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Constructive Pathways: Stimulating and Safeguarding Components of WPS

April 16–17, 2015

Working Papers



Women
Peace
Security

U.S. Naval War College • Newport • Rhode Island

2015 Conference

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**WOMEN & CONFLICT OUTCOMES
ESSAY COMPETITION
AWARD WINNER**

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WHEN WOMEN SERVE AND PROTECT IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES: EVIDENCE FROM THE LIBERIAN NATIONAL POLICE*

Sabrina Karim[†]

* Authors' note: I would like to thank my project partners Kyle Beardsley, Michael Gilligan, and Robert Blair. I would also like to thank the enumerators from the Center for Applied Research and Training (CART), Kou Gbaintor-Johnson, Joshua Riggings, Inspector General Deputy Inspector General of Police for Administration William Mulbah, Inspector General Chris C. Massaquoi, Deputy Inspector of Police Operations Abraham S. Kromah, Chief Superintendent Karson Zubah, Superintendent G. William Forkpa, and Patrolman Adolphus H. Yah Jr. Additionally, I would like to thank Louise Olsson and the Folke Bernadotte Working Group on UNSC 1325 for generous support and feedback.

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INTRODUCTION

The literature in international relations has consistently found a link between gender equality and peace. Countries that are more gender equal are less likely to become involved in inter-and/or intra-state war, are less likely to attack first, or violate human rights (Bjarnegård and Melander 2011, 2013; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Caprioli 2000, 2003; Caprioli et al. 2009; Hudson and Boer 2002; Hudson et al. 2012; Melander 2005a; Melander 2005b). The central question in gender and conflict studies then becomes, how is it possible to make countries more gender equal?

Peace building initiatives in post-conflict countries present a unique opportunity to help promote gender equality globally. In most cases, peace building operations involve a peacekeeping force or other third party actors that invest in rebuilding the post-conflict country's domestic institutions—whether political, judicial, or security. As third parties help rebuild these institutions, they can include policies and initiatives to promote gender equality in the country's domestic institutions. One way to do so is to promote gender balancing—ensuring that institutions include some minimum quota of women—in these different institutions. This means ensuring that women are included in political processes, have access to the justice system, and are included in the security sector.

Since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSC 1325) in 2000, peace building activities have increasingly included gender balancing policies. UNSC 1325 notes the distinct role women can play in conflict resolution and calls for the greater participation of women in the reconstruction of post-conflict countries, especially in politics and security forces. Due to UNSC 1325, gender balancing has been particularly salient in the security sector. Many post-conflict countries experienced high rates of war-time sexual violence (Cohen 2013), which led to international attention on the need to incorporate a gendered perspective in the security sector. As a result, most peace building initiatives and the accompanying security sector reforms include gender balancing (DCAF 2011). While gender balancing has become increasingly popular as a way to increase gender equality in the security sector and in post-conflict societies, it is unclear just *how* it might help improve gender equality in the post-conflict country.

There are four ways that gender balancing may affect gender equality in the post-conflict country. First, including more women in the security sector may affect the level of gender sensitivity in the institution (security sector). Second, including more women in the security sector may affect the level of female participation in the institution. Third, including more women in the security sector may affect the level of discrimination against women. Lastly, including women in the security sector may enhance the legitimacy of the institution in the eyes of the public.

These four mechanisms are examined in this study. Using a unique lab-in-the-field experiment¹ with the Liberian National Police and a representative survey in two ex-combatant communities in Monrovia, Liberia, this study investigates how gender balancing

¹ A lab-in-the-field experiment is an experimental condition where individuals are randomly selected to participate in a series of behavioral games. In this case, I randomly selected 612 Liberian National Police and randomly assigned them to groups. In the groups, they played the behavioral games. The treatment in this case was the group assignment, which varied by sex composition.

efforts may affect gender equality in Liberia's police force and how these efforts might affect public perceptions toward the police.

The study finds that gender balancing has a positive effect on enhancing an institution's legitimacy in the eyes of the public. However, gender balancing has less of an effect within the institution. Rather, the study finds that individual competency plays an important role in improving gender sensitivity and women's participation within the institution. Thus, both gender balancing *and* the quality of security sector officers matter in improving gender equality in post-conflict countries. The results suggest that as third parties conduct post-conflict peace building operations, they should focus on both increasing the number of women in the security sector and ensure that new security officials are highly competent.

GENDER BALANCING IN CONTEXT

Designed to increase the presence of women in political and economic institutions, gender balancing has infused policymaking in areas as diverse as economic development, international trade (UNCTAD, 2009), and climate change (Dankelman 2010). But, nowhere has gender balancing been more salient than in UN policies in war-torn countries—so salient that the Security Council continues to endorse gender balancing in resolutions—Resolution 1325 (2000) being the most prominent. UNSC 1325 marks the first time the UN formally calls for the greater participation of women in reconstruction of post-conflict countries.

Through UNSC 1325 and subsequent resolutions, gender balancing has become a central component of peacekeeping and peace-building operations worldwide (DCAF 2011) and of international interventions in developing countries more generally (Bush 2011). The implications of this shift have been especially visible in the security sector, from the inclusion of women in combat in the US military to the adoption of gender quotas in the police forces of Liberia and Kosovo (DCAF 2011). As gender balancing has become a pervasive international policy, peacekeeping missions have increasingly adopted gendered approaches and taken the lead to include gender as they re-build domestic institutions (Kronsell 2012). Such reform to integrate women into domestic security forces may help increase gender equality by making institutions more gender sensitive, cooperative, less discriminatory, and more legitimate (Kanter 1977; Jewell 1994; Rosenthal 2002; Thomas 1994; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002).

First, gender balancing may enhance gender awareness. Some advocates argue that women are more sensitive than men to other women's needs, and that their presence will improve outcomes on issues that disproportionately affect women rather than men. For example, UNSC Resolution 2106 (2013) emphasizes that women can exert "influence over parties to armed conflict with respect to addressing sexual violence." With the police in particular, gender balancing has been proposed as a way to improve responsiveness to sexual and gender based violence (SGBV). Immediately following high-profile rape cases in India, for example, the Indian government began recruiting more female police officers to address similar crimes in the future (Ghosh 2013). In addition to female awareness of SGBV, women's presence in the security forces may also make men more sensitive to gender issues. Female presence may influence or cue men to think about gender, when they otherwise may not (Williams and Heikes 1993). Consequently, when men are outnumbered by women, they may be influenced by the presence of women (Barnello and Bratton 2007).

Second, gender balancing may enhance women's participation and cooperation in groups. Existing research has found that in gender-balanced groups, women tend to interact in a more stereotypically feminine style that emphasizes cooperation, intimacy, and inclusion of all participants. For example, scholars have found that women pursue more cooperative political strategies, while men prefer competitive, zero-sum tactics, and that women are more oriented toward consensus, preferring less hierarchical, more participatory, and more collaborative approaches than their male counterparts (Jewell 1994; Rosenthal 2002; Thomas 1994).

In policing, there is evidence suggesting that women behave in a more "humanistic way," are better communicators, more empathetic, and have a calming presence in groups (Garcia 2003; McDowell 1992; Schuck and Rabe-Hemp 2007; Schuck 2014). Studies have found that women are quieter and less likely to participate in group activities when they are outnumbered by men (Dindia and Allen 1992; Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2007; McCarrick, Manderscheid, and Silbergeld 1981; Smith-Lovin and Brody 1989). Women in groups with majority women or all women may be more comfortable in asserting their perspectives, advocating for other women and feeling confident in themselves (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). This means that women may participate more as there are more women in the group.

Third, it is possible that integrating women may lead to less discrimination. Such ideas stem from the fact that, as women are integrated, more people observe that women are just as capable as men. In fact, this was the reason for the removal of the combat exclusion rule in the United States (Bumiller and Shanker 2013). Women participated in combat roles in both Iraq and Afghanistan, which demonstrated that women could operate in the same combat roles as men.

However, it is also possible that, as women are integrated into the group, men may become more antagonistic against women (Carli and Eagly 1999). Men may dominate in groups when they are outnumbered, because they may feel alienated or may redouble their efforts to assert dominance if they believe the presence of women will disrupt social cohesion in traditionally male environments (Fenner and deYoung 2001; Maginnis 2013; Gutmann 2000, Febraro and McCann 2003). Some studies also suggest that the increased presence of women cause men to assert their masculinity more forcefully (Smith-Lovin and Brody 1989).

Lastly, including women in the security sector may lead to increased legitimacy for the institution. Institutions that are representative of the population tend to have more legitimacy (Rehfeld 2008). Given that the security sector in many post-conflict countries did not include women before or during the conflict, including women after the war makes the institution more legitimate, as it is representative of the broader population. When individuals have contact with a security sector that looks more like them, they may be more willing to trust it (Tyler 2004, 2005).

Gender Balancing in Liberia

Liberia is an ideal case to look at the mechanisms of how gender balancing may affect gender equality in the security sector. Since the end of the wars in 2003 and the UN's involvement in security sector reform in Liberia, through the UN Mission in Liberia

(UNMIL), there has been a major focus on gender in policing. In 2005, the Norwegian and Danish governments partnered with UNICEF, UNDP, and UNMIL to create the Women and Children Protection Unit in the LNP. The Women and Children Protection Section was established to handle cases of crimes committed against women and children, such as child abuse and abandonment, sexual assault, corruption of minors, and other criminal offences. The LNP also has a special gender unit, which is responsible for promoting gender equality within the Liberian National Police. The unit was started by a UN Police female police officer in 2008, and is responsible for gender training in the LNP's police academy, gender training more broadly, and female recruitment.

Additionally, one of the peacekeeping mission's first tasks was to develop the LNP's Gender Policy (2005), which served as the primary document to ensure gender balancing within the LNP and was the first such policy in any UN Mission.² In 2008, as a part of the Gender Advisory Work Plan, the UN helped the Liberian National Police introduce a 15% and then a 20% gender quota (and in 2012, a 30% quota).³ By March 2014, the LNP had 18% female officers (compared with the 2% in 2005).⁴

RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to understand the effects of gender integration in the security sector, I conducted two studies. In the first, I collaborated with the LNP to conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment with 612 male and female officers. In the second, I surveyed 291 individuals from two ex-combatant communities in Monrovia to assess how interacting with female officers change their perceptions about the security sector.

Lab-in-the-field-experiment with the LNP

I conducted a lab-in-the-field experiment with Liberian National Police (LNP) officers in the capital city of Monrovia in January of 2013.⁵ The experiment consisted of a set of behavioral games designed to assess unit cohesion, stereotyping, and sensitivity to gendered clues in crime scene investigations, among other outcomes. The games were designed in collaboration with a police trainer from the UNMIL to ensure as much correspondence as possible between the stylized scenarios in the games and the real-world challenges of policing.

Officers were randomly selected from available personnel in Monrovia.⁶ The games were conducted in groups of six, with treatment being the sex composition of the group: groups contained zero, two, four or six women. Table 1 provides the breakdown and quantity of the

² See: "The Liberian National Police's female recruitment programme," Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
http://www.gssrtraining.ch/images/stories/PDF/police/example%202_Liberia.pdf

³ UNMIL, Office of Gender Adviser, 2010. Gender Mainstreaming in Peacekeeping Operations Liberia 2003-2009: Best Practices Report,
 <http://www.resdal.org/facebook/UNMIL_Gender_Mainstreaming_in_PKO_in_Liberia-Best.pdf>

⁴ See Appendix for a break down of the officers in each unit.

⁵ The project was conducted with Kyle Beardsley, Michael Gilligan, and Robert Blair, and with the full support of the Liberian National Police. The full details of the research design can be requested from the author

⁶ The sample included 356 men and 256 women. As of 2012 (the numbers were the same in January 2013), in total the Liberian National Police is comprised of 768 females and 3607 males. In total, we surveyed 54% of the manpower in Monrovia, and 92% of LNP women in Monrovia and 42% of LNP men in Monrovia.

groups. Officers were randomly assigned to one of each of these four types of groups once. Teams of trained Liberian enumerators were randomly assigned to the groups to implement the games and record interactions among participants. In addition to the games, the enumerators also administered background and exit questionnaires, including a survey experiment designed to assess gender discrimination in training.

Table 1: Treatment arm and number of groups

Control	Treatment Arm 1	Treatment Arm 2	Treatment Arm 3
6 men, 0 women	4 men, 2 women	2 men, 4 women	0 men, 6 women
33 groups	29 groups	21 groups	19 groups

Enumerators conducted games to assess the level of group participation, gender sensitivity, and discrimination against women. The objective was to see whether group composition affected these outcomes. Officers were given photographs of a hypothetical crime scene.⁷ The photographs contained a number of ambiguous clues suggestive of several possible crimes: burglary, physical assault, murder, domestic violence or rape. Enumerators tested whether certain groups were more gender sensitive by asking the subjects a series of questions about what crime(s) they thought the photo depicted, what evidence led them to that conclusion, and what they would do upon arrival at the crime scene. The enumerators first asked the officers to answer these questions privately in a questionnaire and then enumerators asked them to conduct a group discussion to come up with a consensus “crime report” based on the evidence in the photo. In all of the games, one major concern was whether women were included in the decision-making processes and the extent to which they participated. During the group deliberations, enumerators recorded who spoke, who argued, and who was ignored.

Enumerators used an exit questionnaire to establish the severity of gender biases within the LNP, and to assess whether participation in the group activities might alleviate those biases. The first was a survey experiment in which we offered each officer two short profiles of potential firearms instructors and then asked which of the two instructors they would prefer. The qualifications of the instructors were similar. One of the profiles always had the name “Abraham”, while the other was assigned either “John” or “Patience” at random.⁸ Aside from the randomly assigned names the descriptions of this second instructor’s qualifications were identical. This allowed enumerators to test whether participants tended to prefer the male candidate to the female candidate, despite their identical qualifications. In addition, enumerators asked the participants to vote on which member of the group they thought should serve as leader in the future.

Survey of ex-combatant communities in Monrovia

In July 2012, I surveyed 291 randomly selected individuals from two ex-combatant communities in Monrovia.⁹ The enumerators asked individuals how much contact they have had with the security sector and with women in the security sector, particularly, female

⁷ See appendix for the photographs of the crime scene

⁸ Names were chosen based on common gendered Liberian names.

⁹ The full details of the research design can be found in the attached appendix.

peacekeepers and LNP female officers. In the sample, 11% of individuals had contact with a female peacekeeper, in comparison to 36% of individuals who had contact with a female LNP officer. In total, 74% of the sample had contact with the security sector in general. The goal of the survey was to understand how such contact affects people's preferences for security response. Thus, survey questions asked people which security organizations they preferred for responding to general security provision, armed violence, riot, rape, and domestic violence (beating). Ten options were offered and respondents were allowed to select more than one answer.¹⁰ If people answered that they wanted UNMIL/LNP or female LNP/UNMIL to respond, it was coded as a one and all other answers were coded as a zero, making the variable dichotomous.

In addition to contact, individual knowledge of women's rights may also have an effect on how individuals perceive women in the security sector. I created a score measuring people's knowledge about women's rights. The score ranged from 0-9.

Survey questions also included questions related to perceptions of UNMIL, whether the individual participated in an armed group, views about traditional authority, individual sex, how long they have lived in the community, and how many disputes they have experienced. These variables are included in the statistical models I use to assess the relationships between contact and preferences for security response.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The objective is to understand how gender balancing in post-conflict countries affects gender equality (and thereby long-term peace). To do so, the lab-in-the-field experiment and survey are used to explore the effects of gender balancing policies within security institutions and on society as a whole. The results of the lab-in-the-field experiment provide evidence about whether the inclusion of women in groups have led to more gender awareness and sensitivity, more collaborative groups, and less discrimination within security institutions. It is important to note that the study is not an impact evaluation of gender balancing policies in the LNP, but rather a way to test gender equality seven years after gender reforms in the security sector. The lab-in-the-field experiment is able to test the short term effects of gender integration in group dynamics. Second, the results of the survey provide evidence about whether the inclusion of women has increased the legitimacy of the police force, by changing public perceptions toward the security sector.

Gender Sensitivity


The enumerators asked the groups to assess three crime scene photos that had hints of a gender and sexual based crime. The officers had to identify the crime(s) they thought occurred, identify evidence to match the crime, and suggest what they should do upon arrival of the crime scene. In total, 44% of officers suggested that rape or domestic violence occurred. Among these officers, more were likely to see the crime as rape than domestic violence; only two officers wrote domestic violence. This suggests that the disproportionate

¹⁰ These included: AFL, Police, UNMIL, Religious Leader, Liberian NGO, International NGO, Women's Group, Council of Elders, Judicial System, Township Commissioner/Community Watch, Other. These options are based off of focus group answers about where people seek protection.

attention to rape by the international community may have conditioned officers to think about rape, but not necessarily domestic violence.¹¹

Nevertheless, group composition does not affect whether individuals identified gendered crimes. Figure 1 shows that the group composition did not affect individual likelihood of seeing crimes as gendered.¹² Figure 1 depicts the predicted probability of members in the groups choosing a crime as gendered. For example, the first point (Fem 2f, 4m) suggests that females in groups that had two females and four males were about 37% likely to choose a gendered crime (the predicted range is 21-50%). The next point (Fem, 4f, 2m) suggests that females in groups with four females and two males were between 39-58% likely to say they saw a crime as gendered. There is no difference between individuals in these groups—they were equally likely to see the crime as gendered. The figure demonstrates that individuals were equally likely to see crimes as gendered despite placement in certain groups. Additionally, men and women, regardless of group composition, were equally likely to see crimes as gendered, which suggests that sex does not necessarily play a role in being more gender sensitive. This means that, at least in the short-term, group composition, or integrating more women in groups does not necessarily affect men or women’s likelihood of gender sensitivity.

Figure 1: Probability of individuals and groups observing gender crime (90% CI)



¹¹ The government developed the National Action Plans to End Gender-Based Violence. In 2006, the Liberian Ministries of Gender and Justice launched the National Gender-Based Violence Plan of Action. The Plan includes four pillars: protection of women and children from sexualized and gender-based violence; prevention of sexual and gender-based violence; promotion of women’s human rights; and participation of women in peace processes. Liberia has enacted two major laws aimed at enhancing protection against sexualized violence, and has one pending to address domestic violence. In 2008, Liberia amended its judicial law to establish a separate court with exclusive jurisdiction over sexual offenses. This Criminal Court E commenced operations in February 2009. In contrast, there has been no legislation or policy on domestic violence.

¹² All statistical tables can be requested from the author.

Group Collaboration and Participation

The lab-in-the-field experiment tested whether women's or men's participation has changed as a result of women's integration into groups. Participation is measured as the total number of times each individual spoke or argued divided by the total number of times everyone in the group spoke or argued. On average, each man talked about 17% of the time and each woman spoke about 15% of the time, and both men and women argued at the same level. This suggests that participation may be equal between the sexes. However, group composition did affect participation rates.

In the short term, female participation in groups was not directly affected by group composition, but male participation was affected. When outnumbered by women, men were more aggressive. They were both more talkative and more argumentative than men and women in other groups. Figure 2 displays these results. The points represent the average proportion of individual participation. For example, males in the group of four women and two men (Male, 2m, 4f) were likely to speak on average between 19-21% of the time, whereas men in groups with four men and two women (Male, 4m, 2f) were likely to speak between 17-18% of the time. Women in groups with four females and two males (Females, 4f, 2m) were likely to speak between 14-16% of the time. The same pattern (of male dominance) emerges for arguments.

Men in groups of four men and two women (Male, 4m, 2f) were much more talkative and argumentative than women in groups of four women and two men (Fem, 4f, 2m) which suggests that in heterogeneous groups, men still dominate most of the participation. Men and women in homogenous groups talked and argued at the same rate and at the same level, which suggests that homogenous groups may be more collaborative and inclusive. But, this is not necessarily a reason to disaggregate groups by sex. Rather, it demonstrates that security institutions should be aware of group dynamics when these groups are heterogeneous with regards to sex composition. Thus participation levels appear to be the same between men and women, but group composition affects the likelihood of men participating and dominating.

Discrimination against women

The lab-in-the-field experiment also measured whether integrating women has affected levels of discrimination. Currently, there is still gender discrimination within the LNP. Based on the survey experiment of "Abraham", "John" and "Patience," when given identical backgrounds (between "John" and Patience), individuals (both men and women) chose Patience as the fire arms instructor 38% of the time compared to Abraham, whereas officers chose John 46% of the time compared to Abraham (See Table 2). The difference between the two groups is statistically significant. This means that in comparing the same biographies of firearms instructors, when choosing between John and Patience (who had the same background), individuals were more likely to choose John. Figure 3 demonstrates that compared to women, men were much more likely to be discriminatory. Men were between 46-57% likely to choose Abraham when compared to John, but 56%-71% more likely to choose Abraham when compared to Patience. Females were equally likely to choose Abraham when the alternative was Patience or John. This suggests that men may still not be conditioned to think of women as equals despite seven years of gender reforms in the LNP.

Figure 2: Proportion of individual participation in groups (90% CI)





Table 2: Proportion of officers choosing firearms instructors

	Compared to Abraham	Compared to John	Compared to Patience
Choose Patience	0.38		
Choose John	0.46		
Choose Abraham		0.54	0.62

Figure 3: Probability of choosing Abraham versus Patience by sex



There is also a difference in sex with respect to believing that women are equal to men. Ninety-five percent of women thought that females were just as good as men in terms of policing, compared to 76% of men. Among the women, 97% thought that female LNP make good unit leaders. Conversely, among the men, only 75% thought female LNP make good unit leaders.

Lastly, in total, 39% of LNP officers voted for a female leader, but 76% of female LNP officers voted for a female team leader and 12% of men voted for a female team leader.

Figure 4 shows that there is a large discrepancy here between men and women in believing that women should be team leaders. Again, this suggests that there is still latent discrimination in the LNP, despite seven years of reforms.

Figure 4: Probability of voting for a female leader (90% CI)




Table 3 looks at which sex LNP officers believed the public trusts more based on different functions of the LNP. Interestingly, most women thought that women are better at handling rape than men, but most men thought that both men and women are equally capable of handling rape. Similarly, the majority of men thought that men are better at handling political violence, but the majority of women thought that both men and women are equally competent at handling situations of political violence. This suggests that officer sex corresponds with preconceived notions about gendered work (Dovidio et al. 1988). Women, however, do not think that they are any worse than men in the gendered male activity (handling political violence), and men do not think they are any worse in handling the gendered female activity (rape).

The importance of competency

While there is some evidence that group composition may actually lead to initial backlash by men when females outnumber males, competency of both male and female officers helps to increase gender equality within the security institution. The competence measure is a latent-variable index generated using a scaling model. The measurement model creates a competency score by weighting answers to cognitive and memory questions, and the

validity of crime scene answers.¹³ The model scales the answers based on their level of difficulty, which is more accurate of a measure than simply adding the scores together.¹⁴

Table 3: Officer perceptions of gendered security response

	Female Responders			Male Responders		
	Women	Men	Both	Women	Men	Both
Who is better at handling cases of rape and domestic	60%	2%	37%	38%	8%	53%
Who is better at handling cases of political violence and riot?	9%	42%	49%	1%	57%	42%
Who do you think the public trusts more with community issues?	35%	5%	60%	14%	19%	67%

Competency affects the likelihood that individuals see a crime as gendered. The findings in Figure 5 demonstrate that as competency increases, the probability that the individual chooses rape or domestic violence as the crime increases. The effect is the same regardless of officer sex or group composition. Figure 6 also confirms that, regardless of group composition, competent men and women were more likely to be sensitive to gender. In Figure 6, the competency differential refers to the difference between each individual's competency score and the group's median value. The plot shows one standard deviation below and above the differential median (0). Competent women in the groups of four women and two men (Fem, 4f, 2m) were much more likely than competent men in any group to be sensitive to gender and more likely to be gender sensitive than competent women in groups of two women and four men (Fem, 2f, 4m). Less competent women in the mixed sex composition groups (Fem 4f, 2m; Fem, 2f, 4m) saw crimes as gendered at a much lower percentage. In other words, among less competent women, group composition did not affect their likelihood of seeing a crime as gendered, but group composition did affect competent women's likelihood of seeing a crime as gendered. Among heterogeneous

¹³ To create the score, I used three cognitive questions from the background survey, six memory questions about the crime scene photos, and the crime scene questions to create a latent competency score. I asked a UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) Police peacekeeper to post-code the crime scene questions based on the training the LNP receive in their academy. Crimes that matched a statutory crime were coded as correct. When the evidence matched the crime, each piece was coded as correct. If they correctly listed the immediate action upon arrival (per their training), it was coded as correct. Correct answers were always coded as a one, ensuring that the direction of the scale remained consistent.

¹⁴

groups, women in groups with more women tended to be more gender sensitive. Group composition did not affect gender-30.3 (ge)0.2 () in

Figure 5: Predicted Probability of choosing gendered crime by competency





Figure 6: Predicted Probability of choosing gendered crime by competency and group composition



Competency also affects the level of participation and individual influence by men and women. Figure 7 and 8 break the competency score into the competency differential by group composition. Overall, competent individuals were more likely to participate and influence the group. In Figure 7, compared to less competent women, competent women in groups with four or more women were much more likely to participate compared to women in the groups with two women. Rather, competent women and less competent women in groups with two women spoke about the same amount, but competent women in groups with four or six women spoke much more frequently than non-competent women in those groups.

Competent men were more likely to participate in all the groups, but competent men, when outnumbered by women were much more likely to participate than in groups where competent men were not outnumbered. Less competent men, when they were outnumbered, were as likely to talk as competent women in the same group, but much more likely to talk than less competent women in the same group. Competent males and females in all female and all male groups talked at the same level, as did less competent men and women in the same homogenous groups. This suggests that while competency does make women participate more, competent men and less competent men, when outnumbered by women, tended to participate more.

Figure 8 demonstrates the level of influence of individuals in each group. This is measured by looking at when individual answers to the crime scene questions matched the group answers. In other words, we would expect that if individuals had an influence in the group's decisions, their individual answers would match that of the group's.

Again, across the board, more competent individuals influenced group answers more so than less competent individuals. Group composition did not affect influence.

Notably, competency and rank are not correlated, nor is rank and the gender equality outcomes. This means that rank is not necessarily a good predictor of competency. Those that are more gender sensitive, more participatory, and more influential in groups are not individuals of higher rank, suggesting that rank may not affect gender equality within institutions, but promoting competent individuals may have an effect in promoting gender equality.¹⁵

The lab-in-the-field experiments with the LNP provide a number of useful insights about the effects of gender balancing on gender equality within post-conflict security institutions. The analysis above demonstrates that gender equality within the LNP is affected by group composition and, to a much larger extent, by competency. To increase participation and influence of women, and make the institution more gender sensitive, promoting competent individuals may be more important than pure gender balancing.

Nevertheless, for enhancing women's participation, gender balancing, in addition to competency, may make a difference. Competent women when surrounded by women are more assertive. However the evidence also shows that there may be a backlash among men who are used to the institution being dominated by males. When women outnumber men, men were more aggressive and discriminatory, even when they were more competent. This suggests that more gender awareness should be accompanied by equal ratios of men and women to mitigate the backlash that might occur when rapid gender changes occur in an

¹⁵ The same holds true for education level, which did not correlate with the gender outcomes.

institution. This is not to say, however, that agencies should not promote groups where there are majority women. Rather, steps should be taken to mitigate men's reaction when they may be outnumbered. The *quality* of both male and female officers, in addition to increasing the quantity of female officers improves group dynamics within the institution.

Figure 7: Talk Proportion by Competency Differential





Figure 8: Individual Influence by Competence Differential



Increasing the Legitimacy of Security Institutions

In addition to understandings how gender integration within the LNP affects groups dynamics, it is important to know how the public views female LNP officers and the LNP in general. It is possible that the LNP quota has had an impact on Liberians. With the quota, there has been a significant visible increase in the number of women officers on the streets. Does this improve the image of the domestic security provision? Do people prefer local females to respond to incidents?

Based on the survey results in the two ex-combatant communities, contact with women in the security sector does change perceptions. Whereas the more contact people had with the security sector in general (not just with women), the less they wanted the LNP to respond to rape (See Figure 9),¹⁶ contact with female LNP led people to prefer female LNP to respond to rape and domestic violence and prefer the LNP (as an institution) to respond to armed violence and general security provision (Table 4).

Figure 9: Contact with the security sector and preference for LNP to respond to rape (95% CI)




Table 4: Substantive effects for contact with female LNP and preferred response by domestic security forces (90% CI)

<i>Preference for Responder</i>	<i>No contact with LNP female</i>	<i>Contact with LNP female</i>	<i>Percent change</i>
LNP provide security	0.91 (0.85-0.95)	0.98 (0.95-0.99)	+7%
LNP respond to armed conflict	0.84 (0.75-0.89)	0.96 (0.93-0.99)	+12%
LNP female respond to rape	0.83 (0.75-0.88)	0.93 (0.83-0.96)	+10%
LNP female respond to domestic violence	0.82 (0.75-0.87)	0.94 (0.86-0.97)	+12%

¹⁶ Contact with the security sector is measured based on the level of contact with male and female members of the Armed Forces of Liberia, Liberian National Police, and UNMIL

When individuals in these two communities had contact with female LNP officers, they were 7% more likely to prefer that the LNP provide security, 12% more likely to prefer the LNP respond to armed conflict, 10% more likely to prefer female LNP respond to rape, and 12% more likely prefer female LNP respond to domestic violence. This means that including women in the security sector may change people's minds about trusting the security sector when it comes to protection. When individuals interact with women, they are more likely to prefer female LNP and the LNP, as an institution, but when they have repeated interactions with the security sector (presumably men), then they do not prefer the institution to respond to these concerns.

At the same time, contact with female LNP officers overwhelmingly led to people rejecting assistance by female peacekeepers and UNMIL. Table 5 suggests that when individuals have contact with female LNP officers, it makes international missions less important. For example, contact with female LNP leads to a 35% decrease the probability that people prefer UNMIL to provide security. The presence of female LNP may signal a reformed security such that individuals think that the UN may no longer be needed. When individuals observe a reformed security sector, they may be more likely to prefer the domestic security sector to the international one. The implication is that contact with female LNP serve to increase the legitimacy of local institutions in two ways: increasing preferences to use the domestic institution and by rejecting the continued presence of international institution. Thus, integrating women has a clear positive effect on institutional legitimacy.

Table 5: Substantive effects for contact with female LNP and preferred response by foreign security forces (90% CI)

<i>Preference for Responder</i>	<i>No contact with LNP female</i>	<i>Contact with LNP female</i>	<i>Percent change</i>
UNMIL female provide security	0.47 (0.38-0.56)	0.21 (0.17-0.43)	-26%
UNMIL provides security	0.74 (0.67-0.81)	0.39 (0.5-0.78)	-35%
UNMIL female respond to armed	0.56 (0.47-0.64)	0.25 (0.23-0.52)	-31%
UNMIL responds to armed conflict	0.89 (0.83-0.93)	0.68 (0.46-0.84)	-21%
UNMIL responds to riot	0.90 (0.84-0.93)	0.67 (0.48-0.83)	-23%
Female UNMIL responds to rape	0.62 (0.53-0.69)	0.42 (0.26-0.53)	-20%
UNMIL respond to rape	0.59 (0.52-0.67)	0.27 (0.25-0.52)	-32%
Female UNMIL responds to domestic violence	0.52 (0.44-0.60)	0.25 (0.15-0.40)	-27%

CONCLUSION

If gender equality is important for long-term peace, then it is important to understand how to increase gender equality in post-conflict countries. One solution has been to include

gender balancing reforms in the security sector. International efforts to gender balancing security institutions are prevalent in Liberia, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, Haiti, and Afghanistan, among other countries. Even without international pressure or guidance, gender balancing has been a favorable policy in Latin American countries such as Peru, as a way to mitigate corruption, and in India, as a way to prevent and prosecute rape cases. Yet, thorough empirical evidence about the effectiveness of such policies is lacking. Just how does gender balancing affect gender equality?

This study provides preliminary evidence that gender balancing policies are beneficial in crafting gender equality in post-conflict countries. The evidence in support of gender balancing policies is stronger for changes in public perception than within the institution. The study finds that when individuals have contact with female police officers, they were more likely to prefer that female police officers respond to rape and domestic violence, and that police respond to security provision. This is the first survey that provides evidence that gender balancing affects public perception.

Gender balancing has less of an effect to change gender equality within security sector institutions. *Prima facie* evidence suggests that discrimination is still a problem in the LNP, seven years after a number of gender related reforms. Group composition did not affect individual gender sensitivity. The study finds some evidence that gender balancing may have an effect on increasing the participation of some women in groups, but it definitely has an effect on men. When women in groups outnumber men, men tend to be more aggressive and discriminatory. Again, this evidence does not suggest that groups should be constructed with majority females, but rather that more gender sensitive training is needed. While group composition did not have distinct effects on group dynamics, the competency level of individuals made a significant difference on gender sensitivity, participation, and influence. Competent individuals, both male and female, were more likely to be gender sensitive, participate in group deliberation, and be influential in decision making. Thus, the quality of individuals in the security sector may be just as important as the quantity of women.

The study is particularly useful for policymakers that are working to improve gender equality in post-conflict countries. The study provides evidence that gender balancing works to enhance public perception. It also demonstrates that officer quality can have the side effect of increasing gender equality in security institutions. It also suggests that there should be more training within security institutions about gender sensitivity and more exposure to women in leadership positions (promoting qualified women), to counter the potential backlash against women that may occur in some instances, as women are integrated into the institution.

If gender equality is instrumental for long-term peace, as suggested by numerous scholars of international relations, then understanding how to promote gender equality is of utmost importance. While this study has shown how gender balancing (and competency) affects gender equality (through increasing gender sensitivity and participation, lowering discrimination in security institutions and improving institutional legitimacy), more studies are needed to understand just how to improve gender equality in post-conflict countries.

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**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE TOPICS**

U.S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY INITIATIVES

John Croce, U.S. Pacific Fleet
N17, Personal and Family
Readiness, Equal Opportunity
and Diversity



Acknowledgements:

I wish to thank the following organizations for their assistance in the research and data collection for this paper:

Chief of Naval Operations Navy Office of Women's Policy (N134W)

Chief of Naval Personnel International Officer & Exchange Programs (N13F)

U.S. Pacific Fleet Total Force Management Directorate (N1)

U.S. Pacific Fleet Public Affairs Office (N01PA)

U.S. Pacific Fleet Plans and Policy Directorate (N5)

U.S. Pacific Fleet Operations Directorate (N3)

Navy Education and Training Command, Fleet Training, Management and Planning System
(FLTMPS) Support Office

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION.

A. Purpose. The September 2013 Department of Defense (DoD) Implementation Guide for the U. S. National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) identifies 18 representative actions for DoD Components directing “All DoD components, at a minimal, shall incorporate, monitor, and evaluate the outcomes and actions listed in the NAP, and report progress annually to the DoD.”¹ This paper explores the operational and tactical aspects of WPS and the DoD Guide from a Fleet perspective. In doing so, we hope to:

1. Identify existing Fleet Operations, Actions, and Activities (OAA), programs and policies that may already be implementing WPS objectives or have the potential to do so.
2. Discuss opportunities on how to better leverage and enhance existing OAAs, programs, and policies or establish new ones to further advance WPS initiatives at the operational and tactical levels of Fleet operations.
3. Identify gaps, barriers, and areas for improvement in the Fleet’s current and future potential to implement WPS initiatives.
4. Make recommendations and/or seek additional guidance on how to best address identified gaps and barriers.

B. Background.

1. **The Mission:** The U.S. Pacific Fleet (Pacific Fleet) protects and defends the maritime interests of the United States in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. By providing combat-ready naval forces and operating forward in global areas of consequence, we enhance stability, promote maritime security and freedom of the seas, defend our homeland, deter aggression and when necessary, conduct decisive combat action against the enemy. In support of Pacific Command’s Theater Campaign Plan we will continue to work alongside our fellow Pacific Command Component Commanders to accomplish Pacific Command’s mission. We will collaborate and partner with U.S. Fleet Forces Command to ensure optimum warfighting capacity and capability. We are ready and able to execute our mission in the Indo-Asia-Pacific and around the world.

2. **The Fleet:** The Pacific Fleet consist of 92 Ships, 43 Submarines, 64 Military Sealift Command Ships, 1127 Aircraft, and more than 143,000 Active Duty and Reserve Sailors, Civilians and Contractors.² The Pacific Fleet Area of Responsibility (AOR) encompasses nearly half the Earth’s surface. From the North Pole to Antarctica, our AOR stretches from the west coasts of North America and South America, extends through the Pacific Ocean, and concludes in the Indian Ocean and the western border of India. There are few regions as culturally, socially,

¹ September 2013 DoD Implementation Guide for the U. S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security

² Pacific Fleet 2015 Command Brief (CPF N5) and CPF N1 manpower data.

economically, and geo-politically diverse as the Indo-Asia-Pacific. In addition to the United States, the 36 nations listed below, in B (3), that comprise this region are home to more than 50 percent of the world's population, 3,000 different languages, many of the world's largest and smallest economies, six of the world's largest militaries, and five nations (Australia, Japan, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand) allied with the U.S. through mutual defense treaties. Economically, more than \$6.3 trillion in global and U. S. trade transit via our waters.

3. **Nations of the Pacific Fleet AOR.** Note, the number in parentheses () indicates 2014 World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Index³ rankings. 142 countries are currently ranked in this index, the United States is ranked 20th. Of the 23 countries in the Pacific Fleet AOR that are ranked, 14 or 60% fall into the bottom half of the index. Those countries with no ranking (NR) may have been missing critical information necessary to complete the ranking.

Australia (24)	Bangladesh (68)	Bhutan (120)	Brunei (98)
Burma (NR)	Cambodia (108)	China (87)	Fiji (122)
India (114)	Indonesia (97)	Japan (104)	Kiribati (NR)
Laos (60)	Malaysia (107)	Maldives (105)	Marshall Islands (NR)
Micronesia (NR)	Mongolia (42)	Nauru (NR)	Nepal (112)
New Zealand (13)	North Korea (NR)	Palau (NR)	Papua New Guinea (NR)
Philippines (9)	Samoa (NR)	Singapore (59)	Solomon Islands (NR)
South Korea (117)	Sri Lanka (79)	Thailand (61)	Timor-Leste (NR)
Tonga (NR)	Tuvalu (NR)	Vanuatu (NR)	Vietnam (76)

a. The 2014 World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Gender Gap Index rankings are used throughout this paper to provide context to gender inequalities affecting countries in the Pacific Fleet AOR. According to the WEF: “The Global Gender Gap Index introduced by the World Economic Forum in 2006, is a framework for capturing the magnitude and scope of gender-based disparities and tracking their progress. The Index benchmarks national gender gaps on economic, political, education- and health-based criteria, and provides country rankings that allow for effective comparisons across regions and income groups over time. The rankings are designed to create greater awareness among a global audience of the challenges posed by gender gaps and the opportunities created by reducing these challenges. The methodology and quantitative analysis behind the rankings are intended to serve as a basis for designing effective measures for reducing gender gaps.”⁴ The WEF notes that, “The Global Gender Gap Report 2014 emphasizes persisting gender gap divides across and within regions. Based on the nine years of data available for the 111 countries that have been part of the report since its inception, the world has seen only a small improvement in equality for women in the workplace.

³ The Global Gender Gap Report 2014, World Economic Forum , 2014

⁴ <http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2013>

According to the Global Gender Gap Report 2014...the gender gap for economic participation and opportunity now stands at 60% worldwide, having closed by 4% from 56% in 2006.”⁵

4. ***Pacific Fleet Operations.*** Daily, the Pacific Fleet engages with the nations of the Pacific Fleet through operations, training, military exercises (bi-lateral and multi-lateral), port visits, senior leadership engagements, conferences, and seminars. The more than 143,000 Sailors and Civilians serve as ambassadors of good will to these countries within the AOR as well as many countries outside the AOR. The basic tenant of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security “to empower half the world’s population as equal partners in preventing conflict and building peace in countries threatened and affected by war, violence and insecurity...”⁶ is a strategic imperative to the challenging security environment in the Pacific Fleet AOR where access to common resources remain at risk, unresolved territorial disputes linger, and historical rivalries foster insecurity and a lack of trust. The Pacific Fleet already participates in OAAs, programs, and policies consistent with the objectives of the DoD Implementation Guide. Future Pacific Fleet operational and tactical engagements, when developed within the context of WPS objectives and an increased understanding of gender based cultures and inequalities, will take the NAP to a new level, the “deckplate” Sailor face-to-face interaction with the Navies and people of the countries we hope to influence and empower.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. ***Observation:*** The U.S. Pacific Fleet OAAs engage U.S. Sailors with countries around the globe by way of port visits, exercises, operations, and exchange programs continuously.

Recommendation: Continued cultural training and awareness should be expanded to include gender inequalities (such as the Gender Gap Index) and WPS empowerment initiatives in order to fully leverage the far reaching influence of the U. S. Navy Sailor as they engage with the Navies and citizens of countries we hope to influence on a personal, intimate, face-to-face “deckplate” level.

B. ***Observation:*** The ability to influence countries to empower women is enhanced and validated by a Navy that leads in this empowerment within its own ranks. While significant accomplishments in the integration of women have been achieved in the U.S. Navy and the Pacific Fleet, the 2013 repeal of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule by the Secretary of Defense has finally opened the door for full integration in all occupations. Additionally, the retention of women continues to lag behind their male counterparts, creating gaps in leadership positions, role models, and mentors. ***Recommendation:*** Open all occupations in the Navy to women to the maximum extent possible. Seek incentives, programs, and initiatives to improve the retention of women in the Navy.

C. ***Observation:*** Although the NAP on WPS and the DoD Guide on WPS implementation was only recently introduced to the Pacific Fleet, the Pacific Fleet has championed many of the WPS objectives through a variety of OAAs, such as Pacific Partnership and Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) bilateral exercises targeting gender and women empowerment issues. ***Recommendation:*** Continued education and understanding of the DoD Guide on WPS

⁵ <http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2014>

⁶ September 2013 DoD Implementation Guide

implementation and a deliberate planning effort to include WPS considerations in all OAAs. Expand on the current FY15 Theater Campaign Order to include WPS initiatives in OAA planning efforts.

D. **Observation:** Personnel Exchange Programs have limited female participation and have not included WPS initiatives into account when making personnel exchange assignments.

Recommendation: Expand female participation and participating countries with WPS implementation considerations when making assignments.

E. **Observation:** Databases and lessons learned tools do not readily identify WPS objectives or characterize OAAs as having achieved or advanced WPS Objectives, Outcomes, and Actions.

Recommendation: Databases and lessons learned tools should be modified to capture and properly characterize events related to WPS implementation.

F. **Observation:** Fleet WPS implementation, planning, and oversight is currently limited to the Echelon 2 Fleet Commanders. **Recommendation:** Assign WPS implementation responsibilities to Echelon 3 Commands (Type Commanders and Numbered Fleets) and hold them accountable for WPS implementation to include participation in the annual DoD data call and report on WPS implementation.

End of Executive Summary

I. PACIFIC FLEET GENDER DISTRIBUTION, BY THE NUMBERS AS COMPARED TO TOTAL NAVY.⁷

A. If the U.S. Navy and the Pacific Fleet are to be effective in influencing nations to empower women, we must lead by example, “walking the walk.” Women make up 18% of the total Naval force. Women integration has advanced over the years in our Navy. The 2013 repeal of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule has now opened opportunities for women in almost every warfighting community. Despite these advances, gaps exist in the retention of women, most notably in the upper ranks of both officer and enlisted ranks. Tables 1 and 2 below show a steady decline in women percentages as they move up in rank, indicating that retention remains an issue for women. Lack of women in our upper ranks are a cause of alarm not only from the perspective of implementing WPS initiatives, but also creates a gap in role models and mentors for the more junior women within our ranks. Additionally, the notion of empowering more women to influence decisions regarding peace and security may be muted somewhat due to our own lack of a more equitable gender ratio among the higher ranking, more influential leaders within our own organization.

Table 1 U.S. Navy gender distribution – Officers (FLTMPs data 9 Jan 2015)

GENDER	TOTAL OFFICERS	O10	O9	O8	O7	O6	O5	O4	O3	O2	O1
ALL NAVY											
F	17%	9%	12%	14%	8%	12%	12%	15%	19%	22%	21%
M	83%	91%	88%	86%	92%	88%	88%	85%	81%	78%	79%
PACIFIC FLEET											
F	12%	0%	0%	0%	13%	4%	5%	6%	12%	17%	23%
M	88%	100%	100%	100%	88%	96%	95%	94%	88%	83%	77%

Table 2 U.S. Navy gender distribution - Enlisted (FLTMPs data 9 Jan 2015)

GENDER	TOTAL ENLISTED	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4	E3	E2	E1
ALL NAVY										
F	18%	7%	8%	12%	14%	17%	21%	23%	24%	24%
M	82%	93%	92%	88%	86%	83%	79%	77%	76%	76%
PACIFIC FLEET										
F	16%	4%	5%	8%	10%	16%	20%	22%	22%	25%
M	84%	96%	95%	92%	90%	84%	80%	78%	78%	75%

B. As noted in tables 1 and 2, Pacific Fleet, women percentages are even less because of the operational character of our Fleet forces occupations and the historical limitations placed on these occupations that can be filled by women. Table 3 below shows the top 10 officer designators and enlisted ratings filled by women (listed highest to lowest by percent of the Navy’s female population). Table 4 is the same information for men.

⁷ Fleet Training, Management and Planning System (FLTMPs) data as of 9 January 2014

Table 3 U.S. Navy top 10 designators and ratings assigned to women. (FLTMPS data 29 Dec 2014)

FEMALE OFFICERS		FEMALE ENLISTED	
DESIG	DESCRIPTION	RATE	DESCRIPTION
2900	NURSE CORPS OFFICER	HM	HOSPITAL CORPSMAN
2100	MEDICAL CORPS OFFICER	LS	LOGISTICS SPECIALIST
1110	SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER	IT	INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNICIAN
2300	MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS OFFICER	YN	YEOMAN
1160	SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINEE	MA	MASTER-AT-ARMS
1310	UNRESTRICTED LINE - PILOT	AO	AVIATION ORDNANCEMAN
1830	SPECIAL DUTY OFFICER (INTELLIGENCE)	CS	CULINARY SPECIALIST
2200	JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL CORPS OFFICER	OS	OPERATIONS SPECIALIST
2500	SUPPLY CORPS OFFICER	MM	MACHINISTS MATE
3100	DENTAL CORPS OFFICER	ABH	AVIATION BOATSWAINS MATE, AIRCRAFT HANDLING

Table 4 U.S. Navy top 10 designators and ratings assigned to men (FLTMPS data 29 Dec 2014)

MALE OFFICERS		MALE ENLISTED	
DESIG	DESCRIPTION	RATE	DESCRIPTION
1310	UNRESTRICTED LINE - PILOT	HM	HOSPITAL CORPSMAN
1110	SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER	MM	MACHINISTS MATE
2100	MEDICAL CORPS OFFICER	ET	ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN
1320	UNRESTRICTED LINE-NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER	IT	INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNICIAN
1120	SUBMARINE OFFICER	LS	LOGISTICS SPECIALIST
2300	MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS OFFICER	EM	ELECTRICIANS MATE
3100	SUPPLY CORPS OFFICER	MA	MASTER-AT-ARMS
1830	SPECIAL DUTY OFFICER (INTELLIGENCE)	AM	AVIATION STRUCTURAL MECHANIC
1160	SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINEE	CS	CULINARY SPECIALIST
2900	NURSE CORPS OFFICER	AT	AVIATION ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN

2. Despite historical barriers to female assignments, it is interesting to observe that 8 out of the top 10 officer occupations (designators) and 6 out of the top 10 enlisted occupations (ratings) are shared by both men and women; however, not in the same order of preference or percentage of their respective populations.

3. Therefore, it is not surprising that we see a smaller percentage of women assigned to the Pacific Fleet where the more operational designators and ratings make up a larger portion of Fleet manpower requirements and capabilities. With the 2013 repeal of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, we should see these trends shift as fewer restrictions will be placed on career options and assignments for women. The forecast for a more equitable representation of women within the Navy and the Fleet is positive; however, there is still work to be done in both recruiting and retaining women in our Navy.

4. A recent article entitled “Women in Service Review Rollout Due in 2016” by Amaani Lyle published 12 January 2015 in DoD News, Defense Media Activity highlights the current progress achieved regarding the 2013 repeal of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule.⁸ The article states that: “Following the 2013 repeal of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and

⁸ Women in Service Review Rollout Due in 2016, Amaani Lyle, DoD News, Defense Media Activity, WASHINGTON, Jan. 12, 2015

Assignment Rule, the secretary of defense will announce final decisions to integrate remaining closed occupations and any approved exceptions to policy on or about Jan. 1, 2016, a Pentagon official reported.” Juliet Beyler, the Defense Department's director of officer and enlisted personnel management, stated that “The goal... is to expand opportunities to ensure that all service members are eligible to serve in any capacity based on their abilities and qualifications, and to ‘remove those old gender-based barriers to service that no longer made sense.’” The article sites the fact that: “Since rescission of the definition and rule, Beyler said, the DoD has notified Congress of the integration of approximately 71,000 positions previously closed to women.” Also noted in the article: “More than 280,000 women have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, including Beyler, who's a two-time combat veteran.” On the topic of exceptions to policy, Ms. Beyler states, "But any exception is going to have to be rigorously justified and will have to be based on the knowledge, skills and abilities required to perform the duties of the position..."

(Follow Amaani Lyle on Twitter: @LyleDODNews)

II. Current Fleet Operations. The gender gaps discussed above notwithstanding, there are an incredible amount of Fleet OAAs, programs and policies that offer unique opportunities to implement WPS objectives with other nations in the Pacific AOR as well as nations across the globe. This influence ranges from high level military leadership interactions, Fleet exercises, and humanitarian operations to the very personal and hands on exchanges between the Pacific Fleet Sailors and the Sailors and citizens of nations we hope to influence. The interaction may be as simple as a port visit and liberty interaction to more deliberate execution of humanitarian assistance such as Pacific Partnership medical support to a small island nation or CARAT bilateral exercises as previously discussed. Pacific Fleet Sailors footprint around the world is vast and diverse.

A. The following summarizes Pacific Fleet OAAs over fiscal years 2013 and 2014:

1. **Port Visits:** More than 140 ships and submarines conducted more than 847 port visits to 38 countries, around the world, totaling 6153 days. Each port visit provides for hundreds of U.S. Navy representatives or “touchpoints” to serve as ambassadors of good will towards the host country and city. Our Sailors understanding of the cultures of these countries, especially where gender inequities persist could be leveraged as a means to influence WPS objectives. Below is a list of countries within the Pacific Fleet AOR visited (annotated with their gender gap index ranking if available):

Australia (24)	Bangladesh (68)	Brunei (98)	Cambodia (108)
China (87)	Fiji (122)	India (114)	Indonesia (97)
Japan (104)	Kiribati (NR)	Malaysia (107)	Maldives (105)
Marshall Islands (NR)	Micronesia (NR)	Palau (NR)	Papua New Guinea (NR)
Philippines (9)	Samoa (NR)	Singapore (59)	Solomon Islands (NR)
South Korea (117)	Thailand (61)	Timor-Leste (NR)	Tonga (NR)
Vietnam (76)			

Pacific Fleet ships and submarines also visited the following countries:

Brazil (71)	Canada (19)	Chile (66)	Columbia (63)
French Polynesia (NR)	Mexico (80)	New Caledonia (NR)	Russia (75)

2. **Fleet Exercises:** Pacific Fleet ships, submarines, aviation squadrons, and operational staffs conducted more than 150 bi-lateral and multilateral exercises over 1300 days with Pacific Fleet AOR countries. These exercises tested the Naval capabilities of both the Pacific Fleet and participating nations in a variety of Naval operations including: anti-submarine warfare, mine operations, surface ship interoperability, bilateral and joint operations, logistics, maritime security, ballistic missile defense, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and multi-national counter piracy operations. Each engagement provided a unique opportunity to further influence the gender issues and empowerment of women in the Navies and militaries of partner nations we exercise with.

3. **Leadership Engagements, Forums, Conferences, Symposiums:** Pacific Fleet leadership and key personnel are constantly engaged in various leadership forums, conferences, and training engagements including high level events such as: Pacific Fleet Commander, Admiral Cecil Haney's and Admiral Harry Harris' participation in the annual Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Symposium; Admiral Haney's participation in meetings with the Chinese Ministry Of National Defense, and Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, at the China Institute of International Strategic Studies, at South Sea Fleet Headquarters, and participation in the Malaysia Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition (Lima) Maritime Security Panel Discussion; Commander, Logistics Group Westpac, Rear Admiral Cynthia Thebaud's participation in the Brunei International Defense Exhibition and the Indonesia Komodo (Fleet Review); Rear Admiral Wetherald, Pacific Fleet's Deputy Chief of Staff for Planning and Resources (N5/N8) attendance at the U. S. Navy, Republic of Korea, and Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force Trilateral Maritime Discussion.

4. **Personnel Exchange Program(PEP)/Overseas Education Program(OEP):** 48 men and 5 women currently participate in the Navy's PEP/OEP program in the Pacific Fleet AOR and assigned to foreign military commands and institutes of learning in the following countries (with Gender Gap Index noted). Those countries identified with an asterisk (*) have a woman exchange officer assigned to them.

*Australia (24)	Brunei (98)	*China (87)	India (114)
Indonesia (97)	*Japan (104)	New Zealand (13)	*Singapore (59)
South Korea (117)	*Taiwan (NR)		

(a) 51 men and 2 women from foreign navies (Australia, Japan and Korea) in the Pacific Fleet AOR are assigned to US Navy commands. The two women are from Australia.

5. **Individual Augmentation Assignments:** 249 men and 28 women from the Pacific Fleet were assigned as Individual Augmentees (IAs) in support of operations around the world. Women IAs were assigned to the following countries:

Afghanistan (NR) Cuba (30) Djibouti (NR) Kyrgyzstan (67) Philippines (9)

6. **Reserve Mobilization Assignments:** 2030 men and 301 women from the Pacific Fleet Reserve Component were mobilized in support of operations around the world. Women were mobilized to the following countries:

Afghanistan (NR) Bahrain (124) Germany (12) Djibouti (NR)
Kuwait (113) Kyrgyzstan (67) Philippines (9) Qatar (NR)

B. Despite the recent (June 2014) introduction of the 2011 NAP on WPS and the 2013 DoD Implementation Guide to the Fleet, as demonstrated above, the Pacific Fleet, by way of OAAS, programs and policies already cast a far-reaching footprint across the globe and in many cases, has already engaged in operations, exercises, symposiums, and leadership engagements which could be characterized as promoting and accomplishing WPS objectives. Here are two news releases (there are many, many more) to illustrate how the Pacific Fleet has been addressing women's issues in the operational environment, well before being presented with the WPS initiative:

1. *Sharing a Desire to Serve with Women in the Royal Brunei Armed Forces*

-Navy Live Blog, Nov. 20, 2014. By LTJG Jan Ingram, Assistant Operations Officer, Destroyer Squadron 7.



I have always strived for a life of service and believe life is about the people I am blessed to encounter. Whether the encounter led to someone becoming a close friend or just a smile exchanged, these moments are meaningful to me. Grateful to my country and for the thousands of men and women that came before me, especially those who gave the ultimate sacrifice, I knew military service was the right fit for me.

I began my journey in the United States Navy in 2011 on USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19) in Yokosuka, Japan, where I spent two and a half years working and traveling throughout 7th Fleet. I thoroughly enjoyed my first tour in Asia and decided I would do my second tour in 7th Fleet as well—this time, heading nearly 3,200 miles southeast to a newly stood-up destroyer squadron (DESRON) command.

Forward-deployed to Southeast Asia, one of DESRON 7's responsibilities is the planning and execution of the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) bilateral exercise series with Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and Timor Leste. While I had visited most of these countries on Blue Ridge, the CARAT series opened up new opportunities to work hand-in-hand with our partner nations in the region.

The most recent, and final, exercise of CARAT 2014 allowed me to work closely with the Royal Brunei Armed Forces. This was my first trip to Brunei Darussalam and I had only read briefly about the small country located on the island of Borneo. However, I did know that Brunei is one of our partners in Southeast Asia that is leading the way integrating women into their armed forces.

Unique to CARAT Brunei, a Female Engagement Team Symposium was planned and I was tapped to lead the event. I put together a detailed sequence of events and several standby discussion topics beforehand, even though I knew the main objective was to have an open conversation with our counterparts. While differences in our service policies and procedures were bound to come up in discussion, my hope was for us to not only talk about what it's like to be a woman in the Navy, but to recognize that even though we wear different uniforms, our innate desire to serve our country is what drove us to join the military.

The symposium took place on the first day of the exercise and included 10 women from the U.S. Navy and 15 women from the RBAF. The group was comprised of all different backgrounds,



religions, ages, ethnicities and professions, yet upon entering the room you could feel the electricity and might've even mistaken it for a high school reunion as we made instant connections.

What struck me most was what came by first overlooking assumptions and the raw dialogue and interaction that quickly followed suit—all without the help of my prep work. We found similarities in challenges that we faced not only in our

workplace but also in our daily lives. We discussed topics such as pregnancy—which up until the mid-1970's resulted in a discharge for women in the U.S. Navy—and learned it is a challenge the RBAF is working to refine. While our Navy welcomed its first female pilot in 1974, women in Brunei began attending Officer Candidate School in 2010 and the country's first female military pilot received her wings in 2012. Additionally, women in the RBAF are not allowed in combat roles, which is a policy that our own military continues working through even today, more than 65 years since President Harry Truman signed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act.

This experience not only taught me a lot about the RBAF, but it caused me to reflect on how far the U.S. Navy has come with the integration of women in our own force. It made me appreciate the women who served before me, who challenged the norm and broke boundaries. And I recognized that no matter our cultures or country, there are similarities and challenges that we are all working through as women, but at the end of the day, we have chosen to serve our countries and that's what will bind us together forever.

A wise woman in Brunei told me to never lose yourself and remember where you came from. Thank you to the beautiful women of Brunei for reminding me where I came from and of the others who came before me. I am pleased to say I left Brunei with a mixture of pride, gratitude and humility as a Sailor serving in the U.S. Navy.

<http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2014/11/20/sharing-a-desire-to-serve-with-women-in-the-royal-brunei-armed-forces/>

2. Pacific Partnership Hosts Nursing Conference in Marshall Islands - Navy. Mil, July 13, 2013.

MAJURO, Marshall Islands (NNS) -- Nurses from the University of Hawaii and the U.S. Navy hosted a nursing conference for more than 40 nurses and midwives from Majuro Hospital during Pacific Partnership 2013, July 12.

The conference featured lectures on disaster management and preparedness, cardiac emergencies, pediatric asthma and pneumonia prevention, post-partum exams and obstetric emergencies.

Gary Glauber, a registered nurse volunteering on the mission with the University of Hawaii, taught the lecture on disaster management and preparedness.

"Nurses are very integral to a disaster response because they are able to communicate well, counsel patients, treat patients, triage patients and coordinate care across different levels," said Glauber.

The Marshall Islands, an island country in the northern Pacific Ocean, is vulnerable to natural disasters such as hurricanes, cyclones, floods, and severe droughts.



Glauberger said that the single most important take-away from his presentation was that everyone, especially nurses, should have a family plan and a disaster preparedness kit ready for emergencies. If nurses are busy finding and taking care of their own family they won't be able to do their job as well as they should.

Alitaake Alefaio has been a nurse midwife at Majuro Hospital for 20 years. She said she decided to attend the conference when she saw the topics to be discussed.

"I'm really interested in all of the topics from today," said Alefaio. "These are the topics that involve a lot of the activities we do every day."

Alefaio said that a large wave recently washed over the entire island, and brought an influx of patients to the hospital, making the disaster preparedness lesson one of the most relevant to her.

Salome Lanwi, a nurse and head of training and staff development at Majuro Hospital, worked with Laurie Kukkowem, a nurse from the University of Hawaii and the Pacific Partnership project lead, to choose the topics for the conference.

Lanwi said that the hospital staff was looking forward to the visitors because they understand that procedures and technologies in the medical field are constantly changing and improving.

Lanwi went on to say that the unique partnership between a nongovernmental organization and U.S. military to conduct the conference is representative of the Pacific Partnership mission as a whole.

Alefaio said that the mix of presenters brings different experiences and knowledge that she and her colleagues can use in their daily work.

Pacific Partnership is a collaborative effort of military members and civilians from ten partner nations including Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, New Zealand and the United States that improves maritime security through disaster preparedness.

http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=75356

III. OVERLAY OF FLEET OPERATIONS ONTO THE DOD IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR THE NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY.

A. In order to thoroughly explore the Fleets existing and potential capacity for the implementation of WPS objectives we now need to overlay what we know and, perhaps more importantly, what we DON'T know regarding the integration of WPS objectives into Fleet

operations. The DoD Guide identified 18 Actions and associated Outcomes and Objectives from the National Action Plan for DoD Components to accomplish. Each of these actions and outcomes are discussed below in terms of “Current Status”, “Identified Gaps/Areas for Improvement”, and “Recommendations”.

Outcome 1.1--Agencies establish and improve policy frameworks to support achievements in gender equality and women’s empowerment throughout our diplomacy, development, and defense work.

Action 1.1: Incorporate NAP objectives into appropriate Department of Defense strategic guidance and planning documents.

- *Current Status:* The Pacific Fleet FY15 Theater Campaign Order (TCO)⁹, as directed by the Pacific Fleet Commander, requires that the Pacific Fleet Headquarters, subordinate commands, and direct reporting units “Ensure Women, Peace, and security (WPS) objectives and desired outcomes directed in the United States National Action Plan on WPS and DoD WPS Implementation Guide are incorporated across all Operations, Actions, and Activities (OAA) to the maximum extent possible.”
- *Identified Gaps/Areas for Improvement:* To meet the Pacific Fleet Commander’s intent in the FY15 TCO, a more thorough understanding of the WPS referenced documents by Navy planners and operational commanders will be necessary.
- *Recommendations:* Integrate WPS objectives into planner training. Furthermore, raise the level of knowledge of planners, operators, leadership, etc. on WPS objectives and issues across the Fleet and Navy.

Outcome 1.2--Agencies enhance staff capacity for applying a gender-sensitive approach to diplomacy, development, and defense in conflict-affected environments.

Action 1.2: Ensure all relevant U.S. personnel and contractors receive appropriate training on Women, Peace, and Security issues, including instruction on the value of inclusive participation in conflict prevention, peace processes, and security initiatives, international human rights law and international humanitarian law, protection of civilians, prevention of SGBV, prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), and combating TIP. Training mechanisms may include: Pre-deployment and in-theater training for members of the U.S. military and civilians, as well as Professional Military Education (PME), including Commander’s courses and intermediate and senior service schools.

- *Current Status:* A combined United States Fleet Forces Command (USFFC) and Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet Message from 9 July 2007, a CNO instruction 3500.38B Universal Naval Task List, and a USFFC 21 July 2008 message on regional security education require all staffs and crews of deploying units and individuals deploying OCONUS to develop and maintain cultural awareness, ensuring personnel understand a

⁹ COMPACFLT PEAL HARBOR HI message date time group 270500Z SEP 14

region's or nation's cultural and appreciate how cultural difference may affect their own and host's perceptions and actions.¹⁰

- *Identified Gaps/Areas for Improvement:* WPS initiatives and gender issues are not specifically called out in these cultural awareness requirements. Additionally, a cultural awareness mandate for pre-deployment and in-theater training for members of the U.S. military and civilians, Professional Military Education (PME), Commander's courses, intermediate and senior service schools, etc. may be necessary to achieve this outcome.
- *Recommendations:*
 1. Mandate the inclusion of WPS issues and objectives into cultural awareness requirements. Include an understanding of gender gap studies, such as the World Economic Forum Gender gap Index referenced in this paper.
 2. Mandate cultural awareness training to comply with above mentioned directives and requirements.

Outcome 1.3--Agencies establish mechanisms to promote accountability for implementation of their respective gender-related policies in conflict-affected environment.

Action 1.3: Designate one or more officers, as appropriate, as responsible for coordination of the NAP.

- *Current Status:* The Pacific Fleet Headquarters has assigned Officers and Civilians from the N1, Total Force Management Directorate and the N5, Plans and Policy Directorate. These representatives also participate in Pacific Command (PACOM) forums and activities.
- *Identified Gaps/Areas for Improvement:* Officers assigned for NAP coordination are not assigned below the Fleet Echelon 2 level.
- *Recommendations:* Designate officers to be responsible for coordination of the NAP, and more specifically DoD identified WPS actions to Echelon 3 commands (Type Commanders and Numbered Fleets).

Outcome 1.4--Agencies establish processes to evaluate and learn from activities undertaken in support of Women, Peace, and Security initiatives.

Action 1.4: Develop and improve data collection mechanisms to track and report progress on WPS objectives, assess lessons learned, and identify best practices from existing programs.

- *Current Status:* Existing databases, after action reporting mechanisms, and lessons learned collection tools are limited, and in many cases, non-existent in the identification of WPS related activities.

¹⁰ Draft NAVADMIN

- *Identified Gaps/Areas for Improvement: As stated above.*
- *Recommendations: As stated in the action: “Develop and improve data collection mechanisms to track and report progress on WPS objectives, assess lessons learned, and identify best practices from existing programs.” This action needs to be extended to any program that may be leveraged to advance the ideals of WPS such as gender tracking of Personnel Exchange Program participants.*

Outcome 2.1-- More women are effectively engaged in peace negotiations, security initiatives, conflict prevention, peace-building including formal and informal processes—and decision-making during all phases of conflict prevention and resolution, and transition.

Action 2.1a: Assist partner governments in improving the recruitment and retention of women, including minorities and other historically marginalized women, into government ministries and the incorporation of women’s perspectives into peace and security policy.

Action 2.1b: Provide common guidelines and training to assist partner nations to integrate women and their perspectives into their security sectors.

Action 2.1c: Leverage the participation of female U.S. military personnel to encourage and model gender integration and reach out to female and male populations in partner nations.

- *Current Status: As demonstrated in this paper, the Pacific Fleet footprint spans far and wide within the AOR. One of the best methods to influence and advocate for more women involved in peace and security policies in other countries is to lead by example as Fleet Sailors interact with the military and civilian populations of countries in the AOR.*
- *Identified Gaps/Areas for Improvement: A further expansion of women assignments in the Pacific Fleet and improved retention of women in senior ranks would help to further these action items.*
- *Recommendation:*
 1. Continue the work already in progress following the 2013 repeal of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule and to expand assignment opportunities for women.
 2. Work to improve female retention within the Navy.
 3. When considering key personnel to interact with foreign militaries and civilian populations, consider gender (e.g. leveraging of female Sailors) when attempting to advance WPS objectives.

Action 2.1d: Increase partner nation women’s participation in U.S. funded training programs for foreign police, judicial, and military personnel, PME, as well as exchange programs, conferences, and seminars.

- *Current Status:* The Pacific Fleet oversees 48 U. S. exchange Sailors (43 men and 5 women) assigned to foreign countries in the AOR. Likewise, foreign countries within the Pacific Fleet AOR (Australia, Japan, and South Korea) have 53 Sailors (51 men and 2 women) assigned to US Navy commands across the globe.
- *Identified Gaps/Areas for Improvement:*
 1. There is room to increase female participation in the Navy's Personnel Exchange Program.
 2. Additionally, there may also be opportunities to expand the PEP program to include countries not participating where we may want to further influence WPS initiatives.
- *Recommendations:*
 1. Increase female participation in the PEP program for both U.S. and foreign participants.
 2. Review current participating countries and look for opportunities to leverage the PEP program in current participating countries or include countries of interest who are not already participating in the PEP program.
 3. Assign exchange Sailors, both U. S. and foreign Sailors within the context of advancing WPS initiatives when practicable.

Outcome 2.2-- Laws, policies, and practices in partner states promote and strengthen gender equality at national and local levels.

Action 2.2: Assist partner nations in building the capacity of their Defense Ministries to develop, implement, and enforce policies and military justice systems that promote and protect women's rights.

- *Current Status:* Unknown. Specific exercises that coordinate either bilateral or multi-lateral law enforcement, of combatting trafficking in persons help to foster the intent of Action 2.2.
- *Identified Gaps/Areas for Improvement:* Increased OAAs where WPS objectives could shape the scenario.
- *Recommendations:* Additional research required, however, as planners become more aware of the NAP and WPS objectives, OAAs specific to WPS initiatives should incorporate this action.

Outcome 3.1-- Risks of SGBV [sexual and gender-based violence] in crisis and conflict-affected environments are decreased through the increased capacity of individuals,

communities, and protection actors to address the threats and vulnerability associated with SGBV.

Action 3.1a: Incorporate modules on protection, rights, and specific needs of women in conflict into training provided to partner militaries and security personnel.

- Current Status: Unknown.
- Identified Gaps/Areas for Improvement: It is not clear as to how much Fleet interaction includes this type of training to partner militaries.
- Recommendations: Requires further evaluation.

Action 3.1b: Support education and awareness initiatives for U.S. Government civilian contractors and aid workers on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse in crisis and conflict-affected environments.

- *Current Status:*
 1. OPNAVINST 5300.11 “COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (CTIP)” dated 14 April 2010 outlines Navy’s policy on TIP and prohibits military, civilian, and service contract personnel from conducting activities that support or promote TIP. The policy also mandates annual training. Contractors who are engaged with and in foreign countries are made aware of CTIP issues, laws and the prohibition of certain activities.
 2. A recent OSD memo signed on 26 October 2014 mandated a CTIP Acquisition training for all DoD personnel with job responsibilities that require daily contact with DoD contractors and/or foreign national personnel.
- *Identified Gaps/Areas for Improvement:* Prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse in crisis and conflict-affected environments may not be specifically included in the training. Additionally, enforcement and verification that contractor personnel are getting the required training is difficult to monitor.
- *Recommendations:* Ensure the specific element of Action 3.1b are included in the training curriculum and develop a means to better monitor compliance.

Outcome 3.2--Laws, policies, and reconciliation, transitional justice, and accountability mechanisms designed to combat exploitation, abuse, discrimination, and violence against women and girls are developed and implemented at national and local levels.

Action 3.2a: Support the development of effective accountability and transitional justice mechanisms that address crimes committed against women and girls and reduce impunity.

Action 3.2b: Assist multilateral and international organizations in developing appropriate mechanisms for sexual assault prevention, response, and accountability, and combating SEA among their own personnel. Establish standard operating procedures for United States Government to follow up on cases of SEA by international personnel to ensure accountability.

- *Current Status:*
 1. A significant aspect of DoD and Navy's Sexual assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) efforts has been to hold perpetrators accountable. According to the Report to the President of the United States on SAPR¹¹: "The military justice system has undergone massive change over the past three fiscal years, resulting in the most sweeping revisions since 1968. As a result, the system is better able to investigate and try sexual assault cases in a fair and just manner, while better protecting victim's privacy interest. The military justice system can be further improved, and additional reforms will be implemented." The report shows that the number of sexual assault cases where courts-martial charges were preferred increased by 81 percent since 2009. Note: This includes all sexual assault cases where a military member is the offender and the victim is a foreign national.
 2. Prevention and response are also key elements of the Navy's SAPR efforts.
- *Identified Gaps/Areas for Improvement:* The U.S. Military Justice System and Fleet SAPR initiatives may have some influence on other countries by way of example but it is currently focused on internal issues within the U.S. military and Navy.
- *Recommendations:* Continue to lead by example in sexual assault prevention, response, and accountability. Seek opportunities to assist foreign partners in implementing similar initiatives.

Outcome 3.3-- Interventions are improved to prevent trafficking in persons and protect trafficking survivors in conflict and crisis-affected areas.

Action 3.3a: Maintain a zero tolerance policy with regard to trafficking in persons for U.S. military and civilian personnel.

- *Current Status:*
 1. OPNAVINST 5300.11 "COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (CTIP)" dated 14 April 2010 outlines Navy's policy on TIP and prohibits military, civilian, and service contract personnel from conducting activities that support or promote TIP. The policy also mandates annual training. Sailors, civilians, and government contractors who are engaged with and in foreign countries are made aware of CTIP issues, laws and the prohibition of certain activities.

¹¹ SECDEF 25 Nov 2014 "report to the President of the United States on SAPR p.23

2. A recent OSD memo signed on 26 October 2014 mandated a CTIP Acquisition training for all DoD personnel with job responsibilities that require daily contact with DoD contractors and/or foreign national personnel.
- *Identified Gaps/Areas for Improvement:*
 1. Navy policy references DoD's zero tolerance is clear, yet falls short of using the words "zero tolerance".
 2. Fleet engagements where WPS initiatives are explored could be more specific to include CTIP objectives.
 - *Recommendations:*
 1. Consider including "zero tolerance" in a revised Navy policy.
 2. With the inclusion of WPS objectives into Fleet Theater Campaign Order, CTIP should be explored as training objectives.

Action 3.3b: Coordinate implementation of the anti-trafficking-related items of the NAP with the ongoing work of the U.S. Presidential Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat TIP and the Senior Policy Operating Group on TIP.

- *Current Status:* Pacific Fleet submits input to the annual report to the U.S. Presidential Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat TIP via the CNO Staff.
- *Identified Gaps/Areas for Improvement:* As stated in Action 3.3a.
- *Recommendations:* As stated in Action 3.3a.

Outcome 4.1-- Conflict early warning and response systems include gender-specific data and are responsive to SGBV, and women participate in early warning, preparedness, and response initiatives.

Action 4.1a: Integrate protocols and support opportunities to share best practices for gender analysis in conflict mapping and reporting, including for mass atrocity prevention and stabilization funding. Review conflict early warning systems and conflict assessment methodologies, including the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, to assess and strengthen the integration of gender in these tools.

- *Current Status:* Unknown.
- *Identified Gaps/Areas for Improvement:* Unknown.
- *Recommendations:* Integrate gender analysis conflict mapping and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework into the Fleet planning processes.

Action 4.1b: Actively engage women in planning and implementing disaster and emergency preparedness and risk reduction activities, including regarding how police can better interact with women in their role as first responders.

- *Current Status:* As demonstrated in this paper, women do play a role in the planning and execution of Fleet operations such as Pacific Partnership and CARAT to include a focus on women health issues in foreign countries.
- *Identified Gaps/Areas for Improvement:* Specific women involvement in disaster and emergency preparedness and police first responders needs to be explored further.
- *Recommendations:* Seek increased opportunities for Fleet engagement in this action item.

Outcome 5.3-- Reintegration and early recovery programs address the distinct needs of men and women

Action 5.3: Support demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration programs, including sustainable livelihood alternatives, that address the distinct needs of male and female ex-combatants and those associated with armed forces in other capacities.

- *Current Status:* Unknown.
- *Identified Gaps/Areas for Improvement:* Unknown.
- *Recommendations:* Requires more research in this area.

IV. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS/WAY-AHEAD.

A. Specific observations and recommendations are provided in section III above and in the Executive Summary. In conclusion, the Pacific Fleet has a tremendous potential to implement WPS initiatives as intended in the DoD guidance. Although a relatively new dimension to theater campaign planning, we see that the ideals of WPS were already embedded in the culture of Pacific Fleet OAAs, programs and policies. As identified in the paper, gaps and areas for improvement remain and should be explored further. A more deliberate and conscious approach to the planning and execution of Fleet OAAs in the context of the DoD WPS Implementation Guide will help to advance the WPS initiative and enhance global security.

“The goal of this National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security is as simple as it is profound: to empower half the world’s population as equal partners in preventing conflict and building peace in countries threatened and affected by war, violence and insecurity. Achieving this goal is critical to our national and global security.”¹²

END

¹² September 2013 DoD Implementation Guide for the U. S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security

SOLDIER 2020, THE HUMAN DIMENSION, AND MUSCULOSKELETAL INJURY

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As the Army examines the possible integration of women into traditional combat occupations, Army Medicine is focused on physical performance optimization and injury minimization, and has the lead for one Soldier 2020 Task Force work group on injury and attrition rates. The Army Medical Department is partnering with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Command in determining gender neutral occupation specific physical capability standards and tests. In parallel, the Secretary of the Army stood up a Human Dimension Council to develop recommendations for optimizing individual soldier performance. This requires a cultural mindset shift away from minimum standards towards personalized optimal standards for fitness and performance. Musculoskeletal injuries currently account for over half of the healthcare costs in active duty service members, the majority of evacuations out of theater, and occur at a two- to fourfold rate for women versus men. Women's presence in the Armed Forces quadrupled from 1986-2014. We now face potentially significant changes in women's roles with the rescission of the Direct Ground Combat Assignment Rule. How we approach this intersection of mandate, statistics and challenge has national as well as international implications in fostering women's military roles.

SOLDIER 2020

The expansion of women into Army combat positions has been slow yet steady. From a cap that artificially held women to 2% of the pre all-volunteer Army to the specific rules that attempted to limit exposure to direct action, laws and regulations have gradually been eased towards acceptance of women in combat. U.S. Army women's exposure to combat is not new. The 2% cap on women was lifted in 1978 with the initiation of the all-volunteer force and disbandment of the Women's Army Corps. By 1990, women made up 8% of Army forces.¹ Today that number is 14%.² With that growth comes increased exposure to combat. By 2013, over 250,000 women had served in the OIF and OEF theaters of operation, with 800 wounded and 150 killed.³

In 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed the Armed Services to review specialties and units closed to women with the intent to open as many positions as possible, resulting in the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCAR): "Service members are

¹ U.S. Army Center of Military History. (2006). Rebuilding the Army Vietnam to Desert Storm. In R. Stewart (General Ed.), *American Military History Vol. II* (pp.370-407). Washington, D.C.: Author. Retrieved from <http://www.history.army.mil/books/AMH-V2/AMH%20V2/chapter12.htm>

² Lamothe, D. (2014, December 7). Women and the Elite Forces. *The Washington Post Magazine*, pp. 24-25. Available online at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/style/2014/12/04/women-and-the-elite-forces/>

³ Cone, R. (2013, November). Soldier 2020. *Army*, 64(11). Retrieved from http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2013/11/Documents/Cone_Nov2013.pdf

eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from...units below the brigade level whose primary mission is...direct combat on the ground.... The memorandum defined direct ground combat as “engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy....”⁴

Since World War II, the nature of warfare has evolved from combat forces in face to face formations with decreasing exposure to enemy action the further removed from the forward edge of the battle area, with the rear echelon with least exposure to combat. Today’s warfare is a highly complex battlefield where the enemy has a high degree of mobility throughout the theater and possibly the area of operations. The “rear echelon” today may exist outside the theater of operations; within the area of operations there are simply degrees of risk for direct action. Occupations and positions which women were allowed into based on an assessed relative low risk are now frequently “front echelon”.

By 2004, *Population Bulletin* summarized that “women are permitted to serve in 91 percent of Army occupational categories, but in only 70 percent of the actual positions”.⁵ In 2011 the Army began reassessing women in combat positions and, between 2012 – 2013, over 20,000 additional positions were opened in collocated positions and Special Operations Aviation. An initial 2012 brigade combat team exception to the DGCAR preceded the opening of positions in seventeen active component and nine National Guard brigade combat teams (BCTs).⁶

On January 24, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel rescinded the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCAR) and directed the integration of women into closed units and positions. He directed the Services to develop and implement gender neutral occupational standards and set a date of 1 January 2016 for the integration of women to be completed. As of 2014, fifty-eight positions remained positively closed to women, both officer and enlisted, inclusive of Armor, Infantry, Ranger, Engineer, Special Forces, Multiple Launch Rocket System and Mine Detection Dog Handler.⁷

With less than one year before the mandated deadline, the Services have continued reviewing, and as needed developing, standards for Service Members to perform in these remaining closed occupations and positions. Their approach has been a blend of concept trials and scientific study. For example, the Marine Corps had fourteen of fifty-seven enlisted women pass a basic infantry

⁴ Secretary of Defense Memorandum: Direct Combat Definition and Assignment Rule. (1994, January 13). Washington, D.C.: Author. Retrieved from <http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/irectGroundCombatDefinitionAndAssignmentRule.pdf>

⁵ Segal, M. R., & Segal, M. W. (2004). America’s Military Population. *Population Bulletin* 59(4). Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau.

⁶ Secretary of the Army Memorandum: Plan for Integration of Female Leaders and Soldiers Based on the Elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCAR). (2013, April 19). Retrieved from <http://www.defense.gov/news/ArmyWISRIImplementationPlan.pdf>

⁷ Secretary of the Army Memorandum: Army Directive 2014-16 (Expanding Positions in Open Occupations for the Assignment of Female Soldiers). (2014, June 17). Retrieved from http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/Army_Directives_1.html

course in 2014, with seven allowed to continue on to combat training.⁸ However, no women (of twenty-nine) have passed the officer Infantry Basic Course.⁹ The Army has several efforts ongoing in parallel, from an April 2014 decision to allow women into training for the Rangers within the year to more long term efforts to review occupational requirements, accession and retention standards and physical training programs.

The Army effort, known as Soldier 2020, was designed to develop occupation-specific physical performance requirements to be used for predictive tests to access and retain soldiers in physically demanding occupations (Physical Demands Study; not complete), a Gender Integration Study (not released), and additional work specifically to plan for women in special forces. In October 2013, General (GEN) Robert Cone, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Command, wrote that the fundamental goal of Soldier 2020 is “to train every soldier, by specialty, to the same standard regardless of gender.” This effort will be accomplished through three lines of effort. The first is a study with U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine (USARIEM) on identifying key physical tasks of each military occupational specialty (MOS) and tests for each key physical task. The second is a study “looking at the institutional and cultural factors affecting gender integration.” The third is “setting the conditions for integration.” GEN Cone noted that there are over 500 women serving in key leader roles throughout the accession and training process; he called on their experience and ability to serve as role models as a crucial part of the integration. He also noted that women’s “strong performance” in combat reflected on TRADOC’s successful “history of developing and training soldiers for success.” GEN Cone closed with “TRADOC’s Soldier 2020 effort will provide a level field for all soldiers to succeed based on their personal abilities which can only make our Army stronger.”¹⁰

DEFINING PHYSICAL DEMAND

The Physical Demands Study includes an Army senior officer and non-commissioned officer assessment of thirty-one essential tasks across closed MOSs. These leaders developed proposed standards and the Army then tested the standards in combat arms units. Standards that a significant number of men could not meet are being reevaluated to determine whether the cause was a training shortfall or a too-high standard. For those standards the majority met, the Army is assessing whether the standard was too low or not a discriminator for success in combat.³

USARIEM and the U.S. Army Physical Fitness School should have seven occupational standards (all enlisted MOSs) ready to pilot in summer 2015, that bridge the previous work done with the goals of Soldier 2020. These occupations include infantryman, combat engineer, cavalry scout

⁸ Bowman, Tom. (2014, November 24). Combat Training: Can Female Marines Get The Job Done? Washington, D.C.: National Public Radio. Retrieved from <http://www.npr.org/2014/11/24/365723967/combat-training-can-female-marines-get-the-job-done>

⁹ MacLean, A. (2015, January 9). Two more female marines dropped from infantry course. *The Washington Free Beacon*. Retrieved from <http://freebeacon.com/blog/exclusive-two-more-female-marines-dropped-from-infantry-course/>

¹⁰ Cone, R. (2013, October 17). TRADOC Commander: Train on Ability, Regardless of Gender. *Defense One*. Retrieved from <http://cdn.defenseone.com/defenseone/interstitial.html?v=2.1.1&rf=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.defenseone.com%2Fideas%2F2013%2F10%2Ftradoc-commander-train-ability-regardless-gender%2F72119%2F>

and tank crewman.¹¹ Further work will be needed to translate work requirements/fitness standards into accession or retention fitness tests, as well as developing such gender neutral requirements for all occupations across the Army. This is not an easy task despite decades of dedicated effort. A 2013 review and analysis of Army physical readiness training stated that “the US Army cannot clearly define and operationalize the physiological needs of the modern combat Soldier.”¹²

DEFINING INSTITUTIONAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS

The Army’s effort to gauge institutional and cultural factors affecting women in combat began with a survey of attitudes. Overall responses were unanimous to not lower standards and “most soldiers” agreed that “women...have earned the opportunity to stand in any one of our formations for which they qualify, if they wish to do so.” Other results appeared to break down along lines of familiarity. Men who had worked and fought alongside women had positive expectations. In regards to expressed negative expectations, the Army merely noted that “work remains to be done.”¹³ This study has not been released so there is no data to examine.

The ability to extrapolate from these results the real challenges or probable success of this endeavor is limited. One could speculate that the comment on “work remaining to be done” indicated a significant number of men who had negative expectations for women in combat. That these men appeared to be from the very units women are being considered for integration reflects a significant cultural hurdle to overcome before any integration would be successful.

Similar challenges faced women integrating into the U.S. Military Academy (USMA). A four year period of study deemed the integration a success, describing the deliberate and methodical approach the Army took towards this integration.^{13,14} However, the regular Army cannot be as easily controlled and arguably represents a broader range of views (and thus biases) than those represented at the USMA. In a 2013 Washington Times article, a special operations veteran recommended adding the MOS 18P for women to serve as special operations camp followers.¹⁵ Cultural acceptance may be the single hardest factor in the entire effort.

SETTING THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS

Lastly the Army is working to set the conditions for success. To that end, the Army will rely on women already in units in open occupational specialties to serve as mentors, role models and advisors. The Army will also rely on transferring already collocated women officers and senior

¹¹ U.S. Army Public Affairs. (2014). Soldier 2020: Physical Demands Study Fact Sheet. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army.

¹² East, Whitfield. (2013). A Historical Review and Analysis of Army Physical Readiness Training and Assessment. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press.

¹³ Adams, J. (1979). Report of the Admission of Women to the U.S. Military Academy (Project Athena III). New York: U.S. Military Academy.

¹⁴ Adams, J. (1980). Report of the Admission of Women to the U.S. Military Academy (Project Athena IV). New York: U.S. Military Academy.

¹⁵ Scarborough, R. (2013, June 27). Fear of G.I. Jane: special operations forces are worried about adding women. *The Washington Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/27/special-operations-forces-are-worried-about-adding/?page=all>

enlisted from their current occupations into newly opened occupations as a way to minimize isolation of new women recruits. This is a lesson gleaned from Project Athena, the USMA women's integration study that found a minimum number of women per small unit were required to prevent isolation.³ Outcomes of this phase are pending. Of note, the ratio tentatively identified as a minimum number of women per small unit is not defined in an accessible reference document, but could possibly serve as a mandated minimum for women in combat units, either to set a quota on numbers or as a rationale to delay or set future conditions to permanently commit to women in those units.

The extraordinary challenges presented by developing scientifically based occupational physical requirements and changing culture while insuring lethality are made harder by constantly evolving reality, theory, technology and tactics. The Army is in a drawdown while giving itself a mission that no later than 2025, it will “develop a lean, expeditionary, self-sufficient, and affordable Total Force, able to operate across the range of military operations at the same or greater lethality, with reduced reliance on strategic lift, logistics, and in-theater support, in order to meet the Landpower requirements of the Nation...”¹⁶ The mandate to continuously produce a fighting force that is ever leaner, more efficient, more mobile, and yet retains a lethal edge over opponents will remain an enduring one. Further reality is represented by the need to recruit and train tens of thousands of soldiers annually (57,000 in fiscal year 2014). Role changes also means retraining soldiers already in uniform into other occupational specialties. The crux of how this might be accomplished most likely resides with the Human Dimension initiative.

HUMAN DIMENSION

A framework for operationalizing Total Force 2025 concepts is the Human Dimension, the characteristics each soldier must possess for success of the Total Force. The domains within the Human Dimension that the Army desires to optimize include cognitive, physical and social; “The Chief of Staff of the Army has directed the Army to become *‘the nation’s leader in human performance optimization.’*”¹⁷ The Human Dimension concept outlines the process for how this will occur, to achieve the development and performance the Army needs from soldiers as well as Army civilians and leaders. The Human Dimension White Paper outlines the concept and initial implementation. In a nutshell, the Army is trying to “...assess, integrate, and synchronize its training and education, science and technology, holistic health and fitness, medical and personnel policies, programs, and initiatives in support of the Army Profession” in order to optimize individual, unit and Force performance.¹⁷

In July of 2013, the Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG) was tasked to review the Ranger Athlete Warrior program, a performance optimization program that caught the attention of the Chief of Staff of the Army. Over a period of nine months, culminating in an office call with the Chief, the musculoskeletal experts worked to articulate why decades of research, review, recommendations and education have not markedly changed the incidence of musculoskeletal

¹⁶ Army Capabilities Integration Center. (2014 October). Force 2025 and Beyond: Unified Land Operations. Fort Eustis, VA: Army Training and Doctrine Command. Retrieved from http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/TRADOC_AUSA_Force2025AndBeyond-UnifiedLandOperations-WinInAComplexWorld_07OCT2014.pdf

¹⁷ U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. (2014). The Human Dimension White Paper. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Author. Retrieved from <http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cact/HumanDimensionWhitePaper.pdf>

injury. Their chief observation was that the Army has a multitude of best practices, pockets of excellence, scientifically rigorous and evidence-based physical training doctrine, and experts at all levels. Yet the efforts are not synchronized. The Human Dimension team has been tasked with that synchronization in order to leverage what already exists, reduce churn, minimize cost and use this as a springboard to faster optimization. The infrastructure is being put into place.

In April 2014, the Human Dimension Council was formally chartered by the Secretary of the Army as an advisory body on the Human Dimension Concept. Co-chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and TRADOC Deputy Commanding General for Futures, this charter gives departmental level visibility on tangible and intangible aspects of human performance that have frustrated Army trainers, thinkers, planners and leaders for generations. The mandate is to optimize human development and performance for 2018-2030.¹⁸ The Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG) has representation on this Council, as do other major commands, in order to fully inform the recommendations. The development of this DA level advisory body is a positive move towards a centralized authority for bringing change into the highly individualized realm of physical readiness training. One of the key tenets of the Human Domain concept is that given highly centralized decision criteria, actual decision making can be decentralized.¹⁹ Specific to the discussion of physical attributes, training and the integration of women, it remains to be seen whether this concept will bring synchrony to a historically asynchronous physical training culture.

The Army Medical Department is working on several concepts and lines of effort in conjunction with Human Dimension personnel. These nascent efforts are firmly nested with the Soldier 2020 efforts, and the development of a musculoskeletal service line within OTSG. A priority throughout 2014 was to gain consensus and recognition of the Army's own physical readiness training field manual as the single point of synchronization for all Army physical training. While there is no documented decision, discussions reflect significant change and a rejection of this document. This is an unfortunate outcome.

The dysynchrony in Army physical fitness programs may be of long standing, but the move towards a soldier athlete model, which gained traction during the current conflicts, appears to have made the quality range broader. The Army's partnership with sports organizations such as the National Football League, the National Hockey League and the National Baseball League reinforce the sports model. Increasing specialization within sports related health professions gives commanders more resources to tap. The fallacy of the analogy, particularly for non special operations units, is that the spectrum of fitness or even overall health for soldiers is exponentially wider than that of a professional sports team. Even the best Army programs do not approach the ratio of fitness professionals to "players", yet likely would need to exceed that ratio to truly

¹⁸ Human Dimension Task Force. (2014, May 9). New Human Dimension Council will Optimize Potential. Fort Eustis, VA: Army Capabilities Integration Center. Retrieved from <http://www.arcic.army.mil/Articles/cddl-New-Human-Dimension-Council-will-Optimize-Soldier-Potential.aspx>

¹⁹ Finney, N. (2014, November 17). Re-grading the Army's Human Dimension White Paper. Posted on The Bridge. Retrieved from <https://medium.com/the-bridge/regrading-the-armys-human-dimension-white-paper-bd282c366fa8>

realize a soldier:athlete concept. As budget constraints tighten in the coming years, the difficulty in achieving this internal structure will increase.

Over the last five years, the U.S. Army Physical Fitness School rolled out a new physical readiness training manual, Field Manual (FM) 7-22, Physical Readiness Training.²⁰ It is a comprehensive and well laid out manual on how to execute physical training, to include core training, and shoulder and hip training extension training. These three drills appear to address the flexion oriented pushup and sit up drills common in unit training which may lead to muscle imbalance. FM 7-22 has not been popular with Army units, and there has been discussion within Army circles that it will be replaced by a more generalized FM. What has been extremely popular in all military units are programs such as Cross Fit, P90X, and other highly marketed “extreme” fitness programs. Done correctly, all such programs can address the muscle imbalances and limitations of a routine of run, pushups and sit ups. However, the question remains whether these programs truly address the wartime needs of Soldiers.

Most of the Army’s unit fitness programs share basic training tenets with FM 7-22 and each other, despite a high sense of ownership over the locally named fitness programs (e.g., Mountain Warrior, Iron Horse, Ranger Athlete Warrior, THOR3) with which the generic FM 7-22 cannot compete. Individual commands have invested varying amounts of resources into their programs, in the form of exercise physiologists, sports psychologists, athletic trainers, and certified strength and conditioning coaches; equipment; facilities; and training. RAND reviewed the special forces program, and conceptually gave it high marks, although even within the historically well-funded special ops community, not all of the concepts were fully resourced or adequately executed. There were additional concerns that the need to expand the program from trial to full execution would result in a greater decentralization than might be optimal. While there are minimal differences between most programs, the special operations program is unique in its inclusion of a cognitive component of fitness.²¹ However, based on reviews by musculoskeletal experts within OTSG, there does not appear to be one program which is markedly better at physically preparing all soldiers for combat. These pockets of excellent execution are a prime target for Human Dimension concept application and serve as a starting point for the Army to begin to not only optimize soldier performance, but to reduce injury and long term harm to soldiers.

MUSCULOSKELETAL INJURY

With the advent of increased technology, changes in Army small unit doctrine, and how the Army deploys and fights, there has been an increasing need to keep small units/fire teams together. The Army does not lose men from a fire team easily. These teams live, train, and fight together. Their efficiency and effectiveness is exponentially affected by replacing any one member of the team. The medical community realizes this implied task, and has developed new techniques and procedures to address this. Commanders demand far forward care in order to keep their units intact, their Soldiers healthy, and their combat effectiveness high. It is imperative

²⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2012, October). Field Manual 7-22: Army Physical Readiness Training. Washington, D.C.: Author.

²¹ Kelly, T. K., Masi, R., Walker, B. A., Knapp, S. A., Leuschner, K. J. (2013). *An Assessment of the Army’s Tactical Human Optimization, Rapid Rehabilitation and Reconditioning Program*. Santa Clara, CA: RAND Arroyo.

as women become integral to these units that this mandate is understood and all potential threats to maximized combat effectiveness are minimized if not eliminated.

These competing priorities and imperatives may have finally approached a tipping point to force real change in physical performance optimization. Training and preparation for combat is inherently dangerous. Injuries, and specifically musculoskeletal injuries, are an obstacle to combat readiness the Army has never had adequately under control. There are no headlines about commanders fired for having too many soldiers on profile, and the culture is that injuries are at least partially the soldier's fault. With increasing body mass index and reducing baseline fitness for new accessions into the military, budget constraints which limit the ability to extend basic training for more gradual increases in fitness, and the increasing range of height and weight of both genders, the military faces stiff challenges to effective change. Further exacerbating the situation is the narrowing band of generally eligible youth, which led to broadening accession criteria. Most well-known at the height of OIF and OEF was the acceptance of tattoos and high school diploma equivalents. These exceptions were rolled back but other entrance standards continue to be redefined. In 2014 the shortest infantryman recruited was less than five feet tall; the lightest was under one hundred pounds.³ In light of all this, any discussion on musculoskeletal injury based purely on the physical capabilities of women is too narrow.

The question has to be asked if the increased incidence of women's musculoskeletal injury vice men is irrelevant to opening combat arms positions to women. It can be argued that regardless of gender, military training in many instances does not promote total fitness, does not promote endurance and strength, nor does it promote preservation of those attributes over one or more decades. Injury rates for both genders are too high, with too many veterans with lifelong musculoskeletal conditions that affect their overall functioning and quality of life. The American public is paying for this with exponential healthcare expenditures for veterans.

The data for musculoskeletal injuries is well documented, with injuries the primary reason for medical encounters in the Army as well as for discharges.²² While women in the military have a one to fourfold incidence of musculoskeletal injury versus men, 10% of all soldiers are nondeployable at any given time (up to 50,000). In fiscal year 2013, musculoskeletal conditions or injuries cost the equivalent of \$400 million within military treatment facilities, and over \$86 million (physical therapy and orthopedics specifically) in purchased network care. Yet, studies have repeatedly shown that proper execution of physical readiness training reduces injury rates.²³ The Soldier 2020 mandate for occupational specific standards and testing appears to be the latest round in a historical cycle of recognition of insufficient physical training programs at the unit level, testing which further skews the training that does happen, and injuries which are clearly associated with how physical training is performed.

In a deployed setting, musculoskeletal non-battle injuries account for 87% of all injuries. The rate of non-combat related musculoskeletal injuries are estimated to occur 6.5-7 times more

²² Army Institute of Public Health Injury Prevention Program. (2014). Relative burden of injuries and diseases, U.S. Army Active Duty, 2013. Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD: Author

²³ Roy, Tanya. (2014). Risk Factors for Musculoskeletal Injuries in Deployed Female Soldiers. Dissertation In Fulfillment Of Phd Requirements (Unpublished). Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh.

frequently than combat related injuries. Over 75% of all medical evacuations from OIF and OEF were due to non-combat musculoskeletal injuries related to back, knee, foot/ankle, shoulder, hand/wrist, and neck pain. “The typical Soldier medically evacuated from the OIF/OEF Theater was a 29 year old Soldier in need of additional musculoskeletal care, resulting in a negative impact on operational capabilities.”²⁴

It is important to understand that injuries are not just occurring with running, sit ups and pushups. They occur throughout all training although overuse does seem to be a consistent factor. For example, the estimated weight for an Army rucksack is 55-75 pounds dry. When wet that equipment is heavier. While body armor is getting lighter (and better designed for women), the total weight worn or carried into combat can exceed one hundred pounds (rucksack, weapon, water, helmet, load carrying equipment [belt and suspenders worn to hold first aid pouch, ammunition pouches, et cetera]). A recent survey of the weight of all equipment carried by Ranger candidates ranged from 100 pounds for the initial weeks to 135 pounds during water training.^{25,26}

With the expansion of women into direct combat units, and the inclusion of smaller men, mitigating the potential for injury is essential. The forced codification of standards within all occupations may also serve as a springboard to reconsider the current acceptance of all musculoskeletal injury in the Army.

There have been positive changes iteratively across the Army such as the far forward placement of musculoskeletal care assets into combat brigades and special operations forces. In 2005, the Army created authorized positions for physical therapists (PTs) and physical therapy technicians in brigade combat teams (BCTs). This was the culmination of over twenty years of effort. The concept was that pushing PTs forward would reduce the flow in patients into the military treatment facilities and push forward advice to commanders that would change training and reduce the source of injuries. The PT in the BCT Guidebook states: “The primary focus of physical therapy services in the brigade combat team is to enhance unit readiness and physical performance through injury prevention, human performance optimization and timely rehabilitation.”

The reality is quite different. PTs are pressured to not allow any brigade soldiers to be seen within the MTF, incapable of seeing the crush of patient load, and without sufficient time to perform the command advisement, leader training and development, and human performance optimization/injury prevention which was to be the hallmark of this program.

The theory is the close relationship of these unit level PTs opened a flood gate of unrecognized and unmet need in musculoskeletal care. Soldiers with chronic yet “sub-clinical” injuries

²⁴ Proponency for Rehabilitation and Reintegration. (2010). *Physical Therapy in the Brigade Combat Team*. Falls Church, VA: Office of the U.S. Army Surgeon General. Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20101217144152/http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/prr/PT_BCT_Guide.pdf

²⁵ Smith, Stew. (n.d.). Army Ranger PFT. Military.com. Retrieved from <http://www.military.com/military-fitness/army-special-operations/army-ranger-pft>

²⁶ Jordan, B. (2013, April 10). Heavy loads could burden women’s Infantry role. Military.com. Retrieved from <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/04/10/heavy-loads-could-burden-womens-infantry-role.html>

increased the rehabilitation workload, overwhelming the BCT PTs and spilling over to increased workload at the MTFs. Subclinical injuries are those injuries which if exacerbated reduce combat effectiveness. Typically these are the chronic recurrent injuries seen in primary care, physical therapy, and other associated healthcare clinics every day around the globe. Soldiers get enough care to be around 80% healed before they self-discharge and return to duty. Perhaps the inconvenience of going for care is no longer worth the effort in relation to the amount of dysfunction or pain the soldier is managing daily. Regardless, the end result is residual functional deficits that accrue over time and represent future dysfunction and reinjury, and are a threat to combat readiness.

There is resultant unrelenting pressure on the BCT PTs to spend all of their time performing direct patient care. Despite the authorship of a guide to practice for PTs in the BCT, current BCT PTs spend over 90% of their time performing direct patient care.²⁷ The PT in the BCT Guide is being rewritten this year, with the intent to publish it in an operations order. The pressure for direct patient care is coming from the business metrics of healthcare, and the need for MTFs to reduce purchased care, increase productivity, and insure access to care. The tension between these opposing mandates exists because there still are insufficient assets within the unit footprint to take care of all musculoskeletal conditions and injuries.

A program reintroduced to the Army since the publication of FM 7-22 is the Master Fitness Trainer (MFT). This program gives a focused block of instruction to interested Soldiers at the small unit level in an attempt to continuously improve the level of instruction in physical training. The MFT program will take years to mature, but those soldiers will form a key portion of overall knowledge to help turn the tide on injuries. Over the years there have been multiple other efforts to reduce injury and lost duty time in the training environment. TRADOC ran a program analysis comparing an increase in unit medics with the addition of athletic trainers. OTSG ran a program analysis for TRADOC comparing basic trainee outcomes with no additional assets; teams of one PT, one PTA, one to two athletic trainers and one to two certified strength and conditioning specialists; and athletic trainers only. According to the U.S. Army Public Health Command, these and other program analyses have equivocal results: no program appears superior to another. Putting more assets forward and not changing how we train will not get us where we need to be.²⁸ This appears again to be a call to synchronize all of these efforts into a cohesive program that will begin to roll back injury.

Other efforts to change culture through increasing general knowledge and leader education may bear more fruit. These efforts include the Performance Triad, arguably the signature program of the current Army Surgeon General. In an effort to shift the medical community's focus from a disease and treatment centric model to one focused on optimized health and wellness, the Performance Triad has armed units, leaders and soldiers with a back-to-the-basics education on sleep, activity and nutrition. The Surgeon General has also woven in elements of brain health. In theory, addressing all of these elements would decrease injury, increase fitness, and optimize

²⁷ Personal communication with LTC Scott Gregg, Army PT, Allied Health Staff Officer, and mentor to the Army BCT PTs, based on a survey he performed in 2013.

²⁸ Personal communication with Dr. Bruce Jones and Mr. Keith Hauret, U.S. Army Public Health Command, 2014.

combat readiness and effectiveness. Inclusion of brain health into the Performance Triad brings it conceptually into alignment with the special operations fitness program. The Army is developing outcome measures for this program.

The next step is not only to synchronize these efforts to create real change but in the development of outcomes. Outcomes that show real reduction in injury and real improvement in combat performance must be resourced and institutionalized in a methodical manner. Currently we can measure injury rates, but we cannot measure health rates. We have no definition of maximal fitness. We need a methodical program to cycle rest, ramp up and peak fitness programs so that every soldier has an opportunity to rest after optimizing his or her personal fitness in preparation for deployment, in line with the Army Force Generating cycles. The Human Dimension should be the center of gravity for this synchronization and development.

This overall discussion does beg the question of the future physicality of combat for U.S. Armed Forces. An argument can be made that the importance of an intensely physical orientation may decline over the next decades. Robotics may assist the Army with its host of challenges, from the integration of women into combat roles, soldier injury management, and staying the dominant force in boots on the ground engagement with opponents. Exoskeletons, external carriers for equipment, and potentially for far forward operations have been in development for years. Current limitations to the use of electronics or robotics include limitations on Bluetooth on the battlefield (security issues), and the desire to always keep a human in the loop when robotic equipment may be involved in death.²⁹ The specialized Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit was created for enhanced mobility and protection, and “allow(s) soldiers to carry 17 times more weight than normal and march with significantly less strain on the body. With an XOS 2 suit...a soldier can carry 400 pounds but feel the weight of only 23.5.”³⁰ The primary reason robotics and technology alone are not the answer is that training is not just performed for physical strengthening; the Army would have to develop ways to team build and create mental toughness without the physically demanding regimes employed today by elite forces.

CONCLUSION

The debate on women in combat is far from over. From the known average physical capacity of women versus men to the known determinants of success with an absolute minimum to the number of women who must be in a platoon for successful integration, there remain the cultural and historical arguments against exposing women to combat and the men with them to potentially higher risk.

The Army is doing due diligence in determining the physical requirements for direct combat units, setting gender neutral standards for soldiers to qualify for those positions, with the intent to apply those standards uniformly and objectively. Simultaneously the Army is opening training and qualification courses such as for the Rangers to women. This discussion on the political and

²⁹ Matthews, W. Robot or Not? Army Dismisses Completely Soldierless Battlefield. *Army* 64(11). Retrieved from <http://armymagazine.org/2014/10/22/robot-or-not-army-dismisses-completely-soldierless-battlefield/>

³⁰ Bender, Jeremy. (2014, August 18). The Military Is Closing In On Powerful Exoskeleton Technology. *BusinessInsider*. Retrieved from <http://www.businessinsider.com/military-exoskeletons-2014-8>

physical conditions needed for women to be successful to qualify for these positions is academic. Women can perform the minimum requirements of most of these roles. Technology will most likely allow women to reduce or even avoid the physical cost in the future but there will be a cost to be paid. What we do not know is what that cost will be and whether in retrospect we will believe the gain in equality and opportunity were worth it.

Three years from the rescission of the DGCAR appears on paper to be sufficient time to study, plan and execute means for women to become integrated into the military's combat arms. By 2016, the Services have to have integrated women or ask for an exception / waiver to this mandate. The worst possible outcomes would be for the Services to lower standards because they cannot scientifically prove the current standards are required for combat assignments or for Services to be granted waivers which allow them to continue to exclude women. There are more paths forward than these two. Given five years to focally train women for combat training would give women an opportunity to develop the physical toughness required to push through training that is not only designed to approximate combat but is also designed to forge teams, mental toughness, and an ability to move beyond one's self-imposed functional limitations. Remove the pressure on the Services to make final decisions on this but retain the pressure to make all standards occupation specific, develop logical standards that maximize warrior spirit and function while minimizing injury, baseline combat skills for this era in which there are no rear lines, and bring a greater level of truth to such maxims as "every Soldier an infantryman".

THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF FEMININITY IN U.S. MILITARY CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN

LTC Rose Lopez Keravouri, USAR

ABSTRACT

With the rescission of the combat exclusion policy for the US military, which had previously prohibited women in direct combat roles, and the passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, which emphasized an increase in the inclusion of women in international peacekeeping forces, the US military has been reexamining its policies and practices regarding women soldiers and has been considering how to redefine their role in military actions. The use of female-only Female Engagement Teams (FETs) in the conflict in Afghanistan over the past six years is an example of the US military instrumentalizing femininity in a new approach to conflict resolution. This article argues that the employment of FETs demonstrates an instrumentalization of femininity which has helped subtly shift the US military's approach to conflict resolution in Afghanistan – from a typically masculine one to an approach with more apparent considerations of feminine perspectives, acknowledging genderized meanings of security as well as differing gender perspectives and needs, but in conjunction with programs that do not negate masculine perspectives.

Keywords: Female Engagement Team, FET, instrumentalization, femininity, post-conflict resolution, UNSCR 1325

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In January 2013, the US Secretary of Defense rescinded the combat exclusion policy for the US military which had previously prohibited women in direct combat roles.¹ In addition, the United Nations has recently emphasized an increase in the inclusion of women in United Nations international peacekeeping forces.² In light of these changes and trends, the US military has been reexamining its policies and practices regarding women soldiers and has been considering how to redefine their role in military actions. In the process, it has reignited the decades-old debate of whether women should be allowed in combat. These developments make the examination of the US military's use of female-only Female Engagement Teams (FETs) in the conflict in Afghanistan over the past six years particularly apropos as an example of the US military instrumentalizing femininity in a new approach to conflict resolution.

According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) FET Handbook, the FET:

Is a formally trained, dedicated resource ... to influence and interact with the local population, primarily women, to achieve ... counterinsurgency (COIN) objectives. ... [And] to build enduring trust, confidence, and increased support of COIN and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. (CALL 2011: 9).

The new role and novel use of women in this capacity suggests the instrumentalization of femininity for the purpose of increasing operational effectiveness. This article seeks to explore the instrumentalization of femininity in Afghanistan through the use of FETs and to assess the impact on the US military approach to conflict resolution. The use of female-only teams specifically suggests a change in thinking with a reduction in typically masculine approaches to an approach that incorporates more feminine considerations, perspectives, and objectives towards a more holistic and gender-inclusive result and purpose.

FEMALE ENGAGEMENT TEAMS

The first use of FETs was due to necessity; insurgents would don burqas (the head-to-toe, light blue, religious covering that Afghan women wear when they leave their household compound) in order to escape cordon and searches because the American male soldiers would not search or touch Afghan women. The American military decided that it needed to augment its capability with female soldiers who would be able to search local women. The use of female soldiers expanded as coalition forces searched for a new way to influence the Afghan population, especially when COIN was officially introduced in the Afghanistan campaign.

From 2001- 2008, coalition forces assumed the marginalization of Afghan women in the public sphere was equal to their marginalization in the private sphere of their home. With the

¹ Before the combat exclusion rule rescission, the most recent version of the Department of Defense's policy, established in 1994, was:

Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2012: 17).

² The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 was passed in 2000; it is a landmark resolution in that it is one of the first to address the impact of war on women and their role in conflict resolution (USIP 2010). Follow-on implementation through each country's National Action Plans (NAP) on Women, Peace, and Security followed.

introduction of COIN principles eight years after the initial US engagement in Afghanistan, the idea that Afghan women were marginalized and had no influence in Afghan society began to come into question. COIN theorist David Kilcullen's 19th point from his 2006 *Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency* mentions the role of Afghan women and that of American women in COIN:

Co-opting neutral or friendly women, through targeted social and economic programs, builds networks of enlightened self-interest that eventually undermine the insurgents. You need your own female counterinsurgents, including interagency people, to do this effectively. Win the women, and you own the family unit. Own the family, and you take a big step forward in mobilizing the population (2006: 7).

Afghanistan certainly remains a predominantly male-dominated society, yet the current thinking regarding its women has evolved from one of women's passive acceptance to one where Afghan women have historically contested male domination through covert forms of disobedience (CALL 2011). Marginalization of women in public life does not equate to their private marginalization. Afghan women are viewed as the head of domestic affairs with their own established networks, influential in their own right, with influence on their husbands and children in domestic decisions and with a pulse on village affairs (CALL 2011; Erwin 2012; Mihalisko 2011; Pottinger et al. 2010; Vedder 2011). Due to the agency newly assigned to Afghan women, it was necessary to effectively reach out to them and their network. In a Sandia Laboratory study, Moore et al. conclude FETs provide a "superior ability to affect opinions in the network, and provide an effective means of counteracting influences from opposition forces" (2011: 1). FETs therefore "can bring about a greater shift in opinion than engagement teams who interact with the male community alone" (Moore et al. 2011: 9).

This new view of Afghan women's influence on their home – to include on their husbands and their children, especially sons who might want to join the insurgency – and on their villages, through discussions with other women at the wells and markets – drove the need to reach them specifically. The only way to reach these women in the current security environment and still abide by the Pashtun cultural norms of the *Pashtunwali* code was through US servicewomen.³ The *Pashtunwali* code as well as the tradition of *purdah* prohibiting Afghan women from communicating with men not of their own family leaves American servicewomen in the unique position to engage Afghan women. American women are seen as a sort of "third gender" (CALL 2011; Mihalisko 2011), a group who does not fall under the same assumptions or restrictions of either Afghan women or American men. Whereas Afghan women might have previously viewed coalition forces with fear, they, along with many Pashtun men, showed a preference for interacting with American women when FETs started operating (Pottinger et al. 2010).

At first, the idea of using American military women was "sold" to the local commanders by stating that their primary use would be for female-to-female search capabilities, for disseminating information the local commander needed to disseminate, and for information

³ Pashtunwali, "the way of the Pashtuns", is a non-written ethical code of social norms, customs, and core values which the Pashtun people follow. It acts as a basic law of the land that provides justice through Jirga, or tribal councils (Cathall 2009: 8, 9).

gathering. As they were met in a positive light, more situational awareness and information reached coalition forces, which meant the need to use even more female military to reach yet more Afghan women.

Though US servicewomen might not necessarily be more diplomatic than their male peers, the ISAF mission is undoubtedly helped simply by having a qualified group of diplomatically-trained and culturally-attuned women who can interact with Afghan women. Likewise, US servicewomen might not necessarily protect Afghan women's needs and interests more than US men, but women are perceived as having solidarity with other women and therefore it is assumed they do not do more harm than men.

The CALL FET Handbook states the purpose of FETs is to perform "female engagement"; that is, US servicewomen engaging with the Afghan population (CALL 2011; Mihalisko 2011). Though the engagement is primarily with Afghan women, it is not and should not be limited to women. The engagement is supposed to be an interaction and exchange of information between American women and Afghan women and men that eventually leads to a rapport that engenders trust and respect between the Afghan population as a whole and coalition forces (CALL 2011). This budding trust and respect is, in turn, supposed to develop greater trust and buy-in by Afghans for the new institutions of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), which historically has been notoriously absent, corrupt, abusive of its power, or unconcerned with the lives of most Afghans for the greater part of the turmoil in the last 30 years. Likewise, this trust is supposed to help soften the population's view of military operations conducted by coalition forces.

Just as the use of FETs developed, the desired end states for the FETs developed as well. The CALL FET Handbook lists the end states as four-fold:

- 1) For [local Afghan] women to influence families/communities not to support the Taliban
- 2) For women to influence other women to demand basic services from the local government with Coalition Force support,
- 3) For women to influence family and community members to support the GIROA,
- 4) For women not to support/enable the insurgency (CALL 2011: 2).

Working towards these end states a Marine Corps FET leader cited three indicators of FET success:

- 1) local groups started asking when they were going to build more schools for both their sons and their daughters
- 2) Afghan district officials started complaining that women in their districts were becoming overly demanding – they did not know how they were going to meet their expectations
- 3) the Taliban began suggesting that they supported girls going to schools in Jan 2011 (McBride & Wibben 2012b: 213).

With progress on Afghan women's rights tied to success for the American public, the use of FETs brings us to the fundamental question of Afghan women's issues. Upon entering Afghanistan, First Lady Laura Bush's Nov 17, 2001 speech justified the War on Terror through the liberation of Afghan women: "The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and

dignity of women” (Abu-Lughod 2002: 784). As the FET mission remains to engage the Afghan population without necessarily pushing women’s rights, FETs involve local institutions in order to help solve Afghan women’s grievances. FETs have partnered with Afghan National Police to help the recruitment of policewomen in various provinces and rural districts, have partnered with local doctors and midwives, as well as businesswomen and development workers, to address the needs of women (Pottinger et al. 2010). It is the push by FETs for local solutions for Afghan women’s needs and rights that is significant.

WHY INSTRUMENTALIZE FEMININITY?

In examining reasons for the instrumentalization of femininity, a plausible reason can be seen in the thesis proposed by Hudson *et al.* in *In the Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States*. Hudson *et al.* propose a link between the security and stability of a nation and the security of its women:

These results indicate that if a scholar or policymaker had to select one variable—level of democracy, level of wealth, prevalence of Islamic culture, or the physical security of women—to assist them in predicting which states would be the least peaceful or of the most concern to the international community or have the worst relations with their neighbors, they would do best by choosing the measure of the physical security of women (Hudson et al. 2009: 41).

In searching for an explanatory factor for war other than Huntington’s realist civilizational differences and Doyle’s liberal differing regime types, Hudson *et al.* posit that the treatment of females within a society is the strongest correlation to a nation going to war (2009).⁴ Awareness of Hudson *et al.*’s link between the security of women and the security of a state can easily offer policymakers a tangible goal. If true, the physical security of women within states can potentially bring greater stability to the international system as a whole (2009: 43). Though the stability of states is certainly a complex issue, the idea of the stability of a nation being linked to the stability of its women has been somewhat adopted by US policymakers. On his October 2013 visit to Afghanistan, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said, “If I had to walk blind into a district in Afghanistan and I could only ask one question to determine how secure it was and how much progress it was making, I would ask, ‘What proportion of the girls here are able to go to school?’” (Snow 2013: 2).

Another reason for the instrumentalization of femininity is for an approach that acknowledges genderized meanings of security. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) recognized that “women and men experience conflict differently and therefore understand peace differently” and have attempted to bring these different gender perspectives to their peacekeeping efforts (UN Peacekeeping 2013). The knowledge of the different meanings of security to men and women brings an improved understanding of what is necessary to win the COIN war in Afghanistan.

⁴ Hudson, *et al.* reference Huntington’s and Doyle’s articles, see Huntington, S. (1996) “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” (New York: Simon and Schuster), and Doyle, M. (1983) “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 205–235.

The meaning of security differs substantially between Afghan men and women. For Afghan men, security means not having to take up arms to fight against any enemy, whether Taliban, Soviet, or US ‘invaders’. For Afghan women, security means freedom of movement: being able to go to the well to get water without fear of being harassed or raped, being able to walk their children, both girls and boys, to school without worry (Afghan Women’s Network, cited in Mehra 2010). It also means access to basic services, such as access to police, fair and equal justice, and healthcare (*Ibid.*).

In *Women Waging Peace*, Swanee Hunt and Cristina Posa urge the inclusion of women peace promoters at the negotiation table during post-conflict resolution (Hunt & Posa 2001: 1). They state that because women traditionally are not, for the most part, the ones shooting the weapons in a war, they are more accepted by women of all sides since they are viewed as peacekeepers rather than warriors. Hunt posits that women identify with each other as mothers and daughters who have suffered throughout a conflict and therefore are better able to cut through ethnic and cultural divides and work at the grassroots level to develop and shape a peace agreement (Hunt 2011: 106). Hunt and Posa put forth the concept of an “inclusive security” – a bottom-up approach that uses the typical grassroots style used by women as well as their natural advantages (as opposed to the usual highlight of their vulnerability) to achieve an inclusive security (Hunt & Posa 2011: 1). Inclusive security adds to the traditional view that only the ideas of war and democracy are the concerns of high politics. Instead, inclusive security suggests that high politics should also include human security and stability, which necessitates the participation of all stakeholders in a society, preferably without the rigid top-down approach typically mandated by other governments.

UNDPKO specifies the necessity for women to be involved in the post-conflict process as peacekeepers and identifies the benefits this involvement brings (UN Peacekeeping 2012): women are needed to interact with local women whose society prohibits them from speaking to men, to provide role models for women, to provide increased security to women and children, and to broaden the effectiveness of the peacekeeping force, like making them more approachable to the local community. Having women peacekeepers also allows male and female survivors of sexual-based violence to more easily approach peacekeeping forces (UN Peacekeeping 2012).

The UN, with the passing of SCR 1325, supports the promotion of women as part of the peace process not only from the side of the peacekeeping force, but also from the side of local women because of the impact those women can have in both the direction those women lean, and in the direction their children lean. Kilcullen labels the pull to support different actors as the theory of competitive control: the actor (whether coalition forces or the Taliban) perceived to have the most resilient system of control for providing security and economic activity will win out over other actors in that population’s area (2010: 152).

In *Why the US should Gender its Counterterrorism Strategy*, Miemie Byrd and Gretchen Decker use what they call cultural transmission theory to highlight that women traditionally pass on the cultural expectations of the community to their children – a vertical transmission dynamic. Expectations can include “transmitting norms of violence, radicalism, and martyrdom” (Byrd & Decker 2008: 99). Improving the economic lives and representation in public venues of local women can affect their pull towards insurgent causes (Byrd & Decker 2008) and, in turn, what

they pass on to their children in that regard. It seems that investing in local women, through access to education and basic services as well as through the persistent interaction with women peacekeepers that can empathize with and assist them, changes the dynamic so that these local women support coalition forces as the prevailing actor.

In terms of the vertical transmission dynamic in Afghanistan, several NATO case studies show how a gendered perspective has benefited operations on the ground. In one, a mixed-gender Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team operating in Kandahar had a sustained engagement with Afghan women that led to the development of relationships and information exchange. The local women are quoted as saying that their interaction with the team was so positive it “led them to discourage their sons’ sympathies towards insurgents” (NCGP 2011: 27). The specific use of women peacekeepers and FETs aimed at engaging local women has seen an increase in both the UN and the US military as the advantages of their inclusion have gained a following.

THE TRADITIONALLY MASCULINE US MILITARY APPROACH

The US changed its use of women during the development of its approach to conflict resolution. From 2001-2009, before the COIN strategy was implemented, women were primarily used in the usual roles of combat support and combat service support they held in the Army; namely as logisticians, intelligence specialists, communications specialists, pilots, Civil Affairs team members, medical roles, military policemen, and other similar roles. The US military approach was therefore to use women in the jobs in which they had been trained, with the majority of women (*and* men) not leaving US bases.

COIN was not the primary objective of the ISAF campaign during this time period, thus there was not a concerted effort to experiment with a more feminized approach. Because COIN pushes decision-making down to the lower level, on-the-ground commanders, and because of the COIN fundamental that what works in one district might not work in another (FM 3-24 2006), the US population-centric COIN approach in 2009 became a leader-dependent one. Some leaders were able to adapt to the new environment and use successful COIN tools in their provinces, whereas others were not so adaptive. FETs met with varying acceptance from local US commanders, as did the adoption of other COIN tools.

Some commanders did not see the value of FETs and wanted the positions that US servicewomen took up in a squad to be given back to men who would be more useful for patrolling a village or apprehending insurgents during offensive operations (Boyd 2011). There are several other reasons for the reluctance to use FETs. Some US commanders still held the belief that Afghan women did not hold any agency and therefore it was a waste of time to employ anyone to reach out to them (Pottinger *et al.* 2010). Others questioned the extent to which the use of US servicewomen would offend Pashtun men (*Ibid*).

Many commanders on the ground come from traditionally masculine-dominant combat arms branches, such as infantry, armor, and field artillery, and have worked with women only to a limited extent throughout their careers. Arguably, these career experiences can translate into their not accepting a gendered perspective nor understanding the different approach women can bring to a problem set, as this goes against 15 to 20 years of traditional military training and

experiences. It is natural for any commander to default to what they know from training and experience, which is usually seizing terrain or destroying enemy forces rather than focusing on winning over the population. Seizing terrain predominantly uses men for offensive operations, whereas winning over the population increases the use of women for hearts and minds missions, the “soft” missions which are inherently more complicated, nuanced, messy, frustrating to deal with and difficult to measure.

Another possible reason for why some US military leaders were reluctant to use FETs was because it meant putting women that much closer to combat situations. These military leaders had gendered assumptions of how to employ women in combat due to the restrictiveness of the combat exclusion law and gendered assumptions of US servicewomen’s training and abilities. Even if what FETs do is specifically not combat, it still puts women outside of the protection of big NATO bases and allows for them to be put into situations of combat where they might have to respond to being attacked or ambushed. In essence, it is a role that comes with an acceptance of risk and subsequent training for potential combat. Pottinger *et al.* state that the reluctance of commanders to use FETs begs another question, “Who is shielding their women from Afghan society more: Pashtun men or U.S. commanders?” (2010: 9).

In *Beyond the Burqa*, Daniel Faltas examines the care with which American servicemen tried to respect *Pashtunwali* code in the conduct of their operations. He quotes the 2003 Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan Commander, Lieutenant General Barno, as saying:

We would not have American soldiers cause Afghan women to be separated from their men, unless there was a tribal elder there with the women or, *at worst case*, there was an American female soldier there ... (2011: 140).

Faltas points out that General Barno used women reluctantly, not necessarily because of a bias against women, but due to the combat exclusion policy where the use of US servicewomen would violate the spirit of that law. What Faltas finds important in this anecdote is “the fact that [General Barno] found it necessary to employ female soldiers in spite of the exclusion policy that prohibits him from doing so” (2011: 141). Faltas emphasizes the importance of the commander on the ground, as he is the one best positioned to determine the “feasibility of gender biased policies” (2011: 140).

With time some commanders did grasp the value of utilizing these new assets but had to get around the combat exclusion restrictions of women in prolonged collocation with combat units (Erwin 2012: 34). The CALL FET Handbook summarizes this historical struggle by stating the US Army was slow in accepting the FET concept, but that it finally did so after the Marines and special operations had been utilizing them, and after ISAF commander General McChrystal, who came from a special operations background, issued an order in 2010 for all deployed units in Afghanistan to incorporate FETs (2011). For those commanders still reluctant to use FETs, McChrystal’s ISAF order programming their use helped them overcome their opinions on the appropriate use of military women.

The Swedish Defense Forces (SDF) and the US military demonstrate the broad spectrum of the instrumentalization of femininity. An example from which to compare the change to the US

military's own approach is the SDF's implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the Swedish military's instrumentalization of femininity through the inclusion of a gender perspective.⁵

The UN ranked Sweden as the most gender-neutral country in the world (UNDP 2011). Despite this, Robert Egnell *et al.* in *Implementing a Gender Perspective in Military Organizations and Operations*, state that the SDF accepted gender equality later than the other parts of Swedish society (2012: 18). In fact, the military was skeptical and resistant to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 due to the tension between those values and the ones of their traditional military culture, which gives primacy to masculine offensive operations (Egnell *et al.* 2012: 16). In order to enable a successful implementation of gender perspectives into the Swedish military, it was necessary for the SDF to focus on improving operational effectiveness through the adoption of gender perspectives, rather than focusing on general women's rights issues at large (Egnell *et al.* 2012: 18).

The emphasis on the operational effectiveness of the SDF used the traditional method for incorporating a new battlefield advantage rather than the traditional method for incorporating social issues, an approach able to overcome traditionally held biases (Egnell *et al.* 2012: 18). The emphasis was on how a gender perspective could improve the SDF and its operations by adding value through a new capability – that of understanding and dealing with the array of human security issues not traditionally dealt with by the military but increasingly part of what they faced (Egnell *et al.* 2012: 6, 13). These issues included the stability and reconstruction missions the SDF dealt with in Afghanistan. Other benefits to operations included improved access to the entire population, a broader intelligence picture, and the potential improvement of conditions for local women (Egnell *et al.* 2012: 92).

The key to implementation within the Swedish military was to affect change at different levels (Egnell *et al.* 2012). First, there was the implementation of gender advisors at all levels of its military. Second, there was, and continues to be, an effort to increase the number of women serving in the SDF in order to increase the available number of women for international peace operations. Lastly, there was an effort to provide gender-awareness training to all units, especially to those deploying. Due to the importance of training and accumulating lessons learned, Norway, Finland, and Sweden established a Nordic Center for Gender in Military Operations, which opened in January 2012 to support international militaries' inclusion of gender perspectives (Egnell *et al.* 2012: 31).

Despite the initial reluctance in the SDF, there have been vast and remarkable changes between the passing of UNSCR 1325 in 2000, the implementation of the Swedish National Action Plan in 2006, and the opening of the Center for Gender in Military Operations in 2012. The US military's instrumentalization of femininity might not be as far along the spectrum as the SDF, but it still has incorporated the advantages of this particular instrumentalization.

⁵ UNSCR 1325 specifically calls for the adoption of a gender perspective as an approach that includes “the special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction” (UN 2000), rather than only the traditional focus on matters of state and governance.

THE IMPACT OF THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF FEMININITY ON THE US CONFLICT RESOLUTION APPROACH IN AFGHANISTAN

The US military has undergone quite a bit of change in its conflict resolution approach in Afghanistan from 2001 to present: from counterterrorism to reconstruction to COIN. Assessing the influence female participation plays on the US military is quite difficult to ascertain. For one, women in FETs are statistically such a small percentage compared to the relative population of the US military deployed to Afghanistan doing COIN, that it is hard to make them a sample population in order to evaluate their specific effects. Even though the number of women serving in Afghanistan is more substantial than the FET numbers, it is nearly impossible to separate their influence from those of their male peers due to the military's employment of women and men in a genderless way, i.e. as mechanics, logisticians, etc. Despite the small number of FETs, using women service members has become a necessary tool to wage COIN, and has led to the US military's instrumentalization of femininity for certain stability operations.

Women in the US military have gone from less than 2% of the total force in 1972 to 11% in the late 1980s to a 15% average today (Quester & Gilroy 2002: 114). Despite this higher percentage, women in FETs have included less than 400 women.⁶ The low numbers of FETs can be interpreted as the use of a necessary tool for a short period for a particular problem – that of conducting COIN to induce stability. This is unlike the use of women in a total war, such as World War II (WWII), where the mobilization of entire societies ushered in a new age of changed societal norms for women and permanent inclusion of women in the US Armed Forces.⁷ FET use has also not been sustained over a long enough period of time to usher in a paradigm shift in the US military, as did the use of women post-WWII.

When evaluating the incorporation of gendered perspectives, the US military has not undergone the considerable change that the Swedish Defense Forces have undergone and that UNSCR 1325 ultimately intends for its peacekeeping forces. The incorporation of gendered perspectives may yet achieve greater acceptance in the US military, in a timeline similar to that of cultural awareness – met with initial skepticism, but later adopted throughout the military once their benefit became clear.

In regard to the implementation of UNSCR 1325, most NATO countries felt compelled to implement UNSCR 1325 within their militaries through their NAPs, such as the Swedish military. The US, arguably, felt compelled to comply at a political level, but has not necessarily felt compelled to change its military organization to comply with changing international norms. The US NAP makes mention of the use of US servicewomen only twice, the first: "...the Marine Corps' Female Engagement Teams and the Army's Cultural Support Teams are providing new avenues for women Marines and soldiers to support ongoing operations and engage women in

⁶ There are no published totals for number of FETs. An estimate for 2011 has 33 FETs operating throughout Afghanistan (Bedell 2011). Each FET has two female members, thus 66 women total. Because most deployments are for 12-month duration, a reasonable estimate from 2009 – 2013 would be a total of about 330 women used on FETs.

⁷ In WWII, almost 400,000 women (out of a total of 16 million men and women, so approximately 2%) served in or with the US Armed Forces (Women in Military Service for America Memorial n.d., 1).

local populations” (2011: 4). The second mentions the military in one of its many action lists: “Leverage the participation of female U.S. military personnel to encourage and model gender integration and reach out to female and male populations in partner nations” (US NAP 2011: 15). The reason for this very sparse reference to women in the military may be due to the civilian/military separation in the US, allowing the military as an organization to determine its best course with little interference, but under civilian oversight. What is surprising about the sparse reference; however, is the ample mention of the State Department (DoS) and US Agency for International Development (USAID), which the Department of Defense forces outnumber and out-resource in conflict zones. The military often has had to take the lead in diplomacy and development, especially at the onset of hostilities in conflict zones due to the limitations of movement and general danger, and at the end of hostilities during the transition to reconstruction and nation-building. This necessitates more changes and incorporation of gendered perspectives, rather than less, in the US military.

Even if there are no directives for increased gender perspectives in the US NAP, the use of FETs is an unintended type of implementation of UNSCR 1325. The various anecdotal accounts of the presence of female Marines point out how they “softened and facilitated interaction with local men and children” (CALL 2011: 5, 74; Pottinger *et al.* 2010: 4). The US military COIN field manual states that COIN is the type of war in which officers and soldiers must overcome their own training and assumptions, to include those held about women, in order to win (FM 3-24 2006). The instrumentalization of femininity through FET use suggests changes in the views and assumptions of male commanders. One has only to compare the ISAF commander in 2003, General Barno’s initial reluctance to use women as a “worst case”, to the ISAF commander in 2010, General McChrystal’s, command directive ordering all deploying US and coalition forces to train and use FETs throughout Afghanistan. This one anecdote points to how the view of commanders in the highest military position in Afghanistan, the ISAF commander, developed and how their actions are an embodiment of the broader process of instrumentalizing femininity.

While the institutionalization of FETs in the US military was occurring, FETs have spurred several other female-only teams, to include Female Human Intelligence Exploitation Teams, Female Search Teams, and Cultural Support Teams (Vedder 2011: 10). The US military has somewhat institutionalized the FET for current use in areas around the world and for potential use in future conflicts through doctrine and standardized training and implementation. The US NAP also calls for gender advisors in DoS and USAID (2011: 22). Though not directed in the NAP, the US Army has sent a few gender advisors to train at the Nordic Center for Gender in Operations in 2013 (New Gender Advisors 2013). These small points of institutionalization might not be considered major changes within the US military, but they gesture in a certain direction that military commanders have seen the value of instrumentalizing femininity – that of incorporating female considerations, perspectives, and objectives towards a more holistic and gender-inclusive result.

The implementation of a gender perspective is certainly not a “silver bullet” that solves all of the military’s problems or makes it significantly more effective (Egnell *et al.* 2012: 74). A traditionally masculine institution, like the US military, that instrumentalizes femininity, such as through the use of FETs, more easily incorporates the issues of human security and social hierarchy, typically overlooked in regular military considerations. However, it is one perspective

among others for military commanders to consider. Just as important is to not limit gender perspectives to only female issues. In fact, an Afghanistan Mobile Observation Team's observations suggested that the SDF should use mixed teams rather than all-female teams (Egnell *et al.* 2012: 58-60). Mixed teams were not only easier to create with the lower percentage of women in the SDF, but more importantly, they provided varying perspectives that counteract homogenous groupthink, which occurs just as much in all-female teams as in all-male teams. Instead of having the gender pendulum swing to either extreme – on one end focusing only on women's issues and on the other ignoring 50% of the population due to not assigning women any type of agency – the most effective missions take a gender perspective which detects when men *and* women are being affected and seeks to turn both of their allegiances away from the insurgents by means that effectively address the concerns of each group.

The instrumentalization of femininity through the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the use of US servicewomen in female-only teams bring up many tensions. Feminists criticize the use of FETs because it frames the War on Terror as a “feminist war,” or more precisely, American women liberating Afghan women through the delivery of emancipation and human rights (Abu-Lughod 2002: 783; McBride & Wibben 2012b: 202). Critics of UNSCR 1325 argue it gives powers to Western nations justifying their interventions on the pretext of protecting women's rights (Speake 2013). Adding to feminist scholar Spivak's famous phrase, intervention is thus justified in order for “white men to save brown women from brown men” by using white women (Spivak 1988: 297). This tension becomes visible in the adopted feminist narrative that serves as a marketing function for US policymakers: first, to justify the invasion and long twelve years of conflict resolution to a war-weary US audience by giving an underlying humanitarian mission, and second, as a marker by which to measure US success and progress. As McBride and Wibben explain, “Being able to point to a formal recognition of women's rights will thereby allow the U.S. withdrawal to be considered a victory” (2012a: 3).

The lasting success of women's basic rights is one trend that can be measured over time and used as an indication for progress, among other indicators, despite the inherent difficulty in measuring COIN success. More precisely, it is the popular participation in Afghan government and coalition force programs set up for women that are the valuable metric here. It can represent the degree to which the community perceives the Afghan government as legitimate and as dealing with the community's needs and problems. In the context of Afghanistan, it is also important to keep in mind what women were doing prior to the Taliban: “Afghan women composed 50% of government workers, 70% of schoolteachers and 40% of doctors in Kabul” (Mehra 2010: 20). Sasha Mehra argues that Afghan women are not looking for Western white men to save them, but rather they are seeking to engage in the rebuilding process of their communities through their backgrounds and their pre-Taliban statuses (2010: 8).

In *Afghan Solutions for Afghan Women*, Lael Mohib reminds the reader that conservative cultural norms are not simply perpetuated by Afghan men, but are accepted, followed, and passed down by Afghan women (2012: 2). There is also the added element of the historical urban / rural divide in Afghanistan, which has meant liberal changes in Kabul have rarely been adopted in the more conservative, rural areas of Afghanistan (Mohib 2012: 2). Because of the tenacious conservative values and the urban / rural divide, changes need to be acceptable to Afghan rural men and women, need to be of their own choosing, and need to be implemented on their

timeline. The current use of FETs is as a purposeful engagement mechanism to determine Afghan women's problems and to engage Afghan women and men on the reforms they would like to achieve for women.

Another tension of a gendered approach is that it can tend to give primacy to gender, as opposed to other social identities such as ethnicity, class, and religion, marginalizing other oppressions by putting gender first (Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2011: 495). For the US military approach to conflict resolution, FETs are but one tool in the COIN toolbox, and it is the integration and balance of many tools that work together for the benefit of the community. The purpose of having several tools working at varying degrees in different areas mean they will work differently as they are tailored to the specific problems of the particular province. It also means that the US military will not give up masculine perspectives in favor of female-only perspectives. The US military's stability operations consider women's rights and women's perspectives, but in conjunction with other programs, such as raising the employment rate, providing education for all children, and establishing a transparent rule of law.

CONCLUSION

The Female Engagement Teams' popular exposure portrays them as ushering in a new age for US servicewomen in the military. In fact, the unique use of female-only teams signals not a new era of women warriors, but rather a new approach adopted by the US military for the complex task of conflict resolution in a counterinsurgency environment. Female influence has become a necessary tool to wage counterinsurgency, even if it has not caused a major paradigm shift within the US military. This article argues that the employment of FETs, regardless of success or effectiveness, demonstrates the instrumentalization of femininity, which has helped change the US military's approach to conflict resolution in Afghanistan. The US military approach has changed from a typically masculine one to an approach with more apparent considerations of feminine perspectives.

The United Nations' adoption of UNSCR 1325 brings to the foreground the impact conflict has on women and children and the need for increased employment of female peacekeepers to reach out to these women and children post-conflict. Because Afghanistan is not a permissive environment, the women who can best operate throughout the country are US servicewomen. They are therefore the ones who can best reach out to Afghan women to hear and address their concerns, which is then supposed to lead to trust and support of the coalition forces and the Government of Afghanistan at large.

The effect of FETs on the US military is subtle, not a paradigm shift when compared to the changes brought by women in the Armed Forces during WWII. However, the instrumentalization of femininity for the purpose of increasing operational effectiveness suggests a feminization of the US military's conflict resolution approach.

The instrumentalization of femininity can be both empowering and equally non-empowering to women. Instrumentalization can suggest that femininity and gender equality is not so much a genuine normative objective but rather a means to achieve a more stable male-dominated set of power relations. But at the same time the instrumentalization of femininity can indeed be a

positive development for women. The greater inclusion of women, both local women and women peace promoters, means they have a say in the rules and conduct of post-conflict affairs. Women are made more visible and their ideas are included in the conversation on post-war reconstruction. Being on the outside or in the minority in a conflict means they have traditionally not been agents for change, whereas now they can act as agents. This affects the organizations they are a part of, such as the US military. Their change on an organization suggests a change in thinking to one that incorporates more feminine considerations, acknowledges genderized meanings of security, and acknowledges different gender perspectives and needs, but in conjunction with other programs that do not negate masculine perspectives.

In terms of the future, it is difficult to determine the nature of future US military intervention and it is challenging to determine how exactly FETs will be transposed to future operations and future conflicts. US military leadership will take the lessons-learned from FET use in Afghanistan and realize that women have a role only they can fill. There is now a better understanding of the benefits to approaching a problem through a variety of perspectives, especially that of a gendered perspective, which tempers traditional military masculinized approaches in order to consider the concerns of local men and women equally. If anything, it is in this holistic approach where the US military sees real benefit.

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FEMALE ENGAGEMENT TEAMS: AN EVALUATION OF THE FEMALE ENGAGEMENT TEAM PROGRAM IN AFGHANISTAN

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- *This study was completed in January 2014 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctorate of Law and Policy, College of Professional Studies, Northeastern University.*
- *Research was conducted in Afghanistan in 2013.*
- *The complete study is available upon request.*

INTRODUCTION

In 2009, the US military placed its first Female Engagement Team (FET) into operation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. This new program focused on establishing a positive relationship with Afghan women while remaining sensitive to cultural norms prohibiting the interaction of women with unrelated men. It was started as one of several new Counter-Insurgency (COIN) initiatives by the US military to win the “hearts and minds” of local populations and motivate them to work with US, NATO, and Coalition forces in stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan (COIN 2009: 53).

The FET program was developed as Marines and soldiers in the field observed that half of the population was being excluded from stabilization and rebuilding efforts as a result of strict cultural norms regulating, and greatly restricting, male-to-female interactions. With only 11.6% of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation New Dawn veterans being of the female gender, military units on patrol without female Marines or soldiers often missed opportunities to interact, and build rapport with, the female population in Afghanistan (Veterans 2012: 1). As the US mission in Afghanistan progressed from kinetic to non-kinetic operations¹, from the battlefield to reconstruction and into COIN efforts, a lack of interaction with local Afghan females became an obvious obstacle to achieving US objectives. US planners realized they needed to develop a way in which female Afghans could play an active role in reconstruction and COIN operations, while still adhering to cultural norms (COMISAF 2011: 7). The result was the creation of the FET program.

The FET program’s mission is to act as “battlefield enablers that influence, inform, and interact with the local population, primarily women, to achieve their COIN objectives and to build

¹ Kinetic capabilities refer to activities focused on neutralizing enemy forces. Non-kinetic capabilities refer to actions taken to support security and the well-being of the host-nation population, stability of the host-nation government, and the coordination of military and civilian activities (Hurley 2009: 1).

enduring trust and confidence with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)” (Medeiros 2012: 2). Through this, FET members help military personnel conduct:

key female engagements with individuals, families and villages...community relationship building; information gathering through Information Operations (IO) sensing; messaging and atmospherics; and connecting Afghan families to GIRoA-provided social and legal services, medical and community health clinic outreach and special skills clinics (Medeiros 2012: 2)

By the start of 2014, 14 NATO nations were providing military personnel support to the FET program. These nations include Australia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, New Zealand, France, Italy, Korea, Jordan, Norway, Romania, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States (Medeiros 2012: 3).

A January 2012 report, *ISAF Joint Command’s Female Engagement Team Program Comprehensive Assessment*, stated 149 FETs were currently operating throughout Afghanistan, with the number projected to grow (Medeiros 2012: 2). Due to the program’s original ad hoc creation and lack of documentation during its first two years, an official count of the total FET members to serve since the program’s formation is unknown. Dr. LisaRe Brooks, a Human Terrain Team (HTT) systems social scientist and former FET trainer at the COIN Academy in Kabul, Afghanistan estimates the total number of participants at around three hundred individuals (Brooks 2012: 1). While typical military deployments last between six and twelve months, it is important to note that since FET participation is often considered an “extra” program and is not a permanent Military Occupation Specialty (MOS), actual time spent serving on a FET can vary between a few hours per month to daily participation (Medeiros 2012: 11).

FET members range between 18-56 years of age with ranks ranging from E-2 to Major. Teams generally consist of at least two “engagers” and an interpreter. The *ISAF Assessment* estimates that since formation, about half of the FET members were “volun-told” or forcefully volunteered for the program, while the other half intentionally volunteered to serve on a FET (Medeiros 2012: 3). In late-2013, Dr. Brooks stated that the “volun-told” population was steadily on the decline as the negative issues of mandating female personnel to participate in the program were becoming increasingly more obvious (Brooks 2012: 1).

OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE

The idea that women, even in patriarchal societies, play a vital role in the stabilization and reconstruction of nations, and that engagement with local women should therefore be an active objective of military efforts, did not develop overnight. The theory originated from a collision of several areas of research and thought as the US military found itself facing a long-term strategic stabilization and rebuilding effort in Afghanistan. US forces found themselves lacking access to key information concerning Afghan society due to an oversight in US policy of not addressing how to effectively engage with Afghan women, given Afghanistan’s gender-based societal norms. It became obvious to some leaders that developing a way in which to engage with Afghan women held a significant role in progressing US objectives.

Three areas of research are important in understanding how this idea developed. First is the history of women in war-torn nations and their role in the country's reconstruction. This research primarily originated from studies conducted by international relief and assistance organizations that work to address gender-based needs during, and immediately following, periods of instability and conflict. The second analyzes what gender-based issues occurred in Afghanistan before the development of the FET program. The third represents the emerging literature on the FET program.

Literature discussing the role of women in stabilizing and rebuilding war-torn nations is still developing, as organizations have only recently started to examine the different roles males and females often hold in stabilization and reconstruction efforts. These studies have set the foundation outlining the importance of responding to female-specific needs and concerns as a key action item in progressing a country towards stability. In 1998, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, in the report *Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Sources* stated,

...gender roles and societal values have been deeply affected by the experience of war...

It is important for policy-makers and operational actors in national government and aid organizations to understand the complex ways gender and rebuilding interact.

(Sorensen 1998:11)

In 2000, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1325, which focused on "women, peace, and security", and highlighted a new focus aimed at understanding, and then addressing, the impact of war and conflict on females (UN 2000:1). Two years later UNIFEM (the women's fund of the United Nations) published the report *Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace-building*, in which the authors visited war-torn nations and reported that females were instrumental in negotiating peace, maintaining social networks, and that they could identify individuals within the community who both promoted peace, and who encouraged fighting (Rehn & Sirleaf 2002: 2). Follow-on studies, mostly from the United Nations, further support these observations and continue to call for gender-based programs during stabilization and rebuilding efforts.

Around the same time, US Marines and soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan were starting to voice their own concerns about US military strategy instructing military personnel to avoid direct contact with Afghan females, so as not to offend the local population. Captain Matthew Pottinger, along with several other Marines and soldiers, started to advocate for increased interaction with local females in order to understand the village, its needs, and its social networks. While Afghan males often focused on fighting, the majority of Afghan females appeared to both have a desire for peace and a thorough understanding of the inner-workings of the community. Many Marines and soldiers realized that accessing this information would be valuable to COIN objectives and leading Afghanistan towards peace and stability (Pottinger 2010: 3). The result was the creation of the FET program.

Since the FET program's formation, preliminary studies have been conducted to understand and report on the program's successes and failures. In 2010, the Combined Joint Intelligence Operations Centers of Afghanistan (CJIOC-A) published the article, *Recommended International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Guidance for Female Engagement Teams*, which focused on improving upon the method in which FETs collected information about local villages during missions (CJIOC-A 2010: 2). In 2011, ISAF officials published the report, *Engaging the Female Populace*, which provided the program with defined goals, objectives, and purpose, saying the program acted as doorway that:

“... Will allow for quality introductions between the population and incoming assistance efforts. With enduring relationships, FETs can coordinate and support female engagement efforts with military, government, and non-governmental agencies thereby enhancing the solidarity of effort.”

(COMISAF 2011: 12)

The initial reviews on FETs provides an overview of the program, however a more comprehensive study is needed to fully understand the program's value to the US mission in Afghanistan. Is the program achieving what it was tasked to accomplish? Are FETs engaging and responding to Afghan women's needs in a way that helps and promotes the US mission? If yes, how is this being accomplished? Do relationships between US, NATO, and Coalition forces and local villagers improve after FET visits in a way that promotes US COIN objectives in the region?

STUDY OUTLINE

This study seeks to understand the FET program through the experiences of the individuals tasked to implement the program in Afghanistan by applying Michael Lipsky's theory of “street level bureaucracy” to the FET program. Lipsky's research argues that “street-level bureaucrats” play a vital role in determining the success or failure of a program because “... the decisions of street level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out” (Lipsky 2010: xiii).

While the FET program has been reviewed from a military perspective, the focus has generally been on how to improve training and highlight positive US actions in Afghanistan. This study examines the FET experience from the perspective of the women serving on FETs in order to determine if the FET program contributed to US COIN objectives. In essence, the FET members serve as “street-level bureaucrats” and hold significant influence on how the program operates throughout Afghanistan.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with both former and current FET members. A total of nine individuals were interviewed, ranging from 20-35 years of age. Eight interviewees volunteered to join the FET program and underwent training. Three of the volunteered individuals attended pre-deployment training in the US, while 5 attended training in Kabul, Afghanistan. One interviewee considered herself “volun-told,” as in ordered to participate in the

program despite a lack of interest. One interviewee was on her second deployment as a FET, while the rest were on their first tours serving on a FET.

The primary research question of this study is:

1. Since Counterinsurgency is the current focus of US operations in Afghanistan, are Female Engagement Teams (FETs) an effective approach in which to reach Counterinsurgency objectives in a patriarchal society, as observed and experienced by the FETs themselves?

An effective approach is defined as contributing to the overall COIN measurement of success, defined in the *U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* as meeting “the contested population’s needs to the extent needed to win popular support while protecting the population from the insurgents” (COIN 2007: 53).

The central question is supplemented with the following sub-questions:

- A.) Do FET members report a noticeable increase in positive interactions with local villagers that they believe are a direct result of the FET’s presence?
- B.) Are FET members aware of receiving information from local villagers that was then used to capture insurgent(s)?
- C.) Do FET members perceive that the FET approach addresses the societal gender differences between male-to-female interactions in Afghanistan in a safe and effective manner?
- D.) Do FET members report a difference in FET program objectives and current program capabilities? If yes, do they envision a method in which to remedy this disconnect?

ANALYSIS

Based upon the interviewees’ responses, the researcher concludes that the FET program has had a positive impact in reaching COIN objectives in Afghanistan. However, with the information provided, the researcher is unable to determine the *level* of impact FETs have had on achieving COIN objectives. A lack of information means it is possible FETs contributed anywhere from minimal influence to having a significant influence in reaching COIN objectives. This knowledge gap is due to several internal problems within the FET program that, if properly addressed, would permit future researchers to more accurately understand the *level* of impact FETs have in achieving COIN objectives.

During effective COIN operations, Afghans should actively and independently decide to no longer support and aid those individuals and groups who seek to either disrupt stability in the region or counter US, NATO, and Coalition efforts. Analysis of the interviews indicate that FETs did assist in contributing to “winning the hearts and minds” of the Afghan people and in shifting some local mindsets from supporting anti- US, NATO, and Coalition efforts to supporting pro-US, NATO, and Coalition efforts.

The success of the program, along with the researcher's inability to determine the *level* of impact, are the result of street-level bureaucracy, in which those on the ground enacting policy have significant freedom to interpret and implement the policy. As a result, individual FETs varied in planning, engagement practices, record keeping and documentation, and after-action follow-up. This implementation variation served as both a positive and negative aspect of FETs. On the positive side, the variation allowed for the researcher to identify best practices among many of the activities and behaviors outlined by the interviewees. On the negative side, the variation means no central data records are available for the researcher to reference in measuring the *level* of impact the FET program had in Afghanistan.

The first indicator that FETs are effective in reaching COIN objectives is the observed change in attitude from the village elders, women, and children when they visited the village. While five interviewees reported locals were predominately scared or apprehensive at the FETs initial arrival, these five also reported they were able to mitigate this fear and even transform it into overall curiosity towards the FETs and a positive relationship. This change in perception about US, NATO, and Coalition soldier's presence would likely have not occurred without an all-female team present. It is unlikely that male soldiers would have been able to calm local concerns, especially as they pertained to the safety of local women and children as well as females soldiers. Local Afghans generally view males, especially unknown male soldiers, as being "outsiders" with a strong potential to become dangerous. Afghans view females as less threatening and as wanting to help the village. Therefore, in order to calm local fears and encourage them to cooperate with soldiers, a female presence plays a strong role in promoting this transition.

The second indicator of effectiveness is that FETs presence did not result in retaliation against locals by Taliban or other insurgent groups. While US, NATO, and Coalition forces, along with locals, traditionally must consider what will happen to the villagers once the military completes a mission and departs, this does not appear to be the case with FETs. This is highly beneficial to US, NATO, and Coalition planners interested in conducting missions within a village in order to win locals' support, but who have to plan for potential post-departure retaliation from the insurgency. Only one of the nine interviewees noted a potential case of retaliation against female Afghans speaking with FETs. That case was unsubstantiated and, even if true, originated from within the community, not from an outside insurgent network. It appears villagers do not have to fear acts of retribution for speaking with FETs, which opens the lines of communication between US, NATO and Coalition forces and local villagers.

The third indicator that FETs helped to reach COIN efforts is that military leaders continue to support the program and its continued use throughout Afghanistan. While three out of the nine interviewees reported having an unsupportive leader, three out of the nine also reported having a positive relationship with their team leader. This demonstrates that, while some may be against the program, others believe it has merit and are interested in seeing its continuation. Those leaders also helped set their FETs up for success, indicating that if all FETs had more supportive leadership, perhaps more FETs would have been more proactive in their efforts. The three FETs that reported a positive relationship with their superior were also the most active in their village engagements. They took initial steps to encourage engagement success, such as having male

soldiers meet with village elders prior to FET engagements, in order to fulfill the cultural obligations of the village and obtain permission for FETs to meet with Afghan females.

This analysis indicates that the FET program contributed to reaching COIN objectives in Afghanistan. FETs were able to interact with a previously silent portion of the Afghan population and work to win over their support for US, NATO, and Coalition efforts. Due to strict cultural norms limiting male-to-female interaction, it is unlikely such progress would have occurred without the presence of all female teams. The interviewees reported a positive change in mindset concerning soldier's presence as a result of their interactions, and the program maintains the support of some military leaders. In addition, the program is an effective way to interact with the local population without having to worry about a post-departure retaliation on the village for speaking with soldiers. These factors support the conclusion that FETs contribute to COIN objectives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Data analysis determined that the FET program contributed to achieving COIN objectives. While this is a positive finding for the FET program, the inability to determine the *level* of impact for the FET program diminishes the program's claim of success. To address this issue, the FET program needs to re-examine how they operate and conduct engagements so that they collect enough data to effectively measure the *level* of impact FETs have on the COIN mission. FETs must move from a separated, "street-level bureaucracy" method of operation to a more centralized program with common practices and methods. Below are recommendations on how this can be achieved. In addition, these recommendations will improve FET effectiveness in the Afghan battle-space and may provide enough evidence to support expanding the FET program beyond Afghanistan.

Standardization. The FET program needs to develop a mandatory and homogenous workflow for pre-engagement, scheduling, and post-engagement requirements. Program basics must be outlined to ensure conformity and consistency between teams and leadership transfer. Much of the problems plaguing FET's ability to determine the *level* of influence they had in achieving COIN objectives is directly related to poor program operational consistency between FETs. While FETs need some flexibility to conduct engagements that align with their unique region's cultural and tribal customs, FETs still need to have universal guidelines to ensure proper record keeping, scheduling, and data collection.

FET participation for females should not function on an as-needed basis. Currently FETs are considered an "extra" program for female soldiers, meaning that FETs must first work a full-time MOS before they can attend to their FET responsibilities. This has greatly hindered the program's ability to properly plan for missions, conduct consistent engagements, and compile post-engagement reports. Should this program continue, the US military should consider making FETs a full-time, career-track position for females serving in the military so the program can achieve maximum return on investment.

FET missions should not operate on an ad hoc basis. FETs must engage multiple villages and they must repeatedly visit these villages. In theater, FETs should interact with local villages

every few weeks (depending on team size and workload) in order to track village development, mindset, and other issues that may arise. Such engagements should be pre-determined so FET members can let villagers know they will return within a given time-frame. While it would be dangerous to let villagers know when exactly they will return (providing time for that information to become known to insurgents) FETs should still be able to provide villagers with a general reassurance that they will return within a few weeks. Only through continued engagements and building a relationship with local women will FETs be able to observe a consistent and permanent change in mindset. Without this, FETs will remain unable to measure the *level* of impact the FET program has on achieving COIN objectives.

FETs entering a new village should require a pre-engagement of an all-male team to meet with village elders and receive their approval for FETs to visit and interact with local females. Interviewees who reported having this type of pre-engagement interaction also reported having a more positive and beneficial experience with the village. Once local elders approve, this makes speaking with the FETs possible for Afghan women, and it ensures villagers that the FETs are there to help. This gives FETs the ability to start their efforts in a more relaxed atmosphere.

All FET missions should require an after-action report of the engagement is placed into an appropriate theater-wide system. Currently FETs, if they submit reports, use the US-based CIDNE system, however the researcher recommends the FET program transitions from CIDNE to the International Distributed Unified Reporting Environment (INDURE) system. This system will allow for unclassified, FET after-action reports to reach the widest audience possible. INDURE also feeds directly into CIDNE so any current FET customers will not be lost. It is paramount that these reports include FET contact information so consumers of these reports can follow up with FETs if needed. The FET program must identify their customers and ensure FET after-action reports are tailored to meet their needs. This will increase the program's value throughout the operating environment.

As consumers are identified through the INDURE system or word-of-mouth, the FET program should have a way for customers to submit monthly "Customer Satisfaction Surveys" directly to FETs. This practice is standard among many forward-deployed specialty programs so these units can ensure they are reporting information relevant to their consumers' needs. FETs need to enact a similar program and can easily do so through developing a FET email distribution list and sending out monthly requests for review. Through this process, FETs will maintain ongoing interaction with customers and identify how they use FET reports. Through this, FETs can more easily tailor their efforts to meet their customers' needs, giving them enhanced relevancy to the battle-space.

Leadership. Supportive leadership is vital to the FET program's future. Leaders who believe an all-female team in a patriarchal society can promote COIN objectives are vital to the program's success. These leaders are more willing to actively promote the program, encourage repeat engagements, and try new methods to help the program reach its full potential. Leaders who express concerns or resistance to the program, who do not support females serving in this role, or who do not see value in interacting with Afghan women, will only continue to hinder the program's growth. Since the FET program is still in its initial implementation phase, and needs

to remain adaptable to find its “fit” in the battle-space, having a supportive leader open to experimenting with new methods and practices is vital to FET’s development.

Healthcare. While FETs have provided medical care in the past, the researcher recommends this service is no longer provided by FETs. FETs may decide to provide the “female face” to international aid organizations operating a medical clinic within the area of responsibility. This arrangement will give FETs the opportunity to receive the benefits of providing medical care (such as using this service as an ice-breaker to meet Afghan women) without medical care services overwhelming FET missions. In addition, FETs are not trained, nor do they have adequate personnel, to provide medical care to villages. While providing medical care can assist FETs in winning local hearts and minds, there are other more effective, less time consuming, options available that better align with FET program operations in which FETs should focus their efforts.

In addition to providing general medical care, the topic of birth control surfaced several times during the interviews. FETs should not, under any circumstances, provide birth control to Afghan women. Should this practice become known to insurgents the consequences to US, NATO, and Coalition personnel could be deadly. Insurgents could claim the FETs are here to make Afghan women barren to eliminate Muslims. The reaction to these claims would be tragic to the US, NATO, and Coalition mission. Should Afghan women request birth control during engagements, FETs should refer these women to an international, non-military aligned agency for assistance. FETs should not have further involvement in birth control options for Afghan women.

Program Goals. FETs must develop a comprehensive definition of the program and outline what FETs are, and what they are not. Interviewees were unable to provide a clear definition of the program and why it was developed. This translated into actions in the field that did not align with the FET mission and significant inconsistencies between FETs. While some flexibility is necessary, the purpose of the program and how it plans to fulfill this purpose should be universally known and accepted throughout FETs and the general military.

FETs were created to reach COIN objectives, yet only one interviewee used the word COIN during her interview. Several believed their purpose was to simply help Afghan women. One interviewee believed, even without receiving any intelligence collection and asset training, that her purpose was to collect intelligence. Another stated the goal was to connect Afghan women with GIRoA and GIRoA with Afghan women. All FET team members should know the goals and objectives of the FET program. FETs cannot work towards fulfilling their mission if the mission is not clearly defined. A definition and purpose should clearly state that FETs should:

- Work to achieve COIN objectives;
- Provide situational awareness of the operating environment;
- Work to give Afghan women a voice in the rebuilding of Afghanistan and in GIRoA;
- Identify village concerns and, when possible, assist to resolve them;

- Report on villagers reactions and perception of US, NATO, and Coalition forces (atmospherics); and
- Report on local issues and problems relevant to the US, NATO, and Coalition forces mission.

FETs should not:

- Serve as intelligence collectors on missions;
- Provide medical care;
- Work to change or alter Afghan culture; and
- Endanger villagers or themselves beyond general combat threat.

While FETs have made some progress towards achieving US COIN objectives in Afghanistan, implementing these recommendations would give the FET program the tools to measure the level of impact to the US mission in Afghanistan. Knowing the level of impact may support efforts to implement FETs in other countries undergoing stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

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WOMEN IN DISARMAMENT, NON-PROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE

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“It is time for all of us to take charge of the future, to change how the world thinks about conflict and how we stop it and prevent it; about security and how we provide it; about peace and how we realize it. And as we do so, it is past time for women to take their rightful place, side-by-side with men, in the rooms where the fates of peoples, where their children’s and grandchildren’s fates, are decided, in the negotiations to make peace and in the institutions to keep it”- Former Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, 2011¹

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the past decade, United Nations entities have addressed counterterrorism, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control and advanced the Women, Peace and Security agenda through a series of actions and norm-setting initiatives. However, at both the international and national level, there is a need to better integrate these efforts and to empower women worldwide to participate in the design and implementation of counterterrorism, disarmament, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) nonproliferation and arms control efforts, to promote equal opportunities for the representation of women in all decision-making processes with regard to these matters, and to strengthen the cooperation with civil society and women’s groups. The important contributions of women in countering radicalization, violent extremism and the conditions conducive to terrorism provide an impetus toward identifying new approaches and synergies to empower women to more actively participate in WMD non-proliferation decision-making processes and programming and to shape the environment to discourage actors of concern’ WMD-related activities, in support of the Department of Defense *Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction* and overall US Government related efforts.

I. Introduction

The proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the possibility of extremists or terrorists acquiring and employing WMD-related materials to perpetrate attacks constitute a grave and persistent threat to national and international security. The National Intelligence Council’s *Global Trends 2025* report notes that “*others will seek US leadership on countering WMD proliferation by taking steps to dissuade interest in WMD, strengthening non-proliferation regimes, preventing acquisition of WMD and associated*

¹ US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Keynote Address “*In Pursuit of Peace*” Award Dinner, International Crisis Group, 2011, online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/support/event-calendar/past-events/annual-award-dinner/award-dinner-2011/keynote-address-us-secretary-of-state-hillary-rodham-clinton.aspx> (accessed 28 Jan 2015)

expertise and technology, rolling back or eliminating WMD in countries of concern, fostering deterrence in the use of WMD, and mitigating the consequences of WMD use”². In order to counterbalance these pervasive threats to international peace and security the US must act as an over-the-horizon balancer and enabler. As others pointed out, “the Concert-Balance strategy represents the best national security strategy for the United States in an era of emerging multipolarity and domestic budget constraints”³. The US concert-balance strategy is inherently linked to US diplomatic and military engagements as well as its concerted action under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council.

Moreover, the 2014 Department of Defense *Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction*⁴ acknowledges the current financial constraints and emphasizes shaping the environment, taking early action to dissuade actors from pursuing WMD, and cooperating with domestic and foreign partners, new approaches and synergies should be sought in order to achieve the goal of countering WMD.

As data accumulate illustrating the important role of women in countering radicalization, violent extremism and the conditions conducive to terrorism^{5,6,7,8} there is a need to incorporate a gender component into the US and global counter-WMD strategies. Such an approach would entail empowering women in the US and worldwide to participate in the design and implementation of counterterrorism, disarmament, WMD non-proliferation and arms control efforts, promoting equal opportunities for the representation of women in all decision-making processes with regard to these matters, and strengthening the cooperation with civil society and women’s groups.

The work undertaken by UN entities with regard to women, peace and security (summarized below) confers legitimacy to the proposed US leadership in integrating women’s perspectives into national and international programming on countering WMD and terrorism. Synchronizing

² National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, Nov 2008, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Global%20Trends_2025%20Report.pdf (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

³ Michael Lind, *A Concert-Balance Strategy for a Multipolar World*, *Parameters* 38, no. 3 (Autumn 2008): 48-60, <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/08autumn/lind.pdf> (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

⁴ Chuck Hagel, *Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction* (U.S. Department of Defense, June 2014), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/DoD_Strategy_for_Countering_Weapons_of_Mass_Destruction_dated_June_2014.pdf (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

⁵ Global Post, *An effective weapon in the war on terror: women*, January 25, 2010, <http://blogs.reuters.com/global/2010/01/25/an-effective-weapon-in-the-war-on-terror-women/> (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

⁶ Krista London Couture, *A Gendered Approach To Countering Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned From Women In Peacebuilding And Conflict Prevention Applied Successfully In Bangladesh And Morocco*, July 2014, Brookings Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2014/07/30%20gender%20conflict%20prevention%20countering%20violent%20extremism%20couture/women%20cve%20formatted%2072914%20couture%20final2.pdf> / (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

⁷ Danielle Shapiro, *Pakistan’s Women Are Helping Identify and Counter Extremism*, April 14, 2014, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/witw/articles/2014/04/14/pakistan-s-women-are-helping-identify-and-counter-extremism.html> (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

⁸ Sahana Dharmapuri, *Take Women Seriously In Fight Against ISIS*, 21 Nov 2014, <http://womensenews.org/story/war/141120/take-women-seriously-in-fight-against-isis> (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

counter-WMD/counter-terrorism efforts with activities aimed at enhancing the role of women in counterterrorism, disarmament, WMD non-proliferation and arms control efforts will also help practitioners and policymakers maximize the use of national resources, cross-utilize various mechanisms of assistance, and leverage enabling capabilities.

II. The UN Security Council's Work on Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Arms Control: Women Considerations

i) Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

At the end of the 20th century, the Security Council started its formal consideration of women, peace and security as a distinct thematic issue. Through the landmark resolution 1325 of 31 October 2000⁹, the Council adopted a gender perspective and recognized the important role of women in conflicts' prevention and resolution as well as in peace-building. The Council also emphasized the need to increase the number of women in decision-making positions related to peace and security issues "*in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms*". Follow-on resolutions¹⁰ provided further possibilities for action and guidance to the UN member states as well as instructions to the UN Secretariat on this thematic issue which included efforts to end sexual violence against women in armed conflicts, protect women as a vulnerable subset of broader civilian-protection considerations in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes and in justice and security sector reforms, and empower women politically and economically.

DDR is part of the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping operations and includes gender-responsive stabilization and peacebuilding measures with immediate political and security objectives by active engagement of local communities in programs' design and implementation¹¹. DDR considerations include the livelihoods of ex-combatants and their communities, child and female soldiers, women associated with armed groups, HIV/AIDS-affected combatants, and other vulnerable groups¹². DDR processes are adaptive and linked to other thematic pillars of peacebuilding, such as rule of law, security sector reform and economic recovery. For instance, the reorientation of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)'s traditional DDR into a Community Violence Reduction strategy in 2006 at the request of the Security Council, led to civil society identification and prioritization of actions to address violence associated with racketeering networks, inter-personal violence (including high levels of domestic violence) and gang violence. Such programs support inter alia access to justice for women and youth survivors of violence, support to entrepreneurs in at-risk neighborhoods, education opportunities for

⁹ United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/WPS%20SRES1325%20.pdf> (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

¹⁰ Security Council Report, UN Documents on Women, Peace and Security, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/women-peace-and-security/> (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

¹¹ United Nations Peacekeeping, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ddr.shtml> (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

¹² United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Second generation disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) practices in peace operations*, 18 Jan 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

children from marginalized areas, and the development of legislative frameworks for arms control¹².

The 2013 Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security submitted to the UNSC¹³ on the implementation of UNSC 1325 also praises “*the significant heightening of policy and operational focus on monitoring, prevention and prosecution of violence against women in conflict*”. The annual report also highlights civil society efforts in Haiti (the Women’s Association of Le Borgne) and Kyrgyzstan (the Women’s Peace Network) to engage women in strengthening security and preventing conflict but notes that “*much of women’s conflict prevention work continues to go unrecognized and lacks consistent funding and institutional support*”. The report is based on submissions from various UN entities, Member States, regional and sub-regional organizations and civil society. However, out of the 197 UN Member States only 29 States submitted information for this report, with US being a notable absentee. Many of the reporting States emphasized training on women’s human rights, including prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence for military, police and civilian personnel deployed to international peace operations and also reported the adoption of special measures to promote the recruitment and retention of women in the national security sector institutions (military and/or law enforcement). The Secretary-General notes that “*women can be better placed than men to carry out some peacekeeping tasks, including working in women’s prisons and assisting female ex-combatants during demobilization*”¹³.

ii) Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

While DDR may support in-country governance structures and institutional capacity building for arms control and counter-violence, the UN Peacekeeping operations do not specifically include in their mandates provisions related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) non-proliferation or counterterrorism. Nevertheless, they may help address the conditions conducive to the spread and incitement of terrorism and violent extremism.

Like the thematic issue of women, peace and security, the link between WMDs proliferation and non-state actors is also relatively new on the UNSC agenda. Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security the UNSC adopted UNSCR 1540¹⁴ on 28 April 2004 in order to prevent and deter the potential acquisition and use of chemical, biological, and radiological/nuclear (CBRN) materials and WMDs by terrorists and other malevolent non-state actors.

UNSCR 1540 established for the first time legally binding obligations on all UN Member States (regardless of their membership status in a treaty or convention) to develop and to enforce effective national measures against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological WMDs

¹³ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security*, S/2013/525, 4 September 2013, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/525, (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

¹⁴ United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1540%20\(2004\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1540%20(2004)), (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

and their means of delivery and to implement and enforce a comprehensive system of domestic controls on WMD-related materials. Further guidance to the UN member states on implementation was issued in follow-on related resolutions (UNSCR 1674 (2005), UNSCR 1810 (2008) and UNSCR 1977 (2011))¹⁵.

While penalties for non-compliance were not mentioned in UNSCR 1540 (except for those inherent to Chapter VII of the UN Charter at the UNSC discretion), it wasn't until 2013 when the UNSC (through UNSCR 2118 which was adopted unanimously on 27 September 2013, in regards to the Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons during the Syrian civil war), asked the UN Member States to *“inform immediately the Security Council of any violation of resolution 1540 (2004), including acquisition by non-State actors of chemical weapons, their means of delivery and related materials in order to take necessary measures therefore”*¹⁶.

While the Security Council *“remains actively seized of the matter and expresses its willingness to consider as appropriate, the gender dimensions of armed conflict in carrying out its responsibility of maintaining international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations”*¹⁷ and it is making statements recognizing and welcoming the roles of, and contributions made by women as mediators, educators, peace-makers, peace-builders and advocates for peace, as well as their active contribution to reconciliation efforts and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, no such gender consideration is sought specifically with regard to the role of women in countering WMD proliferation and enhancing their participation in decision-making processes.

While *“the Security Council notes with concern the very low numbers of women in formal roles in mediation processes, and stresses the need to ensure that women are appropriately appointed at decision-making levels, as high level mediators, and within the composition of the mediators’ teams in line with resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008)”*¹⁸, the UNSC has yet to recognize that still few women have a seat at the negotiation table on WMD non-proliferation policies.

Analysis of data (participants lists) from the most recent review conferences of the main treaties regulating the use, development and possession of biological¹⁹, chemical²⁰ and nuclear

¹⁵ United Nations Security Council 1540 Committee website, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/>, (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

¹⁶ United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2118\(2013\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2118(2013)) (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

¹⁷ United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President, S/PRST/2001/31, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/S-PRST-2001-31-E_S/PRST/2001/31


¹⁸ United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President, S/PRST/2009/8, 21 April 2009, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SC_PresidentialStatementMaintenancePeaceSecurity_SPRS_T20098%28english%29.pdf, (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

¹⁹ Biological Weapons Convention, 7th review conference, 2011, list of participants at: <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/5710929.03614044.html>, addendum at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/653/29/PDF/G1165329.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

²⁰ Chemical Weapons Convention, 3rd review conference, 2013, list of participants at: http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=16489, addendum at: http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=16532, (accessed 23 Jan 2015)


²¹weapons of mass destructions show that men overwhelmingly dominated the composition of national delegations of States Parties, Signatory and Observer States (74% of delegates were men at both the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 7th Review Conference (RevCon) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 3rd RevCon; 75% of the delegates at the 8th RevCon of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) were also men)- Fig. 1. Furthermore, only 20% of national delegations were headed by a woman at the BWC RevCon and 22% of national delegations were headed by a woman at the CWC and NPT RevCons (Fig. 2).

Figure 1. Women participation in national delegations at the 2011 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 7th Review Conference (RevCon), 2013 Chemical Weapons Convention 3rd RevCon, and the 2010 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 8th RevCon.



²¹ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 8th review conference 2010, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20\(VOL.%20III\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.%20III)) (accessed 23 Jan 2015)

Figure 2. Women leadership at the 2011 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 7th Review Conference (RevCon), 2013 Chemical Weapons Convention 3rd RevCon, and the 2010 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 8th RevCon. “Headed by a woman” implies that a woman is the formal head of the national delegation or the most senior official in a national delegation.



While potential explanations for this disparity have been offered²², the fact remains that there is a glass ceiling impeding women’s global participation in the fields of arms control, disarmament, and WMD non-proliferation. In the private sector, the glass ceiling was described as a barrier “so subtle that it is transparent, yet so strong that it prevents women from moving up the corporate hierarchy”²³. Men in corporate management tend not to perceive discrimination as a real problem, thereby making it virtually impossible to implement effective remedies²³. It seems that women in foreign affairs also bump against the proverbial glass ceiling^{24,25} and the consistent trend of women’s low participation in the WMD non-proliferation treaties negotiations suggests that similar to the private sector world, men in the position of power might not perceive discrimination as a real problem in foreign affairs either and without concerted UN action and

²² Kathleen Danskin and Dana Perkins, *Women as Agents of Positive Change in Biosecurity*, Science and Diplomacy, June 2014, <http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2014/women-agents-positive-change-in-biosecurity> (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

²³ Feminist Majority Foundation, *Empowering Women in Business*, http://www.feminist.org/research/business/ewb_glass.html (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

²⁴ Anne-Marie Slaughter, *Why Women Can’t Have It All*, The Atlantic, July/Aug 2012, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-women-still-cant-have-it-all/309020/> (accessed 28 Jan 2015),

²⁵ Daniel W. Drezner, *Why Foreign Policy Professionals Can’t Have It All*, Foreign policy, 22 June 2012, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/22/why-foreign-policy-professionals-cant-have-it-all/> (accessed 28 Jan 2015),

direction from the Security Council as well as political commitment of UN Member States, the glass ceiling is most likely here to stay.

This disparity is also evident in related areas. The UN progress report toward meeting the Millennium Development Goals published in 2014²⁶ shows that worldwide, women hold only 17.2 percent of Government ministerial posts and 21.8 percent of all parliamentary seats. The report also emphasizes that “*political commitment and policy are key components to women’s progress in this area*”.

iii) Counterterrorism

As described above, UNSCR 1540 imposes obligations onto all UN Member States under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to deal with the threat to peace and security posed *inter alia* by links between terrorism, non-State actors and WMDs. However, the Security Council has not provided a definition of terrorism but encouraged States to unilaterally define terrorism in national law. While not expressly framed as a definition, the Security Council recalls via UNSCR 1566 (2004)²⁷ that the following acts are never justifiable: “. . . *criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism...*” and “*calls upon all States to prevent such acts...*”.

Since the early 1990s, the Security Council has undertaken a series of measures to counter terrorism²⁸. Notably, in the aftermath of 9/11, the Council issued UNSCR 1373²⁹ which obliges Member States to take a number of measures to prevent terrorist activities and to criminalize various forms of terrorist actions, as well as to take measures that assist and promote cooperation among countries including adherence to international counterterrorism instruments. Member States are also required to report regularly to the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC, comprising all 15 members of the Security Council) on the measures they have taken to implement UNSCR 1373. The resolution’s preamble also reaffirms the need to combat by all means, “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,” threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts. Under UNSCR 1535 (2004), the Security Council established the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to assist the work of the CTC and coordinate the process of monitoring the implementation of UNSCR 1373 (2001).

²⁶ United Nations, *The Millennium Development Goals Report*, 2014, <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2014%20MDG%20report/MDG%202014%20English%20web.pdf>, (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

²⁷ United Nations Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1566%20\(2004\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1566%20(2004)), (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

²⁸ United Nations Security Council actions to counter terrorism, <http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/securitycouncil.shtml>, (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

²⁹ United Nations Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), <http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2012/docs/United%20Nations%20Security%20Council%20Resolution%201373%20%282001%29.pdf>, (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

In 2010, following a Security Council meeting on “*Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorists acts*”, the Council issued a presidential statement³⁰ expressing concerns that the threat posed by terrorism had become more diffuse, with an increase, in various regions of the world, of terrorist acts, including those motivated by intolerance or extremism, and reaffirmed its determination to combat this threat. Notably, the Council emphasized that terrorism would not be defeated by military force, law enforcement measures and intelligence operations alone, but the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism need to be addressed “*including, but not limited to, the need to strengthen efforts for the successful prevention and peaceful resolution of prolonged conflicts, and the need to promote the rule of law, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, tolerance and inclusiveness to offer a viable alternative to those who could be susceptible to terrorist recruitment and to radicalization leading to violence*”.

None of the counterterrorism-related UNSCRs or Presidential Statements makes the connection between the global counterterrorism efforts and the topic of women, peace and security. This is perhaps a testimony to the efforts of certain Security Council members, such as Russia, to negate synergies among different initiatives, as recently demonstrated in the negotiation of a presidential statement on peacebuilding³¹ where Russia stated that it is “*counterproductive to focus on a gender perspective...*” In its 14 January Presidential Statement, the Council collectively reaffirmed however “*that sustainable peace and security required an integrated sustainable approach based on coherence among political, security and development approaches, which were essential for effectively improving the respect for human rights, advancing gender equality, strengthening the rule of law and advancing economic development in countries emerging from conflict*”³².

While a top down approach on the role of women in counterterrorism efforts seem to be lacking in the UN Security Council, others are taking the lead in spearheading such initiatives. In 2014, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) started working with the Global Counterterrorism Forum to promote gender-sensitive strategies, policies and measures to counter violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism and organized a conference on “*Women, terrorism and counter-terrorism*”³³ highlighting women’s “*important unique perspectives to understanding and countering violent extremism and terrorist radicalization*” and that “*only through a gender-sensitive and human rights compliant approach can counterterrorism measures become sustainable and effective*”.

³⁰ United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President, S/PRST/2010/19, 27 Sep 2010, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/551/58/PDF/N1055158.pdf?OpenElement>, (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

³¹ What’s in Blue, Peacebuilding Briefing and Presidential Statement, 13 Jan 2015, <http://www.whatsinblue.org/2015/01/peacebuilding-briefing-and-presidential-statement-1.php>, (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

³² United Nations media report, *Security Council Presidential Statement Emphasizes National Responsibility, Inclusivity in Peacebuilding Efforts for Countries Emerging from Conflict*, 14 Jan 2015, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11734.doc.htm> (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

³³ OSCE website, *Women, terrorism and counter-terrorism*, 05 Jan 2015, <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/120964> (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

Empowering women to contribute to counterterrorism and to address the conditions conducive to terrorism should perhaps be included in national reports and action plans as an illustrative example of measures taken on implementing synergistically UNSCR 1325 (on women, peace and security) and UNSCR 1373 (on counterterrorism), thus helping the UNSC to bridge thematically distinct but operationally linked issues.

III. UN General Assembly's Work on Counterterrorism, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control: Women Considerations

While the UN General Assembly (UNGA) may only make recommendations to Member States (rather than setting binding obligations like the UNSC), it has nevertheless addressed the issue of counterterrorism through various initiatives including through strengthening the international cooperation and coordination on practical counterterrorism measures³⁴.

The UN *Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy* was adopted by Member States on 8 September 2006³⁵ and marked a turning point in the global counterterrorism efforts. It was the first time that all Member States had agreed to a common strategic approach to counter terrorism and established a unique global instrument to enhance national, regional and international counterterrorism efforts. Notably, the UNGA resolution A/RES/68/276 issued at the latest (2014) biannual review of the Strategy, mentions “*the important contribution of women to the implementation of the Strategy, and encouraging Member States, United Nations entities and international, regional and sub-regional organizations to consider the participation of women in efforts to prevent and counter terrorism*”³⁶.

The Secretary-General's report summarizing UN activities throughout Africa that assist Member States in addressing terrorism, as guided by the relevant UNGA and UNSC resolutions, highlights examples of civil society-led programs engaging women to counter violent extremism and incitement to commit terrorist acts such as those of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations in the Horn of Africa. Notably, the Secretary-General says that “*in view of the important contribution of women in countering radicalization and extremism, there is a need to further integrate women's perspectives into national and regional counter-terrorism programming*” and he urges UN entities “*to incorporate a gender component into their counter-terrorism work and to ensure that gender considerations are addressed as part of efforts on counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism, including through enhanced cooperation with civil society and women's groups*”³⁷.

³⁴ United Nations General Assembly Actions to Counter Terrorism, <http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ga.shtml> (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

³⁵ United Nations Action to Counter Terrorism, <http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml> (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

³⁶ United Nations General Assembly resolution adopted on 13 June 2014, A/RES/68/276, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_res_68_276.pdf (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

³⁷ United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the United Nations to help States and sub-regional and regional entities in Africa in fighting terrorism, S/2014/9, 9 Jan 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/9 (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

Arguably, the most relevant resolution issued by the UN on the theme of this paper, is the UNGA resolution 68/33 on *Women, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control*, adopted on 5 December 2013³⁸. While it recognizes “*the valuable contributions of women...in promoting disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control*”, it also notes that the role of women in these areas should be further developed. It calls upon all States to empower women, including through capacity building efforts, to participate in the design and implementation of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control efforts. Through this resolution, UNGA requests that relevant UN organs, agencies, funds and programs assist States, upon request, in promoting the role of women in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. It also “*urges Member States, relevant sub regional and regional organizations, the United Nations and the specialized agencies to promote equal opportunities for the representation of women in all decision-making processes with regard to matters related to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control...*”.

Perhaps the most significant achievement in this area to date is that in 2013 the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) became the first treaty with specific gender provisions due to the concerns that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons may facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children³⁹.

Despite several UNGA and UNSC resolutions and statements on women, peace and security that provide legitimacy for work on raising gender awareness in all aspects of national and international security including disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control efforts, no such gender-sensitive risk assessments were ever conducted for the WMD non-proliferation treaties such as BWC, CWC and NPT. Furthermore, discussions are sparse on gender perspectives in WMD non-proliferation (whether related to increasing women participation in political and technical decision-making, the disproportionately higher impact on women and children of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, etc.). A report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) poses the question whether a gender perspective may aid in understanding “*the politics of nuclear weapons*” based on data linking the structure and formation of masculine identities and “*militarism*”⁴⁰. Other authors have suggested that “*the role of men and a certain kind of masculinity in dominating the political structures that organize wars and oversee security matters is beginning to be questioned*”⁴¹. In this context, the analysis presented here supports the view that there is still a big gap in providing equal opportunities for the women’s engagement and participation in national and international decision-making

³⁸ United Nations General Assembly resolution adopted on 5 Dec 2013, A/RES/68/33, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/33 (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

³⁹ Amanda Shaw, Association for Women’s Rights in Development, *The First Arms Trade Treaty Recognizes Gender-Based Violence*, 16 May 2013, <http://www.awid.org/News-Analysis/Friday-Files/The-First-Arms-Trade-Treaty-Recognises-Gender-Based-Violence> (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

⁴⁰ OECD website, *Conflict, Peace-Building, Disarmament, Security*, <http://www.oecd.org/social/gender-development/1896576.pdf> (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

⁴¹ Carol Cohn, Felicity Hill, Sara Ruddick, The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Policy Paper no. 38, *The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction*, 2005, <http://www.iansa-women.org/sites/default/files/newsviews/en-wmdc-paper38-2005.pdf> (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

processes of WMD non-proliferation and such efforts should be supported by the UN entities (UNGA, UNSC, UN Women⁴², etc.) and individual UN Member States.

IV. Women, Peace and Security: Roles for the Military Staff Committee, NATO and the Department of Defense?

Under the UN Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. All UN member states are obligated to abide by the decisions of the Security Council whereas other UN entities (such as the General Assembly) may only make recommendations. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter provides the Council with the authority to “*determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression*” and to take military and nonmilitary action (e.g. economic sanctions, arms embargoes, blockade, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel bans) to “*restore international peace and security*”. Chapter VII also gives the Military Staff Committee (MSC, made up of the chiefs of staff of the five permanent members of the Council) responsibility for strategic coordination of forces placed at the disposal of the UN Security Council. However, for most of its existence, the MSC has had little to do with military planning, holding only pro forma meetings, but that situation has changed in recent years due to the recognized need of the UN Security Council to improve its access to military advice^{43, 44}. It has been reported that the MSC has started to include the military advisors of the ten non-permanent members of the Council in its discussions and activities but there is no institutional interaction between the Council and the MSC (i.e. no regular reporting to the Security Council as the other subsidiary bodies do, other than the individual permanent representatives receiving advice from their respective military advisors⁴⁴).

It is unclear whether the current efforts to revitalize the MSC will be successful but perhaps is not too early to suggest that a gender perspective should be integrated in future MSC mandates. In this regard, it should be noted that the Director for Plans and Policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J5) has oversight for the US Delegation to the UN MSC and acts as the Pentagon’s primary interface with the US Mission to the UN⁴⁵.

Of note, NATO has established a Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP), composed of senior national representatives from member countries, “*in support of Alliance objectives and priorities, including the implementation of relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions*”⁴⁶. The NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and

⁴² UN Women website, <http://www.unwomen.org/en/about-us/about-un-women> (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

⁴³ **Felicity Hill, *The Military Staff Committee: A Possible Future Role in UN Peace Operations?*** Global Policy Forum, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/199-peacekeeping/40932-the-military-staff-committee-a-possible-future-role-in-un-peace-operations-.html>

⁴⁴ Security Council Report, In Hindsight: The Military Staff Committee, 23 Dec 2014, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2015-01/in_hindsight_the_military_staff_committee.php (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

⁴⁵ United States Mission to the United Nations website, <http://usun.state.gov/about/c31791.htm> (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

⁴⁶ NATO website, Committee on Gender Perspectives, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_101372.htm (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

Security also serves to advance the women, peace and security agenda at every level through relevant policies and activities⁴⁷. The recently released overarching *NATO/EAPC Policy for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related resolutions*⁴⁸ emphasizes NATO's commitment to mainstream a gender perspective into “*policies, activities and efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts*” and to promote “*change in mind sets and behaviors*” and “*awareness and positive changes*”. To monitor the implementation and progress of NATO's policy and action plan, a Women, Peace and Security Task Force was established under the guidance and responsibility of the Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security.

A similar position or organizational structure does not exist within the US Department of Defense. The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security⁴⁹ lists the various organizations within the Department of Defense with dedicated staff responsible for addressing gender considerations in keeping with DOD's mission, such as the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (coordinating the development and implementation of DOD's efforts on Women, Peace, and Security), the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (coordinating the Department's efforts on sexual assault prevention and response, and combating trafficking in persons), and the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (advising on policies related to the recruitment, retention, treatment, and integration of women into the US Armed Forces). The report also emphasizes initiatives of combatant commands to integrate gender considerations across their programs and engagements. Passing into law the *H.R.2874 - Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2013*⁵⁰ which has provisions for, inter alia, conducting a review on the existing US policies and programs on women and girls in foreign countries from a gender perspective, may also spur the creation of additional synergies among programs the US is implementing abroad, including those related to counter-WMD and terrorism.

Similar to NATO's assessment that “*the area of cooperative security...provides a particular impetus for the Women, Peace and Security agenda*”⁴⁸, this author believes that DOD's efforts to counter-WMD and counterterrorism also provide an impetus for advancing the Women, Peace, and Security agenda worldwide and such efforts should benefit from a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign to mainstream a gender perspective into the policies, activities and efforts to prevent terrorism, violent extremism and WMD proliferation. DOD should integrate such a gender component into peacetime activities focused on building the counter-WMD capabilities of international partners such as multinational and interagency training and planning exercises, and into specific programs such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program which aims to prevent state and non-state actors from proliferating WMD technologies, materials, and

⁴⁷ NATO website, Women, Peace and Security, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91091.htm (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

⁴⁸ *NATO/EAPC Policy for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related resolutions*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_109830.htm (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

⁴⁹ *The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/email-files/US_National_Action_Plan_on_Women_Peace_and_Security.pdf (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

⁵⁰ *H.R.2874 - Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2013*, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/2874/text> (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

expertise, with the priority to secure WMD at the source⁵¹. Last but not least, the senior level professional military education and leader development training (which prepare the military, civilian, and international leaders to assume strategic leadership responsibilities in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, or multinational environment) should raise awareness on UNSCR 1325 and the Women, Peace and Security agenda while providing educational modules on WMD non-proliferation and other instruments of international power.

As the former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton once said, “*Women are the largest untapped reservoir of talent in the world*”¹. Ensuring women’s empowerment in WMD non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament negotiations and governance will underwrite global peace and security at a time when new approaches and synergies are sought in order to counter grave and persistent WMD threats and violent extremism.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

⁵¹ DTRA website, *Cooperative Threat Reduction Program*, <http://www.dtra.mil/Missions/Nunn-Lugar/GlobalCooperationInitiative.aspx> (accessed 21 Jan 2015)

SUPPORTING THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

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Many of our partner nations in the US Pacific Command (PACOM) region are encouraging the emerging roles of women in their military services and security sectors. As they do so, they are looking to the US Department of Defense for guidance and “best practices” regarding integrating women and supporting their professional development. The obvious physical and psychological differences between the genders must be acknowledged and addressed for women to serve successfully in the operational environment. Nations must develop healthcare, personnel, and professional development policies and programs to support the full integration and career potential of females in military services. Women who receive the appropriate support during their military service may be more likely to achieve success both in uniform and in their transition back to civilian status.

HEALTHCARE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

Accession and retention criteria and periodic health assessments should address medical conditions unique to females. Conditions like migraine headaches, depression, and musculoskeletal pain may render a candidate unfit for military duty, but these conditions are not unique to females. Relatively few conditions definitively make a female ineligible for accession to active military duty. A female may not access onto active duty while pregnant; following delivery and postpartum recovery of 6 months, she may resume the accession process. Females are not eligible to serve in the US Army if they are anemic (hemoglobin less than 12mg/dl, whether from menorrhagia or other cause), have abnormal uterine bleeding, painful menses, or endometriosis, have symptomatic ovarian cysts, have chronic pelvic pain, or history of cervical cancer. A history of breast cancer, or surgery on the breasts in the preceding 6 months, makes the candidate ineligible. Other medical conditions are relative contraindications to initial entry to military service. Army Standards of Medical Fitness are available on-line.¹ Other military branches have similar accession criteria.²³

Medical criteria for retention on active duty are less strict than those required for accession. A female Service member may be medical retired if she has had unsatisfactory outcome following hysterectomy, or if she has severely debilitating menstrual periods, endometriosis, pelvic pain, or menopausal symptoms so severe as to interfere with performance of duties.

¹ AR 40-501, Army Standards of Medical Fitness, http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/r40_501.pdf

² AFI 48-123, Air Force Medical Examinations and Standards, http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_sg/publication/afi48-123/afi48-123.pdf

³ NAVMED P-117, Navy Manual of the Medical Department, <http://www.med.navy.mil/directives/Pages/NAVMEDP-MANMED.aspx>

Periodic health examinations must address preventive care for female Service members. At age-appropriate intervals, females should be screened for breast and cervical cancer, and may be screened for sexually-transmitted infections. Routine counseling on family planning, safer sexual practices, and mental health issues should be provided. Military healthcare policies and systems must make these routine, health-maintenance visits available and convenient to access.

Medical providers require training to deliver healthcare in a gender-specific fashion. Most enlisted Service members receive their routine and urgent care from General Medical Officers or Physician Assistants. While these medical providers are typically well-prepared to care for a young and generally-healthy male population, they may not have adequate preparation to provide specific gynecological services or recognize potentially life-threatening conditions in young women. Providers need to understand normal female physiology, and must be comfortable performing a routine exam of female breasts and genitalia; this knowledge and skill set requires significant practice in a supervised clinical setting. Female Service members desiring contraception counseling, “morning after” treatment, or evaluation of vaginal discharge or a breast lump should have access to a provider who is skilled and confident in providing these services. Ectopic pregnancy, pelvic inflammatory disease, ruptured ovarian cysts, and pyelonephritis require recognition and immediate treatment to avoid serious morbidity and mortality. Providing appropriate care following sexual trauma requires specialized preparation and it must be delivered in a sensitive, respectful manner. In addition to the requirement for skilled healthcare providers, medical facilities must allow for private and confidential discussion and examination, and trained female chaperones should be available to assist with the exam.

Female Service members deserve behavioral health providers who are sensitive to psychological conditions that affect females. Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder is different and more serious than Premenstrual Syndrome, and often requires pharmacological and other treatments. Among entry-level military personnel, females have a higher-than-expected rate of depression when compared to men.⁴ Female Soldiers are at significantly increased risk for becoming a psychiatric casualty during combat operations when compared to males; among Service members who have returned from combat, females are up to three times as likely as males to have a mental health condition that requires hospitalization.⁵ Female US Army Soldiers are more prone to exceed established “safe alcohol consumption” guidelines when compared to males.^{6,7} Nearly 20% of active duty mothers screen positive for Post-Partum Depression, and over half of them have not regained full functioning by the time they return to military duties.⁸ Behavioral health therapy services should be tailored to meet the needs of females Service members.⁹

⁴ Warner CM. Depression in entry-level military personnel. *Mil Med* 172(8): 795-9 (Aug 2007)

⁵ Goodman et al. Epidemiology of psychiatric disorders sustained by a U.S. Army brigade combat team during the Iraq War. *General Hospital Psychiatry* 33:1 (Jan 2011)

⁶ Siratt D. Epidemiology and prevention of substance use disorders in the military. *Mil Med* 177(8 Suppl): 21-8. (Aug 2012)

⁷ Lande RG. Gender differences and alcohol use in the US Army. *J Am Osteopath Assoc* 107(9): 401-7. (Sept 2007)

⁸ Appolonio KK. Postpartum depression in a military sample. *Mil Med* 173(11): 1085-91. (Nov 2008)

⁹ Miller L. Psychotherapy with military personnel: lessons learned challenges ahead. *Int J Emerg Ment Health*. 12(3):179-92. (Summer 2010)

Physical fitness programs should recognize anatomical and physiological differences between males and females, and must include aspects of injury prevention. Women's relatively lower center of gravity and decreased lean body mass compared to males mean that she may have difficulty with pull-ups or other exercises that require upper-body strength. When compared to males, females typically have a shorter stride length. Combine this with a wider pelvis and relative ligamentous laxity, and she is at risk for hip, knee, and ankle injuries including tendonitis and stress fractures. Female Service members should be placed up front in formation to avoid injury during marching and running.

Additional policies are required to specifically address pregnant Service members. Once a Service member has medical confirmation of pregnancy, her Commander will issue a physical profile with duty and assignment limitations. She will be exempt from specific activities, including certain vaccines, exposure to fuel vapors and other chemical hazards, and no indoor weapons training. She will not be assigned to duties where nausea, fatigue, or sudden lightheadedness would put her or other Service members at risk. Upon diagnosis of pregnancy, the Service member will be exempt from routine unit physical fitness training.¹⁰

Physical fitness programs for the pregnant Service member should focus on maintenance of health and ensure the member's ability to meet strenuous physical requirements when she returns to duty after delivery. In the US Army, the Pregnancy Postpartum Physical Training (PPPT) Program is under the responsibility of the Medical Command and is supervised by a medical provider. The Army PPPT Program focuses on maintenance of health and fitness for pregnant Soldiers with emphasis on return to pre-pregnancy fitness levels, including meeting weight standards and transitioning back to unit fitness programs after the end of the pregnancy.¹¹ Desirable side-effects of the PPPT Program are the potential to reduce physical discomfort and stress during pregnancy, to provide an opportunity to interact with other pregnant Service members in a healthy and supportive environment, and to provide a venue for prenatal education. Specific standards, policies, and responsibilities for the US Army PPPT Program are available on line.¹²

Following a routine delivery, the Service member is normally allowed convalescent leave for 6 weeks. She will not return to full duty until cleared by her physician, and she is not required to meet physical fitness or weight standards for 6 months post-partum.¹³

When faced with extended duty in a deployed or austere environment, female Service members should be offered education in field hygiene. Extremes of temperatures, primitive sanitation and shower challenges, lack of laundry facilities, and unavailable (or seemingly unacceptable) healthcare facilities make a female Service member more prone to vaginal and urinary tract infections.¹⁴ Similarly, menstrual regulation via hormonal manipulation makes it less

¹⁰ IBID, AR 40-501, Ch. 7-9

¹¹ US Army FM7-22, Section 4-21, Oct 2012

¹² US Army Public Health Command Technical Guide Series 255A-E.

¹³ IBID, AR 40-501, Ch. 7-10

¹⁴ Doherty ME. Women's health and hygiene experiences during deployment to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, 2003 through 2010. *J Midwifery Women's Health* - 01-MAR-2012; 57(2): 172-7.

inconvenient to perform duties. Preventive measures should be discussed prior to deployment to these environments.

While not strictly a medical issue, military gear like tactical “bullet proof” vests may require alteration to allow for a woman’s smaller frame. If not, she will be at risk for musculoskeletal conditions like neck and back pain. Also, gapping at the neck and shoulder openings from vests that are too large will potentially prevent protection from bullets and shrapnel.

PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

Career advancement in the military, like in civilian organizations, often means sacrifice of personal lives and traditional family relationships. Military personnel and administrative leaders are encouraged to develop policies and programs that support the opportunity for women to serve in a safe environment that acknowledges potential conflicts as a wife and mother.

Personnel policies should address career management programs for women. Female Service members may not have access to appropriate mentors to highlight opportunities; active career management will help maximize her potential for military service and promotion to higher ranks with greater responsibility. While Commanders may be uncomfortable selecting staff Officers solely based on gender, they should be encouraged to recognize the value that gender diversity brings to their team.

Gender specific grooming and appearance standards allow for some variation between males and females while enforcing a military appearance. Acceptable hairstyles and use of cosmetics should be conservative within cultural norms. Length of hair and nails should not pose a safety hazard. Military uniforms for females should be similar to those for males, with allowance for formal uniforms to include skirts, again within cultural norms. Maternity uniforms should be meet military regulations. Service-specific standards are available on-line.¹⁵¹⁶¹⁷

Support of the military family must include the specific needs of dual military couples. The goal of the Married Army Couples Program (MACP) is to assign married Soldiers to duty stations within 50 miles of each other, thereby offering the opportunity to establish joint domicile while continuing to serve on active duty.¹⁸ While Army Soldiers married to members of another Service (Navy, Air Force) are not formally eligible to request joint domicile, they can informally request assignment to join their spouse and this is typically supported if it meets the needs of the Army.

Military organizations must offer support to single Service member parents (and dual military families) and ensure a “safety net” is present should the member(s) be required to deploy away from home. This family care plan identifies a guardian by name, and allows the Service member

¹⁵ AR 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms, http://www.apd.army.mil/pdf/r670_1.pdf

¹⁶ NAVPERS 156651, US Navy Uniform Regulations, <http://www.public.navy.mil/BUPERS-NPC/SUPPORT/UNIFORMS/UNIFORMREGULATIONS/Pages/default.aspx>

¹⁷ AFI 36-2903, Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel, <http://www.afpc.af.mil/dress/policy.asp>

¹⁸ AR 614-200 Section IV

parent(s) to provide short- and long-term financial, legal, and medical care for the child should they become geographically separated due to military duty requirements. The Army Family Care Plan is detailed in Army Command Policy.¹⁹

Military Equal Opportunity (EO) programs ensure fair treatment for military personnel without regard to race, color, national origin, religion, or gender. These EO programs benefit male and female Service members alike, ensuring maximized potential for both genders with opportunity for promotion based on merit and capability.²⁰ Service members who feel they have been discriminated against based on gender can refer to EO policies and programs for support.

Commanders are obligated to develop and enforce strict policies that address sexual harassment and assault. The US Department of Defense has a specific directive outlining overarching DoD policy on sexual assault prevention and response.²¹ The US Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) program focuses on prevention through education and training, care for victims, and prompt investigation and prosecution of offenders.²² Other Services have similar programs.^{23,24}

While design and management of the military base itself is not strictly a "personnel" issue, the physical plant can be designed to support the female Service member. Barracks accommodations for female Service members should include planning for security, as well as toilet and shower facilities separated by gender. Child Development Centers on military posts and bases make it convenient for the military parent to stay involved in her young child's life. Currently, the US DoD runs 800 Child Development Centers on bases worldwide.²⁵ Facility planners should include areas for the breastfeeding Service member, ensuring access to clean, safe, private rooms and encouraging this preferred nutrition source for infants. Offering family housing close to military unit work areas limits the time the Service member spends commuting to and from duty.

It should be noted that addressing the evolution of women's assignment to military combat roles is beyond the scope of this paper.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

Professional development programs should include counseling that acknowledges and embraces female leadership traits and discusses juggling career and family. With guidance from GEN Vincent Brooks, Commanding General, US Army Pacific (USARPAC), a dedicated team of military and civilian personnel assigned at the USARPAC headquarters at Fort Shafter Hawaii developed a professional development forum known as "Sisters in Arms".²⁶ Since 2013, this

¹⁹ AR 600-20, Army Command Policy (Section 5-5) (04 Aug 11)

²⁰ <http://www.armyg1.army.mil/eo/docs/EO%20Policy%20Tri-Signature.pdf>

²¹ DoD Directive 6495.01, http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/instructions/DoDI_649501_20130430.pdf

²² Army SHARP, <http://www.army.mil/sharp/>

²³ Navy Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/support/21st_Century_Sailor/sapr/Pages/default2.aspx

²⁴ Air Force Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, <http://www.sexualassaultpreventionresponse.af.mil/>

²⁵ <http://www.militaryfamily.org/get-info/military-kids/child-care/child-development-centers.html>

²⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/pages/US-Army-Pacific-Sisters-in-Arms>.

team has organized monthly meetings around the overarching theme of EMPOWERS – Engage (get out in the community), Meet (networking), Perform (accomplishment in duty environment), Overcome (conquer adversities), Wellness (instill confidence in mental and physical health), Educate (emphasize importance of lifelong learning), Revive (have fun!), and Sponsor (advocating for fellow women). The USARPAC HQ forum serves as a model for subordinate military units throughout the Pacific, and has included presentations and discussion led by female elected officials, flag officers, CEOs, community leaders, and veterans. Enthusiastic support from the USARPAC CG has ensured that participation from all ranks is encouraged. The “Sisters in Arms” model was included in recent engagements in Dhaka, where US military participants met with over 300 Lady Officers of the Bangladesh Army,²⁷ and in Thailand, as one aspect of a multilateral military exercise.²⁸

There is a similar forum at US Pacific Command (PACOM) called “WE LEAD” – Women Encouraging Leadership, Empowerment, and Advocacy. Open to men and women, military and civilian, the mission of WE LEAD is to provide a forum focused on the professional and personal development of women working in the defense arena.²⁹ The overarching objective of WE LEAD is to provide opportunity to cultivate skills and approaches for women working in the DoD; subthemes include awareness of women’s challenges, perspectives, and leadership in the workplace, and creating a mutually-supporting work environment for both women and men. Recent topics discussed at WE LEAD meetings include resume development and salary negotiation, comparing masculine versus feminine communication styles, and exploring personal and professional values. Despite the grassroots nature of the organization – it has been envisioned, developed, and executed by mid-level civilian employees at the PACOM HQ – WE LEAD has become a popular recurring venue.

IN CONCLUSION

Partner nations in the PACOM AOR recognize the value that gender diversity brings to their military and security forces. The process of integrating women into the US Armed Forces demanded the development of policies and programs to support female Service members through all stages of their military careers, and our partner nations are consulting these guidelines and “best practices” that the US Department of Defense has developed over time. It behooves the DoD to support our partner nations as they more fully integrate females. USAID has demonstrated that nations with higher rates of women in leadership positions are less likely to exhibit signs of political fragility.³⁰ A woman develops invaluable confidence, knowledge, and skills during a successful experience in the military, and this directly translates into leadership capability once she returns to civilian life. It is the responsibility of her military leaders to give her the support she deserves while in uniform.

²⁷ <http://www.dhakatribune.com/development/2014/mar/07/us-army-lauds-bd-female-army-officers-professionalism>

²⁸ http://www.army.mil/article/120298/_Sisters_in_Arms_program_goes_international_at_Cobra_Gold_2014/

²⁹ PACOM “WE LEAD” proposal, last updated 22 JULY 2013.

³⁰ Backer D. “2013 Alert Lists: Fragility and Risk for Instability.” USAID

MEDIA, COMMUNICATIONS AND SOFT AND HARD POWER

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ELECTRONIC JIHAD: WOMEN AND RADICALIZATION USING ONLINE SOCIAL MEDIA AND NEW TECHNOLOGY

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This paper will address the various online recruitment methods used by extremist groups worldwide and why these groups specifically choose to target women. This paper also looks at how the role of the media can either aide and abed the extremists agenda and/or play a part in discouraging the extremist's message. This paper will focus on means of deterring online radicalization and finally how to specifically deter women from being recruited to terrorist groups through online social media and new technology.

Today, 90 percent of terrorist activity on the Internet takes place using social networking tools....These forums act as a virtual firewall to help safeguard the identities of those who participate and they offer subscribers a chance to make direct contact with terrorist representatives, to ask questions, and even to contribute and help out the cyberjihad.¹

ONLINE RECRUITMENT METHODS

Directly following the Paris terrorist attacks in January 2015, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) at King's College London, observed a drastic increase in social media activity, with researchers identifying a significant number of UK women praising the attacks.² One individual who may be monitored by the ICSR is Hayat Boumeddiene, partner of Amédy Coulibaly, one of the Paris attackers.³ At the time this paper was written, her involvement in the Paris terrorist attacks is still unfolding and it is still unclear if she became radicalized online. What is clear is that she is the most wanted woman in France and believed to have fled to Syria.

2014 proved to be an extraordinary year in the number of young, western females that were successfully radicalized and recruited online through social media outlets. The state of Colorado alone was home to five teenage women that attempted to leave the United States and join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria. The ages of these girls ranged from 15-19 years old. Four of the girls were of Sudanese and Somali descent. The fifth girl, Shannon Conley, worked as a nurse's aide and intended to serve as a nurse for ISIL militants in Syria. Online recruiters encouraged Conley to receive firearms training so she could assist ISIL fighters in Syria. She attended a US Army Explorers cadet training camp to learn US military tactics and

¹ "New Terrorism and New Media" by Gabriel Weimann, Wilson Center, 2014. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/STIP_140501_new_terrorism_F.pdf

² "Isis using UK female jihadis to incite terror acts back home, say researchers." *The Guardian*. January 17, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/17/isis-uk-female-jihadists-database-icsr>

³ "Who is Hayat Boumeddiene?" BBC Newsbeat. January 12, 2015. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/30760975>

practice shooting. At the time of incarceration, Conley told investigators she intended to marry a militant that she met online.⁴ Conley was recently sentenced to four years in prison.⁵

More than 100 Americans have left the country to become foreign fighters alongside ISIL and other extremist groups. Hundreds more recruits have come from Europe, in fact a conservative estimate of radicalized individuals from Europe boils down to five people every single week.⁶ Terrorists have very good reasons to use social media to their advantage: studies show that people are now spending more time with online media than they are with traditional forms of media (books, magazines, television).⁷ The popularity of social media is advantageous to terrorist groups in countless ways: social media outlets allow terrorist groups to be part of the mainstream, social media is user-friendly, reliable, free, and permits terrorists to seek out their target audience and “virtually knock on their doors.”⁸

Social media is quite different from traditional and conventional media in numerous ways, such as in reach (vast, limitless audience), frequency, usability, immediacy, and permanence. It allows any individual the ability to publish or access information online.⁹ Online methods to promote electronic jihad can include operational instructions and training, data mining, coordination, and psychological warfare.¹⁰ Social media is also used to incite fear/threats (using tweets as one method), to form a sense of community and belonging to a group, to radicalize others, to romanticize Sharia law and the Islamic state, and to organize travel for recruits.

As of January 2014, the average age of users on Facebook was 30 years old, with almost half of all users logging in on a daily basis. A report put out by the Department of Homeland Security from 2010 stated the various methods in which terrorist groups use Facebook including:

- As a way to share operational and tactical information, (i.e. bomb recipes, weapon maintenance and use, and tactical shooting);
- As a gateway to extremist sites and other online radical content (via links on Facebook group-pages and discussion forums);
- As a media outlet for terrorist propaganda and extremist messages;
- As a wealth of information for conducting jihad “at home.”¹¹

⁴ “Schoolgirl jihadis: the female Islamists leaving home to join Isis fighters.” *The Guardian*. September 29, 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/29/schoolgirl-jihadis-female-islamists-leaving-home-join-isis-iraq-syria>

⁵ “4-Year Prison Term for Colorado Woman over Plot to Join ISIS.” National Public Radio. January 23, 2015. <http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2015/01/23/379466005/4-year-prison-term-for-colorado-woman-over-plot-to-join-isis>

⁶ <http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/22/us/colorado-teens-syria-odyssey/>

⁷ “Social Media’s Appeal to Terrorists” by Gabriel Weimann, October 3, 2014 <http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/295-social-media's-appeal-to-terrorists>

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ “New Terrorism and New Media” by Gabriel Weimann, Wilson Center, 2014. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/STIP_140501_new_terrorism_F.pdf

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ “Al Qaeda Looks to Make New 'Friends' -- on Facebook.” <http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2010/12/09/facebook-friends-terror>

Twitter is another source of electronic media that terrorist groups are using to their advantage by allowing the dissemination of their propaganda in almost real— time. There have been numerous instances of the mainstream media mistaking tweets as legitimate sources of breaking news. Terrorist groups are keen to this and use it to their advantage to put out fake news stories and attempt to gain followers for their cause and gain sympathy. Twitter has suspended many accounts in an attempt to curtail these extremist accounts, but to no avail. The Syrian group, al-Nusra Front opened up an alternative Twitter account and gained over 20,000 followers in a single day. This illustrates how quickly terrorist groups are able to restore their information networks online.¹²

Another way in which terrorists are using social networking sites is a method called Narrowcasting. Narrowcasting is a method in which specific messages can be aimed at segments of the public “defined by values, preferences, demographic attributes, or subscription” much like how cookies appear on a user’s computer. An online page, video, or chat room can be tailored to match the online profile and user history of a certain individual. Using these methods of deduction and narrowing down their “target” audience, terrorist groups can target specific ages (youth) and gender (female). This technique is similar to how marketing companies view members’ information online to find potential customers and then select products to promote to them. Terrorist groups view people’s profiles and decide whom to target and how each individual can be approached. “An online page, video, or chat’s name, images, appeals, and information are tailored to match the profile of a particular social group. These methods enable terrorists to target youth especially.”¹³

Social media also has technical advantages for terrorists: sharing, uploading or downloading files and videos no longer require access to computers or cyber-savvy members capable of using sophisticated computers and advanced programs. Using smart phones and social media platforms allow simple, free and fast access to all.¹⁴

RADICALIZATION OF WOMEN

Radicalization is widespread amongst men and women where conditions of injustice and political frustration prevail. Radicalization also thrives amongst those that sympathize and grieve with the plight of the oppressed and wish to show solidarity with other Muslims. Both radicalized men and women often feel despair, loss of dignity, outrage against injustice, and a perceived lack of alternatives to influence change.¹⁵ Despite these overlapping trends that affect both men and women, there are, in fact, specific factors that contribute and are unique to radicalizing women.

Unique female experiences for Muslim women include living under patriarchal rule where the status and treatment of women is visibly unequal. Living daily under these unequal conditions may catalyze women to revolt against the status quo and change their lives by changing the

¹² “New Terrorism and New Media” by Gabriel Weimann, Wilson Center, 2014.
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/STIP_140501_new_terrorism_F.pdf

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ “Women and Radicalization”, Margot Badran, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006

fabric of their society; or cause them to relent to their subordinate status and role in society. This often causes quiet frustration and suffering, and in turn may make them more susceptible to joining extremist groups. These women may be lured to these groups because of the promise of elevating their personal status, and social and economic conditions.

These two categories of women differ greatly. The women in the first category rise up and become strong and assertive either through their own defiant will and/or through the encouragement and support of other feminists. It is more complicated to predict the behavior of the second category of women. The second category is often dissatisfied with their lives and secondary status and this, in turn, can determine two different outcomes. These women may achieve fulfilling lives through positive self-development or, on the contrary, they may be vulnerable to further exploitation and suppression.¹⁶ This is the danger zone where the lure of radicalization may occur. This category of women can be a very susceptible portion of the population.

A report published through the Danish Institute for International Studies looked at categories of women most vulnerable to radicalization and concluded that the key characteristics that contributed towards women becoming involved in extremist groups were:

- Economically poor and poorly educated, socially marginalized or displaced (rural women living in towns and cities);
- Strong political grievances and a deep sense of injustice to their national, ethnic, and/or communal group;
- Induction into extremism through religious pressure and a sense of duty or reward for family;
- Relatives of radicalized men;
- Without men (single, divorced, or widowed);
- Young age;
- Suffered the loss of family;
- Suffering from flawed political conditions pushing them to radicalization.¹⁷

In 2015 it is crucial to examine the strategies of the terrorist group, ISIL, in regards to the recruitment and radicalization of women. Recruitment of both males and females is a priority for ISIL, but since ISIL declared itself (in June 2014) a caliphate, there has been an expanded focus on nation-building and growing its ranks. Thus, recruitment of females has turned into a massive campaign. Interestingly, the campaign is carried out primarily by European women who have left their home countries, joined ISIL, and moved to Syria. The recruitment campaign consists of ISIL propaganda, how women can communicate with ISIL members, and logistics on how Muslim women (of all ages) can travel to Syria and join their cause.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

A report put out by Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) in October of 2014, listed specific traits of how ISIL is utilizing cyber methods to a great extent:

ISIL shows the expertise and diversity of their cyber and media team and are using state of the art cyber usage (e.g. messaging and technology). After profiling this group's use of cyber technologies for over a year, we have determined that they use a variety of technological platforms, diverse languages, and tailored messaging. The cyber technologies facilitate internal coordination (e.g. command and control) and focuses information flow externally with the broader Umma and potential foreign fighters.¹⁸

The ISIL campaign has reached hundreds of girls in the West, including the (previously discussed) girls from Colorado. A SITE Intelligence Group study titled "Girl Talk: Calling Western Women to Syria," published in the summer of 2014, explained that many women claiming to be with ISIL have begun targeting foreign women for recruitment. At the forefront of this targeting campaign are English-language social media accounts allegedly run by Western women who live in territories controlled by ISIL and who may be married to jihadi fighters. The women of ISIL do not just act as recruiters; they also provide basic services (caretakers of the home) and some even carry out militant operations. Women have been reportedly involved in violent wings of this group and have acted as suicide bombers.¹⁹

Using online social media methods to reach out to women from around the globe, ISIL recruiters are urging women to move to the "Land of the Caliphate," providing detailed manuals on how to travel, what they need to bring with them, and even what they deem is the religious justification allowing them to lie to their parents. British women have posted pictures of themselves holding various guns, such as AK-47s, grenades and <in one case> a severed head. These women are also tweeting pictures of food, restaurants and sunsets to present a positive picture of the life in Syria awaiting the young women that join ISIL. Mia Bloom, a security studies professor at Massachusetts University, said this recruitment campaign paints a "Disney-like" picture of life within the caliphate. It is not unheard of for young women to be offered financial incentives, such as travel expenses or compensation for bearing militants' children.²⁰

Different research reports state contradictory conclusions regarding how, once recruited and radicalized, women are used within ISIL. Some reports assert that the women are used as merely jihadi brides and maintain traditional domestic duties; other analysts stress that women may be used in many varied capacities within the group. For example, researchers at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King's College London have closely monitored the activities of British jihadists through social media methods. This study shows that between ten and fifteen percent of Western fighters in Syria and Iraq are women. This study asserts that women:

- Tend to have traditional domestic duties and analysts do not believe they are fighting;

¹⁸ "SMA Support to SOCCENT ISIL Effort", October 2014

¹⁹ "Women and Radicalization", Margot Badran, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006

²⁰ "Schoolgirl jihadis: the female Islamists leaving home to join Isis fighters." *The Guardian*. September 29, 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/29/schoolgirl-jihadis-female-islamists-leaving-home-join-isis-iraq-syria>

- They are cooking for the fighters and cleaning and only tend to be allowed to leave the compounds to go shopping;
- Those who have been there for a long time are moving away from merely living in an Islamic state towards a recruitment role;
- The women that have recently arrived in Syria are still in the euphoric stage of having made it there;
- While there have been examples of women joining foreign conflicts and jihad in the past, the scale that is happening now is unprecedented.²¹

This study also claims that under the ISIL interpretation of Islamic law, women are not permitted to fight on the battlefield, but are allowed to engage in suicide bombings.²²

While the study from King's College is certainly accurate in that many women joining ISIL become jihadi wives and homemakers, there are undoubtedly many women that are or will serve other purposes within the group. An article in *Foreign Affairs* from August, 2014 proclaims the danger in simplifying the role that women play within extremist groups. While many women within ISIL may now have domestic duties rather than on the battlefield, history has shown that this role can evolve over time.

It is fascinating to analyze if and why females might be willing of their own accord to support a group whose cause so blatantly oppresses women. Are women also choosing to support atrocities (bombings) that may kill innocent women and children (bystanders)? Despite the assertions in the *Foreign Affairs* article stating:

That question reveals more about the analysts' prior assumptions than the fighters. Those who ask this question assume, first, that women are more peaceful than men by nature; and second, that women who participate in armed rebellion are little more than cannon fodder in a man's game.²³

In actuality, this is a legitimate and worthwhile question to ponder. To ask this question does not necessarily connote that women are innately peaceful. Women have indeed shown time and again that they are willing to take up arms. As this same *Foreign Affairs* article points out, women have been on the front lines of battle within extremist groups the world over; El Salvador, Eritrea, Nepal, Peru, and Sri Lanka to name a few.

Despite the extreme oppression of women within terrorist groups, do women willingly join in an attempt to prove the worth of their gender in the hopes of making strides towards women's rights? While this might cross the mind of some women, this is not the driving force that motivates their loyalty to the group. The reality is that women primarily decide to leave their

²¹ "One in seven British jihadists may be women" The Telegraph, September 5, 2014
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11077592/One-in-seven-British-jihadists-may-be-women.html>

²² Ibid.

²³ "The Women of ISIS", by Nimmi Gowrinathan, *Foreign Affairs*, August 2014

families, friends and lives behind and join extremist groups for many of the same reasons as men: they believe in and are sympathetic to the cause.

ISIL's fight is a sectarian struggle between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, with several minorities caught in the cross hairs. The all-female brigade, al-Khansaa relies heavily on identity politics for recruitment, targeting young women who feel oppressed as Sunni Muslims. Calls for single women to join the fight for an Islamic caliphate have drawn women to ISIL from all over the world.²⁴

Aqsa Mahmood (she has since changed her name to Umm Layth) fled Glasgow and traveled to Syria in November 2014 where she married an ISIL fighter. She is an avid social-media user who writes a blog advising young women about the safest way to travel to Syria and marry a militant.

Most sisters I have come across have been in university studying courses with many promising paths, with big, happy families and friends, and everything in the *Dunya* [material world] to persuade one to stay behind and enjoy the luxury. If we had stayed behind, we could have been blessed with it all from a relaxing and comfortable life and lots of money. *Wallahi* [I swear] that's not what we want.²⁵

Her father said: "If our daughter, who had all the chances and freedom in life, could become a bedroom radical then it's possible for this to happen to any family."

On 02 February 2014, ISIL announced the formation of Umm Al-Rayan, a female brigade, with the purpose of exposing male activists who disguise in women's clothing to avoid detention when stopping at the ISIL checkpoints. ISIL requires the women within this brigade to be single and between the ages of 18 and 25. Each female receives a monthly salary of 25,000 Syrian liras (less than \$200). As of December 2014, the brigade was not used for involvement in acts of terror. This brigade is separate from the other ISIL all-female Al-Khansaa Brigade.²⁶ Stereotypes of the "helpless" and "naïve" female need to be a thing of the past if policymakers ever hope to understand the prevalence of female radicalization and recruitment.

Like the young girls from Colorado, many individuals radicalized online may not be devout Muslims or particularly religious. It is easy to categorize all those recruited online as guileless or feeble-minded, but this is just not the reality. Many people caught up in online propaganda don't initially seek it out—it finds them. The indicators seem to be more in line with those "missing something" from their lives. These individuals may be highly educated, young or old, male or female, from lower economic status or financially stable. The common denominator appears to be that each of those that are successfully radicalized and recruited online feel sympathy towards the cause of the group in which they become aligned. It can just be a spark of sympathy, a small moment which invokes an emotion from them while they are watching a YouTube video of

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ "Schoolgirl jihadis: the female Islamists leaving home to join Isis fighters." *The Guardian*. September 29, 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/29/schoolgirl-jihadis-female-islamists-leaving-home-join-isis-iraq-syria>

²⁶ <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/umm-al-ryan>

innocent victims in Africa and the Middle East. It only takes this tiny spark of emotion and sympathy to garner wider interest in this individual to then begin researching online causes for which various extremist groups are fighting. The recruitment process might start with an indiscriminate person donating money, downloading extremist propaganda, entering a jihadi chatroom, or “liking” a radical group on Facebook. “Entire radicalization, from early attraction to jihadi preaching to the final deadly mission, can be accomplished online through social media platforms.”²⁷

The divine status of a ‘mujahed’ is presumably among the greatest attractions drawing young people to participate in terrorist actions. The threshold for engaging in electronic jihad is markedly lower than for someone who gives up a familiar, comfortable life to travel to an actual battle zone and risk injury or death. If the judgment wins wide acceptance that online activism is, in the eyes of God (Allah) and the people, a proper, respectable, and sufficient form of jihad, one can expect ever-increasing efforts in online propaganda and cyber-attacks, which, in turn, could recruit even more radicalized individuals and, ultimately, lead to new attacks.²⁸

As of January 2015, the vast majority of British women who have gone to Syria to join extremist groups were between the ages of 18 and 24, with the majority being under 20 years old. There have also been countless other females that have inquired about jihad following the beheading of US citizen, James Foley, and the video of his execution online. The female Muslim population in Britain may be vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment due to deep feelings of marginalization. These women may be attracted to the idea of belonging to something greater than them and the “status espoused by ISIL, who want to create an Islamic state.” When women feel they are seen as “the other,” and their own religious ideologies tell them they have a greater purpose and duty as a Muslim, this is prime breeding ground for recruitment. Online interactions are excellent at creating a sense of community and belonging. The same way online social media is used to generate fear and spread terror, it is also used to create relationships and feelings of closeness and fitting-in with a group.

Using social media methods in which to reach individuals prone to radicalization is not as difficult as one might imagine. The teenage girls from Colorado all researched their plan online and visited websites where extremists discussed the logistics of traveling to Syria. Young women in communities such as the minority African population in Colorado are an exceptionally valuable target to extremist groups. These groups promise them the acceptance that may be missing in their lives as well as the honor of becoming the wife of a glorified soldier of Allah. It is not difficult at all for young Muslims to encounter extremists online that are bent on radicalizing vulnerable individuals that are spending time on Facebook and other seemingly innocuous social media sites.²⁹

²⁷ “Social Media’s Appeal to Terrorists” by Gabriel Weimann, October 3, 2014
<http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/295-social-media's-appeal-to-terrorists>

²⁸ “New Terrorism and New Media” by Gabriel Weimann, Wilson Center, 2014

²⁹ “Girls' jihadi quest stirs Muslim communities' fears.” October 29, 2014
<http://www.newstribune.com/news/2014/oct/29/girls-jihadi-quest-stirs-muslim-communities-fears/>

The Colorado girls' online searches and internet activity did not set off any tripwires to the FBI. Searches that once set off alarm bells to intelligence agencies are no longer being scrutinized to the same extent since former NSA employee, Edward Snowden, revealed secrets about the US surveillance programs. It has become much more difficult for US intelligence agencies to track suspicious internet activity.³⁰ UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, and President Obama issued a joint statement in January 2015 asking for large US tech companies to work closely with intelligence and law enforcement agencies in fighting terrorism. The tech companies are being asked to give personal user data over to the government to allow security services to monitor online activity.³¹

MEDIA:

NATO recognizes the threat of terrorist groups using online social media and new technology for recruitment and radicalization purposes. A NATO research paper from September 2014 states

Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and **modern technology** increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks.³²

The dangers of recruiting and radicalizing, specifically women, online are that the reach is endless and the chance of getting caught is minimized (no travel required). The women living in Europe and countries outside the Middle East are the least likely suspects. Jihadi groups encourage attacks “at home” to eliminate the risk of infiltration when traveling. Women are not often seen as posing imminent threats and may be able to travel more freely than men without arousing suspicion. NATO recognizes that “because our citizens can freely travel, visa-free, from the U.S. to Norway and other European states—and vice versa—the problem of fighters in Syria returning to any of our countries is a problem for all of our countries.”³³

ISIL is only one of many terrorist groups that are savvy to the advantages of using online media and new technology for their cause; al-Qaeda has understood the significance of utilizing the internet for quite some time. In an undated letter to Taliban leader Mullah Omar, bin Laden noted that 90% of the preparation for war is effective use of the media.³⁴ al-Qaeda has also called for “information operations” and “electronic warfare” which most certainly refers to use of the Internet. Ayman al-Zawahiri, now leader of al-Qaeda, continually speaks about “the jihad of the spear” and the “jihad of the bayan (message, declaration)”. Of these two, he asserts that the second is of greater importance, and it is the “knights of the media jihad” the “clandestine

³⁰ “Officials: 3 Denver girls played hooky from school and tried to join ISIS”. October 22, 2014 <http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/22/us/colorado-teens-syria-odyssey/>

³¹ “Obama Supports U.K. Request to Pressure Tech Giants on Security Cooperation.” Sputnik International. Accessed January 20, 2015. <http://us.sputniknews.com/us/20150116/1013497431.html>

³² “The ‘Home Game’ Countering Violent Extremism within NATO”, by Jacqueline Page, September 2014

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Deterring an “Army Whose Men Love Death”: Delegitimizing al-Qaida” International Security Summer 2014. Jerry Mark Long, Alex Wilner

mujahideen” who are conducting it. These declarations by Zawahiri are found in a variety of jihadist multi-lingual videos as well as cyber magazines.³⁵

Mujahideen fighters that are radicalized and recruited by al-Qaeda view death in a specific way: they believe that paradise will be theirs, and they will also be “celebrated in cyber-gardens of timeless remembrance on earth.” There are many internet websites which celebrate battle and martyrdom that carry titles like the al-Qaeda (AQAP) online magazines (*Sada al-MalaHim*, *Tala’I Khurasan*). For both males and females that are seeking a greater purpose in life and suffering from feelings of displacement, joining extremist groups holds promise of a new identity and belonging to a group that understands them.

Abu Yahya al-Libi, a now deceased powerful ideologue within al-Qaeda stated, “Our youth love death as your soldiers love wine. They have divorced this world. They don’t give it a second glance because it has no real value to them.” This really sums up the mindset of fighters not only within al-Qaeda but other extremist groups. Male and female group members are not afraid to die and often welcome the idea of dying for their cause.

Terrorist organizations, the world over, represent a very targeted socio-political, cultural, or national community and strive to address grievances that are shared by members of that community. The group gains strength from the larger community through various forms including new recruits, financial, logistical, and material backing, and ideological support. In al-Qaeda’s case, the coercive goal is to influence especially the youth (including young women) and coming generations, who are witnesses to the struggle. Who better to target than women? It is, after all, women who are raising the next generation. Women/mothers play extremely influential roles to their children.

HOW TO DETER ONLINE RADICALIZATION

How can this ever-growing threat posed from the online recruitment and radicalization of individuals using online social media methods and new technology be deterred? An article from *International Security*, Summer 2014 discusses the methods to diminish the appeal of radical messages online. Processes with which this can be accomplished start with depriving extremist groups of their socio-religious appeal. Countering their sacred values takes away the very rationale which individuals use to join the group in the first place. Stripping away the legitimacy of the group will cause their community of support and their target audience to shrink in size. An example of this is to challenge al-Qaeda’s religious appeal, thus eliminating the very way they legitimize their acts of terror. For example, challenge al-Qaeda’s assertions that the actions of the West are entirely aimed at expanding Western policies and advancing their economic stance in the world.³⁶

The fact of the matter is that all terrorist groups have a narrative that can be exploited. If the group’s message loses credibility, then the group will lose sympathizers and recruits. The key is

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Deterring an “Army Whose Men Love Death”: Delegitimizing al-Qaida” *International Security* Summer 2014. Jerry Mark Long, Alex Wilner

to deter men and women by manipulating terror groups' messages. As the *International Security* article states,

In strategic terms, if we can target a message, we thereby deter/compel those who would have adopted it, along with those who currently employ it. And the degree to which the groups' message loses traction with Arab and Islamic publics is the degree to which deterrence by delegitimization will have succeeded.³⁷

Terror groups are not run haphazardly, quite the opposite; their foundation is built on calculated shrewdness. It is vital for policymakers to understand how these groups build support and transmit their legitimacy, but equally important is to understand how their narrative guides their interpretation of history and how they view contemporary Western policies.³⁸ This is essential to deter the threat that extremist groups pose online. To effectively deter terrorist groups, there needs to be a deep understanding of that group's culture because that will shape the strategic choices made by that group.

Deterrence can also be successful by means of a counternarrative: that is if a terrorist group decides against a given course of action (such as an attack) out of fear that their support networks will disappear. A terror group survives if the community supports them; take away the community support and the terror group will diminish and eventually fail. Men and women contemplating joining terrorist groups might be deterred from doing so if they believe that the legitimacy of their cause is compromised or false. When the terrorist group's behavior is deemed offensive and illegitimate by their audience, this group will fall away. Taking away the romantic notions of "becoming a hero for a cause" and exposing these groups as the appalling brutes and killers that they are will diminish their support base and the numbers of recruits online. Vital to the longevity of these groups is how they are perceived by their target audience and how well their cause gains sympathizers.³⁹

The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) have intercepted several accounts online that reveal how dozens of women are mourning husbands lost in battle. The ICSR have seen several online posts from British women complaining about the harsh winter climate in Syria and that fact that there is no electricity. These posts state that the water has been so cold they can't wash and their children are becoming ill.⁴⁰ Grumbings such as these can be used to counter radicalization efforts. Intelligence agencies can use social media to monitor what is going on inside the ranks of groups such as ISIL and provide an opportunity to either create or exploit the discontent within the group. Scrutinizing online chatter of new recruits within extremist groups is an excellent way for intelligence agencies to gain inside information without sending in spies. The internet, which the terrorists use to their advantage to avoid physical travel and detection, can also be used in the same way for intelligence officials.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Deterring an "Army Whose Men Love Death": Delegitimizing al-Qaida" *International Security* Summer 2014. Jerry Mark Long, Alex Wilner

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ "How a team of social media experts is able to keep track of the UK jihadis." January 17, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/17/social-media-british-jihadists-islamic-state-facebook-twitter>

HOW TO DETER WOMEN FROM RECRUITMENT AND RADICALIZATION

Whether or not they live in a patriarchal society, women typically have a solid and powerful network of connections including a connection to their surrounding community. This, to some extent, allows them to have a strong influence in their adjacent area and neighborhoods, towns, villages, and universities. This connection to community is very important when studying female recruitment efforts by jihadi groups because across many cultures, women connect directly with other women at the local level. Women can be a powerful voice in curtailng other women from becoming radicalized.

Counterterrorism officials need to recognize that women's roles within a community can be a key source of intelligence about existing radicalization in their neighborhoods. Within many cultures, women are often very savvy into what goes on in their community. Despite the status of women as second-class citizens in various cultures, they possess a mighty influence that cannot be overlooked in countering radicalization efforts. Women are the ones at home raising the next generation of those that will rise up and become extremists or become the first in their family to graduate from college. The influence of the mothers at home must not be discounted. If counterterrorism officials can focus on changing the hearts and minds of the women at home to teach their sons and daughters to fight with their words and not with their swords, the landscape of future terrorists can change.

A report on women and terrorist radicalization from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe stressed the importance of reaching out to women within extremist communities:

Women can have special potential in countering VERT (violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism). The involvement of women as policy shapers, educators, community members and activists is essential to address the conditions conducive to terrorism and effectively prevent terrorism. Women can provide crucial feedback on the current counter-terrorism efforts of the international community and can point out when preventive policies and practices are having counterproductive impacts on their communities.⁴¹

There are numerous feminist transnational networking organizations already established including those that focus on Muslim communities. One such network is called "Women Living under Muslim Laws." Networking communities amongst progressive Muslim women, such as this one, have developed due to enormous advancements in information technology and increased access to the Internet for women worldwide. With increased access to the Internet, women are able to expand their networking on an unprecedented scale and, at the same time, gain access to uncensored global information.⁴²

⁴¹ Women and Terrorist Radicalization Final Report. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 13 March 2012

⁴² "Women and Radicalization", Margot Badran, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006

The ideal target audience to assist with female de-radicalization efforts is also the same target audience that jihadi groups hope to recruit: modern, young, second generation, perhaps university students abroad. For the extremists, these women are unlikely suspects and often carry European passports, which allow for seamless travel to the Middle East if necessary. Terrorist groups understand, however, that targeting this particular demographic of females is risky; they may already believe in and support gender equality and, in fact, are not prone to radicalization. For feminist transnational networking organizations, this same demographic of women are a whole new generation of Muslims that have grown up exposed to new Islamically grounded gender egalitarian ideas. These women can reach out to other women and play a vital role in deterring radicalization and recruitment of women online.⁴³

What can be done to counter the radicalization and recruitment of women through online social media methods? Is it enough to focus on the obvious technical solution of removing or blocking radical material online? This strategy alone will not solve the problem of terrorist groups gaining recruits. A technical solution will prove to be costly and counterproductive. A successful strategy to dissuade the recruitment of women must include the following:

- Deter the producers of extremist materials by selectively taking down and prosecuting the owners of these websites. This would send a strong signal that those involved in online extremism are not beyond the reach of the law and will be penalized.
- Empower online communities to self-regulate through the creation of an “Internet Users Panel” of sorts that would improve methods to report complaints and allow Internet users to make their voices heard.
- Reduce the appeal of extremist messages by having a larger “counter-message” online such as the creation of more websites (largely for women) that spread an anti-violence message of Islam as a peaceful religion and one that supports women’s rights. An example of spreading a counter message is the recent launch of the Charlie Hebdo (satirical French newspaper that was the target of a terrorist attack in January 2015) app. This app was approved by the Apple (Macintosh) app store and available for download within one hour after developers contacted the Apple CEO. (Typically apps take up to ten days for approval.)⁴⁴
- Promote positive messages online. Efforts to counter online radicalization of women through social media must include using this exact technology, not shying away from online social media methods but utilizing these sites to spread counter-radicalization messages.⁴⁵

⁴³ “Women and Radicalization”, Margot Badran, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006

⁴⁴ “Charlie Hebdo Launches App Version of Latest Issue.” Accessed January 20, 2015.

<http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/charlie-hebdo-launches-app-version-latest-issue/print?id=28345203>

⁴⁵ “Countering Online Radicalisation: A Strategy for Action” 2009 <http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1236768491ICSROnlineRadicalisationReport.pdf>

Terrorist groups are not going to stop using the Internet to spread their message in an attempt to gain sympathy for their cause and gain recruits. As this research has shown, using the online environment is extremely advantageous to them for many reasons, including disseminating their ideas at little or no cost, taking advantage of the vast amount of knowledge and information that is available online, using the internet to create and communicate with virtual networks of like-minded individuals, and finally, understanding that the internet masks their individual identities, making chances of incarceration less probable.

Online social media is not only a potent way to promote terrorism, but also a necessary tool in preventing it...This is the emerging challenge for the West: to regain the cyber territory it has long ceded to extremists.⁴⁶

This paper focused on the various online recruitment methods used by terrorist groups and spoke to what these groups gain when they specifically target women. This paper examined how the role of the media assists the extremist's agenda and/or plays a part in discouraging their message. Finally, this paper focused on how women can successfully be deterred from radicalization through online social media methods.

⁴⁶ "Social Media's Appeal to Terrorists" by Gabriel Weimann, October 3, 2014
<http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/295-social-media's-appeal-to-terrorists>

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FROM AFGHAN CLASSROOMS TO CORPORATE AMERICA, THE INTERNET AS A GENDER EQUALIZING PATHWAY

CDR Suzanna Brugler, USN



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GENDER INEQUALITY WORLDWIDE

Gender inequality is rampant worldwide whether examining traditional women's roles in Afghan society or the modern glass ceiling in corporate America. Drawing on societal effects, the United Nations Development Program states that gender inequality remains a major barrier to human development. According to the UN, girls and women have made major strides since 1990, but they have not yet gained gender equity. This has hampered the development of societies as a whole, which in turn has had an adverse effect on global security.

The World Economic Forum's 2014 *Global Gender Gap Report*, which measures gender-based disparities across the four key areas of health, education, economy and politics, reported that not one country has fully closed the gender equality gap. The study's focus is on progress concerning the gender gap in the chosen fields, rather than whether women are actually winning the 'battle of the sexes.' Although the study reports that all five of the Nordic countries (Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark), having closed more than 80% of the gender gap in the selected key areas, rank in the top five, it will take 81 years for the gender gap to close worldwide if gender equality progresses at its current rate.

Even the United States, which ranked 20th out of 142 countries in the study, recognizes the issue of gender inequality as a matter of global security. In December 2011, the Obama Administration released the first-ever *U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*. The plan's goal is to empower half the world's population as equal partners in preventing conflict and building peace in countries threatened and affected by war, violence and insecurity. Deadly conflicts can be more effectively avoided, and peace can be best forged and sustained, when women become equal partners in all aspects of peace-building and conflict prevention, according to the plan.

THE EFFECTS OF GENDER INEQUALITY ACROSS SOCIETIES

In a 2011 academic paper, a student of Women and Gender studies at the University of Dhaka succinctly wrote,

Unequal power relations between females and males lead to widespread violations of health and human rights. Among the most persistent and pernicious are early or child marriage, sexual trafficking, sexual violence, coercion, and female genital cutting. Institutionalized legal inequality underpins laws that keep land, money and other economic resources out of girls' and women's hands, closing off avenues for redress of discrimination and creating the conditions for gender-based violence and exploitation. (Tanzim, 2011)

Aside from health and human rights violations, a staggering depiction of how the effects of gender inequality translates further into the labor force is found in the UN's July 1980 *Report of the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace*. "While they (women) represent 50 per cent of the world adult population and one-third of the official labour force, they perform nearly two thirds of all working hours, receive only one tenth of the world income and own less than 1 per cent of world property."

More recently, the UN study, *The World's Women 2010 Trends and Statistics*, further explains this phenomenon:

In spite of the changes that have occurred in women's participation in the labour market, women continue to bear most of the responsibilities for the home: caring for children and other dependent household members, preparing meals and doing other housework. In all regions, women spend at least twice as much time as men on unpaid domestic work. Women who are employed spend an inordinate amount of time on the double burden of paid work and family responsibilities; when unpaid work is taken into account, women's total work hours are longer than men's in all regions.

Drawing on these data points, a disharmony exists, and a huge disconnect occurs, when an entire populous of the world – the female gender – is responsible for the overwhelming majority of work required merely for human existence through child care and domestic up-keep. And yet, worldwide, the female populous receives only a fraction of the income, privileges, and rewards and benefits, as a product of their work. This causes an imbalance of power that, due to their traditional role as primary care giver in the home, severely short-hands women on a global scale. According to the same July 1980 UN report, “As a result, women have often been regarded and treated as inferior and unequal in their activities outside the domestic sphere and have suffered violations of their human rights.” Hence, women's labor inequality and human rights violations are inextricably linked.

From a security perspective, countries are more peaceful and prosperous when women are accorded full and equal rights and opportunity as men. This concept is reinforced in the 2010 National Security Strategy, which states, “Women should have access to the same opportunities and be able to make the same choices as men.”

On the diplomacy front, in December 2010 former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton released the first-ever *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*. The review dedicated an entire section to focus on women and girls. It emphasized that they should be integral in all diplomatic efforts – from traditional bilateral and multilateral relationships, strategic dialogues, and public diplomacy, to relations with civil society, community leaders, and other non-state actors. According to the review, “By reaching out to women and girls and integrating them into our diplomatic mission, we ensure more effective diplomacy, whether in driving economic growth, resisting extremism, safeguarding human rights, or promoting political solutions, including in areas of conflict.”

Further addressing women's issues globally, on the eve of the inaugural International Day of the Girl Child in October 2012, Clinton announced new U.S. government and private initiatives to prevent child marriages and promote girls' education around the world. These initiatives acknowledge that early and forced marriage robs girls of opportunities to build better lives through education and skilled work, threatens their health, and traps them into lives of poverty.

These doctrinal proclamations, in both the security and diplomacy spheres, are examples of how the U.S. is trying to secure women's rights and opportunity globally through changing and institutionalizing women's roles in peace and security.

THE INTERNET AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT

The emergence of the Internet over the past twenty years has provided a new, unprecedented pathway for people to connect globally through technology. The basic premise of the Internet is that it is a free, open information superhighway that, once accessed, discriminates against no one. From a policy perspective, the UN Economic and Social Council January 2010 report on *Information and communications technology (ICT) and gender equality* states, "ICT provides important tools to promote gender equality, enhance women's participation and empowerment and help women to achieve greater success in income-generating and domestic activities."

Furthermore, the World Summit on the Information Society, held in Geneva in 2003 and Tunis in 2005, generated a Declaration of Principles that underscored a strong commitment to women's human rights and empowerment, and recognized the importance of their participation in shaping the information society.

We affirm that development of ICTs provides enormous opportunities for women, who should be an integral part of, and key actors, in the Information Society. We are committed to ensuring that the Information Society enables women's empowerment and their full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society and in all decision-making processes. To this end, we should mainstream a gender equality perspective and use ICTs as a tool to that end.

In examining the Internet's role in the information revolution, much of the focus has been placed on the technology, rather than the information and knowledge that are shared using technology over the Internet. But a shift in recent years has placed the focus from technology itself to an emerging global 'knowledge society' centered on people using knowledge, rather than technology. In knowledge society, information technology is applied to the acquisition and use of knowledge toward the end goal of human development and economic growth. Ensuring that women benefit equitably from efforts to develop human capacity is at the core of knowledge society (Hafkin, 2008).

Further expanding this idea of knowledge society and its effect on global security, the Internet has the potential to play a key role in preventing conflict in unstable countries, and to help build peace and security throughout the world, through educating and empowering women. The primary issue, then, is *access* to that technology – specifically, access to the Internet.

BRIDGING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE

The Digital Divide is a social issue referring to the differing amount of information between those who have access to the Internet and those who do not have access. In broad terms, the difference is not determined solely by access to the Internet and the hardware that delivers it, but by access to ICT (Information and Communications Technology) and to Media that different segments of society can use. With regard to the Internet, access is only one aspect – other factors such as the quality of connection and related services, and their affordability, are also considered (*Internet World Stats*, 2014).

One woman who is making a difference in her society by helping to bridge the Digital Divide for other Afghan women is Roya Mahboob. Through her work as a technology entrepreneur, twenty-eight-year-old Mahboob both educates and elevates other Afghan women and girls. How does she manage to do it in a culturally restrictive environment for women such as Afghanistan? Through providing Internet access and cultivating its use among women in school classrooms.

“You have to show everybody that men and women are equal. Women can do something if you allow them. Give them opportunity and they can prove themselves,” says Mahboob.

After enrolling in technology courses sponsored by the UN, in 2010 Mahboob started an IT consulting firm with two Herat University classmates and for which she currently serves as CEO, Afghan Citadel Software Company. Today it employs 35 people, of whom 28 are women. Her employees develop software and databases for private companies, government ministries and NATO. The first time she competed for an Afghan government project, Mahboob beat out six male competitors. She later reinvested most of her work profits with American business partner and philanthropist Francesco Rulli to provide Internet access to 35,000 girls at eight classrooms in Herat in western Afghanistan. They plan to expand the program to 40 schools and 160,000 girls throughout Afghanistan.

Mahboob also runs Women’s Annex, an interactive multi-media global online community that seeks to empower women worldwide by promoting digital literacy. WomensAnnex.com is a film and blog distribution platform created to enable women and children all over the world to express their thoughts and ideas through films, videos, blogs and social media. Mahboob believes that digital literacy is the key to freedom for women in countries where traditional patriarchal values still prevail. Technical proficiency and access to the Internet empower women by making them educated, independent, and by providing them with opportunities to connect with other women online.

On ReturntoHope.com, the NATO website commemorating the close of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force mission, Mahboob is featured for her progressive and ground-breaking work to help women unite across Afghanistan.

Technology empowers women economically, by making it possible for them to work from home and thus to do jobs remotely that they wouldn’t be permitted to do in person, since they would require them to leave home. And it empowers women socially by connecting them with other women whom they’d never be able to meet otherwise – they can share their stories, collaborate, form a community. That, in turn, helps women to develop the confidence they need to pursue their dreams. As the saying goes, there’s strength in numbers.

In the U.S. State Department blog DipNote, Secretary of State John Kerry wrote about Mahboob in November, 2013. “Roya is part of a great and too often untold success story. As opportunities for Afghan women grow, so do the possibilities for peace, economic prosperity and stability. Investing in Afghan women is one of the surest ways to guarantee that Afghanistan will sustain the gains of the past decade and never again become a safe haven for international terrorists.”

BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE AT HOME

Much like her Afghan counterpart, Facebook COO and author of the New York Times best seller *Lean In*, Sheryl Sandberg is breaking down gender cultural barriers in corporate America through cultivating an online platform, spawned from her book, through which women are encouraged to communicate, collaborate and learn from each other to help establish gender equality in the workforce.

In a Ted Talk entitled, “Why we have too few women leaders” filmed in Washington, D.C., December 2010, Sandberg stated her case for women in the workforce. “Women are not making it to the top of any profession, anywhere in the world. ... Women face harder choices [than men] between professional success and personal fulfillment.”

Lean In, the book inspired by Sandberg’s Ted Talk, is packed with practical advice geared toward women on how to believe in themselves, rise above gender disparities, and achieve any goal whether in the corporate boardroom or elsewhere in their lives. A call to arms for women in the workforce, *Lean In* encourages women to aggressively pursue their careers on all fronts through deliberate actions that include: analyzing the leadership ambition gap (she asks her readers, “What would you do if you weren’t afraid?”); sitting at the table; finding a mentor; seeking and speaking your truth; addressing family planning early (don’t leave before you leave); and perhaps most important of all, making your partner a real partner, both career-wise and at home.

Based on the book, related website LeanIn.org is an online platform that offers women the ongoing inspiration and support to help them achieve their personal and professional goals. Filled with instructional videos, expert lectures, courseware and personal accounts, the online platform encourages women to actively meet in-person during so-called “Lean in Circle” meetings, so that they can encourage each other to learn and grow together. The website proudly proclaims, “Through the power of peer support, Circles are changing lives.”

LeanIn.org supports women by providing: 1) an online community that encourages an open exchange of ideas and information, 2) education through a growing library of online lectures on topics including leadership and communication, and 3) the materials and support to run successful Lean In Circles. (Note, although Sandberg’s book primarily focuses on statistics, facts and figures that are U.S.-based, her principles, influence and reach, not to mention her celebrity as Facebook’s COO, extends beyond to the international work force.)

If *Lean In* the book is the manual, then LeanIn.org is the continually updated user’s guide. Above all, Sandberg’s *Lean In* mantra is the answer to her 2010 Ted Talk, and is truly about establishing gender equality in the work place.

THE GENDER EQUALIZING PATHWAY TO A MORE SECURE WORLD

A comparison of Mahboob and Sandberg reveals that both women promote the Internet as a gender equalizing pathway in their respective societies. On the one hand, Mahboob is primarily working to make Internet technology more accessible for her fellow women in Afghan classrooms, so that they may become more digitally literate and virtually connected, if cultural

circumstances dictate that they remain primarily hidden away from society and from each other. On the other hand, Sandberg has built an online network within the knowledge society construct, so that women who once felt isolated in corporate America, especially in the upper echelons of leadership, now have an online meeting place to build comradery and support in their quests for self-actualization in the work force. Mahboob also promotes knowledge society through her Women's Annex website.

On the security front, connecting women through technology can lead to a safer, more secure world. In Afghanistan, leaders are beginning to recognize the importance of including women in the peace and security process as responsibility shifts from the NATO international forces to the Afghan forces. In October 2014, Afghan government officials signed a new national action plan that engaged both women and men in sustaining a peaceful transition. The plan called for increased recruitment of women for the Afghan police force and the Afghan National Army, and for elevating women as full partners in creating a stable future (Jacevic, 2014).

Over the past couple of years Afghan women have engaged with insurgent groups facilitating reintegration and reconciliation processes, even negotiating the release of hostages with wives of the Taliban. Think of the possible potential, if now only improbable, influence Mahboob's WomensAnnex.com could play in a situation where Afghan women who are connected through the Internet create a knowledge society that Taliban wives recognize as a cohort in which they also want to participate. What incredible leaps could be made in international security, then?

On the home front, Sandberg's "Lean in Circles" has inspired countless women's professional groups including a military Lean in Circle that has remained active for over a year in Norfolk, Virginia. A group of roughly twenty officers ranging in rank from Ensign to Rear Admiral faithfully meets every month to discuss leadership and Navy/Marine Corps women's issues on the waterfront. The Lean In knowledge society based in Sandberg's teachings helps shape and mold national security efforts here at home – that's quite an impact.

Both cases distinctly different, yet both demonstrate that the Internet, a globally accessible medium, serves as a gender-equalizing pathway that women internationally are adopting as a means to band together to overcome gender inequality – whether in Afghan schools or in the American corporate boardroom, or even on the waterfront.

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UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325 AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: SOFT POWER SOLUTIONS TO A HARD SECURITY ISSUE

S. Dharmapuri

INTRODUCTION

The West has shot itself in the foot when it comes to women and extremism. Policies and messaging abroad about the merits of democracy and especially women's rights are now tangibly associated with a Western agenda. If Western governments try to curtail the spread of political extremism and terrorism by funding civil society groups in predominantly Muslim countries they are likely to meet with public backlash, or worse. In fact, "Women's rights are a western agenda" is a common retort from human rights spoilers and terrorist groups alike. This combined with increasing reports of groups like Boko Harm abducting girls from schools or increasing numbers of foreign women joining terrorist groups like ISIS present a complicated problem. But the solution to curtailing women's involvement in terrorism and countering violent extremism is more obvious than we think. Getting out of this conundrum requires doing the one thing we haven't yet done enough of: using a gender perspective in international security and peace decision-making, as per UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

Why? Because we know it works.

Including a gender perspective improves CVE analysis, decision-making, programs and policies in three key ways. A gender perspective,

- increases operational effectiveness in CVE and security operations;
- effectively challenges narratives of extremists by consulting with women and including women's recommendations in CVE efforts; and
- Helps identify and avoid adverse unintended consequences of CVE policies and programs by using gender analysis.

Including women in CVE policies and programs first requires us to view women as political actors. That is, acting as if women's experiences, perspectives, priorities and needs matter. Women matter as political actors because there are significant negative consequences when women's needs, experiences, perspectives and priorities are ignored. The international community recognized this fact when it passed UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325) in 2000.

WHAT IS UNSCR 1325?

A comprehensive examination of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security is beyond the scope of this paper, however, it is important to remind ourselves of its genesis and why this resolution provides an innovative policy framework that can help effectively counter the threat of violent extremism.

The Security Council adopted UNSCR 1325 unanimously in October 2000, following decades of advocacy by women’s civil society groups, especially those working in “non-western” conflict zones who recognized the changing nature of warfare because of its direct and deadly impact on the civilian population—mostly women and children. UNSCR 1325 is groundbreaking because it provides an internationally recognized legal framework for promoting gender equality and addressing issues affecting women’s peace and security at the local, regional, and international levels.¹

This policy framework is the result of the advocacy efforts of a global constituency of women living in conflict zones who were working to end the violence they were experiencing through non-violent means.² Women’s organizations from Sierra Leone, Guatemala, Somalia, Tanzania, and Namibia laid the ground work for policy debates at the highest levels of the international system to address the marginalization of women in international peace and security decision-making.³ These women pointed out peace agreements which take so long to negotiate are prone to fail at least 50 percent of the time.⁴ They pointed out that peacekeepers sent to halt conflict-violence in transition countries have acted as perpetrators of violence against the communities they were meant to serve thereby creating instability and discrediting their own security operations.⁵ They noted that constitution drafting and other forms of state architecture which are intended to serve all citizens of a newly formed state were not inclusive, and often struck down fundamental human rights of half the population in the transition state.⁶

Because of UNSCR 1325, women were recognized as significant political actors in international security decision-making for the first time in history. This means that UNSCR 1325 helped the international community recognize non-violent women—that is, peace activists and social justice women’s organizations—as non-state actors of political significance.

And most relevant to countering violent extremism, the resolution also introduced a set of non-violent strategies and tactics to help the international community more effectively address the changing nature of warfare that women living in conflict zones were experiencing first-hand.

The three core non-violent strategies of UNSCR 1325 are:

- Dialogue and consultation with women,
- Increased participation of women in decision-making positions in international security and peace operations, and
- The use of a gender perspective in security analysis and decision-making.

WHY IS UNSCR 1325 IMPORTANT TO COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM?

In 1901, when Theodore Roosevelt said, “Speak softly, but carry a big stick,” he meant that diplomacy is important, but the real muscle of diplomacy rests in the threat of using military force. In the 21st century, when the changing nature of warfare requires a focus on preventing violent instability, the rise of political violence, and mass atrocities against civilians—not just managing state-to-state relationships—strategic options based on threats are likely to fall short. For example, there are no proven military tactics for reversing a wave of violent instability or for halting genocide. Today’s security challenges go beyond managing traditional state-to-state relations. They are varied and require new ways of thinking to solve problems arising from a State engaging in armed conflict with belligerent non-state actors.

In 2000, the Women, Peace and Security agenda revisited Roosevelt’s long-standing policy of Realpolitik. Using military force, or the threat of it, to meet political objectives has not always brought desired results. Witness, for example, US initiated wars based on the concepts of compellence and deterrence in Vietnam or Iraq. The strategic options of deterrence, compellence, and containment are all policy tools based on threats. In brief, deterrence means persuading others to not do something, and compellence means persuading others to stop doing something. Containment is the strategy of isolating the opposing side in order to delegitimize them, or cut them off from the rest of the global commons. The policy of containment is perhaps the most concrete and action oriented of the strategic options available in the world of the “big stick” since it includes the options of using sanctions, travel bans, and diplomatic “freeze-out” of the representatives from the offending State.

In contrast, the Women, Peace and Security agenda provides a new set of strategic options for policymakers that are not based on the threat of military force, but are based on dialogue, human-rights-based approaches to security, and a new perspective on what security means—for men, women, boys and girls, not just on what security means for the State.

WHAT IS A GENDER PERSPECTIVE?

The term gender refers to the differential needs, experiences, and status of *men and women, boys and girls* based on socio-cultural context.⁷ Consideration to these differences and their impact on men, women, boys and girls is what is known as a gender perspective. A gender perspective improves situational awareness because it provides a socio-cultural lens on power relationships, including race, class, poverty level, ethnicity and age. Using a gender perspective in the process of assessing the implications for both men and women of any planned CVE action, program, policy or legislation illuminates the differential threats and opportunities for men and women’s security.⁸ A gender perspective often reveals the persistent and chronic marginalization of women, and can help identify sex-specific strategies to level the playing field for women. These are often women-focused programs. However, using a gender perspective does not exclude men. A gender perspective takes into account both men and women’s needs, experiences and priorities. It is especially crucial to remember when analyzing these differences that gender roles and status change over time and across cultures, and thus so can power relations and the position of power shift over time and across cultures.

WHY IS A GENDER PERSPECTIVE IMPORTANT TO COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM?

The evidence shows that using a gender perspective can significantly enhance the effectiveness of international peace and security operations.⁹ Within the context of CVE, a gender perspective helps reveal innovative solutions and actions that produce positive results in combatting violence. The following discussion provides examples of both women-focused strategies and examples of including a gender perspective in CVE policies and programs. Women-focused strategies include the use of female police to engage with the local female population to do security checks, for example. Women-focused strategies are, unfortunately, often stand-alone activities unconnected to a larger strategic framework. A gender perspective in CVE initiatives includes increasing women's presence in leadership positions, particularly as religious authorities within their communities, consulting with both local women and men on how anti-terror programs and policies are impacting them differently, using gender-sensitive indicators to monitor CVE programs, or reporting incidents of sexual violence as a political and military tactic, not a cultural practice. A gender perspective ensures that consultations with women inform a policy or program's ability to increase protection, prevent or reduce violence, gather more comprehensive information, and perform more nuanced analysis. Gender strategies are most successful when developed in concert with the overall CVE strategy.

The use of a gender perspective in CVE can,

- increase operational effectiveness of the security sector,
- effectively challenge narratives of extremists by consulting with women and including women's recommendations in CVE efforts, and
- Help identify and avoid adverse unintended consequences of CVE policies and programs by using gender analysis.

INCREASED OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

It is widely agreed that one of the most significant ways to curtail the spread of political violence is to improve the relationship between the civilian population and the security sector—such as the police, national armed forces, or border security, for example. This requires building the capacity of the security sector to interact more effectively with the civilian population. One strategy that has repeatedly proven itself at doing this is the application of a gender perspective to gather more nuanced and comprehensive information from an area of operation from men, women, boys and girls. As mentioned previously, a gender perspective is an analytical tool used to understand the power relationships between men and women, power relations among women, and power relations among men. A gender perspective sheds light on who has access and control of resources, who participates fully in decision-making in a society, what the legal status of men and women is, and what the beliefs and expectations are of how men and women live their daily lives.

For example, lessons learned from NATO, the UN and Member States show that information gathering and analysis improved when the differential impact of armed conflict on women and men is taken into account. Attention to both men and women's different experiences in conflicts

reveals comprehensive information on the area of operation including the identities of local power brokers, division of labor, access to resources, kinship and patronage networks, community security threats, risks, interests and needs.¹⁰ Such thorough information gathering about the impact of an operation on the local population—men and women, boys and girls—can increase the capacity of the mission to effectively accomplish its goals.

An important way to increase the capacity of the security sector to meet the needs of civilian population and identify potential threats to security is to include more women in police forces. The inclusion of women in police forces increases the effectiveness of tactical level work such as patrols and searches because female officers can interact with both men and women, whereas in conservative communities male officers can only interact with men in the local population. Research also shows that police operations are more effective at countering violent extremism than military force. This is because police are trained to protect civilian life, and maintain law and order when fighting militant groups. Police forces are also present in communities and are aware of the threats that may or may not exist in the communities in which they do their daily work. Studies have shown that female police in particular can improve the operational effectiveness of police forces overall because they are able to build trust with local communities, can more effectively de-escalate violence, and are able to collect information that male police officers could not.¹¹ Women are also more likely to report cases of gender-based violence to female police than their male counterparts.¹²

This is also true in international peace and security operations. The inclusion of female peacekeepers improves the daily tactical level work of a peacekeeping mission because female peacekeepers can perform certain security tasks that their male counterparts cannot do alone in defensive physical security measures. For instance, female soldiers have a “comparative operational advantage” in sensitive situations such as body searches, working with women’s prisons, providing escorts for victims and witnesses of sexual violence, and screening of female combatants at disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration sites (DDR).¹³ Female police and soldiers can often access and interview more of a local population--the women, boys and girls—especially in cultural contexts that are conservative and do not allow men outside the local community to interact with the local women of the community. This increased access to the population by female officers expands the ability of peacekeepers to gather more comprehensive information that can enhance mission success.¹⁴

Former UN Peacekeeping Operations Force Commander in the DRC, General Patrick Cammaert remarked, “Understanding the problems of the population to prevent atrocities... means at least that one can talk to local leaders in the villages, to the female community leaders, to the teachers and the village elderly. Information is key in addressing the safety and security challenges. Interpreters or language assistants, in particular females [female interpreters] are crucial.”¹⁵

Increasing the number of women in the security sector can also strengthen the capacity of CVE initiatives to stop female suicide bombers. According to one study, in 2007, women accounted for almost a third of suicide bombings in Iraq.¹⁶ At that time, American forces in Iraq recognized the need for female personnel to combat female suicide bombers in a way that would avoid crossing the strict taboo of women interacting with men who are not family members—in this case, when being searched for explosives. The Daughters of Iraq, a group of Iraqi female

volunteers trained to investigate and inspect women for IEDs, was created by American and Iraqi officials as part of a new security plan to curb female suicide bombers and prevent the radicalization of women and children in and around Diyala province.¹⁷ This is a tactical adaptation in environments where men are routinely searched for IEDs, not women.¹⁸

CHALLENGING THE NARRATIVES OF EXTREMISTS

Challenging extremist narratives requires participating in the war of ideas between those who seek change through political violence, and those who do not believe in using violence as an effective means to achieve lasting political change. The influence of the media—whether journalism, movies, or online platforms—is critical in this regard since it is one of the most powerful economic and cultural forces today. The people who decide who gets to shape the public’s imagination, and set the agenda about what is important hold tremendous power. They decide who gets published, and what is worthy of attention, and their decisions form our understanding of the world. Whoever controls the dominant narrative about the way the world is, or could be, is in control.

In this context, Western alternatives to extremist narratives can be tricky. This is because Western countries continue to dance around their problems with promoting gender equality at home while they try to promote women’s rights in other countries. For example, according to a 2014 study on women in the US media alone, 64 percent of bylines and on-camera appearances went to men at the nation’s top 20 TV networks, newspapers, online news sites and news wire services. The study also found that men were quoted three times more often on page 1 in *The New York Times*. However, the study also showed that when women reported the story, more women got quoted.¹⁹ This imbalance in the presence or absence of women in the US media is paralleled in international security and decision-making.

While members of the international community—particularly the “West”—promote women’s advancement abroad, they tend to neglect their own obligations regarding women’s participation in matters of international security and peace. For example, when Ian Martin, the former SRSG for the UN Libya Mission recalled that when he visited Libya in 2011 with his delegation, he met with the National Transitional Council, which had only one woman member at the time. SRSG Martin took the opportunity to chide the Council’s head, Mustafa Abd Jalil, for the lack of women on the Council. Jalil agreed, and said that Libya could and would do better, but then turned the argument back to Martin and pointed out that the UN team had no senior women on its delegation either.

Or, witness the continued lack of women’s presence in the Middle East peace process. When pressured by women’s peace groups for a meeting with the top negotiators in 2010, the Quartet made the public statement that, “Our mandate does not cover women’s issues.”²⁰ This statement was odd considering that the members of the Quartet were all members of the Security Council when they passed UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security—which unanimously calls for women to be at the peace table. This pattern of “Do as I say, not as I do,” has made countering extremist narratives more complicated and difficult.

Women's invisibility as political actors and relevant security decision-makers discredits Western governments in a way that directly feeds into extremist narratives about Western hypocrisy and imperialism. It is also true that Western governments are not alone in this regard. Women are a strategic blind-spot for CVE actors across the board. For instance, studies on counter-radicalization efforts in Saudi Arabia show that although women were arrested for terrorism-related offenses, including involvement in bomb preparation, they were returned home without being prosecuted. Instead, their families were asked to 'supervise' them. In other words, women's radicalization is viewed as a personal matter and not of political consequence.²¹

However, the Women, Peace and Security agenda presents governments who want to challenge extremist narratives with a fresh opportunity. This is because it specifically requires meaningful consultation with women and women's organizations. Meaningful consultation with women means increasing women's presence in decision-making, and amplifying their voices as political actors for peace and security. It means taking women seriously as political actors.

Consulting with women about countering violent extremism can lead to innovative solutions and new recommendations for action. Two areas that show promise for CVE are in the work of women's international networks for peace, and in the promotion of women's religious authority to combat violent extremism.

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS FOR PEACE

Talking with women's organizations, female law enforcement officers and other female experts can shed light on preventing and resolving political violence. Organizations like Women without Borders, the International Civil Society Action Network, and the Women's Learning Partnership are at the forefront of efforts focused on preventing and resolving conflict, and fostering inter-communal dialogue. For example, Women without Borders established Sisters against Violent Extremism (SAVE) in 2008, as the world's first female counter-terrorism platform headquartered in Vienna, Austria. The International Civil Action Network for Women's Rights, Peace and Security (ICAN) was founded in 2006 to elevate the voices and experiences of women living in conflict zones from Africa, Asia and the Pacific, to West Asia, Europe and Latin America. Many of these types of peace-building efforts are programs that directly counter violent extremism by working with women in the private roles as mothers, sisters and wives, and by working with women in their public life as teachers, police, soldiers, and activists.

In addition, these are organizations with global reach. They have hundreds, if not thousands of active members and regularly produce important reports and studies that act as eyes and ears on the ground, tracking and analyzing the circumstances that drive political violence like terrorism. But we are not paying attention to them.

For example, since 2006, the International Civil Society Action Network for Women's Rights, Peace and Security, has consistently produced policy briefs based on the voices, insights, and recommendations from women's civil society groups in the Middle East and North Africa region. These policy briefs focus on issues of women's rights, security and peace in transition countries affected by rising militarism and extremism targeting women. ICAN briefs have repeatedly provided warning signals about the rise of extremist ideology and its impact on

women in the region but these reports have not been taken as seriously as they should be by decision-makers. By ignoring women's experiences with political violence, we are missing early warning signs of violent extremism's rise. By treating rape, forced marriage, and targeted killing as apolitical events, we are missing critical information that would help stop the spread of violence.

Other civil society groups are starting to use social media platforms to reach a broader constituency for peace and make women peace activists more visible. For example, in 2013, Women's Learning Partnership launched the film, *Because our Cause is Just*²² to examine the roles both men and women played in the Arab Spring and to document the rise of Islamist groups. However, no single major media outlet picked this story up. After all, extremist groups often target women first, with gender-based violence tactics like acid attacks, forced marriage, and rape—all of which makes women the first to experience and see behavioral changes in their family members that reflect an increase in political violence in their communities. Similar organizations have been documenting and reporting the activities of violent extremists and their impact on women for years.

By ignoring women's civil society initiatives we are missing out on civil society's power to change the dominant narrative of extremists. For example, a report produced by the Swedish National Defense College, concluded that women's civil society activities in Somalia and Pakistan are crucial in preventing radicalization. Women-led civil society organizations were recognized for their ability to work directly with local communities and track signs of growing militancy. In Somalia, for example, women's groups were noted for their public condemnation of al-Zawahiri's wife's call to mothers to bring up their children to support violence and terrorism in 2012.²³ A 2013 Brookings study on countering violent extremism in Bangladesh and Morocco presents similar findings.²⁴ The study shows that an increase in women's empowerment and gender equality has a positive effect on countering extremism, as it does in peace building.

BOLSTERING WOMEN'S RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY

When we don't take women seriously as political actors we miss out on innovative solutions that make a significant difference in reducing political violence. One such innovation is tapping women's religious authority. This is not a new phenomenon. Within the last century, women and men have been challenging extremist narratives through becoming religious scholars and publishing their own interpretations of Islamic law rather than blindly following what they have been told. This is based on the practice of critical reasoning is also known as *ithihad*. *Itihad* is critical reasoning used by an independent legal scholar, and applied to something in the Quran or in Hadith that did not explicitly address an issue, or when legal scholars could not reach a consensus on the issue at hand. Women and men who support women's rights have used this process of independent thinking to counter extremist ideology. For example, in 1929 Egyptian writer and scholar Nazira Zin al-Din, wrote in her first book *al-Fatat wa'l-shiuk*,

“As women have the right to participate in public governing; they also have the explicit right to participate in the Qur'anic interpretation and explanation. Women are better qualified than men to interpret the Qu'ranic Verses speaking of their rights and duties because everyone is better equipped to understand his or her right and duty.”²⁵

While her feminist viewpoint was challenged in 1929, Islamic scholarship about women's rights, especially Islamic feminist scholarship, has continued to proliferate through women's transnational networks such as Women Living under Muslim Laws (WLUML).²⁶ WLUML was founded in 1984 as a secular organization by women from Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Iran, Mauritius, Tanzania, Bangladesh, and Pakistan to demystify Islamic law for women, and especially around women's rights. It now operates in 70 countries. The organization states on its website that it is an "international solidarity network that provides information, support and a collective space for women whose lives are shaped, conditioned or governed by laws and customs said to derive from Islam." The WLUML website offers women the opportunity to learn about their rights within Islam and connect with Islamic feminists around the world.²⁷

Today, a few governments in the Middle East and South East Asia are following the lead of these women-led civil society groups by establishing programs for formal religious training and publically recognized positions of religious authority for women as a way to counter violent extremism. Morocco offers a good example. In 2005, the Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs trained 50 female preachers known as *mourchidates* (or "guides") as a direct response to the May 2003 suicide bombings in Casablanca. The program aims to counter extremist ideology in mosques, local communities and prisons in Rabat and Casablanca. Through the presences of these women act as spiritual guides and promote religious moderation in their communities. In 2014, the number of certified female increased by 1,000 percent, according to a Brookings study.²⁸

What is brilliant about this program is the State's ability to establish women's religious authority. While female spiritual guides are still not equal to men (they cannot lead the call to prayer for example) women now have the opportunity to act in a public role of significant influence. For example, if a woman feels a family member is becoming radicalized, she can approach a *mourchidate* to discuss the problem of increasing violence in community. Morocco is not alone in recognizing the correlation between women's empowerment and halting political violence. Turkey, Dubai, and Egypt are also recruiting women to positions of religious authority and influence.²⁹

Paying attention to the issues that these women highlight and the recommendations that they put forward is an important part of challenging extremist narratives. Listening to and acting on their recommendations helps Western governments lead by example, and with credibility.

GENDER BLINDNESS: AVOIDING ADVERSE IMPACTS IN CVE

Gender blindness is a failure to take into account the impact of the power relations between the sexes and their impact on the effectiveness of policies and programs. Gender blindness about the different roles, status, needs and priorities of men and women misinforms our understanding of security.

Margaret Satterwaite remarks just how big an oversight gender-blindness is in CVE programs in *Missing Indicators, Disappearing Gender*. She writes, "In their exhaustive report, Jane Huckerby and Fakhri found that even agencies that routinely use gender-sensitive indicators do not require their use in counter-terrorism of CVE context because of an assumption that such

interventions are focused on men. . . . However, as the same study demonstrates, even programs targeted at men have impacts—whether direct or indirect—on women and LGBT communities, as well as men who are the intended targets, and those impacts must be monitored.”³⁰

This is important because evidence-based policymaking depends on comprehensive data-collection. The failure to ask about the differences in men and women’s experiences, needs, priorities and perspectives in security programs and policies makes counter-terror programs ineffective.

Other examples of how gender blindness in CVE policies might impact women and men negatively come from documented findings of adverse funding impacts on women and women’s rights caused by anti-terrorism financing laws. For example, the squeeze on funding for women’s rights cuts across subjects as disparate as counter-radicalization programs in the UK, the US government’s anti-trafficking policies, and international funding for humanitarian assistance in Somalia. Ignoring this money trap has serious consequences for women’s rights. In the case of Somalia, one study found that, “as the United States, other governments and Western foundations curtail funding to Somalia, terrorist organizations and religious foundations are stepping in to fill the humanitarian aid gap with . . . detrimental impacts on women’s ability to access assistance and increasing a trend toward greater restrictions on women’s rights.”³¹

The fact is that gender blindness misinforms policy-making and planning. It is a factor that undermines our understanding of security problems and adversely affects our ability to find the best solutions to these problems.

UNDER-EXPLORED TERRITORY: UNSCR 1325, IHL, AND CVE

While the subject of international humanitarian law and its relationship to UNSCR 1325 requires its own in-depth examination, it is worth noting here briefly because the relationship between the Women, Peace and Security agenda and the laws of war is highly relevant to addressing violent extremism and the protection of civilians in situations of non-international armed conflict.

The application of a gender perspective, as per the Women, Peace and Security agenda, has influenced two specific areas of interest to the CVE practitioner: the means of warfare via the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty agreement, and the problem of using sexual violence in non-international armed conflict.

THE ARMS TRADE TREATY

Spring 2013 witnessed the convergence of two perspectives on the obligation of states to protect civilians from gender-based violence in armed conflict: international humanitarian law (IHL), and UN Security Council Resolution 1325. International humanitarian law is a body of law that provides protection for those directly affected by armed conflict regardless of their sex. On the other hand, the UN Security Council—the highest security decision-making body in the world—stated in Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security that threats to individuals (women and girls) constitute a threat to international peace and security.

It also stated that international peace and security is intrinsically linked to equality between men and women. The “equality between men and women” that UNSCR 1325 speaks of is different than the concept of formal equality expressed throughout the Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols. This is because international humanitarian law requires that protections should be provided “without any adverse distinction founded on sex ...” while UNSCR 1325 explicitly calls for attention to the way men/women and boys/girls are differently affected by their needs, status, and priorities in situations of armed conflict. In short, UNSCR 1325 calls for an understanding of the gendered dimensions of matters of international security, whereas the laws of war alone do not.

The adoption of the ATT is advancement for UNSCR 1325 because it crystalizes the relationship between the gendered dimensions of armed conflict and international humanitarian law in three key areas: prevention of violations of IHL, means of warfare, and prosecution of grave breaches.

Prevention: Ignorance of the law significantly deters efforts to regulate the behavior of parties to a conflict. Therefore, state parties to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are obligated to teach and train military forces in IHL. Similarly, UNSCR 1325 calls for gender training of international peace and security operations forces.

Means of Warfare: Article 36 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention requires the review of new weapons, and means and methods of warfare. In a groundbreaking move, article (7) of the Arms Trade Treaty requires sellers of arms to consider how their weapons will be used and to make that information public in a “risk assessment process.” The treaty specifically calls for sales to be evaluated on whether the weapons will be used to break humanitarian law, foment genocide or war crimes—including the systemic use of sexual violence against women and children in armed conflict. The full and equal participation of women and women’s organizations in this review process is mandated by UNSCR 1325’s call for the inclusion of women in matters of international security and peace.

The Arms Trade Treaty is years away from implementation and needs to be ratified by 50 nations before it will go into effect. However, the fact that sellers of arms must now consider how their weapons, ammunition, parts, or components will be used by or against men, women, and children, and make that information public is a step forward. This is because the treaty specifically calls for sales to be evaluated on whether the weapons will be used to break humanitarian law, foment genocide or war crimes—including the systemic use of sexual violence against women and children in armed conflict. When ratified, states shall not be permitted to authorize transfers if there is a risk of the weapons being used to commit acts of sexual and gender-based violence, thus violating international humanitarian law.

SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT

Sexual violence in armed conflict as a weapon is used to intimidate people, displace them from their homes to grab territory, destabilize communities and destroy local economies. It is also now documented as way to recruit women into the role of suicide bombers. For example, in 2009, a female recruiter named Samira Ahmed Jassim was arrested for arranging the rape of eighty girls

over a two-year period in order to turn them into suicide bombers. Before she was arrested, twenty-eight of the girls had successfully carried out suicide bombing attacks.³²

The issue of sexual violence in armed conflict is widely discussed and there are many norms and policies that aim to curb it and hold perpetrators accountable.³³ For example, jurisprudence from the international criminal *ad hoc* tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda confirmed that rape and other forms of sexual violence constitute a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, and are considered war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in certain circumstances. In addition, customary IHL rule 93 states that rape and other forms of sexual violence are expressly prohibited. There are only 28 articles that govern non-international armed conflict (NIAC) in Additional Protocol II (APII) of the Geneva Convention, which limits the protection of both civilians and combats in NIAC, making women particularly vulnerable.³⁴ However, AP II does include language on the prohibition of rape and acts that are degrading and inhuman.

UNSCR 1325 and the family of resolutions under its umbrella include specific language on sexual violence in armed conflict that underscores rape as a crime against humanity. UN Resolution 1820 specifically protects civilians from sexual violence not soldiers. This is relevant to holding perpetrators accountable even in situations of irregular warfare. Paragraph 4, of UNSCR 1325 specifically states that "...rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide..."

However, none of these emerging legal norms will prevent or protect civilian populations from the threat of sexual violence in armed conflict unless security actors understand the significance of sexual violence in conflict and the need to track it. At least two CIA analysts agree. Aki Peritz and Tara Maller wrote about the absence of any intelligence reporting on sexual violence in Iraq during their tenure at CIA, in a [Foreign Policy Online](#) op-ed, *The Islamic State of Sexual Violence*, "We both worked as CIA analysts focused on Iraq's insurgency and counterterrorism during much of the war. We lived and breathed the Iraq conflict for years, yet we don't recall reading internal or external intelligence products that exclusively focused upon the sexual violence that occurred in Iraq during that time, despite evidence that it was rampant as an instrument of war during the vicious sectarian reprisals of the mid-2000s."³⁵

While organizations like ICAN were reporting quite regularly on conflict violence and the use of sexual violence in armed conflict in Iraq and a number of other MENA region countries, their reports were not being read by counter-terror analysts, or by security decision-makers.

Unfortunately, the gap between good intentions embodied in legal norms and the reality of human suffering due to sexual violence in armed conflict is still wide. Narrowing the gap requires asking new questions. Mainly, how can security analysis and intelligence reporting consistently include a gender perspective so that the issue of sexual violence is not treated as a "women's issue" but as critical information about an escalating conflict and the rise of extremist ideology?

CONCLUSION

Utopia, written by Sir Thomas Moore in 1516 offered a vision of how governments might function in the future. *Utopia* features a national system of education and work for everyone. His vision of a future utopia included a “prince” who was elected by the elected representatives of the people from a list of men nominated by the people of the city—much like a modern parliamentary system. But Moore’s *Utopia* is flawed by his biases—social and cultural attitudes that were so familiar to him that he did not question them. Monarchy and slavery continue to exist in his vision of the future as a clear reflection of the culture in which he lived.³⁶ He could not envision a future that included emancipation.

Western governments are afflicted with the same problem. Debates and discussions about the inclusion of women in international security tend to share the assumption that the only time women matter as political actors is when they have a role in political violence. The international community’s practice of turning a blind eye to non-violent women as political actors reflects an unspoken assumption that women are not central to solving the challenges of international peace and security. This practice is a strategic mistake.

Combating violent extremism is a complicated affair. However, security actors and decision-makers have a range of solutions available to them if they start implementing the Women, Peace and Security agenda and take women seriously as political actors. Through the Women, Peace and Security platform, Western governments, and others that want to effectively counter extremist violence, have an opportunity to advance women’s participation in the security sector, and thereby strengthen the capacity of the security sector to better counter the threat of violent extremists. Funding programs to recruit and train more female police, investigators, and interpreters will increase the effectiveness of security operations to reduce and possibly prevent violence. Funding to promote women’s advancement and leadership positions in traditionally male dominated arenas, such as religious authorities and peace negotiators can bring new ideas and information to the table. Security actors also have the opportunity to consult with women and the many transnational women’s peace networks about how they are combating extremism on a daily basis. These consultations—if they are taken seriously—can inform and improve CVE policy analysis, decision-making and programming. Governments can and should include a gender perspective in security sector analysis. Listening to their perspectives and recommendations could provide valuable information that CVE initiatives are currently missing.

If we truly want to see forward movement in countering the threat of violent extremism we need to view women as political actors. That is, acting as if women’s experiences, perspectives, priorities and needs matter. By engaging in self-examination of our own values and attitudes

¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security has four main pillars, Participation, Protection, Prevention and Gender Mainstreaming. All of the pillars are relevant to countering violent extremism. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf?OpenElement> Accessed 1/30/15.

² After holding an Arria Formula meeting with NGOs and an open debate, the Council passed resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security on 31 October 2000. The Arria Formula meeting on 23 October 2000 prior to the open session of the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security gave representatives of women's NGOs from Sierra Leone, Guatemala, Somalia and Tanzania a chance to explain their work, demonstrate their competence and submit their recommendations on a large number of issues." Extracts from "NGO perspectives: NGOs and the Security Council" by Felicity Hill, in "NGOs as Partners: Assessing the Impact, Recognizing the Potential" 2002.

³ *Women Building Peace*, Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini, 2000.

⁴ See Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars 1945-93" in *American Political Science Review*, 1995, Vol 89, No 3: 681-90. "Research undertaken by Roy Licklider over the period 1945 to 1993 suggests that over the period of 1945-1993 about half of all peace agreements fail in the first five years after they have been signed." African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework, NEPAD Secretariat, Governance, Peace and Security Programme, June 2005, 3.

⁵ See Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning, and Ramesh Thakur, eds., *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007). See also, the UN General Assembly, *Comprehensive Strategy*.

⁶ See for current examples of this phenomena, Sirku K. Hellsten, *Transitional Justice and Aid*, Working Paper No. 2012/06, United Nations University, January 2012, 19, "For instance during the drafting of the new constitution, Kenyan women, and the international community had to give in on significant improvements on women's rights in order to make small gains. The right to abortion for example, was abandoned for cultural and religious reasons..." David Cortright and Kristen Wall, *Afghan Women Speak*, http://kroc.nd.edu/sites/default/files/Afghan_Women_Speak_Report.pdf; and *What the Women Say: Participation and UNSCR 1325 A Case Study Assessment*, International Civil Society Action Network and MIT Center for International Studies, October 2010, http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/WomenReport_10_2010.pdf

⁷ According the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women, gender means "the social attributes and opportunities associated with being a male and female and the relations between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relationships between women and between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes... Gender is part of the broader socio-cultural context." "Gender Mainstreaming: Strategy for Promoting Gender Equality," Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, August 2001. <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/factsheet1.pdf> Accessed 1/29/15.

⁸ "Gender Mainstreaming: A Strategy for Promoting Gender Equality," United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women, August 2001. <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/factsheet1.pdf> Accessed 1/29/15.

⁹ See for example, Sahana Dharmapuri, *Not Just a Numbers Game, Increasing Women's Participation in Peacekeeping Missions*, Providing for Peacekeeping, International Peace Institute, July 2013. <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/IPI-EPub-Not-Just-a-Numbers-Game.pdf> Accessed 1/29/15.

¹⁰ See for example, Swedish Defense Research Agency, *Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325; UN DPKO, Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective*. The UN DPKO study examined five multi-dimensional operations, Namibia, Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, El Salvador, and South Africa.

¹¹ Dr. Kim Lonsway et al., *Hiring & Retaining More Women: The Advantages to Law Enforcement Agencies*, (National Center for Women & Policing, Spring 2003), 2, <http://womenandpolicing.com/pdf/newadvantagesreport.pdf>. Accessed 1/28/15.

¹² Amalia R. Miller and Carmit Segal, Do Female Officers Improve Law Enforcement Quality? Effects on Crime Reporting and Domestic Violence Escalation (February 16, 2014), 4, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2335990. Accessed 1/28/15.

¹³ DPKO/UNIFEM, *Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*, 43.

¹⁴ *UN Gender Advisory Team Annual Progress Report 2010* (DPKO/DFS, 2010), 8.

¹⁵ Author's interview with General Patrick Cammaert, New York, December 17, 2012.

¹⁶ Mia Bloom, *Bombshell: The Many Faces of Women Terrorists*, Canada, Penguin Books, 2011. 214-215.

¹⁷ Mia Bloom, *Bombshell: The Many Faces of Women Terrorists*, Canada, Penguin Books, 2011. 214-215.

¹⁸ Ibid, 247: “Indonesian police employ women to look out for JI militants; the Israeli Defence Forces make sure that female recruits are stationed at border crossings; and Turkish police have hired a handful of women police officers in case they have to search Kurdish Worker Party operatives.”

¹⁹ See, *The Status of Women in the Media, 2014 Report*, Women’s Media Center, <http://www.womensmediacenter.com/pages/the-problem> Accessed 1/30/15.

²⁰ In 2010, US Special Envoy George Mitchell met with members of the International Women’s Commission, a group of Israeli and Palestinian women involved in Track II people dialogues, however there was no mechanism in place to formally include women’s voices in the Track I peace negotiations. Under pressure from the women’s groups for a formal and recognized place at the table, the Quartet insisted, “Our mandate does not cover issues related to women. Ton Blair, the Quartet’s representative, was the UK prime minister when the Security Council passed UNSCR 1325 in October 2000. See *What the Women Say: A UNSCR 1325 Case Study Assessment*, by the International Civil Society Action Network. <http://www.icanpeacework.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/WWS-UNSCR-1325-Case-Study-Assessment.pdf>. Accessed 1/28/15.

²¹ Katherine Brown, *Gender and Counter-Radicalization: Women and Emerging Counter-Terror Measures*, in Gender, National Security and Counter-Terrorism, Margaret, L. Satterthwaite & Jayne C. Huckerby eds. 2013, 36 & 43.

²² See the film *Because Our Cause is just* produced by women on women’s experiences of the Arab Spring at <http://www.learningpartnership.org/arab-spring-women-democracy>. Accessed 1/30/15.

²³ *Prevention of violent extremism in third countries, Executive Summary*, The Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) at the Swedish National Defense College, 2013, 22. Accessed 1/29/15. <https://www.fhs.se/documents/externwebben/forskning/centrumbildningar/cats/publikationer/prevention%20of%20violent%20extremism%20in%20third%20countries%20.pdf>

²⁴ Krista London Couture, *A Gendered Approach to Countering Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Women in Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Applied Successfully in Bangladesh and Morocco*, Brookings Policy Paper, July 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2014/07/30_gender_conflict_prevention_countering_violent_extremism_couture/women_cve_formatted_72914_couture_final2.pdf Accessed 1/29/15.

²⁵ See also, Bouthaina Shaaban, “Networking for Change: The Role of Women’s Groups in Initiating Dialogue on Women’s Issues,” Mahnaz Afkhami ed., *Faith and Freedom: Women’s Human Rights in the Muslim World*, Syracuse University Press, 1995. 78-103.

²⁶ Farida Shaheed, “Muted Voices of Women Interpreters,” Mahnaz Afkhami ed., *Faith and Freedom: Women’s Human Rights in the Muslim World*, Syracuse University Press, 1995. 61-77.

²⁷ See <http://www.wluml.org>; and Isobel Coleman, *Paradise beneath Her Feet: How Women are Transforming the Middle East*, Random House, New York, 2010, 58.

²⁸ Kristin Loudin Couture, *A Gendered Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, Lessons Learned from Women in Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention in Morocco and Bangladesh*, Brookings Policy Paper, July 2014. <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2014/07/30%20gender%20conflict%20prevention%20countering%20violent%20extremism%20couture/women%20cve%20formatted%2072914%20couture%20final2.pdf> Accessed 1/29/15.

²⁹ Isabel Coleman, *Paradise beneath Her Feet*, Random House, New York, 2010, 71-75.

³⁰ Margaret L. Satterthwaite, *Missing Indicators, Disappearing Gender: Measuring USAID’s Programming to Counter Violent Extremism*, in Gender, National Security, and Counter-Terrorism, Margaret, L. Satterthwaite & Jayne C. Huckerby eds., 2013. 82 & 98.

³¹ Lama Fakih, *Soft Measures, Real Harm : Somalia and the U.S. "War on Terror,"* in Gender, National Security, and Counter-Terrorism, Margaret, L. Satterthwaite & Jayne C. Huckerby eds., 2013. 182 & 193.

³² Mia Bloom, *The Many Faces of Women Terrorists*, p223. See also Steven Lee Myers, “Iraq Arrests Woman Tied to Bombings,” *New York Times*, February 4, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/world/middleeast/04iraq.html?_r=0 Accessed 1/29/15.

³³ For a good overview of a gender perspective on IHL see Helen Durham and Kati O’Byrne, *Dialogue of Difference in Gender Perspectives on International Humanitarian Law*, *International Review of Red Cross*, Vol. 92 Number 877, March 2010, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-877-durham-obyrne.pdf> Accessed 1/30/15.

³⁴ See also Article 4 of Additional Protocol II:

<https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=F9CBD575D47CA6C8C12563CD0051E783> See also, Karima Bennoune, “Non-international armed conflict, the most common form in our time, the conventional rules governing the means and methods of combat offer even less protection—leaving women particularly vulnerable... Protocol II, Art. 13 provides general norms to protect the civilian population from the effects of conflict. It prohibits the direct targeting of civilians and the use of acts of violence or threats thereof to terrorize the civilian population.” 382-383.

³⁵ Aki Peritz and Tara Maller, write in their op-ed, *The Islamic State of Sexual Violence, Foreign Policy Online*,” <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/16/the-islamic-state-of-sexual-violence/> Accessed 1/29/15.

³⁶ Edward Cornish, *Futuring: The Exploration of the Future*, (The World Future Society: Bethesda, MA) 2004, 170.

REPORTING DILEMMAS AND SEXUAL ABUSE AMONG INTERNALLY DISPLACED WOMEN

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Originally written October 2012 for Salve Regina University

Edited December 2013 for Women, Peace and Security Conference at the Naval War College

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Since the clash between the Sudanese government and rebel uprisings in 2003, human rights violations in Darfur have led to deaths estimated up to 300,000 people and the displacement of over two million (UNICEF 2008). Of all the victims, internally displaced women (IDW) in Darfur are particularly vulnerable to human rights violations, most prevalent being sexual and reproductive rights (SRR) violations (Kim, Torbay, and Lawry 2007, 359; Tønnessen 2012, 3). There is a significant dearth of self-reporting and press releases on the prevalence of rape, which affects the efforts of humanitarian aid and the global perception of the situation (Cockett 2010, 249). Limited reporting of sexually abused IDW is largely caused by limited researchers in the area, government and militia harassment of these researchers, and the “social ostracism” and “legal retribution” for the victims of rape who report (Miller 2009, 505-506).

Journalists, humanitarian workers, and medical centers record occurrences of mass rape and provide evidence that the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the militia group Janjaweed, comprised mostly of Sudanese Arab tribes, are perpetrators of the crime. As these humanitarian sources become increasingly targeted and suppressed, such as the closing of the Amel Centre for Treatment and Rehabilitation for Torture Victims (ACTRVT) in Nyala, Darfur after the arrest warrant for Al Bashir (Tsai et. al. 2012, 2), the international community becomes deaf to the plight of rape victims. Humanitarian assistance decreases with the disruption in reports and record keeping while the vulnerability of IDW is allowed to continue.

II. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM AND ISSUES

The conflict in Sudan has quite an extensive history predating the string of conflicts beginning in 2003. However, in that year, the rebel forces of Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) comprised mostly of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes attacked the GoS in order to gain more political representation in the capital of Khartoum. Allegedly working with the Janjaweed, the GoS responded with a disproportionate attack on numerous non-Arab villages, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands, the displacement of over one million persons, and the mass rape of several thousand women in 2003 and 2004 alone (Gingerich and Leaning 2004, 3; Young and Maxwell 2009, 1).

Despite several diplomatic attempts to have the GoS disarm the Janjaweed (Resolution 1556) and involve the African Union (AU) to monitor the situation (Resolution 1564), the GoS failed to comply and delayed several humanitarian aid efforts (Collins 2006, 16-20). Throughout the conflict’s history, the GoS has created obstacles for press freedoms as well (Tsai et. al. 2012, 2;

Prunier 2007, 117); “journalists travel rarely to Darfur and are allowed only where Khartoum’s security and intelligence services permit; they confront a hostile bureaucracy that controls all visa and travel permits, and they are closely scrutinized by security forces during their entire stay in Darfur” (Eric Reeves 2012). The GoS made a particularly strong effort to impede any press release that reported any evidence of mass rape (Cockett 2010, 247-8), adding to the suspicion that they allowed it.

Several findings have shown that the GoS and Janjaweed were working in tandem against non-Arabic speaking civilians by means of mass rape (Cockett 2010, 202; Collins 2006, 147; Hagan 2009, 1386; Tsai et. al. 2012, 2; UNHCR 2012, 226). John Hagan has reported that the racial overtones of the sexual assaults constitute sufficient evidence for genocidal rape, and he provides evidence that the GoS tacitly condoned sexual assault as a weapon against particular groups in Darfur (Hagan 2009, 1391). “Strategic rape” used in this magnitude extends the violation of human dignity from an individual to a targeted group of people, as a form of genocide as the name implies (Askin 2006, 142). According to Sarah Clark Miller, genocidal rape constitutes an interconnection of both gender- and ethnic-based violence rather than their mutual exclusivity; in Darfur, rape is used “to humiliate women and girls as representatives of specific ethnic groups, such as the Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit” (Miller 2009, 512), a kind of racial opposition.

Surviving medical reports from the Amel Centre from 2004 to 2006 indicate that ninety percent of the victims, all of whom were from non-Arabic-speaking tribes, identified the perpetrators as GoS and/or Janjaweed, with about twenty percent of these reports attributed racial and tribal identity for targeting explanations (Tsai et. al. 2012, 3). “Given that Darfuri culture regards ethnicity to be determined by the paternal bloodline – any women inseminated by Janjaweed attackers would bear offspring perceived to be Arab” (Jonathan P. Howard 2006, 72). However, these racial tones are not necessarily understood by the women victims due to language barriers, which have a particular implication for inefficiencies in reporting the crime; this is especially true of the ethnic groups such as the Fur and Massalit, where the majority largely speak ethnic tongues in order to retain traditional and cultural identity. Indeed, the reports by secondary witnesses of rape are more prevalent, comprised mostly of men who were able to understand the racial slurs spoken in the Arabic language. This demonstrates that the widespread inability to understand Arabic is an additional contribution to the lack of self-reporting (Hagan 2009, 1390).

Cultural context also provides insight into the disincentives of reporting rape, such as the criminal system. Section 149 of the Sudanese Penal Code 1991 does not sufficiently distinguish rape from adultery, for if the crime of rape cannot be proven by four male witnesses, then the victim can be charged as an adulterer (Melanie Teff 2011). “Legally, women are being trapped between rape and *zina*¹. Because rape is associated with *zina*, the law itself ‘re-victimizes the victim,’ because the perpetrators are almost guaranteed impunity according to the current Criminal Law” (UNHCR 2012, 224). Indeed, the corruption of the judicial system is disheartening for women (Kelly Dawn Askin 2006, 149).

Social stigmatization and peer pressure create yet another disincentive. The prevalence of female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C) provides a strikingly elucidating example of the

¹ Extramarital intercourse.

control that cultural norms and traditions (even non-exclusive to a religion) can hold over the status of an individual and group (Askin 2006, 141). All three types of FGM/C² are part of a deeply rooted practice in Darfur with an overwhelmingly high percentage of women who participate,³ usually with one particular type that is more dominant in one tribe than the other. “Because of their lack of choice and the powerful influence of tradition, many girls accept circumcision as a necessary, and even natural, part of life, and adopt the rationales given for its existence” (Althaus 1997, 132). A study in 2001 found that despite the negative physical effects of the procedure, the majority of women favored female circumcision (66.9% in Haj-Yousif and 56.1% in Shendi) and attributed their choice to social custom and tradition. The researchers also found that the support of FGM/C declines among the young and those with higher levels of education (Islam and Uddin 2001, 75). In a similar study, Mónica M. Alzate found that the majority of sexually assaulted victims did not report their crime due to social taboo. As suggested by Islam and Uddin, Alzate also found that better education for women will lead to more empowerment and informed decision (Alzate 2008, 142).

The cultural perception of gender differences is an important issue for the understanding the societal implications of rape. Sarah Clark Miller provides a philosophical perspective of why genocidal rape is morally significant, which in turn provides insight into the issue gender inequality in the Darfur region. Despite the seemingly obvious nature of her study, she argues that the “wrongfulness” of rape as a crime against humanity is not necessarily a universal notion; rather the society must first “recognize women’s equal moral worth.” The moral significance of rape is determined by the lack of agency and well-being, where the victim loses self-determination and has her interests compromised. She argues that rape is a moral injury that not only harms self-determination and self-interest but also that which diminishes one’s value or dignity; when this notion is applied to mass rape, it is the “social death” of a group. The cultural symbolization of the human body determines the meaning of rape in a society (Miller 2009, 507-510; 514-517) that can predict the society’s acceptance or repudiation of its victim. In Darfur, this perception of discrimination and ostracism contributes to the reluctance of self-reporting by female victims (Askin 2006, 148).

This cultural perception segues to the issue surrounding women’s rights for IDW. Glen Kim, Rabih Torbay, and Lynn Lawry analyzed survey evidence of IDP camps in Nyala, Darfur to determine the inherent health parameters, and found that although basic needs were generally met, with the exception of fuel, mental health, women’s health, and SRR awareness were inadequate. Most women believed that mutual consent for sex was not necessary and an overwhelming majority was denied contraceptives by their husbands (Kim, Torbay, and Lawry 2007, 355-356). The authors suggest that limited education among women is the main cause for SRR ignorance and the lack of informed decisions. They also concluded that insufficient fuel provisions from humanitarian aid requires women to search for fuel alternatives such as firewood outside of the IDP camps, further exposing them to sexual assaults.⁴ The authors suggest that the

² The types of genital excision: Type 1 is clitoridectomy, Type 2 is similar to the first type but with the labia minora removed as well, and Type 3 is infibulation. Not surprisingly, the women who favored the continuation of female circumcision preferred Types 1 or 2 (Islam and Uddin 2001, 73).

³ 80% of women, according to UNICEF both in 2005 and 2013.

⁴ Among the references evaluated in the current study, there is no speculation as to why women were deliberately subjected to sexual assault by collecting firewood.

lack of support for women's freedom of movement could be attributed to "camp circumstances" (Ibid. 359), yet this does not justify women's inadequate access to medical care in light of their freedom to leave the camp for necessities.

III. COMPLICATING FACTORS

Corruption of the GoS

The primary factor that greatly impedes progress toward greater reporting of genocidal rape is the corruption of the GoS. Robert O. Collins provides a historical overview of the conflict in Darfur and investigates government involvement in the atrocities. As previously mentioned the government would create bureaucratic obstacles and deny access to humanitarian agencies, accusing them of having political agendas. It was only after the growing suspicions of GoS and Janjaweed collaboration threatened exposure did the GoS lift some restrictions on humanitarian access. Nevertheless, AU peacekeepers were denied access for years after the initial conflicts, contributing to the continuation of ethnic cleansing (Collins 2006, 13-22). Journalists reporting on rape would be obvious targets and aid workers would risk expulsion from Darfur if they divulged any evidence of genocidal rape (Collins 2006, 16; Cockett 2010, 247-8; Reeves 2012).

In *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, Gérard Prunier analyzes the humanitarian situation in Western Sudan, and states that additional obstacles threatened the safety of aid workers as well. Aside from the obvious impediments caused by the controversy over the label of "genocide," he elucidates the corruption and inadequacy of the GoS. He recounts the storming of the El-Jeer camp near Nyala stating "bombarding the refugees with tear-gas, government forces invaded the camp and started to bulldoze the refugees' shacks; those who tried to resist were beaten and several women were raped." Humanitarian workers were forced to flee (Prunier 2007, 121).

Aside from resisting humanitarian assistance and AU peacekeeper involvement, the GoS also refused to cooperate with the International Criminal Court and applied their common strategy of denying visas to ICC investigators and prosecutors (Askin 2006, 156). The first arrest warrant of President Omer al-Bashir on March 4th, 2008 is suspected to have brought about disproportionate responses by the GoS including the closure of several medical and rehabilitation centers that provided a safe haven for rape victims and maintained records of their experiences (Tsai et. al. 2012, 2).⁵ "Since the ICC indictment, work on GBV [gender-based violence] has proven difficult for both international and Sudanese organizations. In August 2010 Sudan expelled aid officials for distributing 'rape-detection devices' in Darfur. As a result, responding to the needs of rape victims has become sporadic and insufficient, because of government intimidation" (Tønnessen, 4). President Bashir has rejected the validity of his arrest warrant, and was supported by some neighboring countries and China, the latter of which has defended the GoS in the past by "[preferring] to believe the government's version of events rather than that of the West" (Cockett 2010, 248-249); it is suspected that China's support stems from their trade agreements of oil and arms with Sudan ("Bashir Vows to Defy Darfur Charge").

⁵ In addition to the Amel Centre in 2005, the GoS has closed civil society organizations (CSOs) in 2013 (*Sudan Tribune*, January 9, 2013).

Controversy over the label of “genocide”

The controversy over applying the label of “genocide” poses yet another complicating factor. David M. Crane argues that political influence drives the evolution of international criminal law, and disagreement over labels causes confusion of the situation. The international community is cautious in attributing the term genocide to atrocities throughout the world, “yet, if we do not charge genocide, there is the possibility that atrocities may go unpunished...potentially subjecting atrocity victims to the machinations of politicians in their search for justice” (Crane 2008, 144). Genocide is determined upon the “specific intent...to destroy all or part of the victim group,” but some scholars admit that it is difficult to gather evidence in support of the genocide label until the situation is in its end stages (Hamilton 2011). Yet others argue that the mass killings and rape that were directed at civilians of particular ethnic groups should be sufficient to consider it “genocide” despite the supposed lack of evidence supporting intent (Young and Maxwell 2009, 1). Labels change the way the international community responds to atrocity, and without sufficient documentation of deaths and rapes, the only way to get truly effective aid was to name the happenings in Darfur as “genocide” (Cockett 2010, 205).

As a reaction similar to that of humanitarian intervention and the ICC arrest warrant, the GoS reaction to the indirect accusation of genocide was met with strong resistance. The GoS refuted the Western accusation of “massacre” as propaganda and stated that the civilian casualties were collateral damage for war rather than a result of massacres by hired militia groups, and (Prunier 2007, 135).

IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Solution 1: Reform the legal system

The aforementioned Sudanese Penal Code 1991 (or Criminal Law 1991) is both ambiguous in their definition of rape (articles 145 and 148) and as well as in their distinction between rape and *zina*, or adultery (article 149). Liv Tønnessen reports in the March 2012 NOREF Report that this is in dire need of reform; “the categorization of rape as a form of adultery does not result only in the virtual impossibility of convicting a rapist, but may even lead to the incrimination of the female victim of rape instead. This is particularly problematic considering the widespread use of sexual violence in the Darfur conflict” (Tønnessen 2012, 1). A reform of the legal system would also contribute to the mitigation of domestic violence, as the 1991 law does not consider marital rape as a crime. The difficulty of achieving this solution must be noted, however.

Solution 2: Norm-internalization

Harold Hongju Koh examines the enforcement of international human rights law and argues that norm-internalization is the most effective form of law enforcement. He states that “norm-internalization” instills an internal sense of moral obligation apart from external sanctions (Koh 2008, 1403). This is exemplified with the Born Saleema movement in Sudan to eliminate FGM. Sudan’s National Council on Child Welfare and its National Strategic Planning Centre is currently attempting to create behavioral change by replacing *ghalfa*, a traditional derogatory term to describe an uncut female, with *saleema*, a more positive term meaning “whole” or “untouched.” The purpose “was to reinforce the idea that being uncut is a natural, desirable state. Rather than trying to discredit a long-held tradition, the strategy aims at allowing new

social norm to take its place” (Helmore 2012). External rule-based forms for prohibition of such traditions as female circumcision have and are still vulnerable to opposition due to the ingrained cultural and traditional nature of the practice; for instance, the British rule in 1946 against infibulation was largely unsuccessful (UNHCR 2012, 235).

This same idea of norm-internalization is necessary to increase awareness of SRR among IDW and encourage self-reporting of rape. It is important to note that this strategy will likely be a slow process and is also dependent on several variables such as the availability of education as well as access to adequate medical centers that are free from the constraints of the GoS. This will also partially address the first proposed solution concerning the disassociation of “rape” and “adultery.”

Solution 3: Reopen centers such as the Amel Centre

Centers that the GoS has closed such as the Amel Centre in Nyala provided services for Darfuri women, including medical aid, SRR awareness for rape victims, and maintenance of records (Tsai et. al. 2012, 2). These services are an essential safe haven and source of record keeping that contribute to the protection of human rights for IDW, and the closure of such services as a response to ICC indictment is a clear indication of governmental corruption. Additionally, the civil society organizations (CSOs) that were closed in 2013 greatly complimented the aims of the Amel Centre with attempts to improve society and the human condition. Reopening these centers would be a great source of protection for IDW and would reawaken regional and perhaps even international awareness of their plight. It must be noted that the NISS have suppressed the recent attempts of demonstration by journalists and activists, however (*Sudan Tribune*, January 9, 2013).

Solution 4: Increase security for IDP camps

The majority of sexually assaulted women reported that they were attacked in or in the vicinity of their IDP camps, indicating a devastating lack of security (Tsai et. al. 2012, 3); indeed, there were “fewer than 100 staff with protection responsibilities: among the 11,000 humanitarian workers in 2006 (UNHCR 2006, 162). Several scholars indicate that the inadequacy of peacekeepers allows the forces in Sudan to continue systematic cleansing (Collins 2006, 22); Darfuri locals have admitted the dearth of protection, stating that “these peacekeepers [from the AU] have been here for three or four years. Since they entered our country, they have not helped us in any way. They can’t stop the government or those who attack us” (UNHCR 2008). Increasing security in the IDP camps with an adequate force of regional or international peacekeepers will increase protection for IDW and better ensure they can access medical care. Such organizations as the African Mission to Sudan (AMIS) have already demonstrated the ability to provide proper protection despite its limited resources and capabilities: “where AMIS has been present Janjaweed forays into camps of displaced persons have diminished, as have militia attacks on villages and sexual assaults against women gathering firewood and water” (UNHCR 2006, 163).

V. ANTICIPATED OUTCOME

The Born Saleema campaign hosted awareness meetings and also contributed to the construction of hospitals in Darfur and norm-internalization at the community level (Helmore 2012); this coordination has proven very hopeful, for “one of the encouraging consequences of the international attention on war rapes in Darfur is that women activists are increasingly positioning sexual violence against women as a concern on the national political agenda” (Tønnessen 2012, 3). Both awareness campaigns in the form of widespread media and press coverage as well as efforts to reopen centers such as the Amel Centre are very likely to improve the situation for Darfuri IDW and the international awareness of genocidal rape.

The main challenge to the initiative would be the balking of the GoS, with which the international and regional communities are well acquainted; as previously mentioned, the ICC arrest warrant for President Al Bashir was met with the closure of several International Rehabilitation Centers for victims of Torture (IRCT). Like community responses to FGM laws, this sort of external sanction is ineffective. Rather, the transformation of social taboos against reporting rape and a reformation of the Penal Code will likely be received by the local community with more welcoming arms, but this can only be achieved with greater security and credible sources for record keeping. Assistance achieved at the local and regional levels will increase the awareness at the international level, creating a greater demand for humanitarian assistance.

Although Darfuri IDW suffers numerous SRR violations, projects such as Born Saleema reinstall hope that their plight will be recognized and addressed. A combination of legal reform and community-driven programs of norm-internalization will likely direct the attention of the region to the corruption of the GoS and exert pressure to reopen centers such as the one in Amel. Reinstating ICRT services in the local areas will not only provide medical assistance to victims, but will also encourage human rights education and literacy among the abused.

VI. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Several authors agree that better cognizance of SRR at the community level will empower women to break free of social barriers so they may better report rape and resist human rights violations such as FGM. Media and public information campaigns as well as better documentation are the most effective methods for the dissemination of information about rape and FGM, although at the risk of expulsion from the Government of Sudan (GoS). Norm replacement along with increased security and adequate medical access will likely eliminate social barriers for reporting rape and help clarify the Penal Code. It is necessary for the reopening of medical and psychological centers in the Darfuri region, which will not only provide aid for IDPs, but also contribute to better reporting capabilities such as reliable statistical evidence and increased security. International pressure and capabilities has proven inadequate since the beginnings of the Darfur conflicts. Community initiatives and norm-internalization solutions would be the most effective and accessible solutions, and would in turn help reporting issues, thus targeting the protection of women.

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STRATEGIC BLINDNESS: THE WOMEN IN COMMUNITY SECURITY PROJECT

Michelle A. Hughes and Johanna Mendelson-Forman

“Foreign assistance is not a giveaway. It’s not charity. It is an investment in a strong America and in a free world.”¹

“The realm of security is where women are traditionally the most marginalized, as so called “hard” issues are frequently deemed irrelevant to women.”²

BACKGROUND

“Strategic Blindness: The Women in Community Security Project” grew out of a combination of experience, frustration, and a desire to transform the way in which we view women and security. It reflects how Creative Associates International, a leading international development company, sees the challenges faced in the field when it comes to managing programs that work with women, youth, and civil society. Creative recognized that working with women in development makes the difference in the sustainability and effectiveness of field-based programming. The challenges of the last decade for development companies supporting stabilization and reconstruction efforts around the globe reinforced Creative’s practitioner’s eye view that the salience of women in community development is a central factor in ensuring the security and stability of countries emerging from conflict.

Women are still being treated as secondary players in our collective approach to security. Their roles as security actors are seldom recognized and rarely understood. Security assessments, plans, and analysis appear to exclude serious consideration of women’s contributions to community resilience, sustainable peace, and local security. From the perspective of private sector development practitioners on the ground – both those who worked for Creative and those who have partnered with Creative – it appears as though, when it comes to gender, security assistance has not been informed by an accurate understanding of the operating environment. Women’s traditional and emerging leadership roles are not part of the discussion. And in gender-based development programming, women’s contributions to stability are for the most part, disaggregated from security assistance – in many cases by design.

In 2013 encouraged by the issuance of a National Strategy on Women, Peace and Security, Creative set out to challenge the existing development paradigm and mobilize the private sector toward improving the way in which women in community security are viewed. In Creative’s experience, including women in rule of law and security sector assistance is not merely an issue of access to justice or gender inclusion. It is a national security imperative. Around the globe,

¹ Secretary of State, John Kerry Address at the University of Virginia on February 20, 2013

² Camille Pampille Conway, *“The Role of Women in Stabilization.”* USIP, 2006, p.8

women are proving themselves as leaders of political change, drivers of conflict resolution, and anchors of stability for the communities in which they live. When they are connected to the security sector at the local level, they provide important niche capabilities that improve accountability, legitimacy and operational effectiveness. Where they are discounted, disconnected or disenfranchised, we risk losing them as positive change agents. In extreme cases, they themselves become perpetrators of violence and instability.

Over an 18-month period from 2013-2014, Creative studied the issues, identified potential partners and stakeholders, codified its own lessons learned, and organized a series of consultations with a wide range of experts representing government, non-governmental organizations, academia, and business. The result of these efforts led to the identification of five steps that will improve our collective ability to strengthen the role of women as core contributors to community security. Creative then went one step further, and embarked on an effort of its own to implement its first recommendation which was to “establish a community of practice around industry guidelines and operating principles that are guided by lessons learned.”

This paper describes the project and its outcomes, makes recommendations, and highlights critical elements for the way ahead. It is a call to action from an under-represented sector in national dialogue on women peace in security – the private sector. In our experience, women are more than victims and not just constituents with special security needs. It is our view that they are full security partners in countering the complex problems that threaten peace and stability in our time. A development approach that starts with the premise that women are security partners and then builds organizations that leverage their contributions to that partnership will make a far greater contribution to stability. But we must, as a community of practice, improve our understanding of the issues, risks, and opportunities, and more effectively shape security and development assistance to account for them.

INTRODUCTION

As the United States emerges from more almost 14 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, strengthening weak and fragile states has become a central focus of its global development policy. Preventing and mitigating the impact of violent extremism and transnational criminality has created a growing need to use resources toward conflict management. Today, 60 percent of the Department of State’s and USAID’s foreign assistance goes to 50 countries that are in the midst of, recovering from or trying to prevent conflict or state failure. Still, our development capabilities have not been integrated across the different agencies, nor have we learned the lessons necessary to change our own institutions in order to meet the security challenge.³

Empowering women to assume a more significant role in security is no longer up for debate. It is part of national policy, and a strategic imperative. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review articulated this point when it recognized that “women are at the center of our diplomacy and development efforts – not simply as beneficiaries, but also as agents of peace, reconciliation, development, growth, and stability.”⁴ However, subsequent discussion has largely focused on

³ Department of State, *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, Washington, D.C. 2010, p. 122-123.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 23

addressing the security requirements that are peculiar to women and women's concerns rather than the transformation necessary to develop effective female security actors. Furthermore, the private sector, which has a wealth of on-the-ground experience, has not been fully engaged in the current national dialogue.

As the Women in Community Security Project began, Creative believed that in order to move forward, we, as a community of interest, must re-characterize the issues in a way that incorporates three concerns:

1. Including women in community security is as much about meeting immediate security imperatives as it is about inclusion. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 states that including women in peace processes is a means to building lasting peace—a point that has been obscured by the related efforts to advance gender equality. If we do not take the time to understand and reinforce the role that women play in stabilizing their communities, we undermine local security structures and create gaps in rule of law and security assistance programming.
2. Involving women in community security cannot represent inclusion for inclusion's sake, but must instead be a link between citizen security and good governance. It goes to the heart of the relationships between governance and security, the government and its people, and the accountability and responsiveness of security forces to the populations they serve.
3. Women are not always benign actors but can also be perpetrators, instigators, enablers and motivators in conflict. This is particularly true in those areas where men have migrated due to war, civil unrest or economic hardship. Security forces must be structured to address the full spectrum of roles that women and men play in violence. This is particularly important in cultures where security force performance is constrained by prohibitions on engagement between men and women.⁵

When we re-focus our analysis on women as producers of security versus women as consumers, we are forced to confront several operational challenges and gaps:

- Do current assessments and evaluation frameworks aid our understanding of the local culture in countries receiving U.S. assistance?
- Do assessment and evaluation frameworks adequately ensure inclusion that will impact community security?

⁵ The recent concern over the recruitment of women by ISIS and its affiliates provides one compelling example. While the exact number of women who have joined jihadist groups in Syria is impossible to ascertain, terrorism analysts at London's International Centre for the Study of Radicalization estimate there are some 30 European women in Iraq and Syria who either accompanied their jihadist husbands or have gone with the intention to marry members of ISIS and other militant groups. That may be less than 10% of the number of Western men currently estimated to be fighting in Syria and Iraq, but the fear is that the number of women involved will grow. In France, according the French Ministry of the Interior, 45 % of the inquiries directed to a recently established French hotline for reporting signs of jihadist radicalization involve women, and there have been several cases of women arrested at France's airports under suspicion of trying to travel Syria to join Islamist rebels.

- Are assessment and evaluation frameworks designed to leverage women’s capabilities as producers of security?
- Do assessment and evaluation frameworks only address the human rights imperative of gender inclusion and access?
- Do assessment and evaluation frameworks consider the influence of women on violent or non-violent behavioral development as they fulfill traditional roles in child-rearing and education?
- Are we designing gender-integrated security and development strategies that address root causes of insecurity and exclusion before we shape the supporting organizations?
- Are we shaping institutions based on generic models or are we trying to adapt them to meet the needs of the communities they serve and protect?

According to a new study by Valerie Hudson, *Sex and World Peace*, there is “a strong and highly significant link between state security and women’s security.”⁶ This means that the *single* best predictor of a state’s level of peacefulness is not wealth, democracy, or identity; it is how well its women are treated. Hudson notes that democracies with high levels of violence against women also prove to be weak and unstable, a fact evident in countries like Bolivia and Guatemala, where femicide is among the highest in the world. In places where the rule of law allows impunity in crimes against women, there will be higher tolerance for general violence and greater instability.⁷

Through the years, where development was limited or undermined because of community-based insecurity, Creative practitioners often asked themselves: “Was there something different we could have done?” or, “If security forces had known how to react responsively to the needs of the community, would our outcomes have been more sustainable? Would our results have been more effective? Would they have been more accountable?” Experience indicates that the answer to all of these questions is a resounding, “yes.”

I. FROM UNSC 1325 TO THE QDDR TO THE NATIONAL ACTION PLAN

More than a decade ago, the UN recognized that the participation of women was essential to the peace and security of states. UN Security Council Resolution 1325, approved on October 31, 2000, became the seminal document that created a non-binding policy framework and an agenda for promoting the protection of human rights for women and girls in both conflict and post-conflict zones.⁸ UNSCR 1325 urged the Secretary General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys; it urged him to expand the role and contribution of women in UN

⁶ Valerie M. Hudson, “Secure Women, Secure States” in *Women, Men, and Peace*, Alliance for Peacebuilding, <http://buildingpeaceforum.com/2014/03/secure-women-secure-states/>

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf UNSCR 1325 was actually the first of four resolutions that built up the specific needs of women and girls. UNSCR 1820 (2008) addresses the need to protect women in conflict zones from sexual violence, and UNSCR 1888 (2009) and UNSCR 1889 (2009) focus on gender mainstreaming in all post-conflict recovery processes.

field-based operations; and it expressed a willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations.⁹

Three subsequent Security Council Resolutions further refined the agenda as it related to protecting women against gender-based violence with secondary declarations about broader mainstreaming of women in peace processes. Security Council Resolution 1888 specifically created a Special Representative to address sexual violence in conflict.¹⁰

While there has been a growing recognition that women must be part of any overall strategy for ending conflicts and promoting development, the focus of such efforts has been more geared to looking at women as victims. This has resulted in a form of strategic blindness that, until now, has obscured the more positive view of women as also capable of producing greater security.

Starting in 2005, UN member states were asked to translate the aspirations of UNSCR 1325 into action plans.¹¹ The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security was completed in 2011.¹² The Plan complemented the existing policy priority in the State Department's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, which recognizes that "women are at the center of our diplomacy and development efforts – not simply as beneficiaries, but also as agents of peace, reconciliation, development growth and stability."¹³ President Obama signed an Executive Order in February 2012 that transformed the Plan into a mandate that would help "accelerate, institutionalize, and better coordinate our efforts to advance women's inclusion in peace negotiations, peacebuilding activities, conflict prevention, and decision-making institutions; to protect women from gender-based violence; and to ensure equal access to relief and recovery assistance, in areas of conflict and insecurity."¹⁴

Five principles of the Executive Order guide this work:

- 1) Engage and protect women as agents of peace and stability;
- 2) Complement those policies articulated in the United States National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review;
- 3) Make the principle of inclusion the guiding policy by seeking out a wide range of stakeholders;

⁹ See Megan Bastick and Daniel de Torres, *Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions in Security Sector Reform, Tool 13*, 2010, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF),

¹⁰ See http://www.unifem.org/gender_issues/women_war_peace/unsr_1888.html? for details about this Resolution.

¹¹ The small number of states who have actually created and implemented frameworks is disappointing. To date only 21 member states have drafted such plans. They include Austria, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chile, Canada, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Denmark, DRC, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, Uganda, United Kingdom, and United States.

¹² The White House, United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security ("National Action Plan"), December 2011.

¹³ Department of State, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading Through Civilian Power, December 2011, Specifically, Chapter 4: Preventing and Responding to Crisis, Conflict, and Instability.

¹⁴ National Action Plan, p.1

- 4) Coordinate among all relevant departments and agencies of the government, and also with international partners; and
- 5) Hold the United States Government agencies accountable for the implementation of policies and initiatives endorsed in the Plan.¹⁵

The guiding principles and the national objectives have both been used to create communities among those in U.S. government agencies and civil society who are involved in the design, development and implementation of programs in fragile states and conflict-prone regions. However, the voice of the private sector was largely missing from these discussions.

Those in the business of supporting development and diplomatic efforts on the ground bring broad experience working in complex environments. But we rarely capitalize on their experience designing and implementing programs, working with women at the community level and integrating health and education into security initiatives. Creative saw that as a gap.

Creative was also concerned that despite the QDDR characterization of women as protagonists, or “agents” of peace and security, the National Action Plan has predominantly focused on the challenges of protection and inclusion. Creative suggested that the private sector experience may tell a slightly different story: specifically one that produces a more balanced vision of women that goes beyond the constraints of victimhood.

II. SHIFTING THE PARADIGM: RE-CHARACTERIZING “WOMEN IN COMMUNITY SECURITY” AND INCREASING OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Regardless of culture, women can play key roles in community stabilization and security, particularly in preventing conflict, resolving disputes, and mobilizing populations. At times, women’s contributions to peace and justice at the community level are an obvious element of local governance and customary practice. Just as often, their contributions are embedded in the fabric of traditional culture and as a result, hidden to outsiders. Gaps in our understanding of what those exact roles are, and the direct (or indirect) impact they have, lead to uncertainty about policies and programs.

When the picture is incomplete, security assistance can inadvertently undermine women’s traditional stabilization functions within the community. Programs that exclude women altogether or fail to address malign influencers create security gaps that can be exploited by

¹⁵ The framework for the National Action Plan targets five high-level objectives that include:

- National Integration and Institutionalization, which specifically support institutionalization of “gender-responsive approach to diplomatic, development and defense-related work in conflict-affected environments.”
- Participation in Peace Processes and Decision-making
- Protection from Violence, which includes not only addressing prevention of violence, but also holding perpetrators accountable in conflict-affected environments.
- Conflict Prevention, which means using our soft power to help create conditions to create stable societies by promoting education, health, and economic opportunities for women that lays the foundation for lasting peace.
- Access to Relief and Recovery by those who provide humanitarian assistance.

criminals and extremists. It is therefore essential that assessments contribute to greater awareness of women's roles in their communities, and that subsequent evaluation captures their impact.

With this in mind, Creative began the Women in Community Security Project by examining its own programs and activities. Were our assumptions correct? Had we been missing security opportunities, linkages, or dependencies? Were we asking the right questions of our partners? Were we focusing on the right issues? Were we inadvertently undermining or nullifying women's traditional leadership roles? Did the development framework that Creative and its partners were asked to work within allow for sustainable, gender-based security development to occur? The result of this examination was that while we may not have been doing things wrong, it was clear that we could be doing them better.

The examples that follow illustrate unique and necessary contributions by women that impact community security but were not recognized as essential elements of a security strategy. They illuminate gaps in our knowledge, and in the way we do business. The challenge is how to leverage these experiences and others like them to fill our knowledge and practice gaps in a way that will move us closer to inclusion and influence as we address immediate security imperatives.

Case Study #1: Stopping the Violence Before it Begins; Early Childhood Education in Jordan

While there is a lot of momentum in Jordan around prevention of violence among young children, parents do not typically take an active role in their children's education. Women are the primary caretakers, but they often encourage aggression in their sons as a traditional manifestation of strength. Men are disconnected from parenting, and are the typical aggressors outside the home.

While implementing an initiative that trains women in how to more effectively prepare their young children for school, Creative's practitioners discovered an opportunity to advance women's role in community security. As part of a pilot program, mothers received Parent-Child Packages filled with guidance on children's development, nutrition and safety. In the poor, conservative and rural areas where the program was introduced, tribal conflict is prevalent. Positive government reach is a challenge and the conditions that foster extremism are rife. The packages help mothers learn how to teach non-violent social behaviors in a way that shapes their children's ability to control their emotional behavior and resolve conflict.

As the program matured, both mothers and fathers began to see results. They indicated that they believed the packages improved the parenting dynamic in the home. They began to recommend the program to their relatives and friends. The Ministry of Education saw impact as well. As U.S. assistance tapered off, the Jordanian Ministry of Education increased its support.

Parent-Child Packages were not part of a security-related program, but they may turn out to be a development success with positive security outcomes. By empowering mothers, the Parent-Child Packages uncovered a new entry point to address the culture of dispute resolution and can now highlight the special access women have in changing attitudes within their family. They were culturally compatible with the more traditional, rural values of the impacted communities.

Although it was not the primary intent of the program, they addressed an underlying driver of conflict at the community level. As such, these packages presented a special opportunity for further investigation into how to more effectively leverage the informal role women play in community security and conflict prevention by virtue of their role in families.

Case Study #2: Preventing Gang Violence and Building Livelihoods in Honduras; Alianza Joven Regional

In a country where gang violence claims so many lives – 82 of every 100,000 residents—and 75 percent of victims are young men; it is no surprise that Honduran women embrace programs that address prevention. While women are not formally involved in community governance, they participate in meetings, work to build better community-police relations, and advocate for vocational training opportunities to improve their ability to earn a living when their husbands are imprisoned or absent.

Creative's *Alianza Joven Regional* program had been modeled after similarly successful programs in El Salvador and Guatemala. *Alianza Joven Regional* seeks to improve security in 40 of the poorest communities in Honduras. It established community centers—kept up and running by mothers and grandmothers—to get young people off the streets and ultimately reduce violence and gang involvement. Boys are the primary focus, but girls are also encouraged and included. In a country where police are often feared due to corruption and gang connections, these centers offer a place where youth can connect with communities through sports and other non-threatening activities, and have become a platform for community engagement with police and other government officials.

Men are not available to lead this effort. Instead, it is the mothers and grandmothers who make this program a success. They walk a fine line serving as interlocutors between community members, the mayor's offices and the police. By virtue of their gender and status, they can negotiate police access to the poorest and most violent communities in ways the men cannot – often putting themselves at risk in areas controlled by narco-gangs. If the police are the face of the government, the women are the face of the community.

Formalizing these women's involvement in the community centers, and as liaisons between police, youth, and officials, could strengthen their role in community security. Women's valuable knowledge on security issues and needs within their communities is leveraged. Current programming, however, has not formalized women's roles.

Case Study #3: Do No Harm; Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan

While working on a set of community-level programs in Afghanistan, Creative's practitioners observed that in most villages, women who were related to prominent male elders often played important roles resolving disputes within their communities. Although they did not hold formal leadership positions, their authority was acknowledged and accepted throughout the community, contributing to the management of tribal and familial conflict.

An unintended consequence of the international community's emphasis on strengthening the formal justice system in place of informal processes at the sub-national level diminished the role

of women as informal peacekeepers. They longer contributed to community security in a culturally appropriate way.

Some of these women were able to integrate into nascent formal governance or justice structures, but it was the exception rather than the rule. This cultural phenomenon was either invisible to coalition planners, or misunderstood, despite the fact that one of the international community's goals for Afghanistan was to empower its women.

This experience illustrates what can occur when upfront assessments, plans and programming do not accurately capture the cultural contributions that women make to community security. It also provides a clear example of "strategic blindness" when it comes to women's central role in stability.

Case Study #4: Extreme Conflict; Training Women Community Leaders in Syria

The ongoing efforts to prepare Syrian community leaders to address problems of eventual restoration of governance in a post-conflict environment presents a dramatic example of how women can become part of the conflict mitigation process at the community level in an extreme situation. Working with Syrian civil society organizations, Creative experienced first-hand the difficulty in integrating women into the fabric of community stabilization. Creative's facilitators also observed the remarkable strength and resilience of Syrian women leaders once mobilized. The women demonstrated that they were willing to take on critical governance issues that many of their male counterparts would or could not. The experienced has produced some valuable insights that could be key to a more stable future for all Syrians. Such insights are particularly instructive for future conflicts in the fight against radical extremism.

Creative's partner on the ground in Syria is the Center for Civil Society and Democracy (CCSD). As of late 2014, CCSD had offices in 10 of 14 Syrian provinces. CCSD works to promote inclusion of women into local government, community mobilization and public security, and conducts capacity building to ensure women have a seat at the table in local governing councils and the skills they need to be heard. Women's voices are critical because these community-based decision making bodies are one of the only mechanisms that can facilitate access to essential government services in war-torn cities throughout country. As government forces, militias, and other armed actors move in and out of contested areas, they tend to create their own governing structures. The impact on essential services, to include law enforcement, justice, healthcare, and education has been catastrophic. Women, who are generally not part of the armed forces or other security structures, are able to provide needs assessments, continuity, and advocacy in a way the men cannot.

To improve their effectiveness, women from communities throughout Syria were brought to a training center in Turkey near the Syrian border. There they were prepared to more effectively insert themselves into the council decision-making process in order to support greater access to health care, education and food supplies. The training followed the principles of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, supporting the inclusion of women at all stages of peace talks and stressing the importance of gender balance in negotiations to bring conflicts to an end. Selection

of participants in Syria and access to the training was facilitated by CCSD, which is also able to monitor progress upon the women's return.

A number of important lessons for high-conflict, high-risk gender-based development have emerged from the Syria program. The first is the need to address the problem of factionalism before training can begin. An unexpected level of religious, ethnic, and political diversity among the women mandated that confidence building among participants became an essential task.

The second lesson was that lexicon matters. While Western trainers wanted to talk explicitly about security, the women wanted to talk about participation. Discussions about "security" hit nerves on multiple levels. For some participants, because of their religious, ethnic, and local allegiances, it was impossible to speak openly and candidly about challenges and objectives. Women were particularly uncomfortable with the language of security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. The same issues, when couched in terms of "human security," however, could be approached with some success.

Another factor with the Syrian women was their desire to find entry points in the community that would give them a voice. Syrian women had been leaders in the initial Arab Spring uprising in 2012 and they believed they had earned a seat at the table. But addressing security challenges directly was difficult both for the women, and for the men they would work with on the councils. To the extent women could approach issues from their perspectives as educators or health care providers, or in the pursuit of economic stability, they could make a difference. Awareness and sensitivity to the cultural constraints, whether real or perceived, was critical if progress was to be made.

These observations underscore the challenge of short term training that still needs to have long term development impact if it is to be worth the security and political risk. Engaging women in community development is a security imperative in Syria. But the means used to bring women into the process must be carefully crafted based on the cultural norms of the participants. From the interviews we conducted, it became clear that working within a comfort zone for the trainees was one of the most important lessons learned by those providing training.

The courage of women in Syria underscores their commitment to stability. The women leaders, and the men who supported their attendance, see this as essential for the ongoing survival of their respective communities. What remains uncertain is how one can measure both the short and medium term benefits that can be taken from these types of programs in a way that will resonate with policy makers and funding sources, and the degree to which they will have transformational effect once a political settlement is reached or the conflict is ended.

In addition to the Creative case studies, the Women in Security Project team reviewed other organizations' work in re-framing the issue of effective advocacy for women as security

providers. The following conclusions matched Creative's observations, and provide a good summary of the distinct, tangible security value that women can provide:¹⁶

- Women provide knowledge about the security issues, needs, and status within their communities. Their knowledge represents a distinct perspective from that of the men that is essential to understanding the operating environment and guiding security force performance.
- Women are often crucial to conflict resolution. Their understanding of community dynamics and their skills in conflict resolution can make the difference between reemerging violence and peace.
- Women are security service providers. Even if they are not active members of the uniformed security forces, they deliver integrated and essential complimentary services such as shelter and counseling for victims of crime, psychological care and monitoring, prisoner support, and legal assistance.
- Women are often the most effective trainers for security personnel on issues pertaining to human rights, gender violence, and their own roles in peace monitoring and oversight. Women perform critical security tasks that men are sometimes culturally or legally prohibited from doing. In traditional cultures where interaction between unrelated women and men is strictly controlled or frowned upon, it is essential that women are present in security forces to perform those tasks that only women can do (i.e. searching women's persons, collecting evidence from women, protecting female witnesses, and guarding women prisoners or detainees). Many nations have these constraints enshrined in their laws. If trained and qualified women are not present in security forces in sufficient numbers to perform these tasks, security operations are compromised.¹⁷
- In places where organized criminal activities have overwhelmed communities, women are playing an increasingly significant role in policing at the local level: they help counter the recruitment of youth, increase law enforcement intelligence gathering, and facilitate the reintegration and reconciliation of former gang members.

Creative came to the conclusion that armed with greater understanding, progress is possible. Gender-based program assessment and evaluation frameworks can be adjusted to include mapping the security dimension of women's development. Security assistance models that currently address gender solely through the lens of access to justice and equality can be modified

¹⁶ Megan Bastick and Tobie Whiteman, *A Women's Guide to Security Sector Reform*, The Institute for Inclusive Security and the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (2013).

¹⁷ Afghanistan provides an example of a nation that has a number of very specific restrictions on security force interaction with women. As Special Police Units matured and began to conduct operations independent from International Security Assistance Forces, for example, the absence of a sufficient number of trained police women became an impediment to operational success. Units would initiate raids on suspected Taliban-held compounds, for instance, only to be stopped from entering by the presence of women at the gates. When Afghan forces did force entry, they frequently could not completely clear buildings or gather evidence from certain parts of the houses because they were occupied by the women of the house. Source – Author's (Michelle Hughes) personal records and interview notes from her deployment to Afghanistan as the Senior Rule of Law Advisor to the NATO Police Development Mission (2010-2012).

to reflect a more operational focus that recognizes women's contributions to security organizations and community resilience.¹⁸

When women are recognized as actors capable of performing security functions such as information gathering, investigation and analysis, conflict resolution, and community outreach, their value in promoting security becomes clearer. When women are involved in community security, they often bring a layer of responsiveness, oversight and accountability that might not otherwise exist.

III. THE WAY AHEAD: FROM COMMUNITY OF INTEREST TO COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE

How do we fill the gaps between policy and practice; ideas and implementation? Following its initial analysis, Creative reached out to the Civil Society Working Group on the National Action Plan, Business Executives for National Security, and numerous offices, bureaus and agencies throughout the U.S. Government to solicit feedback and recommendations on how to best advocate our approach to women in community security. The conversations, in the form of a series of information roundtables over the course of several months, brought together representatives from government, non-governmental organizations, and the commercial sector. They reinforced our belief that creating a community of practice to establish best practices for gender and security can prevent the sidelining of women's issues in the broader debate around and peace and security. The consultations affirmed that as of yet, a coherent, comprehensive community of practice that can reach across organizational and functional lines to promote best practices and share experience does not exist.

The consultations also exposed the divide between the private sector, and other actors and stakeholders. NGO representatives for example, saw the Creative initiative as a way to reach what they classified as “the contractors,” but while agreeing that so-called “contractor implementers” have been excluded from the discussions, they expressed concerns about trying to reach a “common language” across the governmental, commercial and non-governmental communities of practice. Several participants opined that these groups operate under competitive frameworks with divergent interests. Government officials concurred, but expressed frustration over the difficulty of engaging across such a broad spectrum. They lamented the absence of centralized leadership that could mobilize multiple audiences effectively.

Straddling both the for-profit and not-for-profit worlds as it does, Creative also reached out specifically to the non-development, corporate world for its perspective. At a meeting with members of Business Executives for National Security (BENS), the wide ranging discussion about the work being done to support U.S. national security interests globally focused on women as agents of positive change who can facilitate economic development and mitigate corporate risk. The more practical approach taken by business leaders was apparent from the outset. While cautioning that the profit motive always had to be addressed, they saw the value of leveraging

¹⁸ Recent studies mapping women's police precincts in Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Peru provide an important advance in understanding the way women are affected by violence, but also about ways police practices can inform prevention. See *Regional Mapping Study of Women's Police Stations in Latin America*, IDRC and CEPLAES (Ottawa, Quito, 2008)

women as a potential element in corporate expansion strategies. BENS members noted that they needed to get beyond a "check the box" form of social responsibility and reinforce the notion that the private sector can profit from more effective gender engagement. What was not clear was how corporations incorporate women's security roles into corporate strategy. It was suggested that a set of core operating principles, similar to those that have been adopted within in the extractive industries to establish transparency standards,¹⁹ or the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) initiative that led to a code of conduct for private security contractors,²⁰ would be a significant step forward.

Following the consultations, we believe that the private sector is at the crux of the solution. Often excluded by governments from important operational planning, companies that operate in the commercial side of the private sector also rarely participate in civil society dialogue, yet they are the ones who are most often the government's implementing partners, or are engaged in development amidst conflict and instability. Therefore, Creative's first recommendations are designed to facilitate greater private sector participation in government-led security assistance planning; leverage private sector access, perspective and experience; guide assessment, plans, and strategies; and consolidate a more inclusive community of practice for sustainable transition from conflict to peace.

Step 1: Solidify the Community of Practice for Women in Security Development

Private sector companies that have robust, operational experience with gender development need to coalesce as part of a community of practice that can translate isolated lessons in the field to cogent lessons learned. Currently, so-called "best practices" in gender and security are generally based on anecdote and theory rather than hard, empirical evidence. We have just begun to understand how programs directed at violence prevention provide insights into ways in which women contribute to their own security and the overall safety of their communities. Where such studies exist, they are not always applicable to the most challenging environments. This information is essential to the planning process for stabilization.

A common set of agreed-upon industry guidelines and operating principles would legitimize the role women play in creating and sustaining lasting peace, improve their ability to effectively engage in security-related community development issues and enable greater collaboration with civil society. The principles themselves can be used to inform policy and program design. The process of creating principles would improve information-sharing across governmental and non-governmental, for-profit and not-for-profit lines. Guidelines and principles could also lead to the

¹⁹ The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a global Standard to promote openness and accountable management of natural resources. It seeks to strengthen government and company systems, inform public debate, and enhance trust. In each implementing country it is supported by a coalition of governments, companies and civil society working together. See <https://eiti.org/eiti> (last accessed January 29, 2015).

²⁰ The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) is the result of a multi-stakeholder initiative launched by Switzerland, with the over-arching objectives to articulate human rights responsibilities of private security companies (PSCs), and to set out international principles and standards for the responsible provision of private security services, particularly when operating in complex environments. See <http://www.dcaf.ch/Project/International-Code-of-Conduct-for-Private-Security-Service-Providers> (last accessed January 29, 2015).

creation of true best practices, private sector performance indicators and risk assessment guidelines that connect gender and security.

To jump-start the process, Creative drafted a set of core operating principles for discussion, and socialized them as part of the Women in Community Security Project consultations. The draft principles are attached to this paper at [Annex A](#). The initial feedback was overwhelmingly positive, but experience has shown that adoption of an industry standard can require a significant consensus-building effort led by a wide range of stakeholders. Unless a recognized, inclusive community of practice is formed, it is unlikely that the principles will be able to move beyond concept, and into implementation.

Step 2: Incorporate the private sector openly, objectively and appropriately into the national level dialogue on National Action Plan implementation.

While the mandate of the National Action Plan is clear – working with women is a national security imperative – mechanisms to ensure support for this mandate are not yet fully developed. There are already a few areas where leveraging private sector knowledge about local resources and constraints can make an immediate difference: this can inform how to use women as community advocates when designing programs, and how to recruit, train and equip gender-inclusive and gender-responsive security forces.

Step 3: Review program assessment and evaluation.

Armed with best practices and lessons learned, development practitioners are in a good position to help others identify constraints and restraints, and but also previously unrecognized opportunities. The private sector can assist in the establishment of realistic quantitative and qualitative indicators to measure progress that reflect a more holistic view of community security. A Women's Peace and Security Barometer developed by CORDAID in the Netherlands is one example of a nascent tool that tries to measure and analyze contextualized information in order to develop indicators about women's inclusion and needs at the community level and other, similarly credible efforts are also underway.²¹ Within the United States, the private sector can be used to inform a similar effort that would directly support implementation of the National Action Plan.

Step 4: Review security assistance models through a gender-sensitive lens

There is consensus around the use of international women in peacekeeping; the United States supports this through government-funded programs as a matter of policy. But there is still skepticism and uncertainty surrounding the relevance of investments in women in restoring basic security. By reviewing our security assistance models to ensure they are gender sensitive, culturally appropriate, and informed by a more accurate understanding of the operating environment, we can ensure the necessary linkages exist between security, justice, governance and education development programming.

²¹ See Women's Community Barometer- CORDAID www.cordaid.org

Private sector practitioners have first-hand experience trying to implement narrowly crafted gender-focused programs that are disconnected from related security development initiatives. As a result, they are well-positioned to inform modifications to security assistance models that would facilitate gender-related coherence across the security sector and leverage women's contributions to community security for the greatest impact.

Step 5: Continue our own education

A critical way to support innovation and creativity is to immediately identify training and education opportunities to ensure future programming transcends the traditional stovepipes in development. Private sector companies should bring their experience to bear as they train other actors on best practices and cross-sector interventions as points of entry in reaching women. Using field-based evidence to reach new levels of understanding will enable a larger audience in both government and the private sector to benefit, and should be a dynamic and ongoing process. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Patricia Haslach noted, "We need an approach to transitions that is more inclusive and attentive to the connections between sexual violence and community security and stability."²² This is a goal of government responsibility that a credible community of practice can adamantly support.

CONCLUSION

Realizing the National Action Plan for Women, Peace, and Security's potential will require an end to "strategic blindness". It will also require a willingness to embrace the private sector in an effort to understand what works. This means rethinking what we know about women, not only as victims of violence, but as part of our smart approaches to violence prevention. The lessons learned about the way women fill positive roles in community security, whether through community dialogue or mothers educating their children, provide practitioners with a key missing piece of the security puzzle. Intervention by women in transitioning communities can provide a powerful tool for local conflict management.

Creative is not the only organization calling for a re-characterization of our current gender and security paradigm. In 2011, a group of women leaders from the African Union convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to establish a dialogue on the progress of gender mainstreaming in African security sector reform. Their blunt assessment speaks for itself:

The [gender] policy agenda draws on a Victorian/colonial conception of the security sector that is based on the view that women are recipients of security and protection, while men are the providers and decision makers in matters of security. This approach positions women as security recipients not security actors, and fosters their exclusion from the security sector... As a result, policies on gender mainstreaming within security institutions have been based on a limited interpretation of gender to mean the inclusion of women. The superficial adoption of gender policies in security institutions has hindered

²² Speech delivered to the IHRP Conference, Toronto, Canada, February 8, 2013. Haslach addressed the U.S. role in addressing sexual violence in Libya and Syria, noting that it could not be separated from the role women play in both countries as enablers of security in their respective countries. Ms. Haslach is now the U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia.

tangible transformation of structural power dynamics within the very institutions and the communities they serve.²³

It is time to bring the voices of private sector practitioners into the conversation about ways to ensure a holistic approach to women as security actors in countries emerging from war and conflict. We believe a community of practice can help the U.S. government achieve its national security objectives that put “women at the center of our diplomacy and development efforts –not simply as beneficiaries, but also as agents of peace, reconciliation, development, growth and stability.”²⁴

Women are at the nexus of security and development by their very role as producers of security; they must be considered a strategic asset. Only when the lessons of development practitioners are formalized and absorbed into plans will we meet the national security imperative of including women in the task of creating a more stable and secure environment. One of the best ways to begin this integration of learning is by greater inclusion of those in the private sector, who can transform policy aspirations to field based solutions that are in the national interest.

²³ *A Policy Dialogue: African Union’s Security Sector Reform Framework and Gender Transformation*, Fahamu Networks for Social Justice and the African Security Sector Network (2011) at p. 10

²⁴ Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton, Statement on the release of the Quadrennial Diplomacy, Development Review, March 7, 2012.

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ANNEX A: WOMEN IN COMMUNITY SECURITY CORE OPERATING PRINCIPLES (DRAFT)

1. *The private sector should consciously and actively engage with women as agents of peace and stability and include such engagement in core operating plans.*

- When assessing community security, evaluation frameworks should include mapping the roles that women play in the provision of “soft” security
- Community development programs should be designed to strengthen the security dimension of women’s development
- Corporate risk assessments should include an evaluation of the role that women in the community can play in order to mitigate the security risk to business operations and investment.
- Planning and evaluation frameworks and performance assessments should include the women’s perspective on community security issues, needs, and status as a separate and distinct component of overall community risk assessments and mapping of the operating environment
- Where women are present in security forces, the private sector should actively encourage their professional growth and development, and seek opportunities to include them in security-related decision-making processes.

2. *Do no harm: Women’s roles as agents of peace and stability within the community should be openly acknowledged and protected.*

- Corporate risk assessments should include a culturally sensitive evaluation of the roles that women in the community might play in order to mitigate the impact of investment and operations on the advancement of women’s ability to engage on security issues of interest and importance to them.
- Women’s contributions to conflict resolution, to include their roles in early childhood education, dispute resolution, reintegration and reconciliation, and the provision of health and social services should be reinforced and strengthened within the fabric of community governance structures
- In traditional cultures where interaction between unrelated men and women is controlled or frowned upon, the hard security tasks that women can and should perform, such as searching, investigations, and collecting evidence from women, protecting female victims and witnesses, and guarding women prisoners should be actively reinforced; women’s ability to get the training, fair pay, promotions, and benefits for the work they perform should be monitored, encouraged, and protected.
- Where women are not active members of the uniformed security forces, the complimentary services they deliver, such as shelter and counseling for victims of crime, psychological care and monitoring, prisoner support, and legal assistance should be integrated into both public and private security assistance

- Engagement with women on security issues should be conducted within the framework of host nation law, and sensitive to local and cultural norms and practices

3. *Corporate strategies to strengthen and leverage women's contributions to community security should compliment other external donor development activities.*

- When conducting strategic planning and risk assessments, corporations should make every effort to engage with foreign development agencies, NGOs, and civil society organizations already operating in the communities concerned in order to understand and harmonize with efforts already underway to strengthen the roles of women in community security
- International actors that are supporting gender-related security development should be consulted as possible partners for the advancement of private sector initiatives
- International actors that are supporting gender-related security development should be consulted during operational assessments and evaluation in order to ensure that corporate activities are not undermining gender-related community security, governance, and development
- When designing strategies to engage community leaders on matters of security concern, corporations should strive to create consultative processes and venues that invite sustained, ongoing, and inclusive participation by local women and organizations that are working with local women

4. *The private sector should make a conscious effort to coordinate with relevant departments and agencies within the host nation government to further alignment with host nation policy and development.*

- Private sector-enabled community development should work directly with host nation governments to build in opportunities and venues that enable women to provide knowledge about security issues, needs, and status within their communities
- Community assistance should include training and educating women on how to engage more effectively with the both the public and private security sector on issues of community security concern
- Military and law enforcement-related security assistance should include activities that provide women with opportunities to provide input on security force performance and security force response to the needs of women and the vulnerable populations
- Public-private partnerships should be shaped to reinforce gender transformation within the fabric of community as a core component of security planning and risk mitigation
- Private sector activities should strive to coordinate with host nation government agencies that work on equity issues such as ministries for gender/women's affairs, social services, public health and education, and government-supported women's organizations
- Corporations should take concrete steps to further gender equality by adopting and implementing policies to secure the health, safety, and well-being of women workers, and supporting women workers in their efforts to access security-related government services

5. Private sector development activities that are undertaken on behalf of the U.S. Government should be held accountable to the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.

- USG implementing partners have a duty of care to ensure that, to the extent possible within the framework of their U.S. Government contracts; their operations harmonize with NAP policies and objectives
- Where they are responsible for program design, implementation, and assessment, private sector development companies should ensure that they are incorporating best practices for strengthening the role of women in community security
- The private sector should affirmatively and proactively share experience, lessons learned, and best practices with the U.S. Government in an effort to ensure that policy makers and planners have the full benefit of lessons from the field
- In order to promote improved sustainability of women's roles in community security, development should include provisions for long term or continuing engagement with relevant civil society organizations on the ground
- Operationalizing the NAP will require agreement on public and private sector measures of success; effective public-private partnering on the establishment of such measures should be the goal of all organizations involved in the advancement of women in community security

WESTERN WOMEN AND JIHADIST GROUPS: THEOLOGY, IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL MEDIA

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INTRODUCTION

“...when we say that the woman is one of the greatest obstacles to the Victory of Islam, we must also mention the opposite notion, and it is that the woman is one of the primary and most influential factors in the Victory of Islam”¹

This paper aims to look beyond the growing literature specifically related to women as suicide bombers, focusing instead at a broader range of roles assumed by women within a jihadist movement, with particular emphasis on the Islamic State and the recruitment of western women to factions of the group located in both Syria and Iraq.² In a 2014 study it was noted that out of thirteen ‘terrorist’ groups, seven, all non-jihadist, showed an evolution in the role of women from logistics, recruitment and propaganda, to frontline operations.³

This study highlights the reversal of this trend within jihadist groups with women having historically taken a very limited (i.e. al-Qaeda Central) or operational (al-Qaeda in Iraq) role, to a much wider range of positions in the current Islamic State strategy excluding combat. This includes recruitment and propaganda in addition to the role of wife and mother which is of upmost importance to the jihad. As such, the paper addresses the following research questions:

- How do the historical, theological and ideological narratives impact upon current understandings of women’s involvement in jihadist groups, beyond martyrdom operations?
- How have social media platforms such as Twitter impacted upon western female involvement in jihadist groups?

Limitations to the paper include the relatively short time-span of the research and in relation, Twitter’s current strategy of deleting jihadist-related accounts which has impacted the database. In addition, the paper has focused primarily on English-language sources and social media users, the further use of Arabic (or other) language sources would likely have been a useful addition to

¹ Al-‘Uyayri, Al-Hafith Yusuf Bin Salih. *The Role Of The Women In Fighting The Enemies*. 2001/2. http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/7287/HAF_Role_of_the_Women.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed November 5, 2014).

²For in depth assessments of female suicide bombing see: Jacques, Karen, and Paul J. Taylor. “Female Terrorism: A Review.” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 2009: 499-515; O’Rourke, L. “What’s special about female suicide terrorism?” *Security Studies*, 2009: 681-718; Skaine, Rosemarie. *Female suicide bombers*. Jefferson, N.C. : McFarland, 2006; and Speckhard, Anne. “The Emergence of Female Suicide Terrorists.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 2008: 995-1023.

³ Raghavan, S. V., and V. Balasubramaniyan. “Evolving Role of Women in Terror Groups: Progression or Regression?” *Journal of International Women's Studies* 15, no. 2 (2014): 197-211.

the analysis. This paper is therefore a starting point and could provide the basis for a more in-depth analysis of female jihadist supporters online, more specifically looking at their wider networks and the flow and content of information over a longer time period.

SCHOLARLY AND IDEOLOGICAL VIEWS ON WOMEN AND JIHAD

Whilst historical examples of women taking on a combat role exist, these seem to be the exception rather than the rule with most having served in a support role. This is not to say that the role of women has been downplayed or dismissed though, highlighted through statements of key jihadist leaders and a number of supporting fatwas.

In some cases, the legal and theological texts have been utilised by jihadist figures to either prevent or support women in undertaking various roles, often dependent on the current situation, for instance the need for more suicide bombers in Iraq.⁴ Conversely, this application of religious justification is taken *out* of context when used for recruitment and propaganda purposes, often lacking in-depth detail regarding the environment and situation at the time of its occurrence or recording (i.e. in the Quran or Hadith).⁵ In other words, small sections of text are used to justify an action, whilst the contextual background is not passed on to the recipient. Challenging this sound-bite information, which has become an important tool of jihadist communication and recruitment, is thus an important strand of counter-terrorism.

THE CONCEPT OF JIHAD

The term jihad more often than not generates negative connotations, in the press often translated as “holy war.” Terms such as *qital* (fighting) or *harb* (war) are a more direct reference to violence, however, with *jihad* actually:

*“a verbal noun with the literal meaning of ‘striving’ or ‘determined effort’...the active participle mujahid means ‘someone who strives’ or ‘a participant in jihad.’”*⁶

Ali and Rehman distinguish two broad interpretations of jihad: those who perceive “a permanent state of belligerence with all non-believers” in contrast to those who link jihad to “a state of self-exertion and passivity.” In the first instance jihad is viewed as a tool of expansionist war related to the emergence of Islam as a ‘conquering power’ in the seventh century. The second understanding bases itself on literal interpretations of primary sources such as the Quran and Hadith, specifically the belief that the Prophet distinguished minor jihad from greater, with the

⁴ Speckhard, Anne. “Female Suicide Bombers in Iraq.” *Democracy and Security*, 2009: 19-50; Niva, Steve. *Behind the Surge in Iraqi Women Suicide Bombers*. 11 August 2008. http://fpif.org/behind_the_surge_in_iraqi_women_suicide_bombers/ (accessed December 5, 2014).

⁵ OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. “The Role of Freedom of Religion and Belief in a Democratic Society: Searching for Ways to Combat Terrorism and Extremism.” Baku, Azerbaijan: OCSE, 2002; Stuart, H. “Critiquing Radical Claims to Theological Authenticity.” *NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Countering Violent Extremism Among Youth to Prevent Terrorism*. Milan, Italy: IOS Press BV, 2014. 65-82; for an alternative perspective on the difficulties of countering theological arguments considered extremist given the involvement of clerics with strong religious credentials see: Price, Daniel E. *Sacred Terror: how faith becomes lethal*. Praeger: Santa Barbara, CA, 2012.

⁶Streusand, Douglas E. “What Does Jihad Mean?” *The Middle East Quarterly* 4, no. 3 (1997): 9-17.

former pointing to the use of force in battle and the latter referring to ‘peaceful and personal compliance’ with the regulations of Islam.⁷

Another key differentiation is between *jihad al-daf*’ (defensive jihad), and *jihad al-talab* (offensive jihad) the former of which provides the theological and ideological justifications underpinning the global jihadist movement.⁸ Whereas offensive jihad was formulated in order to regulate inter-state conflict in the context of a strong Islamic state, defensive jihad addresses “politically and militarily powerless” Muslims who find themselves without state or authoritative protection when under attack. In the first instance, jihad is considered *fard kifaya* (collective duty), legitimated at the command of a ruler. In the latter, Muslims could:

“...take up jihad on their own initiative, performing it as an individual obligation (*fard ‘ayn*) without awaiting the orders or permissions of any religious, political, parental, or in the case of married women, spousal authority.”⁹

There is some debate surrounding the evolution of defensive jihad as a concept over time from self-defence against temptation, Satan, the unjust, and religious persecution – none of which are necessarily belligerent, to the right to declare war against *kuffar* (infidels) whether it be an individual ruler or people,¹⁰ although this is disputed. On one hand, there is a degree of agreement that the Quran and Hadith establish warfare as the ‘domain of the state’ in which authorisation cannot be established by non-state actors, even in defence of Islam.¹¹ On the other hand, there is significant debate surrounding the suggestion that there is an evolution of pronouncements within the Quran from the earliest stage of revelation (i.e. when fighting opponents of Islam was forbidden) to a later period in which fighting was encouraged (a timeline established by the exegetes) which undermines the assumption.¹²

⁷ Ali, Shaheen Sardar, and Javaid Rehman. “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law.” *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 10, no. 3 (2005): 321-343. Also see: Cook, David. *Understanding Jihad*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005; Karlig˘a, B. “Religion, terror, war and the need for global ethics.” In *Terror and suicide attacks: an Islamic perspective*, 44-62. New Jersey: The Light, 2004. P.51; Noor, Mohammad. “The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction.” *Journal of Law and Religion* 3, no. 2 (1985): 381-397; Ali, Yusuf. *The Holy Quran*. 2nd Ed. American Trust Publications, 1977. Note 1270; and Ramadan, Tariq. *What I Believe*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 114.

⁸ Al-Dawoody, Ahmed. “Armed Jihad in the Islamic Legal Tradition.” *Religion Compass*, 2013: 476; Bergesen, Albert J. *The Sayyid Qutb reader : selected writings on politics, religion an society*. London: Routledge, 2008.

⁹ Lahoud, Nelly. “The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis’ Exclusion of Women From Jihad.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 5 (2014): 781

¹⁰ Qazi, Farhana. “The Majahidaat: Tracing the Early Female Warriors of Islam.” In *Women, Gender and Terrorism*, edited by Laura Sjoberg and Caron E Gentry, 29-56. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2011. 36

¹¹ This is supported by Shaykh Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani who argued that ‘living well’ is preferable to war even if it is in a state without an Islamic legal system as discussed in: Brachman, J M. *Global Jihadism: theory and practice*. London: Routledge, 2009. 32; similarly, Shaykh Muhammad Afifi al-Akiti argues that only the state can engage in war as discussed in al-Akiti, M A. *Defending the transgressed by censuring the reckless against the killing of civilians*. London: Aqsa Press, 2005. 52-3.

¹² Firestone, Reuven. *Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 64-5

In relation specifically to women, the Prophet's wife 'Aisha reported that upon asking him whether or not jihad is an obligation to females, he responded that it is, however, that women's jihad is the pilgrimage.¹³ Overall though, Cook concludes that "classical Muslim legal literature contains very little material concerning the issue of women participating in Jihad."¹⁴

In more recent times, the issue of women and jihad has become more prominent within scholarly accounts and the subject of a number of *fatwas* (legal rulings). Muhammad Khayr Haykal provided one of the first in depth analysis of the issue in the early 1990s, coming to quite a revolutionary conclusion according to Cook. In his discussion of eligibility, Haykal concludes that in the context of jihad as *fard kifaya* (collective duty) women are not obligated to fight although have the option whereas in the case of jihad as *fard 'ayn* (individual obligation) women *must* fight.¹⁵ This reflects Nelly Lahoud's argument which highlights the contradiction in the invocation of defensive jihad as an individual obligation by jihadists whilst simultaneously excluding women from battle.¹⁶

In relation specifically to martyrdom operations and the participation of women, six fatwas provide justification including those written by Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Qatar); Faysal al-Mawlawi (Ireland); Nizar 'Abd al-Qadir Riyyan (Gaza); and three scholars of the al-Azhar University (Egypt). Cook notes that "it is significant that the more conservative...religious leaders are completely absent from this list" referring to legal authorities in countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan.¹⁷ Fatwa number 9533 of the Saudi Permanent Committee highlights this point, responding to the question of whether it is obligatory for women to take part in jihad, and if so, which type. The response notes that:

*"Jihad against disbelievers through fighting them is not obligatory on women. However, she must take part in the jihad of calling people to truth and manifesting Shari'ah so far as her honor is not violated and provided that she wears clothes concealing her body, does not intermingle with non-Mahram...men, is not too soft of speech and does not stay in seclusion with non-Mahram...men."*¹⁸

The subject of women's exact role in the jihad is also raised within some of the blogs currently contributed to by western women now living in Syria. For instance, 'Bird of Jannah's' blog: 'Diary of a Traveller' responds to a question by a follower in which she states:

*"I was told that women under the Islamic State are not encouraged {some said not allowed} to participate in the battle. And to be very honest – I don't know why."*¹⁹

¹³ Narrated by 'Aisha: "I said, 'Oh Allah's messenger ...we consider jihad as the best deed.' The Prophet said, 'the best Jihad (for women) is Hajj Mabru'" in Sahih al-Bukhari. *Pilgrimage (Hajj)* (Vol. 2, Book 26, Hadith 595). 1520. <http://sunnah.com/search/?q=women+jihad> (accessed December 5, 2014).

¹⁴ Cook, David. "Women Fighting in Jihad?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28, no. 5 (2005): 378

¹⁵ Haykal, Muhammad Khayr. *al-Jihad wa-l-qital fi al-siyasa al-shara'iyya*. Beirut: Dar al-Barayiq, 1993. 995-7

¹⁶ Lahoud, 2014, 781

¹⁷ Cook, 2005, 380

¹⁸ The General Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta (General Presidency). *Women's participation in Jihad: Fatwa no. 9533*. NK.

¹⁹ 'Bird of Jannah'. *Diary of a Traveler*. 2014. <http://diary-of-a-muhajirah.tumblr.com/> (accessed December 5, 2014).

In this instance, the author is clearly not aware of the theological and legal debate surrounding this issue and does not seem to have asked any individuals with which she is currently living. In another instance, blogger and Tweeter ‘Umm Layth,’ dedicates a significant section of a blog post to this topic, again in response to questions on the subject from followers which she states is “one of the most common” questions she receives from women interested in emigrating.

Umm Layth notes:

“I will be straight up and blunt with you all, there is absolutely nothing for sisters to participate in Qitaal. Sheikh Omar Shishani has been quite clear on his answer and has emphasised that there is nothing for sisters as of yet. No amalia istishihadiya (martyrdom operations) or a secret sisters katiba. These are all rumours.”²⁰

She adds that fighting is not *fardh ayn* upon women, acknowledging the arguments surrounding individual and universal obligation, although also explains that there are numerous men who are *not* selected for military operations indicating that there is no tactical need for women at present. Her referral to Shishani, a Chechen Islamic State military commander, as opposed to clerical sources highlights this aspect further. It is unclear whether or not the addition of the caveat “as of yet” is aimed at leaving this issue open-ended.

Another interesting aspect of the post is the insinuation that women have contacted her in regards to joining the jihad but have been dissuaded by the fact that they will not be able to fight. For instance, she argues that “Hijrah is not just for jihad but also with the intention of living honourably under the law of Shariah” although does not relate this to the distinction between Greater and Minor Jihad as outlined above.²¹ Females who have already made the move have also commented on their disappointment in not being allowed to fight, as explained in the following Tweets:



Umm Nosaybah @xmujahidax · May 22

This is one of the times i envy brothers. Before coming here i was gun trained & i was in the kafir army because i thought id be trained



Umm Nosaybah @xmujahidax · May 22

By them & when i get to shaam one of the ameers would let me go fight. I got a "not now woman, sit dow" lol

Finally, ‘Umm Layth’ argues that the greatest women in Islam were not “Nusaybah, or Umm Sulaym or al Khansa” who she acknowledges as renowned for their role in battle (see next section); but in fact “Khadeejah, Asia, Fatimah and Maryam” all of which were critical to the future of Islam due to their roles primarily as mothers and wives. Taking a similar line to a

²⁰ 'Umm Layth'. *Diary of a Muhajirah*. 2014. <http://fa-tubalilghuraba.tumblr.com/post/82181535227/diary-of-a-muhajirah> (accessed December 5, 2014).

²¹ Ibid

number of jihadist leaders and ideologues, Umm Layth emphasises the important role of women in raising “the future Mujahideen of Shaam” which she argues outweighs the importance of fighting.²²

This is a key insight not only into what women can expect upon joining the movement, but also into what women’s motivations are to join – i.e. do those who do not leave, *want* to take part in fighting and what does the theological debate mean in this regard? For instance, Lahoud warns that whilst the doctrine of defensive jihad is undermined by the refusal to allow women to fight, engaging in this debate in order to argue against exclusion of women could have a negative impact should it be seen to justify or permit women in battle – a complex and sensitive area for officials, scholars and jurists to consider.²³

FEMALE FIGHTERS IN ISLAMIC HISTORY

There are a number of female figures recorded as having taken a fighting role alongside men during Islamic battles in the seventh century and beyond. Referred to as the *Mujahidaat*, the earliest women known to have taken such a role protected the Prophet and included members of his family in addition to Islamic converts. Whereas the examples noted below were all believed to have taken an active role in the violence of fighting, it is also known that the *Mujahidaat*:

“Provided necessary logistics support, such as treating the wounded, donating their prized possessions for the war effort, and/or encouraging their husbands, sons and brothers to participate in jihad”²⁴

Nusayba bint Ka’ab, known also as Umm Umarah is believed to have fought in as many as six battles and is referenced in the Quran and within classical works such as ‘Abd al-Ghani b. ‘Abd al-Wahid al-Maqdisi’s small treatise: *Manaqib al-sahabiyyat* (The Merits of the Women Companions [of the Prophet Muhammad]).²⁵ Of note is Nusayba’s participation in the Battle of Uhud (626) in which she tended to the wounded before taking up arms and receiving twelve injuries.²⁶

Umm Sulaim and Umm Haram bint Milhan are also believed to have participated in the Battle of Uhud, with Umm Sulaim’s martyrdom recorded within a Hadith.²⁷ According to Ali, female relations of The Prophet also took part in battles, including his wife ‘Aisha who took a lead role in the Battle of the Camel and his granddaughter Zaynab bint Ali who took part in the Battle of Karbala.²⁸ The paternal aunt of The Prophet, Safiyya bint ‘Abd al-Muttalib, was wounded during

²² Ibid

²³ Lahoud, 2014, 797

²⁴ Ali, Farhana. “Rocking the Cradle to Rocking the World: The Role of Muslim Female Fighters.” *Journal of International Women's Studies* 8, no. 1 (2006): 21

²⁵ See Cook, 2005, 376

²⁶ Qazi, 2011, 33-34; for evidence of how historical figures remain influential (in this case more positively to identify gender equality in the Quran) also see: *MuslimGirl. The Empowered Female Warrior that Fought Prophet Muhammad’s Attackers*. 19 July 2013. <http://muslimgirl.net/6659/the-empowered-warrior/> (accessed December 5, 2014).

²⁷ Ibid

²⁸ Ali, 2006, 25

the Battle of Uhud during which she is thought to have saved the life of Mohammed through using her body as a shield for a spear aimed at him, an act he later praised.²⁹ Later, Safiyya took part in the Battle of the Khandaq (627), reportedly decapitating an enemy combatant who had made his way into the Medina stronghold in which she had taken refuge.³⁰

On one hand, Ali (2006) argues that these women have set a precedent for Muslim women in the contemporary world seeking a more active role in jihadist activities such as suicide bombings. On the other hand, a number of scholars take the view that “the Islamic tradition is not explicitly supportive of women’s militancy as a norm,” highlighted in the previous section.³¹

These historical examples are of particular note when looking at current trends in social media and the role it is playing in recruitment, particularly in the West. One Twitter user notes her belief (and humour) at the suggestion that journalists looking for female jihadist supporters to interview on social media simply search for the first part of feminine *kunyas* (e.g. “*Umm*” meaning “mother” or “*Bint*” meaning “daughter”). While this may be true and is certainly one means of identifying female supporters (although not particularly scientific), of greater interest is the second part of the *kunya* in use.

For instance, a simple Twitter username search for ‘Umm Umarah’ yields eight results for users applying some variation of the name. Whilst it cannot be said that all eight of these Twitter users are jihadist supporters (or even that they are definitely female), at least two are active tweeters, making reference on numerous occasions to the Islamic State and the teachings of radical clerics (in addition to providing insights into their own lives). Similarly, a search for ‘Nusayba bint Ka’ab’ does not identify any individual users carrying this name but does yield results in which Nusayba aka Umm Umarah is mentioned within numerous individual tweets, including one containing the URL to a YouTube video in which the story of Nusayba is told via English subtitles in front of a photo of a militant.³²

The use of these names by female jihadist supporters, and perhaps even more importantly by a range of individuals who may not yet have become radicalised, in addition to the numerous references to historical female ‘warriors’ on Twitter highlights the importance of interpretations that *do not* take the stories out of context. As mentioned above though, the necessity to limit a Tweet to 140 characters makes it extremely difficult for those trying to counter mis-information.³³

²⁹ Lahoud, 2014, 792

³⁰ Cook, 2005, 376; also see Sayeed, Asma. *Women and the Transmission of Religious Knowledge in Islam*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

³¹ Lahoud, 2014, 793-4

³² بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم *The Prophet (saws)'s Shield at Uhud*. 11 April 2009. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcqWRG4FGKg> (accessed December 5, 2014).

³³ For more information on countering extremism on Twitter including U.S. State Department initiatives see: McLaughlin, Jenna. *Why the US Government's Counter-Terrorism Tweeters Are Finding it Tough to Fight ISIS Online*. 19 September 2014. <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/09/isis-social-media-state-department> (accessed December 5, 2014); State Department. “The State Department's Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications: Mission, Operations and Impact.” *Hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2012. 1-58; State Department. *Think Again Turn Away*. 2015. https://twitter.com/ThinkAgain_DOS (accessed January 1, 2015); Khatib, Lina,

JIHADIST IDEOLOGUES AND LEADERS

Jihadist leaders and ideologues, for the most part have not sought to justify the use of women in military operations, however, have also by no means disregarded their importance to the cause. As shown below, messages are often mixed and open to interpretation (likely by design), and dependent on the particular branch of the movement. This highlights a common theme throughout the literature which also assigns importance to the cultural context within which the particular group is operating.³⁴

Abdullah Azzam, a veteran of the Afghan-Soviet conflict, and scholar of al-Azhar University, was one of the first jihadist ideologues to open the debate to the possible role of women in his book, 'Defense of Muslim Lands' in which he argues that women do not need the permission of their husband to participate in jihad. Later writings further stated that "jihad was the action required...of every Muslim, regardless of gender."³⁵

The significance of Azzam's interpretation of defensive jihad is highlighted, by the record of the police interview with British jihadist Roshonara Choudhry, convicted of stabbing Member of Parliament Stephen Timms in 2010. Choudhry told police that although initially she supported others (men) in fighting for the cause, a YouTube video revealed to her "that even women are supposed to fight" which signalled a turning point in her decision to act. Choudhry identified the YouTube video as one in which Azzam's arguments were presented regarding the obligation for "every man, woman and child" to fight when a Muslim land is attacked.³⁶ Choudhry also noted that she had not discussed these views with others, highlighting the power of these arguments and positions particularly when mixed with online capabilities such as social media.³⁷

Prior to his death in 2003, Yusuf al-Uyayri, a key figure in the formation of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia (latterly the Arabian Peninsula) published a document entitled *Daawr al-nisa' fi jihad al-'ada* (The role of women in the Jihad against enemies). The argument of this document underpins a much wider trend among jihadists in which the role of women is stated as extremely

William Dutton, and Michael Thelwall. "Public Diplomacy 2.0: A Case Study of the US Digital Outreach Team." *The Middle East Journal*, 2012: 453-472.

³⁴ Cunningham, Karla J. "Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 2003: 171-195; for an alternative perspective on female terrorists pushing back against cultural constraints see: Sixta, Christine. "The Illusive Third Wave: Are Female Terrorists the New "New Women" in Developing Societies?" *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy*, 2008: 261-288.

³⁵ Ali, 2006, 31

³⁶ Dodd, Vikram. *Roshonara Choudhry: Police interview extracts*. 2010.
<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/nov/03/roshonara-choudhry-police-interview> (accessed November 5, 2014)

³⁷ Quayle, Ethel, and Max Taylor. "Social networking as a nexus for engagement and exploitation of young people." *Information Security Technical Report*, 2011: 44-50; Pantucci, Raffaello. *A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists*. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2011: 19; Conway, Maura. "From al-Zarqawi to al-Awlaki: The Emergence and Development of an Online Radical Milieu ." *CTX: Combating Terrorism Exchange*, 2012: 18; for insights into the online radicalisation of American female jihadist supporter Colleen La Rose see: Halverson, Jeffrey R, and Amy K Way. "The curious case of Colleen LaRose: Social margins, new media, and online radicalization." *Media, War and Conflict* 5, no. 2 (2012): 139-153.

important. Whilst reference is made to historical female figures that fought on the battlefield, al-Uyayri concludes that a supporting role is more appropriate.³⁸

Al-Uyayri argues that the mother is the first point of contact for a child which makes her “mission... greater than what you imagine” especially in influencing the child with “love for Allah, His Messenger and *jihad* in his... childhood” – a role he states no one else can fulfill without great difficulty.³⁹ Later in the document, he seems to contradict himself on one hand arguing that defensive jihad overrules the need for parental permission to fight in jihad, whilst on the other hand concluding that “we do not want you to enter the battleground because of the crudeness and the trials it contains.”⁴⁰ According to Cook, this may be a result of the conservative context within which he found himself in Saudi Arabia at the time, an environment in which a more radical conclusion was likely unacceptable.⁴¹

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) ideologue, Anwar al-Awlaki also contributed significantly to the jihadist movement in terms of his online recruitment strategies which have influenced (if not directly targeted) women, particularly those in the West. In one of his major works (notably produced in the English language), ‘44 Ways to Support Jihad,’ al-Awlaki describes female roles as “internet mujahideen” (discussed in the next section), medical training, and staying fit. The latter point, he argues, relates to the capacity for individuals to endure a prison sentence or torture in which case is also relevant to women.⁴²

In terms of military training though, al-Awlaki does not reference women, instead pointing to the “life of a mujahid” which should be lived by a woman alongside her husband, supporting him should he join the jihad and/or become a *shaheed* (martyr). Despite al-Awlaki’s conclusion which seems to limit women’s role in fighting, he is also mentioned by Roshonara Choudhry as a key influencer. Choudhry notes in her police interview that al-Awlaki’s lectures which she had been downloading from the internet had boosted her understanding of Islam particularly given the “comprehensive” and “interesting” way in which he explained various aspects of Islam.⁴³

This presents an interesting point of conflict in that al-Awlaki’s previous statements have negated or at least not considered the role of women in combat, despite one of his final campaigns prior to death aiming to encourage ‘lone wolf’ terrorism in the West. It is unclear as to how he may have envisaged this potential role for women. In addition, Choudhry’s reference to both Abdullah Azzam and Anwar al-Awlaki as her two major influencers highlights her lack of knowledge or indifference to the fact that Azzam was a trained scholar (via al-Azhar University), whereas al-Awlaki was more limited in his religious credentials⁴⁴. Alexander

³⁸ Al-Uyayri, 2001/2, 15-17

³⁹ Ibid. 4-5

⁴⁰ Ibid. 15-16

⁴¹ Cook, 2005. 382

⁴² Al-Awlaki, Anwar. *44 Ways to Support Jihad*. NK.

http://ebooks.worldofislam.info/ebooks/Jihad/Anwar_Al_Awlaki_-_44_Ways_To_Support_Jihad.pdf (accessed November 2, 2014). 12-13

⁴³ Dodd, 2010

⁴⁴ MacEoin, Denis. “Anwar al-Awlaki: “I Pray that Allah Destroys America.”” *Middle East Quarterly*, 2010: 13-19; al-Awlaki, Anwar. *A Question from a Reader on My Islamic Education*. 26 December 2009.

Meleagrou-Hitchens sums this up in his concluding statement on al-Awlaki's capacity to influence what he calls 'religious seekers,' noting that:

*"Awlaki's description of the 'true' Islam is simplistic, and yet convincing to the seeker: follow the way of Mohammed and his followers. For those who have not studied Islam and its many interpretations, Awlaki's apparent knowledge of the religion places him in a position of authority, and his word is taken at face value."*⁴⁵

This influence supercedes his death as evidenced in the numerous Retweets and mentions his name and quotes receive not only within the online jihadist community more generally but also within the smaller female sub-section.

Meanwhile, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq until his death in 2006 is perhaps the most notable in terms of his use of women within the group, most notably in suicide bombings, the only al-Qaeda franchise to employ such tactics.⁴⁶ In one statement, al-Zarqawi notes "if you are not going to be chivalrous knights in this war make way for women to wage it" also stating: "we want men like Safiyya" (the paternal aunt of The Prophet).⁴⁷ This was most likely a ploy to 'shame' Muslim men into volunteering for battle and al-Zarqawi will have noted "the significant media response by western news outlets and sought to capitalise on the increased media attention."⁴⁸

Al-Zarqawi's position differed significantly from that within the central leadership of al-Qaeda, as highlighted by viewpoints from Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and al-Zawahiri's wife, Uymayma. In Osama bin Laden's most notable fatwa: "*Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places*," he points to women as essential to the

<http://islamicb.blogspot.co.uk/2009/12/imam-anwar-al-awlaki-question-from.html> (accessed December 5, 2014); Barclay, Jack. *Challenging the Influence of Anwar al-Awlaki*. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2010: 10.

⁴⁵Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander. *As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western Jihad*. London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), 2011.79

⁴⁶ Groups associated with AQ although not officially aligned (i.e. non-franchises) including the IMU and Chechnyan group *have* used women for suicide bombings, for example, see: Nivat, Anne. "The Black Widows: Chechen Women Join the Fight for Independence—and Allah." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 2005: 413-419; Roggio, Bill. *'Black Widow' female suicide bombers kill 37 in Moscow metro blasts*. 29 March 2010. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/female_suicide_bombe_3.php (accessed December 1, 2014); Roggio, Bill. *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi launches suicide assault at hospital in Quetta*. 16 June 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/06/lashkar-e-jhangvi_la.php (accessed December 1, 2014); Roggio, Bill. *Turkistan Islamic Party trains women for jihad*. 21 July 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/07/turkistan_islamic_pa_4.php (accessed December 1, 2014).

⁴⁷ Quoted in: Lahoud, N. *Umayma al-Zawahiri on Women's Role in Jihad*. 2010. <http://www.jihadica.com/umayma-al-zawahiri-on-women%E2%80%99s-role-in-jihad/> (accessed November 5, 2014).

⁴⁸Stone, Jennie, and Katherine Pattillo. "Al-Qaeda's use of Suicide Bombers in Iraq: A Case Study." In *Women, Gender and Terrorism*, edited by Laura Sjoberg and Caron E Gentry, 159-175. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2011. 163; Pierce, G. *The media's gender stereotype framing of Chechen "Black widows" and female Afghan self-immolators*. Master's Thesis, Budapest: Central European University, Budapest., 2011; Bloom, Mia. *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007: 144-45.

jihad, particularly within supportive, facilitating, and promotional roles.⁴⁹ In others though, including the 1998 fatwa: “*Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front*” bin Laden mentions women only as victims of American and Israeli violence.

The fact that, both Ayman al-Zawahiri and his wife Uymayma have both made more explicit reference to the role of women in recent years may therefore be reactionary to external events: the increased use of women in Iraq; the role of technology and communication increasing the means through which women can contribute; and perhaps even shifts within culture (e.g. the rise of Islamic feminism). For instance, in 2008, Site Intelligence identified a two-hour recording by al-Zawahiri in which he addressed the role of women within the organisation – restricted to caring for fighters.

According to Basch-Harod, this was in response to “an inundation of queries submitted by women al-Qaeda supporters,” with Site Intelligence suggesting that the position outlined was potentially influenced by the Taliban, highlighting again the importance of cultural elements.⁵⁰ In other statements, al-Zawahiri has confirmed that al-Qaeda Central does not include women within its ranks, and has also addressed the requirements for a Mahram to be present with a woman wishing to emigrate – an aspect that is frequently debated on Twitter and AskFM today.⁵¹

Overall, whilst the views outlined above seem conflicted, some generalisations can be drawn. The jihadist movement is founded upon the doctrine of defensive jihad which is by and large interpreted as being universally applicable, with Abdullah Azzam’s analysis especially important here. However, in practice, most scholars point to Sahih al-Bukhari in which ‘Aisha narrates the Prophet’s belief that female jihad is the Hajj pilgrimage. This seems to be central to the arguments against women in a fighting role, as do factors such as tactical requirements and cultural basis.

Given that the Islamic State at present does not seem to be recruiting women for this role in any case, the range of other roles assigned to woman and the importance accorded to them, particularly by jihadist ideologues and leaders remain extremely important to the counterterrorism debate. This is especially the case given the amount of prestige and authority assigned to these interpretations by the online female jihadist community.

⁴⁹ Von Knop, Katharina. “The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda's Women.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 5 (2007): 397-414. 405-6

⁵⁰ Basch-Harod, Heidi. “The Right to Choose: The Women of al-Qa‘ida.” *Tel Aviv Notes* 6, no. 3 (2012): 1-5; Dearing, Matthew P. “Like Red Tulips at Springtime: Understanding the Absence of Female Martyrs in Afghanistan.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 2010: 1079-1103.

⁵¹ See: Al-Zawahiri, Ayman. *Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri: "Jerusalem Will Not Be Judaized"*. 2010. http://triceratops.brynmawr.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/8486/ZAW20100719_b.pdf?sequence=3 (accessed November 5, 2014); *Jihadist Website Releases 'Second Round' of Open Interview With Al-Zawahiri*. 2008. <http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/4677/ZAW20080422.pdf?sequence=5> (accessed November 5, 2014); and *Text of Al-Zawahiri's Eid Message*. 2006. <http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/5131/ZAW20061231.pdf?sequence=3> (accessed November 5, 2014).

JIHADIST ONLINE STRATEGIES

Propaganda and information dissemination is crucial to the cause and survivability of a non-state armed group, an aspect that pre-dates the emergence of the internet and online communications.⁵² However, the global reach of the internet “makes terrorist communication easily accessible to a vast population” which is especially important for network building.⁵³ According to Rogan, jihadist online media strategies are by no means pluralistic, constantly evolving, and “frequently opening new virtual fronts.” In sum, online communication supports agenda setting and framing of particular events or campaigns contributing at both the strategic and tactical levels and is underpinned by jihadist ownership of several online media outlets reducing reliance on mainstream sources.⁵⁴ Use of the internet has also allowed for “dispersed groups and individuals to participate in the media jihad,” a point which is especially applicable to the increasing number of female jihadists online.⁵⁵

Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and the Islamic State are all engaged in various online strategies aimed at radicalisation of domestic and international audiences, recruitment, increasing financing, and contributing to theological debates often providing justifications for recent events. Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has employed a complex mixture of information warfare. On one hand, this includes clever editing of American online communications, for example, a picture of Michelle Obama displaying a #Bringbackourgirls placard was edited to read #Bringbackourhumvees, a simple technique aimed at embarrassing or shaming western governments.⁵⁶ On the other hand, al-Baghdadi consistently uses the online publication of photos and videos depicting brutally murdered soldiers as a means of undermining morale of government security forces, feeding into the ease of which his forces can take control of a particular area (i.e. through convincing troops to flee).⁵⁷

A number of jihadist groups publish regular online magazines, the majority of which are aimed at men. Most notably, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s *Inspire* and more recently, the Islamic State’s *Dabiq* target English-speaking supporters and potential recruits. According to Lahoud, major publications aimed specifically at women include early issues of *al-Khansa*’ (June, 2009) and *Hafidat al-Khansa*’ (January and February 2010); *al-Shamikha* (February 2011 and February 2012); and *al-Asirat* (May 2012).⁵⁸ These publications have often adopted what one account describes as “the American advertisement approach,” comparing them to magazines such as

⁵² See Bockstette, Carsten. *Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communication Management Techniques*. garmisch partenkirchen: George C Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2008: 12-13; and Dyson, William E. *Terrorism: An Investigator's Handbook*. New York: Routledge, 2012: 7-8.

⁵³ Gonzalez-Perez, Margaret. “The False Islamization of Female Suicide Bombers.” *Gender Issues* 28 (2011): 61; also see Sageman, Marc. *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008: 109-124.

⁵⁴ Rogan, Hannah. *Al-Qaeda's online media strategies: From Abu Reuter to Irhabi 007*. Oslo: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2007. 116.

⁵⁵ Ibid. 115.

⁵⁶ Anderson, Gary. *Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Theory and Practice of Jihad*. 2014. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrn/art/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-and-the-theory-and-practice-of-jihad> (accessed November 5, 2014).

⁵⁷ Ibid; also see: Lister, Charles. *Profiling the Islamic State*. Doha: Brookings Doha Center, 2014: 24

⁵⁸ Lahoud, 2014, 799

Cosmopolitan mainly due to the inclusion of beauty and fashion, although not withstanding articles on encouraging husbands in jihadist pursuits.⁵⁹ Whilst publications such as *al-Khansaa* have generated attention in more recent times, the evidence above suggests that this evolution has in fact occurred slowly over at least the past ten years and has stemmed mostly from al-Qaeda in Yemen.⁶⁰

The Islamic State seems to have taken note of this tactic, highlighted through the recent establishment of the media group, al-Zawra'a which has released publications aimed specifically at women. In October, the group announced its aim to:

*“prepare women for the field of jihad by teaching lessons in Islamic Shariah, weapons use, media creation, and sewing and cooking for male fighters.”*⁶¹

This highlights not only the assumed importance of women to the jihad as expressed in the previous section, but also a conscious decision within the movement to tailor information provided to women. Notably, these publications (including those published by al-Zawra'a) have only been released in Arabic, suggesting that they are aimed for the most part at domestic and/or regional audiences. Suggestions within the press that these sources might be influencing western females may therefore be overstated, given that even those already living in Syria or Iraq frequently comment on their lack of Arabic language skills. This highlights the importance of the English-speaking female jihadist supporters currently using Twitter and other online platforms such as Kik, AskFM and Tumblr to communicate with potential recruits and supporters.

As mentioned, this is one of the roles envisaged for women by Anwar al-Awlaki in '44 ways to support jihad' in which he calls on “brothers and sisters” to become “internet mujahideen” through establishing forums; establishing email lists; posting or emailing literature and news related to the jihad; and setting up topic-specific jihadist websites, for example, on Muslim prisoners of war.⁶² Claudia Carvalho's recent study of 'Okhti online' – a “virtual sisterhood” for Spanish females seeking to share jihadist contents, support the various jihadist conflicts, and become a jihadist fighter, highlights how many women across a range of countries have taken heed (knowingly or not) of al-Awlaki's advice.⁶³

Carvalho argues that the online domain is providing Muslim women with “a new religious and social role” with Facebook groups providing insights into how jihad is understood by women in addition to how they are recruited and “most importantly how they transfer this role from online

⁵⁹ Al-Tabaa, Esther Solis. “Targeting a Female Audience: American Muslim Women's Perceptions of al-Qaida Propaganda.” *Journal of Strategic Security* 6, no. 5 (2013): 11

⁶⁰ Usher, Sebastien. 'Jihad' magazine for women on web. 24 August 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3594982.stm (accessed December 1, 2014).

⁶¹ Site Intelligence. *Female-Specific Jihadi Media Group “al-Zawra'a” Announces Establishment*. 17 October 2014. <https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/female-specific-jihadi-media-group-al-zawra-a-announces-establishment.html>.

⁶² Al-Awlaki, A., NK

⁶³ Carvalho, Claudia. “‘Okhti’ Online - Spanish Muslim Women Engaging Online Jihad – a Facebook Case Study.” *Heidelberg Journal of Religions on the Internet* 6 (2014): 24-41.

to offline reality.”⁶⁴ This is similarly apparent in the analysis of the Twitter accounts included in the database created for this paper, particularly as Twitter not only details interactions between users but also offers insights into day to day life. The presence of several blogs updated semi-regularly by western females who have relocated to Islamic State territory provide further insights, bridging to an extent the online and offline reality. The increasing use of platforms such as Facebook and Twitter also point to a potential move away from the official jihadist forums, the use of which by women has also reportedly witnessed a steady increase in recent years.⁶⁵

METHODOLOGY FOR SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

The database compiled included 51 Twitter accounts belonging to women who have affiliated themselves to the jihadist cause, identified over a three month period between October 2014 and December 2014. By January 2015, 12 of these accounts had been deleted by the user or suspended by Twitter, highlighting one of the challenges in analysing such information. The methodology used has aimed to emulate that of Carter, Maher and Neumann of King’s College London International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) in their paper: ‘#Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks’ with some variations.⁶⁶ Software used to collect and structure the data includes NodeXL, a Microsoft Excel add-on created by the Social Research Foundation, Gephi, and a range of online tools such as Twitonomy. All software used was free and the data collected is all open source.

As in the #Greenbirds paper, the identification of accounts was primarily conducted using non-probability snowball sampling techniques.⁶⁷ The ICSR paper uses this technique in order to identify western foreign fighters within the larger general population of pro-jihadist supporters, whereas this database is focused on the sub-set of female supporters. To note, both the method of sampling and small data-set mean that the findings cannot be generalised and should be viewed instead as insights. In addition, the snowball approach often results in the over-sampling of respondents with ‘homogenous views’ as is the case to an extent with this database.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Ibid. 25

⁶⁵ For more in depth analysis of the jihadist forums and the move to Twitter see: Zelin, Aaron. *The state of global jihad online: a qualitative, quantitative and cross-lingual study*. Washington DC: New America Foundation, 2013; for further insights into women’s active role on the forums see: Hoskins, Andrew, Akil Awan, and Ben O’Loughlin. *Radicalisation and the Media: Connectivity and Terrorism in the New Media Ecology*. New York: Routledge, 2011: 61; and Site Intelligence. *The Women of Jihad*. November 2010. <http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/about-us/21-jihad/225-the-women-of-jihad> (accessed December 1, 2014); for insights into how the forums have been countered see: Heickerö, Roland. "Cyber Terrorism: Electronic Jihad." *Strategic Analysis* 38, no. 4 (2014): 560-61.

⁶⁶ Carter, Joseph A, Shiraz Maher, and Peter R Neumann. *#Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence of Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks*. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), 2014.

⁶⁷ This is due to a number of factors including that it is not possible to draw a random sample from a known list or ‘frame’ of the target population and even if that was the case, expertise on the subject at hand is not randomly distributed. In other words, Twitter users have been identified due to their ‘expertise’ on the subject as opposed to representation of a larger sample. For more on non-probability sampling and application to terrorism research see: Kenney, Michael. “Learning from the "Dark Side"." In *Conducting Terrorism Field Research: A Guide*, by Adam Dolnik, 31-36. New York: Routledge, 2013.

⁶⁸ Ibid

The ICSR defines a foreign fighter as:

*“any person who has travelled to Syria to join any group opposed to the Syrian government; performs combat activities; and lacks Syrian citizenship.”*⁶⁹

However, for the purpose of this database definitions are perhaps less helpful. Whilst all members of the database support a group which opposes the Assad regime, not all have relocated to Syria and none have participated in combat. A general approach therefore codifies all, very simplistically as female jihadist supporters. Challenges with this approach relate to those more generally associated with social media analysis in that most accounts cannot be verified 100% as belonging to, for instance, a female, a jihadist, or where suggested – an individual residing in Syria/Iraq. Accounts could be duplicates or could “include individuals seeking increased status, reputation, or influence” or belong to journalists or security officials.⁷⁰

The accounts used in this database have been verified as far as possible through analysis of biographical information in addition to Tweet content including pictures and videos. Given the current backlash against journalists and analysts trying to communicate with female jihadists identified on Twitter (highlighted by a number of conversations on the site), the author has not attempted to contact any individuals directly and this section relies solely on inferences drawn from the data and content analysis. As per the ICSR’s methodology, organisational affiliation, gender and nationality is based on self-identification.

Overall, this section represents an experiment of sorts in understanding the types of insights that can be gleaned from using social network analysis tools to analyse the female jihadist supporter sub-set. In this context, the analysis undertaken is not particularly advanced in terms of techniques used, although hopes to contribute to a growing number of papers aimed at advancing methodologies for analysing social media and (counter)terrorism.⁷¹

THE FEMALE JIHADIST TWITTER NETWORK


The following diagram presents a visual representation of the connections between Twitter users within a network created by the author consisting of 51 accounts belonging to users identifying themselves as supportive of the jihadist cause (e.g. through positive statements re: the Islamic State), and as being female. The graph consists of 51 nodes (users) and 421 edges (connections). The construction of this network includes only information on the connections between each of the females identified as opposed to their wider networks, due in part to time and software constraints, but also in order to take a closer look at the group itself. As mentioned, in January 2015, 12 of these accounts were no longer in existence and some insights will be drawn from a smaller group of 40 (with one addition) to provide the most up-to-date information.

⁶⁹ Carter, Maher & Neumann, 2014, 10

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ Including: Carter, Maher & Neumann, 2014; Carvalho, 2014; Zelin, 2014 and Strathearn, J.M. Berger & Bill. *Who matters online: measuring influence, evaluating content and countering violent extremism in online social networks*. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2013.

Figure 1: Network visualisation of the Twitter List: Female Jihadist supporters



Source: Data collected using NodeXL from Twitter; visualisation conducted using Gephi

Applying a centrality measure to the graph, the key brokers in the network can easily be identified through size of label, highlighting the importance of _BirdofJannah and UmmKhattab_ in addition to Muhajirah_, Isa_Muh89, Umm_esa73, and BintWater. This highlights the fact that the most important account holders in the network unsurprisingly are those who indicate that they have already made the move to either Syria or Iraq. This is particularly interesting as NodeXL identified the top ten tweeters in the network, only one of which is identified as also being an important network broker. This trend is highlighted by one commentator on social networks who states that “we don’t need to be heavily involved in communities to have an impact, but we need to be able to make the *right* connections.”⁷²

In the context of this paper, there are therefore three broad categories of female jihadist supporters on Twitter – those residing in Syria/Iraq who are the connectors (also highlighted by frequent requests for women to contact them on Kik or Surespot for information); those who remain in their home country but are extremely active in promoting jihadist messaging through frequent tweeting and retweeting, and a third group who are information seekers (highlighted by @Muhajirah_’s account below). Through running a modularity algorithm (see below for details) on the network, several clusters of users have been identified (highlighted by the various colourings), grouping users who are more connected with one another than others in the network. Although the specific importance of each group requires further analysis, the group in the bottom right hand corner seems to consist of those located in Syria, also highlighted by various tweets to one another. These smaller groupings are particularly important given that many of these relationships begin prior to the decision to emigrate, for instance the Birds of Jannah blog notes:

⁷² Macneill, Sheila. *Betweenness Centrality – helping us understand our networks*. 30 August 2011. <http://blogs.cetis.ac.uk/sheilamacneill/2011/08/30/betweenness-centrality-helping-us-understand-our-networks/> (accessed December 5, 2014).


“Umm Tamīm al Britaniyah - she’s my best friend that I met two years back on Facebook. We always discussed matters about jihad and hijrah, and Al Hamdulillah a month after she made her hijrah, I made mine. We promised to meet each other in Raqqah.”⁷³

In January 2015, the smaller group of 40 identified as living in Syria, Iraq, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and South Africa, with another group unknown. Specific location references include Raqqah, Tabqah, Jarabulus, Mosul, Copenhagen, London, Leeds and Port Elizabeth. The majority of accounts showed overt support for the Islamic State, with one account supporting Jabhat al-Nusrah and one supporting al-Qaeda. Several accounts did not identify with a specific group but frequently tweeted what can broadly be described as anti-Western content in addition to quotes of jihadist ideologues and scholars. Three users identified themselves as widows of martyrs, with one stating that her brother who had previously acted as her *mahram* had also been martyred. Nine out of the 40 provided additional information on contacting them directly. Five accounts noted that they had previously been suspended; one was a return following deletion herself; and one advertised a “back-up account.”

UMM LAYTH (@MUHAJIRAH_)

The individual Twitter account selected for a more detailed analysis is that of Umm Layth (@Muhajirah_) believed to be the Glaswegian student Aqsa Mahmood (although unconfirmed – her Twitter account was suspended in September 2014, the @Muhajirah_ account was then opened in October and links back to her blog).⁷⁴ This account was selected due to open affiliation to the Islamic State and as being located in Syria.

Figure 1: Network visualisation of the @muhajirah_ Twitter account



Source: Data collected using NodeXL from Twitter; visualisation conducted using Gephi

⁷³ 'Bird of Jannah'. *Diary of a Traveler*. 2014.

⁷⁴ Dearden, Lizzie. *The Glasgow teenager who dropped out of university to marry an Isis fighter in Syria*. 2 September 2014. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/the-glasgow-teenager-who-dropped-out-of-university-to-marry-an-isis-fighter-in-syria-9706610.html> (accessed December 1, 2014).

Figure 1 shows a directed graph with 987 nodes and 1170 edges. The nodes in the graph have been sized using the Eigenvector centrality algorithm which accounts for the number of connections per node (degree) in addition to the “importance” of the nodes on the other end of the connection.⁷⁵ As would be expected, the 12 most important accounts in the network are those that @Muhajirah_ follows, including several other females identified as living in Syria, but also notably several accounts belonging to terrorism analysts, for instance, Aaron Zelin, Charles Lister and Aymenn J al-Tamimi. This is particularly important given that it is the tweets belonging to those accounts which will fill the timeline of the @Muhajirah_ account – i.e. those are the tweets she will see.

The second important aspect of this graph is the communities that have been identified via a modularity based community finding algorithm⁷⁶ which groups the nodes of the network into those with more connections within than between. In the case of @Muhajirah_ three communities were identified consisting of 88.86%, 8.11%, and 3.04% of nodes as highlighted by the blue, red and green colourings. Whilst time constraints have prevented an in depth analysis of these three groups, a first glance suggests that the blue community which makes up the majority of the graph consists of individual twitter users of no distinct identity who may be broadly interested in Umm Layth’s tweets. The green community consists of accounts of individuals who clearly support the Islamic State and/or jihadist cause more generally, some of which indicate that they are currently located in Syria/Iraq. The red community also includes some individuals of the type noted in the green group, however, for the most part seems to consist of accounts belonging to media sources, counterterrorism analysts, or influential sources such as the @Shamiwitness account.


Umm Layth has a following to follower ratio of 1:92 indicating a high level of influence and supporting the assumption that her account is aimed largely at connecting people rather than receiving information or engaging in large-scale information dissemination on Twitter. Twitonomy identified two users ‘most replied to’ by Umm Layth namely: @bintlad3n and @ummkhattab_ in addition to users ‘most mentioned’ also the @bintlad3n account and @flamesofwar. The fact that these accounts are all linked to women who appear to have relocated from a western country to Syria/Iraq, highlights the fact that she mostly interacts *directly* with other women in her position, advising those seeking advice to contact her privately (for instance, via her Kik account).

Looking at the tweets most favoured and retweeted by followers of Umm Layth also provides insights into what aspects of her rhetoric is most influential and has most impact, especially taking into account the high following to follower ratio. The two most retweeted tweets from Umm Layth’s account reference a warning against women traveling to Idlib (see below), an area associated with al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusrah (JaN) as opposed to the Islamic State. This highlights not only her role in recruitment but also in propaganda more generally. Tweets in November accused JaN militants of leaving women attempting to join the group “stranded in

⁷⁵ Lamberson, P J. *Collecting and Visualizing Twitter Network Data with NodeXL and Gephi*. 2012. <http://social-dynamics.org/twitter-network-data/> (accessed December 30, 2014).

⁷⁶ Algorithm: Vincent D Blondel, Jean-Loup Guillaume, Renaud Lambiotte, and Etienne Lefebvre. “Fast unfolding of communities in large networks.” *Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment*, 2008: 1000.

Turkey” and also joked about women requesting advice via her Kik account on “getting into JAN territory.”



Observing Umm Layth’s tweets and the attention they have garnered from the accounts re-opening in October 2014 through to January 2015, it is also notable that those with a political message generate far more support than those with a religious element. For instance, a tweet in which Umm Layth states: “Only Allah knows how happy I was to hear my sisters from Pakistan stand up and call for the Islamic State” received 4 retweets and 15 favourites. Conversely, several tweets referencing verses from the Quran received only 2-4 favourites.

Aside from Twitter, Umm Layth also publically displays her Kik ID in addition to her blog hosted by Tumblr: ‘*Diary of a Muhajirah*,’ content of which has been referenced in the previous section. An interesting aspect in relation to counter-terrorism is the fact that whilst Twitter has implemented a strategy of regularly deleting accounts connected to Islamic State militants and supporters, other social media sites, for instance, Tumblr have refrained from doing so.⁷⁷ This may be a result of a lack of attention to these sites as compared to Twitter or Facebook, however given the amount of content contained in the blogs referenced in this paper, this potentially needs to be reconsidered. The consistent presence of Umm Layth’s blog, for example, undermines Twitter’s strategy as the association to it allows Twitter followers to quickly identify any new accounts of women claiming to be Umm Layth following deletion. Conversely it is also a key insight into her life and her original recruitment to the cause.

CONCLUSIONS

“A Muslim woman is a female Jihad warrior always and everywhere. She is a female Jihad warrior who wages Jihad by means of funding Jihad. She wages Jihad by means of waiting for her Jihad warrior husband, and when she educates her children to that which Allah loves. She wages jihad when she supports Jihad when she calls for jihad in word, deed, belief, and prayer.” —Umm Badr, ‘Obstacles in the Path of the Jihad Warrior Woman,’ al-Khansaa⁷⁸

The current Islamic State exclusion on women in combat does not signal a lack of interest in or importance assigned to women within the group, a point that extends to western women who have taken on numerous roles from mother and wife to recruitment and propaganda. This is not to say that combat will never become a reality for women joining the organisation, particularly given the inconclusive interpretations of ideologies and leaders within the wider jihadist

⁷⁷ Dearden, Lizzie. *Islamic State: Isis fanatics threaten terrorist attacks on Twitter employees for shutting accounts down*. 10 September 2014. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/islamic-state-isis-fanatics-threaten-terrorist-attacks-on-twitter-employees-for-shutting-accounts-down-9722845.html> (accessed December 1, 2014).

⁷⁸ Quoted in Von Knop, 2007: 397.

movement, and the historical use of women in suicide bombings in Iraq. Notable from a counterterrorism perspective, is the identification of a group of women who request information from those already in situ on possible combat roles who are subsequently put off by the negative response. In this context, perhaps more could be done to highlight the reality of life under the Islamic State for women, especially those who are non-Arabic speakers. Conversely, any work in this area would have to be careful not to accelerate any decisions by the group to lift the exclusion.⁷⁹ This is similarly the case for further debate around the jihadist use of defensive jihad as a foundation to the cause and the problems in excluding women from combat which again could simply encourage the Islamic State to rescind this decision.

The social network analysis presented in this paper provides several insights which could be assessed in greater detail through further research, and whilst the findings certainly should not be taken as generalisations, Shiraz Maher states that “from an intelligence perspective, social media allows us to gauge...mood and gives opportunities to perhaps create or exploit dissent.”⁸⁰ Whilst the paper has not sought to analyse strategies to counter ‘online jihad’ it has aimed to provide an insight into the smaller online female jihadist supporter sub-set, highlighting popular topics (i.e. theological v. political), and the relative importance of certain individuals within the network and their specific role.

Of note is the importance of English-speaking females on Twitter and other platforms, particularly given the current lack of official English-language propaganda aimed specifically at women. Furthermore, those women claiming to have already made the move to Iraq or Syria are clearly among the most influential brokers within the network. Interestingly though, they are not the most active users, advising women to contact them through other means for advice. This points to a second group of users, the goal of which is to disseminate information and engage in online discussion which is of great importance despite the fact that this group may not be receiving direction from the Islamic State or other jihadist groups. A look in more detail at the connections between these two groups of women and also their wider networks could yield some interesting insights for those aiming to counter online extremism.

A final point regards the current approach of Twitter (and Facebook) against the Islamic State and its supporters. Given the amount of users identified as having been previously suspended it is unclear whether or not Twitter’s current approach is effective. Back-up accounts, the consistent presence of blogs, warnings among the group to limit overt discussion on particular issues, the capacity to simply turn an account to private use only, and the use of the network to advertise new accounts of those deleted all undermine the strategy. Online supporters of jihadist groups, as identified in the female sub-section, are therefore quick to adapt with subsequent implications for counter-initiatives.

⁷⁹ Islamic State communications have been very quick to react to stories in the western press around women and education and jobs as indicated by subsequent postings on social media showing women freely walking the streets; in the classroom; and highlighting the opening of medical school in Raqqa which will train and employ both male and female medical staff.

⁸⁰ Townsend, Mark. *How a team of social media experts is able to keep track of the UK jihadis*. January 17, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/17/social-media-british-jihadists-islamic-state-facebook-twitter> (accessed January 20, 2015).

WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY - IF NOT YOU, THEN WHO: IF NOT NOW, WHEN?

Sheila M. Q. Scanlon
Colonel, USMC Retired

“Participation alone is not sufficient. Women must not just sit at the peace table, they must be heard. Not only should women serve in police forces and peacekeeping missions, they must influence decision-making.”

– Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

“If not me, then who? If not now, when?”¹ These questions were posed by United Nations (UN) Women Goodwill Ambassador Emma Watson, at the implementation of the UN’s HeForShe Campaign (Appendix). Ms. Watson’s questions hit home for me, after spending the last three years working as a U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Gender Advisor, for “Women, Peace, and Security” (WPS) issues, in Afghanistan. Our military intervention in Afghanistan provides an excellent case study of our efforts to integrate the Afghan women into the Afghan National Security Forces and provided me first-hand experience of our missed opportunities and lessons learned in order to recommend the solutions discussed in this paper. Additionally, the Afghan theater provides the backdrop on which to perform an analysis of the DOD’s need to embrace the HeForShe Campaign, the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and the WPS into its daily operations (Appendix).

BACKGROUND

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 was signed in October 2000.² In this resolution, the UN reaffirmed “the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.”³ In 2005, the UN Security Council asked the Member States, including the US, to implement UNSCR 1325 through National Action Plans.⁴ The US’s National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security (NAP-WPS) was finally signed in December 2011; but, the DOD did not sign their

¹ Speech by UN Women Goodwill Ambassador Emma Watson at a Special Event for the He/For/She Campaign, UN Headquarters, New York, 20 September 2014. www.cnn.com/2014/09/22/showbiz/celebrity-news-gossip/emma-watson-un-speech-celebs/

² A Security Council Resolution is either an opinion or the will of the United Nations expressed as a UNSCR. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions>

³ Office of the Special Adviser for Gender and Advancement of Women. www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/

⁴ USIP “What is UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and why it is so Critical Today”. www.usip.org/gender_peacebuilding/about_UNSCR_1325#How_is_Resolution_1325_being_implemented

NAP-WPS until December 2013. Afghanistan signed their NAP-WPS (Appendix), in November 2014, which also included NAPs for the Ministries of Interior (MOI) and Defense (MOD).⁵

Afghanistan, also known as the “Graveyard of Empires”, has a history of being a land fraught by one foreign invader after another. Before the Common Era, Afghanistan provided a southern gateway into India and an alternate route for the Silk Road, linking China and Asia with the Mediterranean. This most sought-after route significantly impacted the region and those it connected, providing a pathway for trade, economic development and cultural exchange. Therefore, to understand Afghanistan is to understand why it is the Graveyard of Empires. Neither Alexander the Great⁶, nor Genghis Khan⁷, nor the British (three times)⁸, nor the Soviet Union⁹ were able to conquer Afghanistan.¹⁰ This tribal country has been ruled by kings, warlords, and presidents.

In 1927, Mahmud Tarzi, a prominent figure in Afghan life, also known as the “Father of Afghan journalism,” used his influence to campaign for the modernization of Afghan society, including the education of women and the elevation of their role as men's equal in a new, secular Afghanistan. His daughter, Soraya Tarzi, became Queen Suraya upon her marriage to King Amanullah Khan, under whose reign Afghanistan experienced a period of dramatic social and political transformation. Like his wife's father, King Amanullah Khan believed in a modern, secular nation like those in the West. King Amanullah advocated for the education of girls and was against polygamy and veils/burqas. In a public speech he stated that “Islam did not require women to cover their bodies or wear any special kind of veil”¹¹ However, the long standing struggle between those wanting to modernize Afghanistan and those wanting to hold on to their social and religious traditions burst into a civil war forcing Amanullah to flee the country.¹²

To the present day, Afghanistan remains a country of conflicting social norms. Women's rights have swung from one extreme to another depending upon who was in control and in what part of the country one lives. Oddly, the modern day extremism did not stem from the occupation of a foreign power, but more likely from the efforts of King Zahir Shah, who in 1964 began an experiment with democracy. As in any true democracy, King Zahir allowed for the existence of opposing thought and the emergence of extremism on both the left and the right. Out of this freedom arose the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) which held close ideological ties with the Soviet Union. While those living in the cities leaned towards a modern secular Afghanistan, those living in rural tribal areas continued to be traditionalists, suppressing

⁵ “The Latest Country to Adopt a Women, Peace and Security Policy May Surprise You”, posted by Miki Jacevic, November, 19, 2014, in Afghanistan. www.inclusivesecurity.org/latest-country-to-adopt-women-peace-and-security-policy/. Author assisted the MOD of Afghanistan write their NAP-WPS.

⁶ Alexander the Great was in Afghanistan from 330-323 BC

⁷ Genghis Khan was in Afghanistan from 1218-1221

⁸ The British fought three times in Afghanistan, between 1839-1914,

⁹ Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires, Foreign Affairs, published by the Council on Foreign Relations November/December 2001 Issue. www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57411/milton-bearden/afghanistan-graveyard-of-empires

¹⁰ The Soviets fought in Afghanistan between 1979-1989

¹¹ Ahmed-Ghosh, Huma (May 2003). “A History of Women in Afghanistan: Lessons Learnt for the Future or Yesterdays and Tomorrow: Women in Afghanistan”. *Journal of International Women's Studies*

¹² Ibid

women into unequal roles where men rule and see no need for an independent, educated modern woman.

The Soviets' presence and intervention was not well-received, especially in the areas where tradition, tribal leaders and religion remained the basis for social order and rule of law. Under the Soviet Union, women had the most rights ever held in Afghanistan. They were educated, able to travel freely in and out of the country and work alongside men outside the home. Since most of the reforms were in conflict with the traditional Afghan understanding of its religion, Islam became the unifying call to arms against the government in Kabul and the Soviets. The movement was also a call to strip Afghan women of their rights of equality. The Mujahedeen, with the aid of the United States, were successful in their struggle against the USSR and by February of 1989 the Soviet withdrawal was complete. However, along with the Russian departure, women's equality experienced a tremendous setback. Afghan women were once again forced into the burqa and serving at the pleasure of the traditional male dominated society. When the Taliban took control, they continued using old tribal ways of doing business under the guise of Islam and an uncommon use of jihad. The oppression by the Taliban was especially harsh on Afghan women. They had to completely cover themselves with burquas, were banned from education, not allowed to walk outside the home unless accompanied by a male relative, and were beaten and even executed in public.¹³ They were also excluded from public positions.

Upon its intervention in Afghanistan, it was the mission of NATO and the U.S. to liberate the people from the Taliban. The U.S./NATO mission also included the need to integrate security and stability in Afghanistan through the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). This required the U.S and NATO to simultaneously fight the war and build and train the ANSF to be able to provide and maintain the stability and security of their own nation, without the need for NATO (or any other foreign troops). In executing its mission, a significant opportunity emerged to improve the condition of women whose role had experienced such an extreme set-back under the Taliban regime.

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

Fifty-three percent of the Afghan population is female.¹⁴ Yet, women only make up about 15% of the country's workforce, and about 1% of the 352,000 manned security forces. One might think that a mission aimed at bringing stability and security to a nation would include the role of women in its strategy to accomplish its mission and follow the guidance provided by UNSCR 1325. Unfortunately, in the history of our modern world, women appear to always be the first to lose their rights and last to regain them after the war is over. One may wonder what might have been different in the outcome, had we included how we could utilize the role of the Afghan women in fighting this war. Ignoring 53% of the population resulted in a number of missed opportunities towards the peace and security of Afghanistan.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ ISAF Resolute Support Security Assistance Guide 3.1 updated 27 Sep 2014.

LESSONS LEARNED

According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned “*A lesson must be significant in that it has a real or assumed impact on everyday operations. It must be valid in that it is factually and technically correct; applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision; and it reduces or eliminates the potential for failures and mishaps or reinforces a positive result. Basically, it is the knowledge acquired from an observation or an adverse experience that causes a worker or an organization to improve.*”¹⁵ NATO defines the purpose of a Lesson Learned as “to learn efficiently from experience and provide validated justifications for amending the existing way of doing things, in order to improve performance, both during the course of an operation and for subsequent operations.”¹⁶ Lessons learned from efforts to integrate Afghan women into the full process, from conflict resolution to peacekeeping and security, including joining the ANSF, is factually correct, applicable in that it defines a process and reinforces positive results as well as reducing the potential for future adverse events for all Afghans.

It should be noted that a lot of fine work has been done by both the military and civilian personnel that make up ISAF, as well as forward and enlightened thinkers at the MOI and MOD of Afghanistan. Gender Integration in the ANSF has made great strides in the last five years that the advisors have been assigned to this area. Using lessons learned from Afghanistan implementing UNSCR 1325 will help those that follow in our footsteps and can also be used to assist the Department of Defense as they implement their NAP-WPS. The hope is that the following solutions from lessons learned in Afghanistan will help everyone, not just those who are passionate about this subject, learn why women should and will play a significant and vital role in 21st Century operations and conflicts. As Valerie Jarrett stated in December 2011, “As the chair of the White House Council on Women and Girls, I’m proud of the many steps we’ve taken, both at home and abroad, to help women and girls reach their full potential. *As the President has pointed out, issues that affect women are not only women’s issues. When women have equal rights and opportunities, societies are more prosperous, peaceful, and secure. When women succeed, we all succeed.*”¹⁷

PART ONE: THE LESSONS

Education

It became apparent that most US Military Officers lacked the knowledge of how to apply UNSCR 1325 to the Afghan theater.¹⁸ If asked, they would probably tell you that 1325 is a key code to use to enter one of the secure buildings in their camp. During a Ministerial Advisors Group's (MAG) Command In-Brief for newly arrived Minister of Defense Advisors (MODA) in 2012, the Chief of Staff of the MOD MAG, a Canadian Colonel, was heard to say, “What do we

¹⁵ Establishing a Lessons Learned Program, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Chp.1.
<http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/11-33.pdf>

¹⁶ NATO Lessons Learned Handbook - Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre NATO’s Lead Agent for Joint Analysis, **from** “NATO’s Joint Doctrine for Operations, 2nd Edition dated September 2011 page 1, sighted 2 January 2015. www.jallc.nato.int/.

¹⁷ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/12/19/announcing-us-national-action-plan-women-peace-and-security>

¹⁸ Global War on Terrorism billets, in the Afghan Theater, that the US has agreed to fill with individual personnel from all US services, vice forces in theater.

need a Senior Advisor of Gender for?” After a brief education on the program providing the Colonel an opportunity to apply this new knowledge to his own daughter, he became one of the greatest supporters of gender integration in the Afghan MOD. DOD civilians on the other hand, in-bound to Afghanistan, received comprehensive seven week training and a ten day capstone exercise prior to deployment. Military personnel filling Individual Augment (IA) positions only have to complete a computer based training program prior to their deployment.

At the same time, even Senior Military Officers and Senior Executive Service Officers seemed to lack the knowledge as to the reasons for and benefits of integrating gender perspective at the operational and strategic levels. They additionally lacked the tools to integrate the gender perspective in military operations. In addition, Afghan leaders in the MOD and MOI were not well-educated or knowledgeable of UNSCR 1325 and its related resolutions, as well as the Afghan NAP-WPS. In a nation where women and children are the majority of the population and where religious culture insists that only women may search other women and their homes, it seems quite obvious to obtain the male leader’s buy-in on the resolution and its implementation.

Literacy

Although substantial funding was available for literacy programs for the male Afghan National Security Forces, much less was set aside or available for literacy programs for women. In fact, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, told the 2011 Mother's Day Congregation Delegation (CODEL) that too much literacy funding was assigned to the DOD for teaching the ANSF. However, not enough funding was available for Department of State to fund literacy programs for the majority of the Afghan population, that for all intents and purposes, has been stigmatized as not worthy of the same opportunities given to the minority population, made up of Afghan men.

Sadly, in January, 2014, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) published SIGAR 14-30 Audit Report: *Afghan National Security Forces: Despite Reported Successes, Concerns Remain about Literacy Program Results, Contract Oversight, Transition and Sustainment* concluded that the US military command responsible for overseeing the three literacy contracts for the ANSF, totaling over \$200M for up to five years, did not provide effective oversight of the program. SIGAR could not verify the accuracy of the program. They also stated the literacy program had a limited impact on the ANSF to reach Level 1, (the equivalent of first grade) to Level 3, (the equivalent of third grade) education. Yet, the Department of State had no funding to improve the literacy of the majority of the population of Afghanistan. The opportunity to achieve greater stability, sustainable development and peace and democracy was lost.

Implementation of NAP-WPS

The DOD National Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security clearly states the plan's goal and is supportive of both the UN Resolution 1325 and the importance of the United States NAP-WPS.¹⁹ In 2012 the DOD signed the *Defense Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action*

¹⁹ September 2013 Department of Defense Implementation Guide for the US National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security.

*Plan on Women, Peace and Security.*²⁰ Oddly, this was not well known. The signing was not communicated to the US Gender Advisors or anyone else in the Afghan theater. Guidance was forthcoming in October 2013 when the Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, dated October 20, 2013, was published. Unfortunately, this too failed at providing specific direction and action to be taken to implement the plan. The Memo instructs the recipients to incorporate the NAP “into programs and policies “*as appropriate.*” This wording leaves the implementation process vague and left up to interpretation, and likely to be perceived as not a high priority.

Nowhere is this style of communication more relevant than in a scenario played out in 2013 when the Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Commander challenged that nowhere was it stated he was required to devote any assets to Gender Integration within the Afghan National Security Forces. No additional guidance has come forth from the DOD, US Central Command, nor is there any mention of incorporating these objectives into strategic operational and tactical plans or theater campaigns. This leaves the US Gender Advisors to decide what issues to address, more often than not, without any direction.

Key Leader Engagement

Discussing actions being taken by the MOD to improve their progress on integrating more women into the Afghan National Army, in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act, were challenging. On one occasion, senior advisors at CSTC-A and a staff member for Under Secretary of Defense for Ashton Carter succeeded in including the topic of women in the ANSF on Mr. Carter's and Minister of Defense Bismullah Mohammadi's pre-brief papers and talking points. Unfortunately, Mr. Carter did not bring up either the topic of women, or any other of his talking points. Being a proud, former Mujahedeen, Minister Mohammadi naturally would not raise the topic, being as he was a non-supporter of women in the Afghan National Military. Another opportunity of great importance was missed.

Back in Washington the Congressional Afghan Women's Task Force ensured that anyone from the Hill, when visiting the theater, would have this issue included in their talking points for discussion. Unfortunately, as a senior civilian advisor to the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan, sitting in on these meetings over the course of a year, the issue was only raised on two occasions: during an early 2013 Congressional Delegation (CODEL) (a congresswoman and her male counterparts) and the Mother's Day CODEL of 2013. One must ask, “Why is the subject of inclusion of women in the stability operations so far from the forefront of anyone in key leadership's mind?” Progress will not happen with the lack of Key Leader Engagements to discuss the issue. Afghan leaders continue to put their hands out for funding but fail to act and “improve the participation of women in the peace and conflict resolution processes, protect women and girls from SGBV and help to ensure that women have full relief and recovery resources.”²¹

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ Joint Chief of Staff's Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, dated October 20, 2013, on *Department of Defense Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*. SGBV stands for Sexual and other forms of Gender Based Violence.

Funding

Thanks to the efforts of CODEL ROBY (Chairman Roby and Congresswomen Tsongas, Davis and Duckworth) of 2013, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 directed that “not less the \$25 million” be available to the DoD for the for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund to be used for programs and activities to support the recruitment, integration, retention, training and treatment of women in the ANSF. Prior to this act, there were no funds specified to support the integration of women in the ANSF. Instead, money from the Congressional Emergency Response Program (CERP) was the only DOD funding, used sparingly, to support women and girls programs in Afghanistan. However, this funding, up to \$500,000, was designed to allow commanders to quickly dispense and directly fund urgent humanitarian relief and construction projects. CERP money could be used for agricultural and irrigation projects needed to improve economic and financial security, to restore or improve electrical production and distribution, food production and distribution, as well as projects to build wells and the sanitation of water. CERP funding was to be used for the benefit of the Afghan people as well as provide them employment. Very little CERP funding was spent on ANSF women's issues or facilities; and CERP did not require US leadership to ensure funding was spent on urgent women’s humanitarian relief issues.

Another result of the lack of focus and action on women's issues was that these issues were overlooked when facilities were being built. Projects and decisions on location and type of facilities were made by either consulting with village elders (all males) or on where US Forces thought there was an urgent need, rather than consulting with Afghan women too. According to SIGAR, “Of the 525 CERP projects and initiatives, totaling about \$4.7M in disbursements, there were only two low dollar expenditures for women's and girl's needs. \$11,000 was spent on the construction of a school for girls in Daykundi province and \$240 for beekeeping supplies and training for a group of 25 women in Parwan province.”²²

In 2011, funding was set aside for women’s barracks at the Afghan National Defense University, which was part of a much larger project, and for the recruitment of women into the ANSF. In 2012, \$100,000 was “fenced” for the MOD to use for advertising for the recruitment of women in the ANSF. However, when the money was transferred from CSTC-A to the MOD, there was no special funding/tracking code attached to the money. The funding was included as part of the overall budget; hence, it was never required to be used to advertise for the recruitment effort of women. In addition, what was designed as a two-story women’s dorm at the Afghan National Defense University, somehow became a one-story building with insufficient bed space for four classes of women.

Billions of dollars have been appropriated by Congress for the Afghan Security Forces. “Congress appropriated more than \$5.1 billion to the Afghan Security Forces Fund in fiscal year 2013. Of the \$5B, DOD reprogrammed \$178 million and disbursed approximately \$3 billion as of June 30, 2014.”²³ If the plight of women in Afghanistan was as important an issue that seemed to be made and it is, then how did so little money come to be spent on this 53% majority of the population? We not only built very few ANSF facilities, what we did build did not

²²SIGAR 15-24-AR/U.S. Efforts to Support Afghan Women dated 18 December, 2014, footnote #16

²³ Ibid, footnote #51

support the use of women as needed. For example, the Afghan military would submit their requirements for construction of a facility and our construction advisors would fill them, forgetting to include women's bathrooms, childcare centers and changing rooms providing women members the security needed in order to change from civilian dress into their military uniforms and vice versa. Without these facilities, women faced being targeted by insurgents while in uniform coming to and leaving work, let alone by extremists who were fanatic in their belief that a woman's place was only in the home. Performing a simple gender analysis, when building facilities for the ANSF, would have prevented us from constructing most facilities that failed to support the very people working in them, namely women.

Staffing of the National Action Plan (NAP)

In addition to funding issues and gender amnesia, there was the issue of staffing. The ISAF Headquarters established a Gender Office in 2009 staffed with two to four mixed civilian and military personnel. CSTC-A filled the position of Gender Advisor for the first time in 2010. Due to the forward-thinking of then LTG William B. Caldwell IV, US Army, Commander CSTC-A and Dr. Jack Kemp Ph.D., Deputy Commander CSTC-A, their Gender Office stood up in 2011. Since then, CSTC-A has also had two to four gender advisors of mixed civilian and military personnel. Currently, there are only two DOD civilians.

On December 19, 2011, as required by Executive Order 13595, *instituting a National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security*, the Secretary of Defense was directed “to designate one or more officers, as appropriate, as responsible for coordinating the implementation of the National Action Plan.”²⁴ Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta designated the Under Secretary for Policy (OSD (P)) to be responsible for coordinating the NAP for the DoD, who then designated the OSD (P)/Stability and Human Affairs Office. There is one person from the offices of OSD (P)/Stability and Human Affairs coordinating the implementation with the Secretaries of Military Departments, Commanders of the Combatant Commands and Directors of specified DoD Agencies. The result - there is one part-time, fully engaged individual managing this entire responsibility for all of the Department of Defense.

One could make the argument that compared to the ISAF, which has nine positions for gender advisors the DOD is not taking the issue of gender integration seriously. It is simply not possible to implement the NAP with this insufficient personnel infrastructure. This one, part-time person is responsible for the implementation of the NAP-WPS and “promoting women's participation in conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as in post conflict relief and recovery, advances peace, national security, economic and social development and international cooperation.”²⁵

Today, there are still no women generals sitting at the table with the ISAF commander. Of the 39 general officer positions within the ISAF, there has been on-average, no more than one or two women generals/admirals. In 2011, under General Petraeus, there were two other women in the

²⁴Executive Order 13595 dated December 19, 2011, *Instituting a National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*

²⁵September 2013 Department of Defense Implementation Guide for the US National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, cover page.

room, one a Canadian Major General and the other a US Navy Rear Admiral. Neither of the two women held a place at the table. They sat on the sidelines as non-principles. To be fair, in 2012, General Allen did request NATO provide him with a general officer to be the senior gender advisor for the ISAF. Although it took a year to fill his request, Croatia sent their first one-star woman general. When she completed her tour this past January 2015, she was replaced with an Australian Colonel. The ISAF, in all its infinite wisdom, did not believe that the position necessitated a general officer of either gender. Senior women role-models are critically important, demonstrating the importance of the inclusion of women from countries involved in conflict resolution, peacebuilding and political transitions for both their gender and their gender experience.

PART TWO: SOLUTIONS

Rank Specific Educational Courses

All military officers, especially those filling Individual Augmentee (IA) positions, must be educated on UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions, especially if DOD wants to obtain General Dempsey's (Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff) goal of the NAP-WPS – “to empower half the world's population as equal partners in preventing conflict and building peace in countries threatened and affected by war, violence and insecurity. Achieving this goal is critical to our national and global security.”²⁶ This can be accomplished by sending military officer IA's, filling advisor roles, to the same seven week training that deploying DOD civilians to Afghanistan currently attend. The DOD civilians are assigned as Senior Advisors to assist in ministerial capacity building at the MOD and MOI as part of the OSD MODA. This program includes professional advisor training in cultural awareness, country familiarization, counter-corruption, human terrain-ethnic and tribal identities, cross-cultural adaptability, senior-level consultations and briefings, and language instruction. Additionally, training includes education on engaging women in reform and UNSCR 1325 familiarization. In addition, prior to deploying, civilian DOD attendees undergo an evaluated ten day capstone exercise.

All newly promoted brigadier generals and admirals, as well as Senior Executive Service, should be required to complete a course on UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions, and the DOD's National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security. The course would provide its participants with the tools and knowledge to understand and integrate the gender perspective at the operational and strategic level and in all military operations. The program could be held at their CAPSTONE Military Leadership Program held at National University, Ft. McNair, in Washington DC. The training could mirror that already prepared by the NATO's accredited Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT) Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations in Kungsängen, Sweden.²⁷ The other option would be to accomplish this training by using instructors from SWEDINT.

In addition to all IA's and newly promoted brigadier generals and admirals, Afghan leaders at the MOI and MOD would greatly benefit from receiving similar education. It does not serve the mission of gender integration and WPS without including this group of stakeholders. Their

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/swedint/>

training should include instruction in UNSCR 1325 and all related resolutions and the Afghan National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, also using instructors from SWEDINT. SWEDINT could also provide training to ANSF personnel on the importance of integrating women into the security forces, as well as how the work they perform is of critical importance to Afghan nation building.

Literacy: A Means of Achieving Peace & Stability

Another educational area of great importance in Afghan nation-building is their literacy rate. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), “literacy is a human right and the basis for lifelong learning. It empowers individuals, families and communities and improves their quality of life. Because of its “multiplier effect”, literacy helps eradicate poverty, reduce child mortality, curb population growth, achieve gender equality and ensure sustainable development, peace and democracy.”²⁸ Funding, perhaps too much, was provided to the literacy education of the male Afghan National Security Forces. If the DOD’s literacy funding had been shared with the State Department, there is strong reason to believe that it would have gone a long way to “ensure sustainable development, peace and democracy.” According to UNESCO, an educated woman would assist in finding a way to stop the war and work for their countries’ stability.

Implementation by Its Definition

Implementation is defined by the National Implementation Research Network as “*a specified set of activities designed to put into practice an activity or program of known dimensions. According to this definition, implementation processes are purposeful and are described in sufficient detail such that independent observers can detect the presence and strength of the “specific set of activities” related to implementation. In addition, the activity or program being implemented is described in sufficient detail so that independent observers can detect its presence and strength.*”²⁹

As stated above, having a well-stated goal is the first step for the successful implementation of an activity or program such as the implementation of the Department of Defense's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. The DOD’s mission as set forth in the US NAP-WPS supports the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and yet, it lacks the “sufficient detail” required for success. A Memorandum for the Secretaries of Military Departments, dated October 20, 2013, on the *Department of Defense Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security* directs those listed in the Memo's distribution to incorporate the NAP “into programs and policies *as appropriate* without providing the “specific set of activities” required to achieve the *appropriate and consistent* implementation throughout the DOD. This vague wording basically leaves the implementation up to the specific commander's own interpretation. In fact, no one in the DOD, US Central Command, or further down the chain of command has set forth any clear guidance to Commanders in Afghanistan, nor their Gender Advisors; yet, the military services and combatant commanders are responsible,

²⁸ <http://en.unesco.org/themes/literacy-all>.

²⁹ <http://nirn.fpg.unc.edu/learn-implementation/implementation-defined>

according to the DoD NAP, to incorporate the NAP objectives into strategic guidance and planning documents.

Vague words and phrases, such as “as appropriate” have no place in any military or civilian DOD guide designed to put into practice a change as delicate and divisive as a gender integration plan in a nation in conflict. Furthermore, in the effort to ensure successful implementation, Secretaries of the Military Departments must be aligned with the mission and its goals, which cannot be achieved unless they are mandated to increasing gender mainstreaming within the US Armed Forces and to integrate gender perspective into all strategic plans and operations. Additionally, if the US NAP is incorporated into the US National Security Strategy, it then becomes assimilated into the National Military Strategy. By doing so, the objectives of the US NAP then become included in the Theater Campaign Plans, such that they are then applicable to US Forces in Afghanistan and other similar regions.

Despite the United Nations Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions, the UN HeForShe Campaign, the NAP for Women, Peace and Security, and *Defense Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security*, Gender Advisors were somewhat pushed aside in Afghanistan. It was not uncommon for Senior Afghan Security officials to tell the advisors that they did not understand Afghan culture (a culture that has significant history of equal rights for women). Perhaps this tunnel-vision was the desire of Afghan men to maintain their predominance in Afghan society, whether in the home, rearing the children, obtaining an education, or voting. The Afghan present-day culture is about men making policy and decisions solely for men. Regardless of the work accomplished by Mahmud Tarzi, King Amanullah Khan and his wife Queen Suraya or even that of the PDPA in the 1970s, a severe case of gender amnesia still exists along with a hand out, with the palm facing up asking “what's in this for me?”

Key Leader Engagements

Frequently, during a CODEL, Afghan leaders would offer a woman congressional leader the opportunity to ask follow-up questions about the progress of the gender integration process and status of women members of the ANSF. Knowing present day Afghan culture, where only women can search other women or their homes, this should have come as no surprise. The stock answers given in response should also not have come as any surprise. However, a senior male DOD leader asking the same question would have been taken much more seriously and given a far different response from his Afghan counterpart. This would raise the issue of the inclusion of women to a higher, more serious level of discussion and go the distance in getting their buy-in.

The DOD as an Agent of Change

On Sunday, 1 February, 2015, the Super Bowl will be played in Phoenix, Arizona. One of the most beloved parts of the Super Bowl is the television commercials. These ads are some of the most expensive means for advertisers to bring their brand message to market, costing between \$3 million to \$5 million per ad. Over 100 million people watch the game and some of them just for the commercials. For years there has been this cultural tradition of ranking these ads from best to worst. So, for all these reasons, organizations that have the financial resources to afford a spot go out-of-their-way to create memorable commercials, such that some advertisers push the limits of comedy and parody to get their message across. These television spots have become as

important and a cultural American tradition as the football game itself. What's different this year is that the NFL, one of the most powerful organizations in the country, is paying \$4.5 million for a commercial that, according to the Washington Post, is being touted as the “most important Super Bowl commercial you need to see about domestic violence.” This extremely potent ad will place women's issues, inequities and violence in the forefront of American life and create a topic of conversation across the country. Perhaps the fact that it has taken until 2015 to have this dark, unseemly part of American life finally rise to this level of discussion explains why for more than 13 years, we have mostly ignored women's issues in Afghanistan.

Ironically, in the US, the Department of Defense has been an agency of change in many aspects of American life. The DOD's range of influence stems from its position, as an Executive Branch department of the United States, a place of many firsts. There is no pay inequity between men and women of the same rank. It was first in employing women in the same duties as men and another first in protecting the employment of persons of color as well as gay and lesbian service members. It is a regulated part of the US government, and as such, is required to abide by executive orders and congressional legislation that keeps the wheels of progress moving forward.

Being that the DOD has a mission in many countries across the globe it is well-suited to act as this agent. Being that it has been the barometer of change in American society, it makes perfect sense for DOD to act as an agent of change in these nations and regions of conflict, where we find a portion of the population being culturally and societally restrained by inequitable traditions, void of protection for their human rights. This behavior no longer has a place in the 21st century. If not the Department of Defense, then from where will the impetus for positive change and reform come? If not us, then who? If not now, then when?

CONCLUSION

General Hekmat Shahi, Director of the Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan's Department of Gender, Human Rights, and Children told me that women's issues in Afghanistan were all about power and authority. She said Afghan men in leadership and political roles do not want to share power and authority with women. Our lack of action in the implementation of the NAP and failure to use Key Leader Engagements to ensure progress enables the patriarchal societies like Afghanistan to take little action in the stability and peace of their nation. UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions, and the DoD NAP on Women, Peace, and Security, address the need for women to contribute to conflict resolution.

What is written on paper on the NAP shows great intent but actions will always speak louder than words.

The National Action Plans are well documented. We know from Afghanistan's history, the “Graveyard of Empires” has a checkered past in relation to women and their right to equality. Despite being 53% of the population, 21st century Afghan women have had, yet again, their human rights stripped away. Simple discussions during key leader engagements on why women are needed in the security sectors; why women should fill civilian positions in MOD, why women should be educated and, why qualified women should be promoted to higher positions, goes a long way for the empowerment of women. It strongly demonstrates the US military

leaders as the champions of women. If the DOD, a change agent, takes greater ownership of gender equality than it does today, similar to the UN's HeForShe Campaign, they will become part of the solution in conflict zones and help to make countries like Afghanistan achieve greater stability. Women can't be the only ones fighting for gender equality and justice in conflict zones. By placing their own well-qualified women military officers in positions of authority and as principle staff officers in deployed environments, such as Afghanistan, the DOD again would prove they are a change agent. By increasing the number of staff responsible for the implementation of the NAP on Women Peace and Security at the DOD would also show leadership by example. ISAF having nine times the number of DOD gender advisors is embarrassing.

In light of this, we, the military and civilian personnel of the DOD, must challenge ourselves and ask the hard questions; how did we miss this very significant opportunity to fully integrate women into the Afghan National Security Forces and become the agent of change? Most importantly, would we have changed the outcome of this war had we taken action to advance Afghan women's rights to equality? The issues raised and discussed in this paper are easily found in the public arena. One needs to look no further than the evolution of women's rights, here in our own nation, and to know that women's rights are human rights. The difference between the fight for women in Afghanistan and those within the US is the action required to achieve this equality.

We belong to the greatest nation on earth, and yet, we failed the women of Afghanistan. The lack of senior women officer role models, "top-down" leadership and the failure to provide women ANSF service members support as simple as childcare and changing rooms is implicitly difficult to understand. There is no excuse for this gender amnesia. We have the best Department of Defense which employs great women and men. The DOD has been a change agent for our country. It takes the empowerment and inclusiveness of women in our armed forces seriously. It has been the cultural change advocate/barometer in the US affecting societal issues such as integrating people of color, women, gays and lesbians into the military. Lack of action on the DoD NAP means that terrorists such as Boko Haram, will continue kidnaping young girls to be the "wives" of their fellow terrorists or sell the girls to the highest bidder. This also means more girls to be used as forced suicide bombers. It will allow ISIL to continue to kidnap civilian women to sell as sex slaves in order to fund their terrorism. It means the women of Afghanistan will continue to be second and third class citizens.

The DOD has evolved into the role-model for the US to embrace and implement this overdue, well-documented concept, protected by our Constitution. Action now is the answer, especially as conflict areas such as Nigeria, Syria, Iraq, and other Middle East countries have more and more strife and hostility, and where the rights of women continue to be eroded. Gender Equality and feminism is the DOD's issue and mission too. If the DOD does not start now, when will it take action on the empowerment and inclusiveness of women in conflict prevention, management, post conflict relief, recovery, economic and social development and international cooperation? When is enough, enough? If those reading this paper don't take action, then who will? If not the DOD, then who; if not now, when?

Biography of the Author:

Sheila M.Q. Scanlon, Colonel, USMC Retired, was on continuous active duty for 32 years, from 1979-2011. She was a 0180/Adjutant with command billets, from company to regimental level, as well as assigned to three joint tours. She has one combat tour, in Afghanistan, as a Senior Advisor to the Deputy Minister of Interior for Administration and Support; and, the Gender Advisor for both the Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan and the Commander NATO Training Mission –Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, where she was awarded the Bronze Star and the Combat Action Ribbon. Sheila returned to the US, after working as a DoD civilian (GS-15), in Afghanistan, from July 2012 to May 2014, as the Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan for Gender Integration and was a Senior Civilian Advisor to the Minister of Defense of Afghanistan, as a member of the Ministry of Defense Advisory Team, from September 2012 to July 2013. She is a graduate of the University of Notre Dame with a BA in Political Science and National War College, National Defense University with a MA in National Strategic Studies and Regional Studies in the Middle East.

GLOSSARY

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANA:	Afghan National Army
ANP:	Afghan National Police
ANSF:	Afghan National Security Forces
CERP:	Congressional Emergency Response Program
CIV/MIL:	Civil-Military
CODEL:	Congressional Delegation
CSTC-A:	Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan
DOD:	Department of Defense
E.O:	Executive Order
IA:	Individual Augments
ISAF:	International Security Assistance Force
MAG:	Ministerial Advisor's Group
MOD:	Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan
MOI:	Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan
NAP:	National Action Plan
NAP-WPS:	National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA:	National Defense Authorization Act
OSD:	Office of Secretary of Defense
SIGAR:	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SWEDINT:	Swedish Armed Forces International Centre
OSD (P):	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
UN:	United Nations (UN)
UNESCO:	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNSCR:	United Nations Security Council Resolution
U.S.:	United States
WPS:	Women Peace and Security
1325:	Number given to the UN Security Council Resolution dealing with increasing the participation of women during conflict operations and stability and peace building.

APPENDIX

United Nations SCR 1325

Signed in October, 2000 this resolution reaffirmed *“the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. Resolution 1325 urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts. It also calls on all parties to conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, in situations of armed conflict. The resolution provides a number of important operational mandates, with implications for Member States and the entities of the United Nations system.”*

<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/>

The HeForShe Campaign

On July 11, 2010 the UN established a Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) known as “UN Women” to “strengthen the institutional arrangements for support of gender equality and the empowerment of women.” (UN Resolution 64/289).

“Gender equality is not only a women’s issue, it is a human rights issue that requires my participation. I commit to take action against all forms of violence and discrimination faced by women and girls.” <http://www.heforshe.org/>

Women Peace and Security

“The NGO Working Group’s mission is to collaborate with the United Nations, its Member States and civil society towards full implementation of SCR 1325 and all other Security Council resolutions that address women, peace and security, including ensuring the equal and full participation of women in issues relating to peace and security. Using SCR 1325 as our guiding instrument, the NGO Working Group promotes a gender perspective and respect for human rights in all peace and security, conflict prevention and management and peacebuilding initiatives of the United Nations.” <http://womenpeacesecurity.org/about>

COMBATANT COMMANDS AND REGIONAL STUDIES

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WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Susan Hutchinson

ABSTRACT

The Asia Pacific may be the most militarised region of the world, but security concerns do not simply lie with high end threat of state on state conflict. There are a range of fragile states in the south Pacific where stability is threatened by a range of human security challenges. It is important to consider Women, Peace and Security as part of a broader strategy for security and stability across the Pacific. Advancing WPS in the Pacific fits well with PACOM efforts to build stronger relationships in the region to advance common interests and address shared threats.

In 2012, the Pacific Islands Forum released both a Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security and a Human Security Framework. There is strong engagement from civil society across the Pacific on Women, Peace and Security. The Pacific Islands Forum Reference Group on Women, Peace and Security includes representatives from two different women's civil society organisations. The Australian government has identified WPS as a key component of new regional aid program, but diplomatic and aid efforts need increase from a range of donors and allies. Women, Peace and Security could be one issue which PACOM coordinates with federal partners and NGOs in the region. Regional cooperation, stabilisation and disaster relief activities could be used to reinforce Women, Peace and Security efforts and bilateral exercises like Exercise TALISMAN SABRE could prioritise Women, Peace and Security, as could other bilateral and multilateral exercises with military and police forces from the South Pacific.

INTRODUCTION

During a speech in Australia in 2014, President Obama stated that “American leadership in the Asia Pacific will always be a fundamental focus of my foreign policy... day in, and day out, steadily, deliberately, we will continue to deepen our engagement using every element of American power - diplomacy, military, economic, development, the power of our values and our ideals.”¹ Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda requires coherent military, diplomatic and development efforts. Given the foreign policy pivot to the Asia Pacific, it is time that United States (US) Pacific Command (PACOM) follow the lead of US Central Command (CENTCOM) and support the advancement WPS in the region in accordance with the US National Action Plan.

The WPS agenda can be split into the two components of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325): protection from sexual violence, and participation in peace and security activities. In the South Pacific, the connectedness of these two components is very apparent; they are mutually reinforcing. This paper will consider the South Pacific context,

¹ OBAMA, B. Remarks by President Obama at the University of Queensland. 15 November 2014 Brisbane. The White House.

outline the current state of play for WPS in the region and offer recommendations for how to improve implementation.

SOUTH PACIFIC CONTEXT

Gender

The South Pacific is a culturally diverse region. Accordingly, the socially constructed roles and relationships between men and women vary across the region. Traditionally, some areas of the Pacific were matrilineal, including Fiji and parts of the Solomon Islands; others were patrilineal. Scheyvens claims that in the pre-colonial period, Melanesian “women were often regarded as equivalent in intrinsic worth and experienced their domains as sources of security, solidarity, and dignity.”² Huffer claims that “women have traditionally been valued as complementary partners to men with specialised knowledge and functions to ensure the wellbeing of society.”³ But this cultural experience is not uniform and colonial structures devalued women’s work in agriculture and outlawed customs in which women’s power was affirmed.⁴

Gender inequality in the South Pacific is now vast and there are significant challenges to women’s participation and protection across the region. Women’s economic participation is concentrated in subsistence agricultural production or low-skilled, low-wage, and low-prestige cash employment sectors.⁵ “Women are more likely than men to be informal workers, a consequence of their limited skills, restricted mobility and gender norms”⁶ and the gender wage gap is high, especially for low-skilled workers.⁷ Most Pacific states have small departments or divisions whose aim is to promote the advancement of women; but only Fiji, Vanuatu and Samoa have ministries of women.⁸

Women’s political representation in the Pacific is the lowest in the world, lower even than in the Middle East. Women have never comprised more than 10% of national parliamentarians from the Pacific. As of September 2014, women comprised approximately 30 of the 556 national

² SCHEYVENS, R. 2003. Church women’s groups and the empowerment of women in Solomon Islands. *Oceania*, 74, 24-43.

³ HUFFER, E. 2006. Desk review of the factors which enable and constrain the advancement of women’s political representation in Forum Island Countries. *A woman's place is in the house – the House of Parliament; research to advance women's political representation in Forum Island Countries*. Suva: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

⁴ SCHEYVENS, R. 2003. Church women’s groups and the empowerment of women in Solomon Islands. *Oceania*, 74, 24-43.

⁵ GEORGE, N. 2013. *Pacific Islands: beset by gender violence, but why?* [Online]. The Conversation. Available: <http://theconversation.com/pacific-islands-beset-by-gender-violence-but-why-13150> [Accessed 14 January 2015].

⁶ UN WOMEN 2014. Annual report 2013 – UN Women Fiji multi-country office. Suva: UN Women Fiji Multi-Country Office.

⁷ PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM SECRETARIAT 2013. 2013 Pacific regional MDGs tracking report. Suva: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

⁸ HUFFER, E. 2006. Desk review of the factors which enable and constrain the advancement of women’s political representation in Forum Island Countries. *A woman's place is in the house – the House of Parliament; research to advance women's political representation in Forum Island Countries*. Suva: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

parliaments in the Pacific Islands.⁹ Representation at the sub-national level is similarly low. These statistics compare to the global figure of 21% of parliamentarians being women and in the United States women make up approximately 19%¹⁰ of federal parliamentarians.

Domestic violence in the region has been described as “severe and pervasive.”¹¹ UN Women argues gender-based violence is “at pandemic levels.”¹² At a Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police conference, Tonga’s Assistant Police Commander reported that the police forces of the small island nations in the Pacific contained only 10% women.¹³ In addition to low recruitment of women in the police, there is a “lack of opportunity for promotion and limited participation in management and decision making.”¹⁴ The crimes which “women suffer most frequently are assault and rape, and many women feel unsafe both within their homes and in public.”¹⁵ But a recent study by the Pacific Prevention of Domestic Violence Programme found Pacific police, both men and women, held attitudes around gender that inhibited responses to sexual and gender based violence.¹⁶

Notwithstanding the challenges to gender equality, “there are many deep-seated cultural traditions in the Pacific region that encourage respect towards women.”¹⁷ Baker notes that in Pacific history many prominent women have become community leaders, chiefs, and queens.¹⁸ Traditional practices which endure to the present day mean that men in many parts of the Pacific need the endorsement of women to gain standing in the community.¹⁹

Strategic situation

Then National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon explained that the US government wanted a “stable security environment and a regional order” for the Asia Pacific, “rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for universal rights and freedoms.”²⁰ He

⁹ PACIFIC WOMEN IN POLITICS. 2014. *National Women MPs* [Online]. Available: <http://www.pacwip.org/women-mps/national-women-mps/> [Accessed 14 January 2015].

¹⁰ INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION. 2014. *Women in National Parliaments* [Online]. Inter-Parliamentary Union. Available: <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm> [Accessed 14 January 2015].

¹¹ OFFICE OF DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS 2008. *Violence against women in Melanesia and East Timor: Building on global and regional promising approaches*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

¹² UN WOMEN 2014. *Annual report 2013 – UN Women Fiji multi-country office*. Suva: UN Women Fiji Multi-Country Office.

¹³ NAUTILIS INSTITUTE. 2005. *Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police* [Online]. California: Nautilus Institute. Available: <http://nautilus.org/publications/books/australian-forces-abroad/pacific-islands/pacific-islands-chiefs-of-police-picp/> [Accessed 16 January 2015].

¹⁴ INTERNATIONAL DEPLOYMENT GROUP 2014. *Gender Strategy*. In: AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE (ed.). Canberra, Australian Capital Territory.

¹⁵ Ibid. p1

¹⁶ RONALD, C. 2013. *Phase 2 Activity Progress Report 2012-2013. Pacific Prevention of Domestic Violence Programme*. Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

¹⁷ BAKER, K. 2014. *The Meanings of Success in Gender Quota Campaigns in the Pacific Islands Region*. Australian Capital Territory: Australian National University.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ HUFFER, E. 2006. *Desk review of the factors which enable and constrain the advancement of women’s political representation in Forum Island Countries. A woman’s place is in the house – the House of Parliament; research to advance women’s political representation in Forum Island Countries*. Suva: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

²⁰ DONILON, T. *Address to the Asia Society Conference. The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013*, 11 March 2013 New York. Washington D.C.: The White House.

said the foreign policy pivot to the Asia Pacific would comprise: strengthening alliances, deepening partnerships with emerging powers, building a stable, productive and constructive relationship with China, empowering regional institutions, and helping to build a regional economic architecture.²¹ These five areas are reflected in the five key elements of PACOM's effort to build 'strong relationships'.²²

"Australia has been the partner of choice since most South Pacific islands decolonised."²³ According to figures from the Organisation for Cooperation and Development, Australia and New Zealand are the largest aid donors in the South Pacific.²⁴ Both countries provide substantial capacity development for governance, rule of law and defence programs in the region. For example, in 2013-14 the Australian Federal Budget allocated \$94 million to the Defence Cooperation Program which incorporates Australian Defence Force support to partner nations through advisers, training and capacity building initiatives.²⁵ Approximately 15 percent of Australia's bilateral development assistance is expended in the law and justice sector, delivered in a whole-of-government fashion.²⁶

During the Cold War, the US and United Kingdom invested in the South Pacific for reasons of nuclear deterrence and containment of communism. Since then, China has continued to vie for influence²⁷ and has a "comprehensive geo-economic presence and extensive activities in the South-West Pacific."²⁸ Indeed, there is evidence that China may be providing aid on a scale that would make it the second largest donor in the region, behind Australia.²⁹

China is now identifying strategic interests, projecting both hard and soft power in the region. These interests include signals intelligence, port access and exclusive economic zones. In 1997, China built a satellite tracking station in Kiribati, which it subsequently dismantled after Kiribati switched diplomatic recognition to Taiwan. The relationship between Fiji and China has blossomed since Australia broke ties with the Bainimarama regime. The Chinese fishing fleet operating out of Fiji is said to provide cover for the gathering of signals intelligence, particularly monitoring US bases in Micronesia.³⁰ Engaging in military assistance programs across the region, China is also seeking naval access to ports and is negotiating access to facilities for

²¹ MOSS, T. 2013. *America's Pivot to Asia: A Report Card* [Online]. Tokyo: The Diplomat. Available: <http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/americas-pivot-to-asia-a-report-card/?allpages=yes> [Accessed 22 January 2015].

²² LOCKLEAR, S. J. 2012. *USPACOM Strategy*. Hawaii: Department of Defense.

²³ O'KEEFE, M. 2013. Pacific cold war last thing we want. *The Australian*, 25 March.

²⁴ DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE 2014. *Oceania. Development at a Glance: Statistics by Region*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

²⁵ CHURCH, N. 2013. Australian Defence Force (ADF) operations and regional engagement. *Budget Review 2013-14 Index*. Canberra.

²⁶ COX, M., DUITUTURAGA, E. & SCHEYE, E. 2012. Building on local strengths. In: OFFICE OF DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS (ed.) *Evaluations & Reviews*. Canberra.

²⁷ BUCHANAN, P. 2012. A new containment policy in the South Pacific. *The Scoop*.

²⁸ SALIL, S. 2013. The Far Flank of the Indo-Pacific: India and China in the South West Pacific. *Strategic Analysis Paper*. Dalkeith: Future Directions International.

²⁹ O'KEEFE, A. 2012. Bilateral donors in the Pacific: is it more than development? Asia Pacific Forum, 6 July 2012 Tahiti. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.

³⁰ WALLIS, J. 2012a. *China's South Pacific Diplomacy* [Online]. The Diplomat. Available: <http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/chinas-south-pacific-diplomacy/> [Accessed 16 January 2015].

maintenance and resupply purposes.³¹ Locklear argues that the Asia Pacific is “the most militarized region in the world, with seven of the world’s ten largest standing militaries and five of the world’s declared nuclear nations.”³² Indeed, the Asia Pacific region is the only part of the world to see a steady increase military spending since 2008.³³ It is possible that “a hostile power might establish bases in the South Pacific and threaten the air and sea approaches.”³⁴ But security concerns do not simply lie with the high end threat of state on state conflict.

There are a range of fragile states in the South Pacific where stability is threatened by human security challenges requiring a holistic response. Unity of effort is a key principle in the PACOM strategy for the region, stating they will “contribute to US whole-of-government approaches to resolving regional security challenges, and support the broadest possible involvement of regional counterparts.”³⁵ At the inaugural South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting, representatives noted the “the range of challenges to continued security and prosperity in the Pacific, including the continued potential for conflict within fragile states.”³⁶ These are the very security challenges to which the first principle of the US National Action Plan responds: “the engagement and protection of women as agents of peace and stability will be central to the United States’ efforts to promote security, prevent, respond to, and resolve conflict, and rebuild societies.”³⁷

Pacific Islands Forum

The Pacific Islands Forum (Forum) is the key regional institution for intergovernmental cooperation. The Forum is a political grouping of 16 independent and self-governing states. The membership comprises Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji (suspended from 2 May 2009 till 22 October 2014), Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Other non-sovereign states and international organisations have special observer status or associate membership. The goals of the Forum “are to stimulate economic growth and enhance political governance and security for the region, through the provision of policy advice; and to strengthen regional cooperation and integration through coordinating, monitoring and evaluating implementation of Leaders’ decisions.”³⁸ Among other things, the Forum coordinates aviation, shipping and telecommunications in the region and maintains strong involvement in the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands. “The Forum has proven an effective avenue for small

³¹ Ibid.

³² LOCKLEAR, S. J. 2012. USPACOM Strategy. Hawaii: Department of Defense.

³³ ZULAUF, P. 2014. *Rapid Militarisation of the Asia-Pacific* [Online]. The Atlantic Council of Canada. Available: <http://natocouncil.ca/rapid-militarisation-of-the-asia-pacific/> [Accessed 23 January 2015].

³⁴ WALLIS, J. 2012b. Is Australia still threatened by weak South Pacific states? *The Strategist* [Online]. Available from: <http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/is-australia-still-threatened-by-weak-south-pacific-states/> [2015].

³⁵ LOCKLEAR, S. J. 2012. USPACOM Strategy. Hawaii: Department of Defense.

³⁶ SOUTH PACIFIC DEFENCE MINISTERS. 2013. Joint Communique. South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting, 2 May 2013 Nuku'alofa. Canberra: Department of Defence.

³⁷ THE WHITE HOUSE 2011. United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. Washington D.C.: The White House.

³⁸ PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM SECRETARIAT. 2004a. *Mission and Vision* [Online]. Suva: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Available: <http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/about-us/mission-goals-roles/> [Accessed 29 January 2015].

island states to amplify their voices (with the aid of middle powers Australia and New Zealand) in the international arena”³⁹

“The annual meeting of the Forum Regional Security Committee is the principal forum for setting a regional security agenda and identifying priorities for enhancing the capacity of members to respond to internal and external security threats.”⁴⁰ The Political, Governance and Security Programme advises and coordinates assistance in conflict prevention, together with the United Nations Development Program Pacific Centre. Courses of action to security crises within the region are guided by the Biketawa Declaration which recognises “the importance of averting the causes of conflict and of reducing, containing and resolving all conflicts by peaceful means including by customary practices.”⁴¹ Indeed, within the region, conflict prevention is seen as the main strategy for stabilisation. The Forum’s approach to conflict prevention centres on three elements: “ensuring underlying causes are being addressed; enhancing the monitoring of potential conflict escalation; and strengthening existing conflict resolution capacities in Forum island countries.”⁴² Having said that, regional responses to crises in Solomon Islands, Nauru and Fiji were all been sponsored under the auspices of the Biketawa Declaration. These responses respectively comprised military/police intervention, economic assistance, and targeted measures against military dictatorship.

“The Pacific Islands Forum has, in recent years, become far more attentive to gender issues than throughout its previous four decades of operations.”⁴³ This was particularly well demonstrated at the 43rd Forum meeting in Rarotonga in 2012 where leaders endorsed the *Pacific Gender Equality Declaration*, bringing “new determination and invigorated commitment to efforts to lift the status of women in the Pacific and empower them to be active participants in economic, political and social life.”⁴⁴ At that Forum, leaders committed to supporting women’s political representation; agreed to adopt measures that eliminate all barriers preventing women from participating fully in the economic sphere; and pledged to act to end violence against women,⁴⁵ providing constructive steps as to how they would achieve these aims. Gender equality is explicitly included in one of the guiding principles of the Forum⁴⁶ and the current Secretary

³⁹ SHIBUYA, E. 2004. The problems and potential of the Pacific Islands Forum. In: ROLFE, J. (ed.) *The Asia-Pacific: A region in transition*. Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies.

⁴⁰ PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM SECRETARIAT. 2004b. *Political Governance & Security* [Online]. Suva: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Available: <http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/political-governance-security/> [Accessed 29 January 2015].

⁴¹ PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM SECRETARIAT. Biketawa Declaration. 2000. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

⁴² PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM SECRETARIAT. 2004b. *Political Governance & Security* [Online]. Suva: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Available: <http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/political-governance-security/> [Accessed 29 January 2015].

⁴³ GEORGE, N. 2014. Promoting Women, Peace and Security in the Pacific Islands: hot conflict/slow violence. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 68, 314-332.

⁴⁴ PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM SECRETARIAT. Pacific Leaders Gender Equality Declaration. Forty-third Pacific Islands Forum, 30 August 2012c Rarotonga. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 13-15.

⁴⁵ PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM SECRETARIAT. 2012. Forum Communique. Forty-third Pacific Islands Forum, 28-30 August 2012a Rarotonga. Suva: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

⁴⁶ PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM SECRETARIAT. 2004a. *Mission and Vision* [Online]. Suva: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Available: <http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/about-us/mission-goals-roles/> [Accessed 29 January 2015].

General of the Forum is a woman, Dame Meg Taylor from Papua New Guinea, as are both Deputy Secretary Generals.

IMPLEMENTING WOMEN PEACE AND SECURITY

Regional Action Plan

In November 2012, the Forum launched its Regional Action Plan on WPS. “The Regional Action Plan provides a framework at the regional level for Forum Members and Pacific Territories to enhance women and young women’s leadership in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, mainstream gender in security policy-making, and ensure women and girls’ human rights are protected in humanitarian crises, transitional contexts and post-conflict situations.”⁴⁷

The Pacific Regional Action Plan was developed by a working group comprising civil society, Forum Members, the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific, and relevant United Nations agencies. The document was endorsed by the Forum Regional Security Committee and then released by Pacific leaders. In keeping with the participatory nature of its development and the ‘Pacific Way’ of consensus building, signatories to the plan include international organisations and civil society in addition to the secretariat and various programs of the Forum. The Regional Action Plan outlines three focus areas. The first is about gender mainstreaming and women and girls’ leadership in conflict prevention and management, political decision making, peacebuilding and peacekeeping. The second focus area is about participation in security sector oversight and accountability. The third focus area is protecting the human rights of women and girls during humanitarian crises and in transitional and post-conflict contexts.

In a region characterised by small islands states, the plan provides the opportunity for Pacific nations to pool their policy and personnel resources on WPS. A position has been established in the Forum Secretariat for a Gender Advisor to provide gender analysis and coordination to the Political Governance and Security Program. Within the Forum, WPS is considered as part of the human security agenda, so the plan sits underneath the Human Security Framework. This framework provides a “common foundation and strategic guidance to Forum Island Countries, the Secretariat and other stakeholders for improving the understanding, planning and implementation of human security approaches in stand-alone and broader peace, security and development initiatives in the unique Pacific context.”⁴⁸

Civil Society

In the Pacific, WPS has momentum beyond the Forum. As is the case elsewhere in the world, the implementation of WPS has vast support from civil society. “Women in the Pacific and around the world have been using resolution 1325 as a key to open doors into negotiations, as a loud hailer to have their voices heard, as a pen to inscribe their issues onto the agenda, as a mirror to hold up to governments to remind them of policy and budget commitments, and as a lens to help

⁴⁷ PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM SECRETARIAT 2012d. Pacific Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. Suva: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

⁴⁸ PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM SECRETARIAT 2012b. The Human Security Framework for the Pacific 2012-2015. Suva: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

see security through women's eyes."⁴⁹ Key civil society organisations working on WPS in the South Pacific include FemLINKPACIFIC in Fiji, *Vois Belong Mere* and the Women For Peace Group in Solomon Islands, and the Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville.

Across the region, "women's organisations are now more widespread than in the past. These organisations for the most part remain closely linked to religious institutions."⁵⁰ Some states have established national councils of women, but some of these have been accused of taking resources from church-based groups.⁵¹ "In Fiji, peace vigils have become an important aspect of peace advocacy and have allowed women to yoke religious norms of non-violence with the secularised WPS agenda. Likewise, in Bougainville, Catholic ideals of Marian devotion, intertwined with matrilineal customary traditions, are drawn upon to legitimise women's ongoing work in upholding peace in that territory"⁵² Convened by FemLINKPACIFIC, the Pacific Regional Women, Peace and Security Media and Policy Network brings together organisations from across the region to discuss implementation and communication of UNSCR 1325. Members include the Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, Papua New Guinea; *Ma'afafine Ma'a Fafine mo e Famili and Talitha* Project in Tonga; and *Vois Belong Mere* in Solomon Islands.

Within Fiji, FemLINKPACIFIC empowers women, people with disabilities and other under-served communities. They advocate for women, peace and human security by developing appropriate media and communication materials, enhancing communities of practice, and advocating for policy changes that reflect women's reality at all levels. The focus of FemLINKPACIFIC's community media initiatives is women speaking to women for peace. "By developing and implementing a range of women's media initiatives, such as taking a small mobile radio unit out to women and the communities, FemLINKPACIFIC offers a 'safe space' to articulate and exchange their viewpoints."⁵³ FemLINKPACIFIC explicitly refer to UNSCR 1325 in much of their work and publish Women Peace and Human Security Development Reports. They are a signatory of the Pacific Regional Action Plan and focus some energy on "greater accountability of defence and security process."⁵⁴ By holding events like peace vigils in local churches, they are "developing political goals that have some resonance with the deeply

⁴⁹ FEMLINKPACIFIC 2015b. Policy brief on UN Security Council Resolution 1325. *Women Peace and Security*. Suva: FemLINKPACIFIC.

⁵⁰ BAKER, K. 2014. The Meanings of Success in Gender Quota Campaigns in the Pacific Islands Region. Australian Capital Territory: Australian National University.

⁵¹ DRAGE, J. 1995. The exception, not the rule: A comparative analysis of women's political activity in Pacific island countries. *Pacific Studies*, 18, 61-93.

⁵² GEORGE, N. 2014. Promoting Women, Peace and Security in the Pacific Islands: hot conflict/slow violence. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 68, 314-332.

⁵³ FEMLINKPACIFIC. 2000. *Who we are and what we do* [Online]. Suva: femLINKPACIFIC. Available: <http://www.femlinkpacific.org.fj/index.cfm?si=main.resources&cmd=forumview&cbegin=0&uid=menuitems&cid=5> [Accessed 1 February 2015].

⁵⁴ FEMLINKPACIFIC 2014. Women: Peace, Human Security and Development Report. Suva.

held religious convictions that are interwoven with contemporary articulations of Pacific Island culture, identity and personhood.”⁵⁵

In Solomon Islands there are more than a thousand women’s community groups, most of which have connections to churches, and almost all of them incorporate Christian traditions such as prayers at the beginning of meetings.⁵⁶ During ‘the tension’ of 1998-2003, many of these groups worked on issues relating to WPS. Indeed, *Vois Belong Mere* continues to work on conflict prevention, gender, media, and human security.⁵⁷ During the tension, women in the capital decided to pool their efforts and form the Women for Peace Group (WFPG) under the umbrella of the multi-denominational Solomon Islands National Council of Women. WFPG is a neutral body with the view that “women in their symbolic capacity as mothers of the nation should contribute constructively toward the peace process.”⁵⁸ This view has been criticised by feminist scholars, but was effective in facilitating access and involvement in peace processes.⁵⁹ Working with the international community, local militia and government forces, WFPG appeal for the laying down of arms; share women’s views on certain issues such as compensation, law and order, and security with responsible authorities; and alert foreign development partners for the needs of ongoing assistance. The group participated in ceasefire talks held on HMNZS *Te Kaha* off Honiara in August 2000, but was excluded from the Townsville peace conference of October the same year. Indeed, according to Billy, “women leaders say the achievement of the ceasefire between rival militia groups under the Townsville Peace Agreement in 2000 wouldn't have been possible without their contribution. However, they feel they've been completely ignored in successive discussions ever since.”⁶⁰

The Autonomous Region of Bougainville is an island off Papua New Guinea. Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency is a local non-government organisation, founded in 1992, during the height of the civil conflict between security forces and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. Bougainville is a matrilineal society and women were intrinsic during the peace processes. Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency provided humanitarian aid, rehabilitation, and awareness programs on peace building. They have remained actively engaged in regional WPS work since the conflict. The nature of their work evolves as required. For example, the closer Bougainville comes to a referendum on independence, the more voter education they are taking on. They run training and awareness workshops on gender and human rights, gender based

⁵⁵ GEORGE, N. 2014. Promoting Women, Peace and Security in the Pacific Islands: hot conflict/slow violence. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 68, 314-332.

⁵⁶ POLLARD, A. 2003. Women's organizations, voluntarism, and self-financing in Solomon Islands: a participant perspective. *Oceania*, 74, 44-60.

⁵⁷ PEACE PORTAL. *Vois Blong Mere* [Online]. Geneva: Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Violence. Available: <https://www.peaceportal.org/web/vois-blong-mere> [Accessed 1 February 2015].

⁵⁸ POLLARD, A. 2003. Women's organizations, voluntarism, and self-financing in Solomon Islands: a participant perspective. *Oceania*, 74, 44-60.

⁵⁹ MONSON, R. 2013. Vernacularising Political Participation: strategies of women peace-builders in Solomon Islands. *Intersections: Gender and Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific*.

⁶⁰ BILLY, A. Women's voice ignored in intervention debate. Pacific Beat, 21 July 2003. Radio Australia.

violence, male advocacy, peace building, and legal literacy.⁶¹ They also provide one of the two civil society representatives to the Forum Reference Group on WPS.

Room for support

In 2012, the Australian government announced the Pacific Women Shaping Pacific Development program, \$320 million over 10 years to improve the political, economic and social opportunities of Pacific women.⁶² The United Nations Development Program and UN Women in the Pacific also undertake programming in support of women's political and social leadership, but little sustainable support has been provided to explicit WPS programs. Accordingly, FemLINKPACIFIC recently noted that it was important to "reaffirm UNSCR 1325 as a guiding tool for enhancing women's participation for prevention – for human security, human development and human rights."⁶³

So far the recommendation to "support the implementation of the Pacific Regional Action Plan through political, diplomatic and official channels,"⁶⁴ including through the provision of delegates with suitable WPS experience to the Forum Regional Security Committee, has not been implemented. Civil society has also recommended additional support for the Gender Advisor to the Forum Political Governance and Security Program.⁶⁵ FemLINKPACIFIC recommends strengthening and supporting "regional inter-governmental organisations and CSO collaboration to review and amend regional mechanisms to promote the integration of UNSCR1325 and subsequent resolutions into regional and national security sector governance, peace and security processes."⁶⁶ This needs to include WPS training of Forum Regional Security Committee officials. Participants at the Annual Civil Society Dialogue on Women, Peace and Security also noted the importance of supporting the Forum Reference Group on WPS, particularly for a face-to-face meeting that would include civil society representatives from across the region.

"Advancing the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Pacific requires greater commitment and resourcing of the localisation of the Pacific Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security."⁶⁷ Among other things, FemLINKPACIFIC have called on the international community to facilitate the enabling environment needed to improve women and young

⁶¹ LEITANA NEHAN WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT AGENCY. 2013. *Women Weaving Bougainville Together* [Online]. Buka: Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency,. Available: <https://leitananehanwomensdevelopmentagency.wordpress.com/about/> [Accessed 1 February 2015].

⁶² AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT. 2012. *Pacific women shaping Pacific development* [Online]. Canberra: Australian Government. Available: <http://www.pacificwomen.org/> [Accessed 1 February 2015].

⁶³ FEMLINKPACIFIC 2015b. Policy brief on UN Security Council Resolution 1325. *Women Peace and Security*. Suva: FemLINKPACIFIC. P4

⁶⁴ AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM - AUSTRALIAN SECTION, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR UN WOMEN & AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY - GENDER INSTITUTE 2013. Annual Civil Society Report Card on Australia's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. Canberra. p13

⁶⁵ Ibid. p13

⁶⁶ FEMLINKPACIFIC 2015b. Policy brief on UN Security Council Resolution 1325. *Women Peace and Security*. Suva: FemLINKPACIFIC. P4

⁶⁷ Ibid. p4

women's leadership in conflict prevention and management, peacekeeping, and security policy decision making. This includes the strengthening of "women's groups, including young women and gender equality advocates' engagement with regional security and conflict prevention policy and decision making."⁶⁸ A recent report on law and justice assistance found that donors "could do more to support these informal systems and their linkages with the formal justice system, and to support intermediaries (e.g. churches, women's groups) to raise awareness among local justice providers about constitutional principles, human rights and gender equality."⁶⁹ These lessons could easily be applied to WPS, and support the "mobilization of resources to strengthen and support regional and domestic efforts by women's civil society networks working on peace and security."⁷⁰

In accordance with the US whole-of-government and regional approaches to security challenges in the Pacific, PACOM should integrate the US National Action Plan and the Pacific Regional Action Plan into all regional engagement activities. Promoting security, preventing and resolving conflicts and rebuilding societies in the Pacific requires that the "needs and capacities of the people and communities are taken into account... priorities must be defined from the community level up, particularly to prevent conflict over resources. Prevention strategies must also include investing in women's peace and security by ensuring women can inform and influence decisions which affect their lives."⁷¹ This can be achieved by incorporating WPS in ship visits with appropriate meetings with WPS groups. Regional cooperation, stabilisation and disaster relief activities could be used to reinforce WPS efforts. WPS themes and practical issues could be prioritised in joint exercises such as Talisman Sabre as well as other bilateral and multilateral exercises with military, paramilitary and police forces from the South Pacific.

CONCLUSION

The US government has identified a whole-of-government strategy for the Asia Pacific that includes the broadest possible involvement of regional counterparts. The Pacific Island Forum has identified conflict prevention as key to stabilisation in the South Pacific and has articulated its aims for human security and Women, Peace and Security through a human security framework and the Pacific Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. Stabilisation requires all elements of state power. Diplomacy, military, economic and development efforts need to be powered by values and ideals including democracy and gender equality. Those ideals drive the US National Action Plan and need to be harnessed for the implementation of Women, Peace and Security within the South Pacific. The Pacific, as is the case all over the world, requires localised solutions to security challenges, including the prevention and resolution of conflict, to ensure long term security and stability.

⁶⁸ Ibid. p4

⁶⁹ COX, M., DUITUTURAGA, E. & SCHEYE, E. 2012. Building on local strengths. *In: OFFICE OF DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS (ed.) Evaluations & Reviews*. Canberra. P viii

⁷⁰ FEMLINKPACIFIC 2015b. Policy brief on UN Security Council Resolution 1325. *Women Peace and Security*. Suva: FemLINKPACIFIC. P4

⁷¹ FEMLINKPACIFIC 2015a. Policy brief 3: conflict prevention and human security. *Women Peace and Security*. Suva: FemLINKPACIFIC.

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Susan is currently a PhD scholar at the Australian National University. Her PhD research is in International Relations and focuses on Women, Peace and Security and Australian Defence Force operations in the Pacific. Susan has a Master of Arts in International and Community Development from Deakin University, with a thesis on NGO perspectives of civil-military interaction.

She has worked with a range of non-government organisations in Australia and around the world. She is a Convenor of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Her field experience is in China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bangladesh, Tibet, and on the Thai-Burma border. Susan served in the Australian Defence Force for many years including telecommunications and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) postings. She spent several years as a civilian in the Department of Defence, working on policy and capability issues. Susan also has experience working across the whole of government on issues including the stabilisation operations, regional security and the Security Council.

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NO ANGELS! CONGOLESE WOMEN CAUGHT UP IN SEXUAL ABUSES BY UN PEACEKEEPERS, GOVERNMENT SOLDIERS AND REBELS.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CIMIC	Civil Military Coordination
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FARDC	The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
M23	The March 23 Movement
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
UN	United Nations

ABSTRACT

It has been documented that sexual exploitation and abuse continue to pervade peacekeeping missions and peacekeepers benefit from near-total impunity (Ferstman: 2013). Scores of sexual exploitation and abuse allegations have been levied against the UN troops in the DRC at the same time when FARDC (government troops) were also being implicated in widespread and horrific sexual atrocities of their own.¹ Rebel groups such as M23 have also reportedly killed and sexually abused local women. No group in uniform can therefore claim to be an angel in as far as issues of sexual exploitation and abuse in DRC are concerned. While the national army and rebel groups can be forgiven for indulging themselves in SEA due to the structural, professional and motivational handicaps, the unique nature and international status of peacekeepers and their noble mandates of protecting civilians put them on a higher moral ground with the huge expectations and trust placed on their shoulders. As a consequence, SEA cases perpetrated by blue helmets have huge ramifications for the reputation of peacekeeping initiatives and the UN, potentially impeding the organization from successfully carrying out other aspects of its mission. This paper attempts to explore why, despite seminal efforts and programmes to sensitize, monitor and prosecute the peacekeepers, there are still challenges in preventing blue helmets from conducting sexual abuses on women. Through random interviews and *in situ* observations the paper notes reasons—underpinned in social psychology, sociology and human behavioral theories—as to why blue helmets are prone to committing sexual abuses. The study focuses on a narrow sample: the blue helmets under FIB in Eastern DRC and it is purely on an exploratory level and its recommendations are not definitive. There is room for more scientific analysis to validate some of the suggestions. However, the paper does suggest other areas that need further scrutiny in addressing the problem of SEA among peacekeepers.

INTRODUCTION

Today there are 16 peacekeeping missions around the world². With the dramatic increase in United Nations peacekeeping operations, a major problem has inadvertently emerged - the sexual exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeepers on local populations in the context of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeepers have been accused of engaging in sex trafficking, soliciting prostitutes, forcing children into prostitution, and having sex with minors. In countries as diverse as Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), East Timor, Eritrea, Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, numerous examples of rape, pedophilia, prostitution, and other forms of sexual exploitation and abuse have come to light in recent decades.³ The potential for sexual abuse in peacekeeping

operations is well recognized. The Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping was quoted as saying that his operating presumption is that sexual abuse is either a problem or a potential problem in every single one of the UN missions.⁴ Several seminal United Nations (UN) studies and expert reports provide a useful blueprint of where the gaps lie, what must be done to address them, and how to do so. Zero-tolerance UN policies have focused on preventing new abuse and strengthening codes of conduct. Despite peacekeepers' enormous contributions and sacrifices for the cause of peace and security, they have increasingly been associated with sexual exploitation and abuse of the vulnerable populations they are mandated to protect. Tragically, they benefit from near total impunity. In June 2013, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on women, peace, and security in which it requests "the Secretary-General to continue and strengthen efforts to implement the policy of zero tolerance on sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel and urges concerned Member States to ensure full accountability, including prosecutions, in cases of such conduct involving their nationals."⁵

This resolution is preceded by numerous others making nearly identical requests. Seminal reports by experts have been commissioned and revised memorandums that afford the UN much stronger powers of oversight have been signed, yet years after a series of comprehensive strategies were recommended in 2006, little appears to have changed. In 2013, allegations of mass rapes⁶ allegedly perpetrated by some government troops in the DRC reportedly led the UN to review parts of its security sector support in the country. Yet at the same time, the scores of sexual exploitation and abuse allegations levied against UN troops in the DRC have remained unanswered and unpunished since the early 2000s. All in all, as highlighted above, there are numerous efforts to increase sensitization, safeguards and criminal accountability in UN peacekeeping missions. But why are those efforts not bearing fruits? Maybe they ignore underlying causes of sexual abuses. Like Italian women who, at the end of the Second World War would perform any service for a can of food,⁷ peacekeepers come into contact with women and girls who may offer sexual services in exchange of food. It has been documented that US military bases in South East Asia led to thriving sex trade around them. Therefore, it is apparent that a form of social exchange between the military personnel and civilians is apparent.

More so, in a conflict environment the precarious social structures that exist are a fertile ground for sexual abuses. Sexual misconduct has been identified by Aoi, De Coning and Thakur as one of a number of unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations.⁸ They contend that while peace operations are considered to be an indispensable instrument in the international conflict management toolbox, the post-Cold War shift of focus and modification in the role and scope of peace operations have exposed them (especially UN operations) to a new range of what they refer to as "potential unintended consequences". Sexual and gender-based violence is seen as part of a permissive environment arising from the breakdown of law and order, socio-economic infrastructure and socio-cultural norms in post-conflict societies where the natural checks and balances that would otherwise contain and manage potential negative effects are absent. This permissive environment is identified by Aoi et al as one of the unintended consequences of peacekeeping. The military installations are therefore a magnet to civilian traders who ply along the camps to sell various stuff, or women and children who come to ask for food or water and in turn willing to offer sexual services as subsistence prostitutes⁹ to the peacekeepers.

Therefore, despite all efforts which the UN undertakes before and after deployment of peacekeepers to raise awareness of zero tolerance to SEA and all forms of abuse of locals, the paper seeks to ascertain why incidences of SEA are happening as it the case in Eastern DRC? Secondly, how social dynamics/factors are responsible for fanning sexual abuses?

Thirdly, to what extent does citing of camps and duration which troops stay at a particular place encourage SEA?

Drawing on data through *in situ* observation and random interviews while serving as a UN peacekeeper under the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) of United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), it was apparent that sexual exploitation and abuse of local women by blue helmets was happening at an alarming rate. Mubambiro, Sake is a local village about 45 minutes from Goma—the provincial capital of North Kivu in Eastern DRC. It is the main operating location or base of the newly established Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). FIB is made up of 3,069 peacekeepers. FIB forms part of MONUSCO with a special mandate to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize armed groups that threaten state authority. The brigade consists of infantry battalions from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi as well as Tanzanian artillery and Special Forces Company.¹⁰

Within the same FIB camp are two more Framework units of MONUSCO: Bangladesh Military police component and an Indian contingent. Just outside this seemingly huge and semi-permanent UN installation are two FARDC units and a training base that got established recently in 2014. As such there is a huge military footprint in this small village which is surrounded partly by Lake Kivu in the south and expansive layers of volcanic rocks that are covered with light forests and shrubs. One would expect this to be a model location in terms of civil military relations with issues of SEA being just but rumours. However, the shrubs surrounding this UN installation witness continuous thriving sexual activities between peacekeepers and local women.

One peacekeeper observed:

“There are women of all types who come in those bushes (pointing to some 300 metres). You just go there with whatever you have and you can have sex right away.”

He added that male soldiers from different contingents are seen sneaking into the bushes to meet these ladies. Fed up with these degrading means of survival by their compatriots, FARDC soldiers used to carry out daylight raids into the bushes to apprehend these women and punish them. They were then paraded around the UN camp to demonstrate that they were taking action, severely punishing and later releasing them¹¹.

However, on more than one occasion, the “neighbors” (FARDC) used to complain to UN authorities that their soldiers were sleeping with their wives and they were going to kill any peacekeeper found having sex with the wife of an FARDC soldier.

Interestingly in interviewing some peacekeepers¹² who were caught outside the camp during odd hours around Sake area on how they manage to pass through various checkpoints and evade UN and FARDC Patrols to reach makeshift shebeens in the village, he said:

“There are some generous FARDC officers who give us access at night. They allow us through their checkpoints and even find women for us as long as you give them something.”

Apart from the sex in the bushes, there are numerous drinking outlets also serving as brothels around Mubambiro. In one incident a 14 year old girl was allegedly impregnated by a peacekeeper. She was working as a bartender in a bar run by her aunt.

In an interview with the chief of the locality of Mubambiro, he said that he was aware of rampant prostitution around Mubambiro and Sake Area and that he was sickened by it. The plan, according to him, was to flush out all the bad girls so that the military could work effectively and concentrate on their efforts of bringing peace to DRC. In random interviews with UN peacekeepers on why they were going out to have sex with locals, the common response was that they were out to satisfy sexual desires having been away from home for too long.

This was a bit interesting:

“We sleep with women as part of Cimic (civil military relations). This is a way of fostering good relationships with locals. We help them with juices, meat and sugars and it is gratifying knowing that we are making a difference in their lives. Eish, there is extreme suffering over here,” said one soldier

Some peacekeepers developed the habit of going outside the camp to buy assorted items, to drink and have sex with locals because others were doing it and due to availability of such drinking places and women. This led to the malpractice to continue.

Other researchers have examined the extreme and most violent forms of sexual exploitation including rape in DRC (Maria Erksson Baaz and Maria Stein 2013)¹³ drawing upon insights from the sociology of violence, warring and militarization including “rape as a weapon of war” notion. The conduct of rebels and indeed government soldiers is influenced by factors and circumstances which are too different from those of the peacekeepers. As a matter of fact, sexual abuse perpetrated by blue helmets is often subtle, exploitative and transactional in nature, though incidents of outright sexual assault perpetrated by UN peacekeepers have also been documented. There are no signs of breakdown of military command and hierarchy nor using sex to feel that one is a ‘soldier’ as some rebels may do in militarized masculinities or hyper masculinity and the notion of identity formation (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2009; Whitworth 2004). Typically, a form of social exchange is visible between peacekeepers and female clients bordering on self-interest and interdependence among other matrices (Lawler and Thye 1999).

Lead the peacekeepers not into temptation...

Two interrelated scenarios emerge which require thorough diagnosis and experiment to be validated. Firstly, can citing of UN camps be deterrence to prostitutes and vulnerable women from ever getting close thereby significantly eliminating avoidable cases of SEA?

Closer to this proposition or thinking is a recommendation given by the Office of Internal Oversight Services relating to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the Ituri Region in

DRC in which MONUC (now MONUSCO) was urged to identify and implement measures that ensure that all military compounds are adequately secured to prevent unauthorized entry and egress as well as ad hoc trading between troops and the local population.¹⁴

The case of Mubambiro, Sake provides some evidence to support this line of thinking. The small village might have had a small presence of prostitutes¹⁵ or other women before but with the establishment of a semi-permanent UN camp, there is a shack town booming. It is commonplace that prostitutes (be it subsistence or consumerist ones), pliers of the “world’s oldest trade,” have always found ready patrons among military personnel. American personnel stationed at the air base in Sattahip, Thailand, did not introduce the idea of prostitution into the region. But the brothel industry that was built near that base, in Pattaya Beach, grew into, and remains, one of the East Asian sex industry’s main centers.¹⁶ Similarly, during the period of the United Nation’s peacekeeping mission in Cambodia, from February 1992 to September 1993, the city of Phnom Penh witnessed the number of women and girls in prostitution exploded from an estimated 6,000 to 20,000, more than a 300% increase.¹⁷

Similar statistical increases exist in other peacekeeping regions, thus giving validation to the following observation by Ekberg (2004:1197): “Anywhere there is a military base, pimps, striptease, nightclub, and brothel owners see a potential market.” It was found out at Sake that girls from Goma and as far Masisi were coming to ply their trade in bars at Mubambiro. From the locality chief, it was these women who heavily rely on soldiers for food and literally anything because they do not have any means to sustain themselves. On the other hand, UN camps like those located in Rwindi (which is inside Virunga National park), Tongo (on the periphery of Virunga National Park) and Mavivi and Kamango had no reports of SEA compared to another UN Camp at Beni (a trading centre and built up area) and Sake.¹⁸ To further support this, soldiers were looking forward to going back to Beni or Sake camps to loosen up and unwind, which in one way meant having a chance to sleep with the women.

“I can’t wait to go back to Sake since life is better there. We will be able to go to Mubambiro and have fun,” said one soldier clearly implying that he would be able to find a woman to sleep with.

Therefore, the possible way out, though such a radical proposition, is to insulate the peacekeepers (especially the forces¹⁹) by ensuring that at least in the short term, the positioning of camps should be in such a way that locals are at a considerable distance from UN installations and further prevented by natural or legal obstacles like forests or high features. If UN camps can be in a restricted location for locals to settle, it can bar women and girls including prostitutes from ever erecting huts and ply their trade near them.

Secondly, can reinforcing social structures around UN installations put peacekeepers in check and empower locals so that they do not fall prey to peacekeepers and their resources?

This is no new proposals either. Office of Internal Oversight Services proposed to MONUC (now MONUSCO) to collaborate, perhaps under the auspices of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, with other non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies in Bunia area to find ways of strengthening the existing programmes to empower and

protect the vulnerable population to allow for alternative means of survival.²⁰ It is a reality that countries with precarious social structures can foster sexual exploitation and abuse. Some parts of Eastern DRC have suffered statelessness for some time and indeed government control is lacking in other parts as we speak. Against this background, legal and social structures are still in their infancy in liberated areas to effectively play the watchdog role. The local chief at Mubambiro seemed helpless to bring sanity in his own area and the military (FARDC) was seen not to be ready to assume the daunting task of bringing order in Sake-Mubambiro Area. It was difficult to establish whether it was legal wives of FARDC involved in prostitution or other forms of illicit/extra marital sex with peacekeepers and their motivations in doing so. However, what is apparent were various form of social exchange and interactions between peacekeepers and local women and girls, interactions that are not sustainable and badly affect each and every party involved as they are primarily built on self-interest. They were typically unintended consequences. As Kent has argued before, extreme poverty, lack of economic opportunity, lack of employment and the loss of family and community support networks, all account for the vulnerability of women and girls to sexual violence, exploitation and abuse in post-conflict societies, not only by local predators but also by international peacekeepers.²¹ Therefore, another way of insulating peacekeepers is to allow other groups to make available the basic needs to locals within the environs of UN installations like water, food and clothes so that they don't resort to going to peacekeepers out of destitution. This could best be done by local or international aid groups who could have an added role of monitoring and sensitizing women and girls from going to peacekeepers. It is apparent that peacekeepers have the physiological need of sex as the Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs²² would dictate. Having been away from their families, many crave for sex and may not hold themselves as infamously put by the chief commander of the UN's Cambodian peacekeeping mission when confronted by complaints about his male peacekeepers' inappropriate behavior. Commander Yasushi Akashi explained that "Boys will be boys! Eighteen-year-old hot-blooded soldiers have a right to chase young beautiful beings of the opposite sex" (Ekberg 2004: 1198; Martin 2005: 3). As such, the only remedy to the 'hot-bloodied' ones is found in the local women and girls. The peacekeeper has the resources like money and food at his disposal which the IDPs and poor women badly need for their survival. This is a recipe for abuses to happen unless one party is discouraged through provision of basic needs and employment to locals or in the case of peacekeepers made to stay or operate from locations where civilians cannot easily access and soldiers' discipline is not easily compromised.

CONCLUSION

Instances of sexual exploitation and abuse do not occur in isolation. They are part of an existing chain of problems that include poverty, political instability and abuse of power, lack of education and income opportunities for girls and young women and lack of prevention of the breaches of military discipline.²³ Therefore, any attempt to achieve zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse must address all these root causes including physically maintaining a distance between civilian settlements and UN installations. A series of recommendations to the UN on how to root out or prevent SEA amongst peacekeepers have been offered—and they keeping coming. They include extensive training and sensitizing of troops to issues of violence against women, an effective program of outreach to the local community and a data collection system to track the investigation and resolution.²⁴ The suggestion to keep a distance from locals, though radical, can be another effective remedy in containing a bulk of peacekeepers (peacekeeping forces²⁵) and

ensuring that opportunities for sexual exploitation and abuse are reduced to a minimum. That idea is no panacea, however, considering that peacekeeping has come to involve a diverse array of activities including: confidence-building measures, cease-fire monitoring, disarmament of combatants, election monitoring, and humanitarian relief distribution. Some of these activities have a bearing on determining where peacekeepers operate from with some having no option but to operate from deep in cities and close to human settlements. That is where other recommendations come in like designating and enforcing out of bounds locations for UN personnel and empowering locals around UN installations so that the power and economic disparities between locals and UN personnel are not pronounced in a manner that peacekeepers take advantage of local women and children.

¹ <http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/africa-congo-human-rights-women-crisis-violence-rape-soldiers-troops-death-lloyd-davies-DRC>

² **Peacekeeping Fact Sheet.** <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml>

³ Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning, and Ramesh Thakur, eds., *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007).

⁴ Martin, S. *Must boys be boys? Ending sexual violence and abuse in UN peacekeeping missions.* Washington, DC: Refugees International, 2005.

⁵ UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2106 of June 24, 2013.

⁶ Congo Soldiers' Shocking Stories. <http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/africa-congo-human-rights-women-crisis-violence-rape-soldiers-troops-death-lloyd-davies-DRC>. Accessed 20 December 2014

⁷ Rape is also an unfortunate constant in war. See Susan Brownmiller, *Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), 31-113. Also see Kathleen Berry, *Female Sexual Slavery* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979), p.75

⁸ Aoi, C, De Coning, C & Thakur, R. "Unintended consequences of peacekeeping". Tokyo: United Nations University Press

⁹ Transactional sex as characterized by Higate. From G Simm (2013) *Sex in Peace Operations*. Cambridge; CUP. P145

¹⁰ Wikipedia, Force intervention Brigade.

¹¹ From authors first hand observations while in Sake with FIB

¹² The nationalities of peacekeepers will not be revealed and it has to be mentioned that the subjects that were observed or interviewed belonged to different contingents within Sake camp.

¹³ Baaz M E and Stern M Sexual Violence as a weapon of war? Perceptions, prescriptions, problems in the Congo and beyond. London: Zed Books. P.64-87

¹⁴ United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (UN OIOS) 30 Jan 2007. **Report on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the Ituri region, Bunia (ID Case No. 0618-05), 30 Jan 2007** relating to United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

¹⁵ The purchase and exploitation of "prostitutes" is a dominant allegation against peacekeepers. Therefore, it is important to conceptualize prostitution as sexual exploitation and abuse

¹⁶ On Sattahip and other U.S. bases in Thailand, see Frederica M. Booge, ed., *Thailand: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 157 and 240.

¹⁷ By late 1994, the number of prostitutes increased to an estimated 25,000, according to the Women's Development Association (Enloe 2000: 99)

¹⁸ The period under review was between October 2013 and July 2014 and mainly focused on FIB troops.

¹⁹ Official UN statistics show a higher incidence of allegations reported against peacekeeping forces than that any other UN staff (United Nations. *Annual Reports*. New York, 2005, 2006, 2007).

²⁰ United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (UN OIOS) 30 Jan 2007. **Report on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the Ituri region, Bunia (ID Case No. 0618-05), 30 Jan 2007** relating to United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

²¹ V. Kent, 'Protecting civilians from UN peacekeepers and humanitarian workers: sexual exploitation and abuse', pp. 44-66, in Aoi, de Coning and Thakur, op. cit., footnote 2

²² **The original hierarchy of needs five-stage model includes:** *Biological and Physiological needs - air, food, drink, shelter, warmth, sex, sleep*

²³ United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (UN OIOS) 30 Jan 2007. **Report on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the Ituri region, Bunia (ID Case No. 0618-05), 30 Jan 2007** relating to United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

²⁴ Muna Ndulo (2009). The United Nations Responses to the Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Women and Girls by Peacekeepers during Peacekeeping Missions. P.150
Available <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=facpub>. Accessed on 23/12/14

²⁵ Official UN statistics show a higher incidence of allegations reported against peacekeeping forces than that any other UN staff (United Nations. *Annual Reports*. New York, 2005, 2006, 2007).

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REPRESENTATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY, ASPIRATION VS. APPLICATION IN THE CONDUCT OF PEACE

Submission by LTJG Kathryn Middleton

Theorists and practitioners continue to be fascinated and frustrated by the successes and failures of integrating women into the problem set of conflict resolution on a macro level, as well as the implementation and sustainment of security on a micro level. The majority of recent peace talks have taken place in non-western societies, leading to the tokenism of United Nations Resolution 1325 as the international community has grown reluctant to “hold the new leaders accountable to agreed universal standards” citing “cultural relativism”¹. In studying countries with so many intangibles, weaknesses and possible limitations, it has often been overwhelming to identify theories, results, and possible improvements. This paper will analyze the historical and present role played by women in the peace process in a western country—Northern Ireland—to cut through the ambiguity of cultural variables and consider the governing prerequisites necessary to move beyond aspiration into a reality where civil society is represented at the negotiation table.

BACKGROUND

The initial motivation for this paper came as a result of a guest lecture at Georgetown University’s Security and Development class; Shanam Anderlini, co-founder of ICAN, Senior Gender, Peace, and Security Advisor on the U.N.’s Mediation Standby Team and drafter of USCR 1325, spoke about the role of women in conflict resolution. A continued obstacle to the voice of women in conflict-inflicted countries is that, when it does come time for negotiations, women are not at the table—women are kept on the outside. When asked about the recent attempts of the U.S. to have political leaders of religiously fundamental countries, specifically Islamic countries such as Afghanistan, to involve women in greater public relations events, Shanam Anderlini stated vehemently that these women need to have their voices heard at the negotiation’s table—it did not matter whether they expressed themselves from behind a purdah or completely unveiled—what mattered was that these women had concerns for the population, the common citizen, that would otherwise go unaddressed by those male leaders concerned in playing for positions of power.

Anderlini concluded her lecture by stating, ironically, that as long as women remain non-violent and unarmed, they will continue to be slighted when it is time for negotiations. Within a statement to a United Kingdom-based newspaper, *The Guardian*, in 2010, in reaction to the U.S. recognition of UNSCR 1325 Anderlini again asserted that universally, “The way things are, as long as women are not a security threat, their concerns and interests will be sidelined...Peace processes are about cease-fires and power deals, not real peace.”²

The Northern Ireland conflict, a conflict sited as sustaining “the longest-operating terrorist organization in Western Europe”³ contains a unique historical example of a group of women who, though on opposing sides of the conflict and consistently alienated from national level politics, formed a cross-community coalition that served on the grass roots level, provided new

perspective and demands for human rights on the national level, and clamored for civil society inclusion on the international stage. It is a unique case study in Western Europe of a “Civil Conflict in an Economically Well-Developed State” and gives those with a western perspective an opportunity to study a case of unresolved conflict within a familiar cultural identity, and, thus hopefully, limit the probability of misinterpreting the motivations of the actors within the conflict.⁴

A partial list of the issues brought to the fore by this study include the following:

- The origins and history of “The Troubles”
- The rise and role of the Women’s Coalition of Northern Ireland in the Good Friday Peace Talks, along with analysis of patterns of resistance by parties on both sides of the conflict to exclude the Women’s Coalition from meaningful dialogue
- The weakening of the Women’s Coalition as a national player following the initial agreements, and the follow-on problems in long-term implementation of the agreement that arose with the demise of nonsectarian representation
- Current challenges and changes to reverse the decrease in representation, and analysis of the possible implications of applying this formula universally

In order to understand the magnitude of the role played by women in security and conflict resolution, one must first understand the players and incentives of the conflict itself.

ORIGINS OF CONFLICT

Northern Ireland’s sole limitation to prosperous security and development continues to be long standing conflict. The country is recognized by the international community for its industrial development, port locations, and contribution to the global economy, with much opportunity for continued growth; The politics of Northern Ireland has been groomed under a strong, long established method of governance tied to Great Britain but long standing internal conflict has crippled the security of its country, and limited its potential for rapid development. It is a unique case study in Western Europe of a “Civil Conflict in an Economically Well-Developed State” and gives those with a western perspective an opportunity to study a case of unresolved conflict within a familiar cultural identity, and, thus hopefully, limits the probability of misinterpreting the motivations of the actors within the conflict.⁵

Although the conflict within Northern Ireland divides along the Catholic and Protestant identities Claire Mitchell, in *Religion, Identity And Politics in Northern Ireland: Boundaries of Belonging* analyzes that although “religious identity is the key boundary marker in Northern Ireland...sometimes religious labels have no substantive religious meaning or content and are merely identity markers.”⁶ However ironic it may seem within the context of the modern conflict, in which religion seems to define so much, the early struggles for the independence of Ireland in the 18th century, were led by a Protestant, Wolfe Tone, and did not initially split along religious identity, but economic status. In the modern conflict “the religious ideas and practices overlap and interact with other differences such as ethnicity, nationalism and inequality.”⁷ The

confusing, overlapping implications of religion in Northern Ireland are expanded upon within Mitchell's selected quote:

Politics and religion are so confused in Northern Ireland ... someone who plays rugby or hockey by nature is stereotyped as a Protestant, and that is a religion, whereas someone who plays Gaelic is a Catholic, and that is a religion. Now what those two people believe is their own personal belief. But they play those sports. I suppose that comes from divided communities.

Vinny, Catholic, Co. Down, 60

Although the concepts of the Northern Ireland Conflict originated centuries previous with the British Empire's claim and asserted rule over Ireland, the modern conflict found its foothold in 1921, following two years of increased violence as Irish separatists, "republicans" fought for official recognition and independence. The guerilla attacks, as well as Protestant pro-British "loyalist" or "unionist" acts of retribution, resulted in the British formulation and signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty; or as Timothy Shanahan writes in The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Morality of Terrorism "in 1921, the Irish Republican Army fought Britain to the negotiating table"⁸ The treaty partitioned Ireland in two, ending the United Kingdom's undivided rule that had stretched from the 18th century. The twenty-six counties of southern Ireland were unified under the new Republic of Ireland, gaining the long desired goal of independence, while Britain retained control of the six northern counties.

In 1922 an anti-treaty faction responded with the announcement of a mission statement:

- 1) To safeguard the honor and maintain the independence of the Irish Republic
- 2) To protect the rights and liberties common to the people of Ireland
- 3) To place its services at the disposal of an established Republican Government which faithfully upholds these objects

IRA Constitution, 1922

The statement marked the birth of IRA and established their uncompromising intention to gain the unity and complete independence of all thirty-two counties of Ireland; an intention that has remained unfulfilled and has now made the IRA "the longest-operating terrorist organization in Western Europe."⁹ The IRA refused to recognize the Anglo-Irish treaty, and thus, did not "recognize the legitimacy of the governments of both Ireland and Northern Ireland."¹⁰ The group operated with complete autonomy, and violent conflict ensued sporadically from the 1920s to the beginning of the 1960s. The United Kingdom's contributions to and preoccupations with the two world wars stifled the vigor of the IRA cause until the 1960s, when tensions between the Catholic and Protestant populations mounted to a new level.

BREWING OF "THE TROUBLES"

In analyzing this conflict within the study of Security and Conflict resolution, one must ask what components created the atmosphere for conflict. Douglas Woodwell, author of The "Troubles" of Northern Ireland Civil Conflict in an Economically Well-Developed State, writes that during

the time period of the onset of conflict the economic inequalities between the Protestant and Catholic population of Northern Ireland were substantial, with “the differential rates in employment...such that 6.6 percent of Protestant men were jobless compared with 17.3 percent of Catholic men.”¹¹

Of possible greatest importance when analyzing the outbreak of violence is the fact that Northern Ireland: “included a dominant group of Protestants, comprising 59 percent of the population (in the 1971 census), and a subordinate group of Catholics, comprising 32 percent of the population.”¹² According to Collier’s *The Bottom Billion*: “Societies that have one group that is large enough to form a majority of the population, but where other groups are still significant--what we call “ethnic dominance”--are indeed more at risk (of conflict outbreak).”¹³ The World Development Report (WDR) of 2010 assesses that:

The combination of political and socioeconomic exclusion, especially when perceived to be government policy, can be used to support narratives of social injustice...Perceived injustice in access to political power and economic opportunities between Protestants and Catholics played a role in the Northern Ireland secessionist conflict. Actual or perceived exclusion can be a powerful motivator of violence, creating pools of hostility for rebel leaders to draw on.

WDR 2010, 83

The economic disparities and civil inequalities that plagued and divided the Northern Ireland population championed the common Irish Catholic citizen to a more radical movement for change. The concoction of unrest was created, and waiting for the final catalyst to set Northern Ireland aflame.

In 1968 the tension manifested itself in a violent dispute between civil reform demonstrators and police in Derry/Londonderry, prompting the United Kingdom to deploy security forces into Northern Ireland in August 1969. In December of that same year, internal division concerning the best path forward for the nationalist movement and civil reform caused a split and the formation of the Provisional IRA; The IRA split into two, the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA, (with the Official declaring a ceasefire in 1972).¹⁴ While the British security forces were initially hailed by the Irish Catholics as a normalizing force, a series of individual missteps, and a growing perception of the militia’s pervasive prejudice favoring the Loyalist cause, resulted in a schism and distrust between the Catholic minority and the occupying British forces.

In *Making Sense of the Troubles: The Story of the Conflict in Northern Ireland*, the authors David McKittrick and David McVea argue that:

The practical reality was that the majority of Catholics did not support the IRA, and looked to them only in times of high tension. In such times, and August 1969 was one of them, the IRA was supposed to protect areas such as the Falls and Ardoyne against attack. The consensus in the Catholic ghetto backstreets was that an effective defence force was needed, and so (the) IRA came...

McKittrick and McVea, 59-60

The incident that rallied many Irish youth to the IRA cause was British Parachute Regiment's killing of "fourteen unarmed Catholic civil rights demonstrators in Derry on 'Bloody Sunday' 30 January 1972."¹⁵ In the previously cited book *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* Cronin cites the military action taken by the British on Bloody Sunday, and the reverse unifying effect it had on the republican cause, as a failed attempt at "repression" (one of her six identified pathways to the decline of a terrorist group). She states that British actions illustrate how military "repression is a difficult ending to achieve... (that) can draw sympathy to a cause." For many, the events of Bloody Sunday marked the beginning of the thirty-year stint of ongoing unrest eventually termed "the Troubles".¹⁶

The Troubles can be categorized by a series of failed negotiations, wrong-doings on both sides, attempts at ceasefires, ends to ceasefires, divisions and distrust between the loyalist and nationalist groups, violent division within the sub sects of those two groups, hunger strikes, assassinations, knee jerk reactions from military and paramilitary forces, and acts of retaliation that resulted in a "scene of the worst political violence in Western Europe" and a conflict that "yielded a death toll of 3,281 deaths (through 1998)."¹⁷ Women wove through the tapestry of the Troubles; from witnessing the untimely deaths of their children and husbands, to the incendiary role of first female Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's in enforcing extreme repression of IRA prisoners during the 1981 Hunger Strikes, to local Belfast women desperately taking up the armed conflict themselves as members of the IRA or as Ulster police officers, "women have had a fighter role in the conflict" and when the opportunity came, would be "...involved in the conflict resolution."¹⁸

CHANGING THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT, PAVING THE WAY TO NEGOTIATIONS

In the 1990s internal and external actors, weary of the endless violence, slowly and painfully toiled to develop a political environment in which "Republican concerns were no longer going unheard and violence was no longer their only perceived means for achieving their goals."¹⁹ Up until this time, both socially and politically, the United States (U.S.) had occupied a one-sided role, holding a historically strong sympathy towards the republican cause. The essay on *The New American Connection: President George W. Bush and Northern Ireland* by John Dumbrell states that "The Congressional Ad Hoc Committee on Irish Affairs was set up in 1977 as an organization sympathetic to republican agendas within the national legislature"²⁰ and also asserts that prior to 9/11 "Sinn Fein receiving around 1 million annually in declared donations from the US."²¹ There were U.S.-based contributors, such as Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID) or the Irish Freedom Committee, who did not openly acknowledge any fundraising for the IRA, but had been suspected of such activity.²² *The New American Connection* essay also states that

“prior to the 1990s interest in the American connection to the conflict in Northern Ireland concentrated on fund-raising and support for the republican cause.”²³

In the 1990’s the U.S., under the presidential administration of Bill Clinton, moved beyond the one-sided financial contributor to become a facilitator of negotiations and diplomatic development between Great Britain, Loyalists, and Republicans. The long-standing relationships and interconnections with all sides allowed the U.S. to be an effective outside actor who could comfortably trust their understanding of the cultures in conflict, and communicate the perspectives of all involved.

According to a New York Times article from 2010:

In 1994 Mr. Mitchell, then a Democratic senator from Maine, urged President Bill Clinton — against strenuous British objections — to grant a United States visa to Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein leader. Mr. Mitchell later wrote that he believed the visa would enable Mr. Adams ‘to persuade the I.R.A. to declare a cease-fire, and permit Sinn Fein to enter into inclusive political negotiations.’

Hamas, the I.R.A. and Us, Ali Abunimah

The IRA declared a series of cease fires starting in August of 1994, which stopped and restarted over the course of three years, but held strong starting in the summer of 1997, and allowed for the political component of the IRA, Sinn Fein (translated “we ourselves”) to officially become a member of negotiations. The IRA Ceasefire pronounced that “... We (the IRA) want a permanent peace and therefore we are prepared to enhance the search for a democratic peace settlement through real and inclusive negotiations.”²⁴

RISE OF NORTHERN IRELAND WOMEN’S COALITION

With the IRA Ceasefire and the possibility of substantive negotiations, the 1996 elections for the Northern Ireland Forum became a lightning rod for those jockeying for influence at the Talks. A unique elections system was implemented, with a significant change in past elections being the allotment of 20 of the Forum’s 110 seats for division amongst the 10 parties who could rally the greatest number of votes. The mediator of the talks, former Democratic Senator and now US Special Envoy to Northern Ireland, George Mitchell, suggested the multi-party talks include not only perceived “big players” but also the top 10 parties who could garner the votes. He hoped the temporary change in election procedures would give marginalized sections of civil society a chance to be represented in the peace process, and thus, hopefully, would increase the public support and likelihood of success in implementing the agreements.

Liz O’Donnell, former Minister and representative of the Republic of Ireland during the talks stated that the 1996 system “enhanced political representation, and artificially skewed to allow for the representation of small parties”²⁵; it was an electoral system used only once, in the circumstances of impending negotiations. The policy was meant to open doors to previously established political parties, but women on both sides of the conflict saw the system as an

opportunity for a new type of party, one in which female voices could be heard on a national scale.

Prior to the Good Friday Agreement talks “women from Northern Ireland were affected by armed conflict, but largely excluded from the macro level peace process”; at the grassroots level women were vibrantly active members of community organizations, but even the equality-promoting party Sinn Finn continued to be dominated by men on the national political stage.²⁶ The Northern Ireland Women’s European Platform (NIWEP), an organization founded to provide a platform for women’s voices on both a domestic and international level, along with cross-community based programs such as the Northern Ireland Women’s Information Group, were left frustrated by their series of failures to lobby and secure an automated position for female representation at the All Party Talks.

The community-based lobbyists repeatedly ignored by their own political parties realized that no matter their efforts on the grassroots level, “There is only so much you can do at community level. Unless you are at the table, you cannot have the same clout.”²⁷ As Coalition founder Avila Kllmurray stated, even if a constitutional decision was reached, the people of Northern Ireland “would not be walking into a ‘utopian’...there needed to be a discussion on what was to be done and how to do it.”²⁸ Concerned that the Talks would focus solely on the power-play of the national question, with non-sectarian social issues of health, welfare and education easily left neglected, the women of Northern Ireland from various religious, political and professional backgrounds chose very late in the election hour to form their own cross-community party: The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC).²⁹ The coalition was formed in April, campaigned ferociously, and was named one of the top 10 parties, securing two seats that June.

The NIWC ran under the campaign “Wave goodbye to the dinosaurs”, identifying itself as a nonsectarian “coalition” whose members could continue to align themselves with their varying political beliefs, while also unifying themselves with the coalition’s cross-community principles of inclusion, equality, and human rights. Liz O’Donnell, while speaking at a panel for the Democratic Progress Institute (DPI) on The Role of Women in Conflict Resolution, reflected that the “Coalition was nonsectarian, which was hugely important while trying to heal sectarian divides. No other party had that mindset, all others came from a particular ‘tribe’, a particular legacy.”³⁰ With this bold move to establish a party with no political agenda concerning the issue of constitutional independence, NIWC became the “only political party in the world founded by women with elected representatives”, and was poised to have a voice at the long awaited talks.³¹

THE FORGING OF THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT

The multi-party track of negotiations began with both hope and skepticism in the air. The NIWC representatives, Pearl Sugar, a Protestant community activist from East Belfast, and Monica McWilliams, her Catholic co-chair from South Belfast, were not welcomed by the majority of their male counterparts. In addressing the DPI Liz O’Donnell observed that the NIWC representatives “in the world of politics were seen as a threat as they had cross party appeal” and were initially treated very poorly by those who believed that the NIWC reps, women with backgrounds in business, law, and academics rather than politics, did not deserve a place at the negotiations table.³² O’Donnell stated that “The Chairman of the talks always made time for the

Coalition to speak, but their colleagues did not treat them with respect, especially Unionist men, who took to calling them ‘silly women’.”³³ O’Donnell also expressed that she and “Mo” Mowlam, the Labor Party Talk’s representative, shared a profound respect for NIWC and quickly realized, along with the Chairman George Mitchell, that this non-partisan group, a group whose sole ambition was to embody the credo that civil society needed a voice for successful negotiations, would play a vital role in pushing the talks forward.

The NIWC played three vital roles contributing to the success of the talks, the first being their fresh perspective void of political agenda. A founding member of the Coalition, in speaking at the DPI, stated:

One of the things we found was that because we were looking with new eyes and hearing with new ears, we could pick up the shift between the views of the parties quite unlike men, who had a preconceived view of the parties and assumed they knew what each party stood for.

DPI Comparative Study, 2013

Void of political ego or skewed interpretation of political history, and embodying a genuine will to meet with all parties involved, the NIWC representatives became the literal go-between for delivering messages and forging compromise when clashing parties threatened a standoff to negotiations.

NIWC employed the techniques they had learned at the local level. For example, when on the local level NIWC “received pleas from a pregnant woman in jail who was being strip searched and was from a Sinn Fein background, (NIWC would) send a member from a Unionist background to visit her in the prison”, not her own background.³⁴ NIWC used this same strategy during the Talks when NIWC would send cross-community representatives to ease party disputes. Ironically, the NIWC’s lack of past experience in politics was what continued to drive the political decision-making forward.

The divergent perspective presented by the NIWC lead to it’s second significant contribution: once the Agreement began to take shape in earnest, NIWC put forth clear demands with the sole intent to cultivate peace. The negotiations were broken up into three Strands on which decisions needed to be defined:

- Strand One: East - West: Irish and British government relations
- Strand Two: North - South: Northern and Southern Ireland
- Strand Three: Internal: Northern Ireland.

Once broken down into these three groups, many of the parties were unwilling to submit concrete demands on paper, but the NIWC, free from the ramification of political backlash, and with diverse backgrounds including business and law, quickly capitalized on the opportunity to provide their drafts. The NIWC’s initiative resulted in much of their draft being used as the framework document that was expanded upon for each of the Strands, and many of the issues

they defined early on in the process made it into the final agreement.³⁵ According to one of NIWC's founding members, Kate Fearon:

No other party mentioned victims in any of their initial Strand One submissions (but uniquely among the parties, the NIWC suggested that any agreement should also acknowledge the hurt inflicted on all sides and the trauma existing throughout Northern Ireland, particularly among those who experienced hurt most directly and acutely, the victims.

Women's Work, Fearon

NIWC's presence and persistence insured the concerns of civil society provided demands were not absent from the Agreement. The Talks had to be about more than the constitutional issue—the Talks had to build a map to guide Northern Ireland, over time, towards sustainable conflict resolution and reasonable cross-cultural developments. The NIWC addressed issues aware of the subtle cultural nuances on each side, recognizing that issues could not solely be viewed as bargaining opportunity but had intense cultural implications.

The NIWC presented the idea of identifying possible “confidence building” measures, not demands or prerequisites that the conflicting sides could hold against each other, but optional tokens of good-will that could be built into the peace process that would aid in the healing process; especially as concerned the divisive topic of decommissioning, NIWC emphasized repeatedly that the de-arming process could not be forced by the British as a sign of surrender, or as an uncompromising demand to moving forward in the negotiations, but had to be allowed to occur organically from the Nationalist side as a sign of a growing internal trust in the peace process.

NIWC demanded the Agreement include a call for the establishment of a consultative civic forum, with the intention that the forum would provide sectors of society a formal environment in which to continue open discourse after negotiations had ended. The NIWC's most bold demand of all was that the final agreement “should be underscored by principles of inclusion, equality and human rights, and be capable of winning the allegiance of all citizens.”³⁶ This was a most bold statement to make, as those within, and those looking in, at the negotiations gravely doubted that the GFA, even if all parties signed, could win the allegiance of citizens when it came time for implementation. NIWC demanded that the Agreement receive a vote of confidence from the public prior to implementation.

NIWC played its third most pivotal role energizing a network directly connected to the people. Throughout the negotiations, the Coalition continued promoting cross-community interactions. NIWC continuing to protest for the civil rights of even those continuing to perpetuate armed conflict, while also creatively pushing those individuals to recognize the common ties of hurt and humanity on both sides of the conflict. Liz O'Donnell stated that the NIWC “had huge access to groups that the government did not have access to... women can cross the bridge from community activism into hard politics,”³⁷ and NIWC mobilized its connections to ensure their demand to “win the allegiance of all citizens” became a reality. NIWC worked to insure that the public had access to the decisions taking place. One way they did this was:

Whenever any individual or group wished to come into the building, the NIWC arranged for visitors' passes. It was an attempt to demystify the talk's process, to open up access to the place where the decisions that would directly affect the course of so many people's lives would take place.

Women's Work, Fearon

Once the Agreement was finalized, a referendum was presented for public vote. "Whereas others had become detached from the ground, women had a network,"³⁸ and the NIWC mobilized its connections to infuse both understanding of, and support for, the finalized form of the GFA. NIWC published an 'easy-to-read' version of the Agreement for distribution to the general public and spearheaded a campaign calling for "YES" to the referendum. Their grass-root actions contributed to a final vote of 71% approval in Northern Ireland and an even higher percentage approval vote in the Republic of Ireland. The ceasefire, and ensuing negotiations, opened the door for the creation of the GFA, which resulted in a possible new path of relations within Northern Ireland. According to an essay by Martin Mansergh, *The Background to the Irish Peace Process*

To many people's surprise, all the threads of decades of political initiative and agitation were brought together in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA), which contained a far-reaching constitutional accommodation, a balanced range of partnership institutions and a radical reforming agenda in areas of equality, human rights, policing and justice, with prisoners being released.

Mansergh, 39

NIWC was a key player in the creation of GFA and it's winning of public approval, but "agreements are only as good as the paper they are written on" and the difficult road of practical implementation lay ahead.³⁹ The negotiations and political policy were established, now they had to be trusted.

IMPLEMENTING THE GFA, A LACK OF TRUST IN THE PROCESS

On August 15 1998, months following the endorsement of GFA, 29 people were killed by "in Omagh by a bomb placed by dissident republican group" that called themselves the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)."⁴⁰ Although the PIRA had not been the actor, the attack illustrated a bleak outlook of an attitude of continued acceptance of violence as a means to express discontent. The British, led by Tony Blair, were making steps to indicate their intentions to uphold the GFA, by beginning to make troop reductions, and releasing IRA prisoners, including the release of those believed to be responsible for the Balcombe Street bombings. The loyalist group balked at the British showings of good will, believing that the IRA seemed "to some, (to) smack of triumphalism."⁴¹

Sinn Fein had agreed to the GFA, specifically that "the resolution of the decommissioning issue is an indispensable part of the process of negotiation"⁴² but refused to make any movement towards the decommissioning of their weapons, and without positive action towards

decommissioning, unionists and the British begrudged any further political movement forward. On August 14, 2001 The IRA had also withdrawn from its planning with the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning.⁴³

Adding to the mounting distrust in the IRA's commitment to the GFA, in August 2001, three members of the IRA were connected with training the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia) in Columbia; the decommissioning was at a stalemate and, beyond a stalemate, the implications of the IRA involvement in Columbia greatly alienated their relationship with the U.S. To quote a statement from the United Nations book on the Challenges to peace-building: "it soon (became) evident that reaching an agreement is far from enough if implementation proves to be problematic"⁴⁴ While "the IRA had theoretically agreed that a peaceful solution was the only option; their actions demonstrated that violence was still a viable option"⁴⁵. Entering into the fall of 2001, the GFA was on its way to being defined as another failed negotiation, and it seemed that acts of terrorism would continue to scar Northern Ireland's history.

GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT AS TRIUMPH

The fall of 2001 saw the implementation of the GFA at a standstill, teetering on frustrating failure, but this outlook contrasts harshly with expert analysis within the past ten years, which has marked the GFA as a negotiation success story in preventing the continuation of violence—an example to be studied and duplicated. The WRD 2010 states that:

The basic framework of the WDR focuses on what we have learned about the dynamics of action to prevent repeated cycles of violence--both in the short term and over the time needed to reach a sustained level of resilience. Experiences from...Northern Ireland...amongst others, are drawn on frequently in the Report because, while all of these areas still face challenges and risks, these societies have achieved considerable successes in preventing violence from escalating or recovering from its aftermath.

WDR 2010, 11

What changed the outcome and movement to peace? With decommissioning at a standstill, the NIWC's 2001 General Election Manifesto continued to advocate that

Opening up a number of arms dumps was an important Confidence Building Measure, but the gesture we now require is the concreting over of those dumps, demonstrating unequivocally that there is only one mandate that government Ministers are subject to, and that is the electorate. This will not happen, however, if demands for it are framed in terms of surrender - decommissioning in our view has always been a voluntary activity, and will only happen when it is allowed to be.

NIWC 2001 Westminster General Election Manifesto, 2001

NIWC continued to advocate against the zero sum policy being enforced concerning decommissioning. With their insider understanding of the cultural implications and sensitivities

surrounding decommissioning, NIWC knew the decision to no longer choose armed conflict had to come organically from within.

The NIWC ironically saw their wisdom come to fruition following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 when the IRA immediately took a series of steps to make violence no longer an option, and ensure the political process would become the engine for change. It cannot be denied that in the fall of 2001 something changed the climate of Northern Ireland to make terrorism a non-option, and make the GFA a welcome solution. On the morning of September 11, 2001 Richard Haass, President Bush's special envoy to Northern Ireland, was in Ireland, scheduled to meet with heads of Sinn Fein, and suspected former IRA members, Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness. The meeting was to discuss the involvement of the IRA in training of FARC in Columbia.⁴⁶ A report published in *The Guardian*, titled *How America held the IRA over a barrel: US threats crucial to sealing historic move* claims that on that morning "Sinn Fein was in no hurry. Adams knew that decommissioning had to come but was struggling with hard-liner members of the IRA."⁴⁷

With the attacks of 9/11, a change occurred, and according to the *Belfast Telegraph's* article *9/11 Attacks Changed Our View on Terrorism for Good* "the attack on New York proved to be a catalyst for those who wanted to reject violence, as so many did in Northern Ireland" and "the smart guys in the Irish republican movement, such as Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, swiftly understood the message of 9/11."⁴⁸ Gerry Adams was quick to assert his approval in the change in public policy and made a personal statement following the release of the October 23, 2001 IRA statement that "at a time when there is international calamity in the world, this shows that matters can be resolved through politics."⁴⁹ According to BBC's article *Why Did the IRA Decommission Now?* "September 11th had changed attitudes to international terrorism and pressure on the republican movement intensified. It is now clear many in the IRA leadership do not want to be caught on the wrong side of history"⁵⁰

On September 20, 2001 the IRA restarted engagements with the IICD. On October 22, 2001, the political arm of the IRA, Sinn Fein, for the first time in history, publicly requested that the IRA disarm.⁵¹ The next day, October 23, 2001, news headlines across the world stated that the IRA was to begin disarming. The IRA's Statement on Decommissioning read:

No one should doubt the difficulties these initiatives cause for us, our volunteers and our support base. The Political process is now on the point of collapse. Such a collapse would certainly and eventually put the overall peace process in jeopardy. There is a responsibility upon everyone seriously committed to a just peace to do our best to avoid this. Therefore, in order to save the peace process we have implemented the scheme agreed with the IICD in August. Our motivation is clear. This unprecedented move is to save the peace process and to persuade others of our genuine intentions.

IRA Statement, 23 October 2001

In July 2002, in the month marking the 30th anniversary of the bombings in Belfast famously named "Bloody Friday" the IRA made its first ever public statement of apology to the families of noncombatants that were victims of their attacks over the time period of the troubles. During the

talks, NIWC had repeatedly reiterated the need to recognize the hurt inflicted and the victims of the conflict in order for peace to take root. The willingness of the IRA to issue the statement shifted the public view dramatically. A segment of this unprecedented statement read:

While it was not our intention to injure or kill non-combatants, the reality is that on this and a number of other occasions that was the consequence of our actions. It is therefore appropriate on the anniversary of this tragic event, that we address all of the deaths and injuries of non-combatants caused by us. We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to their families. There have been fatalities amongst combatants on all sides. We also acknowledge the grief and pain of their relatives. The future will not be found in denying collective failures and mistakes or closing minds and hearts to the plight of those who have been hurt. That includes all of the victims of the conflict, combatants and non-combatants. It will not be achieved by creating a hierarchy of victims in which some are deemed more or less worthy than others. The process of conflict resolution requires the equal acknowledgement of the grief and loss of others. On this anniversary, we are endeavoring to fulfill this responsibility to those we have hurt.

IRA Statement of Apology, 16 July 2001

In 2005 two statements were issued by the IRA, the first, the IRA Statement on the Ending of the Armed Campaign on 28 July 2005, the other, the IRA Statement on the Putting Arms Beyond Use on 26 September 2005. That same September, the IICD announced that

We have observed and verified events to put beyond use very large quantities of arms which we believe include all the arms in the IRA's possession...Our new inventory is consistent with these estimates. We are satisfied that the arms decommissioning represents the totality of the IRA's arsenal."

Report of the IICD, 26 September 2005

In the case of the Northern Ireland conflict, the hard work and uphill grind of dedicated politicians in the 1990s created a political environment where peace could last and flourish, and the horrible phenomena of 9/11 caused a catharsis that motivated the peace process. The GFA has become the staple document of Northern Ireland politics, creating a change in rhetoric, from physical violence and terrorism, to policy and debate. A huge step was taken in the shift and when peace, not power, was sought for, the NIWC insured that a road map was built within the language of the GFA.

BEYOND NEGOTIATIONS, PEACE BUILDING

While the NIWC's "involvement in the negotiations not only facilitated and promoted women's participation, and demonstrated the possibility that civil society can participate in and influence formal political negotiations"⁵², their national political roots were weak, and by 2006 NIWC was disbanded as a political party. In 2013 Paula Bradley, Chairperson of the Northern Ireland Assembly All Party Group on UNSCR 1325: Women Peace and Security, stated "I find that I am penalised more for being a woman than a Protestant in the community today,"⁵³ women made

their mark during the initial negotiations, but have struggled to have a presence on the national stage in continued peace building. As recently as 2013, when a conference lead by U.S. Special Envoy to Northern Ireland was sent to discuss ongoing social issues that continue to divide communities, “only 3 women out of more than 30 participants.” The conference ended having made little headway and “peace building was still seen as an activity that primarily involves men.”⁵⁴

Both the policies in the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland, with shared roles of governing, shape the role of women in Northern Ireland. The implementation of the UNSR 1325 has been far from perfect. The United Kingdom has exclude Northern Ireland from it’s National Action Plan (NAP) for Implementation of UNSR 1325 under the formal position that the ‘Troubles’ do not fall within the definition of international law as armed conflict. While a huge setback, groups such as the Northern Ireland Assembly All Party Group on UNSCR 1325: Women Peace and Security, continue to work to receive recognition of the Troubles as armed conflict in order to garner international support for women’s continued involvement as a player in peace building. Unlike the UK’s NAP, the Republic of Ireland’s NAP recognizes the need for women to be involved in continued peace building within Northern Ireland, however, the implementation of their plan up to this point has focused primarily on the role of women as passive victim of violence in need of governmental protection.

While the implementation of Ireland’s NAP needs to be reanalyzed, the Republic of Ireland has made great strides internally concerning past flaws within their own political system: the Republic of Ireland has established a quota system for the next elections in which thirty percent of candidates must be women. This is a huge change in policy that will hopefully be mirrored by Northern Ireland in the future. Progress for women’s representation also continues to be made outside actors, such as the U.S. Special Envoy of Richard Haass and Meghan O’Sullivan, who, disappointed by the lack of female representation and the lack of headway made at the 2013 Conference, have been meeting individually with Northern Ireland’s women’s groups for input on steps for continued peace building.

The security of the state has changed, so that random acts of violence do not plague the everyday environment, and healing can begin to take root. Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair’s chief of staff, stated in 2008, in the decommissioning of the IRA, both sides made “an agreement to disagree...Unionists still want a United Kingdom, the Republicans and Social Democrats a united Ireland. What they agreed is not to pursue those ends by violence.”⁵⁵ Sinn Fein still strives for a united and independent Ireland, and although the IRA has decommissioned, there continues to be deep social and cultural divisions that entrench Northern Ireland.

Today “the peace process is about management of conflict rather than resolving conflict.”⁵⁶ The Civil Forum, created in 2000, was suspended in 2002, due to its lack of perceived effectiveness. However, during the 11-year gap smaller forums took place where various community representatives could voice their opinion on specific subjects and former members of the NIWC, along with other groups, campaigned against the ability of the government to seemingly pick-and-choose when to seek input from civil society, and in 2013 the Northern Ireland Assembly called for its reestablishment. In Belfast prejudices are reinforced by physical barriers, such as the still existent “Peace Walls” built during the Troubles at first to limit outbreaks of violence,

but now continue to divide the Protestant neighborhoods from Catholic neighborhoods.⁵⁷ The segregation is so intrinsic that in recent times there has been conflict “On the outskirts of north Belfast, over the demarcation of the graves of Protestants and Catholics... even in death there is a desire to remain uncontaminated by the presence of the ethno-sectarian ‘other’.”⁵⁸ Possibly the most debilitating to the development of tolerance is the pervasively segregated school system in which, in 2002, of the 326,056 students attending school in Northern Ireland only 14,628 (or 4%) of all students are recorded as attending an integrated school (according to a Department of Education press release in April 2002), and, as of 2008, the numbers appeared no better with “approximately 95 percent of children in Northern Ireland are educated in religiously segregated schools, approximated at 95%.”⁵⁹

Through a unique system of elections the women of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition was able to access the negotiations table and weave, among the demands of the power players, a cultural wisdom and a path to suture peace through steps that would create trust in the process. In Northern Ireland, where physical and emotional barriers continue to exist, respect and understanding will remain foreign and intangible; and changes to the outliers of radicalism and prejudice will require continued patience and courage across multiple generations on both the national and community level. The NIWC’s successful representation of civil society at the negotiating table, their ethos in the power of empathy, and their persistent push for the recognition of the innate dignity of all those involved in conflict, represent a powerful case study that must be duplicated in the future attempts at conflict resolution.

¹“ US Civil Society Working Group’s Expert Statement on the US Government’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security.” *International Civil Society Action Network*. N.p., 10 Dec. 2012. Web.

² Lederer, Edith. "Study: Women Still Kept Away from Peace Talks." <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9328771/print>. N.p., 26 Oct. 2010. Web.

³ Terrorist Organization Profile-START-National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism: Irish Republican Army. Copyright 2010-2012 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism University of Maryland <http://www.start.umd.edu/start>. Web.

⁴ Woodwell, Douglas. "The “Troubles” of Northern Ireland: Civil Conflict in an Economically Well-Developed State." *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*. By Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005. 161. Print.

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⁶ Mitchell, Claire. *Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern Ireland: Boundaries of Belonging and Belief*. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate Pub., 2006. 59. Print.

⁷ Ibid, 133.

⁸ Shanahan, Timothy. *Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Morality of Terrorism*. Edinburgh, GBR: Edinburgh University Press, 2008. p 12.

<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/georgetown/Doc?id=10277568&ppg=22>. Web.

⁹ Terrorist Organization Profile-START-National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism: Irish Republican Army. Copyright 2010-2012 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism University of Maryland <http://www.start.umd.edu/start>. Web.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Woodwell, Douglas. "The “Troubles” of Northern Ireland: Civil Conflict in an Economically Well-Developed State." *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*. By Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005. 165. Print.

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¹³ Collier, Paul. *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are failing and what can be done about It*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. 25. Print.

¹⁴ Terrorist Organization Profile-START-National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism: Irish Republican Army. Copyright 2010-2012 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism University of Maryland <http://www.start.umd.edu/start>. Web.

¹⁵ Shanahan, Timothy. "Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Morality of Terrorism." Edinburgh, GBR: Edinburgh University Press, 2008. p 13.

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¹⁷ Woodwell, Douglas. "The "Troubles" of Northern Ireland: Civil Conflict in an Economically Well-Developed State." *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*. By Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005. 165. Print.

¹⁸ "IDP: The Role of Women in Conflict Resolution Comparative Study Visit Report: Ireland, Nov 28-Dec 2 2013." <http://www.democraticprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/NorthernIrelandComparativeStudy-FINAL.pdf>. London, U.K.: DPI, 2014. N.p. Web.

¹⁹ Hueckel, Catherine. "Sinn Fein without the IRA: Legitimacy or Loss of Popular Support." *The Osprey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry*. http://http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=ojii_volumes. n.d., 6. Web.

²⁰ Dumbrell, John. "The New American Connection: President George W. Bush and Northern Ireland." *A Farewell to Arms: Beyond the Good Friday Agreement*. By Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2006. 357. Print.

²¹ Ibid, 362.

²² Duffy, Johnathan. "Rich Friends in New York." [Http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1563119.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1563119.stm). N.p., n.d. Web.

²³ Dumbrell, John. "The New American Connection: President George W. Bush and Northern Ireland." *A Farewell to Arms: Beyond the Good Friday Agreement*. By Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2006. 357. Print.

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WOMEN IN CONFLICT: ENABLING SYRIAN WOMEN IN FORMAL PEACE PROCESSES

Catherine Moore¹

Although the Syrian revolution empowered women, they have also felt the brunt of its effects, especially as the conflict extends into its fourth year. Women's needs are put off in favor of national security. Yet, the needs of women and their presence in peace negotiations are, in actuality, matters of national security. Peace agreements and negotiations work better when women are involved.² Bringing women to the table improves not only the quality of agreements reached, but enhances the chances that such agreements are implemented.³

The passage of UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) is considered to be the landmark resolution on Women, Peace and Security and recognized the link between peace and gender equality and that women's full participation in peace operations is essential to sustainable peace.⁴ Per the 2002 UNIFEM report "Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peacebuilding," 30 percent of any peace negotiation team should be

¹ Portions of this paper are adapted from a larger work in progress, provisionally titled "Inclusion to Exclusion: Women in Syria," which was presented at the Women In and At War conference at the University of Warwick (September 2014) by co-author Tarsila Talarico.

² See, e.g., Christine Chinkin, *Gender, Human Rights and Peace Agreements*, 18 OH ST. J. DISP. RES. 867 (2002) 868; United Nations, *Women, Peace and Security, Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)*, (2002) at ¶191 ("[C]entral issues of concern to women, including their participation in post-conflict political, social, civil, economic and judicial structures, do not always reach the negotiating table, in part because of the exclusion of women from the formal peace negotiations. Women not only call for issues specific to themselves but raise issues that affect society as a whole, such as land reform, access to loans and capacity-building."); Margaret E. McGuinness, *Women as Architects of Peace: Gender and The Resolutions of Armed Conflict*, 15 MI. ST. J. INT'L L. 63 (2007) 64; David Dollar et al., *Are Women Really the 'Fairer' Sex? Corruption and Women in Government*, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4, (1999) (This behavioral study on women in governance argues that women offer a more holistic approach in conflict resolution because they are grounded in a desire for peace rather than the competition that propels conflict).

³ See, e.g., *Women, Peace and Security*, supra note 2 at ¶167 ("Women's peace movements often focus on the shared social experiences of women, thus producing greater solidarity across lines of division and making it harder to cast the enemy as an ethnic and dehumanized other, which is often a tactic of wartime propaganda."); Laurel Stone, *Women Transforming Conflict: A Quantitative Analysis of Female Peacemaking*, SSRN Working Paper Series (2014) (This empirical study argues that the inclusiveness of local women during the peace negotiations has both a positive and significant impact on peace, increasing the probability of cessation of violence within a year by 24 percent. Her findings also revealed that by including gender quotas for the legislature actually establish a more durable peace over time).

⁴ United Nations Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality, *Taskforce on Women, Peace and Security*, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/history.html> (last accessed January 26, 2014).

female.⁵ Despite this quota, no women were involved in the Geneva II peace negotiations held in early 2014.⁶ Work is still needed to involve Syrian women in such formal negotiations.

Recently, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) connected Syrian and Bosnian women peace activists. This interaction highlighted the value of a comparative study that would enable women to learn from one another, especially where women have had success in participating in formal peace negotiations and peace building.⁷ This paper builds upon that initiative, providing best practices from prior instances where women were involved in the peacebuilding process that could enable Syrian women to have greater agency in the formal peace effort.

Part I of this paper will outline the role and status of women in Syria, both before and after the Arab Spring. Part II will detail what is currently happening in Syria with regard to women and the peace process and peace movement, both in formal and informal processes. Finally, Part III will provide steps that can be taken to improve the participation of women in Syria, drawing on historical successes where women have had active roles in the peace process. If implemented and supported properly, women in Syria will gain greater agency and be able to actively participate in the male dominated role of peace negotiations.

⁵ Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, *Women, War, Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace-Building*, UN WOMEN (2002), 139, <http://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2002/1/women-war-peace-the-independent-experts-assessment-on-the-impact-of-armed-conflict-on-women-and-women-s-role-in-peace-building-progress-of-the-world-s-women-2002-vol-1#sthash.UBTr0EEem.dpuf> (“Gender equality [must] be recognized in all peace processes, agreements and transitional governance structures. International, regional organizations and all participating parties involved in peace processes should advocate for gender parity, maintaining a minimum 30 per cent representation of women in peace negotiations, and ensure that women’s needs are taken into consideration and specifically addressed in all such agreements.”).

⁶ See, Dulcie Leimbach, *Syrian Women's Groups Push for Equal Role at Geneva II Talks*, PASS BLUE (December 5, 2013), <http://passblue.com/2013/12/05/syrian-womens-groups-push-for-equal-role-at-geneva-ii-talks/> (“Just a few weeks ago, Security Council passed Resolution 2122 on Women, Peace and Security, stressing the need to address the persistent implementation gap that has marred the realization of UNSCR 1325,” Yasmine Ergas, director of the new gender and public policy specialization at Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs, said in an email. “In approving Resolution 2122, the Council declared its intention to focus more attention on women’s leadership and participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. It would be astonishing if negotiations intended to begin a peacebuilding process in Syria were now to exclude or only minimally involve women. Would that not fly in the face of the Security Council’s clearly stipulated policy of inclusion?”)

⁷ *Innovative WILPF Conference Gathers Syrian and Bosnian Women's Rights Activists*, WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM (Feb. 21, 2014), <http://www.wilpfinternational.org/innovative-wilpf-conference-gathers-syrian-and-bosnian-womens-rights-activists-2/> (“As one of the Syrian participants concluded, ‘it is the first time anybody outside Syria has understood the processes and challenges I am going through, and I feel their connection and support. The Bosnian women are proof that life continues in one way or the other after the horrors of conflict and we need to continue to build on these experiences.’”)

I. THE ROLE AND STATUS OF WOMEN IN SYRIA

a. Pre-Arab Spring

Syrian women obtained the right to vote in 1949 and, subsequently, the right to stand for election in 1953.⁸ Despite their increasing access to higher education and paid employment,⁹ women remain significantly under-represented in public and political life. Although Syria ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 2003,¹⁰ the CEDAW Committee expressed concern at the continuing low levels of representation of women in 2007.¹¹ Despite the Syrian government commitments to raise the representation of women in decision-making positions to 30 percent,¹² no viable measures have actually been undertaken to implement this objective.¹³ In 2005, the participation of women in the Syrian Parliament was only 12 percent and only 4.2 percent in local administrative councils.¹⁴

In addition, numerous laws that discriminate against women remain in force. In 2007, the CEDAW Committee called on national authorities to “give high priority to its law reform process and to modify or repeal...[such] discriminatory legislation, including discriminatory provisions in its Personal Status Act, Penal Code and Nationality Act.”¹⁵

⁸ International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), *Women and the Arab Spring: Taking Their Place?* (2013) 57, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201206/20120608ATT46510/20120608ATT46510EN.pdf>

⁹ Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Initial report of States Parties – Syria, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SYR/1 (August 29, 2005) 11 (Section IV of the Employment Act No. 91 of 1959 is devoted entirely to women’s employment and prohibits the employment of women at night and in jobs that are detrimental to health, morally damaging or physically demanding.)

¹⁰ Human Rights Watch, *We are Still Here Women on the Front Lines of Syria’s Conflicts* (2014) 41, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syriawrd0714_web_1.pdf

¹¹ Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SYR/CO/1 (June 11, 2007) ¶25 (“While appreciating the State party’s goal of 30 per cent women in decision-making levels in both the Ninth and Tenth Five-Year Plans, the Committee is concerned about the lack of measures adopted towards the realization of this goal and the continuing low levels of representation of women in public and political life and in decision-making positions, particularly in municipal, town and village councils.”).

¹² Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Initial report of States Parties – Syria, *supra* note 9 at 11 (The Ninth Five-year Plan (2001-2005) contains the provisions devoted to women, including, strengthening the participation of women in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government and ensuring gender equality and empowering women to exercise their rights and assume their obligations. It set 30% as the minimum participation rate of women in the government).

¹³ Concluding comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Syrian Arab Republic, *supra* note 9 at ¶25.

¹⁴ Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Initial report of States Parties – Syria, *supra* note 9 at 12.

¹⁵ FIDH, *supra* note 8 at 59.

The only legal women's organization operating in Syria is the General Women's Union of Syria (GWU), established by the government. The GWU follows the mandate from Bashar al-Assad's party, the Ba'ath party; its officials are appointed and promoted from within the party hierarchy and GWU receives financial support from the government.¹⁶ Per the Ba'ath party, the GWU represents *all* Syrian women, regardless of actual political affiliation.¹⁷ All other women's groups operate illegally and are prohibited from receiving foreign funding due to local laws that prohibit donor grants from abroad. As a result, unregistered groups find it difficult to attract members, funding, and participants for their activities.¹⁸ Despite these obstacles, many Syrian women have played important roles in the fight for democracy and human rights, including as leaders of such movements, and some have been prosecuted and imprisoned as a result.¹⁹

b. Arab Spring Movement and Current Conflict Situation

With the Arab Spring, women across the Middle East, including Syria, gained a voice and played a prominent role.²⁰ Women in Syria actively participated in grassroots movements, where many have risked their lives to be heard.²¹ Since the very outbreak of

¹⁶ Syria, *Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Citizenship and Justice* (2010) 6, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Syria.pdf

¹⁷ *Id.* (emphasis added)

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ FIDH, *supra* note 8 at 57.

²⁰ See, e.g., Carol Giacomo, *Women Fight to Define the Arab Spring*, N.Y. TIMES (November 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/opinion/sunday/women-fight-to-define-the-arab-spring.html?_r=1&; *Opening Doors*

Gender Equality and Development in the Middle East and North Africa, WORLD BANK (2013), <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/12552/751810PUB0EPI002060130Opening0doors.pdf?sequence=1#page=135>; Soumaya Ghannoushi, *Rebellion: Smashing stereotypes of Arab women*, AL JAZEERA (April 25, 2011), <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/04/201142412303319807.html>.

²¹ Human Rights Watch, *Syria: Detention and Abuse of Female Activists* (June 24, 2013), <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/24/syria-detention-and-abuse-female-activists> ("Syrian military and pro-government forces known as *shabiha* have arbitrarily detained female opposition activists as well as female relatives and neighbors of pro-opposition activists and fighters, and in a number of cases, subjected them to torture and sexual abuse...Beyond the daily gun battles, women have been a powerful voice in the opposition in villages and towns across Syria. In response, the Syrian government is punishing women for delivering humanitarian assistance, participating in protests, and supporting the opposition by subjecting them to detention, torture, and sexual assault."); See also, *We are Still Here* "Women on the Front Lines of Syria's Conflict," *supra* note 10 at 8, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syriawrd0714_web_1.pdf ("Aleppo University became a hub for protests in the spring of 2011 and Hala...quickly joined. She and three friends created paintings and caricatures for leaflets and posters distributed at Friday demonstrations.... Security force members began calling Hala: "They said, 'We are watching you. We know you are still going to demonstrations. We can arrest you at any time.'" They threatened to arrest her mother and brother and kill her father in detention. They searched her home repeatedly and confiscated her computer, hard disks, and documents."); *We are Still Here* "Women on the Front Lines of Syria's Conflict," *supra* note 10 at 10 ("As one of four "Brides of Peace," on November 21, 2012, Kinda...marched with her sister and two female friends wearing homemade white wedding dresses...They carried signs saying, "Syria is for all of us," "We declare an end to military action in Syria," and "You are tired, we are tired, we need another solution." Thirty minutes into the demonstration, security forces arrested all four girls...They were taken to Military Intelligence Branch 235...where a male officer interrogated each

protests for democratic reforms, women were on the frontline, organizing demonstrations, strikes and all-women marches in solidarity with victims, calling for the release of family members and an end to state violence.²² The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights has reported that approximately 150 Kurdish women in Aleppo have set up the first female battalion, calling themselves the “Martyr Rokan Battalion.”²³ Furthermore, women often assist with transporting weapons and supplies for opposition forces, since typically they are not searched at checkpoints.²⁴ Male and female protesters alike have been arrested and detained by security forces.²⁵ As explained by Nada Darwazeh, from the UN Human Rights Middle East Office, “The Arab uprising has at long last empowered women to claim a larger presence and role in the public arena, which is something revolutionary, and somehow contrary to decades of gender stereotyping.”²⁶

Despite this newfound empowerment, one key tool used by the Assad regime to revoke this role is rape. It is a significant and disturbing feature of the Syrian civil war, which makes women one of the many victims of the conflict and hinders their involvement in any peace movement.²⁷ Many women and girls relayed accounts of being attacked in public or in their homes, primarily by armed men who are a part of the Assad regime.²⁸

woman individually. “He [the officer interrogating her] spit on me...He searched all over my body. He wanted to touch me, not search me,” Kinda said. At 2:30 in the morning, after nearly 12 hours, the officer took Kinda and her friends to the office of a captain. “When we entered [the captain] started to shout the worst words I have ever heard: ‘Now I have four whores to entertain myself tonight.’”

²² FIDH, *supra* note 8 at 54-55 (“In demonstrations in the universities, women protest side by side with men. In the streets of Damascus, women gather in the centre of processions and men surround them to protect them. In villages, men start the marches and women follow. When the security forces arrive to make arrests, women intervene to prevent them. When the security situation prevents women from participating in street demonstrations, women organize meetings inside their homes. They use social networks and online videos to let the outside world know what is happening.”).

²³ Agence France-Press, *Syria Kurd women set up Battalion: NGO*, GLOBALPOST (Feb. 23, 2013), <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130223/syria-kurd-women-set-battalion-ngo> (“Women are fighting on all the fronts now, though it's possibly the Islamist rebel ranks that have the fewest women taking part in them,” the Observatory's Abdel Rahman said.”)

²⁴ *Id.* (“A female activist in the coastal province of Latakia told AFP via the Internet that women often transport weapons and supplies for rebels as they are less likely to be searched at army and security checkpoints.”)

²⁵ FIDH, *supra* note 8 at 54.

²⁶ *Women and the Arab spring: an ongoing struggle for equal rights*, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (March 22, 2013), <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/WomenandtheArabspringanongoingstruggleforequalrights.aspx>

²⁷ Lauren Wolfe, *Syria Has a Massive Rape Crisis*, WOMEN’S MEDIA CENTER (Apr. 3, 2013), <http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/blog/entry/syria-has-a-massive-rape-crisis> (“Eighty percent of [the] reports include female victims, with ages ranging from 7 to 46. Of those women, 85 percent reported rape; 10 percent include sexual assault without penetration; and 10 percent include detention that appears to have been for the purposes of sexualized violence or enslavement for a period of longer than 24 hours...Gang rape allegedly occurred in 40 percent of the reports about women.”)

²⁸ *Id.* (“Government perpetrators have allegedly committed the majority of the attacks we’ve been able to track: 60 percent of the attacks against men and women are reportedly by government forces, with another 17 percent carried out by government and *shabiha* (plainclothes militia) forces together. When it

These rapes, sometimes by multiple perpetrators, often occur in front of family members. Additionally, any woman who is taken into police custody for protesting is suspected to be a victim of either rape or sexual abuse, even if she was not actually a victim. These women are also labeled prostitutes, an insult which stigmatizes them and separates them from the rest of society.²⁹

This endemic use of rape is not limited to Syrian government forces. In the Syrian territory under the Islamic State (IS) control, the violence towards women is barbaric.³⁰ To the men of IS, women are an inferior race, to be enjoyed for sex and later discarded. Older women are sold off as slaves, while the younger ones are kept as brides.³¹ Child brides are commonplace.³² In the Iraqi territory that IS has control over, women have been found naked, tied to trees, appear to have been repeatedly raped by IS fighters,³³ and even executed as a result of speaking out against IS.³⁴

comes to the rape of women, government forces have allegedly carried out 54 percent these attacks; *shabiha* have allegedly perpetrated 20 percent; government and *shabiha* working together 6 percent.”)

²⁹ FIDH, *supra* note 8 at 56 (“In detention centres, women who participated in protests are insulted and labelled prostitutes. Traditionally it is considered shameful for a woman to even enter a police station, it’s even worse if she is arrested or spends time in detention. People suspect that women are sexually abused in these places. Hardly anyone makes complaints about such crimes or even talks about it. If it is known that a woman has been raped, nobody will want to marry her.”).

³⁰ Haleh Esfandiari, *ISIS’s Cruelty Toward Women Gets Scant Attention*, WALL ST. J. (Sep 2, 2014), <http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/09/02/isiss-cruelty-toward-women-gets-scant-attention/> (“To the men of ISIS, women are an inferior race, to be enjoyed for sex and be discarded, or to be sold off as slaves.”)

³¹ *Id.* (“When ISIS moved into Iraq, a similar set of atrocities followed. In ISIS-conquered towns, reports of women and girls having to undergo female genital mutilation spread like wildfire, until denied by ISIS’s savvy social media. Iraqi NGOs reported that scores of women of the Yezidi sect—an amalgam of Zoroastrianism and Islam—were taken captive. The older women were sold off as slaves and the young ones were kept as brides for the ISIS fighters. The nature of these forced marriages remains obscure.”)

³² *Id.* (“From ISIS-captured territory in Syria, we saw a photograph of a line of women, covered from head to toe and tied to one another by a rope, as they were being led to a makeshift slave market. Little girls, who were going to school and playing with dolls before [IS] fighters arrived at their doorstep, were married off to men many times their age.”)

³³ *Id.* (“[a] naked woman, tied to a tree, who had been repeatedly raped by ISIS fighters. In another village, another woman was discovered, similarly naked, tied down and repeatedly raped. The fighters, it appears, are “rewarded” by being allowed to have their way with captured women.”); *See also*, Azam Ahmedaug, *In Retaking of Iraqi Dam, Evidence of American Impact*, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/world/middleeast/in-retaking-of-iraqi-dam-evidence-of-american-impact.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%7B%22%22%3A%22RI%3A7%22%7D&_r=1 (“Muhammad Karim, one of the soldiers, said that when they arrived at the first abandoned militant checkpoint, they discovered a woman, naked and bound, who had been repeatedly raped. Farther into the neighborhood, the Iraqi forces discovered another woman in the same state.”)

³⁴ Nick Cumming-Bruce, *Women’s Rights Activist Executed by ISIS in Iraq*, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/26/world/middleeast/womens-rights-activist-executed-by-islamic-state-in-iraq.html?_r=0 (“An Iraqi lawyer known for her work promoting women’s rights has been killed by Islamic State fighters...continuing a pattern of attacks on professional women...Sameera Salih Ali al-Nuaimy, was seized from her home by Islamic State fighters last week and tortured for several days before a masked firing squad executed her in public on Monday...Ms. Nuaimy had posted comments on her Facebook page condemning the “barbaric” bombing and destroying of mosques and shrines in Mosul, a

Despite the violence and destruction across Syria, women are putting their lives in harm's way to participate in peaceful protests and demonstrations and are working towards peace in Syria.

II. WOMEN IN SYRIAN PEACEBUILDING AND PEACEMAKING

1. Lack of Women in Formal Peace Negotiations

Despite the best efforts of international NGOs, UN Women, and Syrian women themselves, there has been no meaningful role created for women to participate in the formal peace negotiations, which have, thus far, been the only real negotiations.³⁵ Similarly, the Syrian civil society itself have had no opportunity to make their voices heard in the process, despite the lobbying of Syrian civil society actors (including women), international NGOs, and the UN, including UN Women.³⁶ For example, in November 2013, the Syrian Ministry of Social Affairs organized a workshop to discuss the role of women in the peace building and reconstruction processes in Syria. Although the workshop was designed within the framework of UNSCR 1325 (2000) and was subsequently followed by a conference in January 2014, it failed to include prominent Syrian women from civil society.³⁷

In early January 2014, prior to the Geneva II talks, UN Women organized a forum in Geneva for 50 Syrian women, part of UN Women's efforts to include more women in the peace process and negotiations "and to create spaces to hear and advance women's voices and perspectives in peace efforts, consistent with Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 2122 and the Geneva Communiqué I."³⁸ These women, many of whom have been activists for peace in Syria since the outbreak of hostilities, met and discussed issues

northern Iraqi city, by the Islamic State, the militant group also known as ISIS or ISIL. She was convicted of apostasy by a "so-called court.")

³⁵ Dulcie Leimbach, *Syrian Women's Groups Push for Equal Role at Geneva II Talks*, PassBlue: Covering the UN (December 5, 2013), <http://passblue.com/2013/12/05/syrian-womens-groups-push-for-equal-role-at-geneva-ii-talks/> ("Just a few weeks ago, Security Council passed Resolution 2122 on Women, Peace and Security, stressing the need to address the persistent implementation gap that has marred the realization of UNSCR 1325," Yasmine Ergas, director of the new gender and public policy specialization at Columbia's School of International and Public Affairs, said in an email. "In approving Resolution 2122, the Council declared its intention to focus more attention on women's leadership and participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. It would be astonishing if negotiations intended to begin a peacebuilding process in Syria were now to exclude or only minimally involve women. Would that not fly in the face of the Security Council's clearly stipulated policy of inclusion?")

³⁶ Interview with Rajaa Altalli, Co-Founder and Public Relations Director of the Center for Civil Society and Democracy in Syria (August 9, 2014) (on file with authors)

³⁷ Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Syria, UN CEDAW/C/SYR/CO/2 (Advance Unedited Version) (July 18, 2014) ¶13

³⁸ UN Women, *Press release: Conference of Syrian women, convened by UN Women and the Netherlands, ends with strong recommendations for upcoming peace talks* (Jan. 13, 2014), <http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2014/1/press-release-on-syrian-women-meeting#sthash.theXFYA.dpuf>

related to peace and security in their country.³⁹ Out of this forum came the Syrian Women's Initiative for Peace and Democracy (SWIPD). The SWIPD Outcome Document details a comprehensive approach to the peace process.⁴⁰ Among other demands, the SWIPD called for "an immediate ceasefire as a first step towards the permanent cessation of military operations," to be negotiated and bolstered through various levels of society and "with the robust participation of Syrian civil society."⁴¹ Furthermore, the group called upon the UN Security Council to continue to support the UN Arab League Joint Mission and deploy peacekeepers and observers.⁴²

Women often take a more gendered approach to the peace process, ensuring to take into account the issues that affect the most vulnerable of the population. This Outcome Document is no different. It calls for the cessation of gender-based violence, the adoption of "gender-sensitive policies and protect women and girls against sexual exploitation, early marriage, human trafficking and rape,"⁴³ and gender equality when ensuring refugees and IDPs the right to return.⁴⁴ Their demands also extended to fundamental institutional issues that existed before the Arab Spring, primarily discrimination against women and gender equality.⁴⁵

Finally, specific demands were made related to the participation of Syrian women in the peace process and negotiations, including asking the UN to place "pressure on the international community and on the negotiating parties to guarantee the effective participation of women on all negotiating teams and committees in a proportion of no less

³⁹ *Id.* ("We cannot remain silent regarding events in Syria, such as daily death, massive destruction, starvation, displacement of hundreds of thousands of families (in Syria and abroad); and the spread of terror, violence, ongoing detentions, acts of kidnapping, destruction of infrastructure and the spread of disease, particularly among children," said Sabah Alhallak.").

⁴⁰ *Outcome Document*, SYRIAN WOMEN'S INITIATIVE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY (2014), <http://www.unwomen.org/~media/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/News/Stories/Final-outcome-ENG%20pdf.pdf> [hereinafter *Outcome Document*]

⁴¹ *Outcome Document*, *supra* note 40 at Priorities as related to ending the fighting, promoting the peace process and improving the humanitarian situation, ¶3

⁴² *Id.* at ¶4.

⁴³ *Id.* at ¶5.

⁴⁴ *Id.* at ¶8; *See also*, *Outcome Document*, *supra* note 40 at Priorities as related to ending the fighting, promoting the peace process and improving the humanitarian situation, ¶9 ("Put an immediate end to the recruitment of child soldiers as per UN Security Council resolutions 1261, 1612, and 1882. Immediately establish a national education program that suspends all ideological curricula and which adopts modern unified curricula that respect human rights, the equality of citizens regardless of gender, and which addresses the issue of children who have been unable to attend school"); *Outcome Document*, *supra* note 40 at Priorities as related to ending the fighting, promoting the peace process and improving the humanitarian situation, ¶14 ("Restructure and reform security and police institutions in line with international norms of human rights and gender sensitivity.").

⁴⁵ *See*, *Outcome Document*, *supra* note 40 at Demands on the Negotiation Process, ¶5 ("Demand that the constitution guarantees the equality of women and men and penalizes all forms of discrimination and violence against women."); *Outcome Document*, *supra* note 40 at Demands on the Negotiation Process, ¶6 ("Demand a constitution that guarantees the rights of equal citizenship to the Syrian people in all their diversity and affiliations.")

than 30% for the duration of the negotiation process.”⁴⁶ The demands detailed in this section of the Outcome Document make clear the desire for Syrian women to be directly involved in formal peace processes. They have demanded that female representatives from both women’s rights and civil society organizations be allowed to observe and participate in meaningful ways in the Geneva II negotiations,⁴⁷ as well as in the “formation of the transitional governing body, the constitutional drafting committee, the drafting of the election law, mechanisms of transitional justice, the local administration and local committees for civil peace.”⁴⁸

At a special closed session of the UN Security Council, three Syrian women activists and civil society leaders were able to brief the 15 members on the situation in Syria and demanded that women be included in any peace talks and the eventual transitional processes.⁴⁹ PeaceWomen, founded by WILPF in 2000 to ensure that women’s rights and participation in peace processes is made a priority, made this session possible. It was co-sponsored by the United Kingdom and Luxembourg, indicative that some in the international community recognize the importance of female involvement in the peace process.⁵⁰

In July 2014, the CEDAW Committee issued their conclusions from the second periodic report of Syria. In its conclusions, the Committee recognized the role that women should play in the peace process. It called upon Syria to “give due consideration to General Recommendation No. 30 (2013) on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations by setting up a special coordination mechanism with all relevant State institutions at all levels...including international stakeholders currently supporting the State party on its path towards a comprehensive and lasting peace.”⁵¹ This recommendation, unfortunately, came after the Geneva II peace talks.

Women are still viewed as second-class citizens by many, a nod to their pre-Arab Spring status. According to Hibaaq Osman, an activist who has been advocating for Syrian women to take their rightful place at the negotiating table, “men see [women] as the tablecloth...the future of Syria should not exclusively be decided by those who carry guns.”⁵² However, their exclusion has not deterred Syrian women, especially those

⁴⁶ *Outcome Document*, *supra* note 40 at Demands related to the participation of women in the peace process, ¶1.

⁴⁷ *Id.* at ¶2.

⁴⁸ *Id.* at ¶3.

⁴⁹ Maria Butler, *UN Peace Talks on Syria Collectively Failed Women*, PASS BLUE (Feb. 10, 2014) <http://passblue.com/2014/02/10/un-peace-talks-on-syria-collectively-failed-women/> (“We want peace and we want to be part of it — this is the bottom line,” said a representative of the Syrian Women’s League.”)

⁵⁰ *Id.*

⁵¹ Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Syria, *supra* note 37 at ¶5; *See also*, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations, UN CEDAW/C/GC/30 (Advance Unedited Version) (Oct. 18, 2013).

⁵² Medea Benjamin, *No Seat for Syrian Women at the Peace Talks*, HUFF. POST (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/medea-benjamin/no-seat-for-syrian-women-_b_4645000.html

forming SWIPD.⁵³ Although SWIPD did not have a seat at the negotiation table during Geneva II, the group continues to organize and lobby key decision makers to support their participation in future peace talks.⁵⁴

2. Women Find their Voice in Informal, Grassroots and Advocacy Activities

The Center for Civil Society and Democracy in Syria (CCSDS) aims to strengthen the capacity of civil society, with a particular focus on women. This covers a wide range of women, including Syria's ethnic and religious diversity (i.e. Kurdish, Arab, Sunni, Alawite, Christian, Druz, etc.). Through capacity building, these groups increase their ability to participate in national-level peace and transition processes. This capacity building takes various forms, including trainings on topics such as transparency, civic leadership, and transitional justice. Furthermore, CCSDS works to connect grassroots peace groups and peace building resources to both formal and informal peace movements. However, most work is done via informal pathways through the creation of feedback mechanisms, lobbying, and advocacy efforts.⁵⁵

CCSDS trainings typically take place outside of Syria for security purposes. Upon returning to Syria, each participant commits to establishing a peace circle in her local community, which means identifying 8-10 women in their local area who are likely to have an interest in advocacy related to peace building and/or women's inclusion in the political transition. Once the women are identified, those trained individuals lead workshops with their peace circles and introduce techniques on how to develop an effective advocacy strategy—replicating sessions of the trainings they participated in earlier. The peace circles then identify a priority issue and create a strategy for advocacy, working to advance these objectives and change the situation around them with an eye towards peace and conflict resolution.⁵⁶

From July to September 2013, Inclusive Society and CCSDS surveyed 110 women activists living and working inside Syria to document their views on international efforts to broker peace and the perceived barriers to women's full and meaningful participation.⁵⁷ Ninety-one percent responded that civil society should be included in the

⁵³ Syrian Women's Initiative for Peace and Democracy (S.W.I.P.D), www.swipad.org ("We are Syrian women of diverse backgrounds and positions, and we represent a broad range of women's and civil society organizations. We have come together to prepare this set of demands and priorities based on our first-hand experience of the suffering of the Syrian people, which has become intolerable. We share the hopes of the Syrian people that the Geneva II conference will be a serious step towards ending the violence and bloodshed in Syria. We believe that the Geneva I Communique provides a foundation to end all forms of tyranny and to initiate the transition to a civil, democratic, pluralistic, and United States.")

⁵⁴ Rajaa Altalli, *supra* note 36.


⁵⁵ Rajaa Altalli, *supra* note 36 (CCSDS' The Women for the Future of Syria program, organized by CCSDS, is one which female civil society activists build their leadership skills through trainings and networking. Syrian women are empowered through training, consultation and mentoring to take leadership roles as grassroots civil society leaders in their communities, participating in public life actively.)

⁵⁶ *Id.*

⁵⁷ Kristen Williams, *Perspectives on the Peace Process: A Survey of Syrian Women*, The Institute for Inclusive Security and the Center for Civil Society and Democracy in Syria (Jan. 21, 2014) 1,

efforts to end the conflict and negotiate a political transition and, furthermore, 93 percent of respondents stated that women should be included in these efforts.⁵⁸ Notably, it is important to have the “right women [and] not *just* women in order to say there are Syrian women in negotiations,” as one respondent aptly pointed out.⁵⁹ Women have played a crucial role in the revolution, in humanitarian efforts, attempting to build peace and democracy, and, perhaps most importantly, “women have been ‘standing side by side’ with men and are ‘the most damaged’ by the violence.”⁶⁰

Unfortunately, these very same respondents have pointed out that often they are not given access to information about the international efforts to bring peace and democracy to Syria.⁶¹ Most only hear about these efforts through the state-run media, international media, or announcements made by the opposition forces. Any news that women do hear often contains either contradictory or conflicting information.⁶² Only 5 percent of the respondents have actually engaged with international actors and even their responses revealed that barriers exist in delivering reliable information, including a clear lack of strategy to debrief local activists on efforts at the international level.⁶³



SOURCE: *Perspectives on the Peace Process*, *supra* note 60 at 6

http://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/SyrianMemoFinal_Web.pdf [Hereinafter *Perspectives on the Peace Process*]

⁵⁸ *Id.* at 2

⁵⁹ *Id.* at 2 [emphasis added]

⁶⁰ *Id.* at 2

⁶¹ *Id.* at 4 (“Of 110 women surveyed, only 37 said that they have suitable access to information about international-level efforts to end the war and transition to a democratic state in Syria (including the upcoming Geneva II talks). Another 19 women responded with qualified answers that indicate they have partial access to information.”)

⁶² *Id.* at 4

⁶³ *Id.* at 4-5

Despite the lack of coordination and participation of women at the international level, survey data indicates that women are involving themselves at the local level in Syria. The majority of those surveyed are active in mobilizing civil society actors, working in advocacy efforts with parties to the conflict, striving to create peace and security in their local area, and using social media and other media outlets to drive awareness. Although women at the outset of the Arab Spring were involved primarily in nonviolent protests, the lack of participation or use of this method to promote peace is quite telling. As violence has escalated on both sides of the conflict, the use of such protests has decreased due to the increase in security concerns.⁶⁴

As discussed, a woman's role in Syria has increased dramatically with the Arab Spring, yet is still restricted when it comes to actively participating in the key decision making processes that determine the future of their country. By relying on best practices learned from the successful participation of women in peace processes during other conflicts, participation of Syrian women in the peace process can be pushed even further.

III. THE WAY FORWARD BY LOOKING BACK – ENABLING SYRIAN WOMEN THROUGH LESSONS LEARNED

Continuous support is needed to actively involve women in the peace process in Syria. Without local and international support, Syrian women will never be able to fully participate in the peace negotiations.⁶⁵ For example, Frans Timmermans, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, was one of the key organizers of the Geneva conference in January 2014.⁶⁶ He and many others understand the necessity of including women in formal peace processes and continuing to advocate this position will eventually result in their inclusion. In Guatemala, for example, women and a female perspective were included as a direct result of someone pushing for their involvement in the peace process.

⁶⁴ Liz Sly, *Peaceful protest leader in Syria disappears; Islamist rebels suspected of role*, WASH. POST (December 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/peaceful-protest-leader-in-syria-disappears-islamist-rebels-suspected-of-role/2013/12/10/8d1e3364-61d0-11e3-a7b4-4a75ebc432ab_story.html (“Scores of the activists who helped shape the initial uprising against President Bashar al-Assad’s rule have been detained by extremists in rebel-held areas in recent months, exposing the gulf that has emerged between those advocating democratic reforms and the Islamist radicals who have eclipsed them. Most have disappeared in the north of the country, where the al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has gained ascendancy over more moderate rebel units.”); Joseph Daher, *Razan Zaitouneh and her comrades: spirit of the Syrian revolution kidnapped*, OPEN DEMOCRACY (May 29, 2014), <https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/joseph-daher/razan-zaitouneh-and-her-comrades-spirit-of-syrian-revolution-kidnapped> (Four human rights lawyers/activists have been missing since December 2013 after receiving threats for documenting human rights violations.)

⁶⁵ *Women, Peace and Security*, *supra* note 2 at ¶194 (“Women and adolescent girls who have traditionally been excluded from decision-making and peace processes can become more actively involved if they receive support from local and international actors.”)

⁶⁶ *Press release: Conference of Syrian women, convened by UN Women and the Netherlands, ends with strong recommendations for upcoming peace talks*, UN WOMEN (Jan. 13, 2014), <http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2014/1/press-release-on-syrian-women-meeting#sthash.theKXFYA.dpuf> (“Women have a crucial role in implementing a future peace agreement. That is why their voice matters.”)

Although only two women were included in the negotiating teams of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit and the Government of Guatemala, women participated via the women's sector within the Assembly of Civil Society, which had regular communication with all peace talk participants.⁶⁷ The inclusion of gender equality provisions in the final peace agreement,⁶⁸ despite the low percentage of representation at the peace negotiations, is attributable to the ability to exchange information between women's groups and the formal peace negotiators⁶⁹ as well as the support by the mediator of the negotiations, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guatemala, Jean Arnault, and the Group of Friends, who sponsored the peace talks.⁷⁰ This enabled participants to review and comment on the drafting process of the peace agreement itself.⁷¹ Frans Timmermans and other like-minded individuals need to be encouraged and supported in their efforts so that eventually women in Syria can fully participate in the peace-building process.

Furthermore, women must be nurtured, encouraged, and provided with the right tools, as seen in Rwanda. Women were an important symbol of moderation and reconciliation in Rwanda. The genocide created a shift in gender roles as most men had either been killed or fled the country. Due to this shift in roles, women have been key actors in the Rwandan reconciliation process, especially at the community level.⁷² At that time, women and girls constituted 70 percent of the surviving population.⁷³ In an effort to rebuild the country, RFP-led Rwandan government took an unprecedented step to increase the participation of women and young people in governance. The post-conflict transitional government instituted a system of triple balloting for local elections, which

⁶⁷ UN WOMEN, *Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence* (2012), 11, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/03AWomenPeaceNeg.pdf>

⁶⁸ *Women, Peace, and Security*, *supra* note 2 at ¶199 (“The participation of women in the Guatemalan process, for example, resulted in specific commitments to women, such as access to housing, credit, land and other productive resources; the obligation of the Government to implement a national health programme for women and girls; commitments to reunite families and locate children and orphans; a review of the national legislation with the purpose of eradicating all forms of discrimination against women, and penalizing sexual harassment; a guarantee of the participation of women at all decision-making in local, regional and national bodies, on equal terms with men; and the creation of the National Women's Forum and the Office for the Defense of Indigenous Women, in order to promote women's participation and rights.”).

⁶⁹ *Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence*, *supra* note 67 at 8 (“The example of Luz Méndez, delegate for the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity party (URNG) during the Guatemala peace talks in the mid-1990s, shows how a delegate can negotiate not only on behalf of her own party, but on behalf of all women. Influenced by her strong ties to civil society and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, Mendez made significant strides for the women of her country by advancing a number of gender equality concerns and ensuring that they were addressed in the agreements.”)

⁷⁰ *Id.* at 2; *See also*, Michelle Page, Tobie Whitman, Cecilia Anderson, *Bringing Women Into Peace Negotiations*, Institute for Inclusive Security, Strategies for Policymakers No. 2, Washington DC, (October 2009) pp 5-8.

⁷¹ *Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence*, *supra* note 67 at 24.

⁷² Interview with Abdu Mubangizi, Attorney-at-law in Rwanda (August 18, 2014) (on file with authors).

⁷³ Elizabeth Powley, *Strengthening Governance: The Role of Women in Rwanda's Transition*, WOMEN WAGING PEACE (2003), 5

allowed women and youth to be placed on separate ballots from the mainstream candidates⁷⁴ and guaranteed that women would constitute at least 20 percent of district-level leadership.⁷⁵ Further to this, a number of women held critical positions within the ranks of RFP. Such women were appointed to strategic posts in the transitional government; more significantly, their presence has contributed to progressive gender policies within the administration.⁷⁶

Syrian women should learn from Liberian women and not give up even if they continue to be excluded from formal discussions. Liberia suffered a continuum of violence for more than a decade. Initial peace did not last long, as a second round of violence began in 1999 and continued until 2003. The Liberian Women's Initiative (LWI) was the main front for women's advocacy and political activities and made certain that key international actors knew of their situation within Liberia, including Economic Community of West African States leaders, US agencies, United Nations (UN) agencies, and the US Embassy in Liberia.⁷⁷ Yet, women in Liberia did not wait to be included in the peace process. They simply showed up, uninvited, with every intention of advocating for their cause – peace.⁷⁸ Because women felt as if their voices weren't being heard properly, they decided to travel to Abuja and speak before the Organization of African Unity. It was important for women to tell their own stories, of how women and children were being raped and killed during the conflict, since no one else was concerned with this aspect of the conflict.⁷⁹ Syrian women have been telling their stories to human rights organizations since the outbreak of the conflict,⁸⁰ yet this should only be the beginning. The fact that the vice-president of the Syrian opposition National Coalition, Suhair

⁷⁴ Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, *WOMEN BUILDING PEACE: WHAT THEY DO, WHY IT MATTERS* (2007), 121.

⁷⁵ *Strengthening Governance*, *supra* note 80 at 20.

⁷⁶ *Id.* at 5.

⁷⁷ Erica K. Sewell, *Women Building Peace: The Liberian Women's Peace Movement*, 5 *CRITICAL HALF* 15 (2007), 16 (“Before LWI, women were engaged in relief efforts, advocacy and other organizations—such as the Association of Women in Action, Abused Women and Girls Project, Women's Development Association, and the Rural Women's Association—but LWI became the front for women's advocacy and political activities.”).

⁷⁸ *Id.* (“The women did not wait to be invited to the peace conferences. They went because they knew that their children's lives, their husbands' lives, their country, and all of these things were at stake so they went. They could have sat back and waited for an invitation but they went uninvited instead. And they went paying their own fares, driving their own cars, or paying for their own gasoline or diesel. They went on their own.”)

⁷⁹ *Id.* at 17 (“During the war people were not concerned about what was happening with the most vulnerable people, the women and the children. Nobody cared about it. Nobody talked about it until the Liberian women decided that we were going to Abuja to talk to the Organization of African Unity to tell them that they should do something to help and bring these warlords to town because it was the women and children who were dying... The women and children were being raped; they were dying from starvation, from diseases, and dying from every other thing you could ever think of. But yet nobody was concerned about that. Everybody was only concerned about the guns and the fire. Stop the fighting, stop the shooting, but we have concerns, we the women. We went to Abuja and it was unprecedented for a group or individual to go when they are not on the calendar for that event and address the event but Theresa Leigh-Sherman [MARWOPNET president] addressed the Organization of African Unity and for the first time they heard what was really happening.”)

⁸⁰ See, e.g., *We are Still Here Women on the Front Lines of Syria's Conflicts*, *supra* note 10; *Syria: Detention and Abuse of Female Activists*, *supra* note 21;

Atassi, became the first Arab woman to head a session at an Arab League summit in 2013 should only be the starting point.⁸¹ More women should be encouraged to attend any future formal peace negotiations, regardless of whether or not they are invited to participate.

Syrian women themselves have recognized the local level is an area that will lead to their inclusion.⁸² For example, the work that CCSDS is doing with the Women for the Future of Syria program in training and empowering women to take on leadership roles in their own communities is vital to the inclusion of women in the Syrian peace process. Programs such as this must be funded so that they can continue to build and grassroots efforts for peace is supported. If history is any indication of the eventual success that women can have as peace-builders in their own country, the participation of Syrian women now could affect their status in post-war Syria and perhaps lead to their inclusion within the future governmental structure, just as in Rwanda and Liberia.

By appointing more women at the UN level as either Special Representatives, Special Envoys and regional directors in peace missions, this will help facilitate networking and advocating with and for Syrian women and women's groups. The appointment of women to these UN posts would enable further discussions on the ground with women who would otherwise not have a voice.⁸³ This would increase women's involvement in formal processes as well, since the female representative could convey the views of Syrian women at a higher level in the international community.

The Syrian government must comply with CEDAW and increase the participation of women in government positions, including both the Syrian Parliament and in local administrative councils. Women must be given outlets for participation in all aspects of political and public societal life. Laws that discriminate against women must be replaced in order to guarantee women full and meaningful participation in society. The Syrian government can learn from the Philippines in this regard and implement a National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.

Perhaps one of the greatest triumphs post-UNSCR 1325 is the inclusion of women in the peace process in the Philippines. During the peace negotiations in 2007, there were no female participants.⁸⁴ In an effort to better implement UNSCR 1325 and increase the status of women, generally, in the Philippines, the Magna Carta of Women was passed into domestic law in 2009, which aimed at protecting and promoting women's rights. Additionally, the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security was instituted in

⁸¹ *Syria's Attasi, first Arab woman to head Arab League session*, AL ARABIYA (March 27, 2013), <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/profiles/2013/03/27/Suhair-Atassi-.html>

⁸² *Outcome Document*, *supra* note 39 at Demands related to the participation of women in the peace process, ¶8 (“Build the capacity of Syrian women activists and civil society organizations in the areas of negotiation and peacebuilding skills”)

⁸³ *Women, Peace and Security*, *supra* note 2 at ¶185.

⁸⁴ *Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence*, *supra* note 67 at 4-5.

2010.⁸⁵ Part of its main goals included strengthening women's leadership for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, women's capacity building in peacebuilding and reconstruction, and to promote awareness that a female perspective is crucial in order to achieve and maintain peace.⁸⁶ This comprehensive Action Plan was, in part, responsible for the growth in the participation rate in the 2011 peace talks. The Oslo Joint Statement had 33 percent of its signatories and 35 percent of the negotiating team were women.⁸⁷ It is clear that with the support of the Filipino government, women have been able to contribute in a meaningful way to the peace process in their country. Because of the support of the government itself, women have found their way into formal processes, negotiations that very few women have the opportunity to participate in. The implementation of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security taken in support of UNSCR 1325 should be a model that Syria could follow.

According to Rafif Jouejati, the Director of the Foundation to Restore Equality and Education in Syria (FREE-Syria), women see their involvement in the peace process as the only way to stop the violence, despite the fact that it could take years to reach that point. "We are lawyers, engineers and professors; we are housewives, nurses and other medical professionals; we are 50 percent of society and we are determined to stop the war... If Geneva II fails, then we will keep going to make Geneva III, IV or V work. We will keep pushing the men who are making war until they make peace."⁸⁸ The women of Syria will not stop advocating for peace and the international community should not stop advocating for them and their inclusion.

⁸⁵ THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON UNSCRS 1325 & 1820: 2010-2016, (March 18, 2009), http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/NationalActionPlans/philippines_nap.pdf; Global Network of Women Peacebuilders, *Women Count - Security Council Resolution 1325: Civil Society Monitoring 2013* (2013) 211, http://issuu.com/suba_gnwp/docs/women_count_civil_society_monitorin/3?e=8954983/7339869

⁸⁶ PHILIPPINE NATIONAL ACTION PLAN, *supra* note 81 at 5.

⁸⁷ *Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence*, *supra* note 67 at 7 ("[T]he negotiations between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) leading to the 2011 Oslo Joint Statement presents the highest percentage of female delegates, with the 42-member delegations comprising 15 women. This is a powerful illustration of the difference that can be made by women in positions of leadership, combined with longstanding advocacy on women, peace and security by the national women's movement.")

⁸⁸ Medea Benjamin, *supra* note 52.

ARE WESTERN NATIONAL ACTION PLANS LIKELY MODELS FOR THE INTEGRATION OF UNSCR 1325 INTO THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCES' OPERATIONS?

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I. INTRODUCTION

Japan currently faces a number of challenges to its economic and national security posture, not the least of which is a long-term declining birth rate that has reduced the number of Japanese of working age available in the national labor pool.⁴ To address this issue in part, and consistent with Japan's domestic⁵ and international⁶ legal undertakings regarding the equality of women, the government of Prime Minister Abe has instituted a program to increase the participation of Japanese women in Japan's economy and government.⁷ This program also includes efforts by the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to recruit more women into their ranks, to bolster the responsibilities of their occupational positions in the military,⁸ and to provide conditions of service which are more accommodating to family needs.⁹

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⁴ *Fighting Population Decline, Japan Aims to Stay at 100 Million*, NIPPON.COM (Aug. 26, 2014), <http://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00057/>.

⁵ NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [Constitution], art. 14 (Japan); BASIC ACT FOR GENDER EQUAL SOCIETY (Act No. 78 of 1999), available at GENDER EQUALITY BUREAU CABINET OFFICE website, http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/about_danjo/lbp/index.html.

⁶ CONVENTION FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, New York, Sept. 18, 1979, ratified by Japan on June 25, 1985. UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, U.N. webpage, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en.

⁷ Masami Ito, *Can women really 'shine' under Abe?*, JAPANTIMES.CO.JP (Nov. 22, 2014), <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2014/11/22/lifestyle/can-women-really-shine-abe/>; *Can "Womonomics" Save the Japanese Economy?*, NIPPON.COM (Oct. 31, 2014), <http://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00066/>; *Japan's Initiative regarding Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality (Toward a society in which all women shine)*, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (JMOFA) website, http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/page23e_000181.html. *But see* Hisako Motoyama, *Gender Policy under Far-Right Abe Administration: A Reality Check on "A Society in Which Women Shine"*, ASIA-JAPAN WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTER website (Mar. 2014), <http://www.ajwrc.org/eng/modules/myalbum/photo.php?lid=46&cid=1> (Japanese feminist writers argue this policy will in fact work a deterioration in women's rights).

⁸ Kirk Spitzer, *Japanese Women Take Command, Finally*, TIME.COM (Mar. 22, 2013), <http://nation.time.com/2013/03/22/japanese-women-take-command-finally/>.

⁹ MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (JMOD), DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2014 (WHITE PAPER) 351-53, available at, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2014.html [hereinafter "DEFENSE OF JAPAN"].

Meanwhile, Japan has been increasing its collaboration in military training and other military activities with its Western allies, especially the United States,¹⁰ Australia,¹¹ and NATO.¹² In a break with long-standing constitutional interpretations¹³ as to the limits placed on the operational activities of the JSDF, the Abe Administration is also seeking to expand the JSDF's role beyond their traditional activities.¹⁴ As shown by the recent establishment of a Japanese base in Djibouti to support anti-piracy operations in the Western Indian Ocean,¹⁵ for example, this policy reflects an appreciation of Japan's influence and interests in the international security environment. These efforts by the Abe Administration are also in part a response to the significant challenge posed by China's increasingly assertive positions taken regarding territorial claims in the water bodies between Japan and China.¹⁶

These two objectives—increasing opportunities for women and expanding the role of the JSDF—intersect in Japan's almost-completed work of formulating its National Action Plan (NAP)¹⁷ to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security¹⁸ and related subsequent resolutions geared towards increased protections for women and girls in armed conflict and greater inclusion of women in conflict prevention and resolution.¹⁹ Japan's

¹⁰ See Martin Fackler, *Japan and South Korea Vow to Share Intelligence About North Korea via the U.S.*, NEWYORKTIMES.COM, (Dec. 29, 2014), <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/30/world/asia/japan-south-korea-north-intelligence.html>; Karen Parrish, *U.S., Japan Agree to Expand Security, Defense Cooperation*, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Oct. 3, 2013), <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120902>; DEFENSE OF JAPAN, *supra* note 9, 224-238.

¹¹ Jamie Smyth, *US, Japan and Australia to deepen alliance*, FT.COM (Nov. 16, 2014), <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3a34e028-6cb3-11e4-b125-00144feabdc0.html>; *Japan, the United States and Australia Conduct Joint Training in Australia – Southern Jackaroo 2014*, JAPAN DEFENSE FOCUS, No. 53 (June 2014), JMOD website, <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no53/activities.html>.

¹² Adrian Croft, *Japan, worried about China, strengthens ties with NATO*, REUTERS.COM (May 6, 2014), <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/06/us-nato-japan-idUSBREA450RT20140506>.

¹³ KENPO, *supra* note 5, art. 9, paras. 1, 2.

¹⁴ JMOD, FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, JMOD website, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp01.html [hereinafter “FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS”]; *Japan eyes new law to aid non-U.S. forces in international conflicts*, JAPANTIMES.CO.JP (Jan. 10, 2015), <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/10/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-eyes-new-law-to-aid-non-u-s-forces-in-international-conflicts/>; Sean Mirski, *Japan's Constitutional Reinterpretation: A Tug of War between Strategy and Memory*, NATIONALINTEREST.ORG (Nov. 21, 2014), <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/japan%E2%80%99s-constitutional-reinterpretation-tug-war-between-11713>; see Elaine Lies & Tetshushi Kajimoto, *Japanese PM unveils new government, defense pick may rile China*, REUTERS.COM (Dec. 24, 2014), <http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USKBN0K205520141224> (“Nakatani's appointment could draw fire from China, especially given Abe's stated goal of a stronger security profile for Japan that includes passing a law in 2015 to reinterpret its pacifist constitution.”).

¹⁵ *Japan to post intelligence officer at SDF base in Djibouti*, JAPANTIMES.CO.JP (July 26, 2014), <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/07/26/national/japan-to-post-intelligence-officer-at-sdf-base-in-djibouti/>.

¹⁶ Kirk Spitzer, *For Better Or Worse, Japan To Ease Reins On Its Military*, TIME.COM (Jan. 17, 2013), <http://nation.time.com/2013/01/17/for-better-or-worse-japan-to-ease-reins-on-its-military/>; *Japan's About-Face*, PUBLIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM webpage (July 11, 2011), <http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/japans-about-face/introduction/746/>.

¹⁷ *Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality*, JMOFA website, http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/page23e_000181.html.

¹⁸ S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000) [hereinafter “UNSCR 1325”].

¹⁹ S.C. Res. 1820, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008) (addressing the need to more fully address sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) in armed conflict against civilians and calling for further efforts to protect women

NAP will increase participation and opportunities for women in the JDSF, and formalize aspects of gender-considerations in the JDSF's mission set.

Recognizing the gender-differentiated impact of armed conflict upon women and girls, the United States²⁰ and Australia²¹ have already published their NAPs. Each of these NAPs assigns specific responsibilities to the respective defense departments of the two countries to further the NAPs' implementation. Even though NATO is a collective self-defense organization rather than a nation-state, it too has developed and begun implementing the equivalent of a NAP.²² These plans generally utilize "gender mainstreaming" – the incorporation of a gender perspective – in their governmental activities as the means to further gender equity and reduce the negative effects of armed conflict on women and girls.²³

With the exception of incorporating gender perspectives in the kinetic parts of kinetic operations,²⁴ signs of progress in this area in Western military organizations, activities, and operations are both real and widespread. Given the movement towards greater cooperation and coordination between these allies in security matters and recent Japanese efforts to boost the role of women in the JDSF, one might suppose that both trends would be furthered through congruence between the Western NAPs and the Japanese NAP in the operational treatment of gender.²⁵ Our paper addresses the varying models of NAP implementation and finds differences that might to a degree frustrate international coordination amongst these allies.

and girls); S.C. Res. 1888, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1888 (Sept. 30, 2009) (mandating protection of women and children during peacekeeping operations and greater systemic monitoring and reporting on SGBV); S.C. Res. 1889, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1889 (Oct. 5, 2009) (calling for improved reporting mechanisms and greater participation by women in all stages of peace processes, and developing global indicators to track UNSCR 1325's implementation); and S.C. Res. 1960, U.N. S/RES/1960 (Dec. 16, 2010) (defining institutional tools for combating impunity, and setting out steps to prevent SGBV); S.C. Res. 2106, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2106 (June 24, 2013) (emphasizing the need to further combat sexual violence against women in armed conflict); and S.C. Res. 2122, U.N. S/RES/2122 (Oct. 18, 2013) (calling for continued work to more fully include women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts, and increased reporting on instances of SGBV in armed conflict).

²⁰ Executive Office of the President, United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, December 2011, The Whitehouse website, http://www.google.com/url?url=http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/email-files/US_National_Action_Plan_on_Women_Peace_and_Security.pdf&rct=j&frm=1&q=&esrc=s&sa=U&ei=dSijVPffOZCDNvTggOAM&ved=0CBQQFjAA&usg=AFQjCNHML5KwEVGD7akjSgz4DfYwTQqmXQ [hereinafter "U.S. NAP"].

²¹ Department of Social Services, Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018, Department of Social Services website, <https://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/women/publications-articles/government-international/australian-national-action-plan-on-women-peace-and-security-2012-2018> [hereinafter "Australian NAP"].

²² Bi-Strategic Command Directive (BI-SCD) 40-1, Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure (Aug. 8, 2012), available at <http://www.cimic-coe.org/products/conceptual-design/cimic-innovation/advanced-cultural-competence-aac/gender/> [hereinafter "BI-SCD 40-1"].

²³ Donna Winslow, *Gender and Military Society* 20-32 (2009).

²⁴ Jody M. Prescott, *NATO Gender Mainstreaming and the Feminist Critique of the Law of Armed Conflict*, *Geo. J. Gender & Law* 83, 93-104 (2013) [hereinafter "*Feminist Critique*"].

²⁵ See Robert Egnell et al., *Gender, Military Effectiveness, and Organizational Change: The Swedish Model* 23-27 (2014) ("marrying a gender perspective with military effectiveness" – the functional considerations relevant to this linkage).

We argue that the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and a NAP is of particular significance to Japan (and its allies) given the current and anticipated threat environment in which the JDSF is expected to play a greater role: a threat environment characterized by “war amongst the people,” complicated by climatic variability, in which the differential impact of armed conflict and climate change upon women and girls is both severe and influential upon operational and strategic success. However, our analysis of three NAP implementation models indicates that although the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF’s) implementation program is a model of best practices for militaries to consider in general, none is a suitable model for the JDSF at this point in time.

This paper first points to the strategic and operational importance of considering gender-differentiated dynamics in the operational environment. It is to this end that NAPs and UNSCR 1325 contribute. Next, we analyze three NAP implementation models that Japan might consider: US, Australian, and NATO. After assessing these NAP implementation models, we turn to Japan and its efforts to develop and implement a NAP. We assess the role of women in the JDSF and the impact of this construction on operational gender considerations. Finally, the evolving Japanese NAP will be described and analyzed in the context of the Western NAPs analyzed earlier.

II. WAR AMONGST THE PEOPLE

While women’s opportunities in modern militaries have generally increased, the characteristics of the modern operational environment tend to magnify the impact of conflict on women and girls. General Sir Rupert Smith has described the modern operational environment as one that is increasingly civilian-centric, in which contending military and paramilitary forces wrestle more for influence over populations rather than seeking relative advantage over each other in force-on-force engagements oriented on key geographical terrain.²⁶ The idea of “war amongst the people” is not completely new – it had already been operationalized in the irregular warfare models used successfully by Mao and Giap in 20th century conflicts.²⁷ In contrast to the rural insurgencies so central to these models, however, the ever-increasing size of the global human population, mass urbanization and the flowering of the megacity, and the accessibility and leverage that the Internet offers in the human-created domain of cyberspace increase the likelihood of armed conflict occurring ever more frequently in heavily populated areas today.²⁸ Further, there is an increasing recognition on the part of national governments that climate change (including more frequent natural disasters caused by extreme weather events) will likely exacerbate the occurrence and impact of armed conflict.²⁹ What are not currently as well appreciated, however, are the dynamic intersection of armed conflict and climate change, and the gender-differentiated effects of this relationship upon women.

Generally speaking, armed conflict today tends to occur in those areas of the world that are less economically developed. Women in these areas often have a relatively inferior social and

²⁶ Toni Pfanner, *Interview with General Sir Rupert Smith*, 88 INTL. R. RED CROSS 719, 719-20, 722-26 (2006).

²⁷ LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, *STRATEGY: A HISTORY* 183-87 (2013).

²⁸ Jody M. Prescott, *Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations*, 15 VT J. ENVTL L. 766, 767-68 (2014) [hereinafter “*Rethinking Military Operations*”].

²⁹ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD), *QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT* (February 2010) IV.

economic status as compared to men, and this gender discrimination and its effects make women less resilient to the impacts of armed conflict.³⁰ These negative and disproportionate effects occur regardless of whether women are civilians, refugees or even combatants.³¹ As many developed countries have increased the opportunities for women to serve in military positions once exclusively reserved to men, it is now not uncommon to find women in these armed forces serving as both leaders³² and ordinary combatants.³³ While women in these countries might now look forward to greater leadership and career opportunities, the situation of women combatants in less developed countries, particularly those involved in non-international armed conflicts,³⁴ is not at all positive.³⁵

Similarly, it has long been recognized in the international development community that the negative effects of climate change experienced by women and girls are both different and greater than those ordinarily experienced by men.³⁶ As prevailing climates continue to change, extreme weather events are likely to increase in frequency and severity, leading to deeper droughts, greater flooding, and the spread of disease.³⁷ In addition, altered patterns of precipitation may disrupt rain-fed agriculture.³⁸ Particularly in the developing world, the generally inferior social and economic status of women and girls, and their usual roles as their families' primary caregivers, means that these sorts of environmental changes will affect them more severely.³⁹ Tragically, the gender-differentiated impacts of armed conflict and climate change might act to reinforce each other. For example, since women are often responsible for gathering firewood and water, two resources which climate change might render in scarcer supply, the longer distances women will travel on these chores would expose them to greater violence in war zones.⁴⁰

Particularly in the developing world, military operations will be faced with these impacts, which will complicate efforts to promote stable end-states in civilian-centric operations. Campaigns to resolve conflicts in these conditions are unlikely to succeed if they fail to understand that the

³⁰ Judith G. Gardam & Michelle J. Jarvis, *Women, Armed Conflict And International Law* 8-9 (2001).

³¹ *Feminist Critique*, *supra* note 24, at 87-90.

³² See Dean Davis, *Female Engagement Team commander speaks about mission in Afghanistan*, DVIDS website (Oct. 16, 2010), <http://www.dvidshub.net/video/97875/female-engagement-team-commander-speaks-about-mission-afghanistan> (ILT Quincy Washa discussed her team's operations in Afghanistan).

³³ See, e.g., SGT Warren Wright, *Two members of Cultural Support Team receive Combat Action Badges*, U.S. Special Operations Command website (Sept. 12, 2011) <http://www.soc.mil/uns/Releases/2011/September/110912-06.htm> (SGT Shelly Amborn and SPC Sonja Prentiss awarded badges for actions during combat with insurgents in Afghanistan).

³⁴ Sahana Dharmapuri, *Just Add Women and Stir?* 41 *Parameters* 56, 62 (2011).

³⁵ *Id.*; Johanna Valenius, *Gender Mainstreaming in ESDP Missions*, Chaillot Paper No. 101, 23 (May 2007).

³⁶ Fatma Denton, *Climate change vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation: Why does gender matter?* 10 *Gender & Development* 10, 11-12 (July 2002).

³⁷ Ida Arabshahi & Chase Raines, Assoc. of Climate Change Officers, Defense, National Security & Climate Change: Building Resilience and Identifying Opportunities Related to Water, Energy and Extreme Events 9 (2002), available at <http://www.accoonline.org/downloads/ACCO-CCLS-June2012-Report.pdf>.

³⁸ *Id.* at 8-9.

³⁹ Gotelind Alber, *Gender, Cities and Climate Change* 33 (2011) (Thematic report prepared for Cities and Climate Change, Global Report on Human Settlements 2011), available at <http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/GRHS2011/GRHS2011ThematicStudyGender>.

⁴⁰ *Rethinking Military Operations*, *supra* note 28.

military effects of particular actions, kinetic or non-kinetic, may cause greater harm to one half of the population than the other. It is in this context that the different NAPs of Japan's Western allies must be understood and evaluated.

III. WESTERN NAPs

A. United States

i. Implementation

Using a model often described as “gender mainstreaming,”⁴¹ the U.S. NAP assigns DoD particular tasks to execute in furtherance of the NAP's five overarching goals, both internally and in its activities with other U.S. government departments, international organizations, and international military partners. For purposes of this paper, the most significant of these goals are the first three: achieving national integration and institutionalization of UNSCR 1325 in U.S. government activities “through interagency coordination, policy development, enhanced professional training and education, and evaluation;” increasing women's participation and decision-making; and protecting women and children from abuse and sex and gender based violence (SGBV) “in conflict-affected environments.”⁴²

To implement the first goal, DoD will incorporate the NAP objectives “into appropriate DoD strategic guidance and planning documents,”⁴³ and provide gender training to deploying and deployed military and civilian personnel.⁴⁴ It will also provide this training in “Professional Military Education, including Commander's courses, and intermediate and senior service schools.”⁴⁵ DoD is also tasked with including training modules on “the specific needs of women in conflict” in its engagement with international military partners and supporting the “education and awareness initiatives for U.S. government civilian contractors and aid workers.”⁴⁶ In addition to a “zero tolerance” policy for the trafficking of people by DoD personnel,⁴⁷ DoD is required to support the development of accountability mechanisms to hold SGBV perpetrators responsible, and assist other organizations “in developing appropriate mechanisms for sexual assault prevention, response, and accountability[.]”⁴⁸ Finally, DoD will establish standard operating procedures for the [U.S. government] to follow up on cases of [sexual abuse and exploitation] by international personnel to ensure accountability.⁴⁹

⁴¹ Although widely used in different variations, gender mainstreaming has been cogently criticized for a number of reasons by feminist writers. Hilary Charlesworth, *Not Waving, but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights in the United Nations*, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS J. 1, 11-13 (2005).

⁴² U.S. NAP, *supra* note 20, at 12.

⁴³ *Id.* at 12.

⁴⁴ *Id.* at 13.

⁴⁵ *Id.* at 13.

⁴⁶ *Id.* at 16.

⁴⁷ *Id.* at 19.

⁴⁸ *Id.* at 17.

⁴⁹ *Id.*

ii. Assessment

Since the U.S. NAP's publication, DoD has announced its plans to open all military positions to personnel irrespective of sex,⁵⁰ and the services have begun to formulate standards anyone would need to meet to be qualified for combat assignments, and to use training opportunities to assess the practicalities of having women serve in these roles.⁵¹ These positive changes should work to increase opportunities for U.S. military women to have access to career-enhancing assignments in branches of service for which they are physically qualified. They should also assist DoD in executing its tasks to accomplish the NAP's second goal of increasing women's participation in peace processes and decision-making by, for example, effectively engaging women in security operations through the "participation of female U.S. military personnel to encourage and model gender integration, and reach out to female and male populations in partner nations."⁵² Similarly, the creation and establishment of tracking and reporting systems to monitor instances of alleged SGBV and their perpetrators would not seem to pose any serious problems – not only are such systems commonly used on a daily basis at all levels of the U.S. military, but the different services are already specifically tracking the many instances of sexual violence in their ranks.⁵³ In fact, the U.S. military's continuing struggle to confront and reduce the high number of sexual assaults must necessarily be seen as part of the context within which the U.S. NAP is implemented.

These important positive aspects, however, are outweighed by troubling implementation gaps. First, the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (JCS's) J-3 section, responsible for current operations and plans,⁵⁴ does not appear to have received implementation tasks that would require a thorough reassessment of the use of force in the context of UNSCR 1325 and the law of armed conflict.⁵⁵ Second, the training that appears to have been developed for deploying U.S. personnel on women's needs in conflict situations appears specifically geared toward avoiding recreational "opportunities" that could involve trafficking in women⁵⁶ – certainly important, but really only a subset of UNSCR 1325's recognition of the differentiated impact of armed conflict on women.

⁵⁰ Claudette Roulo, *Defense Department Expands Women's Combat Role*, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Jan. 24, 2013), <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119098>.

⁵¹ Bill Briggs, *Women in combat: Three female Marines march I to history by completing infantry training*, NBCNEWS.COM (Nov. 20, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/11/20/21553229-women-in-combat-three-female-marines-march-into-history-by-completing-infantry-training?lite.

⁵² U.S. NAP, *supra* note 20, at 15.

⁵³ See DoD ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY, FISCAL YEAR 2013, DoD SAPRO website, 62-66 <http://www.sapr.mil/index.php/annual-reports> (explanation of DoD data collection and reporting systems and methodology); see also David Alexander, *U.S. military sex assault reports up 8 percent: officials*, REUTERS.COM (Dec. 3, 2014), <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/04/us-usa-defense-sexassault-idUSKCN0JI04J20141204> (it is important to note that in 2014, more than half the victims were men).

⁵⁴ *J-3, Operations*, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS) webpage, <http://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J3%7COperations.aspx>.

⁵⁵ See generally *Feminist Critique*, *supra* note 24.

⁵⁶ See, e.g., Civilian Expeditionary Workforce Program Office, Requirements and information for Civilian Deployees (Dec. 6, 2013), with a URL link to *Welcome to the U.S. Department of Defense Combating Trafficking in Persons Awareness Training*, <http://www.atsc.army.mil/crc/Trafficking/>. It is important to not ignore in this regard the use made by U.S. soldiers of official brothels in Occupation Japan for several months after the end of World War II. Eric Talmadge, *GI's Frequented Japan's 'Comfort Women'*, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Apr. 25, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/25/AR2007042501801_pf.html.

Third, even though DoD's *Implementation Guide* repeats the U.S. NAP's requirement to incorporate gender considerations in appropriate strategic level documents, the examples that it gives include documents such as the *National Military Strategy* and the *Quadrennial Defense Review*.⁵⁷ Although one of the designated JCS implementing offices, the J-7 (Joint Force Development), which is responsible for the development of joint doctrine,⁵⁸ has begun to include operational gender considerations in certain revisions of joint doctrine,⁵⁹ at the time of this writing publically available versions of joint doctrine are largely silent on this matter.

There are four types of U.S. military operations that would seem to be the logical places to lodge U.S. doctrinal treatment of gender's operational relevance at the strategic level because of their significant interfaces with civilian populations: Counterinsurgency, Stability,⁶⁰ Peace,⁶¹ and Civil-Military Operations. Inexplicably, even though most of the joint level important doctrinal publications postdate the U.S. NAP, gender barely registers in any of them at either the joint level or the service level. For example, the recently revised joint counterinsurgency doctrine mentions women just once and gender just once.⁶² However, the scope of this general doctrinal deficiency is perhaps best highlighted by a review of U.S. Civil-Military Operations doctrine.

Civil-Military operations are defined as activities "that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and non-governmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace" "to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives."⁶³ Civil-Military Operations support the entire spectrum of U.S. military operations, from kinetic offensive operations to relatively tame post-conflict peace building actions. Because of Civil-Military Operations' ubiquity and their obvious focus on civilian populations, it would be reasonable to assume that if a meaningful discussion of operational gender issues is to be found anywhere in U.S. military doctrine, it would be here – reasonable, but sadly, not accurate.

In terms of logistics planning as part of Civil-Military Operations, joint doctrine (JP 3-57) notes that planning "must include logistic support that normally is outside military logistics, such as support to the civilian populace (e.g., women, children, and the elderly),"⁶⁴ and that "medical planners may have to adjust typical personnel and logistics packages to care for women and

⁵⁷ DoD Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 9 (Sept. 2013) (copy on file with authors) [hereinafter "Implementation Guide"].

⁵⁸ J-7, *Joint Force Development*, JCS webpage, <http://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J7%7CJointForceDevelopment.aspx>.

⁵⁹ E-mail from Elizabeth O. Lape, Deputy, Individual Training and Learning Branch, Joint Staff, J7, to Jody M. Prescott (Jan. 22, 2015, 1643 EST) (on file with authors).

⁶⁰ Chairman, JCS, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf.

⁶¹ Chairman, JCS, JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations I-1* (Aug. 1, 2012), <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp33-07-3.PDF>.

⁶² Chairman, JCS, JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, III-8, VIII-13 (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf.

⁶³ Chairman, JCS, JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 40* (July 16, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

⁶⁴ Chairman, JCS, JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations III-10* (Sep. 11, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_57.pdf [hereinafter "JP 3-57"].

children effected in operations not originally of a humanitarian nature.”⁶⁵ JP 3-57 mentions women once more, noting that in considering how to make arrangements for meetings with local nationals, planners should ask themselves, “[f]or example, what role do women play in the society?”⁶⁶ Gender as a concept is not mentioned at all. This absence is replicated in subsidiary doctrine used by the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps to implement JP 3-57. Field Manual 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations (FM 3-57), notes only that planning should assess the capabilities and effectiveness of public welfare systems regarding vulnerable populations such as women and children and the impact of these systems upon Civil-Military Operations.⁶⁷

Although the *Implementation Guide* specifically notes the use of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) and U.S. Special Forces’ Cultural Support Teams as examples of activities to “develop and improve data collection mechanisms,” and the tracking of gender-disaggregated data as a best practice, and tasks a number of military agencies including the J-7 with these requirements,⁶⁸ joint doctrine does not meaningfully address the lessons learned from the use of gendered civilian interface units in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁶⁹ FETs were first used by the U.S. Marine Corps in Iraq,⁷⁰ and have been used extensively in Afghanistan by U.S. and allied forces to interface with Afghan women because of cultural norms that restrict them from meeting with men not of their families.⁷¹ Although relevant questions have been raised as to the proper role of FETs, and the scope of any enduring part they might play in future operations,⁷² FETs appear to have largely been successful in completing their different tasks despite some confusion in the field at times as to how they were to be best utilized.⁷³ If there were a doctrinal requirement to consider gender in human-centric analyses of operational areas, however, and operational systems were engineered to allow the immediate delivery of this information when needed by commanders, then the FETs might prove to be the best collectors of data disaggregated on a sex and gender basis – thereby securing themselves an important operational niche regardless of the gender norms of the local cultures in which they might be operating.

The continuing omission of gender from U.S. joint doctrine in general, and the omission of FETs in particular, are both puzzling and troubling. Puzzling, because certain writers have perceived

⁶⁵ *Id.*, Annex C, Appendix A, A-C-2.

⁶⁶ *Id.*, Annex B, B-14.

⁶⁷ HEADQUARTERS, DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 3-57 (FM 3-05.40), CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS 2-25 (Oct. 31, 2011), http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_57.pdf [hereinafter “FM 3-57”].

⁶⁸ IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, *supra* note 57, at 9.

⁶⁹ See LisaRe Brooks Babin, *Fact Sheet – U.S. Army Female Engagement Teams: Overview*, U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL & SOCIAL SCIENCES (Mar. 2014) (U.S. Army does not appear to be taking the doctrinal and personnel management steps necessary to retain this skill set in the force) [hereinafter “*ARI Fact Sheet, Mar. 2014*”] (copy on file with authors); LTC Janet R. Holliday, *Female Engagement Teams – The Need to Standardize Training and Employment*, 92 MILITARY REVIEW 90, 94 (Mar./Apr. 2012) (describing the steps necessary to institutionalize FET training and operational use of them).

⁷⁰ Dharmapuri, *supra* note 34, at 60.

⁷¹ Elisabeth Bumiller, *For Female Marines, Tea Comes With Bullets*, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/02/us/military/02marines.html>. Not surprisingly, a survey of U.S. FET members established that they also engaged with Afghan men very frequently, with one of the results being the collection of intelligence from them. *ARI Fact Sheet, Mar. 2014*, *supra* note 69.

⁷² *Id.*

⁷³ LisaRe Brooks Babin, *Fact Sheet – U.S. Army Female Engagement Teams: Integration & Employment*, U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL & SOCIAL SCIENCES (Apr. 2014) (copy on file with authors).

that “U.S. policymakers and thought leaders seem to be increasingly shifting from a ‘traditional’ national security framework to a ‘human security’ approach, which includes energy, natural resource and environmental components.”⁷⁴ Failure to establish meaningful linkages between gender concepts in higher strategic level policy documents such as the *Quadrennial Defense Review* and lower strategic level doctrine such as joint doctrine means that these concepts would essentially become doctrinal orphans, largely unread outside the Pentagon. These omissions are troubling, because the strong linkages between climate change, gender and armed conflict, discussed *supra*, make it imperative that U.S. forces understand the dynamic relationships between the three so that commanders can develop a more complete operational picture of the areas of operations in which they are likely to be working. Were doctrine to establish the requirement for gender and sex-disaggregated information, an enduring role for FETs in regular military operations, could possibly be validated.⁷⁵

Many of the specific activities assigned to DoD by the *Implementation Guide* to accomplish the other two objectives of the U.S. NAP (conflict prevention and access to recovery and relief) are more consistent with the sorts of overseas missions the JSDF conducts at this point in time, and therefore might warrant consideration by the JSDF as it implements the Japanese NAP and increases its collaboration with U.S. forces. However, the significant implementation gaps that exist in terms of the first and third objectives (national integration and institutionalization, and protection), strongly suggest that the DoD implementation of the U.S. NAP risks undermining effective incorporation of gender perspectives at the planner and operator levels, and therefore the U.S. approach on the whole is not a strong example of an implementation model for the JSDF. Given the outsized role that the U.S. plays in NATO operations, however, it is important to next explore the ways in which NATO’s gender action plan seeks to operationalize gender and how it differs from the U.S. approach.

B. NATO

i. Implementation

NATO’s current gender action plan identifies a number of overarching goals that must be met, including the use of the Comprehensive Approach⁷⁶ to handle risks to civilian populations in the area of operations; the establishment of effective liaison with populations, international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) at all operational levels; consistent pre-deployment training for NATO forces on gender perspectives; and the development of effective reporting mechanisms and SGBV prevention measures.⁷⁷ Gender

⁷⁴ Army Environmental Policy Institute, *Environmental Change and Fragile States: Early Warning Needs, Opportunities, & Intervention*, 1-5 (Sept. 21, 2011), available at http://www.aepi.army.mil/docs/whatsnew/MAN0BC2_report_combined_compressed.pdf.

⁷⁵ Jody M. Prescott, *NATO Gender Mainstreaming: A New Approach to War amongst the People?* 158 RUSI J. 56, 59-60 (2013) [hereinafter “*New Approach*”].

⁷⁶ NATO doctrine notes that “[t]oday’s challenges demand a comprehensive approach by the international community, including the coordinated action from an appropriate range of civil and military actors, enabled by the orchestration, coordination and de-confliction of NATO’s military and political instruments with the other instruments of power.” Allied Joint Doctrine Publication 01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine, 2-11 Dec. 2010).

⁷⁷ BI-SCD 40-1, *supra* note 22, at 1-7.

advisors are the primary means by which these measures are to be accomplished operationally at different levels of command.⁷⁸

BI-SCD 40-1 envisions a three-tiered gender advisory hierarchy.⁷⁹ In static headquarters, such as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, Gender Advisors provide advice on gender issues to the commander and the staff.⁸⁰ At deployed higher-level headquarters, Gender Field Advisors provide this function.⁸¹ In subordinate tactical units, this expertise is provided by individuals performing the additional duty of a Gender Focal Point.⁸² As a matter of practice, it would appear that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan, also uses Gender Focal Points within certain staff elements.⁸³ Importantly, NATO has designated the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) in Sweden as the executive agent responsible for training Gender Advisors and Gender Field Advisors.⁸⁴ Given the part-time nature of their work, however, it is not clear that individuals serving as Gender Focal Points would ordinarily receive this training.⁸⁵

In addition to the normal duties expected of any staff officer, BI-SCD 40-1 places tremendous responsibility upon gender advisors to provide input on staff products and to attend various staff meetings and working group sessions. Gender advisors are also expected to work with IO and NGOs on gender-related activities; support local activities related to UNSCR 1325; assist the commander, the chief of personnel (J1), and the legal advisor (LEGAD) in inquiries involving alleged sexual misconduct on the part of NATO personnel; and “to conduct frequent and flexible engagement with the male [and] . . . female part of the local population.”⁸⁶ Further, they are to support the J1 with relevant policies and the chief of intelligence (J2) with gender-based information collection and intelligence analysis, and to support the chief of operations (J3) with the planning of “[i]nformation operations, [p]sychological operations, patrols and search operations.”⁸⁷

⁷⁸ Although Sweden is a Partnership for Peace country, not a NATO partner, it is important to note the pioneering work done by the Swedish armed forces in the incorporation of a gender perspective and in the use of gender advisors. EGNELL, *supra* note 25, at 50-75. Significantly, Sweden has seen an increasing number of female recruits applying for basic military training – in 2013; they amounted to 20% of all applicants – since the introduction of gender advisors and incorporation of a gender perspective in operations. *More women sign up for Sweden’s military*, THELOCAL.SE, (Aug. 20, 2013), <http://www.thelocal.se/20130820/49738>.

⁷⁹ BI-SCD 40-1, *supra* note 22, at A-1—A-3.

⁸⁰ *Id.*

⁸¹ *Id.*

⁸² *Id.*

⁸³ REVIEW OF THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF UNSCR 1325 FOR THE CONDUCT OF NATO-LED OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS, SWEDISH DEFENCE RESEARCH AGENCY (FOI) 35 (H. Lackenbauer & R. Langlais eds., 2013) [hereinafter “LACKENBAUER”].

⁸⁴ BI-SCD 40-1, *supra* note 22, at 8. The Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations certified to provide training on gender and operations to NATO personnel, *Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations*, FÖRSVARSMAKTEN webpage, <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/swedint/nordic-centre-for-gender-in-military-operations/>

⁸⁵ BI-SCD 40-1, *supra* note 22 at 9.

⁸⁶ *Id.* at A-2.

⁸⁷ *Id.*

ii. Assessment

Consistent with the development of an overarching NATO and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council policy for the implementation of UNSCR 1325-related concepts into military activities and operations,⁸⁸ NATO's work to incorporate a gender perspective in operations has had some positive results. For example, the role of the Gender Field Advisor has registered a higher operational profile in Afghanistan over the last two years,⁸⁹ and the current headquarters military Gender Field Advisor in Afghanistan is a female Croatian brigadier general.⁹⁰ Further, different NATO and Partnership for Peace troop contingents in Afghanistan worked diligently to include a gender perspective in their operations over time.⁹¹ Importantly, in keeping with the comprehensive approach, NATO also began placing gender advisors with different Afghan ministries to help them build gender awareness and capacity.⁹² BI-SCD 40-1 also requires measures to combat the occurrence of sexual violence in NATO operations, such as a code of conduct for TCN servicemembers.⁹³ Further, work has begun to meaningfully include gender considerations in official NATO doctrine, at least from a peace support perspective.⁹⁴

⁸⁸ NATO/EAPC POLICY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 1325 ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AND RELATED RESOLUTIONS, Apr. 1, 2014, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/eu/natohq/official_texts_109830.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).

⁸⁹ The 2013 deployment of a senior Royal Australian Navy officer to the Gender Field Advisor post in the International Joint Command in Kabul is a very positive step, both because of her rank and her long experience working on gender equality issues in a military context. See CAPT Jennifer Wittwer, *The Gender Agenda: women, peace and security in the conduct of NATO-led operations and missions*, 191 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE J. 57, 59-65 (2013) (CAPT Wittwer was posted to ISAF for the better part of 2013).

⁹⁰ LCDR Jennifer Craig, *ISAF's Gender Advisor Mentors Afghan Female Counterparts*, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NEWS website (June 27, 2014), <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122563>.

⁹¹ See, e.g., SSG John Etheridge, *FET Training teaches Soldiers how to work with Afghan women*, ISAF NEWS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) website (Aug. 29, 2014), <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-news/fet-training-teaches-soldiers-how-to-work-with-afghan-women> (eight female soldiers successfully graduate from a two-day FET class held at Kandahar Airfield); *Female Engagement Team Supports International Women's Day*, ISAF NEWS, ISAF website (Mar. 13, 2011), <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/female-engagement-team-supports-international-women> (German, Swedish and U.S. FET members participated in Department of Women's Affairs event marking International Women's Day in Baghlan Province).

⁹² See Melissa Charbonneau, *Women, Peace, and Security Take Center Stage for U.S. Global Women's Ambassador Visit*, ISAF NEWS, ISAF website (Nov. 14, 2013), <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-news-list/women-peace-and-security-take-center-stage-for-u.s>. (Civilian ISAF Headquarters Gender Advisor and ISAF Gender Advisors to Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior meet with U.S. ambassador).

⁹³ Although the measures are certainly useful in the overall scheme of implementing UNSCR 1325's requirements, substantiated reports of SGBV against Afghan women and girls, for example, at the hands of ISAF troops, after a decade of international forces conducting operations there, approach zero. But see *US forces raped two women in Kandahar carnage*, Mar. 17, 2012 (Afghan fact-finding mission informs Parliament that 15-20 U.S. soldiers raped and massacred 16 Afghan civilians), *Afghan girl raped, killed by US forces* (anonymous sources describe to an Iranian news organization five vans of U.S. forces transferring women and girls to an ISAF camp and sexually assaulting them), COUCHTRIPPER.COM (Jan. 14, 2011), <http://couchtripper.com/rapedbysoldiers/?cat=4>. As to the first alleged incident, a U.S. general court-martial determined that a single U.S. soldier murdered the Afghan civilians, but there was no evidence produced as to rape. Rick Rojas, *Afghan witnesses describe horror of Staff Sgt. Robert Bales' attack*, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 20, 2013), <http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/20/nation/la-na-bales-sentencing-20130821>. As to the second, ISAF could not confirm the reports, and even though the news item was widely republished on different sites on the internet, there does not appear to have been any other information related to this report that was developed. This is likely in part due to the operationally-required segregation of

In this regard, the work of a NATO-accredited center, the Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence (CCOE) in the Netherlands, is particularly useful to review. CCOE is staffed by NATO personnel from seven different nations. Even though its published work is not official NATO doctrine, it incorporates many of the lessons learned by NATO forces in Afghanistan and the Balkans. Unlike U.S. Civil-Military Operations doctrine, CCOE's field handbook specifically details the importance of gender awareness in conducting civil-military operations,⁹⁵ and the importance of understanding the physical environment and ecosystems.⁹⁶ The field handbook is supplemented by two other CCOE publications, one which specifically deals with gender,⁹⁷ and the other with ecosystems assessment.⁹⁸ Importantly, the ecosystems assessment guide specifically links women's gender roles in host nations to the issues of resource use and ecosystem restoration, and reminds military planners that women's interests in these matters are often underestimated or overlooked.⁹⁹ CCOE's work demonstrates the feasibility of addressing the gender-differentiated impacts of armed conflict upon women in Civil-Military Operations doctrine, as well as gender's linkages to environmental issues, including climate change. These aspects, if included formally into the NATO gender action plan, might be useful to the Japanese NAP, given the centrality of civilian-centric peacekeeping and disaster relief missions to the overseas activities of the JSDF.

However, even if a NATO field headquarters were to consistently fill the few Gender Field Advisor posts it is assigned under BI-SCD 40-1 itself, the directive places responsibility for an enormous amount of transformative work upon the Gender Field Advisors and their support

troops from Afghan civilians, who are themselves gender-segregated in a conservative, religious society. Although NATO's historical record in this regard is not perfect, *See, e.g., Austrian KFOR Soldier Accused of Rape*, NEWS KOSOVO (May 6, 2011), <http://newskosovo.wordpress.com/2011/06/05/austrian-kfor-soldier-accused-of-rape/> (Austrian soldier charged with rape of several women); Ian Traynor, *Nato force 'feeds Kosovo sex trade'*, THE GUARDIAN (May 6, 2004), <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/07/balkans> (Amnesty International reports complicity of NATO soldiers, policemen, and civilians in Kosovo sex trade); Kim Sengupta, *The forgotten story of rape and murder in Kosovo, American-style*, THE INDEPENDENT (Nov. 3, 2000), <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-forgotten-story-of-rape-and-murder> (U.S. soldier raped and murdered 11 year old Kosovar girl), this trend is consistent with the experiences of NATO operations since the deployment of the Implementation Force into Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in 1996 in less operationally constrained environments. Based on recent statistics from the U.S. military, what is ironically more worrisome from an SGBV perspective vis-à-vis NATO gender mainstreaming is the unacceptable number of sexual assaults against female U.S. soldiers by their male comrades. Lynn Rosenthal, *Combating Sexual Assault in the United States Military*, WHITE HOUSE, Apr. 23, 2012, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/04/23/combating-sexual-assault-united-states-military>.

⁹⁴ *See, e.g.,* NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE SUPPORT, ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION (AJP) 3.4.1, 3-12 – 3-14, Annex E (Dec. 2014) (gender dealt with in text as a thematic operational aspect of peace support operations, and gender considerations dealt with more specifically in annex).

⁹⁵ CIMIC FIELD HANDBOOK, CIVIL MILITARY CO-OPERATION CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, III-6-1 – III-6-6(3rd ed. 2012), available at <http://www.cimic-coe.org/download/cfh/CIMIC-Handbook.pdf>.

⁹⁶ *Id.* at III-5-3 – III-5-4.

⁹⁷ CPT Stephanie Groothedde, CIMIC CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, GENDER MAKES SENSE: A WAY TO IMPROVE YOUR MISSION 2 (2013), http://www.cimic-coe.org/download/gender_brochure_web.pdf.

⁹⁸ CMDR N. Gallagher & MAJ P. Wit, SOCIETY STABILIZATION BY WINNING THE ENVIRONMENT: ECOSYSTEMS ASSESSMENT MAKES SENSE . . . FULL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IN CIMIC 27(2012), available at http://www.cimic-coe.org/download/Ecosystems_Assessment.pdf.

⁹⁹ *Id.* at 35.

staffs. Further, BI-SCD 40-1's taskings are themselves curious. For example, military discipline is a troop contributing nation (TCN) responsibility, so the contribution of the NATO Gender Field Advisor to this process in instances of alleged SGBV would likely be modest at best.¹⁰⁰ The directive states that the Gender Field Advisor could provide the LEGAD with information as to "gender dimensions in the judicial system" and "relevant information where women, girls and boys [sic] legal rights are neglected and/or violated,"¹⁰¹ but it is unclear how this information would factor into a TCN disciplinary action. Similarly, it is not obvious that typical Gender Field Advisors would have sufficient expertise in intelligence matters to provide the J2 meaningful input on how gender-disaggregated data should be collected in a multi-national operation and analyzed to make it operationally relevant.¹⁰² Finally, a deployed headquarters J3 is unlikely to be involved in such tactical activities as a patrol or a search operation, and would not likely have substantial involvement in information or psychological operations.¹⁰³

There are well-founded concerns that the NATO gender mainstreaming program has not really taken hold in the operational area.¹⁰⁴ The data collected in a recent and thorough assessment of the directive's implementation by the respected Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) shows that few members of the ISAF headquarters staff were aware of its requirements, and that even when personnel did know about it, they generally did not know how it might be operationalized.¹⁰⁵ More telling, the gender advisors had only enjoyed limited access to operational decision-makers, and fellow staff members rarely called upon their expertise in performing their duties.¹⁰⁶ Unfortunately, although it is well written and well documented, the assessment did not meaningfully revisit the implausibility of the directive's numerous taskings to the different gender advisors, nor did it address UNSCR 1325 in the context of kinetic operations. NATO has developed a holistic implementation plan specifically to address these shortcomings, but by not realistically tying gender advisor responsibilities to more useful operational tasks, BI-SCD 40-1 runs the risk of marginalizing gender mainstreaming in NATO in the operational context.

In sum, whereas the U.S. military seems largely unaware of the operational relevance of gender at the present time, NATO is quite aware, but not yet able to devise an effective mechanism for implementing UNSCR 1325 across the full range of operational activities. Although Japan was involved in the drafting of the NATO/EAPC policy, BI-SCD 40-1's implementation plan is therefore likely of only modest value as a model to consider with regard to the implementation of the Japanese NAP.

¹⁰⁰ *New Approach*, *supra* note 75, at 58.

¹⁰¹ BI-SCD 40-1, *supra* note 22, at Appendix A, A-3. This would also appear to require a background in international and comparative law.

¹⁰² *See New Approach*, *supra* note 75, at 58 (Further, "the information NATO expects to collect to support gender mainstreaming in operations includes whether there are security issues for women's rights activists and gender-disaggregated data on political participation and education.")

¹⁰³ *Id.* at 59.

¹⁰⁴ LACKENBAUER, *supra* note 83, at 67-68.

¹⁰⁵ *Id.*

¹⁰⁶ *Id.*

C. AUSTRALIA

i. Implementation

Promulgated in 2012, the Australian NAP intends to improve outcomes for women and girls in conflict-affected areas in five specific thematic areas: conflict prevention, increased participation of women in political processes related to conflict, greater protection during all phases of armed conflict, heightened consideration in the implementation of relief and recovery efforts afterwards, and through the promotion of normative measures. The Australian NAP sets out strategies to improve outcomes, and lists numerous actions that benchmark how these strategies will be implemented.¹⁰⁷

For our purposes, three of these five areas are of greatest interest to our analysis of the ADF's implementation efforts: integrating "a gender perspective into Australia's policies on peace and security," promoting implementation internationally, and taking a "co-ordinated and holistic approach domestically and internationally to women, peace and security."¹⁰⁸ As to the use of a gender perspective, the ADF is required to "develop guidelines for the protection of civilians, including women and girls."¹⁰⁹ To promote international implementation in conflict affected areas, the ADF will foster "opportunities for women's leadership and participation in decision-making" at the country level, consider the use of specific capabilities such as "female engagement teams and the use of gender advisors," and to "promote women's involvement in the development of institutions, including national judiciary, security and governance structures."¹¹⁰ The ADF has established a *Defence Implementation Plan (DIP)* to further develop the specific actions that must be taken to meet the NAP's requirements. The *DIP* is described as a dynamic matrix that will allow the inclusion of new tasks as they arise in the course of ADF implementation, and it is reviewed on a quarterly basis by an implementation working group.¹¹¹ The ADF must ensure that policy frameworks are consistent with the objectives and intent of UNSCR 1325, and this approach informed the *DIP*, in particular policy and planning guidance, planning directives for operations, joint and single-service doctrine, and training.¹¹²

ii. Assessment

Australia recently published a progress report on its NAP implementation.¹¹³ As a benchmark for the strategy of integrating of a gender perspective in the ADF, the Australian NAP identifies a metric: "the number, title and description of relevant policy and guidance documents that

¹⁰⁷ AUSTRALIAN NAP, *supra* note 21, at 19-25.

¹⁰⁸ *Id.* at 19.

¹⁰⁹ *Id.*

¹¹⁰ *Id.* at 23.

¹¹¹ *Defence Implementation Plan*, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE website, <http://www.defence.gov.au/vcdf/initiatives/NAP-DefenceImplementationPlan.htm>. Unfortunately, the *DIP* is not available to the public at this point, so detailed assessment of the mechanics of implementation is not possible.

¹¹² E-mail from CAPT Jennifer Wittwer, Director, National Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security, Office of Chief of Defense Force, ADF, to Jody M. Prescott (Jan. 20, 2015, at 1320 EST) (copy on file with authors).

¹¹³ DEPARTMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET, 2014 PROGRESS REPORT, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY 2012-2018, <https://www.dpmc.gov.au/office-women/publication/2014-progress-report-australian-national-action-plan-women-peace-and-security-2012-2018> (2014) [hereinafter "PROGRESS REPORT"].

contain reference to the Women, Peace and Security agenda or resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960.”¹¹⁴ The *Progress Report* notes that the Australian NAP is being implemented “in key strategic guidance documents,” including the 2014 version of the “Defence Corporate Plan, the 2014 Defence Annual Plan, the Defence International Engagement Strategy and the Defence Regional Engagement Strategy.”¹¹⁵ Further, “[o]perational guidance on Women, Peace and Security will be included in the Chief of the Defence Force Planning Directives which inform strategic direction and planning for operations.”¹¹⁶ In addition, in March 2014 the Secretary of Defence and Chief of Defense Forces directed that all current and future operations planning include gender considerations, and a Women, Peace and Security advisor has been appointed to the Commander Joint Task Force 633 for Middle East operation.¹¹⁷

Importantly, the ADF’s intent is to address the operational aspects of gender in strategic-level doctrine as well. As set out specifically in the *Progress Report*, the ADF plans to revise Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.11, *Civil Military Cooperation* (to address gender awareness);¹¹⁸ ADDP 3.20, *The Military Contribution to Humanitarian Operations* (which already covers operational environment, culture, gender, religion, and disabilities); ADDP 3.8, *Peace Operations* (two chapters relating to planning and training are to be revised); ADDP 5.0, *Joint Planning* (to be updated to reflect UNSCR 1325 issues); and Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 5.0.1, *Joint Military Appreciation Process* (“the broad framework for military planning”).¹¹⁹ Importantly, the ADF is undertaking an even wider doctrinal assessment than that set out in the *Progress Report*, and coupled with the comprehensive inclusion of gender considerations in the *Joint Doctrine Development Guide*,¹²⁰ this should lay the groundwork for institutional change in embedding UNSCR 1325-related concepts.

The inclusion of a gender perspective in the strategic level ADF policies and plans would certainly be a positive step, because although these revisions were to have been completed as of 2014, a review of the doctrinal publications at the time of this writing does not show that any of them have been put in place.¹²¹ As with the U.S., this is true even in the kinds of operations most likely to be used in a war amongst the people, such as Multinational, Peace and Civil-Military Operations. For example, at the time of this writing, ADF multinational doctrine mentions women only twice, both times in the context of the composition of different armed forces.¹²² There is no mention of gender or UNSCR 1325. Similarly, Peace Operations doctrine notes only

¹¹⁴ AUSTRALIAN NAP, *supra* note 21, at 28.

¹¹⁵ PROGRESS REPORT; *supra* note 113, at 15.

¹¹⁶ *Id.*

¹¹⁷ Wittwer e-mail, *supra* note 112.

¹¹⁸ PROGRESS REPORT; *supra* note 113, at 83.

¹¹⁹ *Id.* at 84.

¹²⁰ Wittwer e-mail, *supra* note 112.

¹²¹ See generally *Joint Doctrine Centre*, AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE WARFARE CENTRE website, <http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/ADFP.html> (last visited Jan. 2, 2015).

¹²² CHIEF OF JOINT OPERATIONS, HQJOC, ADDP 00.3, MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS 1-5, 3-18 (June 3, 2011), available at <http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/doctrine.html>.

that Australia is party to the *UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime's People Trafficking Protocol*.¹²³

One might logically assume that civil-military operations, with their civilian-centric focus, would meaningfully deal with the operational relevance of gender. The ADF defines civil-military operations as “any measures, activities, or planning undertaken by the military which both facilitates the conduct of military operations, and builds support, legitimacy and consent, within the civil population in furtherance of the mission.”¹²⁴ Although the version of ADDP 3.11 current at the time of this writing is very detailed and comprehensive, it addresses women only twice, noting that they might be a vulnerable population in host nations and that when they are detained in the course of an armed conflict, they “are to be quartered separately from men and supervised by women.”¹²⁵ Gender is mentioned once, in that humanitarian assistance is to be rendered impartially irrespective of gender,¹²⁶ and climate change not at all.

As to the strategy co-ordinated and holistic approach, one benchmark activity shows great promise for implementing this strategy – the fostering of continuing “civil-military cooperation and information sharing in operations.”¹²⁷ Given the capability of the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC), and the work ACMC has already done on the civil-military aspects of responding to natural disasters,¹²⁸ this broadened perspective would appear feasible for incorporation into the ADF's NAP implementation efforts. Importantly, however, there may be a risk that the implementation of the NAP is seen more as a peacekeeping or humanitarian disaster matter, rather than balancing gender perspective efforts in kinetic operations.¹²⁹ It is not clear yet whether the ADF's appetite for doctrinal revision will include supporting doctrine relevant to kinetic operations, such as targeting,¹³⁰ and to a large extent, the law of armed conflict doctrine as it applies to the use of armed force.¹³¹

¹²³ CHIEF OF JOINT OPERATIONS, HQJOC, ADDP 3.8, PEACE OPERATIONS 2-14 (Dec. 14, 2009), *available at* <http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/doctrine.html>.

¹²⁴ CHIEF OF JOINT OPERATIONS, HQJOC, ADDP 3.11, CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS 1-2 (Apr. 1, 2009).

¹²⁵ *Id.* at 1-11, 2B-2.

¹²⁶ *Id.* at 1-11.

¹²⁷ AUSTRALIAN NAP, *supra* note 21, at 25.

¹²⁸ *Disaster Management and Humanitarian*, ACMC webpage, <http://acmc.gov.au/our-work-and-focus/disaster-management-and-humanitarian/>.

¹²⁹ *Summary of Defence Progress as at February 2014*, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE website, <http://www.defence.gov.au/vcdf/initiatives/docs/Defence%20Progress%20FEB%202014.pdf>.

¹³⁰ CHIEF OF JOINT OPERATIONS, HEADQUARTERS JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND (HQJOC), ADDP 3.14, TARGETING (Feb. 2, 2009), *available at* <http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/doctrine.html>.

¹³¹ CHIEF OF JOINT OPERATIONS, HQJOC), ADDP 06.4, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (May 11, 2006), *available at* <http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/doctrine.html>. In general, although ADF LOAC doctrine does meaningfully mention women and the “special” protections they receive under LOAC, this occurs predominately in the context of safeguarding women from “rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault.” *Id.* at 9-7, 9-14. ADDP 06.4 also notes that the importance of providing subsistence articles to civilian women and children in particular, and that women are to receive medical treatment with all consideration due to their sex, although medical treatment priority is of course based on need. *Id.* at 6-15 – 6-16, 9-24. These protections are of course exceedingly important in terms of implementing UNSCR 1325, and they reflect the AUSTRALIAN NAP's focus in the thematic area of protection on the protection of women and girls from gender-based violence. AUSTRALIAN NAP, *supra* note 21, at 14. Unfortunately, they also reflect the Geneva Conventions' outdated and discriminatory premise of female

The Australian NAP includes many benchmarks for the international implementation strategy that are pertinent to the ADF. Some of them are intended to protect women through concrete actions to prevent, investigate and support prosecution of instances of gender-based violence.¹³² Of these important actions, the prevention efforts, which include multilateral discussions on the protection of civilians and particularly the need to combat gender-based violence,¹³³ are likely to be the easiest to accomplish and continue. Formalizing complaint mechanisms to foster the safe reporting of allegations of gender-based violence¹³⁴ are likely quite practicable to implement within ADF units, but as with U.S. efforts in this regard, they may become more complex depending on the status of ADF units in host nations, the multilateral nature of the military organisation with which ADF units might be deployed, and the nationality of the actors involved. As with NATO forces noted *supra*, Australian armed forces are generally very well disciplined in their relations with host nation populations, and the depredations upon local women and girls one associates with certain UN peacekeeping missions¹³⁵ are not part of the Australian military experience.¹³⁶ Further, by defining protection of women in armed conflict as essentially protection from SGBV, this benchmark could channel the development of guidelines for protection into a much more narrow context than would seem necessary for fully implementation of UNSCR 1325's requirements.

Other international implementation strategy benchmarks include the “description of international assistance provided for activities pertaining to women, peace and security,” and the “description of strategies employed by the ADF . . . to facilitate the engagement and protection of local women in peace and security efforts.”¹³⁷ The Australian NAP recognises the FETs as helping to fulfil these tasks, as they “meet with local women and discuss their security needs.”¹³⁸ The *Progress Report* favorably notes the role played by Australian FETs in the engagement with and protection of Afghan women in Uruzgan Province.¹³⁹ Hopefully, since the Australian experience

modesty and status based on relationships with others, or as ADDP 06.4 phrases it, “attacks on their honour,” as the basis for protection of women. ADDP 06.4, *supra*, at 12-8.

¹³² AUSTRALIAN NAP, *supra* note 21, at 24.

¹³³ *Id.*

¹³⁴ *Id.*

¹³⁵ See Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al-Hussein, *A Comprehensive Strategy to eliminate future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Report to the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, A/59/710 (2005), <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekeeping/reform/2005/zeidrep.pdf>.

¹³⁶ DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: PROFESSIONALISM, TRUST AND CAPABILITY IN THE AUSTRALIAN PROFESSION OF ARMS 11(2011), *available at* http://www.defence.gov.au/pathwaytochange/docs/personalconductpersonnel/Review%20of%20Personal%20Conduct%20of%20ADF%20Personnel_full%20report.pdf. Overemphasis upon SGBV in training runs the risk of alienating ADF members who see themselves as professionals. See GENDERFORCE, GOOD AND BAD EXAMPLES, LESSONS LEARNED FROM WORKING WITH UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 1325 IN INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS 39 (2009) (Swedish male officer relates that “the UN headquarters in Beirut arranged a course on gender equality and resolution 1325 . . . before deployment. But there was too much ‘moralizing’ about codes of conduct and how UN soldiers had been responsible for human rights violations . . . Many of us felt accused and could not see how this related to our assignment. It would have been better to inform us about the situation for women in the mission area and what we could actually do about it.”).

¹³⁷ AUSTRALIAN NAP, *supra* note 21, at 29.

¹³⁸ *Id.* at 34, 42.

¹³⁹ *Id.* at 48.

with FETs in Afghanistan has been recognized as a positive one,¹⁴⁰ any doctrinal revisions will carve out space for their continued employment in the ADF. The perspective on the role of the FETs appears to be primarily from a peacekeeping perspective, however, noting that Australian FETs “also support education programmes, economic development, and the provision of health services, medicine and school supplied to the local population.”¹⁴¹ This emphasis could marginalize any efforts to find an enduring role in kinetic operations for the FETs, and might actually be accentuated through the inclusion of women, peace and security considerations in exercises conducted by the ADF Peace Operations Centre with regional partners such as Indonesia and Thailand.¹⁴² However, the ADF is looking to include these themes in other exercises, such as the *Talisman Sabre/Saber* series of exercises it conducts with U.S. forces,¹⁴³ so there is opportunity for balance in the development of exercise themes and scenarios.¹⁴⁴

More broadly, the ADF appears to be addressing institutional change, by developing a coordinated and holistic strategy regarding women, peace, and security both nationally and internationally. This institutional-level approach is not apparent in U.S. efforts, and is probably not replicable near-term in the consensus-driven decision-making environment of NATO. An example of this institutional change is the use of a Gender Equality Advisory Board (GEAB), a direction-setting advisory body that drives and shapes the direction of the “Secretary of Defense’s and Chief of Defence Force’s gender equality priorities within the broader Defence cultural reform agenda.”¹⁴⁵ The GEAB is jointly chaired by the Secretary of Defence and the Chief of Defence Forces, indicating institutional championing of this effort.¹⁴⁶ GEAB members include “Defence officials, ADF Women’s advisors, senior private sector and civil society representatives and a Special Advisor (Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Australian Human Rights Commission).”¹⁴⁷ The GEAB meets quarterly, and since December 2013, it has included Women, Peace and Security and National Action Plan implementation as a standing agenda item.¹⁴⁸ The activities of the GEAB are complemented by the Defence National Action Plan Implementation Plan Working Group, which is comprised of representatives from the Services and Groups within Defence, and is tasked with facilitating progress on the NAP.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁰ Remarks by Air Marshal Mark Binskin, *Annual Civil Society Dialogue on Women, Peace and Security 2013*, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE website <http://www.defence.gov.au/vcdf/Demo2/media/Annual%20Civil%20Society%20Dialogue%20on%20Women,%20Peace%20and%20Security%202013.pdf>.

¹⁴¹ *Id.*

¹⁴² *Id.* at 46.

¹⁴³ PROGRESS REPORT; *supra* note 113, at 78.

¹⁴⁴ See, e.g., *Outcomes from Exercise TALISMAN SABER 13*, AUSTRALIAN CIVIL-MILITARY CENTRE NEWSLETTER 8 (Nov. 2013), <http://acmc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/ACMC-November-Newsletter.pdf> (bilateral military exercise involving ADF and U.S. personnel). *Talisman Sabre 15* will include exercise scenario play that includes gender considerations, and deployed gender advisors supporting commanders and senior staff. Lape e-mail, *supra* note 59.

¹⁴⁵ PROGRESS REPORT; *supra* note 113, at 72.

¹⁴⁶ Wittwer e-mail, *supra* note 112.

¹⁴⁷ PROGRESS REPORT, *supra* note 113.

¹⁴⁸ *Id.* at 72-73.

¹⁴⁹ *Id.* at 73.

In sum, the ADF's implementation of the Australian NAP at this point in time appears to lean towards inclusion of gender perspectives in operations from more of a non-kinetic perspective, consistent with the precepts of Peacekeeping and Stability Operations, rather than a broader perspective that would be more inclusive of UNSCR 1325's requirements regarding kinetic operations.¹⁵⁰ However, the ADF's efforts represent in many ways nothing short of fundamental change in the way it conducts its business with respect to gender considerations. Any assessment of the ADF's incorporation of a gender perspective in its activities and operations must recognize that it is occurring alongside very significant government actions to ensure equal treatment of women ADF servicemembers and to improve gender diversity in the ADF from a capability perspective.¹⁵¹ Accordingly, even though Australia's significant experience in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions might suggest at one level that the ADF's implementation of the Australian NAP might be particularly worthy of the JSDF's consideration in its implementation of the Japanese NAP, there are internal social and legal drivers behind the efforts to increase the number of women in the ADF and their roles and responsibilities that are not likely present in Japanese NAP implementation efforts.

IV. WOMEN IN THE JSDF

U.S. armed forces have the greatest absolute number of women servicemembers, and one of the highest percentages of any NATO TCN (15%).¹⁵² ADF female servicemembers constituted approximately 13.7% of ADF personnel in 2011¹⁵³, but that portion has increased to 15.1% in 2014.¹⁵⁴ In contrast, women only constitute approximately 5.6% of JSDF servicemembers (12,599 out of 225,712).¹⁵⁵

Formally part of the JSDF since 1952 when 57 female nurses were given regular service status in the ground forces of the then-National Safety Forces,¹⁵⁶ women's numbers in the JSDF are up

¹⁵⁰ The PROGRESS REPORT, *supra* note 113, states: "Australia promotes Women, Peace and Security internationally by specifically supporting initiatives related to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the Women, Peace and Security agenda more broadly. The Government's efforts include supporting women's participation in formal peace negotiations, working to prevent and respond to sexual violence in conflict, and supporting women's roles in conflict prevention and peace-building." *Id.* at 74.

¹⁵¹ In describing the impact of the continuing government review of the ADF and its treatment of women servicemembers, set out in the REPORT ON THE REVIEW INTO THE TREATMENT OF WOMEN AT THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY, PHASE 1 OF THE REVIEW INTO THE TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (2011) and REVIEW INTO THE TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, PHASE 2 REPORT (2012), The PROGRESS REPORT notes these reviews specifically describe "how the National Action Plan intersects with the work and recommendations of the Review, which is designed to enhance military capability and contributions to peace and security efforts through increased participation of women in the ADF, on deployments, and in senior decision-making roles." *Id.* at 16.

¹⁵² CNN Staff, *By the numbers: Women in the U.S. Military*, CNN.COM (Jan. 24, 2013), <http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/24/us/military-women-glance/>. The number of women serving in the military is approximately 200,000, and there are approximately 70 female flag officers. *Id.*

¹⁵³ PROGRESS REPORT; *supra* note 113, at Table 3.

¹⁵⁴ Wittwer email, *supra* note 112.

¹⁵⁵ HEISEI 26-NENN-BANN BOUEI HAKUSYO [Defense of Japan 2014], JMoD webpage, <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/hyouka/tokei/women.html> [hereinafter "HEISEI 26-NENN-BANN BOUEI HAKUSYO"].

¹⁵⁶ Fumika Sato, *A Camouflaged Military: Japan's Self-Defense Forces and Globalized Gender Mainstreaming*, 10 ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL 1, 2 (Sept. 2012), http://www.japanfocus.org/site/make_pdf/3820.

slightly since 2009, when only 5.2% of JSDF servicemembers were women.¹⁵⁷ Technically, women in the JSDF are eligible to serve in a fairly large number of military positions, but in reality restrictions are applied because of maternity and privacy concerns, avoiding risks of close combat, and economic concerns regarding the accommodation of women.¹⁵⁸ These *de facto* exclusions significantly limit the roles women can perform in the JSDF – and significantly, there are many JSDF employment areas that have not been traditionally sought by women servicemembers (such as infantry positions).¹⁵⁹ As described in the annual JMoD white paper, *Defense of Japan 2014*,

While there are still limitations to certain assignments, due to the requirement for protecting motherhood and securing privacy (excluded from assignment to tanks, submarines, fighters, etc.), female SDF engage in boarding escort vessels and piloting antisubmarine patrol aircraft and transport aircraft, and their roles are expanding even at the nucleus of the SDF such as the staff offices and headquarters.¹⁶⁰

Reflecting in part at least progress towards gender equality¹⁶¹ rather than gender diversity, that is, a social justice approach rather than a capability approach, JMoD's *Basic Plan for Gender Equality in the Ministry of Defense FY2011-FY2015*, was released in March 2011.¹⁶² The Basic Plan reflects the gender equality principles that underpin the objectives of the government's Cabinet Office *White Paper on Gender Equality*.¹⁶³ As such, the expanded recruitment and retention of women in the JSDF is an objective, but the *White Paper* does not make the crucial link between women's participation and improved JSDF capabilities.¹⁶⁴ For example, programs such as childcare, men's paternity leave, and a greater work-life balance are argued to promote women's participation in the workforce; however, these are not seen as critical to maintaining women in the JSDF workforce. In a commercial enterprise, if female employees' contributions

¹⁵⁷ HEISEI 26-NENN-BANN BOUEI HAKUSYO, *supra* note 155.

¹⁵⁸ *Jyosei Jieikan no Haichi Seigen (Limiting Assignments Rule)*, JMoD webpage, <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/jinji/gender/2-2.pdf> (Dr. Iwata trans.). All of the services are open to female uniformed personnel, but due to the requirements of protecting motherhood and securing privacy, some assignments are limited. In general, women servicemembers tend to be concentrated in communication, intelligence, medicine and accounting specialties, and in general duties units. SABINE FRÜHSTÜCK, *UNEASY WARRIORS: GENDER, MEMORY AND POPULAR CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE ARMY* 91 (2007).

¹⁵⁹ This is sometimes informally described as “the Japanese way of doing things.” Discussion of what are appropriate roles for women in the Japanese military has often become bogged down in outdated ideas of emasculated warfare, rather than focusing on the capability enhancement female servicemembers could bring to the force. FRÜHSTÜCK, *supra* note 158, at 100.

¹⁶⁰ DEFENSE OF JAPAN, *supra* note 9, at 351.

¹⁶¹ See Sato, *supra* note 156, at 8 (government motivations to increase the number of women in the JSDF include claiming “societal advancement following the expansion of workplace access for women in civil society”).

¹⁶² DEFENSE OF JAPAN, *supra* note 9, at 351.

¹⁶³ HEISEI 23-NENN-BANN DANNJYO KYODO SANKAKU HAKUSYO (JAPANESE CABINET OFFICE, CABINET OFFICE WHITE PAPER ON GENDER EQUALITY 2011) 3 (2011), *available at* http://www.gender.go.jp/about_danjo/whitepaper/.

¹⁶⁴ Viewing the role of women through a capability lens, rather than through a social justice lens, can be an effective approach to confront and resolve both overt and covert gender diversity resistance in an organization. Laura Sabattini & Faye Crosby, *Chap. 11, Overcoming Resistance: Structures and Attitudes*, in *DIVERSITY RESISTANCE IN ORGANIZATIONS* 282 (Kecia M. Thomas ed. 2008).

were valued because of their positive impact on corporate operations, one would expect more pragmatic measures aimed at improving retention of female employees.

The JSDF approach acknowledges the social justice argument for increasing opportunities available to women, but does not recognize the improvements in capability that women would bring, particularly in civil-military operations. The focus of the *Basic Plan*'s implementation is largely on opening doors to women, without removing barriers that prevent them from entering, leaving it up to the women who "have the desire and capability" to push through. Importantly, these tweaks to a social justice approach are unlikely to yield significant increases in the number of female servicemembers since this same approach has not resulted in noticeable organizational outcomes in the two decades of its use.¹⁶⁵

When specific career paths within the JSDF for women are examined, it is worth noting, for example, that the maritime component of the JSDF currently has two women serving as ship captains of training vessels,¹⁶⁶ and if restrictions were removed, they could command destroyers in a few years. Further, there is some evidence to suggest that women who join the JSDF do so because it offers a meaningful alternative to non-career employment in mundane service-industry, clerical, and retail jobs.¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, there are only a few long-term career paths open to women, and little opportunity to gain tactical-level experience. The JMoD has stated that it will seek to increase the numbers of women servicemembers in international peace cooperation activities.¹⁶⁸ Despite recent informative reports in the Japanese military press on women officers serving in such missions,¹⁶⁹ and the visible and significant role played by female JSDF female personnel in the Great East Japan Earthquake recovery efforts,¹⁷⁰ anecdotal information suggests that most of the JSDF personnel who have served on such missions have

¹⁶⁵ For example, even though the cap on the number of female cadets admitted to the National Defense Academy was lifted in the early 2000's, the number of female graduates has consistently remained around 5% of any given class. DEFENSE OF JAPAN, *supra* note 9, at 457. Women were first admitted as cadets in 1992. Sato, *supra* note 156, at 6.

¹⁶⁶ Fumiaki Motoyama, *Josei Jieikan Michi Hiraku (Broadening Pathways for Female Japan Self-Defense Force Members)*, ASAHI SHINBUN YAKUN (ASAHI EVENING EDITION) (May 14, 2013); Kirk Spitzer, *Japanese Women Take Command, Finally*, TIME.COM (Mar. 22, 2013), <http://nation.time.com/2013/03/22/japanese-women-take-command-finally.html>.

¹⁶⁷ FRÜHSTÜCK, *supra* note 158, 92-93.

¹⁶⁸ DEFENSE OF JAPAN, *supra* note 9, at 351.

¹⁶⁹ See *Women Making a Difference at the MOD – Interview with a SDF Female Officer*, JAPAN DEFENSE FOCUS, No. 56 (Sept. 2014), JMoD website, <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no56/topics.html> (LTC Kurita noted her gender allowed her to gather information from Timorese women that male officers would not have obtained, and that being a woman officer seems to make an impression on government officials and senior officers from other Asian countries); *Interview with LTC Kawasaki*, JAPAN DEFENSE FOCUS, No. 53 (June 2014), JMoD website, <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no53/specialfeature.html> (LTC Kawasaki deployed to both Timor and South Sudan on JSDF peacekeeping operations, providing medical assistance. When asked whether she thought "there was any particular area that [she thought she contributed to] as a female officer, she stated, "There was nothing in particular. This is because I found my working environment comfortable as my gender did not matter."). In November 2014, LTC Kurita was assigned to NATO headquarters to provide advice on incorporating gender perspectives in military operations. *Dispatch of a female Self-Defense Force personnel to NATO headquarters*, JMOFA website (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000488.html.

¹⁷⁰ James Simpson, *JSW Talks: Prof Sabine Frühstück*, JAPAN SECURITY WATCH, NEW PACIFIC INSTITUTE website (July 30, 2011), <http://jsw.newpacificinstitute.org/?p=7467>.

been men.¹⁷¹ Likewise, there are few opportunities to gain strategic-level planning and decision-making skills for women – and it is therefore no real surprise that there are no women generals, and few colonels. In fairness to the JSDF, however, this situation is also reflected in civilian Japanese society, for there is a notable lack of women in “career streams” and managerial positions there as well.¹⁷²

Ironically, although women constitute 52% of the Japanese population,¹⁷³ if the policies of the Abe Administration do significantly increase the participation of women in the Japanese workforce, this would likely result in the JSDF facing increasing competition for qualified women to help fill its ranks.¹⁷⁴ It is also important to note that unlike the situation in Australia and the United States, Japanese women have not campaigned for gender integration in the JSDF. As Fumika Sato has noted, “By contrast, Japanese women activists, deeply concerned about the threat of resurgent militarism in Japan, have not prioritized support for expanded opportunities for women in the SDF.”¹⁷⁵ It is in this context that the current draft of the Japanese NAP and its requirements for JMoD implementation must be examined.

V. THE EVOLVING JAPANESE NAP

The Japanese government publically announced it was undertaking work on the Japanese NAP in April 2013.¹⁷⁶ Concerned that there was a lack of transparency in the drafting process, a number of NGO’s petitioned the Abe Administration to be more inclusive in August 2013.¹⁷⁷ As a result, the first consultation between representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JMoFA) and

¹⁷¹ The Sixty-Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations – Address by Primer Minister Abe, Speeches and Statements by the Prime Minister, PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND HIS CABINET website (Sept. 25, 2014), http://mofa.go.jp/fp/unp_a/page24e_000057.html (Prime Minister Abe says that Japan has sent total of 9,700 personnel on peacekeeping missions).

¹⁷² See Reports: The World Economic Forum ranked Japan at 105th place by its Global Gender Gap Index, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL WOMEN’S CLUBS OF JAPAN (BPW) website, <http://www.bpw-japan.jp/english/wef105.html> (Japan was 105 out of 136 countries; in particular, the rate of Japanese women’s political participation and empowerment was only 6% compared to that of men).

¹⁷³ Japan, CIA WORLD FACT BOOK, CIA.GOV website, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_ja.pdf.

¹⁷⁴ The JSDF finds itself in a difficult position in this regard. Operational realities mean the JSDF must focus on recruiting young, healthy personnel – who are very much in demand by civilian employers. Relying on immigration to help replenish this age cohort is not realistic – Japan is a very demographically homogenous society, with 98.5% of its population claiming Japanese descent, *id.*, and immigration initiatives that do exist focus on recruiting temporary manual labor, not skilled labor. See Japan, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF MIGRATION website, <http://www.iom.int/cms/japan> (limited temporary migration programs being promoted to ease labor shortages).

¹⁷⁵ Sato, *supra* note 156, at 8. However, Sato would argue that on the whole, “[t]he SDF’s own goals, and those of the government generally, have centered on camouflaging military expansion through the use of women as poster girls and the creation of an image of the SDF as an advanced domestic and international organization.” *Id.* at 6.

¹⁷⁶ Mavic Cabrera Balleza, Japan Develops its National Action Plan on Resolution 1325, GLOBAL NETWORK OF WOMEN PEACEBUILDERS website (Apr. 2013), <http://www.gnwp.org/blog/japan-april-2013>.

¹⁷⁷ 39 groups call for wider civil society participation for Japanese 1325 NAP, ASIA-JAPAN WOMEN’S RESOURCE CENTER website (Aug. 29, 2013), <http://www.ajwrc.org/eng/modules/bulletin/index.php?page=article&storyid=141>.

NGO's occurred in September 2013, followed by almost monthly consultations thereafter.¹⁷⁸ At the time of this writing, the Japanese NAP is nearing completion, but it is not certain when it will be published. As currently drafted, the Japanese NAP has four main objectives, each of which is complemented by sub-objectives and measures that are currently being refined. The four main objectives are best described as implementing UNSCR 1325 and the subsequent related resolutions through participation, prevention, protection, and humanitarian assistance or construction assistance. As with the U.S. and Australian NAPs, different agencies across the breadth of the Japanese Government are given the responsibility to meet the suitable objectives and sub-objectives. Because the Japanese NAP is not finished, however, an explanation of its most important parts must necessarily be more descriptive than analytical at this point in time.¹⁷⁹

The Japanese NAP aims to realize gender mainstreaming in peace and security areas through the participation of women in all areas, at all levels. Specifically, this includes women playing an important part in the decision-making processes in security and peace matters, and for the inclusion of gender perspectives in these processes as well. The objective of prevention is defined as enforcing women's participation and leadership at all levels of conflict prevention, control, and resolution, as well as the inclusion of gender perspectives into all these activities. This will ensure women's participation in conflict prevention activities and the inclusion of gender perspectives in early surveillance and reaction mechanisms, their participation in efforts to control conflict in societies in which it is occurring, and the promotion of women's leadership in these societies. Other important prevention measures include reflecting gender perspectives in peace negotiations and conflict reemergence prevention, in promoting the resolution of conflict without resorting to the use of armed force, strengthening capabilities to both prevent and to respond to sexual exploitation and SGBV by peacekeeping troops, and to provide support to women serving as leaders in peacekeeping missions.

Complementing measures to prevent and respond to instances of sexual exploitation and SGBV, the objective of protection is designed to ensure that women and girls will not be exposed to serious human rights violations such as SGBV in humanitarian crises, whether natural disasters or armed conflicts. Measures to ensure protection include comprehensive support to SGBV victims through physical, medical, socio-physiological, legal and economic assistance, mitigation of SGBV risks resulting from humanitarian crises, and incorporating gender perspectives into the provision of support to displaced persons. Other measures include prevention of SGBV caused by peacekeeping personnel, the investigation of alleged perpetrators and punishment of those found guilty, and the provision of adequate support to DDR efforts during and after armed conflict.

Finally, the objective of incorporating a gender perspective into humanitarian assistance and construction assistance is closely related to the operational activities of JSDF units and personnel overseas as well as inside Japan up until this point. This objective is defined as reflecting the needs of women and girls in these missions, and to further women's participation and

¹⁷⁸ *Drafting Process of Japan's National Action Plan*, JMoFA website (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/page23e_000182.html.

¹⁷⁹ This information regarding the main points in the Japanese draft NAP results from Dr. Iwata's observations of meetings between government officials and members of the NGO community over the last few months.

empowerment in them as well. Measures to accomplish this objective include recognition in both planning and in operations of the vulnerable nature of women and children during and immediately after armed conflict and natural disasters, and the inclusion of women and gender perspectives in the reconstruction and rebuilding activities. Other measures include directly linking medical and health care to human security, education, agriculture, infrastructure improvement, and legal assistance, and seeking gender balance in Japanese assistance staff as well as staff training to prevent SGBV.

As currently drafted, these objectives and measures are very consistent with current JSDF overseas missions underpinning proactive contributions to peace, which Prime Minister Abe has strongly proposed. It is not surprising, therefore, to see them closely reflected in the specific responsibilities detailed to the JSDF. For example, as to participation, JMoD will ensure that gender perspectives are included in pre-deployment training for peacekeeping personnel, and establish a section within it responsible for women's empowerment and the development of these educational activities. JMoD will also increase the number of women serving on deployments. For accomplishment of the prevention and protection objectives, in addition to gender mainstreaming training for female personnel, JMoD will develop measures to prevent the commission of SGBV by JSDF personnel and develop an appropriate judicial mechanism to punish SGBV perpetrators, as well as a system to provide support and compensation for victims. Perhaps because the objective of incorporating a gender perspective in humanitarian and construction assistance activities is already so clearly set out in the current draft of the Japanese NAP, no further directions are given to JMoD in this regard.

VI. CONCLUSION

Since the submission of proposed principles and recommendations for the development of the Japanese NAP by different non-governmental organizations and academics to JMoFA in August 2013, short monthly meetings comprised of these groups and individuals, and the relevant government organizations, have been held to develop the Japanese NAP. Through this process, the government organizations and the NGOs have established good working relationships, despite their often different organizational philosophies. As Rui Matsukawa, the Director of the Gender Mainstreaming Division, JMoFA, recently stated, "We will face difficulties with the [NGOs] together – we will review our NAP over time, and may change focus or indicators to respond to feedback – but in that phase too there [will be] partnership between civil societies and [government] agencies."¹⁸⁰

To review, we have analyzed three Western NAP implementation models that are potentially relevant to the JSDF's implementation of the Japanese NAP; but all of the models have drawbacks that make them of only limited utility to Japan and the JSDF at this point in time. Due to implementation problems with the U.S. NAP from an operational perspective and the unique constitutional status of the JSDF, the U.S. NAP is not likely to serve as a fruitful model. The JSDF is not currently allowed to engage in "kinetic" overseas operations;¹⁸¹ indeed, the military

¹⁸⁰ *Japan Reaffirms Its Commitment to Women's Participation in Peacebuilding*, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY blog (Dec. 8, 2014), <http://giwps.wordpress.com/tag/national-action-plan/>.

¹⁸¹ FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, *supra* note 14.

operations in which JSDF assets have participated overseas, even in Iraq between 2005 and 2006,¹⁸² have been essentially humanitarian.¹⁸³ Furthermore, the NAP development process in the U.S. does not reflect the collaborative relationship between NGOs and government representatives seen in Japan. NATO has taken a more collaborative approach than the U.S., but its gender action plan relies too heavily on too few gender advisors to shoulder the transformative work that must be done within that organization's deployed headquarters for it to effectively implement UNSCR 1325 in a truly operational sense. Therefore, it too warrants only limited consideration by the JSDF at this time as it moves forward with its NAP implementation.

Of the three, the Australian model offers the most robust example of NAP implementation of UNSCR 1325. At one level, the significant experience of the ADF with peacekeeping and its working relationship with organizations such as the ACMC on NAP implementation suggests a potentially useful commonality between the ADF and the JSDF in terms of NAP implementation from a mission perspective. At a deeper level, however, the ADF's need to plan for military missions across the spectrum of operations, and the policy drivers working to increase the number and role of women in the ADF from a perspective of capability, suggest that the Australian approach too might have only limited usefulness to the JSDF. Japan's economic and security situation is moving it in directions that might change the JSDF's role appreciably in the future, however, and at some point, Japan and its Western allies might find that greater harmonization of their respective NAP implementations in the intersection of gender and operations is necessary for the more efficient conduct of their combined missions.

¹⁸² See Masanori Kuroki, *The Deployment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in Iraq and Public Trust among Different Ideological Groups*, 25 *DEFENCE AND PEACE ECONOMICS* 281, 281-82, 288 (2014).

¹⁸³ See *Japan's About-Face, Map: Japan's Self-Defense Forces Deployments*, PBS.ORG, <http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/japans-about-face/map-japans-self-defense-forces-deployments/1275/> (July 8, 2008) (overseas deployments other than Iraq conducted as part of peacekeeping operations or international disaster relief operations).

THE SUB-CONFLICT BETWEEN ISIL AND THE KURDISH FORCES: WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION BEYOND ARMED STRUGGLE

By Pishko Shamsi¹

INTRODUCTION

The chain of events that we look back upon and analyse in this paper had its starting point in the popular protests that were sparked in Tunisia in late 2010, following an act of self-immolation by Mohamed Bouazizi, a 27 year-old street vendor. The protest movement quickly spread to Egypt, Libya and Syria, and became known as “the Arab Spring”. Time Magazine declared “The Protester” as its 2011 Person of the Year for having toppled dictators and started a global wave of dissent.² Within a few years, however, the optimism of that time had faded, buried under cycles of violence and destruction.

Syria's Kurdish minority, despite the systematic discrimination that it had faced at the hands of the Syrian regime,³ was cautiously engaging in the protests that erupted in March 2011. In 2004, a Kurdish uprising, known as the Qamishli uprising had been violently crushed by the Assad government.⁴ Dozens of Kurdish civilians were killed by Syrian security forces. Facing widespread arrests and incarceration, activists and journalists went underground. Following this, the government's systematic repression and socio-economic discrimination of the Kurds deepened. It was in large part because of this history that Syria's Kurds were reluctant to fully embrace the 2011 anti-Government protests.

By mid-2012, with civil war raging around them, Syria's Kurds could no longer sit out the fight. The very pragmatism that had motivated their attempts at neutrality now dictated a policy of defence of the Syrian Kurdish regions from the encroaching threat of Jihadist and Islamist fighters who were increasingly major forces in the Syrian conflict.

¹ The author wish to thank Sareta Jane Ashraph for her extensive comments.

² The Protester: TIME's 2011 Person of the Year, Time Magazine, ‘In 2011, protesters didn't just voice their complaints; they changed the world.’ <http://www.time.com/time/person-of-the-year/2011/#ixzz3POcMAIrZ>

³ Syrian Kurds had faced oppression and discrimination since the early days of Baath party rule. Since the late 1950s Kurdish activists led an underground struggle for political and cultural rights. Initially the Kurdish movement in Syria had close links to the Kurds in Iraq, and the rebellion led by Mustafa Barzani. Decades later Syrian Kurds would be deeply influenced by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) that fought a guerrilla war in Turkey's Kurdish regions, particularly after the PKK set up their political headquarters in Syria in the 1990s. In the aftermath of the 2004 Qamishli uprising, the systematic repression and socio-economic discrimination was aggravated. The Syrian government's repressive policies lasted until the Syrian uprising and partly explains the early reluctance in the Kurdish society to fully join the anti-government protests.

⁴ For further information on the 2004 Qamishli uprising and the crackdown that followed, see Amnesty International, Syria: Kurds in the Syrian Arab Republic one year after the March 2004 events, 10 March 2005, available at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE24/002/2005>.

By late 2012, the Kurdish armed group, the People's Protection Units (YPG) were in running battles with the jihadists. Initially these clashes went unnoticed by the international press and, in some cases; the Kurdish fighters were blamed for acting as a force 'hostile to the Syrian revolution'.⁵ Until mid-2013 the clashes involved jihadist and Islamist fighters from armed groups belonging to the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Ahrar Al-Sham, the Nusra Front (Jabhat Al-Nusra) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). From 2013 onwards, however, the fighting between the YPG and ISIL become protracted and began to expand beyond Syria and into Iraq.

Looking back at armed confrontation between these two non-State actors, a distinct conflict narrative – one largely separate from the narrative of the 'Syrian revolution' – emerges. Careful analysis of the initially unrecognised sub-conflict will shed light on the fighting that later escalated in Iraq's Sinjar and Syria's Kobani regions, triggering concerted international military intervention. To understand the significant and substantive role of Kurdish women in the war requires a new understanding of the sub-conflict that developed between the two parallel non-internationals armed conflicts in Iraq and Syria.

PART I. CONFLICT CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS

1. *The non-international armed conflict in Syria*

From March 2011 anti-government protests spread across Syria and drew hundreds of thousands of people to rallies and demonstrations. As the slogan "[t]he people want the fall of the regime" echoed in the streets of many Syrian cities, government forces – intent on crushing the protests – responded with lethal force.⁶

As the violence escalated and security forces of the Syrian government killed hundreds of demonstrators weekly, the largely peaceful protests morphed into an escalating armed confrontation between the two sides. The ICRC determined that, by February 2012, hostilities in parts of western Syria amounted to a non-international armed conflict, as the armed actors fighting the government had become increasingly organised and clashes in Hama, Homs and Idlib governorates had reached the level of intensity required by the Tadic test.⁷ With the heightened flow of weapons, resources and fighters into Syria, the armed conflict spread to new regions of Syria. In July 2012, the ICRC found that the threshold for a non-international armed conflict had been reached in the territory of Syria as a whole.⁸

⁵ Aljazeera, Syria opposition says armed Kurds 'hostile', 13 Nov 2013
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/11/syria-opposition-says-armed-kurds-hostile-2013111319156414866.html>

⁶ Joseph Holliday, Institute for the Study of War, The struggle for Syria in 2011, p.11
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Struggle_For_Syria.pdf

⁷ ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A, 2 October 1995, para.70.

⁸ ICRC and Syrian Arab Red Crescent maintain aid effort amid increased fighting, 17 July 2012, 'opposing Government Forces and a number of organised armed opposition groups operating in several parts of the country (including, but not limited to, Homs, Idlib and Hama)'
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2012/syria-update-2012-07-17.htm>

1.1 *The Free Syrian Army*

The anti-government armed groups were first organised under the umbrella of the FSA. Soldiers from the Syrian Arab Armed Forces defected in large numbers and joined rebel units of the FSA. The constituency of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, radicalised protesters, and a disenfranchised youth made up other parts of its fighting units. Facing decades-long repression by the Syrian security apparatus, many communities in Syria had cultivated deep grievances and strong anti-regime sentiments that served to forge a military front in the early days of the armed conflict.⁹ As clashes unfolded rebel fighters became increasingly dependent on logistical, economic and military supplies and support, exposing them to infiltration, external control, and the influence of foreign fighters.

As a military organisation, the FSA was a loosely coordinated rebel force, lacking efficient command structures and centralised decision-making between the growing numbers of armed units. In the course of military events in 2012, it became evident that the FSA groups were highly localised and fragmented, with shifting loyalties and allegiances. The hundreds of armed groups fighting under the FSA banner had different orientations and ideologies, ranging from Arab nationalists, Islamists, Salafists, and eventually Al-Qaeda linked commanders.¹⁰

1.2 *Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)*

As early as mid-2011, the first elements of Al-Qaeda are believed to have crossed into rural areas of Deir ez-Zore from Iraq to establish organisational and military structures inside Syria. The Al-Qaeda elements had operated along the Syrian-Iraqi border region for close to a decade, first under Al-Qaeda in Iraq (IQI) and later, by 2006 as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).

The border area was an important supply route for weapons, logistics, and fighters to the Iraqi insurgency, which began in 2003, against the US military, and later against Iraqi Security forces. Local tribes and smugglers were essential to the maintenance of this traffic from eastern Syria into the Anbar and Nineveh governorates of Iraq. As this generated income for the native population, AQI was successful in establishing close relations in the region, and gradually even a constituency.

In early 2012, as the Syrian government's security control over rural areas in Deir ez-Zore and southern Hasakah loosened, the regions provided fertile ground for the deployment and mobilisation of armed elements crossing over from Iraq. ISI operatives knew the region well and had long experience of insurgency warfare from Iraq. They established themselves clandestinely in small villages like Shuail, initially maintaining a low organisational profile before operating under the Nusra Front.

Using these rural areas as a base, the Nusra Front increased its presence in the triangular region between the Syrian cities of Deir ez-Zore, Hasakah and Raqqah. Their fighters fought, often in concert with other rebel groups, against government forces. In April 2013, several audio messages were broadcasted from top level Al-Qaeda and ISI operatives, such as Abu

⁹ Joseph Holliday, Institute for the Study of War, Syria's armed opposition, 2012, p.6

¹⁰ Aron Lund, The Free Syrian Army Doesn't Exist, 16 March 2013, <http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/the-free-syrian-army-doesnt-exist/>

Mohammed al-Joulani, Ayman Al-Zawahari, and Abubakr Al-Baghdadi, indicating underlying divisions. In the following months a rupture took place within the Nusra Front's structure, leading to the decisive break within the group, and the birth of ISIL. This marked a clear separation from the Al-Qaeda base in Afghanistan led by Zawahari.¹¹ Most of the towns and regions where the Islamist forces had fought together quickly fell under the exclusive control of ISIL, as the group first marginalised and then expelled the other groups by force.

1.3 The People's Protection Units (YPG)

In 2011, the Syrian government, guided by Iranian military advisers, responded with a counter-insurgency strategy vis-à-vis all minority groups, aiming at safeguarding their support and not escalating tensions. In contrast with much of Syria – where the violent suppression of protests continued – in the Kurdish regions, expressions of political dissent were tolerated with limited intervention of the security apparatus. Counter-insurgency measures also extended to granting citizenship, by decree 49, to 300,000 Kurds who had been denied citizenship following the discriminatory 1962 census. By mid-2011, many Kurdish political prisoners and activists had also been released.

From 2011 to mid-2012, the main Syrian Kurdish political actor, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) capitalised on the government's less heavy-handed approach to political expression in the Kurdish regions and organised a grass-root movement. Along with staging regular Friday protests and demonstrations, it deployed its cadres by the hundreds to recruit a wide popular base, especially among women, youth, and the poorest strata of the population.¹² The PYD dedicated the bulk of its political activity to enhancing its own organisational capacity through the establishment of local councils and community-based activities. While this provided a solid foundation for its future role in Syria, the PYD received heavy criticism by the mainstream Syrian opposition for not adopting a firm anti-government position, and thus being tolerated by the regime.

The PYD was keen to maintain a neutral position, engaging in hostilities with neither the government nor the anti-government armed groups. This approach was founded upon a pragmatism which had at its heart a view of what would best protect the Kurdish people, and serves their longer-term objectives of political autonomy. While the PYD had not established an armed wing in the early phase of the Syrian unrest, it had, to its advantage, significant military know-how from its senior members that had fought with the PKK in Turkey for over two decades. As the situation in Syria became increasingly violent and unpredictable, the PYD formed plans for military wing, the Popular Protection Units (YPG).

The YPG gained prominence in July 2012 when government forces withdrew from the Kurdish regions of Syria. This enabled the government to deploy its troops to other, more restive, areas of Syria, in particular Aleppo. There are contrasting views of this decision. Many believed that there was a tacit agreement between the PYD and the Syrian government. This was officially

¹¹ Aron Lund, *Is Jabhat al-Nusra breaking apart?*, <http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/is-jabhat-al-nusra-breaking-apart/>

¹² Galdini and Shamsi, *Syria's Kurds and Turkey*, 12 November 2014, <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/15078/syria's-kurds-and-turkey>

denied by the PYD who pointed to minor clashes between its forces and the Syrian army. Others argued that the Kurdish regions were of minor strategic importance to the government and that the withdrawal served to exert geopolitical pressure on Turkey, a main supporter of the Syrian armed opposition. In such an analysis, the YPG merely took advantage of the military realities on the ground to fill the vacuum left by the government and to establish control in the Kurdish regions. Regardless of these conflicting views, it is universally agreed that, by July 2012, the YPG had gained effective control along large parts of the Syrian-Turkish border.¹³

1.4 The emergence of a sub-conflict between YPG and ISIL in Syria

The YPG quickly consolidated its hold over the Kurdish regions ceded by the government. It acted with the dual objective of protecting the territory from other armed groups, and of establishing effective control under a unified command.¹⁴ By late 2012 the first clashes erupted between the YPG and Islamist fighters in Ras Al-Ayn (in Kurdish: Serekaniyê) in Hasakah governorate. In 2013 battles were fought between the two sides in Tel Tamer. Through 2013 and into 2014, the presence of armed units in the northern regions increased. Principal among these were the YPG and the Islamist groups, two armed factions with very different ideologies and political ambitions. Protracted armed confrontations ensued.¹⁵

In late July 2013, ISIL, acting in concert with other armed groups, entered the towns of Tal Abyad in Raqqah governorate and Tal Aran and Tal Hasel in Aleppo governorates (all with ethnically mixed populations). In all three locations, the armed groups used mosque loudspeakers to threaten Kurdish civilians, announcing those who did not leave would face attack. In Tal Hasel, the groups called Kurds “unbelievers”, declaring that “swords are between us and those who decide to stay in Tal Hasel”. Specific threats were directed against Kurdish women and children. Thousands of Kurds fled. Many sought safety in Kobani, which would come under attack from ISIL just over a year later. The UN Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, investigating these events, would later determine that the attacking armed groups had in place “a coordinated and planned campaign to forcibly displace Kurdish civilians” and had committed the war crime of forced displacement.¹⁶

The attacks on Kurdish civilians drew international attention not only to the violations themselves, but also to the nascent sub-conflict being fought in Syria’s Kurdish regions. This growing awareness was augmented by the spike in hostilities between the YPG and Islamist

¹³ Cale Salih, Syria Deeply, 23 September 2013, “In the past two years, the PYD has grown from being a relatively unknown party in Syria to becoming the most powerful Kurdish political and military force inside the country. It has pulled off masterful diplomatic acrobatics, balancing opportunistic relationships with elements of both the regime and the opposition based in Syria, and has asserted military control of key Kurdish cities.” <http://www.syriadeeply.org/op-eds/2013/09/1513/syrias-kurds-joining-mainstream/>

¹⁴ 7th Report of UN Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic - A/HRC/25/65, 12 February 2014, p 6,

¹⁵ 6th Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic - A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, p 7: “Armed violence flared in Kurdish areas in the north-east, where the role of local militias in the conflict grew. Prioritizing their neutrality and the protection of Kurdish localities, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) clashed with both government forces and anti-government armed groups. There was a spike in tensions with radical anti-government armed groups.”

¹⁶ 7th Report of UN Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic - A/HRC/25/65, 12 February 2014, p

fighters from Ahrar Al-Sham, the Nusra Front, and ISIL following the attacks in Raqqah and Aleppo governorates.

As fighting between the Kurdish and Islamist forces continued, it developed into a distinct sub-conflict, with its own front lines and internal military dynamics.¹⁷ Protracted and intensive fighting between the two sides continued throughout the rest of 2013 in locations across Syria's Kurdish regions, including in Al-Yaroubiya, Tel Hamis, Rimelan, Ras Al-Ayn, Kobani and Afrin.¹⁸ In 2013, cracks had developed in ISIL's alliance with the Nusra Front and Ahrar Al-Sham. In towns like Markada (southern Hasakah) and later in Deir Ez-Zore, infighting had left hundreds of fighters and civilians perceived to be affiliated with one of the armed groups, dead. By late 2013, the YPG was solely engaged in combat with ISIL in northeastern Syria.

The YPG proved to be an effective fighting force, benefiting from a unified command, disciplined members and popular support in the Kurdish regions.¹⁹ After the fall of Mosul on 10 June 2014, however, the tide turned dramatically to ISIL's advantage, as the group seized military equipment from several divisions of the fleeing Iraqi army. The heavy weaponry was swiftly moved into Syria in July 2014 and used in onslaughts on Syrian government's military bases in Raqqah and Hasakah, where more arms, ammunition, and artillery were looted.

It was not, however, until the ISIL attack on the Yezidi Kurds in Sinjar in Iraq, together with the response of the Iraqi Kurdish forces and the YPG, that the sub-conflict between ISIL and the YPG spilled over into Iraqi Kurdistan. From the viewpoint of ISIL, these hostilities drew upon its forces still in Iraq, where they were a party to the non-international armed conflict there. For the Kurds, however, the ISIL attack in Iraq was an extension of their aggression against the Kurdish community in Syria.

Out of the battle for Sinjar emerged an expanded sub-conflict setting ISIL against Kurdish armed forces from different parts of the Kurdish regions in Iraq and Syria. It became an armed conflict, fought by two non-State actors, both with unrecognized claims to the territory of two sovereign states. The sub-conflict, therefore, thrived in the cracks between two non-international armed conflicts in Syria and Iraq.

With the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga, the Syrian Kurdish YPG, and increasingly the Turkish-Kurdish PKK fighters seen as the only effective local force against ISIL, the Kurds emerged as the only ground force that the international community could rely upon as it sought some success on the Syria battlefield and the keeping of a measure of stability in Iraq. In this way, the sub-conflict between the YPG and ISIL gained in prominence.

¹⁷ 6th Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic - A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, p. 5

¹⁸ Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, para. 60 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008), <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tjug/en/080403.pdf>

¹⁹ 7th Report of UN Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic - A/HRC/25/65, 12 February 2014, p. 22, page 6

2. *Non-international armed conflict in Iraq*

The series of conflicts that have engulfed Iraq since the Gulf War and in particular following Operation Iraqi Freedom on 19 March 2003, provide a fertile ground for studies of forms of conflicts, phases of hostilities, transitions and cross-border dynamics within armed conflicts.²⁰ The ensuing belligerent occupation of Iraq by coalition forces formally ended on 30 June 2014 when the United Nations Security Council recognised full sovereignty had been transferred back to Iraq.²¹

Nevertheless, American and British forces, together with other coalition partners remained with the consent of the Interim Government of Iraq. The continuing hostilities amounted to a non-international armed conflict, according to the ICRC. Consequently all parties were bound by common article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions. Over the past decade Iraqi Security Forces, Multinational forces, Shiite Militias, and Kurdish Peshmerga Forces had engaged in active combat operations against insurgents in Iraq. The insurgency comprised of former Baath-party elements, Al-Qaeda operatives, Sunni tribal fighters, and foreign fighters.

The regions under the control of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) are known to be the safest areas of Iraq. The Peshmerga forces were mainly focussed on anti-terror operations and tightened security control in urban areas as the greatest threat was posed by suicide bombers and isolated attacks.

2.1 *ISIL – the birth of a new insurgency in Iraq (?)*

With the withdrawal of the last American troops at the end of 2011, as Syria descended in violence and civil war, the situation in Iraq also entered a delicate phase. The sectarian and discriminatory policies of Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki had turned the Sunni community against the central government in Baghdad, undermining what remained of the Awakening (Sahwa) movement. This created socio-political conditions upon which any organised Sunni force could capitalise.

Between 2012 and 2013 prominent operatives of the Iraqi insurgency, in particular Al-Qaeda and ISI elements had expanded and grown strong in Syria and established themselves on multiple frontlines where they had access to weapons, resources and new recruits. Operatives from ISIL shifted their strategic attention back to Iraq after the Anbar unrest in January 2014. This, together with increased insurgency activity in the Sunni provinces, made it clear that a spill over of ISIL-led violence from Syria into Iraq was all but inevitable.

Many analysts had warned of the effects of the Syrian conflict on the fragile situation in Iraq. Yet few anticipated that, on 10 June 2014, Iraq's second largest city, Mosul, would fall under the control of ISIL and other Iraqi armed groups with little resistance from the Iraqi army. ISIL fighters advanced south to Beji, Tikrit and Jalawla as the Iraqi Army evaporated, leaving strategic positions and military equipment behind. The Kurdish Peshmerga Forces swiftly moved

²⁰ *Iraq (2003 Onwards)*, in *International Law and the Classification of Conflict* 356-386, Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., Oxford University Press, 2012, page 357

²¹ UNSC resolution 1546, 8 June 2004, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement>

in and took control of the regions with a Kurdish population, including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. As the military campaign of ISIL expanded south, only the town of Jalawla and rural areas of Kirkuk saw clashes between ISIL and the Peshmerga.

3. The Kurdish sub-conflict with ISIL expands to Iraq

3.1. Starting point: Sinjar crisis

The ISIL attack on the Kurdish Yezidi community in Sinjar on 3 August 2014 escalated the sub-conflict between the Kurds in Syria and ISIL to new levels. For ISIL the ancient Yezidi faith represent a pagan and infidel community that “worships the devil”. As Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces proved unable to repel the attacks by ISIL, thousands of Yezidi families fled in panic towards Mount Sinjar. Chaotic scenes ensued as ISIL encircled the mountain. The mass exodus of the Yezidi community created a humanitarian crisis on Mount Sinjar where Yezidi men, women, and children were besieged, trapped under the August sun without water, food, or medicine.

Within 24 hours, YPG forces had launched a rescue operation from Syria into Iraq to open a humanitarian corridor. The YPG lost 70 fighters during their upholding the humanitarian corridor and fighting ISIL elements. On 4 August, the PKK also intervened by sending reinforcements from Iraq’s Qandil Mountains to Sinjar to assist the YPG. The rescue operation was successful and gained international recognition, as media reports showed how thousands of Yezidis were being evacuated from Mount Sinjar. Most of the Yezidis later returned to Iraqi Kurdistan, though to IDP camps, via a route through the Kurdish-held regions of Syria and over the Fayshkhabour border crossing.

3.2 Engaging Peshmerga forces

During the August offensive on the Sinjar region, ISIL launched substantive attacks in regions north and east of Mosul, targeting Kurdish positions and seriously challenging Peshmerga forces. For the first time ISIL attacks fully engaged the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in combat, and initially, the Peshmerga proved unprepared and unable to repel the rapid ISIL onslaught.

By targeting surroundings of Kirkuk, Zummar, Mosul dam, Gwer, Makhmour and eventually Erbil, ISIL gained control of areas of key strategic importance to the KRG. By 7 August 2014, ISIL fighters stood only 40km away from Erbil, the Kurdish regional capital. Their advance was effectively halted on 8 August by targeted strikes of the US Air Force. With the formation of the international coalition force to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIL, Western states started sending advanced weaponry to the Kurdish Peshmerga forces directly. The arms supplies often bypassed the central authorities in Baghdad, and thus addressed the urgency of the fighting in the Kurdish region of Iraq straightforwardly.²² Moreover, programmes were set up by European military officers to train Peshmerga forces to use advanced armaments and anti-tank weapons.

Since the initial phase of clashes in August 2014, Peshmerga forces have fought against ISIL in Iraq, side by side with the YPG and PKK. Joint military efforts have developed and led to joint

²² White House, Weekly Address: We Will Degrade and Destroy ISIL, 13 September 2014, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/12/weekly-address-we-will-degrade-and-destroy-isil>

operation rooms, sharing of military bases, logistics, and arms.²³ Peshmerga forces quickly adapted to their new combat role, and became increasingly efficient. The YPG and PKK involvement in the protection of Iraqi Kurdish localities as Jalawla, Kirkuk, Makhmour, Sinjar, and Rabiaa became a long-term engagement, as the situation remained highly volatile.²⁴ Their experience in fighting ISIL provided much-needed assistance to the Peshmerga forces that had had little real combat experience over the last decade.

The sub-conflict between ISIL and the Kurds had spilled into Iraq from Syria, and mobilised Kurdish forces along an almost 1000km frontline straddling two non-international armed conflicts.²⁵ Moreover, it had introduced international actors who directly engaged with Kurdish Peshmerga forces, by sending weaponry or coordinating airstrikes.

3.3 International coalition airstrikes and the fight for Kobani

ISIL launched a large-scale, multi-front attack on the Syrian Kurdish enclave of Kobani on 15 September 2014. The offensive engaged thousands of heavily armed ISIL fighters supported by tanks, artillery, and grad rockets. In less than three weeks Kobani's countryside was depopulated as Kurds fled *en masse*.²⁶ The YPG withdrawal from the villages was gradual, and thus provided the civilian population enough time to escape. More than 200,000 persons were displaced as they fled in waves towards Kobani town, and further on to Turkey. The Kurdish population feared executions, rape, and abductions that ISIL had reportedly committed against the Yezidi Kurds in Sinjar.²⁷ The United Nations Special Envoy to Syria, Staffan De Mistura, comparing the town to Srebrenica, warned of a massacre as the imminent fall of Kobani seemed inevitable.²⁸

From mid-October, however, the YPG as well as many volunteers who had responded to the *levée en masse* – succeeded in stopping the ISIL advance with the aid of international coalition airstrikes, which destroyed much of the ISIL's heavy weapons, artillery and tanks.²⁹ At the most critical point, ISIL forces were only a few hundred meters from taking Kobani, in particular on the eve of the Muslim holiday Eid.

²³ Daniella Cheslow, Israeli documentary details Kurds' battle against Islamic State, McClatchyDC, 30 January 2015, "Gerald said he found it jarring to see the peshmerga receiving weapons from the United States and Europe while the PKK remains an outlawed group. But he also said weapons move between groups freely, despite the intentions of the West; he said he saw PKK fighters using armored vehicles the peshmerga had left behind." <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2015/01/30/255035/israeli-documentary-details-kurds.html>

²⁴ Cale Salih, Kurds demand unity amid battle against Islamic State, 15 January 2014, "The PKK gained popularity in Iraqi Kurdistan when the group's fighters rescued Yazidis trapped on Mount Sinjar and fought IS along frontlines in Kirkuk, Makhmour and Gwer."

²⁵ Transcript of press conference by UN Special Envoy for Syria (SES) Staffan de Mistura, Geneva, 10 October 2014 <http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid=3674>

²⁶ Shamsi and Galdini, The conflict between the Islamic State and the Kurds: have Kurdish forces united against a common enemy?, *Revue de défense nationale*, Paris, February 2014

²⁷ UN Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Conference Room Paper: Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria, 14 November 2014, p. 12

²⁸ Transcript of press conference by UN Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, 10 October 2014, <http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid=3674>

²⁹ US CENTCOM: U.S. Military Conducts Airstrikes Against ISIL in Syria and Iraq <http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/oct.-15-u.s.-military-conducts-airstrikes-against-isil-in-iraq-and-syria>
<http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/oct.-14-u.s.-military-partner-nations-conduct-airstrikes-against-isil>
<http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/oct-9-u.s.-military-conducts-airstrikes-against-isil-in-syria-and-iraq>
<http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/oct.-8-u.s.-military-partner-nations-conduct-airstrikes-against-isil>

The street-by-street, house by house, urban warfare slowly turned into a stalemate with both sides relying on snipers, booby-traps and raids by mobile and lightly armed attacking units. ISIL also used human waves of suicide bombers and armoured VBIEDs. However, unlike its previous military campaigns ISIL became bogged down in a static combat situation, which reduced their mobility and ability to launch surprise attacks. The intense media coverage and symbolic meaning the battle had gained, made a sudden or tactical withdrawal by ISIL impossible.

The YPG made it clear from the beginning that “they would not back down, that they were not going to withdraw, that they were going to die if they had to, and that was one of the things that attracted the US to giving support to the Kurds”.³⁰ On October 19, US Air Force conducted multiple airdrops of weapons, ammunition and medical supplies to the YPG in the vicinity of Kobani.³¹ Ten days later, on October 29, Peshmerga forces from Iraqi Kurdistan were deployed to participate in active combat in Kobani, alongside the YPG. The forces were composed of 300 men with heavy artillery and mortar capability. While *en route* to Kobani, as they crossed two international borders from Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey and from there into Kobani, the forces received rapturous welcome from thousands of Kurds in Turkey.

Airstrikes by coalition airplanes that started on 23 September 2014 in Syria, had a major role in defeating ISIL in Kobani. According to US Central Command data, 76% of all airstrikes in Syria had been focussed on Kobani.³² The YPG and the Peshmerga force was in close coordination with the American-led coalition air force to provide locations and targets, for more than 280 fighting positions, 100 buildings, and more than 60 technical vehicles and other equipment. The total number of airstrikes in the Kobani region reached beyond 700 airstrikes. By the end of January 2015, after four months of heavy fighting and shelling, the YPG successfully ejected ISIL from the last pockets in Kobani. The final advance was said to have come as a result of improved coordination between the air force and Kurdish commanders in Kobani.³³

Analysts have rightly asked what strategic importance Kobani holds, and why it became an international symbol that engaged the international coalition to such a degree. The fighting in Kobani was not strategic within the context of the broader non-international conflict in Syria. It was, however, essential in the context of the Kurdish sub-conflict. Had Kobani fallen, the Kurdish held-regions in Syria would have been reduced to two small enclaves in western and eastern Syria, separated by 350km of ISIL-controlled territory.

Larger lesson-learned from Kobani for international actors, however, cannot be “support to anti-IS forces on the ground has discovered a winning formula which can now be replicated

³⁰ Dominique Soguel, After defeating Islamic State in Kobane, what next for Syria’s Kurds?, Christian Science Monitor, 2 February 2015

³¹ CENTCOM: U.S. Military Conducts Aerial Resupply of Kurdish Forces Fighting ISIL, <http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/u.s.-military-conducts-aerial-resupply-of-kurdish-forces-fighting-isil>

³² Danny Gold, 'Welcome to Stalingrad. Welcome to Kobane': Inside the Syrian Town Under Siege by the Islamic State, Vice News, 13 January 2015, <https://news.vice.com/article/welcome-to-stalingrad-welcome-to-kobane-inside-the-syrian-town-under-siege-by-the-islamic-state>

³³ Anne Barnard, Kurd Militia Says ISIS Is Expelled From Kobani, The New York Times, 26 January 2015

elsewhere”.³⁴ This would not only be “a rash deduction because of the specific nature of the Kurdish fighting organizations”, but it would also disregard the dynamics of the 18 month-long distinct sub-conflict. The international coalition’s provision of military aid and air cover to Kurdish forces allowed for the re-taking of Kobani. It also propelled the sub-conflict between the Kurds and ISIL into public consciousness as it emerged as the most active of the conflicts in both Syria and Iraq.

The Syrian government’s reaction to the deployment of 300 Iraqi Kurdish forces across its frontier is also an unanswered question. The Syrian ambassador to the UN in New York stated that his government did not accept any violation of Syria’s sovereignty, but Syrian fighters that had sought refuge in Turkey could return and defend Kobani.³⁵ Nevertheless, it is believed that a substantial number of the volunteers fighting in Kobani were Kurds from Turkey. Moreover, the Peshmerga force was twice rotated, to allow for fresh fighters and new weapons and ammunition to reach Kobani.

PART II. THE EXPERIENCE OF WOMEN’S MOBILISATION IN THE KURDISH REGIONS OF SYRIA

1. The discourse of the passive female

The female perspective in war continues to be the focus of much academic inquiry. With war traditionally associated with male aggression, women are commonly portrayed as passive objects of war and innocent casualties.³⁶ Women are often reduced to being peace-loving reconciliatory forces in conflicts: ‘The natural instinct of women is to nurture, to try to hold a family together, to settle disputes by reconciliation rather than by aggressive measures’.³⁷

The emphasis on masculinity as a core attribute for warriors, pivoted against the complementary generalized notion of feminine weakness and women’s need for protection, has perpetuated gender roles across civilizations. Women are traditionally seen as fragile parts of the property that men need to preserve.³⁸ Systematic attacks on the integrity of the opposing forces’ women are instrumentalized as a tool of war to demoralize the enemy psychologically and are meant to demonstrate to him his incapability to protect his own women. These gendered dynamics are especially the case in cultures with strong patriarchal features, such as the Middle East.

Consequently, women are rarely considered to be primary actors during times of war even though they traditionally are ascribed sub-roles as secretaries and nurses. In instances where women do play a role in warfare, they are often described in a way that generalizes them as

³⁴ Jonathan Spyer, Behind the lines: A major victory – but hard to replicate, Jerusalem Post, 29 January 2014, <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Behind-the-lines-A-major-victory-but-hard-to-replicate-389448>

³⁵ Al-Jaafari: There is moral problem with how the UN Secretariat is dealing with terrorism in Syria, SANA, 1 November 2014, <http://www.sana.sy/en/?p=16569>

³⁶ Eisenstein, Zillah, *Sexual Decoys: gender, race and war in imperial democracy* (London & New York: Zed Books), 2007, page 6

³⁷ Vickers, Jeanne, *Women and War*, (London: Zed Books), 1993, page 44

³⁸ Peterson, V. Spike and Runyan, Anne, *Global Gender Issues in the New Millenium* (Boulder,CO: Westview Press), 2010, page 20

reconstructive peace-makers.³⁹ The idealization of feminine innocence and passivity is challenged, however, if or when women mobilize into active subjects of warfare.

2. Female emancipation in Kurdish regions

As members of a stateless nation in a largely feudal-Islamic, patriarchal society, Kurdish women face multiple layers of systemic discrimination: oppressed ethnically by several states, they also struggle against patriarchal features of their own community where they are at risk of being victims of forced marriages, domestic violence, rape, polygamy, child marriage, honor killings, and even – in some areas – female genital mutilation. In the rural areas of Kurdistan in particular, women and girls have limited access to adequate education and health care. While Kurdish men have, in spite of systemic ethnic and socio-economic discrimination, been able to participate in the societal structures to some degree (for example, by moving away from their villages to find a job), Kurdish women have been impaired from enjoying the same social mobility due to the feudal-patriarchal society.

Despite this, by 1990s, a very strong women's movement emerged from within the Kurdish national liberation movement. The PKK was created in 1978 as a socialist student group and started guerrilla warfare against the Turkish state in 1984. The group initially demanded an independent Kurdistan. However, the cause of the PKK radically shifted in 1999; its key political objectives are now regional autonomy and equal rights for Kurds within the existing borders of the Kurdish majority regions of Turkey. One of the core ideological principles of the organization is gender equality and women's participation in its social grass-root organizations. Apart from growing female involvement in civil society and political activism, female guerrilla fighters joined the armed struggle for Kurdish rights. In so doing, they became symbols of the fight for equal rights within their own society.

3. The emerging Syrian Kurdish women's movement

In 2011, inspired by the PKK's women's movement, female PYD members established a similar structure in the Kurdish regions of Syria. Indeed, the first pioneers who laid the ground for the burgeoning women's movement were senior female PYD members who had returned to the Kurdish regions of Syria after long political experience in working within the PKK in Turkey.⁴⁰ Initially the activism geared towards women's emancipation and participation ran parallel to the overall advocacy of and mobilization for Kurdish rights.

Until 2011, the PYD, established underground in 2004 following the Qamishli uprising, had a very limited presence and function in Syrian Kurdish society. Yet, its ideological framework, according to which women within the PYD should establish their own structures and fields of work in Syrian Kurdish society, already existed. After the unrest in Syria began, these structures were revived and focused on establishing internal decision-making organs that were autonomous from the general PYD councils and bodies. All-women organizations and organs would enable higher participation of women, and enhance their capacity. Gradually, women's political, social

³⁹ Eisenstein, Zillah, *Sexual Decoys: gender, race and war in imperial democracy* (London & New York: Zed Books), 2007, page 10

⁴⁰ Senior female member of TEV-DEM in Derik, 5 December 2013 (copy of notes in author's possession)

and educational organizations were established, operating under the auspices of an organization called Yeketiya Star. In 2013, as hostilities crept closer to Syria's Kurdish regions, plans were also drawn up for the gradual establishment of all-women military formations.

Today, Yeketiya Star forms an ideological umbrella for many grass-root organizations, NGOs, education centers, and political organizations. It functions with the objective of creating a joint and multilayered framework for women. Its mandate is focused on thematic and over-arching issues of shared concern for all women's initiatives.⁴¹

Many of the senior female members of the PYD have spoken of the strong reactions within Kurdish society against their role as female political activists. They recount being met with stubbornness from men who refused to accept them as engaged social and political agents. At the same time, however, parts of their society also lauded them with respect and admiration for having dedicated their lives to the Kurdish cause, and even having fought as guerilla fighters in Turkey. Imprisoned and exiled female PYD members, who had been persecuted by the Syrian government since 2004, became prominent political activists in Syria upon their release during the initial unrest in 2011. This gave them a certain gravitas as serious protagonists with a moral authority, which was instinctively respected by the Kurdish community.⁴²

Getting women and girls out of the protective home-environment was a primary challenge for many of the female activists. The 2011 demonstrations and Friday rallies served this purpose well. Having lived under the threats and repression of the Syrian security forces, most Kurdish men and women deeply appreciated and were inspired by the opportunity that the Syrian uprising provided them to take to the streets or join rallies every week where they could take part in pro-Kurdish demonstrations while chanting long-prohibited slogans. During this phase entire families came to join the public gatherings and marches: men, women, children and the elderly.

As the protests in the Kurdish regions faced limited violence and crackdowns, the demonstrations served as an activity where a potential constituency could be organized, acquire a new role, and express sentiments that no one had dared to state previously. The first group of recruits and members was drawn from the most active and notable at these rallies and marches.

A second wave of female social and cultural activists was drawn from community-based activities. While the protests maintained a peaceful form, female PYD cadres could focus their energy and political engagement on follow-up activities and undertakings mainly related to Kurdish culture and language. Participating in local initiatives and cultural events was a natural and agreeable continuation of attending rallies with close family members; it did not challenge the traditional boundaries and perceived social normative of women and girls too drastically or tactlessly.

⁴¹ Interview with senior member of the Yeketiya Star in Qamishli, 10 November 2013 (copy of notes in author's possession)

⁴² Interview with senior female member of the PYD in Darbasiyah, 7 November 2013 (copy of notes in author's possession)

By the end of 2011 and towards mid-2012, the PYD had set up local councils, civil society organizations, and cultural associations in many regions of Syria's Kurdish regions, which their constituency could engage in. The organizational structure of the PYD-led movement was also becoming clearer. The PYD was the political wing of the movement, whereas YPG became the military wing.⁴³ The TEV-DEM constituted an umbrella of organizations and associations that formed a broader ideological "social movement".

The Yeketiya Star umbrella organization also pursued more ambitious, radical projects to work on and implement in the Kurdish society. Domestic violence was identified as an inexcusable social phenomenon and was confronted strongly. Another project served to oppose prostitution and other forms of abuse of women and girls within the Kurdish society. According to a leading female PYD activist, this proved to be a greater challenge than organizing local committees and women's initiatives within urban neighborhoods.⁴⁴ The criminal networks that profited from the forced prostitution were armed and were also engaged in trafficking of humans and goods across the Syrian-Turkish border. The efforts were eventually successful in eradicating the practice and the industry linked thereto.

Most of the senior male and female PYD members only had access to light weapons, as plans were underway to organize YPG force. It was these female PYD members who, in 2013, would become the vanguard of the YPG's female fighting units that would later gain worldwide recognition for their fighting against ISIL.

4. *Kurdish women's military organization*

In early 2013, as hostilities erupted between the YPG and armed Islamist groups in northern Syria, female fighters in the YPG-ranks formed all-women battalions with an independent structure under the moniker, the Women's Defense Units, YPJ. "The YPJ was established in order to realize women's potential and capability in the face of a dangerous threat to our society."⁴⁵ Today, the YPJ has formed specialized units with fighters organized in heavy machine-gun squads, sniper units, mortar platoons and motorized infantry units. There are also an increasing number of female field commanders within the YPJ.

In 2013 and throughout 2014, the fighters of the YPJ participated in some of the fiercest and most violent clashes fought between the YPG and ISIL. Their participation in the Sinjar

⁴³ In late 2014 YPG was endorsed as the legitimate defence force of the Kurdish region, by a political framework agreement that was signed by all major Kurdish political parties.

⁴⁴ Interview with a senior female member of TEV-DEM in Qamishli, 18 January 2014: "We warned the persons involved in the prostitution networks that their criminal activities had to cease, and that the selling of women's bodies would not be tolerated by us. When they continued with this activity we intervened firmly and closed the brothels, which often had been set up in ordinary houses. We imposed this regulation by force, and made it clear that we would not compromise on our principles regarding this. Such operations were mostly carried out by our female militants, and it affected our constituency deeply; building trust and earning credibility within hundreds of girls and women". (Copy of notes in author's possession)

⁴⁵ Interview with senior member of the Yeketiya Star in Qamishli, 10 November 2013 (copy of notes in author's possession)

evacuation was in particular significant.⁴⁶ ISIL's enslavement of Yezidi Kurdish girls and women marked a major watershed in the commitment of Kurdish women to join the YPJ and to fight ISIL. Many female fighters referenced the suffering and treatment of their fellow Yezidis as a prime motivator for joining the YPJ. "I want to take revenge for the Yazidi women against ISIL. No matter if I lose my life in this fight. I know why I die. No matter. I should give ISIL the lesson they deserve."⁴⁷

From October 2014 YPJ fighters became widely recognized for their courage in the battle for Kobani. As ISIL increased the intensity of their attacks against Kobani with mortars, artillery, and car bombs, many young women stayed behind and joined the YPJ to defend their homes and villages. "I'm not coming with you. It has become a matter of life and death to defend Kobani," an YPJ member told her brother on the telephone, as he was bringing his wife and children to safety in Turkey.⁴⁸

The battle for Kobani was perceived as an existential struggle by all Kurds, and opened the way for mass participation of young women. "For women the fighting against ISIL is not only existential, politically speaking, but also on a very personal level. Life under ISIL is a form of confinement and slavery for women, closed off from society and deprived of our most basic rights."⁴⁹ Many of the YPJ members were killed in direct hostilities with ISIL, and some were executed *hors de combat* around Kobani.⁵⁰ Some of the fighters took their own lives when running out of ammunition, in order to not fall in ISIL captivity.⁵¹

By 2015 an estimated 35% of the total number of YPG fighters are women organized in YPJ battalions across Syria's Kurdish regions. Since the YPG and YPJ's successes in Sinjar and Kobani, approximately a thousand new recruits join the YPG/YPJ each month. The majority of them are women.⁵² This has led to radical social change within Kurdish society where many teenage girls break with old cultural and societal traditions to fully join the YPJ and leave their families to fight at frontlines that could be hundreds of kilometers from their place of origin. Thus, women in the YPJ are not only confronting ISIL but they are also breaking social barriers and challenging a tribal-patriarchy system, changing what it means to be a woman in Kurdistan.

⁴⁶ Telephone interview with YPJ commander in Derik, 10 September 2014, "When the YPG broke the ISIS encirclement of Mount Sinjar, several Special Forces units of the YPJ were among the first to reach thousands of stranded Yazidi refugees. In the course of the rescue operation, several of them fell martyrs while fighting to open a humanitarian corridor." (copy of notes in author's possession)

⁴⁷ Richard Hall, Kurdish women line up to take on Islamic State, USA TODAY, 24 December 2014 <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/12/24/globalpost-kurdish-women-islamic-state/20853391/>

⁴⁸ Mona Mahmood, 'We are so proud' – the women who died defending Kobani against Isis, The Guardian, 30 January 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/30/kurdish-women-died-kobani-isis-syria>

⁴⁹ Interview with senior YPJ member in Kobani, 3 December 2014, (copy of notes in author's possession)

⁵⁰ UN Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Conference Room Paper: Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria, 14 November 2014, p. 12

⁵¹ Mona Mahmood, 'We are so proud' – the women who died defending Kobani against Isis, The Guardian, 30 January 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/30/kurdish-women-died-kobani-isis-syria>

⁵² Richard Hall, Kurdish women line up to take on Islamic State, USA TODAY, 24 December 2014 <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/12/24/globalpost-kurdish-women-islamic-state/20853391/>

5. Kurdish women in the civilian administration

Parallel to the armed struggle several gender-egalitarian policies have been developed and legislated in the self-regulated Kurdish regions. When the three Kurdish regions Efrîn, Kobani, and Jazîra, declared political autonomy in January 2014, the charter of the cantonal administration enshrined important rights and empowering policies for women.

The Charter ‘guarantees the effective realization of equality of women and mandates public institutions to work towards the elimination of gender discrimination’.⁵³ For example, Article 27 stipulates that women have an ‘inviolable right to participate in political, social, economic and cultural life’. Moreover, it specifies that there ‘shall be one member of the Supreme Legislative Assembly per fifteen thousand (15,000) registered voters residing within the Autonomous Region’, and ‘the Legislative Assembly must be composed of at least forty per cent (40%) of either sex according to the electoral laws’. And Article 28 stipulates that ‘men and women are equal in the eyes of the law’. The charter also enshrines the effective participation of women in the legislative assembly.

The cantonal administration has also implemented a system of co-presidency where leading positions are shared between a man and a woman. This is to ensure women’s participation and visibility in leading positions. Examples of women in leading positions within the Syrian Kurdish regions are Ilham Ahmed, co-president of TEV-DEM and a leading member of political negotiations with external parties, and Asya Abdullah, co-president of PYD, who acted as the political voice who remained inside Kobani throughout the battle.

CONCLUSION

The cross-border and fluid characteristics of the non-international armed conflicts in Syria and Iraq, together with the engagement of essentially all regional actors in the Middle East, has made any prospect of a resolution to either conflict seem distant.

As the crises in Damascus and Baghdad continue, with each capital having lost effective control over one third of its sovereign territory, non-State actors have multiplied on the political map of the region. Battles are now as intensely fought between non-State actors as between these actors and the States in which they claim territory.

Nowhere is this truer than the sub-conflict that has developed – and which has now been ongoing for over 18 months – between the Kurdish forces and ISIL. Fought within the territories of the two States, it has tested international law’s capacity to properly define these hostilities. The conflict dynamics at play transcend not only the recognised borders but also the non-international armed conflicts being fought against the governments of Iraq and Syria.

Fighting between Kurdish armed groups and ISIL is likely to reap increased geopolitical attention, as the latest military engagement of the US Air force in both Syria and Iraq has demonstrated. The cause of the Syrian Kurds, largely unknown in the West before 2014, now has

⁵³ The Charter of the Democratic Autonomous Regions of Afrin, Jazira and Kobane, <http://civiroglu.net/the-constitution-of-the-rojava-cantons/>

unprecedented global visibility. As the vanguard fighting force against ISIL, the battle for Kobani has positively improved the standing of the PYD in internationally, providing diplomatic access and leverage.

Significantly, the unprecedented mobilisation of Kurds in the Middle East region has become an opening for the mass participation of women in political and military organisations in the Kurdish regions of Syria. It remains to be seen how the new role of women in the Kurdish society in Syria will develop and manifest itself in a post-conflict setting. Will the current empowerment and participation of women continue or even increase? Or will the celebrated heroines of Kobani return to their previous gender roles, as their war-ridden society falls back on old and traditional values in search for stability and convention?

Despite the obvious difficulties one faces in answering such questions on the future of Kurdish women in Syria, most female fighters and activists appear to agree that “it will not be as it was in the past”.⁵⁴ One female fighter stated, “After this, I can’t imagine leading a life of a traditional Kurdish woman, caring for a husband and children at home. I used to want that before this war.”⁵⁵

International media has lauded the female fighters. Yet they have been made objects once again, the center of photographs that have covered the front pages of magazines worldwide. While the admiration for the courage of the female fighters is well-deserved, it is essential to remember that a larger social emancipatory project accompany their rifles. At the heart of their struggle, there is a political stance against a social order that exists throughout Middle Eastern societies, of which ISIL is only a most extreme incarnation. Considering the radical break with tradition that these women’s struggle pose in the light of Kurdistan’s otherwise patriarchal society, one must not overlook their political motivations.

⁵⁴ Ayla AlBayrak, *Kurdish Women Fight on Front Lines Against Islamic State*, *The Wall Street Journal*, 17 October 2014, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/kurdish-women-fight-on-front-line-against-islamic-state-1413580188>

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

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ENGENDERING DEFENSE POLICIES IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS

LTC Danielle Veira

Although South America is relatively stable with regards to conflicts, it faces threats and challenges related to amongst others international crime, drugs trafficking and internal and cross-border political tensions. The governments in the region have chosen to address issues of conflict and tensions through diplomacy, mediation and negotiation ensuring that mutual respect is the key driver in these endeavors, methods that can be characterized as soft power approaches.

The overall goal of the Defense Council of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) is “to consolidate South America as a zone of peace, the basis for democratic stability and development of our people, and as a contribution to world peace” (UNASUR 2015). One of its specific objectives is the inclusion of the mainstreaming of gender in defense policies. Actions are undertaken, and some countries make more progress than others in ensuring gender mainstreaming in the area of defense and security. The challenges however, of (regional) alignment of concepts and implementation in respective defense organizations still exist.

With the notion that UNASUR already uses soft power in addressing challenges that may hamper stability and peace, how will the engendering of defense policies impact the policy decisions regarding regional security and development in the region?

Firstly the paper will deliver a brief description on UNASUR, its defense institutions and the latest initiatives on gender, a study on the incorporation of women in the defense sector. The research on the necessity of gender implementation in defense polices is still being done. From an assumption base this ongoing research will be discussed, thereby determining possible pitfalls and recommended approaches. These assumptions and recommendations will be tested through the comparison of other regional initiatives on the mainstreaming of gender in the defense and security sector.

The current projection of the UNASUR with regard to its security policies and conflict resolutions are discussed in line with the impact of engendered defense policies. The soft power strategies that the UNASUR conducted with regard to regional security will be outlined. Lastly in the conclusion it is reiterated that gender mainstreaming of defense policies is important as it only strengthens policies, societies, institutions and organizations. It will also made clear that even though the position of women in general is still not fully established, engendering of defense polices will strengthen the soft power strategies within UNASUR, for on the defense level it will prepare both men and women to be competent soldiers that will successfully assist in developmental initiatives.

THE INTEGRATION OF A REGION

Regional integration efforts are not new to the South American region. Numerous efforts regarding economic, trade, social and infrastructural cooperation have been made and they still exist or morphed together in another regional entity. The desire however, to enact regional integration which was not only linked with economic integration was voiced frequently in regional executive forums (Käspar, 2011).

The UNASUR came to take form in 2004 when leaders of all South American countries came together in signing the Cusco Declaration. In that they commit to create “a politically, socially, economically, environmentally and infrastructural integrated South American area” (Comunidad Andina, 2015). The official establishment occurred in 2008 with the signing of the constitutive treaty in Brasilia (Comunidad Andina, 2015). With a set of twenty-one objectives the organization has four bodies that fulfill these goals according to their rank: the Council of Heads of State and Government; the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; the Council of Delegates & Delegates and the General Secretariat (UNASUR, 2015).

Amongst the twelve ministerial councils is the South American Council for Defense (CDS). Defense cooperation is of major significance to regional integration. Especially for South America who has different security challenges, embeds huge areas of vastness, large populations and a great demand for the existence of the abundant resources (Pothuraju, 2012). Accordingly the CDS was created to further promote political dialogue and cooperation in defense matters among the member states.

To assist the CDS to reach its sets goals, specifically to contribute to the alignment of defense policies in South America the Center for Strategic Defense Studies, CEED, a regional strategic think-tank, was created (CEED, 2015). In 2013 the CDS adopted a work plan initiating research on the engendering of the defense policies (CEED, 2015). Specifically the mandate to the CEED was “to assess the incorporation of the women in defense, taking into account their participation and employment in government organizations and institutions dedicated to the defense sector and within the armed forces of South American countries” (CEED, 2015). This endeavor started with a seminar held November 2013 in Venezuela where member states discussed the integration of women in the defense sector (CEED, 2015). The recommendations that were made, led to further research on this matter, which currently is still being done.

Before addressing the research and its implications for the women and men in the defense and security sector in particular and for the defense organizations and the region in general, it is good to mention that the CEED will contribute towards the identification of conceptual approaches and common basic guidelines that enables the establishment of policies in the area of defense and regional security (CEED, 2015). This research therefore, presumably will not done in vain, but its outcome will inform (new) policy on this matter.

THE ENGENDERING OF DEFENSE POLICIES IN THE REGION

For a region that is well known for its macho culture it may be said that this initiative, conducting research on women's incorporation in defense, is quite an accomplishment. The position of women in the region in general has significantly improved, but is at far not what it should and can be (Resdal 2010). As women have more opportunities to higher education their numbers on the corporate and other professions is increasing. Women furthermore are increasingly visible in higher and strategic positions. Unfortunately, it has been studied that this improvement is not in tandem with the progress their male counterparts are making (Resdal, 2010). This, as is presumed lies in the fact that false assumptions and perceptions still exist with regard to the position of women.

As the armed forces are a mirror of society these perceptions also take position. Moreover military organizations, which for centuries are hierarchical male dominated organizations, have their own (internal) set of rules and regulations to which everyone that wants to be part of, needs to abide by. Although these regulations are not set in stone and therefore can undergo change, they embody mostly historically set ideological principles, values and morals that form the fundament of the organization. Opening up the cadres for women is a challenge in itself, but can be done as long as the "core" of what the organization stands for is not being lost (Resdal 2010). That core is the role the organization plays; the members are responsible for protecting and defending the country against internationally and internal threats. This role historically was directed to men. Women who were part of these organizations were tasked with assistant and administrative positions. This moreover has much to do with the stereotypes about the roles of men and women in society. The common idea is that men defend their country land and home and protect their women and children while women are seen as the caretakers and givers of the family (RESDAL 2010).

Another interesting observation is that when defense organizations mention gender or gender issues, it is perceived as a domain and concern of women, implicating that gender is another word for women issues (RESDAL, 2010). And nothing is less true. Gender is the culturally specific set of characteristics that identifies the social behavior of women and men and the relationship between them. Because it is a relational term, gender must include women and men. Like the concepts of class, race, and ethnicity, gender is an analytical tool for understanding social processes (Status of Women Canada 1996). An analysis of gender relations therefore provides information on the different conditions which men and women face, and the different effects that policies and programs may have on them because of their situations. Such information can inform and improve policies and programs, and is essential in ensuring that the different needs of both women and men are met (UNDP, 2001).

An understanding of socio-essential economic relations and its gender relations, is an integral part of policy analysis, and is essential in creating and implementing effective development co-operation initiatives (Canadian International Development Agency,

2015). A gender analysis draws the attention to people and raises questions about who contribute, distribute, who own, who use, and who are wounded and or killed.

Military organizations therefore need to understand that it is not only a matter of numbers, through positive discrimination measures to fulfill set quota. The solution is also not just promoting two or four women in top positions (a decision mostly taken by the predominantly male leadership) for the sake of fulfilling development indicators. It is about understanding the impact the integration of women brings into policy design and implementation. The impact that men and women will have on defense matters in terms of analysis, development and execution of plans on the strategic, operational and tactical level.

Regional defense policies are the fruit of the overall strategic set goals and objectives of the UNASUR, which mainly can be described, as the desire to be a region in which amongst others exists respect for democracy, human rights and that has the propensity to promote peace. These defense policies therefore, should be engendered in such a sense, that gender is not a topic separately discussed, but is fully enshrined in the aforementioned policies. It therefore means that these policies should undergo the process of gender mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming is the process of systematically incorporating gender perspectives into all areas of work and assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs (UNDP, 2001).

The goal of gender mainstreaming is to promote and provoke a “revolutionary change” in the international and domestic policy process. It makes gender issues a core concern, not only for specific departments or bodies dealing with women’s issues, but for all actors across various subject areas, and at all stages in the policy process, “from conception and legislation to implementation and evaluation” (Institute for Security Studies, 2004).

This is not an overnight process, and those involved should prepare for the long overhaul. The region just started the assessment three years ago. Until today, according to the work plan, the member states are sharing information on the status quo with regard to gender in the respective countries. Furthermore, analysis of existing political, legal and doctrine regulations has been done. According to the work plan of 2014, the findings of study would be presented that year. A methodology of quantitative and qualitative analysis would be part of that endeavor as well (CEED, 2015).

In observance of these efforts and studying the work plan, it is not clear whether the final report on this issue will take into account the real position of the women in the armed forces in the region. What presumably will be assessed are the numbers of women, the held positions, and the highest rank a woman can be promoted to. The report in that case will not address if these women have the same real chances to reach those high positions. Moreover, it may not take into account if these women will have the same appointee opportunities for higher training. The fear that is described here is the following. Existing regulations and policies that amongst others describe that women can be members of the forces and that they can reach high ranks do not provide information on

the existing perception of the quality and importance of women in defense organizations. Moreover, these regulations do not show if the respective organizations truly implement them.

The argument that is being made furthermore is that studying gender implies that first and foremost the question should be answered what do we want to achieve? The mere alignment of policies does not ensure women in all the defense organizations have the same opportunities as men, or more importantly that men trust that they can achieve results when women are part of the decision-making process in higher echelons and operations in the field.

Another question to be answered that may facilitate the research process is what is the issue at hand and according to whom? If the objective is just to fulfill a (moral) requirement but the political will does not exist to close the gender gap and look at women and men indifferently, regardless of their sex, the findings of the research will be the next report ending on the “difficult policies” graveyard. On the long run, the result of political decisions that show disregard of women’s positions and ignorance of gender processes will not be a beauty mark on the overall development of such an organization.

Assuming that the findings of the research will lead to certain ratifications it is advisable that work plans in the future will not only address women or gender issues as a separate objective. Gender mainstreaming in all the sectors should be taken into account. Subsequently the respective defense organizations will take the necessary measures to ensure that all policies and budgets reflect consideration for men and women as personnel which needs the utmost care and consideration of its government for they are tasked with responsible tasks working under stressful conditions. If the gender-gap is taken into account and addressed it will enable the researchers to directly and effectively make the necessary recommendations to the CDS. It is therefore expected that the CEED will request frank and detailed information on the position of women.

Alignment and harmonization of defense policies is a laudable endeavor, but in reality not completely feasible. The alignment and harmonization will be evident in conceptual sense. In practical terms however, this may be difficult. Every country within South America regardless of the mutual efforts towards peace and security has different interests and objectives. Every country furthermore experiences a different growth with regards to development. This will not differ for the defense organizations of the respective countries. Some countries experienced a faster development with regard to gender mainstreaming and the inclusion of women in strategic and operational positions. Those, whose policies are still in embryotic state, may profit from this regional endeavor. The predominantly male leadership in those countries however, determines the profit.

Notwithstanding the earlier remarks, the hopeful assumption exists that this research will lead to the desire within the respective defense organizations to address gender as a development issue, as a measure to determine growth and organizational maturity. The respective defense organizations will then opt for gender mainstreaming of their policies. The rationale for mainstreaming gender lies in the fact that “gender equality is an issue of

development effectiveness not just a matter of political correctness or kindness to women” (Resdal 2010). Evidence demonstrates that when women and men are relatively equal, economies grow faster, the poor move more quickly out of poverty and the wellbeing of men and women and children is enhanced (Resdal 2010). This evidence correlates smoothly with the goals and objectives of UNASUR. This shows that every policy and activity has a gender perspective or dimension or implication.

COMPARISON ON REGIONAL INITIATIVES TO ENGENDERED DEFENSE POLICIES

In comparison, taking into account the undertakings of other regions the final solution is that gender mainstreaming is the best way to effectively pursue gender equality and development in defense and security sector.

The European Union adopted a set of 17 indicators for assessing the progress it is making with regard to gender. It furthermore emphasized that gender mainstreaming and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 should be from the early planning to the conduct and evaluation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) missions and operations (EU, 2008). The EU stresses the importance and encourages training, information campaigns and other material on the involvement of men and women, in the military and police as a way to change stereotypes regarding women’s participation, assignments and tasks. The EU also knew that to make these endeavors and common objectives, all the member states needed to be on par with regard to knowledge on this matter. The EU therefore developed a comprehensive approach including a set of measures, listing all policies and best practices (EU 2008).

The South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of small arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) together with the UNDP initiates the three- year “Gender Equality in the Military” Project as a way to assist the Ministries of Defense of the Western Balkans to integrate gender equality through regional cooperation. Started in 2012 the project furthermore addressed that a more systematic approach was needed to attract women in the defense forces, especially in command and management positions (SEESAC 2012).

In Africa, the African Union (AU) just launched the five-year Gender, Peace and Security Programme 2015-2020 that will provide a framework for the development of effective strategies and mechanisms for women’s increased participation in peace and security matters (African Union, 2014). A survey of the security sector and gender in West Africa, done in 2011 by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), was not only to document information that was not easily accessible, but also to provide guidance for the future plans. It made clear that not every recommendation will be useful for all institutions and countries, for there are gaps and country specific challenges. It is therefore that country and institutional specific gender needs assessments need to be done in order to determine starting points for change (Gaanderse & Valasek, 2011). Another assessment done in 2010 to determine AU progress towards the security sector noted amongst others that the AU and other regional mechanisms

should ensure that issues of gender are mainstreamed into all African Peace and Security Architecture components (APSA) (APSA 2010).

The Latin American Security and Defense Network (RESDAL) an Organization that is active in Latin America also second the fact that data on the incorporation of women in defense organizations is not easy to access. The organization showed furthermore that this lack of data was in contrast with the regions increasing interest in peace operations (RESDAL, 2010). An analysis done in 2010 on Women in the Armed and Police Forces showed the dilemma women face in military organizations for being observed as part of the gender equality issue, but not as part of the military profession (RESDAL 2010). This may in itself be the biggest hurdle the UNASUR has to take: to change the perception of stereotypical roles in the military. The analysis shows furthermore the development the incorporation of women in Armed Forces went through as the respective countries took notable steps with regard to legislation and institutional reform. More analysis on the roles that women perform with the military is needed as on the involvement of the political level. Likewise it is also recommended that defense institutions closely assess internal regulations and measures with regard to women's participation.

Regional initiatives regarding incorporation of women in peace and security, the importance of addressing these issues through a gender lens are many. They all show the specific regional willingness and notion that the defense and security sector is an area in which men and women are needed.

COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL SET STANDARDS ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS- SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325

Engendering defense policies will show the regions willingness to comply with the principles as set forth in Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Named to be the landmark resolution it sets the current playing field for peacekeeping operations (RESDAL 2010). Came into force on October 2000 the resolution accounts the international community in taking the necessary steps towards its execution (Gender unit DPKO 2015). Member states are urged to apply the gender lens in all the planning phases of peacekeeping operations. The Security Council recognized the impact of women in making a contribution towards peace and DDR initiatives. It recognized furthermore that women have an active role to play in restoring peace, rather than just victims of war (Gaanderse & Valasek, 2011). Numerous assessments and progress reports show the impact gender mainstreaming, inclusion of women in all stages of peacekeeping has.

Some UNASUR nations are very active in peacekeeping and fulfill the principles of SCR 1325. Other respective defense organizations still need to adopt these gender-based policies. As a critical strategy for preparation rather than crisis management South American nations should start this process of embracing gender mainstreaming. Retrospectively, defense organizations prepare for future operations, so in that regard they should prepare for internal but also regional initiatives to restore peace and security.

THE WORK PLANS OF THE CDS

A closer look at the work plans of the CDS strengthens further the above statements that the mainstreaming of gender is important. With regard to confidence building measures for instance, the link between gender and defense expenditures has been duly proved. Researches showed that there is a link between women in executive power and the increase of defense expenditure (Koch and Fulton 2011, 1-16). It has been studied moreover, that women in these positions are not necessarily playing the stereotypical role, which is expected, from women, but they tend to be more hawkish (Koch and Fulton 2011, 1-16). The involvement of these women executives increases both military expenditures and the use of force as a policy tool. This evidence therefore contradicts the notion that women only possess traits like compassion, warmth and gentleness, while men are more aggressive and competitive. The increase or decrease of defense expenditures has a stronger linkage with the present security situation, the emerging threats and challenges, the progress the respective country is making with regard to internal peace and stability than who is taking the decisions. So the decisions a country will take with regard to its expenditures is more a case of the present political situation than if there was a woman or a man making the final decisions. Subsequently, if the region wants to take certain steps and one country will abstain it is not only a question of the leadership it is because of other pressing interests.

Another activity in the work plan is the South American vision for the Defense of Natural Resources and biodiversity. Indeed, is the region endowed with an abundance of natural resources and a rich biodiversity? Both are aspects that are so important for the sustainability for development. The link with gender that both man and woman should be taken into account when addressing conservation efforts has been made. Man and woman make use of nature in different ways, their knowledge about it differs and both have access to different sorts of natural resources (Srinath 2008, 209-227). The fact exists that women are the less empowered and rarely sought for information when decisions are taken in environmental and agricultural manners (Srinath 2008, 209-227). Few women own land, but over the years they generated knowledge on how to sustain their environment in order to keep feed their family and cattle. The CEED in conceptualizing the South American vision may take into account the positions of the peoples living in specific areas and urging the defense organizations working in these areas to improve their civil-military relations, thereby employing gender-neutral troops for these endeavors.

IMPACT OF GENDER MAINSTREAMING

By now it become apparent that the CDS-CEED is taking steps in the right direction, namely to assess the inclusion of women in defense. The sincere expectation is that this assessment will lead to gender mainstreaming action plans. Having in mind the definition mentioned above, gender mainstreaming in the defense sector means that experience, knowledge and interests of both men and women to operations and is a means to conceptualize defense policies, implementation and the evaluation process (Hendricks and Hutton 2008).

ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL

The South American region showed its aspirations to play an important role in the international community. The decades of dictatorships, military coups make place for democracies that uphold principles of good governance. In line of the issue at hand, the region made progress by breaking down the tradition of male ruling, welcoming at least three women in executive power. In the last ten years in at least five countries women were appointed minister of defense. Much can be said about this as experts' note that appointments of women in executive positions occur more in peacetime (Koch and Fulton 2011, 1-16). Notes are also that two of the three women currently in power in Chile, Argentina and Brazil enjoyed the endorsement of powerful male figures (Rathbone 2013).

These notes however, do not bring into question that these women are leading their country and providing valuable input on the regional and international level. Brazil is a growing political and economic power to reckon with. Argentina is currently coming out of its severe financial crisis and Chile experiences dropping rates of poverty (Radelat 2011). In addressing the issue of stereotypes and the nature of women, it may be said that these three women differ. They have different backgrounds, ideological beliefs and leadership styles (Radelat 2011).

What is important to note is that they came into power through pure democratic proceedings, and they made a case for gender equality, showing that a region with such an unstable past is capable for choosing competent candidates that can be on the forefront for regional development.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The region showed its preference for soft power strategies in its approach towards issues regarding regional peace and security. Soft power frequently is being linked towards feminine approaches, as it is described as the ability to attract and to cooperate, rather than coerce or use force (Nayar 2011). It is a form of power, but not one of the instruments of power (Blechman and Stimson Center 2004, 680-681). The strength of soft power lies more in the way it is utilized to reach desired goals. It is part of the "attractiveness" of a nation of a region policy environment (Blechman and Stimson Center 2004, 680-681). It therefor serves an organization like Unasur its public diplomacy efforts.

The UNASUR showed off its success in implementing this strategy in 2008 when it took a regional stance against internal threats to the democracy of Bolivia (Main 2010). While the UNASUR expressed total support for the Constitutional Government of the president of the Republic of Bolivia, it also made a call to all political and social players involved taking the necessary steps to immediately end all acts of violence and intimidation. The Union furthermore urged for dialogue and the search for a sustainable solution.

Rather than waiting for an eruption, caused by ongoing grievances, which would lead the use of arms in setting the score, the Union acted swift and decisive. The fact that the

union which during that time was led by the Chilean president who happens to be a woman just shows its eagerness for positive change and rather than only fulfilling national interests has the sub regional and regional investments towards growth and development in sight.

The strength of UNASUR soft power strategies were also visible in 2009 during the heightened tensions between Colombia and Venezuela in which the latter named a then announced US- Colombia Defense Agreement a threat to regional security. Subsequently Colombia accused Venezuela for supporting the FARC, a Colombian insurgency organization. Concurrent mediation led to some relief and in setting a desirable environment for renewing of diplomatic ties (Main 2010).

In 2010 again the UNASUR displayed effective conflict mediation skills during the coup attempts of the Chilean police. They condemned this attempt and discussed a Democratic Clause that would also outline the specific actions that would be taken against when member countries their political processes are not respected (Planas 2010).

The nations of South America need to address internal issues but also historical diplomatic and political tensions on interstate relations. The way the UNASUR is using soft power as a means to ensure stability through direct response promotes regional security. The region in its quest to promote economic, social and political development understands that insecurity and unstable peace will decline this process. It understands moreover that ignoring unstable circumstances may lead to exacerbating effects, which will take more time, efforts and finances to bring back to acceptable terms.

REGIONAL DEFENSE

Regional defense therefore will only be formulated as such to adequately serve the political set strategies. Regional defense will be an instrument to consolidate peace, security and development. It will strengthen its capabilities to assist in developmental issues of national states and within the region but also in political and social conflict situations.

As South America is feeling the last convulsions of authoritarian regimes, some countries still face violent threats that in some cases are trans-border in nature. Armed groups whether terrorists and or insurgents, wide availability of small arms and light weapons, illegal drugs trafficking is the pertinent reality. Experts who study these phenomena unanimously agree that to successfully address these issues amongst others first and foremost the root causes need to be tackled. The root causes mostly lie in the social, economic and political sphere. Most countries employ their armed forces when responding kinetic to some of these threats. They may however also choose the Armed Forces to be assist in restoring order and stability, in ensuring government control in certain areas and oversee rebuilding measures. The defense organizations in that regard should ensure gender-neutral deployment for these operations. During these operations the armed forces will not only confront the threats, but will be in contact with the populations. It has been showed that in those circumstances the population is the most

affected by crisis and instability. Moreover it is been assessed that members of threat groups move between the populations, conduct mobilizations amongst the people and seek legitimacy and support for their actions and causes (Marks 2007).

Gender-neutral troops open the opportunity for the Armed forces to effectively approach men, women and children in these communities. It has been reported that in peace and conflict resolution cases women in the affected areas are more likely to share information with the female members of the standing forces than with their male colleagues. Women and men perceive conflict and crisis differently and therefore also perceive peace differently (UNDPKO 2015). If the defense organizations and armed forces understand this gender issue, they will be able to reach successes when being employed for peace and reconstruction efforts.

CONCLUSIONS

Engendering defense policies will have an impact on the soft power regime for it will lead to the strengthening of the personnel of the defense forces as they will prepare for operations other than war. Changes in development or crucial decisions towards peace and security will not depend on gender; they will rely on the smart choices of competent leaders who can be man or woman (Nye 2012).

The impact that gender mainstreaming will bring is the appointment of competent candidates, men or woman, in delicate positions to be the champion in promoting effective foreign affairs, and stable peace and security. The impact it may bring furthermore is that the approaches of soft power on the operational level will be part of civil- military operations.

Understanding the importance of men and women together in promoting peace and security must lead the defense organizations of the UNASUR to take significant steps towards gender mainstreaming and the incorporation of women in all stages within these organizations. Although the perceptions is that men will lose, when women are too visible, it is imperative for the strategic policymakers and the military commanders to understand gender and women and so become agents for change. Education and knowledge sharing is key. The survey of the UNASUR is a modest start in the right direction.

Awaiting the findings of the CEED Study with great anticipation, it is estimative that the CDS will set the stage for gender mainstreaming to ensure effective policies, strengthening of the soft power strategies within the region and have capable men and women in the armed forces to successfully protect and defend their respective nations security in particular and the regions security in general in order to consolidate peace and security for all south American peoples.

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WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY: WHAT A DIFFERENCE A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN MAKES - THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE EXPERIENCE

An Information Paper on the importance of National Action Plans (NAP) to the successful implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security, and the Australian Defence Force's progress against the Australian NAP.

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The views and content expressed in this paper are those of the author based on her experience in her current role.

INTRODUCTION

Defence recognises that stability and peace can only be achieved through a gender-inclusive approach to conflict resolution and peace building.

- Air Marshal Mark Binskin, Vice Chief of Defence Force, 2013

The use of Australian Defence Force (ADF) women in Female Engagement Teams (FET) attached to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)¹ in Afghanistan, beginning in 2011, was not as a result of Australia's response to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325). Rather, it was an initiative of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention that saw our women engaged in a process from which the benefits - information and intelligence collection, networking and collaboration - and the consequences - effective mission analysis and situational awareness - were not fully understood, nor appreciated, by the ADF at that time as an inherent response to the United Nations (UN) women, peace and security (WPS) agenda.

Despite this, the FETs interactions with Afghan women, and their valuable and well-documented operational outcomes, subsequently underpinned Australia's efforts to contribute to WPS priorities in military, crisis and humanitarian operations. This particular initiative served as an example of, and indeed was complimentary to, Australia's and the ADF's efforts to respond to, and implement, the WPS agenda through the *Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018* (NAP), which was released in March 2012. The NAP provided the platform from which the ADF could focus its attention on, and fully embed, the principles and intent of UNSCR 1325, particularly as it applied to military operations.

The ADF and the Department of Defence² has, since 2012, made considerable inroads to ensuring that the practical implementation of the NAP achieves the WPS outcomes being sought by the Australian Government (through political, social, aid and diplomatic actions), aligns closely with those of allied armed forces, and builds on the already significant global contribution to UNSCR 1325. A number of events, and the deployment of the ADF's first Gender Advisor (GENAD) to the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan, in 2013, was the catalyst for this change. The efforts to date undertaken by the ADF to implement UNSCR 1325 have been premised on a NAP that has focussed attention on the inclusion of gender considerations as an important factor in promoting gender equality for women and girls in countries threatened by war, violence and insecurity, and in the planning and conduct of military peace and security efforts for national and global security.

This paper proffers that a NAP is essential to the successful implementation of UNSCR 1325 and WPS principles in and across Government organisations, and outlines the ADF's progress against the NAP and accomplishments to date. The paper outlines the premise, purpose and progress of NAPs, Australia's responses to the WPS agenda resulting in the Australian NAP, the ADF's response to the NAP and obligations to Government, and the ADF's efforts in embedding and networking WPS, through the NAP, into core ADF business. In this regard, the requirement

¹ A multinational effort led by Australia.

² A department of State, headed by the Secretary of the Department of Defence.

to implement the NAP has focussed the ADF's attention on WPS considerations in the planning and conduct of operations. With the ADF's long-standing experience in peacekeeping and kinetic operations around the world, WPS is, through and as a result of the Australian NAP, being steadily implemented across all aspects of Australian military operations.

BACKGROUND

UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions

UNSCR 1325 was adopted unanimously by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in October 2000, and is seen as the landmark resolution that forms the basis of the WPS agenda and NAPs. UNSCR 1325 recognises that the experiences and needs of women and girls differ from those of men and boys in conflict and post-conflict situations and underlines the essential role of women in conflict prevention, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. UNSCR 1325 tasked the United Nations (UN) systems and its member states with thoroughly integrating a gender perspective into all peace-keeping operations, peace processes, and return, resettlement and reintegration programs in post-conflict settings.

The resolution is premised on four pillars: the **prevention** of armed conflicts and war by implementing the gender perspective in national and international peace negotiations, activities and security policy; increasing the **participation** and decision making of women in peace making, post conflict reconstruction and the prevention of conflict; the **protection** of women and children in armed conflict and of their rights; and incorporating a **gender perspective** into peace operations and negotiations³. UNSCR 1325 and its subsequent related resolutions – 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013) – form the WPS agenda and aim to increase women's participation in all efforts related to peace and security and to strengthen the protection of women in situations of armed conflict.

While UNSCR 1325 did not mention, much less require, that NAPs be developed, the UNSC Presidential Statement (2002) and the UN Secretary General's Report (2004) invited UN member states to prepare a NAP as another step towards the implementation of UNSCR 1325. UNSCR 1889, adopted in 2009, reaffirmed the provisions of UNSCR 1325, and encouraged member states to continue to pursue implementation of this resolution, including the development of NAPs.

A National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security

A National Action Plan 'is a strategy developed by a state to implement UNSCR 1325 and other resolutions of the women, peace and security agenda. Plans should contain concrete recommendations on how women should be included in all peace and conflict related decisions and processes, and how a gender perspective should be included in efforts to prevent conflict and sexual violence, protect women and girls, and in relief and recovery activities. They provide an opportunity to assess priorities for the states' work both nationally and internationally and to

³ This means examining the different needs, concerns and challenges of women and men in order to provide the appropriate operational response, and identifying their abilities or potential to promote or contribute to peace and reconstruction.

*coordinate relevant actors, including cooperation with civil society. Plans should contain clear goals, actions and responsibilities and mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation.*⁴

The first country to develop a NAP was Denmark in 2005. As of July 2014, only 46 UN members states (out of 193) had developed NAPs as way of consolidating action taken on the WPS agenda and affirm future activities (23 in Europe, 13 in Africa, three in the Americas, six in Asia and the Pacific, and one in the Middle East), although a further 20 others were in development.⁵ NATO also reports that only 18 of 28 NATO member states and twelve of 41 partner countries have adopted NAPs.⁶

In addition, NATO, in conjunction with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and with the participation of Australia, Afghanistan, Japan, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, approved a revised policy for the implementation of UNSCR 1325⁷. This policy was endorsed at the Defence Ministerial meeting in Brussels in October 2013, and resulted in a NATO Action Plan⁸, published in 2014, outlining specific outcomes relating to cooperative security, crisis and conflict management, NATO-led operations and missions, national contributions, cross-cutting enablers, and monitoring and reporting mechanisms.⁹ This will, in my view, provide a sound and consistent basis for NATO member and partner states to drive implementation of UNSCR 1325 through NAPs in the context of military responses.

However, implementation of the WPS agenda across the globe has been slow and incoherent. A study undertaken in 2014¹⁰ identified two fundamental reasons that are, among others, responsible for the lack of progress in the implementation of the WPS agenda - a lack of capacity and commitment of the actors involved; and scarce resources being earmarked. The study concluded that one of the essential components for successful implementation of the WPS agenda was *the development of national implementation strategies with clear goals, budgets and responsibilities*.¹¹

The study also concluded that the common advantages of NAP included (Government) oversight and comprehensiveness of policies, coordination and avoiding lack of duplication (amongst Government agencies, awareness-raising within Government), ownership by the participating agencies and ministries, and importantly, accountability.¹² Other studies have also emphasised the potential for NAPs to enhance military operational effectiveness through awareness and knowledge of specific security threats by collecting information from both men and women,

⁴ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Study on National Action Plans on the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, 2014, page 25.

⁵ Report of the UN Secretary General on Women, Peace and Security, September 2014, S/2014/693.

⁶ DRPC (EAPC) N (2015)0002 of 20 January 2015.

⁷EAPC(C) D (2014)0001 of 27 March 2014.

⁸ *NATO taking the Women, Peace and Security agenda forward – Policy, Action Plan and Progress Report*, 2014.

⁹ The NATO policy and action plan was, in part, a result of the outcomes of the 2013 *Review into the Effective Implementation of UNSCR 1325 into the Conduct of NATO-led Operations* (in Afghanistan and Kosovo).

¹⁰ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Study on National Action Plans on the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, 2014.

¹¹Ibid, page 9.

¹² Ibid, page 28.

promoting gender-sensitive development which increases legitimacy for military forces and contributes to a more stable environment, and including more women in armed forces to draw on greater source of experience and reach out to greater share of the population.¹³

This clearly establishes the importance of a NAP and a national implementation strategy to the effective implementation of UNSCR 1325. The content and substance of NAPs, as well as the resources attributed to implementation of these plans, have varied widely. With successive NAPs emerging, and with one third of existing NAPs concluding and requiring review in 2013, this has provided an important opportunity to examine the effectiveness of NAPs in accelerating implementation of the WPS agenda at national and international levels.¹⁴

So important was the nexus between NAPs and the practical and successful implementation of UNSCR 1325 that two international seminars were held in 2013 to monitor and assess the efficacy of NAPs. Jumonji University and the Association of Human Rights of Women held a seminar in Japan from 27-28 August 2013. Participants from international governments, civil society and academia made a number of recommendations that independently but subsequently closely aligned with the outcomes of broader international efforts over the past two years to implement UNSCR 1325. These recommendations included; establishing a government-led coordinating mechanism for implementation, identifying senior level focal points for all responsible agencies, ensuring the participation of the security sector, mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 across government agencies through internal action and implementation plans, improving and increasing recruitment of women to the security sector, and establishing regular reporting and monitoring and evaluation systems.

A Global Technical Review Meeting, funded by Austria, Finland and the Netherlands, was held in New York on 5-7 November 2013. The meeting brought together 58 technical experts from various regions of the world involved in national and regional implementation of the WPS agenda, including representatives of member states, regional organisations, UN and civil society organisations and academics to examine accountability for implementation of WPS. Details of their meeting can be accessed in their Final Report¹⁵ but suffice to say that this nexus remains a priority for the High-Level Review on UNSCR 1325¹⁶, and the Global Study¹⁷, led by UN

¹³ Olsson, Louise and Johan Tejpar (eds) 2009, *Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325 – Practices and lessons Learned from Afghanistan*, Swedish Defence Research Agency. Whitman, Toby and Jacqueline O'Neill, 2012, *Attention to Gender Increases Security in Operations: Examples from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)*, The Institute for Inclusive Security.

¹⁴ UN Women Global Technical Review Meeting – *Building accountability for implementation of Security Council resolutions on Women, Peace and Security* – Final Report, November 2013, page 3.

¹⁵ UN Women Global Technical Review Meeting – *Building accountability for implementation of Security Council resolutions on Women, Peace and Security* – Final Report, November 2013.

¹⁶ Resolution 2122 (2013) adopted on 18 October 2013, reiterated its intention to convene a High-level Review in 2015 to assess progress at the global, regional and national levels in implementing resolution 1325 (2000), renew commitments, and address obstacles and constraints that have emerged in the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000).

¹⁷ In the same resolution, the Security Council invited the Secretary-General, in preparation for the High-level Review to commission a global study on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), highlighting good practice examples, implementation gaps and challenges, as well as emerging trends and priorities for action.

Women¹⁸, planned for 2015 to evaluate the progress of 15 years of UNSCR 1325 implementation.

Australia's Response to UNSCR 1325

Prior to the development and release of a NAP, Australia had, in recognizing women as powerful agents of change for peace and security as a key strategy to improve the chances of peace and development, already implemented a significant number of initiatives that supported UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions. Australia has also supported, and continues to support, the international framework of human rights, instruments and obligations relating to promoting gender equality and empowering women and girls that intersect with WPS.

This has included seven core UN human rights treaties like the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Of particular note is the CEDAW recommendation to member states, adopted in October 2013 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict, to ensure '*that national action plans and strategies to implement Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions are compliant with the convention and that adequate budgets are allocated for their implementation*'¹⁹.

The Australian Government also supported the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which was an agenda for women's empowerment and human rights aimed at removing all the obstacles to women's active participation in all spheres of public and private life through a full and equal share in economic, social, cultural and political decision-making. Australia supported the development of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG)²⁰ including MDG Three on promoting gender equality and empowering women. Australia has also supported efforts to enhance international approaches towards gender issues, including the establishment of UN Women.

There is growing international recognition that a comprehensive approach to security issues requires the inclusion of women's experiences and perspectives. Australia was a co-sponsor of UNSCR 1820 in 2008,²¹ UNSCRs 1888 and 1889 in 2009,²² and UNSCR 1960 in 2010²³. Noting the importance of civil-military cooperation to the UNSCR 1325 thematic pillar of protection – of the rights of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict settings - the Australian Government established the Australian Civil Military Centre (ACMC) in 2008 as an initiative to improve Australia's civil-military collaboration for conflict and disaster management overseas.

Australia's long-term commitment to peace building efforts through the UN system was demonstrated by its active engagement as a member of the UN Peace building Commission in 2010. Australia contributes to the UN Peace Building Fund and supports the peace building

¹⁸ The UN organization dedicated to gender equality and the empowerment of women.

¹⁹ CEDAW General Recommendation No.30 (a).

²⁰ Eight international development goals agreed by all UN member states in 2000,

²¹ Condemns the use of rape and other forms of sexual violence in conflict.

²² Calls for appointment of a special representative to lead efforts to end conflict-related sexual violence, and increase in female representation as representatives and special envoys respectively.

²³ Provides measures aimed at ending impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence.

initiatives in Africa identified as priorities by the UN Peace Building Commission. In Burundi for example, Australian assistance included support for the conduct of free and fair elections in 2010, and contribution to peace building priorities identified by Sierra Leone in its agriculture sector.

As a member of the Group of Friends on Children and Armed Conflict, Australia supports the Secretary-General's recommendations that the issue be included in the mandates of all relevant Security Council sanctions committees. This directs effort, including rehabilitation, towards stronger and more effective measures to protect children from harm and exploitation during armed conflict, and advocating for the release of child soldiers and education for former child soldiers.

Australia is a member of the Friends of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)²⁴ at the UN and supports projects and research to advance R2P. This includes strengthening the Joint Office of the UN Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect, to enable it to perform a broader early warning and assessment role in relation to mass atrocity crimes.

Australia has also taken a leading role in international initiatives on the protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations. Australia is working with the African Union (AU) and the UN Secretariat to strengthen protection of civilian capabilities in peace operations. The protection of civilians was the subject of a symposium co-hosted by Australia and the AU in Ethiopia and at the third International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations held in Australia in 2010.

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL ACTION PLAN

The Australian NAP was released in March 2012. It was the result of extensive lobbying and Government-funded action by civil society to undertake national consultations on the development of a response to UNSCR 1325, and sets out what Australia was going to do, at home and overseas, to integrate a gender perspective into its peace and security efforts, protect women's and girls' human rights, and promote their participation in conflict prevention, management and resolution²⁵.

The NAP is premised on a nexus between gender equality and peace. Its purpose is to articulate Australia's ongoing commitment to embed UNSCR 1325 and the broader WPS agenda across Government, establish a clear framework for a coordinated, whole-of-Government approach to implementing UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions, identify strategies and actions that Australia will undertake both domestically and overseas to implement UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions, and measure the effectiveness of this work over a six year period from 2012-2018. The NAP also highlights the important work that Australia is doing in partnership with the international community to respond to women's needs, recognise their roles, promote equal participation, and protect women's and girls' human rights in fragile, conflict and post-conflict settings.

²⁴ R2P is an expression of the irrevocable collective commitment to ensure that never again will the world be confronted with the horrors of genocide and other mass atrocities.

²⁵ *Australian National Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018*, Ministers Foreword, page 3.

The NAP reaffirms that implementation of the WPS agenda is a long term and transformative piece of work. It also reaffirms that it is about changing the approach to peace and security efforts, particularly in the operational context, in order to integrate a gender perspective, and to consider the experience and needs of women and girls across a range of complex issues. The NAP is considered both a symbolic and practical step forward in Australia's implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions. The NAP is not exhaustive or static; it is a living document that will provide ongoing guidance to inform the work and policies of Australian Government agencies and departments²⁶.

The NAP contains five high level strategies that describe what the Australian Government will do to achieve better outcomes for women and girls against each of the five thematic areas identified by the UN for conceptualizing and organizing activities in the implementation of the WPS agenda; prevention, participation, protection, relief and recovery, and normative. The strategies include integrating a gender perspective into Australia's policies on peace and security, embedding the WPS agenda in the Australian Government's approach to human resource management of defence, police and deployed personnel, supporting civil society organizations to promote equality and increase women's participation in conflict prevention, peace-building, conflict resolution and relief and recovery, promoting WPS implementation internationally, and taking a coordinated and holistic approach domestically and internally to WPS.²⁷ Under each of the strategies is a series of more detailed actions (24 in total), which outline how each strategy will be practically delivered, and a number of these actions cut across two or more of the thematic areas.

The NAP also contains a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (MEF) that outlines a number of measures to track the effectiveness of the NAP over time and hold the Australian Government accountable in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions. The Australian Government is required to release a Progress Report against these measures every two years over the six-year lifespan of the NAP. To further strengthen the initial implementation of the first NAP, these three Progress reports will be tabled in Australian Federal Parliament.²⁸

Impact of Australian National Action Plan

Since the release of the NAP, the Australian Government has continued to develop and implement policies that align with the WPS agenda. In 2012, the Government appointed a Global Ambassador for Women and Girls to promote gender equality and the social, political and economic empowerment for women and girls particularly in the Asia Pacific region. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) has been working with other police forces in the region to facilitate women's participation and protect women's and girl's human rights through specific development programs. Australia's aid program supported a range of programs that recognised the role that women played in preventing conflict and building peace. These activities were all directed at improving outcomes for women and girls in conflict-affected communities.

²⁶ Ibid, page 15.

²⁷ Ibid, page 19.

²⁸ Ibid Pages 26-27.

The Australian Government is using its term on the UNSC to work with fellow members to ensure all relevant peacekeeping and peace-building operations address the impact of conflict on women and girls, prevent impunity for sexual violence, pursue more comprehensive consideration and integration of these issues across the UNSC's entire agenda, and advocate for peacekeeping mandates developed by the UNSC to include specific gender equality language and considerations (including the appointment of women protection advisors and GENAD).

The Government also works with civil society organisations to deliver services in conflict and post-conflict settings, promote the role of women in peace-building and reconstruction efforts, and raise awareness and provide education on WPS. In this regard, Australia has an ongoing commitment to UN Women. This is occurring through Australia's role on the UN Women Executive Board, and ongoing funding for UN Women activities and projects.

More recently, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Senator the Hon Julie Bishop, expressed her support for the UNSC Open Debate on WPS held in New York in October 2014 to commemorate the 14th anniversary of UNSCR 1325, where she reaffirmed commitments relating to the importance of WPS to Australia, reiterated the Australian Government's commitment to global implementation of the WPS agenda, and strengthened the ADF's role in implementing WPS principles in peacekeeping and conflict operations.

Australia's Ambassador for Women and Girls, Natasha Stott Despoja, will today represent Australia at the UN Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security in New York. Ambassador Stott Despoja's participation builds on Australia's strong advocacy of the United Nations' women, peace and security agenda. With the number of global crises on the rise, this annual event is an opportunity for the international community to renew and strengthen its commitment to the protection of women and girls in situations of conflict, and women's participation in conflict prevention, resolution and peace building.

- Senator the Hon Julie Bishop, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 2014

Noting the above, the establishment of a NAP has been a critical step towards fulfilling Australia's commitment to the WPS agenda and providing opportunities for Australia to demonstrate leadership on the issue both domestically (through effective implementation of the NAP) and internationally (by example)²⁹.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 1325 AND THE AUSTRALIAN NAP

Of the 24 NAP actions, the ADF and the Department of Defence (collectively known as 'Defence'³⁰) are responsible for 17. Of those 17 actions, the majority are heavily focussed on the

²⁹ The 2013 Annual Civil Society Report Card on Australia's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, page 9.

³⁰ The 'Defence' portfolio consists of a number of component organizations that together are responsible for supporting the defence of Australia and its national interests. This includes the Department of Defence and the ADF which comprises the Royal Australian Navy, the Australian Army, and the Royal Australian Air Force.

ADF's contribution to peace and security efforts, implementation of WPS internationally, training for deployed forces, relationships with civil society in operations, and enhanced participation of women in peace and security operations. Defence is also responsible for reporting against 12 of the measures in the MEF. With this NAP Defence has been able to clearly articulate its commitments to the effective operational implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions.

Australia has been integrally involved in global efforts to build and restore peace for more than 60 years. As a capable and dependable partner, Australia's expertise is sought after in developing the frameworks for promoting human rights, protecting the most vulnerable (women and children) and preventing a return to conflict. No more was this evident than in Australia's involvement in regional peacekeeping missions in Bougainville, Solomon Islands and East Timor from 1997. In 2007, Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie³¹ noted that (as a result of the inclusion of women in these regional peacekeeping missions) *'A positive outcome of the integration of women in the Australian Defence Force is the added influence women peacekeepers have in engaging the most tragically affected group in any post conflict situation, the women and children. Winning the trust of this vulnerable group can also be vital in some cultures, because it is often the women in a society that play the key role in conflict resolution and reconciliation'*³².

It was through these early modern peacekeeping missions that the ADF learnt the value of involving women more fully in peacekeeping missions and in specific cultural-related tasks. Indeed, prior to the release of the Australian NAP, WPS and gender training was, and continues to be, included in UN military observers' courses (MOC) conducted by the ADF Peace Operations Training Centre (POTC) for national and international defence and police force members as a means of contributing to this aspect of peacekeeping operations. The ADF also provides instructors to MOCs conducted by international peace support / operations centres in support of an Australian / UN Memorandum of Understanding for enhanced cooperation in governance and development, capacity building, peace and security, and humanitarian assistance. More recently, this included training conducted in Kenya and Rwanda for students from the AU states.

However, the full integration of women into the ADF, and an expansion of their roles in military operations, has been slow. For Defence, enhancing the rights and roles of women and ensuring gender equality through their **participation** (in the armed forces) and identifying supporting **protection** mechanisms, came with two initiatives subsequently instrumental to the successful implementation of the NAP. The first was the 2011 decision by the Australian Government to remove the gender restrictions on the remaining ADF combat role employment categories for which women were previously excluded³³. Defence directed a five-year implementation strategy

³¹ The then Vice Chief of Defence Force and Chief of Joint Operations, previously Head of Mission East Timor 2000/01.

³² 'The ADF and Peacekeeping', speech at the conference *'Force for Good? Sixty Years of Australian Peacekeeping'*, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 13 September 2007, MSPA 70913/07, <http://www.defence.gov.au/media/SpeechTpl.cfm?CurrentId=7061>.

³³ In 2011 they remaining combat roles previously excluding women were: (Navy) Clearance Divers and Mine Warfare and Clearance Diving Officers, (Air Force) Airfield Defence Guards and Ground Defence Officers and

with a managed and phased approach. Once this plan is fully implemented, the ADF will facilitate the removal of Australia's reservations in relation to combat duties from the CEDAW, and the removal of the exemption under Section 43 of the *Sex Discrimination Act 1984*.

The second was the conduct and implementation of two independent reviews in 2011 and 2012 by the Federal Sex Discrimination Commissioner Ms Elizabeth Broderick working under powers delegated to her by the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) into the treatment of women at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) and the treatment of women in the ADF (the 'Broderick Reviews'). These reviews focused on the adequacy and appropriateness of measures to promote gender equality, women's safety, and to address and prevent sexual harassment and abuse, and sex discrimination.³⁴

The Broderick Reviews also addressed efforts to increase women's participation in the ADF and in key leadership positions, both of which are critical to sustaining the force-in-being enhancing capability building and improving operational effectiveness. Of note, the percentage of women in the ADF increased sharply from 13.8% in 2012 to 15.1% in 2014. In addition, the Broderick Reviews addressed the impact of sexual harassment and sexual abuse, resulting in recommendations to establish a Sexual Misconduct Prevention and Response Office, which provides support, advice and guidance to Defence personnel and to those who are supporting victims of a sexual offence and other forms of sexual misconduct.

The **protection** and **participation** elements of UNSCR 1325, in the operational context were initially demonstrated through the use of FETs by the Australian PRT in Uruzgan Province in Afghanistan. In 2011, in response to NATO policy to integrate UNSCR 1325 into military operations, and building on the United States (US) military's experience and success in Iraq, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) required all military units to create FETs to build relations with Afghan women. These teams had dual and linked military and civilian purposes – one as a force multiplier and important part of evolving counterinsurgency strategy, and the second, to promote the participation of women in conflict and post-conflict settings to help build more peaceful, equitable and democratic societies. In taking this approach, NATO was implementing a 1325 strategy that translated to practical measures and leadership opportunities for women on the ground.

FETs were originally created to gather intelligence but it's really given women a voice.

*- Clint Cooper, an instructor from the Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center
at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 2013*

In response to this policy, the Australian PRT established a female development assistance program with a number of projects relating to education programs and economic development, and the provision of health services, school supplies and medicine to the local population. The PRT also worked with the Director of Women's Affairs in the Provincial Government to improve the living conditions and access to basic services for rural Afghan women and their

(Army) Infantry and Armoured Corps, some Artillery roles, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadrons and Combat Engineer Squadrons – this represents 7% of total employment trades in the ADF.

³⁴ Details about and content of, these reviews can be found at: <http://defencereview.humanrights.gov.au>.

families in Uruzgan, who represent one of the most isolated and disadvantaged population groups in the country.



Figure 1. ADF women are engaging with the local population in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force's FETs

While these three major initiatives occurred prior to the release of the Australian NAP, they now underpin the domestic application of the NAP by creating more opportunities for women to contribute to peace and security efforts, the prevention of conflict, and in building peace. However, before 2013, Defence was unclear about its broader responsibilities under the NAP, and of the reporting requirements to the Australian Government on progress and achievement. There were three key events in March / April 2013 that focussed Defence's attention.

The first was Senate Estimates in the Australian Parliament³⁵. The then Secretary of Defence and the then Chief of Defence Force (CDF)³⁶ were faced with a Senator's probing questions on how Defence was implementing the Australian NAP in Afghanistan. The second event was the inaugural CDF *Gender in Defence and Security* conference, in which the Executive Director (ED) of the Australian National Committee for UN Women, Ms Julie McKay, urged Defence to

³⁵ Senate estimates hearings, also known as estimates committees or simply 'estimates', allow senators to scrutinize how executive government is spending taxpayers' money. Senators focus on how government has spent this money and on the government's future spending plans. The hearings are called 'estimates' because they examine what the government estimates it will collect and spend in the financial year (1 July to 30 June).

³⁶ Then General David Hurley AC, DSC.

do more to implement UNSCR 1325 through the NAP. Finally, the inaugural *Annual Civil Society Dialogue* on the NAP³⁷ focussed attention on Defence's lack of response to the NAP. These last two events followed a call by the UN Secretary General in 2012 on UN Women, in partnership with member states regional organisations, UN entities and civil society, to conduct a review of commitments to national and regional implementation of the UNSCRs on WPS.³⁸

Separately but concurrently with these activities, a Navy commander with a strong background in gender equality and diversity within the ADF was contributing to the development of tools and products to respond to gender issues impacting NATO armed forces and NATO-led operations, through ADF participation in the 2012 NATO Committee on Gender Perspective (NCGP)³⁹ annual conference and meeting in Brussels, Belgium. This commander subsequently deployed in January 2013 as a GENAD to the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) in Kabul. This was the first time the ADF had accepted liability for this role in operations. With a focus on creating the strategic framework within IJC for implementing UNSCR 1325, and ensuring the incorporation of gender perspective considerations into the planning and conduct of operations, the commander developed the experience necessary to inform future Defence NAP implementation back in Australia.



Figure 2. The author with Afghan National Police officers at Kabul City Police Station, July 2013.

³⁷ The aim of the Dialogue is to monitor progress by Government against each of the NAP strategies and to ensure that implementation of the NAP remains both accountable to civil society and informed by its inputs and deliberations.

³⁸ UN Security Council Report of the Secretary General on women, peace and security, 2 October 2012, S/2012/732.

³⁹ Advisory body to the Military Committee on gender –related polices for the Armed Forces of the NATO Alliance.

Defence NAP Implementation Strategy

The principles in this action plan, which reflect the objectives of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, are an important guide in how Defence plans and conducts its operations. These principles influence how we prepare our people for deployment, the activities we undertake, who we work with and consult with on the ground and the incorporation of lessons learned for the future.

- Air Marshal Mark Binskin, Vice Chief of Defence Force, 2013

It was the confluence of these events that created the environment in mid-2013 for establishing a sound benchmark for Defence's response to its NAP obligations, responsibilities and implementation. This included recognising that the NAP was the mechanism by which Defence and the ADF would enable a focus on the fourth thematic pillar of UNSCR 1325, that of integrating gender perspective into its operations and thereby increase operational effectiveness. Without the NAP it was unlikely that this would have occurred. In addition, the commitment to WPS and the leadership of this issue by the ADF's senior leadership has been integral to the NAP's successful implementation within Defence.

To enable NAP implementation, the then Vice Chief of Defence Force⁴⁰ (VCDF), Air Marshal Mark Binskin, created a central focal point for NAP implementation coordination in August 2013 - Director National Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security - at O-6 (NATO OF-5) level reporting directly to him⁴¹. This role was designed to coordinate the implementation of the NAP across the ADF (Army, Navy and Air Force), Joint Operations Command (JOC), and the other relevant Defence Groups that comprise Defence. A VCDF Directive clearly articulated VCDF's expectations, the Director's responsibilities, and anticipated outcomes⁴². This step was pivotal to a coordinated, holistic approach by Defence in responding to its NAP responsibilities and driving Defence action.

Of note, Air Marshal Binskin was promoted to Air Chief Marshal on 1 July 2014 and on assuming command of the ADF as CDF at the same time, he mandated the direct reporting of the Director to his new role. The CDF issued a new Directive to the Director, which outlined his commitment to and leadership on WPS, highlighted the importance of the WPS agenda to Defence and gave prominence to Defence's implementation strategy.

In particular, Defence recognised that implementing the Defence-related actions in the NAP would benefit Defence through increased understanding of gender issues in ADF operations, which would enhance understanding of complex operational environments and increase operational effectiveness. It would also result in improved capability and performance of the Defence workforce through increased diversity, including gender, as an enabler to successful peace and security operations, and would enhance Defence's reputation within the Australian and international community⁴³. The implementation of the NAP in Defence was specifically to

⁴⁰ Three star rank.

⁴¹ Since 1 July 2014, DNAPWPS has reported directly to the Chief of Defence Force (CDF).

⁴² Vice Chief of Defence Force Directive No 5/2013 dated 26 August 2013.

⁴³ CDF Directive No 17/24 dated 24 November 2014, page 1.

align with the intent of UNSCR 1325, ensure delivery of outcomes that built on the positive achievements of current cultural reform programs, and ensure that the process of planning, execution and conduct of Defence-related NAP actions comprehensively and effectively demonstrated implementation of those actions⁴⁴.

The Director's initial responsibilities included the development of a Defence NAP Implementation Plan (DIP) to outline initiatives that supported the Defence NAP actions, to identify and secure stakeholder commitment to, and ensure achievement of, the key aim and outcomes to be achieved through implementation action, and coordinate the planning, execution and reporting of all implementation actions arising from the NAP. In addition, the Director was to liaise with the other Government agency partners responsible for NAP implementation – the AFP, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Attorney General's Department, APMC and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet – and facilitate whole-of-Government progress against the NAP⁴⁵.

Ultimately, the appointment of the Director, and the development of a DIP, also precipitated two key recommendations for all the Government agencies arising from the inaugural 2013 *Annual Civil Society Dialogue* on the NAP in their Annual Report which was published in October 2013⁴⁶ – to establish a senior level focal point responsible for accountability, reporting and liaison with Government partners, and developing implementation plans to ensure accountabilities under the NAP were met. To date, Defence remains the only Australian Government agency to have implemented these two recommendations.

To support the Director, a Working Group (WG) was established (at O4-5 level) with representatives from the three armed Services, Joint Operations Command (JOC), VCDF Group and other relevant Defence (civilian) Groups from the Department of Defence, meeting quarterly to report progress and to facilitate NAP actions within their respective Services and Groups. The inclusion of a civil society representative on the WG⁴⁷ has enabled transparency and collaboration and the strengthening of Defence's relationship with civil society. This has been an important factor in accountability and ownership of NAP actions by the Service Chiefs and Defence Group Heads.

Defence NAP Implementation Plan

The development of the DIP became the major focus from late 2013 as the primary means for implementing UNSCR 1325 within Defence. The DIP was well informed by the outcomes of the 2013 Jumonji University Seminar and the Global Technical Review, and by themes similar to those proposed in the then NATO revised policy and action plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (and subsequently published in March 2014⁴⁸). The original NATO implementation plan was, and the revised action plan is, focussed on the following outcomes:

⁴⁴ Ibid, page 2

⁴⁵ Vice Chief of Defence Force Directive No 5/2013 dated 26 August 2013.

⁴⁶ The intent of the Report Card is to recognize progress against the NAP, identify any shortcomings and offer recommendations for enhancing the implementation of the NAP into the future.

⁴⁷ Currently Ms Julie McKay, ED of the Australian National Committee for UN Women.

⁴⁸ EAPC(C) D (2014)0001 of 27 March 2014.

regional, national and international engagement with NATO, allies and partners, international organisations and civil society, and academia, operational responses such as gender perspective in the planning and conduct of operations and major exercises, addressing conflict-related sexual and gender –based violence and developing a GENAD and FET capability, national initiatives to improve women’s participation in armed forces and military responses to conflict, and training and education in gender, UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda.

These core NATO outcomes influenced the design of initiatives and tasks that Defence could implement that supported NAP actions, which included the following six core areas; key strategic guidance and operational planning documents and processes, training, development of products by ACMC, increasing deployment and leadership opportunities for women, developing the gender advisor and female engagement capability, and national and international engagement on WPS. The DIP was endorsed by the major stakeholders (Service Chiefs, Commander Joint Operations (CJOPS), VCDF, and other Band 3 level Defence Group Heads), and has progressed over the past twelve months as a fluid and live matrix of activities.

Progress against the NAP

As a result of high-level commitment to the implementation of the Australian NAP, Defence has made substantial progress in implementing UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions during the last twelve months. Defence’s progress against the NAP from March 2012 to December 2013, and an update of 2014 initiatives, has been recorded in the first Progress Report to Government⁴⁹, which was tabled in parliament in July 2014 (the report can be accessed at: <http://www.dpmc.gov.au/women/publications-articles/government-international/PMC.htm>) however some of the more noteworthy achievements are noted below.

Foremost among these accomplishments is the successful integration of WPS into key policy and strategic guidance, and operational planning documents and processes, thereby cementing its importance and priority for Defence and within the operational context. Notably, in March 2014, the Secretary of Defence and the CDF directed the inclusion of WPS into the CDF Planning Directives for all current and future operations. Subsequently, the operational orders for current operations, including regional engagements and operations in the Middle East, have been updated with a gender annex incorporating relevant gender considerations for planning purposes. This requirement has also impacted Australian military planning considerations for major exercises, including the 2015 Australian / US bilateral Exercise Talisman Sabre. Significant effort has been directed from both the JOC and civil-military interagency perspective to enhance the planning process for this exercise. DFAT has an establishment for a GENAD on board US Ship Blue Ridge for the duration of the exercise.

Concurrently, a new goal on integrating gender perspective into military operations and implementing UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions was included in the refresh of the 2014 Defence Corporate Plan, and more importantly, in the 2014-15 Defence Annual Plan (DAP)⁵⁰. This new goal articulates eight key outputs derived from the DIP for completion in the financial

⁴⁹ 2014 Progress Report Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018, 2014.

⁵⁰ The DAP articulates the focuses for Defence to progress the implementation of the five year DCP, which in turn builds on the longer-term strategic guidance contained in the Defence White Paper.

year of 2014-2015. The 2015 Defence Enterprise Report due in the first quarter of 2015 will, for the first time, require the Service Chiefs, VCDF and CJOPS to report against their nominated WPS activities outlined in the DAP. This is the first step in ensuring that these Defence agencies are meeting their responsibilities and accountabilities as outlined by the NAP through the DIP.

To enhance the steps being taken within Headquarters JOC (HQJOC) to fully embed WPS principles into operational business as usual, CJOPS has created a permanent GENAD position (O6 level) effective January 2015. This position will directly support CJOPS in integrating gender dimensions and UNSCR 1325 into the planning, conduct and evaluation of operations and exercises, conduct assessments, education and training, and establish, support and manage a network of Gender Field Advisors within HQJOC.

The redevelopment of joint doctrine has further enabled the integration of WPS into operational considerations, with the inclusion of WPS into the Peace Operations and Military Contributions to Humanitarian Operations publications, as well as the Joint Doctrine Development Guide (JDDG), the policy guidance on all joint doctrine development and review. The JDDG is provided to all joint doctrine developers and provides specific guidance on developing the detailed analysis of requirements that establish the context, scope and content of ADF joint doctrine. Currently under revision is the Joint Military Appreciation (JMAP) guide. The inclusion of the roles and responsibilities of GENAD appointments in the JMAP guide is being considered to ensure WPS is an important factor in the overarching framework for campaign and operations planning.

Building on the WPS training already conducted through the ADF POTC for personnel deploying to UN missions, Defence also developed and embedded a new training module on WPS into the force preparation training for forces deploying to Middle East and other international operations. This course includes the legal obligations, mandate and authority to act and protect women and children, zero tolerance policy on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, gender perspective requirements, and coordination mechanisms to increase women's participation in peace processes. This training commenced in September 2014.

In addition, the concept of operationalizing UNSCR 1325 was built into the *Joint Capability Concept* module for the 2014 Australian Command and Staff College course (O3-4 level), and in the *Influences on Security and Defence Policy* module of the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies course (O5-6 level). Work is currently underway to examine how WPS can be embedded into professional and military education commencing with *ab initio* training at the single Service colleges⁵¹ and the Australian Defence Force Academy.

Complimenting this embedded training has been a series of engagements across Defence and to the broader Australian public to raise awareness and understanding of WPS and our obligations to the NAP. This has included conferences, workplace engagements, workshops, panel discussions, seminars, peace operations courses, and civil-military workshops. The audience has ranged from military to other Government organisations, civil society, international military and police personnel students, and academics.

⁵¹ Royal Military College Duntroon, Royal Australian Navy College and Royal Australian Air Force College.

To support all aspects of training, ACMC developed and published, in collaboration with the Australian National Committee for UN Women, a WPS training manual and facilitator guide for use by both Defence and external organisations. The Manual aims to give people and overview of the WPS agenda, why it is important and how Australia is responding to the requirements of UNSCR 1325, which includes the development and implementation of the NAP. It addresses the thematic areas of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions, and provides case studies and sufficient resources to run educational workshops on this issue.⁵² ACMC also published two key research documents in 2013 to enhance understanding of, and training in, WPS; *Conflict-related Sexual and Gender-based Violence; An Introductory Overview to Support Prevention and Response Efforts*, and *Gender Crisis, Gendered Response; The Necessity and Utility of a Gender Perspective in Armed Conflict and Natural Disasters*.

A key outcome for the DAP in 2015 is the development of Protection of Civilian (POC) guidelines by the ACMC for use by deployed Defence and police forces. The purpose of the guidelines is to outline Australia's commitment to POC and the areas where Defence and the police can strengthen their contributions towards protecting civilians. They aim to build a shared understanding of POC across Government and provide guidance for Australian agencies contributing to international peace operations in situations where civilians are at threat of the effects of armed conflict.

Defence is examining ways to provide increased deployment and leadership opportunities for women. In the main, this effort is being captured by the implementation of the Broderick Review and the removal of the gender restrictions, which, over time, will increase the participation of women across all employment categories of the ADF. Separately, Defence is in the process of establishing a five-year, funded non-ongoing position at O4 level to work with UN Women in UN Headquarters in progressing implementation of the WPS agenda. Another initiative includes a review of ADF Operational Manning Directives to remove, where possible, combat classifications, to effectively open up more deployment positions to non-combat corps personnel.

The ADF has also maintained a liability for GENAD positions in Afghanistan; firstly in 2013 and 2014 under ISAF, and again in 2015 under Resolute Support Mission. Internally, the ADF is creating a GENAD structure with a number of specialist, strategic advisors to senior ADF officers. In April 2014, CDF appointed Ms Julie McKay, ED of the Australian National Committee for UN Women, as his (part-time) GENAD. This step has not only provided CDF with an opportunity to build on the experience and expertise of UN Women in addressing gender diversity within the ADF, it has also increased the collaboration and engagement with civil society that is integral to the effective implementation of the NAP.

Further GENAD appointments since 2014 have included a strategic gender / women's advisors to the Chief of Air Force⁵³, a WPS Advisor (WPSA) to Chief of Army (CA), and a WPSA to Commander Joint Task Force 633 (Middle East operations) to support ADF Operation Resolute Support Headquarters in Al-Minhad, United Arab Emirates.

⁵² Women, Peace and Security; An Introductory Manual, UN Women Australia, 2014, page 5.

⁵³ Navy has had a Navy Women's Strategic Advisor since 2010.

The ADF's progress against the Australian NAP has enhanced its reputation and opportunities for increased international engagement on WPS. Firstly, the ADF has committed to a permanent presence at the annual NATO NCGP since 2011. In 2014, the NCGP considered the issue of '*Recruitment and Retention in the Armed Forces – National Human Resource Policies and Exchange of Best Practices*'. The participation by the ADF and the Australian Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Elizabeth Broderick, in this conference, largely influenced two of the three major recommendations to the Military Committee arising from the NCGP syndicate efforts – that nations be encouraged to conduct assessments to identify and address potential gaps in policies and programs that may negatively impact the retention of women in the armed forces, and that nations be encouraged to establish an Advisory Committee to inform and shape military gender equality priorities⁵⁴.

As a result, in July 2014, Ms Broderick, representing the AHRC and the ADF were invited to participate in a NATO Science for Peace and Security Program project, in conjunction with Rey Juan Carlos University, Madrid. The primary aim of this project is to assess the impact of UNSCR 1325 on the recruitment and retention of women in the armed forces of NATO member and partner states, with a focus on Australian / ADF best practise. It is intended to present the outcomes of this review to the UN as part of the global reviews being conducted for the 15th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 in 2015.

Secondly, the participation by Lieutenant General David Morrison, CA, at the United Kingdom Summit on the Prevention of Sexual Violence in Conflict in June 2014, and his closing ceremony speech – which included the now famous '*the standard you walk past is the standard you set*' quote – cemented the ADF's role in, and commitment to, addressing sexual and gender based violence in conflict-affected communities. This and other events have helped cement Australia's position on WPS and its efforts in implementing the Australian NAP as a best practice example of effective implementation of UNSCR 1325.

Lastly, the first day of the annual two-day CDF Gender Conference – *Defence Women in Peace and Security* – held in June 2014, focussed on WPS and included presentations on the operationalisation of UNSCR 1325 in military operations from Major General Jody Osterman, US Marine Corps, (ex-Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Afghanistan), Captain Herve Auffret (Head of Policy and Doctrine in the Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Headquarters), and LTCOL Jesus Gil Ruiz (NATO Office of the Gender Advisor). This contributed to lessons learned, information sharing and raising the level of understanding and awareness of the importance of WPS and gender perspective in the planning and conduct of operations. At this conference, which was attended by ADF members, civil society, academics and other Government departments, the then CDF, the then CDF and VCDF, and both the Minister for Defence and the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Women, left the audience in no doubt as to their commitment to the WPS agenda and the ongoing progress of the Australian NAP within Defence and the broader Australian community.

⁵⁴ NATO IMSM-0286-2014 dated 5 June 2014.



Figure 3. The author with MG Jody Osterman, USMC, at the CDF Defence Women in Peace and Security Conference in Canberra 16 June 2014

I am pleased to see the breadth of work being implemented across government under the National Action Plan and I look forward to continuing to work with both civil society and across government with my Ministerial colleagues to build on the progress we have made thus far. I am also proud that Australia is an active agent in providing better outcomes for women and girls in conflict and post-conflict settings, and of our place as one of the global leaders in relation to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

- Senator the Hon Michaelia Cash, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Women, 2014

There is no doubt that these achievements, and the extent to which UNSCR 1325 and the WPS principles are being embedded into Defence business, would not have occurred in the absence of a NAP, even with its limitations, to focus attention, priority and commitment to UNSCR 1325, and without the leadership of and direction by senior leaders within Defence.

CONCLUSION

Since the adoption of UNSCR 1325 by the UNSC in 2000, Australia has been actively involved in, and supported, a large number of high-level commitments to addressing the role of women in peace and security. In the main, this has been focussed on political, social, diplomatic, or aid responses to crisis and conflict management, human rights, gender equality and peacekeeping. The ADF's initial comprehension of WPS principles was demonstrated only through the recognition that military women could play a role in engaging with the local population in peacekeeping missions, and this occurred informally in regional missions in the early 2000s, and more formally through the use of FETs in Afghanistan after 2011.

However, a more thorough integration of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions into the ADF's approach to military operations did not occur until the Australian NAP was released in 2012 and Defence acknowledged its responsibilities and created the environment for implementation in 2013. Using the NAP actions as a strategic framework, Defence identified six core areas that supported the UNSCR 1325 principle of gender perspective in operations and were likely to increase operational effectiveness and enhance mission outcomes. The current suite of initiatives in the DIP are not exhaustive and are designed to lay the groundwork for ongoing implementation as understanding and knowledge of UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda increases within the Defence community.

Defence's progress against the Australian NAP has been quite significant in a short period of time and this has been influenced by Ministerial and senior ADF leader commitment and action, and Defence's active engagement and transparency in collaboration with civil society. The then VCDF but now CDF confirmed this approach during the 2014 *Defence Women in Peace and Security* conference on 16 June 2014 when he said: *By 2019, one year after the National Action Plan is completed, the women, peace and security agenda will be fully embedded in our approach to personnel management, the planning and conduct of operations, throughout our policy frameworks and in our corporate guidance. It will enhance our ability to effectively contribute to peace and security operations within our region and internationally. We will have an increased relationship of collaboration and engagement with civil society and other Government organisations to ensure a coordinated and whole of government approach to the implementation of women, peace and security objectives. So - how can we be sure we will keep up with our early momentum? My intention is to continue my personal commitment to the women, peace and security agenda – and I expect everyone in Defence to do the same.*

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACMC.....	Australian Civil Military Centre
ADF.....	Australian Defence Force
ADFA.....	Australian Defence Force Academy
AHRC.....	Australian Human Rights Commission
AU.....	African Union
CA.....	Chief of Army
CDF.....	Chief of Defence Force
CEDAW.....	Convention of the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
CJOPS.....	Commander Joint Operations
DAP.....	Defence Annual Plan
DFAT.....	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DIP.....	Defence NAP Implementation Plan
DOD.....	Department of Defence
ED.....	Executive Director
FET.....	Female Engagement Team
GENAD.....	Gender Advisor
HQJOC.....	Headquarters Joint Operations Command
IJC.....	International Security Assistance Force Joint Command
ISAF.....	International Security Assistance Force
JDDG.....	Joint Doctrine Development Guide
JMAP.....	Joint Military Appreciation Process
JOC.....	Joint Operations Command

MDG.....	Millennium Development Goals
MEF.....	Monitoring and Evaluation Framework
MOC.....	Military Observers Course
NAP.....	National Action Plan
NATO.....	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCGP.....	NATO Committee on Gender Perspective
OSCE.....	Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe
POTC.....	Peace Operations Training Centre
PRT.....	Provincial Reconstruction Team
R2P.....	Responsibility to Protect
UN.....	United Nations
UNSC.....	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR 1325.....	United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325
US.....	United States
VCDF.....	Vice Chief of Defence Force
WG.....	Working Group
WPS.....	Women, Peace and Security
WPSA.....	WPS Advisor

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EXPLORING AHMADI WOMEN'S VOICES: PAKISTAN FEBRUARY 2015



WOMEN'S REGIONAL NETWORK
AFGHANISTAN • PAKISTAN • INDIA

Kishwar Sultana, Lead Researcher, is a peace activist, trainer, researcher, artist, advisor and founder of several bodies working on women's rights, improved governance, peace and security. In her professional career of 16 years she has directed several projects and programs. She is currently working as Director of Insan Foundation Trust, an NGO focusing on women's empowerment and youth leadership in peace building. Kishwar is a member of the Steering Committee, Women's Regional Network (WRN) on Security and Corruption, a network of women peace activists from Pakistan, India and Afghanistan; Women Waging Peace Network; Afghanistan/Pakistan Peace Dialogue Forum, Provincial Board of Governors (BoG), Local Council Association of the Punjab (LCAP) and Regional Women's Mediators Network. She has served as member of International Working Group on Women, Peace and Security during 2011-2012. She is also member of Provincial CEDAW Committee of Civil Society Organizations and Ending Violence Against Women and Girls Alliance (EVAWGA). Kishwar has authored numerous booklets and illustrated children's books. She holds master's degree in geography from University of the Punjab. She is the first female of her family to obtain a college education and then work professionally.

Muhammad Asif Rana, Research Assistant, has been working in the human rights field for the past two decades. He is a communication specialist, covering areas such as peace, conflict, democracy, livelihood rights, gender and governance. He has worked for several local and international organizations and projects.

Nadia Imtiaz, Research Assistant, has worked in Pakistan for 10 years with the education management charity, running skill development programs and rights based English language and Communication Skills programs. She is currently enrolled as a PhD candidate at London South Bank University. Her research focuses on the impact of Human Rights Education on sectarian and ethnic violence in fragile states.

Chelsea Soderholm is the Regional Coordinator of the Women's Regional Network, a network of women leaders across Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, working within and

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Beena Sarwar, Editor, is a journalist, artist and documentary filmmaker from Pakistan focusing on media, gender, peace and human rights issues, as a long-time activist with the gender, peace and human rights movements in Pakistan and abroad. She was thrice elected Council member of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Academic fellowships include: Chevening Fellow (Goldsmiths College, University of London), Nieman Fellow (Harvard University) and Research Fellow (Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard Kennedy School). She has extensive experience in television and print media in Pakistan and abroad. Beena is currently based in Cambridge, MA. She blogs at Journeys to Democracy (www.beenasarwar.com). Twitter: @beenasarwar

EXPLORING AHMADI WOMEN'S VOICES PAKISTAN FEBRUARY 2015

THE WOMEN'S REGIONAL NETWORK

The Women's Regional Network (WRN) is a network of women working within and beyond borders to enshrine and protect human rights and sustainable development and enable women's full participation in equitable growth to ensure a more peaceful and just world. The membership is a dynamic network of women peacemakers from Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, including activists, researchers, academics, students, educators, entrepreneurs and development practitioners, as well as supporters outside the network. The Network works to ensure that women from a wide cross section of ethnic, religious and geographical areas are represented.

THE COMMUNITY CONVERSATIONS

How do you take discussions about security, conflict, militarisation and governance outside elite security policy circles? How do you bring more women's voices into this discussion? How do we integrate their experiences and concerns into the security discourse? Brainstorming around these questions generated the idea of Women's Regional Network 'Community Conversations' (CCs).

The WRN documents women's voices on issues of security, militarization and corruption to understand their experiences, fears and insecurities, acknowledging their contribution to justice, peace and social reintegration processes and highlighting the creativity and agency women have shown in adapting their lives to conflict conditions. Women's experiences, their fears, their courage, their priorities and solutions are the focus of the CCs.

The process thus far has generated rich and detailed accounts of the gendered social impact of politicised violence, militarisation and corruption on the lives of women. The process amplifies the voices of women and provides countless examples of women as agents of change rather than victims.

For this report, WRN conducted Community Conversations with 36 women from the Ahmadiyya community both in Pakistan and abroad with members of the diaspora who have fled persecution in Pakistan. These women were from all cross sections of society including civil society leaders, teachers, student and housewives, from Islamabad, Lahore, Faisalabad, Multan, Peshawar and Quetta, from urban to semi urban areas. While the information related in this report is authentic, most names and other details have been changed for security reasons.

The objective of this paper is to understand Ahmadiyya women's experiences and fears, to affirm their courage, and to find policy and program support areas for the international

community and government of Pakistan, in order to address the human rights concerns of the Ahmadiyya community.

Due to the reasons explained further on in this report, the very issue of the Ahmadiyya belief is a sensitive and emotional one in Pakistan. Perhaps because of this, there is very little documentation on the voices of Ahmadi women. This is why WRN also employed the technique of community conversations besides using secondary resources. We asked the participating Ahmadi women open-ended questions in person as well as through questionnaires about their experiences as Ahmadi women, about incidents of discrimination and violence, their fears and apprehensions, and their hopes from the national and the international community.

This paper appears at a time when Pakistan is fighting against militants and extremism on its soil. Pakistani is also fighting the extremists' narrative that feeds upon the Ahmadi issue as this paper tries to explain. The timing is crucial because the narrative and the will of the country shall determine its future course. The issue is also critical to the country's relationship with the global community that is supporting Pakistan to uproot the menace of terrorism and extremism. In this sense, the subject of Ahmadiyya persecution sets the tone regarding how the state of Pakistan views the questions of social cohesion, inclusion, human rights and peace in coming years. This paper is expected to generate examples of policy and program interventions that may be useful for Ahmadiyya community in the region too.

INTRODUCTION

Who are the Ahmadis?

The Ahmadiyya community officially refers to itself as the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat. It emerged in the village of Qadian in Punjab, India, in the late 1880s when a spiritual leader named Mirza Ghulam Ahmed (1835-1908) declared himself to be the Mujaddid (divine reformer) and the Promised Messiah in line with prophecies in different religions, including Islam. Followers of the Ahmadiyya belief system are called Ahmadis. The Jamaat preaches and provides spiritual guidance to its followers through Caliphates, and has a presence in 204 countries around the world, including UK, Europe, Africa, USA and parts of Asia. The world's Ahmadiyya population is estimated to be between 10 and 20 million. The Jamaat claims that its adherents number tens of millions.

A cornerstone of the Ahmadiyya community's faith is their belief in non-violence. The community also believes in proselytizing, and is behind many of the conversions to Islam in other countries. The legendary boxer Cassius Clay who became Mohammad Ali after converting to Islam owed his new faith to Ahmadi missionaries. The Ahmadi belief in non-violence was one of the factors behind Ali's becoming a conscientious objector and refusing to participate in the Vietnam War.

Pakistan, with a population of over 180 million people, has the world's largest Ahmadi population, estimated at between two and five million. After the partition of India and

the formation of Pakistan in 1947, the Jamaat moved its headquarters from Qadian to Rabwah in Punjab on the Pakistani side. Rabwah¹ has an Ahmadi-majority population numbering about 60,000. The headquarters were moved to London after 1984 when the persecution of Ahmadis began in earnest in Pakistan, following the then military dictatorship's imposition of laws targeting the community and making it a criminal offense for them to practice their faith as Muslims.

The finality of Prophethood: An emotive issue

Ahmadis believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of their sect, took birth in the likeness of Jesus, to bring about peace and eliminate religiously motivated wars and bloodshed. However, his claim to be messiah is a big controversy in the Muslim world. Many orthodox Muslims consider Ahmadis to be heretics and some countries ban or prevent them from practicing their faith as Muslims. Differences are centred around the meaning of *Kahatam An-nabiyyin* (The Final Prophet). All Muslims believe in the finality of Prophet-hood of the Prophet Muhammad (on Him be peace). Many consider as heresy Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's claim that he is the promised Messiah.

One of the arguments advanced at the time of the Second Amendment was that officially declaring the Ahmadis to be non-Muslim would prevent violence against them, as people would no longer be "compelled" to take the law into their own hands. However, the persecution has only intensified. Like the proverbial camel that was allowed to put a foot into his master's tent but then took over the whole tent, the "religious" right in Pakistan has taken the opening that was provided by such appeasement and has continued to appropriate more space.

One way that that militant extremists gather support and churn up emotions is by alleging disrespect to the Prophet of Islam (on Him be peace). The Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (Finality of Prophethood) is one of several such organisations that has taken it upon itself to protect the honour of the Prophet as the last prophet. They regularly take out rallies and hold conferences against the Ahmadiyya community, terming them as heretics and distributing pamphlets against them. They also justify the murder of Ahmadis as a religiously sanctioned act that will win the killer a place in heaven. The Khatm-e-Nabuwwat lobby and its allied groups are also behind most of the 'blasphemy' cases in Pakistan.

Fearing a backlash from religious forces in Pakistan who command formidable street power, the government appears unwilling or unable to act against those who indulge in hate-speech or incitements to violence, including the placing of banners in public places.

Persecution in the name of religion

The persecution of Ahmadis began as early as 1953, when hundreds of Ahmadis were killed in Lahore in politically orchestrated riots engineered by "religious" parties, groups and individuals who took out rallies, made speeches inciting violence and

¹ Officially re-named Chenab Nagar in 1999, but still primarily known as Rabwah.

published provocative articles. Some 200 Ahmadis were killed before the government imposed a limited martial law in Lahore for three months.

Anti-Ahmadi riots in 1974 led to the killing of dozens more Ahmadis. Enraged mobs desecrated Ahmadi mosques and graves. The riots culminated in the Second Constitutional Amendment² that officially declared Ahmadis to be non-Muslims on the grounds that they do not regard Prophet Muhammad (on Him be peace) as the final Prophet. The Second Constitutional Amendment set the foundation for the subsequent persecution of Ahmadis and discrimination against them.

Ten years after the Second Amendment, then military dictator General Zia ul Haq promulgated Ordinance XX, 1984, that amended the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) to restrict the freedom of religion and expression of Ahmadis. The new laws, sections 298-B and 298-C criminalize Ahmadis' "posing" as Muslims, calling their faith Islam, preaching or propagating their faith. These laws make it a criminal offense for Ahmadis to greet other Muslims in the customary Islamic manner, to declare their faith publicly, build places of worship or call them mosques, make the call to prayer (*Azaan*), recite their holy book (the Quran) aloud, or even offer funeral prayers in the Muslim way. An Ahmadi "who directly or indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims" can be awarded a three year prison sentence.

It is now irrelevant that these developments ran contrary to the views of Pakistan's founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who had refused to accept the demand of extremist groups to declare the Ahmadis as non-Muslims.

The persecution of the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan is not only severe, but also very systematic. Extremist forces deliberately use this issue, capitalising on the emotional appeal of defending the honour of the Prophet (peace be upon Him) by scapegoating the Ahmadis. Because it is a criminal offense for them to practice and profess their faith, the discrimination starts at birth when they can face legal proceedings for following Muslim rituals. Even in death there is no respite as their graves are defaced for bearing Islamic inscriptions.³ Ahmadis are forced to officially identify themselves as non-Muslims, contrary to their own beliefs. This is the only community in Pakistan that abstains from exercising its right to vote in protest at not being allowed to vote as Muslims. This too is a leftover law from the Zia regime that imposed 'separate electorates' on Pakistan – there separate electoral lists for Muslims and non-Muslims including Ahmadis. They refuse to vote as non-Muslims because they consider themselves to be Muslims.

² The Second Amendment (September 7, 1974) was pushed through under Saudi pressure, as Dr. Mubashir Hassan, a close aide of the then Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto acknowledged years later.

³ Asad Hashim, "Pakistan's Ahmadiyya: An 'absence of justice,'" Al Jazeera, 7 Aug. 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/08/pakistan-ahmadiyya-an-absence-justice-20148616414279536.html> [Accessed 1 Feb. 2015]

While signing for official documents like admission forms for examinations, passports, identity cards and affidavits, Pakistani Muslims have to sign a declaration stating their belief in the absolute finality of Prophethood of Mohammad (peace be upon him) and attesting that Mirza Ghulam Ahmed was an “imposter *nabi*” (prophet) and that his followers are non-Muslims. This symbolic detestation towards a particular community feeds the extremist narrative and legitimizes the systemic marginalization, hate-crimes and aggressive attacks on lives and property of Ahmadiyya community.

The extremist lobby is also behind the distribution of hate-material like notices placed on shop windows announcing that Ahmadis are not welcome. Stickers distributed to schoolchildren to write their names in and place on their notebooks contain a line to the effect that “I will not be taught by a Qadiani (derogatory term for Ahmadi) teacher.”

While the law prohibits hate-speech and discrimination, there are few avenues for the Ahmadis to turn to for redress. The security agencies themselves are often involved in "harassment and in framing false charges against Ahmadis, or have stood by in the face of anti-Ahmadi violence", as a Human Rights Watch report notes.⁴

In a survey of students and teachers at private schools, who are privileged and considered to be moderate, many were of the considered opinion that Ahmadis do not deserve equal opportunities and rights.⁵ This perception translates into bigotry, violence, and marginalization even in times of crisis such as floods and earthquakes. In the 2010 floods, for example, some 500 Ahmadi families were denied humanitarian aid because of their religious identity.⁶

Prominent Ahmadis including doctors are frequently targeted and killed.⁷ One of the worst attacks on the Ahmadi community took place in Lahore in May 2010, when the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) simultaneously attacked two of their worship places (that they cannot refer to as mosques), killing 90 people on the spot and injuring 108 children, youth and adults. Three days later, militants attacked the hospital where the injured were being treated. Twelve police officials and hospital staff were killed because they were treating and protecting injured Ahmadis.⁸

The anti-Ahmadi narrative that has developed in Pakistan even leads to national heroes being sidelined regardless of their distinctions in any field, art, science, medicine,

⁴ Human Rights Watch. 27 May 2012. "Pakistan: Prosecute Ahmadi Massacre Suspects." <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/27/pakistan-prosecute-ahmadi-massacre-suspects>. Accessed 20 Feb. 2015.

⁵ Tariq Rahman, "Passports to Privilege: The English-Medium Schools in Pakistan," *Peace and Democracy in South Asia 1*, No. 1, (2005).

⁶ Atif M. Malik, "Denial of Flood Aid to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Pakistan," *Health and Human Rights Journal* 13, no.1, (2011). <http://www.hhrjournal.org/2013/08/20/denial-of-flood-aid-to-the-ahmadiyya-muslim-community-in-pakistan/> [Accessed 5 Feb. 2015]

⁷ Beena Sarwar, "Poison in the body politic and the Ahmadi issue," *The News on Sunday*, 26 October 2014, <http://tns.thenews.com.pk/poison-in-body-politic-and-the-ahmadi-issue/> [Accessed Feb. 20 2015]

⁸ "Pakistan: Massacre of Minority Ahmadis," Human Rights Watch, 1 June, 2010, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/01/pakistan-massacre-minority-ahmadis> [Accessed 1 Feb. 2015]

defense, literature or diplomacy. The eminent physicist Dr. Abdus Salam is the most prominent example of this ‘otherness’. Because of Dr Salam’s faith as an Ahmadi, Pakistan downplayed his achievement as the country’s first (and only, until Malala Yousufzai in 2014) Nobel Laureate, with Nobel Prize for Physics in 1979. Dr Salam received the Nobel award dressed in traditional Pakistani Punjabi attire and quoted the verses of the Quran in his acceptance speech. Yet on his return to Pakistan in December 1979, there was no public reception for him. Threats of violence by the Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba, student wing of the right-wing Jamat-e-Islami, prevented him from delivering a lecture at Quaid e Azam University Islamabad. Other institutions found it difficult to invite him for the same reason. Dr Salam lived in exile after the Second Amendment declared his community to be non-Muslim. He died in Oxford, UK, in 1996 but was buried in Rabwah, Pakistan. Later, under court orders the word ‘Muslim’ was removed from the epitaph on his tombstone, because Pakistan’s laws do not allow members of the Ahmadiyya community to call themselves Muslims. Thus the epitaph on Dr Salam’s tombstone now reads: “First _____ Nobel Laureate” as no one thought to at least replace “Muslim” with “Pakistani.”

‘Blasphemy’

In addition to Ordinance 20, the Gen. Zia-ul-Haq regime made other amendments to the Pakistan Penal Code (inherited from the 1860 British colonial law) that particularly impacted non-mainstream religious minorities. The new laws added to the old British law relating to religious offenses. Additions made to section 295 that dealt with injuring or defiling any place of worship or insulting anyone’s religion focused on insult and injury to Muslims and Islam. Sections 295-A, B, and C now made it a criminal offense to defile the Quran, to insult the wives, family, or companions of the Prophet of Islam, or to commit any act of apostasy or disrespect to the Prophet Muhammad (on Him be Peace). These laws have come to be known as the ‘blasphemy law’ of Pakistan. Convictions under the last one, 295-C, carry a mandatory death sentence since the option of life imprisonment lapsed in 1992.

The unscrupulous have found a convenient handle in these laws to further the rhetoric of religion as well as to settle scores, as the independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has been documenting since 1992. In this overall context, the Ahmadiyya community that orthodox Muslims consider as heretical is particularly vulnerable and open to vicious persecution that has increased over the years.

The first ‘blasphemy murder’, that of a Christian teacher who was falsely accused of insulting the Prophet of Islam (peace be upon Him), took place in 1992, soon after the option of life imprisonment as a punishment lapsed. HRCP has observed that the severity of the punishments under these laws makes them more liable to be misused. Independent investigations into many such cases indicate that economic interests and rivalries are often involved when it comes to the motives behind such allegations.

While about half the ‘blasphemy’ cases filed in Pakistan are against mainstream Muslims, the other half is disproportionately against non-Muslims especially Ahmadis

who were in 1974 constitutionally declared to be non-Muslim. Judges at the district court level are often intimidated by mobs – many of them members of banned militant outfits. This makes judges wary of acquitting those accused of ‘blasphemy’, especially in high-profile cases.

Some of those accused of ‘blasphemy’ remain on death row for years as the Supreme Court leaves appeals against the capital punishment pending in such cases. Sometimes the accused fall victim to mob violence or are killed in prison by a fellow inmate or a guard. The fortunate may be released after acquittal but not before they have languished in prison for years. And even then, they may have to flee the country for their lives as fanatics feel justified in targeting them despite the acquittal, considering the very allegation of blasphemy to be enough to kill them.

AHMADI WOMEN

Insecurity

There is general insecurity in Pakistan given the ongoing deterioration of law and order and the attempts of the ‘religious’ right (linked to the global ‘terror’ network) using religion as a pretext to remain in the limelight and appropriate political power. In this context, most people feel unsafe, with members of different communities being particularly at risk if they belong to communities that the extremists consider to be heretical or non-Muslim. This includes Pakistan’s Shias, Hindus, Christians and of course, Ahmadi. Within each community, women are particularly vulnerable. And as members of the most persecuted community, Ahmadiyya women feel doubly insecure.

In July 2014, a mother and two of her children died in a fire when a charged mob reacting to an allegation of ‘blasphemy’ looted and torched the Ahmadiyya community’s houses in Gujranwala district, not far from the provincial capital Lahore. A seven-month pregnant woman had a miscarriage and lost her baby due to the attack.⁹ The mob refused to let the fire-trucks through as the police stood helplessly by. Months later, as of January 2015, twenty-three Ahmadi families, consisting of about 125 individuals, were still unable to return to their homes.¹⁰

This gruesome act and the state’s feeble response are particularly alarming in a country that has nuclear weapons and is fighting a war on terror. The barbaric attack on a school at Peshawar in December 2014 where Taliban killed nearly 150 school children and teachers underlines the desperation of the militants and the helplessness of the state. Women are particularly affected by these phenomenon a conservative, patriarchal culture now marked by horror and uncertainty. They battle against emotional, psychological, social, economic and political insecurities on daily basis.

⁹ Three Ahmadi, including two minors, killed in Gujranwala, Express Tribune, 14 July, 2014 <http://tribune.com.pk/story/741943/three-including-two-minors-dead-in-gujranwala-clash/> [Accessed 15 Feb, 2105]

¹⁰ Beleaguered denomination: Ahmadi running from pillar to post to return to their homes, Express Tribune, 8 Jan. 2015. <http://tribune.com.pk/story/818461/beleaguered-denomination-ahmadis-running-from-pillar-to-post-to-return-to-their-homes/> [Accessed 20 Feb. 2015]

The Women's Regional Network (WRN) talked to 36 Ahmadi women from around Pakistan. Most are from Punjab province, but some are from south of Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Some of the women talked to WRN from countries like USA, UK and elsewhere, where they had fled because of persecution. Some of those who had moved abroad had husbands who had been killed or were themselves facing serious threats to their lives. Emotional insecurity is a common thread they share due to having been forced to leave their homes, relatives, and even children and parents. In addition, as women they are fearful of being targeted for sexual violence.

Discrimination

Discrimination, for Ahmadi women, is a multi-layered phenomenon, in every field, from education to employment, promotion, matrimony, travel, and social interaction. The women who talked to WRN revealed that the academic credentials that carry the word "Rabwah" (the Ahmadi-majority town in Punjab) raise eyebrows.

Ahmadi women tend to wear a particular style of headscarf. In response to the persistent discrimination, some in fact wear it as a symbol of political defiance, despite the dangers. One housewife told WRN interviewers that while she was out in the market, a shopkeeper asked if she was Ahmadi. Thinking that he was someone she knew, she answered in the affirmative. She was shocked when the man asked her to leave the shop because he did not do business with Ahmadi. She thinks she was recognized as Ahmadi because of the style of her headscarf.

A young girl shared her experience of being discriminated against by her own classmates who paid a condolence visit to her house after her grandfather passed away. "They saw a picture of our caliph, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, hung on a wall in our drawing room. A few days later, when I returned to school, I was shocked that none of them even greeted me. They just walked away. I never knew I could become a devil for them."

An Ahmadi Montessori teacher from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province told WRN researchers that she was engaged to a recently converted Ahmadi. Her fiancé's family boycotted him after his conversion and he fears they may try to kill him. "I pushed him out to Lahore where he may be safer as people don't know him there. We, as Ahmadi, keep our identity hidden because it is not safe for us to be open about it. Once, a tutor of my younger brother came to the house and happened to see the book of the sayings of our Caliph lying on a table. The tutor bombarded us with questions as if it was a crime to be an Ahmadi. We had to make up a story that the book belonged to one of our guests, who had forgotten it here, and only then the situation subsided."

She said that the threat to her family is doubled because her father is an Ahmadiyya missionary, as Ahmadi are not allowed to preach their religion. "We have lived in five or six cities," she says. "At the moment we are based in Abbottabad, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. It's a lovely city but the people have little tolerance about different religions and ethnicity. We have not told any of our neighbours that we are

Ahmadis. People come to our house for meetings and prayers but we keep all Ahmadi documents and printed material hidden away in lockers. We hold our Friday prayers in different locations, with all the Ahmadi families volunteering to hold meetings and Friday prayers in their homes in rotation.”

Another Ahmadi woman said that her community is afraid to distribute their religious material due to the fear of persecution, as the law prohibits Ahmadis from preaching their religion as Muslims.

Kausar Mushtaq, an Ahmadi housewife from Lahore, said she wanted her children to attend a nearby school. “My children have studied in a Montessori branch of the same school. However, recently, I learnt that the school administration no longer accepts Christian and Ahmadi students. The admission form explicitly asks parents to identify who they are through accreditation by the local imam of the mosque. By this act of the school administration, Ahmadi and Christian children are brushed aside like children of a lesser God. This is the worst form of discrimination. This is violation of the Constitutional right of the children and no one is bothered.”

The fear of being identified and exposed and then persecuted is so strong that the Ahmadi community, particularly women, feel insecure even within their own homes. “We have to pack up and lock certain things that might expose our identity before the maids arrive at our homes to clean the house and do the washing. Sometimes we feel it is not even our home because of the fear we continuously face.”

A young Ahmadi girl, who now is in the UK for higher studies told the WRN interviewers that her uncle was killed in 2010 at his own home, in front of the family. Some fanatics barged into the house, instigated by a local imam who had given a spiteful sermon during Friday prayers. “My mother locks herself up in the bathroom whenever she is alone at home. She can’t bear to be alone at home. She says she looks at her children as if they are tiny sparrows, who grow in my nest but will have to leave it never to return.” The mother walks a tightrope of hope and threat whenever her children visit her from abroad. She herself refuses to leave Pakistan for the love of this country.

One woman, who worked in a human rights organization and now lives in USA, shared her experience of harassment by some members of the support staff who were involved in swearing and jeering at her after they learnt she was Ahmadi. She chose not to complain to the higher management for fear of backlash as well as reluctance to see the workers lose their jobs if they were fired. Instead, she quit the job and left the country along with her husband.

Cross-community relationships

The discrimination the Ahmadi community faces due to constitutional and legal framework has infiltrated personal relationships. Several women had experienced social boycott after their religious identity was exposed in places they had moved to. One

woman narrated her experience of being on good terms with the neighbours and how that all changed one day when the neighbours learnt that the woman and her family belonged to the Ahmadiyya Jamaat.

“I was unmarried and living with my parents in Karachi. We used to share food and visit each other’s houses before that but that all changed after one of our close neighbours found out that we are Ahmadi. It was very humiliating as they stopped greeting us back – it was not a nice feeling to say ‘Salam’ (the Muslim greeting) to someone and not get any reply. They stopped eating with us or sharing food with us. The mother used to visit my mother and have tea together but now she avoided coming to our house. Whenever she did come, she wouldn’t eat anything. We were treated like we were untouchables.”

The woman, whose husband is a mainstream Muslim, explained how complicated and fearsome the experience of being Ahmadi was in the workplace. “I work as an accounts officer. At the office one day, someone who knew one of my cousins was Ahmadi confronted me about my religious beliefs. We became locked in a heated debate and I felt it was becoming dangerous. I had to convince him that I am Muslim, and that some of our relatives are Ahmadis but I am not. The job market is so small that I cannot risk my job. I have children and a home to run. I can’t take the risk of jeopardising my children’s future.”

Her husband’s family who she lives with accepts her faith. They are “different from the majority in regards to the level of tolerance, but even then I have to keep my faith, or religious views, to myself,” she says. “In the beginning, I tried to watch the Muslim Ahmadiyya television channel, in my own room, but my in-laws told me that I should not expose my daughter and son to any Ahmadi religious affairs. I understand that they say this out of fear and love, both. My parents-in-law are scared that if the kids go to school and say something about my faith, they will be discriminated against and might get bullied by teachers. This already happened to one of my daughter’s schoolmates. It is dangerous for my kids to be Ahmadi. My in-laws don’t want my kids to end up like me – someone whose friends left her after university because of her faith.”

With increasing opportunities to interact at educational institutes and places of work, young people from the Ahmadi community and those from the mainstream Muslim community sometimes develop romantic relationships with each other. Some of the challenges that Ahmadi women face stem from such relationships. The situation remains calm as long as the Ahmadi’s identity remains hidden. Sometimes, such relationships lead to unfavourable, even horrifying consequences.

One Ahmadi mother sent her son abroad because of serious concerns about his life. He had fallen in love with a girl from the mainstream Muslim community. They loved each other and wanted to marry, said his mother. “We had no problem. But when the girl’s parents learnt we were Ahmadis, her mother barged into our home with a pistol in her hand. She brandished the pistol and I felt fear running down my spine. She demanded my son immediately cut off all links with her daughter or else he will be killed

and no one will ever bother. And it was over for us. That was about two years ago, but honestly, any gunshot I hear makes my heartbeat go crazy as if that woman is shooting us. What a sad and disgusting world we live in.”

Not everyone has the means to leave the country and go elsewhere, or they are tied down due to personal obligations. One middle-aged Ahmadi woman told WRN that she would like to go away but cannot leave her elderly mother who is almost blind. The woman herself is divorced, which further increases the insecurity of her position in society.

Even when the law takes its course against those engaged in violence, clerics continue to drum up support for the perpetrator and against the victim. One of the women talked about an Ahmadi food inspector who was shot dead in Lahore in 2009. “The murderer was sentenced to serve some time in jail. The local Imam would speak about his innocence on the loudspeaker in every Friday sermon. He also held collective prayers for the murderer’s freedom. He told his followers that killing a non-believer is ‘sawaab’ (a reward by God).”

She talked about how awful she and her family felt when their neighbours and some hooligans of the street threw garbage at their house. They even celebrated the death of the Ahmadi’s fourth Caliph. “They came as a group in front of our house and played loud music, drums and danced to mark the death. We were aghast. How can you celebrate death of someone, especially the one who is religiously dear to others? It is inhuman.”

Forced to sell and move

The economic implications of the insecurity have immense bearings on the lives of the Ahmadi community as we understand after looking into their lives closely. They have to sell their property cheaply or have to leave it unattended, shattered or burnt. Saving their lives is the first priority in such circumstances.

One Ahmadi woman, Zakia Arshad, who now lives in the UK where she works for a local charity, told WRN that her family’s houses in Lahore were burnt twice, during the riots of 1953 and 1974. Luckily, her family got wind of the attack to come and they were able to escape and go into hiding. She, along with her husband and a son, left Pakistan after twin attacks in 2010 in Lahore. Her husband barely escaped the massacre. He pulled dead bodies over him to save himself. He became psychologically unwell because of that carnage. Zakia sold her property very cheaply.

Two women, one from Islamabad and the other from Faisalabad, shared similar stories. Both had constructed new houses, investing everything they had. When the houses were built, they started receiving threats to their lives. They were forced to immediately sell the property at half the market value and move to Rabwah where there is safety in numbers with other members of the Ahmadiyya community.

Another woman from Multan not only lost her husband but also her home because of the persecution. In 2010, three armed men forced their way into her house, and held her and her children hostage. They shut the door, but deliberately left it unlocked. When her husband came home, he entered the courtyard and called out, admonishing the children for their carelessness in leaving the door unlocked. “As he came a little farther into the courtyard, they jumped out and shot him. He died there and then. Those goons killed my husband before my eyes. They killed him before the eyes of my children. We have been unable to sleep peacefully since then. We sold our poultry farm and shops at a throwaway price. We are not sure if success of my husband’s business was the reason for this murder. We moved to Rabwah. Now we live here and are thankful to Jamaat for taking care of us so well. We cannot stay here all our life. There is no NGO or government support available to us in the times of crisis.”

A retired school principal in Sialkot, told WRN about the physical and mental ordeal she underwent after her identity as an Ahmadi was exposed. Someone implicated her in a case of offending religious sentiments of the Muslims. She was a widow, a respected and promising headmistress of the government school in the area, but now no one was ready to stand by her. For fear of the police and consequent humiliation, she fled the city and went into hiding for the next two years. Meanwhile, the government suspended her for her absence from the job without any intimation. Finally, someone managed to get her out of the mess and she was reinstated but transferred to Hafizabad, a city in south Punjab. It took her four to five hours daily to commute between home and workplace. After years of this ordeal, she retired and spent her pension in the construction of her own house. After the house was completed, she started receiving life threats. “I had a grown up girl, my daughter, with me now. I could not just sit and watch her get killed or kidnapped or raped by vigilantes. I sold my house, cheaply, and moved to Rabwah,” she said, bowing her head sadly.

A woman from Gilgit, the northern part of Pakistan, told WRN about how a mob killed her brother in Sialkot. The family managed to rescue his only child, a 14 year-old girl who is now married to the woman’s son. The family now lives in Islamabad in a location where they feel relatively safe. They moved there after selling their house in another part of Islamabad where they felt insecure after a religious seminary started being constructed in the neighbourhood. She said that her husband, a teacher, was forced to retire early for his faith.

Taking a stand: an ongoing struggle

Only one woman out of all those who spoke to WRN had a positive story to share, in terms of her ongoing struggle in the face of persecution, that she has refused to accept. Qudsia Masaud is a teacher who returned from Libya where her husband was working, to her native town of Dunyapur, near Multan in southern Punjab, along with her three children. Her aim, supported by her husband, a former student activist, was to set up a school in Dunyapur. Although they are Ahmadis, the Masauds run the school strictly along secular lines, with the Islamic lessons taught by qualified Islamic teachers.

“Everyone knows we are Ahmadi. I love teaching and wanted to provide a quality education to my people – that is, the people of Dunyapur where my family has always lived and every second person knows me. When we put all our savings into the school and started to build it in 2011, we started getting threats and I was ready to pack up and go back abroad. But Masaud refused to give up. Without his support I wouldn’t have been able to carry on.”

She has faced a full-fledged campaign against herself and her school from ‘religious’ elements. “They went around collecting funds to use against me, tore down my panaflex hoardings advertising the school, held meetings with women in the community to incite them against me, made announcements from the loudspeakers of mosques against me. They accused us of building the school with money from the Jamaat to spread the Ahmadi faith.”

She and her husband, who has the backing of the Gondal ‘biradari’ (the tribe to which he belongs) filed a report with the police against the instigators, and forced the government to take notice. The district administration called a town-hall meeting to resolve the matter and deal with the ongoing processions and agitations against the upcoming school.

“The media was there, the police, the hall was full of these clerics and their supporters, and there was me and my husband. The clerics made speeches against us and said they would not allow the school to function. They called us ‘wajib-ul-qatal’ (deserving of death) to our face.”

Asked if she was afraid, she said, “No. I felt no fear. This is my place, my home. My husband said, ‘Building and running the school is our right. No one can stop us. We are professionals, we are building the school with our hard-earned money, and we want to give back to our country. We can take our money and go abroad, but we don’t want to. We are Pakistani. Leave religion aside.’ The government officials also took a stand and talked about how Islam calls for tolerance and living together amicably.”

The school is up and running with some 160 students today, including the children of some of those who initially participated in the campaign against it. One man was at a mosque where leaflets against the school were being distributed. He himself took 10,000 leaflets to distribute. “But then he came to see me and to see the school, and he realised that this was all false propoganda against me. Now his son has been in my school for the last couple of years, a very bright boy,” says Qudsia Masaud.

The harassment is still ongoing but she and her husband are determined not to give in. “They started a wall-chalking campaign against us. We sent photos to the government officials and demanded action. They had the walls white-washed. One man filed an application against me to get the school closed. I have filed a counter case of libel against him, and have taken it to the High Court. All this is difficult and causes tension. I want to focus on my teaching, and constantly fighting these people diverts my attention.”

How does she cope? Qudsia Masaud says firstly, it is the support of her husband and her in-laws that keeps her going. Secondly, she has built a strong network of people who stand with her – most of them non-Ahmadis. Third, she has used the laws that are available to proactively challenge those who are trying to undermine and threaten her.

The bottom line is that she knows the propaganda against her is not ‘religious’ so much as based in business rivalries, as the administration of another school in Dunyapur is clearly involved in the campaign against her school. This in fact is a pattern that is visible behind much of the persecution and propaganda against Ahmadis (and others who are being targeted) – economic or business rivalries, or the involvement of the land mafia when it comes to targeting buildings and graveyards.

“We have to go beyond religion and think about how we can sort out our issues,” says Qudsia Masaud determinedly.

FINDINGS

Ahmadis in Pakistan face the dilemma of not being able to openly practice their faith as Muslims because of laws that make it illegal for them to do so. Those who live in communities where their families are well known have a degree of protection as people know them and accept them, like the schoolteacher in Dunyapur. However, due to economic reasons and in search of jobs or to set up businesses, many have moved to cities or towns where they are relative newcomers and lack a support network. In such situations they are forced to keep their identity as Ahmadis a secret.

Over the last few years we see enhanced danger from extremist groups that are using the Ahmadi issue for their own visibility and political power. These groups are increasingly mounting orchestrated campaigns to harass and persecute Ahmadis. Their campaigns feed the larger narrative of violent extremism in the name of religion in Pakistan that not only impacts the country but also has implications in the region and indeed the world.

We live in a global village where people and their lives are interconnected. The hate campaign against Ahmadis that began in pre-partition India now pervades in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and other countries. This qualitative paper by the Women’s Regional Network on women in conflict zones finds a plethora of security and socio-political and economic issues concerning Ahmadiyya women in Pakistan.

The global community’s assistance, friendly pressure, and understanding of the issues involved in dealing with this crisis are critical for many reasons. For one thing, the issue impacts the lives of millions, not just Ahmadis but also others who are impacted by the narrative built up around the anti-Ahmadi issue. Secondly, as an ally in the America’s “war on terror”, Pakistan is an important geo-strategic partner that is fighting extremism and terror on its own soil. This war has claimed the lives of over 55,000 civilians and over 3,500 armed forces personnel in Pakistan. Additionally, as Pakistan begins the process of transitioning to a democratic system, the country needs to

urgently strengthen the narrative of social inclusion. Finally, Pakistan is a nuclear-armed nation and its stability, pluralist and democratic society is important for global security.

Recommendations arising from WRN's community conversations and the secondary data on Ahmadi community generally and Ahmadi women particularly relate to:

- Educating Pakistani children, youth and religious clergy on social inclusion
- Religious freedom and repeal of the 'blasphemy laws'
- Safety and security of life and property
- Training of the law enforcement agencies
- Economic assistance programs and training to Ahmadi families
- Capacity building, empowerment and leadership training for women

RECOMMENDATIONS

Educate Pakistani children, youth and religious clergy on social inclusion

Pakistan's Constitution and international commitments make it binding for the State to ensure the peace and security of its citizens. For this to happen, the country's leadership must effectively mobilize and educate its people especially children and youth – that forms nearly 63 % population of Pakistan -- and religious clergy, to engage them in constructive social activism, at schools and communities. Hate- literature, materials and speeches (banners, stickers, graffiti, speeches from mosque pulpits and at public gatherings) targeting different communities, particularly Ahmadis, feed the extremist narrative and must be tackled on a war-footing by Pakistan's political and military leadership. The recommendations of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) in its Annual Report¹¹ are worth following up. They include encouraging Pakistan to re-establish the Federal Ministry for Interfaith Harmony, include discussions on religious tolerance in U.S.-Pakistan dialogues and summits, and encourage national textbook and curricula standards that actively promote tolerance towards all religions.

Curb the freedom to persecute and allow religious freedom

Extremist groups are free to persecute different communities and individuals, not only curbing their religious freedoms but also subjecting them to violence. Pakistan's non-mainstream communities including Hindus, Christians, Shias and Ahmadis live in a state of fear. Pakistan's Constitution permits religious freedom but the amendments by a military dictator curbed these freedoms. Extremism on the one hand and the state of Pakistan's failure to protect and promote the provisions of religious freedoms on the other hand undermines the overall social environment, particularly for Ahmadis. Ahmadis often find it unsafe to reveal their identity in places where they don't

¹¹ Pakistan', US Commission on International Religious Freedom 2014
<http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Pakistan%202014.pdf> [accessed Feb 27, 2015]

have a support network. The international community can play a role in encouraging Pakistan to exercise its writ and reconsider repealing sanctions on religious freedoms and misuse of the “blasphemy” laws, the repeal of which human rights activists have long been calling for. In the meantime, at least the laws against false accusations of ‘blasphemy’ should be invoked in order to deter the misuse of these laws. Pakistan must also implement existing laws against hate-speech and take action against those who take out rallies to support murderers and instigate violence from the pulpit, or through media and street power. There is a need to follow up on the USCIRF recommendations¹² for Pakistan to rescind the laws that criminalize Ahmadis’ practicing their faith and violates their right to freedom of religion guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Safety and security of life and property of the Ahmadiyya community

It is clear from numerous findings and reports that while there is general insecurity of life and property in Pakistan, the Ahmadiyya community is particularly vulnerable to the lawlessness, and further faces the desecration of its worship places and graveyards. Pakistan must prosecute those involved in criminal acts whether committed in the name of religion or honour or any pretext, and ensure that those found guilty are brought to justice. Those who aid and abet the perpetrators or allow them to carry out their criminal actions are complicit in the act. Making their identities public and prosecuting them under existing laws may help in this regard. There is hardly any evidence of compensation to the families of those killed by criminals acting in the name of religion. The Pakistani state needs to evolve a mechanism for immediate and adequate compensation of those who lose their family members and/or lose property to such violence.

Training of the law enforcement agencies

In far too many cases police are helpless bystanders in the face of mob violence. There are many factors behind this inaction including lack of leadership, equipment, and/or training to defuse a volatile situation. Fear of the mob and lack of sensitivity towards the life and property of religious minorities may also play a role. Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies need training to enable them to deal effectively and empathically with vulnerable communities, whether it is women or religious minorities. Training programs on human rights and minorities rights for the police and other law enforcement agencies need to be carried out on a large-scale basis, building Assistance and training for Ahmadi families forced to flee or sell their lands or businesses. Many Ahmadis suffer from loss of livelihood or discrimination at the workplace due to their faith. There is an urgent need for Pakistan to take steps to address this issue so that no one is denied employment, promotion or other facilities due to their faith. Targeted and threatened, Ahmadis are often forced to abandon or sell their businesses or lands at below-market rates and flee to another city or country where they have to start afresh. The Pakistani government must follow such cases of such persecution paying particular attention to motives like land-grabbing or business rivalries and deal with the threats not on a religious basis but through existing laws. Some kind of economic assistance for

¹² USCIRF 2014; Ibid

Ahmadis who are forced to move or start new businesses elsewhere, as well as entrepreneurial training especially for Ahmadi women may go a long way.

In-depth Studies and National Database on Ahmadis' Issues

There is a need for qualitative and quantitative studies on various aspects of Pakistani society, including gendered perspectives in order to make better and more comprehensive policies, analysis and program recommendations. Such a study on the Ahmadi community would also be useful, particularly including the views and situation of Ahmadi women.

Capacity building, empowerment and leadership training for women

Build a support network for women – leadership training, empowerment, capacity building – training in dealing with local administration, filing police reports, working to enforce basic human rights laws in Pakistan.

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