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POLITICAL FACTORS IN THE FORMULATION OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 7 May 1953 by
Dr. James P. Baxter

Admiral Conolly, members of the Naval War College and guests:

It is a great pleasure for me to return to the Naval War College where I have learned much over the years and made friendships I shall always cherish.

You have given me a lot of territory to cover this morning with the title: "Political Factors in the Formulation of National Strategy." I have been trying to think of what I might say that would not be too repetitive of what you have been reading and covering in your discussions, which are the life of this great institution. I am delighted to be asked to take part in a "global" problem, for it seems to me that it is only "global" thinking that will meet our national needs. They were well put for all nations, I think, in the remarks of the distinguished Chinese historian, who represents Chiang Kai-Shek's government in the United Nations, when Doctor Tsiang spoke in the General Assembly on September 22, 1949:

"... Today," he says, "from Iran on the Persian Gulf through Turkey, Greece and Italy to France and the Scandinavian north, the dike against the communist flood has been built and is now in good strong condition.

But we know from experience that floods cannot be contained by building a dike on one side only. . . .

Building the dike on one bank of the river has forced the waters to overflow the lands on the other bank. The Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Pact,

while strengthening the forces of freedom in one part of the world, have really, though unintentionally, increased the dangers to the peoples living in the other parts of the world.”

The fact that we have to think globally makes the formulation of American foreign policy much harder and makes its description to the public much more complicated and difficult.

When I began teaching American diplomatic history at Harvard in 1927, it was a very different thing to describe than what it has become today. Looking back at my old outlines, they seem very thin, indeed, and the subject free of many of its most complex and difficult aspects.

George Kennan, writing in 1949, brought out this contrast:

“Long before World War II, it had been the European and Asiatic peoples—longer and better schooled for the struggle of survival in an atmosphere of deadly international rivalry—who had set on the dangerous marches between the two world—the Russian world and ours—and had borne the main responsibility for meeting the initial impact of the Soviet ambition. It was now the people of the United States of America who were called to shoulder this burden. They were a people unschooled and still inadequate in the relation of military strength to national policy. They were unaccustomed to the sense of national insecurity. They were unprepared for the ordeal of sparring indefinitely and inconclusively with a force committed to the destruction not only of their own national power, but also of the sort of international context in which their ideals could be realized. Finally, they were reluctant to believe that there could be major international problems to which

there would not be incisive and final solutions if their policy-makers could only find them—problems, in other words, which had to be lived with instead of solved. It fell to these American people to acquire suddenly the art of being patient and conciliatory without showing weakness and, conversely, of maintaining strength and using it without being rash or provocative. These qualities, heretofore called for mainly from the rulers of great empires, had now to be elicited from the national understanding and feelings of a democratic republic and translated into action with a requisite promptness and discipline and subtlety through the unwieldy processes of democratic government.”

We realize, of course, every time we pick up the morning paper—and today, perhaps, more vividly than most days—that it is essential to get American public understanding and support of strategy because the whole operation of our foreign policy and our military policy now intertwine. They have become so enormously expensive that without that support we can not get the requisite means from the Congress. It is a tremendous job to explain the need of these huge sums. We are going through a new phase now with the message of the President yesterday, requesting a total of \$5,800,000,000 for the Mutual Security Administration for the next year—a figure considerably higher than what many Congressmen would like to vote.

The preparation, therefore, of a democracy for shouldering loads like this is a problem on a different scale of magnitude, educationally, than anything which previous Presidents had to solve. It is fortunate, indeed, that our best newspapers do such a splendid job—both in the volume of news about foreign questions and about the armed services and in the quality of their comment. It is fine that we are able to have with us in a meeting like this such distinguished exponents of this art as Hanson Baldwin

and Gill Robb Wilson. On these gifted publicists, who are trying to burn away the fog in the American mind about strategic questions, there comes a very heavy responsibility. Fortunately, there are others who are not with us—like Mark Watson of the *BALTIMORE SUN* or S. L. A. Marshall of the Booth newspapers in Detroit—but the top group of military writers is too small; the number of papers that devote adequate space and high quality of reporting to strategic issues should be enlarged.

In the same way, it seems to me, we need more teachers in this country who have the kind of experience in grappling with international problems that you get here in the War College. There has been, of course, a tremendous change since the twenties and thirties. About half of my own faculty (and I imagine that is true of most college faculties) have served their country in uniform in World Wars I and II. Many others have served in civilian war agencies. They, of course, are much more alert to strategic questions and interests than they would have been if they had not been in the service. The revival of interest in military and naval history, which is one of the most striking aspects of the historical scene in America today, springs in part from the fact that so many historians had war experience. Instead of the rather sterile discussions of the thirties about the outlawing of force, there are some pretty fruitful discussions going on now about how you increase it and muster it in the ranks of the Free Nations in the hope of preventing a 'cold war' becoming a 'hot' one; or, at least, seeing to it that if the 'cold war' does become a 'hot' one, it is one that we and our allies are able to win. It would be a good thing if more teachers (like Doctor McGovern of your group) were able to have contacts, as a few of them do now, with this and other war colleges and go back refreshed, with their point of view shaped and stimulated, to spread the word among their colleagues.

Those of us who teach on the college and university front, should try to do more to put strategic material into our courses and to prevent them from becoming too conventional or stereo-

typed. The students in my course at Williams have just been reading a remarkable piece which illustrates, as well as any in recent years, strategic thinking at a high level which affected national policy. This was the testimony of Admiral Forrest Sherman before the Armed Forces Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate in the MacArthur hearings on May 30, 1951. A few weeks earlier he had come here and delivered an admirable lecture at the Naval War College. And not long after his testimony came his tragic and premature death. All of us would do well to reread today his analysis of China's vulnerability to blockade and to attacks on her vital communications, and all of us should ponder his reasons for favoring a UN blockade of China and for disapproving of a unilateral blockade by the United States alone.

The more you study the relation of force to policy in American history, the more convinced you will become that a very large part of the job of informing and alerting public opinion has to be done by the President of the United States himself. For he is the man the public is always ready to listen to, whether it be in a Rooseveltian fireside chat, or in such a comprehensive review of our foreign policy as President Eisenhower made in the middle of April. Fortunate we are, indeed, that our strategic thinking is to be guided and shaped by a President with such vast experience in this field.

There is one aspect of the domestic side of our foreign policy problems that is not always brought up in a short talk but which seems to me should not be left out even in a 50-minute survey: that is the problem that we used to describe by the word "hyphenism." This problem arises from the fact that we have a lot of people in our body politic who think not only about the United States, their adopted country, but about another country to which they also have ties and attachments. There were about 5 million foreign-born in the United States in 1941, and they had a very large and varied foreign language press which many of them read

in preference to our English language press. The monitoring of that foreign language press was a pretty sizable job for the agency that did it—which happened to be the Defense Unit of the Department of Justice.

But “hyphenism” went further than that, for there were a lot of people of the second or third generation who had ties to foreign countries that distorted their thinking about American foreign policies. That, I suppose, will always continue. The isolationists argued in 1919-1920 that if we went into the League of Nations the United States would find that whatever stand we took on foreign questions would divide the American public along fault lines and cause splits in our national unity.

We later found that whether we liked it or not we had to reject isolationism and embark on a cooperative, internationalist policy. The fault lines are still present. There are too many people who think not merely as Americans but who regard some other country with a degree of affection that sometimes muddies their thinking. You can see it not merely in the small (and, I trust, dwindling) group of American communists and fellow travelers; you can see it in pro-Chinese groups in this country where the missionary influence (which got to work on many of us quite young) built up what tended at times to be an unrealistic picture of China. You can see it now in a pro-Polish group. You can see it—and see it perhaps as sharply as anywhere in its troublesome effect on global strategy—in the Zionist influence on American foreign policy. I’m not accepting the view that our concern for the Poles is merely because various people want to transfer a large Polish vote from one party to another. I don’t share that feeling, though I would like to see my party strengthened—but I feel that it is a perfectly respectable attitude for anybody to wish that anybody under the Russian yoke can live a free life.

“Hyphenism” tends to produce a real split in public opinion, to divert us from our pursuit of national interest—which

seems to me the polestar by which we as a nation have to guide our course. You can find a clear illustration of it in the influence of Zionism on American diplomacy in the Middle East. There was no Arab vote in the United States. There was a high concentration of the Jewish vote in New York state, which both major parties wished to capture. As a result, the United States took a course—rightly or wrongly—which did seriously jeopardize our position in the Middle East, for there is no stronger hatred known to man, unfortunately, than the hatred of the Arab for the Jew. Though we don't have Arab voters, there are millions of Arabs and other Moslems in the Middle East whose support would be helpful to us in the event of a war with Russia in that theater.

I am not trying here to rewrite history, but to indicate a danger on the political front that we, who have drawn so much strength from the foreigners who have come and enriched our land and its culture, owe to our melting pot. Here, the proper line was laid down for us by a great representative of this country even before George Washington became President. I am referring to the famous episode when John Adams—that redoubtable, conservative evolutionist—presented his credentials to his former sovereign, George III. A tense moment it was in the history of the British Empire. They had lost the richest jewel from their Imperial crown, and here was a former rebel from Massachusetts presenting his credentials as the minister plenipotentiary of the new state. The King, with more bluntness than tact, said to Mr. Adams something that referred to the current belief that Mr. Adams had been pretty suspicious of the French during the peace negotiations of 1782-3.

Mr. Adams picked it up with equal bluntness and replied to the King: "I must avow to Your Majesty that I have no affection save for my own country."

The King, realizing that he had put his foot in it, rejoined: "An honest man will have no other."

It would be well if all Americans could remember that when they think on other lines than the polestar of American interests they are not following John Adams' example.

Some of our allies have "hyphenism" to deal with, too, in their large communist parties. Though the situation isn't as dangerous as it was in 1947-8, communist influence is a problem that they have to consider and that we have to consider. France has powerful nationalist movements to cope with in Tunisia and in Indochina. One of the strange dichotomies in American life since the period of World War II is the clash between our instinctive national sympathy with a nation struggling to be free and our underlying strategic interest which is affected by this nationalist movement in one of its colonies. I don't expect to take time in this brief survey to try to resolve this dilemma, but simply to remind you that in our approach to this problem we haven't done enough strategic thinking. We have done a lot of emotional sympathizing with people struggling to be free. Have we done enough realistic thinking about the impact of it on defense problems in certain crucial areas?

We have to bear in mind how we look to our allies and how we look to the neutrals. Some of the European neutrals are afraid that we will try to do too much. It is natural that some of them should feel that the danger is that we will do too little. There is that horrible skeleton in our cupboard of pulling out of Europe in 1920, which they never forget. It is highly unlikely that we shall do that again because to do so would be to give the game to Russia and to spell our ruin.

There are certain other aspects of our policy on which they are more sensitive than the possibility of a complete pullout. There is the fear that we might revert to a policy of hemisphere defense, which would be one version of a pull-out; or, that we would revert to the concept of serving only as the arsenal of democracy, which we did so much to popularize in 1940-1.

It is perfectly natural that the Europeans would dread a situation in which, in the event of Russian armies starting west, there would be nobody from the United States to stand with them in an attempt to resist on the ground. They feel very much about this possibility as the Poles must have felt about the situation in which they found themselves in September, 1939— and they don't like it! That is perfectly natural. And because we can understand why they don't like it and because we can understand the necessity of making a contribution not only by sea and air and munitions, but on the ground—we don't like it, either! We, as a result of a great debate that rocked the nation, have committed American troops to bulwark the defense of Europe, hoping that if we can make it strong enough, there will be no fighting.

Many Europeans quite naturally have in the bottom of their hearts the feeling that it would be wonderful if they could sit out the next war. How lovely it would be if their country could be the Switzerland of the next war! Before we blame them too much for that, we have to realize that a lot of us would like to sit out the next war, too. But we know that we can't, without putting ourselves in the position that, strategically, would constitute a major peril. If any of you should wish to contest this view, I suggest that you read carefully all that you can find of the Joint Chiefs' discussions between the Fall of France in 1940 and Pearl Harbor. For the impact on the United States of the situation where the Germans were dominating Western Europe could be repeated again. Once it was repeated—if the Russians and Germans should jointly dominate the European Continent—the Joint Chiefs of that day would have some terrible headaches, too. They would be too busy to look back to the history of 1940-1, when the Joint Chiefs were trying to use utterly inadequate means to cover an extraordinary wide front against a variety of major perils.

Just as there are some people in Europe who are afraid we are going to do too little (though I think we have reassured them pretty well on that score), there are many more who are afraid

that we are going to try too much. They dread that we are going to barge ahead on our own without the necessary patience, skill, or subtlety (of which Kennan spoke in that passage I quoted earlier). They fear that we will land them, as well as ourselves, in a war with Russia that might be an unnecessary war and, at least, would be (in their opinion) an untimely war. We have to be daily conscious of those fears and shape our diplomacy to take account of them.

If you examined the reaction in the delegates' lounge at the UN to the Eisenhower speech of April 16, you found that the minute the President got talking about Eastern Europe—hinting at the rollback concept—there was nervousness and apprehension on the part of many of the European and Asian delegates. This shows the thin ice on which we skate because of the fear of our allies and of all the neutrals that the United States, though talking a good game about a 'cold war' that will never become 'hot,' might really be planning to bring on the 'hot war' at an early date, after all. The Europeans wonder if we Americans will be patient enough with Russia. Not being the most patient of men myself, I find my temper getting short at times, as perhaps you do.

I discovered the other day an extraordinary quotation about Russia, written in 1930 by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to a man I never liked, Harold Laski:

“The communists have killed so far as they could those who did not agree with them and want to kill the rest. They (the Russians) present a case where I fail to see that war is absurd. When two crowds determinately wish to make different kinds of a world, if they come in contact I don't see what there is to do but to fight.”

I hadn't realized that Oliver Wendell Holmes was, even in his more relaxed moods, thinking about preventive war as far back

as 1930. One difficulty with that concept, of course, is that you couldn't sell it to the American people even if you should try.

Henry Stimson, in October of 1947, in an article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS said something that ought always to be remembered on this score:

“An equal and opposite error is made by those who argue that Americans by strong-arm methods, perhaps even by a ‘preventive war,’ can and should rid the world of the Communist menace. I cannot believe that this view is widely held. For it is worse than nonsense; it results from a hopeless misunderstanding of the geographical and military situation, and a cynical incomprehension of what the people of the world will tolerate from *any* nation Americans as conquerors would be tragically miscast.”

Despite that rejection (and I think that almost all the men in the services whom I know reject the concept of “preventive war”), the fear of it is one of the things that poisons our relations with our allies and that poisons our relations with the neutrals. We have to be pretty careful about our statements and put a guard on them on this score.

Another thing that we have done that has irritated our allies has been the extent to which we have pushed the idea of European integration. It is a very attractive idea—it is a very important idea. It may be true, as Paul Hoffman and John Foster Dulles have argued, that it is absolutely indispensable. But when you start pushing it, as we have done (on the invitation, of course, of many a European statesman who would like to move faster in that direction than he is able to), you do stir up old and deep-lying suspicions and resistances—and you get millions of Europeans into a defensive mood.

There was a delightful story a few years ago of a European diplomat who was being ticked off by a high American official for being lukewarm on the subject of European economic integration. He came back with a charge which has a certain measure of force in it—that we were rather “vague” about our formulation of the concept. He said that our American attitude reminded him of a story that he got from a friend of his who was a psychiatrist.

In this story a beautiful young lady told the psychiatrist about a dream she had had. In the dream, she heard a noise in her room, sat up in bed and saw a very handsome and virile-looking man advancing across the floor towards her in the moonlight.

She screamed out: “What are you going to do to me?”

And the man said to her: “You tell me, young lady—this is your dream, not mine.”

It is certainly true that there are some European statesmen that do share our dream about European integration—but there are a lot who do not. When we push the idea, we do have to remember that it is our dream—not theirs.

Down to now, it seems to me, we have made extraordinary progress (considering the length of time we have had on it) in working out the NATO Alliance. What is troubling me now about it is this: To what extent has the progress we have made been due to the fact that the Russians, by maintaining a tough, irresponsible, reckless, and obscenely irritating course, have done the job for us of welding NATO together? However you may estimate that, you certainly have to give them a lot of credit for both the creation of NATO and the development of NATO.

General Donovan, whom we are going to have the privilege of hearing tomorrow, used to say to those of us who worked for him in 1941: “It would be a very good idea if, from time to time,

you put your hats on backwards and asked yourselves what you would do if you were running the show for the enemy." Obviously, we wouldn't have all the information that we needed, but the exercise might alert us to some aspects of the strategic problem that we might otherwise overlook.

I have done that, as you have probably done it, from time to time over the last year—and every time I did it I thought that, in view of the extraordinary importance to us of the evolution of NATO towards a stronger and more effective instrument, a grave danger would arise if the Russians decided that instead of stepping down on the loud pedal of their piano they step down on the soft pedal and cease to be so provocative and challenging. If they did that, would they produce within the NATO Alliance more serious cracks than have appeared to date? Would it be possible for the Russians, by a peace offensive, to weaken the opposition to their aggressive policies more effectively than they have hitherto? Then came a shift of policy in Russia—and I have been worrying about it more than ever, as, no doubt, you have.

That does not mean that one would not want a peace in which the Russians really made concessions of the kind that we must hope for, eventually, when we negotiate from strength. Maybe that time has come—we will have to see. But the danger to my way of thinking, is that they may simply be going through a phase designed to woo us and our allies by a false sense of security, to put a strain on our relations with our allies and with the neutrals. The Russians are experts in driving wedges to split and weaken the opposition.

My view of Russian policy is very much that taken by Ambassador Bullitt back in 1935, when he reported to the State Department, after having watched the Russians from the Embassy in Moscow for two years or more, that he didn't believe that there was any sign that the Russians had laid aside their ambition for world dominion; that what they were doing, in 1934-35 (when

they were early alarmed about the menace from Germany and Litvinov was operating in the front rank of the advocates of collective security) was simply going through a phase—an idea that recurs again and again in Russian ideological writing—going through a phase in which they were buying time by pretending to shelve their long-run aggressive policy.

There is no good evidence that we can muster that their peace moves ever amount to more than that—that they ever do more than go into a phase. On the other side of this phase there always remains their long-run objective of world domination. At present it is smart policy from their standpoint to play the piano for a while with the soft pedal down. For that reason, we have got to be singularly careful of these susceptibilities of our allies and neutrals and see to it that we maintain and strengthen our common front within the NATO Alliance.

At the same time, we must not be blind for a moment to the important opportunities that might present themselves to weaken the Soviets by doing a little wedge-driving ourselves, along the fault lines that divide the Russians from their satellites. We can't study too carefully the important split that took place when Yugoslavia was thrown out of the Soviet system. There is a very interesting and suggestive biography of Tito by a Serbo-Croat communist, Dedijer, which has been translated into English—an English which limps a little. This book is extremely revealing. All through it you will see something of enormous importance: that the Yugoslav communists are nationalists, too. Whatever communist ideology might dictate to them, they remain nationalists with that intense patriotic sentiment that enabled them to throw three invading Austrian armies out of their country in the first World War and made themselves tough to deal with by the Germans in World War II.

To an historian, that spells out an extraordinary parallel—the parallel of the French Revolution, where nationalism rode on

the banners of the armies of the French Republic for a while and for a while on the armies of the Empire. Sooner or later, French expansion provoked a kind of resistance that the French armies hadn't had before. They ran into it in Spain, they ran into it in Austria, and they ran into it in Russia. It seems to me that out of that kind of nationalist sentiment that you find ringing through the words of these Yugoslavs there comes a possibility of more splits between the Russians and their satellites. Abundant as are their means of repression, the Russians will run into trouble in Poland and in East Germany.

One of the things, of course, that interests us the most in this connection is the possibility of a split—eventually, at long last—between the Russians and Red China. It is a strange situation now that perhaps the most distinguished communist in the world—both as an operator and as a theoretician—is the Chinese leader, Mao Tse-tung. His success constitutes a variant in communist ideology. I suggest to you two very interesting books on this, both published by the Russian Research Center at Harvard: one the book by Schwartz, *Mao Tse-tung and the Rise of Chinese Communism*, and the other the documentary volume that came out a year later (in 1952) to accompany it. You can see why for so long Mao was in the Soviet dog-house. He had presumed to run a revolution along lines that were not correct, according to Soviet ideology. He had made a successful revolution without having the leadership in the hands of the urban proletariat—and that just wasn't done in Soviet ideology.

To us Americans, who are pragmatists from the time we begin to take our first meal, ideology is of slight consequence—but it is not so to the Russians. They have spent a lot of time on problems like these and they take them really hard. Because of their concept that the government must be right they have to go through some extraordinary gyrations when the government changes the party line. This has been well described in Moore's book, *Soviet Politics: the Dilemma of Power*—one of the most

amusing and sophisticated accounts of how they change their minds when they get around to it, and pretend they never have really changed at all.

You have here an important fault line in Russo-Chinese relations. Of course, it was always absurd to refer to the Chinese Reds as agrarian reformers — for they were communists, root and branch, but they achieved their success by methods that were not right, according to Soviet ideology. That still probably plagues and bothers the Russians. Moreover, who can tell when in the evolution of Chinese communist expansion and Russian expansion there may be clashes of interest and resultant strains? A well-known Chinese historian has pointed out in this connection that by and large in Chinese history, when there was a change of dynasty, the dynasty consolidated power internally over a period of years before embarking on radical foreign ventures. The advent to power of Chinese communism is the equivalent of a new dynasty like the Mings or the Manchus. If the historic pattern repeats itself, one might expect a considerable period of domestic consolidation before an embarkation on any overseas expansion. Yet, you have Chinese armies now posted on the border of Indochina—a point of tremendous strategic significance.

As we look at the Indochinese problem, which is only a part of the French problem, we see almost in a microcosm the kind of strategic approach that we are faced with in Washington today. On the one hand, our French ally, like ourselves, has to do the tremendous difficult job (of which I spoke at the beginning of this talk) of educating its public to the heavy sacrifices required by an enormously expensive foreign policy. It is a difficult thing for the French to do because with the Gaullists opposing the government on the one hand and the communists on the other, the French Cabinet rests on only about 55% of the voting strength of the country. Though the Cabinets shift frequently, there is a continuity of personnel that belies the change at the head of the Ministry. But the French Government is even more dependent on

public opinion than is our own. If we ask them to do too much at any given moment, we may drive the standard of living of the French worker (which is already perilously low) below the point at which he becomes a push-over for communist propaganda.

The American public scarcely recognizes the magnitude of the French effort in Indo-China, or its cost in casualties as compared with the Korean operation, and its cost in money. The French have been spending one and one-third billion dollars a year in Indo-China and it has not been enough. Many Americans have asked why the French continue such staggering expenditures. There are a number of reasons but the one that concerns us Americans is the strategic factor. If Chinese communism is to expand southward over Southeastern Asia, there are only two main routes and both of them pass through Northern Indo-China. If Chinese communism extends southward it may do so without clashing with Russian expansion interests. If Chinese communism is blocked off from expanding to the south, there is much more chance of a split between Russia and China over their conflicting interests along their extended boundary in Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang.

I think that the administration in Washington in its negotiations with the French, since the beginning of the new administration, has faced up to this strategic problem in a remarkable fashion. We know from the pressure in Laos how serious the situation is. The French need at least four more divisions there than they can afford to pay for. In the recent negotiations, we have agreed to increase our share of the cost to perhaps a third.

If we are to play our role of holding the fort while strength is built up within the NATO Alliance, we have to explain a highly expensive foreign aid program to an American public that has got weary of tax-paying. That we shall succeed in doing so, I am confident. For, no matter how ignorant certain elements of the American public may be of the finer points of strategy that you dis-

cuss here, something happened under President Roosevelt's enlightened leadership in 1940-41. The American public—which had done all too much thinking from 1933 to 1937 about staying out of international affairs at all costs—had realized before it was too late that our security required of us a new concern in the balance of power; and that our security made it impossible for us to tolerate the domination of Europe or the domination of Asia, either, by powers who could, upon that domination, build a threat that would have us fighting on our hearthstone with insufficient strength.

Something happened back there in 1940-41 and the American public deeply learned a lesson. They don't know as much about strategy as you, but I believe from the bottom of my heart that they are prepared to pay the price when the need for it is spelled out to them by such competent leadership as now is ours.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LECTURER

Dr. Baxter was born in Portland, Maine, 15 February 1893. He attended Williams College, receiving an A. B. degree in 1914 and an A. M. in 1921. In 1923, he received an A. M. degree from Harvard and a Ph.D. from the same institution in 1926. Honorary degrees have been bestowed upon him by Harvard, Amherst, University of Maine, Wesleyan University, Hobart College, Bowdoin, Syracuse, Case Institute of Technology, Kenyon College and Union College.

From 1914-1915, Dr. Baxter was with the Industrial Finance Corporation in New York City. In 1921-22, he was an instructor in history at Colorado College and was a traveling fellow at Harvard in 1924-25. From 1927-37, he taught history at Harvard—climbing from instructor through the ranks to full professorship. He was master of Adams House from 1931-37. Since 1937, he has served as President of Williams College.

Dr. Baxter was a lecturer at Lowell Institute, Boston, in 1931, and at Cambridge University in 1936. He has lectured at the Naval War College periodically since 1932. From August, 1941 to June, 1942, he was Director of Research and Analysis for the Coordinator of Information in Washington, D. C., and from

June, 1942-43, he was Deputy Director of the Office of Strategic Services. From 1943-46, he served as Historian in the Office of Scientific Research and Development.

In 1945, Dr. Baxter was President of the Association of American Colleges. He has served as a trustee for Williams, Radcliffe, the World Peace Foundation, Phillips Academy and the American Military Institute. In 1947, he was winner of the Pulitzer prize in history. He is also a director of the State Mutual Life Insurance Company.

Dr. Baxter is the author of several books and is a contributor to history and law journals. He is a member of numerous professional organizations, including the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Historical Association, and the American Political Science Association.



GROUP SESSION