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Volume VII

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The Constantin Review is a publication of the Constantin College of Liberal Arts at the University of Dallas. The College and this review are named in honor of Eugene Constantin, Jr., who served as chairman of the Board of Trustees and was a founder and generous benefactor of the College.

The Constantin Review is published under the auspices of the Phi Beta Kappa chapter of the University of Dallas. Its purpose is to promote student writing and to recognize students who have achieved a high degree of literary skill. Students are encouraged to submit papers to the editorial board, which includes but is not limited to Phi Beta Kappa members.

Special thanks to all students who submitted essays and all faculty who recommended essays; also, thanks to the readers for the *Review*: Stacie Kadleck, Phillip Kendall, and Christina Montalvo. Dr. Mark Lowery of the Department of Theology is the faculty advisor and typesetter for the *Review*, with the generous help of David Brown.

Contributors to this issue: Shannon Bralick is a junior majoring in English; Andrew Decaen graduated in May 1997 with a degree in Art; Peter Fletcher graduated in May 1997 with a degree in Philosophy; Sameena Karmally graduated in May 1997 with a degree in Biology; Shena Muldoon is a junior majoring in Philosophy; Kha Manh Nguyen graduated with a degree in Philosophy; Richard Weber is a senior majoring in Classics. Tom Westerman is a senior majoring in English.

In past years, the *Review* has included first and second place winners of the Clodecott Award for Children's Literature. Unfortunately, the drawings of this year's fine winners were not conducive to black and white copying, and we regret not being able to include them. The originals are available for your reading pleasure in the library of the Department of Education.

* * *

This issue of the *Review* is dedicated to Msgr. Milam Joseph, President of the University of Dallas, with sincerest wishes for his continued success guiding the University into the future.

* * *

More Human than Human: a Look at Mortality and Reality In Blade Runner

Sameena Karmally

The eye is the introductory image to Ridley Scott's *Blade Runner*¹, and this image is the key to interpreting and analyzing this film. With the aid of self-proclaimed "visual futurist" Syn Mead, Scott creates a tech-noir world where the androids are more human than the humans. To do this, Scott combines aspects of the film noir style of the 40's and 50's with a solid science fiction plot to create a new kind of story. Detective Deckard must kill four replicants who resemble humans in every way: Roy Batty, Pris, Zhora and Leon. The story is simply the retirement of four unwanted androids, but this film also provides a commentary on technology, capitalism, humanity, reality, mortality, and other philosophical and social questions through the director's unique use of the many tools of film making.

To begin with, the most significant visual component of *Blade Runner* is the setting: Los Angeles in the year 2016. Tightly organized composition and attention to small details accumulate to create a claustrophobic environment. There is no suggestion of open air; buildings close in on every side and even the night sky is eclipsed by a gigantic blimp. Every scene is full of complexity, indicating technology has penetrated every crevice of every day life. Long shots and deep focus are used to convey emptiness instead of openness, or to draw attention to the overall depth of detail of the decaying city. Through an imaginative and surrealistic set design, Earth is transformed into a ghetto, crowded with people and with technology poking its way into every corner. The setting immediately cues the viewer to expect cold, impersonal inhabitants:

. . . dark shadows contrast with glittering sputtering neon to convey the nightmarish qualities of urban life in the future. Scenes in Detective Deckard's apartment also use the contrast between the muted colors revealed by a few table lamps and the shadowy edges of the rooms to suggest the emotional bleakness of his existence as a hunter and destroyer of replicants.²

While there are many people who crowd the city streets, there is no sense of a shared humanity between them. Nowhere do you see people interacting in a meaningful social way; the few interactions we do see are for commercial purposes. All this adds together to create a sense of isolation among the people in the film. They are totally disinterested in life, and besides, there is not much life to look at anyway.

The influence of film tradition prior to *Blade Runner* is an essential reference frame for understanding many of the key issues in this film. Film Noir is the obvious category for this film, as there is not a ray of natural sunshine to be found (excluding the dream sequence).

Often, the private eye is linked with a group of films identified by certain common themes and stylistic traits. These are called film noir, that is, "black film". Film noir is visually marked by its nighttime imagery, urban landscape, and thematic focus on ambiguously corrupt characters whose chief activity is double-dealing in a society that seems to have no redeeming members and

¹This paper is concerned with the director's cut (letterbox), which differs in that there is no voice over, no happy ending, but it does include a unicorn dream sequence that the original omits.

² Sobchack, Thomas and Vivian Sobchack. *An Introduction to Film*. (Illinois, Scott, Foresman and Company, 1987) 71.

no hope for a moral and civilized survival.³

There is constant rain, fog, or smoke, and every light serves only to cast shadows. This setting is reminiscent of the seedy downtown city streets of the film noir genre, always damp, rainy, and dark. The neon signs or commercial billboards provide a synthetic light, to contrast glaringly against the black night, and also the blackness of human nature. The setting is part of the story, part of the characters who live there:

The film noir is set in an urban landscape: cheap apartments, dreary streets, warehouse districts, crummy dives. This landscape is a metaphor for the corruption, dishonesty, and conniving that takes place in a dog-eat-dog world where survival is the only value. Even though set in the near future, *Blade Runner* exhibits all the visual style and moral miasma of a typical 1940's film noir.⁴

Almost every shot of *Blade Runner* utilizes the classical film noir conventions of playing with light and shadow (chiaroscuro). Another code of the film noir genre is the cynical and charming half-shaven detective, who works alone and drinks too much (i.e. Bogart's Sam Spade). Searles writes, "Its brilliantly calculated unpleasantness stemmed from its updating of the 'hard-boiled detective' genre and setting it in a wonderfully conceived future in Los Angeles, overburdened with people and pollution."⁵

While the setting is very original on the part of Ridley, he did have a rich source of science fiction films from which to draw. In the same way that *Blade Runner* drew upon the film noir tradition, the film noir tradition draws upon German expressionism of the 1920's and 30's, and this style also gave Ridley a starting point in terms of creating a futuristic, yet convincing, landscape.

Stylistically, the ancestry of these films could be traced to the horror films of the 1930's and early 1940's, films whose use of light and shade (chiaroscuro) had been imported with German directors and cameramen during the late 1920's and 1930's.⁶

Films like *Metropolis* and *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* used incredible set design not just as a background, but to infuse an additional dimension of meaning into the story. The visual imagery is a metaphor for the themes in these films. For example, the opening seconds make reference to Lang's classic film *Metropolis*; *Metropolis* begins with a strange vehicle flying over the gray city scape, and *Blade Runner* begins with a hovering car over the burning city of Los Angeles. *Metropolis* also contrasts human sentiments with technological coldness in the person of Maria and her robot look alike.

Metropolis created visual equivalents for many of the great ideas of science fiction: men dwarfed by inexorably working machinery and subjugated to it. And the contrasts between the world of feeling and the world of technological progress - cold, powerful, and rational.⁷

³ Sobchack 271.

⁴ Sobchack 272.

⁵ Baird Searles, *Films of Science Fiction and Fantasy* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., Publishers, 1988) 72.

⁶ Sobchack 217.

⁷ Peter Nicholls, *The World of Fantastic Films* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1984) 15.

The same techniques used in German expressionism are revived in Ridley's film to tell the story of evil within society. The setting reflects the theme, which is the submission, or even worse, the loss, of humanity to technology. The visual aesthetics which *Blade Runner* borrows are from some of the earliest science fiction films ever made.

Many of the ideas dealt with in *Blade Runner* are actually an examination of themes which have also been introduced in the earliest science fiction films. In Wienes's *Caligari*, Cesare the somnambulist is a monster by all appearance and action, but in reality Caligari is the monster. *Dr. Jekyll* expressly also deals with an "advance" of science which turns out to conflict with the reality of human nature. *Frankenstein* deals with man trying to conquer nature and also addresses science as a potential danger. The first screen android appears in *Metropolis*, and the idea of a human looking machine immediately threatens the human identity and begs for a distinction to be made between humanity and technology. *Blade Runner* asks the same question more subtly throughout the course of the plot: who really has emotions?

In *Blade Runner* humans never show emotion or empathy, only androids do: they care deeply for each other, and the love between Roy, their leader, and Pris is the source of their desire to find their maker. Humans have no respect for life. In their gray world there probably is not much difference between life and death. But androids feel the difference - acutely.⁸

Another significant issue developed from classical films is the religious overtone that exists between the relationship between androids and the humans who created them. The scene in which Batty returns to confront his maker who abandoned him is reminiscent of *Frankenstein* returning to question his creator about the nature of his existence. The replicants have come back to meet their maker, only to find out that their god is a false god.⁹ Tyrell is referred to by Roy as the god of bio-mechanics. The Tyrell building rises above the decaying city and has a special glow about it, another visual clue to decode:

To emphasize this religious imagery, the temple effect, the huge central hall (which seems to be all there is, this is no ordinary office building) is lined with Greek columns, and the ceiling is so high that it simply disappears. This is Tyrell's cathedral, his St. Peter's with its symbolic replica of the unfathomable heavens above.¹⁰

Again, the "religious imagery" descends from *Metropolis*. In Lang's film, the city is divided into the underworld, where the workers slave during the day, and the over world, where the overseers live in opulence.¹¹

The question of appearance versus reality is a uniquely appropriate topic for the media of film. Cinema gives people the ability to visualize what is not. In the first moment of the film, the burning decrepit city of Los Angeles reflects in the pupil of a human eye, and the symbolic code of eyes as continued throughout the plot effectively ties together the significant themes of the film. Basically, the eye symbolizes the central question "what is it to be human?" In *Blade Runner*, the eye had a direct connection to the soul, which reflects universal understanding. The only way to tell the difference between a replicant and a human is through an intense examination of the eye. Throughout the film, eyes reappear in odd situations. For example, the replicants meet

⁸ Per Schelde, *Androids, Humanoids, and Other Science Fiction Monsters*. (New York: New York University Press, 1993) 234

⁹ Dr. Eileen Gregory, University of Dallas.

¹⁰ Schelde 235.

¹¹ Fraying 118.

the man who made their eyes; Batty and Leon play with eyes as toys, and Tyrell has exaggeratedly thick glasses. The sign system is complex, but careful analysis reveals much about the central question. According to Schelde: "The glasses, in the film's symbolism, are of course significant. He has pushed glass walls between his eyes and those of everyone else, human or replicant. Tyrell is a cold distant god who doesn't care about his creation."¹² This is just one example, but many references to sight and eyes are sprinkled throughout the dialogue. Although it initially appears to the viewer that the replicants are not human; the director, with a subtext of eye imagery, makes a persuasive argument that the replicants are more human than some of the humans.

In addition to the symbol of the eye, other visual details give the reader additional information from which a hidden message can be decoded. For example, there is a chess game played between Sebastian and Tyrell, which follows a game played in 1851 which is universally known as "The Immortal Game."¹³ This seems like an inconsequential fact; however, directors often choose small details to underscore the major themes in a film.

The concept of immortality has obvious associations in the ensuing confrontation between Tyrell and Batty. On one level, the chess game represents the struggle of the replicants against the humans: the humans consider the replicants pawns, to be removed one by one. The individual replicants (pawns) are attempting to become immortal (a queen). At another level, the game between Tyrell and Sebastian represents Batty stalking Tyrell. Tyrell makes a fatal mistake in the chess game and another fatal mistake trying to reason with Batty.¹⁴

Another symbol weaved into the story to add an overtone of religious meaning is the dove which suddenly appears in Roy's hands. When he dies, the dove is released into heaven, which makes the viewer subconsciously think of Roy's soul ascending to heaven, a clear indication that the director feels that replicants do have real souls. By far, the most obscure symbol in this film is the unicorn. Midway through the film the scene breaks from the claustrophobic choking environment of Los Angeles in the future to Deckard's dream of a beautiful unicorn galloping through the field. The unicorn could simply be making a statement about Rachel - that, being a replicant, she is "different from other horses."¹⁵ However, the unicorn, possibly a symbol of mortality, is edited into the film right before Deckard examines his photographs, which the audience has already linked to replicants.

The film has been cut in such a way that its subtext is almost invisible. I do not suppose that more than one in hundred viewers took the point that Rick Deckard, the slayer of androids, may without knowing it be a specialized android himself. He has, in common with the androids he hunts, curious intermittent deficiency in human feeling. There is a subtle point being expressed here about what actually makes us human and about destruction making us less human.¹⁶

Together, the symbols convey a hidden message; the director wants the viewer to actively participate in determining who has a soul and who does not.

¹² Schelde 236.

¹³ Murray Chapman, Blade Runner FAQ. (Brisbane, Australia: http://www.vir.com/Video/Film/Blade/brfaq_9.html, 1994) Part 10.

¹⁴ Chapman Part 10.

¹⁵ Chapman Part 9.

¹⁶ Nicholls 106.

The soundtrack also offers a subtle commentary on the visual images, and adds to the overall psychological experience on the part of the viewer. Throughout most of the movie, the music is a synthetic series of simple notes, adding to the foreign and cold feeling of alienation in the city. During the romantic scene between Deckard and Rachel, it is not so much the dialogue or actions as it is the music which conveys the mood of the scene. Rachel lets down her hair, Deckard moves closer to her, but what makes this more than a scene of lust and passion is the music; from this the viewer understands that these two characters have made a real connection. The death of Zhora is accompanied by the sounds of a car screeching, but her struggle to escape and bloody death is very human. Meanwhile, Deckard hunts and shoots her in cold blood, feeling no apparent remorse. This contrast again brings to mind the fundamental questions of the film: who is really human? Another example is the scene where Roy saves Deckard's life, which is accompanied by church bells ringing. The bells imply that Roy is a Christ-figure, a savior, in some way. These are some examples of how music is used to evoke a psychological response in the viewer at a conscious or unconscious level.

The themes of *Blade Runner* are effectively elaborated through several cinematic devices which Scott adapts to fit the tech-noir genre he creates. Science fiction watchers need to be thoroughly convinced that what they are seeing is real; therefore the setting is an integral part of the story and essential to decoding the themes of the film. After the setting has been established, then the other elements of cinema (sound, symbolism, characterization, etc.) take on a specific meaning within this new context. The fact that *Blade Runner* leaves such an impression on the viewer that they have seen a very real possibility for the future is a testimony to the persuasive power of the science fiction film.

Films by Ridley Scott

1978	The Duellists
1979	Alien
1982	<i>Blade Runner</i>
1986	Legend
1987	Someone to Watch Over Me
1989	Black Rain
1991	Thelma and Louise
1992	1492: Conquest of Paradise
1996	White Squall

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The Making of a Hero

Shena Muldoon

At a very basic level, the hero is one with an extraordinary amount of strength which, properly used, results in heroic action. Definitions of the hero change as poets re-define the meaning of "proper" within human action. The meaning of the hero develops from the Homeric age to that of "Sir Gawain and the Green Knight" as the understanding of the propriety of human actions changes from that which gains personal worldly success to one which involves the ethical action of the soul.

The Homeric hero is concerned with achieving a personal worldly goal with the utmost effectiveness. The central action of The Iliad is the efforts of Achilles to win back his personal honor which was degraded by Agamemnon at the beginning of the story. In the end, the poem shows Achilles' successful action in achieving his goal; the superiority of Achilles, particularly over Agamemnon and Hector, is proven in the reconciliation initiated by Agamemnon and in Achilles' slaying of Hector. Thus the descriptions of Achilles are those which indicate his effectiveness: Homer calls him "brilliant," "swift-footed," "born of a goddess," "most violent in battle;" "the best of the Achaeans" (16,274). In The Odyssey, Odysseus is also concerned with achieving his end effectively. Although the end has changed from a self-centered glory as in The Iliad to a peaceful mortal life as found at home, and the means are no longer the strengths of the warrior but those of a thinker, Odysseus' greatness, like that of Achilles, lies in the success of his efforts to accomplish his end. The Homeric heroes deviate from heroic acts when they abandon a reasoned, and therefore effective, approach to their end. Thus Achilles acts un-heroically when he allows his indignation at Agamemnon to turn into unreasoned anger, resulting in the loss of his best friend Patroklos.¹ Similarly, Odysseus acts un-heroically when he allows his curiosity to overcome his reason in the cave of Polyphemus and loses some of his men to the giant. The flaw of the Homeric hero — ultimately one of the mind — is that which most inhibits effective actions.

Morality is seriously introduced in Vergil's hero Aeneas. Like the Homeric heroes, Aeneas is portrayed as the best and strongest of all men, "noble as a god" (1, 801), but his strengths are meant to be applied to a mission which is outside of personal gain. In The Aeneid, Aeneas is concerned with achieving his end - the founding of a new city - responsibly and dutifully despite personal sacrifices and difficulties. Thus Aeneas must leave Dido, whom he loves; and though he longs to live the quiet life of Helenus and Andromache in little Troy, he must go on to a duty which beckons him. This effort to fulfill one's goal, which is a sort of vocation, despite personal difficulties and even the lack of desire, is significantly different from the Homeric hero's act; Homer's heroes pursue their ends simply because they desire and choose them. Through Aeneas, Vergil introduces a sort of morality which holds that man cannot finally be content until he has fulfilled his duties well and is not ruled purely by desire for personal gain. Vergil thus places the hero within a political community by introducing the idea of a duty which is larger than one's personal desires.

Beowulf's definition of a hero continues Vergil's emphasis on the soul and its responsibilities to other humans, while translating this concept of heroism into a Christian context through the introduction of faith and charity as part of the heroic act. Beowulf's motivation for acting is similar to that of Aeneas, for he too sees himself within a community; but unlike Aeneas he seems truly eager to fulfill his obligation

to those in need. When Beowulf parts from Hrothgar after defeating Grendel and the Troll-Wife, he eagerly tells Hrothgar that, should he ever need it, "with thanes by the thousand I will hasten to help" (59). His recognition that he has not totally resolved Hrothgar's difficulties shows another difference from Vergil's hero. While Aeneas was called to fulfill a vocation dutifully, Beowulf is only asked to act heroically. Although being described as the strongest of men - "of living strong men he was the strongest" - Beowulf is not concerned with achieving his mission perfectly. He believes that the outcome is dependent upon God; all he can do is act in a courageous manner: "Foe against foe I'll fight to the death, / And the one who is taken must trust to God's grace!" (16). In fact, both of Beowulf's main actions end in failure; the hall later perishes, and in slaying the dragon Beowulf himself dies from a mortal wound. Thus Beowulf's hero is defined by a self-less, courageous act for the sake of others which reflects his faith in God in face of sure failure.

In Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, the hero is sort of a synthesis of Beowulf, Aeneas, and the Homeric heroes. The medieval idea of a hero which the story portrays is one who effectively uses the world to achieve his goal while retaining strong moral virtues. He must "maintain balance between religious ethos and the unavoidable necessity of using worldly means."² The presence of the pentangle on Gawain's shield reflects his dependence on things of the world (symbolized by the shield) to complete his mission while remaining true to God through the protection of the virtues (symbolized by the pentangle). Sir Gawain's fault lies in choosing to replace faith in God with a worldly means of trickery (the girdle); in doing so, he shows his lack of true faith and thus the shallowness of his virtues. Sir Gawain is always required to place God over the flesh, and Sir Gawain's failure to do so is his disgrace. When he is redeemed in the end through his confession of guilt, he returns to the round table to warn his fellow knights against the weakness of the flesh which, if given prominence, cause "covetousness and cowardice" (4,25). Thus the true hero in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight combines the effectiveness of the Homeric heroes, the personal sacrifice as emphasized in The Aeneid, and courage from faith as exemplified in Beowulf.

The poets' portrayals of heroism reflect their cultures' understanding of the good life. In the ancient Greek world, strengths which made one personally successful were admired; the warrior, who combined intellectual and physical strength, was seen as the ultimate hero. The definition of the hero necessarily had to change in The Aeneid, where Vergil wrote for a culture which had triumphed because of its ability to enforce a universal law. Rome's hero had to display respect for duty, and in doing so Vergil introduces the notion of the necessity for the hero's soul to be properly ordered. Christianity's arrival developed this concept to mean that the soul must express its dependence upon God and act according to His laws for the benefit of others. Beowulf emphasizes the hero's dependence on God to the extent that the hero defines himself only through his actions in the face of certain failure. In Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, the hero becomes more confident in this ability to succeed, but safeguards his worldly pursuits by insisting that the hero must above all be guarded by his virtues. Thus the shift is from the hero who believes that in his heroic actions the end justifies the means to one who holds that the means must be moral in order for him to be heroic at all.

¹ cf. Preston Epps, Thoughts from the Greeks, (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969) 3.

² Donald Howard, "Structure and Symmetry in Sir Gawain," Twentieth Century Interpretations of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, ed. Denton Fox (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968) 50.

The Poor Shepherd: Why Agamemnon Lacks Leadership Ability

Tom Westerman

Agamemnon fails as the Achaian leader because he does not have control of his passions. Pride leads to a thirst for honor and glory that sparks in Agamemnon insatiable blood lust. A great orator, Agamemnon stirs anger in the hearts of his brave men, but he is unable even to control the fear in his own heart when his courage is tested. These passions cloud Agamemnon's judgement when they lead to emotionally-based decisions, rendering him an unfit leader.

Selfish pride taints Agamemnon's character because he puts his own interests ahead of the army's welfare. Out of pride, Agamemnon ignores the advice of his men and denies the return of Chryseis because he values her as a symbol of his honor. Any leader must do what is necessary for the people; therefore, after bringing affliction to the Achaians, Agamemnon relents. He immediately, however, demands "some prize that shall be my own, lest I only / among the Argives go without, since that were unfitting" (*Iliad* 1.118-119). This statement reveals how unsure of himself Agamemnon is. He needs the crutch of a concubine, his symbol of honor, to assert leadership. Whenever this leadership is threatened, Agamemnon instinctively reacts, regardless of the consequences, to put down the threat. At all costs, the king must put Achilles in his place:

"Run away by all means if your heart drives you....
... There are others with me
who will so me honor, and above all Zeus of the counsels.
To me you are the most hateful of all the kings whom the gods love.
.....
I care nothing about you." (1.173-176, 180)

A good leader would not create discord by ostracizing one of his own men in this manner for the sake of honor. Agamemnon's pride, therefore, brings misfortune to the Achaians. This pride leads Agamemnon into ill-fated power struggles and a hunger for honor and glory.

Agamemnon creates disunity amongst the Achaians because he is only concerned about acquiring honor and glory. Helen hints at the king's ambition when she explains to Priam, "That man is Atreus' son Agamemnon, widely powerful, / at the same time a good king and a strong spear fighter" (3.178-179). Though she knows Agamemnon to be a good king, she seems to stress the word "powerful" in her description of him. Hunger for power may be another motive behind Agamemnon's quest for glory in this war. Passionately, the king stirs anger in the hearts of his men by rebuking them and saying, "Now, though, you would be pleased to look on though ten battalions / of Achaians were to fight with the pitiless bronze before you" (4.347-348). Agamemnon successfully rouses his men, but does not display the logic and reason needed for unity and organization. For example, the king praises Idomeneus saying, "I honor you, Idomeneus.... [Y]our cup stands filled forever / even as mine, for you drink when the pleasure takes you" (4.257-263). Yet he soon rebukes Odysseus. After nine years of fighting for this king, Odysseus scoffs at this treatment and remarks that Agamemnon does not deserve to talk this way to the men who are risking their lives for his glory. They risk their lives heroically, but they should never be treated as a commodity at the disposal of the king's honor.

Once in battle, with the first taste of glory, Agamemnon becomes crazy in a desire for the slaughter of Trojan men. A man in control of passions does not speak of how "vultures shall feed upon the delicate skin of their bodies, / while we lead away their beloved wives and innocent / children, in our ships, after we have stormed the citadel" (4.237-239)--even when speaking about the enemy. Agamemnon shows again that he cannot control his passions when he lusts for Trojan blood. Another crucial reason for Agamemnon's failure as a leader is his cowardice. Odysseus was right: Agamemnon is simply all talk. When Agamemnon finds "no shame in running, even by night, from disaster" (14.80), he no longer deserves any respect. In disgust, Odysseus exclaims, "I wish you directed some other unworthy / army, and were not lord over us.... / Now I utterly despise your heart for the thing you have spoken" (14.84-95). Emotionally driven, Agamemnon breaks down in the face of fear.

Agamemnon, thus, fails as the Achaian leader because "the heart inside him has no control to make him [sit] steady" (13.280). A soldier consumed by passion is not fit to lead.

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
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Photographs of Color Lithographs


Andrew Decaen




Reconciliation



Confirmation



Vows



Communion (drawing)

Winners of the 1996 Sonnet Contest

Two Songs of the Fisherman

Joseph O'Brien

Song I

I cannot thinly lilt this sea-borne thing,
But clear salty winds and ice from my voice
To belt storm-strong Neptunes of sea-felt song
For my own rough trade and a god's deep face.
With seasons of slippery harvest cold-clenched
By oil tackle baiting on the tides
I net the foaming crests trough-borne and bunched
Until fish crash my casts like cavalcades
Of green and gold, shiny galloping shards
Stripped and shred from the stormy horizon.
--I'm drawn like the needle's true steerage towards
That taut line of sight the sea wriggles on.
So let Leviathan sing high, men, high!
High as deep heaven in Poseidon's sky!

"Stigmata"

Alexander Shane Alderman

She heard me falsely ask, "Who wouldn't want
These hidden wounds," and she believed, so pure
But young a heart--I feared a blessed Tyrant

Soon from holy fancy stirred. Surgeons but to cure,
I thought, when unmarked intervention lost
Her interest, and gauged my palms to lure

Her faith and hope, but more the third. Yet, most

She pitied, washed chilled alcohol flames through
Cuts, smelting images blood loss blurred. Dost

Thou, God, before me stand, here seen, but tough
To understand--for what, that I recant
From false desire: a fine thought, even though

Absurd. But, in mercy, will Thy swerving sword
Make true lies of love, the hopeful's faithless word?

Ode to Keats

Ellen M. Dowd

Of permanence and purity you write.
Phoenix wings grant words their elevation;
The ebb and flow of Cortez's ocean
Imparts grace to posey's winged flight.
Your fair seraph, that steadfast eremite,
Joy's nemesis with sovran shrine, Grecian
Bride of old unmarred by time's progression,
All unfold tales of beauty infinite.
But in Autumn, your melody is made
Simple, your colors grayed to transparent
Windows framing a peaceful truth--A rose
With thorns more crimson than its bloom. You've stayed
Your stay with nightingales to fulfillment;
Now the swallows coax you into repose.

The Chimpanzees in the Fort Worth Zoo

Kha Manh Nguyen

"The World of Primates" is situated straight ahead the main entrance. There are many species of primates. We can name bonobos, common chimpanzees, orangutans, colobus monkeys, baboons, and gorillas. Our observation centers on the chimpanzees housed in a cage high but not larger than an average living room. There are smooth rocks cemented and piled up to make a slope and a high terrace, and some timbers put upright and bridged to one another as beams with ropes connected from those beams to walls. Apparently this is not the natural habitat of the chimpanzees, and our observation, conducted outside the glass wall and limited in a period of an hour, cannot be expected to yield sufficient objective and functional description of their behavior.

Nevertheless, we try not to miss any of their moves, activities, and facial expressions in our attempt to observe with an objective description, that is, not to ascribe any human intention to the facts observed or not to describe and interpret them in the context of human motivation and purpose. The biggest male chimpanzee we observe is the oldest of the four. He sits on one of the beams with his hands folded upon his knees. His face leans forward upon his arms, staring at the glass wall through which the crowd of visitors stop by to look at them. His eyes are fixed open without blinking. Occasionally he scratches his arms or back. Meanwhile the youngest juvenile male is very active along with his companion, a bigger female. Sometimes they scramble for a cardboard, and each tries to bite or tear it off into pieces. These two also pat on each other's head or shoulder or back. They do that sitting or lying. They embrace each other and one lightly bites or gnaws the other's fur. When patting the other, one usually opens his mouth half-way and shows the lower teeth. Sometimes they suddenly chase one another around only to stop and start patting or embracing again. The fourth chimpanzee in the cage is a male bigger than the other two but smaller than the oldest mentioned above. He wanders around picking up and eating some lettuce or fruit. He has a small scratch on his back. It is not bleeding, but lying on the beam, he keeps touching it with a finger and then looking and even licking that finger. After a while the biggest one jumps down and approaches the younger two. These two rise up and draw back a little. But the old does nothing. He starts to run around, and one of the two chases behind not to catch him but only to stop near behind when the older stops. Then the oldest climbs up the rocks and again sits still with his folded arms resting on the rock and his chin on his arms. The other two again start to interact with each other. Suddenly the fourth one or the second biggest male throws himself very fast bumping at the glass wall. That move makes some kids standing fixed to it draw back in fear. But there is no change in the chimpanzee's facial expression. His face looks normal as before. Then he climbs back to the beam and lies down again.

How can we explain this action which appears to be an intimidating charge? Also, what can we say about the interactions between the two youngest? Last, how can we interpret the quiet mood of the biggest? To answer these questions we must rely on the previous systematic long-term research and observation of the chimpanzees living wild in their natural habitat. Gathered over thirty years, Jane

Goodall's description of their behavior in social interactions, sexual relationship, feeding patten, intergroup conflicts, or mother-child bonds will help us read or interpret the meaning or the function of the activities and the facial expressions of those we observe. Goodall also describes different kinds of sound uttered by the chimpanzees which she call 'pant-hoots' (Goodall, *In the Shadow*, 273). Unfortunately, standing behind a thick wall of glass or brick with a noisy cascade behind, we cannot hear any of their sounds.

In the face of the biggest or oldest male, who usually sits still, we cannot read any peculiar expression. In ordinary language can we say that he sits there, doing nothing and just staring at the glass wall or at the human visitors who shout, talk, smile, gaze, and wave at him behind it, especially the kids? Can we say he is in turn observing us? Rarely or nowhere in Goodall's book can we find such a description of an immobile mood and posture lasting in a long period of time in the chimpanzees living in the wild. When not in moving or feeding, they usually gather together in a mutual social interaction which can be a cooperative play of the infants or the juveniles or the grooming of the adults (Kano, 204). Grooming is to use finger or lips to remove dirt, leaves, or dead skin. It is a friendly form of physical contact which serve as a reassurance of their relations or an appeasement of any tensions caused by hierarchical or feeding conflicts (Goodall, *In the Shadow*, 245). But in this case our observed male chimpanzee does nothing of the kind. Actually he joins the younger two and runs away chased by one of them only to stop without doing anything else towards others. Is it that he does not need any social interaction with others? Is his staring fixedly at the visitors a kind of interactions? But what kind of interaction is that? Goodall mentions that an angry chimpanzee may stare fixedly at an opponent before running or charging towards him (247). We cannot have an appropriate answer, but may say that his behavior is changed according to his captivity in the context of artificial habitat in which there is no large group to relate, no need to perform life-sustaining activities such as foraging, feeding, nest building, or no territory to 'patrol' (Kano, 157).

The younger two may be juveniles. Then in Goodall's terms, they are more playful than the adults. Like human children they play together with physical contact in wrestling or chasing one another. Our chimpanzees are observed to be doing the grooming by touching or slightly biting with lips on each other's skin as described above. The cardboard, as told later the zoo program coordinator in our meeting, is supplied for them as something to play with. A lack of a natural habitat and a social group to live in influence drastically the infants and juveniles. For example, for Goodall the ability to manipulate objects, though innate, needs actualizing by learning from the mother or the adults (Goodall, *In the Shadow*, 241). Besides, the youngsters must learn to discern what leaf or bud or fruit is edible. The facial expression we can observe from these playing youngsters is somewhat similar to the "low open grin" with the mouth opened and showing the lower teeth as described in the previous paragraph. According to Goodall it expresses a "play face" when the young play together (273).

Lastly, how can we explain the apparently aggressive display of the fourth chimpanzee in our observation? In a hierarchical conflict the chimpanzee tries to drag around or bend down branches or trees. In an aggressive display the chimpanzee stares at the opponent, raises his forearms rapidly, jerks back his head a little, and charges forward to the adversary upright. In our case he just jumps down to the glass wall without any warning signs or any aggressive facial expression. Is it a territorial display? It might be more correct to say that, as the coordinator suggests in the context of captivity, this action is that one performed by the chimpanzee by his want to interact with humans.

But what thought or emotion emerging in his mind makes him perform such an aggressive action? Due to the lack of knowledge of their natural behavior observed in their natural habitat, we usually come quickly to such an anthropomorphic question or description of everything they do. This jumping down and bumping into the glass wall is then considered by us as an attack out of a vicious nature. Or the oldest chimpanzee, sitting still, is observed by a woman standing next to us as a poor guy who "looks so sad." But this anthropomorphic attitude towards the chimpanzees is adopted and supported by Jane Goodall

herself, even though her project is to observe and describe them objectively as they are. She argues that their behavior and emotions are so similar to those of humans that even an inexperienced observer can understand "what is going on" (Goodall, Through A Window, 16). Moreover, she recalls that humans "differ from the apes not in kind, but only in degree," even though that degree is still overwhelmingly large (The Chimpanzees, 592).

But, to what extent can the intelligence of the chimpanzee reach in comparison with that of humans? Many researchers are still trying to find a final sufficient answer. But meanwhile they all agree that observing the chimpanzees in the natural habitat or studying them in captivity are interesting and beneficial not only to the protection of the species from extinction but also to the study of "the emergence of human mind" because the chimpanzees are "humans's closest evolutionary relatives" (Rumbaugh, 26). In fact, in the search of the emergence of human mind, we can find only the reconstruction of the physical characteristics of early humans in Africa or the speculation on the use of the various tools and artifacts. But behavior, understood as the result of a process of intelligent activities, "does not fossilize" (Goodall, Through A Window, 206).

Therefore, in that context our observation or study of the chimpanzees can be said to contribute to the understanding of the way the human mind develops. Then this knowledge of the origin of our mind will help us understand our own behavior and then ourselves. And is this the achievement inherently desired by our nature, the achievement which is constantly approached and tackled by human efforts in different disciplines in philosophy, psychology, sociology, or anthropology?

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On The Comparison of the Thought of Henry Adams and Walter Lippmann

Richard Weber

History, it would seem, is a fertile ground for the speculation of causes and effects, meaning and context; for in every case wherein humanity is presented with a situation that calls out for explanation and interpretation, the intellectual efforts of reflective individuals rise to the task. This, we may say, is the objective nature of history. Its subjective nature arises when we go beyond this concrete fact of the need to draw meaning from experience and proceed to the actual substance injected into this general intellectual mold, that is to say, to the actual business of adumbrating the essence of the particular explanation and interpretation. For it is here that the objective universal crumbles into the subjective particular, a process which may be asserted as the essential nature of the intellectual endeavor we refer to as history.

An example of this movement from the empirical general to the theoretical specific may be found in the contrasting ideas of history put forward by Henry Adams in his Education of Henry Adams and Walter Lippmann in his work, Drift and Mastery. Both works provide a fundamental recognition of the social, political, and economic characteristics of industrial modernity - the objective historical element, as it were - yet each moves in a different direction with regards to an explanation and interpretation of the general circumstances within which they were formed. While Adams moves in a direction that is generally parallel to that of Lippmann with respect to a recognition of the profound nature of the changes in society brought about by a rapid industrialization, he disagrees with the conclusion that Lippmann draws concerning the usefulness of the change itself. This fundamental distinction would seem to direct the divergent paths taken by both authors in their treatment of a common subject. Consequently, any treatment of their works must take as its principle of departure this unity in opposition, in both its aspects of similarity and its dissimilarity. The purpose of this particular exposition of the ideas of Adams and Lippmann will begin from this point, attempting to sketch the primacy of elements set forth in each work, while placing them in a hierarchy relative to the importance attached to each by the author, as well as endeavoring to state any conclusion the works draw from the arrangement of their internal elements.

To begin, it must be noted that the logically primary element of any history that is consistent with itself is man. In Drift and Mastery, Walter Lippmann presents to the reader a view of modern society in which this primary element has experienced fundamental and rapid change; the social alterations of industrial production taken to extreme heights of expansion and complexity have left the individual in a state of confusion. Each person within the new industrial society is confronted with the need for more information and organization in order that he may attain his goal of power and wealth.

In relation to what has transpired before, Lippmann offers, not a new goal, but a new means of attaining it necessitated by changes in the means of production and consumption.

Lippmann begins his exposition of change with the observation that society has altered its expectations of the proprieties of public action, as seen against the mores of the private sphere; the phenomenon of "muckraking" is the element used to group this collective shift in public awareness of different stages of action. The mythic animal of the public servant is found to be held to a higher level of morality than other individuals in society; the politician must not act in such a way as to benefit himself or his friends; the essential nature of the crime being "not that he filches money from the safe but that he betrays a trust." This places the civil servant in a different sphere of expected action from the average citizen, one based on a notion of trust; yet this trust concerns elements of personal economic policy that the average individual embraces and applauds within the private sphere: "[Our actions] say in effect that no public servant must allow himself to follow the economic habits of his countrymen. The corrupt politician is he who brings into public service the traditions of a private career." We expect a higher level of loyalty from our servants than we expect from ourselves.

When applied to the business world, the private firm is held to a new notion of propriety; the industrialist is equally charged with maintaining a trust with the public that borders on the social contract. The political and economic, through the manifestation of the accusations of the muckraking press, have revealed a new notion of trust and morality to which they must hold themselves. "These charges and countercharges arose because the world has been altered radically." These changes proceed as a direct contradiction of what had gone on before in society; machine politics and corruption in business were once common and accepted facts of life in the 19th century: "...if we brand as criminal the conventional acts of twenty years ago, it's because we have developed new necessities and new expectations."

The old world "of twenty years ago" existed in such a way that the young at the time of Lippmann's writing can only reconstruct it "with the greatest difficulty." In the short span of a generation the facets of social life have expanded and changed. "We know that the huge corporation, the integrated industry, production for a world market, the network of combinations, pools and agreements have played havoc with the older political economy. The scope of human endeavor is enormously larger..." This change has led to a rejection of older political conceptual forms; following upon other figures (such as Marx), Lippmann places the foundations of the political order firmly on those of the economic. Consequently, the changes reflected in the nature of the economic will be made manifest in the other spheres of social existence.

One of the most basic of these changed elements is private property; Lippmann proposes that his generation is moving toward an abstract theory of ownership; for in some aspects of the economy the owner "may never see his property. He may not know where his property is situated." The idea of property as a tangible, concrete, material-spatial object is receding before a new conception of property as an abstraction, an understanding between individuals concerning commodities which themselves grow the more abstract the further they are removed from the material aspects of their production; witness the shares held by stockholders in firms. This erosion of private property is a function of a shift toward what Lippmann feels is inevitable government ownership of production, which will bring about cooperation and efficient means of production through a process of centralization.

The process that will lead to a society which efficiently produces and operates will be brought about by the efforts of educated, disciplined participants in the society itself; it will be a struggle between centralized authority and democracy. On the one hand, government as the most effective repository of centralized power is the most efficient means toward the realization of social cooperation,

yet it must work "without democratic interruption." Collectivism, the word Lippmann uses for this new society toward which his industrial times point, contains as the kernel of its difficulty of realization the problem of "combining popular control with administrative power." The people he refers to are largely uneducated, being led by consumerist advertising, and lacking a sort of mental discipline that will allow them to exercise effective control of affairs. As a consequence of their feebleness, control rests with those who are specialists within the fields indispensable to production and consumption; but "that control is challenged now ...by...the consumer, the worker, and the citizens at large."

Yet even this aspect of the state of affairs, brought about by the industrialization of society, is leading to the notion of collectivism; for Lippmann posits the true power in the democratic politics of his day to be the people moving against the high cost of living; through a desire for self preservation, the public is coming to be the "determining force in government." In essence, the democratic force is an organization of the people in response to an industrialization of their existence; to attain its highest logical end, this body of people must be educated and disciplined, that democracy may extend to the industrial world. The self discipline needed for self government will come through labor; this necessary process is realized through the activities of labor unions, the participation of the wage-earner in the control of industry. The ultimate reason for this need is that the older, absolutist concept of society no longer leads to a civilized end. "Employers are not wise enough to govern their men with unlimited power, and not generous enough to be trusted with autocracy...[That is] why private industry has got to prepare itself for democratic control." Opposition to the activities of organized labor retards this natural process, turning its energies away from the attainment of "discipline and preparation for the task of the future" to "despair and hate and servile rebellions." The labor problem is, then, the "efforts of the wage-earners to achieve power" to realize an end embodied in the circumstances that create their elements in a modern industrial society.

The ultimate realization of the collective structure will be "paid for" by the gradual elimination of the unproductive through a process of centralization of authority in a competent government; the money "saved" can be devoted to "social purposes." If these funds are used for civilization, industry will be increased in efficiency, thereby educating and disciplining the people it governs in a harmonious circle of social improvement through organization and centralization. The question this raises is whether the government can spend more efficiently than the private individual - if it can it is "entirely justified in substituting itself for the activities of the private individual"; "there is no question of inalienable rights. It is a question of good use and bad use, wise use and foolish use."

Consequently, Lippmann's view of history involves a notion of evolutionary teleology, that is, through the processes of the organism (society) as seen in its actions, a discernable end is developed, which the historian identifies in the trends and currents of his time. For Lippmann, the development of the trust has led to a process of industrial expansion that has forced a change in the public conception of the political and economic; the activities of labor in response to these new notions promotes a discipline and energy needed by the wage-earner in his effort to introduce popular rule into the industrial and the economic. The result will be "collectivism," a society of cooperation produced by a well organized, efficient industry fostered by a centralized government.

On the opposite end of the spectrum is Henry Adams' presentation of a somewhat different view of society and history in his work, The Education of Henry Adams. While Lippmann presents his work within the context of an impersonal investigation of social and economic historical factors with an eye to some future end, Adams puts forth instead a view of his own times from the standpoint of personal experience; consequently, The Education of Henry Adams is a work of extreme subtlety and complexity, there often being the finest of lines between the exposition of personal experience and general historical commentary.

The themes and elements of the work are grouped under the author's attempt to find "education." This may be taken as a quest for a productive ordering of experience, something useful to allow one to live well in the world. Through this seemingly simple desire, Adams presents an unwieldy notion of an historical theory as the backdrop for his search for education. This theory he defines as "dynamic," that is, as involving force as the basic constituent of the cause of action; relying heavily on mechanistic terms, Adams describes what may be termed the events of history as the effects of the opposition of force. The number and kinds of force vary in his treatment of the subject, but the theory may be taken to rest on primary force, or man. This force acquires "a faculty of memory, and, with it a singular skill of analysis and synthesis." By a gradual expansion through the cognitive faculties made available to him through his memory, the force of man is educated in a practical sense through his experience: "Fire taught him secrets that no other animal could learn; running water probably taught him even more...with little or no effort on his part. All these forces formed his thought, induced his action, and even shaped his figure." Thus the force of man is a force drawn to and created in response to the other forces of nature ("a dynamic theory...takes for granted that the forces of nature capture man. The sum of force attracts"). Thus, in a sense, man's education was complete before history began, history being a thing requiring education - of how to record force. The forces which man experienced enlarged his mind, placing within it the idea of their unity in the totality of his experience, and gave him the notion of this unity as God; this conception contains all the forces except man himself. Consequently, nature (the forces other than man) and man become the two masses that "a dynamic law requires," forever "reacting upon each other, without stop." This relation of the historical forces (which supply the material for history itself) follow laws of economy and change; thus, each stage in the efforts of man to exist in nature follows a pattern that may be expressed "in a mathematical formula." Adams uses the example of the Roman Empire to illustrate this notion of history: "the economic needs of a violently centralizing society forced the empire to enlarge its slave system...until it consumed itself and the empire too, leaving society no resource but further enlargement of its religious system in order to compensate for the losses and horrors of the failure." History, it would seem, in the dynamic process of unfolding events retains no place for actions taken in opposition to the direction taken by its force.

Education, then, is an attempt to encompass these forces, to aim "at a conscious purpose" and reach a unity of force, an equilibrium; yet this is never attained; it is a "fiction that society educated itself." Placed in terms of modern history, the introduction of "thought-inertia" upsets this move toward a unity of forces through education. Because of this negation of force, man has no reason to posit unity in the cosmos: the mind - the active force of man - has turned away from trying to derive unity from itself and has instead placed its efforts in observing and recording the forces of nature - without positing a unity for them. Thus, new forces grew - the "chemical and mechanical" - until they acquired sufficient mass to displace the old forces of religion. "Nature, not mind, did the work that the sun does on the planets. Man depended more and more absolutely on forces other than his own, and on instruments which superseded his senses." These new forces gathered acceleration from their gathered mass until the "stupendous" velocity "ended in 1900 with the appearance of the new class of supersensual forces"; in short, man's shift from a reliance on the religious unity in mind that he experienced in nature was supplanted by an attempt of mind to merely catalogue and record phenomena. The nature of man, as given in Adams' anthropology, is based on a mental awareness of the universe - on education - that shaped his thought, because early man in his education needed a unity of the forces which molded him; man's eventual abandonment of this educational/psychological nature constitutes on his part an act which is untrue to himself. This new direction is toward the mechanical, the industrial, which, as man applies himself to move, grows in force and supplants the older way of thinking by a process of displacement - the greater mass forces the lesser mass aside.

This, in paraphrase, is the historical theory of Adams; it concerns man within a world of change that is undesirable, being a change that defeats the nature of man's original "education"; man

cannot hope to cope fully in a world he has made in opposition to his instinctive needs, needs which have even themselves become antiquated in the new view of the world. Hence, for Adams, there can be no true education, only a recognition of the opposition of the forces of man and nature, an opposition aggravated by the movement away from unity on the part of man. In such circumstances the discomfort and bewilderment experienced by Adams (who may be taken for an "every man" of his generation) may be understood as the experience of an individual who recognizes the outmoded nature of the traditional education; in a world reaching hyper-optical velocity, change is the dominant element of existence. Adams is too much a figure of both worlds to be at home in either; thus his quest for education leads him to a stoic realization that the only knowledge attainable is that of knowing no knowledge is attainable, i.e., the knowledge of non-knowledge; for Adams change is undesirable, a product of a change of forces initiated by man, who is nevertheless unable either to control or accommodate himself to the new situation. In many ways, The Education of Henry Adams is a tragedy of the isolation and alienation of modern man, who is a slave to his own inventions.

A comparison between Adams and Lippmann must accord a place to these respective differences in the understanding of history. Both theories work with change, a change seen as rapid and forceful; but, whereas Lippmann sees an end in the rush of change, namely, a movement to a cooperative society, Adams sees largely a blank field of despair within which one can only hope for contentment of sorts arising from accommodation; he admits no teleology in his dynamic theory of history. In society, Lippmann sees in industrial capitalism the means for achieving his idealistic collectivism, whereas Adams sees this aspect of modern society as the result of the new materialistic-scientific forces run amuck. Where in such a world can a figure like Adams find an education sufficient to supplant the antiquated remains of tradition? He seems to find no answer, and perhaps there is none for someone of his generation, being on the threshold of a new age. For Lippmann, a member of a time accustomed to the crushing rate of social change (indeed, he dwells as little on the past in his work as Adams does on the future in his own), the diverse activities so despised by Adams as chaotic seem to point to a future of prosperity and genuine progress. But ultimately it is in the tool of this progress - business- that the two authors most strongly disagree; for Lippmann holds that, while business bred the new social awareness, it will bring its ideal end -collectivism- to fruition. Adams, on the other hand, feels that business is merely the cause of chaos, not of any transcendent social order. Consequently, as both theories are based on a perspective of change, and each takes an opposite view of the subject, it must be concluded that they are in some sense in a sort of fundamental opposition.

This opposition may be seen in terms of pure politics, a great preoccupation of Adams and an expansion by application of the differences in their respective historical theories; for it would seem that Lippmann, drawing upon his idealistic, optimistic theory of history, would criticize Adams with regard to the presentation of his thought. For example, Adams presents his treatment of the Civil War largely through the vehicle of personal recollection and memoir; combined with a diplomatic slant (diplomacy being at the time Adams' occupation); he presents a curiously anecdotal presentation of an important historical event. It is subjective and unclear in its adumbration; its specific events draw on the personal, and, as such, rely on personal commentary for much of their validity. In other words, Adams gives the "little picture," as it were, which derives its larger significance from the characters involved and its relation to "education"; Lippmann, who favors a large scale view of history, would not agree. His criticism would stem from the fact that Adams draws no conclusion beyond himself, that a connection to history through the ephemeral notion of education does not constitute a valid judgement of events. Further, Adams' use of diplomatic events to paint historical pictures would seem to be in opposition to Lippmann's method of using broad social, political, and economic trends to draw equally broad generalizations. In effect, Lippmann might ask Adams "Yes, but what's your point?" If Adams draws no conclusion of events and does not, in turn, apply this to a concept of the future, Lippmann would not have much use for such a theory of history in his own understanding of the meaning of the terms.

Yet despite these differences of opinion, the two would seem to agree on other issues. Lippmann finds "a thousand inconsistencies" in social institutions, as does Adams (Washington, Harvard); further, Lippmann sees in the institution of the church a tradition "that the great things are permanent" but which meets a population "that needs above all to understand the meaning and the direction of change." Adams find similar features in religion with the collapse of man's desire for unity. In the realm of politics, both thinkers find government to have "only the faintest relation to actual conditions." With regard to women, both authors hold a sort of reverence and respect; for Lippmann, woman deserves a place in the effort to produce a cooperative society, but she must be educated in order to exercise her rights; Adams finds in woman a nobility and lofty superiority.

But regardless of these random areas of agreement, both authors express different ideas concerning the same subject, namely, historical change. In summary, one might select a sampling of each writer's thoughts on the nature of education in order to illustrate this difference. Lippmann writes, "Children are immured in what their parents fondly picture to be a citadel of innocence. In reality they are plunged into a fantastic brooding or into a haphazard education." For Adams, "The object of education...should be the teaching [of]... how to react with vigor and economy...[it] should try to lessen the obstacles, diminish the friction, invigorate the energy, and should train minds to react, not act haphazard, but by choice..." Each explains the other; Lippmann gives a definition of education that Adams would have applied to himself, while Adams gives a picture of education that fits Lippmann's conception of the ennobling force of labor. In a strange way, the notion of education, while a facet of the differences of the works, is at the same time an element that would seem to connect them through what appears to be a commentary of each author on the other. It is as if each is a force, united in opposition through what may be called "education." It is in such a manner that a unity of opposites, whether spiritual or material, conservative or liberal, ultimately exists.

Aristocracy or Democracy

Shannon Bralick

Aristocracy has become synonymous with tyranny in the democratic minds of many people – it is almost a monarchy, and that, of course, is despotism. The United States, however, began existence breathing the air of aristocracy, both from the exhalations of Europe and through its own innate qualities. Alexis de Tocqueville, writing in the 1830s, makes keen observations about the character of both aristocracy and democracy; he is, in fact, quite even-handed and discusses the advantages and drawbacks of both systems. Is aristocracy conducive to a better political system and arrangement and democracy conducive to a better social arrangement, or vice versa? This is the question which Tocqueville seeks to answer, and, through his examination and critique of American democracy, it becomes clear that an aristocracy is a more efficient, more refined, and more desirable political arrangement than a democracy.

Aristocratic governments have certain qualities which make them both more efficient and more effective in governing. The three which Tocqueville explicitly mentions are patience, perseverance, and secrecy; Tocqueville says that an aristocracy, as opposed to a democracy, is able “to coordinate the details of a great undertaking and to fix on some plan and carry it through with determination in spite of obstacles...[to combine] measures in secret and [to wait] patiently for the result” (Tocqueville 229). These qualities are especially useful in conducting foreign affairs, and democracy, Tocqueville asserts, does not have any of them: “[f]or my part, I have no hesitation in saying that in the control of society’s foreign affairs democratic governments do appear decidedly inferior to others” (Tocqueville 228). He also defrays the charge that an aristocracy “[works] for itself alone and not for the whole community” in matters of foreign policy by saying that, in these matters, “it very seldom happens that an aristocracy has an interest distinct from that of the people” (Tocqueville 229). With this “main vice” absolved, aristocracy is presented as a better alternative, perhaps, in the conduct of foreign affairs. This will be addressed in another context later.

It is intriguing to note the similarities between Tocqueville’s qualities for a government involved in foreign affairs and Publius’s qualities for the chief executive of the United States. In *Federalist 70*, Publius advances the idea that there are four qualities essential to the executive, and that these four qualities are produced most frequently when that executive is unified: “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number...” (Rossiter 424). Decision – being distinct from deliberation – is best taken to mean the ability to choose between two or more courses of action without lengthy consultation or consideration. In this sense, it can be compared to Tocqueville: the need for being able to “[coordinate] the details of a great undertaking and [fix] on some plan of action...” (Tocqueville 229). The quality of activity seems to associate itself most readily with Publius’s character of energy, and in this sense it comes close to Tocqueville’s requirement of being able to “carry [a plan] through with determination...” (Tocqueville 229). Secrecy in both cases is identical, and the only quality which seems not to have a mate is that of dispatch; that, however, could be combined with activity and thus could fall under activity’s corresponding quality. Far from suggesting that Tocqueville has erred in his assessment of democratic governments, this correspondence suggests

that, perhaps, the American regime is not – or was not intended to be – so democratic as first meets the eye. The selection of the president and the unification of the executive both indicate something fundamental about the character of the government: the federal system, as established by the Founders, is a synthesis of democratic and aristocratic elements.

This synthesis is best seen in the nature of the bicameral legislature. Both Tocqueville and Publius remark on the variant characters of the House and the Senate, but this variance does not prevent the two Houses from working together and meshing their functions as neatly as interlocking gears. Tocqueville presents the contrast between the Houses in his usual colorful style:

When one enters the House of Representatives...one is struck by the vulgar demeanor of that great assembly. ... A couple of paces away is the entrance to the Senate... Every word uttered in this assembly would add luster to the greatest parliamentary debates in Europe (Tocqueville 200-201).

Tocqueville is intrigued by this difference, by the fact that “the elite of the nation [is] in one room and not in the other” (Tocqueville 201). He decides that they are so vastly different because of the means of their election – the House is elected directly, whereas the Senate is elected by the State legislatures. The Senate, according to Tocqueville’s descriptions, is a noble place, a place as aristocratic as any parliament in Europe. Even so, he makes it clear that it is not an aristocratic body and that it is derived, no matter how many times removed, from the popular will. Even though he is careful to deny that title to the Senate, it is clear that this body represents the legislative elite and is the closest America will get to an aristocratic ruling class.

Publius makes interesting note of this tendency in the Senate – the tendency to aristocracy which Tocqueville is so careful to disavow – in *Federalist* 63. He writes, “the federal Senate will never be able to transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic body” (Rossiter 389). This statement refuses to allow that the Senate, by its nature and based on those qualities which Publius ascribes to it – security, stability, enlightenment, dignity, and reason – is already an aristocracy of sorts. The nobility and stature which the Senate lends to the character of the federal government – qualities which would be welcomed and esteemed by aristocratic governments – suggest that this body is, indeed, a legislative elite which has its roots in democracy and meshes with democracy without tarnishing or lowering itself.

The refinement, or the nobility, natural to aristocratic or elitist bodies is evident in other aspects of the government as well. Tocqueville discusses the differences, for example, between aristocratic and democratic scandals and vices:

There is in the corruption of those who reach power by chance something coarse and vulgar which makes it contagious to the crowd, but even in the very depravity of great noblemen there is often a certain aristocratic refinement and an air of grandeur which prevents it from being communicated (Tocqueville 221).

This section on the corruption of democratic rulers is one of Tocqueville’s more scathing reviews of democracy. He asserts here that aristocracies, even when corrupt, still maintain their dignity and keep their heads above the contagion of the masses. Democracies, on the other hand, cannot help but revert to that contagion, for that contagion gave them birth. Tocqueville attributes the rise of some men to power to their vices and declares, “in this way there comes about an odious mingling of the conceptions of baseness and power, of unworthiness and success, and of profit and dishonor” (Tocqueville 221). Had he lived to see the turn of the twentieth century, Tocqueville would have seen this prophetic statement proven by Tammany Hall giants like George Washington Plunkett, who claims,

"There's an honest graft, and I'm an example of how it works. I might sum up the whole thing by sayin': 'I seen my opportunities and I took 'em'" (Marcus 125). As Tocqueville says, "There is less reason to fear the sight of the immorality of the great than that of immorality leading to greatness" (Tocqueville 221).

There is a difference, too, Tocqueville asserts, in the quality of the laws produced by aristocracies and democracies, respectively. The laws in the United States, he says, are obeyed because no law is passed which might be broken: "law in the United States patently favors those who everywhere else have the greatest interest in violating it" (Tocqueville 224). According to Tocqueville, the only advantage to democratic lawmaking is that its "aim...is more beneficial to humanity than that of aristocracy," but that, in general, "its laws are almost always defective or untimely" (Tocqueville 232). Aristocracy has the upper hand in all other respects:

[I]t is infinitely more skillful in the science of legislation...it is not subject to transitory impulses; it has far-sighted plans and knows how to let them mature until the favorable opportunity offers...[it] moves forward intelligently; it knows how to make the collective force of all its laws converge on one point at one time" (Tocqueville 232).

Tocqueville lessens the harshness of his criticism by approving of the leaders' identification with the people, of democratic government's influence on the general prosperity, and of the short duration of a bad leader's term (Tocqueville 232-233). But, he adds, aristocracies are not always hostile to the popular will; in fact, "the aristocratic magistrate is impelled at the same time and in the same direction by the passions of the ruled, by his own, and...by the passions of those who come after him" (Tocqueville 234). In this sense, then, the aristocratic ruler has the larger constituency – he rules for the present and the future in the same instant.

Aristocracy presents the advantage of stability in legislation, as well. This is the foremost argument for the creation of a Senate, and it is a good one. Tocqueville points out that several of the great American political thinkers have deplored the lack of stability in the laws – even Jefferson, who was "the greatest democrat ever to spring from American democracy" (Tocqueville 203). He asserts, in one of the most beautiful passages of the book, that

Nothing in the world is so fixed in its views as an aristocracy. The mass of the people may be seduced by its ignorance or its passions; a king may be taken off his guard and induced to vacillate in his plans; and moreover, a king is not immortal. But an aristocratic body is too numerous to be caught, and yet so small that it does not easily yield to the intoxication of thoughtless passions. An aristocratic body is a firm and enlightened man who never dies (Tocqueville 230).

This avowal of the great advantage of aristocracy – stability in all things and reason in all things – is a profound support for the argument for the supremacy of aristocracy over democracy.

There are two other smaller advantages which an aristocratic government possesses over a democratic one, and they are these: its ability to respond to conflict and its expense. In regard to the first, Tocqueville makes an intriguing observation:

It is incontestable that in times of danger a free people generally displays infinitely more energy than one which is not so, but I am inclined to believe that this is especially true of a free people in which the aristocratic element is dominant. Democracy seems to me much better suited to directing a peaceful society...rather

than to braving over a long period the great storms that beset a nation's political existence (Tocqueville 223).

Tocqueville here makes two crucial points: one, that having an aristocratic elite does not impede the freedom of the people, and two, that aristocracies are better suited to weather prolonged struggles. The reason for the latter, Tocqueville explains, is that democracies are near-sighted; "it is this clear perception of the future...which must often be lacking in a democracy." He in turn attributes this fact to this, that the "people feel more strongly than they reason" (Tocqueville 223). The upper classes, he asserts, are better able to see and understand the contingencies that drive the future, and they are also better able to bear the trials of the present; an aristocracy, therefore, would be better able to plan for the future based on present events, and it would also be better able to withstand the tremors that so often shake the foundations of governments.

As for the second advantage, that of expense, Tocqueville demonstrates very clearly that democracies are not economical governments. "Countries," he says, "where lawmaking falls exclusively to the lot of the poor cannot hope for much economy in public expenditure." Then he adds, "In other words, a democratic government is the only one in which those who vote for a tax can escape the obligation to pay it" (Tocqueville 210). He attributes the extravagance of democracy to other sources, as well: innovation, for one, and constant drive for improvement. On the other hand, "an aristocracy thinks more about preservation than about improvement" (Tocqueville 211). The last and greatest reason which Tocqueville offers for democratic largesse is this: "it has not learned the art of being economical" (Tocqueville 212). One would think that this situation would be reversed - that aristocracies would be more extravagant than democracies rather than vice versa- because of the class background of the rulers. Tocqueville, however, has demonstrated that it cannot be, and is not, so.

Tocqueville arrives at the conclusion, then, that democracy has promise but needs improvement in many areas, and that aristocracy has problems but has advantages over democracy in many areas. I would agree, and I would contend that the United States, as originally founded, was more aristocratic than not in spite of Publius' assertions to the contrary. Now, however, the government has become what Tocqueville called "a tyrannical power commanding in the name of the people" (Tocqueville 222); it has become more "democratic" with the addition of the Seventeenth Amendment and the virtual abolition of the electoral college, and so those elements which were meant to add stability and dignity to the character of the government are gone. The federal system has been drastically altered through the tyranny of the national judiciary; the state legislatures have lost their status as intermediaries between the people and the national government. All of these factors combined have led to that state of which Publius warned the nation in *Federalist 63*: "liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as by the abuses of power..." (Rossiter 387). The over-democratization of American government has caused the nation "to be miserably lost among the shoals of democracy" (Tocqueville 201) - this people has not listened to Tocqueville, and it is only proving him more right with every passing day.

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which we are trying to communicate. We will continue to illuminate the way *by our example* for other nations to develop great and democratic governments. If we abandon our ideals for the sake of some momentary gain, then they will surely be abandoned in the world; the brilliant light of our city will give way to the black night of chaos and tyranny.

I submit to you, dear gentlemen, that we are *not* here to decide whether to give democracy to the Philippines, (as if democracy could be simply given), and we are *not* here to decide whether to keep order in some distant set of islands. In short, we are *not* here to decide what kind of nation the Philippines will become. We *are* here, at the dawn of the 20th Century, to decide what kind of nation this United States will become. Will we cling to the values which have made us free, the values which have made us strong? Or will we join those who would deny these very ideals which our forefathers stood and died for? At the end of the day, who will be heard, the voices of liberty...or of tyranny? Join me, *I entreat you*, speak out with me...speak out for liberty.

more suited to the just cause of liberty, one must assume that the right of consent of the governed is at grave risk - or has in fact been altogether destroyed, as is now the case in the Philippines.

Now my competent fellow Senators have responded by asserting that many times in our history we Americans have ignored the notion of consent for the purpose of annexing territory and establishing new states. I answer that in each case, the great purpose of America's statesman was not to conquer a foreign and friendly people but either to develop largely vacant land or else to ensure the safety of those Americans who lived near the border of these annexed lands. Some examples of the first case include the purchase of the Louisiana Territory and of Alaska. Examples of the second include the wars with the Indians in the West and with Mexico. Can one really see a parallel between these annexations and the heroic fight that the Filipino people are putting up against our invading guns? Can one really argue that these islands threaten us in distant North America, or that there is no one to complain should we decide to develop the Filipinos' land against their will? Define "consent" any way you wish, but without doubt, we are now actively denying the just right of the consent of the governed in the Philippines. This is wrong. We cannot justify it, we cannot explain it away, and we cannot allow it to go on if we expect to maintain the same moral stature which we have developed since the first days of this great nation's existence.

Mr. Beveridge, I am sure, would want to impress upon us the great service we are giving the Filipino people in this time of crisis. But why are we *suddenly* placed in this moral dilemma of deciding whether to help the Filipinos keep order in their country against their will, or to abandon them to the dangers of chaos, revolution, and other imperialist countries' intrigue. He does not ask the obvious question: what are we doing in the Philippines in the first place? We destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay as part of the Spanish war machine, but why did we continue the fight to take the city of Manila, so many thousands of miles away from Cuba, the real issue of this war? In truth, was it not for the blatantly imperialistic ambition of Admiral Dewey and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt?

A warning, fellow Senators: acquiescing to Mr. Beveridge's and Mr. Lodge's arguments amounts to accepting the imperial policy which these men have thrust upon the American people. Now we must see through the heavy mist of this crisis: Mr. Lodge and Mr. Beveridge are not suggesting a solution to this temporary situation but rather a fundamental new policy wherein we take on the appearance and mores of the European Empires. Listen carefully to their promises of the great possibilities in trade and commerce and land. Here is where their real affection lies, not in the development of democratic institutions in a distant land. In the end, all their careful and lucid rhetoric amounts to pure and base greed.

Let me humbly suggest, therefore, that we, the United States, immediately declare a truce with the Filipino people and with General Aguinaldo. I suggest that we give them what we promised them in the first place: independence. I suggest that we offer the new government much advice and some financial assistance to help them establish order and just institutions. I suggest that we extend to the Philippines an "Open Door" policy wherein other imperial nations may trade freely but must respect the territorial integrity of the Philippines. And I suggest that we hold the new government ultimately responsible for the internal tranquillity of the Philippine Islands. We cannot, in practice, and should not, by right, attempt to guarantee the internal peace of these islands. In the end, the Filipino people should be self-determining and self-responsible. Any further unwanted involvement, it should be clear by now, directly conflicts with the very principles upon which our great nation was founded and in good conscience must be rejected.

In the due course of time, I believe we *will* spread the blessings of liberty throughout the world, down through the ages, but we will do it not, nor should we ever, by compromising those very ideals



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