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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND MEANS OF RESOLUTION

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 26 August 1954

by
Professor Filmer S. C. Northrop

Admiral McCormick, Captain Miller, Gentlemen:

Although the topic, upon which I have been asked to speak, may seem especially academic, in view of the present state of the world, it none the less has important implications for you as military men. Roscoe Pound, former Dean of the Harvard Law School, has reminded us that there is no evidence from history that disputes between men, whether they be domestic or international, are ever settled by means other than force unless those disputes have been brought under the rule of law and of legal institutions. Thus, in judging the likelihood of war as a means of settling disputes between nations in the world at the present time, it is worth our while to indicate what the conditions are for settling disputes between nations by the establishment of legal institutions, such as the League of Nations, the United Nations, or a modified form of one of these, and the degree to which these conditions are met at the present moment.

In order to understand international relations, it is first necessary for us to become fairly clear about what a nation is. A nation is a group of people who pursue a group policy upon which they agree. Where there cannot be agreement on the fundamental norms for organizing the economic, political and military activities of a group of people there cannot be a nation. A nation is a group of people with at least some basic major norms and aims in common for relating themselves economically, politically, and even militarily.

It is worth our while to consider the source of the unity of people in a nation and the unity of people under law. To get at this, we need to consider what an individual is, because there are certain things which are true about individuals that make a nation possible. It is often said that the key factor in a nation is its economic strength or its physical and military power. This is true but it is one of those truths which, if taken as the whole truth, is somewhat misleading. The reason is that the effective power of a nation is a function of what it does with its power.

When a nation is divided internally by strife between its political parties and is weak from a political and an internal point of view — as, for example, France has been since World War II — it may not use or realize the potential power that it possesses. When a nation is divided in its foreign policy by: (1) an isolationist group who would restrict military policy and foreign policy to merely a defensive position in the contemporary world, after the manner of the late Senator Taft and, in part, of former President Hoover; (2) a group who would have an immediate showdown with the Soviet Union, as represented by General MacArthur and perhaps in part by Senator McCarthy; (3) a group who would pursue a go-it-together-with-allies foreign policy dedicated to a roll-back crusade to release the satellites in Eastern Europe and to shore up Asia; and (4) a group who would go-it-together-with-allies, but merely to contain communism — when a nation is divided in its own internal public opinion with respect to four such different foreign policies, then you can have the communists win two most dramatic diplomatic victories and have a country go down to two of the worst diplomatic defeats in its history. This, I take it, is what has just happened to our own country in the last few months. The communists have won diplomatically in Asia by succeeding in dividing us from our allies there, and the failure of E.D.C. means the breakdown of U. S. foreign policy for even containing, to say nothing about rolling back, communism in Europe.

This points up the fact that the power of a nation is not a function merely of its physical power, which is but a potential.

Whether the physical power is effective or not depends on the ideas with respect to how, when and where it is to be used, and even on the ideas guiding a people's diplomacy which, keeping the power in reserve, may achieve its aim without firing a shot. If a people are divided internally in the theory or the ideas upon which they are going to base their foreign policy, they can have the power and never get the benefit of it.

Why this importance of ideas and why the importance of theory as well as matter and force in international relations? This goes back, I believe, to the very nature of man himself and to the very nature and constitution of man's own nervous system. To make this clear in thoroughly physical and physiological terms, so that we keep away as far as possible from vague notions like "consciousness" and "mind," I would like to call attention to a recent theory of the nervous system that has been developed by a group of physiologists, neurologists and engineers with whom I have been connected — the cybernetics group made up of Wiener, Von Neumann, McCulloch, Pitts, Rosenblueth, Bigelow and Lorente de No'.

The old theory of the nervous system follows these lines. Picture in your minds a line of oval objects. These oval-like things are individual neurons. The neuron to the left is the sensory neuron. If there is an explosion that fires the sensory neuron from my ear, which fires another neuron in my cortex, which fires another neuron in the cortex, and yet another neuron in turn, then the firing of the last cortical neuron fires the motor neuron and I jump. If our nervous systems were based only on such a linear ordering of its neurons from the sensory neurons, through the cortical, to the motor, the aforementioned phenomena would be explained: There would be the stimulus which fires the auditory neuron that, in turn, fires the sequence of cortical neurons, which fire the motor neuron that contracts one's muscles.

But if this were all that man is, neurologically, he never could remember anything. The explosion would occur, but he could

never remember that it had occurred; neither could he have ideas; nor would he ever have science; he would not be able to reflect on the fact that he jumped or that he has muscular power to use and direct in a certain way. Such considerations led many people to think that the mental part of man — that is, the use of ideas and reflection — was purely phenomenal. The real thing supposedly was the physical stimulus connected linearly to the physical muscular response. They thought, to be sure, that we had a consciousness stuck on top of this but that the consciousness never had a thing to do with what happened; the stimulus hit you, they said; you had a motor response, and ideas did not matter. Ideas and theory were just rationalizations after the fact, and the fact (the motor response) was determined quite independently of any reflection upon it or memory of past motor responses.

A Spanish physiologist and neurologist, Lorente de No', who is now in the Rockefeller Foundation Laboratories in New York, came upon the discovery that neurons can be ordered in the cortex not merely in this linear way, but also in a circle. This opened new possibilities.

Let us suppose, again, that we have our initial explosion, the bang. It fires the auditory neuron which fires the adjacent cortical neuron in the circle of cortical neurons, which fires the cortical neuron to its right and so on until the motor neuron, adjacent to the circle or cortical neurons, is fired. If this were the end of the story, the final result would be the same as before, i.e., in the linearly ordered neural net; nothing would be left in the system to record the original stimulus.

Neurons operate on an "all or none" principle; they either are latent or they fire; there is no such thing as "half-firing." Also, a neuron will not fire unless it contains a stored amount of energy. If you stimulate a neuron instantly after it has fired, it will not fire again because it has used up the energy necessary for firing. The time it takes (and which is accurately measured) the metabolic activities of the body to build up the energy in that

neuron again so that it will fire is called the "refractory period." With this in mind, let us return to the last neuron to fire in the circular neural net.

Let us suppose that in addition to firing the motor neuron adjacent to it, it also fires the next cortical neuron in the circle of cortical neurons, which in turn fires its successor in the circle and so on. Thereby an impulse will have been passed around the circle. Suppose also, as is the case, that the time it takes to pass that impulse around the circle is no longer than the refractory phase of any neuron in the circle. Then the impulse will be passed on continuously throughout the life of the human being; i.e., as long as the metabolic processes of the body restore each neuron's energy within the refractory period following any firing. Then you have a "trapped impulse," representing *uniquely* the past stimulus. Such a circle of successively firing neurons with its trapped impulse passed continuously around it, Lorente de No' called a "reverberating circuit."

McCulloch and Pitts pointed out that this is the neurological correlate of memory. Something is left in the cortical system, after the stimulus has fired the sensory neuron and after there has been the motor response, that represents the past stimulus uniquely. When a fact represents something other than itself uniquely, the name for it is a "symbol." When anything stands for something other than itself, it is functioning as a symbol. A symbol is an idea. Thus, McCulloch and Pitts pointed out that any one of these trapped impulses, related uniquely to a specific type of stimulus, is the neurological-physico-chemical, energetic correlate or equivalent of an idea.

Recall also that a firing cortical neuron can fire an outgoing motor neuron which causes muscles to contract and the physical body to jump, strike out with force or move. This means that ideas really matter. It means also that muscular or other power is a function of ideas.

Let us suppose that a second, later explosion occurs and the fired auditory neuron leads to the same reverberating circuit of neurons to which the first explosion was carried. Then the trapped impulse in the circuit is representing not merely one particular bang — the one, let us say, of five minutes past eleven, but also a second particular “bang” — the one, say, of ten minutes past eleven. Then, that trapped impulse is the symbol, not for one unique event, but for a whole group of similar events. Such a symbol logicians call a “universal.” It is a class symbol; it is standing for a class of entities. In short, each and every man is a walking set of trapped universals which fire his motor neurons and hence determine the direction his walking takes.

Furthermore, the different reverberating circuits with their diverse incoming stimuli and trapped universals do not exist in isolation from one another. Incoming sensory neurons feed to a common area. Otherwise, you would not be hearing these sounds while you were seeing the color of this coat and experiencing certain inner bodily sensations. This is your specious present. This is the world of true immediate fact, directly inspected, which is a mixture of auditory, visual, tactual and other simultaneously experienced sensations. But this is not all. From the common area to which the different incoming sensory neurons run, the impulses representing visual data are pulled out and trapped in a visual area of the cortex; those representing sounds in an auditory area, and so on. This is the way the nervous system, starting with a complex of simultaneous inductive facts, pulls out abstract class concepts.

A moment later the simultaneous indicative facts are different. Novel events have occurred with different sensory neurons firing. In the cortical abstractive process there must be circuits, therefore, that trap temporal relations and that trap special relations. Finally, the many reverberating circuits with their trapped representatives of both entities and relations must be connected in ways that permit them to be put together in different combi-

nations. Thereby theory capable of being tested against the incoming stimuli is possible. One simple permutation of three reverberating circuits, A, B, and C, representing three different trapped universals, is a neural connection between them such that if A and B fire, then C fires. This is the neurological correlate of a definition. Then concept C is defined in terms of Concepts A and B. Definition orders concepts hierarchically. Thus, our abstract concepts, each one representing similar inductive facts of our experience, are built up into a hierarchy of elementary concepts and defined concepts, or, in other words, a hierarchy of basic and derived, or secondary, concepts. The effectiveness of the power — i.e., stored energy and muscular response — of any individual is a function, therefore, of his basic trapped universals and their adequacy to the facts of experience.

This neurological conception of any human being makes it possible to give an exact definition of a nation. A nation is a group of people who order their motor responses with a common set of trapped universals.

With this concept of the nation in mind, let us now return to our initial question of the likelihood of settling disputes between nations by recourse to law rather than by the traditional recourse to force. Clearly, one's conclusion will depend on whether it is possible to obtain an effective international law. Upon what does law depend for its effectiveness? Even in domestic communities certain laws are effective; others, such as the Prohibition Amendment in the United States, are not. Why?

It happens that legal scientists have investigated this question. One of the most distinguished was an Austro-Hungarian named Ehrlich. He spent a considerable portion of his life in Eastern Europe in the province of Bucovina. This community would find itself under one national government at one time, a different national government in another decade, and a still different nation with its particular federal law in another fifty years. Ehrlich noted

that the different positive laws which came down on this local community from the rival national capitals did not alter the behavior of the people. They went on marrying, inheriting their property, carrying on their social lives under the same rules as before. This observation caused Ehrlich to distinguish "the positive law" from "the living law," where by the former he meant the legal constitutions, statutes and institutions and by the latter he meant the inner order of the daily habits of the people quite apart from the positive law.

From this distinction Ehrlich derived the following criterion of effective law: Positive law for settling disputes is effective only when the norms of its constitution and statutes are the norms of the underlying living law of the people to whom it is applied. It may be possible to get new legal norms passed as positive law, as the Prohibition Amendment indicates, but if the living beliefs, habits and values of a large group of the people do not correspond to the positive legal norms, the positive law will automatically break down. The problem of an effective international law is that, therefore, of so designing its positive norms that they draw upon the living law of the peoples of the world for its effectiveness.

We now have two points that we shall take for granted in what follows: *First*, that you never have a nation except as a people have a common set of trapped universals which define their way of relating themselves to one another economically, politically, militarily, religiously, aesthetically, and in every way; and, *second*, that legal institutions can be devised to settle disputes without resource to force, as they have been in domestic communities, if positive law norms for handling these disputes are supported by similar common norms in the living beliefs and habits of the people.

If we take these two points for granted and then turn to our world, I think we begin to see why both the League of Nations and the United Nations turned out to be so weak in practice in handling their professed aims. At San Francisco the foreign mini-

sters of the major nations in the world (including the major Powers) signed solemnly, with the parliamentary backing of their respective governments, the Charter of the United Nations, dedicating themselves to bring about freedom, economic well-being, health and peace in the world and to achieve peace by legal rather than by warful methods between nations. But the ink was no more than dry on that document before the foreign ministers of the four major powers met in London to agree upon a peace treaty for Germany. This conference, as you well know, broke up (General Marshall represented the United States).

A British newspaper observer commented on the breakup to the following effect:

The discouraging thing about the breakdown of the recent Foreign Ministers' Conference was not that they failed to solve the problem — a peace treaty for Germany which they came together to resolve — but that they could not find common norms or principles for carrying on soberly a further discussion of the problem.

Events since then have amply confirmed the correctness of that English newspaperman's observation and judgment.

Why this breakdown, but a few weeks after the United Nations' Charter was signed, when there was an atmosphere of collaboration throughout the world including even the United States and the Soviet Union who had just come out of a tremendous collaborative effort which had defeated both Hitler's Germany and Japan? I believe that the reason is that both the League of Nations' Charter and the United Nations' Charter were based on a false positive law premise: the false premise that the trapped universal, "freedom," the trapped universal "economic well-being," and the trapped universal, "settlement of international disputes by peaceful means" has the same meaning for all the signatories of those treaties.

We know that this premise is false. When Mr. Molotov signed the Charter of the United Nations, the word "freedom" meant "a society built on Communistic principles"; "a peaceful settlement of disputes" meant "a settlement in which any nation that was granted a peace treaty would build a society on communist principles — and only communist principles." When Secretary of State Stettinius signed that same document for the United States, he read into the words "economic uplift" the following: "the organization of the economic life and society on the basis of a free capitalistic economy." When Foreign Minister Bevin approved the United Nations' Charter, officially representing the British government (which was then a Labor Party government), by "economic uplift" he meant: "the type of social and national organization that involves nationalized industry."

When, however, the four foreign ministers came together to sign the peace treaty for Germany, they had to come down from undefined, abstract nouns to face the question: To what economic or political groups are we going to turn over the German economy? The Soviet delegate would not sign a peace treaty for Germany that did not turn the German people and the German potential industrial power over to a communist regime. A few of the British at that time would have liked to have seen a socialized economy — although they would not have fought over this. We would have liked to have seen a free enterprise economy. You can imagine if our Secretary of State had committed himself to a nationalized, socialist economy for Germany that members would have stood up in the Congress of the United States and said: "The State Department is using American taxpayers' money to bring about socialism in Europe."

We therefore, see that the words "economic need," "economic aid" and "economic well-being of men" cannot be separated from a specific set of norms for solving the economic problem. One political party or one national group has one set of norms and another political party and another national group has a different set.

Furthermore, the London conference of foreign ministers made it clear that you cannot separate the military and the economic from the political. The movement toward European union and the European Defense Community have established this same point. I spent the last half of 1950 interviewing the major political party leaders of the six Continental nations in E.D.C. It came out very clearly then that the economic unification of Europe, known as the Schuman Plan, which is already in effect, will break down if E.D.C. does not go through. The reason is obvious: If E.D.C. does not go through, you are back in a power politics, bilaterally-arranged Europe. In such a Europe each nation must have absolute control of its steel and iron industries. This will break down the Schuman Plan because if each nation goes in for an autonomous national army it must have, if that army is to amount to anything, an autonomous coal and steel economy. This will mean that Italy will have to build steel mills, even though it is uneconomic to do so there. The whole Schuman Plan will go; in other words, the Schuman Plan will fail unless military collaboration is achieved. This shows, again, that you cannot handle the economic factor in society by itself. Many people say that the key to international relations is "economics." I think that the dependence of the European Coal and Steel Community on E.D.C. is disproof of such a contention.

Furthermore, it became clear in my interviews in Europe that there was not a chance of E.D.C. going through unless the political community went through. The reason, again, is obvious. I got it from Guy Mollet, the leader of the Socialist Party of France, which is the largest liberal party in the present French Parliament. (It is not the largest party in France — the largest one is the de Gaullist Right Party). He told me that the Socialists voted through the Schuman Plan one hundred per cent and that they would vote through E.D.C. — but only on condition that the political community went in simultaneously. The reason is obvious: The whole point of E.D.C., from the French standpoint, is to get German economic and military power under European control in-

stead of leaving it merely under unilateral, nationalistic German control. It is not going to do much good to have the Military High Command under European control if the politicians (who decide what is done with the military) are not under European control. This is why the Socialists — and I think most of the other French parties and leaders supporting E.D.C. — felt very strongly that they would not vote for military unification and collaboration between France and Germany unless there was political unification. It appears, therefore, that the economic and the military come down to the political.

Upon what does the political depend? The political turns around your over-all norms for ordering your social relations. Where peoples and nations do not have common, over-all norms, they will not trust one another politically. No people will vote away the control of their own domestic internal lives (the way in which they develop their economy — whether they do it with a free enterprise capitalism or with a nationalized semi-socialism, or with a complete, nationalized industry) to a supranational community unless they know that the community is going to be governed by the economic policies in which they believe.

This means, therefore, that if we are going to move toward a more effective international law we must give up the false premise that people mean the same thing by the word “freedom,” the word “peace,” or the words “economic well-being.” We must realize we are living in a world in which the living law of different people is based on different sets of normative ideas. In other words, they are guiding their overt social behavior with different sets of trapped universals.

One of the major mistakes in thinking about the Soviet Union, and one of the things which has done as much as anything else to corrupt allied collaboration to stop it, is the theory that we are dealing with nothing more than an old-fashioned imperialistic power; in other words, one of the major causes is the neglect of the *ideological* factor. Admiral Stevens is one who has seen

this point and has emphasized that the international situation is far more serious than many people suppose, not merely because the United States and the Soviet Union are two major powers in it, but because of the specific ideology, the set of trapped universals, that define the communist concept of proper living law and proper positive law.

In the old Europe we have had in history many opposing powers — even powers with an imperialistic urge. The present situation, however, is different from this. In the old Europe those conflicting powers — France, Germany, Great Britain — had a common living law civilization. They all came out of a Christian civilization; they all accepted the rule of law; they all operated most of the time with a many-party political system instead of a one-party dictatorship, and they were all interconnected through their royal families in intermarriage. So there were certain rules of the game which, even if one got into war, one could trust because all the parties accepted those rules of the game. The military had respect for one another, even when they were fighting one another, because they knew they had a common code. Of course there are exceptions to this, but, on the whole, that was roughly the case.

Furthermore, even the most imperialistic of the traditional military powers never, due to its own ideology, regarded itself as having the moral commitment and the historical destiny to take over the whole world. Great Britain in her heyday never attempted to take over the whole world. She got a good piece of it and with that piece was able to be the dominant naval power and to control the situation. But never did she feel herself driven by her own internal ideology and morality to take over the world. Further, Great Britain in her own ideology taught herself, as she taught us in this country, that in the long run there is not really any good government that is not local self-government. Thus it was of the very essence of British imperialism that it would give up that imperialism in the end, as it did in India. You cannot fol-

low British political theory, as we have done and as Great Britain herself has done, and not stand for the position that when a native people acquire the power to run their own affairs in a modern way they have got the right to run them, themselves, and not have them run by a foreign power.

So power politics in the days of the old imperialism was one thing. The power politics in a world in which the Soviet Union and Mao's China are two of the major powers, with the two largest land armies on the surface of the earth, is a quite different thing because of the nature of the trapped universals that define the living and positive laws and the morals and ideas of any Communist society. This ideology has two points: *First*, ideas are secondary to matter; ideas are really the effect of body (this is their *materialism*). This means that morals are rooted in power. I do not think that is true of the British imperialism for the reason which I have just given: that morals are rooted in the freedom of the individual and the right of the individual to run his affairs himself when he has the competence, the wisdom and the learning to do so. This is what sobered the British Empire. It is what kept the British in their empire from running that Empire into the ground. It enabled them to really welcome U. S. independence in a way and to blame their own leaders for being so stupid as not to grant the U. S. the right to self-government and perhaps keep this country in a Commonwealth. But to the Soviet Union, matter is what determines ideas; ideas go where body goes and where power goes. That is the first point.

The *second* point is this: It is a part of Soviet reading of history that history is governed by a *determinism*; that what men think, what men do, has nothing to do with where their society is going and where the course of civilization is going. They believe this is all set up by an absolute determinism, as rigid as that lower sequence of cortical neurons; that this determinism is such that it is in the very nature and root of Western civiliza-

tion and world civilization that the societies represented by the liberal democracies will generate internal contradiction which can be resolved only by a revolutionary resort to force which will achieve a communist state for the entire world. This is what we are up against.

This means, as Admiral Stevens has pointed out, that you are not going to achieve peace in the present world by merely getting the power to balance their power, because their ideology is such that they are always going to attempt to overdrive the other powers. If you are in a power-politics world alone, it would be just a question of balancing your power against theirs, or with a little more power; there would be no danger of them making a foolhardy judgment to go to war because they thought they could win easily. But when you have a nation governed by moral imperialism, when a nation's own ideology, its morality and its norms — for morals are defined by norms, the norms for ordering social relations — when those norms are rooted in what is called "dialectical materialism" and "dialectical determinism" this means that you are dealing with a nation which, according to its own sense of morality, believes that matter is the deciding factor and that destiny is on the side of its use of power.

This is where the neutralists go wrong — where men like my friends Pandit Nehru and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan of India go wrong; that is in thinking that the creation of a reasonable atmosphere is sufficient to bring peace with the Soviet Union. A nation whose morals are rooted in the concept that ideas go where power goes and where matter goes is only going to be reasonable if it is confronted with power. But power alone is not enough! Combined with their ideas of the role of power is their theory of history, which is, paradoxically enough, an idea — the idea that they are destined to take over the world. They would be traitors to their own morality if they believed it were proper to create a power-politics, balanced equilibrium that would give peace over the long run. Indeed, they would be betraying their own idealism if they accepted such a policy.

This means that because of the very nature of the trapped universals that define the ideology of any communist power we must not only meet them with power, but we must also meet them with a positive ideology and program. To my mind, one of the things that makes the present mood of the world so pessimistic with respect to the prospects of peace is that the communists have apparently won their game, diplomatically, of dividing the free world. So, instead of the communist nations being met by a united free world with a positive ideal backed with police power, they are met by a divided free world, each nation tending to revert to a go-it-alone foreign policy.

What possibility is there for recovering the morale of the free world? For, unless morale is recovered military power will not be effectively used. It seems to me that there are two positive ways. I shall have to state them dogmatically. (I have outlined them and given more detailed reasons for them in my book, *The Taming of the Nations*). The first way is to break from the basic premise that I believe is unconsciously underneath the League of Nations and the United Nations — the premise that all men have the same ideals and that all nations have the same ideals. We must honestly and unequivocally face the objective fact that the different nations of the world are building their social lives, their national unity, their economic institutions and their common law in terms of different sets of trapped universals. The communists use the Marxist ideology; the British Labor Party wants a semi-nationalized industry; the British Conservative Party stands for very much more action at the government level than either the Democratic or Republican Parties in the United States, yet at the same time insists on a free enterprise industry; France is divided into six political parties, no one of which has even a respectable minority, the largest political party being the de Gaullist Party with 118 seats of 627 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Hence, France can have a majority government only with a coalition (coalition governments are inevitably weak — they can only agree in their opposition to their enemies and they cannot put

through a positive policy because they do not agree in their norms for policy). This is the nature of the European world in which we are living.

Similarly, the whole Asian world has reacted against the West, throwing off Western imperialism. There is a movement throughout the whole Middle Eastern, Islamic and Eastern Asian world to root their institutions not only in the Western ways which they want, but also in terms of indigenous Islamic and Asian traditions and values.

It seems to me that the first positive step to get an ideology that can rebuild the morality of the free nations of the free world is to root this ideology in this plain fact of *living law pluralism* — in the fact that the Commonwealth nations of the British tradition want to root themselves in their British living law norms; that in India there is a Hindu religious tradition; that the Islamic world wants to build a modern state, drawing on their Islamic background, religion and law. This was the reason why British India had to be divided between India and Pakistan — the Muslim portions of India did not want their lives socially and culturally dominated by non-Islamic positive law in the national government.

I believe that for the world, as a whole, federalism is a mistake. An effective federalism is possible only between nations that have a common ideology and common norms. The world as a whole does not have common norms. The most we can hope for, therefore, so far as international law for the whole world is concerned, is a *confederation*. N.A.T.O. is an example of a workable alliance based on confederation. We have Islamic Turkey and Greek Orthodox Greece in it as well as Roman Catholic Continental Europe and Protestant Great Britain and the United States. This is workable provided the members going into the confederation will respect the right of each other party to build his institutions on ways other than one's own. If the members mutually guarantee that right, backing it with police power, such a positive international policy can build up the morale of the world.

I believe also that you can move toward a federalism of the nations with respect to certain specified powers in those nations where they have a common living law ideology. In *The Taming of the Nations*, I pointed out one case where I believed this to be possible. This is the Islamic nations. Two months after that book came out I had a letter from the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who was then the Chairman of the Pakistan Delegation to the United Nations, saying that he was in agreement with its conclusions. Two weeks later he announced the Pakistan-Turkey Treaty. I believe that is a workable alliance because both Turkey and Pakistan are Islamic nations trying to modernize and Westernize themselves. They have common problems, they have a common ideology, and they can trust one another and work together.

Thus it appears that legally, and from the standpoint of building the morale of the free nations of the world, there are but two practical things which can be done — and, again, both of them will take time. One is to build up an ideology for the world as a whole on the principle of living law pluralism — on the right of individual nations to build their institutions in the light of their own living law cultural traditions, and a guarantee of that right up to the point where they respect the right of their neighbors to do the same thing. This will permit the outlawing of aggression, while not requiring, for an effective international law, common economic, political, religious or cultural norms between the nations supporting it and protected by it.

In the case of nations like those English-speaking nations of the British Commonwealth, in the case of the Islamic nations, and perhaps in the case of the Buddhist nations of Southeast Asia, alliances — even a federation like the Continental European Union — would be possible. There, you can get stronger transfers of sovereignty from the member nation to the international community. The strength of a transfer of sovereignty from a nation to a supernational depends upon the strength of the common law of

the participating nations. Where nations agree in their political parties, their religion and their cultural traditions, it is possible to have a greater transfer of sovereignty from the national to the international group. Also military alliances of such nations will have greater strength. I believe, notwithstanding the present differences between the United States and Great Britain, that in the long run collaboration between these nations is going to work because our culture came out of their culture and our ideology, our political and economic theories came from the same sources as theirs. This gives us common norms and helps us, notwithstanding our momentary misunderstandings, to understand and trust one another.

To the extent that neither of these two conditions (world confederation on the principle of living law pluralism or alliances of peoples with common norms) is present, I think we must conclude that war is the likely outcome of the present world situation. If Dean Pound is correct in saying that there is no evidence for believing that disputes in any realm between men are settled by means other than force unless those disputes are brought under law — and if the two conditions for an effective international law have not been met— it follows, automatically, that we must keep our powder very, very dry.

BIOGRAPHY

Professor Filmer S. C. Northrop

Professor Northrop received his B.A. degree from Beloit College in 1915; his M.A. degree from Yale in 1919; and an M.A. degree (1922) and a Ph.D. degree (1924) from Harvard University. He studied abroad at the University of Freiburg, Germany; the Institute of Science and Technology, London; and Trinity College, Cambridge University, England.

In 1923, Professor Northrop joined the faculty of Yale University and was appointed Professor of Philosophy in 1932. From 1938-40, he served as chairman of the Department of Philosophy. For the next seven years he was Master of Yale's Silliman College. In 1947, he became Sterling Professor of Philosophy and Law at the Yale Law School, while continuing as a Professor in the Department of Philosophy. Since 1947, he has been working in the field of anthropological philosophy under a grant from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research.

Professor Northrop is the author of: "The Meeting of East and West," originally published in 1946 and in its eighth printing; "Science and First Principles," 1931; "The Logic of the Sciences and Humanities," 1947; "The Taming of the Nations," 1952 (for which he received the Wendell Wilkie Award, presented by the American Political Science Association).