discourses, genres and styles that compose them (Fairclough, 2003). I argue that Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) offers a set of valuable analytical tools for this type of multi-layered textual analysis (Halliday, 1994; Eggins, 2004). I then address the pros and cons of such an approach, and I provide a rationale for selecting this particular framework to analyze political discourse on Twitter. The second section deals with the selection and collection of the data used in this study, which comprises 208 campaign tweets relating to three real-world events – a press release, a

political scandal and a terror attack – that took place during the 2017 French presidential campaign. Finally, the last section of this chapter outlines my methods of analysis and bridges the gap between Fairclough's concept of interdiscursivity and Halliday's multifunctional approach to textual analysis (Halliday, 1978, 1994). My intent is to show that a critical approach is not incompatible with rigorous textual analysis, and to introduce an analytical framework that is both replicable and transferrable to other studies. In the era of 'big data', I also hope to illustrate that Critical Discourse Analysis can provide valuable insights on how politicians are adapting their campaign tactics to new technologies.

Conceptual framework

Scope and aims of Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a theoretical and analytical framework which focuses on the relationship between discourse, power and ideology (Fairclough, 1989; Wodak, 1996). CDA operates from the premise that discourse is a social practice whereby language is intertwined with how we act and how we maintain and regulate our societies (Kress & Hodge, 1988). This approach to discourse analysis is "critical" because its focus is not upon language itself but upon "the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures" (Wodak, 1996, p.17). Rather than identifying and

describing language patterns for the sake of linguistic research, CDA uses those patterns to uncover hidden ideological values:

> [CDA] can allow us to reveal more precisely how speakers and authors use language and grammatical features to create meaning, to persuade people to think about language in a particular way, sometimes even to seek to manipulate them while at the same time concealing their communicative emotions. (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.1)

CDA researchers believe that power is both transmitted and practiced through discourse and seek to uncover the implicit relationship between discourse and power by challenging surface meanings and taken-for-granted assumptions (Fairclough, 1989). Indeed, language can be used strategically to vehiculate particular worldviews and to ultimately 'naturalize' them i.e., make them appear natural and common-sensical (Fairclough, 2003). For instance, politicians may seek to promote ideologies in ways that everyone can agree upon, such as the neo-liberal discourse that anything which enhances efficiency and adaptability is desirable (Fairclough, 2003, p.58). These naturalized ideas then become part of the way we organize our social and political institutions. The type of ideology that interests CDA researchers is the "hidden and latent type of everyday beliefs, which often appear disguised as conceptual metaphors and analogies" (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p. 8). Accordingly, the aim of Critical Discourse Analysis is to 'denaturalize' language in order to expose information that is communicated but not directly present in the text (Fairclough, 1989). Indeed, Fairclough argues that "what is

'said' in a text is always said against the background of what is 'unsaid'" (Fairclough, 2003, p.17). The key to uncovering this 'unsaid' is finding out which elements are backgrounded or even excluded altogether by discursive strategies such as passivation and nominalization (van Leeuwen, 1996; Machin & Mayr, 2012).

Fundamentally, CDA does not refer to one single homogeneous framework but encompasses multiple approaches to discourse analysis. Among others, we may cite the socio-cognitive approach of Teun A. van Dijk (van Dijk, 1993), Ruth Wodak's social-historical approach (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001) or the dialectical-relational approach developed by Norman Fairclough (Fairclough, 2001). Hence, CDA can be defined as a "problem-oriented interdisciplinary research program, subsuming a variety of approaches, each with different theoretical models, research methods and agenda" (Unger, Wodak & KhosraviNik, 2016, p.2). Nonetheless, all approaches emphasize the need to look at discourse both reflectively and interpretively by researching the production and reception of texts within social structures (Young & Fitzgerald, 2006, p.8). To this end, CDA researchers draw on a wide range of linguistic and analytical methods (Unger, Wodak & KhosraviNik, 2016).

Fairclough's dialectical-relational approach

To Fairclough, the term 'discourse' signals "the particular view of language in use as an element of social life which is closely interconnected with other elements." (Fairclough, 2003, p.3). Fairclough has a dialectical-relational approach to text analysis (Fairclough, 2009), meaning that he is concerned with the analysis of the dialectical relationship between discourse and other elements of social practices (Fairclough, 1993).

The dialectics of discourse

Fairclough is perhaps best known for his three-dimensional framework, which aims to map three forms of analysis onto one another: (a) the analysis of texts (i.e. lexicogrammatical features), (b) the analysis of discourse practices (i.e. the production, distribution and consumption of texts), and (c) the analysis of texts as sociocultural practices (Fairclough, 1993):

> Each discursive event has three dimensions or facets: it is a spoken or written language *text*, it is an instance of *discourse practice* involving the production and interpretation of text, and it is a piece of *social practice*. (Fairclough, 1993, p.136).

This conceptualization of discourse emphasizes the mutual determination and connection of the micro and macro levels (see Figure 4.1). Semiosis (i.e., meaning-making) occurs between the micro level of linguistic features and the macro level of social practices (Fairclough, 1993). Accordingly, an internal

analysis of political discourse has limited value if detached from the political field and its wider frame.

Figure 4.1: Norman Fairclough's three-dimensional network

Fairclough argues that researchers can reconcile these three dimensions through 'interdiscursive analysis', that is, by "seeing texts in terms of the different discourses, genres and styles they draw upon and articulate together" (Fairclough, 2003, p.3). Discourses, genres and styles are the three main ways in which discourse figures as a part of social practices. Together, they form unique combinations which Fairclough calls 'orders of discourse' and which encapsulate "the totality of discursive practices of an institution, and relationships between them" (Fairclough, 1993, p.138). These three elements are described below:

1) **Discourses** are *ways of representing* and construing aspects of the world. Fairclough attaches several meanings to the term 'discourse'. As an

abstract noun, discourse broadly refers to "language use conceived as social practice" while the count noun indexes a "way of signifying experience from a particular perspective" (Fairclough, 1993, p.138). Discourses are generally associated with different positions of different groups of social actors. For instance, the discourse that "immigrants are a threat to national identity" is rampant in far-right circles.

2) **Genres** are *ways of acting* and interacting in discourse. Genres are more or less conventionalized with recognizable and reproducible elements (e.g. the expression "once upon a time" indicates that a text belongs to the fairytale genre). This study approaches campaign tweets as part of a broader 'tweet genre' with its own set of conventions, such as hashtags and @mentions (Longhi, 2013; Paveau, 2013). For Fairclough, genre analysis can make a significant contribution to research on the relationship between technological advancement and wider social change, especially in terms of how the integration of new technologies into social processes is instantiated through new "emergent genres" (Fairclough, 2003, p.78).

3) **Styles** are *ways of being* and of construing one's identity in discourse. The present study bears upon the notion of 'presidentiability' i.e., communicating through discourse that one is "presidential caliber" (Alduy, 2017). Indeed, being a politician is partly a matter of developing the

appropriate semiotic style, and Donald Trump's disregard of "political correctness" has been a key component of his outsider persona (Oates & Moe, 2017).

Genres, discourses and styles are dialectically related: each element 'internalizes' the others. Together, they illustrate the dialectical relationship of the text to the event, to the wider social context, and to the social actors involved in the event (Fairclough, 1993).

Internal and external relations

Fairclough's approach is a relational approach to text analysis as it is concerned with several 'levels' of analysis and with the relations between these levels:

Figure 4.2: Fairclough's levels of analysis (Fairclough, 2003)

We can distinguish the 'external relations' from the 'internal relations' of texts. The external relations of texts refer to their relations with other elements of social events and, more abstractly, social practices and social structures. In contrast, internal relations correspond to semantic, grammatical, lexical and phonological relations within a text (Fairclough, 2003, p.36). Discourses, genres and styles belong to the intermediate level of discourse – a mediating level between the text and its social context, and between internal and external relations:

> Discourses, genres and styles are both elements of texts, and social elements. In texts they are organized together in interdiscursive relations - relations in which different genres, discourses and styles may be "mixed", articulated and textured together in particular ways. As social elements, genres, discourses and styles are articulated together in particular ways in orders of discourse – the language aspects of social practices in which language variation is socially controlled. (Fairclough, 2003, p.37).

In other words, an interdiscursive perspective allows us to connect concrete social events to more abstract social practices, and to ask broader questions about the role of language in social life. Fairclough's dialectical-relational approach is motivated by his belief that "texts have social, political, cognitive, moral and material consequences and effects", and that "it is vital to understand these consequences and effects if we are to raise moral and political questions about contemporary societies" (Fairclough, 2003, p.14). Accordingly,

textual description should not be seen as prior to or independent of social critique but as a dynamic dialogue across disciplines, methods, and theories.

SFL and the social functions of language

Fairclough's approach draws heavily from Systemic Functional Linguistics, a social semiotic theory of language developed by Michael Halliday (Halliday, 1978, 1994). Essentially, SFL is the study of the relationship between language and the 'social functions' it has evolved to serve (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 27). SFL thus emphasizes the interrelation of form and meaning, and approaches language as an elaborate system of 'options' through which speakers can 'realize' a wide array of 'meaning potentials' according to social circumstances (Eggins, 2004).

The semogenic power of language

SFL and CDA are part of what Karen Tusting calls 'critical social linguistics' - an umbrella term for areas in linguistics that explore the role of language in broader social processes, or "language as social practice" (Tusting, 2005, p.42). The common goal of these disciplines is to uncover the 'sociosemantics' of texts, i.e., "the meanings of language in use in the textual processes of social life" (Eggins, 2004, p. 2).

A social semiotic approach to discourse analysis recognizes that language cannot be divorced from the social context in which it is embedded, and that speakers create texts by selecting or excluding semiotic resources from a network of shared options (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.19). Indeed, Halliday argues that a text is a continuous process of semantic choice: "Text is meaning, and meaning is choice" (Halliday, 1978, p.137). The concept of 'realization' describes the process through which grammatical choices represent (or 'realize') social meanings (Eggins, 2004; Young & Fitzgerald, 2006). Hence, the meaning of a text is dependent upon the choices made by the speaker from the options within the language system. Because language has the ability to generate new meanings, it is a 'semogenic' system:

> Not all semiotic systems are also semogenic: a system of traffic signals, for example, is a system of meaning, but its meaning is fixed – it cannot create meanings that are not built into it. By contrast, the meaning potential of a language is open-ended: new meaning(s) always can be, and often are being, created. (Halliday, 2009, p. 60)

This semogenic system is the result of the constant interaction of three levels of meaning: (a) discourse-semantics, (b) lexicogrammar, and (c) expression. Per this model, abstract meanings are realized by words and structures which in turn are realized by sounds or writing (see Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3: The three strata of language.

Halliday (1978) coined the term 'lexicogrammar' to reflect the interdependence of syntax (grammar) and vocabulary (lexis). The lexicogrammar is the intermediate level responsible for turning meanings into wordings as speakers pick from an available repertoire of discrete signs (Eggins, 2004, p.14). Each sign consists of an abstract meaning (the signified) being arbitrarily realized by a concrete expression (the signifier). As such, the lexicogrammar enacts the pairing of a meaning with its realization (Halliday, 1978).

In describing how a text forms a unified whole, Halliday and Hasan (1976) introduce the concept of 'texture' as the property that holds the clauses of a text together to give them semantic and structural unity (Halliday & Hasan, 1976, p.2). Texture involves the interaction of two components: cohesion and coherence. Eggins defines cohesion as the process through which "referential, lexical and logical ties bind passages of language into relatively

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coherent, unified semantic units" (Eggins, 2004, p.53). In a cohesive text, each clause can be linked to the clauses that precede it. This process of ongoing contextualization is an essential element of the meaning-making process: "there has to be cohesion if meanings are to be exchanged at all" (Halliday & Hasan, 1976, p.300). Coherence, on the other hand, refers to a text's relationship with its extra-textual context (i.e., with the social and cultural context of its occurrence). Indeed, SFL posits that texts display continuity not just with elements within their boundaries but also with the context within which they take place: "Just as all texts in fact point outwards, to context, and depend upon context for their interpretation, so also all texts carry their context within them" (Eggins, 2004, p.87).

For Halliday, "a text is a sociological event, a semiotic encounter through which the meanings that constitute the social system are exchanged" (Halliday, 1978, p.139). He thus approaches language as a form of socialization, enabling individuals to perform meaningful actions within 'contexts of situation'. Halliday describes the 'context of situation' as "a theoretical construct for explaining how a text relates to the social processes within which it is located" (Halliday, 1991, p.277). This concept was borrowed from the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, who argued that a text has no meaning when taken out of its situational context:

> A word without linguistic context is a mere fragment and stands for nothing by itself, so in reality of a spoken living tongue, the utterance has no meaning except in the context of situation. (Malinowski, 1946, p. 307; quoted in Eggins, 2004, p.89).

Furthermore, Malinowski argued that the context of situation itself can only be understood if placed within the larger 'context of culture'. In other words, linguistic interpretation depends on contextual information about the situation and the culture within which the text is located. As a social systemic approach, SFL apprehends textual analysis in terms of 'linguistic predictability' (Firth, 1957). That is, contextual cues enable us to make predictions about patterns of language use (cf. Figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4: The SFL model of text-in-context.

According to this model, patterns of social organization in a culture (i.e., social structures) are realized by patterns of social interaction in a situation (i.e., social practices), which in turn are realized by patterns of language use in a text. The context of culture thus constitutes "the total environment in which a text unfolds" (Halliday, 1978, p.5).

Because linguistic production relies on the context of situation, we can infer that it is only by reference to the various situations in which language is used that we can understand its functioning. Halliday coined the term 'register' to refer to "variety according to use" (Halliday, 1994, p.87). Hasan (2014) describes register as follows:

> Language is not realized in the abstract: it is realized as the activity of people in situations, as linguistic events which are manifested in a particular dialect or register. A speaker positioned in a specific context of situation would in all likelihood speak with relevance to it; in other words, he would speak 'in' register. (Hasan, 2014, p.4)

In order to identify the main 'situation types' associated with distinct registers, Halliday suggests "a classification [of register] along three dimensions, each representing an aspect of the situation in which language operates and the part played by language in them" (Halliday, 1994, p.90). Registers can thus be distinguished according to three 'register variables': *field*, *tenor* (also referred to as 'style') and *mode*:

1) The **field of discourse** is concerned with the nature of the social event of which language forms a part. Language can be fully constitutive of the activity (e.g. a lecture or an essay) or can have more of a secondary role (e.g. a soccer game). Each activity or event involves participants, processes and participants organized into particular taxonomies that distinguish one field from another.

2) The **tenor of discourse** or **style of discourse** is concerned with social relations between the participants, and with how social status (equal vs. unequal) and social distance (close vs. distant) affect these relations and by extension patterns of language use (e.g. colloquial vs. polite).

3) Finally, the **mode of discourse** refers to the semiotic mode of the language activity, and to how it affects the role played by the language activity in the social situation. One primary distinction is between spoken and written language.

Each variable portrays the interrelationship between text and context by at once representing an aspect of the situation in which language plays a role, and an aspect of the role played by language in the situation (Halliday, 1994). As such, tenor, field and mode bear upon three social functions of language: enacting relationships, construing experience, and packaging these enactments and construals into meaningful discourse (Martin & Rose, 2008).

Halliday's systemic functional grammar

Halliday's main contribution to linguistics is his development of a 'systemic functional grammar' that aims to represent how different strands of meaning are expressed in clause structures (Halliday, 1994). The term *systemic* refers to Halliday's view of language as "a network of systems, or interrelated sets of options for making meaning" (Halliday, 1994, p.15). In that sense, SFL emphasizes paradigmatic relations over syntagmatic relations. While syntagmatic relations refer to relations between elements that are actually present in a text, paradigmatic relations are relations of choice that draw attention to relations between actual and potential elements (Fairclough, 2003). That is, texts include particular features that realize particular meanings, but they could have included others which were available to the speaker but were not selected. Eggins explains that "wherever people have the possibility of choice, there we find the potential for semiotic systems, as the choices we make are invested with meaning" (Eggins, 2004, p.15). The context of situation 'activates' a set of available features, while the chosen features 'realize' (i.e., project) a particular representation of the world. Interpreting texts from a paradigmatic perspective thus allows us to consider the appropriacy (or inappropriacy) of linguistic choices in relation to their contexts of use (Eggins, 2004, p.3).

Central to SFL methodology is the use of 'system networks' (or 'sys-nets') that represent the 'options' available to speakers for the realization of meaning. Sys-nets are networks of interrelated options that are organized paradigmatically (Hasan, 2014). Below are two examples of system networks representing lexical choice and grammatical choice, respectively.

1) **Lexical choice**

Figure 4.5: Lexical choice, specifying attitude.

System networks of lexical choice capture the semantic relations of contrast or opposition between lexical items (Eggins, 2004, p.16). Eggins (2004) gives the example of a social situation where a mother is describing the latest exploits of her five year-old child to a friend. The mother faces multiple word options for referring to her progeny, such as *child, kid, brat, darling, angel,* etc. Her decision requires her to select which 'dimension(s) of contrast' she wishes to encode (Eggins, 2004, p.17). For instance, she may choose to specify her

'attitude' towards the child, with words such as *darling* or *angel* realizing a positive attitude, while *brat* or *punk* encode a negative attitude (cf. Figure 4.5).

2) Grammatical choice

Figure 4.6: Grammatical choice, specifying Mood.

Although paradigmatic relations are foregrounded in SFL, features in grammatical systems are realized as structures, or 'syntagms', rather than as individual words. The elements that constitute these structures (or 'constituents') are given functional labels that describe the contribution they make to the structure as a whole. Figure 4.6 outlines three main combinations of Mood constituents found in English clauses. For example, the structure [Subject ^ Finite ^ Predicator ^ Complement ^ Adjunct] describes the syntagmatic (i.e., sequential) organization of declaratives in English. In technical terms, a structure can thus be described as a "set of functional constituents in syntagmatic relation" (Eggins, 2004, p.193).

Most networks cannot be described with only one system (i.e., one set of options). Additional systems are added to the network to capture further choices and extend the network in 'delicacy'. Simply put, the first system in the network represents the 'least delicate' choice. As the network expands, it moves in delicacy, with the final system being the 'most delicate' choice (Eggins, 2004, p.196-197).

Figure 4.7: An extended system network (Eggins, 2004).

The 'scale of delicacy' refers to the logical priority among choices. For example, picture a situation where you must select a side for your main dish at a restaurant (illustrated in Figure 4.7). Before you can choose between mashed or baked potatoes, you must first have chosen between potatoes and beans, which in turn means you must first have chosen cooked vegetables rather than salad as your side choice. Each step in the process leads to a more 'delicate choice' than the previous one(s).

SFL is also *functional*, as Halliday posits that language has evolved and continues to evolve in response to socio-functional needs. Indeed, he argues

that the clause is a simultaneous realization of these three major strands of meanings, which he calls 'metafunctions' (Halliday, 1978):

1) **The ideational metafunction** refers to the linguistic representation of action (i.e., who does what to whom). Its function is thus to "encode our experience of the world" by representing the processes, participants, and circumstances that surround us.

2) **The interpersonal metafunction** is concerned with how speakers exchange information (statements, questions, commands and requests), and with how they introduce stances and attitudes into their discourse. This includes stances and attitudes towards their topic but also towards their interlocutor(s).

3) **The textual metafunction** involves the different ways in which speakers connect parts of their discourse so that their messages are communicated in a cohesive and coherent fashion. Textual resources therefore ensure information flow by coordinating how "ideational and interpersonal meanings are distributed in waves of semiosis, including interconnections between waves" (Martin & Rose, 2008, p.24).

These three metafunctions are fused together in all linguistic units (Eggins, 2004, p. 3). They are expressed simultaneously at the level of the clause, which

SFL regards as the pivotal unit of grammatical meaning. According to Halliday:

> With only minor exceptions, whatever the speaker is doing with language he will draw on all three components of grammar. He will need to make some reference to the categories of his own experience – in other words, the language will be *about* something. He will need to take up some position in the speech situation; at the very least he will specify his own communication role and (will) set up expectations for that of the hearer – in terms of statements, questions, response and the like. And what he says will be structured as 'text' – that is to say, it will be operational in the given context. (Halliday, 1973, p.100)

Eggins argues that because SFL seeks to describe clause structure at several levels of functional organization, it can be described as "a multi-functional approach to language". (Eggins, 2004, p.135). With this orientation, system networks become instruments for revealing the meaning potential of language, as they reflect its organization into bundles of interdependent options (Martin & Rose, 2008, p.29).

Furthermore, Halliday (1978) suggests that the metafunctions 'resonate' systematically with the three variables of register. Accordingly, the linguistic patterns oriented to the ideational metafunction correlate with the field of discourse, those deriving from the interpersonal metafunction correlate with the tenor of discourse, while the resources of the textual metafunction correlate with the mode of discourse. In other words, this metafunctional

orientation can provide guidance for identifying the lexicogrammatical patterns capable of realizing the social meanings pertaining to each situational variable (namely, construing experience, enacting relationships and organizing discourse). For Hasan:

> The metaphor of 'resonance' is apt for referring to the reciprocal relations of context and metafunction. The metafunctions have evolved in language being used as a form of action, as a means of enacting interpersonal relations, and also as a means of creating relevance, continuity and coherence in interaction. (Hasan, 2014, p.12)

To conclude, SFL is oriented to asking questions about the relationship between meaning potentials and actual realizations. For Eggins, "[i]t is only by knowing what a speaker *could* have meant that we can understand in full the meaning of what they *did* in fact mean" (Eggins, 2004, p.204; original emphasis). In other words, SFL researchers study what speakers actually mean by describing the choices they made and relating them to the other possibilities they had. This requires looking outward to the social and cultural context, for the linguistic system itself can only produce circular explanations. In order to avoid this trap, we must consider the relationship between the social roles of the interactants and the meaning potentials to which they have access (Eggins, 2004). Indeed, Martin and Rose suggest that "as language realizes its social contexts, so each dimension of a social context is realized by a particular functional dimension of language" (Martin & Rose, 2008, p.11). The potential/actual orientation of SFL offers a framework within which we

can compare different choices and consider the appropriacy and the relevance of these choices according to the social circumstances (Hasan, 2014).

Two complementary approaches

Halliday's systemic functional framework is closely tied to Critical Discourse Analysis. In fact, Wodak argues that "an understanding of the basic claims of Halliday's grammar and his approach to linguistic analysis is essential for a proper understanding of CDA" (Wodak, 2001, p.8). Fairclough, who cites Halliday as his "main point of reference within existing literature on text analysis", describes SFL as a socially-oriented approach to discourse:

> SFL is profoundly concerned with the relationship between language and other elements and aspects of social life, and that its approach to the linguistic analysis of texts is always oriented to the social character of texts. (Fairclough, 2003, p.5)

Young and Fitzgerald (2006) argue that critical approaches to discourse look at language both *reflectively* (by asking why speakers chose certain features and not others) and *interpretively* (by analyzing relations between language use and social structures). Halliday's SFL and Fairclough's dialectical-relational approach to CDA thus share numerous similarities:

(1) **Language as social practice:** Halliday and Fairclough share a dialectical view of text-in-context whereby discursive events shape and are shaped by the contexts in which they occur. SFL operates from the

premise that language structure is integrally related to social functions. For Halliday, language is central to the development of culture; Culture is instantiated in texts and becomes tangible to speakers as they participate in a variety of social practices (Hasan, 2014).

(2) **Language as ideological**: Eggins (2004) argues that our use of language is inevitably influenced by our ideological positions: "to use language at all is to use it to encode particular positions and values" (Eggins, 2004, p.11). In acknowledging that language is ideologically based, both SFL and CDA provide specific attention to the construction of ideology in discourse. Halliday suggests that grammar itself is an "ideological interpretant built into language" (Halliday, 2003, p.135). That is, ideologies take shape through repeated manifestations of semantic patterns instantiated by particular lexical and grammatical choices (Halliday, 2003).

(3) **Language as multidimensional**: Both approaches posit that language operates across multiple interrelated dimensions of meaning, which in turn coincide with several levels of analysis. Fairclough and Halliday emphasize the need to link the micro analysis of texts to the macro analysis of culture, thereby situating textual analysis within organizational analysis. To that end, Fairclough (1993) calls for a theory of language "which stresses its multifunctionality" and "which sees any

text as simultaneously enacting what Halliday calls the 'ideational', 'interpersonal' and 'textual' functions of language" (Fairclough, 1993, p.134).

However, CDA differs from SFL in its primary concern with how language contributes to creating, sustaining and challenging power relations within society (Fairclough, 1989). Indeed, Fairclough argues that the productivity and creativity of discourse practices are controlled and restrained by power relations. That is, discourse practices "are ideologically invested in so far as they incorporate significations which contribute to sustaining or restructuring power relations" (Fairclough, 1992, p.91). In sum, SFL and CDA are complementary approaches: while SFL analysis asks how grammar realizes meanings, CDA seeks to determine how and why these meanings can be used to exert power and influence over others (Young & Fitzgerald, 2006). By doing so, CDA brings the linguistic field into the domain of social and political relevance. Fairclough's approach in particular aligns with the Marxist view that in order to achieve social change, we must first document the hegemonic structures that foster social inequalities (Fairclough, 2003). SFL provides an angle and a toolkit that this study can exploit to understand how these structures are expressed in discourse. Fairclough himself has adapted Halliday's multifunctional approach to his analysis of political and

institutional discourses, such as academic discourse (Fairclough, 1993) and the discourse of New Labour (Fairclough, 2000).

Strengths and weaknesses of the CDA approach

From theory to practice

Because of its emphasis on ideology and relations of power, CDA emerged as the most appropriate approach for this study, for political discourse plays a crucial role in the "enactment, reproduction, and legitimization of power and domination" (van Dijk, 2001, p.95). CDA seeks to understand the nature of social power and dominance and to "formulate ideas about how discourse contributes to their reproduction" (van Dijk, 1993, p. 254). To this end, it exposes strategies that appear neutral on the surface but that are in fact ideological and seek to shape representations of events and people to particular ends (Fairclough, 1992).

However, some critics have questioned whether CDA adheres to "standards of careful, rigorous and systematic analysis" (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p.259). Specifically, the qualitative approach within CDA has been criticized for extrapolating conclusions from a limited amount of minutely examined data. In other words, critics are concerned that CDA encourages broad generalizations about social representation and social change without

the linguistic evidence to support it (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). Fairclough and Wodak have responded to this criticism by arguing that while the social scientific knowledge of texts is possible and increasing, it is still inevitably partial (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). Indeed, reality cannot be reduced to our *knowledge* of reality, which is contingent, shifting, and most of all incomplete. Consequently, there is no such thing as a "complete" or "definitive" analysis of a text. Furthermore, textual analysis is also inevitably selective; In any analysis, our motivations lead us to ask particular questions about texts (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). Yet, transdisciplinarity allows us to increase and extend our knowledge of texts. For Fairclough, discourse analysis should indeed be seen as "an open process which can be enhanced through dialogue across disciplines and theories, rather than a coding in the terms of an autonomous analytical framework or grammar" (Fairclough, 2003, p.6). By drawing upon various disciplines and approaches, researchers can operationalize a wide range of social and theoretical perspectives in textual analysis (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Fairclough, 2003). Moreover, most CDA scholars insist that discourse analysis requires the application of some level of "linguistic expertise" (Meyer, 2001, p. 30) during the analytical process, for "detailed textual analysis will always strengthen discourse analysis" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 194). Chouliaraki and Fairclough argue that "the social concerns of CDA do not deflect from the detailed and careful linguistic (and

semiotic) analysis of texts" and that systematic analysis can in fact "give a firmer linguistic grounding to its social claims about discourse" (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 152). The development of Systemic Functional Linguistics has been driven by its constant extension into new contexts of use and new areas of research (Halliday, 2009, pp. 60-61). According to Eggins, SFL seeks to develop "both a theory about language as social process and an analytical methodology which permits the detailed and systematic description of language patterns" (Eggins, 2004, p.21). Halliday's systemic-functional approach to language use aims to show how social actors draw on all three metafunctions to "mediate between the potentialities of language structure and the actualities of what ends up being said or written in any given event" (Tusting, 2005, p.47).

While textual analysis is a valuable supplement to social research, it shall not be seen as a replacement for informed social critique. Fairclough indeed argues that the ideological effects of texts can only be assessed by framing textual analysis within organizational analysis, i.e., by linking the 'micro' analysis of individual texts to the 'macro' analysis of how power relations work across networks of social practices and structures (Fairclough, 2003, p.15). Because language reflects and reproduces power relations in society, uncovering linguistic strategies can help us understand, expose, and challenge power inequalities:

Since language can (re)produce social life, what kind of world is being created by texts and what kinds of inequalities and interests might this seek to perpetuate, generate, or legitimate? (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.24)

Hence, the purpose of CDA is not only to highlight power equations within texts, but also to suggest ways of bringing about social and political change (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p.258). Stubbs (1997) argues that it is precisely because CDA raises important social issues and has an agenda of "potentially very considerable social significance" (Stubbs, 1997, p.114) that enhancing its methodology should be a priority.

In sum, this study acknowledges the limitations of qualitative discourse analysis but seeks to show that it can provide valuable insights when combined with systemic analysis. Accordingly, my goal is not to infer broad generalizations on how French politicians exploit Twitter for political gain, but rather to uncover how the 2017 presidential candidates utilized particular discursive strategies in order to realize a variety of discourses, genres, and styles.

Researcher bias

As discussed in the previous section, there is no such thing as "objective" discourse analysis (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). CDA researchers must accept this inevitability and acknowledge that the discourse being analyzed is seen through the lens of the researcher:

What we are able to see of the actuality of a text depends upon the perspective from which we approach it, including the particular social issues in focus, and the social theory and discourse theory we draw upon. (Fairclough, 2003, p. 16).

As a result, any analysis of political discourse must account for the researcher's political leanings. Fairclough himself states that he is "a socialist" (Fairclough, 2003, p.4) and recognizes that his political commitment motivates his selection of texts. Fairclough openly condemns 'new capitalism' and notes that terms such as 'globalization', 'post-modernity', 'information society', 'knowledge economy' and 'consumer culture' are all characteristic ways of referring to "changes in contemporary capitalism" (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 4-5). As a French citizen, I was personally invested in the 2017 presidential election. I identify as a social democrat and I support policies that promote social equality and fair distribution. It is worth noting that I did not feel strongly in favor of any of the 2017 candidates. However, my political views imply a bias against conservative candidates such as François Fillon and Marine Le Pen. Indeed, it was my opposition to Marine Le Pen and to her beliefs that motivated my vote for Emmanuel Macron, rather any strong affinity for the candidate himself. The nature of CDA research and its dealing with power and ideology make this disclosure necessary. However, I argue that the integration of SFL methods can help reduce ideological bias by allowing a greater sensitivity to texts

resulting in more precise and transparent analysis (Young & Fitzgerald, 2006, p.53).

Finally, it is important to acknowledge that digital culture has become an integral part of our social lives. Web 2.0 discourse is now fully embedded in our everyday thoughts and conversations, even when we are "off the grid". We could thus argue that studies focusing on online discourse adopt an ethnographic approach requiring the "systematic presence of the researcher in the context of the practice under study" (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, pp.61-62). Nancy Thumim (2012) argues that because CMD researchers are "writing both from within and about digital culture" (Thumim, 2012, p.11), they do not yet have the benefit of hindsight regarding the repercussions of new media on our society.

Application to computer-mediated environments

This study seeks to illustrate how CDA can be applied to the analysis of computer-mediated communication (CMC). The use of social media represents an important aspect of contemporary politics and has disrupted long-standing campaign norms - from how candidates run their campaigns to how voters receive and share information (Schill & Hendricks, 2017). Espousing this 'digital turn' thus seems essential for CDA to remain a relevant framework for the analysis of political discourse. The challenge, however, lies in adapting

existing methods of analysis to the properties of online discourse (Herring, 2011). Because CDA focuses on the social dimension of language rather than on linguistic units *per se*, texts are analyzed against genre-specific backgrounds to address their processes of production, distribution and consumption:

> A fully 'critical' account of discourse would (…) require theorization and description of both the social processes and structures which give rise to the production of the text, and of the social structures and processes within which individuals or groups as social historical subjects, create meanings in their interactions with texts. (Wodak, 2001, p.3)

Before engaging in detailed analysis, CDA scholars must account for the nature of the data, the intended audience, the semiotic features of the language used, and the possibilities provided by the genre of communication (Unger, Wodak & KhosraviNik, 2016). Moreover, we must acknowledge how new affordances influence the overall qualities of texts when considering how a framework can be applied to social media data (Herring, 2013).

However, the framing of the 'online world' as a separate discursive arena, as advocated by early CMC studies, does not sit well with the social aspirations of CDA research. Hence, just as CDA scholars would not endorse an analytical approach that separates linguistic production from its social and cultural context, they should not treat 'the online' and 'the offline' as separate and independent of one another - a perspective Jurgenson (2012) calls 'digital dualism':

As social-media scholars we view the participatory Web as part of a media apparatus which is used by individuals in society, hence we do not treat digitally-mediated texts as part of a "virtual" world that is separate from the physical world and "reality", despite acknowledging that digitally-mediated contexts have specific features that may affect our analyses. (Unger, Wodak & KhosraviNik, 2016, p.8)

In recent years, politics and social media have become inextricably linked, as the online bleeds onto the offline and transcends virtual space (Schill & Hendricks, 2017). Online political discourse should be analyzed within this new interactive context, while bearing in mind that the social nature of communication is a core property of the participatory web (Herring, 2013). A challenge pertains to the apparent 'hybridity' of discourse on Web 2.0 platforms. Despite being a predominantly written mode of communication, Twitter bears many similarities with spoken modes (Zappavigna, 2012). Eggins (2004) notes that spoken discourse often contains spontaneity phenomena, including slang, dialect features (e.g. *y'all*) and non-standard grammar. In contrast, she argues that written texts correlate with 'prestige' vocabulary and standard grammatical constructions (cf. Table 4.1). Twitter is asynchronous, meaning that its users have the ability to reflect and carefully craft their messages (Tagg, 2012; Zappavigna, 2012). Yet, users often try to emulate casual spoken language – a deliberate stylization Caroline Tagg calls 'speech-like performativity' (Tagg, 2012, p.176).

SPOKEN DISCOURSE	WRITTEN TEXT
Face-to-face	Not face-to-face
Synchronous	Asynchronous
Language-as-action	Language-as-reflection
Spontaneous / unrehearsed	Not spontaneous / polished
Casual / informal	Not casual / formal
Non-standard grammar	Standard grammar
Grammatical complexity	Grammatical simplicity
Everyday lexis	'Prestige' lexis
Lexically sparse	Lexically dense

Table 4.1: Characteristics of spoken and written language.

When analyzing Twitter data, we must thus reflect beyond the old spoken/written dichotomy, which portrays spoken discourse as interactive and informal and written texts as static and formal.

Accordingly, this study is concerned with how Twitter and its online ecosystem affect the linguistic productions of political figures. Fairclough argues that texts lead social and cultural change in contemporary society as they can "transform prior texts and restructure existing conventions (…) to generate new ones" (Fairclough, 1992, p.270). Hence, he believes that genre analysis can make a significant contribution to research on the relationship between technological change and wider social change - in terms of how "the integration of new technologies into social processes is instantiated through new genres", and of how these genres get "woven into the fabric of the information society" (Fairclough, 2003, p.78).

Corpus and data collection

This study focuses specifically on the 2017 French presidential election, which culminated in the victory of Emmanuel Macron on May 7, 2017 after a run-off with Marine Le Pen. From November 2016 to May 2017, I followed the latest developments of the campaign on Twitter, and collected tweets relating to twenty-eight "breaking news" events. Because this is a qualitative study, however, I have limited my analysis to three major events. These events constitute 'contexts of situation' for the tweets I have collected, providing three distinct 'snapshots' of the election. As defined by Popescu and Pennacchioti (2010), a Twitter snapshot is a tripartite concept consisting of (a) a target entity (such as a specific event), (b) a given time period, and (c) a set of tweets about the entity from the given time period (Popescu & Pennacchioti, 2010, p.1873). On Twitter, users often post about events as they are happening – a practice called 'livetweeting' – meaning that Twitter language is highly temporarily bound. In other words, "the time at which the snapshot occurs impacts on the kind of language retrieved from the Twitter stream" (Zappavigna, 2012, p.177). A main appeal of doing discourse analysis on Twitter is to study the raw reactions of people to live events. The aim of a "snapshot approach" is not to provide a representative description of linguistic activity on Twitter across all users and topics, but rather to conduct a case study in which field variables are held relatively constant to afford a rich

investigation of meaning-making in a single specific domain (Zappavigna, 2012).

Events

The tweets discussed in this study were posted in reaction to three "breaking news" events which occurred during the 2017 French election. I approached these events as three distinct 'contexts of situation' (Halliday, 1994) or 'frames' through which the election could be analyzed: a press release, a political scandal, and a terror attack. These events are introduced in Figure 4.8 (for ease of reference, a hashtagged title was assigned to each event):

#HollandeRenonce
(50 tweets)
On **December 1, 2016**, President François Hollande announced that he would not seek re-election.

#Fillongate
(78 tweets)
On **January 25, 2017**, Republican nominee François Fillon was accused of misusing more than €500,000 in state funds through a 'fake job' he created for his wife Penelope.

#ChampsElysées
(80 tweets)
On **April 20, 2017**, three National Police officers were shot by Karim Cheurfi, a French national wielding an AK-47 on the Champs Elysées in Paris. One officer, Captain Xavier Jugelé, did not survive the attack.

Figure 4.8: Description of events.

Each event was chosen for its overall impact on the election and for the likelihood that it would bring out a variety of genres, discourses, and styles.

Participants

For the purpose of this study, I focused on five 2017 presidential candidates: Emmanuel Macron (EM), Marine Le Pen (FN), François Fillon (LR), Jean-Luc Mélenchon (FI), and Benoît Hamon (PS).

PARTY AFFILIATION	EM! EN MARCHE!	FN FRONT NATIONAL	IR LES RÉPUBLICAINS	La France insoumise FRANCE INSOUMISE	PS PARTI SOCIALISTE
CANDIDATE	Emmanuel Macron	Marine Le Pen	François Fillon	Jean-Luc Mélenchon	Benoît Hamon
TWEETS	38	44	43	45	23

Table 4.2: Top five candidates in the 2017 French presidential election.

Although eleven candidates ran in 2017, the six candidates who were excluded from this study attracted little national attention and garnered only a small portion of the vote (from 0.18% to 4,70%). Despite the former president's aversion for Twitter (Larrouturou, 2013), the tweets of François Hollande (PS) were also included in the study to offer a comparison between Hollande's "presidential voice" and the "presidentiable claims" of the candidates. A brief description of each politician is given in Figure 4.9:

- A former investment banker, **Emmanuel Macron** was Hollande's Minister of Finance until his resignation in August 2016. Shortly after, he launched *En Marche!,* his independent movement. Macron ran on a centrist platform, which he described as "neither right nor left".

@EmmanuelMacron

- **Marine Le Pen** is the leader of the National Front (FN), a far-right party founded by her father in 1972. Le Pen has sought to distance herself from her father's legacy by leading a campaign of "de-demonization" of the FN. Yet, her politics remain centered on immigration.

@MLP_officiel

- **François Fillon** won the Republican nomination in December 2016. An early favorite, Fillon positioned himself as the champion of traditional Christian values. In January 2017, however, he became the center of a financial scandal for his alleged misuse of public funds.

@FrancoisFillon

- **Jean-Luc Mélenchon** is the leader of *La France Insoumise*, a far-left movement he founded in 2016. Mélenchon prides himself on being 'anti-establishment' and has called for a complete overhaul of French politics.

@JLMelenchon

- **Benoît Hamon** won the Socialist nomination in January 2017. Seen as "Hollande's heir", Hamon suffered from the unpopularity of the previous administration.

@benoithamon

- Under the banner of the Socialist Party, **François Hollande** won the presidency in 2012. Hollande remains one of the most unpopular presidents of the Fifth Republic with approval ratings as low as 6%.

@fhollande

Figure 4.9: Description of candidates.

With respect to the three events chosen for this study, the participants tweeted at different rates (cf. Table 4.3), which could be imparted to their individual

platforms and beliefs. For instance, Marine Le Pen was most vocal regarding the terror attack on the Champs-Élysées whereas, Fillon tweeted mostly in relation to the "Fillongate" financial scandal. As to François Hollande, the former president shared his decision not to seek re-election on Twitter but remained discreet during most of the 2017 campaign.

Sampling and collection methods

A main challenge regarding data collection pertained to downsizing the volume of data to a manageable amount. While the term 'political discourse' has multiple meanings – it can refer to the discourse of politicians or more generally to any discourse about politics – this study focuses on political discourse as defined by Le Bart (2003):

> Le discours politique, (…) défini de façon restrictive comme le discours émanant des seuls acteurs investis dans le champ politique.
> [Political discourse, defined in a restrictive way as the discourse emanating from the sole actors invested in the political field.] (Le Bart, 2003, p.97)

I originally collected the bulk of my data during the presidential campaign and compiled 1,236 tweets from twelve separate events and three user groups (presidential candidates, non-candidates and the public). However, such a large dataset would not have allowed for close, in-depth textual analysis. Indeed, van Dijk (2001) argues that "complete discourse analysis of a large

corpus of text or talk, is totally out of the question" as "a 'full' analysis of a short passage might take months and fill hundreds of pages" (van Dijk, 2001, p. 99). I thus narrowed my focus to three events and to six users (cf. Table 4.3).

	Hollande	Le Pen	Fillon	Mélenchon	Hamon	Macron	**ALL**
#HollandeRenonce	13	4	4	12	10	7	**50**
#Fillongate	NA	11	29	25	8	5	**78**
#ChampsElysées	2	29	10	8	5	26	**80**
TOTAL	**15**	**44**	**43**	**45**	**23**	**38**	**208**

Table 4.3: Distribution of tweets by event and by user.

The corpus used in this study consists of three datasets totaling 208 tweets published between December 2016 and April 2017. All tweets were collected manually through Twitter's 'advanced search' option, which tailors search results to specific usernames, date ranges, words, phrases, hashtags, locations and languages (cf. Figure 4.8). Because I sought to analyze how the candidates commented on the events both directly *and* indirectly, limiting my search to specific keywords or hashtags would have been too restrictive and would likely have excluded valuable results. Instead, I tailored my search to specific usernames and to specific date ranges:

- *From these accounts:* @fhollande; @EmmanuelMacron; @FrancoisFillon; @JLMelenchon; @benoithamon; @MLP_officiel

- *Date ranges:* December 1 to December 3, 2016; January 25 to February 6, 2017; April 20 to April 22, 2017.

Figure 4.10: Twitter's advanced search option.

I combed through the content published by these accounts during each time period (excluding retweets) and collected all the tweets related to my three events. Finally, I organized my data into three datasets – one for each event – in which the tweets are numbered and organized by user. All three datasets are available in Appendix A. Albeit labor-intensive, this method proved to be

the most effective for extracting tweets related to specific events from a small number of accounts.

In sum, my sampling strategy was determined by the nature and purpose of this research, which aims to show how CDA can help uncover ideological beliefs through close and in-depth textual analysis. Thus, my purpose is not to make a descriptive list of linguistic patterns, but rather to investigate how those patterns form an order of discourse that sheds light on the social processes involved within a particular field (namely, electoral campaigns on Twitter). In statistical terms, my sample size is purposive rather than representative; This is because Critical Discourse Analysis requires a small dataset in order to subject each sentence to a complex analysis of semantic and syntactic parameters (van Dijk, 2001; Fairclough, 2003).

Methods of analysis

The present study examines how each event can trigger its own 'order of discourse', i.e., its unique set of discourses, genres and styles reflecting some of the main power dynamics underlying the 2017 election. With this goal in mind, I have adopted a CDA approach rooted in SFL methodology, specifically metafunctional analysis (Halliday, 1978, 1994). However, SFL tools are used in light of Fairclough's dialectical-relational approach, rather than as a separate method. This combined approach centers on specific

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lexicogrammatical features to help uncover the relation between text (i.e.,
campaign tweets) and context (i.e., real-world events). However, it is worth
nothing that SFL is highly complex and that it is beyond the scope of this study
to cover all of its aspects. This section identifies the aspects which are most
relevant to my research.

Metafunctional analysis

A functional analysis analyzes how clauses realize ideational,
interpersonal and textual meanings in a text (Halliday, 1994). Fairclough
(1993) argues that the interdiscursive character of a text is realized in
semantic, grammatical and lexical features at all three levels of text
organization:

> Particular semantic relations or grammatical categories and relations
> will be seen as primarily associated with either genres, or discourses, or
> styles. 'Primarily', because there is not a simple one-to-one relation – so
> for instance modality will be seen as primarily associated with styles,
> but also germane to genres and discourses. (Fairclough, 2003, p.67)

Together, the metafunctions bring in descriptive richness as three
complementary kinds of meaning and their distinctive structuring principles
are brought into play (Martin & Rose, 2008, p.29). Most importantly, the
functions of language are dialectically related as they work *together* to realize
meaning. Accordingly, all three aspects of meaning should be accounted for in

a textual analysis. This analysis is concerned with how discourses, genres and styles are simultaneously realized by ideational, interpersonal and textual resources. A textual analysis of these interwoven meanings involves looking at the grammar of the clause (such as transitivity and modality), cohesive relations between clauses and between sentences (including lexical relations) and at generic forms and overall structure of texts.

I argue that a meta- and multi-functional approach can help us answer a set of analytical questions which in turn can reveal the interdiscursive character of texts. SFL analysis is concerned with how grammar realizes meanings, while CDA asks how these meanings can be used to exert influence over others, and how they reflect unbalanced relationships between powerful and weaker groups (see Table 4.4).

METAFUNCTION	SFL	CDA
Ideational	What are the main patterns in terms of participants, processes and circumstances?	Can we identify who has the power in this text by identifying who is doing what to whom – when, where, how?
Interpersonal	What are the main patterns of choices that express attitudes, opinions, and judgments?	How do the attitudes and opinions reinforce the impression of power of the main participants?
Textual	What are the main features that make the discourse a unified whole?	What do the cohesive features tell us about who is in power and who is not?

Table 4.4: Analytical questions (Young and Fitzgerald, 2006).

In Halliday's systemic model of language, the lexicogrammar is the level responsible for turning 'meanings' into 'wordings', thus enabling us to understand *how* language realizes meanings (Eggins, 2004). My rationale for this study is to look for interdiscursivity (genres, discourses and styles) in the lexicogrammar and its realizations. The following sub-sections outline the different lexicogrammatical resources featured in my analysis.

Ideational resources: Transitivity and representation

According to Halliday, the ideational function describes how participants, processes, goals, and circumstances are represented in discourse (i.e., *who* is doing *what* to *whom, where, when, why* and *how*). It is also concerned with how concrete or abstract these representations are and, importantly, with what information is included or excluded from the text (Machin & Mayr, 2012). In SFL, an analysis of ideational meanings is primarily concerned with *transitivity*.

Transitivity refers to the study of social action and of the various roles played by social actors (Halliday 1994). A transitivity analysis of clause structure involves three components: (a) *processes* realized by verbal groups, (b) *participants* involved in these processes and (c) *circumstances* expressed by adverbial groups or prepositional phrases. Halliday outlines six main 'process

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types': material, mental, behavioral, verbal, relational, and existential. The system of transitivity is shown in Figure 4.8.

Figure 4.11: System of Transitivity

Participants play different roles according to the type of process in which they are involved. For example, the subjects of material processes are referred to as Actors, while the subjects of mental processes are called Sensers. All processes require at least one participant, but can have up to three. With the exception of Sensers and Behavers, participants may be either animate or inanimate. For Halliday, "each process type constitutes a distinct model or schema for construing a particular domain of experience as a figure of a particular kind" (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014, p.213). The six main process types and their participants are summarized in Table 4.5.

Type	Meaning	Participants	French Examples
Material	'doing' 'happening'	**Actor - Goal** Range, Force, Scope Beneficiary, Initiator	*faire, donner, prendre, créer, construire, détruire, travailler, protéger, sortir*, etc.
Mental	'sensing' 'thinking' 'wanting' 'feeling'	**Senser Phenomenon** Inducer	Perceptive: *voir, entendre*, etc. Cognitive: *penser, comprendre*, etc. Desiderative: *vouloir, espérer*, etc. Emotive: *aimer, haïr, craindre*, etc.
Verbal	'saying'	**Sayer** Receiver, Verbiage, Medium, Target	*dire, raconter, demander, annoncer, ordonner, répondre, écrire*, etc.
Behavioral	'behaving'	**Behaver** Behavior, Phenomenon	*regarder, écouter, rire, sourire, pleurer, soupirer, tousser*, etc.
Existential	'existing'	**Existent**	'il y a', *exister, rester, subsister*, etc.
Relational	'attributing' 'identifying' 'having' 'being'	**Carrier – Attribute Token – Value** Possessor, Possessed Attributor, Assigner	Attributive: *être, devenir*, etc. Identifying: *être, représenter*, etc. Possessive: *avoir, posséder*, etc. Circumstantial: *durer, causer*, etc.

Table 4.5: Summary of Transitivity.

- A **material process** is an action or event of a physical nature. It typically features two main participants: the Actor who carries out the process and the Goal who is affected or changed by the process. The Beneficiary (sometimes referred to as Recipient or Client) is the participant towards whom the process is directed.

- In contrast, a **mental process** is an event of a cerebral nature. It can be perceptive (*see, hear,* etc.), cognitive (*think, realize, believe,* etc.), desiderative (*want, wish, desire,* etc.) or emotive (*love, hate,* etc.). The Senser is the conscious participant who is experiencing the mental process, while the Phenomenon expresses the content of the experience.

- A **verbal process** is a process of communication. The Sayer is the participant who projects the Verbiage (i.e., what is being said) in relation to a Target or a Receiver (i.e., the participant to whom the Verbiage is directed).

- A **behavioral process** is a "half-way house between mental and material processes" (Eggins, 2004, p.233). However, it functions more like a process of 'doing' rather than of 'sensing'. Examples include *laugh, cry, listen, watch, smell, cough*, etc. A behavioral process typically involves a Behaver and a Phenomenon.

- An **existential process** simply states the existence of an entity, the Existent. In French, it is most commonly realized by *il y a*.

- A **relational process** depicts a relationship between two elements. As such, they always require two participants. There are two main types of relational processes: attributive and identifying. An *attributive relational process* relates a Carrier to an Attribute, i.e., to one of its features or characteristics. In contrast, an *identifying relational process* relates a Token to a co-referential Value. Finally, a relational process may also be *circumstantial* or *possessive*. The latter involves two participants: a Possessor and a Possessed.

Texts can be analyzed to see which kinds of processes tend to be used to represent the actions of particular groups. In fact, J.R. Martin (2000) argues that transitivity analysis is most relevant to CDA researchers:

> From the perspective of ideational meaning we are interested in how a text (…) constructs power. In the experience of CDA analysts, one relevant part of language is transitivity; its purpose is to construct processes, the participants involved in them and the circumstances in which they take place. […] Clearly this dimension of meaning is central to the analysis of the inequality and power in discourse. It allows us to ask questions about who is acting, what kinds of actions they undertake, and who or what if anything they act upon. (Martin, 2000, p.276)

In other words, transitivity plays a key role in highlighting power dynamics within texts, as certain processes can obscure responsibility by suppressing or removing agents from representations. On that account, van Dijk (2000) argues that ethnic minorities are more likely to be represented in passive roles unless they are involved in actions deemed reprehensible. By showing us what kinds of participants are given active or passive roles, transitivity can help us uncover assumptions and ideologies that are not overtly stated (Machin & Mayr, 2012). Agency can be backgrounded or suppressed through a variety of discursive strategies, such as passive agent deletion and nominalization (van Leeuwen, 1996).

Interpersonal resources: Mood and modality

The interpersonal function describes interactions between participants (such as asking questions, making statements, or giving commands) as well as attitudes and stances regarding what is being said or who they are interacting with (Eggins, 2004). In other words, while the ideational function realizes the content of our information, the interpersonal function realizes the ways in which we modify the 'yes/no' aspect of our information in order to express our attitudes and positions (Young & Fitzgerald, 2006). Interpersonal meanings are primarily expressed through two interrelated grammatical categories: *Mood* and *modality*.

Mood

Taylor and Van Every define mood as "the grammatical expression of modality that appears in the structural representation of the sentence as an inflection (the mood) of the main verb" (Taylor & Van Every, 1999, pp. 127-128). In SFL, Mood (with a capital 'M') refers to the types of exchanges, or **speech functions**, which are used in a given context of situation. Halliday (1994) explains that whenever we use language to interact, we establish a relationship with our interlocutor(s) by assuming different speech roles in the exchange: giving and requesting. Moreover, we decide on the kind of commodity we are exchanging: information or goods/services. By cross-

classifying these two dimensions of 'speech role' and 'commodity', we obtain what Halliday calls the four basic speech functions: *statement, question, offer*, and *command* (cf. Figure 4.10).

Figure 4.12: The four speech functions (Halliday, 1994)

Mood analysis refers to the analysis of these speech functions and to the ways they are expressed grammatically. Speech functions are expressed through three basic Mood types: *declarative, interrogative* and *imperative*. Different Mood choices express different commitments and reflect different relationships between interlocutors. These choices are often influenced by contextual demands and power relations (Fairclough, 2003, p.165).

Modality and attitude

Bybee and Fleischman describe modality as a semantic category pertaining to "the addition of a supplement or overlay to the most neutral semantic value of the proposition of an utterance, namely factual and declarative" (Bybee & Fleischman, 1995, p.2). That overlay is usually taken to refer to the attitude or

stance of the speaker, or to their degree of commitment to an action or state.

Halliday (1994) offers the following definition of modality:

> Modality means the speaker's judgement of the probabilities, or the obligations, involved in what he is saying. A proposition may become arguable by being presented as likely or unlikely, desirable or undesirable – in other words, its relevance specified in modal terms. (Halliday, 1994, p.75).

In other words, modality is an aspect of *identification* which describes how speakers commit themselves to propositions in a text, with respect to truth, obligation and evaluation (Fairclough 2003). As such, modality includes any unit of language that expresses the speaker's personal opinion of or commitment to what they say. Fairclough argues that modality plays an important role in the "texturing of identities" (Fairclough, 2003, p.166). Modality choices in texts reflect the speaker's identity (through the commitments they make and the stances they take) as well as their own sense of perceived status and power over others (Fairclough, 2003). For instance, modals expressing a high level of certainty and confidence may be used in order to convince the audience (e.g. "We *must* act now! We *will* not fail!"). Through the use of modal elements, speakers can modify factual statements in order to communicate their opinions, beliefs, and perspectives (Young & Fitzgerald, 2006). Linguistically, modality is expressed in a variety of ways, not only by the mood of the verb but also through modal verbs, auxiliaries and adjuncts, and sometimes just by intonation or phrasing (Taylor & Van Every, 1999).

SFL distinguishes two semantic dimensions within modality: modalization and modulation (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014). Modalization corresponds to epistemic modality and is used to argue about probability and usuality (i.e., frequency). Modulation, on the other hand, is concerned with the expression of obligation and inclination. In other words, it combines deontic modality (which relates to the moral world and expresses obligation and permission) and dynamic modality (which relates to the physical world and expresses ability and physical possibility). These dimensions are shown in Figure 4.11 below:

Figure 4.13: System of modality (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014)

Modulation and modalization can be realized in the clause in three possible ways: (a) a finite modal operator (e.g. "Son train *doit arriver* à dix heures."), (b) a modal adjunct (e.g. "Son train arrive *normalement* à dix heures.") and (c) the combination of a modal operator and a modal adjunct (e.g. "Son train *doit normalement arriver* à dix heures."). Halliday argues that modality interacts

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with **polarity** in the sense that a modal process expresses some intermediate degree between positive and negative. In other words, the four types of modality all constitute varying degrees of polarity and "different ways of construing the semantic space between the positive and negative poles" (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014, p.692). This relationship between modality and polarity is summarized in Figure 4.12.

[probability] [usuality] positive [obligation] [inclination]

certainly always required determined

probably **modalization** usually supposed **modulation** keen

possibly sometimes allowed willing

negative

Figure 4.14: Relation of modality to polarity

However, modality and engagement can also be expressed through a variety of discursive strategies, such as *hedges*, *evidentials*, and *attitude markers*:

- **Hedges**, or hedging statements, use lowered modality. Speakers can use hedging to create a strategic ambiguity within their claims, by avoiding directness or commitment (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.192). They may for instance seek to distance themselves from their claims (e.g. "some people say") or to dilute the force of their statements with vague aggregation such as "sometimes" or "quite often".

- **Evidentials** refers to modality markers that indicate the source of information, and that reflect the speaker's commitment to the information and the credibility of their claims (Hyland, 2005; Smirnova, 2015). The source of information directly affects *information reliability* (e.g. hearsay information is perceived as less reliable than direct perception of the event). Evidentials serve as an "indexing of knowledge" (Jaffe, 2009, p.7); By not naming an explicit referent, the speaker does not directly attribute this knowledge to any one referent in particular (Bouguerra 1999). The avoidance of evidential forms emerges as a general feature of totalitarian discourse, which often presents opinions as absolute truth that cannot be questioned (Friedman, 2003).

- **Mitigators**, or mitigating evidentials, provide nuances that reveal the speaker's evidence of the idea being expressed (Mullan 2010). Examples of mitigating evidentials in French include *je pense, je crois,* and *je trouve.*

- **Attitude markers** indicate the speaker's emotions and feelings rather than simply commitment. Attitude is an aspect of modality which refers to "the feelings and values that are negotiated with readers" (Martin & Rose, 2008, p.31). An SFL analysis of attitude looks at three main dimensions: affect (expressing emotion), judgment (assessing behavior) and appreciation (estimating value).

Textual resources: cohesion and coherence

The textual metafunction shows how ideational and interpersonal meanings are weaved together into meaningful discourse (Eggins, 2004). Textual analysis describes the flow of information within and between texts, including how texts are organized, how the known and the new are related, and what is made explicit as opposed to what is assumed as background knowledge (Halliday & Hasan, 1976). Any text, no matter how short or long, conveys meaning to others when it contains two essential elements: *cohesion* and *coherence.* While cohesion refers to internal ties within the text and among its clauses, coherence refers to external ties between the discourse and the context in which it occurs (Young & Fitzgerald, 2006, p.108). Cohesion creates semantic and structural links between clauses in order to form a "whole" (Eggins, 2004). Contrary to rally speeches or blog entries, tweets consist of "fragments of discourse" of no more than 140 characters. Yet, political candidates defending a position will often try to build cohesion between individual tweets relating to the same topic, so that they can be read as one longer thread. Another common practice is to transpose a speech onto Twitter by segmenting it into multiple "tweet-sized" quotes (Longhi, 2013). Although those quotes are partly decontextualized (i.e., cut off from their context of production), they usually retain some degree of cohesion allowing the reader to relate them to one another.

Lexical cohesion

Lexical cohesion refers to how the speaker uses lexical items to consistently relate the text to its field. An analysis of lexical relations allows us to describe how words in a text relate to each other, and how they cluster to create 'lexical strings' (Eggins, 2004, p.42). SFL recognizes two main kinds of lexical relations:

- **taxonomic relations** where one item is related to another through either class/sub-class (*félin-chat*) or part-whole (*moteur-voiture*) relations.

- **expectancy relations** where there is a predictable relation between a process and the one(s) affected by it (*miauler-chat*; *conduire-voiture*).

Words can be taxonomically related through either classification or composition. **Classification** refers to the relationship between a superordinate item and its members (or 'hyponyms'). This includes (i) co-hyponymy (*banane:cerise*), (ii) class/sub-class (*fruit:cerise*), (iii) contrast (*sucré:salé*) and (iv) similarity through synonymy (*délicieux:succulent*) or repetition (*délicieux:délicieux*). **Composition** is the part/whole relationship between lexical items which are meronyms (*corps:jambe*) or co-meronyms (*jambe:bras*). In contrast, **expectancy** relations operate between a verbal element and a nominal element. The relation may be between an action and the doer of the action (*pleurer/bébé),* or between an action and the participant

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affected by that action (*jouer/piano*). **Collocation** refers to patterns of co-occurrence between lexical items, i.e., "the company words keep" (Martin, 2016, p.24). Lexical items contribute to setting a particular context within a text, as we come to expect particular semantic domains. **Lexical strings** thus enable speakers to create texture by using words or phrases that are semantically related to one another.

Reference

Reference pertains to how a speaker introduces **participants** (people, places or things) and keeps track of them throughout a text (Eggins, 2004, p.33). Participants may be either "presented" explicitly to the audience or "presumed" (i.e., encoded in such a way that their identity (or **referent**) needs to be retrieved from elsewhere). The identity of a **presuming participant** can be retrieved from the general context of culture (*homophoric reference*), from the immediate context of situation (*exophoric reference*) or from within the text itself (*endophoric reference*). Endophoric reference builds cohesion by shaping the internal texture of the text, while homophoric and exophoric reference both contribute to the text's coherence (Eggins, 2004). Reference analysis looks for ties of dependency between presuming participants and their referents within a text. In *whole text referencing*, the referent is more than a single participant – it may be a sequence of events or actions mentioned previously, or even "the

whole text up to this point" (Eggins, 2004, p.36). On Twitter, this commonly occurs in "threads" of tweets which require the audience to read a series of tweets in linear order whereby the meaning of each tweet relies on the one that precedes it (Longhi, 2013).

Registerial or situational coherence

A text has registerial coherence when all of its clauses occur within an identifiable **register** (Martin & Rose, 2008). This happens when we can specify the domain the text is focusing on (its **field**), the relationships between the participants (its **tenor**) and the role language is playing in the activity (its **mode**). Due to Twitter's strict character limit, tweets often rely on the audience's familiarity with the context of situation. **Exophoric reference**, wherein the referent is retrieved from the immediate context of situation, is of particular importance in CDA – as meaning is present not only in what is clearly stated but also in what Fairclough calls "significant absences" and "common-sense assumptions" (Fairclough, 2003, p.37). Indeed, ideological discourse constructs hegemonic attitude, opinions and beliefs in such a way as to make them appear natural or "commonsense" to the audience. Political actors may use commonsense assumptions to create a basis for their arguments; for instance, the argument that "French culture being under attack

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by immigration" presupposes that there is such a clearly identifiable thing as "French culture" (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.222).

Generic coherence

A text has generic coherence when we can recognize the text as belonging to a particular **genre** (Martin & Rose, 2008). Generic coherence occurs when we can identify a unified purpose motivating the language (e.g. it tells a story or accomplishes a transaction). This purpose is usually expressed through a predictable generic or *schematic structure*. For example, the primary purpose of news texts is to inform, while tabloid forms focus more on entertainment (Fairclough, 2003). Halliday explains that most contexts of situation are not unique, but often reoccur as *situation types* that make up "a scenario of persons and actions and events from which the things which are said derive their meaning" (Halliday, 1978, pp. 28-30). Over time, these situation types become conventionalized as participants develop typified ways of interacting. **Generic structure** specifies "the semantic configurations that the speaker will typically fashion" within particular situation types (Halliday, 1978, p.110). Indeed, if genres are different ways of using language, texts of different genres will reveal different lexico-grammatical choices. In other words, realization patterns will differ across genres (Eggins, 2004). Some genres are highly conventionalized with recognizable elements; for example, a news article

usually contains a headline, a lead paragraph and several satellite paragraphs (Fairclough, 2003). Most genres, however, are far less standardized ways of using language in less ritualized activities (Martin & Rose, 2008). SFL uses the distinction between obligatory and optional schematic structure elements to define what constitutes a particular genre. The inclusion of optional elements gives more extended variations of the genre (Eggins, 2004). In longer, more complex texts, Martin (1992) suggests we may need to identify the entire text as an example of a *macro-genre*, within which it is possible to identify a range of other genres being used. Another possibility, *genre hybridity*, refers to combining or blending different genres to produce 'hybrids' (Eggins, 2004, p.81). This study focuses primarily on the 'political tweet' genre as defined by Julien Longhi (2013) and as described in chapter 3. It thus explores the conventions which characterize campaign tweets as examples of the political tweet genre, including 'techno-discursive' elements (Paveau, 2013) such as hashtags and hyperlinks.

Coding and labelling

SFL prioritizes language function and offers a description of language that is multifunctional (Eggins, 2004). Because all three strands of meaning operate simultaneously in the clause, any separation is artificial to an extent. However, the ability to focus an analysis in terms of a particular level

of meaning allows for the production of information more specific to the issue under discussion. Furthermore, SFL distinguishes formal labels from functional labels. Formal labelling involves classifying an item in terms of its class membership (e.g. noun, adjective, adverbial phrase) whereas functional labelling involves classifying an item in terms of its role relative to the unit of analysis (e.g. Subject, Deictic, Classifier, etc.). This study prioritizes functional labelling, as a functional perspective can highlight how multiple constituents contribute to meaning-making within the clause structure (Eggins, 2004, p.61). Functional labels were used to conduct of clause-by-clause analysis of transitivity, modality (i.e. modalization and modulation) and polarity. These labels were supplemented by bracketing, color coding and highlighting.

Transitivity

A transitivity analysis requires the researcher to first identify the figures in a text and then label each figure's constituents. A functional approach looks at the semantic and pragmatic functions (or 'roles') of the constituents instead of approaching them in terms of class. Indeed, the concepts of 'process', 'participant' and 'circumstance' are *semantic categories* that explain in the most general way how phenomena of our experience of the world are construed as linguistic structures. The categorization of the six processes types (material, mental, relational, verbal, existential and behavioral) is based upon the experiential structure of the clause (the syntax and semantics of the elements,

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specifically the process and participants). Importantly, SFL is concerned with how participants relate to the process and to other participants. For example, Actors are inherent to material processes whereas Sensers are inherent to mental processes.

As part of my analysis, I manually identified 438 figures. Each figure was then organized into a table where its constituents were manually labelled according to the categories aforementioned in Table 4.5. Examples for each process type are provided below. Additionally, the full transitivity analysis of #HollandeRenonce is shown in Appendix B.

(1) [material] *Monsieur #Fillon* **va désosser** *l'État.*

Monsieur #Fillon	*va désosser*	*l'État*
Actor	Pr : material	Goal

(2) [mental] **J'aime** *la fonction publique!*

J'	*aime*	*la fonction publique*
Senser	Pr : mental	Phenomenon

(3) [behavioral] *Toute la salle* **éclate** *de rire.*

Toute la salle	*éclate*	*de rire*
Behaver	Pr : behavioral	Behavior

(4) [verbal] *De Gaulle* **disait** *: "La vague ne détruit pas le granit…"*

De Gaulle	*disait*	*"La vague ne détruit pas le granit…"*
Sayer	Pr : verbal	Verbiage

(5) [existential] **Il n'y a pas** *de gauches irréconciliables.*

Il n'y a pas	*de gauches irréconciliables*
Pr : existential	Existent

(6) [relational : attributive] *Nos enfants* **ne sont pas** *protégés dans notre pays!*

Nos enfants	*ne sont pas*	*protégés*	*dans notre pays*
Carrier	Pr : rel-attr	Attribute	Circ : place

(7) [relational : identifying] *Ma bataille* **est** *celle des idées.*

Ma bataille	*est*	*celle des idées*
Token	Pr : rel-ident	Value

(8) [relational : possession] *Les violents* **n'auront pas** *le dernier mot.*

Les violents	*n'auront pas*	*le dernier mot*
Possessor	Pr : rel-attr : possession	Possessed

Most tweets in my corpus contain several figures, i.e. several sentences and/or sentences made of several clauses (or 'clause complexes'). I have summarized my findings into three tables showing the distribution of process types by user and by event. These tables are shown in Chapter 5.

Social actor analysis

This stage of analysis is concerned with the representation of social actors. It consists in tracing human referents as realized by nominal groups as well as subject and object pronouns. This process can give us a picture of how texture

is created as *reference chains* develop across a group of tweets. A convenient way to do this is to highlight the mentions of individual and collective entities (in two different colors) and then to organize them into lists for each dataset and for each user. For example, Table 4.6 provides a list of all the social actors mentioned by Benoît Hamon in the dataset #HollandeRenonce:

Individuals	*Groups and collective entities*
- #Hamon2017 **(S)** - François Hollande (x2) - [le] PR - @Linda_Gourjade - @MathieuHanotin	- la gauche (x2) - une gauche totale (x2) - la gauche des prochaines années - [des] gauches irréconciliables - son camp - [la] droite - [l']ext-droite - tous les candidats - [les] autres - bien d'autres

Table 4.6: Example of reference patterns in #HollandeRenonce.

Importantly, an analysis of reference patterns on Twitter must not omit so-called 'techno-words' (Paveau, 2013) such as hashtags and @mentions. A tweet-by-tweet analysis of these features can enable us to determine their pragmatic functions and to study how they contribute to the meaning-making process. Next, I analyzed the distribution of subject and object pronouns throughout the corpus. To this end, each pronoun type was assigned a particular color code. I then counted the instances for each pronoun type and organized them into two tables, one for subject pronouns (cf. Table 5.6) and one for object and disjunct

pronouns (cf. Table 5.7). As compared to automated analysis, manual coding allowed me to limit my selection to pronouns referring to conscious actors (e.g. excluding non-referential *il*) and to make certain distinctions, such as between inclusive and exclusive 'on'.

Modality and polarity

As described earlier in this chapter, SFL views modality as the ability to express four different stances: (a) probability, (b) usuality or frequency, (c) obligation and (d) inclination. At the clausal level, these stances may be realized by modal verbs and pseudo-modals (*devoir, pouvoir* and *falloir*) as well as modal adjuncts (*certainement, fréquemment, etc.*). In order to analyze the distribution of modal processes in the corpus, I assigned a unique color code to each stance which I then used to highlight instances of each type. Examples are given below:

(9) [probability] *Il vient **le plus probablement** de sa propre famille.*

(10) [usuality] ***Une nouvelle fois**, ce sont nos policiers qui ont été visés.*

(11) [obligation] ***Il faut retrouver** nos frontières nationales.*

(12) [inclination] ***J'entends** combattre ce mal qui nous aggresse.*

Moreover, I took count of all the processes with a negative polarity. Percentages of modal and negative processes were calculated in relation to the total number of finite clauses in the corpus (cf. Table 5.8).

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Lexical strings

A 'lexical string' is a list of all the lexical items that occur sequentially in a text that can be related to a 'head word' either taxonomically or through an expectancy relation (Eggins, 2004, pp.44-46). One way to capture the lexical cohesion in a text is to list all related lexical items, showing how they form lexical strings that add texture to the text. Some words can be linked to more than one string (thus contributing to texture through both semantic relations). As part of my analysis, I have compiled sets of lexical strings for each dataset. This required me to go through each dataset multiple times in order to identify words belonging to the same lexical field. Below is an example of a lexical string from the #ChampsElysées dataset. The letters in bold correspond to the initials of the six study participants:

Family (33 items)

FH famille – proches | **MLP** famille – unité – unité – unit – membres x famille – autorité –enfants – chez nous – jeunesse – compatriotes – mère – enfants – enfants | **FF** les nôtres | **JLM** familles – famille – familles – unis – patrie – fraternité | **BH** les siens – compagnon – famille | **EM** concitoyens – unité – cohésion – famille – proches – proches – famille

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The lexical strings for all three datasets are shown in Appendix D.

Quantitative tools

Fairclough (2003) argues that qualitative social analysis is 'labor-intensive' and can thus only be applied productively to samples of research material rather than large bodies of text. However, he affirms that critical analysis can be supplemented by quantitative tools borrowed from corpus linguistics (Fairclough, 2003). Indeed, corpus analysis can identify keywords (or 'tokens') in a corpus of text(s) and show patterns co-occurrence and collocation between these tokens. Even though this study is primarily qualitative, I provide some quantitative data about the frequencies and distribution of linguistic structures, as is often done in classical content analysis. Nonetheless, CDA relies on context to assign meaning to linguistic forms and requires that quantitative findings be complemented with detailed textual analysis. Indeed, van Dijk (1997) stresses that meaning is not 'immanent' but rather emanates from social interactions between groups and institutions, Accordingly, if we aim to understand discourse, we must also seek to understand the context in which it appears.

Chapter 5
Analysis

Introduction

This chapter presents the results of the lexicogrammatical analysis of the three datasets introduced in §4.3. The entire corpus of tweets can be found in Appendix A. This is a contrastive analysis which examines how different systems of meaning are realized across three distinct but interrelated events (Hollande's announcement, Fillongate and the Champs-Elysées attack) by six different users (François Hollande and the main five 2017 candidates). Each dataset has been analyzed for the following systems and categories: (a) transitivity, (b) self- and other- representation, (c) modality and engagement, (d) texture and (e) generic structure. All examples within this chapter are numbered and labelled with the user's initials and the dataset from which it was extracted (namely, E1, E2 and E3). For instance, [MLP, E3] refers to a tweet from Marine Le Pen / @MLP_officiel regarding the Champs Elysées attack.

Transitivity and representation

Transitivity is the main function of the ideational metafunction, which highlights the "features of the clause which contribute to the linguistic representation of the speaker's experience" (Halliday, 1976, p.159). This first section presents the results of the transitivity analysis of each event. A total of 438 verbal processes were identified. Table 5.1 shows the distribution across the events and the users. Hollande did not react to the Fillon affair on Twitter, and is therefore absent from the Fillongate dataset.

	E1 (#HollandeRenonce)	E2 (#Fillongate)	E3 (#ChampsÉlysées)	ALL
Hollande	32	N/A	3	35
Le Pen	12	26	57	95
Fillon	7	66	18	91
Mélenchon	23	60	12	95
Hamon	18	19	8	45
Macron	11	9	57	77
ALL	**103**	**180**	**155**	**438**

Table 5.1: Number of processes per user and per event.

To conduct this analysis, I first identified all the predicates in each dataset, then manually labeled the processes and their accompanying participants and circumstances. The results are aggregated and tabulated in the following subsections. For illustration purposes, the full transitivity analysis of #HollandeRenonce can be found in Appendix B.

#HollandeRenonce

The #HollandeRenonce dataset contains 103 processes belonging to five process types (material, relational, mental, verbal and existential). Table 5.2[17] below presents the total number of clauses of each process type for each user. Percentages were rounded to the next decimal point.

	Material	Relational		Mental	Verbal	Exist.	ALL
		Id.	*Attr.*				
Hollande	10 (31.2%)	5 (15.6%)	11 (34.4%)	5 (15.6%)	1 (3.2%)	0	**32**
Le Pen	2 (16.7%)	0	7 (58.3%)	2 (16.7%)	0	1 (8.3%)	**12**
Fillon	3 (42.8%)	0	1 (14.3%)	0	2 (28.6%)	1 (14.3%)	**7**
Mélenchon	6 (26.1%)	3 (13%)	8 (34.8%)	1 (4.4%)	3 (13%)	2 (8.7%)	**23**
Hamon	3 (16.7%)	2 (11.1%)	5 (27.8%)	5 (27.8%)	1 (5.5%)	2 (11.1%)	**18**
Macron	1 (9.1%)	1 (9.1%)	7 (63.6%)	1 (9.1%)	1 (9.1%)	0	**11**
ALL	**25** (24.3%)	**11** (10.7%) **50** (48.5%)	**39** (37.9%)	**14** (13.6%)	**8** (7.8%)	**6** (5.8%)	**103**

Table 5.2: Process types in #HollandeRenonce

As this table shows, relational processes are dominant (48.5%), followed by material processes (24.3%), mental processes (13.6%), verbal processes (7.8%) and finally existential processes (5.8%). This suggests that the tweets featured in this dataset deal primarily with the description and categorization of the

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[17] Key: *Id.* = Identifying; *Attr.* = Attributive; **Exist.** = Existential

event. We find several noteworthy patterns when we look at the users individually:

Hollande's declaration contains a slight majority of attributive relational processes (34.4%), followed by material processes (31.2%). After announcing his attention not to seek reelection, Hollande proceeds to list his accomplishments as president. Most of these accomplishments are realized by material processes, as in examples (1) and (2):

(1) *J'ai engagé nos armées dans le monde pour nous protéger, pour lutter contre le terrorisme.* [FH, E1]

J'	ai engagé	nos armées	dans le monde
Actor	Pr : material	Range	Circ : place

(2) *J'ai modernisé notre démocratie avec la réforme territoriale.* [FH, E1]

J'	ai modernisé	notre démocratie	avec la réforme territoriale
Actor	Pr : material	Goal	Circ : means

Although his agency is implied by the context of situation, Hollande represents himself as an Actor (i.e., the doer of the action) in only five instances during his declaration. Indeed, he tends to resort to passive structures (most likely unconsciously) that have the effect of downplaying his involvement. Passivation signals a shift from action to description, as loss of agency transforms a material process into a relational process. The participant who

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carries out the action is missing, and the action itself becomes an Attribute, as exemplified in the examples below:

(3) *L'égalité entre les couples **a été** renforcée.* [FH, E1]

L'égalité entre les couples	*a été*	*renforcée*
Carrier	Pr : rel-attr	Attribute

(4) *Les comptes publics **ont été** assainis.* [FH, E1]

Les comptes publics	*ont été*	*assainis*
Carrier	Pr : rel-attr	Attribute

Moreover, some material processes are mitigated by mental processes, a phenomenon Halliday calls 'projection' (Halliday, 1994). In this scenario, a mental process 'projects' a dependent material process, as portrayed in example (5):

(5) ***J'ai fait en sorte*** *d'aider les embauches.* [FH, E1]

J'	*ai fait en sorte*		*d'aider*	*les embauches*
Senser	Pr : mental		Pr : material	Goal

Here, Hollande is not an Actor but a Senser who provides a 'modal assessment' of the projected material clause. Specifically, he does not say that he reduced unemployment but that he *tried* to do so. Whether or not he was successful is up to the reader's interpretation. In sum, the French president downplays his active involvement in most of the actions he presents to his audience. Mechanisms such as passivation and projection are likely to have contributed

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to Hollande's reputation as a 'backstage president' who lacks authority (Alduy, 2017).

Le Pen's tweets contain a majority of attributive relational processes (58.3%). In example (6), the far-right leader undermines France's two mainstream parties by boasting the alleged superiority of the National Front with the Attribute *donnés* ('given'):

(6) *Nous **sommes** donnés au second tour.* [MLP, E1]

Nous	sommes	donnés au second tour
Carrier	Pr : rel-attr	Attribute

Moreover, Le Pen uses a possessive relational process to emphasize the fact that neither mainstream party has a *de facto* leader, which she attributes to weakness (*faiblesse*) with an attributive process (where *ce* is an anaphoric referent):

(7) *Pourquoi il y a des primaires à droite et à gauche ? Parce qu'ils **n'ont pas** de leader.* [MLP, E1]

Ils	n'ont pas	de leader
Possessor	Pr : rel-attr : possession	Possessed

(8) *C'**est** une preuve de faiblesse.* [MLP, E1]

C'	est	une preuve de faiblesse
Carrier	Pr : rel-attr	Attribute

Mélenchon is on the offensive. His main target is the Socialist Party (*le PS*), from whom he distances himself tweet after tweet. Specifically, Mélenchon is on a crusade to expose lies and false appearances. Most of the relational processes in his tweets have a corrective function, as he juxtaposes what he perceives to be falsehoods with 'the truth':

(9) *La primaire du #PS **n'est pas** une primaire: **c'est** un congrès.* [JLM, E1]

(10) *En janvier, ce **n'est pas** la primaire de la gauche, c'**est** la primaire du #PS.* [JLM, E1]

Ce	n'est pas	la primaire de la gauche,
Token	Pr : rel-ident	Value

c'	est	la primaire du #PS
Token	Pr : rel-ident	Value

In addition, Mélenchon sets up a false dilemma with an existential process (*il y a*) in (11):

(11) *Maintenant, **il y a** le choix entre @FrancoisFillon qui dit "chacun pour soi et Dieu pour tous" et moi qui dis "Un pour tous, tous pour un".* [JLM, E1]

Maintenant,	il y a	le choix entre…
Circ : time	Pr : existential	Existent

The tweet invites a reading where voters only have two options, Fillon or Mélenchon, and obscures the existence of the other candidates.

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Fillon first positions himself as a reporter, who describes and comments on Hollande's announcement in real time. In (12), the verbal process *admet* frames the tweet as a paraphrase of the announcement rather than as a biased interpretation:

(12) *Ce soir, le Président de la République **admet**, avec lucidité, que son échec patent lui interdit d'aller plus loin.* [FF, E1]

le Président	*admet,*	*avec lucidité,*	*que son échec patent…*
Sayer	Pr : verbal	Circ : quality	Verbiage

The Republican nominee then puts on his candidate persona and commits to rebuilding France with the material process *bâtirons*:

(13) *Nous **bâtirons** sur la vérité sans laquelle il n'y a pas de confiance, et l'action courageuse seule en mesure d'obtenir des résultats.* [FF, E1]

Nous	*bâtirons*	*sur la vérité*
Actor	Pr : material	Circ : manner

Hamon's tweets also contain a high number of desiderative mental processes, i.e., processes of 'wanting'. Hamon is above all a Senser who wants to share his vision of a united Left oriented towards social progress:

(14) *La primaire tranchera ce que sera la gauche des prochaines années. Je la **veux** tout entière tournée vers justice et progrès social.* [BH, E1]

Je	*la*	*veux*
Senser	Phenomenon	Pr : mental

In this particular dataset, Hamon positions himself as the spokesperson of *la gauche* ('the Left') and thus presents his positions as those of the party rather than his own:

(15) *Plus que jamais, la gauche **doit porter** 1 alternative sociale, écologique et démocratique face à droite et ext-droite* [BH, E1]

la gauche	*doit porter*	*1 alternative sociale…*
Actor	Pr : material	Circ : quality

By representing the Left as the main Actor, Hamon backgrounds his individual agency and portrays himself as a middleman rather than as a unique voice.

Finally, Macron does not directly mention Hollande's announcement. Instead, he capitalizes on the event to reiterate his desire to unite the country and to end political cleavages. In (16), he expresses his determination with the material process *rassembler* projected by the desiderative mental process *veux*:

(16) J*e **veux rassembler** les Françaises et les Français.* [EM, E1]

Je	*veux*		*rassembler*	*les Françaises et les Français*
Senser	Pr : mental		Pr : material	Range

In this first dataset, Macron's tweets are unadorned, with vague qualifiers (*difficile, facile, heureux, vraies*) and few adjuncts. The form reflects the content: not only is Macron explicitly saying that he wants to end cleavages, his discourse itself is inclusive (e.g. *les Françaises et les Français*) and consensual.

#Fillongate

	Material	Relational		Mental	Behav.	Verbal	Exist.	ALL
		Id.	*Attr.*					
Le Pen	3 (11.5%)	1 (3.8%)	12 (46.3%)	6 (23.1%)	0	3 (11.5%)	1 (3.8%)	**26**
Fillon	23 (34.9%)	1 (1.5%)	21 (31.8%)	11 (16.7%)	1 (1.5%)	7 (10.6%)	2 (3%)	**66**
Mélenchon	12 (20%)	10 (16.7%)	15 (25%)	5 (8.2%)	4 (6.7%)	10 (16.7%)	4 (6.7%)	**60**
Hamon	3 (15.8%)	1 (5.3%)	4 (21%)	5 (26.3%)	1 (5.3%)	5 (26.3%)	0	**19**
Macron	1 (11.1%)	2 (22.2%)	5 (55.6%)	0	0	1 (11.1%)	0	**9**
ALL	**42** (23.3%)	**15** (8.3%) / **72** (40%)	**57** (31.7%)	**27** (15%)	**6** (3.3%)	**26** (14.5%)	**7** (3.9%)	**180**

Table 5.3: Process types in #FillonGate

The #Fillongate dataset contains a majority of relational processes (40%), and attributive processes (31.7%) are clearly dominant over identifying processes (8.3%). 23.3% of the clauses are material processes, followed by mental processes (15%), verbal processes (14.5%), existential processes (3.9%) and behavioral processes (3.3%). The tweets of Fillon and Mélenchon contain instances of all six process types whereas Macron's only contain three (relational, material and verbal). However, this could very well be due to sample size. Indeed, Macron was the least vocal on Twitter regarding the Fillon affair. Unsurprisingly, Fillon was the most reactive with 29 tweets and 66 processes. Mélenchon closely followed with 25 tweets and 60 processes. Even though he was not directly involved in Fillongate, Mélenchon ran on an anti-establishment platform that focused on ending the tyranny of the 1% and

combatting corruption in mainstream politics. The very nature of the scandal thus had a strategic appeal. Some of the differences between the candidates are explored below:

Material processes are dominant in Fillon's tweets – a trend we find in all three datasets and which distinguishes him from the other candidates. With this abundance of material processes (34.9%), Fillon assumes an active role as he fights to restore his public image. To this end, Fillon denies any wrongdoing and chooses instead to portray himself as the victim of a vicious witch hunt. He emphasizes his 'determination' and even his 'courage' despite relentless 'attacks'. This tenacity is partly expressed through material processes, as in example (17) below:

(17) *Chaque jour, je reçois en pleine figure de nouvelles bourrasques. Je **fais front**, j'**avance**, **garde** mon cap et **trace** ma route.* [FF, E2]

Fillon also represents himself as a Target (*reçois, déverse sur moi*) through an extended storm metaphor (*bourrasques, torrents de boue*):

(18) *Cela fait 2 mois que la presse déverse **sur moi** des torrents de boue.* [FF, E2]

la presse	*déverse*	*sur moi*	*des torrents de boue*
Actor	Pr : material	Recipient	Goal

This metaphorical language allows Fillon to remain vague not only about the nature of the accusations made against him, but also about the identity of his

accusers. By replacing human agency with a natural force, such as 'gusts of wind' (17) or 'torrents of mud' (18), Fillon approaches the scandal indirectly and shifts the focus to his victimhood. Another way to obscure responsibility is through the 'nominalization' of verbal constituents. Indeed, Halliday argues that nominalization results in a loss of ideational meaning: "the configurational patterns of participant roles are lost or obscured when figures are realized as groups or phrases" (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014, p.715). In example (19), a desiderative mental process ('vouloir') is nominalized into the noun *volonté* and a verbal process ('présenter') is nominalized into *présentation*. These two nouns are the grammatical subject and object of the sentence, respectively. Although both processes imply human agency, conscious actors are absent from the tweet:

(19) *Seule **la volonté** de nuire peut expliquer **la présentation** mensongère des éléments publiés ce soir par le #CanardEnchainé.* [FF, E2]

This strategy is part of Fillon's conspiratorial style; While he claims that there is 'a willingness to hurt him' (*volonté de nuire*), he employs nominalizations to avoid naming specific actors. Other nominalizations that contribute to this conspiracy-mongering include *attaques* (20), *interrogations* (21), and *manipulation* (22):

(20) ***Ces attaques** ne sortent pas de nulle part.* [FF, E2]

(21) *Je comprends **les interrogations**, et **le besoin** de me voir clarifier les choses.* [FF, E2]

(22) *Je ne pouvais imaginer être victime d'**une manipulation** pareille.* [FF, E2]

Finally, Fillon panders to his supporters by showering them with positive Attributes (*fiers, forts, volontaires*) and implying that they share the same ordeal (*notre chemin*):

(23) *Soyez **fiers**, soyez **forts**, soyez plus **volontaires** que tous les obstacles qui se dressent sur notre chemin, que toutes les volontés adverses !* [FF, E2]

Le Pen's tweets contain few material processes compared to the other candidates (11.5%). Attributive relational processes clearly dominate and constitute almost half of the clauses in her tweets (46.3%). In this dataset, Le Pen is not an Actor: she is a commentator, a narrator who offers a ruthless portrayal of her rival's predicament. Indeed, Le Pen criticizes Fillon from multiple angles: his campaign (*campagne*), his presidential bid (*candidature*), his character (*caractère*), his personality (*personnalité*), his behavior (*comportement*) and finally his relationship with the French people:

(24) *La campagne de M. #Fillon **est** en jachère.* [MLP, E2]

La campagne de M. #Fillon	est	en jachère
Carrier	Pr : rel-attr	Attribute

(25) *Le comportement de François #Fillon **est** incohérent.* [MLP, E2]

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(26) *La candidature de François #Fillon **était** déjà très fragile.* [MLP, E2]

Yet, Le Pen does not involve herself in any of these representations: she simply states what 'is' or 'was'. Accordingly, her use of descriptive relational processes in (24-26) allows her to present her personal opinions as undisputable truths.

Mélenchon uses verbal processes to represent his inability to talk about serious matters due to Fillon's shenanigans. Indeed, he expresses his frustration through his repeated use of *parler* ('talk') in conjunction with the pseudo-modal *pouvoir* ('be able to') and the expression of negation *ne…plus* ('no longer'):

(27) *On **ne peut plus parler** du fond avec ce candidat.* [JLM, E2]

On	*ne peut plus parler*	*du fond*
Sayer	Pr : verbal	Verbiage

Moreover, Mélenchon's tweets contain several behavioral processes. This process type is absent from the other datasets and there are only six instances in #Fillongate, four of which are found in Mélenchon's tweets. Three out of four of these processes refer to laughter and ridicule (*éclate de rire, rigole, huent*) and are used to describe the public's reaction to Fillon:

(28) *C'est terrible ! On ne peut plus parler de #Fillon sans que tout le monde **rigole** !* [JLM, E2]

tout le monde	*rigole*
Behaver	Pr : behavioral

(29) *Ce n'est plus possible. Les gens le **huent**.* [JLM, E2]

Les gens	*le*	*huent*
Behaver	Phenomenon	Pr : behavioral

In these examples, Mélenchon implies that Fillon has become a national laughing stock and thus that his candidacy has lost all credibility and legitimacy.

Hamon differs from his rivals in that he uses a majority of verbal and mental processes (52.6%). For instance, he expresses his indignation with respect to Fillon's behavior with the performative verbal process *accuse*:

(30) ***J'accuse*** *François Fillon d'indignité, ce candidat n'est pas digne de cette élection* [BH, E2]

J'	*accuse*	*François Fillon*
Sayer	Pr : verbal	Target

Overall, Hamon's tweets describe a 'break of communication' as a result of the Fillon affair, with verbs such as *parler, interroger* and *dire*:

(31) *Je **parle** aujourd'hui des 12 millions de personnes en situation de handicap et on m'**interroge** sur les costumes de M. Fillon* [BH, E2]

Je	*parle*	*aujourd'hui*	*des 12 millions de personnes…*
Sayer	Pr : verbal	Circ : time	Verbiage

on	*m'*	*interroge*	*sur les costumes de M. Fillon*
Sayer	Receiver	Pr : verbal	Verbiage

Macron's tweets echo his reaction to Hollande's announcement. He only mentions Fillon once, while his other tweets use the scandal as a way to address the subject of morality in politics. Once again, Macron adopts a consensual discourse and avoids cleavages through his use of generic 'catch-all' terms. While he offers some vague propositions, he does not explicitly represent himself as the one who will enact them. Instead, he relies heavily on relational processes (77.8%) and on strategies that suppress agency, such as passive agent deletion, nominalization and non-finite clauses:

(32) *Indispensable **moralisation** de la vie publique. Elle doit être inscrite dans la loi.* [EM, E2]

In example (33), the non-finite clauses function as grammatical participants in an attributive clause, allowing the social actor(s) responsible for the actions to be excluded.

(33) ***Moraliser** la vie politique, c'est **exiger** que la **rémunération** des parlementaires soit plus transparente et déclarée en totalité.* [EM, E2]

Moraliser la vie publique	*c'est*	*exiger que…*
Token	Pr : rel-ident	Value

Moreover, Macron often resorts to the impersonal expression *il faut* to express necessity:

(34) ***Il faut** remettre du pluralisme et de la moralisation dans la vie publique. C'est le ciment de cette alliance.* [EM, E2]

Unlike the modal verb *devoir*, *falloir* enables a speaker to state a necessity without making the personal commitment to tackle the issue. In (34), Macron does not mention *who* or *what* is involved in his concept of *moralisation*. Human actors are absent from the process.

#ChampsElysées

	Material	Relational		Mental	Verbal	Exist.	ALL
		Id.	*Attr.*				
Hollande	1 (33.3%)	0	1 (33.3%)	0	1 (33.3%)	0	**3**
Le Pen	15 (26.3%)	3 (5.3%)	23 (40.3%)	9 (15.8%)	5 (8.8%)	2 (3.5%)	**57**
Fillon	9 (50%)	4 (22.2%)	2 (11.1%)	2 (11.1%)	0	1 (5.6%)	**18**
Mélenchon	3 (25%)	1 (8.3%)	7 (58.4%)	0	1 (8.3%)	0	**12**
Hamon	4 (50%)	0	2 (25%)	1 (12.5%)	1 (12.5%)	0	**8**
Macron	18 (31.5%)	5 (8.8%)	14 (24.6%)	14 (24.6%)	4 (7%)	2 (3.5%)	**57**
ALL	**50** (32.3%)	**13** (8.4%) **62** (40%)	**49** (31.6%)	**26** (16.8%)	**12** (7.7%)	**5** (3.2%)	**155**

<div align="center">**Table 5.4:** Process types in #ChampsElysées</div>

Relational processes (40%) and material processes (32.3%) are the two dominant process types in #ChampsElysées. Most of the tweets in this dataset consist of solemn statements about the attack and of condolences addressed to law enforcement. Several candidates (Le Pen, Fillon and Macron) use material processes to describe the actions they would take against terrorism if they were

elected. Mental processes constitute 16.8% of the processes but are predominantly used by Le Pen and Macron. While Le Pen uses mental processes to express her anger and sorrow with respect to the attack, Macron expresses his determination to act against terrorism once elected president.

Le Pen describes the attack through relational processes coupled with multiple negative qualifiers. In examples (35) and (36), she enumerates negative Attributes in reference to Islamism and to the 'useless' government:

(35) *La guerre qui nous est menée **est** asymétrique, révolutionnaire, qui a pour objectif notre soumission à une idéologie totalitaire.* [MLP, E3]

(36) *Nos prétendus gouvernants, insuffisants et pusillanimes, **sont** dénués de toute autorité et de toute force morale.* [MLP, E3]

Moreover, she relies heavily on emotive language. Her emotions are often expressed through possessive processes wherein she is represented as the Possessor of various feelings (*tristesse, colère*):

(37) ***J'ai*** *un sentiment de tristesse pour nos forces de l'ordre qui paient un lourd tribut.* [MLP, E3]

J'	*ai*	*un sentiment de tristesse*
Possessor	Pr : rel-attr : possession	Possessed

(38) ***J'ai*** *une colère sourde. Tout n'est pas fait pour mettre nos compatriotes à l'abris [sic].* [MLP, E3]

(39) *Je suis une mère, j'ai 3 enfants, et je ne veux pas **avoir** la boule au ventre quand ils vont dehors.* [MLP, E3]

Furthermore, she uses several verbal processes as calls for action with the verbs *appeler, demander and ordonner*. Le Pen already positions herself as the commanding voice in the country as she affirms her authority with orders and commands:

> (40) **J'appelle** *tous les Français à l'unité, une unité profonde comme celle qui unit les membres d'une même famille dans l'épreuve.* [MLP, E3]

Yet, she is a Sayer and a Senser rather than an Actor. While she outlines what she believes are necessary measures for tackling terrorism, she avoids making the explicit commitment of tackling it herself. Instead, she demands it from others through verbal processes (41) or conveys a sense of urgency through mental processes (42):

> (41) *À ce gouvernement éphémère, usé par l'inaction, je **demande d'ordonner** la restauration immédiate de nos frontières nationales.* [MLP, E3]

À ce gouvernement éphémère,	*je*	*demande*	*d'ordonner*	*la restauration…*
Receiver	Sayer	Pr : verbal	Pr : verbal	Verbiage

> (42) *Je ne **veux** pas que l'on s'habitue au terrorisme islamiste [...] c'est fini le laxisme, c'est fini la naïveté !* [MLP, E3]

Je	*ne veux pas*	*que l'on s'habitue au terrorisme islamique*
Senser	Pr : mental	Phenomenon

Additionally, Le Pen resorts to multiple strategies that suppress agency such as nominalization (*la réponse, la lutte*) and impersonal structures (*il faut*):

(43) *Puisque le pays est en état de guerre, **la réponse** doit être globale, totale, c'est-à-dire celle du pays tout entier.* [MLP, E3]

(44) ***La lutte** contre le terrorisme commence par retrouver nos frontières nationales.* [MLP, E3]

(45) *Face au terrorisme, **il faut** retrouver nos frontières nationales* [MLP, E3]

In sum, while she expresses the need for action, Le Pen does not explicitly position herself as the Actor who will undertake those actions.

Rather than commenting on the circumstances of the attack, Mélenchon remains focused on the election and poses as a guide for his supporters with modalized material processes (46-47) and imperatives (48-49):

(46) *Nous **devons faire** la démonstration que nous ne sommes pas intimidés par les tueurs.* [JLM, E3]

(47) *Nous **devons faire** notre devoir de citoyens.* [JLM, E3]

(48) *Pas de panique. **Restons** unis.* [JLM, E3]

(49) ***Continuons** le processus électoral.* [JLM, E3]

In the examples above, we notice that Mélenchon has become one with his supporters through the use of the plural pronoun *nous*. He is the literal voice of the entire movement, as exemplified in (50) where *nous* ('us') is the Sayer in the verbal process *adressons*:

(50) *Nous **adressons** une pensée émue à la famille du policier décédé et aux familles des policiers blessés.* [JLM, E3]

Nous	*adressons*	*une pensée émue*
Sayer	Pr : verbal	Verbiage

Macron, whose discourse had until now focused on description than action, shifts his perspective in this last dataset. Indeed, his tweets contain a majority of material processes (31.5%) as he projects a presidential ethos with first-person pronouns and verbs of 'doing':

(51) *J'installerai une task force, organe de renseignement auprès du président de la République, pour lutter contre Daech.* [EM, E3]

J'	installerai	une task force
Actor	Pr : material	Goal

(52) *J'ai annulé deux rassemblements publics car je veux que les forces de l'ordre soient mobilisées sur les priorités.* [EM, E3]

Macron also represents himself as a Sayer by emphasizing the performativity of verbal processes (*dis, redire, témoigne*). In (51), for example, not only does Macron express his condolences, but he also portrays himself as enacting the verbal process by prefacing the Verbiage (*ma solidarité*) with *je dis* ('I say'):

(53) *Je dis ma solidarité à l'égard des forces de l'ordre et des proches de la victime.* [EM, E3]

Je	dis	ma solidarité
Sayer	Pr : verbal	Verbiage

(54) *Je veux redire ma solidarité à l'égard des forces de l'ordre qui assurent notre sécurité.* [EM, E3]

(55) *Je témoigne toute ma solidarité à l'égard de nos forces de l'ordre.* [EM, E3]

Even though he is omnipresent in this dataset through the use of the first-person pronoun *je*, Macron's use of generic language and nominalized referents enables him to remain vague with respect to his policy platform. In (56), for instance, Macron claims that an 'action' will be undertaken against terrorism, but he does not offer any clues as to the nature of this action nor does he take personal responsibility for undertaking it:

(56) ***Une action vigoureuse*** *sera engagée pour lutter contre la radicalisation islamiste.* [EM, E3]

Une action vigoureuse	*sera*	*engagée*	*pour lutter…*
Carrier	Pr : rel-attr	Attribute	Circ : purpose

The word *action* creates the illusion that Macron is actively 'engaging' himself in a process of 'doing', yet *une action vigoureuse* is all but a vague nominalization whose agent has been suppressed.

The main participants in this dataset are police officers and terrorists. Police officers are represented positively as Carriers in relational processes and as Actors in material processes:

(57) *Nos policiers **sont** attaqués parce qu'ils **sont** les symboles de l'État.* [MLP, E3]

Nos policiers	*sont*	*attaqués*
Carrier	Pr : rel-attr	Attribute

ils	*sont*	*les symboles de l'État*
Token	Pr : rel-ident	Value

(58) *Nos services de police **font** un travail formidable.* [MLP, E3]

Nos services de police	*font*	*un travail formidable*
Actor	Pr : material	Range

The material process with which the police is most often associated is *protéger* ('protect') with the French people as the Goal (i.e., those who receive the protection):

(59) *Nos policiers, nos gendarmes, nos militaires doivent être remerciés, soutenus et respectés parce qu'ils **protègent** les Français.* [FF, E3]

ils	*protègent*	*les Français*
Actor	Pr : material	Goal

(60) *Merci à nos forces de l'ordre de nous **protéger** au quotidien.* [EM, E3]

(61) *Hommage aux forces de l'ordre qui donnent leur vie pour **protéger** les nôtres.* [FF, E3]

In contrast, the terrorists themselves are mentioned mostly indirectly as the majority of tweets comment on the *concept* of terrorism in general, rather than on terrorists as individuals. The attackers are represented by nouns whose meaning does not include the semantic feature 'human' – a representational strategy called impersonalization (van Leeuwen, 1996):

(62) ***Les actes terroristes** ne seront jamais impunis, les complices jamais oubliés.* [JLM, E3]

(63) *Soutien total aux forces de l'ordre contre **le terrorisme.*** [BH, E3]

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(64) *Nous vivons et vivrons durablement avec **la menace terroriste.*** [EM, E3]

Le Pen and Fillon rely on hyperbolic abstractions that highlight the barbaric aspects of terrorism:

(65) *L'islamisme est une **idéologie hégémonique monstrueuse** qui a déclaré la guerre à notre nation, à la raison, à la civilisation.* [MLP, E3]

(66) *J'en appelle au réveil de l'âme millénaire de notre peuple capable de s'opposer à **une barbarie sanguinaire**.* [MLP, E3]

(67) *J'entends combattre **ce mal qui nous agresse** d'une main de fer.* [FF, E3]

Mélenchon does not once mention terrorism. Instead, he describes the attackers through negative appraisements realized by nouns that denote violence and murder (*violents, tueurs, criminels, complices*). However, he remains vague as to the crime that was committed, and his representations require the audience to be familiar with the context of situation:

(68) ***Les violents** n'auront pas le dernier mot.* [JLM, E3]

(69) *Nous devons faire la démonstration que nous ne sommes pas intimidés par **les tueurs.*** [JLM, E3]

(70) ***Les criminels** ne seront jamais impunis et **leurs complices** jamais oubliés.* [JLM, E3]

Indetermination is another representational strategy (van Leeuwen, 1996) whereby agents are replaced by indefinite pronouns, such as the demonstrative pronoun *ceux* ('those') in (71) and the subject pronoun *ils* ('they') in (72). In

these examples, the identity of the referents is implied by the context of situation (namely, the Champs Elysées attack):

(71) *Il faut être implacable à l'égard de **ceux** qui veulent remettre en cause nos valeurs dans notre démocratie* [BH, E3]

(72) *C'est la démocratie qui est visée, notre cohésion qu'**ils** veulent ébranler, nos valeurs auxquelles **ils** veulent porter un coup décisif.* [EM, E3]

We also find a high occurrence of passivated sentences where the focus is placed on the victims of the attack rather than on the perpetrators:

(73) *La France **n'est pas visée** pour ce qu'elle fait mais pour ce qu'elle est, les Français pour la simple raison qu'ils sont Français.* [MLP, E3]

(74) *Nos policiers **sont attaqués** parce qu'ils sont les symboles de l'État.* [MLP, E3]

Passivation can serve as a means of topicalization, i.e., of foregrounding one constituent rather than another (namely, *La France* and *nos policiers*).

Finally, this last event is characterized by an unanimously positive representation of the French nation. Nearly all the candidates participate in this national self-glorification:

(75) *Notre feuille de route est la devise de **la patrie** : Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité.* [JLM, E3]

(76) ***La nation** est solidaire avec les policiers.* [FF, E3]

(77) *Je sais que les Français n'ont pas peur. Je sais, **chers concitoyens**, que vous tiendrez bon. Je sais que nous saurons maintenir notre unité.* [EM, E3]

These tweets portray a heterogeneous French nation, who must stay united in the face of adversity.

Personal pronouns

Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show the distribution of personal subject and object pronouns in the corpus:[18]

	je	il/elle[19]	on		nous	vous	ils/elles
			inclusive	*exclusive*			
Hollande	16	0	0	0	0	2	0
Le Pen	12	7	2	0	2	0	5
Fillon	28	0	2	2	4	5	2
Mélenchon	10	5	6	4	7	1	2
Hamon	8	2	1	3	0	3	0
Macron	21	0	1	1	4	1	3
ALL	95	14	12	10	17	12	12
			22				

Table 5.5: Distribution of clitic subject pronouns

	me/moi	le/la/lui lui/elle	nous	vous	les/leur elles/eux
Hollande	4	0	3	2	0
Le Pen	0	4	3	0	1
Fillon	11	2	2	8	3
Mélenchon	4	2	0	1	1
Hamon	2	3	3	0	3
Macron	0	0	2	1	1
ALL	21	11	13	12	9

Table 5.6: Distribution of disjunct and clitic object pronouns

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[18] Because there were no instances of *tu* (singular second person) in the data, it is not included in tabulations.

[19] These numbers do not include any impersonal/non-referential uses of *il*.

The presidential *je*

In #HollandeRenonce, François Hollande uses the presidential *je* to outline his responsibilities as the head of the State. In addition to subject pronouns, this sense of duty is also expressed through possessive articles (e.g. *mon seul devoir, ma tâche, ma décision, mon mandat*):

> (78) ***Je*** *ne suis animé que par l'intérêt supérieur du pays. L'expérience m'a apporté l'humilité nécessaire dans **ma** tâche.* [FH, E1]

Of all candidates, Fillon is the one who uses the most singular first-person pronouns. A majority of his tweets revolve around himself as he battles what he claims to be a 'political assassination':

> (79) ***Je*** *vais affronter les attaques jusqu'au bout, et **je** serai candidat à l'élection présidentielle.* [FF, E2]

> (80) *Ceux qui ont pensé **m'**atteindre doivent être certains de **ma** détermination.* [FF, E2]

For Mélenchon, *je* is a way to assert his individuality and to distance himself from establishment politicians, i.e., the mainstream Socialist Party. Indeed, lays heavy emphasis on his outsider persona in #HollandeRenonce before shifting to a populist *nous* which encompasses him and the French people in the other datasets:

> (81) *Pourquoi **me** demande-t-on **à moi** de rejoindre la primaire du #PS ?* [JLM, E1]

(82) *Je suis candidat depuis février, je le reste. Je n'affronte pas un personnage de la primaire #PS. Mon adversaire, c'est M. #Fillon.* [JLM, E1]

As the election grows nearer, Macron becomes more assertive. The presidential *je* is omnipresent in #ChampsElysées, as Macron projects an ethos of president onto his audience:

(83) *Je sais que les Français n'ont pas peur. Je sais, chers concitoyens, que vous tiendrez bon. Je sais que nous saurons maintenir notre unité.* [EM, E3]

Nous and *vous*: establishing a relationship with the electorate

In political discourse, the primary purpose of *nous* ('we') and *vous* ('you') is to reduce the distance between politicians and the people (Fairclough, 1992, Laclau, 2005). The concept of *nous* is slippery in political discourse. Indeed, its referent is open-ended: it can refer to a particular audience but can also refer to the French people as a whole. By leaving this open to interpretation, politicians can frame their ideas as being the people's ideas (Fairclough, 1992). For instance, when Mélenchon uses *nous* instead of *je* in (84), he talks in the name of the people, and presents his words as those of the people:

(84) *Nous adressons une pensée émue à la famille du policier décédé et aux familles des policiers blessés.* [JLM, E3]

The collective *nous* is also a way for Mélenchon to reaffirm one of the pillars of his campaign: his commitment to replace the corrupt establishment with one

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ruled directly by the people. From #HollandeRenonce to #ChampsElysées, Mélenchon progressively shifts from *je* to *nous*. In #ChampsElysées, he has fused with his electorate as he and his movement have become one:

(85) ***Nous*** *devons faire notre devoir de citoyens. Pas de panique.* ***Restons*** *unis.* [JLM, E3]

Next, the use of *vous* allows for the audience to feel included in the discourse, as politicians seem to be addressing them directly. In #Fillongate, we find multiple instances of Fillon begging his audience for approval and support. By telling his supporters not to let themselves be intimidated, Fillon also implies that Fillongate is part of a larger conspiracy that is targeting the entire party:

(86) *Mes amis, j'ai besoin de* ***vous***. *Ne* ***vous*** *laissez pas faire. Ne* ***vous*** *laissez pas intimider !* [FF, E2]

There are only two instances of the formal singular *vous* in the corpus. In (87), Hamon uses the formal singular *vous* in order to address Fillon directly. The first *vous* is a coreferential dislocated disjunct pronoun.

(87) ***Vous*** *M.Fillon* ***vous*** *avez ruiné le pays.* [BH, E2]

Exclusive and inclusive *on*

As a subject pronoun, *on* possesses a wide range of potential meanings and referents. Moreover, *on* can be either inclusive or exclusive, i.e., it can either

include or exclude the speaker. This versatility can create ambiguity, whether this is done intentionally or not. In some cases, the vagueness of *on* can instill a sense of paranoia suggestive of a sinister conspiracy. In the examples below, Fillon paints himself and his supporters (*nous*) as the victims of a hit job whose perpetrators (*on*) remain unidentified:

(88) ***On*** *voudrait **nous** éliminer de la course à la présidentielle ? Au profit de quoi et de qui ?* [FF, E2]

(89) *Au-delà de ma seule personne, **on** cherche à casser la droite, à lui voler son vote* [FF, E2]

Next, the use of *on* can create an 'us vs. them' distinction, which we often find in populist discourse (discussed in chapter 6). In (90), Mélenchon appears to be including himself with the people (*on*) against the political establishment (*ils*). In (91), however, he distances himself from *on* and suggests to his audience (*vous*) that the election is being rigged by the establishment (*on*):

(90) *Le plus frappant, c'est qu'**ils** ne comprennent pas ce qu'**on** leur reproche.* [JLM, E2]

(91) ***Vous** n'êtes pas fatigués qu'**on** vous arrange l'élection d'avance ? D'abord c'était #Juppé, après #Fillon, maintenant #Macron...* [JLM, E2]

As such, *on* establishes a differentiation between the Self and the Other, and between 'us' and 'them'.

The faceless *ils*

Ils is used to refer to collective entities. In (92), for instance, Macron uses *ils* to refer back to *les terroristes*:

(92) ***Les terroristes*** *cherchent à bousculer les élections.* ***Ils*** *veulent la contemplation du désastre. Je ne céderai en rien. #le79inter* [EM, E3]

Unlike the first and second persons, the third person is external to the discourse. It also helps establish an 'us vs. them' distinction, as in (93):

(93) *C'est la démocratie qui est visée,* ***notre*** *cohésion qu'**ils** veulent ébranler,* ***nos*** *valeurs auxquelles **ils** veulent porter un coup décisif.* [EM, E3]

As such, *ils* may be used with no directly given referent to invoke a faceless enemy and to create a sense of threat heightened by the anonymity of the referent.

Modality and attitude

Modality and polarity

Table 5.7 shows the number of instances belonging to the four types of modality recognized by SFL (probability, usuality, obligation and inclination) as well as the number of processes with a negative polarity. The system of modality interacts with polarity in the sense that modal processes express

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intermediate stances, i.e., stances that are situated somewhere between the positive and negative polarities.

TYPE	FH	MLP	FF	JLM	BH	EM	ALL
modalization: *probability*	2 (5.7%)	2 (2.1%)	11 (12.1%)	7 (7.4%)	2 (4.4%)	6 (7.8%)	**30** (6.8%)
modalization: *usuality*	0	7 (7.4%)	3 (3.3%)	3 (3.2%)	0	2 (2.6%)	**15** (3.4%)
modulation: *obligation*	3 (8.6%)	6 (6.3%)	7 (7.7%)	2 (2.1%)	6 (13.3%)	6 (7.8%)	**30** (6.8%)
modulation: *inclination*	4 (11.4%)	7 (7.4%)	5 (5.5%)	9 (9.5%)	8 (17.7%)	15 (19.5%)	**48** (10.9%)
negation	1 (2.8%)	11 (11.6%)	11 (12.1%)	28 (29.5%)	4 (8.8%)	6 (7.8%)	**61** (13.9%)
no. of clauses	35	95	91	95	45	77	**438**

Table 5.7: Modality and polarity of verbal processes

Hollande uses a majority of modulated processes (i.e., processes of obligation and inclination) in order to emphasize the moral responsibility tied to the presidential function. In (94), for instance, he uses the pseudo-modal *devoir* in conjunction with the material process *diriger l'État* ('lead the State'). Additionally, the reflexive clitic *me* attached to *devoir* implies that it is a personal duty concomitant with his function as *président de la République:*

(94) *Comme président de la République je **me dois** de diriger l'État.* [FH, E1]

This sense of duty is also realized by nouns (*devoir, mandat, tâche, responsabilité, engagement*) and by adjectives (*nécessaire*), as in the following example:

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(95) *Je ne suis animé que par **l'intérêt supérieur** du pays. L'expérience m'a apporté l'humilité **nécessaire** dans ma **tâche**.* [FH, E1]

On the other hand, Hollande completely avoids the negation and his tweets contain only one process with a negative polarity (2.8%). This suggests a willingness to focus solely on the positive aspects of his mandate, which is largely at odds with the public's perception of his presidency.

Le Pen uses an equal proportion (7.4%) of processes of usuality and inclination. In #ChampsÉlysées, she uses numerous adjuncts of usuality (*une nouvelle fois, une fois encore, à nouveau*) and verbs such as *recommencer, s'habituer* to suggest that terrorist attacks occur at a high frequency. This creates a sense of constant threat and urgency as part of a fear-mongering strategy:

(96) *Je ne veux pas que l'on **s'habitue** au terrorisme islamiste.* [MLP, E3]

(97) *J'ai appris que le cauchemar **recommençait, une fois encore**.* [MLP, E3]

(98) *Notre pays a vécu **une nouvelle fois** la barbarie d'une attaque terroriste en plein cœur de notre capitale.* [MLP, E3]

(99) *Émotion et solidarité pour nos forces de l'ordre, **à nouveau** prises pour cible.* [MLP, E3]

Next, she presents current immigration policies as unacceptable with negative processes coupled with the modal verbs *pouvoir* and *vouloir*:

(100) *On **ne** peut **pas** laisser à nos enfants un pays impuissant à les défendre.* [MLP, E3]

(101) *Je **ne** veux **pas** dire à notre jeunesse de s'habituer à vivre avec le terrorisme.* [MLP, E3]

In some instances, the negative polarity of the process is amplified by other markers of negation such as the determiner *aucun*, or the pronouns *personne* and *rien*.

(102) *La campagne de M. #Fillon est en jachère. Plus **rien ne** s'y passe. Plus **aucune** proposition. Il a déserté le débat public !* [MLP, E2]

In example (102), the adjectives *en jachère* and *déserté* further reinforce Le Pen's representation of Fillon as having lost all relevance and legitimacy as a candidate.

Fillon uses a majority of modalized processes (15.4%) as he asserts his certainty regarding his innocence and as he depicts the relentlessness of his presumed attackers:

(103) *Ceux qui ont pensé m'atteindre **doivent** être **certains** de ma détermination.* [FF, E2]

In terms of negation, the adverb *jamais* ('never') conveys his indignation as he claims to have a spotless public record:

(104) *En 36 ans de vie publique, **jamais** mon honneur **n'**avait été mis en cause.* [FF, E2]

(105) *Je **n'**ai **jamais** hurlé avec les meutes, **ni** fouillé dans les poubelles de mes adversaires !* [FF, E2]

In (106), the modal verb *pouvoir*, which expresses ability (or lack thereof), emphasizes his disbelief:

(106) *Je **ne** pouvais imaginer être victime d'une manipulation pareille.* [FF, E2]

Mélenchon's tweets are remarkable for the proportion of negative processes they contain (29.5%), which sets him apart from the other candidates. In #HollandeRenonce, for example, Mélenchon uses numerous negative processes in an effort to distance himself from the mainstream Socialist Party:

(107) *Je **ne** suis **pas** membre du #PS. Je l'ai quitté, ce **n'**est **pas** pour y retourner.* [JLM, E1]

In Mélenchon's tweets, negative polarity often has corrective and/or contrastive function, especially when used in parallel structures such as (108):

(108) *En janvier, **ce** n'est **pas** la primaire de la gauche, c'est la primaire du #PS.* [JLM, E1]

Mélenchon offers a critical and pessimistic representation of the country which lays emphasis on the government's wrongdoings. Yet, he offers few positive alternatives:

> (109) *@fhollande **n'a pas** appliqué son programme.* [JLM, E1]

> (110) *Monsieur #Fillon avait dit qu'il **ne** serait **pas** candidat s'il était mis en examen. Il **ne** respecte **pas** sa promesse.* [JLM, E2]

> (111) *#Fillon **n'écoute rien** et #LePen refuse d'aller aux convocations !* [JLM, E2]

Like Fillon, Mélenchon engages in conspiracy-mongering, suggesting that the public are being lied to, and that mainstream parties as backstabbers who cannot be trusted:

> (112) *@fhollande **n'a pas** renoncé à l'élection présidentielle : il en a été éjecté par ses propres amis.* [JLM, E1]

> (113) *Le coup contre #Fillon **ne** vient **pas** de la gauche. Il vient le plus probablement de sa propre famille.* [JLM, E2]

In #ChampsÉlysées, however, he adopts a more reassuring voice, as he tells his supporters that they must not be afraid in the face of terrorism:

> (114) *Nous **devons** faire la démonstration que nous **ne** sommes **pas** intimidés par les tueurs.* [JLM, E3]

However, Mélenchon's attitude could be interpreted as dismissive as he seems to diminish the gravity of the attack. Surprisingly, he invites his supporters to place their trust in the justice system and to focus on the election instead (115).

As such, he uses imperatives to remind them that voting is their duty as French citizens, and that must stay united within the movement (116):

> (115) **Continuons** *le processus électoral. Les violents seront* **toujours** *battus par les républicains.* [JLM, E3]

> (116) *Nous* **devons** *faire notre devoir de citoyens. Pas de panique.* **Restons** *unis.* [JLM, E3]

With this controversial take, Mélenchon distinguishes himself from Fillon who temporarily halted his campaign in the wake of the attack:

> (117) *Je considère qu'il n'y a pas lieu de continuer une campagne électorale parce que nous* **devons** *manifester notre solidarité avec les policiers.* [FF, E3]

In (116) and (117), Mélenchon and Fillon use the same modal expression of obligation (*devons*), yet they have different priorities. While Mélenchon emphasizes the necessity to keep the eyes on the prize, Fillon argues that the country must for now focus on expressing solidarity for law enforcement.

Hamon uses mostly modulated processes as he shares his vision for the Left. The Socialist nominee expresses his desire for a united Left and outlines the necessary steps his party must take to remain a key player in French politics. Accordingly, Hamon's tweets contain numerous modal verbs that express obligation (*devoir, falloir*) and inclination (*vouloir*):

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(118) **Il faut** désormais une gauche totale, qui **veut** à la fois gouverner et transformer, pour défendre le #ProgrèsSocial [BH, E1]

(119) La gauche **doit** se positionner radicalement différemment sur le travail, le progrès social si elle **veut** être entendue. [BH, E1]

Finally, Macron is the candidate who uses the most modulated processes of inclination (19.5%), along with very few negative processes (7.8%). Most of these negative processes are actually optimistic in tone, as he promises the French people that he will not bow down to terrorism (120) and tells them that they have a great future ahead of them despite the Champs Elysées attack (121):

(120) Les terroristes cherchent à bousculer les élections. Ils veulent la contemplation du désastre. Je **ne** céderai **en rien**. [EM, E3]

(121) L'ombre sur cette fin de campagne **n'**enlève **rien** au fait que nous devons construire notre avenir, et que nous avons un grand avenir [EM, E3].

Engagement and evidentiality

Evidentiality reflects the speaker's commitment to the information they share and to the credibility of their claims (Hyland, 2005; Smirnova, 2015). The avoidance of evidential forms presents the information as absolute facts and truth that cannot be questioned. Longhi (2013) argues that the concise format of tweets invites the removal of hedging and evidential for the sake of

concision. This study seems to confirm his hypothesis hedges and markers of evidentiality are rare across the corpus.

In French, evidentiality is primarily expressed through mitigating mental processes. Halliday refers to the mitigation, or 'projection', of another process by a mental process as *modal assessment* (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014, p.900). Modal assessments are subjective assessments of modality whereby the speaker expresses his or her personal attitude or stance about the process (e.g. *je pense, je crois, je veux,* etc.). In (122-124), the projecting clause (i.e. the mental process) is a 'modal assessment' of the projected clause. Together, the two clauses form a 'clause complex' (Halliday, 1994):

(122) ***Je considère qu'****il n'y a pas de gauches irréconciliables.* [BH, E1]

(123) ***Je sais que*** *les Français n'ont pas peur.* [EM, E3]

(124) ***Je vois que*** *la séquence des boules puantes est ouverte.* [FF, E2]

The most common form of modal assessment is *je veux* ('I want') across all three datasets. This is not unexpected considering the electoral context: through *je veux*, the candidates share their vision for the future. Indeed, 53.7% of the mental processes in the corpus belong to the desiderative subtype, which expresses a modality of inclination (cf. Table 5.8).

	Perceptive	Cognitive	Desiderative	Emotive	**ALL**
Hollande	0	1	3	1	**5**
Le Pen	2	5	8	2	**17**
Fillon	1	5	4	3	**13**
Mélenchon	0	2	3	1	**6**
Hamon	0	2	8	1	**11**
Macron	0	5	10	0	**15**
ALL	**3** (4.5%)	**20** (29.8%)	**36** (53.7%)	**8** (11.9%)	**67**

Table 5.8: Subtypes of mental processes

Moreover, tenses and aspects can also affect the type of modality expressed by mental processes (cf. Table 5.9).

	Present	**Past**			**Future**	**Cond.**	**ALL**
		IMP	PC	PQP			
Hollande	13	3	13	1	3	1	**34**
Le Pen	63	4	15	1	0	1	**84**
Fillon	60	5	10	1	10	3	**89**
Mélenchon	70	4	8	1	7	3	**93**
Hamon	37	1	3	0	2	0	**43**
Macron	54	0	3	0	9	0	**66**
ALL	**297** (72.6%)	**17** (4.1%)	**52** (12.7%)	**4** (1%)	**31** (7.6%)	**8** (2%)	**409**

Table 5.9: Tenses and aspects.

For example, Hollande uses the past structure *j'ai voulu* ('I wanted') which has the effect of mitigating the process by framing it as an intention rather than a success. In the example below, Hollande merely conveys a past wish, and it is unclear whether it came to fruition:

(125) **J'ai voulu** *que soit maintenue la cohésion nationale.* [FH, E1]

Another occurrence in Hollande's tweets is *je pensais* ('I thought'), which in (126) expresses wrong assessment of ability:

(126) ***Je pensais*** *qu'elle pouvait nous unir, elle nous a divisé.* [FH, E1]

In comparison, the future simple can convey certainty:

(127) *Les violents* ***seront*** *toujours battus par les républicains.* [JLM, E3]

As such, it may be used to make a formal commitment – a strategy which electoral candidates can exploit to express their determination to enact particular policies once elected:

(128) *De Washington à Moscou, je* ***prendrai*** *l'initiative diplomatique pour bâtir une coalition mondiale contre le terrorisme islamique.* [FF, E3]

(129) *Je* ***serai*** *implacable pour vous protéger.* [EM, E3]

However, while (128) outlines a specific policy, (129) expresses a general commitment. In other words, Fillon explains what he would do to fight terrorism, but Macron does not elaborate on his promise.

Texture and genre

Lexical cohesion

Table 5.10 provides a summary of the main lexical strings (i.e., with ten or more lexical items) in each dataset:

Event	**#HollandeRenonce**	**#FillonGate**	**#ChampsElysées**
No. of strings	12	10	10
Heads (no. of words)	décision (22) guerre (20) construction (19) progrès (18) conclusion (17) justice (17) cohésion (16) préservation (16) division (14) leader (14) responsabilité (13) échec (12)	légalité (29) corruption (21) débat (14) morale (13) faux semblants (12) attaque (12) bataille (12) vérité (11) presse (10) argent (10)	guerre (40) nation (40) sécurité (34) autorité (30) terrorisme (28) famille (25) unité (18) domination (12) mort (12) peur (11)

Table 5.10: Main lexical strings (> 10 items).

Lexical strings enable us to see each event as a whole by informing us about the recurring themes, images, emotions and activities associated with the event. This is especially useful on Twitter, where lexical strings create texture by relating multiple individual tweets to the same 'context of situation' (Halliday, 1994; Martin, 2000). As such, they are threads running through interrelated tweets that help establish a cohesive and coherent narrative around an event (Eggins, 2004). The #HollandeRenonce narrative is woven around the concepts of *décision, guerre* and *construction*. The *décision* string is predictable given the immediate context of situation (namely, Hollande announcing his decision not to seek reelection). The *guerre* string, however, is more unexpected. If we study the co-text (i.e., the textual context) surrounding

the lexical items, we find that this 'war' is a metaphorical one. In fact, it evokes one of the most prevalent metaphors in political discourse: ARGUMENT IS WAR. In this verbal battle, the candidates' arguments are built upon a conflict frame, i.e., a conceptual model involving two opposing sides. Mélenchon, for instance, is waging a war (*affronte, combattre*) against the political establishment (*mon adversaire*). Benoît Hamon, on the other hand, frames Hollande's withdrawal (retrait) as a self-sacrificing gesture enabling his political camp (son camp) to come up with a new 'plan of attack'. Finally, the *construction* string can be tied to a building metaphor (Chilton & Ilyin, 1993) through which the campaigning process is comparer to a building enterprise. Fillon, in particular, draws repeatedly from the lexical field of masonry (*bâtis, bases solides, redressement, bâtirons,* etc.). In #Fillongate, the main lexical strings deal with justice, corruption and debate. On the one hand, Fillon denies any guilt (*culpabilité*) claims that he is the victim (*victime*) of unjust accusations (*actes d'accusation*) from the press and from his political adversaries (*inquisiteurs*). He goes as far as to suggest a sinister conspiracy (*entreprise de demolition, manipulation*) cooked up (*mijotées dans les arrière-cuisines*) by his detractors (*volontés adverses*) to steal the election (*voler l'élection*) from him and his supporters. On the other hand, his opponents suggest that Fillon is an illegitimate candidate due to the illegality of his actions. According to them, he is a liar who made false promises (*promesses*) and who fooled the people with dirty tricks

(*arrangements, combines*). As such, he has no dignity (*dignité*) and cannot be trusted (*confiance*). The candidates also lament that Fillon has hijacked (*prend en otage*) the election because the media (*la presse*) is more concerned with his shenanigans than with policy debates (*le fond, le programme*). Finally, the main themes discussed in the #ChampsElysées tweets include war, security, authority and national identity. The attack is portrayed as symptomatic of a war waged against France (*la guerre qui nous est menée*), and the candidates tend to focus on the threat of terrorism (*la menace terroriste, le terrorisme islamique*) in general rather than on the specificities of this particular attack. Policemen (*les policiers, les forces de l'ordre*) were the victims of the attack (*victimes, martyrs, visés*) but they are also being celebrated for their continuous effort to keep the French people safe (*protéger, en sécurité*). On the other hand, Le Pen criticizes the Hollande government vehemently for its lack of authority (*autorité*) and moral strength (*force morale*). The candidates also make numerous patriotic appeals whereby they portray the French people as a united front (*unis, membres d'une même famille*) against the enemy.

In addition to lexical cohesion, rhetorical figures such as anaphora and parallelism are another way through which politicians can create a sense of continuity between their tweets. In examples (130) and (131), the repetition of the expression *présider, c'est protéger* at the beginning of each sentence enables the reader to connect the two tweets:

(130) ***Présider, c'est protéger*** *à l'extérieur de nos frontières pour lutter partout contre le terrorisme islamiste.* [EM, E3]

(131) ***Présider, c'est protéger*** *à l'intérieur de nos frontières en renforçant les moyens de sécurité, de renseignement.* [EM, E3]

Moreover, hashtags can place several tweets within the same context of situation. As such, hashtags can operate as context markers – a function which Longhi (2013) calls 'techno-contextualization'. In (132) and (133), the hashtags #JLMFrance2, #Presidentielle2017 and #15minutesPourConvaincre tell us that both tweets are quotes or paraphrases of Mélenchon's interview on the channel France 2, on the guest show *15 minutes pour convaincre*, and in the larger context of the 2017 presidential election:

(132) *Nous devons faire notre devoir de citoyens. Pas de panique. Restons unis. #JLMFrance2 #Presidentielle2017 #15minutesPourConvaincre* [JLM, E3]

(133) *Les criminels ne seront jamais impunis et leurs complices jamais oubliés. #JLMFrance2 #Presidentielle2017 #15minutesPourConvaincre* [JLM, E3]

Generic coherence

This section looks at the pragmatic function of 'techno-words' (Paveau, 2013), i.e. words of both linguistic and technological nature[20]. On Twitter, such words

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[20] See Chapter 4 for an introduction to the concept of techno-discursivity (Paveau, 2013)

include hashtags and @mentions, which are not only an integral part of the discourse but also clickable hyperlinks (Zappavigna, 2012; Paveau, 2013).

Hashtags

Throughout the corpus, a distinction emerged between two types or 'functions' of hashtags, which will henceforth be referred to as 'topic hashtags' and 'context hashtags', respectively.

'Topic hashtags' indicate what or who is the topic of the tweet:

> (134) *On ne peut plus faire campagne. Chaque jour il y a une nouvelle aventure de l'affaire **#Fillon**. **#Elections2017*** [JLM, E2]

> (135) *"La lutte contre le terrorisme commence par retrouver nos frontières nationales, et arrêter avec la naïveté." **#AttentatChampsElysées*** [MLP, E3]

Hashtags may be used even when the context is 'strictly given'. This is because hashtags can increase a tweet's impact and readership by making it 'searchable' (Zappavigna, 2012). In some cases, however, hashtags add needed context to decontextualized tweets. In (136), for instance, the hashtag #Fillon situates Mélenchon's tweet within the context of the Fillongate scandal. In (137), the hashtag #LutteTerrorisme indicates that Macron's remark was part of a discussion on terrorism.

> (136) *Je ne vais pas passer deux mois à critiquer la droite pour autre chose que ses idées ! **#Fillon*** [JLM, E2]

(137) *François Fillon a un problème avec la vérité, c'est chaque jour un peu plus manifeste.* **#LutteTerrorisme** [EM, E2]

'Context hashtags' frame tweets as reported speech from interviews or rallies. As such, they evoke the physical context of the story being told. These hashtags usually reference specific TV channels or talk shows (as in (138)) or campaign rallies (as in (139)), and are often prefaced by the candidate's name or initials.

(138) *"Le problème de François #Fillon, c'est le problème de la confiance entre le candidat et les Français."* **#MLPTF1** [MLP, E2]

(139) *Les journalistes me demandent comment je fais pour tenir : grâce à vous et à votre ferveur comme ce soir à Quimper !* **#FillonQuimper** [FF, E2]

Hashtags are usually added to the end of a tweet, but can also be included in the proposition itself – especially in reference to people (140) or to specific events (141):

(140) *Tout l'espace médiatique a été saturé par M.* **#Fillon** *et ses aventures avec* **#LesRépublicains**. [JLM, E2]

(141) *"La candidature de François #Fillon était déjà très fragile avant le* **#PenelopeGate***, à cause de son projet d'une grande brutalité."* [MLP, E2]

Despite few instances in the corpus, it is also worth mentioning 'self-promoting hashtags', which usually consist of either the candidate's name followed by the election year (as in (142)) or of the candidate's campaign slogan (as in (143)).

(142) *Le choix du PR de ne pas se représenter à la présidentielle nous permet de nous tourner vers l'avenir* ***#Hamon2017*** [BH, E1]

(143) *Notre premier devoir est un devoir de sang froid.* ***#LaForceDuPeuple*** [JLM, E3]

In terms of usage, some candidates used more hashtags than others. Mélenchon and Le Pen used the most, while Macron and Hollande only used a handful of hashtags. There were no noteworthy differences between candidates with respect to hashtag functions.

@mentions

@mentions often serve as referent markers, providing clickable access to a specific person's or organization's timeline. They may function as circumstantial adjuncts, indicating the sources of articles or the authors of quotes shared by the candidates:

(144) *Indispensable moralisation de la vie publique. Elle doit être inscrite dans la loi. Mon interview dans* ***@LaCroix***: [hyperlink] [EM, E2]

They can also be used to address another user directly (thus indicating the addressee of the tweet) or to extend thanks or congratulations to specific social actors:

(145) *Merci à* **@Linda_Gourjade** *pour son soutien à la #PrimaireGauche.*
[BH, E1]

In terms of placement, @mentions are usually included directly into the propositions. As vocatives, they usually precede the main proposition at the beginning of the tweet. However, they can also appear at the end of tweets where they resemble context hashtags:

(146) *"Face au terrorisme, il faut retrouver nos frontières nationales, expulser les étrangers fichés S pour islamisme !"* **@bleuprovence**
[MLP, E3]

Embedded multimodal content:

While Macron uses relatively few hashtags compared to some other candidates, he frequently embeds short videos (147), photos (148) or campaign quotes (149) into their tweets:

(147) *Ce soir, je veux témoigner toute ma solidarité à l'égard de nos forces de l'ordre.* [embedded video] [EM, E3]

(148) *Solidarité avec nos policiers après les événements de la nuit dernière.* [embedded image] [EM, E3]

(149) *L'ombre sur cette fin de campagne n'enlève rien au fait que nous devons construire notre avenir, et que nous avons un grand avenir #RTLMatin* [embedded campaign quote] [EM, E3]

Moreover, Twitter now enables the live streaming of rallies, interviews, and speeches, as in (150):

(150) *Déclaration à la suite de l'attentat des #ChampsÉlysées* [live streaming] [FF, E3]

There were no occurrences of 'playful' technological features, such as emoticons, gifs or non-standard punctuation. This confirms the hypothesis that political tweets differ from other tweets in terms of formality, and that politicians are still expected to uphold a certain standard (Longhi, 2013).

Orality and informality

French campaign tweets often consist of decontextualized quotes, i.e., of quotes that have been extracted from their original context of production, such as rallies and TV interviews (Longhi, 2013). Through this process, spoken words are being transposed onto a written medium. Le Pen is the only candidate who uses quotations marks to distinguish extracted quotes (as in (151)) from original tweets (as in (152)). Additionally, the initials at the end of (152) indicate that Le Pen was the author of the tweet (rather than one of her staff members).

(151) *"Mes pensées vont à la famille du policier tombé en service, à ses camarades blessés et au-delà à toutes nos forces de sécurité." #ConfMLP* [MLP, E3]

(152) *Émotion et solidarité pour nos forces de l'ordre, à nouveau prises pour cible. MLP* [MLP, E3]

As a result of this medium transposition, decontextualized tweets often contain speech-like linguistic features, such as vocatives (153-154), dislocations (155-156), and assertive questions (157-158). Fillon employed the most vocatives, while both left and right dislocations were mostly found in the tweets of Hamon and Mélenchon. Examples of these patterns of orality are shown below.

Vocatives:

(153) ***Mes amis***, *j'ai besoin de vous.* [FF, E2]

(154) ***Vous M.Fillon*** *vous avez ruiné le pays.* [BH, E2]

Dislocations:

(155) *Ils$_i$ ont bonne mine* ***les défenseurs de l'ordre et de la justice****$_i$!* [JLM, E2]

(156) ***À F. Fillon qui fait de l'autisme une insulte****$_i$, je veux lui$_i$ dire que les personnes atteintes d'autisme$_{ii}$ ne mentent pas ne trichent pas, **elles**$_{ii}$!* [BH, E2]

Assertive or non-inverted questions:

(157) ***Pourquoi il y a*** *des primaires à droite et à gauche ?* [MLP, E1]

(158) **Vous n'êtes pas fatigués** *qu'on vous arrange l'élection d'avance ?*
[JLM, E2]

Concision

As hypothesized from previous research on political tweets, the corpus contains very few abbreviations despite the character limit. There are only two instances in the entire corpus, contained within one of Hamon's tweets. In (159), Hamon abbreviates *une* into '1' and *extrême-droite* into 'ext-droite'. Then, he also removes the articles from 'droite' and 'ext-droite'. Interestingly, the tweet only consists of 116 characters. Hamon could have thus spelled out the sentence without going over the character limit.

(159) *Plus que jamais, la gauche doit porter 1 alternative sociale, écologique et démocratique face à droite et ext-droite* [BH, E1]

However, we find some examples of truncated sentences without predicates. Macron is particularly fond of the 'caption style' illustrated below:

(160) *Détermination. Avec mes conseillers sécurité avant ma déclaration solennelle. @JMFauvergue77* [embedded image] [EM, E3]

Finally, we find the evidence of a microgenre in the #ChampsÉlysées dataset, as all the candidates use Twitter to express their formal condolences (161-164):

(161) **Émotion et solidarité** *pour nos forces de l'ordre, à nouveau prises pour cible.* MLP [MLP, E3]

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(162) **Hommage** *aux forces de l'ordre qui donnent leur vie pour protéger les nôtres. #ChampsÉlysées* [FF, E3]

(163) **Pensée émue** *pour les policiers mort et blessés et leurs familles.* [JLM, E3]

(164) **Solidarité** *avec nos policiers après les événements de la nuit dernière.* [embedded image] [EM, E3]

These condolences consist of nominal groups that are elaborated with adjuncts and/or relative clauses.

Chapter 6
Discussion and Conclusion

*Political language is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder
respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.*
George Orwell.

Introduction

This final chapter recontextualizes the findings presented in the
discourse analysis phase of this study into a discussion of the discourses, styles,
and genres underlying the campaign tweets of the 2017 candidates. First, I
discuss how particular discursive mechanisms contribute to the realization of
three distinct ideological discourses, namely progressivism, conservatism and
nationalism. Next, I argue that anti-establishment sentiment is realized by
two rhetorical frames' or 'styles of politics' in the corpus: the populist style and
the centrist style. I then discuss the impact of Twitter on political discourse as
I approach campaign tweets as a genre of discourse with its own affordances
and constraints. Specifically, I argue that Twitter constitutes a powerful
platform for anti-establishment politics, as the combination and concision and
decontextualization can amplify populist appeals. Finally, I conclude this
study by revisiting the Research Questions and reiterating the significance of
the methodological components that have guided my analysis. I discuss the

potential of CDA and SFL for future research on social media, and offer some final thoughts on the state of contemporary politics in the age of social media.

Discourses and styles

This discussion builds on the findings described in chapter 5 and frames them within Fairclough's concept of orders of discourse. Indeed, we have thus far seen that lexicogrammatical choices can signify discourses that shape our perception of events, participants, and circumstances. These choices may promote particular ideologies that are not overtly stated in the text. Additionally, they can index particular 'styles of politics' or rhetorical strategies used by candidates to further their agendas. In essence, my findings show that various discourses (e.g. conservative, progressive, nationalist) and styles (such as populism and centrism) comprise many heterogenous elements that are arrayed in particular structures. That is, particular combinations of lexicogrammatical features are structured as different systems of meaning or 'frames of expectation'. Accordingly, discourses function as "template[s] imposed upon the world to give the appearance of order to events" (Barkun, 2016, p.7). In the following section, I discuss how the 2017 candidates took advantage of triggering events to evoke preferred discourses and styles.

Ideological discourses

Before we discuss ideological discourses, we must first draw a distinction between ideology and party affiliation. Indeed, ideology is not a spectrum that runs from the far left to the far right, and even though there is some overlap between political parties and particular ideologies, there is no neat correspondence between the two. Van Dijk defines ideology as the "shared, socio-cognitive system of a group, culture, or society" (van Dijk, 1991, p.36). Ideology monitors the development of a particular set of norms, values and attitudes, and its application in a way that serves group interests and favorizes ideological reproduction (van Dijk, 1991, p.37). As such, ideologies are both cognitive representations and social systems shared by social groups. The process of ideological reproduction mentioned above aims to maintain the in-group's 'position' in a particular social structure or culture. Similarly, ideologies are not limited to the domain of ideas, but have a material basis or expression in institutions and in the social practices of group members. Van Dijk (1998) states that ideologies should not be reduced to discourse, as they are also being expressed in other semiotic practices, but that discourse plays a unique role in the expression and reproduction of ideologies: "discourse not only exhibits ideologies indirectly (…) but also explicitly formulates ideological beliefs directly" (van Dijk, 1998, p. 193). The type of ideology that interests CDA researchers is the "hidden and latent type of everyday beliefs, which often

appear disguised as conceptual metaphors and analogies" (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p. 8). Accordingly, the aim of CDA is to uncover how discourse expresses and reproduces underlying ideologies by exposing the ideological content hidden in minute linguistic details.

Conservative discourse	Progressive discourse	Nationalist discourse
Emphasis on **authority**, **moral foundations** *and* **self-discipline** *through:* - Material processes and first-person reference - Modality of obligation - Demands and orders - References to romanticized past - Conceptual metaphor: 'countries are buildings' - Lexical strings: order & disorder, restoration, authority	*Emphasis on* **empathy**, *and responsibility to protect the* **common good** *through:* - Third-person reference to vulnerable groups - Humanizing referential choices - Modality of inclination and desiderative mental processes - Mitigating evidentials and modal assessments - Lexical strings: dignity, respect, party unity and the public sector	*Emphasis on* **national identity** *and* **external threat** *through:* - Modality of usuality (repetition) and obligation - Emotive verbal processes - 'Us' vs. 'them' dichotomy - Genericization and dehumanization of the 'other' - Conceptual metaphors: 'nation is family', 'countries are containers' - Lexical strings: war, savagery, fear, family, and patriotism

Table 6.1: Summary of ideological discourses.

The following section deals with three ideological discourses – conservatism, progressivism and nationalism – and discusses their realizations in the tweets of the 2017 French presidential candidates. As a reference for the reader, Table 6.1 offers a summary of the lexicogrammatical features and rhetorical figures which I have identified as enabling the realization of each discourse.

Progressive discourse

In chapter 2, we saw that progressivism relies on the fundamental concepts of empathy and equal opportunity. A progressive morality based on empathy leads to an ethic of diversity and to the recognition of basic human dignity. Accordingly, progressives believe in a strong government that can ensure that all citizens are protected from discrimination and are assisted in realizing their full potential. In turn, citizens have a moral responsibility to contribute to the 'common good', which includes public services as well as welfare programs for the less fortunate. In this first section, I outline several markers of progressive discourse in the tweets of the 2017 presidential candidates.

Throughout the corpus, Socialist nominee Benoît Hamon portrays himself as an advocate for public sector workers (*les fonctionnaires*) and marginalized groups such as the handicapped (*les personnes handicapées, les*

personnes atteintes d'autisme). Hamon emphasizes that everyone deserves to be treated with dignity and respect, and castigates his conservative rival François Fillon for what he perceives to be an utter lack of empathy:

(1) *Quand on prétend devenir chef de l'État, **les serviteurs de l'État**, infirmières, policiers, enseignants, on les **respecte** M. Fillon!* [BH, E2]

(2) ***À F. Fillon*** *qui fait de l'autisme une insulte, **je veux lui dire** que les personnes atteintes d'autisme ne mentent pas ne trichent pas, elles!* [BH, E2]

Hamon chooses to cite *infirmières* ('nurses') and *enseignants* ('teachers') as examples of public sector workers. Both occupations have a deeply affective appeal as they assist some of the most vulnerable members of society: children and the sick. As such, they embody the nurturing role of the government.

(3) *Nommez-les, ces fonctionnaires: ce sont des **infirmières**, des **enseignants**.* [BH, E2]

Dignity is a concept he mentions on multiple occasions. With respect to Fillongate, the term is negatively associated with François Fillon, who lacks the dignity expected from a presidential candidate. Hamon thus accuses him of *indignité* in a performative verbal act:

(4) ***J'accuse*** *François Fillon d'**indignité**, ce candidat n'est pas **digne** de cette élection.* [BH, E2]

In his reaction tweets to the Champs Elysées attack, Hamon barely mentions the attack itself. Instead, he focuses on expressing his empathy for the victim,

Captain Xavier Jugelé. While the condolences extended by the other candidates are more or less vague, Hamon humanizes the victim by referring to him by name and not just by his function. He is also the only candidate to specifically mention the victim's life partner (*son compagnon*) and to go beyond the umbrella terms *famille* and *proches*.

(5) *Mes hommages au **capitaine Xavier Jugelé**. Mes pensées vont vers les siens, notamment **son compagnon** qui a eu des mots si forts et si justes.* [BH, E3]

Hamon is, above all, a Senser. His tweets contain a majority of mental processes (24.5%). In terms of self-reference, he represents himself as a Senser (i.e., as the one who experiences the mental process) more than in any other role (55.6%).

(6) a. Cognitive: *Je **considère** qu'il n'y a pas de gauches irréconciliables.* [BH, E1]

b. Desiderative: *Je la **veux** tout entière tournée vers justice et progrès social.* [BH, E1]

c. Emotive: ***J'aime** la fonction publique !* [BH, E2]

Transformative social change (*transformation de la société*) is another recurrent theme in Hamon's tweets. Hamon uses the future tense very sparingly, which goes against most preconceived ideas about progressivism[21]. The concept of 'future' is mostly realized by various nominal forms (*futur,*

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[21] Due to the small sample size, however, we should not infer any general conclusion.

avenir, progrès, etc.) and occasionally by adjuncts (*désormais*). For instance, he frames Hollande's announcement as an opportunity for reinvention rather than as a failure:

(7) *Le choix du PR de ne pas se représenter à la présidentielle nous permet de nous tourner vers l'avenir #Hamon2017* [BH, E1]

Overall, Hamon portrays himself as a progressive socialist (Chaigne, 2017) who focuses on protecting the public sector and on making sure that the most vulnerable have access to a reliable support system.

As much as he rejects partisan politics, Macron embraces the *progressiste* label. His tweets mention *progressistes* and *conservateurs* on several occasions, yet there is no definition or qualification attached to either term:

(8) *Les vraies divisions ne sont plus entre les partis, elles sont entre les **progressistes** et les **conservateurs**.* [EM, E1]

(9) *Les **progressistes** de droite et du centre ont vocation à nous rejoindre.* [EM, E1]

In other words, Macron presents complex ideologies as "common-sense assumptions" (Fairclough, 1995, p.107) not requiring definition. The same strategy is applied to overused concepts such as *progrès* and *liberté*, which are nearly meaningless unless defined and/or placed within a specific context (Alduy, 2017):

(10) *Il faut réconcilier* **le progrès** *et* **la liberté**. [EM, E1]

These presuppositions have the effect of emptying words from their meaning: even though Macron proclaims to be a *progressiste*, we do not know what it entails.

In his declaration, Hollande distinguishes his 'president persona' (*comme président de la République*) from his 'partisan persona' (*comme socialiste*). In other words, he underlines the fact that he is a progressive but that his role as the head of the nation surpasses partisan biases:

(11) **Comme président de la République** *je me dois de diriger l'État.* **Comme socialiste**, *je ne peux me résoudre à la dispersion de la gauche.* [FH, E1]

Hollande mentions some of the core values of progressivism, such as defending the common good in (12), fighting for equality and civil rights in (13) and advancing individual freedoms in (14):

(12) *Je ne suis animé que par* **l'intérêt supérieur** *du pays.* [FH, E1]

(13) **L'égalité** *entre les couples a été renforcée.* [FH, E1]

(14) *J'ai fait avancer* **les libertés**. [FH, E1]

Yet, quite a few items in Hollande's list of accomplishments are described as maintaining the 'status quo': the emphasis is placed on maintaining and reinforcing (*renforcée, conforté, maintenue, continuer à*) rather than on transforming:

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(15) *J'ai voulu que soit **maintenue** la cohésion nationale.* [FH, E1]

(16) *J'ai voulu que notre modèle social soit **conforté** et élargi.* [FH, E1]

These actions are further mitigated by the modal assessment *j'ai voulu* ('I wanted') which frames them as wishes rather than as concrete successes. As a result, Hollande appears to describe his tenure as an attempt at damage control rather than as a transformative presidency.

Hamon, Hollande and Macron all make numerous references to unity and cohesiveness. In electoral contexts, however, these tend to be empty 'buzzwords' exploited across the political spectrum (Alduy, 2017). After all, presidential hopefuls all share the same goal: broadening their electorate in order to attract as many voters as possible. Hamon distinguishes himself, however, by focalizing on the unity of the Left and of the Socialist Party:

(17) *Il faut désormais **une gauche totale**, qui veut à la fois gouverner et transformer, pour défendre le #ProgrèsSocial* [BH, E1]

(18) *Ce qui m'intéresse c'est de défendre **une gauche totale**, de transformation de la société, pas les petits calculs des autres.* [BH, E1]

Although he values empathy and equality, Hamon's discourse is also the most partisan at a time when the majority of the French electorate felt alienated from the Socialist Party.

Conservative discourse

In contrast to progressivism, conservative ideology centers on issues of authority and control. As such, conservatives typically believe that morality comes from obeying legitimate moral authorities (God, the law, parents, etc.) but that we are ultimately responsible for our own destiny. With enough self-discipline, everyone can pull themselves by the bootstraps. Self-discipline is rewarded by the principles of the free market whereas the government poses a threat to liberty with excessive regulations and a welfare system that rewards laziness (Lakoff, 2005). This worldview is realized mainly in the tweets of François Fillon and of Marine Le Pen.

Fillon portrays himself as a strong believer in the bootstraps principle. Indeed, he presents courage and action (*action courageuse*) as two core ingredients to success:

(19) *Nous bâtirons sur la vérité sans laquelle il n'y a pas de confiance, et l'action courageuse seule en mesure d'obtenir des résultats.* [FF, E1]

(20) *Plus que jamais, l'alternance et le redressement de la France doivent être bâtis sur des bases solides.* [FF, E1]

In examples (19) and (20), Fillon uses a building metaphor which draws from the semantic field of masonry (*bâtirons, redressement, bâtis, bases, solides*). For Machin & Mayr (2012), building metaphors are particularly persuasive as they can be used "to give a sense of commitment through abstraction rather than

concrete details" (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.168). The verb *bâtir* ('build') evokes hard work and tenacity. Fillon does not plan on building from scratch: the structure must rest on solid groundwork (*bases solides*), i.e., on existing moral and historical foundations. The act of building is portrayed as a collective act (*nous*) and the future tense conveys a sense of progress and commitment. However, the intransitive structure obscures the nature and the aim of this building enterprise.

Moreover, Fillon highlights tradition and heritage by quoting historical figures, such as De Gaulle in (21):

(21) *De Gaulle disait : "La vague ne détruit pas le granit…"*
Je suis toujours là, debout, avec vous, pour vous et pour la France. [FF, E1]

By comparing himself to De Gaulle, Fillon anchors himself in *la Grande Histoire* and evokes a heroic destiny (Duhamel, 2016).

Fillon and Le Pen both share a concern for discipline and a romanticized perception of the past. They are 'strict fathers' who comes home after his unruly child (France) was left with a permissive and irresponsible parent (the government). As such, they express the same desire to restore order (*arracher au désordre*) within the country left in shambles (*pagaille, deliquescence*):

(22) *Ce quinquennat s'achève dans la pagaille politique et la déliquescence du pouvoir.* [FF, E1]

(23) Je *veux arracher le pays au désordre dans lequel l'UMP et le PS l'ont plongé.* [MLP, E1]

The NATION IS FAMILY metaphor is omnipresent in Le Pen's tweets. In (24), she calls for French citizens to unite like the members of a same family:

(24) *J'appelle tous les Français à l'unité, une unité profonde comme celle qui unit les membres d'une même famille dans l'épreuve.* [MLP, E3]

But because the government itself lacks authority and moral strength (25), it is unable to protect the citizens from harm (26):

(25) *Nos prétendus gouvernants, insuffisants et pusillanimes, sont dénués de toute autorité et de toute force morale.* [MLP, E3]

(26) *Le gouvernement est défaillant face au terrorisme. Nos enfants ne sont pas protégés dans notre pays !* [MLP, E3]

Finally, she demands action with a variety of verbal processes (*appeler à, ordonner, demander*) and reprimands:

(27) *À ce gouvernement éphémère, usé par l'inaction, je **demande d'ordonner** la restauration immédiate de nos frontières nationales.* [MLP, E3]

(28) *C'est fini le laxisme, c'est fini la naïveté !* [MLP, E3]

Le Pen thus tries to establish herself as the authoritative voice in a country which she sees as currently lacking legitimate figures of authority.

Nationalist discourse

In recent years, France has been the target of several terror attacks orchestrated by Islamic extremists, including the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shooting, the November 2015 Paris attacks and the 2016 Bastille Day truck attack. The April 2017 Champs Elysées attack, which resulted in the death of a police officer, occurred three days before the first round of the presidential election and led Hollande to declare a state of emergency. These attacks have not only contributed to the rise of the Front National as a main political actor, but have also played an important role in the increase of nationalist and anti-immigration sentiment in France (Duhamel, 2016; Alduy, 2017). Moreover, political malaise and economic precarity, most notably persistently high levels of unemployment, have widened the FN electorate outside its traditional bases of influence and have elevated the issue of immigration to the top of the French political agenda (Duhamel, 2016; Chaigne, 2017).

French nationalist discourse encompasses *discours frontiste* (i.e., the discourse of the Front National) and more recently, *discours identitaire*[22] ('identitarian discourse'). Van Leeuwen (1996) describes anti-immigration discourse as follows:

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[22] In France, the main identitarian movement is Génération Identitaire, a far-right, white supremacist youth movement established in 2012. The movement has since expanded to other countries, including the United States under the name Generation Europa.

> [A] discourse which represents immigration in a way that is founded on fear—the fear of loss of livelihood and the fear of loss of cultural identity as a result of the 'influx' of immigrants who are perceived as 'other', 'different' and 'threatening'. (van Leeuwen, 1996, p.32).

In the #ChampsElysées dataset, Le Pen exploits the attack to stroke the fire on fear-driven islamophobia in a country already traumatized by multiple terror attacks. She uses different formulas to hammer the same talking point: attacks from blood-thirsty Islamists are a constant threat that warrants closed borders and mass deportation:

(29) *Notre pays a vécu une nouvelle fois la barbarie d'une attaque terroriste en plein cœur de notre capitale.* [MLP, E3]

(30) *Face au terrorisme, il faut retrouver nos frontières nationales, expulser les étrangers fichés S pour islamisme !* [MLP, E3]

Since 2015, a series of deadly terror attacks have triggered a *virage sécuritaire* in French political discourse (Alduy, 2017; Chaigne, 2017). According to Buzan et al. (1998), security discourse relies on a sense of acute threat in order to 'dramatize' an issue and to present it as an issue of supreme priority. This allows the speaker to claim a legitimate need to address the issue with extraordinary measures for the sake of national security. In example (31), for instance, Le Pen calls for the immediate closing of France's borders:

(31) *Je demande d'ordonner **la restauration immédiate** de nos frontières nationales.* [MLP, E3]

Nationalist discourse uses fearmongering to promote ethnic and religious intolerance. Specifically, nationalists attempt to rationalize their intolerance by claiming that their anti-immigration stance is solely related to a perceived security threat rather than ethnicity or religion. Patrick Teo (2000) refers to this strategy as 'new racism':

> The people who practice the 'new racism' believe in and uphold the basic values of egalitarianism, and would thus emphatically deny that they are 'racist'. Nevertheless, they would speak and act in such a way that distances them from the ethnic minority, engaging in discursive strategies that blame the victims for their circumstances on their own social, economic and even cultural disadvantages (Teo, 2000, p.2).

The aim of fearmongering is to provoke a 'moral panic', i.e., an episode which makes society worry that the values and principles it upholds may be in jeopardy. News coverage of moral panics is often disproportionate to the actual social problem (Machin & Mayr, 2012, pp.221-222). Lakoff argues that when a well-publicized tragedy occurs, repeated coverage activates its framing over and over, strengthening and amplifying particular frames over time. Fearmongering harnesses and exploits this potential. For instance, repeating examples of shootings or violent attacks by immigrants raises people's fears that it will happen to them despite the miniscule probability (Lakoff, 2017). Le Pen uses a high proportion of modalized processes (*recommencer, s'habituer*) and of modal adjuncts of usuality (*à nouveau, une nouvelle fois, une fois encore*) to create a sense of urgency. Moreover, van Dijk (1991) argues that the far

right often dramatizes and negativizes ethnic events by intensifying the illocutionary force of utterances. Throughout the dataset, Le Pen uses vivid and violent imagery to drive her point home with multiple lexical items related to the fields of fear, war and death. Le Pen presents her hyperbolic descriptions as straightforward statements of fact. In other words, she sacrifices credibility in the interest of rhetorical impact:

(32) *J'en appelle au réveil de l'âme millénaire de notre peuple capable de s'opposer à une barbarie sanguinaire.* [MLP, E3]

A main feature of nationalist discourse is in-group favoritism coupled with out-group derogation (van Dijk, 1991). Since its creation in 1972, the Front National has been running on the promise of in-group favoritism, which the party calls *préférence nationale* ('national preference'). Van Dijk (1993) argues that aligning us alongside or against a group of people through referential choices is a form of 'ideological squaring'. In European nationalist discourse, Muslims tend to be represented as threatening and as refusing to integrate in society (Wodak, 2015). This effectively frames the Muslim community as an out-group. The discursive construction of a 'conflict frame' between two opposing sides constitutes the ideological basis of security discourse (Buzan et al., 1998). In Le Pen's tweets, this frame assumes the form of a Manichean opposition between Good and Evil, as she creates a radical contrast between the innocence of French children and the barbarism of Islamic terrorists. In

(33), for instance, she alleges that France is under a state of war, and that the war waged against 'us' seeks out 'our' subjugation, i.e., the destruction of the in-group. Moreover, the passive structure makes the 'enemy' appear faceless, ubiquitous and thus more frightening:

(33) **La guerre qui nous est menée** *est asymétrique, révolutionnaire, qui a pour objectif notre soumission à une idéologie totalitaire.* [MLP, E3]

In contrast, Le Pen referring to herself as *une mère* ('a mother') with three children has the opposite effect and humanizes her:

(34) **Je suis une mère**, *j'ai 3 enfants, et je ne veux pas avoir la boule au ventre quand ils vont dehors.* [MLP, E3]

In (35), she invites the French people to resist foreign attacks by staying united as if they were part of the same big family – a family from which Islam is excluded:

(35) *J'appelle tous les Français à l'unité, une unité profonde comme celle qui unit* **les membres d'une même famille** *dans l'épreuve.* [MLP, E3]

Finally, Le Pen relies on several metaphors that are commonplace in anti-immigration discourse (van Dijk, 1991; Chilton & Ilyin, 1993). In particular, the war metaphor serves to create groundless or exaggerated alarm. In the corpus, this 'war' (*guerre*) is linked to totalitarianism and subjugation:

(36) *La* **guerre** *qui nous est menée est asymétrique,* **révolutionnaire**, *qui a pour objectif notre* **soumission** *à une idéologie* **totalitaire**. [MLP, E3]

Another metaphor which plays a crucial role in anti-immigration discourse is the container metaphor (Chilton, 2004). The primary function of the COUNTRIES ARE CONTAINERS metaphor is to delineate the boundaries between in-groups and out-groups. Indeed, countries are being compared to entities that can be either sealed or penetrated. As such, this metaphor is often used to disseminate value judgments, such as "what is inside is close to the self, and what is outside is also outside the law" (Chilton, 2004, p.118). In examples (37) and (38), protection from terrorism is anthologized in terms of France as a container (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980):

(37) *La lutte contre le **terrorisme** commence par retrouver **nos frontières** nationales.* [MLP, E3]

(38) *Face au **terrorisme**, il faut retrouver **nos frontières** nationales.* [MLP,E3]

In these examples, immigration is strategically replaced with terrorism. By suggesting that closing France's borders is the solution to terrorism, Le Pen implies that immigrants are all potential terrorists, and that terrorism and immigration are intrinsically connected. Through the actions of extremists, she depicts those who practice Islam as potential murderers whose sole objective is to annihilate France's national identity.

The styles of anti-establishment politics

In a climate of widespread public distrust, being an established politician no longer provides legitimacy in the eyes of the public. This section discusses two 'styles of politics' or 'rhetorical frames' which are often wrongly identified as ideologies: populism and centrism (cf. Table 6.2).

The populist style	The centrist style
Othering*, *fear-mongering *and* ***lack of nuance*** *through:*	*Building* ***consensus*** *and* ***avoiding cleavages*** *through:*
- Relational and existential verb processes	• Verbal processes and performativity
- Tactics that diminish or exclude the agent (passivation, nominalization, *on*, *falloir*)	• Modality of inclination and desire
- Delineation between "us" and "them"	• Collective and generic reference
- Collective and generic reference	• Non-referential *il* and nominalization
- Lack of evidential and hedging features	• Inclusive pronouns (*nous, vous*)
- Lexical strings: family & unity, deception & betrayal, violence & fear	• Presuppositions and common-sense assumptions
	• Future simple and commitment
	• Lexical strings: unity & cohesion, future & progress, ethics

Table 6.2: Summary of rhetorical styles.

Even though they tend to be seen as irreconcilable stances, populism and centrism both rely on the same 'anti-establishment' appeal; Populist and

centrist candidates situate themselves outside of the left-right political spectrum and profess to offer an alternative to this traditional bipolar scheme.

The populist style

From Brexit to Donald Trump, recent years have touted the success of political outsiders across the western world. Even though the term 'populism' typically carries a pejorative connotation, two candidates in the 2017 French election happily embraced the label: Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Le Pen and Mélenchon situate themselves on opposite sides of the political spectrum, yet their discourse shares striking similarities. If they are both 'populists', should we infer that they share the same ideology? According to a growing number of political scientists, the characterization of 'populism' as an ideology is at the core of the issue. Indeed, unlike fully-fledged ideologies such as conservatism or progressivism, populism is not associated with a clear set of values or with well-articulated social and economic principles. In fact, it is more easily defined by what (or who) it stands against than by what it stands for (Barr, 2009). The defining feature of populism is that it depicts political reality as a moral struggle between the virtuous people and the corrupt elite. Populists claim that the elite currently in power has betrayed the people, and must be replaced by empathic leaders who will restore the people's supremacy

in politics. As such, populism constitutes a dynamic 'discourse strategy' that can be exploited by either side of the political spectrum in order to challenge the status quo (Bonikowski, 2017, p.10). Moffitt and Tormey (2014) refer to populism as a 'political style' which they relate to the concepts of performance and impression management (Goffman, 1959). This perspective invites an approach to populism as a 'discursive identity' that politicians can wear or take off in order to fit their ideological motivations. As such, populism constructs a particular relationship between politicians and citizens, and can assist in sustaining ancillary ideologies: "like accent in speech, style (…) is a marker of identity and social differentiation" (Cameron, 1996, p.320).

Populism is characterized by several rhetorical features. First, it always involves a binary moral classification (i.e., 'us vs. them'). The identities of both 'the people' and the 'the other' vary according to ancillary ideologies (Westlind, 1996; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014). Right populism typically blames immigrants for the country's problems while left populists project their wrath onto the rich (Bonikowski, 2017). In both instances, however, the political establishment, or *système*, is at fault. For example, Le Pen blames the Champs-Elysées attack on the government and on current immigration policies, which she labels as dangerously lax and naïve:

> (39) *À ce gouvernement éphémère, usé par **l'inaction**, je demande*
> *d'ordonner la restauration immédiate de nos frontières nationales*

[MLP, E3]

(40) *C'est fini **le laxisme**, c'est fini **la naïveté** !* [MLP, E3]

Furthermore, Laclau (2005) argues that populism requires forming a common 'we' which presupposes not only an equivalence between the politician and the people ('us') but also the existence of an imagined other ('them'). Fairclough (2000) notes that the concept of 'we' is slippery, as it can be used by politicians to make vague statements and to conceal power relations. This is because 'we' often has an unclear referent, i.e., a referent that has not been clearly delineated. In political discourse, 'we' can mean the nation, the political party or another unspecified group. As such, it can be used strategically during political campaigns; when presidential candidates use 'we', it can imply that the entire country is behind them. Moreover, pronouns like 'us', 'we' and 'them' can be used to align the audience alongside or against particular ideas. Speakers can present their own ideas as being 'our' ideas and thus create out-groups ('them') who are in opposition with those shared ideas.

Mélenchon's use of subject pronouns reflects a two-fold strategy. First, he builds his outsider persona by distancing himself from the collective Socialist Party. He is an independent *je* who is situated outside of the system:

(41) ***Je*** *ne suis pas membre du #PS.* ***Je*** *l'ai quitté, ce n'est pas pour y retourner.* [JLM, E1]

Once this goal is achieved, Mélénchon becomes one with the French people through a populist *nous* which stands in opposition to the political establishment. By the time of the Champs-Elysées attack, the collective *nous* has completely replaced the individual *je* in Mélenchon's tweets. Mélenchon unifies 'the people' by remaining vague about who specifically makes up this community (Westlind, 1996). Yet, he talks in the name of 'the people' and he describes their emotions and their needs. In example (42), for instance, *nous* is the Sayer in the verbal process *adressons*:

> (42) ***Nous*** *adressons une pensée émue à la famille du policier décédé et aux familles des policiers blessés.* [JLM, E3]

This is symbolical of Mélenchon becoming one 'voice' with his supporters, les Insoumis – he no longer positions himself as a leader but as a spokesperson. This *claim of equivalency* (Fairclough, 2000) with the people assists politicians in building the 'us vs. them' discursive trope of populism (Barr, 2009).

Le Pen uses relatively few personal pronouns, although she sets up the 'us vs. them' dichotomy in the first event when she opposes herself and her supporters ('nous') to the left and right blocks. She does not differentiate between the two mainstream parties – implying that they embody the same toxic establishment and are just as destructive:

> (43) *Je veux arracher le pays au désordre dans lequel **l'UMP et le PS** l'ont plongé.* [MLP, E1]

Furthermore, Le Pen is possessive of France: *notre pays, notre jeunesse, nos enfants, nos policiers* – the country is a cherished possession that must be protected from outsiders who want to steal it. Fundamentally, Le Pen is using presuppositions to construct a homogeneous group of people who share her ideas and beliefs. Indeed, she talks about 'the people' in the same terms she uses to describe France:

> (44) *La France n'est pas **visée** pour ce qu'elle fait mais pour **ce qu'elle est**.* [MLP, E3]

In this metonymical description, France refers to a distinct identity (*ce qu'elle est*) and is represented as the victim (*visée*) of permissive immigration policies.

In order to strengthen the common 'we', populism relies on the negative representation of the Other. Because of its simplistic, unidimensional message, populist rhetoric is indeed fundamentally based on denunciation. Both Le Pen and Mélenchon engage in *ad hominem* attacks. Throughout the corpus, they criticize a variety of groups (*le gouvernement, la gauche, la droite, les milliardaires, les immigrés*, etc.) and individuals (Hollande, Fillon, Macron, etc.). These actors are labelled pejoratively to minimize their power (*faiblesse, échec*):

> (45) *Pourquoi il y a des primaires à droite et à gauche ? Parce qu'ils n'ont pas de leader. C'est **une preuve de faiblesse.*** [MLP, E1]

> (46) *La déclaration de @fhollande est **un énorme aveu d'échec**.* [JLM, E1]

Instead of discussing the moral implications of Fillongate, Mélenchon chooses to ridicule Fillon and to emphasize the fact that he has become a laughingstock, and that people start roaring in laughter at the sole mention of his name.

(47) *C'est terrible ! On ne peut plus parler de #Fillon sans que **tout le monde rigole** !* [JLM, E2]

While they constantly attack the status quo, populists rarely offer alternatives besides a few radical yet simplistic ideas such as closing the borders or overturning the 5th Republic. Accordingly, the populist is not an Actor but a harsh commentator who focuses on describing the chaotic state of affairs through relational and existential processes. This judgmental attitude is also reflected in the polarity of verbal processes. Compared to other candidates, Mélenchon uses more than twice as many negative predicates. He adopts a corrective posture and portrays himself as a truth-teller who exposes and corrects the lies of the establishment and of the media:

(48) *La primaire du #PS n'est pas une primaire : c'est un congrès. Il n'y a là que des gens du #PS.* [JLM, E1]

Several of Mélenchon's tweets have a distinct conspiratorial bent. Conspiracy theories usually posit the existence of secretive coalitions of individuals and speculate on their activities. As such, they often serve the needs of populist candidates, who blame elites for a variety of issues and suggest that popular action can remove them from positions of power. In (49) and (50), Mélenchon

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positions himself as having privileged access to secret knowledge that contradicts the official account presented by the political establishment (Barkun, 2016). In (49), he evokes an 'enemy within' (*ses propres amis*) who lurks inside the Socialist Party. In contrast, example (50) hints at an 'enemy above' (*on*) manipulating the election for their own gain (Walker, 2013).

(49) .*@fhollande n'a pas renoncé à l'élection présidentielle : il en a été éjecté par ses propres amis.* [JLM, E1]

(50) *Vous n'êtes pas fatigués qu'on vous arrange l'élection d'avance ? D'abord c'était #Juppé, après #Fillon, maintenant #Macron...* [JLM, E2]

In conclusion, populists exploit and even amplify the public's anger with a variety of fearmongering techniques but fail to offer any viable solutions. Bourdieu (1991) argue that the power of speech is only created through "the belief in the legitimacy of the words and of those who utter them" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 170). Therefore, it is Bourdieu's contention that the audience to discursive acts, such as audiences of political speeches, give those discursive acts power through the audiences' legitimation of what is said and by whom. This speaks to Le Pen and Mélenchon's power to construct themselves as outsiders, despite their pasts suggesting otherwise. This power to create reality comes from the relationship they have established with their electorate, i.e. "the relation between those who exercise power and those who submit to it" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 166). The discontent felt by supporters of anti-

establishment politicians stems from disparity between those who hold no power and those who do, which explains the 'us versus them' rhetoric (Barr, 2009).

The centrist style

In contemporary politics, centrism is a 'catch-all' term that lacks a clear or defined meaning. Pundits often talk about 'centrists', 'moderates' or 'the center' as an ideological alternative to progressivism or conservativism. Yet, the widespread conceptualization of centrism as an ideology is misleading. Indeed, Lakoff (2011) argues that there is no such thing as an ideology of the 'center', and relates the concept of centrism to his theory of 'biconceptualism'. Lakoff posits that most people are 'biconceptuals', meaning that they apply conservative and progressive worldviews to different areas of their lives (Lakoff, 2005, 2011). For instance, someone may be socially progressive but fiscally conservative. Yet, Lakoff emphasizes that these frames are mutually exclusive in the sense that they cannot be activated *at the same time*. While we may apply different worldviews to different contexts, we cannot approach the same issue from both perspectives at once. Učeň (2004) suggests that, like populism, centrism is not an ideology but a rhetorical frame that politicians can use strategically for electoral gain. Indeed, centrist candidates and parties capitalize on the electorate's dissatisfaction with mainstream politics by

claiming to offer an alternative that can overturn the political status quo. Unlike populism, centrism does not incline towards extremist policies. Nonetheless, it is 'a populist strategy' in the sense that it is built upon an anti-establishment appeal. Učeň refers to this phenomenon as 'centrist populism'. Centrist candidates seek to distance themselves from mainstream politics by offering a 'third-way strategy' that does not align with either side of the political spectrum (Učeň, 2004).

In France, centrist politicians and parties have enjoyed relative success in local and regional elections. Macron, however, was the first self-proclaimed centrist to reach the second round of a presidential election. Throughout the 2017 campaign, Macron carefully cultivated his image as a political outsider, in spite of some critics accusing him of being more integrated with the 'establishment' than he claimed. At first glance, it may seem counter-intuitive to think of Macron as an anti-establishment candidate. Indeed, the young politician appears to embody everything that populists despite. As a graduate of the École Nationale d'Administration (ENA) who then became a Rothschild investment banker, Macron has long been part of France's political, cultural and economic elite. Yet, he successfully reinvented himself as an outsider. His movement *En Marche!,* which was launched just months before the election, could be described as an 'anti-party' or even as a 'non-party'; It is *ni de droite, ni de gauche* ('neither left nor right'). Taking advantage of the anti-

establishment political climate, Macron claimed to be a reformer not relying on traditional party structures. By doing so, he broke the traditional left-right bipolar scheme. In the following section, I explore several aspects of Macron's discourse that reflect his non-confrontational approach to politics.

From the outset, Macron has presented his movement, *En Marche!*, as ideologically amorphous, i.e., as situated outside of the traditional left-right axis. As such, Macron's discourse is fundamentally inclusive and seeks to prevent political cleavages. First, Macron privileges generic over specific referential choices (van Leeuwen, 1996). For instance, he uses the inclusive term *les Françaises et les Français* in an effort to explicitly include women:

(51)   *Je veux rassembler **les Françaises et les Français**.* [EM, E1]

Likewise, he refrains from using traditional party labels and frames the political landscape in terms of *progressistes* and *conservateurs*:

(52) *Les vraies divisions ne sont plus entre les partis, elles sont entre les **progressistes** et les **conservateurs**.* [EM, E2]

In contrast to Le Pen and Mélenchon who happily engage in ad hominem attacks, Macron avoids any direct mention of individual actors. While he does state that Fillon has *un problème avec la vérité* ('a problem with truth'), his reaction tweets to #FillonGate consist of impersonal, vague statements. For

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instance, he calls for 'pluralism' and for the 'moralization' of political life, but he does not specify what either concept entails:

(53) *Il faut remettre du **pluralisme** et de la **moralisation** dans la vie publique.* [EM, E2]

In the example above, Macron also uses the impersonal modal verb *falloir*, which is used with a non-referential *il* pronoun. Here, *falloir* enables Macron to talk about what 'must be done' without positioning himself as an active participant in the process.

Throughout the corpus, Macron uses 'catch-all' lexis as he mentions abstract concepts (*progrès, liberté, vérité, éthique, unité*) with vague qualifiers (*difficile, facile, bel, grand*). By leaving his statements open to interpretation, Macron avoids the risk of disagreement. Moreover, his frequent use of the future tense gives the illusion of involvement and commitment, yet the processes themselves are described in abstract, non-specific terms. In the following example, Macron uses the nominalization *une action* as he claims that "a rigorous action will be engaged against terrorism". But ironically, the sentence itself lacks any conscious participants:

(54) ***Une action vigoureuse** sera engagée pour lutter contre la radicalisation islamiste.* [EM, E3]

In the process of nominalization, human agency has been removed. In (41), action is not a process but a passive participant (namely, a Carrier in an

attributive relational process). In example (55), Macron once again uses the word *action,* this time as part of a nominal group enhanced by a relative clause ('the action that I want to understake'). While Macron is included in the representation, the modal assessment *je veux* places *action militaire* in the realm of wishes rather than of concrete actions:

(55) ***L'action militaire que <u>je veux</u> conduire*** *aura pour priorité votre sécurité.* [EM, E3]

In other words, the future tense (*aura pour priorité*) allows Macron to feign active commitment while avoiding having to inject any substance into his words. It is a « performative discourse » filled with (empty) promises.

Moreover, Macron makes up for this lack of substance by filling his discourse with emotive appeals. Indeed, he adopts a resolutely positive tone as he constantly panders to the French electorate. Even in the face of terrorism, Macron mitigates the negativity by reminding the people that they have a great future ahead of them:

(56) *L'ombre sur cette fin de campagne **n'enlève rien** au fait que nous devons construire notre avenir, et que nous avons un grand avenir.* [EM, E3]

In sum, Macron's abstract, non-confrontational discourse is a unifying strategy which borrows from the discursive trope of populism. Despite the striking lack of substance in his words, the concept of 'the third way' (Učeň,

2004) is vague enough to allow Macron to distinguish himself from other parties while getting away with not subscribing to any concrete policies or principles. In a broader sense, Macron's anti-establishment style could be seen as a case of 'soft populism' posing as a remedy to the hard populism of his competitors. Time will tell whether he is merely a conservative with a new book cover.

Twitter and 'sound-bite' politics

Social media and the marketization of political discourse

As Web 2.0 technology started to infiltrate the domain of politics, the question arose of whether it would change politics and, if so, how (Vergeer, 2015). One dominant perspective was that Twitter could potentially change political power distribution, meaning that smaller political parties would be able to attract more voters and to achieve greater electoral gain thanks to digital campaigning. Indeed, the rise of digital campaigning heralded the ability to circumvent traditional media in favor of non-hierarchical and participatory forms of communication. Schweitzer (2012) argues that the participatory web could enable political actors "to free themselves from the discretionary power of the mass media and to reach voters in an unfiltered way" (Schweitzer, 2012, p.283). In other words, Twitter could break the

dominant media logic of the old campaigning style and thus open the way for politicians to overcome the deeply rooted disaffection of voters towards mainstream politics. Donald Trump in the United States and Pablo Iglesias' Podemos in Spain are two notable examples of successful social media campaigns. The Trump campaign, for instance, opted for a campaign style which relied on framing the traditional media as elitist, biased and dishonest, and harnessed the affordances of social media in order to attract voters who had lost faith in the political system (Oates & Moe, 2017; Gross & Johnson, 2016). Wodak (2015) argues that social media has facilitated the intrusion of market logic into the sphere of politics:

> We are witnessing the development of a 'media-democracy' across Europe and beyond, in which the individual, media-savvy performance of politics seems to become more important than the political process. (Wodak, 2015, p.11).

Specifically, the design of social media platforms is inviting users to equate visibility with legitimacy by promoting the most visible and impactful content at the expense of factuality. KhosraviNik (2018) argues that Trump's performance is a prime example of "the central logic of corporatized participatory web" (p.438) which has created a fertile ground for populist politics. Populism is the realm of charismatic performers who make colorful claims for the people's sovereignty against the corrupt elites. Incidentally, the empowerment of ordinary citizens is one of the core appeals of social media

platforms. Twitter not only feeds into an equation of popularity as legitimacy but also acts as a challenge to the perceived monolithic nature of traditional media (Marwick, 2011, 2013). Bartlett (2014) states that:

> Social media is in many ways the ideal medium for populist parties. It is distributed, non-hierarchical and democratic. It is an alternative to the mainstream media, which many supporters of populist parties strongly distrust. It is therefore not controlled by the elites: the content is generated by us – the honest, hard-working, ordinary citizens – exactly those people who the populists are defending. Indeed, populist parties are far less likely to trust mainstream media sources than the typical citizen. (Bartlett, 2014, p. 106)

In sum, the language of advertising has colonized the domain of politics. In recent elections, candidates have become salesmen who sell their platforms as products to voters-consumers.

A platform tailored for populist appeals

Beyond the participatory aspect of the network, Twitter enabled the emergence of a genre of discourse that is tailored for populist appeals. Longhi (2013) argues that political tweets are characterized by two discursive phenomena: semantic condensation and decontextualization. Twitter, unlike other social networks, imposes a strict character limit. The 2017 presidential candidates had to adhere to a 140-character constraint, which required them

to choose their words carefully in order to communicate information as concisely as possible. In this process of 'semantic condensation', content that is deemed superfluous is omitted, such as hedges and evidential markers. (Longhi, 2013). As a result, political tweets often lack nuance. On the other hand, this brevity lends itself to *petites phrases* ('sound bites'), which refer to short, quotable phrases or sentences meant to capture the essence of utterances (Krieg-Planque, 2011). In recent decades, politicians have learned to talk in sound bites to fit the changing nature of television shows and radio news. To make it past journalistic gatekeepers, they have indeed been steered into expressing their ideas in a concise yet compelling manner (Fairclough, 1993; Negrine, 2008). This mediated approach has in turn affected the nature and the quality of politics, raising the concern that electoral campaigns are being turned into popularity contests at the expense of policy platforms. Because concision constrains speech within prescribed parameters, it limits broader discussions of ideologically charged issues. These parameters also test the ability of politicians to project catchy snippets onto their audiences, and prioritize style over content (Schweitzer, 2012). We can relate this phenomenon to the marketization of politics, which refers to the progressive colonization of political discourse by the discourse of advertising (Fairclough, 1993). One of the features of marketization is the use of vivid images packed into short messages for impact. A majority of the tweets analyzed in this study

take the form of self-promoting statements and of attacks on the government or other politicians. Actual discussion of political issues is much scarcer, as 140-character tweets do not allow for much elaboration.

Moreover, most tweets are decontextualized quotes extracted from interviews and from campaign rallies. Quotes are chosen strategically and fashioned into impactful sound bites. Through this process of 'decontextualization', the original context of production is overshadowed (Longhi, 2013), which carries the risk of oversimplifying or misrepresenting aspects of events. Hollande's announcement is a case in point. The former president made the decision not to seek a second term amidst extremely poor approval ratings that hinted a low chance of reelection. After stating that his retiring at the end of his mandate is in 'the best interest of the country', Hollande lists a series of accomplishments which appear to frame his presidency as highly successful. Given the context, this self-praise creates cognitive dissonance. When we look at the transcript of the press conference, however, we realize that his original speech was much more nuanced and that most of the modal and affective content was stripped off in the process of transposing the speech onto Twitter. A side-by-side comparison of two tweets and of the corresponding sections of the speech is shown below:

> **Tweet: Je porte un bilan et j'en assure** (sic) **toute la responsabilité.**
> *Speech: Voilà ce que j'assume devant vous en revendiquant les avancées, en reconnaissant les retards et même en admettant certaines erreurs parce que je porte un bilan et j'en assume toute la responsabilité.*
>
> **Tweet: Les résultats arrivent.**
> *Speech: Les résultats arrivent plus tard que je ne les avais annoncés, j'en conviens, mais ils sont là : l'investissement, la consommation, la construction repartent et depuis le début de l'année, le chômage enfin diminue mais il reste à un niveau trop élevé et je mesure ce que cette situation peut avoir d'insupportable pour nos concitoyens qui vivent dans la précarité.*

Hollande appears delusional as a result of his digital alter ego cherry-picking the positive in his speech and avoiding the mention of any shortcomings. Nuance and affective content were mislabeled as superfluous when they were in fact an essential part of his speech. This suggests that Hollande's Twitter announcement is a failed attempt at medium transposition. On the other hand, concision can benefit populist candidates as it enables them to share unidimensional messages without the need to elaborate. Indeed, populism is fundamentally reductive: it rejects nuance in favor of moral outrage (Bonikowski, 2017). Twitter allows Le Pen to make sweeping generalizations or dubious claims and frame them as undisputed truths. Moreover, the asynchronous nature of the network removes the pressure of having to deal with pesky counter-arguments.

While populism is not a new phenomenon, it has gained considerable momentum over recent years (Wodak, 2015). Widespread dissatisfaction with

mainstream politics has certainly exacerbated the appeal of populist politics (Cevipof, 2017). However, we should not underestimate the role of digital platforms and their ability to amplify the performance of populism. Indeed, populist politicians have quickly learned to leverage the communicative affordances of new media in order to increase their visibility and broaden their electoral appeal (Bartlett, 2014). Unlike traditional mass media, the lack of external gatekeepers allows them to use Twitter as an unfettered signaling device. Most importantly, the influence of Twitter reaches far beyond its active users. In the age of Trump, Twitter has become a cross-over medium that links social and traditional media (Gross & Johnson, 2016). Because they are required to be concise, tweets are formatted for wide distribution not only online but also through other media, and they routinely get inserted into news cycles. As such, Twitter is "a sound-bite medium for the sound-bite media age" (Gross & Johnson, 2016, p.749).

Conclusion

Revisiting the Research Questions

Through this dissertation, I have provided a critical discourse analysis of political tweets in the context of the 2017 French presidential election. My analysis focused on demonstrating a) how the 2017 candidates framed a

variety of events through particular patterns of linguistic choice, b) how the discursive strategies involved in this framing process relate to particular ideological discourses and rhetorical styles, and c) how campaign tweets form a unique genre of discourse that plays a pivotal role in the dissemination and amplification of political discourse. To this end, this study approached electoral campaigning on Twitter as a dynamic social practice with an emerging order of discourse (Fairclough, 2003). In our modern information society, social processes, developments and changes are all reflected in discourse. As such, discourse plays a pivotal role in the production, legitimation and reproduction of ideologically-based dominance and inequality (Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 1998). Indeed, texts do not passively report upon the world; They imbue it with meaning and shape our perspectives. For Halliday, "a text is a sociological event, a semiotic encounter through which the meanings that constitute the social system are exchanged" (Halliday, 1978, p.139). In other words, language is a form of socialization, enabling individuals to perform meaningful actions within 'contexts of situation'.

The participatory web has changed how politicians conduct electoral campaigns and how private citizens are exposed to political information. The growing presence of social media in the political domain has led researchers to question whether it could narrow the proverbial gap between citizens and politicians (Parmelee & Bichard, 2012). This remains highly questionable.

Indeed, research has shown that politicians use Twitter mostly for self-promotion (Page, 2012), which was confirmed in this study. Politicians can project a semblance of proximity with second-person pronouns, informal language, and personal anecdotes and stories (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). However, there is little evidence that this "synthetic personalization" (Fairclough, 1995) is more than a clever marketing strategy. Twitter is a tool in a larger arsenal of resources that politicians use to disseminate their ideas and to shape public opinion in their favor. Yet, the affordance of on-going communication is an invaluable add-on to this toolkit. As noted by Le Bart (1998), political actors constantly seek to affirm the noble motivations behind their involvement in politics. The strategic dimension of these pretenses finds its manifestation in the process of 'self-representation' in which they engage (Le Bart, 1998, p. 79). Twitter enables political actors to 'personalize' their discourse and to create a false impression of proximity with their followers (Parmelee & Bichard, 2012). In this context, we saw that Twitter is tailored for populist and affective appeals. Given the concision of tweets, politicians make strategic decisions about which elements to use to evoke their discourse. The microblogging format enables politicians to communicate mostly in sound bites and catchphrases that attract attention but often contain little substance (Krieg-Planque, 2011). For some scholars, this is a symptom of the 'marketization' of politics whereby *homo politicus* has become an object of

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consumption within the popular media sphere (Bourdieu, 1991; Negrine, 2008; KhosraviNik, 2018).

The 2017 French election was marked by each candidate's effort to transgress discursive norms in an effort to seduce a disgruntled electorate. This unpredictable election culminated in the triumph of outsiders and the collapse of the left-right axis that had dominated France since the 1960's. Have traditional parties become obsolete in this networked age? Present-day politics are primarily centered around the notion of performance, and on the necessity to craft an identity that will appeal to a wide array of voters. Candidates rely on 'styles of politics' that they can activate to invent personas that fit their electoral needs. At a time when an overwhelming majority of French voters were dissatisfied with their political leaders, the 2017 candidates capitalized on the performance of anti-establishment politics. Despite having served as finance minister for the deeply unpopular Hollande government, Macron managed to reinvent himself as a political outsider. Similarly, Mélenchon relied on radical anti-establishment appeals in spite of his lengthy political career (including 30 years as a member of the mainstream Socialist Party). The ability to craft and frame one's campaign along a desired identity now seems to matter more than the candidate's actual record. Politics is a stage, and politicians are performers: the election is the performance the voters are given to see.

Relevance and avenues for further research

With the dawn of the participatory web, political discourse has been evolving in an effort to adapt electoral practice to the dominant communication paradigm set by social media platforms. Web 2.0 technologies are so embedded in modern society that they have become an integral component of our everyday lives (Paveau, 2013). As a result, perpetuating the online/offline division can inhibit our ability to understand social practices (Zappavigna, 2012; Bouvier, 2015). On Twitter, politicians create online identities that complement their physical interventions (e.g., speeches, interviews, debates) and are thus an integral part of their campaigns. Yet, ambiguity in authorship is a prevalent concern in Twitter research due to the inability to determine whether public figures write their own tweets or whether they have a team of 'ghost writers'. Longhi (2013) addresses this conundrum by arguing that tweet analysis focuses on (techno)discursive representation of identity. Building an online presence is a continuous process which requires stylistic consistency; for example, any tweet posted via the Twitter handle @FrancoisFillon is *bound* to François Fillon – it is understood to be *his* words, regardless of who authored them. Analyzing the tweets of presidential candidates can thus allow us to uncover their rhetorical strategies, dominant ideologies, and representations of real-world events (Longhi, 2013).

The challenge lies in adapting existing discourse analysis methods to social practices that have emerged in digital environments. The dynamicity and participatory character of new social media has brought new types of content to be analyzed, new contexts, and new usage patterns (Jenkins, 2009; Herring, 2013). Fundamentally, these new forms of communication are not just about linguistic innovation and multimodal interaction. They also point to ideological shifts resulting from globalization and a market-based neoliberal approach to politics and education (Fairclough, 2003; Blommaert, 2010). Hence, online discourse should not be studied in isolation from the greater sociopolitical landscape (Bouvier, 2015). In order to understand how power relations are influenced by shifts in discourse, we need to produce studies that tie the micro-level of text to the macro-level of culture (Fairclough, 1992, 2003).

Indeed, Fairclough (1992) argues that "changing discursive practices are an important element in social change" (p. 56) as orders of discourse mutate and evolve to adapt to new contexts. New social practices give rise to new orders of discourse, while existing orders are constantly reshaped and rearticulated. A multifunctional approach to discourse can make a significant contribution to research on the relationship between technological advancement and wider social change, especially in terms of how the integration of new technologies into social processes realizes new genres of discourse (Fairclough, 2003). The methodology used in this study is embedded

in a complex interdisciplinary framework concerned with how discourse interacts with social processes (including beliefs, values and ideologies) within a particular context of culture. Critical Discourse Analysis and Systemic Functional Linguistics are social-semiotic approaches in the sense that they look at the micro-level of text to gain understanding of the macro-level of culture, and vice versa. Studies focusing on Twitter during political elections are becoming increasingly diverse in terms of theory, methodology, and types of data being analyzed. Indeed, there is growing interest in interdisciplinary research and in crossing field boundaries to gain new insights and methods from a wide range of disciplines (Unger et al., 2016). Yet, few studies have attempted to analyze online political discourse from the standpoint of critical linguistics. Systemic Functional Linguistics is a demanding approach due to its complexity and its reliance on a metalanguage. However, it has great value in the sense that it applies rigorous analytical methods to texts "in their authentic form in their actual contexts of social life" (Eggins, 2004, p.352):

> [W]hen we interpret language in these terms, we may cast some light on the baffling problem of how it is that the most ordinary uses of language, in the most everyday situations, so effectively transmit the culture, the systems of knowledge, all the deepest and most pervasive patterns of the culture. With a functional perspective on language, we can begin to appreciate how this is done. (Halliday, 1973, p. 45).

As I hope to have shown in this dissertation, the distinction of three functional levels within the semantic component of the SFL model helps highlight the

features of the text in a particularly clear, powerful, and objective fashion. Because they combine linguistic analysis and social theory, SFL and CDA can make a significant contribution to understanding online political discourse and the complex social and cultural processes it involves.

Final thoughts on the state of political discourse

Several researchers have suggested that ideological differences between political parties have been progressively fading in the post-WW2 era (Fairclough, 1993; Mayaffre, 2004; Negrine, 2008). Fairclough (2003) argues that this is a consequence of a neo-liberal turn in global politics. The dislocation of the left-right axis in France could thus be symptomatic of a wider phenomenon: the progressive/conservative divide is being erased and replaced by a new political landscape dominated by technocrats and populists. Yet, many politicians cling to old party labels that do not reflect their approach to politics, and by doing so contribute to the electorate's confusion and alienation. On Twitter, some frustrated Democrats call for 'purity tests' to weed out 'neolib' and 'centrist' imposters, while Republicans hunt down RINOs (Republicans In Name Only). Party affiliation is no longer seen as trustworthy. Donald Trump claims to be a Republican, yet he has little in common with the conservative Strict Father depicted by Lakoff. On the other side of the Atlantic, former prime minister Manuel Valls posed as a socialist in spite of a staunch

anti-immigration stance and repeated attempts at undercutting the public sector.

In today's networked age, the online world and the offline world are deeply intertwined. However, the degree and extent of Twitter's influence on national elections is still up for debate. First, the hope that the participatory web would bring together users from all horizons has quickly faded. In fact, Twitter seems to have intensified party polarization. Indeed, people tend to select information which is consistent with their own preferences. In turn, social media algorithms use these preferences to create tailored feeds. Over time, users become less and less likely to be exposed to opposing views and are stuck in 'echo chambers' or 'filter bubbles':

> Social media do not show you the world out there, they construct a world to your liking and as such they are breeding ground for echo chambers, and constructions of filter bubbles where all like-minded people get together and reinforce their own perception of the realities and priorities rather than engaging with other views. (KhosraviNik, 2018, p.433)

Finally, it remains to be seen whether social media could truly level the playing field between career politicians and outsiders. While Twitter can amplify a candidate's message, current research suggests that newcomers and outsiders are still reliant on traditional mass media for exposure (Vergeer, 2015). Even Donald Trump, the 'Twitter President', benefited from extensive media coverage in the months leading to the 2016 U.S. election (Oates & Moe, 2017).

Moreover, successful campaigns naturally get more media and academic attention and could thus paint a skewed picture of how influential these networks actually are (Wodak, 2015). Nonetheless, the social media appropriation employed in the recent success of populist movements across western democracies cannot be overlooked, and emphasizes the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of extremist discourse.

Appendices

Appendix A: Tweets (n = 208)

E1: #HollandeRenonce (December 1, 2016)

- **User: @fhollande**

Dans les mois qui viennent mon seul devoir sera de continuer à diriger l'État, mandat pour lequel vous m'avez élu en 2012.

Aussi, j'ai décidé de ne pas être candidat au renouvellement de mon mandat

Je ne suis animé que par l'intérêt supérieur du pays. L'expérience m'a apporté l'humilité nécessaire dans ma tâche

Comme président de la République je me dois de diriger l'État. Comme socialiste, je ne peux me résoudre à la dispersion de la gauche

Le plus grand danger c'est le protectionnisme, c'est l'enfermement, qui seraient un désastre pour les travailleurs français

Je porte un bilan et j'en assure toute la responsabilité. Dans cinq mois vous aurez à faire un choix pour notre pays

Je n'ai qu'un seul regret et c'est d'avoir proposé la déchéance de la nationalité. Je pensais qu'elle pouvait nous unir, elle nous a divisé

Dans ce contexte j'ai voulu que soit maintenue la cohésion nationale

J'ai engagé nos armées dans le monde pour nous protéger, pour lutter contre le terrorisme.

L'engagement que j'avais pris était de faire baisser le chômage. J'ai fait en sorte d'aider les embauches. Les résultats arrivent.

J'ai fait avancer les libertés, l'égalité entre les couples a été renforcée. J'ai modernisé notre démocratie avec la réforme territoriale

Les comptes publics ont été assainis. J'ai voulu que notre modèle social soit conforté et élargi

Je m'adresse à vous pour vous faire connaître ma décision dans la perspective de la prochaine élection présidentielle

- **User: @MLP_officiel**

"Je veux arracher le pays au désordre dans lequel l'UMP et le PS l'ont plongé." #LeGrandJury

"Si #Hollande a renoncé à être candidat, c'est aussi parce que nous sommes donnés au second tour." #MLPTF1

"Nous sommes au centre de cette élection présidentielle, tout tourne autour de nos idées." #MLPTF1

"Pourquoi il y a des primaires à droite et à gauche ? Parce qu'ils n'ont pas de leader. C'est une preuve de faiblesse." #MLPTF1

- **User: @FrancoisFillon**

Ce soir, le Président de la République admet, avec lucidité, que son échec patent lui interdit d'aller plus loin. #DirectPR

Ce quinquennat s'achève dans la pagaille politique et la déliquescence du pouvoir. #DirectPR

Plus que jamais, l'alternance et le redressement de la France doivent être bâtis sur des bases solides. #DirectPR

Nous bâtirons sur la vérité sans laquelle il n'y a pas de confiance, et l'action courageuse seule en mesure d'obtenir des résultats.

- **User: @JLMelenchon**

La déclaration de @fhollande est un énorme aveu d'échec. #JLMTF1 #TF1

Il ne faudrait pas que la déclaration de @fhollande fonctionne comme une amnistie pour tous les autres. #JLMTF1 #TF1

La primaire du #PS n'est pas une primaire : c'est un congrès. Il n'y a là que des gens du #PS. #JLMTF1 #TF1

Maintenant, il y a le choix entre @FrancoisFillon qui dit "chacun pour soi et Dieu pour tous" et moi qui dis "Un pour tous, tous pour un".

En janvier, ce n'est pas la primaire de la gauche, c'est la primaire du #PS. #DIMPOL #France3

Pourquoi me demande-t-on à moi de rejoindre la primaire du #PS ? #DIMPOL #France3

Je ne suis pas membre du #PS. Je l'ai quitté, ce n'est pas pour y retourner. #DIMPOL #France3

.@fhollande n'a pas renoncé à l'élection présidentielle : il en a été éjecté par ses propres amis. #DIMPOL #France3

Je suis candidat depuis février, je le reste. Je n'affronte pas un personnage de la primaire #PS. Mon adversaire, c'est M. #Fillon. #DIMPOL

.@fhollande n'a pas appliqué son programme. #JLMTF1 #TF1

Ceux qui ont élu #FrançoisHollande pour combattre la finance ont été roulés et trahis. #JLMTF1 #TF1

La semaine culbuto - [hyperlink] … - Nouvelle note de blog à découvrir et partager - #Hollande #Fillon #Nucléaire

- **User: @benoithamon**

Merci à @Linda_Gourjade pour son soutien à la #PrimaireGauche. Grâce à elle et bien d'autres, j'ai déjà les parrainages pour être candidat.

#Itélé : il faut désormais une gauche totale, qui veut à la fois gouverner et transformer, pour défendre le #ProgrèsSocial #PrimaireGauche

La gauche doit se positionner radicalement différemment sur le travail, le progrès social si elle veut être entendue #LEmissionPolitique

Le choix du PR de ne pas se représenter à la présidentielle nous permet de nous tourner vers l'avenir #LEmissionPolitique #Hamon2017

Je considère qu'il n'y a pas de gauches irréconciliables. C'est un aveu d'échec de penser le contraire #LEmissionPolitique

Pour @MathieuHanotin : "le retrait de François Hollande met tous les candidats à égalité pour la primaire" [hyperlink] …

#RTLMatin : François Hollande ne pouvait plus rassembler son camp, il en a tiré la conséquence avec humilité et lucidité.

#RTLMatin : ce qui m'intéresse c'est de défendre une gauche totale, de transformation de la société, pas les petits calculs des autres.

#RTLMatin :la primaire tranchera ce que sera la gauche des prochaines années. Je la veux tout entière tournée vers justice et progrès social

Plus que jamais, la gauche doit porter 1 alternative sociale, écologique et démocratique face à droite et ext-droite

- **User: @EmmanuelMacron**

Dans mon livre, j'écris qui je suis. #RTLSoir

Je veux rassembler les Françaises et les Français. #RTLSoir

Les progressistes de droite et du centre ont vocation à nous rejoindre. #RTLSoir

Quand on vient d'un milieu populaire, c'est plus difficile de réussir. On ne peut pas être heureux de ce système. #RTLSoir

Il est trop facile quand une société va mal de dire « L'ennemi c'est l'autre. » #RTLSoir

Les vraies divisions ne sont plus entre les partis, elles sont entre les progressistes et les conservateurs. #BourdinDirect

Il faut réconcilier le progrès et la liberté. #RTLSoir

E2: #Fillongate (Range: January 25, 2017 – February 6, 2017)

- **User: @MLP_officiel**

"Tout révèle aujourd'hui que M. #Fillon aime l'argent, et cherche l'enrichissement personnel. Son caractère s'est révélé." #BourdinDirect

"La campagne de M. #Fillon est en jachère. Plus rien ne s'y passe. Plus aucune proposition. Il a déserté le débat public !" #SaintRaphaël

"Les Français se sont rendus compte qu'en réalité, même s'il jouait l'austère, #Fillon est un homme qui aime beaucoup l'argent." @RFI

"#Fillon lui-même s'est mis dans la nasse, en déclarant qu'il ne serait pas candidat en cas de #miseenexamen." @RFI

"La personnalité de François #Fillon se révèle très éloignée de l'image austère qu'il avait voulu se donner." #8h30Aphatie

"#Bayrou avec #Macron et Lagarde avec #Fillon sont des experts en arrangements d'appareils et en vieilles combines électorales !" #Mirande

"Depuis le début, le comportement de François #Fillon est incohérent. Il n'arrive pas à faire campagne ni à parler de fond." #QDMéthode

"La relation de confiance entre #Fillon et les Français est à mon avis rompue." #QDI @LCP

"La candidature de François #Fillon était déjà très fragile avant le #PenelopeGate, à cause de son projet d'une grande brutalité." #QDI @LCP

"Le problème de François #Fillon, c'est le problème de la confiance entre le candidat et les Français." #MLPTF1

"La candidature de #Fillon était déjà fragilisée par son programme de casse sociale d'une grande brutalité." #MLPTF1

- **User: @FrancoisFillon**

Ceux qui ont pensé m'atteindre doivent être certains de ma détermination.

Je vois que la séquence des boules puantes est ouverte. Je suis scandalisé par le mépris et la misogynie de cet article.

Pourquoi, alors que mon épouse était rémunérée depuis 1997, cette affaire explose deux mois et demi avant l'élection présidentielle ? #LE20H

Non seulement je serai candidat, mais ces attaques me renforcent. #LE20H

Ma lettre aux Français : [hyperlink]

Seule la volonté de nuire peut expliquer la présentation mensongère des éléments publiés ce soir par le #CanardEnchainé.

Je comprends les interrogations, et le besoin de me voir clarifier les choses. Je le fais car je n'ai rien à cacher.

On voudrait nous éliminer de la course à la présidentielle ? Au profit de quoi et de qui ? Des utopistes, des extrémistes ?

Mes amis, je vous demande de m'aider à résister. Je mène un combat pour des convictions, pas pour le goût du pouvoir. #FillonCharleville

J'assume le choix qui fut le mien de m'appuyer sur mon épouse et sur mes proches. #FillonCharleville

Au-delà de ma seule personne, on cherche à casser la droite, à lui voler son vote. #FillonCharleville

J'éprouve une colère froide face à cette meute qui se complait dans cette entreprise de démolition et qui s'affranchit de toutes les règles.

Ces attaques ne sortent pas de nulle part. Elles ont été soigneusement mijotées dans les arrière-cuisines des officines qu'on découvrira.

Je vais affronter les attaques jusqu'au bout, et je serai candidat à l'élection présidentielle.

Il y a aujourd'hui des journaux qui reçoivent des documents 48h après avoir été saisis dans des perquisitions. Qui les leur donne ?

J'ai eu tort d'accepter les costumes qui m'ont été offerts. J'ai fait une erreur de jugement. Ces costumes, je les ai rendus.

Cela fait 2 mois que la presse déverse sur moi des torrents de boue. En 36 ans de vie publique, jamais mon honneur n'avait été mis en cause.

Ma bataille est celle des idées. Je n'ai jamais hurlé avec les meutes, ni fouillé dans les poubelles de mes adversaires ! #FillonCaen

De Gaulle disait : "La vague ne détruit pas le granit…" Je suis toujours là, debout, avec vous, pour vous et pour la France. #FillonCaen

Chaque jour, je reçois en pleine figure de nouvelles bourrasques. Je fais front, j'avance, garde mon cap et trace ma route. #FillonCaen

Soyez fiers, soyez forts, soyez plus volontaires que tous les obstacles qui se dressent sur notre chemin, que toutes les volontés adverses !

Ne me jugez pas d'après les actes d'accusation de ces nouveaux inquisiteurs, mais jugez-moi sur mon parcours. #FillonNantes

Pouvait-on imaginer un jour que des responsables politiques réclameraient le retrait pur et simple de votre candidat ? #FillonNantes

Oui, ils ont osé demander l'élimination, avant même le vote, de la principale famille politique de ce pays. #FillonNantes

Allons-nous les laisser faire ? Allons-nous les laisser vous voler cette élection ? Certainement pas ! #FillonNantes

Mes amis, j'ai besoin de vous. Ne vous laissez pas faire. Ne vous laissez pas intimider ! #FillonQuimper

Les journalistes me demandent comment je fais pour tenir : grâce à vous et à votre ferveur comme ce soir à Quimper ! #FillonQuimper

Je ne pouvais imaginer être victime d'une manipulation pareille. #BourdinDirect

Si j'avais le moindre doute sur ma culpabilité, je ne serais pas candidat à l'élection présidentielle. #BourdinDirect

- **User: @JLMelenchon**

Vous n'êtes pas fatigués qu'on vous arrange l'élection d'avance ? D'abord c'était #Juppé, après #Fillon, maintenant #Macron... #JLMRennes

Monsieur #Fillon va désosser l'État. #BourdinDirect #RMC #BFMTV

Le cas de monsieur #Fillon conseiller d'assurances ramassant 200 000 euros, ça concerne les Français et la République. #DirectFerrari #CNews

On ne peut plus faire campagne. Chaque jour il y a une nouvelle aventure de l'affaire #Fillon. #Elections2017 #Europe1

«Le plus frappant, c'est qu'ils ne comprennent pas ce qu'on leur reproche.» #Fillon #CàVous

Ce qu'il y a de plus choquant chez #Fillon, c'est qu'il soit conseil d'une compagnie d'assurance pour 200 000 euros. #CàVous #France5

Ce qui est le plus frappant, c'est que #Fillon et ses équipes ne comprennent même pas ce qui dérange les gens sur les costumes. #CàVous

Juan Branco : "François #Fillon prend en otage l'élection présidentielle." #18mars2017

Tout l'espace médiatique a été saturé par M. #Fillon et ses aventures avec #LesRépublicains. #RTLSoir #RTL

Monsieur #Fillon avait dit qu'il ne serait pas candidat s'il était mis en examen. Il ne respecte pas sa promesse. #JLMEurope

Désormais, il y a des candidats qui renient leurs promesses avant le premier tour comme monsieur #Fillon. #JLMEurope

Quand je fais un meeting et que je parle de #Fillon, toute la salle éclate de rire. On ne peut plus parler du fond avec ce candidat. #DimPol

Pendant qu'on parle de #LePen et #Fillon, on ne parle pas des 9 milliardaires qui détiennent 90% des médias de ce pays. #DimPol #France3

Ma méthode, c'est la constituante et la 6e République. #Fillon, c'est la décadence de la 5e République ! #DimPol #France3

Ils ont bonne mine les défenseurs de l'ordre et de la justice ! #Fillon n'écoute rien et #LePen refuse d'aller aux convocations ! #DimPol

Je ne vais pas passer deux mois à critiquer la droite pour autre chose que ses idées ! #BFMTV #Fillon #18mars2017

Le mieux serait un autre candidat que #Fillon pour qu'on puisse enfin parler de fond dans cette élection. #BFMTV https://18mars2017.fr

Il faut tourner la page. Le #18mars2017, c'est la 5e République que nous allons mettre en examen. #BFMTV #Fillon https://18mars2017.fr

Il y a quelque chose de fou dans ces institutions qui mettent le pays entier dans l'attente de la décision d'un homme. #Fillon #18mars2017

C'est terrible ! On ne peut plus parler de #Fillon sans que tout le monde rigole ! #JLMBrest

Quand j'étais à #Strasbourg, j'ai voulu parler du programme de #Fillon. Ce n'est plus possible. Les gens le huent. #BFMTV #19hRuthElkrief

Maintenant on ne peut plus parler de #Fillon sans que ça provoque des rires ou des huées... #JLMStrasbourg [hyperlink]

Fillon : la droite méritait mieux. La France aussi.

Le coup contre #Fillon ne vient pas de la gauche. Il vient le plus probablement de sa propre famille. #RTLSoir

Pour moi, François #Fillon est un adversaire politique. Sa cause devient intenable. #RTLSoir

- **User: @benoithamon**

J'accuse François Fillon d'indignité, ce candidat n'est pas digne de cette élection #BHMontpellier

Concevoir des compromis avec François Fillon et pas avec Benoît Hamon, cela en dit long. #8h30Aphatie

Je parle aujourd'hui des 12 millions de personnes en situation de handicap et on m'interroge sur les costumes de M. Fillon #19hruthelkrief

Les affaires de M. Fillon révèlent un rapport à l'argent incompatible avec l'éthique et la morale que l'on attend d'un chef d'État.

Quand on prétend devenir chef de l'État, les serviteurs de l'État, infirmières policiers, enseignants, on les respecte M. Fillon! #BHRennes

J'aime la fonction publique! Vous M.Fillon vous avez ruiné le pays. Nommez-les, ces fonctionnaires: ce sont des infirmières, des enseignants

Je parle aujourd'hui des 12 millions de personnes en situation de handicap et on m'interroge sur les costumes de M. Fillon #19hruthelkrief

À F. Fillon qui fait de l'autisme une insulte, je veux lui dire que les personnes atteintes d'autisme ne mentent pas ne trichent pas, elles!

- **User: @EmmanuelMacron**

François Fillon a un problème avec la vérité, c'est chaque jour un peu plus manifeste. #LutteTerrorisme

Il faut remettre du pluralisme et de la moralisation dans la vie publique. C'est le ciment de cette alliance.

Je n'ai aucune leçon à recevoir en matière d'éthique, de prise de responsabilité et de prises de risques. #BourdinDirect

Indispensable moralisation de la vie publique. Elle doit être inscrite dans la loi. Mon interview dans @LaCroix : [hyperlink]

Moraliser la vie politique, c'est exiger que la rémunération des parlementaires soit plus transparente et déclarée en totalité. #MacronDijon

E3: #ChampsÉlysées (April 20, 2017)

- **User: @fhollande**

Mes pensées vont à la famille du policier tué et aux proches des blessés. Un hommage national sera rendu.

Aujourd'hui, la Nation toute entière exprime sa profonde gratitude et sa reconnaissance au capitaine Xavier Jugelé.

- **User: @MLP_officiel**

"Mes pensées vont à la famille du policier tombé en service, à ses camarades blessés et au-delà à toutes nos forces de sécurité." #ConfMLP

"Nos policiers sont attaqués parce qu'ils sont les symboles de l'État." #ConfMLP

"La France n'est pas visée pour ce qu'elle fait mais pour ce qu'elle est, les Français pour la simple raison qu'ils sont Français." #ConfMLP

"La guerre qui nous est menée est asymétrique, révolutionnaire, qui a pour objectif notre soumission à une idéologie totalitaire." #ConfMLP

"Puisque le pays est en état de guerre, la réponse doit être globale, totale, c'est-à-dire celle du pays tout entier." #ConfMLP

"J'appelle tous les Français à l'unité, une unité profonde comme celle qui unit les membres d'une même famille dans l'épreuve." #ConfMLP

"Nos prétendus gouvernants, insuffisants et pusillanimes, sont dénués de toute autorité et de toute force morale." #ConfMLP

"J'en appelle au réveil de l'âme millénaire de notre peuple capable de s'opposer à une barbarie sanguinaire." #ConfMLP

"À ce gouvernement éphémère, usé par l'inaction, je demande d'ordonner la restauration immédiate de nos frontières nationales." #ConfMLP

"Les noms de ces nouvelles victimes s'ajoutent à la longue liste des martyrs du terrorisme." #ConfMLP

"L'islamisme est une idéologie hégémonique monstrueuse qui a déclaré la guerre à notre nation, à la raison, à la civilisation." #ConfMLP

"Une nouvelle fois, ce sont nos policiers qui ont été visés et qui ont payé le prix du sang dans la lutte contre l'islamisme." #ConfMLP

"La France a vécu la barbarie d'une attaque terroriste sur cette avenue si symbolique pour tout Français, les #ChampsÉlysées." #ConfMLP

"Notre pays a vécu une nouvelle fois la barbarie d'une attaque terroriste en plein cœur de notre capitale." #ConfMLP

"La lutte contre le terrorisme commence par retrouver nos frontières nationales, et arrêter avec la naïveté." #AttentatChampsElysées @RFI [hyperlink]

"On ne peut pas laisser à nos enfants un pays impuissant à les défendre." #15minutesPourConvaincre #ChampsÉlysées

"Il faut s'attaquer à l'idéologie de ce terrorisme, qui pullule chez nous depuis des années." #15minutesPourConvaincre #ChampsÉlysées

"Je ne veux pas dire à notre jeunesse de s'habituer à vivre avec le terrorisme." #15minutesPourConvaincre #ChampsÉlysées

"Je ne veux pas que l'on s'habitue au terrorisme islamiste [...] c'est fini le laxisme, c'est fini la naïveté !" #15minutesPourConvaincre [hyperlink]

"Les Français attendent autre chose de nous que de la compassion." #15minutesPourConvaincre #ChampsÉlysées

"J'ai une colère sourde. Tout n'est pas fait pour mettre nos compatriotes à l'abris." #15minutesPourConvaincre #ChampsÉlysées

"J'ai un sentiment de tristesse pour nos forces de l'ordre qui paient un lourd tribut." #15minutesPourConvaincre #ChampsÉlysées

"J'ai appris que le cauchemar recommençait, une fois encore." #15minutesPourConvaincre #ChampsÉlysées

Émotion et solidarité pour nos forces de l'ordre, à nouveau prises pour cible. MLP

"Je suis une mère, j'ai 3 enfants, et je ne veux pas avoir la boule au ventre quand ils vont dehors." #15minutesPourConvaincre

"Nos services de police font un travail formidable, alors qu'ils sont en sous-effectifs, à cause notamment de M. #Fillon !" @bleuprovence

"Face au terrorisme, il faut retrouver nos frontières nationales, expulser les étrangers fichés S pour islamisme !" @bleuprovence

"Le gouvernement est défaillant face au terrorisme. Nos enfants ne sont pas protégés dans notre pays !" @bleuprovence

"Monsieur #Cherfi, qui a tué Xavier Jugelé sur les #ChampsÉlysées, a violé son contrôle judiciaire et le magistrat l'a libéré." #2017LeDébat

- **User: @FrancoisFillon**

Policiers, gendarmes et militaires me trouveront toujours à leurs côtés pour défendre leurs missions, leurs moyens et leur honneur. [hyperlink]

Il est temps d'afficher notre tolérance zéro à l'égard de l'islam radical, qui est l'inspirateur du totalitarisme islamique. [hyperlink]

De Washington à Moscou, je prendrai l'initiative diplomatique pour bâtir une coalition mondiale contre le terrorisme islamique. [hyperlink]

J'entends combattre ce mal qui nous agresse d'une main de fer. Le combat pour la liberté et la sécurité des Français sera le mien. [hyperlink]

Nos policiers, nos gendarmes, nos militaires doivent être remerciés, soutenus et respectés parce qu'ils protègent les Français. [hyperlink]

Déclaration à la suite de l'attentat des #ChampsÉlysées [hyperlink]

Le combat contre le totalitarisme islamique doit être la priorité absolue du prochain président de la République. [hyperlink]

Je considère qu'il n'y a pas lieu de continuer une campagne électorale parce que nous devons manifester notre solidarité avec les policiers.

La nation est solidaire avec les policiers. La lutte contre le terrorisme doit être la priorité du prochain président de la République. [hyperlink]

Hommage aux forces de l'ordre qui donnent leur vie pour protéger les nôtres. #ChampsÉlysées

- **User: @JLMelenchon**

Pensée émue pour les policiers mort et blessés et leurs familles. Les actes terroristes ne seront jamais impunis, les complices jamais oubliés

Nous adressons une pensée émue à la famille du policier décédé et aux familles des policiers blessés. #JLMFrance2 #Presidentielle2017

Les criminels ne seront jamais impunis et leurs complices jamais oubliés. #JLMFrance2 #Presidentielle2017 #15minutesPourConvaincre

Nous devons faire notre devoir de citoyens. Pas de panique. Restons unis. #JLMFrance2 #Presidentielle2017 #15minutesPourConvaincre

Les violents n'auront pas le dernier mot. Notre feuille de route est la devise de la patrie : Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité.

Nous devons faire la démonstration que nous ne sommes pas intimidés par les tueurs. #LaForceDuPeuple [hyperlink]

Notre premier devoir est un devoir de sang froid. #LaForceDuPeuple

Continuons le processus électoral. Les violents seront toujours battus par les républicains. #JLMFrance2 #Presidentielle2017

- **User: @benoithamon**

Mes hommages au capitaine Xavier Jugelé. Mes pensées vont vers les siens, notamment son compagnon qui a eu des mots si forts et si justes.

Il faut être implacable à l'égard de ceux qui veulent remettre en cause nos valeurs dans notre démocratie #15minutesPourConvaincre

J'adresse mes pensées à la famille du policier tué ainsi qu'aux blessés. #15minutesPourConvaincre

Mes pensées vont au policier tué, à ses collègues blessés. Soutien total aux forces de l'ordre contre le terrorisme. #ChampsElysees

Toutes celles et ceux qui s'en prennent aux services publics nous désarment face au terrorisme. #15minutesPourConvaincre

- **User: @EmmanuelMacron**

Solidarité avec nos policiers après les événements de la nuit dernière. [hyperlink]

Devant mon QG de campagne. Merci à nos forces de l'ordre de nous protéger au quotidien. [hyperlink]

« Tenter, braver, persister, tenir bon, tenir tête ; voilà l'exemple dont les peuples ont besoin, et la lumière qui les électrise. » V. Hugo [hyperlink]

Je sais que les Français n'ont pas peur. Je sais, chers concitoyens, que vous tiendrez bon. Je sais que nous saurons maintenir notre unité.

Je n'ai pas voulu interrompre notre campagne présidentielle car notre démocratie est plus forte. [hyperlink]

Une action vigoureuse sera engagée pour lutter contre la radicalisation islamiste, y compris sur Internet.

C'est la démocratie qui est visée, notre cohésion qu'ils veulent ébranler, nos valeurs auxquelles ils veulent porter un coup décisif.

J'installerai une task force, organe de renseignement auprès du président de la République, pour lutter contre Daech.

L'action militaire que je veux conduire aura pour priorité votre sécurité.

Chacun mesure le tribut payé par ces femmes et ces hommes qui risquent chaque jour leur vie pour notre sécurité.

Le rôle premier du président de la République est de protéger les Français. J'y suis prêt. Je serai implacable pour vous protéger.

Mes premières pensées vont à la famille de la victime, ses collègues, ses proches. Je rends hommage à toutes nos forces armées.

Hier soir, Paris a une nouvelle fois été frappée au coeur, comme Londres, Berlin, Stockholm et Bruxelles ces derniers mois.

Détermination. Avec mes conseillers sécurité avant ma déclaration solennelle. @JMFauvergue77 [hyperlink]

Les terroristes cherchent à bousculer les élections. Ils veulent la contemplation du désastre. Je ne céderai en rien. #le79inter [hyperlink]

Je dis ma solidarité à l'égard des forces de l'ordre et des proches de la victime. #le79inter

L'ombre sur cette fin de campagne n'enlève rien au fait que nous devons construire notre avenir, et que nous avons un grand avenir #RTLMatin [hyperlink]

Le prochain président de la République aura à faire face à la menace terroriste. J'y suis prêt. #RTLMatin [hyperlink]

J'ai annulé deux rassemblements publics car je veux que les forces de l'ordre soient mobilisées sur les priorités. #RTLMatin [hyperlink]

Nous vivons et vivrons durablement avec la menace terroriste. #RTLMatin

Je veux redire ma solidarité à l'égard des forces de l'ordre qui assurent notre sécurité. #RTLMatin

Présider, c'est protéger à l'extérieur de nos frontières pour lutter partout contre le terrorisme islamiste.

Présider, c'est protéger à l'intérieur de nos frontières en renforçant les moyens de sécurité, de renseignement.

Je témoigne toute ma solidarité à l'égard de nos forces de l'ordre. J'ai une pensée pour la famille de la victime.

Le premier devoir, la première mission du président est de protéger.

Ce soir, je veux témoigner toute ma solidarité à l'égard de nos forces de l'ordre. [hyperlink]

Appendix B: Transitivity analysis of #HollandeRenonce

1. <u>**François Hollande**</u>

*Dans les mois qui viennent mon seul devoir **sera** de continuer à diriger l'État, mandat pour lequel vous m'**avez élu** en 2012.*

(1a) relational : identifying

Dans les mois qui viennent	*mon seul devoir*	*sera*	*de continuer à diriger l'État*
Circ: duration	Token	Pr: rel-ident	Value

[relative clause] material

mandat pour lequel	*vous*	*m'*	*avez élu*	*en 2012*
Circ: purpose	Actor	Goal	Pr: material	Circ: time

*Aussi, j'**ai décidé** de **ne pas être** candidat au renouvellement de mon mandat.*

(2) mental : desiderative || [projection] relational : attributive

Aussi,	*j'*	*ai décidé*		*de*	*ne pas être*	*candidat*	*au renouvellement de mon mandat*
	Senser	Pr: mental			Pr: rel-attr	Attribute	Circ: matter

*Je **ne suis animé** que par l'intérêt supérieur du pays. L'expérience m'**a apporté** l'humilité nécessaire dans ma tâche.*

(3) relational : attributive

Je	*ne suis animé*	*animé que par l'intérêt supérieur du pays*
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute

(4) material

L'expérience	*m'*	*a apporté*	*l'humilité*	*nécessaire dans ma tâche*
Actor	Beneficiary	Pr: material	Goal	Circ: condition

*Comme président de la République je **me dois de diriger** l'État. Comme socialiste, je **ne peux me résoudre** à la dispersion de la gauche*

(5) material

Comme président de la République	*je*	*me dois de diriger*	*l'État*
Circ: role	Actor	Pr: material	Range

(6) mental : emotive

Comme socialiste	*je*	*ne peux me résoudre*	*à la dispersion de la gauche*
Circ: role	Senser	Pr: mental	Phenomenon

*Le plus grand danger c'**est** le protectionnisme, c'**est** l'enfermement, qui **seraient** un désastre pour les travailleurs français*

(7a) relational : identifying

Le plus grand danger c'	*est*	*le protectionnisme,*
Token	Pr: rel-ident	Value

(7b) relational : identifying

c'	*est*	*l'enfermement,*
Token	Pr: rel-ident	Value

(7c) [relative clause] relational : attributive

qui	*seraient*	*un désastre*	*pour les travailleurs français*
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute	Circ: viewpoint

*Je **porte** un bilan et j'en **assure** toute la responsabilité. Dans cinq mois vous **aurez à faire** un choix pour notre pays.*

(8a) relational : attributive : possession

Je	*porte*	*un bilan*
Possessor	Pr: rel-attr: possession	Possessed

(8b) relational : attributive : possession

et	*j'*	*en*	*assure*	*toute la responsabilité*
	Possessor	Circ: matter	Pr: rel-attr: possession	Possessed

(9) material

Dans cinq mois	vous	aurez à faire	un choix	pour notre pays
Circ: time	Actor	Pr: material	Goal	Circ: behalf

*Je **n'ai** qu'un seul regret et c'**est** d'avoir proposé la déchéance de la nationalité. Je **pensais** qu'elle **pouvait** nous **unir**, elle nous **a divisé***

(10a) relational : attributive : possession

Je	n'ai	qu'un seul regret
Possessor	Pr: rel-attr (possession)	Possessed

(10b) relational : identifying

et	c'	est	d'avoir proposé la déchéance de la nationalité
	Token	Pr: rel-ident	Value

(11a) mental : cognitive || [projection] material

Je	pensais		qu'	elle	pouvait	nous	unir,
Senser	Pr: mental			Actor	Pr: material...	Goal	...Pr: material

(11b) material

elle	nous	a divisé
Actor	Goal	Pr: material

*Dans ce contexte j' **ai voulu** que **soit** maintenue la cohésion nationale*

(12) mental : desiderative || [projection] relational : attributive

Dans ce contexte	j'	ai voulu		que	soit	maintenue	la cohésion nationale
Circ: condition	Senser	Pr: mental			Pr: rel-attr	Attribute	Carrier

*J'**ai engagé** nos armées dans le monde pour nous protéger, pour lutter contre le terrorisme.*

(13) material

J'	ai engagé	nos armées	dans le monde	pour nous protéger, pour lutter contre le terrorisme
Actor	Pr: material	Range	Circ: place	Circ: purpose

*L'engagement que j'avais pris **était** de faire baisser le chômage. J'**ai fait en sorte** d'aider les embauches. Les résultats **arrivent**.*

(14) relational : identifying

L'engagement [[que j'avais pris]]	*était*	*de faire baisser le chômage*
Token	Pr: rel-ident	Value

(15) material

J'	*ai fait en sorte*	*d'aider les embauches*
Actor	Pr: material	Goal

(16) relational : attributive (with incorporated attribute)

Les résultats	*arrivent*
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr/Attribute

*J'**ai fait avancer** les libertés, l'égalité entre les couples **a été renforcée**. J'**ai modernisé** notre démocratie avec la réforme territoriale*

(17a) material

J'	*ai fait avancer*	*les libertés,*
Actor	Pr: material	Goal

(17b) relational : attributive

l'égalité entre les couples	*a été*	*renforcée*
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute

(18) material

J'	*ai modernisé*	*notre démocratie*	*avec la réforme territoriale*
Actor	Pr: material	Goal	Circ: means

*Les comptes publics **ont été assainis**. J'**ai voulu** que notre modèle social **soit** conforté et élargi*

(19) relational : attributive

Les comptes publics	*ont été*	*assainis*
Goal	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute

(20) mental : desiderative ||[projection] relational : attributive

J'	*ai voulu*		*que*	*notre modèle social*	*soit*	*conforté et élargi*
Senser	Pr: mental			Carrier	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute

*Je **m'adresse** à vous pour vous faire connaître ma décision dans la perspective de la prochaine élection présidentielle*

(21) verbal

Je	m'adresse	à vous	pour vous faire connaître ma décision	dans la perspective de la prochaine élection présidentielle
Sayer	Pr: verbal	Receiver	Circ: purpose	Circ: matter

2. Marine Le Pen

*"Je **veux arracher** le pays au désordre dans lequel l'UMP et le PS l'**ont plongé**."*

(22) mental : desiderative || [projection] material

Je	veux		arracher	le pays	au désordre [[dans lequel l'UMP et le PS l'ont plongé]]
Senser	Pr: mental		Pr: material	Range	Phenomenon

[[embedded clause]] material

dans lequel	L'UMP et le PS	l'	ont plongé
	Actor	Range	Pr: material

*"Si #Hollande **a renoncé** à **être** candidat, c'**est** aussi parce que nous **sommes** donnés au second tour."*

(23a) mental : desiderative || [projection] relational : attributive

Si	#Hollande	a renoncé		à être	candidat,
	Senser	Pr: mental		Pr: Rel-Attr	Attribute

(23b) relational : attributive

c'	est	aussi	parce que nous sommes donnés au second tour
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr:		Attribute/Circ: reason

[[circumstantial clause]] relational : attributive

parce que	nous	sommes	donnés	au second tour
	Carrier	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute	Circ: matter

*"Nous **sommes** au centre de cette élection présidentielle, tout **tourne** autour de nos idées."*

(24a) relational : attributive

Nous	*sommes*	*au centre de cette élection présidentielle,*
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute/Circ: place

(24b) relational : attributive : circumstantial

tout	*tourne*	*autour de nos idées*
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr: circumstantial	Attribute/Circ: matter

*"Pourquoi **il y a** des primaires à droite et à gauche ? Parce qu'ils **n'ont pas** de leader. C'**est** une preuve de faiblesse."*

(25) existential

Pourquoi	*il y a*	*des primaires à droite et à gauche ?*
Circ: reason	Pr: existential	Existent

(26) relational : attributive : possession

Parce qu'	*ils*	*n'ont pas*	*de leader*
	Possessor	Pr: rel-attr: possession	Possessed

(27) relational : attributive

C'	*est*	*une preuve de faiblesse*
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute

3. <u>François Fillon</u>

*Ce soir, le Président de la République **admet**, avec lucidité, que son échec patent lui **interdit** d'aller plus loin.*

(28) verbal

Ce soir,	*le Président de la République*	*admet,*	*avec lucidité,*		*que son échec patent lui interdit [[d'aller plus loin]]*
Circ: time	Sayer	Pr: verbal	Circ: quality		Verbiage

[projection] verbal || [projection] material

que	*son échec patent*	*lui*	*interdit*		*d'aller*	*plus loin*
	Sayer	Target	Pr: verbal		Pr: material	Circ: distance

*Ce quinquennat **s'achève** dans la pagaille politique et la déliquescence du pouvoir.*

(29) material

Ce quinquennat	s'achève	dans la pagaille politique…
Actor	Pr: material	Circ: manner

*Plus que jamais, l'alternance et le redressement de la France **doivent être bâtis** sur des bases solides.*

(30) relational : attributive

Plus que jamais,	l'alternance et le redressement de la France	doivent être	bâtis	sur des bases solides
Circ: time	Goal	Pr: material	Attribute	Circ: condition

*Nous **bâtirons** sur la vérité sans laquelle il **n'y a pas** de confiance, et l'action courageuse seule en mesure d'obtenir des résultats.*

(31) material

Nous	bâtirons	sur la vérité [[sans laquelle…]]
Actor	Pr: material	Circ: default

[[embedded clause]] existential

sans laquelle	il n'y a pas	de confiance
	Pr: existential	Existent

4. __Jean-Luc Mélenchon__

*La déclaration de @fhollande **est** un énorme aveu d'échec.*

(32) relational : attributive

La déclaration de @fhollande	est	un énorme aveu d'échec
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute

*Il ne faudrait pas que la déclaration de @fhollande **fonctionne** comme une amnistie pour tous les autres.*

(33) relational : attributive : circumstantial

que	la déclaration de @fhollande	fonctionne	comme une amnistie	pour tous les autres
	Carrier	Pr: rel-attr: circumstantial	Attribute/Circ: comparison	Circ: behalf

*La primaire du #PS **n'est pas** une primaire : c'**est** un congrès. Il **n'y a** là que des gens du #PS.*

(34a) relational : attributive

La primaire du #PS	n'est pas	une primaire :
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute

(34b) relational : attributive

c'	est	un congrès
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute

(35) existential

Il n'y a	là	que des gens du #PS
Pr: existential	Circ: location	Existent

*Maintenant, il **y a** le choix entre @FrancoisFillon qui **dit** "chacun pour soi et Dieu pour tous" et moi qui **dis** "Un pour tous, tous pour un".*

(36a) existential

Maintenant,	il y a	le choix
Circ: time	Pr: existential	Existent

(36b) [relative clause] verbal

entre	@FrancoisFillon qui	dit	"chacun pour soi et Dieu pour tous"
	Sayer	Pr: verbal	Verbiage

(36c) [relative clause] verbal

et	moi qui	dis	"Un pour tous, tous pour un"
	Sayer	Pr: verbal	Verbiage

*En janvier, ce **n'est pas** la primaire de la gauche, c'**est** la primaire du #PS.*

(37a) relational : identifying

En janvier	ce	n'est pas	la primaire de la gauche
Circ: time	Token	Pr: rel-ident	Value

(37b) relational : identifying

c'	est	la primaire du #PS
Token	Pr: rel-ident	Value

*Pourquoi me **demande**-t-on à moi de rejoindre la primaire du #PS?*

(38) verbal || [projection] material

Pourquoi	*me*	*demande-*	*t-on*	*à moi*		*de rejoindre*	*la primaire… ?*
Circ: reason	Receiver	Pr: verbal	Sayer	Receiver		Pr : material	Range

*Je **ne suis pas** membre du #PS. Je l'**ai quitté**, ce **n'est pas** pour y retourner.*

(39) relational : attributive

Je	*ne suis pas*	*membre du #PS*
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute

(40a) material

Je	*l'*	*ai quitté,*
Actor	Goal	Pr: material

(40b) relational : attributive

ce	*n'est pas*	*pour y retourner*
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute/Circ: purpose

*.@fhollande **n'a pas renoncé** à l'élection présidentielle : il en **a été éjecté** par ses propres amis.*

(41a) mental : desiderative

@fhollande	*n'a pas renoncé*	*à l'élection présidentielle :*
Senser	Pr: mental	Phenomenon

(41b) material : causative

il	*en*	*a été éjecté*	*par ses propres amis*
Goal	Circ: matter	Pr: material	Agent

*Je **suis** candidat depuis février, je le **reste**. Je **n'affronte pas** un personnage de la primaire #PS. Mon adversaire, c'**est** M. #Fillon.*

(42a) relational : attributive : circumstantial

Je	*suis*	*candidat*	*depuis février,*
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute	Circ: duration

(42b) relational : attributive

Je	*le*	*reste*
Carrier	Attribute	Pr: rel-attr : circumstantial

(43) material

Je	n'affronte pas	un personnage de la primaire #PS
Actor	Pr: material	Goal

(44) relational : identifying

Mon adversaire, c'	est	M. #Fillon
Value	Pr: rel-ident	Token

*.@fhollande **n'a pas appliqué** son programme.*

(45) material

@fhollande	n'a pas appliqué	son programme
Actor	Pr: material	Goal

*Ceux qui ont élu #FrançoisHollande pour combattre la finance **ont été roulés et trahis**.*

(46) relational : attributive

Ceux qui ont élu #FH	pour combattre la finance	ont été	roulés et trahis
Carrier	Circ: purpose	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute

5. **Benoît Hamon**

*Grâce à elle et bien d'autres, j'**ai** déjà les parrainages pour être candidat.*

(47) relational : attributive : possession

Grâce à elle et bien d'autres,	j'	ai	déjà	les parrainages pour être candidat
Circ: reason	Possessor	Pr: rel-attr: possession	Circ: time	Possessed

*Il **faut** désormais une gauche totale, qui **veut** à la fois gouverner et transformer, pour défendre le #ProgrèsSocial*

(48a) existential

Il	faut	désormais	une gauche totale,
	Pr: existential	Circ: time	Existent

(48b) [relative clause] mental : desiderative

qui	veut	à la fois	gouverner et transformer	pour défendre le #ProgrèsSocial
Senser	Pr: mental	Circ: quality	Phenomenon	Circ: purpose

*La gauche **doit se positionner** radicalement différemment sur le travail, le progrès social si elle **veut** être entendue*

(49a) relational : attributive : circumstantial

La gauche	*doit se positionner*	*radicalement*	*différemment*	*sur le travail, le progrès social*
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr: circumstantial	Circ: degree	Attribute/Circ: quality	Circ: matter

(49b) [hypothetical clause] mental : desiderative

si	*elle*	*veut*	*être entendue*
	Senser	Pr: mental	Phenomenon

*Le choix du PR de ne pas se représenter à la présidentielle nous **permet** de nous tourner vers l'avenir*

(50) material

Le choix du PR [[de ne pas se représenter à la présidentielle]]	*nous*	*permet*	*de nous tourner vers l'avenir*
Actor	Beneficiary	Pr: material	Goal

*Je **considère** qu'il **n'y a pas** de gauches irréconciliables. C'**est** un aveu d'échec de penser le contraire*

(51) mental : cognitive || [projection] existential

Je	*considère*		*qu'*	*il n'y a pas*	*de gauches irréconciliables*
Senser	Pr: mental			Pr: existential	Existent

(52) relational : attributive (*c'est*-cleft)

C'est	*un aveu d'échec*	*de penser le contraire*
Pr: rel-attr	Attribute	Carrier

*Pour @MathieuHanotin: "le retrait de François Hollande **met** tous les candidats à égalité pour la primaire"*

(53) relational : attributive : causative

Pour @MathieuHanotin	*le retrait de François Hollande*	*met*	*tous les candidats*	*à égalité*
Circ: viewpoint	Attributor	Pr: rel-attr	Carrier	Attribute

*François Hollande **ne pouvait plus rassembler** son camp, il en **a tiré** la conséquence avec humilité et lucidité.*

(54) material

François Hollande	ne pouvait plus rassembler	son camp,
Actor	Pr: material	Range

(55) material

il	en	a tiré	la conséquence	avec humilité et lucidité
Actor	Circ: matter	Pr: material	Range	Circ: quality

*Ce qui m'**intéresse** c'**est** de défendre une gauche totale, de transformation de la société, pas les petits calculs des autres.*

(56a) mental : desiderative

ce qui	m'	intéresse
Phenomenon	Senser	Pr: mental

(56b) relational : identifying

c'	est	de défendre une gauche totale
Token	Pr: rel-ident	Value

*La primaire **tranchera** ce que **sera** la gauche des prochaines années. Je la **veux** tout entière tournée vers justice et progrès social*

(57) verbal || [projection] relational : identifying

La primaire	tranchera		ce que	sera	la gauche des prochaines années
Sayer	Pr: verbal		Value	Pr: rel-ident	Token

(58) mental : desiderative [ellipsed relational process]

Je	la	veux	tout entière	tournée vers justice et progrès social
Senser	Carrier	Pr: mental	Circ: degree	Attribute

*Plus que jamais, la gauche **doit porter** 1 alternative sociale, écologique et démocratique face à droite et ext-droite*

(59) relational : attributive : possession

Plus que jamais	la gauche	doit porter	1 alternative sociale, écologique et démocratique	face à droite et ext-droite
Circ: time	Carrier	Pr: rel-attr: possession	Attribute	Circ: comparison

6. Emmanuel Macron

*Dans mon livre, j'**écris** qui je **suis**.*

(60) verbal || [projection] relational : identifying

Dans mon livre	*j'*	*écris*		*qui*	*je*	*suis*
Circ: place	Sayer	Pr: verbal		Value	Token	Pr: rel-ident

*Je **veux** rassembler les Françaises et les Français.*

(61) mental : desiderative

Je	*veux*	*rassembler les Françaises et les Français*
Senser	Pr: mental	Phenomenon

*Les progressistes de droite et du centre **ont** vocation à nous rejoindre.*

(62) relational : attributive : possession

Les progressistes de droite et du centre	*ont*	*vocation à nous rejoindre*
Possessor	Pr: rel-attr: possession	Possessed

*Quand on vient d'un milieu populaire, c'**est** plus difficile de réussir. On **ne peut pas être** heureux de ce système.*

(63a) [circumstantial clause] relational : attributive : circumstantial

Quand	*on*	*vient*	*d'un milieu populaire,*
Circ: contingency	Carrier	Pr: rel-attr: circumstantial	Attribute/Circ: place

(63b) relational : attributive (with split Carrier)

c'	*est*	*plus difficile*	*de réussir*
Carrier…	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute	…Carrier

(64) relational : attributive

On	*ne peut pas être*	*heureux de ce système*
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute

*Il **est** trop facile quand une société va mal de dire « L'ennemi c'est l'autre. »*

(65) relational : attributive (with split Carrier)

Il	*est*	*trop facile*	*quand une société va mal*	*de dire « L'ennemi c'est l'autre. »*
	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute	Circ: time	Carrier

*Les vraies divisions **ne sont plus** entre les partis, elles **sont** entre les progressistes et les conservateurs.*

(66a) relational : attributive

Les vraies divisions	*ne sont plus*	*entre les partis*
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute

(66b) relational : attributive

elles	*sont*	*entre les progressistes et les conservateurs*
Carrier	Pr: rel-attr	Attribute

*Il faut **réconcilier** le progrès et la liberté.*

(67) material [agentless]

Il faut	*réconcilier*	*le progrès et la liberté*
	Pr: material	Range

Appendix C: System of Circumstance

Appendix D: Lexical strings (> 10 items)

1. #HollandeRenonce (12 strings)

Décision (22 items)
FH décidé – élu - choix – proposé – voulu – voulu - décision – élection - MLP veux - renoncé – élection – FF alternance – JLM choix – renoncé – demande - élection – élu – BH choix – permet – tranchera – alternative – EM veux

Guerre (20 items)
FH armées – lutter contre – MLP arracher – leader – faiblesse – FF redressement – courageuse – JLM éjecté – affronte - adversaire – combattre – BH défendre – retrait - à égalité – camp – défendre – tranchera – face à – EM ennemi – réconcilier

Construction (19 items)
FH tâche – travailleurs – modèle – FF patent – redressement – bâtis – bases – solides –bâtirons – action – mesure – JLM fonctionne - BH soutien – transformer - travail – transformation – calculs – tranchera – porter

Progrès (18 items)
FH renouvellement – avancer – modernisé – réforme – élargi – FF aller plus loin – alternance – BH transformer - #ProgrèsSocial – progrès social – tourner vers - avenir –transformation – progrès social – alternative – EM progressistes – progressistes – progrès

Conclusion (17 items)
FH bilan – déchéance – résultats – MLP renoncé – FF échec – s'achève – déliquescence – résultats – JLM échec – amnistie – quitté – renoncé – éjecté – BH échec – retrait – conséquence – tranchera

Justice (17 items)
MLP preuve – FF admet – interdit – redressement - vérité - JLM déclaration – aveu – déclaration – amnistie – roulés – trahis – BH défendre – aveu - défendre – calculs – justice - EM vocation

Cohésion (16 items)
FH unir – cohésion – égalité – JLM congrès – rejoindre – membre – amis – BH soutien – à égalité – rassembler – camp – tout entière – EM rassembler – rejoindre – société –réconcilier

Préservation (16 items)
FH continuer à – protectionnisme – enfermement – maintenue – protéger – renforcée –modèle – conforté – FF bâtis sur – bases – bâtirons sur – JLM reste – BH défendre - se représenter – défendre – EM conservateurs

Division, désordre (14 items)
FH dispersion - divisé - MLP arracher - désordre – FF pagaille – déliquescence –
JLM quitté – éjecté – adversaire – BH irréconciliables – camp - EM ennemi – autre -
divisions

Leader (14 items)
FH diriger – élu – président - diriger – responsabilité – engagé – engagement –
modèle – FF président - MLP leader – JLM élu – BH gouverner - rassembler – camp
– EM rassembler

Responsabilité (13 items)
FH devoir – mandat – élu – mandat – intérêt - tâche – responsabilité – aurez à –
engagé – engagement – JLM amnistie – programme - élu

Échec (12 items)
FH me résoudre – regret —— MLP renoncé – FF échec – s'achève – déliquescence –
JLM échec – renoncé – éjecté – BH irréconciliables – échec – retrait

2. #FillonGate (10 strings)

Légalité (29)
MLP mise en examen - FF convictions – règles – s'affranchit – saisis – perquisitions
– jugement – tort – actes d'accusation – inquisiteurs – jugez – jugez – mis en cause –
responsables – culpabilité – responsables – victime - JLM cas – reproche – mis en
examen défenseurs – justice – convocations – mettre en examen – décision - BH
accuse - interroge - EM loi – responsabilité

Corruption (21)
MLP arrangements – appareils - combines - FF boules puantes – affaire - voler –
cacher - entreprise - arrière-cuisines – mijotées – fouillé – poubelles – voler –
intimider – manipulation - JLM arrange – affaire - coup - BH affaires - mentent –
trichent

Débat (14)
MLP débat – proposition – faire campagne – parler de fond – projet – programme –
FF idées - JLM – faire campagne – programme – parler du fond – parler de fond –
idées – programme - BH compromis

Morale (13)
FF honneur - JLM respecte - BH – indignité – digne – respecte – éthique – morale -
EM vérité – moralisation – responsabilité – leçon – moralisation – moraliser

Faux semblants (12)
MLP image – jouait – en réalité – se révèle - FF cacher – costumes – costumes - BH costumes - mentent – trichent – prétend

Attaque (12)
MLP brutalité – brutalité - FF boules puantes – explose - attaques – nuire – démolition – attaques – attaques – victime - JLM prend en otage – coup

Bataille (12)
FF résister - bataille – combat - affronter – fais front – adverses – obstacles – adversaires – retrait - bataille - JLM adversaire – EM risques

Vérité (11)
MLP révèle - en réalité – révélée - FF mensongère - cacher - clarifier - BH révèlent - mentent - EM vérité – manifeste - transparente

Presse (10)
FF article – publiés – journaux – presse – journalistes - JLM l'espace médiatique – saturé – médias – page - EM interview

Argent (10)
MLP argent – enrichissement – argent - FF rémunérée – appuyer - JLM euros – euros – milliardaires - BH argent - EM rémunération

3. **#ChampsElysées (10 strings)**

Guerre (40)
FH blessés – MLP blessés – visée – guerre – état de guerre – victimes – martyrs – guerre – visés – lutte – attaque – attaqués – lutte – s'attaquer – à l'abri – cible – FF militaires – combattre – agresse – combat – attentat – combat – lutte – JLM blessés – blessés – battus – battus – BH blessés – blessés – désarment – EM lutter – visée – coup – lutter – militaire – frappée – victime – lutter – lutter – victime

Nation (40)
FH nation – nationale – MLP symboles – État – France – Français – français – pays – pays – Français – nationales – symbolique – français – nationales – chez nous – compatriotes – pays – FF Français – Français – République – République – nation – JLM citoyens – devise – patrie – républicains – BH – valeurs – démocratie – EM Français – concitoyens – démocratie – démocratie – valeurs – République – République – protéger – République – République – République -

Sécurité (34)
FH policier – MLP – sécurité – policiers – policiers – défendre – police – protégés – FF policiers – gendarmes – militaires – défendre – sécurité – policiers – gendarmes – militaires – protègent – policiers – policiers – protéger – JLM policiers – policier – policiers – BH policier – policier – EM protéger – policiers – sécurité – sécurité – protéger – protéger – protéger – sécurité – sécurité – protéger

Autorité (30)
MLP forces – force – gouvernants – autorité – gouvernement – ordonner – forces – ordre – forces – ordre – gouvernement – contrôle – forces – ordre – BH implacable – EM forces – ordre – décisif – conduire – implacable – céderai – forces – ordre - présider – présider – forces – ordre – forces – ordre

Terrorisme (28)
MLP terrorisme – islamisme – islamisme – terroriste – terroriste – terrorisme – terrorisme – terrorisme – terrorisme – islamiste – terrorisme – FF islamisme – islamiste – attentat – terrorisme – islamique – JLM terroristes – BH terrorisme – terrorisme – EM islamique – Daech – terroristes – terroriste – terroriste – terrorisme – islamique – terrorisme – islamique

Famille (25)
FH famille – proches – MLP famille – membres x famille – enfants – chez nous – jeunesse – mère – enfants – enfants – FF les nôtres – JLM familles – famille – familles – patrie – fraternité – BH les siens – compagnon – famille – EM – famille – proches – proches – famille

Unité (18)
MLP camarades – unité – unité – unit – solidarité – FF coalition - mondiale – solidarité – solidaire – JLM unis – BH compagnon – EM solidarité – unité – cohésion – solidarité – solidarité – solidarité – rassemblements

Domination (12)
MLP asymétrique – soumission – idéologie – totalitaire – totale – idéologie – hégémonique – idéologie – contrôle – FF totalitarisme – absolue – BH total

Mort (12)
FH tué – MLP tombé – sang – victimes – tué - tué – JLM mort – battus – BH tué – tué – EM victime – victime

Peur (11)
MLP Cauchemar – boule au ventre - risques – JLM panique – intimidés – sang froid – EM – peur – risquent – menace – menace

Appendix E: List of social actors

	Event	Individuals	Groups and collective entities
Hollande	E1	- comme président de la République **(S)** - comme socialiste **(S)**	- l'État (x2) - [le] pays notre pays - nos armées - la gauche - les travailleurs français - les couples
	E3	- [le] capitaine Xavier Jugelé	- la famille du policier tué - [les] proches des blessés - la Nation toute entière
Le Pen	E1	- #Hollande	- le pays - l'UMP - le PS - [la] droite - [la] gauche
	E2	- M. #Fillon (x2) - #Fillon (x5) - François #Fillon (x4) - #Macron - #Bayrou - Lagarde - le candidat	- les Français (x3)
	E3	- une mère **(S)** - M. #Fillon - Monsieur #Cherfi - Xavier Jugelé - le magistrat	- la France (x2) - les Français (x3) - tous les Français - tout Français - le pays - le pays tout entier - notre pays (x2) - notre peuple - notre nation - nos compatriotes - nos enfants (x2) - notre jeunesse - les membres d'une même famille - 3 enfants

			- nos policiers (x2) - nos forces de l'ordre (x2) - nos services de police - toutes nos forces de sécurité - les symboles de l'État - la famille du policier tombé en service - ses camarades blessés - ces nouvelles victimes - [les] martyrs du terrorisme - le gouvernement - nos prétendus gouvernants - ce gouvernement éphémère - les étrangers fichés S
Fillon	E1	- le Président de la République	- la France
	E2	- ma seule personne **(S)** - votre candidat **(S)** - mon épouse (x2) - De Gaulle	- [les] Français - la France - mes amis (x2) - mes proches - ceux qui ont pensé m'atteindre - le #CanardEnchainé - des utopistes - des extrémistes - cette meute - les meutes - mes adversaires - les volontés adverses - ces nouveaux inquisiteurs - des responsables politiques - des journaux - la presse - les journalistes - la droite - la principale famille politique de ce pays
	E3	- [le] prochain président de la République (x2)	- les Français (x2) - la nation - les nôtres - [les] forces de l'ordre - les policiers (x3)

			– nos policiers – [les] gendarmes – nos gendarmes – [les] militaires – nos militaires – une coalition mondiale contre le terrorisme islamique
Mélenchon	E1	– @fhollande (x4) – #FrançoisHollande – #Hollande – @FrancoisFillon – M. #Fillon – #Fillon mon adversaire – un personnage de la primaire #PS	– [le] #PS (x4) – des gens du #PS – la gauche – ceux qui ont élu #FrançoisHollande – tous les autres – ses propres amis
	E2	– Monsieur #Fillon (x3) – #Fillon (x14) – François #Fillon (x2) – M. #Fillon – Fillon – monsieur #Fillon conseiller d'assurances – ce candidat – un autre candidat que #Fillon – un adversaire politique – #Juppé – #Macron – #LePen – Juan Branco	– l'État – la République – les Français – la France – ce pays – le pays entier – les gens (x2) – tout le monde – la gauche – la droite (x2) – #LesRépublicains – #Fillon et ses équipes – sa propre famille – des candidats qui renient leurs promesses avant le premier tour – toute la salle – les défenseurs de l'ordre et de la justice – ces institutions – la 5e République – [les] 9 milliardaires – 90% des médias
	E3	(none)	– la patrie – les républicains – les policiers mort et blessés

			- la famille du policier décédé - [les] familles des policiers blessés - leurs familles - les violents (x2) - les tueurs - les criminels - les complices - leurs complices
Hamon	E1	- #Hamon2017 **(S)** - François Hollande (x2) - [le] PR - @Linda_Gourjade - @MathieuHanotin	- la gauche (x2) - une gauche totale (x2) - la gauche des prochaines années - [des] gauches irréconciliables - son camp - [la] droite - [l']ext-droite - tous les candidats - [les] autres - bien d'autres
	E2	- Benoît Hamon **(S)** - François Fillon (x2) - M. Fillon (x4) - F. Fillon - ce candidat - un chef d'État - [le] chef de l'État	- le pays - les serviteurs de l'État - ces fonctionnaires - [les] infirmières - [les] policiers - [les] enseignants - des infirmières - des enseignants - les personnes atteintes d'autisme - 12 millions de personnes en situation de handicap
	E3	- [le] capitaine Xavier Jugelé - le policier tué - son compagnon	- les forces de l'ordre - la famille du policier tué - les siens - ses collègues blessés - [les] blessés - ceux qui veulent remettre en cause nos valeurs

			–	toutes celles et ceux qui s'en prennent aux services publics
Macron	E1	– l'ennemi – l'autre	–	les Françaises et les Français – une société – ce système – les partis – les progressistes de droite et du centre – les progressistes – les conservateurs
	E2	– François Fillon	–	@LaCroix – des parlementaires
	E3	– [le] président – [le] président de la République (x2) – [le] prochain président de la République	–	les Français (x2) – chers concitoyens – les forces de l'ordre (x3) – nos forces de l'ordre (x3) – nos policiers – toutes nos forces armées – [les] proches de la victime – la famille de la victime (x2) – ses collègues – ses proches – mes conseillers sécurité – une task force – Daech – les terroristes – ces femmes et ces hommes – les peuples

KEY:

E1: #HollandeRenonce; E2: #FillonGate; E3: #ChampsÉlysées

(x_): Number of occurrences in the dataset

(S): Self-reference

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