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# Bases of Islamic Political Thought

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## **BASES OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT**

A Lecture Delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 29 October 1953 by  
*Professor Hans Kohn*

Gentlemen:

Though this is my twenty-seventh lecture here, it is my first lecture on the present subject. I congratulate the Naval War College in thinking out new assignments and, thereby, a greater variety in the offerings which, I would say, involves more work for me.

Speaking on "Bases of Islamic Political Thought," that means the general motivation behind the actions of the Mohammedan peoples in the world today. Let me first start with a short historical introduction. You know very well that, today, there are about 250 million Mohammedans who live in the area stretching from Morocco, on the Atlantic coast, to Java and the Indonesian islands in the south Asian region. This whole immense bloc from the southern Mediterranean, even to the Philippine Islands, with a half-million Mohammedans there, has been, we may say, a conquest for the faith of Islam by the vigor of the initial originators of Islam, the Arabs.

When we use the word "Mohammedans," we use a name which the Mohammedans themselves never use. The Mohammedans do not call themselves "Mohammedans," because that means "followers of the prophet, Mohammed." This would sound too much like the deification of an individual and in the religion of Mohammed all glory belongs to God, and God alone. The glorification of any individual, even of Mohammed, is counter to the tenets of the Islamic religion. The real word used by them is "Islam," and they call themselves "Moslems." "Islam" is an Arabic word which means "abandonment of one's self to the will of God."

In these words, "abandonment of one's self to the will of God," we have one of the characteristic features of the Islamic religion, which we sometimes call *fatalism*. They accept fatalistically, whatever comes as God's will. If we look, today, at the Islamic masses in Egypt or in Pakistan who suffer under malnutrition, under misery, under immense ill-health, and think they protest against it we are mistaken. They still, today, accept misfortunes of all kinds as the will of Allah (which is their name for God) against which men cannot revolt, but which men have to accept. This abandonment to the will of God makes the Mohammedan people into enduring, long-suffering people, very little inclined to revolt.

What we call "revolutionary" is an attitude entirely absent in the Islamic masses. We shall see very soon that it is not absent, today, in the intelligentsia or in the small educated class, but it is absent in the people at large.

The second thing about it is that all life is abandonment of one's self to the will of God and this means that God directs, rules all human life in every respect. Islam is not a religion. It is much more; it is an all-inclusive social system, a way of life which directs every aspect of life.

As you know, Islam is a religion which in the beginning of the 7th century was founded by an Arab of Mecca, in Hijaz, which even today is the sacred city of Islam—a man called Mohammed, who in 622 had a vision, or rather an audition with the archangel, Gabriel, who dictated to him the will of God. The will of God was put down by Mohammed in a book called the *Koran*; the word *Koran* means just "reading." The book of Islam is the *Koran* and the *Koran* has become to an unimaginable degree the guiding light for the life of every Mohammed. Mohammedans may be illiterate (most of them are) but there are none of them who do not know at least some chapters of the *Koran* by heart.

The Koran imposes upon the faithful one supreme duty: to do everything possible to expand the faith. Because Islam is a religion not for the Mohammedans, but for the whole world, it is the task of Moslems to spread it. The Arabs in the 7th century burst forth, a primitive, nomadic people, from the Hijaz, from the interior of the Arabian Peninsula, and within a few years overran most of the civilized world. From Spain to India, within a few decades, the whole world succumbed to the power of the Arabs and the preaching of Islam. Don't forget the people overrun were attracted by the power of Islam. Today, the people in Egypt or in Syria, as you know, speak Arabic. Before the 7th century nobody spoke Arabic there; it was an alien language imposed by the Arab conquerers. And it was gladly accepted by the peoples of these lands. Of all the movements which I know, I would say none have shown such a tremendous power of conquest and winning-over as Islam did.

You know (and I think rightly so) that some people today compare Bolshevism to Islam. The rapid expansion of Bolshevism as a kind of new religion can be compared, in my opinion, only to the rapid expansion of Islam 1300 years ago. You know very well that the Arabs, the Moslems, not only conquered Spain but marched into France. Only the victory of Charles Martel at Tours in the 8th century stopped them and threw them back beyond the Pyrenees, a battle which decided whether the whole of Europe would be Mohammedan, one battle on which the fate of Europe depended. The Mohammedans, frustrated in the west, now turned to the east, and moved against Byzantium and the Balkans. Constantinople in the east, in 1453 — five hundred years ago — fell to them, and they planted the Crescent on the top of Christendom's greatest church, Saint Sophia; because, as you know, it is not the cross but the crescent which is the sign of Islam. As recently as 1683 the Turks were right at the gate of Vienna and the whole of Europe trembled before them.

Don't forget that the Mohammedans are still conscious of this glory of their history. There is not one educated Mohammedan

who does not remember the great day when Islam ruled the Mediterranean, from Spain to Turkey. There is not one educated Mohammedan who does not remember that Mohammedans were in France and in Hungary. Even more so, you might know that today no mission is as successful in Africa as the Islamic mission. The Mohammedan missionaries are much more successful than the Christians in Africa for two reasons. First, the Mohammedan religion, as far as I can judge it — though I am no theologian — Islamic is the simplest religion and the most rational one. It certainly resembles, with a few differences, the Unitarian religion here in the United States. It is one God — nothing beyond that; no mythology, no liturgy, no miracles, no sacraments, no priests. In their mosques they read the Koran. The Koran, the sacred book, is read every Friday — for Friday is the Mohammedan holiday; it is their Sabbath. It is not read as I talk. There is a special art in reading it, a certain singing to reading it; a traditional incantation of reading it. People trained in it, or what you might call the clergy, do nothing but read the Koran. There is no dispensing of sacraments. It is the simplest religion which you can imagine.

Secondly, and more important, it is a religion in which there is no racial feeling. Every Mohammedan is the other fellow Mohammedan's brother. Turks who look more or less white and Negroes who become Mohammedans are on equal footing and there is not the slightest feeling of a racial differentiation within the one brotherhood of Islam. Again, that naturally appeals — and understandably — to the Africans. That is the reason why Islam, today, is making most of the converts.

This Islamic religion — or, rather, this Islamic world — has fallen, as you all know, in the last three hundred years into a period of torpor, of decadence; something shared on the whole by all Mediterranean and Asian peoples. The Mohammedans were among the last to fall for it. In the West, their power declined first. Early in the 18th century the Turkish Mohammedan Em-

pire receded and became, finally, the "Sick Man of Europe," "the Sick Man of the Bosphorus," the "Sick Man of Constantinople," but the Mohammedans remained the ruling group of India until the 19th century. When the British East India Company built up, sometimes without any plan or preconceived intentions, the vast British Empire there, it was done during the time that the nominal head of India was still the Great Mogul, the Islamic emperor of Delhi. Until 1858, India was ruled officially, though not really, by the Mohammedans. You must understand the pride of the Indian Mohammedans, of the Pakistanis, who do not wish to be under the rule of the Hindus who were their subjects a little bit more than a century ago—but more than by pride they are motivated by old memories, the discrepancies between Islamic and Hindu thought and traditions; they brought about the partition of India into Mohammedan Pakistan and Hindu India.

Let me say one more word about that. The Hindu civilization and the Confucian civilization, of which Dr. Northrop spoke, are very different from ours. I would say that there is little in common between our thinking and the thinking of the Hindus or the Confucians. The Mohammedans are much nearer to us. Certainly the Mohammedans are Mediterraneans, as Italians, as Greeks, as Christianity originally was. Islam was born under the influence of Judaism, Christianity and the Hellenistic culture, the late Greek culture of the Mediterranean. If you ever take the time to read the Koran, you will see that it is not metaphysical speculation as the books of the Hindus are—something of a far-away, philosophical nature. It is something much more practical, something much nearer to our own thought. It is therefore understandable why, for instance, the leading British civil servants and military men in India felt themselves much more attracted to the Mohammedans than to the Hindus. There is much more in common between British gentlemen and the Mohammedan noblemen; both, I think, have in common a point of view which may go back to military traditions on the one hand and to "rural" traditions on the other hand.

Now let us consider modern Islam. Don't forget that all Mohammedans even today feel an immense closeness, a feeling of fellowship, because they are united by two facts. Every faithful Mohammedan prays; in fact, Islam *consists* of praying five times a day. That is all a Mohammedan needs to do. The prayers are short and very simple. The only thing which is important is that when they pray they must always turn so they face Mecca. Mecca, the Arab holy city, remains the center for Islam from the Philippine Islands to Morocco.

The second point is that every Mohammedan is bound by his faith, at least once in his life, to go to Mecca to make the famous pilgrimage which they call "haj." Therefore in the Islamic lands, Haji is a very honorary title for it means "a man who has gone to Mecca." Thus, once a year pious Moslems from everywhere congregate in Mecca and in common perform certain hallowed rites. That doesn't impress us as being very much because we go everywhere. But don't forget that in the 13th, 16th, or even 19th centuries to go to Mecca from Bukhara or from Java was not as simple as going to Athens or to Tokyo today. It was an adventure; it meant risks. To have done that in the service of Allah was one of the great meritorious things which Moslems claim. Wherever you go in Mohammedan lands, they are held together by this devotion to Mecca and by their common, sacred language — the Arabic of the Koran. All Moslems pray in Arabic.

You remember that in all Mohammedan lands there are houses of worship called "mosques." Each mosque has a high tower called a "minaret," and around the high tower at the top is a balcony. There, around the balcony, five times a day walks a man called the "muezzin." And the muezzin cries out five times a day, calling the faithful to prayer, just as in Christian lands the church bells ring. There, in Islam, is something very poetic. I lived for many years in the shadow of a mosque. Five times a day — sometimes at an impossible hour — the muezzin awakened me (I was not one of the faithful, but I hope it awakened the

faithful, too) with the call to prayer. The call to prayer is always the same Arabic words sounding from Morocco to the Philippine Islands five times a day; five times bringing home to all the faithful the unity of Islam and the task of Islam of spreading the faith of Allah, of God, to all the infidels.

There is a very deep tradition in Islam which they call the "jihad." Jihad means "holy war, sacred war, the war for the spread of Islam." It is something which was taken very seriously centuries ago, but no longer today. I would say as I look at Bolshevism (I may be wrong, naturally, because no historian can predict the future), I sometimes think that it may take the way of Islam. Because centuries ago, every Mohammedan was ready to take his sword to spread the realm of Allah. Today, they have learned to accommodate themselves to a world which is not Mohammedan in its large majority. But (and this we should not overlook) deep down in every Mohammedan there is still a war-like fanaticism which is unknown to the Hindu. It is so because Allah, the Mohammedan god, is a jealous god; a unique god who does not tolerate any competitors, while the Hindu gods are much more tolerant gods, not monotheistic gods. Of all the great religions, Islam is the most monotheistic; one god, and one god alone. This deep-seated fanaticism may still be aroused in Islamic peoples.

So on the whole we may say that the Islamic peoples are by nature the most warrior-like, perhaps second to the Japanese (this is a guess of mine, one of the many inevitable generalizations). There are certain peoples today who are not warrior-like. Take the Hindu; a Hindu by nature is not warrior-like or otherwise a phenomenon like Gandhism would be impossible because Gandhism is possible only to an unwarrior-like people. From my own experience, I would say that the Italians are not a warrior-like people. The Mohammedans are warrior-like and, on the whole, the Mohammedans have always made good soldiers, disciplined, given to the will of Allah, fatalistic. In India, under British domi-



nation, most of the soldiers were Mohammedans. The Turks, today, I would say have the best army of all the small nations; not the best equipped army, that is something different, but an army on which I would rely, one that has courage, devotion and the readiness to sacrifice one's life for Allah in a certain fatalistic attitude which a Western man hardly shares. Even among the Arabs, where I would say that the population of the cities has been largely undermined and corrupted (I shall speak about this very soon), the warriors of the interior still keep the spirit alive.

As I turn from this background of Islamic thought to the present situation, to the present Islamic thought, let me say that today those who are most important are not the most numerous. The most important are the eastern Mediterranean Mohammedans. There is the center of Islam, there is Mecca; there are the Arabs; from there Mohammed came. I say they are not the most numerous. The most numerous are the Pakistanis, 80 million, and the Javanese, 60 million; these are the most numerous Mohammedans. But they are not the backbone of Islam. The backbone of Islam for any foreseeable future will be what you might call the "Middle Eastern Islam," Arabs and Turks.

As you know, Christianity is divided into Catholics, Orthodox and Protestants. Islam is divided only into two groups. What is regarded as the immense majority live in Turkey, Arabia, and Pakistan and elsewhere, are called "Sunnites." The word "sunnah" means "tradition." They are the majority. Now the minority is a small group of not more than 25 million amongst 250 million, who call themselves "Shi'ites," from the word "sh'i'ah," which means "sect." Shi'ites are sectarian. This division started very soon after the death of Mohammed. Upon the death of Mohammed, the Arabs chose a successor to Mohammed — not as the head of their religion, for there is no head of the religion in Islam; there is no Pope, no bishop, no head of the church. The successor is called "caliph," from "khalifah," which means "successor"; successor to Mohammed not as a church head, but to defend the faith as a

secular ruler of the sword. The emphasis is on the sword on the military side, and this has been strong throughout Mohammedan religion. There is nothing of pacifism in Islam.

As you know, the first caliphs were recognized by all Mohammedans. But then came a split and the Shi'ites refused to recognize the later caliphs and turned to the grandson of Mohammed. Mohammed was married and had only one daughter, Fatima, whose sons killed in battle are supposed to survive in a mystical way. There are different Shi'ite sects. One of these you know very well. You have all heard of Aga Khan. You have also heard of his son who married Rita Hayworth. His father spends his whole time on having a good time in an expensive social way. Now, this man is the mystical head of such a Shi'ite sect. It is only the money which these Shi'ites pay to him that makes it possible for him to live the way he does.

It is difficult to say what makes people happy. Think of our own Father Devine, to whom many people paid immense sums because it made them happy. And it made Father Devine happy, too, naturally. It is the same with Aga Khan. He is the head of a mystical, Shi'ite sect which is very strong in India, in Lebanon and Syria. The Iranians who form the great majority of the orthodox Shi'ites are different, of course, as a people, compared to Turks or Arabs. They are more "civilized," but have much less stamina. I would not rely too much on a Persian army if I had to. A Persian knows poetry by heart, but does not have the Islamic stamina so strong in the Pakistanis or in the Turks.

Now we will look at the Turks and the Arabs. Both are today in the grip of an immense transformation. This should not be forgotten and should not be overlooked because sometimes when we speak of the Middle East, and of the peoples there, we see mostly on the dark side. There are many dark sides inherited from two or three centuries of complete decay and decadence. There is much corruption there — infinite corruption, in-

finite poverty, and what I would call a dire lack of social responsibility. In the older generation (people who are, today, 40 or older), we find there hardly any sense of social responsibility. But I would say the idea that the native peasants are unhappy is a wrong idea. The American picture of the Mohammedan peasant being unhappy because he is poor, ground down by taxes, disturbed by disease such as trachoma and so on, is a wrong picture. He is not an American, nor an Englishman, nor a Dutchman. He is a fatalistic Mohammedan who accepts these things as we accept rain or thunderstorms, or something about which we cannot do much. On the other hand, there is a great dissatisfaction and a feeling of frustration in the new, growing-up intelligensia, an educated or, if you like, half-educated middle class which is under the influence of Western ideas that they regard as their own. They explain it to themselves by saying that Islam is something Western, not Asian. It came from the same lands as Christianity, as Judaism, as Greek or Roman civilization came. Don't forget that they remember that at the time of the Crusades, the Mohammedans were stronger than Europe and defeated all the Crusaders. Secondly, remember that at that time they were culturally superior to the Knights, to the flower of European chivalry, who came to the Near East. With astonishment and awe the European Knights looked upon the wealth and civilization of medieval Islam.

You all know very well that a great, early renaissance of scholarship in Europe in the 13th century was brought about by the influence of Arabic philosophy; through Arabic Spain it spread to European Christian thinkers. The Mohammedans know that. That is not true of the peasant for, of course, he doesn't know anything. But I mean this half-educated intelligensia know that. And they now accept what I regard as other ideas which I may sum up in three words: (1) that certain ill can be remedied; that poverty, diseases can be fought; (2) that the elite, leading class must have a sense of social responsibility, an entirely new thought throughout Asia which was never there before, brought by English administrators or some American educators like those in

the American university in Beirut; (3) and, finally, and this is very important, that a nation can only be strong if the people as a whole, if the masses, have a sense of democratic responsibility. They claim these new tenets come from Islam, but we know they come from the modern West. In any case, they cling to them. What is going on today in the Arab and Turkish lands is a kind of a birth of a new society, of a birth of new thought. A birth is a very unappetizing and often painful phenomenon; people are born in not too very beautiful circumstances; a birth is a rather dirty process. I am not an expert on birth so you must ask your doctors or your wives. But, in any case, the picture is not lovely.

And now one point which I wish to stress: the leaders everywhere in this re-birth are military men. Without exception the leadership is in military hands. This can be easily explained if you think back in European history — not in English, American or Dutch history, because these are advanced democratic peoples, but in the more backward southern or eastern European lands such as the Spaniards or the Russians, who were over one hundred and fifty years ago there where today, or yesterday, the Arabs were. You should not forget that the difference between the English, on one hand, and the Spaniards and the Russians on the other hand is as great a difference in political thought, in immaturity, in irresponsibility as there is between the English and the Arabs or Americans and Arabs.

If you think back to Spain in the 1820's, or Russia in the 1820's, or the kingdom of Naples in southern Italy in the 1820's, who were the leaders of all the forward movements? The officers throughout because they were the only ones who had the 'know-how' to improve the administration, who had technical education, who in a certain way had a certain activation which is so much lacking in all these nations.

I will speak in another lecture this afternoon about Russia. When I speak about Russia I always point out that Peter the

Great around 1700 in Russia was such a great man because he decided to go to the West, to Amsterdam, to the West in general, to learn how to do with his own hands certain things such as an apprentice learning about shipbuilding, learning how to build boats. That was something fantastic which no Russian at that time, no Arab, no Turk, no Mohammedan, no Spaniard thought of doing with his own hands if you were not a peasant. The officers alone knew that things had to be done, not only talked about. On the whole, they had more integrity than the other classes.

If you look at Turkey, at the renaissance of Turkey, the rebuilding of the medieval Islamic society there was entirely due to an officer, to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, whom the Turks now call Kemal Atatürk, and who (as you all know) was a successful colonel on the Turkish General Staff in World War I. And the first successor after his death, after Kemal Atatürk died, was a friend of his — a general, again, Ismet İnönü. It was this little group of officers who wished to make Turkey strong, to revive her old virtues.

We have the very same picture in Egypt, in Syria, in Saudi Arabia. The leaders of the renaissance are exclusively military men. Although Mohammed Naguib in Egypt might not be (and probably is not, there is no doubt about that) a “democrat” in our sense, he tries, nevertheless, to do much more for the country than any of the preceding governments ever did. He tries to arouse the country’s masses from their fatalism; to imbue the people, the masses, with: “You can help yourselves,” and break the whole preceding fatalism of Islam.

Mind, this new generation wants only one thing: it wants an understanding, a sympathy from the West. You know we try to do very much. Look at Point Four. The Point Four Program is a very good program in economic support, but it is not a program itself which is a good policy. Point Four is a very good handmaiden of policy, but it is not a substitute for a policy. So

far, I think, there is no good American policy for Islam; or, rather, there is no American policy at all in Islamic countries. We are now slowly getting one and I think that the last step made by our government, by General Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles, of greater impartiality in the Israelic-Arabic countries was one of the most important, good steps towards such a constructive policy.

Don't forget what hurts the Islamic world most today are two things. It is not the British occupation in Egypt, for one very simple reason: they know that the British will go sooner or later (and very much sooner than later); about this, the Arabs have no doubt. And, secondly, the occupation itself is nothing but diminishing national sovereignty. We have bases in the Philippine Islands — naval, I think, and air bases — and the Philippines are independent. We have quite large air bases in Britain; I don't know how many, but I would say at least 40,000 American air men and others are in Britain. Yet, Britain is independent. Egypt has followed her own policy entirely for years now — since the end of World War II — in spite of the British garrison in one very small part of Egypt which is separated from the bulk of Egypt by 130 miles of desert: the Suez Canal from the Nile valley which alone is inhabited. The former Egyptian government, the corrupt government, used this demand of evacuation to divert people from their real grievances. The real grievances of the Middle Eastern peoples are two at present. First, the French in Morocco and in Tunisia; not the French government but the French settlers there. The difficulties are not concerning the French government, but the 400,000 Frenchmen in Morocco who have invested there their capital, very much labor and energy, and do not wish to abandon it now. They are afraid that independence for Morocco means the end of the French dominant economic positions there. In Tunisia, it is not the French government; again, it is the French settlers who make any Tunisian self-government impossible. There are no British settlers in Egypt and there are none in India. There is a tremendous difference between these countries and Tunisia and Morocco.

The second point is Palestine. The Jewish settlers are just like the French settlers in Morocco, wishing to preserve their positions there and, beyond that, doing something which the French did not do in Morocco — driving out the Arabs from the land.

But what even more deeply hurts them are two things. One, that the Arab nations tried to fight Israel. In 1948, the Arab nations were badly defeated, ignominiously defeated, by a small army from Israel. The only Arab army which stood up was the British-led Transjordanian legion. But the Arabs did not learn anything from that. They should have learned that what they need for their own benefit is some British leadership or American leadership, some Western leadership for their army, their administration. The only army which was successful was the British-led Arab Legion. By their lack of unity and of leadership, by their corruption and inefficiency, the Arabs were badly defeated. It was this defeat which rankled the intelligentsia in Syria, in Egypt, which brought up the military men to command positions in both countries and which is slowly transforming these Arab lands into something much more modernized. Turkey has been transformed in the very same way by military leadership.

The second thing about this was that the Arab lands believe (and rightly) the United States government was not impartial in their struggle with Israel, but took the side of Israel. This was expressed in the very strange fact of our appropriations. In the Middle East, we gave the very same amount to the small state of Israel and to all the Arab nations together. That means 1.5 million people in Israel and 40 million people in the Arab lands. The Arabs say this shows partiality. They say: "We have twenty times as many and we are twenty times poorer," which is true.

I think our present government under General Eisenhower, is beginning to rectify this point and that American prestige will gain in the Middle East. We have already won great assets there with the splendid American University in Beirut. I have visited it many times in years gone by and I would say that there has rarely been done as good work by American missionaries

as at this university, founded by Presbyterian missionaries in the 1860's. And, today, I would say that in the best educational institutions throughout the whole of the Mohammedan lands there is nothing comparable to the American University at Beirut. And the Arabs know that. I think there is a very good chance of America regaining the prestige amongst the Mohammedan lands. Naturally, we cannot favor the Islamic lands against others, but what they demand is sympathy and impartiality.

In conclusion let me say one word. I think there is very slight possibility for Communist penetration in Islamic lands. I think there is none, practically; infinitely less than in Italy or France. In spite of the poverty of the masses, the masses have not yet any revolutionary spirit to which the Communists appeal. But there is tremendous danger that this immense world from Morocco to Java — the Mohammedan world — though not turning Communist, will turn away from the West. They may adopt the position of a plague on both houses, Western and Communist. The danger is not that they become Communist but the danger is that we, instead of making friends, are losing friends; not to Communism, for I don't believe for one minute that here is any possibility, except by military conquest, that Turkey or Arabia, or even Persia, India or Pakistan will go Communist. But instead of winning friends who will be willing to be friends, we are alienating the people; or did so in the short period when we, unprepared for it, had to assume world leadership.

Don't forget one thing: we have always been interested in Japan and China; since 1860, let's say, we have been always interested in them. We have not been interested in the Middle East, in the Islamic lands. For the first time, we are finding our way. And we are learning quite well from some of the excellent Islamic Institutes like the one at Princeton University, and other educational institutions like the Institute for the Middle East in Washington and the American Friends of the Middle East, which try to supply us with knowledge of the Islamic lands and Islamic culture in which we, until the last five years, were not interested.



## BIOGRAPHY

### Professor Hans Kohn

Professor Hans Kohn is a native of Prague, Czechoslovakia. During World War I he served in the Austrian Army and became a prisoner of war in Russia, where he lived for five years in Turkestan and in Siberia, witnessing the Russian revolutions and Civil war. After his return, he lived from 1921 to 1931 in Paris, London and Jerusalem, studying the history of nationalism, especially in the Middle East, and modern history.

In 1931 he came to the United States through the Institute of International Education in New York to lecture in American colleges on the Near East. He became professor of modern history at Smith College in 1934 and held the Sydenham Clark Parsons Chair in history there from 1941 to 1949. For two years he taught government at Harvard and at Radcliffe. In 1949 he became professor of history at City College of New York.

Professor Kohn has taught in the summer sessions of Harvard, University of California, University of Colorado, Yale, and University of Minnesota. He was a Guggenheim Fellow in 1940 and a member of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton in 1948. He is an editorial advisor of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Among his books are three basic studies on nationalism in the Middle East: *A History of Nationalism in the East* (1929); *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East* (1932); and *Western Civilization in the Near East* (1936). His most recent books are: *The Idea of Nationalism* (1944); *Prophets and Peoples, Studies in the 19th Century Nationalism* (1946); *The Twentieth Century, a Midway Account of the Western World* (1949); *Panslavism, Its History and Ideology* (1953); and *German History, Some New German Views* (edited by Hans Kohn, 1954).