

The Arctic Countries' Supply Chain Strategies in The Context of Arctic Territory Delimitation

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Abstract- The article discusses the supply chain strategies of the so-termed Arctic Five – the Russian Federation, Canada, the USA, Norway and Denmark, which have borders in the Arctic in the context of the search for their common goals and objectives in order to develop possible ways and means to solve the main common problem – the territory delimitation in the Arctic between these countries. Much has been written about the legal methods of maritime delimitation in the Arctic, but their essence is to compare the principles of "Sectoral division" in the Arctic with the norms of the 1982 "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea". Meanwhile, the current international situation and the current state of the Arctic countries in relation to each other in the sphere of military power, economy, science and climate change in the Arctic, force us to consider the issue of territory delimitation in the Arctic in an extensive aspect.

Keywords- supply chain strategy, policy, the Arctic, the Arctic countries, delimitation, problems, law.

1. Introduction

The Arctic is the northern polar region of the Earth, including the continental margins of Eurasia and North America, almost the entire Arctic Ocean with islands, except for the coastal islands of Norway, as well as the adjacent parts of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The most remarkable fact is that the Arctic, occupying one sixth of the Earth, is still the only large territory without a clear international legal status (regime) and with many available territorial disputes between the Arctic countries. Therefore, the Arctic territories should be given a legal status, which would be similar to the status of Antarctica, noting the need to sign an International Treaty that will be modelled on the Madrid Protocol on environmental protection to the Antarctic Treaty of 1998 [1, 2]. However, some experts believe that besides areas under national

jurisdiction in the Arctic Ocean, the Arctic region includes such territories and maritime areas that are "beyond national jurisdiction as well as several areas of contested jurisdiction". According to geologists, the Arctic region of the planet is the world's largest circumpolar mineragenic belt that is replete with oil and gas and ore deposits. A significant part of hydrocarbons is produced here already today, and the potential reserves of oil and gas fields are estimated at almost a quarter of the world's forecast resources [24, 25]. In this regard, all Arctic countries have strengthened and repeatedly increased their scientific sea expeditions in the Arctic and their presence in their polar territories in recent years. The main objective of scientific researches in the Arctic is to gather the necessary evidence to establish the boundaries of the special exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf in the Arctic, which are potential sources of large deposits of natural resources. At the same time, the approximate boundaries of the exclusive economic zones and continental shelves of the Arctic countries touch each other, which causes territorial disputes. Currently, all the Arctic countries have territorial disputes among themselves, which have not been settled until now and are unlikely to be settled in the next decade. This is primarily explained by the fact that the geological structure of the bottom of the Arctic Ocean is very complex, and its research is extremely difficult and costly due to climatic conditions. The second factor is the international mechanisms of legal regulation, in particular the work of the UN Commission on the Continental Shelf, which is designed to settle territorial disputes and considers such disputes for years. In this regard, there is a need to consider the goals and objectives of the Arctic countries in their Arctic

territories in search for mutually acceptable and joint actions to solve joint problems and joint activities in this region, which ultimately will not only accelerate the resolution of delimitation issues, but also will help determine the legal regime of the Arctic.

2. Methodology

The methodological framework of the study is the dialectical method of reality cognition in its connection and interaction. The authors used general scientific and special methods (systemic and historical method, method of analysis and synthesis); specific scientific methods (systematic research method, problem-chronological method); theoretical methods followed by the analysis and generalization of the results (statistical and empirical methods, observation and comparison), and also particular scientific methods, such as a comparative legal, technical-legal, formal-logical ones in their various combinations in the research process.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Canada's arctic strategy

Canada ranks the second after Russia in the world in its length of the Arctic coast. In terms of the development of its Arctic territories (fishing, mining, creation of new sea routes, population, military presence, etc.), Canada is to some extent lagging behind its Arctic neighbors. However Canada is the first country that has declared sovereignty over a certain part of the Arctic at the legislative level and gave a "start" to the so-termed principle of "Sectoral division of the Arctic", having begun to form a political mechanism to ensure its national and state interests in the Arctic [3]. Thus, in 1904 the Department of Internal Affairs of Canada published a map of Canada in which the Western and Eastern borders of Canada were shown at the meridians 60° and 141° W, which passes through the Eastern and Western ends of the coast facing the Arctic Ocean. The *Northwest Territories Act* was adopted in 1907 in order to consolidate Canada's rights to its Arctic sector. In 1909, a Canadian Senator Poirier made a public statement that the Arctic basin is a special systemic whole – a vast semicircle, which is a natural extension of the Arctic States' territory, and therefore it is logical to consider all the lands and islands of the Arctic system as a part of the coastal countries and divide them between these countries. It is customary to associate the birth of the "sectoral

theory" with this date and with the name of this Senator. In 1925, amendments were made to the *Northwest Territories Act*, under which Canada established that activities within the Canadian Arctic sector, including for the exploration and development of natural resources, required the appropriate permits of Canadian authorities. A Royal decree was issued in 1926, in addition to the *Northwest Territories Act*, which established the rule that foreign nationals wishing to visit the land areas adjacent to the Canadian coast in the Arctic must first obtain permission from the Canadian authorities. Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century, Canada not only launched the sectoral principle in the territory delimitation in the Arctic, which later became a norm of customary international law, but also for the first time defined its strategy in the Arctic. It was to consolidate Canada's jurisdiction over the vast northern territories up to the North Pole. In fact, Canada unilaterally established its state borders in the Arctic. The main objective of this strategy was to take possession of the territory and extend its jurisdiction over it, setting its own boundaries. Moreover, Canada, through Senator Poirier in 1909, invited other Arctic countries to follow its example and divide the Arctic basin into sectors, thereby giving legitimacy and international recognition to own actions. The Russian Empire, later the Soviet Union, followed the example of Canada, and the Notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire dated September 4, 1916, a Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of 1921, a Memorandum of People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR dated October 04, 1924, and the Decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dated April 15, 1926 consolidated the Russian sector in the Arctic. In fact, Canada and the USSR acted in the Arctic in the early twentieth century almost the same with respect to the territory delimitation in the Arctic and surprisingly, they did not have territorial disputes. The strategies of both countries also had common features and were aimed at the protection of sovereign rights, regulation of fisheries and navigation in the waters related to their sectors. Since the beginning of the Cold War, Canada's strategy in the Arctic has not changed much. Of course, military security became a priority, but it was more of a "declarative" nature than actually carried out actions. This was determined by the fact that there were no direct military threats in the Arctic region for Canada, as there are none to this

day. Canada, which is in close contact with the US and NATO, relied heavily on the US military power. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Canada's strategy began to finally lean towards sustainable socio-economic development of the northern territories and environmental development. Since the early 2000s, Canada has been developing a doctrinal framework for its policy in the Arctic. In 2002, a document entitled *The Northern Dimension of Canada's Foreign Policy* was adopted, providing for a series of government measures to ensure international cooperation in the Arctic. In 2008, the *Canada First Defense Strategy* was unveiled, with a significant focus on the Arctic issues. For the first time, the Ottawa Arctic Doctrine was set out in a systematic form in the official document, *Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future*, published in 2009 [4]. If we generalize the Northern Strategy of Canada in the most general way, it is divided into internal and external parts, with the internal part being considered the main part, and therefore the current Arctic Strategy of Canada has an internal rather than external orientation. The main meaning of the internal part is reduced to the integrated development of the northern territories of Canada. And this is understandable, since according to preliminary data, there are huge reserves of not only oil and gas in the coastal zone of the Canadian Arctic, but also of such minerals as methane hydrate, diamonds, copper, zinc, mercury, gold, rare earth metals, and uranium, not to mention bio resources [5]. In this regard, the internal part of *The Northern Strategy of Canada* refers to the establishment of an appropriate legislative, socio-economic, research and institutional framework for the management of the Canadian northern territories. The external part of *The Northern Strategy of Canada* includes three main aspects:

- settlement of territorial disputes with neighboring countries;
- expansion of the exclusive economic zone through the increment of the continental shelf in the Arctic;
- Development of multilateral cooperation mechanism in the region, including improvement of security system aimed to protect against natural and manmade hazards.

From the above aspects, it is clear that Canada does not intend to militarize its part of the Arctic in any

form, except for the establishment of several seaports and the strengthening of the coast guard. Canadian military authorities continue to adhere to their early concept of relying on the US military power. This concept is the most advantageous in financial and functional terms, as in the years of the Cold War, as Canada has neither the desire nor the logistical capacity to get involved in the event of a large-scale military conflict [6]. *The Northern Strategy of Canada* in its current form is more than attractive for Russia, since the external part of this strategy identified the settlement of territorial disputes with neighboring countries on the basis of international cooperation and international law as a priority. Despite certain statements by Canadian politicians in the international arena about Russia's aggressive actions in the Arctic and the need to resist this aggression, Canada is interested in delineating the disputed territories in the Arctic Ocean with Russia for the following reasons:

1. There is only one territorial dispute between Canada and Russia – the Lomonosov Ridge, major submarine ridge with the width varying from 60 to 200 kilometers, stretching almost for 1800 kilometers from the Novosibirsk Islands across the North Pole to Ellesmere Island and is a giant “underwater bridge” connecting the mainland platforms of Asia and America. From a geological point of view, it is not entirely known whether it is an extension of the Eurasian or North American continental plate. For scientific research, heavy nuclear icebreakers of the “Yamal” type and the necessary underwater vehicles and drilling facilities are needed. These facilities, being able to work near the North Pole, are partially possessed only by Russia. Canada, for its part, has significant financial resources to conduct such research. Whatever it was, at a certain level, Canada stated, though not officially, that if for some reason it will not be possible to establish the geological affiliation of the Lomonosov Ridge, it is possible to proceed from the principle of equidistance from the North Pole. Thus, it is hinted that the Lomonosov Ridge can be divided based on the common average of its length or using the “sectoral principle”. In this connection, many experts note that the degree of contradictions between Canada and Russia on the division of the shelf in the Lomonosov Ridge is greatly exaggerated, and therefore, there is a possibility of compromise [7]. In doing so, a compromise can be reached by using or partially using the sectoral principle, which Canada has never formally abandoned. It is this circumstance that “brings together” Canada and

Russia, as the use of the maritime delimitation in the Arctic Ocean, exclusively the rules of the 1982 Law of the Sea, deprives both of significant territories, which means the loss of potentially large reserves of natural resources. Both countries are well aware of this and proceed from the maximum protection of their rights to the waters of the Arctic Ocean and coastal seas. Having huge borders in the Arctic and a long-term practice of dividing the Arctic territories according to the sectoral principle even in the “coldest” times of confrontation, Canada and Russia have all the chances and legal mechanisms to settle the territorial dispute in the Lomonosov Ridge with maximum benefit for both sides.

2. Paradoxically, another point why Canada should cooperate with Russia on delimitation issues is that Russia can help Canada in its dispute with Denmark and the US. Canada disputes the ownership of a small (an area of only 1.3 square kilometers) uninhabited Hans Island and the boundary line in the Lincoln Sea with Denmark. In the US, Canada disputes the maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea, namely the 6,250-nautical-mile expanse of the sea supposedly rich in oil and gas. Russia having a significant icebreaker fleet can provide these facilities to confirm Canadian claims in the dispute with Denmark and the United States. Currently, the concept of sectoral division of the Arctic space has not lost its relevance, although it is criticized primarily by the three Arctic countries of the United States, Denmark and partly Norway, thereby giving the sectoral principle the status of a normal rule. In this part, it is important to draw attention to the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008 [8], adopted in Ilulissat (Greenland) by the Arctic States, which enshrined the following intentions of the participating countries:

By virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in large areas of the Arctic Ocean the five coastal states are in a unique position to address these possibilities and challenges. In this regard, we recall that an extensive international legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean as discussed between our representatives at the meeting in Oslo on 15 and 16 October 2007 at the level of senior officials. Notably, the law of the sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal

framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims [9].

Thus, Russia should build its strategy for the delimitation of the Arctic territories with Canada on the basis of customary international law – the sectoral principle with the possible partial application of the norms of the Convention of the United Nations in maritime law [in 10]. The benefit for applying this strategy for Russia can be seen in a positive international precedent when, in 2018, after 22 years of negotiations on the legal status of the Caspian Sea the Caspian countries carried out the delimitation of the disputed areas on the basis of the sectoral principle, with partial application of the provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 [11].

3.2. Denmark's arctic strategy

The Kingdom of Denmark is an Arctic state because of Greenland. Without Greenland, Denmark would have lost the ability to claim for the Arctic territories, as well as its resources. In 1920, Denmark declared sovereignty over Greenland. “In 1933, when the Permanent Court of International Justice declared the legal status of Greenland in favor of Denmark [12], it referred to a note from the British Government, acting on behalf of Canada, which in 1920 assured the Danish Government that it recognized Danish sovereignty over Greenland” [13]. Denmark's strategy in the Arctic does not have a long historical period. Conditionally, it began only when Denmark became a member of NATO. In those days, the whole policy of Denmark in relation to its Arctic territories was to ensure the security of Greenland together with the United States, which, with the consent of Denmark and Greenland, placed a military base there to monitor the Northern and Baltic fleet of the USSR. This was the main policy of Denmark until the early 2000s. At the beginning of the new Millennium, with other Arctic countries adopting doctrinal strategies for their Arctic territories, the Danish authorities began to think about a full-fledged strategy for their Arctic territories in general and for Greenland in particular. In August 2011 the Danish Government in agreement with the governments of Greenland and the Faroe Islands approved the *Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011 - 2020* [14]. This unusual tripartite format of the Danish strategy is associated with a significant level of autonomy for Greenland and the Faroe Islands in many matters, including those relating to the exploration and development of mineral resources.

One of the tasks of the document was to fix common goals and ensure coordination of actions in all three subjects of the Kingdom. In this regard, it is not surprising that the main mechanisms for the implementation of the strategy are the creation of a tripartite Steering Committee and the joint development of measures in the areas of foreign and security policy in relation to the Arctic. It should be noted that the main vector of the Danish Arctic Strategy, the object of the declared steps is Greenland, including provision of its economic growth, environmental protection of the island and adjacent waters, and promotion of the socio-economic development of the indigenous population. This approach seems quite justified, since Greenland is Denmark's "window" to the Arctic, a factor that allows the Kingdom to be ranked among the Arctic States. The strategy establishes the following measures as the main activities of Denmark:

- Ensuring a peaceful, protected and safe Arctic (priority use of international law, strengthening the safety of navigation, the exercise of sovereign rights);
- Achieving self-sustainable growth and development (application of the highest standards in field development, use of renewable energy sources, sustainable exploitation of bio resources, growth and development based on scientific data, active involvement in international trade);
- Promoting development with respect for the climate, environment and nature of the Arctic (increasing knowledge about the effects of climate change, protecting the natural environment and biodiversity);
- Providing close international cooperation with foreign partners (search for global solutions to global challenges, expansion of regional cooperation, ensuring national interests on a bilateral basis).

Denmark intends to achieve the goals set in the strategy both through national measures (closer cooperation on the Arctic issues with Greenland and the Faroe Islands, continuation of scientific research in the Arctic, strengthening of its sovereignty and control in the national maritime and continental areas), and mainly through the active promotion of its positions in international organizations (the UN, the European Union, the Arctic Council, the International Maritime Organization, the Nordic Council of Ministers), in the context of bilateral relations with the United

States, Canada, Norway, Iceland and Russia. Meanwhile, currently, Denmark is actually implementing only the following directions of the stated main directions in the strategy:

1. Ensuring the socio-economic development of Greenland and the Faroe Islands;
2. Protection of the Arctic ecology.

There were essentially no territorial disputes between Denmark and Russia until 2014. However, in 2014, Denmark applied to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to recognize a significant part of the Arctic shelf as belonging to Greenland. The area of the territorial claims is about 895 thousand square kilometers; this is 20 times the size of Denmark and includes the North Pole and the entire Lomonosov Ridge [15]. Unlike previous applications, the foreign policy initiative of 2014 became more ambitious for the Danes – the country claims strategically and symbolically important territories. This application adds a new dispute with Russia over the Lomonosov Ridge and adds a dispute with Canada to the existing Danish territorial disputes. Denmark refused Russia's proposals to start negotiations, pointing out that it was necessary to wait for the position of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. As stated by a number of Danish politicians, Denmark currently is not interested in bilateral talks with Russia about partial overlapping of territorial claims of both countries near the North Pole, so as to negotiate it is necessary that experts of the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf have tested these territorial claims [16, 26]. But for Russia, the Danish strategy in general is acceptable for solving a number of issues related to the Arctic in general and delimitation in particular. Taking into account Denmark's commitment to international norms and organizations in solving its problems, Denmark has developed a policy and fully supports it for many years, that is, the internationalization of the Arctic and the exclusive application of the norms of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including in solving issues on the territory delimitation between the Arctic countries. Denmark reaffirmed this position in its strategy by adhering to the provisions of the Ilulissat Declaration dated May 28, 2008. According to this Declaration, any possible overlapping claims in respect of the continental shelf will be resolved exclusively on the basis of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Based on the above circumstances, Russia's position in bilateral negotiations on the territory delimitation in the Arctic should be based on the

application of the Law of the Sea, avoiding the emphasis on the sectoral principle. This approach will allow Russia to find a mutually acceptable solution without prejudice to its interests, and enable Denmark to settle the territorial dispute in accordance with the stated objectives – any disputes must be resolved through negotiations. In general, the political will expressed in the Danish Arctic Strategy – to promote stable and conflict-free development of the situation in the Arctic – forms a favorable background for increasing bilateral Russian-Danish cooperation in many areas: from political and economic to social and scientific ones. The task is to proactively use the opportunities for mutual benefit and cooperation, translate them into practical actions and concrete agreements.

3.3. Norway's arctic strategy

Norway did not have a clearly formulated Arctic Strategy for a long time, although its basis originated at the turn of the 19th – 20th centuries. At that time, the great Norwegian explorers left their names in the history of Arctic exploration: F. Nansen's expedition in 1893-1896 to explore the Central part of the Arctic Ocean; O. Sverdrup's expedition in 1898-1902 to explore the Canadian Arctic archipelago. The Arctic Policy of Norway is fully reflected in the Old Norse meaning of its name – “the way to the North”. By “Northern areas” Norway means the vast expanses, both geographically and politically, comprising parts of land and sea, individual islands and groups of islands, which extend to the North from Sør-Helgeland and to the East from the Greenland Sea to the Barents and Pechora Seas. In political terms, these areas include the administrative units of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia, which are united by the Barents Cooperation, the EU Member States within the “Northern Dimension”, as well as the Arctic spaces of the United States and Canada within the Arctic Council [17]. Currently, the Norwegian government policy has a pronounced “northern” vector. In December 2006, Norway submitted the statement of the borders of the shelf beyond 200 nautical miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and so far Norway's statement is the only one of the Arctic countries that has been approved by the Commission. Norway's Arctic strategy was presented in December 2006. The overall objective of this document was to create a sustainable growth and development of the Arctic region on the basis of three principles: presence, activity and

knowledge. The strategy also outlined seven major policy priorities for Norway:

- To implement a stable, consistent and predictable Arctic policy;
- to take a leading role in international efforts to develop the Arctic region;
- to achieve the best parameters in the interaction with the environment and natural resources of the Arctic;
- to provide an appropriate basis for further development of oil activities;
- to protect the livelihoods, traditions and culture of indigenous peoples and promote cooperation between them and the state;
- to strengthen cooperation with the Russian Federation.

The Arctic region is a top priority for both domestic and foreign policy in Norway. The government allocates huge funds for projects in the Far North. Norway's updated strategy *Norway's Arctic Strategy – between geopolitics and social development* was adopted in April 2017. The main goal declared by the government is to make the northern territories of Norway the most innovative and sustainable regions in the country in the coming years. This document established five priority areas:

1. International cooperation;
2. Business development;
3. Knowledge development;
4. Infrastructure;
5. Environmental protection and emergency preparedness.

Unlike the rest of the Arctic countries, Norway has fully settled the existing territorial dispute with Russia.

For example, since 1970 there has been a territorial dispute over the border between the States in the Barents Sea. Its essence tended to revolve around the fact that Russia drew the border along the coast of Spitsbergen; Norway believed that the border should be equidistant from Spitsbergen, on the one hand, and the Land of Franz Josef and Novaya Zemlya, on the other hand. Since the States were on friendly terms, the dispute over the border rarely resulted in any actions, and Russian fishing vessels were occasionally detained. However, the dispute escalated further, as hydrocarbon reserves were discovered in the Barents Sea, including in the disputed waters. In April 2010, the parties agreed that the new delimitation line would divide the disputed water area into two equal parts. On

September 15, 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg signed the Treaty concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The absence of territorial disputes does not mean that the Parties can now “run away” in any direction. The Arctic, as a region rich in hydrocarbon deposits, bio resources and potential attractive sea routes, requires both countries to deepen mutual cooperation in the Arctic. Thus, cooperation with Russia also remains among the key topics in Norway’s Arctic Strategy for 2017. As stated in *Norway’s Arctic Strategy – between geopolitics and social development*, “Despite Russia’s violations of international law in Ukraine and Norway’s response to these, it is vital that Norway and Russia work together to address key challenges in the north. Our relations with Russia will remain a constant and important element of Norway’s Arctic policy. Norway wants to have good neighborly relations with Russia, and the Government gives high priority to dialogue with the Russian authorities” [18]. Russia is certainly interested in deepening cooperation with Norway not only in the field of hydrocarbon production, but also in fishing, conservation of biological resources and ecology of the Arctic waters, etc.

3.4. U.S. strategy in the arctic

The United States did not have a separate Arctic Strategy until the beginning of the twenty-first century. During the entire period of the 20th century, the Arctic was considered in the context of national security, and until the end of the 20th century only from a military point of view. The foundations of modern Arctic Policy of the United States were defined in the Presidential Decision Directive of W. Clinton in 1994 [19].

The document set six principal objectives in the Arctic region:

- (1) Meeting post-Cold War national security and defense needs,
- (2) Protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its biological resources,
- (3) Assuring that natural resource management and economic development in the region are environmentally sustainable,
- (4) Strengthening institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations,
- (5) Involving the Arctic’s indigenous peoples in decisions that affect them, and

(6) Enhancing scientific monitoring and research into local, regional and global environmental issues [20].

The revision of the US interests and policy in the Arctic begins after 2004 in connection with the revival of Russia’s activities in the Far North and the Arctic. National Security Presidential Directive on the Arctic Region Policy of the United States was published on January 2, 2009. It states that “the United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests” [21]. This document totally confirmed the priorities laid down in the 1994 Presidential Decision Directive, describing in more detail certain areas of policy. In particular, the document consolidated the US standpoint on the regime of an international governance of the region, according to which, with the increase in the economic activity in the Arctic, it becomes necessary to raise the issue of developing new international legal instruments regulating existinf arrangements. However, Washington sees no need to create a comprehensive legal instrument like the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. Washington benefits from the maximum implementation of the principle of freedom of navigation and economic activity in the Arctic, since the United States does not participate in the UN conventions on the Law of the Sea, enabling to file a claim in disputes over the division of the shelf.

Declared officially American interests can be grouped into several categories:

- Military strategic interests – missile defense and early warning, deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight. The US is ready to act unilaterally, if necessary, to protect these interests.
- Homeland security interests – preventing terrorist attacks and mitigating those criminal or hostile acts that could increase the United States vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region.
- Political and economic interests – expanding the US economic presence while demonstrating maritime power. The United States intends not only to protect its rights in the exclusive economic zone (200 miles offshore), but also to exercise “proper control” over the adjacent waters. Freedom of transarctic flights and freedom of navigation with regard to the entire Arctic,

including the Northern Sea Route, which runs along the territory of Russia, are also named the highest national priority [21].

The USA considers the Arctic Council to be the main platform for discussing Arctic problems, appreciating its contribution to achieving sustainable development goals and protecting the interests of the indigenous population of the region. At the same time, the Americans see the Council only as a high-level regional forum and oppose giving it the status of an international organization. This is because Washington fears that the Council will be given the authority to make binding decisions that could run counter to state policy. The priority of the United States in the Arctic is to ensure military strategic superiority and the possibility of free and operational maneuvering of the Navy. The 2009 Directive named freedom of navigation as the national interest Number One in the region. This dictates the position of the Americans on the legal status of the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage: Washington considers them international straits in which the right of transit passage operates, and the coastal States (Russia and Canada, respectively) cannot infringe this right by their national legislation. The importance of freedom of navigation for the United States is growing due to the accelerated melting of the Arctic ice and the emergence of new transport opportunities, as a result. The prospects for the Americans to extend their jurisdiction to the extended continental shelf (i.e. to the shelf areas beyond 200 nautical miles offshore) remain unclear. The 2009 Directive determined that defining the seabed boundaries on which the state will have sovereign rights to extract marine resources is a key direction to ensure the energy and environmental security of the country. Therefore, the United States reserves the right to act not only unilaterally, but also to exercise control over the Arctic beyond the legally justified dividing lines in the Arctic Strategy. The work on the implementation of the US strategic interests in the Arctic, set out in the documents of 1994 and 2009, was continued by Obama's administration. Only the accents have changed in the politics. Thus, the US National Strategy for the Arctic Region adopted in 2013 sets the task of raising public awareness about the Arctic problems, primarily environmental ones. Obama's visit to Alaska in September 2015 was, in particular, aimed at drawing the attention of the population to the issues of climate change and environmental protection of the North. In addition,

the US President achieved significant political dividends on the climate agenda in December 2016 where the issuance of licenses for the development of oil and gas fields in the waters of the Chukchi Sea and the Beaufort Sea was banned. It seems that the overall strategic course of the United States in the Arctic, planned at the end of the 20th century, will continue. An indirect confirmation of the continuity of the current US Arctic policy is the fact that almost all key employees of the State Department that are responsible for the implementation of the US policy in the Arctic under the Obama administration, retained their seats under current President Donald Trump. In this regard, the opinion of one of such high-ranking officials D. Bolton, who holds the post of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for oceans and fisheries and concurrently Chairman of the Committee of senior officials of the Arctic Council, deserves attention. At a press conference at the end of the Council meeting in Juneau (Alaska) on March 10, 2017, David Balton, who has worked for more than 30 years in the Foreign Ministry, noted that the US course in the Arctic had undergone minimum changes over the years. According to him, the goals of the state in the region were unchanged and based primarily on the socio-economic interests of Alaska and the need to ensure the environmental security of the region. D. Balton suggested that this situation would not change in the coming years [22]. Due to the absence of the current US policy concerning the Arctic, the US non-participation in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the available common tensions in bilateral relations and the fact that the US does not support the sectoral principle force Russia not to hurry with the choice of a certain method for conducting bilateral negotiations. The current US foreign policy does not have permanence, unity and compliance with the previous commitments. In these circumstances, Russia needs to focus its activities on the territory delimitation in the Arctic with Denmark and Canada [23-25]

4. Conclusions

In our opinion, having considered the positions of each Arctic country in the context of the territory delimitation in the Arctic and the emerging problems in dispute settlement on the basis of existing normative legal acts of international law, it will be very important that Russia's strategy for the delimitation of the Arctic territories is combined, since the diversity of problems and contradictions

do not allow Russia to proceed from only one plane in solving problematic issues on the Arctic in general and on the territory delimitation in the Arctic in particular. In general, the solution of this problem should be based on such factors as:

- Geological difficulties in studying the bottom of the Arctic Ocean;
- Methods and techniques of the Arctic countries for the territory delimitation and their relationship with each other;
- Certain conflicts in the norms of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in attempts to apply its rules for the territory delimitation in the Arctic;
- The lengthy nature of considering the controversial issues in the international bodies.

The authors of this article would like to note once again that it is necessary to understand that the solution of delimitation issues should not be regarded as something separate, independent and unrelated to other problems in the Arctic. On the contrary, the Arctic countries, which have territorial disputes among themselves, have to settle them in the complex by solving other issues. It is important to understand the strategies of the Arctic countries in this context, what their goals are and what underlies their strategies. In this regard, the Russian approach in solving territorial disputes with its Arctic neighboring countries needs to be integrated and multifaceted, that is, the delimitation should be considered in the context of other issues, such as economic cooperation, joint actions, ecological safety, etc [26]. The combined approach and the integrated solution enabled the five Caspian countries to define in 2018 the legal regime of the Caspian Sea and to delimit the disputed waters using both the customary norms of international law and the norms of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the same time, Russia's strategy in relation to bilateral formats with other Arctic countries should be based on the historical relations between them and the current policy pursued by these countries. Therefore, we believe that Russia should build its strategy on the delimitation of the Arctic territories on the basis of customary international law – the sectoral principle with the possible partial application of the provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea for Canada, and in respect of Denmark, Russia should apply the opposite strategy – the rules of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. These relations should form the basis of bilateral negotiations on the territory delimitation in the Arctic. And such a strategy should be pursued

not only in relation to Canada and Denmark, but also in relation to Norway and the United States. In any case, integrated cooperation will give at least some positive result or a way to solve the problems associated with the delimitation in the Arctic. In this connection, it is impossible to apply a single method or methods to resolve territorial disputes, and to consider territorial disputes themselves outside of other problems that require mutual solutions. Only in this case, it is possible to achieve success in the peaceful settlement of the issue and further cooperation in one of the most important parts of the world for humanity, such as the Arctic.

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