

**Timing is Everything? Organized Interests
and the Timing of Legislative Activity**

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Abstract

Different perspectives on the role of organized interests in democratic politics imply somewhat different temporal sequences in the relationship between legislative activity and the influence activities of organized interests. Unfortunately, a lack of data has greatly limited any kind of detailed examination of this sequence. We address this problem by taking advantage of the temporally very precise data on lobbying activity provided by the door pass system of the European Parliament (Berkhout and Lowery 2011). After reviewing the several different perspectives on the timing of lobbying and legislative activity, we present the data used in our analysis and then use them to consider the larger issue of what our findings can tell us about the role of organized interests in democratic politics and, more importantly, our theories of organized interests in the policy process.

Stopping by the European Parliament for a Chat: Organized Interests and the Timing of Legislative Activity

What is the relationship between the timing of legislative actions and the activity of organized interests? This is an important question because, despite a half century of work on the politics of interest representation, the literature offers an extraordinarily wide range of assessments of the role of organized interests in democratic politics. These views range from the traditional pluralist view (Truman 1951) that such interests are a vital part of democratic governance to assessments that they exert a pernicious influence by essentially purchasing public policy and, thereby, extract rents (Olson 1982). And a few theorists even assert that organized interests are instead exploited by political officials via their manipulation of public policy agendas in what amounts to extortion racket designed to secure campaign support (McChesney 1997). In a somewhat more benign organizational-based version of this argument, neocorporatist scholars tend to emphasize the relative strength of political officials in setting the agenda and the activity of interest organizations responding to political events (or, at best, occurring contemporaneously with legislative or executive activity) (Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005, 452; Wessels, 2004, 202). Sorting through these very several perspectives has constituted a very large part of our collective research agenda on organized interests. More to the immediate point, these different perspectives imply somewhat different sequences in the relationship between legislative activity of governments and the influence activities of organized interests. That is, they respectively suggest that the latter might lag, lead or be contemporaneous with the former. Thus, a close examination of their temporal relationship might provide an important lens through which to assess these wide-ranging perspectives on the role of organized interests in democratic governance.

Unfortunately, the lack of data needed to examine this temporal relationship has greatly limited any kind of detailed examination of this important question. Beyond case

studies of specific, usually very controversial pieces of legislation with their inherent and inevitable selection biases, systematic data has been limited to examination of legislative activity in the national and state governments of the United States and their relationship to lobbying activity as provided via lobby registration data (Leech, Baumgartner, La Pira, and Semanko. 2005; Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and Anderson 2005). Lobby registration data, however, are typically reported on an annual basis, making them extremely lumpy in terms of assessing the precise timing of legislative activity and the lobbying of organized interests. As Gray et al (2005) note, the annual data at best suggest that their relationship *appears* to be contemporaneous. But this may only be because, at the level of annual observations, more precise assessments of their timing simply cannot be observed.

We address this problem, and thereby the larger question of the role of organized interests in democratic politics, by taking advantage of the temporally precise data on the entry of organized interests into the EU interest community provided by the door pass system of the European Parliament (Berkhout and Lowery 2011). These data, while not without their own unique problems, have the very significant advantage that they can be sliced into very precise temporal units (of about four to eight weeks). They thus provide an almost unique opportunity to systematically assess the relationship between the timing of legislative activity and lobbying. In the first section of the paper, we review the several different perspectives on the timing of lobbying and legislative activity along with a number of practical limitations on their interpretation. We then present the data used in our analysis. Following the analysis of that data, we return to consider the larger issue of what our findings can tell us about the role of organized interests in democratic politics and, more importantly, our theories of organized interests in the policy process.

Lagging, Leading, or a Contemporaneous Relationship

In reviewing the many different perspectives now offered on the relationship between

the timing of legislative and lobbying activity, we start with the first of two null hypotheses. This first perspective suggests that the two activities are *substantively* contemporaneous where, by substantive, we mean that there is no causal relationship between them. Rather, they are both responsive to something else. In this pluralist view, both lobbying activity and legislative agendas reflect less each other than real policy issues facing society. Thus, Truman (1951, 511) identified the locus of mobilization in disturbances in society. Organized interests engage in political activity to secure redress on these disturbances. But executive and legislative entrepreneurs also have powerful incentives to monitor their constituents' concerns (Wawro 2000). Parties too win elections by finding issues on which to campaign (Macdonald and Rabinowitz 2001). This does not mean, of course, that organized interests play an insignificant role. Indeed, pluralists assert that they are vital in sharpening political officials' understanding of the public's concerns (Truman 1951; Denzau and Munger 1986). But if both government officials and organized interests are responding swiftly to the same disturbances in society, then we should see the volume of lobbying activity and the content of legislative agendas changing in a contemporaneous manner with both reflecting the public's concerns. But we must also note that while this traditional pluralist expectation might be well founded for national governments, it is less clear that it applies so forcefully to the institutions of the European Union given its attenuated linkage between the citizens and political officials.

A second hypothesis suggests that the content of legislative agendas *lags* lobbying activity. There are a variety of different perspectives on the politics of interest representation that might be consistent with such a sequence. Traditional critics of interest group pluralism (Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman 1984) imply that presence in the lobbying community insures success in both defining legislative agendas and the actions taken upon their items. Critics of the campaign finance system in the U.S. often assert that interest organizations buy legislation (Drew 1999; West 2000). Similarly, Stigler (1971) and Peltzman's (1976)

economic model of organized interests, like that of Olson (1982), implies that organizations approach legislators with demands for protection from market competition and that they are nearly always successful. All of these models suggest that agendas change following the mobilization of organizations for political activity. Unfortunately, all are somewhat weak in empirically relating activity and agendas. Schattschneider and Schlozman do not analyze policy agendas; focusing only on lobbying presence, they simply assume that presence implies influence. Stigler and Peltzman's work are formal models with no empirical content, and much the same can be said about Olson (1982). And despite findings that U.S. campaign contributions and lobbying are closely related (Ansolobehere, Snyder, Tripathi. 2000), the precise causal link between campaign contributions and policy agendas remains highly contested (Wright 1996). Even more problematic in terms of our data, it is not at all clear that organized interests have the means to purchase policy in the European Union. The critical currency in these analyses of the American cases is comprised of campaign contributions, something that organized interests obviously have little access to in Brussels.

But even models that are less critical of organized interests and less dependent on campaign finance as an instrument of influence often opt for a sequence suggesting that organizations precede agendas. Especially important here is Baumgartner and Jones' (1993) punctuated equilibrium model of the policy process. In their view, legislative agendas are quite sticky, changing only periodically as the prior policy regime becomes incapable of addressing new issues. But interest organizations play a significant role in bringing about these changes, raising new issues and new perspectives on old issues. As Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 190) note, "The mobilization of interests changes over time, and with these changes come differences in the likelihood of certain issues to hit the public agenda." Nownes' (2003) time series analysis of the mobilization of gay and lesbian organizations reaches a similar conclusion. While some initial possibility of success is necessary for the

first organizations in a policy area to mobilize, growth of imitators and competitors follows swiftly, which only then leads to more frequent success in first securing space on policy agendas and then winning policy victories. Similarly, Brasher, Lowery, and Gray's (1999) time series analysis of the boom and bust cycle of mobilization in the Florida interest system found that a huge build-up of its interest community occurred over the decade of the 1980s *prior* to resolution of a long-standing fiscal crisis. These studies have offered important insights about long-term changes in interest systems. Still, they examine what are almost by definition exceptional cases – the emergence of new issues and/or significant changes in the composition of interest communities. It is less clear whether the population dynamics of most interest organization guilds and the kinds of lobbying activity that comprise politics as usual typically follow this pattern. This is especially so because recent research shows that there are marked differences between cases where organized interests lobby to change policy and where they seek to maintain the status quo policy (Baumgartner et al. 2009).

Our third hypothesis suggests that legislative agendas *lead* change in the composition of interest communities. While not a common view within political science or in European analyses of organized interests, this hypothesis lies at the heart of one of the major competitors to the Stigler-Peltzman-Olson model within economics (Mitchell and Munger 1991). The lagging model switches the direction of corruption, with politicians extorting campaign funds from economic sectors by introducing bills that compel them to organize for political activity so as to pay protection money (Mueller and Murrell 1990; Coughlin, Mueller, and Murrell 1990; Shugart and Tollison 1986). That is, politicians introduce bills to expropriate rents or to encourage bureaucratic agencies to propose new regulations that have the same effect. The resulting rush to the capitol constitutes an auction that “provides valuable information whether regulator action or inaction will be more lucrative to politicians themselves; it helps to identify the likely payers and to set the amounts of compensation to be

paid” (McChesney 1997, 36). Over time, politicians learn who the most lucrative extortion targets are and maintain a steady stream of proposed legislation to insure that funds continue to flow. In this model, agendas arise neither from the demands of interest organizations nor disturbances in society. Rather, they arise from the need of legislators to raise campaign cash or some equivalent resource that they value. Thus, legislative agendas are constructed prior to lobbying activity, with the latter responding to the former.

Though from a fundamentally different point of view, neocorporatist and institution-oriented scholars would expect a similar time-order. In such a view, interest organizations enter into a relatively long-lasting exchange relationship with policy makers. Indeed, over time, organized interests may develop very close ties with state actors. In the words of Streeck and Kenworthy (2005, 452), the former “may turn into extended arms of government.” Such ties are especially likely to develop when governments provide subsidies or give interest organizations a formal role in policy implementation. Although such ties may become so close as to render the occurrence of legislation and lobbying so proximate as to be contemporaneous, we think it more likely in such cases that organized interests typically react to, and thus lag, legislative activity. In the EU case, it has been argued that political actors create – through, among other incentives, subsidies – the very interest community that is affected by the legislation (Greenwood, 2007; Sanchez-Salgado, 2007). Before legislation on subsidies is adopted, there is simply no organized interest present to lobby.

Although there have been a few indirect tests cited in support of its core propositions (Beck, Hoskin, and Connelly 1992; McChesney 1997, 83-85), the underlying assumptions of the lag model have rarely been examined empirically. In one exception, Lowery, Gray, and Fellowes (2005) found that the size and breadth of U.S. state legislative agendas are only weakly or even inversely related to a number of variables that would seem to address directly the incentives of legislators to raise campaign cash – the costs of state legislative electoral

campaigns, the extent to which they are publicly financed, and the presence of contribution limits. More broadly, it seems unlikely that the hard extortion version of this view can provide a general explanation of the structure of interest communities. Even in the United States, most organized interests do not contribute campaign funds, the purported reason for their existence from the legislator's perspective. And when we turn to European cases, this currency of extortion is missing entirely, and there is no obvious alternative currency that might provide the kind of powerful incentive to fuel this kind of coercive relationship. Nor do most interest organizations in Europe receive some form of subsidy.

Still, there are other reasons to expect that the relationship between lobbying and legislative activity might be a leading one. That is, the pluralist model suggests that organized interests respond to disturbances (Truman 1951). But not all disturbances are limited to exogenous events occurring in society. Rather, government activity itself constitutes a powerful disturbance to which organized interests might well respond. And indeed, studies of this "demand" function of lobbying in the U.S. and the European Union have often found that greater government attention to policy issues powerfully draws organized interests into lobbying activity (Leech, Baumgartner, La Pira, and Semanko. 2005; Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and Anderson 2005; Messer, Berkhout, and Lowery 2011). However, such findings are largely based on very lumpy temporal observations and/or cross-sectional observations across the American states or the European Union. A more precise level of measurement is needed. But such more precise observations might be especially expected to uncover such a lagging demand response in the case of the European Union. That is, given the very powerful policy role of the European Commission, we might well expect organized interests to rush to the European Parliament as an appeals court, thereby seeking redress to the policy disturbances inherent in Commission policy proposals.

Finally, we must consider a number of practical limitations that together comprise

something of a second null hypothesis – in this case, an *observational* null hypothesis. That is, the activities around which organized interests mobilize are not all of a single kind. These differences might make it difficult to observe a simple pattern of contemporaneous, lagging, or leading relationship. First, not all issues attract the same level of activity on the part of organized interests. Some issues attract the attention of only one or a few organized interests, others pit small groups of interests against each other (e.g., air and rail transport), and still others generate titanic battles between armies of lobbyists representing, for example, consumer and producer interests (Smith 2000). A leading function might be far more plausible for the first, where a specific interest is seeking a change in policy, and less so for the last, where organized interests are drawn to the sound of an on-going battle. Second, different kinds of interests might respond to a given policy proposal at different times. Thus, one set of interests (e.g., rail transport interests) might promote policy changes advantageous to them, thereby leading policy activity. Their success might well generate a lagging response by other interests (e.g., air transport interests) if the very success of the first set of interests constitutes a disturbance to the second's vital interests. While evidence of such counter-mobilization is limited (Gray, Lowery, Wolak, Godwin, and Kilburn 2005), it remains an attractive hypothesis in the literature. In either case, we might see lagging, leading, and perhaps even contemporaneous responses simultaneously.

A final complication in this regard concerns the kinds of interest organizations that are either responding to or generating policy activity. That is, while all of the models we have examined here tend to treat all organized interests as if they were the same, there are marked differences in their levels of policy involvement. While observations of populations of interests in the U.S. and the European Union have found them to be highly volatile with considerable churning within interest communities, a few interests are nearly permanent members and most but temporary residents there for a short time (Anderson, Newmark, Gray,

and Lowery 2004; Berkhout and Lowery 2011). The former, the old bulls among lobbying organizations, are often advocacy groups whose main purpose is lobbying to promote or impede lobbying change. The latter – the mayflies of the lobbying community – are often interests whose main functions are not advocacy per se (e.g., producing tires). They appear only as policy impinges on their primary interests (Gray and Lowery 1995). It would seem likely that the old bulls might well be more likely to engage in leading policy change while the latter are more responsive, and thus lag, proposals for policy change.

Testing the Competing Expectations

Data

In order to test the arguments outlined above, we combine two unique sources of information directly relevant to the puzzle we have identified – data on the interest group registration at the EP and data on the legislative activity of the EU from EURLEX. In the following section, we briefly describe these two data sources.

The European Parliament maintains a door pass system for lobbyists. Everyone entering the Parliament's premises as a lobbyist is expected to register on this list (EP, 2003-ongoing). This registration list is available online and reports personal names and organizational affiliation. If not renewed, the accreditation expires after one year. The door pass requirement has been part of the Rules and Procedures of the European Parliament since 1996. For a more elaborate discussion of the register in relation to other registers and its history, see Chabanet (2006: 10, 21), Balme and Chabanet (2009: 208-234), and Berkhout and Lowery (2008, 2011). While limited in many respects, the door pass data have a number of advantages for our purpose in comparison to other directories (CONECCES, Public Affairs Directory). First, as said, the register is relatively time sensitive. Second, the door pass system poses a low entry barrier as various types of organizations may register. . At the same time, there still is a certain threshold that must be passed for registration; contrary, for

instance, to the EC directory of interest representatives, one cannot register online and a registrant needs to provide personal and organizational information. This is good and representative data source for the purpose of our study both because the door passes are important, indeed necessary, to lobbyists in conducting their influence activities and because the list is well administered by the Parliament.

We use more or less bi-monthly copies of the register for the time period 2007-2009. These copies have been merged into a single database listing all 6033 unique organizations registered at any moment in time between 2007 and 2009. Organizations have been identified on the basis of the exact spelling of their names in the register. This probably still leaves some duplicates. For instance, ABN AMRO may have been registered between 2007 and 2008 as ABN AMRO and then reappear under the title of ABN AMRO Liaison Office in 2008. Other duplicates may have arisen from different languages used; that is, organizations sometimes appear under both their French and English names. While student coders removed one listing of such duplicate organizations when recognized in their own portion of the sample, duplications across coders may remain. While such duplication error is largely random, it may be that this slightly biases our sample towards, for instance, “tourists” or “mayflies” in the lobbying system when spelling differences arise from re-registration of national associations when these may often use multiple working languages. However, we do not have any theoretical expectations to think that these types of organizations are more or less likely to lag, lead or be contemporaneous to legislation and they should consequently not affect our substantive results.

A random sample of 1300 organizations was drawn from the list described above. The sampling was done after their merger into a single list. This means that organizations that are present throughout the time period studied have the same chance to be in the sample as those that were present for only a very short period of time. On the aggregate, however, this

produces a sample that is not representative of the lobby *activity* over the full time period because organizations that have been present for four years are likely to have developed more activities than organizations that were present for only a couple of months. However, we are interested in changes in the interest community in terms of or in association with the policies lobbied. Still, if anything, this bias towards ‘tourists’ in the system (and an overestimation of system volatility) should make it more likely to find a relationship between interest community changes and legislative activity.

Four student coders visited the websites for each organization and recorded the kind of interest each group represents (business, public, societal, or cross-sectoral) as well as the specific policy areas that each group/organization lists as its policy priorities (see below for a description of the categories used). Intercoder reliability for the placing of groups into policy areas was moderate (0.60 for Cohen’s Alpha). The presence or absence of a group on different copies of the registry enabled us to track the coming and going of each group, and hence the number of groups present in each policy area for a given period. Because the register was copied frequently, but not always after the same length of time elapsed, we aggregated the series upward to quarters. Hence from the beginning of 2007 to the end of 2009, we have interest organization counts for twelve periods for each policy area.

The data used to track the legislative output of the EU is derived from the EURLEX (former CELEX) database /<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm/>. First, we extracted the information on all legal acts (directives, regulations, and decisions) for the period 2005-2009. Relying in the search functions of EURLEX does not produce precise information (for example, one gets numerous corrigenda of legal acts listed separately in the list of results). In responding to this potential problem, we used automated data extraction to obtain data at the lowest possible level of aggregation (legal act) and performed all further manipulations and categorizations using this legal act-level data.

In order to categorize the EU legislative output, we used the classification heading provided by EURLEX. The classification headings provide a hierarchically-structured scheme. That is, each legal act was put into several (up to three) categories. The main list consists of 13 categories, and under each of the general categories there are additional subheadings. Annex I shows how we mapped our policy domains to the existing categories of the EURLEX classification system.

Method of analysis

We examine the relationships between interest organizations and legislative production using a series of vector autoregression (VAR) models (Brandt and Williams 2007). In VAR modeling, each potentially endogenous variable is regressed on lagged values of other endogenous variables and lagged values of itself (and any exogenous variables) using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. The significance of individual coefficients (for each lag) is less important than the joint significance of the set of lags for each variable (assessed using a conventional F-test): if the lags of one variable together improve the fit of the model of the dependent variable over the lags of that dependent variable alone, then we say that that variable “Granger causes” the dependent variable (Granger 1969). By estimating a model as a set of equations for each potentially endogenous variable, causality between endogenous variables can be assessed in both directions. We estimate a simple VAR model for each policy area, with only the number of interest organizations (excluding public organizations) and the total legislative output as endogenous variables with no exogenous variables.¹ The number of lags included was dictated by circumstances: although the performance of VAR modeling improves when a sufficient number of lags can be included to account for all dynamics, with such a short time series we chose to include only two lags.²

¹ The legislative output time series shows no signs of auto-correlation. The time series of the number of interest organizations appears to be first-order auto-correlated according to the examination of the auto-correlation and the partial auto-correlation functions.

² The results changed little when one, two, or three lags were included.

Findings

Table 1 presents the results of the models for the specific policy areas. Among sixty-four policy areas, significant results (indicating Granger causality in one direction) are present for only nine, but even these should be viewed skeptically as some significant results should be expected due to chance alone. Histograms display the relative frequency of the different p-values observed for each direction in Figure 1. Changes in legislative output lead to changes in the number of interest organization registrations in the general energy and nuclear energy policy areas, two areas in which both business and advocacy groups should lag and lead, respectively, legislation (thus generating ambiguous expectations). Evidence for the opposite relationship – legislative output lagging the registration of organized interests – exists in three agricultural areas (eggs, fruit and vegetables, and sugar), general energy, “other” services, textiles, justice and human rights, and general transport. While the significance of justice and human rights in this direction seems to support the notion that, in policy areas dominated by advocacy groups, interest organization should lead legislative output, contrary findings exist for areas dominated by business interests (transport, services, and textiles).

The story becomes even more complicated when the signs of these effects are considered. Thus in the case of the sub-policy-fields “Agriculture: Eggs” and “Agriculture: sugar,” the biggest cross-correlation between interest groups and legislation is found for lag 1 and is negative (the correlation is maximized for interest organizations at time zero and legislation from time -1). Hence, although interest organization registrations seem to lead legislation in these cases, their registration is associated with a decrease in legislative output. The same negative relationship is observed for fruit and vegetables and justice and home affairs. On the other hand, a positive relationship between from interest organization registrations to legislation is found in the general transport category.

Table 2 reports the results for the models using the aggregated policy areas, while

Figure 2 shows in histograms the p-values obtained. Using this categorization, only the internal market policy area shows significant results, with legislation leading interest groups. Business interests dominate this area. But in this case, the contemporaneous correlation is largest (but positive, indicating that increased numbers of interest organization registrations are associated with increased legislative output, during the same period). In general, however, we see no relationship over time in lobbying registrations and legislative activity in most policy areas.

Similar results were obtained with various other model specifications we examined. In addition to adjusting the lag length, both legislative output and interest organization registration numbers were operationalized differently in several of these alternative specifications. Legislative output was examined using only Directives, only Regulations, and only legislation on which the European Parliament played a role. The total number of interest organizations was replaced with the number of business organizations and advocacy organizations, respectively. Some policy areas gained or lost significance, but no major changes in the general pattern of mixed – and mostly null – results were observed.

Conclusion

Such largely null results must be considered from a number of perspectives. First, from an empirical standpoint, the analysis can be improved in several ways. First, a longer time series (as it becomes available) might enable us to better account in terms of statistical power for the dynamics in the relationships between legislation and interest organization mobilization. And it could be argued that the two-year period observed here might be too short to observe the interplay between these two series across a full policy cycle, from the earliest informal proposal stage to the final adoption. Moreover, the availability of more data points would enable us to include more lags in the VAR models without compromising their reliability. Second, the categorization of legislation based on EURLEX codes may exclude

key legislation directly affecting interests in a given policy area, while including legislation that is of peripheral importance to those interest organizations. Interest organizations lobby specific pieces of legislation, not policy areas as a whole. Thus, we would not argue that our analysis necessarily offers the final word on these relationships.

Still, we are not persuaded that our null and mixed findings can be fully explained by these data limitations. In regard to the first set of issues, especially, the data were very well suited to the theoretical question at hand. Indeed, the key problem with the few prior studies of the temporal relationship between legislative and lobbying activity has been the lack of shorter-term observations of their co-variation, not a lack of data on longer-term co-variation. And the length of the time series in terms of lags and leads encompasses well the time period in which most legislation is considered. And even greater specificity of linking lobbying and legislation would seem unlikely to dramatically alter our findings given the essentially null results for both our specific and general policy results.

Instead, we think that we need to give greater attention to the observational null hypothesis introduced earlier in our discussion of the competing theoretical expectations about the temporal relationship between legislation and lobbying. The several theoretical perspectives we noted – highlight lagging, leading, and contemporaneous effects – are essentially caricatures that are typically drawn from studies of specific, often extremely controversial or prominent (changes in) legislation or specific interest organizations that are, again, often atypical in the sense of a prior reputation for influence that may largely be related to maintaining status-quo policies and legislation. More often than not, scholars extract lessons from these atypical cases that they then apply to interest organizations as a whole, suggesting that all interest organizations operate in an environment in which, alternatively, they or government policymakers dominate the process. The truth is likely to be much more complex. Interest organizations sometimes lag, sometimes lead, and sometimes

contemporaneously engage the public policy process. Given this mix of modes of engagement, null results would be expected and none of the caricatures would be expected to provide a sufficient account of the complexities of the policy process insofar as it involves the activities of wide range of quite different kinds of interest organizations, a wide range of different kinds of policy proposals, and a wide range of governmental actors.

So, while more complete data and more thorough data analysis might well be called for, it may be even more important that we step back to address the rather thin – and at the same time overly broad – theoretical expectations provided by the caricatures now available in the literature on interest representation. That is, we need to step back and consider in a much more precise manner when and how organized interests become engaged in the policy process. This will necessarily entail considering how interest organizations differ among themselves, when and how they react to each other, and when and how different kinds of policy legislation engage the activities interest organizations. Given the null results presented here, such more complex theoretical expectations are needed to drive further empirical analysis beyond merely looking for more detailed and dynamic central tendencies in the timing of legislative and lobbying activity. Does time matter? Almost certainly. But it is likely to matter in several different ways for different policies and different interest organizations. At a minimum, our null results suggest that a single, simple pattern of temporal relationship is unlikely to be sufficient or satisfying.


Table 1. Results from Granger causality tests I: Sub-policy fields. The numbers reported are the p-values from the F-tests of the OLS estimations. The time period covered is from the first quarter of 2007 until the last quarter of 2009 (12 observations). Two lags have been included. For the scope of the sub-policy fields, see Annex I. The signs in the brackets indicate the signs of the OLS coefficients for the two lags of Legislation in the equation for Interest Groups (second column) and the two lags of Interest Groups in the equation for Legislation (third column).

Policy sub-field	Legislation to Interest Groups	Interest Groups to Legislation
agriculture animals	0,37 (+/-)	0,38 (+/-)
agriculture cereal	0,14 (-)	0,25 (-)
agriculture eggs	0,31(-)	0,01(+/-)
agriculture feeding staff	0,87 (-)	0,83(+/-)
agriculture fisheries	0,36 (+/-)	0,52 (-)
agriculture fruit vegetables	0,95 (+/-)	0,01 (-)
agriculture hops	0,59 (+/-)	0,49 (-)
agriculture milk	0,22 (+)	0,96 (+/-)
agriculture oils	0,88 (+)	0,84 (-)
agriculture other	0,56 (+/-)	0,45 (-)
agriculture plants flow	0,44 (+/-)	0,65 (+/-)
agriculture rice	0,09 (+)	0,07 (+/-)
agriculture seeds	0,68 (-)	0,52 (+/-)
agriculture sugar	0,26 (-)	0 (-)
agriculture tobacco	0,38 (-)	0,61 (+)
agriculture wine	0,4 (+)	0,08 (+/-)
animal protection	NA	NA
consumer protection	0,98 (+)	0,2 (+/-)
development	0,46 (+)	0,94 (+/-)
economic policy general	0,6 (+/-)	0,49 (+/-)
economic policy law	0,4 (+)	0,36 (+/-)
economic policy monetary	0,8 (-)	0,93 (+/-)
economic policy taxation	0,98 (-)	0,86 (-)
energy general	0 (-)	0,05 (+)
energy coal etc	NA	NA
energy nuclear	0,03 (+/-)	0,1 (+/-)
energy oil gas	0,68 (+)	0,28 (+)
energy other	NA	NA
environment general	0,83 (+)	0,72 (+)
environment nature	0,48 (+)	0,61 (-)
environment pollution	0,64 (+)	0,79 (+/-)
foreign policy	0,97 (+)	0,98 (-)
health	0,15 (+)	0,63 (+/-)
industry real-estate	NA	NA

industry insurance	0,15 (+)	0,55 (+)
industry aero	NA	NA
industry agricultural vehicles	0,27 (+)	0,25 (+/-)
industry banking sec	0,53 (+)	0,55 (+/-)
industry cars	0,62 (-)	0,26 (+)
industry cosmetics	0,31 (+/-)	0,06 (+/-)
industry foodstuffs	0,23 (+)	0,26 (+/-)
industry general	0,12 (+/-)	0,3 (-)
industry medic	0,07 (+)	(+/-)
industry other goods	0,5 (+)	0,96 (-)
industry other services	0,26 (+/-)	0,03 (-)
industry ships	NA	NA
industry telecom	0,84 (+/-)	0,26 (+/-)
industry textiles	0,7 (+/-)	0 (+)
industry other	0,42 (+/-)	0,23 (+)
justice and human rights	0,12 (+/-)	0,03 (+)
industry iron	0,67 (-)	0,07 (-)
regional development	0,41 (+)	0,12 (-)
science, culture & edu: culture	0,95 (+/-)	0,18 (-)
science, culture & edu: edu	0,83 (+)	0,32 (-)
science, culture & edu: general	0,75 (-)	0,54 (-)
science, culture & edu: science	0,17 (-)	0,14 (+)
social policy	0,66 (+)	0,26 (-)
trade external	0,93 (-)	0,06 (+)
trade internal	0,73 (+)	0,89 (-)
transport maritime	0,35 (+)	0,43 (-)
transport air	0,43 (+/-)	0,45 (+/-)
transport general	0,42 (+/-)	0 (-)
transport land	0,92 (-)	0,19 (+/-)

Figure 1 Histogram and density of the p-values from the Granger causality tests (63 policy sub-fields).

A. Legislation to Interest Groups



B. Interest Groups to Legislation





Table 2. Results from Granger causality tests II: General policy fields. The numbers reported are the p-values from the F-tests of the OLS estimations. The time period covered is from the first quarter of 2007 until the last quarter of 2009 (12 observations). Two lags have been included. For the scope of the general policy fields, see Annex I. The signs in the brackets indicate the signs of the OLS coefficients for the two lags of Legislation in the equation for Interest Groups (second column) and the two lags of Interest Groups in the equation for Legislation (third column).


Policy field	Legislation to Interest Groups	Interest Groups to Legislation
agriculture	0,17 (+)	0,31 (+/-)
CFSP	0,97 (+)	0,98 (-)
competition	0,13 (+/-)	0,74 (-)
energy	0,16 (+/-)	0,33 (+)
environment	0,95 (-)	0,24 (+/-)
external	0,99 (+/-)	0,64 (+)
fisheries	0,36 (+/-)	0,52 (-)
internal market	0,03 (+)	0,35 (+/-)
justice	0,88 (+/-)	0,98 (-)
monetary	0,8 (-)	0,93 (+/-)
regional	0,41 (+)	0,12 (-)
science, culture and education	0,77 (+)	0,62 (-)
social policy	0,72 (+/-)	0,38 (-)
taxation	0,52 (+/-)	0,29 (+/-)
transport	0,15 (+)	0,71 (+/-)

Figure 2 Histogram and density of the p-values from the Granger causality tests (15 general policy fields).

A. Legislation to Interest Groups



B. Interest Groups to Legislation



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Annex I. List of policy areas and the corresponding EURLEX classificaton codes

Detailed category	General category	EURLEX category
Agriculture: animal protection	Environment	15.40. Protection of animals
Agriculture: animals	Agriculture	03.50.30. Animal health and zootechnics
	Agriculture	03.60.52. Pigmear
	Agriculture	03.60.57. Beef and veal
	Agriculture	03.60.68. Sheepmeat and goatmeat
Agriculture: cereals	Agriculture	03.60.51. Cereals
Agriculture: eggs	Agriculture	03.60.53. Eggs and poultry
Agriculture: feedingstuff	Agriculture	03.50.10. Animal feedingstuffs
	Agriculture	03.60.62. Dried fodder
Agriculture: fisheries	Fisheries	04.05. General, supply and research
	Fisheries	04.07. Statistics
	Fisheries	04.10.10. Structural measures
	Fisheries	04.10.20. Market organisation
	Fisheries	04.10.30. Conservation of resources
	Fisheries	04.10.30.10. Catch quotas and management of stocks
	Fisheries	04.10.30.20. Other conservation measures
	Fisheries	04.10.40. State aids
	Fisheries	04.20. External relations
	Fisheries	04.20.10. Multilateral relations
	Fisheries	04.20.20. Agreements with non-member countries
	Agriculture: fruit and vegetables	Agriculture
Agriculture		03.60.63. Products processed from fruit and vegetables
Agriculture: general	NA	02.50. Mutual assistance
	NA	02.50.10. In the application of customs or agricultural rules
	NA	02.50.20. For the recovery of claims in customs or agriculture
	Agriculture	03.05. General
	Agriculture	03.07. Statistics
	Agriculture	03.10. Basic provisions
	Agriculture	03.10.10. National aid
	Agriculture	03.10.20. Common agricultural policy mechanisms
	Agriculture	03.10.30. Accessions
	Agriculture	03.20. European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF)
	Agriculture	03.20.10. General
	Agriculture	03.20.20. EAGGF (Guidance Section)
	Agriculture	03.20.30. EAGGF (Guarantee Section)
	Agriculture	03.30. Agricultural structures
	Agriculture	03.30.10. Social and structural measures
	Agriculture	03.30.20. Processing and marketing of agricultural products
	Agriculture	03.30.30. Accountancy data network
	Agriculture	03.30.40. Agricultural statistics
	Agriculture	03.30.50. Agricultural research
	Agriculture	03.30.60. Forests and forestry
	Agriculture	03.40. Monetary measures
Agriculture	03.40.10. Fixing of compensatory amounts	

	Agriculture	03.40.20. Other monetary measures
	Agriculture	03.50. Approximation of laws and health measures
	Agriculture	03.60. Products subject to market organisation
	Agriculture	03.60.05. Arrangements covering more than one market organisation
	Agriculture	03.80. Agreements with non-member countries
	Agriculture	06.20.10.10. Agriculture
Agriculture: hops	Agriculture	03.60.66. Hops
Agriculture: milk	Agriculture	03.60.56. Milk products
Agriculture: oils and fats	Agriculture	03.60.59. Oils and fats
Agriculture: other	Agriculture	03.60.69. Other agricultural products
	Agriculture	03.70. Products not subject to market organisation
	Agriculture	03.70.10. Silkworms
	Agriculture	03.70.20. Isoglucose
	Agriculture	03.70.30. Peas and beans
	Agriculture	03.70.40. Albumens
	Agriculture	03.70.50. Non-Annex II products (now Non-Annex I products)
	Agriculture	03.70.60. Cotton
	Agriculture	03.70.70. Other agricultural products
Agriculture: plants	Agriculture	03.50.20. Plant health
	Agriculture	03.60.61. Flowers and live plants
Agriculture: rice	Agriculture	03.60.58. Rice
Agriculture: seeds	Agriculture	03.50.40. Seeds and seedlings
	Agriculture	03.60.67. Seeds
Agriculture: sugar	Agriculture	03.60.60. Sugar
Agriculture: tobacco	Agriculture	03.60.64. Raw tobacco
	Agriculture	03.60.65. Flax and hemp
Agriculture: wine	Agriculture	03.60.55. Wine
Competition policy	Competition	08.10. Competition principles
	Competition	08.20. Restrictive practices
	Competition	08.20.10. Prohibited agreements
	Competition	08.20.20. Authorised agreements, exemptions and negative clearances
	Competition	08.20.30. Supervision procedures
	Competition	08.30. Dominant positions
	Competition	08.40. Concentrations
	Competition	08.50. Application of the rules of competition to public undertakings
	Competition	08.60. State aids and other subsidies
	Competition	08.70. Intra-Community dumping practices
	Competition	08.80. Obligations of undertakings
	Competition	08.90. National trading monopolies
Consumer protection	Environment	15.20. Consumers
	Environment	15.20.10. General
	Environment	15.20.20. Consumer information, education and representation
	Environment	15.20.30. Protection of health and safety
	Environment	15.20.40. Protection of economic interests
Economic policy: general	NA	06. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
	NA	06.07. Statistics
	NA	06.10. Principles and conditions
	NA	06.20. Sectoral application
	NA	06.20.10. Production and processing activities

	NA	06.20.30. Business activities
	NA	06.20.40. Self-employed activities
	NA	06.20.50. Medical and paramedical activities
	NA	06.20.60. Other activities
	NA	06.30. Public contracts
	NA	06.30.10. General
	NA	06.30.20. Public works contracts
	NA	06.30.30. Public supply contracts
	NA	06.30.40. Public services contracts
	NA	06.30.50. Other public contracts
Economic policy: law	NA	17. Law relating to undertakings
	NA	17.01. General
	NA	17.10. Company law
	NA	17.20. Intellectual property law
	NA	17.30. Economic and commercial law
	NA	17.30.10. Business procedures
	NA	17.30.20. Other economic and commercial provisions
Economic policy: monetary	EMU	10. Economic and monetary policy and free movement of capital
	EMU	10.07. Statistics
	EMU	10.10. General
	EMU	10.20. Monetary policy
	EMU	10.20.10. Institutional monetary provisions
	EMU	10.20.20. Direct instruments of monetary policy
	EMU	10.20.30. Indirect instruments of monetary policy
	EMU	10.30. Economic policy
	EMU	10.30.10. Institutional economic provisions
	EMU	10.30.20. Instruments of economic policy
	EMU	10.30.30. Economic and monetary union
	EMU	10.40. Free movement of capital
Education, science and culture: culture	Education, science and culture	16.40. Culture
Education, science and culture: education	Education, science and culture	16.30. Education and training
Education, science and culture: general	Education, science and culture	16.20. Dissemination of information
	Education, science and culture	16. Science, information, education and culture
	Education, science and culture	16.01. General
	Education, science and culture	16.07. Statistics
Education, science and culture: science	Education, science and culture	16.10. Science
	Education, science and culture	16.10.10. General principles
	Education, science and culture	16.10.20. Research sectors
Energy: coal	Energy	12.20. Coal
	Energy	12.20.10. Promotion of the coal industry
	Energy	12.20.20. Competition: rates and other conditions of sale
	Energy	12.20.30. Coal products
	Energy	12.20.40. Other measures relating to coal
Energy: general	Energy	12. Energy
	Energy	12.07. Statistics

	Energy	12.10. General principles and programmes
	Energy	12.10.10. General
	Energy	12.10.20. Rational utilisation and conservation of energy
	Energy	12.30. Electricity
Energy: nuclear	Energy	12.40. Nuclear energy
	Energy	12.40.10. Fuel supplies
	Energy	12.40.20. Power stations and joint undertakings
	Energy	12.40.30. Safeguards
	Energy	12.40.40. Nuclear research
	Energy	12.40.50. Other measures relating to nuclear energy
Energy: oil and gas	Energy	12.50. Oil and gas
	Energy	12.50.10. Supplies and stocks
	Energy	12.50.20. Intra-Community trade
	Energy	12.50.30. Other measures relating to oil or gas
Energy: other	Energy	12.60. Other sources of energy
Environment: general	Environment	15. Environment, consumers and health protection
	Environment	15.07. Statistics
	Environment	15.10. Environment
	Environment	15.10.10. General provisions and programmes
	Environment	15.10.40. International cooperation
Environment: nature	Environment	15.10.30. Space, environment and natural resources
	Environment	15.10.30.10. Management and efficient use of space,
	Environment	15.10.30.20. Conservation of wild fauna and flora
	Environment	15.10.30.30. Waste management and clean technology
Environment: pollution	Environment	15.10.20. Pollution and nuisances
	Environment	15.10.20.10. Nuclear safety and radioactive waste
	Environment	15.10.20.20. Water protection and management
	Environment	15.10.20.30. Monitoring of atmospheric pollution
	Environment	15.10.20.40. Prevention of noise pollution
	Environment	15.10.20.50. Chemicals, industrial risk and biotechnology
External relations: CFSP	CFSP	18. Common Foreign and Security Policy
External relations: development	External relations	11.70. Development policy
	External relations	11.70.10. General
	External relations	11.70.20. Aid to developing countries
	External relations	11.70.20.10. Food aid
	External relations	11.70.20.20. European Development Fund (EDF)
	External relations	11.70.20.30. Aid to Latin American and Asian countries
	External relations	11.70.30. Generalised system of preferences
	External relations	11.70.40. Associations
	External relations	11.70.40.10. Overseas countries and territories (PTOM)
	External relations	11.70.40.20. African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States
External relations: economic	External relations	11.30. Multilateral relations
	External relations	11.40. Bilateral agreements with non-member countries
	External relations	11.50. Action in favour of countries in transition
	External relations	11.60. Commercial policy
External relations: general	External relations	11. External relations
	External relations	11.10. General

	External relations	11.20. European political cooperation
Health	Environment	15.30. Health protection
Industry: aeronautical	Internal market	13.20.30. Aeronautical industry
Industry: agricultural vehicles	Internal market	13.30.11. Agricultural and forestry tractors
Industry: banking and securities	NA	06.20.20.20. Banks 06.20.20.25. Stock exchanges and other securities markets
	NA	
Industry: vehicles	Internal market	13.30.10. Motor vehicles
Industry: chemical	Internal market	13.30.19. Fertilisers
Industry: cosmetics	Internal market	13.30.16. Cosmetics
Industry: foodstuffs	Internal market	13.30.14. Foodstuffs
	Internal market	13.30.14.10. Colouring matters
	Internal market	13.30.14.20. Preservatives
	Internal market	13.30.14.30. Other provisions
Industry: general	Internal market	13.40. Internal market: policy relating to undertakings
	Internal market	13.50. Miscellaneous
	Internal market	13. Industrial policy and internal market
	Internal market	13.10. Industrial policy: general, programmes, statistics and research
	Internal market	13.10.10. General
	Internal market	13.10.20. Programmes and statistics
	Internal market	13.10.30. Research and technological development
	Internal market	13.10.30.10. General principles
	Internal market	13.10.30.20. Research sectors
	Internal market	13.20. Industrial policy: sectoral operations
	Internal market	13.30. Internal market: approximation of laws
	Internal market	13.30.05. General, programmes
	Internal market	13.40. Internal market: policy relating to undertakings
	NA	06.20.10.20. Other production and processing activities (225)
	Internal market	13.50. Miscellaneous
Industry: insurance	NA	06.20.20.10. Insurance
Industry: iron and steel	Internal market	13.20.10. Iron and steel industry
	Internal market	13.20.10.10. Competition: prices and other conditions of sale
	Internal market	13.20.10.20. Other measures relating to iron and steel
Industry: medicinal products	Internal market	13.30.15. Proprietary medicinal products
Industry: other goods	Internal market	13.20.70. Other industrial sectors
	Internal market	13.30.12. Metrology
	Internal market	13.30.13. Electrical material
	Internal market	13.30.18. Dangerous substances
Industry: other services	NA	06.20.20. Service activities
	NA	06.20.20.60. Personnel services
	NA	06.20.20.70. Services provided to undertaking
	NA	06.20.20.80. Other service activities
Industry: real estate	NA	06.20.20.40. Real property
Industry: shipbuilding	Internal market	13.20.20. Shipbuilding
		13.20.60. Information technology, telecommunications\
Industry: telecom	Internal market	
Industry: textiles	Internal market	13.20.40. Textiles
	Internal market	13.20.50. Leather, hides, skins and footwear

	Internal market	13.30.17. Textiles
Industry: tourism	NA	06.20.20.50. Leisure services
Justice and human rights	Social policy	05.20.05.10. Anti-discrimination
	Social policy	05.20.05.20. Gender equality
	Justice	19. Area of freedom, security and justice
	Justice	19.01. General
	Justice	19.10. Free movement of persons
	Justice	19.10.10. Elimination of internal border controls
	Justice	19.10.20. Crossing external borders
	Justice	19.10.30. Asylum policy
	Justice	19.10.30.10. Right to asylum
	Justice	19.10.30.20. Right of refugees and displaced persons
	Justice	19.10.40. Immigration and the right of nationals of third countries
	Justice	19.20. Judicial cooperation in civil matters
	Justice	19.30. Police and judicial cooperation in criminal and customs matters
	Justice	19.30.10. Police cooperation
	Justice	19.30.20. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters
	Justice	19.30.30. Customs cooperation
	Justice	19.40. Programmes
	Justice	19.50. External relations
Regional development	Regional development	14. Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
Social policy	Social policy	05. Freedom of movement for workers and social policy
	Social policy	05.07. Statistics
	Social policy	05.10. Freedom of movement for workers
	Social policy	05.20. Social policy
	Social policy	05.20.05. General social provisions
	Social policy	05.20.10. European Social Fund (ESF)
	Social policy	05.20.10.10. Organisation and reform of the ESF
	Social policy	05.20.10.20. Administrative and financial procedures of the ESF
	Social policy	05.20.10.30. Operations of the ESF
	Social policy	05.20.20. Working conditions
	Social policy	05.20.20.10. Safety at work
	Social policy	05.20.20.20. Wages, income and working hours
	Social policy	05.20.20.30. Industrial relations
	Social policy	05.20.30. Employment and unemployment
	Social policy	05.20.30.10. Programmes and statistics
	Social policy	05.20.30.20. Protection of workers
	Social policy	05.20.30.30. Employment incentives
	Social policy	05.20.40. Social security
	Social policy	05.20.40.10. Principles of social security
	Social policy	05.20.40.20. Application to migrant workers
	Social policy	05.20.50. Approximation of certain social provisions
Taxation	Taxation	09. Taxation
	Taxation	09.10. General
	Taxation	09.20. Direct taxation
	Taxation	09.20.10. Income tax
	Taxation	09.20.20. Corporation tax
	Taxation	09.20.30. Elimination of double taxation
	Taxation	09.30. Indirect taxation
	Taxation	09.30.10. Turnover tax/VAT

	Taxation	09.30.20. Excise duties
	Taxation	09.30.30. Taxes on capital and transactions in securities
	Taxation	09.40. Other taxes
	Taxation	09.50. Prevention of tax evasion and avoidance
Trade: external	NA	02.20. Basic customs instruments
	NA	02.20.10. Customs tariffs
	NA	02.20.10.10. Common Customs Tariff
	NA	02.20.10.20. ECSC unified tariff
	NA	02.20.10.30. European Community's integrated tariff (TARIC)
	NA	02.20.20. Value for customs purposes
	NA	02.20.30. Origin of goods
	NA	02.20.30.10. Common definition used in non-preferential traffic
	NA	02.20.30.20. Rules of origin
	NA	02.20.30.21. EFTA countries
	NA	02.20.30.22. Mediterranean countries
	NA	02.20.30.23. ACP states and OCT
	NA	02.20.30.25. Countries benefiting from the system
Trade: internal	NA	02.40. Specific customs rules
	NA	02.40.10. Movement of goods
	NA	02.40.10.10. Free movement of goods
	NA	02.40.10.11. Community transit
	NA	02.40.10.12. Other arrangements concerning movement of goods
	NA	02.40.10.13. Turkey
	NA	02.40.10.20. Extra-Community trade: EFTA agreements
	NA	02.40.10.30. Export procedures
	NA	02.40.10.40. Elimination of barriers to trade
Transport: air	Transport	07.40. Air transport
	Transport	07.40.10. Competition rules
	Transport	07.40.20. Market operation
	Transport	07.40.20.10. Market access
	Transport	07.40.20.20. Route distribution
	Transport	07.40.20.30. Prices and terms
	Transport	07.40.30. Air safety
	Transport	07.40.40. Structural harmonisation
	Transport	07.40.50. International relations
	Transport	07.40.50.10. Consultation procedure
	Transport	07.40.50.20. Conventions with non-member countries
Transport: general	Transport	06.20.20.30. Transport
	Transport	07. Transport policy
	Transport	07.05. General
	Transport	07.07. Statistics
	Transport	07.10. Transport infrastructure
	Transport	07.10.10. Coordination and investment
	Transport	07.10.20. Financial support
	Transport	07.10.30. User tariffs
	Transport	13.60. Trans-European networks
Transport: land	Transport	07.20. Inland transport
	Transport	07.20.10. Competition rules
	Transport	07.20.20. State intervention

	Transport	07.20.30. Market operation
	Transport	07.20.30.10. Market monitoring
	Transport	07.20.30.20. Market access
	Transport	07.20.30.30. Transport prices and terms
	Transport	07.20.40. Structural harmonisation
	Transport	07.20.40.10. Technical and safety conditions
	Transport	07.20.40.20. Social conditions
	Transport	07.20.40.30. Taxation
	Transport	07.20.50. Combined transport
	Transport	07.20.60. ECSC provisions
Transport: maritime	Transport	07.30. Shipping
	Transport	07.30.10. Competition rules
	Transport	07.30.20. Market operation
	Transport	07.30.20.10. Market monitoring
	Transport	07.30.20.20. Code of conduct for liner conferences
	Transport	07.30.20.30. Market access
	Transport	07.30.30. Safety at sea
	Transport	07.30.40. Structural harmonisation
	Transport	07.30.40.10. Technical conditions
	Transport	07.30.40.20. Social conditions
	Transport	07.30.40.30. Taxation
	Transport	07.30.40.40. Flags, vessel registration
	Transport	07.30.50. International relations
	Transport	07.30.50.10. Consultation procedure
	Transport	07.30.50.20. Conventions with non-member countries