

Contesting Europe, contesting identity? An empirical study of party positioning on national and European identity, 1979-2009

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Abstract

As the EU's political powers expand, so do concerns about its impact on the traditions and identities of the member states. The prediction is that parties will try to capitalize on such concerns and compete over this cultural dimension of European integration. Collective identities will become decisive if and when political parties cue voters to perceive national identities as incompatible with European integration. Yet most extant research focuses on the effects of parties' general stance toward European integration, while the specific content of partisan messages remains unexplored; in consequence, we know little about if and how parties deliberately mobilise collective identities for or against European integration. By disaggregating party positions on Europe, this paper seeks to explore more closely to what extent parties appeal to national and European identities. Drawing on party manifesto data from the Euromanifestos Project (EMP), I examine the salience and determinants of national and European identity mobilization by national political parties in the EU 15 over the period 1979-2009. The empirical analysis finds only little evidence for an increase in the salience of national and European identity mobilization with on-going EU integration. Patterns of identity mobilization are shown to vary as a function of parties' ideological positions and political opportunities.

1. Introduction

How and to what extent are collective identities mobilised in the context of European integration? We have good reason to expect that national political parties play a key role in this respect.

Since the ratification of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, the European Union has increased in depth and scope, yet support for the integration project among citizens in the member states has not always followed suit (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007; Mikhaylov and Marsh 2009). In light of the apparent ‘constraining dissensus’ of public opinion (Hooghe and Marks 2009) the future of EU integration will depend on whether or not political elites succeed in gaining popular support for a growing number of EU policies. Within the nation state, policy-makers can normally rely on a shared ‘sense of community’ (Easton 1965, p.185), or *collective identity*, which facilitates political cooperation and lets the individual agree to collectively binding decisions even if these go against her immediate preferences. Whether EU citizens already share a similar sense of (European) community is open to question; ultimately, however, a common European identity will be indispensable if citizens in the member states are to accept that collectively binding decisions, and in particular decisions with redistributive consequences, are taken at the supranational level rather than domestically. The need for a common European identity thereby arises at a time when the European Union affects citizens more and more in their everyday lives, thus fuelling concerns for member states’ cultural traditions and national identities (McLaren 2004). For these reasons, group attachments and questions of collective identity are expected to become more important for citizens’ attitudes towards the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2009).

Public opinion and political attitudes do not form in a void, however. Research on opinion formation and issue framing shows the potential of political elites and mass media to sway public opinion. Political parties are among the most prominent sponsors of such issues frames (see Chong and Druckman 2007 for an overview of the concept of framing and framing effects; Zaller 1992). Following this logic, identity considerations gain greater influence on attitudes towards EU integration if and when they are mobilised by political parties (De Vries and Edwards 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2005; 2009).

Elite-mass linkages in EU opinion formation have been previously explored by authors assessing the influence of party elites on citizens’ attitudes towards EU integration (Franklin *et al.* 1994; Ray 2003; Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Steenbergen *et al.* 2007). The present analysis, in contrast, takes one step back and looks more closely at the party-side of the connection. That is, we are interested in the *contents* of party messages on EU-related

issues rather than the effects of these messages on attitudes towards EU integration. The aim is to explore if political parties engage in identity mobilisation in the debate over EU integration. The relevance of this question becomes clear if we reconsider one of the central assumptions behind party effects on mass opinion towards the EU: parties are expected to drive the importance of identity considerations for EU support by emphasising the links between national identity, European identity, and EU integration, thus encouraging citizens to think about EU integration in terms of their identification with the national and European community. A thorough test of the assumption requires that we look not only at the effects of identity considerations on EU support at the individual level, but also at the salience of national and European identity at the party level. Extant research on the substantive contents of party contestation over Europe examined parties' general stance on EU integration (e.g. Kriesi 2007), euro-critical party messages (e.g. Statham and Koopmans 2009), and references to specific policy areas and issues (e.g. Arnold and Pennings 2009; Pennings 2006). None of these analyses explores the specific salience of identity issues in party contestation. The present paper takes on this task by assessing to what extent parties highlight identity issues in their campaigns for European Parliament elections.

Do parties deliberately raise the salience of national and European identities in the public? Do they address questions such as who belongs to the national community, who is part of the community of Europeans, what do members of each community have in common and what sets them apart from other collectives? In other words, do parties take up questions that likely bring national and European identity considerations to the top of citizens' minds? These questions will be at the centre of the following analysis. Parties' efforts to increase the salience of the national and the European community as object of identification in the wider public with a view to influencing opinion towards EU integration will thereby be referred to as identity mobilisation.

As collective identities developed first within nation states, a popular assumption holds that parties will mobilise national identities *against* integration by framing the EU as a threat to the national community (De Vries and Edwards 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Kriesi *et al.* 2006). But while collective identities emerged first at the national level, the European Union now constitutes a political regime in its own right; as such, it forms an object of identification besides and above the national community and citizens in the member states have begun to identify with Europe (see, e.g., Bruter 2005; Citrin and Sides 2004; Fuchs forthcoming; Marks 1999). Hence, it may be an equally viable strategy for parties to mobilise a common *European* identity with a view to generating support *for* the integration project. For

a complete picture of how identity considerations are mobilised in the context of EU integration we thus need to examine both, national and European identities. To this end, the present paper examines the salience political parties assign to collective identities at the national and the European level in the run-up to European Parliament (EP) elections. The following questions are explored:

- To what extent do political parties engage in mobilising national or European identities?
- Have parties increased their efforts to mobilise national and European identities as the European Union has developed a genuine political structure in the wake of Maastricht?
- Which factors make parties more likely to either mobilise national identities or promote a collective European identity?

Party positions on issues of identity are analyzed based on the contents of party manifestos for European parliament (EP) elections in Western Europe (EU15) over the period 1979 to 2009. Building on previous research, the paper first develops a typology of patterns of identity mobilisation by political parties in the context of European integration. The second part of the paper assesses to what extent issues of national and European identity have become more salient in partisan competition over time and which factors determine the type of identity political parties predominantly promote. A concluding section discusses the implications of identity mobilisation for the integration project.

2. Identity as an issue in political conflict in past research on party positioning on EU integration

The present analysis of identity mobilisation by political parties builds on extant work on party positioning on EU integration and the dimensionality of the European political space. In contrast to previous work, however, we will narrow down the focus of analysis to identity issues as a distinct element of party positioning on EU integration.

Building on cleavage theory, the bulk of the literature on party positioning in the EU context assesses whether EU integration leads to new structural conflicts with potential for political exploitation, or, rather, is linked to existing dimensions of domestic political conflict (Hix 1999; Kriesi 2007; Marks and Wilson 2000; Marks and Steenbergen 2004). Empirical analyses show that European integration not only pits opponents and defenders of economic liberalization against each other, but also creates tensions between cultural liberals and advocates of national culture and sovereignty (Gabel and Hix 2004; Hooghe *et al.* 2002; 2004). This line of reasoning ties in with research considering EU integration as part of larger processes of globalization and denationalisation which intensify economic, political, and cultural competition between and within nation-states (Kriesi *et al.* 2006; 2008). The conflict over Europe thus has both an economic and a cultural dimension with the latter becoming more important for political competition over time (Hooghe *et al.* 2002; Kriesi *et al.* 2006; 2008).

Concerns for (national) identity are discussed as part of the cultural dimension of political conflict over EU integration; given their overall focus on the potential of EU integration as a new line of conflict, however, these analyses provide little empirical findings regarding the salience of identity issues in political contestation specifically. The lack of empirical studies of identity mobilisation by political parties stands in contrast to the ‘key importance’ (Kriesi *et al.* 2006, p.929) for political mobilisation that is attributed to identity issues in the theoretical debate. Two points in particular require further elaboration: first, more work is needed on the actual content of parties’ appeals to collective identities.¹ Second, previous analyses mostly concentrated on how political parties mobilise national identity considerations against EU integration and, in particular, on the role of radical right-wing

¹ Public opinion research on EU integration has previously discussed identity mobilisation by political parties as an example of partisan cueing. However, the contents of so-called party cues with regard to collective identities appear underspecified. Extant analyses of cueing effects operationalise party cues either by parties’ general stance on European integration as measured by expert ratings (Hooghe and Marks, 2004, 2005; Steenbergen *et al.*, 2007), by the presence of right-wing parties in a party system (Netjes and Edwards, 2005), or by a combination of both (de Vries and Edwards, 2009). However, a party’s general position on EU integration appears too crude a measure if we are interested in how parties frame the particular issue of identity and attempt to mobilise tensions between identity and integration.

parties in this regard. Yet the focus on national identity neglects the flip-side of identity formation in Europe, namely the emergence of a collective European identity. Claims that parties promote above all national identities require an analysis of the relative weight that parties give to identities at different levels – do parties describe attachments to the nation as irreconcilable with EU integration, thereby promoting the type of exclusively national identity that is thought to thwart popular support for the EU? Or do parties (also) appeal to identifications with the European community so as to generate support for EU integration? These questions require, first, a more thorough discussion of the concept of identity mobilisation, and, second, a discussion of the factors which make parties more likely to engage either in the mobilisation of national identity or the mobilisation of a collective European identity.

To this end, the next section develops an operational concept of collective identity and identity mobilisation on which the empirical analysis will draw. A subsequent section formulates expectations with regard to patterns of identity mobilisation by political parties in the context of EU integration.

3. Conceptualizing collective identities in the EU context

Following Fuchs (forthcoming), the identity of a collective can be analysed at two ‘levels’: first, at the level of community, in terms of citizens’ subjective feeling of belonging together as a group with a common political structure and a common political fate (Easton 1965); second, at the level of the contents, in terms of shared beliefs regarding the criteria for defining and describing an individual’s membership in the group, the group’s common interest and experience, as well as the communalities shared by group members (Brewer 2001; Klandermans and de Weerd 2000). Social and political elites are expected to play a key role in defining these contents by generating and communicating specific ideas, news or symbols (Bruter 2003; Marcussen *et al.* 1999). Consensual representations of the community eventually become embedded in institutions, symbols and cultural understandings, and internalized by individual members through socialization processes, making collective identities relatively resistant to change (Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Marcussen *et al.* 1999; Risse 2000).

The beliefs and representations underlying collective identities are context-specific and can only be empirically assessed; in the case of collective national and European

identities, we would thus have to analyse the representations of national community established in each member state as well as the different representations of the European community, a task that is beyond the scope of this paper. In contrast, the present analysis approaches the question of identity formation from a slightly different angle. The objective is not to determine the specific *contents* of member states' national identities and/or a common European identity, but how national and European identities gain *salience* among EU citizens and which role political parties play therein. I argue that it is possible to specify at a more abstract level which types of beliefs must be salient in a community in order to establish a common identity, and how political elites, and in particular political parties, are able to raise the salience of these beliefs among citizens. The assumption is that, in order to influence citizens' identification with the national or European community, parties need to emphasise particular topics and convey messages of a particular type. In brief, rather than asking what it means, substantively, to be German, French, Italian or European, the central question is how political parties make the national and European collectives salient as political communities and objects of identification for citizens in the member states.

Processes of collective identity formation and the mobilisation of identity for collective action have been studied extensively in social movement research (for overviews, see, e.g., Hunt and Benford 2004; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Snow and McAdam 2000). I will use insights from this literature as a starting point for the analysis of identity mobilisation in the context of European integration.

Collective identity formation in social movement research

For social movement research collective identities are socially constructed and can be defined as the 'shared representations of the group based on common interests and experiences' (Brewer 2001, p.119; similar Taylor and Whittier 1992, p.172). Typically, these representations include shared norms, values and ideologies, common criteria for group membership as well as agreed upon definitions of the group's boundaries (see, e.g., Brewer 2001; Johnston *et al.* 1994; Klandermans and de Weerd 2000). Collective identities are seen to result from the interrelated processes of boundary construction and the development of group consciousness (Hunt and Benford 2004; Klandermans and de Weerd 2000; Taylor and Whittier 1992; 1995). Boundary construction implies the designation of (putative) differences between members of the in-group and members of the out-group; the objective is to demarcate a particular group of individuals from others and create a sense of who group

members *are* – the ‘us’ or collective self – and who they are *not* – the ‘them’ or collective other (Hunt and Benford 2004). Group consciousness in the sense of an awareness of ‘togetherness’ may stem from engagement in collective action on behalf of the group; potentially more important are framing processes which strengthen collective identities “by situating or placing relevant sets of actors in time and space and by attributing characteristics to them that suggest specifiable relationships and lines of action” (Hunt *et al.* 1994, p.185; see also Hunt and Benford 2004; Snow and McAdam 2000). While principally all members of the collective may engage in ‘identity talk’ (Hunt and Benford 1994), prominent social and political actors such as political parties, members of government, or movement leaders are likely to dominate framing processes via media appearances, political campaigning, public pronouncements and participation in public debates (Klandermans 1997; Snow and McAdam 2000). For the individual, identity talk constitutes a ‘pool of collective beliefs’ (Klandermans 1997, p.44) to draw on when considering issues of group membership, group boundaries and the norms and values shared by its members.

How may the insights of social movement research inform the analysis of identity mobilisation by political parties in the context of EU integration? From a general point of view, we can infer from the above that a group’s collective identity will be stronger if the group’s boundaries and membership criteria are more salient among group members and the more members share an awareness of belonging together as a group with a common fate. With regard to the *mobilisation* of collective identity, we can infer that identity mobilisation takes place to the extent that political actors deliberately promote processes of boundary construction and the development of a common group consciousness. This implies, on the one hand, that political actors specify the group’s properties and define criteria for group membership so as to render the collective ‘us’ salient in the general public; on the other hand, political actors need to demarcate the collective ‘us’ from the collective ‘other’ so as to recall the in-group’s distinctiveness vis-à-vis those who have different values, beliefs, and practices and therefore do not belong to and potentially conflict with the in-group.

Applying these conclusions to the context of EU integration, parties will increase the salience of collective national and European identities in the wider public by making citizens aware of the criteria for membership in the national and/or European group and demarcating the collective ‘us’ – be it national or European – from outsiders. The following section discusses in more detail how parties engage in mobilising national and European identity with a view to influencing public opinion towards EU integration.

Partisan mobilisation of collective identities in the context of EU integration

The contentious relationship between collective identities at the national and European level and the implications of identity for EU integration provide opportunities for politicisation and political mobilisation. I expect parties to promote either a collective European identity or a strong national identity to legitimise or de-legitimise EU integration. Denouncing European integration as harmful to the national community is a way for parties to articulate a conflict between national identity and supranational integration and thus mobilise citizens against EU integration; on the other hand, portraying the European community as a distinct and desirable group is a way for parties to encourage citizens' identification with the European level and, in turn, strengthen support for the European integration project.

The two levels of political community co-existing within the European Union – national and European – make room for two strategies of identity mobilisation in the context of EU integration: first, mobilising national identity; second, mobilising a common European identity. Mobilising national identity entails a clear demarcation of the nation and the defence of the national 'way of life' against external influence, be it from Europe or other non-members of the nation; the criteria for membership in the national community and the related affects and evaluations exclude feelings of belonging to the wider community of Europeans. Accordingly, national identity will be mobilised to the extent that parties emphasise the national community as a distinct group while downplaying the European community and depicting national attachments as incompatible with identifications with the community of Europeans. Likewise, national identity is mobilised when parties advocate the view that the common interests and experiences of the national community do not extend to and potentially conflict with those of the European collective and vice versa - you can either be a committed Brit or a committed European, but your identification with Europe will necessarily weaken your loyalty to Britain and vice versa. By promoting such an exclusive concept of national identity parties are able to appeal to citizens who see their position threatened by the integration process because they lack the necessary skills and resources to succeed in an integrated Europe. Often, these citizens have few sources for pride and self-respect other than the national community (Kriesi 2009). Exclusive conceptions of national identity allow parties to capitalize on these anxieties; by portraying the nation as a tight community with distinct qualities they can offer a refuge to those unsettled by the uncertainty of social and economic change coming with integration.

By contrast, mobilising European identity implies highlighting the distinctiveness of the European collective while paying less attention to the national level. It requires parties to

set Europe apart in the global community, implying strict rules for membership in the community of Europeans in defence of a 'European way of life'. European identity will be mobilised to the extent that parties promote a sense of belonging at the European level through references to a common 'Europeanness' and common experiences and interests which demarcate EU citizens from members of other collectives. A crucial question in this regard is the definition of group boundaries. Given that, by definition, the wider community of Europeans is inclusive of the populations of the member states, it is hard to conceive of the European collective as a community apart from and excluding the national communities. Consequently, an exclusive understanding of European identity does not necessarily entail a strict demarcation of the European collective from the national level; rather, it should be seen as an expansion of the idea of exclusive national identities to the level of the EU. As such, it primarily implies boundaries between the collective of EU members on the one hand and non-EU member states on the other. I argued above that exclusive national identities hold promise for people who feel disadvantaged by the integration process. By the same token, highlighting the European community as a distinct group and promoting a European-wide identity is a means for parties to appeal to the beneficiaries of integration, i.e. those citizens who possess the necessary qualifications to compete on an integrated market and/or hold culturally liberal values that resonate well with the supranational project.

So far, we ignored the possibility of multiple identities, that is, identifications with both the national and the European community. Following the above logic, mobilising multiple identities implies that parties at the same time emphasise the nation and Europe as objects of collective identification. To this end, national and European community would need to be portrayed as concurring rather than competing. We will not further explore the potential for multiple identity mobilisation, however, and concentrate on the two clear-cut cases of European identity on the one hand and national identity on the other. The decision to focus on the two distinct types of identity is based on the expectation that, for several reasons, parties will promote exclusive types of identity rather than multiple identifications: first, for parties seeking to capitalize on issues of identity to de-legitimise EU integration, it is easier to invoke a conflict between national identity and supra-national decision-making if the gap between the level of community (nation) and the level at which decisions affecting this community are taken (EU) is clear and unambiguous. Exploiting the conflict between identity and integration would arguably be harder if parties allowed for multiple identifications and encouraged feelings of belonging to both European and national communities. Likewise, parties seeking

to strengthen support for EU integration will likely focus on promoting feelings of belonging to the European community rather than appeal to national identities too as the latter may conflict with supra-national decision-making. What is more, parties have an interest to adopt a clear-cut position on issues of identity so as to deliver a coherent message to voters and distinguish themselves clearly from rival parties. Previous research shows that the effect of parties on voter position on EU integration is indeed greater when parties are internally united on the issue and take a clear pro- or anti-integration stance (Ray 2003). Finally, concentrating on the mobilisation of exclusive national or European identities appears justified from a methodological point of view: by focusing on the exclusive categories of identity as the 'extreme' cases we provide a more rigorous test of claims that identity issues have become more important for partisan competition over EU integration than if we considered just any kind of reference to collective identity.

4. Political parties and patterns of identity mobilisation

A number of propositions can be formulated regarding patterns of identity mobilisation by political parties in the context of EU integration. Whether parties promote national or European identity is likely to vary as a function of parties' ideological predispositions and strategic considerations as well as the specific contextual circumstances in which parties compete.

A first set of expectations points to the ideological bases of national and European identity mobilisation by political parties. Mainstream political parties typically support European integration (Hix 1999; Hooghe *et al.* 2002; Marks *et al.* 2002), yet take diverging positions regarding the economic and cultural dimension of the integration process (Helbling *et al.* 2010). Social democratic parties on the centre-left tend to criticise market liberalisation and economic integration for its negative consequences for social security and social justice; in line with the left's international traditions, however, these parties can be expected to endorse the cultural dimension of integration. Similar arguments can be made for Green parties which are typically in favour of cultural integration (Helbling *et al.* 2010; Kriesi *et al.* 2006). The overall support for the integration process by the centre-left and their generally positive view of the cultural dimension of integration leads us to expect that Social democratic parties and Green parties promote a collective European identity.

Hypothesis 1: Social democratic parties are more likely to mobilise European identity than national identity.

Hypothesis 2: Green parties are more likely to mobilise European identity than national identity.

In contrast to the centre-left, right-wing parties tend to favour market liberalisation but are traditionally more concerned with the cultural and social integrity of the national community (Helbling *et al.* 2010; Kriesi 2007). Some variation is to be expected within the political right, however. More than any party family, Christian Democrats have been associated with the origins of European unification (Marks and Wilson 2000). This involvement makes them natural supporters of the integration process, typically taking an intermediate position with regard to both cultural and economic dimensions of EU integration (Kriesi 2007). For the same reasons, we expect Christian democratic parties to mobilise a collective European identity. Conservatives, on the other hand, are usually more weary of cultural integration as a result of nationalist factions and strong concerns for national sovereignty present within these parties (Marks and Wilson 2000). As a result, conservative parties are expected to mobilise national identity rather than a common European identity.

Hypothesis 3: Christian democratic parties are more likely to mobilise European identity than national identity.

Hypothesis 4: Conservative parties are more likely to mobilise national identity than European identity.

As within the right, different currents can be distinguished within the liberal party family (Kriesi 2007; Marks and Wilson 2000). While generally supportive of market liberalisation, parties within the liberal camp tend to diverge with regard to their positions towards political and cultural integration; in effect, radical liberals are typically more favourable to the non-economic dimensions of EU integration than their liberal-conservative counterparts (Marks and Wilson 2000). Given liberals' general approval of supranational integration and the classic liberal heritage valuing social and cultural openness, they are likely to mobilise a collective European identity.

Hypothesis 5: Liberal parties are more likely to mobilise European identity than national identity.

Parties at the extremes of the political spectrum are generally more critical of EU integration than the political mainstream, albeit for different reasons. Radical parties on the right typically frame their opposition toward EU integration in terms of a defence of the national community against immigrants and the social and cultural competition caused by the removal of national borders (Kriesi *et al.* 2006; Kriesi 2007). Accordingly, they are highly likely to emphasise the national identity and clearly demarcate the national group from and within the wider European community. Opposition to the EU by the radical left, in contrast, is mainly based on economic grounds and the threat EU integration poses to social achievements within the nation state (Kriesi *et al.* 2006; Kriesi 2007; Marks *et al.* 2002). These parties are expected to be more favourable to cultural integration, however, as a result of the left's internationalist traditions and the EU's potential to lower cultural boundaries (Helbling *et al.* 2010; Kriesi 2007). As a result, we expect radical left-wing parties to promote a common European identity rather than national identity.

Hypothesis 6: Parties on the extreme right are more likely to mobilise national identity than European identity.

Hypothesis 7: Parties on the extreme left are more likely to mobilise European identity than national identity.

A second set of expectations can be derived from parties' political opportunities and their access to and participation in decision-making processes at the national and European level. With regard to parties' overall stance on EU integration, parties with only limited access to the European decision-making process, i.e. opposition parties and sub-national party actors, have been shown to be more critical of EU integration than government parties which are directly involved in EU council negotiations and more easily gain access to EU institutions (Statham and Koopmans 2009). In a similar logic, we can expect government parties to promote a common European identity. Government parties participate in decisions at the EU level and need to 'sell' these decisions to the national electorate. Emphasising membership in a European wide community and promoting a common European identity thereby is a way of defending potentially contentious EU decisions domestically.

Hypothesis 8: Parties in government are more likely to mobilise European identity than national identity.

Third, we might expect cross-national differences in party emphases on national and European identity issues. We thereby expect a kind of socialisation effect based on when a party's country of origin joined the EC/EU. For the six original member states, the decision to join the European communities was closely connected to the objective of avoiding another war on the continent and to dampen any extreme form of nationalism in the future. Given this specific historic trajectory, we expect parties from these countries to be more likely to emphasise the European community dimension than parties from later accession countries where economic interests may have played a greater part in the decision to join the EC/EU. What is more, parties from the original member states have had more opportunities to participate in and adapt to the EU political system; as a result of their greater experience within the EU system, they are expected to put more emphasis on European identity building than 'later-comers' to the EU political process.

Hypothesis 9: Parties from the six EC founding states are more likely to mobilise European identity than national identity.

5. Data and operationalisation

Party positions on issues of identity will be analyzed using national party manifestos for European parliament (EP) elections in fifteen EU member states² for the period 1979 to 2009. Data on the relevant party manifestos has been provided by the Euromanifestos project (EMP) at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES).³ The Euromanifestos project codes manifestos of all parties which have been represented in the European parliament at least once. Overall, the data set used here includes information on 600 manifestos issued by 209 national parties in the run-up to seven EP elections from 1979 to 2009.⁴

Manifesto data lends itself in particular to examining party positions on specific issues over time. Because manifestos are devised in extensive debate and negotiations within the party and usually are ratified by party conventions, these documents enjoy authoritative and representative status for party policy at the time of publication (Budge 1987). From a party

² Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK.

³ For more information on the EMP, see the project homepage at <http://www.ees-homepage.net>. For the 1979-2004 manifesto studies see the documentation by Braun *et al.* (n.d.), Wüst and Schmitt (2007), and Wüst and Volkens (2003). For the 2009 manifesto study, see the PIREDEU project homepage at <http://www.piredeu.eu> and the documentation by Braun *et al.* (2010).

⁴ By-elections in new member states, i.e. first elections after a country joined the EU such as in Sweden in 1996, have been omitted from the analysis.

perspective, elections manifestos help maintain discipline within the party by defining the official party line to which individual party members are expected to toe. From the perspective of the electorate, election manifestos are important indicators of parties' political ideas and policy goals. This is true even if few people actually read electoral programmes themselves because the contents of manifestos are spread via the mass media, forming the basis for debate over parties' policy proposals and questions raised with party candidates in the campaign. Research by the Manifesto Research Group provides evidence that party manifestos are indeed one of the major indirect influences on voters' perceptions of what parties are standing for (Budge 1987). On this basis, manifesto data appears a fruitful source for assessing the extent of identity mobilisation by political parties: on the one hand, in terms of the contents of party competition, because given their representative status for parties' programmatic orientation, we should observe an increase in references to issues of identity and related considerations in party manifestos if issues of identity have indeed become more important for political contestation in the EU context; on the other hand, with regard to the presumed effects of party competition, because if voters' perceptions of party positions can indeed be traced back to manifestos, parties' influence on the salience of national and European identity in citizens' minds will also be a result of what parties say about these issues in their electoral programmes.

What is more, parties issue novel programmes ahead of each election making it possible to explore how the salience of identity issues for political parties has evolved over time and compare parties not only at any one election but also from one election to another. The potential for cross-temporal analyses is one of the major advantages of manifesto data over expert surveys of party placements which typically capture more long-standing ideological positions and appear less suited to observing dynamics in party positioning (McDonald and Mendes 2001). Given the prominent argument in the literature whereby parties' attempts to mobilise collective identities have increased in recent years (Hooghe and Marks 2009), such a diachronic design appears particularly suited for the purpose of the present analysis.

I analyze EP election manifestos rather than national electoral programmes as the former usually include more arguments related to issues of European integration, the European Union, and its policies and institutions (Wüst and Schmitt 2007). Hence, it is possible to assess the relative importance of identity considerations compared to other EU integration-related issues. What is more, with EP elections taking place simultaneously in all member states, parties issue their respective manifestos at roughly the same point in time;

thus, external conditions that may affect the salience of identity considerations, e.g. the debate on the Constitutional treaty or subsequent EU enlargement waves, can be held constant across countries. Analysing national parties' manifestos rather than Euro-Party programmes for EP elections allows us to detect variation in the salience attached to specific issues in different domestic contexts.

The Euromanifestos Project maintains the approach first developed by the Manifesto Research Group (MRG; see, e.g. Budge 1987) in focussing on the emphasis parties put on different issues as manifested by the number of arguments devoted to these issues in their electoral programmes. It deviates from a 'pure' salience approach, however, by registering not only the sheer number of references to a specific issue in a manifesto, but also the *direction* of references by coding whether parties adopt a pro- or con-position on the issue in question. Moreover, the EMP includes additional coding categories to capture parties' positions on European issues in more detail than the original MRG framework. Finally, the EMP coding scheme is 'mirrored' for different levels of government to determine whether a statement has an explicit focus on the party's country (national level), Europe or the EU/EC (supra-national level), or neither as the relevant political arena or political protagonist.⁵ Overall, the EMP coding scheme contains 170 different categories grouped into seven major policy domains (for details on the EMP coding scheme see Braun *et al.* 2010; Wüst and Volkens 2003; Wüst and Schmitt 2007).

Manifesto data has mainly been used to determine party positions on the Left-Right dimension (see e.g. contributions in Budge *et al.* 1987; Budge *et al.* 2001; Klingemann *et al.* 2006). More recent studies also relied on manifesto data to determine party positions on European integration (Marks *et al.* 2007; Netjes and Binnema 2007; Ray 2007). By measuring party positioning on a single dimension ranging from support for national independence to support for further EU integration, these analyses confound party positions on economic, political, and cultural aspects of EU integration. Therefore, these measures cannot be used for the purpose of the present analysis which seeks to assess whether parties (also) compete over questions of cultural traditions and collective identity that are separate from economic interests. Kriesi *et al.*'s analysis of the transformation of the national political space in the wake of globalisation (Kriesi *et al.* 2006) is one of the few studies investigating the components of the cultural dimension of political conflict over supranational integration;

⁵ The level of government is identified by two so-called meaning elements that may be part of an argument, namely the governmental frame (national government, EU/EC government, or world government/unspecific) and/or the policy scope (nation/sub-national entities, EC/EU/Europe, or world/unspecific). If only one meaning element is present, it defines the code; if both elements are present but do not suggest the same code, governmental frame beats policy scope (see Wüst and Volkens, 2003).

however, their measure for political mobilisation along the cultural dimension includes parties' stances on a variety of issues, including post-materialist values, cultural and social liberalism, EU integration, and immigration and security policies (Kriesi *et al.* 2006, pp.932-934). As a result, this measure is too broad to tap political mobilisation of national and European identities specifically.

Given the lack of adequate measures in the literature, I construct a novel measure of identity mobilisation by political parties based on selected coding categories of the EMP data. Items have been selected by applying the insights of social movement theory discussed above to the empirical analysis of party manifestos. I thereby assume that while different ideas may be associated with the concepts of national and European identity in specific time periods and/or countries, there is a core set of arguments which underlie identity mobilisation more generally. The assumption is that if parties are to have an influence on citizens' identifications and feelings of belonging to the national or European community, they need to emphasise particular topics and convey messages of a particular type. These are, on the one hand, messages which refer to and invoke an awareness of 'togetherness' or group consciousness among members of the community; on the other hand, messages which refer to and invoke the boundaries between the community and outsiders. Following this line of reasoning, it becomes possible to construct measures of national and European identity mobilisation which are sufficiently abstract to allow a comparison of parties' attempts at identity mobilisation over different time periods and across EU member states.

In this fashion, nine of the original 56 EMP coding categories have been retained to measure parties' attempts at mobilising national and European identities; six categories from the domain 'Fabric of society' and two from the domain 'Political system'. Table 2 indicates for each selected coding category which political arena (European or national) a manifesto statement refers to and whether it adopts a positive or negative position on the coded objective. The nine selected codes can be considered indicators for the mobilisation of a national or European identity in that they stand for the type of messages described above: they define criteria for membership in the national or European community and highlight the characteristics that are shared by national or European citizens (but not by others); in this way, these statements can be seen to promote an awareness of belonging together among national citizens or Europeans while at the same time, they call attention to the boundaries between the national or European community and other groups. Items are grouped, first, according to whether they emphasise the national community so as to mobilise national

identity considerations (upper half of table 1) or the wider community of Europeans, evoking a common European identity (bottom half of table 1).

The upper half of table 1 lists codes which pertain to the mobilisation of national identities.⁶ These are EMP Variables p1_601 (national way of life), p1_6021 (retaining national way of life in Europe), p1_608 (opposition to multiculturalism in country), and p1_606 (social harmony in country). Variables p1_601 and p1_608 are used as measures for the degree to which parties emphasise the dividing line between the national community and members of other groups: by promoting established national ideas (p1_601) and characterising the national community as a culturally homogenous group that requires foreigners to give up their religious, linguistic or cultural customs in order to assimilate with the host society (p1_608). Variables p1_6021 and p1_606, on the other hand, are used to measure the degree to which parties attempt to promote an awareness of togetherness and communality within the national community by emphasising the need to retain national customs in the process of EU integration (p1_6021) and calling for national efforts and solidarity (p1_606).

The bottom half of table 1 lists the corresponding codes for the mobilisation of a collective European identity. Variables p2_601 (European way of life) and p2_608 (opposition to multiculturalism in Europe) are used to measure the degree to which the European community is characterised as distinct from other groups, with a unique way of life and proper cultural traditions to which newcomers must adopt. Variables p2_302 (opposition to decentralisation of the EU), p2_3021 (support for the transfer of powers to the European level), and p2_606 (social harmony in Europe), on the other hand, are used as measures for the degree to which parties promote a European consciousness among EU citizens, namely by calling for a united Europe (p2_302) that enjoys sufficient competencies to act collectively (p2_3021) and whose members show their solidarity with the European community (p2_606).

By combining items referring to the national community on the one hand and the European community on the other, I construct measures of party positions on national and European identities so as to assess which types of identity are mobilised by different parties, in different countries, and at different points in time. Beforehand, however, it is necessary to establish whether the theoretical differentiation between national and European identity mobilisation is in fact empirically tenable. This is the focus of the following section.

⁶ In order to account for differences in the length of party manifestos, the EMP variables used here do not represent raw counts of the number of times a specific code has been used in a manifesto, but the *share* of arguments (in percentages) coded into a given category compared to the total number of arguments in a manifesto.

Table 1: Constructs and indicators of party positioning on national and European identity

Construct/ Indicators					
EMP Var #	Governmental frame	EMP Domain	EMP Code	Direction	Description ^a
National identity					
p1_601	National	Fabric of society	National way of life	positive	Appeals to patriotism/nationalism; support for established national ideas
p1_608	National	Fabric of society	Multiculturalism in country	negative	Support for enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration in manifesto country
p1_606	National	Fabric of society	Social harmony in country	positive	Appeals for national effort and solidarity in manifesto country
p2_6021	Europe	Fabric of society	Retaining national way of life in Europe	positive	Emphasis on need to retain national way of life and national cultures in Europe or the EC/EU
European identity					
p2_601	Europe	Fabric of society	European way of life	positive	Appeals to European way of life, the Occident, or Western Civilisation
p2_608	Europe	Fabric of society	Multiculturalism in EU	negative	Support for enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration in Europe, the EC/EU
p2_606	Europe	Fabric of society	Social harmony in EU	positive	Appeals for a common effort and solidarity in Europe, the EC/EU
p2_302	Europe	Political System	Decentralization of EU	negative	Support for more unitary Europe and more Europeanisation
p2_3021	Europe	Political System	Transfer of power to EU	positive	Support for transfer of power and competences to the EC/EU

^aDescription of codes correspond to the descriptions provided in the original Euromanifestos coding scheme (see Braun *et al.* n.d.).

Dimensions of identity mobilisation in party manifestos

Our theoretical expectation is that political parties adopt a clear-cut position on identity issues and seek to mobilise *either* a collective national *or* a collective European identity. Accordingly, EMP coding categories were identified theoretically as indicating either a strategy of national identity mobilisation or a strategy of European identity mobilisation. I conduct explanatory factor analysis to establish whether national identity items on the one hand and European identity items on the other indeed hang together. The expectation is that parties jointly emphasise either national identity categories or European identity categories resulting in high correlations among national identity items on the one hand and high correlations among European identity items on the other (but low correlations between national and European identity items). The results of the explanatory factor analysis are reported in table 2.

Table 2: Dimensions of party positions on issues of national and European identity

Constructs and indicators	Components			
	1	2	3	4
<i>National identity</i>				
p1_601 National way of life (positive)	.726			
p1_608 Multiculturalism in country (negative)	.805			
p1_606 Social harmony in country (positive)			.772	
p2_6021 National way of life in Europe (positive)			.772	
<i>European identity</i>				
p2_601 European way of life (positive)				.859
p2_608 Multiculturalism in EU (negative)	.412			.572
p2_606 Social harmony in EU (positive)		.677		
p2_302 Decentralisation of EU (negative)		.787		
p2_3021 Transfer of power to EU (positive)		.458		

Note: Principal component analysis with varimax rotation; explained variance: 56 %; blanks indicate loadings <0.3; N=600, constructs and indicators refer EMP variables and codes with direction of codes in parentheses; for a description of the coding categories see table 1.

Source: Euromanifestos 1979-2009

Overall, four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.00 are extracted. Two of these (components one and three in table 2) reflect concerns related to the national community while the other two (components two and four) reflect issues pertaining to the European community. The first ‘national’ factor (component one) is composed of support for the national way of life and opposition to multiculturalism within the country while the second (component three) is composed of support for social harmony in the country and the conservation of the national way

of life within Europe. Referring to the European level, one factor (component two) is composed of the three items social harmony in Europe, opposition to decentralisation of the EU, and support for the transfer of competences to EU institutions while the other one (component four) combines support for a European way of life and opposition to multiculturalism in Europe.

The results of the factor analysis show that parties not only distinguish between issues related to the national community on the one hand and the European community on the other; rather, a further differentiation is made between cultural and socio-political aspects of national and European community. Concerning cultural aspects of identity mobilisation, we observe notable parallels between national and European levels. Both times, one factor is extracted that reflects demands for internal cultural homogeneity and the predominance of established national or western ideas. Given the emphasis on cultural integration into the host society, be it national or European, we term these factors ‘national cultural protectionism’ (component one) and ‘European cultural protectionism’ (component four) respectively. The relatively high loadings of the item ‘opposition to multiculturalism in Europe’ on the first factor can also be interpreted in this light. Parties advocating cultural homogeneity at the national level appear to extend this position to the European community. This is plausible if we think of Europe as synonymous with a cultural sphere - ‘the Occident’ - to which the fifteen EU member states analysed here historically belong. The two remaining factors (components two and three) both reflect socio-political concerns, but with distinct focuses at the national and European level. Given the emphasis on national solidarity and the defence of the national way of life in Europe, component three will be termed ‘national societal autonomy’; in contrast, component two more strongly reflects political aspects with an emphasis on a stronger political union (Europeanisation) and European-wide solidarity. It will therefore be termed ‘European political unification’.

In line with our initial expectation, parties can be distinguished in terms of emphases on issues related to national and European identity, making the differentiation between national and European identity mobilisation in party campaigning plausible. The following section turns to the empirical analysis of the salience parties attach to issues of national and European identity in political conflict and assesses the scope of national and European identity mobilisation over time and for different member states and party families. Given that more than two dimensions have emerged in factor analysis, we start by examining the different aspects of identity mobilisation in the context of EU integration separately. To this end, we construct four additive scores based on the components derived above. In addition, total national and European identity scores are constructed aggregating all four variables referring to the national community and all five

variables referring to the European community respectively. Thus, two sets of three indices each will be used in the following analyse: the first three indices, termed ‘national cultural protectionism’, ‘national societal autonomy’ and ‘total national identity’, are constructed from the four variables capturing concerns for the national community (upper half of table 1); the second set, termed ‘European cultural protectionism’, ‘European political unification’, and ‘total European identity’, are constructed from the five variables capturing concerns for the European community (bottom half of table 1).⁷ Thus, the salience of national identity and its sub-dimensions as an issue in political conflict is defined by the total share (in percentages) of a party’s manifesto dedicated to questions of national community; likewise, the salience of European identity and its sub-dimensions is reflected by the total share of a party’s manifesto dedicated to questions of European community.

6. Empirical findings

The following section provides empirical evidence on the extent to which political parties engage in national and European identity mobilisation and the types of collective identity prevailing in different countries and among parties from different ideological families. It further analyses whether identity mobilisation by political parties is related to parties’ ideological position, participation in government, and the length of time their country of origin has been a member of the European community. We start with a descriptive account of the salience that parties have attached to issues of collective identity since the first direct elections to the EP in 1979. A second part analyses which factors make parties more likely to mobilise national or European identity respectively.

The salience of national and European identity mobilisation in party manifestos

The first objective of this paper is to compare the relative salience of identity-related issues for party competition in EU member states. Over the whole period under analysis, national political parties appear to devote comparatively little space to issues of national and European identity in their EP election manifestos (see table 3).

⁷ ‘national cultural protectionism’ is the additive score of EMP variables p1_601 and p1_608; ‘national social autonomy’ is the additive score of EMP variables p1_606 and p2_6021; ‘total national identity’ is the additive score of EMP variables p1_601, p1_608 p1_606, and p2_6021; analogously, ‘European cultural protectionism’ is the additive score of EMP variables p2_601 and p2_608; ‘European political unification’ is the additive score of EMP variables p2_606, p2_302, and p2_3021; ‘total European identity’ is the additive score of EMP variables p2_601, p2_608 p2_606, p2_302, and p2_3021.

Table 3: Salience of identity mobilisation in EP election manifestos by year (in percent)

Year	National identity						European identity						Total		Diff.		No. of coded manifestos/arguments
	National cultural protectionism		National societal autonomy		Total national identity		EU cultural protectionism		EU political unification		Total European identity		EU + national identity		EU - national identity		
	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	
1979	0.8	2.0	0.2	0.8	1.1	2.3	0.9	2.0	1.7	2.8	2.6	3.7	3.7	4.3	1.5	4.5	38/ 12 889
1984	1.2	3.9	0.5	1.5	1.7	4.2	0.4	1.0	1.6	2.4	2.1	2.9	3.7	4.7	0.4	5.5	41/ 17 763
1989	0.9	2.6	0.9	4.3	1.8	5.5	1.3	3.3	1.0	1.8	2.3	3.8	4.1	6.7	0.5	6.7	63/ 21 513
1994	1.2	3.4	0.7	3.4	1.9	5.0	0.9	1.8	1.0	1.5	1.9	2.3	3.8	5.4	0.0	5.6	85/ 33 594
1999	0.6	1.5	0.6	2.3	1.2	2.8	0.7	1.6	1.4	1.9	2.1	2.6	3.3	3.5	0.9	4.0	114/ 38 555
2004	0.6	1.9	0.4	1.1	1.0	2.3	0.8	2.6	1.2	1.9	2.0	3.1	3.0	4.1	1.0	3.6	137/ 58 796
2009	0.5	1.5	0.5	1.1	1.0	2.1	0.6	1.7	1.2	1.5	1.8	2.2	2.8	3.1	0.8	2.9	122/ 58 885
<i>Total 1979-2009</i>	<i>0.8</i>	<i>2.3</i>	<i>0.5</i>	<i>2.3</i>	<i>1.3</i>	<i>3.4</i>	<i>0.8</i>	<i>2.1</i>	<i>1.3</i>	<i>1.8</i>	<i>2.0</i>	<i>2.9</i>	<i>3.3</i>	<i>4.4</i>	<i>0.7</i>	<i>4.5</i>	<i>600/ 241 995</i>
Eta ²	.01		.01		.01		.01		.01		.01		.01		.01		
F	1.08		.56		1.06		1.15		1.51		.60		1.01		.73		

Note: Entries are percentage shares of arguments falling in the respective category relative to the total number of arguments coded for one year (all party manifestos combined). Total EU+national identity gives the additive scores of shares EU identity plus shares national identity. Diff. EU-national identity gives the subtractive scores of shares EU identity minus shares national identity in a party manifesto. *= $p < 0.05$ **= $p < 0.01$ ***= $p < 0.001$

Source: Euromanifestos 1979-2009.

On average, about 3% of manifesto statements can be related to parties' attempts at mobilising collective national or European identities with appeals to a common European identity (2.0%) exceeding attempts to strengthen national identities (1.3%). The overall salience of identity issues thereby has remained fairly stable over time, reaching a peak of 4.1% in 1989 and decreasing to 2.8% in the last election campaign 2009. Similarly, the space devoted to the mobilisation of national and European identities respectively has seen only minor fluctuation, with concerns for national identity being most salient (1.9%) in 1994 while party support for a common European identity was most significant in 1979 (2.6%). Overall, these initial findings provide little support for claims that on-going political integration at the EU level has been reflected by a new focus on a non-economic dimension of political conflict related to issues of group membership and associated values. The fact that the salience of identity issues in party manifestos is not significantly related to the time of the campaign also points in this direction.

What is more, in all years under consideration, parties' emphasis on the European community exceeds references to the national community (see second to last column on the right of table 3). Remarkably, however, parties emphasise different dimensions of collective identity depending on whether they refer to the national or the European community. At the national level, parties emphasise cultural unity over national autonomy while we observe the inverse pattern at the European level: here, parties predominantly emphasise political unification over cultural homogeneity (see the first two columns for national and European identity respectively). Thus, while relying on demarcation along cultural lines when mobilising national identity, parties accentuate the political dimension of the European community when mobilising a common European identity.

Table 4: Salience of identity mobilisation in EP election manifestos by party family affiliation and government incumbency (in percent)

	National identity						European identity						Total		Diff.		No. of coded manifestos/arguments	
	National cultural protectionism		National societal autonomy		Total national identity		EU cultural protectionism		EU political unification		Total European identity		EU + national identity		EU - national identity			
	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.		
Party family																		
Greens	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.8	0.3	0.8	0.2	0.4	1.6	2.2	1.8	2.3	2.1	2.5	1.5	2.4	57/ 38 651	
(Post-)Communist	0.2	0.9	0.2	0.6	0.4	1.3	0.2	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.8	0.5	2.0	70/ 29 194	
Social Democrats	0.6	2.1	0.4	1.1	1.0	2.7	0.6	0.9	1.6	1.8	2.2	2.0	3.1	3.3	1.2	3.4	121/ 48 993	
Liberals	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.4	1.1	1.5	1.7	2.0	2.1	2.3	2.3	1.6	2.2	69/ 28 653	
Christian Democrats	0.8	1.6	0.5	1.4	1.3	2.1	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.8	3.0	3.7	4.3	4.0	1.7	4.4	73/ 21 721	
Conservatives	0.4	1.3	0.5	1.1	0.8	1.7	0.8	1.5	1.0	1.4	1.7	2.0	2.6	2.6	0.9	2.7	48/ 22 184	
Nationalist	4.4	5.1	1.5	2.6	5.9	6.4	2.4	5.1	0.4	1.1	2.8	5.2	8.7	8.3	-3.0	8.2	30/ 6 891	
Agrarian parties	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.0	0.1	2.3	4.2	2.4	4.2	2.8	4.4	1.9	4.2	7/ 2 389	
Regional parties	1.5	3.4	1.3	5.3	2.7	6.1	1.6	3.5	0.8	1.1	2.4	3.9	5.2	6.7	-0.3	7.7	86/ 30 060	
Special interest	0.4	1.2	0.5	1.4	1.1	1.9	0.5	1.4	0.3	1.1	1.0	1.8	2.1	2.6	-0.1	2.6	39/ 13 259	
Eta ²	.17***		.03*		.14***		.08***		.07***		.05**		.15***		.06***			
F	13.10		2.07		11.02		5.45		5.27		3.16		11.37		4.28			
Incumbency																		
Government party	0.4	1.2	0.3	0.8	0.7	1.4	0.9	2.5	2.1	2.5	3.0	3.5	3.8	4.1	2.3	3.3	143/58 606	
Eta ²	.01		.00		.01		.00		.06***		.04***		.01*		.13***			
F	2.25		.29		2.33		1.12		26.53		18.07		5.53		6.01			

Note: Entries are percentage shares of arguments falling in the respective category relative to the total number of arguments coded for the same party family (all years combined). Party family labels and classification of parties into party families follow EMP coding and are based on the founding period of the party (see Braun *et al.* n.d., p.49). Parties are classified as “parties in government” if they participated in the national government in the legislative period during which EP elections took place or, if national and European elections took place on the same date, in the legislative period prior to EP elections. Information on government incumbency for 2009 taken from the EES 2009 Contextual Data, Advance Release, 16/05/2010 (see www.piredeu.eu and the documentation by Czesnik *et al.* 2010). Information on other years taken from the Parliament and Government Composition Database (see parlgov.org and the documentation by Döring and Manow 2010). *= $p < 0.05$ **= $p < 0.01$ ***= $p < 0.001$

Looking at parties by ideological orientation, the results reported in table 4 confirm some of our initial expectations: overall, identity mobilisation is most prevalent among nationalist and regional parties followed by Christian Democrats and Social Democratic parties (see column total EU + national identity in table 4). As expected, with 5.9% of all statements, issues of national identity have the greatest salience for nationalist parties while issues related to European identity are most salient for Christian Democratic parties (3.0%). Remarkably, however, nationalist parties also come second in terms of the salience of the European community in party manifestos followed by agrarian and regional parties. Comparing the relative salience of national and European identity for individual party families, Greens, Social Democrats as well as Liberals and Christian Democrats all put more emphasis on a common European identity, in line with our initial expectations. To a lesser extent, this is also true for conservative parties which we initially expected to highlight national identity over a common European identity. At the national level, parties emphasise both dimensions of identity mobilisation more or less equally, the exception being nationalist parties which clearly highlight the cultural boundaries of the national community. These parties, and to a lesser extent regional parties, further extend cultural demarcation to the European level, putting more emphasis on European cultural homogeneity than political unity (2.4% to 0.4%). For all other party families, in contrast, the political dimension of unification prevails in European identity mobilisation. Overall, parties' ideological stance in terms of party family affiliation thus appears to have a significant influence on the salience of both national and European identity issues in a party's manifesto.

Government parties too show the expected pattern (see bottom of table 4): with a clear dominance of issues related to the European community in their election manifestos, they appear to opt for the mobilisation of a common European identity rather than encouraging strong national identities. This observation is corroborated by the measures of association listed at the bottom of table 4 which a significant association between government incumbency and the mobilisation of (the political dimension of) European identity whereas there is no significant relation between government parties and national identity mobilisation.

Table 5: Salience of identity mobilisation in EP election manifestos by enlargement waves (in percent)

Country groups by year of EC/EU accession	National identity						European identity						Total		Diff.		No. of coded manifestos/arguments
	National cultural protectionism		National societal autonomy		Total national identity		EU cultural protectionism		EU political unification		Total European identity		EU + national identity		EU - national identity		
	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	
Original six members	0.9	2.5	0.8	3.1	1.6	4.2	1.1	2.7	1.5	2.1	2.6	3.4	4.3	5.4	1.0	5.4	297/ 134 570
1973 enlargement	0.7	2.4	0.2	0.7	0.9	2.6	0.1	0.4	1.0	1.5	1.1	1.7	2.0	2.9	0.2	2.9	147/ 45 793
1981/1986 enlargement	0.8	2.0	0.5	1.4	1.3	2.6	0.8	2.2	0.6	0.9	1.5	2.3	2.8	3.2	0.1	3.2	93/ 44 955
1995 enlargement	0.3	1.0	0.3	0.5	0.6	1.1	0.6	1.3	1.7	2.0	2.3	2.4	2.9	2.6	1.7	2.6	63/ 16 677
Eta ²	.01		.01		.01		.04***		.04***		.05***		.05***		.01*		
F	1.02		2.51		2.61		7.37		8.42		11.54		9.98		2.64		

Note: Entries are percentage shares of arguments falling in the respective category relative to the total number of arguments coded for one country group. Country groups: Original six members: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland, Luxemburg; 1973 enlargement: Denmark, Ireland, UK; 1981/1986 enlargement: Greece, Portugal, Spain; 1995 enlargement: Austria, Finland, Sweden.
 *= $p < 0.05$ **= $p < 0.01$ ***= $p < 0.001$

Turing to our expectations whereby parties in countries that joined the European community earlier in the process are more likely to promote a common European identity, our hypotheses are only partly confirmed. Parties in the original six EC member states generally attach the greatest salience to issues related collective identity and, with 2.6% of all statements, they also devote the most space to European identity issues specifically (see table 5). Remarkably, however, parties in Austria, Finland, and Sweden (1995 enlargement) come second in terms of the space given to the promulgation of a common European identity (2.3% of party manifestos) and even exceed the original members in terms of the relative salience given to European identity compared to national identity issues in party manifestos. In light of the parallels between parties from the original EC member states and parties from the latest enlargement wave, there is no clear-cut evidence of socialisation effects due to longer experience within the EU system which we expected to make parties more inclined to European identity mobilisation. This rather heterogeneous picture is reflected at the country level, too (see table 7 in the appendix). Among the countries where parties pay most attention to issues of collective national and European identity, we find old and newer member states as well as large and smaller countries (Luxembourg: 5.4% of all statements related to issues of collective identity; Belgium, France: 4.7%; Austria: 4.2%; Italy: 4.1%; Germany: 4.0%; Finland: 3.7%). Attempts at mobilising a common European identity thereby appear particularly salient in smaller member states (parties in Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg devote on average 3.7% of their manifestos to statements invoking a common European identity vs. 1.6% in Germany, 1.3% in France and 0.6% in the UK) while national identity mobilisation is most pertinent in two of the largest member states, France (3.4%), and Germany (2.4%). Together with the UK, these are also the countries where national identity mobilisation clearly exceeds attempts at mobilising a common European identity while the reverse is true for Austria, Belgium, and Italy⁸. As to the different dimensions of national and European identity, national cultural protectionism is most salient in Germany (1.8%), Portugal (1.7%) and the UK (1.3%) while French parties stand out for their emphasis on national societal autonomy (2.3%). At the European level, Italian, Belgian, and Spanish parties in particular define the European community in cultural terms (1.9%, 1.6%, and 1.4% respectively) whereas emphasis on European political unity is highest among parties from Luxembourg (3.1%), Austria (2.5%), and Finland (2.3%). Overall, these results seem to indicate that particularities of the respective national context have a greater influence on collective

⁸ The difference between shares of arguments devoted to European identity and shares devoted to national identity is -2.0 for France, -1.4 for Portugal, -1.0 for the UK, and -0.8 for Germany. In contrast, the difference is +3.3 for Austria, +2.7 for Belgium, +2.3 for Italy, and +1.9 for Luxembourg.

identity mobilisation by political parties within a country than socialisation into EU decision-making processes over a longer time horizon as a result of early EC/EU accession.

Explaining the salience of national and European identity mobilisation

The descriptive analysis and measures of association discussed so far indicate that parties' engagement in mobilising national and European identities is primarily related to their ideological stance as indicated by party family affiliation, the national context parties compete in, and, in case of EU identity mobilisation, parties' participation in government and, to some extent, the length of EC/EU membership of parties' country of origin. Using multiple regression analysis, the following section seeks to assess the relative impact of each of these factors while controlling for the other explanatory factors. To this end, we estimated seven models (see table 6): one for the overall salience as well as the salience of each dimension of national and European identity in party manifestos respectively (models 1 to 6 in table 6) plus an additional model testing the likelihood that a party devotes more space to issues of European identity than to national identity in its manifesto (model 7 in table 6). Models 1 to 6 were estimated using OLS regression with the share of arguments falling in the respective category as the dependent variable. Model 7 is a logistic regression model with "dominant identity in party manifesto: European identity" as the dependent variable, coded 1 if the share of arguments related to European identity exceeds the share of arguments related to national identity in a party manifesto, and coded 0 otherwise. Because party manifestos are clustered within member states and election years, standard errors were corrected to avoid bias. As independent variables, we include government incumbency during the EP election campaign, parties' ideological stance (party family affiliation), and time of EC/EU accession of a party's country of origin. All predictor variables are dichotomous variables coded 1 if the party issuing a manifesto falls in the respective category and 0 otherwise.

Table 6: Explaining identity mobilisation in EP election manifestos

	National identity						European identity						Dominant identity: “European”	
	National cultural protectionism (1)		National societal autonomy (2)		Total national identity (3)		EU cultural protectionism (4)		EU political unification (5)		Total European identity (6)		(7)	
	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.
<i>Government incumbency</i>														
Government party	-.13	.13	-.07	.08	-.19	.15	.21	.27	.74**	.20	.95**	.33	.47	.33
<i>Party ideology (reference category: Social democrats)</i>														
Greens	-.44**	.17	.01	.15	-.43	.24	-.45*	.17	.22	.31	-.22	.36	-.03	.63
(Post-)Communist	-.38	.20	.01	.12	-.37	.26	-.17	.24	-.51*	.20	-.68*	.28	-.59	.48
Liberals	-.39*	.16	.06	.10	-.33	.20	-.23	.19	-.05	.26	-.28	.33	-.30	.56
Christian Democrats	-.10	.18	.33	.24	.22	.29	-.09	.15	.52	.38	.42	.38	-.37	.61
Conservatives	-.25	.18	.18	.14	-.07	.24	.46	.27	-.69**	.22	-.24	.32	-.42	.61
Nationalist	3.03**	.67	.99*	.42	4.01**	.78	2.65	1.64	-1.08*	.44	1.57	1.53	-2.74**	.62
Agrarian parties	-.12	.25	.10	.13	-.02	.28	-.49*	.20	.86	1.48	.37	1.42	-1.35	1.01
Regional parties	1.48*	.66	.17	.20	1.65*	.71	1.47*	.57	-.33	.27	1.14	.64	-.93	.62
Special interest	-.23	.34	.14	.25	-.09	.44	.18	.30	-1.08**	.26	-.91	.35*	-2.08*	.81
<i>Time of EC/EU accession (reference category: original six member states)</i>														
1973 enlargement	.15	.26	-.28**	.10	-.13	.27	-1.17**	.24	-.30	.29	-1.47**	.39	-.75	.38
1981/1986 enlargement	-.08	.30	.15	.22	.08	.42	-.76*	.29	-.61*	.26	-1.37**	.34	-.76	.56
1995 enlargement	-.04	.14	-.10	.10	-.14	.16	-.56*	.27	-.04	.36	-.59	.52	.31	.58
Constant	.50**	.18	.29**	.10	.78**	.21	.98**	.20	1.49**	.20	2.47**	.26	2.25**	.40
<i>R</i> ²	.19		.07		.20		.17		.13		.14		.11	
N	433		433		433		433		433		433		354	

Note: Entries for national identity and European identity models are OLS estimates with robust, cluster-corrected standard errors. Entries for “dominant identity: European” are logistic regression estimates with robust, cluster-corrected standard errors. The R^2 for “dominant identity: European” is McFadden’s pseudo- R^2 . *= $p < 0.05$ **= $p < 0.01$

Overall, government incumbency, parties' ideological orientation, and the length of EC/EU membership explain a comparatively small proportion of the variance of the salience of national and European identity issues in party manifestos. While we can account for about 20% of the variance in salience attached to national identity, the above factors only explain 14% of the variance in European identity mobilisation. For both the national and the European level, the model thereby performs better for the cultural dimension of identity mobilisation than the second, socio-political dimension (19% and 17% explained variance to 7% and 13 % respectively).

Parties' ideological stance proves most influential for the salience parties attach to national and European identity in their manifestos. Compared to social democratic parties, the reference category, nationalist parties – and to a lesser extent regional parties– are significantly more likely to promote national identities, and demarcate the national community culturally as well as in terms of societal autonomy. Inversely, and in line with our expectations regarding their overall support for cultural openness, Greens and Liberals are significantly less prone to cultural protectionism at the national level; for Green parties, this effect also extends to the European level. Regarding European identity mobilisation, we observe the expected negative effect for Conservative parties, albeit only for the political dimension of EU identity mobilisation.

As hypothesised, government incumbency proves influential for mobilising a European identity and in particular for EU identity mobilisation in terms of emphasis on the need for European political unification. We further find confirmatory evidence for the socialisation hypothesis, observing that parties from countries which joined the EC/EU at a later stage generally attach significantly less salience to EU identity issues in their election manifestos than parties from the EC founding states. This difference is significant for all three accession waves for the cultural dimension of EU identity mobilisation whereas for the political dimension of EU identity mobilisation we find statistically significant effects only for parties from the Southern European countries (1981/1986 enlargement).

Contrasting these results with a view to our initial hypotheses, we can infer the following: The first two hypotheses postulating a greater likelihood of centre-left parties to mobilise European identity are only partly confirmed. While are not necessarily more likely to mobilise European identity, Greens in particular are significantly less likely than parties from other ideological families to mobilise *national* identity along cultural lines. Similarly, we do not find the expected positive effect of Christian democrats on European identity mobilisation (hypothesis 3); Conservatives, on the other hand, are significantly less likely to mobilise European identity,

albeit, inversely, a conservative background does not have a significant positive effect on national identity mobilisation, so that hypothesis 4, too, is only partly confirmed. In contrast, we find sound evidence for hypothesis six referring to parties on the extreme right of the political spectrum: nationalist parties are significantly more likely to mobilise national identity and have a significant negative effect on (the political dimension of) European identity mobilisation; in effect, the odds of nationalist parties to predominantly mobilise national identity in their manifestos are about 15 times higher than the odds of Social Democrats to attach more salience to national identity issues rather than a common European identity. The picture is less clear for parties on the extreme left: while overall, a radical left-wing position has a negative rather than positive effect on European identity mobilisation, this effect pertains primarily to the political dimension of EU identity building while there we observe no effect on the cultural dimension, providing only partial support for hypothesis seven. Finally, we find sound evidence for hypotheses eight and nine: both government incumbency and origins in one of the six EC founding states have the predicted positive effect on the salience of European identity in parties' manifestos.

7. Conclusion

This paper set out to assess the extent to which parties attempt to mobilise national and European identities in the context of on-going political integration in the EU. It set out from the assumption that identity considerations must be made salient for citizens in the member states if national and European identity are to become more important for public opinion towards the EU and that political parties are among the prime actors for making citizens aware of their collective identity and the national and European communities as objects of identification.

We examined party manifesto data over the thirty year period from 1979 to 2009 to assess the extent of national and European identity mobilisation empirically. The results of the analysis show that identity issues overall (still) have little salience in party programs, with European identity issues given comparatively more emphasis than national identity issues. Whether a party predominantly advocates national or European identity thereby is affected by its political opportunities in the EU decision-making process (government incumbency), its country of origin and the national historical experience with the EC (time of EC/EU accession) and, to a lesser extent, its position on the left-right dimension. Ideological factors thereby are particularly influential at the extremes of the political spectrum with nationalist parties being by far more

likely than any other party family to emphasise national identity over European identity. So far, these results provide only weak support for recent claims whereby parties increasingly engage in identity mobilisation to sway public opinion towards the EU. At least on the party side of this link between EU citizens and political elites, identity considerations appear to still have to gain in salience if collective identity really is to drive political conflict over EU integration.

To bring the analysis full circle, however, these preliminary results ought to be combined with public opinion data so as to assess whether identity mobilisation by political parties has the expected effects on citizens' collective identifications with Europe and the nation and, eventually, on citizens' support for the EU integration project in general. Further research should thus combine contextual data on the salience of national and European identity in the national political conflict with individual data on citizens' attitudes towards the EU so as to test whether there mass-elite link in collective identity construction postulated here can be empirically confirmed.

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APPENDIX: Table 7: Salience of identity mobilisation in EP election manifestos by country (in percent)

Country	National identity						European identity						Total		Diff.		No. of coded manifestos/arguments
	National cultural protectionism		National societal autonomy		Total national identity		EU cultural protectionism		EU political unification		Total European identity		EU + national identity		EU - national identity		
	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	
Austria	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	1.2	2.1	2.5	1.9	3.7	2.5	4.2	2.6	3.3	2.5	17/ 6 003
Belgium	0.7	2.1	0.3	0.5	1.0	2.3	1.6	3.1	2.1	2.5	3.7	4.0	4.7	4.6	2.7	4.7	68/ 43 935
Denmark	0.3	1.1	0.1	0.3	0.4	1.3	0.2	0.5	1.6	2.1	1.8	2.3	2.1	2.5	1.4	2.8	56/ 10 790
Finland	0.6	1.5	0.4	0.6	1.0	1.7	0.4	0.6	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.6	3.7	2.8	1.6	3.4	22/ 4 200
France	1.0	3.2	2.3	6.4	3.4	7.2	0.8	1.9	0.6	1.2	1.3	2.2	4.7	7.4	-2.0	7.7	57/ 16 064
Germany	1.8	4.2	0.6	2.0	2.4	5.4	0.9	1.6	0.7	0.8	1.6	1.9	4.0	6.2	-0.8	5.3	44/ 26 471
Greece	1.1	2.8	0.9	2.3	1.9	3.4	0.1	0.3	0.9	1.5	1.1	1.5	3.0	3.2	-0.9	4.1	23/ 9 253
Ireland	0.2	0.8	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.9	0.2	0.4	0.6	1.0	0.8	1.1	1.2	1.3	0.4	1.5	30/ 12 222
Italy	0.3	1.2	0.6	1.6	0.9	2.0	1.9	4.3	1.4	1.7	3.2	4.6	4.1	5.4	2.3	4.5	50/ 14 902
Luxembourg	1.0	2.2	0.8	1.5	1.8	2.5	0.5	1.1	3.1	3.4	3.7	3.5	5.4	4.6	1.9	4.0	27/ 6 976
Netherlands	0.4	0.9	0.2	0.7	0.6	1.2	0.6	1.4	1.7	1.6	2.3	2.1	3.0	2.3	1.7	2.4	51/ 26 222
Portugal	1.7	2.3	0.7	1.5	2.4	3.0	0.5	0.8	0.5	0.5	1.0	0.9	3.3	3.3	-1.4	3.0	22/ 6 187
Spain	0.3	1.2	0.2	0.6	0.6	1.6	1.4	2.9	0.5	0.7	1.9	3.0	2.4	3.3	1.3	3.5	48/ 29 515
Sweden	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	0.7	1.0	24/ 6 474
United Kingdom	1.3	3.5	0.3	0.9	1.6	3.6	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.9	2.3	3.6	-1.0	3.8	61/ 22 781
Eta ²	.05*		.07***		.07***		.08***		.17***		.14***		.07***		.13***		
F	2.04		3.19		3.31		3.52		8.37		6.77		3.35		6.01		

Note: Entries are percentage shares of arguments falling in the respective category relative to the total number of arguments coded for one country (all years combined). *= $p < 0.05$ **= $p < 0.01$ ***= $p < 0.001$