

**Tanzania's Mainstream News Media Engagement with National
Development**

Ananilea Wilbert Nkya

Supervisor: Dr Fiona Macaulay

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Abstract

This thesis examines the ways in which Tanzania's media report news on development issues and what accounts for the way they report, guided by social constructionist philosophy and framing theory. In terms of *how* they report news, the thesis draws on primary data generated from: (1) an analysis of 10,371 news stories reported by 15 Tanzanian media outlets over the course of one month, noting the general types of preferred stories and the range of news sources relied upon (which tend to be government or elite sources and male); (2) an in-depth analysis of 36 newspapers' front-page lead stories, looking not just at the presentation and framing of these stories, but also at the omissions and elisions, using interpretive content analysis. In order to explore *why* the Tanzanian media cover development issues the way they do, the thesis draws on another set of primary data: semi-structured, face-to-face interviews conducted with 76 media stakeholders, where editors, journalists and media owners reflect on the constraints and opportunities – media ownership, laws used to control media autonomy, financing and professional training – facing them as media professionals trying to report on topics linked to their country's social, economic and political challenges. There is, to date, little literature that foregrounds the views and experiences of media professionals in Tanzania or, indeed, in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and it is to this literature that this thesis primarily contributes. It concludes that from the colonial period to the current day Tanzanian media has been a contested space in which different stakeholders have diverse views about the role and functioning of the media. If the media are to play a normative, watchdog role, holding government to account and thus contributing, indirectly, to national development, then the issues of ownership, legal constraints, training and financial capacity are key.

Key words: Tanzania, media, news, development issues, autonomy, ownership, finance, training, news sources, gender.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my parents Wilbert and Naimi, a.k.a. Mr and Mrs Nshanga, who although they did not get an opportunity to be educated beyond primary school, understood development from a gender perspective and practised this so well in bringing up their children. Specifically, I consider my mum to be my key teacher and philosopher. Often during my childhood whenever she wanted me to solve any problem I was facing, she would tell me Kiswahili words 'injini ya mtu ni kichwa chake' meaning the 'brain is the engine of every individual'. She believed that a person who does not think critically will not make positive progress in her/his life.

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My thanks to the Almighty for the gift of life and all the blessings which contributed to the accomplishment of my six and a half-year PhD journey on campus at the University of Bradford in the UK.

TAMWA, a women's rights activist organisation, which I provided leadership to for eleven years, deserves special appreciation because I used the organisation as a learning space and opportunity to use radio, television and newspapers to advocate for the women's development agenda. Indeed, it is the interaction I had with the media professionals in Tanzania that motivated me to pursue this PhD.

I would also like to thank all those who have supported me to complete this PhD. My supervisors, Dr Fiona Macaulay and Dr David Potts – thank you for the supervision which helped in shaping my thesis. Dr Anna Mdee, my former supervisor before she left the University of Bradford in June 2015, also deserves thanks for her support at the formative stages. Professor Chee Wong from the University of Leeds offered me a free, brief session on literature review. His session left me with the understanding that when analysing literature, you need to explain the context behind it because knowledge changes with context and time. Professor Andrew Coulson and Dr Rebecca Enuoh, I salute you. You read early drafts of Chapter One and provided feedback that made me realise that I was very far from where I was going. My daughters Moureen and Winnie, thank you for your timely support in reading my chapters and providing critical feedback. Mat Andrews, thank you for taking your time to educate me on how to write references and spending your time checking references in this thesis to make sure they are correctly written. Kudakwashe, Mabebe, Paksi, Yagmur and Hussein, you all supported me in different ways which made my journey worthwhile. Thank you.

At the beginning I had planned to research the ways in which Tanzania's media – radio, television and newspapers – portray women. However, I

changed the topic to focus on Tanzania's news media engagement with national development with the assumption that this topic would yield more interesting knowledge that could attract the attention of both men and women in Tanzania and beyond. I could reflect on my original topic after an interaction with an expert on PhDs, Professor Derek Pugh from Open University Business School in the UK, on June 20, 2013. Bradford School of Management had invited him to facilitate a workshop for the new PhD researchers titled 'How to get a PhD'. I would like to thank my PhD cohort member Dr Raiyya from Oman who took the initiative to request that the coordinator of the workshop, Professor James Wallace, allow me to be one of the workshop participants. The key lesson learned from Professor Pugh's session was that a doctoral thesis has four key parts: background theory, focal theory, data theory and contribution to the body of knowledge. According to Professor Pugh, contribution is something new compared to what other people have said and 'new' means it could be how it is presented or how it is argued.

My niece, Weshy Nathanael, you worked assiduously to help me every day to accomplish the massive tedious manual analysis of 10,371 news items. My husband, Mwidimi Itaeli, thank you for your patience and the time you spent in checking computation to make sure the empirical data was accurate. My young sister, Dr Juliana Goodluck Wilbard, you played a crucial role in taking care of my family throughout my PhD journey – thank you. My daughter, Annabel, through your excellent performance in A Level Secondary education and University you provided me with great support, love and encouragement which inspired me to continue the journey. Thank you for your unconditional love.

Pursuing a PhD abroad through self-sponsorship can be expensive in terms of draining family resources. Special thanks to the UK-based Fund for Women Graduates (FfWG) for financial support for accommodation and meals for many months in 2016 and Father Christopher Angel for allowing me to stay for some months in the Chaplaincy students' accommodation near the

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Along the way, there were also losses. Goodluck Christian (Samali), my brother-in-law and a long-time friend from primary school and a man whose fun and humorous personality were inspirational to me, died in February 2015. Meanwhile, my father's young brother Sabastian, died in September 2016 and my uncle Zablon in April 2017. Most importantly, my mum Naimi and dad Wilbert, a.k.a. Nshanga, who had seen me through the previous levels of academic achievement, did not live to see me pursuing the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. My mum Naimi specifically motivated me because at the age of 75, three years before she passed away, she had told me if she was aged 50 she would go back to school and study to get at least a first degree. Therefore, for me, the personal human gratification of doing a PhD far outweighed the difficulties encountered along the way.

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List of Abbreviations

- ARV:** Antiretroviral
- AIDS:** Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
- BBC:** British Broadcasting Corporation
- BRN:** Big Results Now
- CA:** Constituent Assembly
- CCM:** Chama Cha Mapinduzi
- CCT:** Christian Church of Tanzania
- CHADEMA:** Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo
- CSOs:** Civil Society Organisations
- CUF:** Civic United Front
- EJAT:** Excellence in Journalism Awards Tanzania
- FfWG:** Funds for Women Graduates
- GDP:** Gross Domestic Product
- HIV:** Human Immunodeficiency Virus
- LHRC:** Legal and Human Rights Centre
- MCT:** Media Council of Tanzania
- MDGs:** Millennium Development Goals
- NECTA:** National Examination Council of Tanzania
- NGOs:** Non-governmental Organisations
- PCT:** Pentecostal Church of Tanzania
- SDGs:** Sustainable Development Goals
- TAMWA:** Tanzania Media Women's Association
- TANU:** Tanganyika National Union
- TEF:** Tanzania Editors Forum

TGNP: Tanzania Gender Networking Programme

TMF: Tanzania Media Fund

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

URT: United Republic of Tanzania

USARF: University Students African Revolutionary Front

WEZA: Zanzibar Women Empowerment

Chapter One: Introduction

1.0 Introduction

This thesis examines the ways in which Tanzania's media report news on development issues and what accounts for the way they report on them. It explores the kinds of development issues the Tanzanian media of national status report in the news with prominence as lead stories and what the views are of media stakeholders about how these topics are reported. In establishing this, it analyses news stories reported in newspapers, radio and television to understand the Tanzanian media news sources on issues that affect the majority of citizens and the media stakeholders' views about the selection of people to provide views used to construct news stories. It also scrutinises the stories to reveal how Tanzanian media construct and frame news on development matters of national interest. Similarly, it investigates the key constraints and opportunities for Tanzanian media reporting on development issues from the viewpoint of ordinary citizens and how this has changed over time.

This case study research investigates the ways in which Tanzanian media report politics, economic and social development stories to show what remains the same, what has changed over time and what accounts for any changes. In so doing, it reflects on media access by the general population in changing political contexts, based on the level of literacy and technology advancement in information delivery. It examines the variables that influence media autonomy in choosing the content to report news stories, namely ownership, laws, finance and training. These variables are discussed in detail in Chapter Two and will be reflected in the subsequent chapters.

Further, it analyses categories of news sources, kinds of development issues and viewpoints on development issues given prominence in the 10,371 news stories reported by 15 Tanzanian media sources of national status for 28 consecutive days and the views of 76 media stakeholders about such reporting.¹ Specifically, it scrutinises the kinds of development issues in the 10,371 stories covered in large numbers as lead stories.² It also examines the categories of people dominating as news sources and the information on development issues framed in 36 emblematic

¹ Detailed procedure on how the news stories were analysed – discussed in Chapter Four – Methodology.

² See findings in Chapter Five.

news items selected from the 10,371 stories and published as front-page daily newspapers' lead stories.³

The data were gathered using qualitative methods combining primary and secondary sources. Primary data were gathered using face-to-face semi-structured interviews (Kvale 2007). Meanwhile, secondary data were gathered by buying copies of the newspapers and recordings of the radio and television news bulletins. Analysis of the data used interpretive content analysis (Gunter 2000).

The key findings show that politics-related news stories focusing on issues of interest of the ruling and governing elites receive high prominence in the national news. The viewpoints of the average citizens on social, economic and politics issues affecting their lives hardly receive prominence in the news reported in the media of national status. Such reporting is a result of a lack of media autonomy due to the mode of media ownership, laws that curtail media freedom, and finance and professional training capacity challenges facing the majority of media outlets in the country.

This study is significant because there is little systematic research focusing on the manner in which the media in Tanzania frame the national development agenda and ways in which contestations are articulated. The media channels involved in the inquiry were eleven daily newspapers including the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)-owned Uhuru⁴ and the state-owned Habari Leo and Daily News. The privately owned newspapers were Nipashe, Mwananchi, Mtanzania, Majira, Jambo Leo, Tanzania Daima, The Citizen and The Guardian. The broadcast news reports under scrutiny were aired in the 8 o'clock bulletins on TBC1 and TBC Taifa, the state-owned television and radio, and ITV and Radio One Stereo, the privately owned television and radio, respectively.

Therefore, the focus of this introductory chapter is to present what this inquiry seeks to achieve, the significance of the study, the philosophy underpinning the study, the theoretical approach for the analysis and a summary of research methods. It also discusses the genesis of the research, knowledge gap, the meaning of the concept

³ See section 5.2 on criteria used to select the emblematic news stories.

⁴ Uhuru is published in tabloid format from Monday to Saturday but on Sunday Uhuru is named Mzalendo which was also a tabloid. In this research Mzalendo was considered as the Uhuru newspaper and the same applies to the Daily News which on Sunday is named The Sunday News. The same applies for The Guardian newspaper which on Sunday comes out as The Guardian on Sunday. Similarly, the Citizen newspaper over the weekend comes out as the Citizen on Saturday and the Citizen on Sunday.

of media and of development in contemporary Tanzania, and it also presents a synopsis of the chapters in this thesis.

The chapter is organised into five sections. Section 1.1 focuses on observed practices in the Tanzanian media channels and the knowledge gap. In doing so, it discusses the genesis of the study and looks into research on media in Africa and Tanzania. Based on this gap the section also presents the research questions. Following this, section 1.2 discusses social constructionism, the philosophy foundation for this research, while section 1.3 looks at the the relevance of using a framing theory in this investigation. Section 1.4 deliberates on the contested definition of the two key concepts in this thesis, media and development. Section 1.5 looks at development issues in contemporary Tanzania and section 1.6 highlights the synopses of the subsequent chapters in the thesis.

1.1 The Genesis, Media Research and Methods

This section describes the genesis of the research before looking at media research in Africa, the knowledge gap and the research questions formulated for this investigation. The first subsection considers the genesis of the research while the second subsection focuses on the knowledge gap. This part also presents the research questions.

1.1.1 The Genesis of the Study

This study is the result of six observations and the questions that these observations raised. The observations are the result of my experiences, first as a news reporter and Shift News Editor at Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam (RTD) for over two decades and later as Executive Director of Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA), an organisation using media to report development issues involving women's and children's rights. Smith posits that social science researchers 'often enter into the activity of getting evidence on the basis of a particular conception of what is a normal or abnormal state of affairs' (Smith 1998: 15) in their society.

During my interactions with media professionals reporting news on development issues over many years, I observed unusual practices which prompted me to suspect that the relationship between media and development (maendeleo) of the general population in Tanzania was problematic. The practices include the continued

news reporting on development topics that focused on the viewpoints of the political elite in state power since single-party politics in the continent in the 1960s to contemporary multi-party politics. They also include the limited capacity of reporters to investigate and report effectively social, economic and politics issues concerning the majority of the population. Other issues were the media professionals' tendency to be uncritical of what high-level government leaders said about development issues. Other observed aspects included increased cases of violence against media professionals in contemporary times, rapid growth of unethical conduct of journalism and non-governmental organisations supporting the media in reporting social development issues.

Firstly, continuity has been observed from the single-party era to the contemporary multi-party politics of media culture of reporting news on social, economic and politics topics by giving prominence to views of politicians in state power. Media in Tanzania, both under the single-party politics era and in the contemporary multi-party system, rarely give prominence to news which is critical to the state power elite.

Media professionals need to scrutinise information on development issues gathered from people in state power because government leaders may spin information to avoid accountability. They can do so because governments have formidable powers as they possess three levers of power: coercive instruments (the police, the army and the law), legitimacy from the people who elect them to power and control of national resources. Therefore, irrespective of the type of government, democratic or non-democratic, due to the powers that government possess, the media as independent institutions in society mandated to monitor the government performance, should play a significant role to ensure news on development matters based on government sources gives a complete account of an issue.

Secondly, it has been noted that since private media were allowed in Tanzania in 1992, most reporters appear to have a limited capacity for investigating, interpreting and framing news on social, economic and politics issues in a way that the majority population can understand issues that require politicians in state power to be held accountable. Working as TAMWA's Chief Executive and an active member of

FemAct, a loose coalition bringing together civil society organisations, we noted skills gaps amongst reporters in interpreting development issues. To avoid misquotation or unclear reporting of our issues, before calling a press conference, we would write a press statement, both in English and Kiswahili, containing the information we intended the media to report on. After the press conference, the statement would be distributed to each reporter. In so doing, our issues would receive substantive news coverage, both in print and broadcast media, and without unnecessary mistakes. Otherwise, on occasions where we would not do so, reporting on the issues would be negligible and often misinterpreted.

Nonetheless, as much as one might associate this challenge with reporters' poor quality of professional skills and commitment to do their job effectively, I would argue that news production is problematic. Given my experiences in the production of broadcast news bulletins, it is impossible to avoid mistakes and subjectivity completely because of the nature of newsrooms. The volume of news requires journalists to work under pressure within a limited time frame to meet news deadlines. In such a situation news may become automatically subjective because media professionals may include information in the news that is not well interpreted because of the pressure to meet the deadlines. Similarly, they may select only the stories they understand well to ease production of the number of stories required.

Thirdly, the tendency of the media to be uncritical and afraid to follow up news on development issues involving high-profile government leaders has continued from the single-party to the multi-party era. For example, in 2005, a BBC Kiswahili service journalist asked the fourth President, Jakaya Kikwete (2005–2015), why the majority of the population in Tanzania was poor (Kicheche 2009). The Head of State replied that he did not know as he was quoted saying in Kiswahili: 'hata mimi sijui kwanini Tanzania ni maskini', meaning 'even I do not understand why Tanzania is poor'. Kikwete governed the country for ten years from 2005 to 2015. One would expect that the Tanzanian media would follow up the issue to understand why Kikwete would run for presidency for a second term in 2010. Yet he had no clue about what was making many people in the country live an undesirable life while a few people in the ruling and governing class were getting richer and richer. However, no single

media channel followed up the story. Meanwhile, in the previous decade, Tanzania had experienced impressive economic growth but 'much of the benefits of this growth went to the salaried elite' (Coulson 2013: 7). This clearly gives credence to the view that 'the mainstream media are not a complex collection of independent agencies holding the system to account but an elite-directed component of that system' (Harrison 2017).

Fourthly, incidences of violence against media professionals by police have increased when the fourth estate members are performing their normal duties. For example, the Chair of Tanzania Editors Forum and New Habari Cooperation Managing Editor, Absalum Kibanda, cheated death after being attacked by unidentified persons near the gate of his house on March 6, 2013. The editor was badly injured as 'some of his teeth were pulled out, fingernails plucked out, a finger cut out and his eye pierced'. An independent investigation revealed that the attack on Kibanda was engineered by security officials (Mbashiru 2013).

Such attacks were also targeted on reporters. For example, police brutally killed Daudi Mwangosi, a journalist with Channel Ten television on September 2, 2012, while on duty at Nyalolo village, Mufindi district in the southern region of Iringa. Mwangosi was amongst the eight journalists who travelled from Iringa town to the village to cover the Chadema rally (Mireny 2012: 19; The Guardian 2015). The reports indicated that police in Iringa had tried in vain to block the journalists from going to the village to cover the opposition party rally (MCT 2012). Editorials published by some Tanzanian press, such as The Guardian, condemned the police killing of the journalist (Ng'wanakilala 2012), however, a few days after the incident, the Police Commander in the Iringa region, Michael Kamuhanda, received a presidential promotion (MCT 2012b). The President promoting the Police Commander was interpreted as demeaning the general population (Msuya 2013).

Fifthly, there has been a rapid growth of violation of ethical journalism conduct. Before the introduction of private media in 1992, generally, media professionals would report news issues without demanding rewards from news sources. In contrast, in contemporary times, many media professionals have developed a culture of seeking rewards (mshiko) for coverage of social, economic and politics issues.

Mshiko is the money journalists receive from news sources as a 'favour', which reporters consider as a transport allowance.⁵ Some reporters directly or indirectly demand mshiko from a news source without which they will not report the news from the source. Otherwise, if the story gets reported it may be subjected to spin or focus on a trivial or controversial angle to the detriment of the news source. For example, press coverage of news about the 2010 Tanzania Gender Festival, a biannual civil society event organised to debate social, economic and politics issues from a gender perspective, was problematic. The reason was that reporters were not given mshiko (transport expenses) daily as they had demanded. The organising team, of which I was a member, decided that each reporter would be paid their mshiko at the end of the festival on submission of their stories. Such an arrangement would help organisers avoid rewarding *kanjanjas*. In the media sector in Tanzania *kanjanja* refers to an individual who introduces herself/himself as a journalist at organised events such as press conferences, seminars, workshops and meetings that attract media, but the *kanjanja* is a fake journalist soliciting money through dubious deals.⁶

The festival discussed themes such as land grabbing and cost sharing in the health service in a free market economy and their negative implications for the underprivileged population. However, these themes received minimal news coverage in the media. The media, particularly some Kiswahili daily newspapers, gave massive prominence in their news reporting to trivial controversial issues relating to homosexual and transgender groups.

Yet, homosexuality was and still is a sensitive topic in Tanzania. Newspaper reporters decided to give more news coverage to the controversial topic discussed by these groups because the festival media coordinating team refused to pay *mshiko* to the reporters on a daily basis as they had demanded. This incidence blended well with Hirji's (2012) notion that bias in the media takes many forms: some are direct

⁵ Transport allowance for coverage of a press conference, workshop or meeting may range from TZS 10,000 to 50,000 (equivalent £3.3 to 16) depending on the budget of the organiser.

⁶ Some *kanjanjas* possess fake press card(s) and use them to access media events or present themselves as journalists for a news source but do not produce any media work after engaging with the news sources. While in the field, a journalist I interviewed introduced me to a *kanjanja* and provided me with the person's telephone contacts. I made efforts to meet the *kanjanja* face to face who initially agreed to participate in the research after I communicated over the phone without disclosing how I got the telephone number, but later he changed his mind. The person refused to be interviewed even over the telephone and kept giving different excuses during the four telephone attempts I made at different intervals over a period of 30 days. Arguably, the person refused to be interviewed because, during a telephone conversation with me on the first day, I had explained my wish to conduct an interview because I was doing academic research on how the media in Tanzania engage with development issues, hence, the person might have sensed the danger of participating in the research.

while others are indirect but all impact on national development because they influence the minds and actions of audiences.

However, it seems that *mshiko* journalism is growing to become an institutionalised patronage system in the media industry in Tanzania where the news source expects certain services in return from the receiver (media professional). Such practices are noted in other African countries, such as Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, Zambia, Ghana, Cameroon, South Africa, Mali, Botswana, Benin and Nigeria (Skjerdal 2010). However, I would argue that *mshiko* journalism undermines the media's responsibility to report news on development issues with partiality. This is because news issues gathered from news sources who are unable to afford *mshiko*, may not be reported extensively or at all. Similarly, a reporter or editor can be bribed to 'kill a story' (Skjerdal 2010: 380). However, a study on bribery in the Tanzanian media shows that 78 percent of Tanzanian media professionals said they 'have never accepted a bribe' (Mpagaze and White 2010: 545). This means Tanzanian media professionals do not regard *mshiko* as a bribe. So, how do the media reporters frame news from news sources such as government officials which do not offer *mshiko*? What are the factors influencing such reporting?

Sixthly, social governmental organisations (NGOs) support media to carry out reporting on development issues in a collective (*bang style*)⁷ to ensure credibility of the news and reduce risks of attacks on reporters, editors and their respective media channels. Such organisations include Haki Elimu, LHRC, TGNP-Mtandao, TAMWA and Women's Dignity Project. These organisations largely work on gender and human rights issues. For example, in 1996, TAMWA organised a journalistic investigation in Lushoto district, Tanga region, involving a number of newspaper, radio and television channels to find out why the plague had persisted in the district for over 15 years, killing dozens of people every year, the majority being women and children. The investigation established that cultural beliefs, lack of knowledge on the

⁷ *Bang-style* media news coverage is an approach under which several newspapers, radio and television outlets investigate and report collectively and at once a piece of news (information) on development issues. The aim is to ensure the media news on development issues is accurate, appropriately sourced and contains the required information so that the news becomes a valuable resource for public accountability. The approach discourages the media culture of an individual scoop for news competition, instead encouraging a collective media approach to development issues. *Bang style* reduces risks of attacks on both media channels and individual journalists by politically and/or economically powerful individuals or groups. The approach has been used by Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA) since plural media were introduced in the country in 1992 and has been useful in reporting with impact on issues concerning women and children.

disease by the villagers in the area, and poor management of the disease were the reasons for its persistence. The news was given prominence as lead stories in the newspapers involved. Following the extensive media news coverage on the issue, the government – both at national and district levels – and Usambara Development Foundation intervened and finally plague fatalities came to an end (Nkya 2008).

These observations left me with several questions which prompted me to conduct a literature review to understand if there had been research in Tanzania that examined the ways in which Tanzanian media engaged with national development.

1.1.2 Media Research in Africa

Alan Bryman notes that the aim of analysing existing literature in the research subject is to know amongst other things: What is already known about this area? What concepts and theories are relevant to this area? Are there unanswered questions in this area (Bryman 2008: 81)?

Tanzania is a developing country in the African continent. Generally, there is relatively little literature about the media in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Bourgault 1995). Literature on the media in Africa focuses on aspects such as training and journalism ethics (Bourgault 1995; Schiffrin and Behrman 2011). ‘Brown envelope’ (bribery) for a story to be reported or not reported is one issue which has been researched by the media in SSA. Such research focused on: ‘(a) the extent and nature of the practice; (b) the link between poor economy and brown envelope journalism; (c) the impact of political and social conditions; and (d) ethical and professional considerations’ (Skjerdal 2010: 391). For example, research on bribery in the media has been carried out in Zambia (Kasoma 2010), Zimbabwe (Mabweazara 2018), Nigeria (Nwabueze 2010), Kenya (Helander 2010), Ethiopia (Lodamo and Skjerdal 2009) and Tanzania (Mpagaze and White 2010). In Ethiopia, what the research considered as a bribe (freebie) included taking things such as food, travel tickets and the like for journalists’ personal gain and ‘brown envelopes’, the informal money that journalists receive from sources (Lodamo and Skjerdal 2009).

On the other hand, there is a comparative study on ethical guides for newspapers covering business issues in South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe involving Business Daily in South Africa, Business Daily in Kenya and Financial Gazette in Zimbabwe (Mare and Brand 2010). The research revealed that although the three newspapers 'had ethical guidelines in place and editors and journalists recognised the importance of ethical behaviour, ethical practices did not follow. This is largely due to the precarious economic basis of the news organisations, lack of effective monitoring and cultural perspective of unethical behaviour at some sites' (Mare and Brand 2010: 410).

There are also studies focused on media professional training in African countries. The findings indicate that specialised training in most cases is provided by foreign organisations. They include news organisations such as Thomson Reuters Foundation (TRF), the BBC or international organisations such as the World Bank. Others are the International Centre for Journalism, based in the United States, and the International Institute for Journalism (IIJ) based in Berlin, Germany (Schiffrin and Behrman 2011).

The first study of 2009 commissioned by Revenue Watch Institute (RWI), an organisation mandated to strengthen civil society capacity to improve government accountability in countries with rich resources, involved Uganda, Ghana and Nigeria (Schiffrin and Behrman 2011). The second study was carried out by students and alumni of the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University as a follow-up to the first study. It examined the impact of business reporting training offered to African countries by TRF in 2009/2010. Methods used were both qualitative and quantitative through interviews (some face to face and others via Skype) and online surveys sent via e-mails on surveymonkey.com. The 65 journalists interviewed were different from those interviewed in the first study. The countries involved in the second study were Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and Nigeria (Schiffrin and Behrman 2011).

Findings of the studies showed that 79.1 percent of participants noted that lack of knowledge and skills to cover news on development topics was a major challenge to African media professionals. Further, the study of 2009 showed that 71.4 percent of

participants noted that unavailability of the 'Freedom of Information Act and poor information' was an inhibiting factor for the African journalists to perform their normative media function effectively (Schiffrin and Behrman 2011: 353).

A study on media in which Tanzania was involved was conducted by the Global Media Monitoring Project in 2015 involving 114 countries. It examined media content to understand the disparity between the number of men and women who speak in the media and involved media content produced in a single day. The study revealed that female voices in the news made up only 24 percent (Grimley 2015; Macharia 2015).

Research involving Tanzania alone examined the reporting of three newspapers: The Guardian, Nipashe and the Daily News on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) (Kweka 2013). The findings revealed that the Tanzanian press excluded vital information on environmental issues that could inform stakeholders of effective measures to tackle deforestation and forest degradation in Tanzania (Kweka 2013).

Two key conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of media in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Firstly, literature on the media in SSA and Tanzania is largely about media professionals' ethical practices related to financial matters (bribes). There is no systematic rigorous research on the way the media in SSA report news on development issues and why they report in that manner. Secondly, the small amount of literature available in Tanzania focuses on the way the media cover development issues related to a single issue – reduction of environmental deforestation and degradation – and involve a few media channels of the same type – three newspapers. However, the study does not examine the reasons for such reporting.

This analysis reveals that very little is known about media engagement with development issues in Tanzania more broadly. It also reveals that the media in sub-Saharan Africa lack freedom, financial capacity, professional skills and ethics. However, it does not examine why the media lack freedom and the impact of this for

the media watchdog role. Importantly, very few studies interview the local professionals who are involved in the production of media in SSA.

The gap identified on media research in Africa and Tanzania prompted me to formulate the following research questions.

1.1.3 Research Questions

Primary question: How do the Tanzanian media report news on development issues and what accounts for the way they report?

Secondary questions:

- a) What kinds of development issues do the Tanzanian media report in their news with prominence as lead stories and what are the views of media stakeholders on how these issues are reported?
- b) Who are the Tanzanian media news sources on development issues and what are the media stakeholders' views about such sources?
- c) How do the Tanzanian media interpret news on development issues?
- d) What are the key constraints and opportunities for the Tanzanian media in reporting development issues and how has this changed over time?

The knowledge generated in this research will be a potential contribution to literature on media social responsibility for three reasons. First, it involves a large sample of media constituting privately and state-owned electronic and print media, consequently allowing a large number of news items to be examined. Second, it interrogates media professionals and representatives of institutions that use media to champion their development agenda on what the reasons are for the ways in which they cover news on development topics. Third, it evaluates Tanzanian media autonomy to perform a watchdog role through reporting development issues based on media ownership, training, regulation and finance from the colonial era to the contemporary period.

1.1.4 Summary of Research Methods

As shall be discussed in detail in Chapter Four, this research uses a case study approach (Bryman 2012). The case focuses on a single case: media institutions in

Tanzania. The case study approach enables understanding of a particular issue of concern (Creswell 2007). This view is compatible with framing theory analysis which investigates how the Tanzanian media have been framing news on development issues in a changing context. Similarly, a case study is an 'empirical method that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the case) in depth' (Yin 2014: 14).

The study explores Tanzanian media autonomy in reporting development issues from the colonial to the contemporary period using media ownership, laws, finances and training as variables for analysis. Then it analyses the news content of the stories the Tanzanian media reported on development issues. It also uses a semi-structured face-to-face interview method (Kvale 2007) to gather the views of media stakeholders as to why the Tanzanian media report development issues in the way they do. Further, it uses the interpretive content analysis method (Gunter 2000) to understand the meaning contained in the news content and in the interview transcripts.

Since this study is qualitative in nature it uses social constructionism as guiding philosophy.

1.2 Social Constructionism: Philosophy Underpinning This Inquiry

This study is ontologically constructionist, thus, the media news text and media stakeholders' viewpoints examined in this study are not natural phenomena but human creations that can change. 'Constructionism is an ontological position (often also referred to as constructivism) that asserts that social phenomena and their meaning are continually being accomplished by social actors' (Bryman 2008: 19). It also means that the epistemologies being used in the inquiry are suitable to produce knowledge belonging to the constructionist tradition. Epistemology entails the way knowledge is generated. According to Crotty, epistemology can be defined as 'a way of understanding and explaining how we know what we know' (Crotty 1998: 3).

Social constructionism is rooted in multi-disciplinary social science knowledge, combining linguistics, philosophy and sociology (Burr 2015). Social constructionism can be traced back to the thinking of Berger and Luckmann (1967), who initiated the debate on objective and subjective reality, for the purpose of removing the uncertainty which surrounded the sociology of knowledge.

This research adopts the social constructionist philosophical tradition because the epistemologies used are interpretive, requiring explanation for meaning making. Social constructionist philosophy is an interpretive paradigm for understanding reality which posits that 'all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and transmitted within an essentially social context' (Crotty 1998: 42). Additionally, the thesis is guided by the social constructionist approach because knowledge produced through social constructionism tends to be credible as the methods used to generate the data focus on 'explaining the reality' (Robson 2011: 133). Social constructionists emphasise the use of discourses generated through interactions (Tublin 1996; Burr 2015). As explained in section 1.0 in this chapter, this inquiry is not only investigating the kinds of development issues and news sources the media professionals select for news, but it also interacts with media literature and stakeholders to understand why reporters and editors select such issues and news sources.

Similarly, as discussed in subsection 1.4.1 in this chapter, development is a socially constructed phenomenon based on human thoughts and practices. Likewise, news covered in the media is not a phenomenon independent of peoples' minds, but rather constructs of journalists (editors and reporters) and/or the media owner. Publishing news is a culmination of a complex sequence of actions taking place both within and outside the newsrooms. Media professionals construct news from the secondary data, interviews they conduct with individuals and groups of their choice. For example, for newspapers, in most cases, it is the news editors or news editorial board which make decisions on the news to be published as front-page lead stories and what information should be framed as the news key headline. Even in television, although viewers may see real images of the people involved in a news item, the news is constructed because there is invisible censorship of what is broadcast (Bourdieu 2001).

Ott and Mack argue that by selecting 'to include some topics and to exclude or ignore others, the media establish which social issues are considered important and which are considered unimportant' (Ott and Mack 2010: 13). O'Shaughnessy and Stadler concur and observe that because of their representation, interpretation and evaluation roles, the media do not just reflect events, but also actively construct

them. Consumers of the media learn from media constructs and, after some time, are naturalised (O'Shaughnessy 2012). Hence, it is important to be critical of news covered in the media. For Ott and Mack, 'critical studies are generally concerned with determining whose interests are served by the media, and how those interests contribute to domination, exploitation, and/or asymmetrical relations of power' (Ott and Mack 2010: 15). This will be discussed further in Chapter Two.

Through a social constructionist approach this research seeks to investigate how the Tanzanian media report news on development issues. This is important because critical studies 'view society as a complex network of interrelated power relations that symbolically privilege and materially benefit more individuals and groups over the others' (Ott and Mack 2010: 15). The way journalists construct news maintains a 'particular relationship of power' (ibid.). Social constructionists understand that inequality in society is a result of the categories of social groups which have been socially constructed and are the product of culture and history (Tublin 1996). However, Vivien Burr argues that change is possible because the actions that society takes on situations are informed by the type of knowledge available (Tublin 1996; Burr 2015). Moreover, the knowledge produced through social constructionism tends to be credible because methods used to generate the data focus on 'explaining the reality' (Robson 2011: 133).

Social constructionism philosophy blends well with the framing theory and analysis approach used in this inquiry.

1.3 Framing Theory

This study adopts the framing theory as an analytical approach to understand the way the Tanzanian media report development issues. Framing is credited to the thinking of the sociologist Erving Goffman (1974) and anthropologist-psychologist Gregory Bateson (1972). The term framing 'refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue' (Chong and Druckman 2007: 104). This assertion suggests that frames are constructed using the human mind.

Framing theory was selected because it blends well with social constructionism – the philosophy underpinning this study as the key principle for the two paradigms is that the reality is socially constructed: to frame is to construct. The major premise of

framing theory is that an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and be construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations (Chong and Druckman 2007). Further, framing involves organising information so that, when it is socially shared, it provides meaning to reality (De Vreese 2005; Chong and Druckman 2007). Frames are the key considerations emphasised in communication (Chong and Druckman 2007). As Todd Gitlin puts it: 'Frames enable journalists to process large amounts of information quickly and routinely to recognise it as information, to assign it to cognitive categories and to package it for effective relay to their audiences' (Gitlin 2003: 7). The five framing devices that journalists use are: (1) metaphors, (2) exemplars (i.e. historical examples from which lessons are drawn), (3) catchphrases, (4) depictions and (5) visual images (Gamson and Modigliani 1989: 3).

Moreover, frames enable the audience to make sense of news information because, generally, people think that journalists 'spin' stories (Davis 2018). Studies in cognitive psychology demonstrate that audiences are highly influenced by the way choices are framed. For example, the landmark study of Tversky and Kahneman (1981; 1984) suggested that people will select varied outcomes depending on whether the same information is framed in terms of risks or benefits. Frames that focus on 'conflict, morality, and uncertainty drive more public concern than frames that emphasise economics, policy and other more routine issues' (Davis 2018). This assertion suggests that negative news sells more because people do not want to put their life at risk.

Moreover, the way frames work is that they highlight information, making it more visible, expressive and memorable to audiences (Entman 1993). Framing of news involves selection of particular topics, issues, events and individuals' views deemed worthy of media news attention (Price et al. 1997). News stories involving the ruling and governing elite are given more attention and prominence than others. The Italian philosopher Gramsci used the concept of hegemony to explain how powerful groups in society exercise power over ideas compared to other subordinate groups.

Framing was also selected because news stories involving the ruling and governing elite are given more attention and prominence than others. As a result, the 'idea of powerful interests opposing much weaker and more disorganised ones has proved

to be one of the most hotly debated issues in media and communication theory' (Price 1998: 21). But what is the reality in Tanzania?

Other theories, including agenda setting, which has been used in media research since the 1970s (McCombs and Shaw 1972), were not appropriate for this study. Reflecting on the key question of this research: How do the Tanzanian media report news on development issues and what are the reasons for the way they report? I realised that the agenda-setting theory would not be able to inform my research sufficiently. This is because agenda setting places emphasis on the importance of a story and the amount of coverage it receives (accessibility) (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Collins and Loftus 1975; Tulving and Watkins 1975; Price et al. 1997; Carroll and McCombs 2003; De Vreese 2005; Iyengar and Kinder 2010). Moreover, framing is more appropriate for this study than agenda setting because what matters 'is not what you say, it is how you say it' (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007: 9).

However, framing theory has some weaknesses. The main weakness is that it makes assumptions that media audiences have sufficient knowledge and experiences of all issues all the time to enable them to deconstruct media content (Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Zaller 1992; Iyengar 1994). Yet, the audiences have little or no clue about many issues of political and social interests (ibid.). Further, framing theory is appropriate for this study because the media meaning for development is contested.

After discussing the importance of adopting framing theory in the study, the next subsection looks at the contested meaning of the two key concepts in this thesis: media and development.

1.4 Contested Meaning of Media and Development

This section examines the meaning of the two dominant concepts in this inquiry – media and development – and argues that both concepts are pervasive but the meaning of each is contested. Neither of the two concepts have a universal agreeable definition of what they constitute or mean. The intended meaning of media or development tends to change with political, social, economic and technological contexts as shall be discussed in this section.

1.4.1 Contested Meaning of Media

Media is a concept frequently used in the literature, but its meaning is contested as discussion in this subsection demonstrates. The term 'media' has its origin in the Western world and it dates back to 1440 when a German, Johannes Gutenberg, initiated the technological method of printing (Lehmann-Haupt 2017). Gutenberg's Bible was the first material the printing technology produced in 1450 (Needham 1982; Lehmann-Haupt 2017). During this time few people were literate. For example, in Britain, by 1642, very few people were able to write their names (Stone 1969). Therefore, until the 18th century, 'the business of producing and transmitting messages was viewed as being vested in the hands of an elite, however it may be defined' (Bennett 1982: 26).

Bennett observes that, during the 17th and 18th centuries, in the sociology of mass communication, media was known as 'mass media' and they included newspapers, the record industry and the cinema (Bennett 1982). However, the word 'mass' was dropped because of the relationship between media and the state, and media and the audience (ibid). In media studies, the audience refers to people either as individuals or groups like newspaper readership, radio listeners and viewers of television news (Napoli 2012). Bennett argued that if 'the audience, which constituted the receiving end of the communication process, was to be regarded as a "mass" or "the masses", then the business of producing and transmitting messages was viewed as being vested in the hands of an elite, however it may be defined' (Bennett 1982: 26).

Bennett's assertion suggests that, during the early years, media audiences were regarded as passive individuals who would not enter into dialogue with media text to critically shape it or even to reject it. Hence, whoever disseminated information on any topic using radio, television and/or newspapers was construed as an expert on that topic.

However, after technology advancement, in contemporary times, media scholars from both developing and developed countries refer to media as radio, TV, newspapers, magazines, billboards, films, recordings, books, the internet and the smart media (Fox 1988; Yadava 1991; Stewart et al. 2001; Ogundimu 2002; Hydén et al. 2003; Fourie 2007; Kohli-Khandekar 2008; Postil 2008; Stadler 2012; Wimmer

and Dominick 2013). This definition is not universal because technology advancement varies from one continent to the other. Even within the same country, what constitutes media varies from one community to the other. The key reason is the variation in social and economic opportunities (Nyamnjoh 2005a; Küng et al. 2008).

For example, in Africa, some rural communities are poor and illiterate, and not all people have access to radio, newspapers, television, e-mail and mobile phones. For example, in Uganda, modern means of communication are not accessible to some rural communities because of the lack of software and hardware, and the necessary infrastructure for computer-retrieved information. Therefore, traditional drums and horns are used 'as a medium of mass communication to transmit important, urgent messages to a relatively large audience' (Mushengyezi 2003: 110).

Based on the definitions provided by scholars, two observations can be put forward. Firstly, from the 18th century to the contemporary period, newspapers, radio and television have consistently featured in what scholars construe as media. Secondly, the scholars' definition of media is confined to technologies used in delivering information from sender to recipient. This is problematic because theorising media solely as a mechanism of transmitting information is misleading.

This is because, from an interpretivist's point of view, media are not just tangible communication technological tools. They also include intangible or software power (a message) that is transmitted for the purpose of making a particular meaning between the sender and the recipient. Henry Jenkins asserts that: 'Delivery systems are simply and only technologies but media are also cultural systems. Delivery technologies come and go all the time, but media persist as layers within an ever more complicated information and entertainment stratum' (Jenkins 2006: 14). This is why UNESCO defines the meaning of media by focusing on its critical watchdog role in society. It says that media is a channel of information communication and is a 'watchdog of government in all its forms, promoting transparency in public life and public scrutiny of those with power through exposing corruption, maladministration and corporate wrongdoing (UNESCO 2008: 3).⁸

⁸ The media watchdog role will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two.

In the same vein, Lisa Gitelman advances UNESCO's view and posits that media is more than communication delivery technologies because it also involves social interactions determined by individuals' economic, social and material relationships. For Gitelman (2007: 7-8), media refers to:

...socially realised structures of communication, where structures include both technological forms and their associated protocols, and where communication is a cultural practice, a ritualized collocation of different people on the same mental map, sharing or engaged with particular ontologies of representation...

While Gitelman's meaning of media includes both communication delivery instruments and the meaning that a message makes between the sender and recipients (social constructionism), it has a fundamental flaw. This is because interpreting media from this point of view makes an assumption that peoples' ways of interpreting the world (constructivism) are homogeneous. Yet, individuals have different thoughts because of their varied life experiences as, for example, some are rich while others are poor, some are dominating, others dominated. As a result, individuals have different mental processes (cognitive) which make them perceive the world differently (Goffman 1974).

Two observations can be made from the varied meaning of media provided by scholars. First, what constitutes media is contested as it varies with context and the intention of whoever is using the concept. Second, the meanings are limited as they ignore the audiences' capacity to reconstruct and rebuild media text.

Therefore, in this inquiry, 'the media' means Tanzania's newspapers, radio and television, and the interpretation of the news they report on social, economic and politics issues.

But what is news? Harcup and O'Neill (2016a: 1471) observe that news generally must satisfy one or more of the following requirements:

- (1) The power elite: Stories concerning powerful individuals, organisations or institutions.
- (2) Celebrity: Stories concerning people who are already famous.

- (3) Entertainment: Stories concerning sex, show business, human interest, animals, an unfolding drama or offering opportunities for humorous treatment, entertaining photographs or witty headlines.
- (4) Surprise: Stories that have an element of surprise and/or contrast.
- (5) Bad news: Stories with particularly negative overtones, such as conflict or tragedy.
- (6) Good news: Stories that have positive overtures such as rescues and cures.
- (7) Magnitude: Stories that are perceived as sufficiently significant either in the numbers of people involved or in potential impact.
- (8) Relevance: Stories about issues, groups and nations perceived to be relevant to the audience.
- (9) Follow up: Stories about subjects already in the news.
- (10) Newspaper agenda: Stories that set or fit the news organisation's own agenda.

However, as will be discussed in Chapter Four, news about entertainment is not included in the sample of news examined in this inquiry.⁹

The next subsection discusses the meaning of development and, at the end, explains the meaning of development adopted for this research.

1.4.2 Contested Meaning of Development

The meaning of the term 'development' is contested (Sen 1999; Sachs 2000; Pieterse 2001; Szirmai 2005; Rist 2008; Hopper 2012). For example, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, developing countries, which were decolonising from foreign domination and exploitation, interpreted development as a 'struggle' to achieve independence (Sachs 2000; Szirmai 2005; Rist 2008). However, it would be inimical for Western industrialised countries to construe development that way because colonisation was beneficial to them. The European countries acquired agricultural materials produced on the land and cheap human labour obtained from the African countries they colonised (Rodney 1972; Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009).

Similarly, the struggle for decolonisation could not be understood to mean development for the African countries which were not colonised. For example,

⁹ Chapter Four discusses the methodology used for this inquiry.

Ethiopia and Liberia were the African members of the League of Nations which were not colonised (Bello and Gebrewold 2009).

In the 1970s and 1980s, development was construed as modernisation, meaning investing in industrialisation in developing nations. However, Arturo Escobar argued that billions of dollars that were used in the name of 'development' had no significant value to the developing world, rather it was perpetuation of colonialism in disguise (Escobar 1995). Similarly, development that was understood only as modernisation, potentially destroyed social cohesion because such an approach ignored indigenous knowledge (Gray 2007).

In the 2000s, the concept of development referred to in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) meant the process of freeing men, women and children from the abject and dehumanising conditions of extreme poverty (United Nations 2015). However, extreme poverty continues and the world's poor remain overwhelmingly concentrated in some parts of the world, particularly sub-Saharan Africa (ibid.).

In contemporary times, the United Nations (UN) refers to development as 'sustainable development', meaning 'development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (Drexhage and Murphy 2010: 2). However, it is not clear whether this concept of development can become a reality in a world in which extreme poverty is still a pervasive reality, particularly in the sub-Saharan African countries.

That is why Amartya Sen conceptualised development as freedom including individual freedom, political freedom and media freedom (Sen 1999). Sen (ibid.) contends that media autonomy encourages journalists to investigate and expose the wrongdoings of public leaders that undermine the wellbeing of the general population. The scholar cites an example that the famine that occurred in China after the Great Leap Forward in 1959–61 was exacerbated by lack of media autonomy to inform the authorities in advance of the need to take preventive measures (Sen 1999).

Therefore, given that what constitutes development is contested because the meaning depends on the user's interest (Hopper 2012), this thesis adopts Sen's

(1999) definition. The definition of development as freedom is suitable for this thesis which examines how Tanzanian media engage with national development issues. This is because Sen (1999) observes that freedoms include media freedom. Autonomy is the fundamental factor which influences media social responsibility as it encourages journalists to investigate and report the wrongdoings of public leaders which undermine the development of the general population (Stapenhurst 2000; Brunetti and Weder 2003; O'Grady 2014).

1.5 Development Issues in Contemporary Tanzania

This section discusses development issues in contemporary Tanzania. It highlights how Tanzania came into existence and its political geography. Next, it discusses the effects of a patriarchal approach to government that does not encourage the voice of women in the discussion of development issues. It also explains the types of political systems that have been used to govern the country over the last 55 years, economic growth and its distribution challenges, and population growth and its implication for land, which is still the key source of livelihood for most Tanzanians. It also looks at Tanzania's contemporary performance in indicators of development such as happiness, peace and freedom. Figure 1 shows the map of Tanzania and its neighbouring countries.

Figure 1: Tanzania and Neighbouring Countries



Source: Worldatlas retrieved from

<https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/lqcolor/tzcolor.htm> on 12/04/2019.

Tanzania was formed after the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar on April 26, 1964. Prior to that, the two countries had been colonised by the UK and Germany. Germany was the first European nation to colonise Tanganyika in 1885, initially through the Society for German Colonisation founded by Carl Peters. German rule of Tanganyika was officially recognised in 1890 through a treaty with the British government that defined the border between present-day Kenya and Tanzania. Tanganyika was known as German East Africa and it initially encompassed the current three countries of Burundi, Rwanda and mainland Tanzania. Germany ruled Tanganyika from 1885 until the end of the First World War in 1918. Subsequently, the UK administered Tanganyika as a protectorate under a mandate from the League of Nations and later as a United Nations Trust Territory (Taylor 1963).

Tanganyika attained independence from Britain on December 9, 1961. From 1967 Tanzania was governed under single-party politics before adopting a multi-party political system in 1992.

Geographically, Tanzania occupies a total area of 940,000 square kilometres (362,000 square miles) and it is the largest country in East Africa, six times bigger than England and bigger than France and Germany combined (Taylor 1963). Tanzania is located a few degrees south of the equator and borders the Indian Ocean in the east, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique in the south, Kenya and Uganda in the north, and Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the west.

Tanzania became the first country in Africa to make an African language the national one in 1964 and Kiswahili is now understood by the general population all over the country (Petzell 2012: 138). Laitin (1992:140), cited in Petzell (2012: 138), observed that, in Tanzania today, some 90 percent of the population speaks Swahili. The language has become a unifying force in the country since it is used as the medium of communication in primary schools, public gatherings and in the media. Although there are more than 120 tribal languages in Tanzania (LOT 2009), 'their use is seen as a risk to national unity and as backward looking' (Petzell 2012: 139). Many other African countries, including neighbouring Uganda, are not able to use one language to communicate with the entire general population (Kwesiga 1994).

Nonetheless, Tanzania, like most other African countries, is a patriarchal society (Gneezy et al. 2009). Walby noted that social scientists such as Weber (1947) referred to patriarchy 'as a system of government in which older men "rule the societies through their positions as heads of households"' (Walby 1989: 214). This suggests that in a patriarchal society woman and young men are not considered equal to older men. As a result, the viewpoints of women and most men in Tanzania are given little emphasis in the discourses on national development. Even where laws have been put in place to give women a voice to articulate their development concerns, subtle patriarchy is exercised to reduce that voice. Yet, women in Tanzania face problems including gender-based violence, workload burden,

maternal mortality and lack of safe water (URT. 2013; World Bank 2017). Therefore, the presence of women in decision-making positions remains problematic; such positions include in the parliament (Yoon 2011). Yet, parliament is supposed to oversee government performance including equal distribution of national wealth to benefit all people in all areas.

Meanwhile, Tanzania possesses rich and diverse natural development resources, which include valuable minerals such as gold, diamonds and tanzanite. But it seems that the multi-national mining companies have been benefiting excessively from generous mineral extraction contracts (Lundstøl et al. 2013). On attaining state power in 2015, the government of Tanzania's fifth President, John Magufuli, amended mining contracts so that the government could get a better return from mining projects (Kapdi and Parring 2018). Tanzania also has world-class tourist attractions, including the highest mountain in Africa, Mount Kilimanjaro, which reaches 5,895 metres above sea level. Similarly, it has world-class wildlife resources, including elephants and rhinos. However, poaching is a big challenge as it threatens the extinction of precious animals.¹⁰

The country also has plenty of water as it is bordered by three large lakes. Lake Tanganyika is the second deepest lake in the world. The lake lies in the west, forming borders with Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Lake Victoria is the second largest freshwater lake in the world, located in the northern part of the country, bordering Kenya and Uganda. Nyasa is the third lake, lying at the southern border of Tanzania with Malawi (LHRC 2013; URT. 2013; LHRC 2016). Additionally, much of the country's land is fertile and it is dissected by numerous rivers and streams. Much of the country receives reasonable rainfall every year, making it useful for agriculture and animal husbandry activities. Fertile land and water are fundamental resources depended upon by the majority of citizens as the source of their livelihoods (Kahama et al. 1986; World Bank 2017).

After independence and the union, Tanzania was governed under single-party rule for 28 years from 1967 to 1995. It was ruled by the Tanzania National Union (TANU) and later, from 1977, by Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), after the Afro-Shirazi Party

¹⁰ See details on these issues in Chapter Seven, section 7.2.

of Zanzibar merged with TANU. Under the single-party state, many aspects of the economy were also controlled by the state and the country implemented a form of African socialism known as ujamaa. In this process, ujamaa villages were formed in the rural areas to try to introduce a form of rural socialism.¹¹ However, after multi-party politics were adopted in 1992, the media and economy were also liberalised. Since then, there has been a mushrooming of privately owned print and broadcast media, of national and community status, competing with the state-owned media.

Moreover, several political parties have been established, but at present, two – CUF in Zanzibar and Chadema in mainland Tanzania – seem to be the main competitors to CCM. Since 1995, the parliament, an organ mandated to enact the country's laws and provide oversight, has included Members of Parliament (MPs) from both the ruling party and opposition and the number of MPs from the opposition has been increasing over time.¹² However, there has not been any change of governing party although the presidency changes after two five-year terms (World Bank 2017). As a result, the MPs from the party in state power tend to define the national development agenda in such a way as to favour the personal interests of both leaders and their parties.¹³

Social indicators of development in Tanzania, such as literacy, school enrolment and life expectancy, seem to be progressing relatively well. For example, life expectancy at birth increased by 16.1 years from 50.2 in 1990 to 66.3 in 2017, while mean years of schooling increased by 2.2 years and expected years of schooling increased by 3.4 years (UNDP 2018a). However, there have been issues of quality of delivery and inequality in the distribution of human development across the population at the country level (ibid.).

Similarly, development based on general welfare measured by per capita gross domestic product (GDP) suggests that, in recent decades, there has been rapid economic growth in Tanzania. For example, Tanzania's real GDP grew on average

¹¹ Chapter Three provides details of how the ujamaa village development approach was implemented.

¹² See Chapter Three, section 3.1.4, for the size of the ruling party CCM and the opposition in parliament after the 2015 general elections.

¹³ See Chapter Seven, sections 7.1 and 7.1.1 on the way CCM affiliates in the Constituent Assembly pushed for the party's development agenda in the Constituent Assembly in 2014. As a result, the country failed to write a citizens-centred development constitution though the draft popular constitution had been constructed based on the views gathered from the diverse groups countrywide.

by over 7 percent in the period 2013–2017 (World Bank 2018b). However, recent economic growth has tended to favour the elite because ‘much of the benefits of this growth went to the salaried elite’ (Coulson 2013: 7). For example, the take-home salary of an MP, inclusive of all other packages, is TZS12 million, not less than £4,000 per month (Makweta 2016), about 15 times the income of an average household. Similarly, there is a huge disparity in development between the urban and rural areas. For example, only about half of the rural population have access to safe water compared to three quarters of the urban population (World Bank 2017: 25).

Moreover, it seems that the continued increase in population combined with the sale of significant areas of land to large investors threatens to undermine the access of rural Tanzanians to land (Potts forthcoming 2019). It is estimated that Tanzania’s current population is 57.3 million people (World Bank 2018a), almost one third more than ten years ago. Similarly, because the majority of Tanzanians depend on land as a means of livelihood (Coulson 2013; Potts forthcoming 2019), with such rapid population growth, the future of development for the majority of Tanzanians whose livelihoods depend on lands is constrained by the increasing scarcity of land. The Tanzanian land policy of 1997 suggested that the increased human population ‘have increased the demand for land and competition for plots especially in and around the urban areas’ (URT 1997: 1). Moreover, with liberalisation of the economy, many poor citizens are likely to lose their land to investors or the few well-to-do Tanzanians. For example, the Minister for Lands, Housing Development, William Lukuvi, announced on November 28, 2018 that people who own plots in Bunju, Mpiji, Mtoangoma, Mwanagati Kibada, Gezaulole Mwongozo, Mbweni and Mbweni Malindi in Dar es Salaam will lose their land if they have not developed the land at all by December 31, 2018 (Jamal 2018). This suggests that after the government takes this land it will be subjected to open market forces for those who have the money to access and develop it.

In contemporary times, ideas about development have been influenced by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UNDP 2015) and Tanzania is trying to implement them through its development, Vision 2025 (URT 2000a). For example, to

improve the development of people living below the food poverty line, the government started a massive overhaul of its current national Productive Social Safety Nets (PSSN) in 2013. It initiated a programme focusing on pregnant women and children under five in poor households which, so far, has benefited 1.1 million households in 9,976 villages (United Nations 2018).

In theory, multi-party elections should improve political freedoms, but in practice, evidence of electoral malpractices has increased over time, so these freedoms are threatened (Potts forthcoming 2019). Since John Magufuli took over as the fifth President of Tanzania in 2015, up to 2018, he has prioritised efforts to clamp down on corruption, improve public administration and manage public resources for improved social outcomes. Magufuli's attempts to curb corruption in government have been appreciated, as 72 percent of Tanzanians say corruption has decreased compared to previous years (World Bank 2018b). However, performance in human security in the country has become problematic. According to Newman, human security is 'freedom from want and freedom from fear' (Newman 2010: 78). Citizens are not certain of their safety because, between 2016 and 2018, there have been incidences of abduction of people including journalists, musicians, politicians and entrepreneurs. For example, a young millionaire, Mohamed Dewji, was abducted from a public place in Dar es Salaam in October 2018 (BBC News 2018) but the unknown abductors returned him after several days (Aljazeera 2018). Similarly, in April 2017, three musicians, including Ibrahim Musa, alias Roma Mkatoliki, were kidnapped after their assailants invaded a studio where they were working in the Masaki area of Dar es Salaam (Namkwahe and Mwalimu 2017). Roma Mkatoliki said: 'the kidnappers tortured them before they let them free' (Mesomapyra 2017). Moreover, others who have been abducted have not been seen to date and it is not known whether they are alive or dead. They include Mwananchi newspaper journalist Anzory Gwanda, reportedly kidnapped on November 21, 2017 in Kibiti town near Dar es Salaam (Frykberg 2017). Before disappearing, Gwanda had published a series of stories on the mysterious killings of civilians and police officers in Kibiti (ibid.).

Such uncalled for practice against citizens contradicts what is stipulated in Tanzania's 2025 development vision, which asserts that by 2025 the country will

have achieved a strong and competitive economy and a well-educated and learning society, good governance, high-quality livelihood and peace, stability and unity (URT 2000b). The Global Peace Index 2018 shows that the trend of peace in Tanzania has been decreasing sharply over the last three years (Global Peace Index 2018). Following the decrease in peace, the trend of happiness also deteriorated sharply during the same period and by 2018 Tanzania ranked 153 out of the 156 countries evaluated in the index of happiness (Helliwell et al. 2018). This suggests that Tanzania was amongst the five countries whose citizens face the most problems that make them unhappy.

The indicators which the UN used to measure happiness included strengthening of the social support network, healthy life expectancy, philanthropy, absence of corruption in government and business, and individual freedom (Ventura 2018). According to the Freedom House report for 2018, Tanzania is currently facing serious problems with freedom of speech, political freedom and media freedom. In all these freedoms it scores four out of seven, whereby one is the highest (freedom) and seven is the lowest. The report highlights numerous incidences of violation of these freedoms including the shooting of Chadema MP Tundu Lissu, banning political parties' activities, harassing non-governmental organisations and closure of some of the press (Freedom House 2018).

Interpretation of the increasingly unequal distribution of economic growth and the decrease in peace, happiness and freedoms – including individual freedom, political freedom and media freedom – suggests that Tanzania's future national development is problematic.

1.6 Synopsis of the Thesis Chapters

This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter Two sets out the theoretical framework for understanding the ways in which the Tanzanian media report development issues and the reasons for the ways they report these issues. It looks at the media's social responsibility function – the watchdog role and its contested views. It also explores media autonomy in sub-Saharan African countries using media ownership, laws, regulations and training as variables for analysis. It reveals that from the colonial to the contemporary period the state power elites have used

the media to push their development agenda and as a result they see critical media as a threat to their continued state power control.

Chapter Three examines how Tanzanian media has changed from the colonial to the contemporary times. The chapter reveals that state power elites increased media control as media technology of delivering information to a wider mass improved and more of the population became literate and hence able to access media information.

Chapter Four defends the research methodology while Chapter Five discusses the kinds of development issues the media reported, the issues framed as lead stories in 10,371 stories and the views of the media stakeholders as to the rationale for such reporting. One finding shows that politics issues focusing on interests of the ruling elite dominated lead stories, especially in Kiswahili dailies.

Chapter Six presents and discusses findings on news sources in 10,371 stories on development issues and the reasons provided by media stakeholders as to why the media select news sources the way they do. The findings show that the biggest number of news sources were government affiliates; the reason being the media's autonomy to source valuable information for national development is constrained by ownership, regulations, training and financial factors. For example, media's source of revenue largely depends on government agencies' advertisements which put media freedom in an awkward position when it comes to non-state power news sources which can reveal classified information.

Chapter Seven analyses information in 36 emblematic news items published as lead stories on daily newspapers' front pages. The findings show that most of the lead stories and their headlines were constructed using non-investigative information which would not help citizens understand issues which required public leaders to be held accountable.

Chapter Eight concludes the thesis. It reflects on the key findings and discusses the implications of the findings for theory and practice. It also explains the contribution of this study to the body of knowledge in the field and proposes future research.

Chapter Two: Media Watchdog Role in Africa: Framing Analysis

2.0 Introduction

The overall perspective underlying this inquiry is the view that most news media in sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, particularly Tanzania, will perform their normative social responsibility role of watchdog provided they have autonomy. Yet, media autonomy is influenced by ownership, regulations, finance and training. As a result, journalists are manipulated and consequently their professional values are influenced by the interests of influential individuals and social groups wanting to use the media to push for their development agenda.

This investigation, therefore, builds on available literature on the media watchdog function by using the framing theory as an analytical framework to provide a better understanding of the ways in which media in sub-Saharan Africa perform a watchdog role. As Louise Bourgault observes, there is a 'lack of accounts in the literature of day-to-day or lived reality of the mass media in sub-Saharan Africa' (Bourgault 1995). Moreover, the small amount of research conducted about media in Africa is not rigorous because, among other reasons, the researchers used a small sample size (White 2010).

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first discusses the media watchdog function by focusing on how autonomy influences media's social responsibility and the contestations around this function. The second part investigates the autonomy of the media in sub-Saharan Africa for a better understanding of the opportunities and constraints involved in executing the watchdog role. In doing so, it examines the ways in which media ownership, regulations, finance and training influence the media's social responsibility function. The third part draws a conclusion.

2.1 Media Watchdog Role

This section examines the media's social responsibility – the watchdog role. It explores what the media watchdog role entails, its importance in society and discusses contestations about the media's performance in reporting effectively, including the content and voices to which the media news reporting give prominence. It also looks at the key condition of autonomy required for the media to execute the watchdog function and how media ownership, regulations, finance and training influence media autonomy.

The dominant view is that the key social job of the media is the watchdog function (Francke 1995; Neelakantan 2010; Odugbemi and Norris 2010; Rieder 2013; Cage 2014; Eggerton 2018; Tito'ona 2018). The media are able to play a watchdog role because it is assumed that the way they frame information on an issue in news reports influences how the issue is understood by audiences (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).

The watchdog idea is based on the liberal conception of the news media as autonomy institutions in society (the fourth estate), that through news reporting on development aspects the media ought to provide a monitoring role towards government on behalf of the general population (Jebril 2013). For example, it has been the job of the news media since the press came into existence to help produce an informed electorate so that they can make up their own minds. Similarly, in the case of war and terror, when societies are in fearful times, the job of the media is to let the audience know how the government is performing in protecting the lives of the masses. However, the press cannot carry out such a public service if it allows the government to be the editor and the sensor of what is published (Keller 2007).

The above assertion suggests that the press can perform this important public service only if it has freedom and capacity (the fourth estate) to do their job. The term 'fourth estate' hails from the European concept of the three estates of the realm: the clergy, the nobility and the commoners. It has come to symbolise the media or press as a segment of society that has an indirect but key role in influencing the political system. Nowadays, the term is often used as a collective noun to refer to all journalists. Thomas Carlyle attributed the origin of the term to Edmund Burke, who used it in a parliamentary debate in 1787 on the opening of press reporting to the House of Commons of the UK. Oscar Wilde wrote that the press had become the 'only estate' that had 'eaten up the other three' (Cooke 2018). This theory suggests that the media deserve to be called the fourth estate and are supposed to be autonomous from all other estates in society.

Odugbemi and Norris observe that 'the watchdog role requires the news media to provide a check on powerful sectors of society, including leaders within the private and public domains. Journalists are expected to guard the public interest and to

protect it from incompetence, corruption and misinformation' (Odugbemi and Norris 2010: 1).

The media watchdog role is fundamental because, where the media do not play such a role, the government does not feel accountable to the people as 'it can act with impunity, and indulge in corruption more freely' (Tito'ona 2018). The press is supposed to scrutinise both government conduct and policy on a regular basis to expose any ills. In so doing, the media provides a public service. As Auletta posits, the proper role of the press 'is to ask questions of people in power, and oftentimes people in power don't like to be asked questions. It is very natural' (Auletta 2007).

The media's public service helps development of all people in societies because, where the general population is informed accurately and in time, they can make informed decisions on matters concerning their lives. For example, a free, informative media in a democratic context can investigate and use appropriate frames to inform voters about corruption and the underperformance of political representatives. Voters in turn may decide to punish incumbents by electing their opponents (Chowdhury 2004). Similarly, if citizens are accurately informed in time about their government's conduct or policies, they can choose to either vote the government out or keep it in power (Ogundimu 2002; Tito'ona 2018).

However, I would argue that the concept that media reporting of the wrongdoings of the elite in state power can influence government turnover through citizens' votes is contested, especially for the sub-Saharan African countries, where vote rigging is a common phenomenon in elections. For example, the Kenya general election in 2017 was disputed in court after the opposition, led by Raila Odinga, alleged vote rigging (BBC 2018). Similarly, the Zimbabwe election of 2018 ended in uproar due to alleged vote rigging (Fabricius 2018).

2.1.1 The Beginning and Impact of the Media Watchdog Role

This subsection locates the beginning of the media watchdog role. It also cites examples of the impact of media reporting of abuse of power and corruption in different countries around the world which resulted in the accountability of the political elite in state power.

The media watchdog role began in the United States in the 1830s (Francke 1995). However, the media work in the 20th century that exposed big scandals, such as Watergate, and brought down US President Richard Nixon in 1974, suggests that media social responsibility is useful and effective for national development. At the centre of the Watergate political scandal stood the Washington Post and its two prominent reporters, Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, who were assigned to cover the June 17, 1972 break-in at the Democratic headquarters inside the Watergate Hotel (Shepard 2012). Arguably, the Watergate scandal stories made such a positive impact on accountability because they used frames that helped the general public understand the issue. Additionally, the reporters, and publisher Katherine Graham, were courageous, committed and focused throughout, even though they faced serious threats from Nixon's side, particularly from the Attorney General John Mitchell, during their investigation of the story (Schudson 2004).

Scandals involving high-profile political elite figures, which the news media have exposed, have made a difference in other parts of the world in shaping governance, including the corruption charges which led to the downfall of President Carlos Perez of Venezuela. Corruption is 'the abuse of public power for personal gain or for the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance' that occurs 'when public office is abused by an official accepting, soliciting, or extorting a bribe' (Stapenhurst 2000: 1). Corruption occurs in both rich and poor countries (Stapenhurst and Kpundeh 1999; Quah 2011).

Similarly, investigative news media coverage resulted in the Brazilian Parliament impeaching the country's President Fernando Collor de Mello on September 28, 1992 (Atwood 1992; Stapenhurst 2000). This was after the Brazilian *Jornal do Brasil*, *Isto é* magazine and the *Folha de Sao Paulo* and *Estado de Sao Paulo* had reported financial scandals that involved President Collor. The scandals included embezzlement of public funds that had been earmarked for charity (Stapenhurst 2000). The press also reported that Collor had directly received at least \$8 million out of the \$55 million that his campaign treasurer, Paulo Cesar Farias, had raised from 'firms in exchange for favourable treatment by the government' (Stapenhurst 2000: 3).

In Canada, the news media framing a corruption scandal involving the government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1993 resulted in a number of high-profile leaders ending up being charged in the courts of law on corruption scandals (Stapenhurst 2000). Additionally, Mulroney's Progressive Conservative Party was defeated in that year's election which reduced it to a small party with only two seats in the parliament (ibid.).

Meanwhile, in the Philippines, a team of investigative journalists revealed that the then President Joseph Estrada had been accumulating resources from illegal gamblers that he could not disclose without implicating himself. The information that the media used in reporting the scandal led to the opposition initiating impeachment charges against President Estrada and a public uprising that led to the ousting of the President in January 2001 (Coronel 2010). Media news stories led to public action because they were framed in moral terms showing that President Estrada's illegal accumulation contravened the standard of how public leaders should behave (ibid.).

However, there are contestations on the media watchdog role as discussed in the next subsection.

2.1.2 Contestations on the Media Watchdog Role

This subsection looks at contestations about the media watchdog role in relation to the media's reception theory and framing theory. Although the media watchdog role is generally seen as a public good, it is contested as it is not always endorsed by the state power elite. For example, in the United States, while some studies have shown that the general population endorse the media watchdog role as a public good, other studies indicate that politicians who are members of political parties in state power, do not endorse it.

A public opinion survey conducted in 2013 by Pew Research Center indicated that the general population embrace the media scrutinising the way governments and other powerful institutions do their jobs. The poll established that by a margin of more than three to one, people believe that the news media's criticism of public officials keeps leaders from doing things that should not be done (Rieder 2013). The

study shows that some 68 percent of respondents in this 2013 study said that the media watchdog role was crucial for monitoring public leaders' conduct, while 21 percent said it was not. This shows that in 2013 popular acceptance of the media social responsibility role had increased by 10 percent since 2011 and that the watchdog role is largely embraced by the young generation (Rieder 2013). A survey conducted by the same institution in 2011 revealed that 56 percent of US citizens aged between 18 and 29 had views suggesting that media 'prevent politicians from doing bad things'. Meanwhile, in 2013, the Pew survey revealed that the number of youths holding the opinion that media social responsibility was a good thing for the general public had increased to 75 percent (Rieder 2013).

However, a survey carried out by Pew in 2018 involving 5,035 respondents reveals that media social responsibility is contested. The survey shows that only 38 percent of Republican Party politicians supported the media watchdog role during the tenure of President Donald Trump. On the contrary, 82 percent of politicians belonging to the Democrat Party approved the media watchdog function (Eggerton 2018). Further, the survey established that 68 percent of people involved in the survey held the view that the news media are biased when reporting social, economic and politics issues, while fewer than one third said the media were impartial. Eighty-six percent of Republican politicians indicated that the media favours one side while 52 percent of Democrats said this was so (Eggerton 2018). These findings suggest that politicians of the political party forming the government of the day were the most affected by the media frames that promote public accountability.

Meanwhile, it seems that most of the population do not endorse that what the media do in reporting development issues is important for them. The 2013 survey shows that 58 percent of the audience said 'news outlets don't understand "people like them" and that they don't feel "particularly connected" to their main sources of national news' (Eggerton 2018). These contestations, however, confirm the media reception theory, which suggests that the meaning of information relayed by the media is subject to audience interpretation (White 2012). This assertion suggests that it is not necessary that what the media say is interpreted homogeneously by the audiences. This is because there are other intervening factors that influence the way individuals construe information relayed by the media. As Erving Goffman, the

scholar credited with framing theory, argues, individuals have different 'primary frameworks' which enable them to interpret the natural world differently from one another (Goffman 1974).

The view that the media's normative social responsibility function has a positive impact on society is subject to contestation is also compatible with the views of scholars who focus on information for development from a gender perspective. For example, Narayanaswamy argues that there is a difference between the knowledge and information delivered through communication delivery systems and what actually happens in society as a reaction to the knowledge and information delivered (Narayanaswamy 2015). Narayanaswamy (ibid.) argues that the kind of life the general population – mostly women – live, makes it very difficult for this social group to act on information that requires the general population to hold politicians in power to account.

This inquiry concurs with this view based on experiences on the ways in which the Tanzanian media report news on social, economic and politics issues. For example, in 2014, the Mwananchi newspaper investigated and reported a financial scandal involving high-profile government figures including the then Attorney General, Judge Frederick Werema, and Anna Tibaijuka, of the Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development. The scandal was about the withdrawal of TZS 306 billion (more than £105 million) from the ITPL Tegeta escrow account held at the Bank of Tanzania (The Citizen 2015; Mtulya 2015). However, regardless of constant media reporting and pressure from statements issued by civil society organisations, the general population did not act to demand government accountability on this scandal. As a result, the accused government officials did not resign until the donors decided to withhold their financial support to the country's budgets for development plans (Mugarula 2015). Yet, one could argue that Tanzanian women amongst other social groups, for example, were supposed to take action to hold the government to account because the squandered money could be used to improve maternal health care to reduce the maternal mortality rate. Currently, not less than 5,000 Tanzanian women die annually due to preventable causes (URT 2014).

Moreover, the view that the media provide a good public service is also contested in a recent study. The survey by Pew 2018, for instance, shows that some 58 percent of respondents said that journalism is politically biased. Some 75 percent of the media audience believe that the news media are influenced by powerful people and institutions (Eggerton 2018). Meanwhile, 67 percent think stories published in the mainstream media are often inaccurate and 65 percent said the media give prominence to unimportant stories (ibid.). The findings confirm that the audience are highly influenced by the way choices are framed (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Kahneman and Tversky 1984).

But what are the conditions that are favourable for the media to perform a watchdog function? The following subsection discusses how autonomy influences the media's social responsibility function.

2.1.3 Autonomy: Key for Media Watchdog Function

This subsection discusses the ways in which autonomy helps the media to execute the watchdog role. In doing so, it looks into media ownership, regulations, finance and training, and the way they influence media autonomy in selecting the voices and content to be framed in news media constructs on social, economic and politics issues.

Autonomy, in the sense of independence from external control and influence, is an important factor that influences the media watchdog function (Stapenhurst 2000; Ogundimu 2002; Hydén et al. 2003; Chowdhury 2004; Odugbemi and Norris 2010). Empirical evidence suggests that, in many societies, an independent press, in most cases, encourages transparency, while journalists in autocratic contexts largely face challenges in reporting ills involving the state elite.

A study involving 125 countries, tested whether media autonomy and media access reduce the level of corruption. It concluded that there is 'a strong association between the level of press freedom and the level of corruption across countries' (Brunetti and Weder 2003: 1820). This study suggests that 'an increase by one standard deviation in a country's level of press freedom generally reduces the level of corruption in that country by 0.4 to 0.9 points, on a six-point scale' (ibid.). The study noted that the reason why a free, accessible press reduces corruption is that,

where freedom of the press prevails, the private sector and individuals are encouraged to speak out freely and to expose corruption. Additionally, freedom encourages journalists to investigate and report the wrongdoings of public officials (Brunetti and Weder 2003).

However, media autonomy to perform such a public service role is influenced by media ownership. A study on the patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world showed that the largest media institutions are owned by government or by private families associated with the government (Djankov et al. 2001). In such cases, media ownership is concentrated in the hands of the few super-rich billionaires, multi-national corporations and governments (O'Grady 2014). For example, in Britain, just three companies control nearly 70 percent of national newspaper circulation. They are Rupert Murdoch's News UK; DMGT (The Daily Mail group), chaired by Jonathan Harmsworth, 4th Viscount Rothermere; and Trinity Mirror. Five companies control three quarters of regional daily newspaper circulation and five control more than 70 percent of online news consumption measured by browsing time (O'Grady 2014).

Critics argue that there is a plausible link between media ownership and editorial stance of both public and privately owned media (Simiyu 2013; O'Grady 2014). For example, in 2008, the House of Lords Select Committee on Communications heard evidence from former editors of a number of national newspapers who said the media moguls Robert Maxwell, Conrad Black and the Barclay brothers openly meddled with editorial decisions (O'Grady 2014).

Similarly, although the press in sub-Saharan African countries has changed since the 1990s, it lacks diversity of content and voices (Daniels 2016). Media coverage of news on social, economic and politics issues in the region, ignoring the viewpoints of most ordinary people – men and women – has continued to the present times. For example, in 2012, a strike happened in Merikana platinum mine in South Africa and police opened fire, killing 34 miners (Davies 2017). However, a research conducted by Media Tenor group on the Marikana killings found that 'the majority of reporting used voices of authority, for example the police and politicians rather than the miners' (Daniels 2016).

The Marikana killings research further revealed gender inequality in news reporting on the police killing of miners, as views of women in the media news coverage were far less than those of men. The research established that the overwhelming news sources quoted in articles reported in newspapers on the killing of the Merikana miners focused on men, at more than 70 percent, while views of women were scarcely included. Of the stories reported in mainstream newspapers, female news sources were only 14 percent of all sources in the news (Daniels 2016). Yet, the Merikana platinum miners were married or in relationships with women and most of these women depend on the men economically (South African History Online 2019). This thesis argues that the media could have gathered views, constructed and framed more interesting stories on social, economic and politics issues to shape the destiny of the Merikana miners and their spouses if they had considered national development from a gender perspective.

Meanwhile, in 1995, the Global Media Monitoring Project (GMMP) conducted a piece of quantitative research that examined the content of media published and broadcasted in a single day. The aim was to establish how women were portrayed in the three traditional mainstream media mediums of television, radio and newspapers. The findings of the research revealed that only 17 percent of the world's news sources were women across the 71 countries involved in the survey (Gallagher 2001).

Moreover, because media ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few politically and economically powerful people, the media lack accountability as they display bias in favour of the elite (Daniels 2016). Ownership also influences media freedom when it comes to framing issues that matter in the lives of the majority population. This is because the business interests that run the press are interested in scoops, headlines, selling papers and boosting circulation, and therefore they go for more entertainment news, more conflict news and more 'wow' news (Auletta 2007).

Regulation is another factor that influences media freedom to investigate and frame information on development issues accordingly to be understood by the audience. Media regulation comprises all state measures to influence consumers and

producers of media (Nowak 2014: 3). Where the government enacts restrictive laws, the media work in a state of fear, hence they conduct self-censorship; journalists rarely frame news from views that expose government wrongdoings such as corruption and abuse of human rights.

Another factor that influences media freedom is finance (Nyamnjoh 2004). Media activities and content depend on the media economic environment (Odugbemi and Norris 2010). Journalists can engage in investigative reporting if they are well equipped financially, however, this is not the case for most media in sub-Saharan African countries. For example, research on bribery in the media carried out in Zambia (Kasoma 2010), Zimbabwe (Mabweazara 2018), Nigeria (Nwabueze 2010), Kenya (Helander 2010), Ethiopia (Lodamo and Skjerdal 2009) and Tanzania (Mpagaze and White 2010) found that journalists receive bribes from news sources because they are poorly remunerated.

Similarly, training also influences media autonomy in investigating and reporting classified information which pro-citizen development politicians and citizens themselves can use as a basis for taking action to hold public leaders to account. For example, in order for journalists to be able to effectively investigate and frame news on scandals involving business matters, amongst others, they require specialised training in financial and economic issues (Ludwig 2002). Journalists also need training to cope with advanced media technology, such as digital equipment. As the Press Association Training (2018) argues, 'the skills of story-finding and story-telling plus the latest digital production tools has the potential to restore trust for those in whom it might be waning'.

After exploring what the media watchdog role entails, the importance of freedom for the media to perform the watchdog role and the key factors that influence media autonomy, ownership, finance, regulations and training, the next section examines the autonomy of the media in sub-Saharan African countries.

2.2 The Autonomy of Media in Africa

This section examines media autonomy in sub-Saharan African countries. In doing so, it explores favourable conditions for media to execute their normative public

service function, media social responsibility, from the colonial to the contemporary times. It argues that most countries lack favourable conditions for the news media to work for the benefit of the general population through the framing of information on development issues. The analysis is organised in four themes. The first explores media ownership to understand the media owners and their development agenda in the changing contexts in Africa. The second looks at media training and notes that, after the African countries attained independence, the colonial masters used media training as part of their framework to sustain their influence in their former colonies. The third reflects media financial capacity, while the fourth examines media regulations and the ways in which they influence media content.

2.2.1 Media Ownership

This subsection explores media ownership in sub-Saharan African countries in their changing contexts, to enable better understanding of how they have influenced content in relation to the media watchdog role. As this subsection discusses, those who established the press have used it for the purpose of achieving their particular development agenda. Consequently, they ensure that their media reflect their agenda. For example, when reporting development issues, the media owned by politicians will use frames meant to promote the owners' political interests and those of their allies and respective political parties. Similarly, media owned by business persons will prefer frames that will add value to the business interests of the owners, their allies and advertisers.

On the other hand, the autonomy of media outlets is given within the boundaries of owners' interests (Maheshwari 2015). This suggests that the media owned by the state are unlikely to use frames that will put the topmost leader of the state in an awkward position. They will be selective in reporting development issues so that the overall image of the government is not significantly damaged.

For example, state-owned media will avoid reporting that exposes the government's maladministration and misuse of power. Yet, a study on the patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world shows that the largest media institutions are owned by government or by private families associated with the government (Djankov et al. 2001). The findings of this study can be interpreted to mean that the current ownership patterns make the media in many countries around the world an

appendage of the government. As a result, the media lack full autonomy which it requires as independent social organisation (the fourth estate) to hold the power elite to account.

How has the pattern of media ownership in Africa changed from the colonial to post-colonial period?

During the colonial period, both colonial masters' and nationalist movements owned the press but each used their media to pursue their agenda (Shaw 2009). The colonial regime was the first to own newspapers, while it took time for the African nationalists to enter the media industry. Press owned by nationalists in different African countries constructed stories that would mobilise the masses to participate in anti-colonial activities (Shaw 2009; Jenks 2016). For the Africans, the process of decolonisation was vital, for it provided African states with the opportunities to regain their independence, which they had lost for more than half a century. As a result, press owned by nationalists 'became very militant, playing more or less a critical watchdog role, in dealing with the colonial administration' (Shaw 2009: 9).

For example, in the British West African anglophone countries of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana and Gambia, the press was owned by politically vibrant, prominent, educated Africans (Jenks 2016). They were very vocal as they used frames that were critical of colonialism during the struggle for independence. In Nigeria, the Liberian-born journalist John Payne Jackson owned the first Nigerian newspaper in English, the Lagos Weekly Record in 1891. The newspaper regularly criticised Sir Frederick Lugard, the then British Governor of southern Nigeria (Shaw 2009; Jenks 2016).

In Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast), the first newspaper owned by the British administration started circulation in 1822. The newspaper, called The Royal Gold Coast Gazette, was established by Sir Charles McCarthy, the British Governor in the country. The colonial regime used the publication to perpetuate its economic and political agenda. Meanwhile, the first newspaper owned by Africans was called the West African Herald and it was established and owned by the Bannerman brothers in 1857. The newspaper constructed its news on social, economic and politics issues

using frames that encouraged decolonisation, but it ceased circulation in 1873. After the demise of the West African Herald, several years later, a vibrant nationalist press emerged. The Times of West Africa was the first nationalist press established in 1931, owned by a lawyer – Dr J.B. Danguah. Most of the nationalist newspapers established between 1931 and 1949 were owned and edited by prominent African lawyers. The lawyers were against the laws and regulations that restricted press autonomy to report news that exposed the wrongdoings of the colonial administration (Anokwa 1997).

In Tanganyika, the British administration established a Kiswahili language newspaper known as Mamboleo (Today's Events) in 1923. In the beginning Mamboleo focused on agriculture, but when Mwafrika, the Kiswahili newspaper owned by Tanganyikan nationalists, was established for the purpose of disseminating information against colonialism, the British rulers used Mamboleo and changed its framing of news from agriculture to political propaganda to suppress anti-colonialism activities (Read 1979; Sturmer 1998; Rioba 2008; Mwakikagile 2009).¹⁴

In Kenya, during the 1950s, the newspapers owned by indigenous Kenyans and Indian immigrants reported on anti-colonial resistance matters, such as calling for revolutionary meetings and organisations throughout Kenya. The role that the media played 'reached a level of influence that worried the colonial government' (Frederiksen 2011). Meanwhile, during this historical period, the press owned by Western colonialists 'portrayed resistance to British colonialism in Kenya as terrorist, fanatical and backward' (Johnson and McEnroe 2018).

The media owned by nationalists in anglophone Africa somehow had the autonomy to publish news stories using frames which were critical of the colonial masters because the Western countries valued the liberal media system (Shaw 2009). Asante (1996:25), quoted in Shaw (2009: 494), argues that 'the whole notion of media development and use in sub-Saharan Africa was basically premised on a

¹⁴ See Chapter Three which explores how media in Tanzania performed social responsibility from the colonial period to contemporary times.

largely liberal western value-system that favoured a free and lively press, although this of course differed from one colonial power to the other’.

The situation was somehow different in francophone Africa as the French colonialists had formulated a policy that made it very difficult for Africans to establish and run the press. The French colonial rulers ‘imposed a heavy tax on printing materials, and unlike the Anglophone colonies, there was limited missionary activity in Francophone Africa’ (Shaw 2009: 496). As a result, ‘the few African-based newspapers that existed served only the interest of the white settler population’ (ibid.). However, regardless of the stringent French media laws, two newspapers, *Le Cri Negre* and *La Phare du Dahomey*, owned by nationalists, emerged in Benin (formerly Dahomey) in the early 1920s. The press played a critical role as it used frames that provided Africans with information about the consequences of colonial rule (Bourgault 1995). Similarly, in the 1930s, newspapers owned by nationalists emerged in Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire and they published news with information that was critical of the French colonial rulers and local leaders that supported them. The emergence of such African critical media had a multiplier effect on other French colonies too. In the 1960s, Mali, Guinea, Togo and Niger nationalists had established dailies, while in Gabon and the Central African Republic, weekly and fortnightly press respectively, were in operation under the ownership of natives (Bourgault 1995).

Meanwhile, after the African countries attained independence in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the nationalists who became leaders of governments in their respective countries, established state-owned media and used it to pursue their post-colonial development agenda. The post-colonial leaders formulated policy that made it very difficult to establish and run press that used frames that would expose weaknesses and wrong doings of government leaders.

For example, after Ghana achieved independence from Britain on March 6, 1957, its first President, Kwame Nkrumah, established the Ghanaian Times. The purpose was to use the newspaper to suppress the critical views against his government published in the *Graphic* and *Ashanti Pioneer* owned by British proprietors. The Times newspaper also served as an ideological mouthpiece for the Convention of People’s Party (CPP) which was championing freedom. The first editorial of the

Times stated clearly its philosophy and functions as follows: 'Our policy will be to support the government in power and whenever necessary we shall criticise it objectively. We believe unalterably that socialist policies of CPP government are wisely and soundly conceived' (Anokwa 1997: 11-12). Additionally, in July 1962, Nkrumah's government officially became the owner of the Daily Graphic. The change in ownership marked the surrender of independence of the Graphic and other independent newspapers in Ghana (Anokwa 1997). In 1961, the Ghanaian government had introduced a series of authoritarian directives against Ashanti Pioneer of Kumasi, including demanding the paper's editor to submit its copy to the Ministry of Information before printing (Shaw 2009: 499). In Tanzania, as shall be discussed in detail in Chapter Three, the first President, Julius Nyerere, used the media to instigate into the minds of Tanzanians the ujamaa socialism approach to national development.

However, the level of government media control in post-colonial Africa was not similar in all the countries. For example, Botswana attained its independence on September 30, 1966. Nonetheless, 'tight regime control of national media institutions was not deemed as crucial in Botswana's immediate post-independence period as it had been elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa' (Zaffiro 1993: 10).

It seems that the African post-independence governments needed to control the media autonomy to report news stories to inform and educate their people about their development policy.¹⁵ They also required the world media to shake off the substantial legacies of foreign dominance (Jenks 2016). On the other hand, the European colonialists wanted to continue influencing African culture, politics, trade and education. Jenks observes that this led to a scramble for the African media by the British government, Reuters and Thomson. Reuters and Thomson were very different organisations with different goals in sub-Saharan Africa. The London-based Reuters news agency had spread Anglo-American fact-based journalism and a British-influenced view of the world since the 1850s. In the late 1940s, Reuters had 42 bureaus and 200 correspondents around the world. British newspapers and a few

¹⁵ See Chapter Three, section 3.1.3, for example. In the 1960s Tanzania adopted ujamaa socialism as the country's national development policy implemented through ujamaa villages.

Commonwealth news agencies owned Reuters in a complicated trust arrangement designed to keep the agency free, independent and unbiased (ibid.).

The Canadian businessman Roy Thomson started his empire with a string of small-town newspapers in Canada and expanded relentlessly. In 1953 he crossed the Atlantic to buy the Scotsman newspaper chain. Over the decade he expanded into Scottish television and English magazines, publishing houses and newspapers, including the Sunday Times of London (Jenks 2016: 6-7).

Between 1960 and 1965, Roy Thomson established newspapers and television in Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa and Tanzania. Thomson established television services in 14 African countries, including Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone. Thomson, together with the British government, worked hand in hand in monitoring the operations of these media (Jenks 2016).

Reuters, up to the 1950s, had only tiny businesses in sub-Saharan Africa outside the Republic of South Africa because it 'had seen little profit in expanding in such an unpromising market' (Jenks 2016: 13). However, after several African countries attained independence, it changed, as its service was in demand both in anglophone and francophone countries. There was stiff media competition as 'the AFP was expanding with a service that was faster and more comprehensive than Reuters, and the Soviet TASS agency and its East Bloc allies were looking for opportunities'. Reuters competed with the French news agency AFP to maintain British influence (ibid.).

This suggests that both the newly established governments in Africa and their former colonisers, immediately after decolonisation, needed to own media to push their development agenda. The African independent governments sought to own the media for controlling information flows that would criticise the government's performance in delivering development outcomes to the people. At the same time, the colonisers wanted to establish media in their former colonies to propagate their neo-colonialist agenda (Jenks 2016).

Meanwhile, from the 1990s, the media landscape in sub-Saharan African countries changed, as, after decades of state-controlled media, these countries adopted multi-party politics accompanied by a proliferation of the privately owned press (Bourgault 1995; Shaw 2009). The change in the media's political geography encouraged African journalists to craft a declaration known as the Windhoek Declaration of 1991. This document was a milestone for media development in Africa as it promoted an independent and pluralistic African press, including the expansion of private broadcasting (Ojo 2016).

Since 1993, following the Windhoek Declaration, May 3rd has been designated World Press Freedom Day, celebrated around the world annually to raise awareness about press freedom and remind governments of their duty to respect and uphold the right to freedom of expression enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Ojo 2016). The Windhoek Declaration was also endorsed by UNESCO (Wasserman and Benequista 2017). Ever since, some privately owned media in Africa have played a crucial role in holding the power elites to account. For example, in 1991, Mali embraced media freedom and pluralism as an essential part of its democratic transition after two decades of single-party rule. As a result, for two decades, the country was considered a success story of democracy in Africa (Wasserman and Benequista 2017).

However, the diverse ownership of the media in the context of multi-party democracy in African countries has not added much value in terms of the media working freely as a government watchdog on matters concerning development of the general population. As Cage (2014) noted, although media competition is seen as a guarantee for media freedom, in contemporary sub-Saharan African countries the press is of low quality. Additionally, 'in practice, the government did not withdraw completely and press throughout the region is still influenced by politics' (Nyamnjoh 2004: 60).

For example, Shaw (2009) observes that when multi-party democracies were introduced into African countries during the 1990s, political parties in most countries were polarised along ethnic groups and media ownership followed the same patterns. Further, Nyamnjoh (2005:236), cited in Shaw (2009: 501), observes that, in

Cameroon, although the country's constitution restricted such polarisation, newspapers such as *Le Messange* and *Le Patriote* defended it.

Nyamnjoh's assertion suggests that, in contemporary multi-party democracy, the press in sub-Saharan African countries are weakened as they do not work as a unified, strong, independent, social institution as the fourth estate. Media institutions work as affiliates of other estates in societies, including, but not limited to, ruling parties and their respective governments and opposition political parties. This view is also observed by a journalist in Zimbabwe, George Chiramba, who has also worked in various capacities including in the Ministry of Information. Langa (2018) quoted Chiramba as arguing that:

The industry is divided by people coming from outside the newsroom by way of governments, NGOs who are not in fact media outfits, by way of political actors. If you find yourself succumbing to influence from government, opposition, foreign governments and embassies, donors, then it means you have not been able to establish your own estate. You are an extension of other forces and so you cannot therefore pretend as media that you are an estate. If you find yourself doing the bidding of government or of opposition, then it means you are an extension of the first estate. It does not make you a fourth estate because government is in power as the first estate and similarly the opposition is government in waiting which means they are still hovering within the confines of the first estate. So, it does not matter to you as pro-government, pro-ruling party or pro-opposition, you are still an appendage of the first estate...what that reflects is that you are ill equipped to stand and define your own space. You are ill equipped by way of intellect and ill equipped by way of professional identity (Langa 2018).

This assertion suggests that the three media system models distinguished in the Western world also apply to sub-Saharan African countries' media. Hallin and Mancini (2004), cited in Cage (2014: 8), itemise the media models as follows:

(1) The 'Liberal Mode', which prevails across the UK, Ireland and North America, and is characterised by a relative dominance of market mechanisms and of commercial media.

(2) The 'Democratic Corporatist Model', which prevails across northern continental Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland), is characterised by a historical coexistence of commercial media and media tied to organised social and political groups, and by a relatively active but legally limited role of the state.

(3) The 'Polarized Pluralist Model', which prevails in the Mediterranean countries of southern Europe (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), is characterised by integration of the media into party politics, weaker historical development of commercial media and a strong role of the state.

Their classification relies, in their view, on four dimensions according to which media systems can usefully be compared:

- (1) The development of media markets, with emphasis on the strong or weak development of a mass circulation press.
- (2) Political parallelism, that is, the degree and nature of the links between the media and political parties or, more broadly, the extent to which the media system reflects the major political divisions in society.
- (3) The development of the journalistic professionalism.
- (4) The degree and nature of state intervention in the media system.

However, the new media that have evolved in contemporary times have made the state power elite act to control social media. Social media can be a threat to social cohesion and can also be a powerful force for democracy (Ogola 2018). As a result, many governments in Africa, including Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, Gambia and Tanzania, have already passed laws that target social media users specifically. Some of these laws criminalise free speech online, while others have made the use of social media too expensive for users (ibid.).

In conclusion, sub-Saharan African countries have experienced varied ownership of media from colonial to post-colonial contemporary times. However, this does not mean that the press has had autonomy to report news that would expose the wrongdoings of the ruler.

Media autonomy in sub-Saharan African countries is also influenced by professional training, as discussed in the next subsection.

2.2.2 Media Training

This subsection explores the media training in sub-Saharan countries from the colonial period to the present. It reveals that, during the colonial period, there were

no established training facilities for media professionals in these countries. People working for the media owned by the colonial rulers received training provided by foreign organisations. Meanwhile, people working for the media owned by nationalist movements did not have professional training. They were just intelligent people who had been educated overseas but were concerned with the future of the continent. This section also discusses specialised training offered by international institutions in contemporary times so that media in developing nations, including Africa, could report issues related to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Training for journalists is important because their role is to gather information and put it in frames in a manner that the audience can form opinions and make prudent decisions (Uche 1991). For the media to perform its social responsibility role effectively, journalists require professional training. Rigorous professional training enables journalists to produce stories and content that are accurate, impartial, balanced and fair in meeting ethical standards (Press Association Training 2018). Further, Uche argues that, although professionalism is no cure for all the present deficiencies in the media, it could play an invaluable pedagogical role by educating journalists to the transnational, transcultural and transideological dimensions of development (Uche 1991: 5). This assertion suggests that training should also equip journalists with knowledge about their countries' historical, social, politics and economic issues and what the media should do to achieve development of the general population. However, most media professionals in Africa are not well trained (Uche 1991).

The problem of media training has existed since the colonial period as the colonial rulers did not invest in establishing media training facilities in sub-Saharan African countries. During the British administration, for example, European-based media organisations, such as the BBC, were used to provide training to indigenous Africans who worked in the media owned by the colonial regime (Jenks 2016). For example, the British-owned *Graphic* and *Mirror* became the most effective public communication media in Ghana because it had a 'well trained indigenous editorial staff' (Anokwa 1997: 10). It seems that the indigenous Africans working in broadcast media received training because such media were owned and used by the colonial regimes to suppress anti-colonial activities. It is noted that the BBC has been

exporting its template and training for Africans in radio technology and production since the 1930s (Jenks 2016: 5).

However, people working in the media owned by nationalists did not have professional training but were those who had been educated overseas (Shaw 2009). It seems that 'colonialists refused to train Africans in that field because the press became an effective medium in the anti-colonial rule campaign and the demand for independence' (Uche 1991: 6). Nonetheless, despite the fact that the people who worked in the media owned by nationalists were not professionally trained journalists, they were intelligent people, committed to the job, and concerned with the overall state of the press on a continental scale and at the country level (Fair 2015). It is observed that their media work 'formed part of a generally optimistic project across all sectors, of anticipating vectors of economic and societal growth in Africa and identifying essential infrastructural investments that new states and the international community could make to ensure stability and prosperity, as former colonies turned into new nation-states' (Fair 2015: 22).

During post-colonial times, the challenge of media training in sub-Saharan Africa continued (Uche 1991). This had a bearing on the decolonised African countries. These newly independent countries lacked home-grown, strong (autonomous) media institutions that could play the role of the fourth estate to sustain the independence of their respective countries. The nationalist leaders needed media to mobilise and educate their people and use the world media to shake off substantial legacies of foreign dominance. Meanwhile, the European colonial masters wanted to continue influencing the African culture, politics, trade and education (Jenks 2016).

The lack of proper professional training after independence forced the governments of decolonised African countries to enter into bilateral agreements with the former colonial masters to attain professional competence (Uche 1991; Jenks 2016). This led to a scramble for the African media by the British government, Reuters and Thomson (Jenks 2016). The move, however, was to the disadvantage of decolonised African countries because the former colonial masters used the training opportunity to pursue their development agenda (Shaw 2009).

It is observed that, because of a lack of trained manpower and essential infrastructure to sustain the independence of the emergent nation-states, the former

colonial powers consciously used technical aid schemes (especially in the areas of training in newspaper, radio and television) as strategies to ensure the preservation of continued dependence on the values and ideological inclinations of their former colonies (Uche 1991: 3). This assertion can be interpreted to mean that, after winning the training agreement, the former colonial masters ensured that modules for media training did not include topics that would enable trainees to be critical of their colonial masters' post-colonial economic exploitation in Africa. As Ibrahim Seaga Shaw observes:

The colonial powers introduced a new bureaucratic framework that oriented their African colonies outward towards the metropolises rather than one which fostered integration between and within African communities and peoples. Part of this framework was the mass media (Shaw 2009: 495).

To achieve their objective, the former colonial masters ensured that they had influence in the training facilities established for training journalists in the decolonised countries. Thomson and the British government coordinated the training and operations of the media because 'both wanted to keep British influence predominant, seeing Communism as the feared alternative' (Jenks 2016: 7).

In contemporary times, media training in sub-Saharan Africa is still a challenge. In Tanzania, for instance, most 'of the journalists hold a diploma level of education' (Mwita 2017).¹⁶ The media training challenge is even bigger in specialised skills as these African countries continue to depend on foreign support. For example, the Thomson Reuters Foundation partnership with the UN Foundation in the recent past offered intensive training to 700 journalists and government and non-governmental communicators from 40 developing countries, including from Africa, on reporting news focusing on the complex issues related to the SDGs. The training was meant to enable journalists to better understand 'how integral environment and sustainability issues are to political, economic and humanitarian news stories' (Thomson Reuters Foundation 2018).

However, a critical mind would expect that, because the SDGs are meant to be a strategy to bring about fundamental change to bridge the gap between the poor and rich in the world, the training would equip the journalists with analytical skills. Such skills would enable them to report stories using frames that challenged vested

¹⁶ This aspect shall be discussed further in Chapter Three.

interests at local, national and international private or public levels. In so doing, after the training, journalists could produce SDG-related news stories critical of their countries' state elite and multi-national organisations which, through extraction of economic resources, destroy the environment (Tietenberg and Lewis 2016). On the contrary, the training focused on very basic journalism topics, such as 'how to avoid the jargon around sustainable development, and craft real stories that people can fully understand and relate to' (Thomson Reuters Foundation 2018).

Similarly, the Thomson Reuters Foundation and the Global Corporate Governance Forum in 2007 developed a special training programme to help journalists in developing nations to strengthen their skills in reporting issues related to corporate governance.

A report from the Global Corporate Governance Forum published in 2009 shows that, in the period of two years up to 2009, no fewer than 130 journalists were trained in seven workshops, starting in Belgrade in October 2007, and then moving on to Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia. However, the training was limited as it focused on reporting of corporate audited financial reports (World Bank Group 2009). This suggests that the training provided by these global organisations is not geared to equip journalists from developing countries with skills to be able to report bigger issues related to inequality in the world, as discussed earlier in this section. Further, the report shows that, for Africa, the training was held in Zambia, but it did not indicate how many journalists participated and specifically how many from Tanzania.

Importantly, this thesis argues that the Forum focused on training of media personnel to promote the private sector and ultimately the free market and open competition (Wade 2003). For example, one of the critics of the SDGs, Fukuda-Parr, posits that, although some people argue that the shift from Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) promises a more transformative development agenda, generally the SDGs promote the liberal agenda (Fukuda-Parr 2016).

Nonetheless, this does not mean that such training is totally useless. Journalists who are trained on how to use appropriate frames in reporting matters related to financial auditing, for instance, can report news about auditing matters in a manner

that the audience can easily understand the information communicated. Similarly, skills-based news reporting on corporate governance can reveal information showing challenges and/or wrongdoings relating to a corporate entity. In so doing, appropriate actions can be taken to address the challenges in time.

After reviewing training, which is one of the variables that influence media autonomy in sub-Saharan African countries, the subsection explores another factor: sources of revenue.

2.2.3 Media Financing

Financing is another factor that influences the media watchdog function in Africa. The autonomy of a media institution depends on the interests of the people who fund the operationalisation of the media. For example, the content of media established primarily for commercial purposes 'will reflect the point of view of the news organisation's owners and advertisers' (Maheshwari 2015: 3).

During the colonial era, the press owned by the colonial regime received a government subsidy. For example, the Daily Graphic (a daily) and the Sunday Mirror (a weekly) were established for political as well as economic reasons. They were set up to promote British policy in Ghana. Shareholding in Graphic Company was limited to British investors. The two newspapers received massive financial support from British banks for their operations in Ghana. They also employed the patronage of British colonial officials including the Governor (Anokwa 1997: 10), however, the media owned by the indigenous Africans experienced financial difficulties as their revenue depended on the sales of their newspapers. For example, Bourgault noted that the press in both anglophone and francophone Africa shared common socio-economic problems: the difficulty in selling newspapers and therefore making money when readers are too poor to attract the interest of advertisers (Bourgault 1995: 135).

After independence, as discussed in subsection 2.2.1, the former European colonialists established media in their former African colonies to continue their influence. Establishing and running the media required investment. For example, before independence, Reuters had not focused on African colonies to a large extent for its news business, either as sources of or markets for news. It was after

independence that it decided to consider Africa as a potential region for its press activities, however, it realised that expanding into Africa required substantial funding. The British government financed Reuters by paying a concealed subsidy to allow it to cover the heavy financial losses expected during the initial expansion. The British government invested money in Reuters because its interest was to gain media influence after the African countries achieved their independence (Jenks 2016).

Similarly, Thomson, who also had a close relationship with the British administration, invested money to establish media in Africa. For example, in East Africa, Thomson invested £25,000 in the Aga Khan's Nation Media Group in Kenya, some of which was used to establish the English language daily newspaper *The Nation* (Jenks 2016).

Further, as explained in subsection 2.2.1, Thomson invested heavily in broadcast media in Africa. Such media played a role in cultural imperialism which endangered local culture. For example, ten years after Thomson had established radio in Nigeria, a study conducted in 1983 revealed that almost 70 percent of music aired by the most popular radio station in Lagos, Nigeria, was foreign sounds, coming mostly from the United States, the Caribbean and Western Europe. The music format of Radio Nigeria influenced the music preferences of the Nigerian youth, as about 60 percent of the audience of Radio Nigeria Two (FM-Stereo) consisted of those aged 16–25 years (Uche 1991).

Meanwhile, during the post-colonial period of the Cold War, governments in the independent African countries and ruling parties financed the media they owned. For example, the government of President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and the country's ruling party, CPP, financed the buying and operationalisation of the newspaper it established as the *Ghanaian Times*. It also funded the *Daily Graphic*, the newspaper it bought from British proprietors (Anokwa 1997).

In contemporary times of multi-party politics, countries in sub-Saharan Africa share certain features in common in relation to media financing; they depend heavily on advertising (Cage 2014). As such, shortage of financial capacity for the media to perform their social responsibility is a reality in these countries. For example, in

Tanzania, journalists find it very difficult to travel and effectively report 'when a story breaks' (Mwita 2017).

On the contrary, in developed countries, the media – particularly newspapers – rely on revenue from sales, advertising and 'sometimes also on government subsidies' (Cage 2014: 10). This puts the autonomy of the African media in jeopardy. The reason is that advertisements are not a reliable source of media revenue in the changing world. Advertising no longer accounts for such a huge amount of media revenue even in the United States where it now represents less than half of the total revenues. Similarly, in France, media revenue from advertising has been decreasing in importance since 2000, from nearly 60 percent of total revenue to less than 40 percent today. Even in some sub-Saharan African countries, such as Nigeria and South Africa, advertising is no longer the main source of revenue for media. For example, in South Africa, revenue from advertising for newspapers declined dramatically 'between 1997 and 2012, from 40 percent to 29 percent of the total advertising expenditures, in favour of both television and internet'. In Nigeria, advertising expenditures in the press began to decrease in 2011; both the share of the press in total advertising expenditures and the amount of print advertising decreased (Cage 2014: 10-11).

But why is depending on advertising as the main source of revenue risky for the media in sub-Saharan African countries? The key reason is that, if the sponsor of the advertising is government, it may decide to starve the media as a strategy to weaken the media's watchdog role. For example, before the general election in Kenya in 2017, the government issued a note to all government accounting officers that 'state departments and agencies would only advertise in My.Gov – a government newspaper and online portal. Electronic advertising would only be aired by the state broadcaster, the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation' (Ogola 2017).

Yet, advertising sponsored by the national governments remains the single largest source of revenue for news organisations in sub-Saharan African countries. For example, 'in Rwanda, a staggering 85–90 percent of advertising revenue comes from the public sector, while in Kenya, it is estimated that 30 percent of newspaper revenue comes from government advertising. In Nigeria, the total money spent on advertising for all media channels increased by more than 50% between 2000 and

2004 from \$63.076 million to \$117.537 million' (Cage 2014: 11). Meanwhile, in 2013, the Kenya government spent KES40 million (\$386,922) in two weeks just on publishing congratulatory messages for the new President, Uhuru Kenyatta (Ogola 2017).

However, this does not mean that media in Africa are able to generate enough revenue to finance their operations only through advertising. In most cases, the media get a small amount of revenue from sales because, for example, newspapers are very urban-based, as distribution outside the capital and the big cities is too costly for newspapers and there is a serious lack of transport facilities. For example, Faye (2008), cited in Cage (2014), noted that there is no modern newspaper distribution corporation in Benin and Togo. For Beninese and Togolese journalists to sell their newspapers in rural areas, one has to go early in the morning to bus stations and request the so-called 'bush taxi drivers' to deliver the copies to rural resellers (Cage 2014: 10).

Lack of financial capacity can influence sub-Saharan African media freedom (Nyamnjoh 2004). In such situations, media practitioners are vulnerable to temptations that put the media integrity at risk, such as seeking favours from news sources. Media depending on news sources for financial support can hardly frame news in a manner that could jeopardise the interests of the financial supporter. Lack of financial autonomy has left the media in Africa with no other choice than to rely on corruption for survival (Cage 2014: 12).

The media watchdog role in Africa is also constrained by restrictive regulations. The next subsection explores media regulations passed by rulers during the colonial and post-colonial periods to control media freedom in Africa.

2.2.4 Media Regulations

This subsection examines the way in which the state power elite in sub-Saharan African countries have used regulations from the colonial to the contemporary periods to restrict media autonomy to act as a watchdog for the general population. During the colonial era, the colonialists enacted several stringent laws to suppress the media that championed the decolonisation agenda in sub-Saharan African countries. For example, in Ghana, the laws enacted included the Newspaper

Registration Ordinance of 1894 (Cap 116) and the Book and Newspaper Registration Ordinance of 1897 (Cap 12). These laws required each newspaper editor to make sure that the name and address of the printer of the newspaper appeared on the first and last page of the newspaper. Additionally, a newspaper editor had to send the title of the newspaper, its offices, printers and publishers, as well as total revenue to the colonial regime's secretary (Anokwa 1997).

Another repressive media law enacted in Ghana was the Criminal Code No 21 of 1934. Section 330 of the Criminal Code of 1934 specified that 'any person who published any seditious words or writing or was found in possession of any newspaper, book or document or any part of the extract thereof that contained seditious words or writing and who did not show to the satisfaction of the court that, at the time he was found in such possession, he did not know the nature of its content, was guilty of an offence' (Anokwa 1997: 9).

Several African newspaper owners and editors were prosecuted under these restrictive media laws. For instance, in Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast), Altor Ahama and Charles Newton, the editor and the printer of the Methodist Journal were prosecuted under the Book and Newspaper Registration Ordinance of 1897. Similarly, in Nigeria, between 1936 and 1937, the editor of the African Morning Post, Nnamdi Azikiwe, was prosecuted. In Sierra Leone the operationalisation of the colonial restrictive media laws led to the prosecution of Wallace Johnson, the prominent article writer of the African Morning Post. Azikiwe and Wallace Johnson were prosecuted for 'publishing a seditious article and for possessing material that contained seditious words' (Anokwa 1997: 10).

In Tanzania the British administration passed the Penal Code of 1920. As independence insurgence intensified, it enacted a more stringent law called the Newspaper Ordinance No 22 of 1928 (TLS 2014). The British rulers used Section 63 of the Penal Code of 1920 to restrict Mwafrica from publishing news which the rulers construed would create distress in society. The Newspaper Ordinance No 22 of 1928 required newspapers that were published at an interval of less than 30 days to have a 'security bond' before they were registered. It also required individuals interested in the media business to make specific financial pledges that the regime would fall back

on in case the media owners failed to abide by media regulations (Sturmer 1998). This can be interpreted to mean that only very rich indigenous Tanzanians who were well-grounded educationally and financially could establish, own and run a newspaper during the British colonial period.

In Kenya, nationalist newspapers which championed anti-colonial insurgence during the British administration encountered repeated attempts to suppress and close them down (Frederiksen 2011). As a result, in 1952, at the onset of the anti-colonial Mau-Mau uprising, the small newspapers published in Kenya were owned by Asian immigrants and Christian missionaries (Jenks 2016).

After the African countries achieved independence the governments that came into power copied the colonialist ways, controlling media autonomy using restrictive media laws and the mode of ownership. For example, in Ghana, the government of President Kwame Nkrumah enacted a Newspaper Licencing Act, in 1963. The law required newspaper publishers to obtain a licence renewable annually from the government. Nkrumah also ensured that the media established were an appendage of the government. In so doing, Nkrumah established a government body to run the media sector including broadcast and print media, Ghana News Agency, Film Industry and Ghana School of Journalism (Anokwa 1997). Ghanaian government control of the media prevented debate and/or criticism of the national development policies or national leaders.

In Zambia, Mission Press, which was established in 1970 by Catholic Franciscan missionaries in Kansenshi border with Chifubu Township in Ndola for evangelisation through publications, faced challenges after it started focusing on human rights and governance issues. The Zambian government intimidated, threatened and sometimes manhandled editors of the Mission Press ‘for its fight for justice and defending “the rights of the poor and the vulnerable in society”’ (Kabombwe 2015: iv).

In Uganda, during the era of the dictator Iddi Amin, working in the media sector was dangerous. The Amin regime detained and killed some journalists in a manner that had consequences even in the post-Amin era up to the present as subtle strategies

were (and are) applied by the state elite to suppress media autonomy (Eribo and Jong-Ebot 1997).

In the 1990s, when African countries ended more than two decades of single-party rule, they embraced pluralism and media freedom as an essential part of democratic transition in their respective countries. This opened up media opportunities in terms of playing a watchdog role to hold powers to account (Ogundimu 2002; Hydén et al. 2003). Certainly, there has been some improvement in the media generally across Africa in terms of an increase of media channels owned by non-state actors (ibid.), however, the press in sub-Saharan Africa is still 'relatively young when compared to the rest of the world' (Cage 2014: 5). This assertion can be interpreted to mean that the media in Africa have a long way to go to be able to become the fourth estate able to publish news that focuses on public accountability frames.

The growth of media in sub-Saharan Africa is affected by laws that the governments pass to control the media function of monitoring social responsibility. A free media is able to investigate and frame the workings of government, social institutions and individuals without fear of prosecution or intimidation. It can search and report wrongdoing, especially of the state elite. Such wrongdoings include, but are not limited to, corruption, misuse of power to violate human rights and incompetence of the government organs. As Robert Ssempala posits: 'the press is the surrogate of the citizen, reporting back through print and broadcast media what it has found so that the citizenry can act on that knowledge' (Ssempala 2018). It builds state capacity as it provides information 'crucial to good governance and democratic development' (Cage 2014: 1).

For example, in Sudan, the media not affiliated to the government or the ruling party have used democratic space to execute their roles responsibly – without fear – in using frames that are critical of development issues (Eribo and Jong-Ebot 1997). However, the media that have done their job well to enable fundamental change for the benefit of all people 'may appear rare in Africa' (Nyamnjoh 2005b). The reason is the restriction of media autonomy. Use of restrictive laws has continued in African countries to the contemporary times of democratisation. The African governments

have been enacting laws to control media autonomy to avoid criticism. For example, in Mali, in 2000, the government passed a law allowing journalists found guilty of defamation to be fined or imprisoned, and journalists came under pressure to self-censor reports on sensitive topics. And when a coup d'état in 2012 and conflict in the country's north threatened the country's democracy, the space for media was further constrained (Wasserman and Benequista 2017).

Similarly, in Tanzania, between 2015 and 2017, the government passed several laws that limit the media from playing a watchdog role. They include (*The Access to Information Act, 2016* 2016), the Cybercrimes Act (2015) and The Media Services Act (2016). For example, The Media Services Act (2016) replaced a draconian law, The Newspaper Act (1976) and purported to strengthen freedom of expression and press freedom, but instead the new law undermines those rights. The implication of these laws will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three and reflected in the analysis chapters.

2.3 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the media's normative social responsibility in sub-Saharan African countries. It used framing theory as the analytical framework. Three key observations can be drawn from the analysis. Firstly, the media's critical news reporting on development matters is fundamental for a nation to achieve equitable distribution of development as it encourages public leaders' accountability. Secondly, autonomy is a fundamental factor for the media to perform their social responsibility function. However, media autonomy is problematic because it is influenced by ownership, laws and regulations, finance and training. Thirdly, the media's ability to perform social responsibility effectively (the watchdog function) is contested. While some sections of society embrace it, others, specifically the state power elite, do not like it as it risks their political positions.

From colonial to post-colonial contemporary times the state power elite in sub-Saharan African countries have controlled and used the media to fulfil their development agenda. The European colonial masters established, controlled and used the media to achieve their development agenda – extraction of economic materials from African countries. Meanwhile, on coming to state power after independence, the African nationalist movements equally did the same to realise

their post-colonial development agenda – building national states. Neither the colonial regimes nor the nationalist governments would endorse the news media that would frame their wrongdoings, to avoid being held accountable. Consequently, it has become difficult for the media in Africa to thrive to report news effectively on development issues as the media lack autonomy.

This chapter set out the conceptual framework of analysis for this investigation. It used the framing analytical approach to examine how media ownership, regulations, finance and training influence media autonomy in sub-Saharan Africa. The next chapter will use this framework to further examine the media's watchdog role in Tanzania from colonial to post-colonial contemporary times.

Chapter Three: Tanzania's Media Autonomy in the Historical Perspective

3.0 Introduction

One of the factors that this thesis examines to explore and explain how the media in Tanzania approach reporting on development issues is that of media autonomy. Since the emergence of print media in Tanzania in the late 19th century, the media and their autonomy to report on issues of national interest have been shaped and constrained by the political, legal and social environment in which they have operated. However, these environments have changed over time, due to both external factors (colonial rule, the influence of external actors) and internal factors (the nature of representative democracy and government in the country). This chapter therefore explores the factors that have influenced the relative autonomy of the Tanzanian media over a 128-year period. This encompasses three main political periods: German colonial rule and the British protectorate; the post-colonial single-party political system; and the contemporary period of multi-party politics. The analysis is guided by the following questions: How has Tanzania's political, legal and social environment changed over time? How has this environment created both constraints and opportunities for the media to report on national development concerns? What are the continuities and discontinuities in this media environment through these three periods?

This chapter also traces the evolution of the changing political and legal regulation of the media in Tanzania, which determined the extent to which the media had freedom from political interference and influence. The chapter also notes the increased control of media access to the general population as literacy levels increased and technology involved in delivering information advanced. The capacity of the media to report with competence, professionalism and independence is also a function of patterns of ownership of the mainstream media, and of the existence and provision of professional training. Together, these factors shape the ways in which editors and journalists report on national development issues, the stories they highlight or ignore, the language in which they frame those stories and the audiences to which the reporting is directed. Examples of such content are given in each section.

This chapter consists of four sections. Section 3.1 looks at media autonomy in the context of German colonial rule and British administration. Section 3.2 examines the


media under the single-party state between 1967 and 1995. Section 3.3 looks at the state of the media under the presidencies of Benjamin Mkapa (1995–2005), Jakaya Kikwete (2005–2015) and Dr John Magufuli (2015–2018). Section 3.4 draws conclusions.

3.1 The Media in the Colonial Context 1885–1961

3.1.1 The Media in German Tanganyika

During German rule communication technology had not advanced much as until the Germans were defeated in the First World War, newspapers were the only modern form of media that existed in Tanganyika (Taylor 1963). Figure 2 shows Tanzania before 1820 when it was known as German East Africa.

Figure 2: Tanzania (Germany East Africa) Before 1820



Source: Modified map retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/place/Tanganyika/media/582427/1192> on 14/04/2019

During German colonial rule, the majority of Tanganyikans ‘were pre-literate’ (Iliffe 1979: 26). This suggests that, when the Germans occupied the East African region, very few Tanzanians could read and construe information constructed in the news

published in newspapers. To improve literacy amongst the general population, missionaries from Europe, who had settled in Tanganyika, provided education to Tanganyikans as well as preaching Christianity (Iliffe 1973; vanderPloeg 1977; Mazrui 1978). For example, in St Andrews' College situated in Kiungani, Zanzibar, lessons taught to students included reading in English and Kiswahili (Iliffe 1973).

Tanganyika under German rule also had no training institutions to deliver journalism skills to media professionals, as literature shows that stories were constructed and edited by Tanganyikan public servants (mainly teachers) who had benefited from the European missionaries' education (Cohen 1993). Many newspapers were established under German rule. This chapter focuses on three. Two of them, Msimulizi and Kiongozi, were published in Kiswahili and owned by religious-based institutions, and the third, Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung (DOAZ), was owned by a German citizen and German was the language used in reporting news on various aspects in the society.

3.1.1.1 Msimulizi Newspaper

Msimulizi, or News Bearer as translated by Mazrui (1978), was the first newspaper in Tanganyika (Sturmer 1998; Lobulu 2011; Askew 2014; TLS 2014). It was published in Zanzibar and became operational in 1888 (Sturmer 1998; Jeong-Kyung 2008; Askew 2014), two years before the Germans officially colonised Tanganyika.

Msimulizi, which by 1890 had 34 pages, was owned and published by the Anglican Universities' Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) in Zanzibar (Askew 2014). Published in Kiswahili, it used male and female reporters to cover development issues in the Zanzibar town suburbs of Mkunazini, Mbweni and Kiungani (Hamdani 2014).

The Arab Sultanate of Oman established its direct rule in Zanzibar in 1881 (Lodhi 1986), and Msimulizi's lead stories tended to depict the Arab Sultan as a friendly and caring leader. For example, Hamdan (2014) noted that the visit of the leader Seyyid Khallifa to the Kiungani area in Zanzibar town was covered as the front-page lead news story in Msimulizi.

3.1.1.2 Kiongozi Newspaper

Kiongozi (The Leader) monthly newspaper, published in Kiswahili and located in Tanga, started circulation in 1904. Owned by the Lutheran Church, it received a subsidy from the German regime. It too was written and edited by Tanganyikans who had benefited from European education (Sturmer 1998; Askew 2014). The Kiongozi print run was 2,500 copies and contents consisted mainly of topics about German East Africa, official announcements and entertaining articles (Sturmer 1998: 37).

It also reported on instances of anti-colonial insurgence but in such a way as to discourage Tanganyikans from participating in such activities (Askew 2014). Poems discouraging anti-colonialism were intended to persuade Tanganyikans who were against German rule that participating in the Majimaji uprising of 1905–1907 was wrong (Curtin 1960; Taylor 1963). A poem written by Jakobo Kombo Kiongozi in January 1911, reads in part:

Afrika furahi, mshukuru sana Kaisari wee; Baraka na amani kakupa Kaisari wee! Chuma pendo umpende sana Kaisari saa; Dola yake ni kubwa miji yote kaiwasha taa; Eleza ya kale kama sasa yakufaa, Fundisha watoto wako wapate kumtii, Jinsi gani wafanya matata wala hutulii? Hura, hura, umwigie, umuombe uhai.

In English:

[Rejoice Africa, be very grateful to the Kaiser. Blessings and peace the Kaiser has given to you! Gather love that you may love dearly the Kaiser. The empire is big: in all towns he has lit lamps! Tell the past and if the present is useful to you. Teach your children so that they obey him. Why do you cause trouble instead of being calm? Shout 'Hurrah, Hurrah' for him and pray that he will have a long life. When danger threatens, it is he, the eagle, who protects (Askew 2014: :518).]

Indeed, the German colonial administration gave a contributor of poems, Hamisi Auwi, a luxurious trip to Germany as a token of appreciation for an article he wrote in the form of a poem entitled 'Who Has the True Authority if Not the Kaiser?' While in Germany, Auwi was offered an opportunity to meet with the country's leader, the Kaiser, and was rewarded handsomely for the propaganda poem (Askew 2014).

The propaganda role that this newspaper played was visible during the First World War. As the British were fighting with Germany in East Africa, the Kiongozi newspaper published several Kiswahili poems that framed the British as weak and

Germans as mighty. Askew (2014) quotes a poem written by Ramazan Saidi, published in *Kiongozi* in February 1915, and translated into English, which reads in part: 'Wote tukastaajabu, Waingereza watakani? Watajitia aibu kwa nguvu za jerman' ('All of us were amazed: What do the English want? They'll embarrass themselves against Germany's might') (Askew 2014: :519). However, though the poem framed the British as a weak nation, Germany was defeated and the British took over the German East Africa territory after the war (Keegan 2014).

3.1.1.3 Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung Newspaper

In February 1899, a privately owned newspaper known as DOAZ, was established in Dar es Salaam (Iliffe 1969; Mazrui 1978). News reported in DOAZ paid attention to social, economic and politics issues affecting the large-scale German farms in the East Africa territory (Iliffe 1969; Sturmer 1998; Mwakikagile 2009; TLS 2014). This included issues concerning Tanganyikans who worked as labourers on these commercial farms. They included the labourers' inability to pay the cash taxes demanded by the German administration, and forced labour migration, which caused great hardship to the labourers' families (Taylor 1963).

DOAZ received a subsidy from the German colonial administration (Iliffe 1973), but the owner and its editor, both German citizens, discouraged official meddling in their news reporting (Scotton 1978). To minimise the interference, DOAZ editor Willy von Roy decided to publish a DOAZ supplement called DOAR which specifically reported news about the administration's declarations and activities. The German rulers later enacted and used the German East Africa Territory Newspaper Decree of 1912 to control DOAZ autonomy (Scotton 1978; Sturmer 1998; TLS 2014). This law was used to punish the DOAZ editor (Scotton 1978). There are contradictory theories over the reasons for the legal action taken against the DOAZ editor, von Roy. One suggests that von Roy had published a news item accusing a senior official in the German colonial regime in East Africa of being homosexual. He was subsequently prosecuted and sentenced to time in jail (Iliffe 1969). Another theory points out that DOAZ was at loggerheads with the German colonial rulers because the former had backed the concerns of labourers on German commercial farms in the Tanga region

about the head tax (Scotton 1978). Table 1 summarises the characteristics of the three newspapers published during German rule in Tanganyika.

Table 1: Media Patterns Under German Rule in Tanganyika

Year	The media and its language in bracket	The media training	The media owner	The media content	The media laws	The media source of finance
1888	Msimulizi newspaper (Kiswahili)	-	European missionaries	Arabs' elite activities	-	UMCA ¹⁷ Mission
1899	DOAZ newspaper (Germany)	-	Private German individual	News on German settlers and concerns of farm labourers	Newspaper decree of 1912	German regime subsidy
1904	Kiongozi (Kiswahili)	-	European missionaries	German East Africa and official releases	-	German regime subsidy

Table 1 shows that in German East Africa, there was no newspaper published in English and no training college had been established to provide professional training to media workers in the region. How did the media context change after the British took over the administration in Tanganyika? How autonomous was the media under British rule in reporting news on development issues that concerned the majority population?

3.1.2 The Media Under British Protectorate Tanganyika

This section examines media autonomy during the British administration in Tanganyika. It explores the ways in which the rulers controlled media access when technology advancement in information communication had brought about broadcast media, including radio.

Radio broadcasts usually reach a wider audience than print media (Quora 2018). This section discusses the media patterns of ownership, regulations and news content during British administration.

¹⁷ Anglican Universities' Mission to Central Africa (UMCA)

3.1.2.1 The Media Owned by the British Administration in Tanganyika

The first publication owned by the British administration in Tanganyika was known as Tanganyika Territory Gazette and it started circulation on June 24, 1919. Its news coverage focused on the British administration's press statements, legal matters and parliamentary reports. The Gazette focused on issues that would help the British rulers to administer Tanganyika. For example, it would publish news giving prominence to information directing the British administrative officers on the ways in which to establish courts, the procedures for conducting cases in the courts and aspects to take into consideration when passing judgement over a case (Read 1979).

Tanganyika Territory Gazette was written in English. Its readership was mainly the British administration officials, the Zanzibar Arab Sultanate elite, the Arab landowners in Zanzibar and native Tanganyikans who had benefited from education offered by the Europeans. During this period, some educated natives formed part of the British administrative system (Mazrui 1978).

On November 19, 1919, a weekly tabloid known as the Dar es Salaam Times, also known as the Voice of Tanganyika, and owned by the British administration, came into circulation (Read 1979; Sturmer 1998). The publication focused on dramatic news from Westminster, local social gossip, economic matters and issues affecting women in the East African territory (Sturmer 1998; Mwakikagile 2009).

Later, in 1923, the British rulers also established the Mamboleo (Today's Events) newspaper published in Kiswahili (Sturmer 1998). Initially, the news that occupied almost 50 percent of the Mamboleo newspaper focused on agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry. But as anti-colonial insurgency intensified, Mamboleo became the British rulers' tool for discouraging Tanganyikans from participating in anti-colonial activities (ibid.). The publication also gave prominence to news stories that would 'lure the people away from the struggle for independence' (Rioba 2008: 11). The purpose was to counter the criticism levelled by Tanganyikans through the Mwafrika newspaper. However, Mamboleo ceased circulation after Julius Nyerere,

the TANU leader, discouraged Tanganyikans from reading the newspaper as it was against the independence struggle (Sturmer 1998).

The first radio channel was established in Tanganyika on July 1, 1951 and it was named Sauti ya Dar es Salaam of Dar es Salaam Broadcasting Station or Sauti ya Dar es Salaam (Moshiro 1990; Sturmer 1998; Mwakikagile 2009). The proposal to establish this radio station had been made by the BBC¹⁸ (Lobulu 2011). The radio's capacity to reach out to the public grew fast because, soon after it was established, the British rulers continued to inject huge funds through a grant to expand its geographical coverage (Mwakikagile 2009).

The British administration owned and financed the establishment radio in Tanzania, known as Dar es Salaam Broadcasting Station (Mwakikagile 2009). Initially, the British administration – through its Colonial Development and Welfare fund – gave the radio station a grant of £10,000. A year later it received an additional £10,000 and in 1954 the grant grew five times bigger, reaching £50,000. By May 8, 1956, when the radio station's name was changed to Tanganyika Broadcasting (TBS), the station's capacity had reached South Africa. Additionally, the radio professionals were well-trained Tanganyikans. By 1961 the radio station had 123 workers, of which 94 were qualified professional natives (Sturmer 1998; Mwakikagile 2009).

As Moshiro (1990) observes, the role of the radio was to discourage Tanganyikans from participating in anti-foreign occupation activities. To ensure that anti-colonial groups would not access the radio to broadcast their views, the British rulers established a broadcasting policy that restricted broadcasting of any piece of news or programme on political debates unless 'it was something really exceptional' (Sturmer 1998: 80). This suggests that British rule would not allow the radio to broadcast news focusing on discourses relating to independence struggles unless the news was detrimental to the cause. To achieve this objective, the radio would be closely monitored as the Governor had the power to ban broadcast materials construed to be unfavourable to the interests of the regime (Patterson 2004; Mwakikagile 2009).

¹⁸ BBC stands for British Broadcasting Corporation.

The next subsection discusses the private media established under the British administration.

3.1.2.2 Privately Owned Media in British Tanganyika

Establishing private media during the British administration required capital investment and it seems that, at the beginning, Tanganyikans had no financial capacity to engage in the media industry. As a result, the first privately owned publication was established by a business person of Asian origin, M.D. Patel, in 1923 (Read 1979). It was a daily and weekly publication known as *Tanganyika Opinion*, published in English and Gujarati. The publication focused on topics related to business and marketing issues. For example, the *Gazette* issue of September 16, 1920 published the trade report for the year ending March 31, 1920. The report shows that imports had increased from 15,116,097 rupees in the previous year to 17,376,405 rupees, while exports' value had almost doubled from 10,114,366 rupees to 19,940,156 rupees (ibid.). However, only Asians had access to the *Tanganyika Opinion* newspaper (Sturmer 1998). This suggests that most Tanganyikans had no access to news that would provide them with information to enable them to engage in business and economic activities.

Thus, because Tanganyikans had few media skills and financial muscle, it took time for them to garner resources to establish press. Moreover, media laws enacted by the British rulers were complicated and they made it even more difficult for Tanganyikans to set up a publication. It was not until towards the 1940s, that, for the first time, a publication owned by Tanganyikans was published (Scotton 1978). The publication was known as *Kwetu* and it came into circulation for the first time on November 18, 1937 with 1,000 copies in Kiswahili (Sturmer 1998). The news that was published as the lead story on the publication's front page was translated into English (ibid.). Perhaps this enabled the British rulers to get updates on the activities of the independence struggle. *Kwetu* was the mouthpiece of Tanganyikans and, as such, reading it meant being critical of the colonial masters' economic exploitation and racial discrimination (Scotton 1978).

News published in Kwetu included topics on native social rights. For example, Kwetu's editor, Fiah, had published a special issue condemning the British rulers' practice of denying Africans access to facilities used by the Europeans, such as shops and recreational areas (Scotton 1978: 4). The critical point of view of the paper put the editor at loggerheads with the British administration. Therefore, as a way of avoiding further trouble with the colonial rulers, the editor allowed critical letters to be read by the relevant British authorities before publication. On one occasion the publication was sued in a court of law because the editor published an article without it being scrutinised first by the government. The news published in the Kwetu issue of March 8, 1942 alleged that a Chagga chief had killed some people who had accused him of mistreating citizens. However, the publication luckily escaped legal punishment because the file for the case got lost. Additionally, because the editor, Fiah, had been warned that legal action would be taken against him, he had published a statement denying that citizens had complained against the Chagga chief (Scotton 1978). Therefore, because Kwetu from time to time published stories on development issues concerning indigenous Tanganyikans, it was very popular both in urban and rural areas. Research conducted a decade after independence showed that the Kwetu newspaper was frequently available in villages and it was popular amongst its readers (Hall and Kassam 1972).

Another publication owned by native Tanganyikans was Mwafrika (The African). The newspaper was established in September 1957 and it was owned by two Tanganyikans, Robert Moses Makange and Kheri Rashidi Baghdelleh (Sturmer 1998). However, the foundation of this publication was laid by Julius Nyerere in the mid-1950s by initiating production of a newsletter known as Sauti ya TANU, a duplicated newsletter in a mixture of English and Swahili which was later renamed Mwafrika (Tanzanian Affairs 1990). The news reported in Mwafrika encouraged Africans to raise native issues, such as their representation in decision-making organisations, through the TANU political party (Scotton 1978). Mwafrika opposed the foreign rulers' conduct that undermined the political, economic and social rights of the native Tanganyikans and for that reason it became popular amongst the indigenous population (*ibid.*). Table 2 summarises the media during the British administration in Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

Table 2: The Media Patterns Under British Administration in Tanganyika

Year	The media (language in brackets)	The media training facility	The media owner	The media contents	The media laws	The media source of finance
1919	Tanganyika Territory Gazette (English)	-	British colonial rulers	Administrative laws & political statements	-	British regime in Tanganyika
1919	Dar es Salaam Times/Voice of Tanganyika (English)	-	British colonial rulers	Sensational news from British Westminster associated with social gossip & love affairs		British regime in Tanganyika
1923	Tanganyika Opinion (English & Gujarati)	-	A business person of Asian origin, M.D. Patel	Export of agricultural products of British colonial interests & economy & market news targeting Asians only	-	M.D. Patel
1923	Mamboleo (Kiswahili)	-	British colonial government	Early years used as a tool for colonial rulers' economic gains. Towards independence from the 1950s the regime used it as its propaganda tool countering natives' insurgence	-	British regime in Tanganyika
1929	Al-Falaq -The Dawn (Arabic & English)	-	Arab Sultanate rulers	Initially concerns of the Arab landowners. Later in 1948 became the Arab Sultanate rulers' tool of political propaganda	-	Sultanate Arabs in Zanzibar
1937	Kwetu (Kiswahili & English)	-	Private natives Tanganyika mainland	Natives' social rights	Penal code & ordinance	Tanganyikans
1957	Mwafrika (Kiswahili)	-	Robert Moses Makange and Kheri Rashidi Baghdelleh	News on natives' political rights – specifically mouthpiece of TANU	Penal code & ordinances -	Tanganyikan nationalists
1951	Radio Sauti ya Dar es Salaam (Kiswahili)	-	British colonial rulers	Propaganda discouraging Tanzanians from participating in anti-colonial insurgence	Broadcast Act of 1951	UK government

However, the British administration ensured that privately owned media would not report news focusing on social, economic and politics issues constructed using frames that would enlighten the general population on the negative impact of colonialism. In so doing, the British rulers enacted laws to make it very difficult for individuals to establish press outlets and to sustain them. The British rulers maintained the newspaper decree enacted by the German rulers in 1912, and enacted new laws that were even more restrictive. The first laws that the British regime enacted to control the media were the Penal Code of 1920 and the Newspaper Ordinance of 1928 (TLS 2014).

For example, the British administration used Section 63 of the Penal Code of 1920 to restrict Mwafrica from publishing news that the rulers construed would create distress in society. More laws were enacted as independence struggles intensified. The Newspaper Ordinance No 22 of 1928 was enacted on November 1, 1928 requiring newspapers that were published at an interval of less than 30 days to have a 'security bond' before they were registered (Sturmer 1998). The British rulers required individuals interested in the media business to make specific financial pledges that the regime would fall back on in case the media owners failed to abide by media regulations. This means that only very rich individuals or groups who were very well backed financially could establish a newspaper. Issa Shivji (1993), cited in Sturmer (1998), argues that the British colonial idea of requiring media proprietors to have collateral was so that 'hardly any person from the indigenous community could do so' (Sturmer 1998: 73). Thus, the indigenous Tanganyikans, who were the majority of the population, suffered more than other groups (Asians and Arabs) from the foreign ruler's domination, oppression and exploitation, yet they had no voice (Killian 2008).

At the beginning of the 1950s, as the independence movement had become more complex and formidable, the British rulers introduced further media laws that would make it impossible for newspapers to publish information critical of the regime. The British Legislative Council passed the Newspaper Ordinance No 35 of 1952 which increased the penalty for what the British rulers considered as libel from \$400 to \$1,300 (Sturmer 1998). Furthermore, in 1955, the regime added Section 63 to the Penal Code of 1920 which made it a criminal offence for a newspaper to publish

information that may cause public uproar. This section was used to charge Mwafrika newspaper editors in court. Mwafrika editor Kweri Rashidi Baghdelleh and his assistant Robert Moses Makange faced charges and were sentenced to six months' imprisonment each. Mwafrika had published a statement on June 1, 1958 which read in part: *Sisi wote tunajua kuwa Mwingereza yupo hapa kwetu kwa sababu ya kutunyonya damu na kujipatia manufaa yake mwenyewe* (Sturmer 1998: 74). The statement could be translated to mean: 'We all know that the British are in our country to exploit us for their own benefit'. The Mwafrika editors were jailed because the British regime framed the charges to suggest that the information had meant that British rulers were in Tanzania to suck peoples' blood (Sturmer 1998). Table 3 summarises media laws enacted during British rule.

Table 3: The Media Laws During British Rule in Tanganyika

MEDIA LAW	INFRINGEMENT
Penal Code of 1920	Empowered British colonial rulers to ban publication of information construed by the rulers as creating distress in society
Official Secret Ordinance Cap 45 of 1922	Criminal offence to publish what was considered as government secrets
Newspaper Ordinance No 22 of 1928	Required all publications to be registered and newspapers published at an interval of less than one month to pay security bond
Newspaper Ordinance No 35 of 1952	Increased penalty for any publication which British rulers considered as libel
The Newspaper Registration Ordinance Cap 229 of 1952	Made it very hard for a private newspaper to be registered and operationalised
In 1955 additional section on sedition was added in Section 63 of the Penal code of 1920	Criminalised publication of information that may cause public uproar
Broadcasting Act of 1951	Empowered British colonial rulers to prohibit news and programmes on natives' independence activities

Table 3 shows that during British rule, laws enacted to control media access increased seven times compared to laws enacted by German rule to curtail media autonomy. This suggests that under the British administration, the media had become more accessible and more important for the development agenda of the Tanganyikans, particularly in relation to independence activities.

Meanwhile, under the British administration, training of media professionals (as during German rule) was problematic as it depended on the support of foreign organisations. The foreign organisations that provided media-related training included the BBC (Jenks 2016).

In conclusion, the continuities in the media under the two colonial regimes include, firstly, the use by both German and British rulers of restrictive laws to control the freedom of the privately owned media to report development issues in a way that would expose the negative impacts of colonialism; secondly, most of the media, both under German colonial and British administration, reported news stories using Kiswahili. This suggests that the media indirectly promoted the literacy of the general population in Kiswahili.¹⁹ However, the issue of censorship as part of autonomy control was a reality under the British administration while it was not a serious matter during German colonial rule. Also, while the German rulers did not own the media directly, the British rulers owned some broadcast and print media.

How did the media environment change following the political changes after Tanganyika attained independence in 1961? To what extent did the media after independence change in reporting issues affecting the majority of people? In answering these questions, the next subsection begins by exploring media autonomy in Tanzania immediately after the country attained independence from Britain in 1961. Specifically, it considers the period of the presidency of the first Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere (1960s–1980s) whose government initiated and implemented the ujamaa socialism development policy guided by single-party politics ideology and government- and party-owned only media.

3.1.3 The Media in Post-Colonial Single-Party State 1967–1995

Under the leadership of the first President, Julius Nyerere, Tanzania officially adopted a single-party political system on July 5, 1967 (Campbell and Stein 1991; Wuyts 2008). In the meantime, Nyerere initiated an ujamaa socialism development policy to guide the development of the country (Nyerere 1973; Samoff 1981; Campbell and Stein 1991; Nyirabu 2002; Shivji 2008). Although Tanzania was the initiator of the philosophy of ujamaa (which means ‘familyhood’ in Kiswahili), the idea was associated with a wider regional phenomenon of African socialism strategically constructed from the varied ideologies that dominated the world in the 1960s and 1970s (Lal 2015).

¹⁹ See the next section in this chapter on the impact of Kiswahili literacy on media access.

Nyerere's initial thinking about ujamaa socialism as a national development path focused on communal production mainly through farming in rural areas (Hydén 1980; Ibbott 2014; Lal 2015). As Priya Lal asserts: 'The political imaginary of ujamaa configured the settled communal village as the anchor of Tanzanian socialism' (Lal 2015: 129). The idea was to create a classless society in which everybody would settle in villages, work in communal production and the benefits garnered would be used to bring positive change in their lives, the lives of others and the nation at large. After paying several visits to the model ujamaa village in Litowa in the Ruvuma region, Nyerere argued that:

An ujamaa village is a voluntary association of people who decide of their own free will to live together and work together for their common good. They and no one else will decide how much of their land they will cultivate together from the beginning, and how much they will cultivate individually. They and no one else will decide how to use the money they earn jointly – whether to buy an ox-plough, install water or do something else. They, and no one else, will make all the decisions about their working and living arrangements (Ibbott 2014: 135).

Nyerere wanted Tanzanian ujamaa socialism to be different from socialism implemented in other parts of the world which allegedly reinforced class stratification in societies.

How, then, is ujamaa socialism positive or negative to Amartya Sen's (1999) conceptualisation of development as freedom? Sen's definition of development as freedom considers 'freedoms of individuals' as a vital variable for social development as people require 'capabilities' to 'lead the kind of lives they value – and they have reason to value' (Sen 1999: 18). For ujamaa, with all Tanzanians living in villages, Nyerere argued that it would be easy for the government to perform its responsibility of providing basic, enabling services and opportunities such as water, health care and education to all people, both in rural and urban areas (Kahama et al. 1986; Ibbott 2014; Lal 2015). By providing these social amenities and infrastructure, such as electricity and roads, the socialist government of Nyerere aimed to build the capabilities of Tanzanians to be able to improve their lives and

shape the future of their nation. In fact, even in the contemporary period, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) measures development using the human development index which uses the proxies of life expectancy (a function of decent health care), literacy (a function of education provision) and per capita income (a function of available livelihoods) (UNDP 2018b).

Ujamaa also shaped the political life of Tanzania. Moving into villages enabled some people 'to advance to a new position of power in village government' and some found their 'pathway to higher district-level political involvement' (Lal 2015: 186). Moreover, at international and national level, ujamaa was a political language that Tanzanian leaders used as a power to speak and act. Marie-Aude Fouéré notes: 'Indeed, at the time of the Tanzanian experiment ujamaa was more than strictly a development strategy: it provided a new political lexicon that the state used to articulate its national narrative' (Fouéré 2014: 4).

It could also be argued that the positive characteristics of ujamaa socialism are compatible with the contemporary lexicon of global development, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – there are 17 SDGs (UN 2015). Connecting the 17 goals is an understanding that sustainable development embraces the so-called triple bottom-line approach to human wellbeing. Almost all the world's societies acknowledge that they aim for a combination of economic development, environmental sustainability and social inclusion, but the specific objectives differ globally, between and within societies (Sachs 2012: 2206). Some of the goals are related to social outcomes and inputs related to quality of life. For example, goals 1 to 7 focus on poverty, the elimination of hunger, good health and wellbeing, quality education, gender equality, clean water and sanitation, and affordable and clean energy, respectively. Others, such as goals 8, 9 and 11, focus on decent work and economic growth, industrial innovation and infrastructure, and sustainable cities and communities which are basically economic issues. Meanwhile, goals 16 and 17 focus on peace, justice and strong institutions, and partnership in goals, which can be understood as specifically political and governance-related issues.

However, a central element in ujamaa is its collectivism, with the emphasis on collective production and the common good rather than individual preferences, and therefore is at odds with Sen's emphasis on the freedoms of individuals. This collectivism also tips into authoritarianism. Moving people from scattered settlements into ujamaa villages undermined the freedom of some social groups, including community groups whose mode of production was complex and incompatible with the ujamaa principle of living in a village and working communally. Such groups included pastoralists whose mode of production compels them to shift with their animals from one area to another, searching for water and grass for survival. However, the operationalisation of ujamaa villages did not consider the source of livelihoods of pastoralists (Lal 2015). I would argue that by being forced to live in a confined area, regardless of the availability of the feeding needs of their animals, pastoralists' freedom to choose the kind of mode of production they preferred to earn their livelihood was curtailed.

Farmers too faced challenges during the implementation of ujamaa villages development approach. For example, in the Mtwara region, some farmers found it difficult to move into new settlements because they had already invested long term in their cashew farms and abandoning them would be a waste of livelihood. So, although they moved into the established villages, they spent several hours per day going back to their cashew farms, as Fatou Mohammed Nyonde reveals: 'We were experiencing the punishment of having to walk to our distant farms after we had moved' (Lal 2015: 207).

Moreover, ujamaa national development approach to some extent reinforced gender inequality (Lal 2015). In some regions such as Ruvuma ujamaa villages were created along the highways for political and economic purposes. As a result, men would engage in petty business while women were left to do hard work such as cultivating farms, fetching water and firewood far away from homes (ibid).

During the initial implementation of ujamaa villages between 1967 and 1969, moving into the villages was slow as only 5 percent of the Tanzanian population had moved into ujamaa villages (Jennings 2017). However, when Nyerere's government realised that people were not willing to move into villages, it used force. Nyerere is recorded

as saying '[i]f we do not start living in proper village communities then all of our attempts to develop the country will be wasted efforts' (Green 2010: :31). In 1970, Nyerere decided that people in the drought-stricken region of Dodoma should be moved into villages comprising at least 250 people within 14 months and those who refused were denied food aid following the 1969 famine (Scott 1998). In 1973, Nyerere made a decree that 'villagization was *sio ombi, ni amri*, not a request, but an order' (Becker 2013: 249). In implementing the decree, tactics were used to force people to live in ujamaa villages. For example, former houses were commonly made uninhabitable by ripping out doors and windows, and kicking holes in the mud walls or by setting fire to the thatched roofs. In some cases grain stores in or near the house also caught fire and the family food supply was destroyed (Meredith 2005: 255-256).

Importantly, working in communal production denied people an opportunity to compete. Yet, in principle, the human being is a complex creature which survives through competition (Giddens 1984).

Ujamaa socialism was also not entirely compatible with Sen's (1999) understanding of development as freedom in relation to individual freedoms, political freedoms and media freedoms. During the single-party era, the media were concentrated in the hands of the government and its ruling party TANU, later CCM. This party was officially formed in 1977 after the merger of TANU and the Afro Shirazi Party in Zanzibar. The aim of restricting privately owned media was 'to curb opposition and foster development of socialistic principles' (Sturmer 1998: i). They could not be critical for fear of being branded anti-patriotic, anti-people, anti-ujamaa socialism and anti-nation. As Gervas Moshiro argued, the key role of the media 'then was the ideologization of the nation from feudal colonial-capitalist practice and mentality to a brand of socialism' (Moshiro 1990: 26). Similarly, as Sturmer noted, the aim of restricting privately owned media was 'to curb opposition and foster development of socialistic principles' (Sturmer 1998: i).

Yet, effective press freedom could have played a fundamental part in exposing the shortcomings in the implementation of ujamaa villages. For instance, journalists could have investigated the complexities of pastoralist land issues in relation to

ujamaa villagisation. This would have helped the government understand the impact of the ujamaa village on the economy of pastoralists as well as the social conflict aspect. But there was no coverage of such potential land conflict and tension between pastoralists and farmers in villages in Tanzania is today a common phenomenon, often spilling over into violence (Lal 2015).

Although in contemporary Tanzania the media landscape is more pluralistic, featuring many more press outlets and both state-owned and privately owned media, these social institutions are still weak in their scrutiny of the performance of government in the implementation of SDGs. When they do report critically on citizen-centred development-related matters, they are targeted by politicians in state power. For example, in early March 2019, the Tanzanian Ministry of Information banned The Citizen newspaper alleging that on February 23, 2019 the paper published false information about the depreciation of the Tanzanian currency and the state of democracy in the country (CPJ 2019). Moreover, media reporting of news on social, economic and politics issues rarely includes views of the general citizenry as the findings in Chapter Five, Chapter Six and Chapter Seven reveal. Yet, the Tanzanian government has signed up to international commitments to implement SDGs, several of which speak, if indirectly, to the importance and value of an active and independent press. For example, SDG 17, on Partnerships for the Goals, under Data, Monitoring and Accountability, includes target 17.19 which urges states to 'build on existing initiatives to develop measurements of progress on sustainable development that complement gross domestic product, and support statistical capacity-building in developing countries' (UN 2015). The media have a role, alongside government and civil society, in measuring progress on the SDGs. Similarly, under SDG 5 on Gender Equality, the aspiration to 'ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life' requires that women are given voice in national debates, including through the media. SDG 16, on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, urges the development of 'effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels' (16.6) and exhorts governments to 'ensure public access to information' (UN 2015).

But how important really is the legacy of ujamaa now in Tanzania? Ujamaa socialism as a national development path came to an end when Nyerere stepped down as Tanzanian President in 1985 after serving as the Head of State for 24 years. As Michael Jennings observes, 'the adoption of a multi-party constitution in 1992 formally ended the commitment of Tanzania to socialist development' (Jennings 2017). However, although today ujamaa has been dismissed as an old-fashioned ideology, people still use ujamaa socialism as a moral code and Nyerere as an icon for morality for people-centred development (Fouéré 2014). Since the first multi-party elections in 1995, politicians seeking to be endorsed for state power positions during election periods have been referring to ujamaa and Nyerere's leadership ethics as a strategy to win votes (Fouéré 2014).

Meanwhile, regarding training, during the early years of post-independence under ujamaa socialism and the single-party era monitored by government-owned-only media there was no formal training institution established in the country for formal journalism training. Formal professional media training began to be offered after the Tanzania School of Journalism was established in 1975 (Sturmer 1998). The school offered a two-year diploma in journalism (ibid.).

Two types of media, radio and newspapers, had existed during British rule and continued during the single-party era. Although the technology of communication had seen the invention of television broadcasts, President Nyerere discouraged the establishment of television on the Tanzania mainland and argued that it would not help to build socialism (Lwoga and Matovelo 2005). According to Sturmer (1998) and Lobulu (2011), the media that operated in Tanzania during the single-party state period were as shown in Table 4.

Table 4: The Media Patterns During Single-party Rule

Year	The media and its language (in brackets)	The media training facility	The media owner	The media contents	The media laws	The media source of finance
	Uhuru newspaper (Kiswahili)	-	TANU/CCM party	News sourced from government and ruling party on implementation of ujamaa villages	Penal code & ordinances	TANU/CCM party
1972	Daily News (Kiswahili)	-	Union state	News on government and ruling party activities	Penal code & ordinances	The government
1951	Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam (Kiswahili & English)	-	Union state	Government leader's activities propagate ujamaa, socialism, campaigns on national development issues including health & literacy	Radio Tanzania Dar Es Salaam Act No 11 of 1965	The government
1951	Sauti ya Unguja (March 15, 1951) – later changed to Zanzibar Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), Radio Zanzibar 1963 (Kiswahili)	-	State in Zanzibar	News on elite activities	Zanzibar Broadcasting Corporation Decree No 25 of 1961	The government of Zanzibar
	Television Zanzibar (TVZ)	-	State in Zanzibar	Government events and statements	Zanzibar Broadcasting Corporation Decree No 25 of 1961	The government of Zanzibar

As shown in Table 4 all the media that operated during the single-party state, except the Daily News, was published in Kiswahili. The use of Kiswahili in the media increased Kiswahili literacy among the general population because some newspapers not only wrote their articles in Kiswahili but also devoted space for teaching Kiswahili to the audience. For example, the Ngurumo newspaper owned by Habari Printers Co-operative Society Limited, which started circulation on April 15, 1959 and ceased on November 30, 1976, made a significant contribution in educating its readers in Kiswahili (Sturmer 1998). Similarly, a survey conducted by Budd Hall and Yusuf Kassam in 1972 revealed that the Uhuru newspaper was devoting space in a page to offer adult education and text of an educational content that was written in larger type (Hall and Kassam 1972). This suggests that literacy amongst the general population in Tanzania was increasing, making media information accessible to a wider audience.

However, because under President Nyerere the single-party state media were owned by the government and its ruling party, they played an insignificant watchdog role in evaluating leaders' performance in implementing the national development

agenda – ujamaa villages. Instead the media worked as appendages of the government and hence played the role of a conveyor belt of government and ruling party leaders' views on the development agenda. As Gervas Moshiro noted, the key role of the media 'then was the ideologization of the nation from feudal colonial-capitalist practice and mentality to a brand of socialism' (Moshiro 1990: 26). The media were used to communicate what was said by the party and government leaders to the general public (Moshiro 1990). For example, radio played a key role not only in mobilising people to move into ujamaa villages but also in issues of agriculture, health (such as child immunisation) and literacy campaigns (Hall and Kassam 1972; Kahama et al. 1986; Rioba 2008).

Nevertheless, the Daily News would sometimes publish stories that exposed the wrongdoings of government leaders. But this thesis argues that such criticism was not a major threat because most Tanzanians are not competent in English (Gran 2007). The people who read English newspapers are mostly the expatriate communities, the educated and Westernised elite of society, and the Asians (Tanzania 2018).

The media social responsibility in the implementation of ujamaa was important because putting ujamaa into practice through ujamaa villages ignored Sen's (1999) idea of development as freedom. Ujamaa was adopted without even getting the consensus of parliament (Samoff 1981), the organ which ought to represent the views of all people from all areas of the country. Yet, the 1961 TANU constitution promised that its government would focus on 'democratic' socialism. This means that the government violated what TANU had committed it to do. It moved Tanzanians into ujamaa villages without first getting their consensus based on understanding how the villages would operate to ensure peoples' improved social and economic life. As Scott observes, in formulating the ujamaa villages the 'plans were promulgated without any real consultation and were based on abstract assumption' (Scott 1998: 232).

This thesis argues that, based on the definition Nyerere provided for ujamaa villages after visiting Litowa village, it seemed that the ujamaa development approach was worthwhile as an ordinary citizen-centred development strategy. However, lack of critical media to monitor and expose the mistakes of the governing elite had

implications for the success of ujamaa villages in the country. It seems that TANU's Central Committee was against the Ruvuma Development Association (RDA) initiative to put ujamaa villages into practice (Mueller 1980). As a result, in September 1969, although there were no votes cast, 87.5 percent of the 24 TANU Central Committee members endorsed banning the RDA followed by destroying the ujamaa village initiative at Litowa (Ibbott 2014).

Apart from the media being used as appendages of the government and its ruling party, repressive laws were enacted to prohibit the media from reporting news on development topics that exposed leaders' wrongdoings in the implementation of ujamaa villages. The laws used included some of those enacted by the British regime. The laws enacted by the post-colonial government to control media autonomy to report development issues using information frames which the general public could use as a basis to demand accountability were many compared to those enacted by the British administration. There were seven repressive laws, including the Newspaper Registration Ordinance Cap 229 of 1952; Preventive Detention Act of 1962; Radio Tanzania Dar Es Salaam Act No 11 of 1965; National Security Act of 1970; Official Secret Ordinance Cap 45 of 1922 maintained through the Newspaper Act of 1976; Film and Stage Plays Act No 4 of 1976; and Newspaper Act of 1976 (Rioba 2012).

For example, the Preventive Detention Act of 1962 restricted freedom of questioning decisions made by government leaders. This suggests that even if politicians in state power committed a crime that undermined the prosperity of the nation and the general population, no media during the single-party state would report the criminal act and remain safe without being targeted by the politicians in state power. This explains why the TANU Central Committee decided to ban the RDA that had done a commendable job setting up the role model ujamaa villages. The established villages, for example Litowa, and the way it was operationalised, provided villages with freedoms including making decisions on who would become their leaders and what kind of economic activities they would engage with and how (Ibbott 2014). But when Nyerere returned from overseas, he did not take the committee to task (ibid.).

Moreover, it was not only the media of national status who were restricted from reporting news on development topics that the ruling elite could construe as bad taste, the newsletters published by the universities were also affected. For example, George Hajivayanis observes that, when *Cheche* magazine was born at the University of Dar Es Salaam in November 1969, the university leadership and the state in general 'were deeply annoyed' (Hajivayanis 2010: 83). The reason was that *Cheche* published news reflecting the realities of poor living standards in rural communities compared with life in the cities. The articles were written by students who visited the villages and stayed with villagers to understand how development policies affected the general citizenry (Meghji 2010). *Cheche* articles contained views, opinions and ideas of the people at the grassroots level. The citizens' views challenged the mainstream thinking and hence *Cheche* 'gave a concrete, radical analysis of the local situation' (Hajivayanis 2010: 95).

In 1985 Nyerere stepped down and Al Hassan Mwinyi took over as President. Before relinquishing power, Nyerere ensured that the National Constitution had been amended to limit the tenure of the Presidency to two terms of five years.

After taking over, President Mwinyi signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). The agreement required the country to adopt neo-liberal economic policies of privatisation of economic enterprises, democratisation of politics and cuts in government spending. The cuts in government spending were such that many of the achievements under Nyerere's leadership, such as near-comprehensive primary education, a health point in almost every village and large-scale drinking water supplies, were threatened (Coulson Forthcoming 2019). It did not take long before the gap between the rich and poor began to be visible in city centres. By the end of the 1990s mansion houses with security fences had been built in many areas on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam city, 'while in the city centres there were street children and beggars' (Caplan 2007: :684).

In conclusion, throughout the three decades of single-party politics, Tanzanians did not have access to media which could play a watchdog role through reporting of development issues.

The next subsection explores media autonomy in a multi-party political system.

3.1.4 The Media in Multi-Party Politics 1995–2018

Tanzania adopted multi-party democracy in 1992 and it was followed by allowing privately owned media to operate. Democracy is against one-size-fits-all as it requires participatory decision-making (Stoker 2006). The word ‘democracy’ is generally taken to mean ‘the rule by the people’ (Box 2015).

The mushrooming of privately owned media started to become a reality in 1994 (MCT 2007; TLS 2014). The first television station in the mainland, ITV, became operational on the Tanzanian mainland in 1994 (ITV 2013). By July 2013, out of the print publications registered, there were 14 national newspapers²⁰ of which two, the Daily News and Uhuru, were owned by the state and ruling party CCM, respectively (MCT 2007).

Then, from 1995, community²¹ radio and television outlets became a phenomenon in a number of regional and district urban centres across the country (Shartiely 2005). By March 2012 there were 83 radio stations and 26 television outlets on the Tanzania mainland (Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority 2012). Out of the 83 radio channels five had national coverage.²² Table 5 shows the distribution of radio and television channels per region by March 2012 in Tanzania’s mainland.

²⁰ In an informal interview in July 2013 with a senior official with the Tanzania newspaper registrar, Mr Hokororo, the newspapers are The Guardian, The Citizen, the Daily News, Business Times, the African Tanzania Daima, Mwananchi, Majira, Mtanzania, Uhuru, Mawio, Jamhuri, Rai and Raia Mwema.

²¹ In this context, community radio and television are those which reach specific geographical coverage. It could be a region or a district or some districts in a region.

²² Radio One Stereo, Radio Free Africa (RFA), Radio East Africa, Claudi Entertainment and TBC Taifa.

Table 5: Radio and Television Outlets Registered by March 2012

No	Region	Radio station		TV station	
		2012	Percent	2012	Percent
1	Dar es Salaam	20	24	11	42
2	Mwanza	11	13	1	4
3	Morogoro	8	9.6	2	7.6
4	Iringa	8	9.6	2	7.5
5	Mbeya	5	6	3	11
6	Kagera	4	4.8	-	-
7	Dodoma	4	4.8	-	-
8	Kilimanjaro	4	4.8	-	-
9	Shinyanga	3	4	-	-
10	Arusha	3	4	-	-
11	Ruvuma	3	4	1	4
12	Mtwara	3	4	2	8
13	Manyara	2	2	-	-
14	Tabora	2	2	1	4
15	Tanga	1	1	1	4
16	Mara	1	1	-	-
17	Rukwa	1	1	1	4
18	Singida	-	-	1	4
Total		83	100	26	100

The ownership of broadcast media in the context of multi-party democracy changed from one (state-owned) to eight categories: the state, councils, churches, individuals, communities, universities, NGOs and political parties. However, no community, political party or NGO owned a television station in the country by March 2012 (see Table 6).

Table 6: Radio and Television Ownership

Year		Radio		Television	
		Total	Percent	Total	Percent
2012	State	3 ²³	4	1	4
	Council	3 ²⁴	4	11	42
	Church	27 ²⁵	33	2	8
	Individual	42 ²⁶	50	10	38
	Community	3 ²⁷	4	-	-
	University	2 ²⁸	2	2	8
	NGO	2 ²⁹	2	-	-
	Political party	1 ³⁰	1	-	-
		83	100	26	100

In Zanzibar, the MCT State of the Media Report 2012 shows that, by 2012, three newspapers, two weeklies (Zaspoti and Zanzibarleo Jumapili) and a daily, ZanzibarLeo, were published in Zanzibar under the ownership of the Zanzibar Corporation of Government Newspapers. Twenty licences had been issued to individual applicants but none of them had published yet (MCT 2012). It seems independent newspapers have not flourished in Zanzibar because the newspapers published in the mainland (Dar es Salaam) have circulation in Zanzibar and most of the media outlets have correspondents in Zanzibar. Similarly, of the 20 radio stations that were established and operational in Zanzibar by 2012, three quarters (15) were on Unguja Island³¹ and five radio stations³² were located on Pemba Island.

²³ TBC Taifa, TBC FM and TBC International Radio.

²⁴ Boma Hai Radio (Hai), Kitulo Radio (Makete) and Ulanga Radio FM (Ulanga).

²⁵ Three radio outlets: Radio Imaan FM (Morogoro), Sauti ya Quran (Dar es Salaam) and Qiblatain FM Radio (Iringa) owned by Muslim groups. Church outlets were Radio Kwizera (Ngara/Kagera), Radio Tumaini (Dar es Salaam), Sauti ya Injili (Moshi), Radio Maria (Songea/Ruvuma), Radio Mwangaza FM (Dodoma), Radio Chemchem (Sumbawanga/Rukwa), Radio Faraja (Shinyanga), Wapo Radio (Dar es Salaam), Radio Ukweli (Morogoro), Morning Star FM (Dar es Salaam), Living Water FM (Mwanza), Radio Uzima (Dodoma), Radio Habari Njema (Mbulu/Manyara), Radio Furaha (Iringa), Baraka Radio (Mbeya), Radio Huruma (HR) (Tanga), Radio Ushindi Stereo (Mbeya), HHC Radio Station (Mwanza), Kwa Neema FM Radio (Mwanza) and Top Radio FM (Morogoro).

²⁶ Radio One Stereo, Radio Free Africa, Radio East Africa FM, Clouds Entertainment FM Radio, Passion FM, Radio Kissi FM, Capital Radio, Times Radio FM, Safina Radio FM, Sibuka FM Radio, Radio 5 Arusha, Radio Ebony FM, Radio Kili FM, Country FM, Classic FM Radio, Magic FM Radio, Aboud Radio, Sunrise FM Radio, Triple 'A' FM Radio, Victoria FM Radio, Choice FM Radio, CG FM Radio, Voice of Tabora, Kisibante FM Radio, Uplands FM Radio, Moshi FM Radio, Pambazuko FM Radio, Mbeya Highlands FM Radio, Bomba FM Radio, Kahama FM Stereo Radio, Kifimbo Radio Station, Generations FM Radio, Hot FM Radio, Radio Vision FM, Pride FM Radio, Safari Radio, Jogoo FM, Spot FM Radio, Info Radio FM, Planet FM, Radio Metro FM Stereo and Radio Best FM.

²⁷ Radio Sengerema sponsored by Tanzania Commission of Science and Technology (COSTECH) for Sengerema community, Orkonerei FM Radio sponsored by Pastoralists Community groups for Manyara community and Fadeco community radio for Karagwe community sponsored by Family Alliance for development.

²⁸ Radio Sauti and Mlimani FM owned by St Augustine University (Mwanza) and University of Dar es Salaam, respectively.

²⁹ Afya Radio (Mwanza) owned by Registered Trustee of Mwananchi Trust and Nuru FM Radio in Iringa owned by Iringa Development of Youth, Disabled and Children Care (IDYDC).

³⁰ Radio Uhuru FM in Dar es Salaam and by People's Communications Limited but its contents are mainly political propaganda in support of the ruling party CCM.

³¹ There were 15 radio outlets established in Zanzibar (Unguja Island) by 2012 and operational: Spice FM Station Unguja, STZ (Short Wave 1) Unguja, STZ (ShortWave 2) Unguja, STZ (Medium Wave) Unguja, STZ/BBC Unguja, Adhana Broadcasting, Bomba FM Radio, Chuchu FM, Coconut FM, Zenj FM Radio, Al-noor, STZ/China, Hits FM Unguja, Bhaa FM and Radio Imaan.

³² Radio outlets licenced for Pemba Island and in operation by 2012: Spice FM Station, STZ/BBC, Radio Maria, Coconut FM and Voice of Istiqama.

Regarding training, by 1984, the country had only two public universities: the University of Dar Es Salaam and Sokoine University near Morogoro. There was no private university. Private universities started in Tanzania after 1990. The first was Tumaini University, established in 1997, followed by Saint Augustine University in 1998. The University of Dar Es Salaam started offering a degree course in Journalism and Mass Communication in 2003.

Although under multi-party politics, privately owned media have been allowed, the quality public service provided by the media is problematic. One factor hindering media function is repressive media laws. For instance, the enactment of the Cybercrime Act (2015), Statistics Act (2015) and the Media Service Act (2016), which criminalise defamation and sedition offences, have made it difficult for Tanzanian journalists to conduct any 'critical and thorough journalism' (Mwita 2017). This situation has been made even worse since the fifth President of the Republic of Tanzania came to power (ibid). On the other hand, during the multi-party politics era, several colonial inherited laws were used and new laws were also enacted as shown in Table 7

Table 7: Media Laws During Multi-party Politics 1992–2018

MEDIA LAW	INFRINGEMENT
The Newspaper Registration Ordinance Cap 229 of 1952	Made it very hard for independent newspapers to be registered and operate. Requires publisher of newspaper to have one or more sureties
Film and Stage Plays Act No 4 of 1976	Restricted filming
Preventive Detention Act of 1962	Infringes freedom of questioning decision made by government leaders
National Security Act of 1970	Section 5 prohibits holders of public office to release classified information and breach of it attracts up to 20 years' imprisonment upon conviction
Official Secret Ordinance Cap 45 of 1922 maintained through National Security Act of 1970	Infringes media freedom to publish what the state construes as government secrets
Newspaper Act of 1976 read together with Newspaper Regulations 1977	Section 25 empowers the Minister of Information to ban publication or refuse registration. Sections 31 to 35 criminalise publishing information which the regime may construe as sedition in that it can cause uproar and Sections 38 to 47, publishing defamatory material against a person.
Tanzania Broadcasting Service Act, 1993	Restricts broadcasting of materials that in the view of the government may cause uproar
The Records and Archives Management Act, 2002	Section 16 restricts access to classified documents or information deposited in the National Archives or any other archive before 30 years after depository
Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority (TCRA) Act, 2002	Empowers TCRA to issue sanctions using different media laws
Cybercrime Act of 2015	Criminalises whistle-blowers of government wrongdoings, creates fear amongst the players of watchdog role on development as it places too much emphasis on criminalisation of cyber activities and not enough stress on regulation and protection of legitimate activities
Statistic Act, 2015	Introduces uncertainty in terms of who is allowed to generate statistics and what authorisation is required
The Access to Information Act, 2016	Resembles the Newspaper Act of 1976 as it allows the government to ban the press from publishing news that the rulers interpret as being unfavourable
The Media Services Act, 2016	Some sections in the law are deemed to be a threat to press freedom and freedom of expression

President Benjamin Mkapa was the first to be elected as Head of State in the multi-party politics context in Tanzania after the general election that was held towards the end of 1995. Under Mkapa, IMF development policies that had been introduced by President Mwinyi were strengthened. As a result, during President Mkapa's ten years of leadership, the capitalist mode of development began to become a reality in Tanzania. Many state enterprises were liberalised.

However, Mkapa, who was formerly a journalist, accused the Tanzanian media professionals that they were not competent to report on development issues. So, when addressing the public, he would make a written speech to avoid being misquoted by the media.

Nonetheless, Mkapa was generally a democratic leader as he did not impose dictatorial rule and he allowed the media to play its role in national development. During Mkapa's first five years, when Julius Nyerere was alive, to some extent the media would report development issues vibrantly, including the wrongdoings of high-profile government leaders. For example, in 1996, the media unveiled a corruption scandal involving Mkapa's Finance Minister, Professor Simon Mbilinyi. After the scandal was reported in the media, it did not take long before the Minister resigned (Tanzania Affairs 2011). This could be taken to mean that President Mkapa not only recognised but also appreciated the media's role in news reporting on social, economic and politics issues in enhancing accountability of government leaders in ensuring that national resources are used to benefit all Tanzanians.

However, this does not mean that during Mkapa's presidency tenure there were no restrictive media laws. The inherited draconian laws, including the Newspaper Act of 1976, which curtails media freedom, were still on the books. Section 25 of the law empowers the Minister to ban publication or refuse newspaper registration, while Sections 31 to 35 criminalise the publishing of information that the regime may construe as sedition, meaning that it can cause uproar. The law is a replica of the German East Africa territory Newspaper Decree of 1912, which the German colonial regime enacted to make the media toothless after the independent newspaper DOAZ decided to promote views on development issues that affected the natives

(the head tax and forced labour migration). The law also resembles the Penal Code of 1920 enacted under British colonial rule, which empowered the regime to ban publication when the rulers perceived the information published as seditious. However, by not using these citizen-centred development unfriendly media laws often, it seems Mkapa respected the national commitment his government had made – Vision 2015 – whose successful implementation requires democracy and media freedom (URT 2000a). Similarly, Mkapa honoured the international development commitments which Tanzania is a signatory to, such as MDGs, which later shifted to SDGs, and the Tanzania Vision 2015. This development of an effective media role knew that success for national development requires the media to play their role.

After ten years of Mkapa, President Jakaya Kikwete took over in 2005. Liberalisation continued during Kikwete's leadership. The growing economy during the Kikwete era prompted a construction boom in Dar es Salaam, however, some buildings were built without following the required standards and as a result they collapsed. For example, a building near the mosque at Kisutu area, which would be at least twelve floors high when finished, collapsed in March 2013, killing 17 people (BBC News 2013).

During the ten-year leadership of Kikwete, which ended in 2015, the society enjoyed relative freedom of speech and media freedom. The media used such freedom to expose some of the acts of government leaders that undermined national development. For example, in April 2011, a weekly newspaper – Raia Mwema – published an investigative report revealing a scandal related to alleged smuggling outside the country of 16 live birds and 116 animals worth Shs 170.57 million (about \$107,000). Following the news coverage, the Director of Wildlife, Obeid Mbangwa, had to be suspended to allow an investigation after the scandal reached Parliament on August 19, 2011 (MCT 2011). This is what Ndimara Tegambwage means when he says serious media outlets have sent shock waves into the ranks of those in power (Tegambwage 2014).

Similarly, because the government allowed some media freedom during the Kikwete era, some broadcast media of national status designed some strategic programmes

which enabled ordinary citizens and policymakers to discuss various current development issues. For example, the Kipima Joto broadcast on ITV television was a popular programme which enabled Tanzanians, regardless of their political affiliation, to discuss social, political and economic issues without fear. Similarly, to some extent, citizens' views on social, economic and politics topics were included in the news aired in ITV news bulletins. To achieve this, ITV designed its 8 o'clock evening news bulletins in such a manner that a few minutes were allocated for citizens to give their views on the issue at hand.

Generally, the government of President Kikwete allowed greater freedom of speech, media freedom and political freedom. However, towards the end of his first term of five years and during the second term, government threats were used against the media. For example, during the general election campaigns in 2010, the Ministry of Information Permanent Secretary, Sethi Kamuhanda, toured the print media and threatened to shut down any media house that 'put the government in a bad light' (Rhodes 2010). Similarly, Kikwete's government also used draconian laws inherited from colonialists to ban publication of news on development issues which the government interpreted as bad. For example, on July 4, 2012 Kikwete's government banned indefinitely the critical Kiswahili language weekly *MwanaHalisi*, accusing the paper of publishing seditious and false news (Media Watch 2012). Table 8 illustrates the government's actions against the media during Kikwete's tenure of leadership.

Table 8: Government Actions Against the Media During Kikwete's Rule

The Media	Year	Government Action	Reasons
MwanaHalisi	2007	Registrar sent threatening letter demanding why issue was published without permission	Allegedly MwanaHalisi published a special issue No 063 without a letter of notification to the registrar
MwanaHalisi	2008	Suspended for three months	Published a story violating Article 31 and 33 of Newspaper Act of 1976 alleging that a plot to eliminate the fourth President Jakaya Kikwete from vying for the 2010 elections had been uncovered. The government interpreted the story as sedition aimed at causing uproar.
Kulikoni	2010	Suspended for three months	Published a story in its issue No 812 of November 2009 titled Mdudu wa wizi wa mitihani sasa aingia jeshini, literally meaning 'Exams theft virus gets into the army'. The state construed it as sedition and going against national security.
Leo Tena	2010	Banned	Published pornographic picture on the front page
Mwananchi	2010	Registrar wrote a letter threatening to de-register the newspaper	Reported October 2010 elections in a manner that the government did not like
MwanaHalisi	2010	Registrar wrote a letter threatening to de-register the newspaper	Reported October 2010 elections in a manner that the government did not like
Tanzania Daima	2011	Editor Adsalum Kibanda and writer Samson Mwigamba charged in court	Publishing article 'Waraka Maalum kwa Askari Wote' meaning 'Special note to all security persons', which amongst other things advised security forces to remain neutral during election periods
Mwananchi Communications	2011	Managing editor Revacatus Makunga	Printing Tanzania Daima newspaper which published 'Waraka Maalum kwa Askari Wote' meaning 'Special note to all security persons'
MwanaHalisi	2011	Summoned by registrar	Written analytical story comparing performance of the First Lady Salma Kikwete with other First Ladies around Africa; the registrar construed the story as sedition aimed at causing uproar in society
Mtanzania	2011	Registrar's threat	Published article alleging that CCM had decided to drop the names of former Presidents Benjamin Mkapa, Ali Hassan Mwinyi and Aman Karume from the party central committee. The government construed the news as sedition.
MwanaHalisi	2012	Registrar's threat	Published a letter written by President Jakaya Kikwete to Chief Executive of the International Monetary Fund which the ruling elite construed as a government secret.
MwanaHalisi	2012	Banned indefinitely	Published news which the government construed as sedition and false. The news linked national intelligence with the torture of Dr Steven Ulimboka, Chair of the Medical Doctors Association of Tanzania who had championed demands for the government to improve health services at Muhimbili national hospital.
Kwa Neema FM	2012	Suspended for six months	Aired contents through its programme Kwa Mpemba on July 21, 2012 whose contents were construed by the ruling elite to mean mobilising the Muslim community not to participate in the national census of 2012
Kyela FM Radio	2015	Closure on August 3, 2015 for unspecified period	Allegedly, politically motivated reasons

However, regardless of the restrictive media laws, some of the media outlets were critical as they reported wrongdoings of politicians in state power which jeopardised national interest. By 2015 there were 22 registered political parties (Abdallah 2016). Then, by June 2016, the Union Parliament had 389 MPs, of which one was ex-officio, and four political parties occupied the seats (Parliament of Tanzania 2016). The political parties and their respective Union Parliament MPs were CCM 273

(70.49%), Chadema 71 (18.02%), CUF 42 (11.7%), NCCR Mageuzi one (0.26%), ACT Wazalendo one (0.26%) (ibid.). An analysis based on the number of Union Parliamentary seats each political party won following the 2015 elections reveals that CCM in each year up to the next general elections in 2020 will receive not less than 70 percent of the total annual budget from the public coffers allocated as the political parties' subsidy.

Similarly, individual and political freedoms were somehow tolerated by the politicians in state power. Citizens could discuss social, economic and politics issues of national interest in the public arena and through media channels. For example, such issues were in media discourse through the ITV weekly programme Kiti Moto (Hot Seat) and Channel Ten programme Je Tutafika? (Shall we succeed?). As a result, the 2015 general elections were obviously the most competitive since Tanzania's first multi-party elections in 1995. The defection from CCM of a former Prime Minister, Edward Lowassa, and his decision to contest the presidency through CHADEMA under a coalition of key opposition parties changed the assumption that CCM could never be defeated. Lowassa secured 6 million votes (40%) as against 8 million (58.5%) garnered by the winning CCM candidate Dr John Magufuli. In the previous election in 2010, the CCM presidential opposition competitor Dr Wilbrod Slaa, had won only 26 percent of the votes (Brewin 2016).

After Kikwete accomplished ten years' tenure, John Magufuli was elected as Tanzania's third President under plural political party politics. Magufuli campaigned as the candidate who would end corruption, especially in the civil service, and foreign travel by ministers and civil servants was reined in (Coulson Forthcoming 2019). Immediately after Magufuli took over he demonstrated that his government would do many good things to enhance national development. They included increasing national revenue by controlling unnecessary expenditure of public funds, improving discipline in public service, enforcing public accountability and combating corruption (Kabwe 2017; Paget 2017a; Daily News 2018).

In achieving this, one would expect that the government of Magufuli would embrace political freedom, freedom of speech and press freedom. For example, media freedom would allow the privately owned media to work as the watchdogs to

investigate and report matters related to Magufuli's government development agenda. However, President Magufuli could criticise rent seeking and other unacceptable practices in the public service, but would not allow the opposition political parties or the media to do so (Paget 2017a). As a result, control of media autonomy has been made worse since Magufuli ascended to power towards the end of 2015 (Mwita 2017).

Magufuli also confronted the multi-national mining companies. For example, he accused Acacia Mining of under-reporting the value of mineral exports. The government charged Acacia Mining with fines and back-dated taxes amounting to \$190 billion. Magufuli even threatened to nationalise the mines. His strategy of brinkmanship worked. On October 19, 2017 Acacia's parent company Barrick Gold announced that it had reached an agreement with the Tanzanian government. It promised to find ways to further process copper-gold ores in Tanzania, instead of exporting them for smelting, and it made a number of pecuniary concessions (Paget 2017a). Further, Magufuli banned some opposition political parties' rallies (Potts forthcoming 2019).

In a period of less than two years of his presidency the media freedom to perform their social responsibility function has been problematic. President Magufuli also oversaw numerous closures and suspensions of media outlets. For example, he twice forcibly shut down a weekly Kiswahili popular newspaper, Mawio. The newspaper was banned after it published an article in June 2017 detailing problems in Tanzania's mining industry and attaching pictures of two former Presidents to the story. Using administrative powers, the government suspended Mawio for two years on the grounds of 'national security and public safety'. The move came just months after the country's High Court had lifted a previous ban, handed down in January 2016 (International Press Institute 2018). Then, in 2017, the government banned MwanaHalisi, accusing it of publishing false information, going against the journalists' code of conduct and endangering national security with a series of articles published in January, April and September 2017 (Mwakangale 2017; Natabaalo 2017).

Similarly, President Magufuli banned the opposition political parties' rallies (Paget 2017b; Paget 2017a; Coulson Forthcoming 2019). This suggests that in contemporary times the media in Tanzania have continued to become more and more of a threat to the political party in state power and its government.

3.2 Conclusion

This chapter has examined Tanzania's media autonomy to report social, economic and politics issues using frames that can make the general citizens understand the wrongdoings of the holders of state power that undermine the prosperity of the general population from colonial to contemporary times. The chapter has demonstrated the continuity of repressive media laws from the colonial to the post-colonial single-party state and to contemporary multi-party politics. People in state power used the laws to control the media regarding reporting issues which would jeopardise their position in power. However, the way state power elites in different periods used laws to control media autonomy varied. The variation was not only between colonial regimes and post-colonial governments but also in the post-colonial era between single-party state and multi-party systems, and within different government phases in the multi-party era between persons holding the presidency.

However, the extent to which laws were used to control media autonomy varied depending on the general population's capacity to access and construe information. This depended on the literacy levels of the general population which tended to increase from colonial to post-colonial periods. It was also based on changes (advancement) in information communication technology. For example, under German colonial rule, many people did not have access to media because of low literacy levels in understanding the Kiswahili and German used in reporting news stories. Similarly, because of the narrow range of technology in communication delivery, as media that existed were of print form only, which would hardly reach the large population living in rural areas because of poor transportation infrastructure. For this reason, the German regime rulers did not use many laws to control media from reporting critical issues against the German colonial rulers. In other words, there was not much need for restrictive media laws to control media freedom. But in contemporary times, many people in Tanzania have access to media because of their literacy level in Kiswahili, the language used in reporting news by most national

media outlets. Most Tanzanians can understand spoken Kiswahili and can also read and interpret information framed in stories published in newspapers. Therefore, politicians and, indeed, the party in state power through its government, consider restrictive laws as fundamental in contemporary times to prevent the media from exposing their malpractices, abuses and misappropriation of national resources. The control of media autonomy is vital in preventing classified information to be accessed by the general population as it would risk them losing state power.

After exploring the autonomy of the Tanzanian media to report development issues of the average citizen population since colonial regimes to the contemporary post-colonial governments' leaders, the following chapter defends the methodology of this inquiry.

Chapter Four: Methodology: Data Generation, Presentation and Interpretation

4.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodology used for this research. Research methodology refers to the choices that the researcher makes about the methods used to generate and analyse data, and all other procedures observed in accomplishing research (Creswell 2007; Silverman 2010; Robson 2011). In choosing research methods, Crotty (1998), Bryman (2008), William (2011) and Robson (2011) observe that the researcher has to consider the question that needs to be answered.

This research is a qualitative case study and it answers the primary research question: How do the Tanzanian media report news on development issues and what accounts for such reporting? A case study approach requires rigorous formal and explicit procedures which begin with a thorough literature review and careful and thoughtful posing of research questions or objectives (Yin 2014: 3). The study answers four secondary questions.

- (1) What kinds of development issues do the Tanzanian media report in their news with prominence as lead stories and what are the views of media stakeholders about how these issues are reported?
- (2) Who are the Tanzanian media news sources on development issues and what are the media stakeholders' views about such sources?
- (3) How do Tanzanian media interpret news on development issues?
- (4) What are the key constraints and opportunities for Tanzanian media reporting on development issues and how has this changed over time?

Answering these questions is important because several media in Tanzania, both privately and state-owned, refer to development in their mission statements. For example, the privately owned Nipashe and Guardian newspapers' mission is: 'To consistently collect and deliver the most credible news content meant to improve the functionality of the society we serve' (IPP Media 2018). Similarly, the mission statement of The Citizen and Mwananchi newspapers, also privately owned dailies, reads: 'To enrich the lives of people and empower them to provide positive change in the society' (Mwananchi Communications Limited 2018). However, do narratives on

development issues in the news stories reported in the Tanzanian media resonate with what the media claim in their mission statements?

In exploring these questions, the study did the following:

Firstly, it analyses the texts of 10,371 news items reported by 15 Tanzanian media of national status for 28 days consecutively in 2014 to understand four things: (1) the number of news items reported on politics, economic and social matters; (2) the number of news items on politics, economic and social issues published as lead stories; (3) the number of citizens, government officials, representatives of civil society organisations and politicians quoted in the news; (4) the number of females and males quoted in the news. The aim is to understand the kinds of issues and categories of people given prominence in the Tanzanian development agenda.

Secondly, it analyses information included in 36 emblematic news items published as lead stories on newspapers' front pages. The lead stories are part of the 10,371 news items. The analysis involves critically reading each story on each theme and examining the information included and excluded in each news item. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) argues that 'information' is important to 'call governments to account' (UNDP 2016: 17). The analysis then examines if the information framed in the headline reflects the information included in the news. Framing information in the news headline is vital to inform the audience effectively. Robert Entman posits that to frame 'means making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences' (Entman 1993: 53). Moreover, as Scheufele posits: 'Viewers interpret and process information based on the tone of the news story' (Scheufele 1999: 107). After that, information excluded was identified. The aim is to understand whose development agenda Tanzanian media lead stories promote.

Thirdly, the study analyses the media stakeholders' views in 76 semi-structured face-to-face interviews. The aim is to understand their accounts about the development issues given prominence as lead stories and the categories of people who predominated as news sources.

In interpreting the data, the thesis uses qualitative content analysis methods. Barrie Gunter identifies five types of qualitative content analysis methods. The first is

structural-semiotic analysis used in research that looks into 'how meanings are generated in media texts'. The second is discourse analysis, which 'pays specific attention to the linguistic component of language use in the media'. The third is rhetoric analysis which is best used in studies that examine how the message is presented visually and textually in adverts. The fourth is content analysis suitable for evaluating text that focuses on storytelling. The fifth is interpretative analysis which is a method of qualitative content analysis of social science origin (Gunter 2000: 84-90).

This investigation adopts an interpretative analysis approach for two reasons. First, the data generated from 10,371 news stories on development issues, 36 news emblematic lead stories and 76 interviews required interpretation. Moreover, Gunter observes that the qualitative content analysis method, which uses interpretive analysis methods, is clearly spelt out and coding rules are more explicitly explained (Gunter 2000: 90). In this thesis, for example, clear guidelines have been made on types of news on development issues considered as social, economic and politics; categories of news sources; government, civil society organisations and businesses (CSOs), politicians and citizens.³³ Second, interpretive methods involving qualitative analysis of media news texts and interviewing media stakeholders such as journalists were also used in a study that examined British media coverage on migrants (Philo et al. 2013). However, while this thesis focuses on Tanzania's media news coverage on development issues, the study of Philo et al. (2013) is about British media coverage of migrants and it pays attention to 'the language used to describe contested issues' (Philo et al. 2013: 2).

Therefore, the interpretation of media news text accounts and media stakeholders' accounts was the key technique used to assess how Tanzania's media cover news on development issues in the contemporary period and what accounts for such reporting. However, because the interpretation is mine, and someone else could interpret the data differently, this does not mean that the validity and credibility of the knowledge generated in this study is 100 percent correct. Social scientists such as Sayer (1992) argue that there is no knowledge which is watertight.

³³ See subsections 4.2.3.1 to 4.2.3.3 and 4.2.4.1 to 4.2.4.4.

This chapter comprises five sections. Section 4.1 discusses the researcher's positionality. Section 4.2 explains the procedures used in analysing news sources and kinds of development issues in 10,371 news stories published by 15 of Tanzania's media outlets including issues in the stories published as lead stories. Section 4.3 explains the procedure used in analysing information framed in the 36 emblematic lead stories. Section 4.4 discusses the techniques used to gather and analyse 76 semi-structured interviews of Tanzania's media stakeholders. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter by explaining the way forward.

4.1. The Researcher's Positionality

In generating knowledge, researchers are required to recognise their own positionality to examine the object in a way that will minimise subjectivity (Sayer 1992; Smith 1998). Positionality is a term used to describe how people are defined during the research process, including crucial relational factors such as class, gender, sexuality and knowledge (Maher 1999). My position in this inquiry is both insider and outsider because I am a researcher and a participant in the object being researched (media). This blended insider-outsider position had both benefits and challenges in this research. Being an insider in this research enhanced my insight relative to someone coming to the topic from the outside. It helped me in my data collection because the familiarity with and closeness to the people in the media made it easier to access them.

The challenge of insider positionality is that it could negatively affect the data collection process through bias in interviewing, or researchers may consider themselves well informed on the issues being investigated (Maher 1999). However, in my case I conducted this research based on the understanding that researcher and research participants have a shared sense of what goes on in the media. Therefore, to use my position as an insider but to minimise subjectivity I borrowed the theory of reflexivity as theorised by Kim England who asserts:

... reflexivity is self-critical sympathetic introspection and the self-conscious analytical scrutiny of the self as researcher. Indeed, reflexivity is critical to the conduct of fieldwork; it induces self-discovery and can lead to insights and new hypotheses about the research questions. A more reflexive and flexible approach to fieldwork allows the researcher to be more open to any

challenges to their theoretical position that fieldwork almost inevitably raises (England 1994: 244).

Moreover, the multiple methods used in this research enable triangulation of knowledge.

4.2 Analysis of Content of 10,731 News Stories

This section explains the procedures followed in examining the content of 10,371 news stories reported by 15 of Tanzania's media channels, which this study used as a sample. The procedures are as follows:

- Selecting the media sample
- Selecting news to include in the analysis
- Explaining the categories of news
- Explaining the categories of news sources
- Designing the coding frame and piloting
- Recruiting research assistants
- Gathering copies of print and broadcast news
- Extracting data from news stories and presenting in tables
- Interpreting the figures presented in the tables

This section shall explain each of these procedures, beginning with the selection of the media sample.

4.2.1 Selecting the Media Sample

The media sample included 15 privately and government-owned mainstream media outlets. They consisted of two television and two radio outlets: TBC1 and TBC Taifa, the state-owned television and radio, and ITV and Radio One Stereo, the privately owned television and radio, respectively. The newspapers included eight Kiswahili dailies: the ruling party CCM-owned Uhuru³⁴, the state-owned Habari Leo newspaper and the privately owned Kiswahili dailies, Nipashe, Mwananchi, Mtanzania, Majira, Jambo Leo and Tanzania Daima. The three English language dailies were the two privately owned newspapers, The Citizen and The Guardian, and the state-owned Daily News.

³⁴ Uhuru is published in tabloid form from Monday to Saturday but on Sunday, Uhuru is named Mzalendo, which is also a tabloid. In this research, Mzalendo was considered as the Uhuru newspaper and the same applied to the Daily News, which on Sunday was named the Sunday News, and for The Guardian newspaper, which on Sunday comes out in the name of The Guardian on Sunday. Similarly, The Citizen newspaper over the weekends comes out as The Citizen on Saturday and The Citizen on Sunday.

Using a large media sample size has two advantages. Firstly, to avoid the criticisms associated with small sample sizes which could be claimed as a reason for the lack of rigour in media research in Africa (White 2010).³⁵ Secondly, a large sample of Kiswahili newspapers was included in the research because the majority of citizens in Tanzania read and understand Kiswahili (Hyden and Okigbo 2002).

Meanwhile, news reported in newspapers was selected rather than news published in social media or websites because generally newspaper news is constructed and edited by skilled journalists.³⁶

However, there were three disadvantages of including a large media sample. Firstly, it produced a huge number of news stories to examine. In total, the 15-media sample produced 10,371 news items. Analysing each of these stories manually was a huge task. Therefore, as explained in subsection 4.1.6, three research assistants were recruited.

Analysing this huge number of news items was time-consuming, especially for newspaper articles. While it was possible for a single person to analyse the news covered in a radio or a TV bulletin and manage to enter data into a coding frame within several hours, it was not possible for the two people to read each story in all eleven newspapers within a day and enter the data into a coding frame. Broadcast bulletins had a few brief hard news items while for newspapers, news included hard news, opinions, editorials and features. Yet some of the feature articles were long, therefore computing the data from the coding frame for all copies of each newspaper was a huge task and required considerable concentration to ensure accuracy.

Nonetheless, engaging research assistants also had disadvantages as it involved financial resources. I paid my assistants a fee, which varied with the amount of work done by each.

Secondly, analysing 10,371 news items took longer than planned. Initially, the plan was to finish analysis of these news items within three months and conduct

³⁵ 308 newspaper issues and 58 one-hour TV bulletins and 56 radio news bulletins each 10 minutes..

³⁶ The media skills could have been acquired through in-house or formal training. News in social media could be written by individuals irrespective of their background in media news-reporting expertise.

interviews in three months. However, it took almost a whole year to accomplish the two tasks for fieldwork.

4.2.2 Deciding on News to Exclude from the Analysis

News on development issues reported in February 2014 was selected for analysis because the country held local government elections later in the year. Often, during elections campaigns, media news coverage on development issues is dominated by political propaganda. For the broadcast media, a decision was made to examine news published in prime-time evening bulletins at 8 o'clock only. Usually, the 8 o'clock bulletins cover major news stories reflecting on social, economic and politics issues of the day. Therefore, these bulletins attract more viewers and listeners compared to other news bulletins.³⁷

However, the news examined excluded foreign, sports and advertisements of all kinds and picture stories of private events, such as weddings and pre-wedding parties. Sports news stories were not included because they focus on leisure. Foreign news items were excluded because, in most cases, they are sourced from foreign people. The decision was made to exclude such news because, as Baron (2008) and Simon (2011) observe, the researcher has to make decisions about what does not add value to the research.

Nonetheless, news from an international conference on elephant poaching held in London was included as Tanzania's fourth President, Jakaya Kikwete, attended the conference accompanied by Tanzanian journalists. The journalists reported what Kikwete said before, during and after the conference. Therefore, the news had a strong domestic angle.

4.2.3 Explaining Categories of News

As explained earlier, a researcher makes decisions based on the value of the decision in the research. Therefore, I decided to separate the news into three themes: social, economic and politics. The decision was based on the researcher's experience that, in most cases, the Tanzanian media and especially the Kiswahili daily newspapers, give politics issues prominence as front-page lead stories.

³⁷ Since the 8 o'clock news bulletin attracted maximum viewers and listeners compared to other news bulletins in 2015, the government tabled the Media Services and Access to Information Bill in the national assembly which, amongst other things, required all broadcast media to tune to state-owned broadcast media for the 8 o'clock bulletins. The government claimed that in this way the maximum population of the country could follow the national news. However, the Bill was strongly opposed countrywide.

Therefore, the aim of coding news in these three categories was to understand which of these three issues formed the biggest number of news items published as lead stories. This could explain whose views on development issues Tanzania's media considered important.

4.2.3.1 News on Social Issues

News under the social issues theme included reported human rights problems, such as gender-based violence including forced child marriage, rape, domestic violence, female genital mutilation (FGM) and human trafficking. They also included land disputes, education-related issues, such as shortages of teachers, classrooms, desks and teaching facilities in public schools, and the lack of loans for students in higher learning institutions. Similarly, news on issues associated with faith, food shortages, health facilities, water, electricity, roads and environmental issues such as floods, roads and accidents were considered social.

4.2.3.2 News on Economic Issues

News on economic issues included reports of corruption scandals, embezzlement, misuse of public funds and tax collection using the electronic fiscal device (EFD). News focusing on the agricultural sector, such as lack of farm inputs and markets for varied agricultural produce, were also considered under the economic theme. This included news focusing on issues of mining, tourism, industry, wildlife poaching, investments and investors, employment and unemployment, fishing, illegal logging, deforestation, land degradation, the stock exchange, and all business and entrepreneurship-related issues.

4.2.3.3 News on Politics Issues

News including issues related to the national constitution, including drafting of the popular constitution, Constituent Assembly (CA) members under the 201 category, the process of choosing the CA chair, and the CA expenses allowance. This category also included news constructed from interviews with politicians and politicians' speeches delivered during political rallies, meetings, election campaigns and political parties' press statements and press conferences.

The next subsection explains the categories of news sources.

4.2.4 Explanation of Four Categories of News Sources

People quoted in the news were divided into four categories. They included: (1) government officials; (2) politicians; (3) civil society organisations and business (CSOs); and (4) citizens. The decision to put news sources into these four categories was based on my experience with the media in reporting news on development matters. As Robson theorises, researchers are encouraged to use their experience (Robson 2011).

Understanding categories of people given more opportunity in the national news to speak about development issues was important because the media can be a powerful tool. Dijk argues that: 'those groups who control the most influential discourse also have the chance to control the minds and actions of others' (Dijk 2001: 355). Therefore, it is important to explain the composition of news sources in each category.

4.2.4.1 Government Officials

News sources under the government category included public officials from the lowest level to the topmost level of government administrative structures. They also included officials from all government institutions and sectors, corporate bodies and agencies. Officials from international institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, UN bodies like UNDP and UNICEF, foreign embassies and foreign aid donors were also grouped under government news sources.

4.2.4.2 Politicians

News sources put into the politicians' category included representatives from all political parties. Politicians were quoted from speeches in political rallies, press conferences, interviews, political party meetings and press statements supplied to the media outlets.

4.2.4.3 Civil Society Organisations

People quoted in the news as CSOs included the representatives of professional organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), trade unions, faith-based groups, private companies and enterprises. Private enterprises included financial facilities, private health facilities, private universities, private colleges and private primary and secondary schools.

4.2.4.4 The Citizens

News sources categorised under the citizens theme were the ordinary citizens quoted in newspapers and news broadcast on television and radio news bulletins.

After explaining the categories of news sources, the next subsection explains the coding frame and piloting.

4.2.5 Designing the Coding Frame and Piloting

Initially, the coding frame was designed to capture three sets of data. The data were the type of development issue reported in a news story, the prominence a story was given in the newspapers or radio and television news bulletins, and the category of people quoted in a story. However, after piloting, the frame was refined.

To pilot the coding frame, I bought a copy of each Kiswahili and English newspaper and analysed them. In the process, I noted that female voices were rarely included in the news. Therefore, I decided to add a column in the coding frame to capture the number of female and male news sources as shown in Tables 9 and 10.

Table 9: Coding Frame for Newspapers' Data

Name of the newspaper:					
Date	Headline	Kinds of issues reported in the news	Lead stories	Type of news sources	Gender of news sources
Feb, 1	Title of the story	Type of development issue a news story discussed Is it politics, social or economic	Page a news story published and put a circle on a story published as newspaper front-page lead story	Number of people quoted in each news story into the following categories: Government CSOs Politicians Citizens	Number of males and/or females quoted in each news story
	News 1)...				
	News 2)...				
	News 3)...				
	News 4)...				
	News 5)...				
	News 6)...				
Feb, 2	News 7) etc				

Table 10: Coding Frame for Broadcast Bulletins News Data

Name of Radio/Television					
Date	Headline	Kind of issue reported in the news	Lead stories	News sources	Gender of news sources
Feb, 1	Title of the story	Type of development issue a news story discussed. Is it politics, social or economic	Indicate a place news story was placed in the running order of the bulletin. For example, 1 st , 5 th story.	Number of people quoted in each news story under the following categories: Government CSOs Politicians Citizens	Number of males and/or females quoted in each news story
	News 1)...				
	News 2)...				
	News 3)...				
	News 4)...				
	News 5)...				
	News 6)...				
Feb, 2	News 7) etc				

The next subsection explains the recruitment and orientation of research assistants.

4.2.6 Recruiting Research Assistants and Orientation

Three assistants were recruited. Two were engaged in recording and analysing the data in broadcast bulletins and entering them into the coding frame. One was an employee of IPP Media, which amongst other media, comprises ITV and Radio One. The second assistant belonged to the Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation (TBC), the owner of TBC1 television and TBC Taifa radio. Both assistants were long-serving media professionals in their respective media outlets and their respective leaders

gave permission to involve them in the research. The third assistant was an undergraduate in social science subjects who had just completed her degree and was waiting for an employment post; she is my cousin. My husband also sometimes assisted us during weekends and would spare a few hours to crosscheck the computed figures to ensure maximum accuracy.

After recruiting the three assistants, they were oriented to be able to do the data gathering successfully and efficiently. For the two broadcast assistants, a one-to-one approach was used because it was easier for me to access each of them at a convenient place and time for them. For the third assistant, the orientation session took place in our house.

During the orientation sessions, the assistants were informed about the aim of the research, their expected roles and how to do the job. Examples were provided of how to enter data in the coding frame. After orientation, each assistant received a copy (both hard and electronic) of the designed coding frame and written explanations of the categories of news and news sources. They were also availed of all these documents through their emails.

Engaging a relative as an assistant had advantages and disadvantages. One advantage was that the assistant was reliable. Consequently, we could plan together what to achieve within a day, a week or a month. The disadvantage was that the family had to incur more expenses for monthly meals to ensure she got a free, balanced diet every day and all other necessities throughout the research period and she was paid a token amount each month as she was staying full-time with us in our family home.

The next subsection explains the process of accessing newspapers, radio and television news bulletins.

4.2.7 Gathering Copies of Print and Broadcast News Stories

Collection of media news text involved two processes: buying copies of newspapers, and recording television and radio news bulletins. Every day for 28 consecutive days, I would spend roughly Tshs 10,000 (equivalent to \$6) buying a copy of each of the eleven newspapers: Daily News, Uhuru, Habari Leo, Jambo Leo, Mwananchi,

Mtanzania, Majira, Tanzania Daima, Nipashe, The Citizen and The Guardian. One research assistant recorded the ITV and Radio One news bulletins and the other TBC Taifa radio and TBC1 television news bulletins. However, four bulletins of TBC1 television and TBC Taifa radio could not be recorded because the research assistant had to be out of the office after a family problem arose.

The news subsection explains what entailed the analysis of print and broadcast news.

4.2.8 Extracting Data from the News Stories and Presenting it in Tables

Analysing each news item to identify the data required (kinds of development issue reported, categories of news sources and stories reported as lead stories) was a long process. For print news, it involved thoroughly reading each news item considered as an economic, politics or social issue reported in each of the 308 copies of newspapers, identifying the data required and entering them accordingly into the coding frame. Then we computed totals of data extracted in each copy of a newspaper. After we finished all the analysis of issues of each of the 28 versions of the eleven newspapers examined, we computed totals for all the eleven newspapers and presented them in tables. However, one copy of The Citizen newspaper was lost before the news had been scrutinised, therefore, only 27 copies of The Citizen were included in the newspapers sample.

For radio and television news this involved playing recorded news, listening to what was said by the news sources (for radio news) and for television (listening to what was said by the news sources and watching the accompanying pictures) before entering the data into the coding frame. The two tasks were executed by the two research assistants as explained earlier. After finishing their tasks, the two assistants handed over the gadgets containing the recorded data and the filled coding frame to me. I alone did the computation of the broadcast news data while my cousin and my husband crosschecked the data to ensure correctness. To ensure maximum accuracy for broadcast news data, before adding up the totals, I scrutinised a few news items reported on both television and radio channels.

After extracting the required data from each news item reported in both the print and broadcast media examined, what followed was computing the data gathered and

presenting the figures in tables. The figures presented in tables included the total number of news items on social, economic and political issues reported by each of the examined media. The data presented in the tables also included the total number of news sources, which belonged to the categories of government, politicians, CSOs and business and the citizenry – females and males.

The final step was the interpretation of the figures, which the next subsection explains.

4.2.9 Interpretation of Figures Presented in Tables

After all the data required were extracted from the 10,371 news stories, computed and summarised in tables, I did the interpretation of figures presented in the tables. As noted in the previous subsection, there is a table presenting figures showing the total number of news stories on social, economic and politics issues. There is also a table showing the amount of news stories on social, economic and politics issues, which each media examined, covered during the period under review. Further, there was a table showing the total number of lead stories on social, economic and politics issues each media channel published. Similarly, there is a table showing the total number of news sources belonging to government, CSOs, politicians and citizenry categories for news reported by each media channel. Additionally, there is a table indicating the total number of females and males each media channel used as their news sources. Likewise, views of the media stakeholders as to why the media reported development issues in such manner and why they selected such news sources are also discussed.

Thereafter, the development issues published as lead stories are examined to understand the information framed in the news stories. To achieve this, emblematic news items reported as daily newspapers' front-page lead stories are considered as a sample for analysis. What are the criteria for selecting the news included in the emblematic case? How many stories on politics, economic and social issues qualified as emblematic cases? How was the analysis carried out? The next section answers these questions.

4.3 Analysis of 36 Lead Stories

Analysing information on social, economic and politics issues framed as lead news stories was intended to answer the question: How do Tanzanian media interpret news on development issues? In answering this question, this inquiry selected 36 news items published as daily newspapers' front-page lead stories. Selection of these stories was based on one key criterion: that the news story must have been published by more than one daily newspaper on the same day.

This criterion was applied for four reasons. Firstly, news published in newspapers is physically available for review and can be accessed online for re-examination should the need arise. For example, the story on a network of elephant poachers published as a lead story on the front page of *The Guardian* on February 15, 2014 is accessible online via this link: <https://hakupensheni.blogspot.co.uk/2014/02/jk-runs-away-from-catching-poachers.html>. The accessibility of news examined in this study is important to enable whoever wants to challenge the researcher's arguments in this analysis.

Secondly, of the 10,371 news items published by the 15 media channels during the period under review, 9,607 (92.6%) were published in eleven daily newspapers. Meanwhile, 508 (4.9%) and 256 (2.5%) respectively were reported on television and radio news bulletins.³⁸

Thirdly, out of 411 news stories selected from the 10,371 news stories and published as lead stories during the period under review, 307 (over 74%) lead stories were covered in newspapers. Importantly, out of the 307 lead stories published in newspapers, 201 (65%) focused on politics issues. This suggests that Tanzania's daily newspapers gave more prominence to politics issues than social and economic issues.

Fourthly, and perhaps most important, in Tanzania, news covered as the lead story on the newspapers' front pages is reviewed in the morning's radio and television channels' news summary programmes. This increases the penetration of these lead stories to a wider geographical location and consequently a wider audience in

³⁸ See Chapter Five, Table 13.

society. This is important because the majority population of Tanzania still live in rural areas. According to World Development Indicators, by 2016 the rural population in Tanzania was 67.68 percent (Trading Economics 2018).

To understand information on development issues included in each of the 36 lead stories, the stories were organised based on the three kinds of development issues: politics, economic and social.

The analysis involved critically reading each story on each selected theme and examining information framed in news including the news headlines.³⁹ After that, it looked at information which could be included for the audience to get a better understanding of the issue reported. Audience understanding of information on issues reported in the media is important for accountability. As the UNDP argues, 'information' is important to 'call governments to account' (UNDP 2016: 17).

The next section discusses the process used to get the stakeholders' accounts.

4.4 Examining the Media Stakeholders' Accounts

The aim of the analysis of media stakeholders' views in 76 interviews was to answer parts of two secondary research questions: part of question (1) What are the views of media stakeholders about how these issues are reported? Then part of question (2) What are the media stakeholders' views about such sources?

The process of answering this question involved data collection through semi-structured interviews and analysis of interview transcripts to get extracts which could provide the best answers for the question.

4.4.1 Semi-Structured Interviews

Collection of stakeholders' accounts involved conducting semi-structured interviews. The 'unstructured nature' of this approach enabled research participants to express themselves freely and openly on how they view the object of the study (Bryman 2008: 438). Semi-structured interviews with an interview guide enabled social interaction as it sought to understand individuals' experiences, viewpoints, feelings and thinking about certain situations, issues or problems in society (Arksey and

³⁹ See section 7.0 in Chapter Seven on the importance of framing information.

Knight 1999; Keats 2000). Moreover, the way interaction occurs through an interview enables the researcher to ascribe meaning and construct knowledge based on social reality (Kvale 2007).

The interview method was useful in gathering narratives from media stakeholders because, during face-to face interviews with respondents and with their consent, I wrote some notes for use in case any problems arose with the recorded interviews. However, these notes were not used because all went well with the recorded interviews. Furthermore, face-to-face interviews were useful because the study required the researcher to interact with different media professionals, especially news reporters and news editors. News reporters play a role in gathering and constructing news stories while editors are the decision makers who assign reporters the stories to cover. On the other hand, in the process of editing news, news editors decide what information will be included and whose voice (news source) should be included in or excluded from a news story. Editors also make the decision on the place (prominence) a news item should have in a newspaper or television or radio bulletins. Therefore, the process of conducting semi-structured interviews involved five stages: (1) deciding on research respondents; (2) preparing an interview guide; (3) conducting interviews; (4) transcribing interviews; (5) analysing interview transcripts.

4.4.1.1 Selecting Research Respondents

Two groups of respondents were included in the research. The first group included media professionals and this research identifies them as media insiders (MIs). The second group included representatives of social institutions using media to address development issues. The thesis identified this group as media outsiders (MOs). Sixteen people of high-profile social status – knowledgeable not only about the country's political, social and economic issues, but also about how the Tanzanian media work – constituted the MOs. The institutions and respondents interviewed were as follows: non-governmental organisations (NGOs) of national status (5), government (1), political parties (4), Members of Parliament (2) and religious institutions (4) as shown in Table 11.

Table 11: Media Outsider Respondents

Ministry of Information and Culture	Male	Director of Information
Chama Cha Mapinduzi	Male	Representative of Secretary General
CUF	Male	Media Engagement Officer
NCCR Mageuzi	Male	Media expert
CHADEMA	Male	Media expert
BAKWATA	Female	Representative of the Chief Sheikh
TIC	Male	Deputy Imam Kichangani Magomeni
Lutheran Church of Tanzania	Male	Head of the Church, Tanzania
Catholic Church of Tanzania	Male	Representative of Dar es Salaam Archbishop
Parliament	Female	CHADEMA MP special seat
Parliament	Male	CCM Constituency MP
TGNP-Mtandao	Female	Executive Director
TGNP-Mtandao	Female	Immediate Executive Director
TAMWA	Female	Representative of the Executive Director
LHRC	Female	Media Engagement Officer
Mikono Yetu	Female	Executive Director

Meanwhile, MIs involved 60 people including 29 editors,⁴⁰ 23 reporters and 8 media trainers⁴¹ as shown in Table 12.

⁴⁰ For this study editors are media decision makers, namely news editors, news sub-editors, managing editors/directors and media owners.

⁴¹ Media trainers are research participants from journalism universities, colleges, Media Council of Tanzania and Tanzania Media Fund.

Table 12: Media Insider Respondents

Media	Gender	Title
TBC Taifa	Female	News editor
TBC Taifa	Female	Reporter
TBC1	Male	Reporter
Nipashe	Male	News editor
Nipashe	Female	News editor
Nipashe	Female	Reporter
Nipashe	Male	Reporter
The Guardian	Male	News editor
The Guardian	Male	News sub-editor
The Guardian	Female	Reporter
The Guardian	Male	Reporter
Daily News	Female	News editor
Daily News	Male	News editor
Daily News	Female	News sub-editor
Daily News	Male	Reporter
Uhuru	Male	Managing editor
Uhuru	Male	News editor
Uhuru	Female	Reporter
Uhuru	Male	Reporter
Mwananchi	Male	News editor
Mwananchi	Female	Reporter
Mwananchi	Female	Reporter
Mwananchi	Male	Reporter
Tanzania Daima	Male	Managing editor
Tanzania Daima	Male	News editor
Tanzania Daima	Male	Reporter
Tanzania Daima	Female	Reporter
Mtanzania	Male	Managing editor/Chairman Tanzania Editors Forum
Mtanzania	Male	News editor
Mtanzania	Female	Reporter
Raia Mwema	Male	Media owner/editor
Raia Tanzania	Male	New editor
Raia Tanzania	Male	Reporter
The Citizen	Male	News editor
The Citizen	Male	Reporter
ITV/Radio One Stereo	Female	Managing Director
ITV Radio One Stereo	Male	Media owner
ITV/Radio One Stereo	Male	Reporter
ITV/Radio One Stereo	Female	Reporter
Habari Leo	Male	Managing editor
Habari Leo	Female	Retainer/reporter
Radio Tumaini	Male	News editor
Jambo Leo	Male	News editor
Jambo Leo	Male	Reporter
MwanaHalisi	Male	Owner/news editor
Jamhuri	Male	Owner/news editor
Jamhuri	Male	Reporter
Majira	Male	News editor
Majira	Female	Reporter/correspondent
TV Sebuka	Female	Reporter
Afya Radio	Female	Reporter
TV Mlimani	Female	Reporter
Media Council of Tanzania	Male	Secretary General
Tanzania Media Fund	Male	Executive Director
University of Dar es Salaam	Male	Lecturer Faculty of Mass Communication
Tumaini University, Dar es Salaam college	Male	Lecturer Faculty of Mass Communication
Royal Journalism College	Male	Lecturer
Dar es Salaam School of Journalism	Male	Lecturer
Tanzania Media Fund	Male	Trainer
Tanzania Media Fund	Male	Trainer

As shown in Table 12 many MI respondents were included. The reasons were: (1) the researcher, being a media insider could access the respondents easily; (2) not all the questions were required to be answered by all MIs because the process of publishing a story involves different stages and different people; (3) a large sample of media outlets were examined. While the media sample included 15 media outlets, the sample of research participants from the media involved 60 people from 20 media institutions. It also included four training institutions and two media associations. The people interviewed were not only from the media that reported the 10,371 news stories examined, but also from the media excluded from the media sample selected for this study.

Additionally, media news coverage involves gathering data and constructing and re-constructing the story. In the process, a story passes through different stages of editing and decision-making. For example, the process of producing a news story involves news reporter(s), news sub-editor(s) and a news editor, and may sometimes involve a media owner. Therefore, in some media outlets up to four people were involved in the interview. The aim was to be able to triangulate the narratives of news reporters and editors/media owners. Additionally, many respondents helped to get saturation of respondents' answers for credibility of knowledge. Different people may have different thinking and ideological positions, which in one way or another alter the meaning carried in the final version of the published story. This argument is based on the view that constructionists believe that meaning is constructed (Tublin 1996; Burr 2015).

Similarly, the respondents under MOs (16 people) were from five different social groups, which also have some subgroups. For example, parliamentarian respondents were selected from both the ruling and opposition parties.

The selection of reporters interviewed was partly influenced by events which took place in the country while the fieldwork was being completed. One such event was the Excellence in Journalism Awards Tanzania (EJAT) coordinated by the Media Council of Tanzania (MCT) since 2009 (MCT 2014a; MCT 2014c; MCT 2014b), which was celebrated at the end of March 2014. After the Awards, the Tanzania Media Fund (TMF) decided to offer a six-month fellowship in Dar Es Salaam involving ten female radio and television news reporters who had won EJAT awards.

All but one of these female broadcast media reporters involved in the fellowship were working with privately owned radio and television outlets licenced to operate in district and regional levels. Hence, three of these women were included in the sample to understand the types of development issues reported in their news stories that won awards.

Importantly, before the interviews were conducted, processes to facilitate data collection based on ethical consideration were observed, as discussed in the next subsection.

4.4.1.2 Interview Guide and Research Ethics

An interview guide was prepared to help research participants in providing their accounts. The guide questions help to reduce the challenge of the interview method as participants may provide ideas, views and thoughts beyond the research topic (Flick 2009). A draft interview guide was prepared before travelling from the University of Bradford to Tanzania for fieldwork. However, the tool was refined after accomplishing initial analysis of the 10,371 news stories the 15 Tanzania media outlets covered in 28 days to establish whose voices on development issues the media news coverage gave most attention to.

The interview tool was in English and Kiswahili, however, participants were asked to use the language they preferred and all except two spoke in Kiswahili. Two sets of interview guides were prepared: one focused on MIs and the other MOs. The key questions that representatives of key social institutions responded to, were as follows:

- ✓ What do you do when you need the media to cover news from your organisation?
- ✓ What challenges do you face in getting your news stories covered in the media?
- ✓ What challenges do you think media people are facing in covering news on development issues?

Regarding the guiding tool for MIs, questions related to decision-making included a process of selecting a lead story directed to Kiswahili newspaper editors alone. This is because data generated from the analysis of the 10,371 news stories had suggested that most Kiswahili tabloids would select politics news as lead stories, mainly focusing on what politicians say.

Reporters were mainly required to answer questions concerning news sources including quoting males and females, challenges they face in covering news, type of issues they prefer to report about and the impact of their stories. Hence, specific questions for reporters were as follows:

- ✓ What development issues do you prefer to report on and why?
- ✓ Who are your main sources of news?
- ✓ What do you consider as your key achievement so far in covering news on development issues? Could you provide an example?
- ✓ What challenges do you face in covering news on development issues?
- ✓ In your experience, why do you think media select more men than women as news sources?

Piloting tested the questions put forward to reporters. I decided to only pilot the reporters' interview guide because most of the questions on MIs required reporters' experiences. The key role played by editors is making decisions on the story that gets prominence as a lead story and what stories to publish or not to publish.

The piloting exercise was helpful because I was able to note that the MIs' interview guide lacked a question that required reporters to provide examples of the best news stories they had reported in contemporary times and which they thought had made a positive impact. This question helped me to gather not only examples of issues where the media had made an impact, but also the techniques used in pursuing news stories that have made a positive impact on peoples' lives. Additionally, the prepared questions allowed discussion with the participants and enabled the participants to respond to questions as they wished (see interview extracts in Chapters Five and Six). As Kumar observes, an interview allows the respondent to speak freely because questions are not restricted to selected answers or language (Kumar 2011).

Moreover, because this research partly involved human data, the researcher sought ethical approval to ensure that respondents' and researchers' safety, dignity and rights were protected during and after the fieldwork. In so doing, before going into the field, the researcher was involved in two ethics processes. First was attendance of graduate school classes and undergoing an examination on research ethics. Second was the process to obtain ethics approval through the University of Bradford Ethics Committee. The ethics classes were instrumental in equipping the researcher with ethics tips before embarking on fieldwork, for example, obtaining consent for a recorded interview is crucial (O'Sullivan et al. 1998; Berger 2000; Silverman 2010). Therefore, before interviewing respondents, I sought consent not only for the interview, but also for recording or scribing notes.

4.4.1.3 Conducting Interviews

The researcher conducted all the interviews and the process took four months from August to November 2014. In conducting the interviews, I used a sequential approach (Creswell 2009). The decision to use a sequential approach was to ensure the validity and credibility of knowledge based on understanding that the process of getting a news story published involves two groups of people: news sources (MOs) and news professionals (MIs). Moreover, news professionals include reporters, editors and sometimes media owners. Therefore, the approach helped to minimise interview limitations, for example, participants may not be honest because they want to say things to please the researcher, thus reducing the reliability and validity of the data (Berger 2000). Although it is almost impossible to get rid of this problem in research, it was not a big threat to the reliability of data generated in this research. This is because triangulation was possible as interviews were conducted sequentially, beginning with the MOs, followed by the MIs. Interviewing MOs first was important for understanding the media professionals' ethical practices. Similarly, interviewing of the MIs started with the reporters, to understand the challenges they face in reporting news on development issues.

During interviews with the editors, apart from key theme questions, they were asked to respond to issues raised by MOs and reporters. For example, most MO respondents claimed that reporters usually ask for mshiko (a transport fee) from the

news sources. Similarly, some reporters claimed that most private newspapers use freelance reporters, but these reporters were paid very little for the stories they cover. Therefore, a sequential approach helped the researcher to be critical and not to take a participant's view at face value (Berger 2000).

Accessing MIs involved a different approach. For female broadcasters who were award winners, although some were from community-based media in upcountry regions, they were accessed during their fellowship activities, which required them to be in Dar Es Salaam city. Other reporters interviewed for this research were from newspapers, radio and television outlets, and were accessed by visiting their media offices and seeking appointments, or while they were on their normal assignments. Some were reached through the government press centre, Maelezo, in Dar es Salaam, while others were accessed through the offices of the NGOs based in the city. The researcher had requested to be allowed to attend the organisations' media activities such as press conferences. One such conference was held by the Legal and Human Rights Centre to reflect on the Constituent Assembly debate on the Draft Popular Constitution.

Before embarking on interviews, I requested TAMWA to retrieve the latest lists of mobile telephone contacts for editors and reporters in both print and broadcast media for me, because the organisation often interacts with people in the media industry. For newspaper editors the telephone numbers published in their newspapers were also used to make contact. On the other hand, the media trainers were approached by visiting their respective offices and collecting their telephone numbers. Since the researcher was also a media professional, it was not difficult to access media people. The initial appointment was used to introduce respondents to the research and ask them to participate. Then we agreed on a day for an interview at a place of the respondent's choice. Additionally, to avoid unnecessary risks to my respondents and myself, interviews were conducted during the daytime.

For MOs, different approaches were used to access respondents, including visiting the offices of each research participant, explaining to him/her about the aim of the research, and seeking consent before requesting an appointment for the interview. Before leaving their offices, I requested their mobile numbers so that it would be easy to contact them for the interviews. However, some participants were accessed

through their personal assistants, who made all the arrangements for the researcher to conduct the interview. Moreover, for each participant, a day before the interview, he/she would be contacted over the telephone to remind them about the interview. All the interviews were conducted at the respondents' respective offices except for three, which had to be conducted in a hotel.

During my interviews with religious leaders, I dressed in a manner that would not contravene their religious beliefs. For example, during my interview with Sheikhs, I dressed like a Muslim woman, covering my head with a cloth and putting on a dress with long sleeves, and covering my body to the legs. Similarly, during interviews with Christian religious leaders, I put on a Kitenge dress covering my body appropriately. This enabled me to conduct interviews smoothly in the Muslim and Christian leaders' offices located within their respective mosque and church compounds.

Meanwhile, to ensure confidentiality and anonymity I followed advice given by Silverman (2010). Each recording and interview transcript was given a code and the name of the individual was written in a notebook, which was accessible only to the researcher. To protect the research participants from being identified anywhere in the recorded material, the name of the respondent was not identified. Instead, before recording an interview, I recorded my voice to indicate, for example, media outsider number five, reporter number eight or editor number two. Then I wrote down that number and the category of respondent in my private notebook.

Therefore, in this thesis, the media owners, editors, reporters and media trainers were given a common code – MIs (media insiders) – and each participant was given a number known only to the researcher. For example, MI, #6, 2014, and not based on the alphabetical order of their names as listed in Table 4.2. The same applied for MOs. Meanwhile, in Tanzania, research materials except for newspapers were locked in a suitcase kept in my house. The original recorded interviews and transcripts were saved on my laptop, which could only be accessed using a password.

On coming back to the university, a copy of the interviews and transcripts was saved in the researcher's computer at the university and a backup was put on a flash drive and kept in a locked suitcase in my room.

The next subsection discusses the process of ensuring interviews were effectively transcribed.

4.4.1.4 Transcribing Interviews

Generating media stakeholders' accounts also involved transcribing respondents' narratives. The interview plan made, gave me the opportunity to ensure an interview was transcribed before embarking on the next. This was possible because a respondent was not asked many questions. Transcribing an interview in most cases did not take more than six hours. As a result, before coming back from the fieldwork in Tanzania to the university in the United Kingdom, interviews of all MOs had been transcribed and roughly 90 percent of those of MIs. The MIs interviews for which transcribing were not finished while in the field were those of reporters and editors. I listened to the interviews audio versions, extracted best narrations and translated into English and used the extracts in the thesis.

The next part looks at how analysis of the interviews was conducted to generate the data used in this thesis.

4.4.1.5 Analysing Interview Transcripts

In analysing interview transcripts, a qualitative content analysis method known as interpretative analysis was used (Gunter 2000). The author of this thesis transcribed interviews, which were in Kiswahili, and interpreted and provided an explanation in English. Transcripts for MIs were from three groups: reporters, editors/media owners and media trainers. I read each transcript in each group to locate the best quotations, which would explain what influenced the media to:

- cover news from the three types of development issues: social, economic and politics
- give a type of development issues prominence as lead story
- select news sources from three categories: government, CSOs, politicians and citizens
- quote males or females in the news

Then quotations were translated into English. Therefore, because the areas that required answers were few and some questions did not require a response from all three groups of MIs, only the best quotations were selected for the thesis. Moreover, as explained earlier in this chapter, reporters were not required to respond to the questions of decision makers in the media.

For MOs, transcripts were put into five groups: NGOs, political parties, Parliamentarians, faith-based groups and government. For these groups, key questions focused on their experiences in engaging with media for news coverage on the development issues they would like to address. The same technique of reading transcripts of each group was followed.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter looked at the methods used to gather data for this research and approach for data analysis. The following three consecutive chapters will discuss the findings of content analysis of 10,371 news stories and interviews of the media stakeholders in relation to the type of development issues reported in these stories, news sources and development issues given prominence as lead stories. It begins with Chapter Five which presents findings on the type of development topics reported in the 10,371 news stories, issues the Tanzanian media give prominence to as lead stories and the views of media stakeholders on such reporting.

Chapter Five: Lead Development Issues Stories

5.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the research question: What kinds of development issues do the Tanzanian media report in their news and give prominence to as lead stories and what are the views of media stakeholders about such reporting? Exploring this question is fundamental to understanding whose development agenda the Tanzanian media promote through the development issues they cover with prominence in their news stories. In achieving this, the chapter examines development issues reported in 10,371 stories published in 15 media channels on 28 consecutive days. It also explores the accounts of media stakeholders about development issues covered in the 10,371 stories and those news items selected and framed as lead stories. As Melkote and Steeves argue, news media 'reinforces hegemonic values and priorities' through 'what gets reported in the media and how it is presented' (Melkote and Steeves 2001: 31-32).

This chapter comprises of five sections. Section 5.1 explores the types of development issues reported in the 10,371 stories published by 15 media channels on 28 consecutive days. Section 5.2 reflects on stakeholders' views regarding the proportion of news on social, economic and politics issues media reported in those news stories. Section 5.3 looks at the proportion of social, economic and politics issues selected in 411 news items framed as lead stories out of the 10,371 stories. Section 5.4 reflects on stakeholder views on the types of development issues published in large numbers as lead stories. Section 5.5 draws conclusions.

5.1 Kinds of Development Issues Reported in National News

This section examines the types of development issues in 10,371 news stories published by the 15 Tanzanian media outlets on 28 consecutive days. The media involved included eleven newspapers, namely Uhuru, Nipashe, Mwananchi, Mtanzania, Majira, Jambo Leo, Habari Leo, The Guardian, Tanzania Daima, the Daily News and The Citizen. The radio stations were TBC Taifa and Radio One Stereo. The television stations were TBC1 and ITV. The section argues that the kinds of development issues the media reported in 10,371 news stories were not only diverse but also stories in each type vary remarkably as they reported different topics. Moreover, while social development issues constituted the largest proportion

of these stories, the media gave prominence as lead stories to politics issues which constituted the smallest number of these stories.

Kinds of development issues in the Tanzanian media national news published by 15 media channels on 28 consecutive days are shown in Table 13.

Table 13: Kinds of Development Issues in 10,371 News Stories

THE MEDIA	Social issues news	% of the total news items	Economic issues news	% of the total news items	Politics issues news	% of the total news items	Total news	% of the total news items
Uhuru	540	5.2%	193	1.9%	177	1.7%	910	8.8%
Nipashe	658	6.3%	190	1.8%	140	1.4%	988	9.5%
Mwananchi	854	8.2%	161	1.6%	158	1.5%	1173	11.3%
Mtanzania	425	4.1%	124	1.2%	242	2.3%	791	7.6%
Majira	609	5.9%	244	2.3%	133	1.3%	986	9.5%
Jambo Leo	456	4.4%	143	1.4%	150	1.4%	749	7.2%
Habari Leo	716	6.9%	202	2%	98	0.9%	1016	9.8%
The Guardian	269	2.6%	207	2%	58	0.5%	534	5.1%
Tanzania Daima	343	3.4%	189	1.8%	272	2.6%	804	7.8%
Daily News	456	4.4%	287	2.8%	119	1.1%	862	8.3%
The Citizen	368	3.6%	257	2.5%	169	1.6%	794	7.7%
Newspapers total news	5694	54.9%	2197	21.2%	1716	16.5%	9607	92.6%
TBC1 television	106	1.0%	39	0.4%	31	0.3%	176	1.7%
ITV television	167	1.6%	92	0.9%	73	0.7%	332	3.2%
Television bulletins news	273	2.6%	131	1.3%	104	1.0%	508	4.9%
TBC Taifa radio	86	0.8%	31	0.3%	29	0.3%	146	1.4%
Radio One	67	0.7%	15	0.1%	28	0.3%	110	1.1%
Radio bulletins news	153	1.5%	46	0.4%	57	0.6%	256	2.5%
The media total news	6120	59%	2374	22.9%	1877	18.1%	10371	100%

As Table 13 shows, social issues constituted the largest proportion (59%) of the 10,371 news stories. The proportion of news on economic issues followed next, while news on politics issues formed the smallest number of the stories the 15 media outlets produced during the period under review. The largest proportion (92.6%) of the 10,371 stories was covered by newspapers. Subsequently, the biggest proportion (54.9%) of news on social issues was reported in the daily newspapers.

As explained in the methodology chapter, social issues included violation of human rights such as rape, child marriage and shortage of basic social services. Such services include shortage of clean and safe water, quality health care facilities, reliable electricity, roads that are passable all seasons of the year, and teachers and a friendly learning environment in public primary and secondary schools. The media reporting of a huge amount of news focusing on social issues was important for the public leaders to understand the issues and take necessary actions to solve them. For example, clean and safe water is still a big problem for a large part of the

population in Tanzania as '63 percent of households have no access to piped water' (URT 2014: xii).

Meanwhile, slightly less than a quarter (2,374 – 22.9%) of the 10,371 news stories reported news on economic topics. This suggests that the media paid less attention to economic matters including corruption, taxation, mining contracts and misuse of public funds. This thesis argues that the media needed to cover and give prominence equitably to news on the three kinds of development issues: social, economic and politics. Giving less attention to news on economic topics means the media provide less information on economic topics to encourage accountability for national economic development matters. This argument is reinforced by Smith's view that in order to 'achieve development objectives it is not only necessary to have government but governance' (Smith 2007: 3).

Accountability on issues reported in the media is vital for national development because despite economic growth in Tanzania, few people benefit. For example, at the beginning of the new millennium, 'half' of citizens in Tanzania were living 'under conditions of deprivation' (World Bank 2001: xiv). Moreover, almost two decades later 'though Tanzania's poverty rate has gone down, the absolute number of its poor is high; about 12 million people are still under the national poverty line, almost the same as in 2007' (World Bank 2017: 2).

The findings in Table 13 show that politics issues constituted the smallest amount (18.1%) of news items out of the 10,371 stories. Politics topics that were topical in February 2014 included the draft popular constitution prepared from the views collected from citizens all over the country. This constitution included several important articles that would enhance governance. Therefore, a critical perspective would expect the media to cover many news items from the viewpoints of ordinary citizens focusing on the articles in the draft popular constitution.

However, the small number of news items the media reported on politics topics focused on areas that were of interest to the parochial elite group. For example, politics topics published as lead news stories included those that reported about 201

presidentially appointed Constituency Assembly (CA) members (Butahe 2014; Hongo 2014; Kapama 2014a; Mbashiru 2014; Mgonja 2014; Mossi 2014a; Mwanakatwe 2014; Nsanzugwanko 2014a; The Guardian 2014; Uhuru 2014a; Vullu 2014) and the CA members' daily expenses⁴² (Kinabo at el 2014; Mwakangale 2014; Nyemenohi 2014; TanzaniaDaima 2014; The Guardian Team 2014; Uhuru 2014b; Uhuru 2014c).

Whose interests did the lead stories promote? This question will be answered in Chapter Seven which examines information on development issues framed in the lead stories.

Meanwhile, the next subsection reflects on the media stakeholders' views on the kinds of development issues which the media published in large numbers in the 10,371 news stories.

5.2 Media Stakeholders' Views on Types of Development Issues in the News

This section reflects on the media stakeholders' views on the types of development issues which constituted the biggest number of the 10,371 news stories. It explores three themes that emerged from the media stakeholders' interviews. Firstly, the views that social topics were not controversial compared to politics issues. Secondly, social issues were not hard to interpret compared to news on economic topics. Thirdly, reporting social issues had rewards for media professionals.

The next subsection discusses the theme suggesting that social issues are not controversial.

5.2.1 News on Social Development Topics that are not Controversial

During the interviews with reporters, they were asked to mention the types of topics they prefer to report news on and why. Many reporters noted they felt comfortable reporting news on social topics such as education, health matters, water and human rights-related issues. The reporters argued that they focused on social issues because these issues relate directly to the lives of the general population. This point is exemplified in the quotation extracted from the interview transcription of this reporter who argued:

⁴² See Chapter Seven.

For me, reporting news on social issues related to social amenities such as water, health services, roads, electricity, food, security, human rights and the like is very important. Such news is about the life of many poor people. Indeed, for me, there is nothing more important than human life (MI, #16, 2016).

However, through further interaction, some reporters said news on social topics was not controversial. The reporters noted that they feared covering controversial issues which would subject their respective media channels to be at loggerheads with leaders of the government of the day, as an extract from the interview of this reporter exemplifies:

I fear reporting news on politics, because they may subject me, my editor and our media house to trouble with people in power...I like peace...I have family to look after (MI, #17, 2014).

This claim was also supported by the views provided by this editor who said:

I have noted that the government appreciates the media where they cover issues that will make the government be seen to be doing their job right. However, when the media publish issues that the public can interpret as government failures this is where the troubles begin...the government sees the media as its enemy (MI, #44, 2014).

The argument that news on social issues was not controversial was corroborated by reporters who provided examples of news on social development issues which they had covered and did not receive a negative reaction from the governing elite. For example, this reporter recalls:

One story I am proud of, I investigated a report on mice that were trained to detect bombs. The mice can also detect human spit that contains TB (MI, #31, 2014).

Another reporter cited an example of an investigative story pursued on dengue fever which seemed to be sensitive, as it exposed some government weaknesses, but the reporter did not face any trouble. Dengue fever is a mosquito-borne tropical disease caused by the dengue virus and its symptoms are muscle and joint pains, headache, high temperature (fever) and diarrhoea or vomiting (Rigau-Pérez et al. 1998). The reporter said it seemed that the government had hidden the information about the disease yet an epidemic had broken out and many people had been affected. The reporter explained how the news was investigated and how reporting stimulated the government to take appropriate action to help the people affected. The reporter explained:

I was the first journalist in the country to report on the dengue fever outbreak. It is not that the disease had not been known about, but the government was sitting on the information and people were suffering, suffering, suffering. People would go to hospital and get admitted, but the government would not announce that this is a disaster ...I did my investigation. I started from Mwananyamala hospital in Kinondoni district, I got the data then went to Temeke hospital in Temeke district and got the data for the patients and moved on to Amana hospital in Ilala district and got the data on dengue patients. We came up with data showing that about 300 people in the Dar es Salaam region were suffering from dengue. From there, the government realised that now dengue is a serious health issue in the country. We continued reporting on the follow-up to the story and finally the WHO had to intervene and offered drugs for clinical tests and sprays for destroying the dengue virus (MI, #26, 2014).

Furthermore, one male media trainer cited a story he covered when working as a reporter for the BBC Kiswahili service. The London-based broadcaster transmits its news through local privately owned broadcasters in Tanzania, such as Radio Tumaini and Radio Free Africa. The trainer said the news story he reported was about a shortage of food that occurred in Ndobeye villages in Ngara district, in the north-western region of Kagera in 2008. The trainer contended that because the news was properly investigated and intelligently presented, the government was pleased with the work that the media did and therefore:

Immediately after the story was aired, the President ordered the Regional Commissioner of Kagera region to act. As a result, a few days later, the villagers were given some sacks of maize to help them survive (MI, #3, 2014).

This trainer's account suggests that for the media to report news stories in such a way that government leaders do not construe them as a threat to their posts, reporters need to be professionally competent. Explaining further about strategies used to pursue the hunger story the trainer recollected:

After visiting the area and observing that the problem was negatively affecting the lives of the people, I interviewed the villagers and recorded their narratives. Amongst the people I interviewed were members of households who had been surviving on a cup of porridge (*uji*) for seven days. Also, I interviewed local community leaders (*viongozi wa serikali ya mtaa*) who revealed that 80 percent of the population in the area were facing a shortage of food (MI, #3, 2014).

Furthermore, the research participant explained that the hunger news story led to investigation of whether the government leaders at district level were aware of the problem. According to this participant it seemed that the District Executive Director (DED) knew of the hunger issue but he feigned ignorance. For this reason, the

respondent said he had to apply special techniques to make the district government official see the gravity of the problem through the villagers' point of view. The reporter explained how the story was tackled:

After recording the interviews in which villagers spoke, highlighting their suffering, I visited the district hospital... A doctor revealed to me that there were some cases where people had been brought to the hospital and when checked, they did not have any disease but were starving and children's growth was stunted. The District Executive Director, who had refuted the existence of a hunger problem, admitted it after listening to the interviews of the doctor and villagers and then asked him to reply to those claims that people had aired (MI, #3, 2014).

The assertion suggests that the hunger story could have got the District Commissioner into trouble if the reporter had not been professionally competent. The reporter could have constructed a story based on the evidence provided by the doctor and the villagers to inform that villagers were suffering from hunger and at the same time criticise the government leaders in the area for not doing their job well. However, in this way, the reporter approached the news on the hunger issue, by using the doctor's and the villagers' views as evidence that there was a shortage of food in the region. Moreover, the government leaders appreciated the media's role in enhancing national development. As a result, the public leaders played their role to ensure the villagers were supplied with food aid.

On the other hand, some reporters argued that they preferred to cover news on social-related topics because such stories expose anti-social practices. A reporter provided an example of a story illustrating how an issue regarding illicit drugs was investigated and reported. The reporter narrated:

I got a tip that there was a house in Manyanya Kinondoni where illicit drugs were being sold. It took me about three weeks to investigate. I would go to the place every day and observe people going in and out of the house, business going on in the shops around the area. I also identified someone who provided me with information about who owned the house, who was bringing the illicit drugs into the house, who was packing the drugs in the house and how the drugs were being packed, who was distributing the drugs from the house and techniques used in selling the drugs in the shops around the area. You know, you find the shop selling shoes yah but below the shoes you could find illicit drugs. I even took a photograph of the house myself because our office photographers feared being killed. The same day the story came out,

police went and invaded the house and dismantled the network of drug dealers around that area (MI, #26, 2014).

This assertion suggests that, although some reporters argued that news on social issues was not controversial, for a news story on social issues to disseminate worthwhile information for national development, reporters and editors must be courageous and committed to engage in investigative reporting. McCombs supports this argument and posits that 'investigative reporting and editorial campaigns actively seek to move issues onto the public agenda' (McCombs 1997: :438).

But why don't reporters cover a lot of news stories on economic issues?

5.2.2 Economic Issues are not Easy to Interpret

The reasons for media reporting more news stories on social issues somehow emerged during interviews with representatives of social institutions using the media to push for their development agenda. They were asked: What challenges do you think media professionals are facing in covering news on development issues? One argument put forward by the media outsiders was that social issues are easier to comprehend not only by media professionals but also by society in general as this representative of a social institution noted:

Although I have not done any research if you read the stories which media people write during the budget session you realise that they know very little or nothing about economic issues (MO, #14, 2014).

This challenge was noted by an editor who stated that 'one of the challenges my newspaper faces is the shortage of people who can write a good piece of news on economic issues' (MI, #12, 2014). This is also exemplified by another reporter who said:

Media people are not trained very much in this area including myself and as a result I have never written a news piece on economic issues (MI, #16, 2016).

The view of this reporter suggests that journalism training colleges do not focus on practical training in reporting news on economic issues. Similarly, the reporter's view hints that the coverage of news on economic issues mostly does not receive support from external development actors compared to social issues. This argument is corroborated by literature which noted that, in most cases, skills in reporting economic/business issues in African countries have been provided by foreign

organisations. Such institutions included the Revenue Watch Institute (Schiffrin and Behrman 2011).

One editor also argued in favour of this argument and posited:

If the media professionals prefer reporting news on social issues such as health and education we must ask ourselves why news coverage on economic issues does not get big news coverage. In my view, I would argue that the media and other development actors put little effort in to ensure journalists are able to cover economic news (MI, #48, 2014).

This argument is also corroborated by Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge who, since 1963, have argued that factors which selectors of the news use to show that the 'less ambiguity the more likely the event is to become news. The more clearly an event can be understood, and interpreted without multiple meanings, the greater the chance of it being selected' (Harcup and O'Neill 2001: 263).

The assertion somehow is also supported by some participants from institutions that use media to push for their development agenda. For example, one of the research participants asserted:

So many people in this country shy away from difficult things. This is the reason up to this moment why there is not any serious business-related newspaper or any media focusing on economic reporting (MO, #1, 2014).

Yet, one media outsider who has experience of observing peoples' reactions while watching TV said that whenever business people hear any news related to economics and/or business, they follow it keenly. The respondent said that many news consumers were disappointed with the development issues covered in the news. Reflecting on news content the media outsider argued as follows:

The news that the media were currently publishing is just bla bla ...you see... Just follow news in any of our media ... What you hear or read is who said what...what happened where... kind of news. Or economy has grown by such and such percent. No news on how the economic growth has improved the lives of people...No news on what you can do to become economically successful like this person, this village, this country...you know! ... How can the majority of people in this country graduate from economic poverty if the media is not helping them to identify economic opportunities and the actions they can take to benefit from the opportunities (MO, #2, 2014)?

The general population also assumes that journalists are more knowledgeable about a variety of issues than ordinary citizens, but in many cases journalists were not even able to correctly report news involving figures, as captured in the views of this media outsider who argued:

I have noted many times where a news story involves figures, the media news reporting does not get the figures right (MO, #10, 2014).

This view is corroborated by Karim Hirji (2012) who observed that the quality of reporting statistics has been a long-time concern in the media worldwide.

The media not only largely fail to correctly report news stories involving statistics, but also news reporting on development issues generally does not focus on issues that would make the general population see economic opportunities. A media outsider argued that the media focus on issues associated with beauty and provided this example:

We have a lot of media in the country now which venture into beauty pageants. This kind of stuff influences the public to want to see naked pictures...and tell me how does a beauty show benefit most poor people in this country (MO, #1, 2014)?

However, this does not mean that Tanzania's news media do not engage at all with economic-related news. The argument is well reflected in the quotation of a male editor who gave an example suggesting that his newspaper was the first to report the financial scandal that involved the withdrawal of TZS 133 billion from the External Payment Areas account from Tanzania's Central Bank in 2005 (MI, #6, 2014). Similarly, one reporter said he had covered an economic story which focused on gold reserves and it triggered a fierce debate in Parliament. The reporter argued:

I remember, I wrote a news story three or four years ago wondering why Tanzania does not have gold reserves in the Central Bank while the country has gold mines. In my view the story had impact because some MPs picked it up and debated it in the Parliament and the Central Bank Governor Mr Ndulu also responded, saying the country does not need gold reserves because the gold price fluctuates. However, I was happy because the debate in Parliament went on and I asked the Governor why if the gold price fluctuates, do developed countries, specifically the United States and the UK, have gold reserves (MI, #16, 2014)?

Moreover, it could be misleading to put all the blame on the media professionals because, as discussed in Chapter Three, during the colonial era indigenous

Tanganyikans were marginalised from economic news as news on business and economics were restricted to few foreigners of Asian origin (Read 1979).

Based on the account generated from the media stakeholders' interviews it can be argued that the Tanzanian media cover more news stories on social issues than economic topics partly because media professionals are not skilled in economic reporting.

This takes us to the next theme suggesting that social issues attract news reporters because social organisations implementing development activities receive financial support from foreign donors to implement development. In so doing, the organisations allocate budgets for media coverage on their development activities.

5.2.3 Organisations Working on Development Projects Support Reporters

In the interviews, some reporters said that they like covering news stories on social issues because they can easily obtain data to construct news stories. They noted this specifically in relation to development activities carried out by NGOs. One editor made this observation:

These NGOs not only have wide knowledge on the social issues they work on but also provide reporters with tips on how to obtain valuable information on development issues they work on and financially support to enable many media reporters to cover the issue collectively (MI, #18, 2014).

Some reporters said they had been able to cover several stories on social problems such as maternal deaths and infant mortality after attending a training workshop organised by social organisations such as Women's Dignity Project, Haki Elimu, TAMWA and TGNP Mtandao to mention but a few. For example, after the training organised by the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP-Mtandao) one male reporter said he was part of a team of journalists from different media channels the organisation sent to Kisarawe district in Pwani region to report health-related issues. The reporter said that as a team they investigated and reported issues some media channels published as lead stories. What helped the team of journalists to report well on the social issues to the extent that it was selected as the lead story? This reporter remembered:

TGNP convened a meeting and we were told that the aim of our trip was to report the realities of health services problems that Mwanarumango health centre was facing. They gave us some hints on where and how to uncover the

realities. The briefing helped us to focus our news angles on problems the people in the area were facing in accessing health services (MI, #18, 2014).

Three conclusions can be drawn from these accounts: (1) news coverage of some social issues attracts news reporters because NGOs working on development activities help reporters to identify issues and support reporters financially in the process of investigating and reporting the issues; (2) NGOs working on development issues focusing on social-related problems build the skills capacity of the journalists they involve in news coverage; (3) the social organisations involve reporters from multiple media to report one issue at once, hence ignoring the media culture of getting a 'scoop' for news markets.

Some reporters noted that the approach that NGOs use to engage several media to cover an issue at the same time minimises the risks of attacks on individual reporters and individual media channels. One reporter recalled investigative reporting organised by TAMWA which exposed unethical health practices including pharmacies selling antibiotics without medical prescriptions. The participant said that the story could be considered sensitive because it exposed malpractice in health care facilities by government-owned agencies and private proprietors. However, the reporters and their respective media outlets did not face any threat because the data gathered collectively to construct the stories were credible. The reporter explained the coverage of the story on the issue:

All the newspapers involved published the story as the front-page lead story. Immediately after the story was published, the government announced the closure of several pharmacies in Dar Es Salaam for violating drug dispensing regulations and ordered all workers in all private and government health facilities countrywide to put on name tags... None of the reporters or media channels involved were harassed afterwards for reporting such a story (MI, #48, 2014).

The respondent said the media coverage on the story about the misconduct of pharmacies in Dar Es Salaam was selected as the lead story because:

I think the news was thoroughly investigated because TAMWA requested our respective media outlets to relieve us from other assignments and focus on the health issue. I also remember that, before embarking on the investigation, TAMWA convened a meeting which enabled us to brainstorm and share tips and tools for collecting the data from pharmacies, dispensaries, health centres and hospitals. In that meeting we agreed that no one should publish any news in relation to the issue until all data were collected, put together and analysed.

We formed small teams and each team had to accomplish surveys in health facilities and pharmacies in their allocated areas within...seven or ten days but I do not remember very well. We also agreed that each team submit to TAMWA office the report on their findings. TAMWA convened another meeting and we discussed the findings, made corrections and clarifications. Then we brainstormed and agreed on the angle, all important facts included in our news story and the day for publishing it. I remember all the key paragraphs of the story we wrote together during that meeting. We also agreed that TAMWA should write a news press statement and distribute it to all media houses including those which did not participate in the survey (MI, #48, 2014).

This assertion suggests the media tend to produce news of poor quality because of the culture of 'scooping' to attract markets for news stories. Usually competition tempts the media to report news without fact-checking (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2002). Moreover, the assertion confirms the observation by Galtung and Ruge that unusual 'events... will have the greatest chance of being selected as news' (Harcup and O'Neill 2001: 263).

However, the critical perspective could argue that journalists in Tanzania prefer to report social issues involving NGOs' activities mainly for personal gain. Somehow, they benefit from money they receive from NGOs as daily expenses when they are sent out for news coverage on development activities implemented by the social organisations. The reporter who participated in the media news coverage of the health issues in Kisarawe district disclosed the benefits obtained in the process of reporting news on development issues involving social organisations, mostly NGOs, funded by foreign donors. The reporter revealed as follows:

Let me be frank with you ... the money I saved from the daily expenses motivated me to start making serious savings and a few years later I had raised the money I used to buy my farm (shamba) in the Bunju area (MI, #18, 2014).

A similar view is upheld by some reporters who had covered several news stories on social issues supported by TAMWA. An extract from this reporter's interview revealed that media professionals benefited by reporting news on development activities implemented by social organisations with affiliations to foreign donors:

Ohoo...last month my three features were published and for each I was paid TZS100,000 (roughly £30). The money helped me and of course I had to make a cut for my editor... you know.... you know we all need to survive, don't we (MI, #21, 2014)?

However, it can be argued that NGOs funding reporters for reporting news on development matters has a downside. This is because, as discussed in Chapter One, media professionals have developed the habit of focusing on news which is accompanied by mshiko (transport expenses). This is revealed in the views provided by representatives of the key social institutions. For example, regarding reporters' practices of demanding mshiko for news reporting, one representative from a social organisation had this to say:

Reporters mmm... they are of two types: there are reporters per se and those we call kanjanja; they have no affiliation but may gather news and send to editors to ask them if they can help publish... They sell news stories because you must provide them with transport although they will not ask for it directly but will come to you and say 'vipi bwana', meaning what about transport expenses, or they will hang around until they are given money or else no news story will be published on your activity. I hate it but what can you do because even my friend working as a hospital administrator also told me they had the same experiences with reporters (MO, #14, 2014).

In conclusion, it can be argued that media professionals – mostly reporters – prefer to report news on social issues because these issues are not controversial like politics issues and are hard to comprehend as opposed to economic matters. Additionally, in covering some of the social issues reporters receive financial and skills support from social organisations implementing development projects with financial support from foreign development partners (donors).

This concluding remark leads us to the next subsection which reflects on 411 news development issues selected as lead stories from the 10,371 stories examined.

5.3 Tanzania's Media Lead Stories on Development Issues

This section examines the kinds of development issues in 411 news items selected from 10,371 news stories and published as lead stories by 15 media channels on 28 consecutive days. The section argues that news on these kinds of development issues can be selected as lead stories. However, the largest number of 411 items selected as lead stories from the 10,371 news items was on politics issues. Yet, news on politics issues constituted the lowest proportion of the 10,371 news stories examined while social issues comprised the biggest number of news items.

Development issues selected by each of the 15 media channels and published as lead stories are as shown in Table 14.

Table 14: Tanzania's Media Lead Stories on Development Issues

The media	Lead stories on social issues	Lead stories on economic issues	Lead stories on politics issues	Total lead stories	Total days
Uhuru	5	2	21	28	28
Nipashe	8	1	19	28	28
Mwananchi	4	0	24	28	28
Mtanzania	4	2	22	28	28
Majira	8	1	19	28	28
Jambo Leo	3	1	24	28	28
Habari Leo	7	4	17	28	28
The Guardian	10	10	8	28	28
Daily News	10	8	10	28	28
The Citizen	7	8	12	28	27
Tanzania Daima	1	2	25	28	28
Total lead stories in newspapers	67	39	201	307	
Radio One Stereo	18	4	6	28	28
TBC Taifa radio	10	4	10	24	24
Total lead stories in radio bulletins	28	8	16	52	
ITV television	16	-	12	28	28
TBC1 television	10	4	10	24	24
Total lead stories in television bulletins	26	9	17	52	-
Total lead stores in broadcast bulletins	54	17	33	104	-
Total lead stories in all media channels	121	56	234	411	-

As shown in Table 14, radio and television channels selected social-related topics to construct many of their lead stories. On the contrary, of all the eight Kiswahili daily newspapers, except the state-owned Habari Leo, more than two thirds of their lead stories were constructed from politics discourse. This suggests that news given prominence as lead stories in the Tanzanian Kiswahili daily newspapers in contemporary times is not much different from the issues that the Kiswahili press covered as front-page lead stories during the colonial era. During the historical era, news reported in press that was meant to be accessed by the majority of Tanganyikans focused on developed issues constructed from politicians in state power (Iliffe 1969; Scotton 1978; Read 1979; Habermas 1991; Sturmer 1998; Mwakikagile 2009). However, for the English newspapers, The Guardian, the Daily News and The Citizen, there was no big variation between lead stories constructed

from social, economic and politics topics. The findings show continuity of the historical media pattern of news content. Similarly, during the colonial era politics issues, especially those focusing on insurgency against colonialists, were not given space in the broadcast news.

What are the views of media stakeholders on such reporting on development issues?

5.4 Media Stakeholders' Views on Lead Stories

This section analyses the media stakeholders' views on the type of development issues in 411 news items selected as lead stories from 10,371 news stories. The section argues that there are competing views of media stakeholders as to why the daily newspapers selected a huge number of politics issues and published them as lead stories. The first theme suggests that the Tanzanians consider politics as the most successful career, thus news focusing on politics attracts media markets. The second theme suggests that the media are owned and controlled by politicians, hence development issues concerning politics and politicians are given more attention. The third theme contradicts the two themes. It argues that the media were unable to investigate and produce news that can sell because of restrictive media laws and financial constraints.

The subsection that follows discusses the view that, in Tanzania, politics is seen as the most successful career.

5.4.1 Tanzanians Consider Politics as the Most Successful Career

Tanzania is now a society in which politics is increasingly becoming everything, as it is considered to be the most successful career. The media, by focusing on politics, reinforce this culture. It is now common to see learned people, including university professors, engineers and medical doctors, dissatisfied with their academic career, moving into politics either by themselves in vying for elected posts or getting presidentially appointed posts. The professionals are joining politics because politicians are handsomely remunerated and taken care of more than any other civil servants. Above all, politicians' contributions to the national good are celebrated. One key theme that emerged from the interviews suggests that Tanzanian society has construed politics as the most important career and politicians as the most

important people. This argument is clearly articulated in a quotation extracted from the interview with this media trainer who cited an example of how politics is glorified:

Tanzania celebrated 50 years of independence and some medals were given out to prominent politicians. Why wasn't the medal given to Filbert Bay,⁴³ why wasn't a medal given to Suleiman Nyambui,⁴⁴ why wasn't a medal given to Shafii as a great novelist? Why? ...Why wasn't a medal given to some of our very good engineers, pioneer pilots or whatever? We have pilots who, during the first break of the East African Community in 1977, risked their lives to literally steal airplanes from Nairobi to Dar es Salaam and Kilimanjaro because Tanzania wouldn't have been left with anything. Why aren't such people recognized? ...We have traditional midwives who have done a lot of great work under terrible situations, why aren't any of them ever recognized? So, if you ask me I would say this is a national disease, it is a big problem. So, our editors publish news in a way that reinforces such culture of thinking politicians are the only people doing a great job in this country. They select politics as lead stories because in our society politics is what sells, politics is construed as the most successful career (MI, #59, 2014).

The assertion confirms the argument by McCombs that the media focus on 'boosterism', meaning that media news reporting promotes the interests of elite groups in society (McCombs 1997). However, such an argument contradicts the observation by Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge that the 'actions of elite people, who will usually be famous, may be seen by news selectors as having more consequence than actions of others' (Harcup and O'Neill 2001: 263).

Further, some editors said that politics topics dominated the lead stories because media is business and any business looks for products that sell and because politics issues are contentious their news sells more than others. The view provided by this editor exemplifies the argument:

You know in life everything is politics. Any story involving a topical political issue will sell a newspaper. As you can see now, during the constitution debate, a story that focused on the debate on a new constitution would sell. For example, during the just-ended Constituent Assembly session, if you put a lead news story out that did not discuss the constitution your newspaper would not sell (MI, #4, 2016).

⁴³ Filbert Bayi Sanka, born June 23, 1953, is a former Tanzanian middle-distance runner of the 1970s who set the world records for 1500m in 1974 and the mile in 1975. He is still the 1500m Commonwealth Games record holder.

⁴⁴ Suleiman Nyambui (born February 13, 1953) is a former track athlete from Tanzania who specialised in various long-distance disciplines. Nyambui won the bronze medal at the 1978 All-Africa Games, the silver medal in the 5000 metres at the 1980 Summer Olympics, and finished first in three consecutive marathons between 1987 and 1988. He holds multiple indoor national records for Tanzania in athletics.

But, a critical perspective would argue why Tanzania's media focus on politics issues mainly from aspects concerning mostly politicians and not political matters that affect the majority of the population? Yet, it has been recommended that for the media to contribute effectively in national development they have to use more 'coverage of non-elite people' (Galtung and Ruge 1965: 85).

However, some argued that the media are not just social service institutions as they facilitate communication but they are also industries established for commercial purposes. A quotation extracted from the transcript of this editor expounds on this view. The editor argued:

The truth of the matter is that media is about business. Always we newspaper editors will look for a story that sells our newspaper. Politics sells and stories involving big names in politics sell more (MI, #18, 2014).

This editor's argument corroborates an observation suggesting that media owners appoint 'editors in the expectation that they will do as they are told in the private interest of a profit-oriented enterprise' (Habermas 1991: 186).

The observation is also supported by views of some media outsiders who argued that the media tendency of focusing on politics and political figures is also reinforced by media professionals whose interests are to support the development agenda of political elites in society so that they can also be rewarded. They argued that such media professionals will accomplish their mission by doing anything they can to achieve what they want. This is what the view of this respondent reveals:

Most people enter the media industry to get wealthy. Some people join journalism to serve the interests of a few people, mostly politicians and financially powerful individuals, so that they are also rewarded afterwards. So, it doesn't matter for them if by so doing they wouldn't observe ethical considerations and undermine media social responsibility for national development (MO, #1, 2014).

The next subsection discusses the theme suggesting that media are owned mainly by elite groups, hence they must champion the agenda of the owners.

5.4.2 Politicians Own the Media

Some media professionals argue that media ownership is a fundamental factor that influences the selection of politics topics as lead stories. Politicians, mostly in the

ruling circles, own the media to fulfil their political agenda. In so doing, they ensure their media channels focus on the owners' interests. This view is captured well in a quotation extracted from the interview transcript of this editor who put it like this:

...when read political news in any of these newspapers and you know their owners, you will realise that the news stories reflect the perspectives of their owner and/or their editors. This makes people in society follow the media trends of wanting to read and hear about politics...politics...politics. What is disturbing is that a politician can utter a trivial thing or even tell lies and the issue becomes a lead story in a newspaper and people buy the newspaper (MI, #4, 2014).

Moreover, this view confirms the observation that most media outlets across the world are owned by politicians in governing positions (Djankov et al. 2003). Focusing on politics suggests that media in contemporary Tanzania are part of a global context. For this reason, the lead stories selected suited the interests of media owners. One long-serving editor who had worked with the Uhuru newspaper during the single political party era provided insight into how lead stories were selected during that time based on high-profile politicians in the government. The editor went on to say:

... if in that day say Rashid Kawawa (when he was CCM Secretary General) was touring Tabora region, and President Nyerere was in Kigoma region, the Chief Editor would tell the Editorial Board that Nyerere is the first lead story and Kawawa is the second lead even before the editor knew what these leaders had done or spoken about on that day (MI, #5, 2014).

However, that trend of focusing on what high-profile public leaders say about development issues continues even in contemporary times, as this extract from the view provided by the editor of one of the state-owned media confirms:

Although we are not forced to publish as a lead story what top politicians in government say... selecting what gets prominence in the news of the day we firstly consider what top government leaders have done or said in that day (MI, #21, 2014).

Another view that emerged from the interviews with editors in relation to the selection of lead stories noted that media focus on even trivial political stories because Tanzanians focus on personalities rather than fundamental issues affecting the general population. The editor argued:

...if your newspaper is focusing on serious issues you face challenges in reaching the market because many Tanzanians like to read about gossip (udaku) and this problem is growing because the ward secondary schools are

adding millions of young people with this kind of mentality every year (MI, #19, 2014).

However, the assertion contradicts the views of some representatives of social institutions using the media to push for their development agenda. For instance, a respondent argued that the news on development issues reported in daily newspapers does not satisfy the audience expectations. The respondent pointed out that:

Our office purchases several daily newspapers every day. Every morning I read all the lead stories in these newspapers. But if I were to buy the newspapers with my own money, to be honest with you, I wouldn't be willing to invest buying even a copy of a newspaper every day...the news stories are of low quality...do not attract actions. Maybe some weekly newspapers because at least occasionally you may find a story worth your money... No no... I find it to be a waste of money buying a newspaper every day only to read a lead story saying: President says...politician so and so says ... government says. I tell you it is all rubbish. The news would be slightly more useful if it said leader so and so has accomplished this or that to improve the lives of the citizens in a certain area (MO, #6, 2014).

This assertion leads to the next subsection suggesting that media in Tanzania are not capable of conducting investigative reporting on development topics to obtain data worth producing a valuable lead story.

5.4.3 Lack of Investigative News Reporting

Several newspaper editors noted that getting a news story worth publishing as a lead story is problematic. They admitted that many of the news stories which their reporters construct was not worth publishing as lead stories. As a result, the news selected as lead stories is a result of poor output by news reporters. One newspaper editor explained the challenge in this way:

... imagine you have on your table 50 news stories to select from, plenty are from the Dar Es Salaam region and some are from the up-country regions which you need to select to get the best...you know... to sell your newspaper. But all the stories are about government leader says this, a prominent politician said that, a religious leader says this and that, a leader of this NGO says...this or that or a bad road accident happened somewhere. Then you have no option apart from checking the factual accuracy of the stories. Otherwise you are not left with any alternative. You end up selecting as a lead story what the politicians say it sells ...What can you do when the newspaper must be published and be sold (MI, #10, 2014)?

But why are most of the Tanzanian media not able to investigate development issues to get information to construct news that could sell based on its relevance to national development?

The media professionals provided competing viewpoints. Several reporters expressed concerns that it was extremely difficult to obtain information from government offices on things that were not going well in relation to development issues. This editor succinctly pointed out the challenges in this narration:

Hahaha... my sister you are asking questions as if you are not a Tanzanian and indeed as if you are not a journalist. Does it mean you do not understand that it is very difficult in this country for a journalist to obtain information from government offices, even if it is a village government, unless it is information that the government wishes to reach the public? You do not know that if a media outlet publishes information the government construes as its secret, the journalist involved is at risk and the media involved can be banned? Who doesn't want to live? Who does not want to get his/her daily bread? If the big shots really wanted the media in this country to play their role in exposing ills that hinder national development why are they keeping restrictive media laws? Why are they implanting fear and harassing journalists and the media houses (MI, #50, 2014)?

This assertion suggests that media professionals not only face difficulties in getting valuable information to produce lead stories which can sell. It also suggests that in Tanzania media professionals work in fear. They have no freedom to access information about public leaders' practices that undermine national development.

Several editors complained about the use of draconian laws to restrict media reporting of development issues. One editor of a daily newspaper recalled their newspaper's experiences with such laws:

... even two years ago our newspaper was threatened with being de-registered. Whenever our newspaper has had an issue with the registrar, draconian laws have been used to punish us. The laws include the National Security Act of 1970 and the Official Secret Ordinance Cap 45 of 1922 maintained through the Newspaper Act of 1976 which consider it a criminal offence to publish any information the government in power may construe as government secrets (MI, #14, 2014).

The editor of a weekly Kiswahili tabloid noted that often their newspaper's lead story is a result of a thorough investigation. However, the editor was quick to argue that such reporting often puts the newspaper at loggerheads with the newspaper

registrar. The editor explained the repercussions of a story on a social issue that their newspaper published as a lead story:

Do you remember ... the Muhimbili Hospital health service saga that led to Dr Ulimboka's torture ... our newspaper was banned indefinitely...The story we covered as lead story on the issue government considered it to be sedition because it linked national intelligence officers with the torture (MI, #6, 2014).

Such use of draconian laws to restrict media reporting of development issues that undermine national development was also noted by several editors involved in this research.

However, such strict laws are not the only reason for the media focusing on politics issues as lead stories. Another view of media stakeholders suggests that the challenge is also partly due to a shortage of skilled professionals in most of the media channels. One trainer noted that because of skills gap many reporters were reporting one-sided stories and without making follow-ups. The trainer argued as follows:

The way most reporters in Tanzania work is that something has happened somewhere and the reporter is just writing a one-sided story (MI, #3, 2014).

The trainer argued that the quality of news produced by the media is a key indicator of the challenge of professional excellence in the media. The trainer illustrated this gap using their own experience:

I was reading one of the newspapers... now you find that a story is talking about a certain issue but really you see that you wanted to know more about this issue, especially about the causes, who are involved, why this is happening, who is responsible and why they are not doing their job and what is the implication for people so that when people read a story, they can connect it to their own daily life. But in the end, you do not find such details (MI, #3, 2014).

This claim is supported by many of the 36 emblematic lead stories examined in this thesis.⁴⁵ Not only the lead stories but also other news items in the 10,371 stories examined reveal a skills gap in Tanzanian media professionals. For example, on February 10, 2014 a reporter for Majira, a privately owned Kiswahili daily, covered a story from the southern region of Ruvuma. The story was about what the MP for Namtumbo, Vita Kawawa, had said at a rally to mark 37 years of the ruling Chama

⁴⁵ See Chapter Seven.

Cha Mapiunduzi (CCM) political party in relation to the national constitution which was a topical issue that period. The story that occupied 18 percent of the space on page ten of the newspaper reads in part in Kiswahili in the news headline:

‘Wananchi watakiwa kuomba mchakato wa wa Katiba ili nchi ipate Katiba bora bila Vurugu’...Wito huo umetolea na...’(Mwambije 2014).

In English this means citizens are urged to pray to the Almighty so that the country gets a popular constitution without violence. (See details of the story in Figure 3.)

Figure 3: A Story Showing A Member of Parliament Escaping Responsibility



However, the critical perspective would want to understand why an MP (citizens' representative) advised citizens to ask the Almighty to give them a popular constitution. The responsibility of the MP, who was also a Constituent Assembly member, was to ensure the Constituent Assembly members approved the draft popular constitution. The popular proposed Tanzanian Mather law had been prepared based on the views of diverse social groups and individual citizens from across the country. By constructing and publishing such a story it suggested that the issue of lack of professional capability amongst media professionals in reporting development issues is critical in the Tanzanian media. Most reporters who do well in their profession have also been well trained. But why do Tanzania's media engage unskilled news reporters?

Some editors argued that the media in Tanzania lack financial capacity. Financial challenges not only make the media reproduce what the elite group say in relation to development concerns, but they also hinder the media from employing skilled professionals. This view is well captured in the account of this editor who said:

Three of our reporters have requested us to support them to further their professional qualification and all of them seem to be committed in the profession. However, as much as we would like to do so we have a financial challenge because even paying salaries we are struggling because of revenue challenges (MI, #11, 2014).

The view of this reporter supports the editor's argument. The reporter shared personal experience saying:

This is my fifth year... I remember in my third year I requested them to support me to further my career – do a degree in journalism. They said when financial status allows. I have waited for two years, nothing has come in sight yet (MI, #4, 2014).

However, some editors argued the quality of journalism training offered by the media training institutions in the country also poses challenges. The institutions do not train reporters on how to produce valuable news stories on social, economic and politics topics from non-elite groups.

If you evaluate the kinds of issues most of these media report you realise that they follow the ancient media news patterns, giving prominence to news about prominent people in government, political parties, NGOs, faith organisations...you name it. You rarely have the views of ordinary people about development issues affecting average Tanzanians. With such news, can the media really claim to be the drivers of national development in contemporary times? So, for me, I see a very big gap (MI, #36, 2014).

The editors noted that many graduate journalists, on arrival in the newsrooms, were not able to construct a simple news story. This concern is amplified in an account by one editor who contended that:

... most of the universities and colleges do not engage their journalism students in practical work. As a result, most of them after joining the media and realizing what journalism is all about, find it very difficult to cope and they quit the job (MI, #6, 2014).

This view supports the observation made by a male lecturer from the University of Dar Es Salaam who provided reasons as to why the public university was not able to produce competent journalists. The lecturer noted that the University of Dar Es

Salaam has practical training opportunities, such as its own newspaper called the Hill Observer and the radio and television channel Mlimani. However, most of the journalism lecturers have a PhD but they lack practical media skills because the degree in journalism was introduced in the country only a few years ago. For example, while by 2000 the country had a population of 32 million people, graduates from local universities 'were only 40,000 – one of the lowest rates in the world' (TOMRIC Agency 2000). By 2000 there were only three public universities in the country, two public-owned – the University of Dar Es Salaam and Sokoine University of Agriculture, and one Roman Catholic-owned – the St Augustine University. Courses for journalism were offered mainly by the Tanzania School of Journalism and St Augustine University but the highest level was diploma.

The lecturer insisted that journalism is a practical profession, arguing:

...that is why whenever I have a class on newswriting I do very little strategic lectures. And, before lecturing, I walk around with my students from one place to another in the nearby area. I just tell them to observe and conduct interviews with people in the area. When we come back I tell each of them to produce a two-paragraph news story. But very few will be able to write anything worth a news story. But when I write what I observed they are surprised. In that way they learn through practice (MI, #45, 2014).

Nonetheless, to bridge the gap in media professional skills, external practical training actors, such as the British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC), have offered training to journalists in some media channels. For example, the female reporters interviewed who were the winners of Excellence in Journalism Awards Tanzania (EJAT) organised by the Media Council of Tanzania (MCT), had received short in-house training courses offered by BBC experts through special arrangements made by individual media houses. One of the female reporters affirmed with this assertion:

Our director not only invests to ensure news professionals from the BBC come to the station to train us on media skills but also because our radio station focuses on health issues, occasionally he invites medical experts on different issues to give us insights. For example, if you want to produce a programme on maternal mortality, the expert will give a lecture on factors that contribute to the problem, why pregnant women die and who can do what to avoid the deaths. What I am trying to say is that the director will convene a session in the station allowing us reporters to discuss the issue with medical experts and in that way as news reporters and programme producers we will be enlightened on the issue. In that way, not only as journalists, we are encouraged to love our profession, but the insights we get from the experts help us to publish very educative news and programmes (MI, #14, 2014).

This observation suggests that although in contemporary times colleges of journalism have been established in Tanzania, like they were in the past, some media outlets focus on in-house training using the knowledge of foreign experts.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter examined types of development issues reported in 10,371 news items examined in this study with focus on the issues given prominence as lead stories and the views of media stakeholders about such reporting. The evidence highlights controversy in relation to the development issues that the media constructed for most of these stories and the issues selected and reported as lead stories. Political issues constituted the lowest proportion of the 10,371 news items while social issues formed the biggest number of news stories. However, politics topics mostly constituted the biggest proportion of news reported as lead stories. The media stakeholders' views suggest that politics news involving politicians sells as Tanzanians give priority to political issues because they consider politics to be the most successful career. The second view suggests that the media are owned mostly by politicians in state power and hence news production focuses on the owners' development agenda. These findings confirm the observation provided in Chapter One that activities involving the state power elite are likely to become news (Harcup and O'Neill 2016a). Similarly, the findings confirm the argument that the ownership of the media influences the media autonomy (Maheshwari 2015).

This chapter discussed findings which revealed development issues given prominence in the 10,371 news stories examined and views of media stakeholders on such reporting. Chapter Six will present and discuss findings on the categories of people quoted as news sources in 10,371 news stories, their gender and views of the media stakeholders about selection of such news sources.

Chapter Six: Tanzania's Media News Sources on Development Issues

6.0 Introduction

This chapter analysed news sources for 10,371 stories on social, economic and politics issues reported in 15 Tanzanian media channels on 28 consecutive days and the accounts of 76 media stakeholders about the news sources. The aim is to answer the research question: Who are the Tanzanian media sources for news on development issues and what are the views of media stakeholders about these sources? Scrutiny of news sources on development topics is vital because, by selecting news sources, the media tend to focus on a few influential groups in society. Consequently, the media 'reinforces hegemonic values and priorities in society' (Melkote and Steeves 2001: 31). Revealing whose views on development matters the media give precedence to in the news enables understanding of the extent to which the state power elite listens to the views of ordinary citizens to understand their concerns and solve them in time. As Smith posits, achieving development for all people in society requires a 'stronger citizens' voice' (Smith 2007: xii-xiii). This is fundamental 'based on the assumption that exposure alone provides an important consciousness-raising function that may challenge hegemony' (Melkote and Steeves 2001: 31).

This chapter comprises three sections. Section 6.1 discusses the categories of news sources in the 10,371 news stories examined in this inquiry. In doing so it establishes the categories of people in society given prominence in the news. Section 6.2 discusses the media stakeholders' views regarding the categories of news sources that dominated these stories. Section 6.3 draws a conclusion.

6.1 Categories of People Selected as News Sources on Development Issues

This section examines the number of people quoted in each category that the Tanzanian media selected as news sources for 10,371 news stories on development issues. As explained in the methodology chapter, there were four groups of news sources: ordinary citizens, government officials, people from civil society organisations and individual politicians. The media which covered these stories included eleven newspapers, namely Uhuru, Nipashe, Mwananchi, Mtanzania, Majira, Jambo Leo, Habari Leo, The Guardian, Tanzania Daima, the Daily News and

The Citizen. The radio stations were TBC Taifa and Radio One Stereo. Television sources were TBC1 and ITV. The proportion of people quoted in each of the four categories and the percentage of the total number of people in the 10,371 news stories examined is shown in Table 15.

Table 15: Categories of News Sources on Development Issues

Media	Total	Government	%	Politicians	%	CSOs	%	Citizens	%
Uhuru	1072	658	61.4	190	17.7	115	10.7	109	10.1
Nipashe	1427	846	59.3	209	14.6	269	18.9	103	7.2
Mwananchi	1444	838	58.0	203	14.1	267	18.5	136	9.4
Mtanzania	913	476	52.1	156	17.1	182	20	99	10.8
Majira	1500	843	56.2	217	14.5	301	20	139	9.3
Jambo Leo	983	566	57.6	114	11.6	211	21.5	92	9.3
Habari Leo	1445	885	61.3	171	11.8	252	17.4	137	9.5
The Guardian	781	488	62.3	42	8.6	212	27.1	39	5.0
Daily News	1386	869	62.7	86	6.2	306	22.1	125	9.0
The Citizen	961	518	53.9	127	13.2	206	21.4	110	11.4
Tanzania Daima	910	429	47.1	163	17.9	208	22.9	110	12.1
	12822	7416	57.8	1678	13.1	2529	19.7	1199	9.4
TBC 1	433	290	67.0	62	14.3	45	10.4	36	8.3
ITV	814	311	38.2	124	15.2	122	15.0	257	31.6
	1247	601	48.2	186	15.0	167	13.4	293	23.4
TBC Taifa	433	290	67	62	14.3	45	10.4	36	8.3
Radio One	135	91	67.4	19	14.1	16	11.8	9	6.7
	568	381	67.1	81	14.2	61	10.7	45	7.9
Grand total	14,637	8,398	57.4	1945	13.3	2,757	18.8	1537	10.5

6.1.1 Government Affiliates as News Sources

As shown in Table 15, in total 14,637 people were selected to provide their views about development issues framed in 10,371 news stories. Computation of the number of these news items and the total number of people quoted suggests that, on average, each of these stories were constructed using views gathered from a single source. It also shows that on average most of the news sources (57.4%) in all the 15 newspapers examined were affiliated to the government, while 13.3 percent were individual politicians, 18.8 percent civil society organisations and business (CSOs), and 10.5 percent were ordinary citizens.

This finding is like that of Brown et al. in the United States in 1987 which revealed:

...that 31 percent, or almost one third of all sources in front-page news stories was affiliated with the US government. More than half were affiliated with some governmental body. By comparison, only one quarter were affiliated with non-governmental organisations and barely 4 percent were non-affiliated US citizens (Brown et al. 1987: 48-49).

However, some media quoted a higher percentage of government affiliated sources than the average shows. Such media included Jambo Leo (57.6%), Mwananchi (58%), Nipashe (59.3%), Habari Leo (61.3%), The Guardian (62.3%), Daily News (62.7%), TBC1 and TBC Taifa (67%) and Radio One (67.4%). The findings support the observation suggesting that the media in Africa focus on the views of people in government (Nyamnjo 2005a) and 'the public is rarely given a voice' (Tucker 1998: 151). The government had the strongest voice in the news. The findings also confirm the contemporary observation on media suggesting that activities of the state elite are more likely to become news than activities of other groups in society (Harcup and O'Neill 2016a).

However, there was a remarkable variation in the number of news sources associated with government between the stories reported in newspapers and those that were aired in radio and television channels' news bulletins. In total, 12,822 people provided views about social, economic and politics development topics that the eleven newspapers selected to construct 9,607 news stories during the period under review. This suggests that most of news stories on development issues reported in the daily newspapers were constructed from ideas obtained from a single source.

This was contrary to the news on development topics reported in television news bulletins. On average, the news stories on development concerns reported in the two television channels, ITV and TBC1, were constructed from the views of 3.3 news sources. As shown in Table 16, in total 1,694 people were quoted in 508 news stories which the two television channels of national status aired in their 8 o'clock news bulletins. Further, on average, each news item reported in ITV news bulletins about social, economic and politics discourse was gathered from roughly four sources. Moreover, of the 814 news sources in 332 news items reported in ITV television broadcasts, 257 (31.6%) were ordinary citizens. This suggests that, on

average, each news story on development topics aired in ITV news bulletins, included views of one ordinary citizen. Table 16 shows the average number of news sources in stories reported by all 15 media involved in this inquiry.

Table 16: Average Number of People Quoted in Each News Item

Name of the newspaper	Total number of news items published	Number of people quoted in news	Average people in a news item
Uhuru	910	1072	1.18
Nipashe	988	1427	1.44
Mwananchi	1173	1444	1.23
Mtanzania	791	913	1.15
Majira	986	1500	1.52
Jambo Leo	749	983	1.31
Habari Leo	1016	1445	1.42
The Guardian	534	781	1.46
Tanzania Daima	804	910	1.13
Daily News	862	1386	1.61
The Citizen	794	961	1.21
Total	9607	12822	
TBC1	176	433	1.9
ITV	332	1261	3.8
Total	508	1694	
TBC Taifa	146	433	2.9
Radio One	110	135	1.2
Total	256	568	

Since 8,398 (57.4%) people out of 14,637 quoted in the 10,371 news stories were from government affiliated agencies, and on average each newspaper story quoted a single source, this implies that most of the newspapers' stories were based on the ideas of politicians in state power about development issues affecting Tanzanians. This raises a question about the role of the media as a watchdog over development issues concerning the majority population. The Tanzanian media rely heavily on government views as the main source of news on development issues suggesting that the media largely work as a government public relations agent. Such kind of news reporting compromises the fourth estate role of the watchdog because statements from the government affiliated news sources are unlikely to be critical of the performance of the government of the day. Moreover, this kind of news sourcing 'offends journalists' professional culture, which emphasises independence and editorial autonomy' (Lewis et al. 2008: 2).

So why does the media coverage of news on development issues give priority to the views of the governing elite? Section 6.3 answers this question. Meanwhile the next subsection looks at the politicians' news sources.

6.1.2 Politicians as News Sources

As shown in Table 16, on average, individual politicians quoted in the 10,731 news stories on development issues reported in the 15 media channels constituted 13.3 percent of the total 14,637 news sources for these stories. However, some media channels quoted more politicians than others, as follows: Mwananchi (14.1%), Radio One (14.1%), TBC Taifa (14.3%), TBC1 (14.3%), Majira (14.5%), Nipashe (14.6%), ITV (15%), Uhuru (17.7%) and Tanzania Daima (17.9%). Individual politicians used as news sources for the stories reported in all three of the English language newspapers – The Citizen, Daily News and The Guardian – were less than 14 percent of news sources for the news stories which each of these three newspapers reported.

The findings show continuity of colonial media patterns of news content. For example, during German colonial rule, the Kiswahili newspaper Kiongozi was used as a tool for political propaganda (Askew 2014). Similarly, during the British mandate administration, the Kiswahili newspaper Mamboleo was used as propaganda machinery by the regime, while Mwafrika was a tool for anti-colonial insurgency by the natives (Read 1979; Sturmer 1998). Meanwhile, in contemporary times, CSOs in Tanzania have become potential news sources.

6.1.3 Civil Society Organisations as News Sources

As shown in Table 16, on average, 18.8 percent of all people whose views were included in these 10,371 stories were from civil society organisations. However, in comparison to daily newspapers, radio and television channels quoted the least number of people from this group in their news.

Meanwhile, for all the newspapers apart from the three Kiswahili dailies – Uhuru, Habari Leo and Mwananchi – the proportion of news sources affiliated to CSOs was 18.8 percent.

6.1.4 Ordinary Citizens as News Sources

Ordinary citizens constituted the least number of news sources in the 10,731 stories examined. Table 16 shows that, on average, 10.5 percent of the news sources from whom the 15 media channels sought views used to construct the 10,371 news stories came from the ordinary citizens category. This finding suggests that the views of ordinary citizens in these news stories on social, politics and economic issues

were relatively ignored compared to the views of the three other categories of news sources: government officials, CSOs and individual politicians. Further, the finding suggests that, although ordinary citizens make up the majority population in Tanzania, the media make little effort to ensure that their views on development policies are heard through news reported in the media of national status.

The findings suggest that for the media in Tanzania – although since 1992 ownership has been diversified to include government-owned and privately owned – the way they source and report social, politics and economic issues concerning the common man has not changed. News reporting on the national development agenda has remained as it was during the ujamaa socialism era: focusing on the views of politicians in state power. Yet, like during the time of the ujamaa village when people were pushed out of their ample lands to join planned ujamaa, in contemporary times ordinary people – including farmers in the rural areas and pastoralists – are pushed out of their land to allow the so-called economic investors in. As Priya Lal asserts: ‘On the ground, Tanzanian farmers displaced from their rural homes by today’s large-scale land grabs draw on the same adoptive survival strategies that they used to cope with forced villagisation in the 1970s’ (Lal 2015: 5).

However, the Tanzanian media autonomy of reporting issues that undermine the interests of the ordinary people including such economic injustices is controlled by the ruling and governing elite. The control is executed through political pressure on the media owners, editors and reporters as the country had continued to keep the old and enact new media-unfriendly laws. For example, as discussed in Chapter Three, immediately after taking power, the government of President Magufuli twice forcibly shut down a weekly Kiswahili popular newspaper, Mawio. The newspaper was banned after it published an article in June 2017 detailing problems in Tanzania’s mining industry and attaching pictures of two former Presidents to the story (International Press Institute 2018). Then, in 2017, the government banned MwanaHalisi, accusing it of publishing false information, going against the journalists’ code of conduct and endangering national security with a series of articles published in January, April and September 2017 (Mwakangale 2017; Natabaalo 2017). The way politicians in state power in Tanzania control the media autonomy clearly gives credence to the notion that the media in contemporary times

are 'supporting those in power and subordinating the working people' (Gorman and McLean 2009: 3).

Nonetheless, the degree to which each of the 15 media channels selected ordinary citizens as news sources on development issues in the news examined varied remarkably. For example, of all the 15 media outlets, only the news stories aired in ITV news bulletins included views of ordinary citizens as more than 30 percent of news sources. For most of the other media channels the proportion of news stories constructed from the views of ordinary citizens was less than 10 percent. However, in contemporary times the situation could be worse. This is because, for example, after President John Magufuli came into power towards the end of 2015, private media television, radio and newspaper news reporting on social, economic and politics issues changed tremendously, ignoring the views and voices of average people while focusing mainly on politicians in state power. The press that strive to report from the perspective of citizens have been punished. These include The Citizen newspaper which was banned from publication for one week in March 2019. The Citizen was suspended after reporting a news story which reflected the situation of democracy and economy specifically regarding the depreciation of the value of the Tanzanian currency (CPJ 2019).

Moreover, it was not only that the views of most of the population were given the lowest priority in news on development issues but particularly the views of women, as presented in the next section.

6.1.5 Males and Females as News Sources

This study has revealed that very few women were selected as news sources to provide views on social, economic and politics problems affecting the quality of life of many Tanzanians reported in the 10,371 news stories examined in this study, as shown in Table 17.

Table 17: Female and Male News Sources on Development Issues

The media	Total	Female	Percent	Male	Percent
Uhuru	1072	219	20.4%	853	79.6%
Nipashe	1427	234	16.4%	1193	83.6%
Mwananchi	1444	270	18.7%	1174	81.3%
Mtanzania	913	146	16.0%	767	84.0%
Majira	1500	273	18.2%	1227	81.8%
Jambo Leo	983	176	17.9%	807	82.1%
Habari Leo	1445	246	17.0%	1199	83.0%
Tanzania Daima	910	163	17.9%	747	82.1%
The Guardian	781	145	18.6%	636	81.4%
Daily News	1386	343	24.7%	1043	75.3%
The Citizen	961	156	16.2%	805	83.8%
Subtotal of sources in newspapers' news	12822	2371	18.5%	10451	81.5%
Radio One Stereo	135	17	12.6%	118	87.4%
TBC Taifa	433	68	15.7%	365	84.3%
Sub-total of sources in radio news bulletins	568	85	15.0%	483	85.0%
ITV television	832	122	14.7%	710	85.3%
TBC1 television	433	68	15.7%	365	84.3%
Subtotal gender in television bulletins	1265	190	15.0%	1075	85.0%
Total people in the media news	14,655	2,646	18.1%	12,009	81.9%

A key observation from the data in Table 17 is that males dominate as news sources on development issues. On average, in the 10,371 news stories female sources constituted 18 percent of the 14,655 people whose views were selected and included in these stories. The implication is that the 10,371 news stories included a disproportionately low number of views of women on the national development agenda. Yet, women constitute more than 51 percent of the Tanzanian population (URT 2014).

However, the findings are not much different from other countries around the world. For example, a study was conducted in the United States in 1987 where 'of roughly 50 percent of the sources who were identifiable by sex, barely 10 percent were women' (Brown et al. 1987: :50). Similarly, in contemporary times, a study conducted by the Global Media Monitoring Project in 2015, involving 114 countries, including Tanzania, found that, on average, female news sources made up only 24 percent of the total (Grimley 2015; Macharia 2015).

Further, apart from a single newspaper, the Daily News, in which female news sources were slightly above 24 percent and the Uhuru newspaper with around 20 percent, for the rest of the eleven daily newspapers, female sources were below 20 percent of the total. The implication is that, on average, the 9,607 news stories on development themes (81.5%) largely discussed political, social and economic challenges from the male perspectives.

On the other hand, news reported in broadcast media had the lowest number of female news sources compared to the rest of the 15 media channels. Radio One selected less female news sources in their news on development topics aired at prime-time 8 o'clock in the evening than any of the other broadcast media (two radio and two television channels of national status) involved in this inquiry. Out of 135 people quoted in 110 news stories, 17 (12.6%) were females. This suggests that Radio One news bulletins at 8 o'clock include very few women's voices in the news that focused on the development agenda of the average Tanzanian. Yet, radio is still the most reliable media channel to reach out to rural communities where many Tanzanian women and men live. A few years ago, Tanzania's state-run radio network (RTD, now TBC Taifa) was the only medium disseminating information on development issues in up-country rural areas (Bello and Wilkinson 2017).

Why is the media news reporting on development issues dominated by mainly male government affiliates? The next subsection presents the media stakeholders' accounts focusing on this question.

6.2 The Media Stakeholders' Views on News Sources

As shown in Table 15, government news sources constituted the biggest proportion of people who provided views which journalists selected and used to construct the 10,371 news stories examined in this study. This section reflects on the views of media stakeholders as to why government affiliated news sources dominated the news stories that were examined. This section discusses four themes emerging from the media stakeholders' accounts as to why the media gave priority to the views of government-related officials in their news on development issues. The section is divided into six parts. Part 6.2.1 presents views suggesting that patterns of media ownership influence news sources. Part 6.2.2 suggests that political interference

contributes to the media's failure to report news on development issues from the views of ordinary citizens. Part 6.2.3 reflects on the argument that, because government is the key implementer of national development projects, the media cannot avoid including views of government officials in the news. Part 6.2.4 discusses views that some media professionals often select government officials as news sources to fulfil their own interests in being appointed to political posts. Part 6.2.5 presents the theme suggesting that the media have an intricate relationship with government agencies as the latter is the key source of the former's revenues. Then Part 6.2.6 presents the views of media stakeholders as to why the number of female news sources is very low in the 10,371 news stories examined.

6.2.1 Media Ownership

Differences in ownership of media enterprises shape news coverage on development issues. Reporters and editors from both privately and publicly owned media (newspapers, television and radio channels) noted that media ownership influences the types of news sources. However, it seems that privately owned media were significantly more likely to report news from diverse news sources than their state-owned counterparts. This is what the narration of this reporter reveals:

I have worked with both private- and state-owned newspapers. When I was working with the Daily News most news sources for the stories I would be assigned to cover were largely government-related officials. In the private newspaper I am working for now, I would say, somehow, the focus on government news sources is not so high. Also, I am free to report diverse issues involving even news sources which are critical to government (MI, #22, 2014).

This view was corroborated by viewpoints provided by some editors and reporters from state-owned newspapers, radio and television channels who indicated that news sources that were affiliated to state agencies were given priority in their news on development issues. The excerpt from the interview transcript of this editor exemplifies such views. It reads:

To us our key stories of the day depend on the big activities that involve top government leaders. For example, if the President is inaugurating an important national development project, such a story is given high priority unless something else occurs that is disastrous or more important. What I want to say is that most of our key focus is on government activities and as such news sources are mostly government affiliates as our media is state-owned (MI, #33, 2014).

Similarly, one reporter from state-owned radio noted that news sources for the news aired in their radio bulletins are carefully selected. The reporter said:

I remember an incidence whereby I wrote a news story from a press conference called by the Legal and Human Rights Centre on Human Rights Violation. Our shift editor spiked the story and I was not told the reason (MI, #19, 2014).

However, when it comes to the issue of financial interests affecting the owners of private media, news sources whose views in the news story may jeopardise financial interests or relationships with a business acquaintance cannot be published. One reporter narrated a case where a story in which one of their newspapers' reporters had written about a privately owned factory in a residential area emitting pollution, was killed after the newspaper owner intervened because they were business friends with the owner of the accused firm. The editor said:

Our reporter had been tipped off by a resident from the area where the factory was located. I assisted the reporter on techniques of getting information to write a good piece of story based on the reporter's own observations, views gathered from residents in the area who experienced the bad smell, the councillor of the area and the area's local government leader. However, I did not know how our newspaper owner got information that the reporter had pursued the story...I was surprised to receive a phone call from him and he directed me not to publish the story. The reporter sent the story to another newspaper but the editor of that newspaper said he would not publish the story until their newspaper did its own investigation. The feedback my reporter got was that the other newspaper's reporter, who was sent out three days later, could not detect any awful smell in the area. Our reporter also went there a few days later and could not detect the awful smell as was the case before. It seems the owner of the factory decided to stop production of materials which were emitting a bad smell after sensing that the media was going to publish the story (MI, #9, 2014).

Moreover, many editors from all types of media noted that sources used in the news depend on events of the day and issues that require follow-up. This view is well captured in the narration of this editor who said:

Usually in the mornings when we hold a post-mortem meeting...we go through the stories published in our newspaper to check if there is a story that needs a follow-up. In case there is such a story, we brainstorm who could be the best sources for the story. If it is a story that requires government response we identify possible appropriate government sources. Similarly, if it is a story related to politics we identify appropriate politicians to be interviewed. Likewise, if it is a story involving issues related to faith, business or anything, what we do is to ensure we help reporters to get tips of news sources based on a story that requires being reported. After finishing with follow-up stories we look into the news diary for the news events of the day,

such as press conferences, workshops, seminars or meetings and we send reporters to those events (MI, #7, 2014).

The next subsection looks at the views which argue that selection of news sources on development issues were influenced by political interference due to unfriendly media laws.

6.2.2 Political Interference Due to Restrictive Media Laws

One theme that emerged from stakeholders' views about the ruling elite dominance in news sources on development topics suggests that the media failed to source news on development topics from the citizens because of political interference. One newspaper reporter cited an incident whereby a group of police officers in Dar es Salaam was accused of killing a businessman but political interference killed the story. The reporter recalled:

My news editor told me that if we continue pursuing the story both of us (I and he) were at risk of losing our jobs and our newspaper being suspended because the Minister for Home Affairs, Mr ... had contacted our investor (the media owner) and said the story was risking the Minister's political career (MI, #9, 2014).

The reporter said the initial story that their newspaper had published showed that a group of police invaded the deceased businessman's house in the Kurasini area, in Dar es Salaam, during the daytime and brutally beat the man while demanding money from him. Then the police put the man into the police car and drove him away and it seems afterwards the businessman died or the police killed him to destroy evidence. The reporter further said:

Luckily, while the police were inside the house, one of the businessman's children came back from school and from outside the house witnessed what the police were doing. When the businessman's wife came back home a while later, the child explained to her what had happened. The women informed the relatives who went to the police station looking for their relative but did not find him (MI, #9, 2014).

According to the reporter, the following day the businessman's relatives went to Oysterbay police in Kinondoni district but did not get any information from the police desk about the whereabouts of their relative. The reporter continued:

At this point the deceased's relatives demanded to see the officer in charge of the police station but, while in the corridor heading to his office, a police officer told them that their relative had died and the body was in Mwananyamala hospital. I investigated the story and established that the report at Oysterbay

police station said that the man was killed by a mob of angry citizens (*wananchi*) while the report at the Mwananyamala hospital said his body was found off the Indian Ocean (MI, #9, 2014).

A key conclusion emerging from the narration of this reporter suggests that because of the media's lack of independence, the citizens' voice that would expose police misconduct was denied opportunity in the news. As a result, an investigation and news reporting on an alleged crime by police against citizens was blocked for good.

Another example showing political interference in the media in relation to news stories on development subjects, in which the media selected ordinary citizens as key news sources, cited dismissal of a newspaper reporter after reporting a story of views of citizens about claims of wrongdoings of a presidential aspirant. The editor of the newspaper went on to narrate the incidence:

We got the hint of our story from African Analysis which was published in the UK. I guided and encouraged my reporter...to pursue the story giving it a local angle and specifically interviewing a wide range of citizens from Dar es Salaam and in up-country regions. I gave the reporter the contacts of the government leader. In the first interaction with the reporter, the leader was furious but half an hour after the interview, he called our newsroom back, demanding to talk to the news editor. I received his call but I refused to talk to him and put him through to the same reporter he had spoken to before to listen to him. My reporter said this time round the government leader was calm and appealed to us not to publish the story claiming that the issue was the work of his political opponent...I directed my reporter to include what the government leader said in response to the issue in the news and how he reacted differently to the issue. Then, we published that story. On reading the news it seems he was very much annoyed... My reporter and I did not know what went on between the government leader and our bosses but I was surprised to learn that my reporter had been dismissed...I believe the government leader pressurised our bosses or...you know, politicians (MI, #23, 2014).

Another account cited a case whereby a newspaper that had become popular because of reporting news stories that used citizens as news sources to expose corruption suddenly ceased circulation after the owner was threatened by high-profile state leaders. This reporter explained what had happened following the owner's order for the newspaper editorial team to stop the investigative reporting:

Our editor told us that the owner wanted us to reduce our investigative reporting because the government was on his back. From that day, what followed if you had been assigned an investigative story, before you started working on it you would be surprised to receive a call from a source (accused

of wrongdoing) whom you intended to interview and would threaten you... telling you not to do the story...otherwise you risk your life. You wonder how the news source knew about the story you are doing ... Therefore, the newspaper died as it could not raise funds to pay its slim editorial team (MI, #38, 2014).

Further interaction with research media insiders confirmed that media owners were often troubled by the ruling elite over what their news on development matters reported. One media owner provided an example:

I remember one time I received a call from a top-level official from... who asked me: 'What is your media up to? All the time your reporter focuses on news about citizens complaining this and that against government performance. Does it mean there is no other issue to be reported?' So, you see, you want your media to give citizens' views on an issue but such kind of reaction from leaders is a challenge (MI, #7, 2014).

Further, the owner explained why the reporters can construct stories from citizens' news sources:

...I leave my editors and reporters to do their job ... make decisions based on their profession...What I do is to remind them to put the public interest first... However, this does not mean that they do not make mistakes (MI, #7, 2014).

An interpretation of the accounts of reporters and the media owner suggests that in Tanzania, as much as media professionals and media owners were committed to use ordinary citizens as news sources, elite interference limits them. This view is corroborated by the observation that:

Given the competing interests that must be satisfied in the day-to-day production of news, it seems reasonable to expect that elites, who have a vested interest in the preservation of things as they are, will dominate news coverage (Brown et al. 1987: 46).

The next subsection looks at the theme suggesting that the media largely constructed news on development topics from government sources because government is the key implementer of national development projects.

6.2.3 Government – the Key Implementer of National Development Projects

Editors and reporters said it would be professionally unethical for the media to publish a news piece on development issues related to the government projects without including the views of the responsible government ministries, departments or

state agencies. This assertion is exemplified in narration provided by this editor who argued:

... if you want to write a news story about shortage of water in an area (Mtaa) in Dar es Salaam city, that news will require collecting data from amongst other sources, the government sources dealing with water issues in the area to understand the root cause of that problem (MI, #21, 2014).

This argument is corroborated by the explanation provided by reporters who shared their experiences about news sources. For example, an extract from the interview transcript of one reporter had this narrative:

I do not remember having reported a story, be it about water, food, environment, health, roads and the like, without including government officials in my sources, whether at village, district, region or national level. Even for a feature article on HIV and AIDS, which I finished last night, amongst my news sources were government officials (MI, #6, 2014).

This review is corroborated by findings of the study conducted in America in 1987 which noted that:

Elite sources make certain useful information easily available to reporters (they provide 'information subsidies') to ensure that the information is consumed by target audiences – audiences capable of affecting the normal policy agendas of government and other institutions such as business or education. By controlling the information available to these target audiences, sources are able to define decision-making options and, ultimately, to control the decision-making process (Brown et al. 1987: 46).

However, one editor who had long-term experience of working with both privately owned and state-owned media said most stories on development issues for which their sources were government officials tended to be uncritical of wrongdoings involving public leaders, as implied in the following statement:

When I was recruited to work on a government-owned newspaper I had to change my mindset and style of reporting on issues that involved government to ensure my reporting did not contradict government interests (MI, #4, 2014).

Moreover, some editors and reporters noted that the history of media has contributed to the way the media in contemporary Tanzania cover news on development issues.

One editor, who had worked with the press for more than 30 years, noted that:

If you go back to our history...press was used as the mouthpiece of state administrators. In most cases they reported what state leaders wanted to communicate to the public. So, we cannot expect much in the contemporary period (MI, #36, 2014).

But some editors seemed to believe that media news coverage on development topics is problematic because training institutions in the country are not doing their job well. They argued that training offered in journalism institutions does not equip students with the required skills to cover news on development issues intelligently.

The editor argued as follows:

The media industry in this country has grown very fast but it seems training institutions do not produce professionals who can deliver what media markets require (MI, #18, 2014).

Therefore, it can be argued that although government sectors are the key sources of news on development issues, there is a need to build on the capacity of journalists.

However, media professionals too have to take a share of the blame for elite dominance of news sources on development topics. Media stakeholders' accounts show that some media professionals focus on government news sources to fulfil their personal agenda, as discussed in the next subsection.

6.2.4 Media Professionals Desire to be Presidentially Appointed to Political Posts

One theme that emerged in the interviews with media professionals suggests that, in contemporary multi-party politics in Tanzania, some people join the media sector to use it as a platform to attain their desired ambition. A long-serving editor argued that working in the media can provide someone with an opportunity to rub shoulders with the high-level politicians and governing elites. Those interested in joining the ruling and governing elite use the opportunity to find their way to high-level posts obtained through presidential or ministerial appointment. The argument is captured in this editor's narrative which says:

These days the media has been invaded by people whose motivation is not to use the media to ensure the government of the day and other development stakeholders work hard to improve the lives of citizens, but rather to seek to join political elites...who are 'eating the country' (*kutafuna nchi*). What I can say here is that some reporters, editors and programme producers are not in the media because they are concerned with the poor living conditions of the majority of citizens; they want to use the media to achieve personal ambitions because they have seen others who have done so and succeeded (MI, #14, 2014).

This statement is confirmed by the fact that, since multi-party politics was introduced in Tanzania in 1992, it has become a trend that every election cycle, journalists who supported the presidential winner have been awarded presidentially appointed political posts.

For example, during President Jakaya Kikwete's tenure (2005–2015), several male and female media professionals were appointed District Commissioners (DC) and one female journalist became a Regional Commissioner (RC). Others were appointed as Press Secretaries to the President's office and the Prime Minister's office. Some of those journalists who benefited from presidential appointments were TAMWA members. They were District Commissioners (DCs) Elizabeth Mkwasa, Jaqueline Liana and the late Sara Dumba, while Fatma Mwassa was appointed Regional Commissioner (RC) and Irene Bwire became Deputy Press Secretary to the Prime Minister's office and Penzi Nyamungumi Press Secretary to the Vice-President's office. The men who benefited from political appointments under President Kikwete's tenure were Salva Rweyemamu, appointed to head the Directorate of the State House Communications and Shaaban Kisu, Selemani Mzee and the late Muhingo Rweyemamu were appointed DCs.

However, it is not uncommon for journalists to cross over into politics although the modalities used may not be similar. For example, in the UK, two well-known Conservative politicians, Michael Gove and Boris Johnson, started out as journalists. Boris Johnson was a former journalist with the Times before he became correspondent for the Daily Telegraph (Telegraph Media Group Limited 2018). Theresa May, the second female Prime Minister in Britain, appointed Boris Johnson as Britain's Foreign Secretary on July 13, 2016 (Kuenssberg 2016). Two years later, on July 9, 2018, Johnson resigned and one critic argued that he was a frustrating figure that, at a time of unprecedented challenge for UK foreign policy, 'could not apply himself with any consistency or purpose to any task' (Wintour 2018). Before crossing over into politics, Johnson had become the editor for the Spectator magazine before standing as an MP, winning the Henley seat between 2001 and 2008, and then becoming MP for Uxbridge and South Ruislip in 2015 (Telegraph Media Group Limited 2018).

Meanwhile, Michael Gove had a career as a journalist before becoming a Member of Parliament (MP) for Surrey Heath in 2015 (Telegraph Media Group Limited 2018). Then he became Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor in David Cameron's new Cabinet (ibid.).

However, the argument does not mean that journalists have no right to become politicians. The argument is that someone joining the media and using it to pursue a personal political agenda and specifically to push for presidentially appointed posts, has far-reaching consequences for the media's role in national development. This is because journalists with such prospects of being appointed to high-profile government jobs cannot be critical of government wrongdoings for fear of jeopardising their future careers.

This view was corroborated by the views provided by one editor who argued that news stories that government officials released to the media would always safeguard the interests of the elite group. The editor argued:

News which any government leader will be willing to give should be a public relations sort of you know...what government has achieved, what government intends to do, but not showing where the government has done wrong and failed to deliver social services (MI, #23, 2014).

The argument was further supported by narrative provided by a reporter who claimed to have experienced difficulties in getting information from a government institution. The reporter narrated the experience:

There was a story I was following at the port in relation to some people smuggling containers without paying taxes. Several port officials I contacted would not provide the information. So, to get my story I decided to go to the port during the day for several days and hide in an old abandoned container... and observe ... It was such a risky undertaking but I got the story. When we published, the government investigated and several port officials were suspended and others sacked (MI, #28, 2014).

Moreover, some views on this theme suggest that some newsrooms orient their reporters to understand that government is the key news source on development issues. One reporter remembered that, after being recruited as a reporter, in a newspaper newsroom, the advice from the news editor was to ensure the news

reporter established as many sources as possible, especially government ministries and social organisations. The reporter said the editor hinted:

A good journalist has a data bank of news sources...you are assigned to do a story, very easily you get a good story if you have a wide range of credible sources in government offices at different levels and other social institutions (MI, #42, 2014).

Another factor which influences the media to cover news on development issues in such a way that sources from government circles dominate the news is media dependency on government advertisements as a key source of revenue.

6.2.5 Financial Relationship Between Media and Government Affiliates

Several editors interviewed argued that the media were bound to publish news that promoted what government officials say on the development agenda because the media's main source of income was adverts sponsored by the government. They said that generally between 70 to 80 percent of the newspapers' income originated from government-sponsored adverts while newspaper sales account for 30 percent. However, this has negative implications because media independence is curtailed. For example, one editor of a private newspaper said that because of a fear of losing money from government adverts, their newspaper often avoided reporting news on scandals related to the ministries which advertise with their newspaper. The editor exemplified:

Many times, our newspaper does not report small scandals involving government ministries which give us adverts worth big money (MI, #19, 2014).

However, the editor said there was a big scandal in one ministry which advertised with their newspaper but they were compelled to report the scandal to avoid losing credibility from the public because many other newspapers were covering the scandal. He revealed:

The Ministry of Minerals advertises with us but when the IPTL scandal came up, our Board met, discussed it and said no...no...no...this is a big scandal...we will publish the story because the public will not understand us if we keep quiet. They threatened us but we continued...yah? ...So, what I am saying, money from the government adverts make us turn a blind eye to small scandals in the government sectors but big scandal, no way; we sacrifice the money (MI, #19, 2014).

The above assertion suggests that regardless of financial gains from government adverts, the press could do a lot to report scandals that undermine national development.

However, in so doing the government may decide to suffocate the media by withholding advertising revenue in case the media report anything the government would not like to be known to the public. As this newspaper owner narrated:

There was a time we could not pay salaries for almost three months because advertisers owed us millions of shillings and had delayed the payment for several months (MI, #4, 2016).

Another editor added:

Our company has had a problem of failing to pay its staff on time. Sometimes staff can go without salary for two months. We depend largely on adverts from the government. We can pay salaries after adverts are paid for. Therefore, the issue of salary is like the water on the seashore – sometimes it is dry and sometimes it is full of water (in Kiswahili: *ni kama maji kupwa na kujaa, mara yanajaa mara yanakupwa*). This is the trend, what can we do? We have to go with the reality (MI, #7, 2014).

But the media not only avoid exposing ill practices of government ministries, departments and agencies that advertise with the media, but also social institutions and businesses which in one way or another contribute to media revenue.

This editor provided an example of such institutions. In Kiswahili, the editor's account reads:

...sasa hivi magazeti mengi hayawezi kuandika vibaya Vodacom, hayawezi kuandika Airtel, hayawezi kuandika TRA simply because ndiyo wanaoendesha bajeti za newsroom. Matangazo yakiondoka shiiiiiiiiii newsrooms zote zinacollapse hapa nchini (MI, #36, 2018).

In English, a literal translation of the statement reads:

[...currently many newspapers cannot report bad stories involving Vodacom, Airtel, TRA simply because these institutions finance the newsrooms' budgets of newspapers. Without adverts shiiiiiiiiii all newsrooms in the country will collapse.]

The accounts generated from editors' interviews suggest that the media news coverage promotes the voice of government and social institutions because of financial relationships.

The next subsection examines media stakeholders' accounts in relation to gender disparity in news on development topics.

6.2.6 Huge Disparity in Number of Males and Females Quoted in the News

As shown in Table 17, male news sources in 10,371 news stories on development issues numbered four times as many as female sources. This means that reporting of women's views on development issues in these news stories was very weak. The findings confirm gender theory which observes that the social construction of unequal gender relations in society leads to men being considered superior and women inferior (Butler 1990).

However, the media in Tanzania claim to promote development including gender equality. Therefore, it is important to examine what media stakeholders say about the representation of men's and women's views on development issues reported in the examined news stories. This is important because political scientists argue that the higher the number of women at decision-making levels the more consideration is given to issues affecting women directly (Phillips 2013).

This thesis discusses two themes that emerged from media stakeholders' accounts about the huge disparity of the number of men and women selected as news sources for the 10,371 news stories. Subsection 6.2.6.1 presents accounts suggesting that women at decision-making levels fear the media. Subsection 6.2.6.2 discusses a theme focusing on gender policy to guide and hold editors and reporters accountable for sourcing news on the development agenda equally from both women and men.

6.2.6.1 Women in Political Decision-Making Positions Fear Media

Representatives of key social institutions using media to push for their development agenda blamed the media for focusing on news that portrays what men say on development issues while giving women very little opportunity to contribute to debate on national development policies. One respondent specifically argued that reporters covering Parliamentary sessions give more attention to male Parliamentarians' voices. The respondent presented the argument as follows:

Just watch TV news from the Parliament. A story comes... a man speaks another, another and another... Then a woman MP ... (MO, #3, 2014).

However, it is misleading to blame the media for giving male voices on development matters more opportunity in the news than women while the number of women in the Tanzanian Parliament is much less than men. By 2016, women in the Tanzanian Parliament made up one third of the total (African leadership magazine 2016).

Moreover, when it comes to female leaders in political posts they have a lot of skill gaps, including media literacy, hence, they are scared to speak out. A female MP confirmed this as she said:

Almost the whole of the first year in the Parliament in 2010, I did not contribute publicly in the general assembly because I was afraid of the media. You know the media can decide to leave out pertinent development issues you may raise and capitalise on your mistakes and this can have a negative impact on you as an MP and your political party as well (MO, #7, 2014).

The statement above could also mean that, in general, women in political leadership fear being quoted in the media. Yet in the context of the African culture of 'big man' politics, it is not only women who fear being quoted making open criticisms on the performance of the top 'big men' in society. For example, one reporter argued that if an issue emerged in Parliament requiring MPs to criticise the government executive, which is headed by the President, in most cases, both male and female Parliamentarians from the ruling party tend to avoid their voice being heard because they might be construed as being critical of the big man in their party. The reporter's argument is captured in this statement:

It may happen that an MP from the opposition camp discusses an issue in the Parliament exposing wrongdoings of government executives and as a reporter you want to come up with your exclusive news ...you know... a well-balanced piece with news containing views of diverse MPs. Then you may plan to do interviews to include in your news views of female and male MPs from both the ruling party and the opposition political parties. My experience...I tell you, it will be easy to get the views of male and female MPs from the opposition camp and probably very few male MPs from the ruling party but it will be very difficult to get viewpoints of female MPs from the ruling party (MI, #8, 2014).

Therefore, it can be concluded that some Parliamentarians are wary of commenting on development subjects because of political dynamics which favour male leaders.

The next theme to emerge from the media stakeholders' accounts regarding women's voices in the news on development agenda is gender policy.

6.2.6.2 The Media Lack Strategy in Reporting on Development Issues

Some media outsiders noted that there were strategies which the media could use to ensure development discourses that were reported in the media were from diverse social groups. One of the strategies mentioned was guidelines or policy on the selection of news sources on development matters. All the reporters interviewed indicated that their respective media institutions had no guidelines requiring reporters to include views of both women and men when constructing stories on development topics. As a result, it was not mandatory for reporters and editors to include women's viewpoints in the news. This deficiency is noted by this reporter who said:

I have worked as a reporter with this newspaper for some years and my editor often provides me with tips on the news sources, but the majority are males who have a social status ... government officials, politicians, leaders of NGOs, religious leaders etc... Sometimes I decide to include the views of ordinary people – men and women – in my story but usually their views will be chopped off or put last after the views of big shots (MI, #12, 2014).

One representative of social institutions explained the usefulness of gender policy in news reporting:

Although currently there have been some changes, our society is still largely patriarchal; it favours interests of males more than those of females. The media can play a crucial role in changing society if, for example, they put in place policies compelling reporters to include views of women and men in each news item they report on development matters (MO, #5, 2014).

However, because it was not a requirement for reporters to use diversified views on the development agenda, the implication was that news items on issues that affect women were often published as feature articles and/or very brief hard news.

A female reporter was emphatic about the way that media decision makers treat news on development issues constructed from discourse gathered from women. The reporter provided this lived experience:

I have noted that our news editor assigns stories which involve interviewing women to reporters who are good at feature writing and mostly women. When they bring in their stories they are sometimes told to write short hard news out

of it and directed to develop feature articles. Oooh...I am saying this because I have been assigned several such news stories which ended up being published as feature articles (MI, #4, 2014).

The representative from social institutions provided an insight into how the media could strengthen the voice of women and the general citizenry in the news on the development agenda:

Today we have mobile phones, transport in the cities and towns are better compared to 20 years back. Many ordinary women and men engage in different economic development activities... but the media style of reporting news has remained almost the same...the 'big men' news... big names news...politics news. News that can help ordinary people, especially women, to access information to engage in economic activities that can transform their lives is rarely published in the media. This is how the media reinforces patriarchy. This is how the media fail to contribute to the development of most Tanzanians. If you do not believe this, buy two or three of today's newspapers, read news stories published in there, you will understand what I am saying (MO, #5, 2014).

This view is corroborated by De Silva and Zainudeen (2007), cited in (Mpogele et al. 2008: 62), who noted that although 'mobile phones cannot offer a panacea for all development problems, it has been argued that there is ample evidence that, used in the right way and for the right purpose, mobile phones can have a significant outcome in addressing specific social and economic developmental goals as well as play a key role in broader national development strategies'. However, this view is contested, because as much as many people could have access to mobile phones, reaching out to most women living in rural areas through mobile phones can still be a challenge. This is because 'the majority of mobile phone owners and users do own/use mobile phones for mainly maintaining relationships and not for economic or business purposes' (Mpogele et al. 2008: 70).

6.3 Conclusion

This chapter presented and discussed the findings about news sources for the 10,371 news stories on social, economic and politics issues used as the sample in this study. The stories were reported in 15 Tanzanian media channels of national status on 28 consecutive days. The findings reveal that newspapers, radio and television in Tanzania largely gather news on social, economic and politics issues from government affiliated news sources. The findings show that about 57 percent of news sources of 10,371 stories examined were government officials. This is a clear

indication that Tanzania's media construct news stories on the development agenda from the perspectives of politicians in state power.

The media stakeholders provided contested views in relation to news sources. For example, one view argued that Tanzania's news sources on development issues are influenced by the media patterns of ownership as most of the media established after plural media were allowed in 1992 are owned by people with connections in state power. This view supports the theory provided in Chapter Two which suggests that media freedom in sub-Saharan Africa is influenced by ownership. However, another view from the findings suggests that media professionals' personal interests also lead to pro-government bias in collecting views used to construct the examined news on social, economic and politics matters in the country.

This chapter presented findings which show that dominant news sources in 10,371 news stories were affiliates of the governing and ruling elite. This group control the media autonomy in two ways. They own some media and finance media owned by non-state actors. Hence, directly and indirectly, the state power elite dictate what the media in general can and cannot cover. Moreover, they use cohesive instruments, including police and stringent laws, to control independent media that strive to report development issues from citizens' views that could expose state leaders' wrongdoings which undermine the wellbeing of the majority population. Chapter Seven will discuss the findings on analysis of information constructed and framed in the 36 emblematic lead stories published in eleven daily newspapers.

Chapter Seven: Lead Stories on Development Issues

7.0 Introduction

This chapter examines development issues reported in 36 emblematic news items published by Tanzanian media as lead stories. The aim is to answer the question: How do Tanzanian media interpret news on development issues? Answering this question is important because the way media professionals construe and frame news on development issues helps audiences to get a better understanding of the issues reported. As discussed in Chapter Two, framing information makes it noticeable, meaningful and memorable to the audience (Entman 1993). Importantly, media framing of information on development issues concerning the general population is vital as it can 'call governments to account' (UNDP 2016: 17).

The 36 emblematic news items were selected from 307 news items published as front-page lead stories in eleven newspapers on 28 consecutive days. As discussed in Chapter Four, the key criteria used to select a news story as an emblematic case for analysis was that it must have been published by more than one daily newspaper on the same day. In the process of analysis, the lead stories are organised in three themes: politics, economic and social.

Twenty-two news items on politics qualified for the analysis. They included eleven that reported on 201 individuals of the presidentially appointed category of Constituent Assembly (CA) members. The 201 individuals joined 359 Members of Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania and 80 members of the Zanzibar House of Representatives to form the 640 CA members mandated to produce the country's new constitution based on the popular draft constitution prepared from the views gathered from various individuals and groups across the country. Seven politics news sources reported claims of the increase of CA members' daily expenses of TZS 300,000 (£107) and four covered results of the re-run of councillors' elections in 27 wards.

Three economic news items qualified for the analysis. These stories reported the issue of a network of wildlife poachers which the Tanzanian government claimed it had identified. On the other hand, eleven news items on social matters met the

criteria of which eight reported about the 2013 Form Four national examination results and three covered a scandal relating to a fake antiretroviral drug.

This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 7.1 examines information framed in the 22 politics stories, while section 7.2 scrutinises three lead stories which reported one economic issue. Section 7.3 discusses information given prominence in eleven lead stories on social issues. Section 7.4 draws conclusions.

7.1 Information in Lead News Stories on Politics Issues

This section analyses information framed in 22 news items that reported three different politics issues published as daily newspapers' front-page lead stories. As shown in Table 14 in Chapter Five, the 411 news stories out of 10,371 news items examined in this study were given prominence as lead stories. Most of the 411 lead stories reported politics discourses, and the majority of them (307 or 75%) were covered in the eleven newspapers. News on politics issues constituted 201 (65.4%) out of 302 lead stories that the newspapers reported. However, only 36 news items on political subjects qualified as emblematic for analysis in this thesis. They included eleven which reported on the 201 presidentially appointed Constituent Assembly (CA) members category. The popular constitution was to be written based on the popular draft constitution that had been prepared from the views of the diverse groups in the country, including ordinary citizens. Seven politics news stories focused on the CA members' daily expenses saga, while four reported preliminary results of the re-run of elections for councillors in 27 wards. What information was given prominence in the news stories' headlines? Whose interests did the information promote? The next subsection looks at these questions in more detail.

7.1.1 Lead Stories on the 201 Constituent Assembly Members Category

This subsection examines news on the presidentially appointed CA members category published as front-page lead stories in eleven newspapers. It argues that information selected as the news headlines does not reflect important information for accountability included in the news. The information given prominence in the headlines did not mention the unrepresentativeness of the 201 CA members category in the CA in writing a popular constitution. The news on the Constituent Assembly was published on February 8, 2014 and the headlines are as shown in Figure

Figure 4: Headlines of the 201 Constituent Assembly Members Category



Sources: Fieldwork 2014

What information was framed in the stories, including in the headlines?

7.1.1.1 Information in the 201 Constituent Assembly Members Category

As shown in Figure 4, the information framed in the key headlines of seven out of the eleven newspapers (63.6%) suggests that the 201 individuals were the only CA members. Yet, the reality was that the CA constituted the 201 presidentially appointed individuals, the 359 MPs of the United Republic of Tanzania and the 80 members of the Zanzibar House of Representatives. The key headlines in the eight newspapers read as follows: Daily News – ‘Constituent Assembly named’ (Kapama 2014a); Habari Leo – ‘Bunge la katiba hili’ (Here is the Constituent Assembly) (Nsanzugwanko 2014a); Mtanzania – ‘Wajue wabunge Bunge la katiba’ (Know the Constituent Assembly members) (Mossi 2014b); Tanzania Daima – ‘Wabunge Bunge la Katiba hawa hapa’ (Here are the Constituent Assembly members) (Vullu 2014); Majira – ‘Wabunge Bunge la Katiba watajwa’ (Constituent Assembly members named) (Hongo 2014); Nipashe – ‘Bunge la Katiba’ (Constituent Assembly) (Mwanakatwe 2014); and Uhuru – ‘Katiba mpya’ (New Constitution) (Uhuru 2014a).

The information framed in the headlines suggests that many journalists in Tanzania have no/or very little knowledge of the political matters of their country. This confirms the argument put forward in Chapter Two that many African media professionals lack the skills of reporting politics, social and economic matters (Uche 1991). Yet, this weakness has implications as it could weaken the understanding of the citizenry on

political matters. As Johanna Martinsson argues, 'lack of media literacy prevents the audience from acquiring an adequate understanding of how current affairs affect their lives and, therefore, diminish their political authority' (Martinsson 2009: 4).

Only information framed in The Guardian newspaper's key headline indicated that the 201 people were part of a bigger team which constituted the CA. The Guardian's main headline reads: 'Countdown to historic convention: Members joining the big team' (The Guardian 2014). On the other hand, The Citizen and Mwananchi newspapers' key headlines were ambiguous. Mwananchi's headline reads: 'Yametimia' (Accomplished) (Butahe 2014), while The Citizen's says: 'Make or Break Team' (Mbashiru 2014). Nonetheless, the subheadline of The Citizen indicated that 201 individuals, together with 357 MPs and 80 members of the House of Representatives from Zanzibar established the eagerly awaited Constituent Assembly to kick-start the home straight for the envisaged new constitution (ibid.).

Meanwhile, the Jambo Leo newspaper in its key headline postulated a crisis in the CA. The headline reads: 'Mtikisiko Bunge la Katiba' (Crisis in the Constituent Assembly) (Mgonja 2014). The paper also published photos of high-level politicians from the ruling party, CCM, and the opposition parties whose names were in the list of 201 CA members.

However, the news published in all eleven newspapers as front-page lead stories was not analytical in the representativeness of the presidentially appointed names. The story was sourced from a single person, a government official, the Deputy Chief Secretary, Dr Florence Turuka, in Dar es Salaam and it reproduced what the source said without interpretation. Firstly, the lead stories reproduced information saying that the President carefully appointed individuals in the 201 CA members category to, amongst others, consider Zanzibar and mainland representation. However, the newspapers reported this information without fact-checking it.

As a result, two weeks later it was learned that what the State House Official had said about the criteria the President had followed in appointing the 201 CA members was not all factual. For example, the official said that amongst the criteria the President applied in appointing the 201 CA members, was ensuring that both sides of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) were represented in the CA. The URT consists of the area officially known as Tanganyika (the Tanzanian mainland) and

Zanzibar. But the President’s nomination of representatives of some political parties did not in fact consider such representation. For example, the National League for Democracy (NLD) did not have representatives from Zanzibar. Yet, the party had two representatives appointed from the mainland who were spouses: the NLD chairman Dr Emmanuel Makaidi and his wife Modesta Ponera. The Mwananchi newspaper reported the controversy surrounding the NLD party’s representation on February 20, 2014 with the headline ‘*Mume na mke wazua balaa Bunge la Katiba*’, meaning ‘spouses cause uproar in Constituent Assembly’ (Mwinyi Sadallah 2014) (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: News Revealing Spouses Appointed CA Members



Source: Fieldwork 2014

Secondly, stories in all the eleven newspapers itemised names included in the list of 201 presidentially appointed CA members category while indicating which social group each presidentially appointed CA member represented, as shown in Figure 6.

Vuai Ali Vuai, Elizabeth Minde, Dr Zainab Amir Gama, Evod Mmanda, Dr Ave Maria Emmilius Semakafu, Paul Makonda and Professor Costa Mahalu. Jambo Leo, Nipashe, Uhuru Majira, Tanzania Daima, Mtanzania, The Guardian and the Daily News published pictures of these high-profile politicians associated with the ruling elite on their front pages. The analysis was crucial because the ruling party, CCM, had publicly opposed the popular draft constitution (Forum' 2013). Therefore, it would be a miracle for President Kikwete, who was also the CCM Chairman, to nominate individuals without taking into consideration that his party was not in favour of the popular constitution. Additionally, the modality used to select representatives for the CA based on the Constitution Review Act of 2011 allowed politicians affiliated to the party of the ruling elite to dominate the CA.

Allowing the CA to be dominated by representatives affiliated to people in the government weakened the possibility of realisation of the intended popular constitution. This is because 'at the constitutional level good governance requires changes that will strengthen the accountability of political leaders to the people' (Smith 2007: 6).

So, what important information for accountability was excluded from the lead stories about the 201 presidentially appointed CA members?

7.1.1.2 Information Excluded from the 201 CA Members Category Lead Stories

As indicated in the previous subsection, headlines of seven lead stories were misleading and two were ambiguous. Also, none of the eleven newspapers included in their lead stories information suggesting that the lists of 201 CA members comprised many people who were affiliates of the political party in state power. Including such information would help the audience understand that spending taxpayers' money on the CA was compromised because it was not fully representative. The popular constitution had been commended by citizens nationwide in that it would facilitate citizen-centred development (RozToday 2013). For example, the popular draft constitution would improve multi-party politics to allow government change. Often, when there is no opportunity for change of government democratically, the political party in state power tends not to worry about losing

power because of poor performance. Yet, people 'consider good performance in office the main currency by which a government buys popular support, especially economic performance' (Goergen and Norpoth 1991: 191).

The issue of expenses incurred in the new constitution project, which never materialised, is important as far as accountability in the use of public resources to improve living standards for all people in Tanzania is concerned. Pro-citizen-centred development activists argued that the use of TZS 116 billion (approximately £41 million) of public funds, without delivering the new constitution as expected by the general population, required the government to be held accountable (Mallya 2016). For example, during 2016, the Mwalimu Nyerere Intellectual Annual Forum held at the University of Dar es Salaam, renowned pro-citizens development-centred Jenerali Ulimwengu argued that the former Tanzanian President, Jakaya Kikwete, was required to be charged in court for squandering public funds without delivering the intended new constitution. Kikwete's government abused the public coffers because CA members sat in Dodoma for three months at the public's expense to produce a proposed constitution which removed almost all the 70 popular articles contained in the draft popular constitution (Polepole 2015).

The draft popular constitution, if passed, would affect the elite status quo. But because the CA was dominated by the affiliates of the political party in state power, the CA members spent several days discussing issues of personal interest – the daily expenses allowance – instead of focusing on the popular constitution. As we shall see in the next subsection, the newspapers' lead stories failed to include information for the citizens to understand that by the government paying TZS 300,000 (£107) as daily expenses to each CA member, millions of taxpayers' money was squandered.

7.1.2. Lead Stories on Constituent Assembly Members' Daily Expenses

This subsection examines information framed in the lead stories on CA daily expenses. It shows that the CA daily expenses frame attracted media headlines for several days because the media did not conduct an investigation in time to establish the reality of daily expenses in Dodoma. This would have enabled the public to understand if the CA claim for the increase of TZS 300,000 (£107) was genuine. As discussed in Chapter Two, in a liberal democracy, the media have a role to

investigate and provide a watchdog role on behalf of the general population (Jebril 2013).

The seven newspapers reported the CA daily expenses issue on February 21 as shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Headlines on Constituent Assembly Members' Daily Expenses



Source: Fieldwork 2014

What information did the media provide in the lead news stories on CA members' daily expenses allowance? Does the information framed in each news headline reflect the entire news story? The next subsection answers these questions.

7.1.2.1 Information in the News on Constituent Assembly Members' Daily Expenses

The headlines in the seven newspapers contain three different pieces of information. One piece of information gave prominence to a steering committee which the Constituent Assembly Interim Chair, Amir Pandu Kificho, established to handle CA members' claims for daily expenses. The news headlines on this theme read as follows: Tanzania Daima – 'Posho Bunge la Katiba yaundiwa tume (Committee formed for CA daily expenses) (TanzaniaDaima 2014); Majira – 'Bunge la Katiba: Posho zaundiwa Kamati Dodoma' (Constituent Assembly: Committee formed for CA daily expenses) (Kinabo at el 2014).

The second theme focused on the information which suggested that the CA members' demands for increased daily expense above TZS 300,000 (£107) had

been opposed countrywide. This theme was framed in three newspapers, as follows: Uhuru – ‘Nyonyeza ya posho yaibua mjadala’ (Increased daily expenses provokes debate) (Uhuru 2014b); Nipashe – ‘Posho ya wabunge yapingwa kila kona’ (Representatives’ daily expenses opposed every corner) (Mwakangale 2014); The Guardian – ‘Public on allowances: Not a cent more’ (The Guardian Team 2014).

The third theme highlighted that CA members were divided over the claim that TZS 300,000 was not sufficient. The information on this was framed in the two daily newspapers as follows: Habari Leo – ‘Posho yagawa wabunge’ (Representatives divided over daily expenses) (Nyemenohi 2014); Daily News – ‘CA members divided over pay’ (Daily News 2014).

The news that gave prominence to information about the formulation of a steering committee was gathered from three categories of news sources: government, politicians and representatives of civil society organisations. Specifically, the news sources came from the following individuals: the CA Chair Kificho, the then Chadema Secretary General Wilbrod Slaa and Jukwaa la Katiba, Chair, Deus Kibamba (Majira 2014; TanzaniaDaima 2014).

Meanwhile, news on public opposition to the increase in daily expenses for CA members was published by The Guardian, Nipashe and Uhuru, and was sourced from four categories of people: government officials, politicians, representatives of CSOs and ordinary citizens. For example, The Guardian quoted eight people, four (three males and a female) ordinary citizens, three politicians – one from the ruling party and two from two different opposition parties, and one government official, the CA Chair. Commenting on the CA members’ allowance a citizen resident in Dodoma argued:

The highest amount one can pay for a hotel stay here is not more than TZS100,000 (£33) per night...and no matter what or how much you eat you cannot spend up to TZS 100,000 (£33) on food. It is obvious that TZS 300,000 (£107) is enough (The Guardian Team 2014).

The story did not quote any proponent of increased daily expenses, but it included Sumve MP, Richard Ndassa, as one of the MPs who complained that TZS 300,000

(£107) daily expenses were not enough. It also indicated that the CA Interim Chair had formed a committee to deal with the issue of the CA daily expenses.

On the other hand, the Uhuru lead story quoted seven people: the CA Interim Chair; four politicians – of which two were MPs from the ruling party and one from the opposition, the District Commissioner (DC) for Korogwe, and two ordinary citizens – female and male – from Dar es Salaam. The proponents were the two MPs. Sumve MP, Richard Ndassa, argued:

Posho ya Sh 300,000 (£107) wanayolipwa hailingani na hadhi ya kazi wanayoifanya wajumbe wa Bunge la Katiba (Uhuru 2014b).

In English:

[The allowance of TZS 300,000 (£107) paid does not resonate with the value of the work of CA members.]

Selemani Nchambi supported Ndassa and said in Kiswahili, 'Posho zinazolipwa kwa wajumbe ni sawa na mishahara ya vibarua', meaning 'The amount paid to CA members is similar to salaries paid to casual labourers' (Uhuru 2014b). However, this statement is ambiguous, because it is not clear if Nchambi meant that the CA members' daily expenses rate was equivalent to the monthly salary of a casual labourer or the ruling party MP was complaining that in giving a CA member Tshs 300,000 as daily expenses, CA members were poorly remunerated like casual labourers.

The story noted that four people – two politicians and two ordinary citizens – opposed the increased daily expenses. The female citizen, Subira Juma from the Kiwalani area in Dar es Salaam, represented the anger of the ordinary citizens as follows:

Hawa wanataka posho kubwa fedha hizo zitatoka wapi, kama wamekwenda kushibisha matumbo yao wajiondoe (Uhuru 2014b).

In English:

[These people want high rate daily expenses, where will the money come from? If their interest is to fill their stomachs, they should pack and go back home.]

The DC also opposed the increase and wondered why the representatives were so greedy. The opposition MP for Kigoma North, Zitto Kabwe, was quoted as saying he would request President Jakaya Kikwete to ignore the CA members' claim because 'the amount the government was providing was sufficient' (Uhuru 2014b).

Meanwhile, the Nipashe story quoted 18 people: a government official (CA Chair); seven ordinary citizens, of whom five were students from four universities (Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre (KCMC), University of Dodoma, Moshi University College of Business and University of Mwenge (Mwuce)). The two other citizens included a teacher from a primary school in Arusha and a resident of the Mbeya region. Two of the seven citizens were females. There were four representatives from CSOs: a religious leader from Dodoma and representatives from two NGOs, namely TGNP and Jukwaa la Katiba and a retired freelance lawyer cum social activist, Professor Issa Shivji. Nipashe also quoted six politicians: two from the ruling party and four from different opposition political parties.

This thesis argues that the headline of the lead story published by Nipashe, compared to the stories reported by The Guardian and Uhuru, justifies the statement: 'Posho ya wabunge yapingwa kila kona' (Representatives' daily expenses opposed on every corner). The news sources for the Nipashe story were relatively diverse. They included ordinary citizens from Dodoma, Arusha, Mbeya and Kilimanjaro.

Meanwhile, news about the divisions over the daily expenses claim of CA members in the state-owned newspapers, Daily News and Habari Leo, was constructed using the views of four difference sources. They included the CA Chair (government official) and three politicians – two from the opposition (Zitto Kabwe MP for Kigoma North and Israel Naste MP for Karatu) – and the ruling party MP for Nkasi, Mohamed Keissy. The newspapers' stories included information about the action the government (CA Chair) had taken over the daily expenses issue and views of the three MPs. For example, Keissy's assertion disclosed the amount MPs were paid during Parliamentary sessions. Keissy asserted:

Tumekuwa bungeni, nimekuwa mbunge, tunalipwa Sh 170,000 kwa siku. Kima cha chini Sh ngapi, walimu wanapata Sh ngapi kwa siku na wanaishi na

wake na watoto...nyie hamuoni huruma kwa wananchi wenu (Nyemenohi 2014).

In English:

[We have been in Parliament, I have been an MP, we are paid TZS 170,000 (£65) per day. How much is the minimum wage? How much do teachers get per day and they have wives and children...you do not feel sorry for your citizens.]

This assertion was supported by the opposition MP for Karatu, Israel Natse, who posited:

Hata kama tungeambiwa tufanye bure tungefanya, kwa sababu ni suala la kitataifa...Watanzania wanaishi maisha magumu... kiwango cha maisha kati ya wananchi na viongozi lipo tabaka kubwa (Nyemenohi 2014).

In English:

[Even if we were told to do this job free of charge, we would do because it is a national issue...Tanzanians are living difficult lives...there is a huge difference in the quality of life between ordinary citizens and leaders.]

Meanwhile, a headline which focused on CA members' divisions over the expense allowance could only be appropriate for the story published by the Daily News but not Habari Leo. The headline does not reflect information that Habari Leo obtained through an independent inquiry which revealed the actual costs of living in Dodoma. The information shows that self-contained accommodation, which many representatives were using, cost TZS 20,000 (£7). This was a decent room with a television, a big bed, washroom, toilet and bathroom. Additionally, tenants were entitled to a free continental breakfast (Nyemenohi 2014). Moreover, the Habari Leo inquiry also revealed the costs of local travel in Dodoma town as this part of the newspaper's story reads:

Kwa upande wa usafiri wasio na magari binafsi, zipo teksi ambazo kwa usafiri ndani ya Dodoma kwa masafa mafupi, nauli ni wastani wa Sh 3,000 hadi Sh 7,000 kwa kuzingatia umbali wa safari, lakini nyingi ya hoteli zipo katika usawa wa wastani wa was Sh elfu tatu kwa maeneo ya kati ya mjini na elfu 7,000 pembeni kidogo (Nyemenohi 2014).

In English:

[Regarding transport for those who do not have private cars, there are taxis which offer a service within Dodoma, at an average rate of TZS 3,000 (£1.08) to TZS 7,000 (£2.40) and many hotels were within the distance not exceeding this rate.]

However, this information was not given prominence in the news story structure. Similarly, it was not framed in the news headline that Habari Leo reported. On the contrary, Habari Leo's headline reads: *Posho yagawa wabunge* (Representatives divided over daily expenses) (Nyemenohi 2014). Meanwhile, the valuable information the newspaper gathered through independent investigation was used towards the end of the story as shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Habari Leo Under-rated Information for Development



Source: Habari Leo February 21, 2014

Moreover, Habari Leo's news did not indicate the amount which its investigation revealed would suffice for each CA member for daily expenses. This would have enabled readers of the story to understand the amount of taxpayers' money each representative was squandering every day by collecting TZS 300,000 (£107) from the public coffers. This finding again confirms the view stated in Chapter Two, arguing that African media professionals are not well trained (Uche 1991).

This leads to the next subsection which examines information excluded from the news for the public to understand that each CA member receiving TZS 300,000 (£107) daily expenses was above the amount that would suffice.

7.1.2.2 Information Excluded from Lead Stories on Constituent Assembly Members' Daily Expenses

Of the three newspapers which reported the issue of CA members' daily expenses rate on February 21, only the Habari Leo story conducted an independent inquiry into the issue. The investigation revealed information which would enable the public to understand that the rate given – TZS 300,000 (£107) – was far above the amount that would be needed. However, as explained earlier, Habari Leo did not prioritise this information either in its news headline or in the main body of the news story. Moreover, the fact that Habari Leo had conducted a survey about the reality regarding the costs of living in Dodoma suggests what the media could have done to understand the reality of the contested matter. The claim for daily expenses had been reported by some newspapers two days earlier. For example, on February 20, Habari Leo had published news which quoted Sumve MP Richard Ndassa as saying that TZS 300,000 was not enough (Nyemenobi 2014b).

Therefore, by not reporting thoroughly on the issue of daily expenses, the Tanzanian media failed to inform the general population that TZS 300,000, which each CA member received as daily expenses, was double the amount that would suffice. The media missed this important information because they relied solely on statements made by news sources (politicians) about the daily expenses. This suggests that Tanzania's media is largely doing a public relations job on what news sources say instead of acting as watchdogs on matters of national development. This clearly gives credence to research conducted in the UK which found that the media rely heavily on information provided by news sources. This trend, however, challenges 'the media role as fourth estate' (Lewis et al. 2008: 1).

Through lead stories, newspapers not only failed to report intelligently on the issue of CA representativeness and CA daily expenses but also election issues as discussed in the next subsection.

7.1.3 Lead Stories on Re-run Elections for Councillors in 27 Wards

This section examines information in the news on re-run elections for councillors in 27 wards which four daily newspapers framed as front-page lead stories. The section

argues that Tanzanian newspapers are polarised – some support the ruling party and its government while some support the opposition. As a result, they reported election stories using a frame that would inform the public that their affiliate political parties performed better than their opponents. As discussed in Chapter Two, negative stories sell more. However, in so doing, the media failed to frame news on violence in elections which undermines the growth of democracy in a country. Yet, as discussed in Chapter Two, journalists are expected to guard the public interest by providing accurate and informative information (Odugbemi and Norris 2010). The reason being, informative media play a key role in strengthening democracy in societies (Cage 2014).

The newspapers reported the story on re-run elections on February 10, 2014 and the headlines were as shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Headlines for News on Re-run Elections for 27 Wards Councillors



Source: Fieldwork 2014

What information for accountability was included in and excluded from the news about the re-run elections in the 27 wards?

7.1.3.1 Information Included in News on Re-run Elections for 27 Wards

As Figure 9 shows, the headlines were as follows: Uhuru – ‘Uchaguziwa madiwani: CCM kidedea, Chadema hoi’, literally meaning ‘Councillors’ election: CCM winner, Chadema loser’ (Uhuru 2014d); Tanzania Daima – ‘Chadema yang’ara matokeo ya udiwani’, meaning ‘Chadema shines in councillor results’ (Mkireri 2014); Mtanzania – ‘CCM, Chadema wagawana kata’, meaning ‘CCM, Chadema win half the wards’ (Mtanzania 2014); and Majira – ‘Udiwani kata 27: CCM, Chadema mchuano mkali’,

meaning 'Councillors in 27 wards: CCM, Chadema in stiff competition' (Chuwa 2014).

Each newspaper framed different information in its news headline. Majira's 'CCM, Chadema in stiff competition' suggests that CCM and Chadema, had each won almost half of the 27 wards. However, this headline is misleading for two reasons. Firstly, the information is based on results of five (18.4%) out of the 27 wards of which only four had their results officially declared. Secondly, based on the information contained in the story that Majira reported, out of the four wards, Chadema had won one ward (Kiboriloni) with 1,019 votes against CCM with 255 and UDP with two votes. Meanwhile, CCM had won three wards in Malindo – Mbeya 737 against Chadema 408, while in Ubwagwe Kahama, CCM got 323 votes and Chadema 219 votes; and in the Mkwiti ward in Tandahimba district, CCM garnered 615 votes against CUF 213 and Chadema 76 votes. In one ward, Santilya (Mbeya), the CCM candidate was leading in 20 out of 22 polling centres which obviously suggest that CCM was the winner. These results suggest that out of the five wards, CCM won four (80%) wards. Therefore, the Majira headline, 'CCM, Chadema in stiff competition', does not suffice for the information included in the story. This means the reporters failed to interpret the information they gathered about the results.

Nonetheless, Majira gathered the story from credible election results sources as this part of the story quoted one of them, reading:

Msimamizi wa uchaguzi katika kata ya Kiboriloni, Bwana Shaban Ntarambo alimtangaza mgombea wa CHADEMA Bwana Frank Kagoma kuwa mshindi wa kiti cha udiwani katika kata hiyo. Bwana Kagoma alishinda kwa kura 1,019 wakati mgombea wa CCM Willy Aidano akipata kura 255 na mgombea wa UDP Aidan Magunga akipata kura mbili (Chuwa 2014).

In English:

[Returning officer for Kiboriloni ward, Mr Shaban Ntarambo, declared CHADEMA candidate Frank Kagoma the winner for the councillor seat in the ward. Mr Kagoma won with 1,019 votes, while CCM candidate Willy Aidano got 255 and UDP candidate Aidan Magunga obtained two votes.]

On the other hand, Tanzania Daima's headline, 'Chadema yang'ara matokeo ya udiwani' (Chadema shines in councillor results), suggests that Chadema had done

well in the re-run election in 27 wards. The headline was based on information gathered from polling stations but without mentioning the names of sources. The information claimed that CCM had won three wards: Tungi and Malindo (Morogoro), and Kiomoni (Tanga), and Chadema had won eight wards. The story listed the names of all 27 wards and claimed that in the re-run election, Chadema had recovered the two wards it had lost and gained six more. It listed wards which it claimed Chadema won: Njombe town (Njombe), Kiboriloni (Moshi town), Sombetini (Arusha town), Partimbo and Lolera (Kiteto), Kasunga (Sumbawanga), and all the wards in Dodoma involved in the re-run election for Segela and Mpwayungu (Chamwino) (Mkireri 2014). Information in the lead story on re-election published by the Majira newspaper shows that, in Dodoma region, the re-run election took place in Segela and Mpwayungu in Chamwino (Chuwa 2014). However, it did not say who the contestants were or their winning votes.

Therefore, it is argued that Tanzania Daima's headline does not resonate with information constructed in the news which the newspaper published about the re-run election. The headline claimed Chadema 'shined'. However, information in the story claims Chadema won eight (29.6%) of 27 wards. Critics could ask why the Tanzanian Kiswahili dailies considered that eight out of 27 wards would make Chadema shine.

Additionally, the credibility of the story is contested because news sources and votes garnered by Chadema in each ward in which the story claimed Chadema won were not disclosed in the news. The reason why the news story was missing such information could be because reporters were feeling time constraints because of news deadlines. This gives credence to the notion that 'whether objectivity as a philosophical concept, exists or not, the concrete conditions of production and reception of the media message make the very realization of news objectivity impossible' (Boudana 2011: 390).

Moreover, the Tanzania Daima story included information suggesting that violence had occurred in some polling centres. It said that the MP for Arusha town constituent Godbless Lema was intercepted by police while in a polling centre and was thrown into a ditch. The story also said violence occurred at the Sombetini polling centre whereby a group of youths claiming to be Chadema opponents, armed with harmful

instruments, intercepted Chadema supporters. In the same story, the Tanzania Daima newspaper said the Chadema Chair in Central Zone, Innocent Zawadi, had reported that violence occurred in the Morogoro region. The story said Zawadi claimed traditional weapons and poisonous liquids were used in Tungi ward in Morogoro town and Ludewa in Kilosa by CCM supporters against the opposition supporters. The news also said that because of the violence, the CCM Chair in Kilosa district, Naroso Udulele, was held by police for five hours. The story claimed Morogoro Regional Police Commander, Fustine Shilopigile, refuted that any violence had occurred in the region. The news quoted Shilopigile as saying 'hakuna matukio hayo...taarifa hizo ni za uongo', meaning 'there were no such incidents ... the reports were lies' (Mkireri 2014).

Tanzania Daima's news noted that violence occurred at the Majengo primary polling centre in Magomeni ward, Bagamoyo district, where CCM, Chadema and CUF supporters attacked each other and 15 people were injured. It quoted an anonymous source who claimed that before the violence happened, CUF and Chadema supporters, on arrival at the centre, destroyed all the tyres of a vehicle which CCM was using to distribute the party agents. CCM supporters then reacted by attacking their opponents before the police force came and used bombs. The news informed that Pwani Regional Police Komanda Ulrich Matel confirmed the violence occurred (Mkireri 2014).

Meanwhile, news which Uhuru reported also included information on violence in Arusha region and about 15 people who were injured in the Magomeni area in Pwani region, but did not include the incidence of violence in Morogoro region. Uhuru's news sources for a story about violence were the CCM Chair for Pwani region, Sauda Mpambalyoto, and the Election Returning Officer for Pwani region, Samweli Sarianga. Further, the Uhuru newspaper story indicated that violence had also occurred in Mbeya region. Uhuru quoted the Regional Police Commander, Ahmed Msangi, as saying violence happened in Mbeya's rural area. Msangi claimed three people were injured, namely: Rev Lackson Mwanjale, a CCM financial official, Shadrack Mwanguya and candidate for Santilya ward, Anton Mboma, after

unidentified people – believed to be Chadema supporters – attacked them (Uhuru 2014d).

However, the Uhuru newspaper headline, like that of Tanzania Daima's, did not frame information on violence on election day in its news headline. Instead its headline focused on CCM's performance in the few wards where results had been announced. Additionally, Uhuru, like Tanzania Daima, reported its news without disclosing the names of its news sources. The story claimed that while Chadema had won the election in two wards – Sombetin (Arusha) and Kiboriloni (Moshi) – CCM had won three wards: Magomeni (Bagamoyo), Ubagwe (Kahama) and Namikago (Nachingea). However, a critical perspective could ask how the results of five wards could be used to decide a winner and a loser when the election was held in 27 wards?

This question is vital because, without providing evidence, the Uhuru story claimed that CCM was leading in Ukumbi (Kililo), Kiwalala (Lindi), Kudewa (Kilosa), Nduli (Iringa), Ibumu (Kilolo), Rudewa (Kilosa), Mkwiti (Tandahimba), Kiomoni (Tanga), Kiwalala (Lindi), Njombe town and all wards which held re-run elections in Dodoma region (Uhuru 2014d). Yet, as explained earlier, Tanzania Daima's story also claimed that the eight wards that Chadema won included all wards in Dodoma (Mkireri 2014). Further, the Tanzania Daima news story claimed that the Chadema candidate in Njombe town won after defeating the CCM candidate in 40 out of 41 polling centres as the story reads in part in Kiswahili:

Habari zinasema kuwa katika matokeo ya awali, Chadema imeshinda wilayani Njombe ambapo CCM imegaragazwa katika vituo 40 kati ya 41 vya kata ya Njombe mjini. Mgombea wa Chadema katika kata hiyo ameibuka kidedea kwa kushinda katika vituo 40 kati ya 41 huku mgombea wa CCM akizidi Chadema kwa kura mbili katika kituo alichofanikiwa kupata kura nyingi (Mkireri 2014).

In English:

[Reports say in preliminary results, Chadema won in Njombe district as CCM was defeated in 40 polling centres in Njombe town. The Chadema contestant won in 40 polling centres out of 41 while the CCM contestant won by two votes in that one centre.]

Therefore, this thesis argues that information framed in the headline of Uhuru newspaper was misleading because official results for the wards which Uhuru claimed CCM had won had not officially been announced. Additionally, the unofficial results on which the Uhuru story was based are contested because the sources of information were not revealed. Moreover, the number of wards which Uhuru claimed CCM had won or were leading were too few to justify the headline: 'Uchaguziwa madiwani: CCM kidedea, Chadema hoi', literally meaning 'Councillors' election: CCM wins, Chadema defeated' (Uhuru 2014d).

Meanwhile, information framed in the Mtanzania headline, 'CCM, Chadema wagawana kata', meaning 'CCM, Chadema each win half the wards', was not upheld by information in the story. It was based on the results of only four wards and those results were not official. Without mentioning the news source, Mtanzania claimed that Chadema won Kiboriloni (1,001 votes against 254 for CCM) and in Arusha Chadema garnered 2,548 votes against 2,077 for CCM. The Mtanzania lead story also said that the CCM candidate for Nduli ward (Iringa) won by 856 votes against Chadema's 432 votes and that CCM won Kiomoni ward with 857 votes against CUF's 432 votes (Mtanzania 2014).

At the same time, the story reported by Mtanzania newspaper also included information about violence in the Bagamoyo district in Pwani region, like Tanzania Daima. Similarly, Uhuru's story also reported the same number of people injured in Bagamoyo. For Arusha, the Tanzania Daima story reported that, in Sombetini ward, Chadema MP Godless Lema and CCM special seat MP Mary Chitanda exchanged 'dirty' words. It also said that the Councillor for Engusuto, Elibariki Male of Chadema, survived death after a group of people with traditional weapons and swords chased him with the intention to kill him. The story said Male survived after managing to break into the CCM office and hide. But why would the councillor for Engusuto be killed? Mtanzania's story explained:

Diwani huyo alinusurika kuuwawa wakati yeye na wenzake walipokuwa wakilinda gari aina ya Land Cruzer lenye namba T399 BFE, walilohisi lina silaha za moto na za jadi walizodai ziliandaliwa kwa ajili ya uchaguzi katani humo (Mtanzania 2014).

In English:

[The councillor survived death because he and his companion decided to stand guard to prevent movement of a Land Cruiser T399 BFE. They had suspected that the car was carrying modern and traditional weapons to be used in the ward during that election.]

Further, the Mtanzania story claimed that violence also occurred in Nduli and Igumu wards in Iringa and that the violence erupted after Chadema supporters invaded CCM's camp. It also reported that the MP for Iringa town, Reverend Peter Msigwa (Chadema), and some Chadema supporters, were arrested and taken to the police station but later released (Mtanzania 2014). In addition, Mtanzania claimed that a CCM supporter attacked Mwananchi reporter Christopher Maregesi and grabbed his professional equipment (ibid.).

However, this thesis argues that the Mtanzania, Tanzania Daima and Uhuru newspapers failed to interpret the bigger issue between the winner of the election based on the initial results, which covered a few wards, and violence that left more than 15 citizens injured. How can democracy grow in a country if elections are not violence free?

This suggests that the media reporting of the re-run election excluded vital information that would have informed that multi-party elections in Tanzania are problematic. The next subsection highlights the information the press excluded or did not give prominence to in the re-run election.

7.1.3.2 Information Excluded from News on Re-run Elections for 27 Wards

As discussed in the previous subsection, except for the Majira newspaper, the three other newspapers – Mtanzania, Uhuru and Tanzania Daima – included information in their news stories suggesting that violence had occurred in some polling centres and several people had been injured. However, these newspapers did not frame that information in their key front-page lead stories' headlines. On the contrary, each of these three newspapers reported the preliminary election results in a way that would attract their intended readers. Such coverage confirms the argument that newspaper 'editors and reporters can slant news coverage in various ways – some subtle and difficult for casual readers to detect, others ambiguous and easily identified' (Kahn and Kenney 2002: 283). It also confirms the observation that there are three models

of media systems: the 'Polarized Pluralist Model', the 'Liberal Model' and the 'Democratic Corporatist Model' (Cage 2014). Based on the findings on the way Tanzanian press covered the re-run elections for councillors in 27 wards held on February 9, 2014 and the press reports on the following day it seems that the press in Tanzania fall under the 'Polarized Pluralist Model'.

It is further argued that, if the press in Tanzania was not polarised, the three Kiswahili newspapers – Tanzania Daima, Mtanzania and Uhuru – could have given prominence to the issue of violence in their key news headlines. In this way the audience could understand that the operationalisation of multi-party politics in Tanzania was facing some serious challenges. This could encourage accountability of different actors in politics to act to ensure future elections were free of violence. For example, (1) police could take measures to ensure that, in the future, polling centres were a violence-free zone; (2) political parties, both ruling and opposition, could take the initiative to persuade their leaders, affiliates and supporters to resolve politics issues in a non-violent manner, not only on election day but in all political activities at all times; (3) CSOs working in the area of governance could strengthen their activities on civic education to strengthen multi-party democracy in the country.

The lack of professional media capacity to interpret development issues and report accordingly was also evident in the analysis of the press coverage of an economic issue related to wildlife poaching.

7.2 Lead Stories on Economic issues

As shown in Table 14 in Chapter Six, out of the 411 lead stories, 56 (13.6%) reported economic topics, of which radio and television reported 17, while newspapers covered 39. Wildlife poaching issues received huge coverage as nearly half of the 39 news items on economic topics reported this issue. Wildlife poaching attracted media coverage during this period partly because an international meeting had been organised in London, UK, to deliberate strategies to end the illegal ivory trade which was threatening the extinction of rhinos and elephants. The conference was held on February 13, 2014 to seek 'a high-level political commitment' to end the wildlife trade which had threatened the extinction of rhinos, tigers and elephants (Government 2014). Importantly, Tanzania had featured in a global debate in relation

to its government's commitment to tackle the tusks and horn trade. For example, the UK-based newspaper the Mail on Sunday had claimed that President Kikwete's government had 'presided over a slaughter of elephants that is unprecedented in his country's history' (Fletcher 2017).

However, only the issue of a network of 40 wildlife poachers, which President Kikwete claimed that his government had identified, qualified as an emblematic case for analysis. What information did the press include in their news stories on wild animals poaching? Where did the press obtain the information published in the news? Which newspaper(s)' headline(s) reflected information in the news and which did not? What information could have been included in the news stories for the audience to better understand this issue? These are the questions which this analysis tries to answer.

7.2.1 Lead Stories on Network of 40 Wildlife Poachers

This section analyses the news about a network of 40 wildlife poachers which President Jakaya Kikwete claimed his government had identified and was published as the lead story in three daily newspapers. This subsection argues that because the media professionals in Tanzania are not well trained on economic reporting, the Kiswahili newspapers' reporting of the issues failed to frame information in their stories that could encourage public leaders' accountability on the poaching issue.

Three newspapers reported the issues as their front-page lead story on February 15, 2014 with the following headlines: The Guardian – 'JK runs away from catching poachers' (Rweyemamu 2014); Mwananchi – 'JK: Kuna majangili papa 40' (Majani et al. 2014), meaning 'JK: There are 40 big poachers'; Nipashe – 'JK: Mtandao wa ujangili wajulikana' (Shayo 2014), meaning 'JK: Wildlife poacher network identified' (see the newspapers in Figure 10).

Figure 10: Three Newspapers Headlines About 40 Wildlife Poachers



Source: Fieldwork 2014

The headlines can be categorised into two themes: wildlife poachers have been recognised and President Kikwete avoided catching the poachers. But does the information framed in the two headlines represent the content of stories published in these three newspapers?

7.2.1.1 Information Included in News on Network of 40 Wildlife Poachers

Information which the three newspapers – The Guardian, Nipashe and Mwananchi – included in their lead stories on the network of 40 poachers suggests that President Jakaya Kikwete spoke about the poachers in a special programme broadcast by the BBC Swahili Service in London. The three newspapers' stories also indicated that Kikwete said that the Tanzanian government had identified a network of 40 wildlife poachers, as this part of The Guardian story reveals:

The President says Tanzania security organisations had since recently, managed to arrest 40 ivory dealers in Northern Tanzania, describing some of them as big tycoons with business roots out of the country working with local business icons and said poaching was a business of the rich...The President also made it public that the government now know the identity of the ringleader of the ivory trade in the country, but fell short of identifying this man, driving every one of us mad, claiming this would weaken his strategic war waged against poachers (Rweyemamu 2014).

The Mwananchi story says: 'Kuna majangili 40 waliotambuliwa na tumetambua mtandao mzima, pale Arusha kuna mtu mkubwa alikuwa anaendesha biashara. Kazi ilikuwa ni kutambua mtandao wote, ule mtandao ni mpana sana, alisema rais Kikwete' (Majani et al. 2014).

In English:

[There are 40 poachers identified and we have identified a whole network in Arusha where there is a big person who was involved in the business. 'The task was to identify the entire network, the network is so wide,' said President Kikwete.]

The Nipashe story says:

'Tumeutambua mtandao huo na wakubwa zao ni matajiri pale Arusha, kuna mmoja mkubwa sitaki kumtaja jina alikuwa akiendesha biashaya hiyo naye yupo kwenye kundi hili la watu 40 kazi iliyokuwa ikifanyika ni kuutambua huo mtandao kwa upana', alisema (Shayo 2014).

In English:

[We have identified the network and their leader is a businessman in Arusha. There is one big man – I don't want to mention the name – who has been engaged in the business as part of this group of 40. The work was to identify the network and its wide scope, he said.]

A conclusion that can be drawn from these three extracts suggests that, somehow, The Guardian headline reflects information included in the lead story which Nipashe published. On the other hand, the headline for Nipashe somehow overlooked the information that President Kikwete claimed that his government had identified 40 wildlife poachers but hesitated to name the accused and did not take legal measures against the persons involved. One could argue that the Mwananchi headline reflects the information in the newspaper's story, however, considering that reporters of all the three newspapers gathered data used to construct the story from a similar news source, a special programme for the BBC Kiswahili Service in London, it means that the authors of the Mwananchi news story overlooked fundamental information that could have enabled the general public to understand that the Kikwete government was not accountable in protecting wild animals. What is the vital information which all the newspapers could have included in their news and in headlines of their news published as their front-page lead story?

This investigation reveals that the BBC Kiswahili special programme was the source of the story about the 40 alleged wildlife poachers reported by all three newspapers. However, the story reported in the two Kiswahili newspapers, Mwananchi and Nipashe, did not give prominence to information saying that President Kikwete hesitated to unveil the poachers' identities. Yet, the President said the government had invested taxpayers' money in the process of identifying the poachers. As The

Guardian story reads in part: ‘President Kikwete said Tanzanian officials had a difficult big job identifying the poaching network in the Northern zone’ (Rweyemamu 2014).

The information overlooked in the news story could have enabled the audience to ask questions, for example: (a) Why did President Kikwete hesitate to unveil the poachers while the government had invested taxpayers’ money in searching for the 40 alleged poachers? (b) Why did the President not say what actions would be taken against the alleged poachers? (c) Why did the government not arraign the 40 poachers into court so that their names could be disclosed to the public through the hearing of their case? It is argued that information excluded from the story could have stimulated accountability towards dismantling the poachers’ network and prevented a few Tanzanian rent-seekers continuing to squander the country’s natural wealth at the expense of the general population. However, this does not mean that the media news reporting would guarantee that the government would be held accountable in the wildlife poaching scandal. This is because, as argued in Chapter Two, the relationship between media and audience is complicated. This is because different people may interpret the same information differently and hence act differently depending on what they go through in their daily lives (Goffman 1974).

The next subsection examines news on two social issues which the newspapers also covered as lead stories during the same period under review. However, as was the case regarding the news on the wildlife poaching issue, the press did not focus on information that could have enlightened the audience effectively.

7.3 Lead News Stories on Social Development Issues

Table 14 in Chapter Six reported that out of the 411 lead stories, 121 (29.4%) related to social issues and of these 121 news items on social related topics, 67 were published in the eleven newspapers examined in this study. However, only eleven stories on social issues qualified as emblematic for analysis in this inquiry and they focused on two different social issues. One was on a health-related matter – a scandal surrounding fake antiretroviral (ARVs) drugs – and another on education – 2013 Form Four national examination results.

What information was framed in the news headlines? What information was excluded from the headlines and/or news which could have helped the audience understand the issue better? This subsection answers these questions. It starts with the education issue concerning the Ordinary Level National Examination results of 2013.

7.3.1 News on the 2013 Form Four National Examination Results

This subsection analyses information included in the news about the 2013 Form Four national examination results which eight Tanzanian daily newspapers published as a lead story. We argue that the press did not frame information in the lead stories which could help the general population understand that massive failure was still a challenge in Form examinations. The press focused on what government officials from the Education Ministry said, suggesting that in 2013 there was an increase in pass marks compared to the previous year. However, the reality was that in 2013 pass grades were lowered from 34 percent to 19 percent compared to the previous years' marking system whereby grades below 34 percent were classified as a failure. NECTA announced the results of the 2013 Form Four examinations on February 21, 2014 and eight newspapers covered the results as their front-page lead story, as shown in Figure 11.

Figure 11: Information Included in the News About the 2013 Examination Results



Source: Fieldwork 2014

The news headlines read as follows: Habari Leo – ‘Ufaulu kidato 1V wapanda’ (Form 1V passes increase) (Nsanzugwanko 2014b); Majira – ‘Matokeo Kidato cha Nne: Ufaulu juu’ (Form Four Results: Passes up) (Swai 2014); Uhuru – ‘Ufaulu

waongezeka' (Passes increase) (Shimye 2014); Mtanzania – 'Ufaulu Kidato cha Nne 2013 wapanda' (Form Four 2013 passes increase) (Kimelemeta 2014); Nipashe – 'Matokeo Kidato cha Nne 2013: Ufaulu wapanda' (Form Four results 2013: Passes increase) (Zaya and Shayo 2014); Mwananchi headline – 'Makoeko kidato cha Nne', meaning 'Form Four results' (Azzah 2014); Tanzania Daima – 'Wasichana Wang'ara', meaning 'Girls shine' (Mark 2014); the Daily News headline – 'Girls beat boys in Form IV results'.

Reporters from all the eight newspapers constructed their story from a single source, NECTA Deputy Executive Secretary Dr Charles Msonde, and without analysis of the data the official released. What information was included in both the newspapers' stories and in the key headlines?

7.3.1.1 Information in the News About 2013 National Examination Results

Three different pieces of information were framed in the key headlines of the news about 2013 Form Four examination results reported as the lead news story in eight daily newspapers. One piece of information reported by only one newspaper, Mwananchi, which reads, 'Makoeko kidato cha Nne', meaning 'Form Four results' (Azzah 2014), was ambiguous. Another piece of information, which was less dominant, was reported in two newspapers: Tanzania Daima and the Daily News. The information suggested that in the 2013 Form Four examination results, female students performed better than their male counterparts. It focused on girls' performance as the majority of the top ten students (seven) were girls. The information was reflected in the content of the whole story and in the headline.

However, this thesis argues that, although such news challenged the misconception or belief that girls cannot do what boys can do academically, these newspapers overlooked the bigger news, which was the overall performance of girls and boys from both private and government secondary schools who sat for the said examination. Performance of all students in the examination is crucial for the national development of all people in the whole of society. As UNDP asserts, development is 'not just of a few' (UNDP 2016: iii).

The argument is vital because the seven highest-scoring girls did not come from government schools but had attended fee-paying schools that most Tanzanians cannot afford: Marian Girls-Pwani, St Francis Girls in Mbeya and Canossa in Dar es Salaam (Mark 2014). The three top-scoring boys were also from similar schools with easy access to books, skilled teachers and proper meals. Two of the boys were from Annie Marie Secondary School in Dar es Salaam region and one from Kaizirege, in the north-west region of Kagera (Mark 2014; Robi 2014). However, as will be discussed later, by focusing on the performance of the topmost few girls from the well-to-do families, the press squandered a precious opportunity to raise the bigger issue of education standards, especially in the newly established state-owned ward secondary schools.

Meanwhile, five (63%) out of the eight newspaper dailies which covered the news focused on information suggesting that more students had passed the 2013 Form Four national examinations than in the previous year. This information was reported in Habari Leo, Majira, Uhuru, Mtanzania and Nipashe. However, this leads to the question: What had been done to improve the quality of education in most of the public schools in a period of only one year of implementing 'Big Result Now' (BRN) to enable the increased pass rate? This question is fundamental because none of these newspapers indicated what contributed to the better performance. Yet, afterward secondary schools (Shule za Sekondari za Kata) were introduced in 2008 for a very good developmental reason – for all Tanzanian children to get secondary education – Form Four examination results had been recording massive failures. For example, 46 percent of students failed the Form Four examinations in 2011 and the failure rate went up to 61 percent in 2012 (Twaweza 2013).

To reduce the mass failure, in 2013, the government adopted a development approach coined Big Results Now (BRN) through which its development projects, amongst others, focused on addressing issues in the education sector (Balozi et al. 2014). Specifically, the BRN indicators for improvement in education were that the pass rate for both primary and secondary education would increase by between 60 and 70 percent by ensuring that there were 'enough textbooks for students at both primary and secondary schools' (Mtulya 2014). However, apart from reading

materials, state-owned primary and secondary schools in Tanzania also face numerous other challenges including the quality standard of teaching and offering a friendly environment for learning. For example, a study that focused on schools in Moshi Municipality revealed that government secondary schools in the area faced the following challenges:

...limited number of teachers per subject to be taught and number of students; lack of conducive teaching and learning environment, and shortage of teaching and learning materials. Other factors were associated with the employment of unqualified teachers, lack of reliable libraries and laboratories, weak communication amongst teachers and parents and students, and poor classroom attendance by teachers (Komba et al. 2014: iv).

The analysis of the lead stories in the press about the 2013 Form Four national examinations shows that the dominant information framed in the headlines suggests an increased pass rate. The increased pass rate was reported in headlines of stories published by *Majira* (Swai 2014), *Nipashe* (Zaya and Shayo 2014), *Uhuru* (Shimye 2014), *Mtanzania* (Kimelemeta 2014) and *Habari Leo* (Nsanzugwanko 2014b). However, the *Daily News* (Robi 2014) and *Tanzania Daima* (Mark 2014) headlines and main body stories focused on girls' performance while *Mwananchi's* headline was ambiguous.

Moreover, although the *Daily News* story did not focus on the increased pass rate, in the main body it asserted that 2013 results showed improvements in the pass mark. The third paragraph in its news story reads:

These results are an improvement on the previous year (2012) which recorded massive failures with 204,093 out of 397,136 candidates scoring division zero (Robi 2014).

Therefore, a crucial question remains: Did the newspapers' stories say what the Ministry of Education had done to account for such a remarkable increase in the pass rate by 15.17 percent within the period of one year?

This question is fundamental because only three newspapers, *Mwananchi*, *Tanzania Daima* and *Habari Leo*, included information in their news stories about a new system Dr Msonda said NECTA used for grading 2013 examinations. The system

was as follows: 100–75 = A; 60–59 = B+; 59–50 = B, 49–40 = C; 39–30 = D; 29– 20= E and 19–0 = F (Azzah 2014; Mark 2014; Nsanzugwanko 2014b).

However, all the stories reported by all eight newspapers, except Mwananchi, missed out the important information which could have enabled the audience to understand that the NECTA claim that there was a pass increase in 2013 Form Four examination results was contentious. What is the information the newspapers excluded from their stories?

7.3.1.2 Information Excluded from the News About the 2013 National Examination Results

As noted in the previous subsection, except for the Mwananchi newspaper, the other newspapers which covered the story on 2013 Form Four national examination results excluded information suggesting that the new grading system helped in reducing mass failure from their stories. The Mwananchi key headline, though ambiguous, included in its three subheadlines some pieces of information which, amongst others, indicated that the news formula for marking which was adopted in 2013 reduced the mass failure. The subheadlines translated from Kiswahili read as follows: (a) New formula rescued thousands; (b) Pass rate reaches 58.25 percent; (c) Girls leading; (d) Government schools in horrible situation (shule za serikali hoi); (e) Student drew Freemason symbols in their examination papers; (f) The best students incautious after getting results (Azzah 2014). Importantly, it was only the Mwananchi story which included information about the old system of grading, revealing the grading system, as its news story reads in part:

Kabla ya mabadiliko hayo, alama zilizokuwa zinatumiwa kupanga matokeo ya kidato cha nne ni A 80–100, B 65–79, C 50–64 D 35–49 and F 0–34 (Azzah 2014).

In English:

[Prior to the adoption of the new grading system, grading of the Form Four national examination results was based on the following intervals: A 80–100, B 65–79, C 50–64, D 35–49 and F 0–34.]

Therefore, it could be argued that the five newspapers framed contentious information in their news headlines, suggesting that in 2013's Form Four examination results more students passed than the previous year. In so doing, the

newspapers denied the nation an opportunity to be informed appropriately about the realities of the students' performance in secondary school education. Yet, if the reporters and editors had done their jobs well, their media would have been able to inform the public accordingly. They could have done so by analysing what had transpired between 2012 and 2013 and framing such information in their key news headlines to indicate whether the pass rate increase in 2013 was contentious or not certain as the pass mark in 2013 was lowered from the usual 34 percent to 19 percent.

Such information could have helped the general population to understand that the problem of massive failure in Form Four examinations was yet to be resolved. For example, it could prompt Parliamentarians and ward councillors to advise the central and local governments respectively, to allocate sufficient budget to improve the quality of education in ward secondary schools.

The newspaper reporters' and editors' lack of capacity in analysing the news stories on the examination issue contradicts the notion that media can encourage national development (Schramm 1964). It further challenges the idea that it 'has an indirect but key role in influencing the political system' (Cooke 2018).

Therefore, a critical perspective would ask: How could the press be considered as an autonomous social institution (the fourth estate) while news reporters just copy and paste statements made by news sources without doing any investigation? This clearly gives credence to the observation in Chapter Two that in contemporary times the media are 'supporting those in power and subordinating the working people' (Gorman and McLean 2009: 3).

Moreover, such a huge number of newspapers giving prominence to the front-page lead story could be detrimental as it can become a 'mass production of ignorance' (Philo 2004). However, critics might argue that such misinformation might not be detrimental to the country's efforts to improve the quality of education because some individuals in society will have the agency and critical minds to deconstruct the misleading information they receive from the media (Giddens 1984). However, the individuals' power to act to correct media-disseminated misinformation is limited

because social boundaries give media audiences little or no chance to convey back to the media what they know to be the truth about a topic (Tilly 2004).

Meanwhile the analysis of the lead stories the media reported about a scandal regarding fake antiretroviral (ARV) drugs provides yet more evidence suggesting that media professionals in Tanzania require more training to provide a meaningful contribution to society. As discussed in the next subsection, the analysis of this story shows that journalists have very little capacity to report effectively on social issues involving squandering of public funds.

7.3.2 Lead Stories on Fake Antiretroviral Drugs

This subsection analyses information constructed in the news about fake ARV drugs reported as front-page lead stories in three newspapers. It is argued that the key headline of one newspaper was misleading and all three newspapers excluded from their stories' headlines vital information disclosed in the court in relation to the accused's criminal charges.

The news was reported by Nipashe, Majira and The Guardian on February 11, 2014. The Daily News headline read: 'Five in court over fake ARVs' (Kapama 2014b). The two Kiswahili dailies focused on the prominent politician involved in the scandal and their headlines were similar. In both newspapers the headline of the front-page lead story reads: 'Madabida kortini kwa ARVs feki', meaning 'Madabida in court over fake ARVs' (Balama 2014; Mwango 2014) as shown in Figure 12.

Figure 12: Newspaper Headlines for News on Fake Antiretroviral Drugs



Source: Fieldwork 2014

What information did the newspapers include in their lead stories? Does the headline of the news reported in each newspaper reflect the information included in the story? The next subsection answers these questions.

7.3.2.1 Information Included in the News on Fake Antiretroviral Drugs

All three newspapers, the Daily News, Majira and Nipashe, listed the names of the six people alleged to be involved in the scandal of fake ARVs. They were Ramadhani Madabida, Seif Salume Shamte, Simon Alfred Msoffe and Fatma Ally Shango, Chief Executive Officer, Director for Operations, and Marketing Manager and Assistant Accountant for Tanzania Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd, respectively. And also, Sadiki Frank Materu, Quality Assurance Manager and Evans Mwenezi, Quality Assurance Officer for Medical Store Department (MSD). The news stories published in the three newspapers indicated the accused were charged with five counts (Balama 2014; Kapama 2014b; Mwangi 2014). The counts will be highlighted later.

However, while Nipashe and Majira provided details of the five charges, the Daily News just highlighted the charge counts and mentioned one count and noted that the case was a continuation of disclosure of the ARV scandal which had been unveiled earlier. The Daily News introductory paragraph reads:

The fake ARVs supply saga continues to unfold as renowned pharmacist-cum-politician Ramadhani Madabida and five others yesterday appeared before a Dar es Salaam court charged with five counts, including occasioning loss of over Shs 148 million (Kapama 2014b).

Meanwhile, Majira and Nipashe itemised each of the five counts and people involved in each count, as Senior State Prosecutor Faraja Nchimbi and State Prosecutor Shadrack Kimaro explained in court.

The stories reported in the two Kiswahili newspapers said that the prosecution side noted that the first count involved Madabida, Shamte Msoffe and Shango who, on April 5, 2011, in Dar es Salaam, sold and supplied MSD with 7,776 containers of fake antiretroviral drugs. The accused purported that the drugs had been manufactured in March 2011 and would expire in February 2013. These drugs were 30gm of

Stavudine, 200gm of Verirapine and 'Batch' number OC 185. The second count that the same individuals were charged with was distributing the abovementioned drugs and purporting that the drugs were original. The third count for the same people between April 12 and 29, 2011 in Dar es Salaam was intention to cheat TZS 148,350,156.48 (approximately £52,052) from MSD after claiming the drugs were original while they knew they were fake. The fourth count involved Sadik and Evans, who were charged that, on different dates between April 5 and 13, 2011 in Dar es Salaam, in their capacity as MSD officials, they were responsible for quality assurance, while aware that the drugs were not genuine. They failed to use their authority to prevent the crime. The fifth count involved all six people and states that between April 5 and 30, 2011, the accused failed to execute their duties. Consequently, they caused MSD to be supplied with fake drugs and occasioned MSD a loss of TZS 148,350,156.48(approximately £52,052) (Balama 2014; Mwango 2014).

Additionally, the Nipashe story provided some detailed background about the scandal. It said that the then Minister for Health and Social Welfare, Hassan Mwinyi, admitted that the fake ARVs had been distributed in several health centres in the country. Further, the Nipashe story said that, following the scandal, the government suspended the Director General of MSD, Joseph Mgaya, and the two charged MSD Quality Assurance Officials, Materu and Mwenezi. The news story reported by Nipashe also noted that the government suspended TPIL from producing ARVs (Mwango 2014).

However, the stories reported by these newspapers excluded important information about accountability on the issue of fake ARVs as discussed in the next subsection.

7.3.2.2 Information Excluded from the News on Fake Antiretroviral Drugs

The Daily News, apart from excluding detailed information regarding the five counts, had a headline that was ambiguous. While the Nipashe and Majira news stories indicated that six people were arraigned in court, the Daily News story mentioned 'five people...' (Kapama 2014b). Also, the stories reported in Majira and the Daily News did not indicate that the six people were facing a case for economic sabotage.

Nipashe's news story highlighted the crime this way: 'Kesi hiyo ya uhujumu uchumi namba 5 ya mwaka 2014', meaning 'The case of five counts of economic sabotage in 2014'. Importantly, the headline of the story in all the three newspapers did not give prominence to the information about the loss of Shs 148 million of taxpayers' money.

Therefore, provided that the reporters from all three newspapers obtained their stories from similar news sources, i.e. the court, and that all information on the story was disclosed in court, it means they ignored or had no capacity to construct a story based on information about finances. As a result, all three newspapers did not frame information about the financial loss in their stories' headlines. Yet, the excluded information could enable the audiences to understand that the six people were charged with two serious offences that undermine the wellbeing of Tanzanians, one selling fake ARVs and two squandering Shs 148 million of public funds. The findings confirm the observation in Chapter Two that the media in African countries are not well educated and well versed in reporting economic, politics and social issues (Uche 1991).

7.4 Conclusion

The findings from the analysis of 36 emblematic lead stories show how the media in Tanzania construct news on development issues. They reveal that issues selected as being most important and framed as newspapers' front-page lead stories, did not contain information which could inform the general population effectively on aspects that required actions for accountability. For example, the headlines for the news on fake ARVs focused on the prominent politician involved in the case, the then Dar es Salaam region CCM Chairman, Madabida, instead of the real issue of public concern – the loss of TZS 148 million (more than £52,000) from public funds and risking the lives of people living with HIV through fake ARVs. Similarly, in the lead stories on the economic topics, the media did not focus on information about President Kikwete's hesitance to take action against 40 people he alleged his government had identified to be wildlife poachers. Instead the media gave province to what Kikwete said – there were 40 wildlife poachers and the ringleader was based in the Arusha region. Proponents of the framing theory could argue that appropriate frames were not used

to inform Tanzanians effectively on the issue of the alleged wildlife poachers. As discussed in Chapter Two, to 'frame is to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation* for the item described' (Entman 1993: 52). Based on this assertion this means the Tanzanian media professionals were supposed to construct a news story which would make Tanzanians understand that the problem was that President Kikwete hesitated to take legal action against the alleged 40 wildlife poachers. The story would also explain the negative impact of continued poaching to the quality of life of many Tanzanians following President Kikwete's government's failure to prosecute the alleged poachers. Such information could form the basis for average citizens to question Kikwete's government's accountability in dismantling the network of the alleged poachers.

On politics issues, the media, for example, published several lead stories focusing on the Constituent Assembly (CA) members' claim for the increase in their daily expenses. Yet, an independent inquiry later revealed that the amount each CA member was receiving per day (Tshs 300,000 (£107)) was double the amount that would actually be needed (Nyemenobi 2014a). This clearly gives credence to the notion that, when it comes to news, the key requirement is that the media give prominence to stories concerning interests of powerful individuals, organisations or institutions (Harcup and O'Neill 2016b: 1471).

The research also demonstrates that the media in Tanzania are not developed in terms of training. As a result, journalists are not able to identify important information for accountability on news concerning political, economic and politics issues. This confirms the argument by Uche (1991) that the majority of national media systems in Africa are not equipped with skills to cover social, economic and politics news effectively.

Findings discussed in this chapter demonstrated that most of the news which the press select as lead stories contains very little or no information for that could make the general population understand issues hindering development of average citizens. Such information could make the general population – both women and men – understand that they need to act so that the party and the politicians in state power

are accountable to ensure national resources benefit all citizens. The chapter which follows concludes this thesis by reflecting on the research's main findings and their implication for theory and practice. It also highlights the research contribution to knowledge and proposes the future areas of research.

Chapter Eight: Conclusion

8.0 Introduction

This thesis has examined the ways in which the Tanzanian media report news on social, economic and politics issues, and what the reasons are for the manner in which they report. The research was an opportunity to explore the way the changing political environment in Tanzania over time has been influencing media autonomy and consequently the general population's access to news about issues that affect the quality of life of average Tanzanians. What emerged from the findings is that the media is a contested space, just as development is a contested phenomenon. As a result, whoever gets into state power strives to limit media autonomy as a strategy to control the actions of the general population for them to achieve their development agenda and to maintain political power.

This concluding chapter presents the lessons from this study by first presenting the key findings of each of the four secondary research questions. Next, it discusses the implications of the findings for theory and practice. Then, it looks at the contribution of this study to the body of knowledge in the field. Lastly, it provides some suggestions for future research in which their findings could be used to transform the media industry in the sub-Saharan African countries.

8.1 The Research's Main Findings

This section presents the key findings of this research. Generally, what this study reveals is that in Tanzania, from the colonial period to the present, many things have changed in relation to Tanzanian media reporting of news about politics, economic and social issues affecting the general population. For example, the literacy of the Tanzanian media audience in terms of its ability to access and understand information delivered through media channels has changed. Similarly, media technologies in the context of gadgets used to disseminate information have changed in terms of types. However, the way the media professionals negotiate with or relate to politicians in state power in the process of investigating and reporting news on issues affecting interests of the general population – women and men –has remained almost the same. This gives credence to the notion that news focuses on issues concerning interests of powerful individuals, organisations or institutions (Harcup and O'neill 2016b: 1471). The key findings of each secondary question are

presented in this section which starts with the question focusing on the media constraints and opportunities in reporting development issues and the changes that have occurred over time.

8.1.1 What are the Key Constraints and Opportunities for the Tanzanian Media in Reporting Development Issues and how has this Changed Over Time?

This question was set to examine the opportunities and constraints which the media in Tanzania have experienced in covering news on economic, politics and social matters in the changing political context and media environment (literacy and technology) from colonial to contemporary times. The findings reveal that whoever got the chance to control the state power, has consistently controlled media autonomy, though the strategies used vary. The control of media autonomy started with the German colonisation of Tanganyika in 1890, through the post-colonial single-party political system with state-owned media until the contemporary period of multi-party politics. The purpose of controlling media autonomy has been to limit the general population's access to classified information which pro-citizen development-centred politicians and the general citizenry can use as a basis to call to account the ruling and governing elite. As the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) argues, 'information' is important to 'call governments to account' (UNDP 2016: 17). However, the degree to which the Tanzanian media autonomy has been controlled from colonial times to the present has varied depending on the literacy of the general population and the capacity of the media to reach a wider audience.

During German rule, the media were not a big threat to the rulers because technology evolution at that time had only brought about print media. Similarly, during this historical period, literacy amongst the general population was low. Hence, the majority of people – men and women – could hardly access, interact with and interpret information disseminated through the media that existed during that time: newspapers only. Moreover, because of physical constraints due to transportation, newspapers could not be distributed to a large part of the country. The content published in the newspapers, such as Msimulizi and Kiongozi, which were owned by faith-based organisations, was supportive of the German rulers' development agenda. Meanwhile, the privately owned Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung (DOAZ), which could investigate and report news exposing the wrongdoings of the ruling and

governing group could only be accessed by the very few Tanganyikans who understood German. Therefore, based on the explained media environment in that historical context, this thesis concurs with Iliffe's (1973) view that DOAZ editor Willy von Roy was prosecuted and jailed because the newspaper had published an article accusing a senior official in the German colonial regime in East Africa of being homosexual. This thesis disagrees with the other view which argued that the DOAZ was banned and its editor von Roy sentenced to jail because the newspaper had backed the concerns of labourers in the German commercial farms in Tanga region (Scotton 1978).

Under the British administration, especially after the 1940s, media constraints that limited the general population's access to critical media information on development issues changed. Media access challenges associated with physical reach and literacy (reading and understanding media text) had decreased. Technology advancement in communication which brought about radio broadcasts provided an opportunity for a wider audience, which in the past could not access print media because of literacy constraints and challenges in distribution. As discussed in Chapter Three, the radio established in Tanganyika at that time was owned by the British administration (Sturmer 1998; Mwakikagile 2009). However, to ensure that the majority of the Tanganyikan population could not access information that was critical to colonial powers, the rulers enacted laws that made it very difficult for content that focused on nationalist movements' activities to be broadcast over the radio.

Similarly, under the British administration, some newspapers published in Kiswahili, for instance Kwetu and Mwafrika, which were owned by nationalists, gave prominence to the anti-colonial economic, politics and social interest matters. The changes in ownership patterns to bring on board publications owned by nationalists, as well as the technology evolution that brought radio into existence, put the British administration at more risk than German rule. The reason being, more Tanganyikans could access and interpret information that the nationalist press published in Kiswahili which was detrimental to the colonial rulers. The media information helped the general population understand that the colonial foreign rulers were exploiting the Tanganyikans. Hence, laws restricting the media from investigating and publishing

classified information so that such information could not be accessed by the Tanganyikan masses, were more vital for the British administration than for the German rulers.

In the post-colonial period, during the three decades of single-party political system, the media were not a major threat to the state power elite as information which would expose the wrongdoings of the ruling and governing elite hardly penetrated the media. One reason for this was that there was no media diversity as the media were owned by the state and the ruling party alone. Importantly, these media were supportive of the pro-development agenda of the rulers and as a result they largely operated as an appendage of the government (Moshiro 1990).

However, in contemporary times when politics are competitive (multi-party politics), critical media have become a greater threat to politicians holding the state power than before. It seems that the media threat to the political party holding power since independence, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, has been increasing from one presidency term to another, especially after the introduction of multi-party politics and plural media in 1992. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, allowing private media ownership has changed the media landscape by widening audience access. As discussed in Chapter Three, by 1995, radio and television outlets became a phenomenon in a number of regional and district urban centres across the country (Shartiely 2005). By March 2012, 83 radio stations and 26 television outlets had been established in Tanzania mainland (Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority 2012).

Similarly, social media has become a reality phenomenon in the contemporary world. In Tanzania, literature shows that 13.8 percent of people using the internet interact with social media activities (Pfeiffer et al. 2014). Additionally, as discussed in Chapter Three, media policy has allowed the establishment of plural media channels, both print and broadcast, covering districts, regions and the nation. This has allowed many people to have more access to information on the social, economic and politics issues affecting their lives.

Secondly, literacy amongst the Tanzanians has been increasing steadily in the Kiswahili language as most young Tanzanians now have access to primary education. Kiswahili is the main medium of communication in the country. Government attempts to control media autonomy intensified after President John Magufuli came to state power in 2015. The critical perspective argues that restriction of media autonomy became more severe during Magufuli's presidency. One view posits that for the first time since multi-party elections began in Tanzania in 1995, there was a possibility of a government change during the 2015 general elections (Paget 2017a).

This trend, however, is likely to continue, unless major transformations take place in the laws that undermine media freedom and the political pressure that restricts the constitution-given freedom of speech. Similarly, it requires media outlets to change their traditional culture of getting a 'scoop' in competing for news markets. They need to converge in reporting development issues to improve the quality of reporting and reduce the vulnerability to attack when covering issues from the viewpoints which are not in favour of the politicians in state power.

The next subsection looks at the findings of the second question explored in this investigation.

8.1.2 What Kinds of Development Issues do the Tanzanian Media Report in their News With Prominence as Lead Stories, and What are the Views of Media Stakeholders on how these Issues are Reported?

The findings revealed contestation on the kinds of development issues that Tanzania's media report in a large proportion of issues given prominence as lead stories. Politics issues constituted the lowest proportion of the 10,371 news stories while social issues formed the largest number of these stories. However, politics issues specifically, which focused on the interests of the politicians in state power, dominated lead stories, especially those published on the Kiswahili newspapers' front pages. In contrast, social-related issues comprised the largest proportion of the total of 10,371 news stories examined in this inquiry. However, these issues constituted a smaller number of news stories reported as front-page lead stories. Yet the social-related stories reported issues of concern for the general population, such

as clean and safe water, roads, electricity, quality health care and quality education. Clean and safe water for example, is still a big problem in Tanzania as '63 percent of households have no access to piped water as the main source of drinking' (URT 2014: xii).

The media stakeholders provided contradicting views as to why the media report development issues in the way they do. The views included monetary rewards that reporters get from organisations commissioning journalists to report news from the projects they implement. This is more so especially when the media report social issues involving development activities implemented by social organisations receiving funds from foreign donors. Another view is that the media give prominence to politics matters because Tanzanian society considers politics to be the most successful career. Meanwhile, another noted a lack of investigative journalism because of restrictive media laws, poor professional skills and lack of financial capacity, and the media largely depend on advertisements as the key source of revenue.

The key findings of the third question which this inquiry answered are explored and presented in the following subsection.

8.1.3 Who are the Tanzanian Media News Sources on Development Issues and What are the Media Stakeholders' Views About Such Sources?

The findings revealed that the media rely very heavily on government affiliates as key news sources. More than 57 percent of the news sources of the 10,371 news stories examined in this thesis were government affiliates. This is a clear indication of dominance of the elite group as news sources for news stories on development issues. The media selected very few citizens as news sources on development issues. The media stakeholders provided diverse views regarding the dominance of the governing and ruling group as news sources for stories on development issues.

The media stakeholders interviewed provided varying views concerning such coverage. One view was that government-related institutions are the key implementers of national development policy. Another view noted that the media are owned by affiliates of people in state power. They argued that this kind of relationship allows political interference and in so doing it makes it difficult for media

professionals to frame stories on development issues from the viewpoint of ordinary citizens, civil society organisations and opposition politicians. They contended that the media avoid using frames that the ruling elite may construe as bad and end up being punished using media-repressive laws.

Nonetheless, another perspective posited that some media professionals focus on the views of the governing and ruling elite for their own personal interests to get presidentially appointed political posts. Additionally, the media stakeholders argued that media outlets had no policy to guide reporters on how to source stories on development matters, a strategy which, amongst others, could improve gender equality in the news. The findings show that female sources in the examined stories made up only 18 percent. The next subsection presents the key findings of the fourth question which this inquiry answered.

8.1.4 How do the Tanzanian Media Interpret News on Development Issues?

The findings show that the way in which 36 emblematic lead stories on social, economic and politics issues were framed, largely gave prominence to what government officials said on development issues. The findings suggest that journalists in Tanzania do not investigate and interpret information given by the ruling elite about development issues. As Scheufele and Tewksbury posit, framing is based on the assumption that how the issue is presented in news reports influences the way in which it is understood by audiences (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). This suggests that the audiences read these lead stories the way they were reported. Yet, most of these stories contained information that was questionable or untrue, which means that the audiences were misinformed.

8.2 The Implications of the Research Findings

This subsection discusses the theoretical and practical implications of the research findings, beginning with the theoretical implications.

8.2.1 Implications of the Findings in Theory

It is argued that Tanzanians usually depend on the media to investigate the social, economic and politics issues reported that affect their living standards. One potential implication of the findings of this study in theory is that in most cases, reporters were not able to investigate and interpret information on the development issues they

reported as lead stories. In most cases they just constructed lead stories based only on what was said by the news sources. Yet, most of the news sources were affiliated with state power and focused on development issues that promoted their status quo and interests. They did not focus on issues that promoted the development concerns of the average population. This finding, however, contradicts the theory used in this inquiry – framing. According to Robert Entman, the process of framing a news story involves selecting some aspects of a text and making them salient in order to ‘promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation’ (Entman 1993: 52).

On the contrary, as discussed in subsection 8.1.4, information selected and framed as key headlines in most of the 36 emblematic lead stories misinformed or could not inform the audience about the key problem and its cause. This suggests that journalists in Tanzania construct news on development issues based on the views of news sources without analysing them to get the information which they could use to construct stories worth promoting the living standards of most of the population. They do not make efforts to analyse what the news sources say on development issues and come up with their own interpretation based on facts so that they are able to inform the general population accordingly about a development issue and its root cause.

To address this challenge, more needs to be done to improve the quality of journalism training offered by journalism colleges. Moreover, media outlets/organisations ought to converge and plan in order to ensure that they are able to offer specialised training for journalists to be able to look at development issues from a critical perspective before they construct stories on an issue. The media outlets’ convergence in specialised training is vital because this study has established that currently media organisations in sub-Saharan Africa depend on foreign organisations to provide such training. Such institutions include the Thomson Reuters Foundation (TRF), the BBC and international organisations such as the World Bank. Others are the International Centre for Journalism, based in the United States, and the International Institute for Journalism (IJJ) based in Berlin, Germany (Schiffrin and Behrman 2011).

8.2.2 Implications of the Findings for Practice

One potential implication for practice is concerned with the finding which shows that news reporters in Tanzania demand rewards from news sources, a practice known locally as *mshiko* journalism, or regionally in Africa as *brown envelope* journalism (Skjerdal 2010). This means that Tanzanian journalists are not doing their normative public service job – the *watchdog* function – as expected in society.

When journalists demand rewards or any incentive from news sources, the practice not only makes their reporting biased but it also jeopardises the image of the entire media as independent institutions (the *fourth estate*) able to scrutinise government wrongdoings that undermine the living standards of Tanzanians. Since the media are mandated to provide an independent *watchdog* role on issues that undermine the development of all people in society, it ought to be credible not to receive rewards from news sources. However, one could contend that rejecting gifts and incentives contradicts the African culture of hospitality (Hasty 2005) or simply collides with the very basics of survival for media professionals which is to make ends meet. However, this thesis argues that *mshiko* journalism or *brown envelope* journalism can be contained provided the media in Tanzania and elsewhere in the developing world work as a converged communication industry that is committed to work for the better future of all Tanzanians. In this way, media organisations can monitor and mould journalists' ethical practices.

Another implication is based on a finding which clearly demonstrated that while the media are supposed to act as the *watchdog* of the government on behalf of the general population (Neelakantan 2010; Jebiril 2013; Cooke 2018), Tanzania's media largely work as appendages of the government because of repressive media laws and dependency on government-related advertisements as the key source of revenue. As a result, media in Tanzania are not able to report development issues in a manner that can inform the general population effectively on matters that require accountability. The finding suggested that most of the media in Tanzania do not make money for operationalisation of their activities.

This suggests that the media institutions in Tanzania are not organised as a business proposition. Instead they are running a very archaic business model in the communication industry. To get away from this model, for example, all newspapers

could pull their resources together to buy modern news printers as an industry to leverage their numbers. Although each company would like its newspaper(s) to be published on time, there is no need for each newspaper to have its own printing press which could be refurbished.

Furthermore, several newspapers could also collectively, instead of individually, procure all the inputs required in the printing process. Additionally, all newspapers could pool their resources together and invest in a delivery system, be it a van or any other means, instead of each organisation that owns a newspaper buying its own van, so having several vans going in the same direction but each carrying its own organisation's few copies of newspapers for the same reason – to reach markets.

By private press conversing in common sectors – publishing, printing, marketing, distribution and procurement – not only can they end the individualistic business model in which at the end of the day the newspapers ruin each other as no one makes good money out of the business, but become strong social institutions (fourth estate) able to play social responsibility of holding the power to account. However, where newspapers are converging to reduce costs in printing, procurement of printing materials and marketing, individual newspapers should compete in the production of quality investigative news on the development agenda.

Regarding the restrictive media laws, the association of Tanzanian media owners, the Editors Forum, the Media Council of Tanzania and other media fraternities in the country need to meet and strategise. The strategy could focus on the best way to educate the state elites on the negative impact of restrictive media laws and persuade them to review or repeal them. For example, instead of having several pieces of legislation the country could enact just two pieces of legislation. These include legislation which takes care of print media and legislation that encompasses electronic media but both laws realising the converged nature of the communication industry. Then, legislation that focuses on the creative industry, which takes on board various genres (not only film as it is now), that comes on board in the wake of the competition of digitalised communication.

After discussing the implications of the research findings in theory and practice, the next section explains the research contribution to the body of knowledge in the field.

8.3 Research Contribution to the Field

This study makes contributions to the field of media studies in three specific aspects. Firstly, the study contributes methodology to study media in a specific context: sub-Saharan African countries that were colonised. While there has been some research on the media in Africa, to our knowledge there has been little research that has used the analytical framework applied in this inquiry. Specifically, there is no one that used variables of media ownership, laws, finance and training to explore Tanzania's media autonomy and access in engaging with their normative social responsibility in reporting development issues for more than 100 years, from colonial to contemporary times. The use of this analytical framework has helped us to understand why Tanzania's media report development issues the way they do. Further, in relation to the rigour of research, no research on media engagement with development issues in Tanzania has interrogated such a large number of media outlets or such a large news sample or such a huge number of media professionals. As White argues, media research on the media in Africa is not rigorous since the sample size used tends to be small (White 2010). Additionally, no research has used multiple qualitative methods and interrogated four aspects of Tanzanian media. These are the ways the Tanzanian media in contemporary times interpret development issues: types of development issues, given prominence as lead stories, categories of people the media select most as news sources, the views of media professionals and media users on such reporting.

Secondly, this inquiry contributes to the field of media studies based on its focus. Few media studies that have been conducted in sub-Saharan African countries, specifically in contemporary times, have focused on journalism training (Schiffrin and Behrman 2011) and journalism ethics, and specifically on the issue of brown envelope journalism (Kasoma 2010; Mpagaze and White 2010; Nwabueze 2010; Skjerdal 2010; Mabweazara 2018), which in Tanzania is known as mshiko journalism. Little research has been done on how the media report news on development issues and the reasons for the way they report it. The results of this study can be used as an advocacy tool by media bodies in Tanzania, specifically the Media Council of Tanzania, Tanzania Editors Forum and Tanzania Media Fund to champion transformation in the ways in which the media frame news on development issues. When participating in this study several reporters and editors

expressed their hopes that the results of this study will help shape the future of the media industry in Tanzania in reporting development issues that affect the general population.

Thirdly, this study adds value to the theory about the media's normative social responsibility function in society to promote government accountability. The findings strongly suggest that the existence of plural media in Tanzania does not guarantee that they will cover development issues effectively. As discussed earlier, politicians in state power strive to own the media and control alternative media to limit the general population's access to information that can threaten their power. This clearly gives credence to the notion that the media, in contemporary times, are 'supporting those in power and subordinating the working people' (Gorman and McLean 2009: 3).

Having highlighted the contribution this study has made in the field; the next section makes proposals for future research.

8.4 Suggestions for Future Research

This last section makes some suggestions for future research, with the aim being to enhance further studies to improve media scrutiny so that governments in sub-Saharan African countries become accountable to the peoples' wellbeing. This is important because there are few 'accounts in the literature of day-to-day or lived reality of the mass media in sub-Saharan Africa' (Bourgault 1995: xii). The focus of this research on how the Tanzanian media report news on development issues and what the reasons are for the way they report was constructed taking into consideration the country's historical and contemporary contexts. Such contexts include the increasing state elite control of media autonomy to sustain their power by constraining the access of the general population to information about national development policy and wrongdoings of the ruling elites.

However, conducting an intercontinental study in sub-Saharan African countries on how media report development issues is necessary. This will enable more comprehensive understanding of the way the power elite in contemporary sub-Saharan African countries control media freedom for sustaining their power and status quo. Such research is important because the characteristics of news

organisations and reporters differ amongst sub-Saharan African nations and vary within a single country (Bourgault 1995; White 2010).

One variable for selection of a country to be included in the study could be those countries operating under multi-party democracy, but where there has been single-party dominance for more than 20 years. Another criterion could be those countries governed under multi-party politics since the 1990s, which have not experienced government turnover in terms of a change of political party in state power.

The findings could help in bringing about institutional changes in sub-Saharan African countries, both in terms of media ownership, training, financial and regulation challenges that hinder media development. For example, the findings of the research could encourage institutional reform in media training institutions. The reforms could strengthen media training to build journalism students' capacity to understand issues that affect prosperity of the general population and report them appropriately. The findings could also be used as an advocacy tool in encouraging the power elite in sub-Saharan African countries to repeal repressive laws that suppress media autonomy in reporting development issues that undermine the development agenda of the majority population. Further, the findings could propose strategies for improving the media's financial capacity in sub-Saharan African countries unlike currently where they largely depend on advertisements. This is what Getachew Engida, Deputy Director-General, UNESCO means by this assertion which suggests that 'We need a revolution in media' (Macharia 2015: 4).

9.0 References

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Appendix 1: Interview Guide

Study title	Tanzania's mainstream news media engagement with national development
Introduction	<p>a) Thanks respondent for granting an interview</p> <p>b) Assures respondent of confidentiality and anonymity</p> <p>c) Seek to confirm/know respondent's role in the organisation</p>
Questions for Media Outsiders (MOs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ What do you do for the media to report news on your organisation project(s) activities? ✓ What challenges do you face in getting your news stories reported in the media? ✓ What challenges do you think media professionals face in covering news on development issues? <p>(all the questions involved probing)</p>
Questions for media Insiders(MIs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Please explain in brief your journey to become a journalist/media proprietor (Editors and Reporters) <p>Reporters</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ What topics on development issues do you cover often? Why do you prefer to report such issues? ✓ What do you consider to be your key achievement so far in covering news on development issues? ✓ Could you provide an example? ✓ What challenges do you face in covering news on development issues? ✓ In your experience, between men and women who do you use more as news sources? Why? <p>Editors/media owners</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ In your experiences, what kinds of development issues do your media report news more than the others and why? ✓ What influences your decision in selecting news to be published as a lead story? ✓ What do you use as a guide for news sources? <p>Trainers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ What challenges does your training institution face in producing competent journalists? ✓ (all the questions probe to get examples etc)
Winding up interview	<p>i) Thank the participant and close the interview</p> <p>ii) Ask for opportunity for further clarification</p>