

Understanding Pilot Response to Flight Safety Events Using Categorisation Theory

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Categorisation theory explains our ability to recognise events in terms of a similarity overlap between either a prototypical, ideal case or a stored exemplar derived from experience. Evidence from aviation accident reports indicate that pilots are not always able to recognise flight safety events in real-time and this can lead to undesirable pilot behaviour. Flight safety events may not always arise in recognisable formats, especially as rare and unusual combinations are possible. Correspondence with prototypes or exemplars may be weak, creating borderline cases and harming recognition. In this article we extend categorisation theory to develop a new framework which characterises flight safety events. We model three case studies using the new framework to demonstrate how categorisation theory can be used to understand flight safety events of different types. Finally we propose a roadmap for future research and discuss how categorisation theory could be applied to training or the organisation of flight crew reference material to improve response to inflight events.

Relevance to Human Factors/Ergonomics Theory

Categorisation theory is established in cognitive psychology as a leading explanation of variability in the human capacity to recognise objects and events. Several recent air transport accidents appear to show flight crew have difficulty recognising some events, and this article applies this theoretical framework to analyse such failures. We account for borderline cases, and argue that typicality and familiarity gradients are important drivers of pilot behaviour. We provide a theory-driven account of why some events are not recognised.

Keywords: flight safety events; categories; concepts; typicality; recognition-primed decision making

1. Introduction

In June 2009 an Airbus A330, operating as Flight AF447, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean 4 minutes and 23 seconds after the first indication of a problem. The accident report states that the crash resulted from a succession of events, including the loss of airspeed data and an aerodynamic stall (BEA 2012). The crew were unable to make sense of the situation and the appropriate remedial action was not taken resulting in the loss of the aircraft (BEA 2012). This type of loss of airspeed data, caused by ice accumulation on sensors, had been experienced by at least thirteen other Airbus A330 and A340 crews, from five different airlines. Four crews did not recognise the event, two crews concluded it was another type of event ('inconsistent angle of attack data') and none of the crews linked the event to the correct remedial response (BEA 2012).

Some flight safety events do not present as clear cases which map exactly on to training and experience. Even for very experienced pilots the world can be poorly structured and confusing. In the simplest information processing terms, an event is not directly diagnosable by the cues found in the world, and response is impaired. Some situations will be familiar, others not so much. In this article we apply categorisation theory to understand pilot response to different situations. Categorisation theory proposes that recognising entities in the real-world requires a similarity overlap between either a prototypical, ideal case or a stored exemplar derived from experience. Insufficient correspondence with a prototype or exemplar could damage recognition and pilot response. In categorisation theory real-world entities vary in how central they are to a concept, with clear cases exhibiting centrality, whilst other cases occupy the margins (Barsalou 1985; Dry and Storms 2010). These marginal, borderline cases can affect appropriate diagnosis and response to in-flight events.

For pilots, dynamic environments are grouped into categories, or types of events, which they must link to an adequate response. This is articulated by the BEA, (2012) in their final report into the crash of the AF447:

‘...the crew must analyse and confirm the type of failure before undertaking any failure processing action...the “adequate reaction” expected of the crew supposes immediate memory items with the purpose of stabilising the situation, then recourse to action instructions

available on the [cockpit display] and/or recourse to procedures explained in the [checklist] and classified by category of diagnosed anomaly.’
(BEA, 2012, p.102).

Pilots are expected to diagnose and confirm the type event, recall any memory items to stabilise the flight, then refer to expanded procedures. Response tools, such as abnormal and emergency checklists, order known flight safety events into families based on shared features, so at a practical level flight safety events are grouped and indexed by categories decided by the manufacturer or aircraft operator. Such indexes are a form of taxonomic order, a central principle of categorisation and knowledge structure (Rosch 1978). Underpinning this process is recognition, which demands a similarity overlap with an event concept. It is this categorisation that drives behaviour; insufficient overlap with a concept can lead to delayed or inappropriate pilot response.

In this article we demonstrate the application of categorisation theory to better understand the variability seen in event recognition and pilot response. We review categorisation theory, identifying the unique contributions that the theory can make to understanding flight safety events. A new framework is developed which describes three conceptions of events and the characteristics in relation to categorisation theory. Finally three case studies are analysed using the framework and a roadmap for future research is proposed.

2. Categorisation theory

Categories are the reduction of sensory experiences into equivalent groups on the basis of shared attributes (Pothos and Wills 2011). Table 1 contains a lexicon of key terms used in this primer. Categorisation, interchangeable with diagnosis, denotes the ability to determine if a new instance is a member of a category (Sloutsky 2003). It allows the cognitive system to treat similar entities equivalently, hence we can behave differently to different things and conserve cognitive effort by collapsing diversity (Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin 1956; Rosch 1978; Harnad 2005). The terms concept and category have also been used interchangeably, but here we are adopting the convention of Murphy and Medin (1985), which uses the term category to denote the set of entities

in the world, and concept to denote the mental representation that supports the grouping. There is converging evidence from cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology (e.g. category specific deficits) that humans process stimuli according to category criteria (Ashby and Ell 2001; Keri 2003; Shohamy et al. 2008; Mahon and Caramazza 2009). Categories may be organised into broad classes, which can be binary (safe/unsafe; edible/not edible), or more complex forms to reflect higher levels of discrimination (Hackett 2017). Many work environments of interest to ergonomics, such as police and security operations, healthcare and public emergency response, require specialist discrimination of events in order to tailor response. Additionally, such work systems are intolerant of delayed or inaccurate categorisation.

There is natural link between categorisation theory and the influential recognition-primed decision making (RPD) model (Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco 1986; Klein 1993). This model proposes mechanisms by which experienced professionals use prototypical patterns in the environment to make rapid judgements and implement response. Decision makers recall previous cases in order to assess the current situation and plan potential actions. The model has also been applied to the aviation context (O'Hare and Wiggins 2004; Wiggins et al. 2014). There has been little empirical development of the recognition strand of this model, especially in relation to professionals' abilities to acquire and use event knowledge in domains that produce both prototypical and indistinct situations. Applying the theory and associated methods can elucidate and define specific aspects of the RPD model through specification of the concepts that help and hinder recognition. Important event variability can be identified and this will clarify why recognition and decision making sometimes fail to follow the architecture of the model.

2.1 Approaches to categorisation

There are two broad approaches to categorisation, the classical view and the probabilistic view (Medin 1989). The classical view asserts that there are defining features (cues) of category members, and these features are 'necessary and sufficient' to confer category status (Smith & Medin 1981). However, there are few concepts, if any, for which there is widespread expert agreement about the category-defining features (Medin 1989). The classical view would also predict that all category members are equal as they all possess the necessary properties. This position has been weakened by

the apparent graded internal structure of categories – some members are better than others (Barsalou 1985; Dry and Storms 2010; Rosch 1978). In the classic example of graded structure, robins are reliably considered better examples of the category ‘bird’ than penguins (Nosofsky 1988).

The probabilistic approach to categorisation rejects the idea of definitive features, in favour of gradations of membership, with some category members being central and ‘good’, whilst others are borderline, less well defined and close to the category boundary (Rosch 1975; Mervis and Rosch 1981). The environment is ordered around probabilistic relationships, rather than certain relationships, so category judgements are really about what is likely, and membership is by degree (Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin 1956; Harnad 1990; Mervis and Rosch 1981). This explains variability in the human capacity to recognise objects and events – as the degree of membership varies, so does the ability of the human to discriminate. The roots of this approach are often attributed to Wittgenstein (1953) and his proposition that fuzzy boundaries and shared properties better define the world, not clear boundaries and essential properties. The perennial example of ‘games’ illustrates the point. Games share a family resemblance, but there is no single collection of necessary properties, merely sharing some properties, drawn from a cluster, is sufficient for an activity to be called a game (Lakoff 1987). Fuzzy category boundaries are typically used in decision support systems, such as medical diagnosis applications, as abrupt category distinctions fail to capture the subtleties of borderline cases (see Miranda and Felipe 2015 for a contemporary example).

2.2 Prototypes and exemplars

Eleanor Rosch and colleagues mounted the first challenge to the classical approach, proposing that categories are organised around the clearest and best cases, known as prototypes (Rosch and Mervis 1975; Rosch 1978, 1973, 1975). These act as cognitive reference points, and new instances are judged more or less similar to the generalised, prototypical case (Rosch 1975, 1978). Clusters of the best cues, known as high cue validity, indicate the clearest, prototypical cases of membership.

The exemplar view proposes that judgements are based on particular instances that have been encountered (Smith & Medin 1981). A new case is judged against

experience of previous cases, and this accommodates metrics that are known to influence category judgements, such as familiarity, or how often a person has experienced an entity (Barsalou 1985; Nosofsky 1988). Exemplars are particularly important for more complex concepts for which there may be no prototype (i.e. no ‘best’ case) such as categories with rare members or categories that exhibit high diversity (e.g. the concept ‘supercomputer’; Osherson and Smith 1997).

The view that exemplars are an important form of experiential knowledge is shared with the analogical, or case-based reasoning paradigm, where important similarities are detected between a current situation (the ‘target’) and a problem solved in the past (the ‘source’) (Schunn and Dunbar 1996; Buchanan, Davis, and Feigenbaum 2006). Case-based reasoning (CBR) places emphasis on the structure of problems, rather than recognition and discrimination, thus it often involves more elaborate knowledge of elements and relations between elements (De Mantaras et al. 2005; Krawczyk 2012; Kolodner 1992). CBR also proposes two levels of similarity matching, which is of interest to the current work (De Mantaras et al. 2005). Surface similarity refers to superficial resemblance, whilst structural similarity refers to deeper relations between elements (De Mantaras et al. 2005). Detection of structural similarities between entities is overcome by means of more elaborate abstract indexing, which draws on more sophisticated domain knowledge. In categorisation theory this is accomplished through taxonomic organisation and centrality (Mervis and Rosch 1981), where concepts are formally grouped, with central cases offering something akin to surface similarity. Discriminating deeper structural similarities, just like CBR, requires enhanced domain knowledge, often in the form of specialist taxonomies. Surface similarity tends to have better transfer in the problem-solving domain, and this is mirrored in categorisation by the superior verification of prototypes (Keane 1987; Blanchette and Dunbar 2000; Rosch, Simpson, and Miller 1976).

Allied to this approach, instance-based learning theory (IBLT) has been used to model how experience, stored as ‘instances’, drives learning and decision making (Gonzalez, Lerch, and Lebiere 2003). In this paradigm previously successful decisions are used to inform current decisions. Within IBLT instances have three elements; the attributes, or cues of the situation, the corresponding decision and the utility of the outcome (Gonzalez 2013). The recognition phase matches past experiences with the

1 current environment, and as experience grows attention becomes more selective. This
2 approach draws on cognitive knowledge of ‘typical’ and ‘atypical’ instances, with
3 typical situations being deemed closely similar to previous encounters (Gonzalez 2013).

4
5 The complementary nature of analogical reasoning, CBR, IBLT and
6 categorisation is illustrated by their shared assumption that specific knowledge
7 structures arise from previous, concrete experience of a phenomenon, be they analogies,
8 cases, instances or exemplars, and retrieval of this knowledge allows the actor to
9 recognise entities. Indeed, the literatures share a substantial amount of terminology (e.g.
10 Aamodt and Plaza 1994; De Mantaras et al. 2005). Each of these perspectives has
11 different objectives, but in the context of this article we assume the exemplar to be the
12 unit of direct experience, and we draw on notions of recognition and similarity
13 discussed above.

14
15 Research in categorisation theory has advanced using both prototype and
16 exemplar views, and current conceptions indicate they have complementary, supportive
17 functions; for example, exemplars update malleable prototype knowledge (Murphy &
18 Hoffman, 2012; Murphy, 2002; Smith, 2014; Smith & Minda, 1999), although
19 theoretical controversies still exist (e.g. Murphy 2016). Both processes are unified by
20 similarity, or the degree to which a new encounter matches, or overlaps with known
21 concept distinctions, be they prototypes or exemplars (Medin 1989; Murphy and
22 Hoffman 2012; Sloutsky 2003; Smith, Patalano, and Jonides 1998; Larkey and
23 Markman 2005; Goldstone 1994). It is possible that pilots have weak, decayed or no
24 prototypical event knowledge for certain event types, or they may never have seen
25 particular events before (even in training), therefore have no exemplar.

26 27 *2.3 The key gradients of typicality and familiarity*

28 As noted above, categories appear to exhibit internal gradations, meaning that some
29 members are reliably judged better than others. There are central cases and there are
30 borderline cases. These variations are known as gradients. This article is focussed on the
31 gradients of typicality and familiarity. Typicality is the degree to which a category
32 member serves as a good, central instance (Rosch 1975). Rated typicality provides the
33 strongest empirical evidence that categories exhibit gradients, and this has been
34 demonstrated across a wide range of categories, including animals, metals, furniture,

1 sports and even formal categories like numbers (Dry and Storms 2010). The typicality
2 effect is associated with variations in category verification tasks (member yes/no),
3 category learning and category member naming (Rosch, Simpson, and Miller 1976;
4 Storms, De Boeck, and Ruts 2000; Sandberg, Sebastian, and Kiran 2012). Typical cases
5 confer cognitive advantages, such as speed and accuracy. The best cases, proximal to
6 the prototype, are powerful reference points for rapid and effective response.

7

8 Familiarity, or the subjective estimate of frequency of occurrence, has also been
9 shown to be a potent driver of recognition and retrieval (Nosofsky 1988; Barsalou
10 1985). Frequency is analogous to repetition, so is influential in learning (Rosch,
11 Simpson, and Miller 1976). This may be a particularly important gradient for pilots
12 when rare and unusual cases present, possibly many years after brief exposure to a
13 crude exemplar. Adverse familiarity gradients could damage recognition and response.

14

<i>Term</i>	<i>Definition</i>
Borderline case	Cases that are not central, or readily categorised, due to imperfect information or cue combinations. Cases proximal to category boundaries. (Genero and Cantor 1987).
Categorisation	The ability to determine if a new instance is a member of a known category. Interchangeable with <i>diagnosis</i> . (Sloutsky 2003). <i>Delayed categorisation</i> involves a temporal gap that interferes with response and safety. <i>Mis-categorisation</i> is assigning an entity to an incorrect category. <i>Non-categorisation</i> is failure to assign an entity to a category.
Category	A group of distinct items or entities that the cognitive system treats as equivalent for a particular purpose. See also <i>concept</i> . (Markman and Ross 2003).
Category structure	Real-world categories exhibit internal gradations (e.g. members vary in their <i>typicality</i> and <i>familiarity</i>). Some category members are more central, and therefore better at conveying the category distinction, than others. (Barsalou 1985).
Concept	The mental representation that supports the grouping of entities into categories. (Murphy & Medin, 1985).
Cue	A characteristic of the environment that can be used to resolve distinctions. The best cues provide clear cases of category membership. (Rosch 1978).
Exemplar	Particular stored example of a category member or particular instances that have been encountered. (Minda and Smith 2002; Smith and Medin 1981).
Familiarity	The subjective estimate of how often a person has experienced an entity. (Nosofsky 1988).
Prototype	Generalised case of the clearest and best examples of category membership. Used as a cognitive reference point to make category judgements. (Rosch 1975).
Similarity	The degree to which a new encounter overlaps with known category distinctions, such as exemplars or prototypes. (Goldstone 1994).
Typicality	With reference to a category member, the extent to which it serves as a good, central member. (Rosch 1975).

Table 1. Lexicon of categorisation theory across the literature.

1 **3. Case Studies: Applying categorisation theory to flight safety events**

2 In this section we present a new framework developed from categorisation theory.
3 We describe three types of event and their characteristics (Table 2). We then
4 demonstrate through case studies how the theory can assist in understanding
5 events and reduce future risk of adverse outcomes.

6
7 This framework is compatible with recent developments in startle and surprise
8 **(for example, Landman et al. 2017) and also supplements Clewley and Stupple's**
9 **(2015) conception of procedural vulnerability.** Transport systems are heavily reliant
10 on rules and procedures (Pélegrin 2013) and it is notable that events similar to AF447
11 show very poor compliance with response protocols (BEA 2012). Clewley and Stupple
12 (2015) propose that rules and procedures become vulnerable under demanding
13 conditions, and this can progress to two undesirable situations. Procedures become
14 fragile, and at significant risk to being partially implemented or not achieving their aim,
15 or they may fail completely, meaning they are not implemented at all. This offers a
16 more nuanced progression which reflects the fact that procedures, response tools and
17 protocols are used and misused in many ways. Case studies two and three elucidate.
18 This connection between event structure and the effectiveness of response tools and
19 protocols has important implications for training and pilot education.

20
21 We also wish this framework to reflect current thinking in event complexity.
22 Walker and colleagues (2010) reviewed and translated the ideas of complexity to the
23 field of ergonomics. The attribute view of complexity (see Walker et al. 2010) defines
24 the ergonomic problem space as containing multiplicity (multiple interacting factors),
25 dynamism (system state changes over time) and uncertainty (difficulty and vagueness in
26 determining the final system state), with high levels of each producing the most
27 complex situations. We view these attributes as important contextual factors in the
28 structure of events. The case studies note how this informs our argument.

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Type of Event	Status	Characteristics	Predicted Response	Example Flight Safety Events	Case Study Notes
Prototype or Exemplar	Friendly	<p>Clearest and best cases. Typical and familiar. Clusters of the best cues. Good correspondence with previous encounters. Proximal to reference concepts. Strong information position. Exhibits stable features.</p>	<p>Adequate recognition. Appropriate response likely. Response tools used effectively to enhance safety. Startle unlikely. Procedural compliance robust. Pilots are well adapted, able to produce rule and skill-based response.</p>	<p>Events regularly seen in actual flight operations. Events that are well replicated in flight simulators and arise in a similar context in the real-world. Events where assistive technology conveys a clear, unambiguous concept. Events reinforced through repetition. Events that clearly correspond with checklists and protocols.</p>	<p>Case study 1. Engine failures are well replicated and often practised. Assistive technology conveys a clear concept.</p>
Non-Typical or Unfamiliar	Alarm	<p>Cues may be masked, contradictory, conflicting, intermittent, unusually dynamic, configured in unusual combinations, or unfamiliar. Limited correspondence to reference concepts.</p>	<p>Recognition may be delayed or inaccurate. Delayed or inappropriate response possible. Response tools may not be used effectively. Startle possible. Procedures vulnerable.</p>	<p>Events that have not been encountered before, but are similar to known, strong concepts. Events that have been encountered in the flight simulator but arise in a significantly different context or format. Events that exhibit high variability in terms of cue combinations and temporal characteristics. Events that are tenuously similar to previous brief encounters. Borderline events that are conceptually similar to others, causing confusion. Familiar events but mismanaged.</p>	<p>Case study 2. The familiar go-around manoeuvre is mismanaged. Unfamiliar flap malfunction causes confusion. Response tools not used effectively.</p>
Weak or No Concept	Hostile	<p>Cues may be masked, contradictory, conflicting, intermittent, unusually dynamic, configured in unusual combinations, or unfamiliar. Minimal or no correspondence with known category distinctions. Distal from reference concepts. Concepts resistant to prototypes. Weak information position.</p>	<p>Recognition may be delayed, inaccurate or absent. Delayed or inappropriate response likely. Response tools may not be used effectively. Startle likely. Procedures fragile. Pilots are poorly adapted.</p>	<p>No previous experience of event or anything similar. Severely decayed memory trace of an encounter. Events that exhibit high diversity and complexity in the real world, but are trained through brief, contrived exemplars. Complex events where cue processing in training/testing is inadequate to form robust foundation concept. Events where assistive technology fails to stabilise in a coherent state or cues are inadequately diagnostic. Events beyond published procedures. Unfamiliar events mismanaged. Multiple, dynamic, concurrent events.</p>	<p>Case study 3. Complex presentation involving multiple, dynamic events. Unfamiliar events mismanaged. Minimal overlap with reference concepts. Procedures and response tools failed.</p>

Table 2. Three conceptions of events and predicted characteristics.

1 *3.1 Case study 1, Airbus A330 engine shutdown: Friendly.*

2 This case study describes a prototypical event structure with good correspondence to
3 strong concepts. Categorisation theory would predict adequate recognition and
4 response. It serves as a base line.

5
6 In January 2013 an Airbus A330-300 took off from Orlando Airport, Florida,
7 and suffered a birdstrike at 530 feet (AAIB 2013). Shortly afterwards the Electronic
8 Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM, an assistive technology that suggests event titles
9 and remedial actions) displayed 'ENG 1 FAIL' and 'ENG 1 LO PR', indicating that
10 engine 1 had failed and the oil pressure was low. The crew subsequently shut down the
11 damaged engine and returned to Orlando for a safe landing. The total time from first
12 warning to engine shutdown was 1 minute and 46 seconds.

13
14 This event description closely matches the BEA's expectations of pilot
15 behaviour, as described above. The main cues available to the crew were
16 [BIRDSTRIKE] + [ENG 1 FAIL ECAM] + [ENG 1 LO PR ECAM] + [ENG 1
17 PARAMETER VARIATIONS], and collectively they form a strong, non-contradictory
18 cluster, known as high cue validity. The event content closely matches, or is equivalent
19 to, a known concept, the often practised 'engine failure on take-off'. The event is a
20 good, central case, proximal to the prototype, and the report indicates the crew had no
21 difficulty recognising or responding to it. These events are rarely encountered in flight
22 operations, but often encountered in this context in training. Furthermore, the ECAM
23 technology conveyed a highly descriptive, stable concept (simply 'ENG 1 FAIL'), but
24 this is not always the case (see case study 3, below). As Cantor and colleagues (1982)
25 pointed out when they originally extended prototype theory to situations, prototypes
26 allow an actor to plan and regulate behaviour. Well-structured events like this elicit
27 desirable flight crew behaviour, and the crew used procedures and response tools
28 effectively. This is the cognitive dividend of the typicality effect (Rosch, Simpson, and
29 Miller 1976). This event was conceptually friendly due to its proximity to a strong
30 cognitive reference point. We interact well with clear concepts, and they optimise
31 adaptation, prediction and behaviour (Anderson 1991).

32
33

1 3.2 Case study 2, Boeing 757 go-around: Alarm

2 Systems do not always fail close to cognitive reference points. Pilots are not always able
3 to use clear concepts to interpret and respond to flight safety events. A mismanaged go-
4 around in a Boeing 757-200 (AAIB 2014) demonstrates the alarm case in Table 2. A
5 go-around is a manoeuvre flown to discontinue an approach to land, and involves
6 applying high power whilst changing the flight path to an upward trajectory. The crew
7 were conducting an instrument approach, with landing gear and flaps extended,
8 approximately 1250 feet above the ground, when they were instructed to go-around.
9 The Captain disengaged the automatic thrust control, applied maximum power, but left
10 the autopilot engaged in the programmed landing trajectory. Shortly after, with the
11 speed increasing rapidly, the Captain disconnected the autopilot and manually flew the
12 aircraft into a climb. The aircraft subsequently deviated from its cleared altitude and
13 experienced two flap speed exceedances, which could cause structural damage to the
14 aircraft. The crew mismanaged the flap malfunction and its response protocol, but later
15 landed safely.

16

17 The report suggests go-around events most often occur during simulator
18 exercises with one of the two engines on the Boeing 757 inoperative; they are usually
19 initiated at or near the decision altitude of approximately 200 feet; rule-based weather
20 criteria usually prime the decision; and they typically take place under examination,
21 with high levels of anticipation. The Captain noted that ‘you know they [go-arounds]
22 are coming’ (AAIB 2014 p.58) during such training encounters.

23

24 This instance deviated significantly from the prototypical event markers. It was
25 initiated at higher altitude, with full thrust, was unexpected and included a procedural
26 error. If flight crew knowledge of these events is organised around a well-executed
27 prototype, the clear case in training, it is predictable that their knowledge and
28 performance would deteriorate as they diverged from the typical instance. Go-arounds
29 are demanding manoeuvres. The European Aviation Safety Agency report that 1 in 10
30 go-arounds result in hazardous outcomes similar to this case (EASA 2014). This case
31 also suggests that even relatively minor procedural errors can lead to significant
32 deviation from typicality, resulting in a ‘familiar event but mismanaged’ scenario.
33 Trained prototypes may be difficult to override and may leave pilots poorly positioned

1 to recover from non-typical instances. Events may deteriorate quickly, leaving the pilot
2 in a flight regime for which they have little coherent conceptual knowledge.

3
4 The crew also exceeded the speed limit for the wing slat and flap devices during
5 the go-around, and this caused a variety of unusual system behaviour. They were not
6 sure if they had exceeded the flap speed limits, despite experiencing an 18 knot and 47
7 knot exceedance at two different flap settings. Flap speed exceedances are not practiced
8 as they are usually a consequence of inadvertent mismanagement of energy and
9 flightpath. As a result the crew had no exemplar events to compare with their
10 predicament or help with recognition. They then experienced two separate caution
11 messages, 'LE (leading edge) SLAT DISAGREE' and 'TE (trailing edge) FLAP
12 DISAGREE', partly the result of the speed exceedance and partly due to the incorrect
13 execution of the checklist. These failure messages are conceptually similar, so prone to
14 confusion, a situation exacerbated by their subsequent disappearance brought about by
15 switching to alternate flap control. This illustrates how connecting failure messages
16 with correct checklist selection can be difficult in non-typical scenarios, especially
17 where system behaviour is less transparent and informative than previous flight crew
18 encounters. The difficulty the crew had in managing these events was attributed to their
19 unfamiliarity with this type of malfunction and the associated checklist. The
20 infrequency of exemplar slat/flap events leads to weaker conceptual knowledge; a
21 classic gradient that damaged the crews understanding of the situation and their
22 behaviour. Unfortunately a great number of flight safety events show this characteristic.

23 24 *3.3 Case study 3, Airbus A330 unreliable airspeed data: Hostile*

25 This case study examines the previously discussed AF447 accident. To re-cap, the
26 aircraft experienced ice accumulation on the airspeed sensors, and this resulted in
27 unreliable airspeed readings and eventually an aerodynamic stall (BEA 2012). Many
28 other system indications were triggered during the event, including six separate
29 episodes of the flight director vanishing, intermittent stall warnings and multiple system
30 malfunction messages. The event was particularly dynamic, with approximately thirty
31 system transitions in the first 99 seconds (BEA 2012). Neither the unreliable airspeed
32 nor the stall were adequately recognised and the remedial actions were not carried out.

1 *3.3.1 The role of exemplar events*

2 The BEA report specifically refers to each crew member exposure to unreliable airspeed
3 scenarios and stall scenarios. All the three crew members on AF447 had encountered
4 such scenarios during routine simulator training. These encounters occur during the
5 initial aircraft type training (type rating), or during routine re-validation of the pilot's
6 licence and type-rating. These encounters are intended to serve as sample events that
7 will lead to greater reliability of pilot performance during a real encounter. They are
8 exemplars. Categorisation theory proposes that the real encounter must have sufficient
9 overlap with the exemplar if it is to be recognised.

10

11 First, we consider exemplar unreliable airspeed events. The three crew on board
12 AF447 had all experienced an unreliable airspeed event in the simulator training and
13 testing programme for 2008-09. Additionally, the Captain had an additional exposure to
14 such an event in 1997. This puts a lot of emphasis on minimal exposure. There is no
15 telling how long these simulated events lasted. We cannot be sure how well the
16 pilots were able to process the patterns of cues during the session. We cannot be sure
17 the cues exhibited in the simulator session corresponded with the cues in the real
18 encounter. Given that the crew, with collectively over 19,000 hours, had difficulty
19 decoding the event, we suggest that an exemplar effect damaged both recognition and
20 response. Categorisation theory points to a weak or decayed exemplar, combined with
21 unruly event content that had minimal overlap with reference concepts.

22

23 Second, we consider exemplar stall events in the flight simulator. The Co-Pilot
24 occupying the right-hand seat had experienced a simulated encounter five years
25 previously, the Captain's most recent stall exercise was eight years previously and Co-
26 Pilot in the left hand seat had not seen an exemplar for eleven years. The BEA note that
27 simulator fidelity, flight envelope constraints and lack of startle effect pose problems for
28 stall recreation in a simulator. In addition, they underline that in the cruise flight
29 conditions at Mach 0.8, just a 1.5-degree change in wing angle of attack is sufficient to
30 induce a stall warning, and this contrasts sharply with the classic low-speed stall seen
31 during basic training. Accepting that typicality and familiarity confer a cognitive
32 advantage, then the reverse is true. There was no cognitive dividend for the crew, they
33 were in a weak information position remote from reference concepts and response was
34 disrupted. We acknowledge that situations will occur beyond the reasonable prediction

1 or resources of training departments (Dahlstrom et al. 2009), but we would also argue
2 that a greater understanding of event structure could have safety benefits in cases such
3 as this. Categorisation theory offers scope to train pilots to be sensitive to event
4 variability and diversity, thereby reducing reliance on crude, possibly brief exemplars.
5 Pilot education could be expanded to include the friendly, alarm and hostile levels of
6 event structure, and this could make procedures and response tools less vulnerable – see
7 section 4, below.

8 9 *3.3.2 The role of assistive technology*

10 Air data malfunctions, such as this unreliable airspeed encounter, do not always arise
11 with descriptive and stable indications from the assistive technology. This is in stark
12 contrast to case study 1, where a clear concept was conveyed to the crew via the ECAM
13 display ('ENG 1 FAIL'). Air data events demand more elaborate diagnosis and can
14 often involve a wide variety of system indications and cue diversity, requiring story
15 building and collecting more diagnostic features. Many of the diagnostic cues available
16 to the AF447 crew were intermittent. System transitions were almost continuous, so
17 whilst it is seductive to think there was a single, recognisable condition (e.g. a stall), the
18 multiplicity of conflicting cues make this remote. In terms of story-building, this event
19 structure had no narrative arc. This is a two-fold cognitive burden – the assistive
20 technology conveys no clear concept and the diagnostic cues do not come to rest (or
21 near rest). This leads to variability in diagnosis. The BEA report that two other crews
22 who experienced a similar unreliable airspeed encounter concluded it was a 'loss of
23 angle of attack data'. In categorisation theory this is known as an adjacent concept and
24 this can lead to 'mis-categorisation' (see the 'categorisation' entry in Table 1). It is
25 conceptually similar and close to the correct distinction, but not accurate. These are
26 known as boundary or borderline cases (Genero and Cantor 1987), and such exotic
27 events appear to be demanding to recognise, even for experienced professionals. These
28 are more hostile and complex forms of event structure.

29 30 *3.4 Summary*

31 There are several notable insights from categorisation theory. Event prototypes offer
32 typicality and familiarity benefits, especially if they arise in similar contexts to
33 simulated or previous encounters. These are relatively friendly situations to which pilots
34 are well adapted. However, prototypical events may be conceptually narrow and very

1 well primed, leading to deterioration in performance when significant deviations from
2 typicality occur. These situations prompt alarm, and response protocols may become
3 vulnerable. Complex events may exhibit considerable cue diversity and may have no
4 clear correspondence with reference concepts. Crude or brief training events may be
5 inadequate to promote recognition and satisfactory pilot response, especially during
6 unfamiliar and exotic situations. This is a hostile cognitive environment to which pilots
7 may be poorly adapted. The recognition of events appears deeply connected to
8 typicality and familiarity gradients. A weak information position harms the connection
9 between event and response, perhaps leading to delayed or inappropriate pilot
10 behaviour. A key contribution of categorisation theory is its ability to describe the
11 structure of the environment, as well as human cognition. In Table 2 we have defined
12 three levels of this transaction and illustrated the potential of the framework through the
13 case studies.

14
15

16 **4. Application to flight safety**

17 A number of exploitation routes are available for the application of categorisation
18 theory to flight safety. Firstly, training could be a beneficiary of this approach. The
19 commercial aviation industry recognises the need for updated training and testing of
20 pilots, which has barely changed in over 30 years (Learmount 2017). Case studies 2 and
21 3, above, indicate a gap between trained situations and the variability and diversity
22 exhibited in the real-world. This shortfall is often absorbed through failure, with
23 significant human, social and economic costs.

24

25 We view current training/testing encounters (e.g. the simulator) as possibly
26 being limited environments for pilots to acquire cue combinations and build conceptual
27 knowledge. There are audit-based expectations on pilots, they are often under test
28 conditions with other cognitive tasks and documentary evidence of their performance is
29 being gathered (see Roth 2015). This may seriously limit their ability to process event
30 cues, yet these encounters may be their only exposure to relatively complex events.
31 Furthermore, several events may be presented in quick succession. Categorisation
32 theory, its lexicon and its methods allow the event envelope to be expanded to take
33 account of non-typical and complex event structure. We see two routes to this. Firstly,
34 improving opportunities to process cue combinations may lead to better reference

1 concepts, which we know to be important drivers of recognition. Better event
2 recognition should lead to more reliable response. Secondly, additional emphasis on
3 event variability and diversity could provide flight crew wider conceptual knowledge
4 and strategies for dealing with unruly information, for example contradictory and
5 intermittent data. We predict this will provide better pilot performance when faced with
6 borderline events or events where assistive technology fails to convey a stable concept.
7 Some event types, such as the air data malfunction of AF447, are profoundly more
8 complex than others, and training needs to take account of this.

9
10 As an example, we will now describe how this could be done using our event
11 framework found in Table 2. If we consider an ‘Airspeed Mismatch’ condition where
12 pilot airspeed indications do not match, requiring flight crew intervention. Pilots could
13 experience a prototypical event of this type, where cues are clear, stable and correspond
14 well with the response tools, such as memory items and checklists. This is the routine
15 event to which pilots are well accustomed (Casner, Geven, and Williams 2013). Using
16 Table 2, a more complex form of this event could be generated. An instance involving
17 intermittent cues that fails to stabilise in a particular system state, or a presentation that
18 is more difficult to connect to the response tools, will offer training benefit. Pilots
19 experience important variations on an event theme, and they also get exposure to non-
20 typical and complex event characteristics. We feel this has the potential to improve pilot
21 training in the simulator, or more broadly contribute to pilot education, by providing a
22 theory-driven framework to devise scenarios or event characteristics that expand pilot
23 knowledge. Indeed, using the Table 2 framework for educational tasks need not carry
24 the cost burden of simulator training (see paragraph 5.2, below, where concept building
25 is suggested). We acknowledge it is not possible to assemble exhaustive cue patterns for
26 all types of scenario, but improvements to pilot knowledge that we propose should lead
27 to greater cognitive flexibility in managing non-typical events. Overall, we feel this
28 offers pilots opportunities that are currently beyond industry thinking.

29
30 Finally, we believe response protocols and procedures, such as those specified in
31 abnormal and emergency checklists and aircraft handling manuals, could be enhanced
32 to include recognition guidance that reflects the ambiguous nature of some events.
33 Response protocols pre-suppose that a situation has been recognised adequately. If we
34 examine the thirteen other crews, from five different airlines, who experienced an

1 AF447 type-event, it is notable that the BEA found no evidence any had used the
2 remedial ‘memory actions’ or emergency checklist procedure. This suggests a
3 systematic weakness in pilot capability to connect these events to the correct procedure.
4 Assistive technologies such as the Quick Reference Handbook (an abnormal and
5 emergency checklist) could include likely cue combinations and sources of the best and
6 strongest data. This also raises design issues, particularly around presentation and
7 display of failure messages and diagnostic cues. For example, in the case of AF447,
8 displaying angle of attack data may have provided the crew with strong, supportive help
9 in recognition (see The Boeing Company 2000 for a discussion on the benefits and
10 drawbacks of providing angle of attack data on large commercial aircraft). This
11 reorganisation of cockpit materials could provide algorithm-based support to
12 recognition. Such information could be used by pilots when briefing abnormal
13 situations or during the real-time event management. A recognition-focussed approach
14 may reduce the fragility of procedures and response tools. In principle these
15 improvements to training and response protocols could be used in other domains, such
16 as security and police operations, medicine, nursing and social work.

17
18

19 **5. Future directions in research**

20 Application and expansion of this theory can provide greater precision in describing
21 flight safety events, deliver insights into pilot behaviour and inform future best practice
22 The key objective of this research programme is to offer solutions that provide tangible
23 safety improvements. We have identified three themes that are amenable to empirical
24 study and draw on gaps in current knowledge in flight safety.

25

26 **5.1 Concept gradients and strength**

27 The gradients of typicality and familiarity are measurable, so may be used as a proxy
28 for concept strength. This will allow us to identify which event types may challenge
29 appropriate crew response. One interesting application of this would be the apparent
30 difficulty flight crew have recognising unstable approaches to land (e.g. NTSB 2014a;
31 NTSB 2014b; AAIB 2014b; DSB 2010). For example, pilots may have weak conceptual
32 knowledge of unstable approaches, compared to prototypical successful approaches.

33

1 These gradients may also indicate which events are resistant to prototypes, and
2 so rely heavily on exemplar exposure. The source of event concepts may also be
3 important, as the repetition of real flight operations may form concentrations of
4 knowledge, whereas flight simulator encounters may involve weaker concepts or over-
5 learning a response, at the expense of recognition. This is compatible with recent
6 developments in surprise and startle, where dominant concepts, fed by the typical and
7 familiar, bias response (Landman et al. 2017).

8 9 **5.2 Acquisition, maintenance and decay of concepts**

10 Pilots have the opportunity to acquire and maintain event knowledge through a variety
11 of channels. Over time this knowledge can decay. Recent empirical data suggests that
12 abnormal events presented outside the usual training and testing paradigm pose
13 problems for pilot response (Casner, Geven, and Williams 2013), and this certainly
14 mirrors the case studies presented above. Pilots may acquire the ability to respond to an
15 event in the context of a training encounter, but do not necessarily acquire cue patterns
16 that will lead to real-world recognition. It may be possible to devise vignettes for
17 ‘concept building’, outside of the training/testing paradigm, in order to boost
18 recognition power. Allied to this, there does not appear to be a simple connection
19 between some events and their response protocols, particularly ‘memory actions’.
20 Following AF447 the BEA interviewed a sample of flight crew and found a prominent
21 reluctance or inability to use these procedures. We need a better understanding of how
22 procedures, response tools and protocols are acquired and maintained, and crucially,
23 how they remain connected to event concepts. This procedural vulnerability and
24 fragility needs to be better understood.

25 26 **5.3 Signatures of complex events**

27 The AF447 accident demonstrates that multiple, overlapping events may poorly
28 correspond to exemplar events that flight crew see in simulator exercises. The real-
29 world also presents cases that are beyond published procedures (NASA 2005). This
30 suggests some events exhibit a complexity for which pilots are ill-prepared. If we
31 expect crew to recognise these events then we need a greater understanding of these
32 signatures. For example, pilots do not routinely or intentionally practice recovering
33 from mismanaged events, yet paradoxically this may extend conceptual event
34 knowledge. Even minor procedural errors during a go-around, for instance, can escalate

1 into a more complex situation, as case study 2 indicated. We propose a research
2 programme to understand the interaction between concept gradients and the three key
3 attributes of complexity, dynamism, uncertainty and multiplicity (described in Walker
4 et al. 2010). This may shed light on the most challenging forms of event structure that
5 pose the greatest risk of delayed or inappropriate pilot behaviour, and procedural
6 fragility. Capturing complexity, or a useful proxy, means it can be embedded in pilot
7 training and education.

9 **6. Conclusions**

10 Categorisation theory proposes that recognising events in the real-world requires a
11 similarity overlap between either a prototypical, ideal case or a stored exemplar derived
12 from experience. Pilots are not always able to recognise events and this often leads to
13 undesirable pilot behaviour. Using categorisation theory we have introduced a stable
14 lexicon, and established a framework to understand how pilots recognise and respond to
15 flight safety events. We have significantly extended the idea of event prototypes and
16 analysed the cognitive benefits and costs of such knowledge structures. The framework
17 also accounts for important event variety, describing both the typical and familiar, and
18 troubling divergence away from reference concepts. We have linked this event diversity
19 to predictions of pilot response, specifying key environments that pose risks to
20 procedures and response tools. We have suggested a research programme to refine the
21 application of the theory. Such research can contribute to broader themes in ergonomics
22 science, such as capturing the enigma of complexity. We believe categorisation theory
23 can account for important variability in event recognition and pilot behaviour, and
24 ultimately contribute tangible improvements to safety.

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