

Naval War College Review

Volume 5
Number 8 *October*

Article 2

1952

Future of the Far East

William McGovern

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Recommended Citation

McGovern, William (1952) "Future of the Far East," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 5 : No. 8 , Article 2.
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW**

**Issued Monthly
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.**

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FUTURE OF THE FAR EAST

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 28 February, 1952, by
Dr. William McGovern

Admiral Conolly and Gentlemen:

It is always a privilege and a pleasure to be with you, and I welcome the present opportunity to discuss with you some of the problems that face us in the world today, with especial reference to the Far East.

All during World War II I served as an office boy with the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization down in Washington. During a good portion of this time I was attached to the Joint Intelligence Committee and had to devote a good deal of effort in studying the capabilities and intentions of our enemies and of our allies. I very soon learned that intelligence estimates are very far from being infallible. From time to time I and the other members of the intelligence staff made some howling mistakes, but I am glad to say that our estimates turned out to be more than 90% accurate.

Today, we Americans are faced with a very different strategic situation. Our enemies, both actual and potential, and also our allies, both actual and potential, are very different from what they were during the period 1941-1945. But I should like to utilize some of the techniques that I learned during this earlier period and apply them to an analysis of the present situation. I can only hope that in the "guesses" which I shall make this morning I shall be as much as 90% correct.

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Owing to lack of time I shall eliminate from my talk almost all consideration of the capabilities of the various countries of Asia (though I have some very strong views on the subject) and shall confine myself to an exposition of what I think are their intentions, with special reference to their long term intentions. I, for one, am convinced that if you wish to learn the long term intentions of any country it is essential to start with a serious study of the basic ideology which prevails among the group which governs and controls that country. During World War II such success as I achieved in preparing estimates of the long term intentions of the Germans, Italians, and Japanese was due in large measure to a careful study of the Nazi, Fascist, and Shinto ideologies. Today it is clear that we must study a very different set of ideologies, but I still feel that an analysis of the ideological systems which dominate large areas in Europe and Asia will give us a key to the solution of our problem.

I think that you will agree with me when I claim that in the world today, and more especially in Europe and Asia, there are two dominant ideologies: one of them is the ideology which we call "Communism"; the other is the ideology which we call "Nationalism." If we can secure a clear understanding of the direct meaning and of the indirect implications of these two ideologies we shall have gone a long way in preparing an estimate of the probable lines of development, both political and military, of the more important countries of what we call the Old World.

COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY AND INTENTIONS

Our first task is to make a brief analysis of the basic Communist ideology and then show how this ideology is likely to affect the long term intentions of the Communist powers.

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It is not particularly difficult to arrive at an adequate understanding of the basic tenets of the Communist ideology. All of these tenets have been clearly laid down in the writings of the major Communist leaders. In view of the significance of the Communist movement I am somewhat surprised that most of our Naval officers have neglected to read the basic material on the subject, most of which is readily available in service libraries. May I especially recommend to your attention three basic books: One of them is Karl Marx's "*Das Kapital*"; one is a book by Lenin called "State and Revolution"; and one is a book by Stalin called "Problems of Leninism." These books are of importance because, in addition to expounding the dogmas of the Communist creed, they also throw a great deal of light upon the long term intentions of the Communist powers.

I do not think that I need to stress the importance of an adequate understanding of the ideas expounded by Marx. To be sure, the life and the writings of Marx belong to the nineteenth and not to the twentieth century. His "*Communist Manifesto*" was written in 1848, over a hundred years ago. The first (and most important) volume of "*Das Kapital*" was published in 1867, and Marx himself died in 1883. But we must never forget that the ideology formulated by Marx is still the dominant ideology inside the whole Communist world. All Communists unite in regarding Marx as the inspired prophet of the New Dispensation and his writings as the authoritative exposition of eternal truth. It is for this reason that I recommend a perusal of "*Das Kapital*," his major work. But I must warn you that this work consists of three hefty tomes and that the style is far from easy. If any of you gentlemen suffer from insomnia, going to bed with one of these volumes may help you get to sleep.

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In this brief lecture I shall not attempt to deal with the more abstract and purely theoretical aspects of the Marxist philosophy. I have not the time to deal with such matters as the dogmas regarding dialectical materialism, the labor theory of value, and the theory of surplus value. In my opinion, all of these dogmas are completely erroneous and are based upon false assumptions, but a detailed consideration of such matters lies beyond the scope of my present talk. As students of political and military realities we are, for the moment, more concerned with the practical conclusions which Marx drew from these dogmas.

It is important to remember that Marx thought of himself not as a social philosopher but as a social scientist. He was convinced that his new system, based upon the dogmas mentioned above, not only gave him a scientifically accurate analysis of social and economic conditions in his own time, but also provided him and his followers with a method by means of which they could predict, with almost mathematical certainty, future developments in the economic, in the political, and in the military spheres. In point of fact, *Das Kapital* is not at all a plea that men *ought* to accept Communism; it is essentially an elaborate analysis showing that certain developments will necessarily and inevitably take place, irrespective of whether the bulk of mankind does or does not approve of these developments. I once tried to make a check list of the number of definite prophesies which Marx made in the course of his writings, and I came out with a catalogue of over one hundred and fifty predictions. I then made another list of how many of these predictions have been verified and how many had proved false—and I discovered that he was wrong in at least a hundred and forty cases. As a result, I do not think that I would recommend Marx for a post with any Intelligence Staff.

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I shall not attempt to deal with these predictions in detail, but I think it may be of interest and value to point out one particular group of forecasts. Not only did Marx insist that the triumph of Communism throughout the world was inevitable, he also insisted that he knew when, and how, and where the Communist revolution would break out. According to the Marxist system of analysis the Communist Revolution would necessarily start in the highly industrialized and highly capitalized areas of the world—the bigger and better the industrialization, the bigger and better the growth of capitalism, the sooner the inevitable revolution. Following out this line of argument Marx made the definite prediction that the outbreak of revolution was bound to take place in such areas as England, Germany, France or possibly the United States of America. He then made further prediction that the revolution would not and could not take place in such backward areas as Russia and China, two countries which he mentions by name.

It is interesting to note that when the revolution did take place it broke out exactly where he told us it could not take place, and did not break out where he told us it *must* take place. Incidentally, Marx's basic assumption that the growth of capitalism and the growth of the Communist movement necessarily go hand in hand has been proved fallacious time and again. Even in Asia the revolution did not take place in Japan, the most highly industrialized of all the Asiatic nations, but in relatively backward China. And in China itself the development of the Communist movement did not take place in the big industrialized cities of Tientsin, Shanghai and Canton but in the relatively backward, agrarian areas of North and Northwest China.

But though all of Marx's basic assumptions are fallacious, and though the vast majority of the predictions he made on the

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basis of these assumptions have proved definitely false, we must not blind ourselves to the fact that Marx has won an enormous number of converts, most of whom are animated by a fiery and fanatical devotion to the Marxist creed. For this reason it is absolutely essential that we constantly bear in mind one or two other features of the Marxist ideology. One of these features is the doctrine that the Communist revolution can not be a partial or a limited revolution but must be world-wide in scope. Marx vigorously rejected the idea that the Communist movement could be confined to a single country or to a single continent. He rejected the notion that it is possible for the world to be divided between several different powers, each with its own ideology. He insisted that his followers should seek to overthrow each and every one of the states which refused to accept the "dictatorship of the proletariat." He insisted that his followers must constantly aim at the domination of the whole world.

We must never forget that the true Marxist refuses to believe in the possibility of an enduring peace between Communist and non-Communist nations. The true Marxist believes that there is, and necessarily must be, perpetual war between the Communist and non-Communist forces. Sometimes this war may be a hot war, sometimes it may be a cold war, sometimes it may be a "lukewarm war," depending upon the strategic position of the Communist forces at the moment; but in one form or another the war must go on until one side or the other has been completely vanquished. The true Marxist is prepared to negotiate a truce between campaigns, but to his mind a truce is merely a convenient interval permitting the Communists to reform and rebuild their depleted forces and prepare for a new and more vigorous attack, either in the same place or else in some other, more favorable, area.

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Another basic feature of the Marxist ideology which has been accepted by all the later Communists is the doctrine that in their struggle to secure and maintain power the Communists must be bloody, ruthless, and relentless. He despised any and every form of toleration and of humanitarianism. Any tendency to shrink from shedding blood, any notion that it was wrong to kick a man when he is down, and that it is noble to spare a fallen foe, were regarded by Marx as weak and decadent. Associated with this doctrine was the complete and absolute rejection of traditional or conventional morality. To his way of thinking the Ten Commandments were arbitrary inventions of greedy exploiters of the proletariat, and hence could and should be ignored by the true Communist. To lie, to cheat, to deceive, to rob, and to murder was not bad but good, if such actions promoted the sacred cause of Communism. To Marx, the true Communist must be prepared to make wild promises, with no idea of carrying them out; to make wild and baseless charges, if such charges weakened the opposition. The true Communist must be prepared to make and tear up solemn treaties at will; to make non-aggression pacts, so as to throw non-Communist nations off their guard; and then make sudden, bold and vicious attacks on these nations when a favorable opportunity arises. To a Marxist there is no such thing as good or bad; there are only some things which do and others which do not promote the success of the Communist cause.

On most points the later Communist leaders have been content to follow blindly in the footsteps of Marx. But on two or three vital points both Lenin and Stalin made significant changes in the Marxist program. For the most part these changes did not necessitate any serious modification of the basic ideology as laid down by Marx, but they did necessitate a marked modification in the ideas as to the best strategy to be used in securing the success of the

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Communist movement. It was Lenin who was primarily responsible for the decision to make use of the rural and agrarian populace in the struggle to place the Communist party in power. Marx himself was concerned only with the urban and industrial element in the population. Marx disliked and despised the peasant, the tenant farmer, the sharecropper, and the landless agricultural laborer. Such persons played no part in his program for active revolution. He believed that they tended to accept the ideology of the "bourgeoisie" and hence would be inclined to be enemies of the Communist cause. Lenin, however, was shrewd enough to realize that the agrarian populace could be used as valuable allies, or rather as easily manipulated tools by the Communists in their struggle to secure power. At the time of the Russian revolution, the Russian Communist party consisted of a small and insignificant group of persons. The people who might be regarded as their natural allies, the Russian factory workers, were too few in numbers and too weak in influence to place control over Russia in the hands of Lenin and his followers. Lenin, however, made a bold move. He declared that the Communists were the natural protectors of the agrarian populace. He promised, moreover, that if he were placed in power, the big estates would be broken up and that the land would be distributed, without cost, among the peasants and the agricultural laborers.

Lenin's appeal to the agrarian populace of Russia met with immense success. The Russian peasant knew nothing and cared nothing about Marx and Marxism. He never bothered his head about dialectic materialism or the theory of surplus value, but he was enormously attracted by the promise of free land, and it was primarily because of peasant support that Lenin was able to seize power. It goes without saying, that as soon as the Communists had consolidated their position they lost interest in the peasant, and in the peasant ownership of land. The big landowner did, in-

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deed, lose his estates, and for a brief period "the little fellows" were allowed to take possession of the land, but before long the Communist program called for the collectivization and nationalization of all arable fields and those peasants who tried to cling to their newly won possessions were ruthlessly liquidated.

What is especially interesting in this connection is the fact that the Communists, inspired by their success in Russia, continue to make use of the same technique in other countries and it continues to meet with a considerable amount of success. There can be no doubt that much of the popular support which the Chinese Communists secured during their early struggles with the Nationalists came from the poorer sections of the agrarian populace who were inspired by the Communist attacks on "the selfish and greedy landlords," and by the promise of the redistribution of the land. Following Russia's example, the Chinese Communists climbed to power largely through the support of the peasants. Following Russia's example, the Chinese Communists, having consolidated their power, are already beginning to take away from the peasant his newly won land in the name of collectivization and nationalization. Already we are witnessing a brutal and ruthless liquidation of a large section of the Chinese peasantry. But this fact does not prevent the Communists making successful use of the same facile promises in other lands. Much of the support which the Huks have had in the Philippines and which the Indian Communists have had in India comes not from factory workers but from disgruntled peasants who are lured into the Communist camp by promises of "agrarian reform."

In point of fact, to an impartial and scientific observer there is serious doubt as to the amount of economic good to be accomplished by the wholesale redistribution of land, even when a gen-

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uine and well-meaning attempt is made to do so. In some cases it brings about economic benefits as evidenced by an increase in the total amount of crops harvested. In other cases it brings about economic harm as evidenced by the decrease of the total amount of crops harvested and thus made available to the general population. In pre-revolutionary Russia there was much to be said for some sort of land reform. There were many ten-thousand-acre, twenty-thousand acre and even hundred-thousand-acre estates, and many of these estates were wastefully and inefficiently managed. The break-up of these estates and the development of peasant proprietorship would probably have aided Russia's agricultural economy. In China, on the other hand, there was a very different situation. Really big estates, in the Russian sense of the word, were almost unknown. A three-hundred-acre estate was considered enormous and, from what statistics are available, it would appear that the average prosperous landlord owned about fifty or sixty acres. In many cases these fifty-acre estates have been broken up into minute fractional holdings—plots of an acre, or half an acre, or even a quarter of an acre. Such fractional holdings have proved to be economically unsound. The real truth of the matter is that in China, as in many other Asiatic countries, there are just too many people and not enough land, with the result that no scheme of land distribution or redistribution can bring about economic prosperity.

As long as we are primarily concerned with a study of Communist intentions we are not called upon to face or to solve this problem. What we can assert, however, is that Communist agitators will continue to make use of the same or similar techniques in order to stir up trouble in other parts of the world. Wherever there is a severe population pressure resulting in widespread poverty among the rural and agrarian population, we can expect to find

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Communist agents at work proclaiming that if the populace will only support the Communist cause every one will secure an adequate amount of free land and poverty will be abolished. Conditions in Java, and in the countries of the Near East—especially Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Iran—present an enticing field to Communist agitators who have been trained to use slogans of “agrarian reform” in their efforts to bring about a collapse of the existing regimes.

Another major modification in the original Marxist strategic program was the emphasis upon Nationalism and upon the support of nationalist agitations as a means of spreading Communist control. This modification was also initiated by Lenin, but has been developed and perfected by Stalin. It must be remembered that Marx himself was not in the least interested in the cause of nationalism—in fact he placed himself in bitter opposition to all nationalist movements. He regarded Nationalism not as an ally but as a deadly rival to Communism. He was horrified at the idea that the Italians, or the Russians, or the Chinese, or the inhabitants of India should get together and form a united front, irrespective of class differences. To his mind the dominant slogan should be “The workers of the world should unite,” without regard to nationality.

Marx was not only opposed to Nationalism; in addition, he was a serious advocate of the principle of Imperialism and Colonialism on the ground that the building up of vast colonial empires was a useful and even a necessary step in the development of world Communism. He wanted to have world power concentrated more and more in the hands of a few great nations. The more powerful these great Empires became, the greater and the more rapid would be the development of industrialism and capitalism within their borders. This in turn would lead to the more rapid develop-

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ment of the Communist movement and the outbreak of the Communist revolution. Once the Mother Country was controlled by the Communist hierarchy, the colonies and dependencies would automatically fall into the Communist orbit. His basic thought ran somewhat as follows: "It is useless to try and communize India directly, because India is too backward industrially for it to be receptive to Communist propoganda. But if England controls India and the Communists seize power in England (which is ripe for the Communist revolution because of its industrialization), then the Communists secure control over India. In like manner, why try to communize such a backward nation as Russia? Why not let Germany conquer the whole of Russia? The communization of Germany would then automatically bring Russia within the Communist fold."

Lenin and Stalin, being very capable and shrewd persons, realized that Marx had made a fundamental mistake in his strategy. Like Marx, they had no real use for the principle of Nationalism, but they saw that various Nationalist movements (especially the Nationalist movements in Asia) could be made into useful tools for the spread of Communist control. They realized the enormous force and driving power that lay behind these Nationalist movements and instead of trying to suppress them, they determined that these movements were to be encouraged in order to bring about the overthrow of existing governments. At the same time, careful, elaborate, and successful efforts were made to see that the leadership of these Nationalist movements were infiltrated by trusted Communist agents so that each such movement could be made to follow the dictates of the Kremlin. It goes without saying that the support which Lenin and Stalin gave to the Nationalist movements of Asia is based upon deception and upon fraud. Smal-Stocki's book on "*The Nationality*

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Problem of the Soviet Union" shows how brutally the Kremlin authorities treat any genuine Nationalist movement once they have complete control over the area. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Communist hierarchy has in several instances met with signal success in using Nationalist movements as weapons with which to strike blows at the Western powers in general and at America in particular.

As the result of subtle but effective Communist propaganda, many of the illiterate masses of peoples in Asia have come to believe that the USSR is the genuine friend of the upsurging Nationalist movements and that the United States of America is the spearhead of reactionary European Imperialism. We know that this belief is completely ridiculous, but in an attempt to draw up an intelligence estimate we must take into consideration the fact that this idea is blindly accepted in many parts of Asia. We know that the Chinese Communists have utilized this doctrine to strengthen their position in China and in Korea. We can see an interesting and dangerous example of this situation in Indochina. As you gentlemen are well aware, the Vietminh forces in Indochina are entirely controlled by Ho Chi Minh, who is a wholehearted Communist. And yet, by posing as the advocate and protector of Indochinese Nationalism, he has been able to secure warm support from many people who have no use for Communism whatsoever. In the near future we must be prepared to see the Kremlin attempt to use a similar technique in other parts of Asia, more especially in Iran and in the Arab countries of the Near East.

So far I have dealt primarily with Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, the leading representatives of European Communism. It is now necessary to say a word about Mao Tse-tung and the other repre-

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sentatives of Chinese Communism. During the crucial years 1945-1950 there were a great many persons in America who came to realize the true nature of European Communism, but who continued to insist that Chinese Communism represented something very different. During this period I remember reading dozens of books and articles and listening to hundreds of lectures on developments in China. The vast majority of the writers and lecturers during this period insisted that the Chinese Communists were not really Communists at all—they were agrarian reformers; they were forward-looking liberals; they were anti-Fascist progressives; they were this, that, and the other thing, but they certainly were not genuine Communists. That was (and is) complete and absolute nonsense.

If I may be permitted to bring in a personal note. I should like to say that a good deal of my boyhood was spent in China and Japan and that I grew up speaking Chinese and Japanese along with English. For this reason I have always been interested in the Far East and have tried to keep in touch with significant developments in that area. In the years 1935-1936, I became especially interested in the study of the Chinese Communist movement and what it really stood for. I was back in China during the period 1937-1938 and took advantage of my visit to examine, as far as I could, the ideological tendencies which seemed to be developing among the Chinese Communist leaders. Even at this period I was led to the conviction that these leaders were in all probability genuine Communists, but I was determined to keep an open mind on the subject and wait for further evidence before coming to a definite conclusion. In the spring of 1945 (when I was still in uniform) I was sent back to China, this time on a special mission to look into the capabilities and intentions of the various Chinese political groups. At this time I had long

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talks with some of the leaders of the *Kuomintang*, long talks with the leaders of the various semi-independent groups, and, finally, had a series of conversations with some of the leading representatives of the Communist movement.

I remember that before leaving Washington on my mission I was told by several of my American friends, including persons holding official posts with the government: "In dealing with the Chinese Communists, don't forget that they are not really Communists." I was somewhat skeptical on the subject and so when I came to have my conversations with the representatives of the Chinese Communist party I made a special point of trying to find out the truth of the matter. In the course of my talks I suggested several times that perhaps the Chinese Communists were not *really* Communists, and I was somewhat startled when these men pounded on the table and insisted: "We *are* Communists." I had to make up my mind whether to believe what some of my American friends said about the Chinese Communists or what the Chinese Communists said about themselves. I was childish enough to believe what the Chinese Communists said about themselves.

When I came back to Washington in the summer of 1945 I wrote up my report, in the course of which I indicated my strong conviction that the Chinese Communists were going to follow the Communist line—and I indicated that by the term "Communist" I meant not Socialist or Communist in general, but the Marxist form of Communism as modified by Lenin and Stalin. My report was duly filed away and forgotten, and during the next few years it was popular to laugh at the ideas contained in this report. I think you gentlemen will agree with me, however, that the events of the past few years have fully justified my position.

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There is, however, one matter on which there is still considerable difference of opinion. There is one school of thought which says that though the leaders of the Chinese Communist party are genuine Communists, they are not likely to remain subject to Kremlin dictation; there is the possibility and even the probability that they will become the Titos of the Far East. I should like to say that in my considered opinion this idea is completely false. I do not pretend to have any knowledge of what is going to happen one hundred or two hundred years from now, but from a careful study of the speeches and writings of the Chinese Communist leaders—of such men as Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and Chou En Lai—I am of the firm conviction that Chinese Communism will continue to follow the Kremlin line for the foreseeable future. Our intelligence estimates must be based upon this supposition until there is strong evidence to the contrary.

So far, in dealing with the Chinese Communists, I have been speaking in broad terms trying to indicate what their general attitude is going to be. The time has now come for us to be bolder and attempt to draw up a more specific and detailed estimate of the long range intentions of the Chinese Communist leaders. My careful study of the Chinese Communist movement over a period of several years makes me think it is possible to do so.

In the first place it is clear that, if possible, the Chinese Communists intend to secure control over the whole of the Korean peninsula. In this connection I should like to point out that in a report which I made to the Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs, and which was printed in March 1948, I made the definite prediction that if American forces were withdrawn from South Korea the North Korean Communists, aided by their fellow Communists from elsewhere, would undoubtedly attempt to overrun

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the country. Consequently, I was not at all surprised by the events of 1950. At the same time I am convinced that the Chinese Communists regard the conquest as the least important of their long term intentions because most of these intentions are concerned with securing certain strategic raw materials, and Korea will be of little benefit to them in this way. What the Chinese Communists want in Korea is, primarily, to secure a psychological victory so as to strengthen their position at home. As all of you well know, in the Far East prestige, or "face," has very vital significance; "to win or lose face" is regarded as an all-important matter. If the Communists in their struggles with the United Nations forces can come out, or appear to come out, even it will be interpreted as a tremendous Communist victory and America and the other Western nations will lose a great part of the prestige not only in China and Korea, but also in Japan, in the Philippines, and in other parts of Asia.

There is another reason which makes the Communists wish to secure control over the whole of Korea; namely, that such an event would give them a psychological hold over Japan. I do *not* think that the Chinese Communists intend to invade Japan because of the fact that Japan possesses too few strategic raw materials to make its physical possession of any great significance. But the Communists are convinced that if they secure control over the whole of Korea they will also secure strategic control over Japan without having to embark upon an armed invasion. The Communists are firmly convinced of the truth of the old adage "Korea is a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan," and they believe that once their power in Korea is consolidated Japan will be so terrified that she will automatically shift into the Communist orbit.

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As I have already tried to indicate, the Communists are seriously interested in the conquest of Korea but they believe that other areas are, from the long term point of view, of even greater value and importance. One of these areas is the island of Formosa, or Taiwan. This is partly due to the fact that, as regards modernization and industrialization, Formosa (because of Japanese influence) is far ahead of most parts of China proper. Of even greater significance in the eyes of the Communists, Formosa is potentially the strategic key to large-scale offensive and defensive operations in the Far East. The Communists believe that the nation which holds Formosa has control of an all-important air, naval, and submarine base. It so happens that at one period I spent two years on Formosa and, as the result of this experience, I personally am in hearty accord with the Communists with respect to their belief in the importance of this island.

In addition to Korea and Formosa, the Chinese Communists are determined, I am convinced, to secure control over the following areas at some time during the foreseeable future; viz.—Indochina, Thailand (or Siam), Malaya, the islands of Sumatra and Borneo and last, but not least, the Philippines. China wishes to secure Indochina and Thailand primarily because of their agricultural resources. China is not self-supporting as regards food, but if she possessed the “rice baskets” of Indochina and Thailand she would have gone a long way towards achieving self-sufficiency in this respect. Of even greater significance is the fact that Indochina and Thailand would serve as stepping stones to Malaya. Malaya looms very large in China’s long term strategic plans, largely because Malaya produces many things for which China stands in urgent need. We all know of the importance of Malaya’s tin and rubber, but I should like to remind you that China lays even

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greater stress upon the iron ore deposits on the northeast coast of Malaya.

Why should China feel such a strong desire to secure Sumatra and Borneo? The answer is simple and can be summed up in one word—oil. China proper produces almost no oil whatsoever, but with the possession of Sumatra and Borneo she would be able to fill all of her petroleum requirements. Why the Philippines? Again, largely because of the raw material situation. The Philippines has the largest supply of iron ore in the Far East and, in addition, produces ample supplies of manganese and chrome—two essential elements for the production of steel.

In order to understand China's long term intentions we must bear in mind that Mao Tse-tung and his cohorts are determined to make China into a major industrial power and that, in order to become such a power, the Communists are convinced China must have free access to certain necessary raw materials. Most economists are agreed that in order to develop a great industrial civilization it is necessary to have adequate amounts of coal, of oil, and of iron ore and the ferro-alloys which, together, go to make steel. Now China does possess all the coal she needs, but she produces almost no oil, almost no chrome and manganese (the basic ferro-alloys) and only a very inadequate amount of iron ore. That is the true basis of her wild desire to expand to the south and southeast, for it is only by possessing this area that she can achieve her goal of industrialization. Some of China's intentions have reference to the immediate and short term future; some have reference to the more distant future. In point of time, in all probability China will first strike at Indochina and Thailand and not long thereafter she will attempt to secure Malaya. There will probably be a cooling off period before she strikes at the Philippines. But we must not forget that though the attempt to control the

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Philippines will come last in point of time, the Communists place this area first in point of importance.

NATIONAL IDEOLOGY AND INTENTIONS

So far, I have dealt with Communist ideology and its probable effect upon Communist intentions. It now becomes my task to attempt to summarize the ideology of extreme Nationalism and how this ideology is likely to affect the intentions of some of the more important Asiatic countries. I must start by stating that in my opinion it is much easier to make an estimate of Communist intentions than of Nationalist intentions because control over all Communists is highly centralized, while there is no such centralization among various Nationalist groups. All true Communists, whether American, French, Chinese, or Indian, want and intend exactly what Moscow orders them to want and intend. Among the various Nationalist groups, on the other hand, there is no such unity of purpose and command. What the fiery Nationalists of India want and intend is obviously not the same as what the fiery Nationalists of Pakistan want and intend—and so on with the other countries, dominated by ultra-Nationalist ideology.

Nevertheless, a careful study of the various Nationalist movements, and more especially a detailed study of the ultra-Nationalist movements now so dominant in many parts of Asia, does bring to light a remarkable similarity in ideological pattern and, by studying this pattern, we should be able to gain some insight into probable trends and intentions among the leading exponents of the principle of extreme Nationalism.

In the first place I should like to draw attention to the intensity and fanaticism of Asiatic Nationalism, a fact which many of us in the past have failed to take into consideration. Speak-

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ing in general terms, we may say that the Asiatic Nationalist is four or five times as fanatical as is the ordinary European Nationalist. We tend to think of the Irish and of the Poles as being extremely Nationalistic. For the most part they are, but the intensity of their feelings on the subject pales into insignificance compared with the typical Asiatic Nationalist. If you will permit me to make use of a rather jocular remark, I should like to make use of the following example of the difference between the average Irishman and the average Hindu. On first acquaintance the average Irishman would appear to be terrifically Nationalistic but, judging from my experience with many Irishmen (some of whom, incidentally, happen to be distant cousins of mine), the average Irishman would appear to be first of all interested in women; second, interested in hard liquor and, third (and only third), interested in Nationalism. If, on the other hand, you go out to India and talk to a typical Hindu, it would appear that he is first of all interested in Nationalism; his interest in women appears to be a bad second and, seemingly, he is not interested in hard liquor at all.

There is, I think, a basic reason for the difference in intensity of feeling between European and Asiatic Nationalists. Nationalism in Asia is especially fiery, largely because it is a very new movement grafted on peoples with a very old civilization. For some curious reason, Nationalism appears to act like a childhood disease—the later in life you get it, the more severe case you have. As you all know, if a child of six or seven gets an attack of measles or mumps or whooping cough, it is usually not a matter of great seriousness. His mother, naturally, worries a good deal, but for the most part at the end of two or three weeks the child is well again and, moreover, is immune against a recurrence of the same disease. With a grown man, on the other hand, things are

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far different. If the father of the child gets an attack of the same disease, things are apt to be more serious and there is need to look out for complications. It is still worse, far worse, if it is not the father but the grandfather who catches the disease for the first time. Such a case usually calls for a nurse twenty-four hours a day. So with Nationalism. Those nations which are converted to Nationalism fairly early generally get a rather mild dose; those nations which go Nationalistic later on generally get a heavier dose; those nations which are the last to adopt Nationalism as a basic ideology are apt to get a terrific dose.

Most of us fail to realize that what we now call Nationalism is a concept which has developed only in comparatively recent times. But if you take a brief glance at history you will remember that in ancient Greece, for example, there was very little of what we would now call "Nationalism." At this period there was a great deal of fighting and a great deal of patriotic feeling; but the fighting was between, and the patriotism was centered around, the various city states such as Athens, Thebes and Sparta. The Greeks were very proud of being Greeks and thought that all non-Greeks were barbarians. But it never seems to have occurred to them that the Greeks constituted a nation and should be unified into a nation-state.

In like manner, there was very little of what we would now call Nationalism in ancient Rome. Rome jumped overnight from being a city-state to being a world empire, and never passed through the stage of being a nation-state. Hence, in the whole of Roman history there was never anything corresponding to what would now be termed Roman or Italian Nationalism. Likewise, in the Middle Ages we can find only a trace of Nationalism. God knows, during the Middle Ages fighting of some sort or other was going on almost constantly and universally. But the fighting was based

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on such things as feudal rights, or women, or religion, and almost never was the principle of nationality involved.

We find a trace of Nationalism at the time of the Reformation in connection with the development of Lutheranism in Germany, Anglicanism in England, and Gallicanism in France—but nowhere did this incipient Nationalism burst into full flower. Even in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Nationalism played an insignificant role in international affairs. Most of the wars waged during this period were dynastic wars and were concerned with whether this or that territory was to be governed by the Bourbons, the Hapsburgs, or the Hohenzollerns, and no one stopped to ask to what “nation” the territory in question rightfully belonged. In the eighteenth century we witness the rise of an important new ideology centered around the “natural and inalienable rights of Man,” but you notice that people were talking about the rights of Man—Man in the abstract—and nothing about the particular rights of Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans or Italians.

The real rise of Nationalism as an important factor in international relations took place about 1800, during the latter part of the period of the French Revolution. The first major spokesman for Nationalism as a basic ideology was the German philosopher, J. G. Fichte, who was active during the first decade of the nineteenth century. The first concrete expression of the Nationalist principle in the practical spheres of politics, diplomacy, and war was centered around the Greek War of Independence during the period 1815-1830. But, with the success of the Greek Nationalist movement, the whole idea of Nationality and Nationalism spread like wildfire all over Europe. Within a few years we witness the rise of fiery Nationalist movements in a number of different countries.

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It is noteworthy, however, that those countries that had already achieved their unity and independence prior to 1830 developed only a mild form of Nationalism. We may say that the Nationalism which developed in such countries was a sound and healthy kind of Nationalism. Witness, for example, the Nationalism of England, France, and the United States. On the other hand, those countries which did not secure their unity and independence until the middle or latter part of the nineteenth century developed a more intense form of Nationalism. Witness the cases of Italy and Germany. In like manner, those countries which secured their unity and independence only during the early part of the twentieth century developed an especially fiery type of Nationalist ideology. Witness the cases of Poland and Ireland.

What about Asiatic Nationalism? Asiatic Nationalism, as a real factor in political affairs, was practically non-existent until 1900. I think we can be more specific and date the rise of Nationalism in Asia from the winter of the year 1904-1905. This was the period of the Russo-Japanese war, and the success of the Japanese in their conflict with Russia had a great deal to do with fomenting Nationalism in all parts of Asia. The Russo-Japanese war led to the Revolt of Asia against White Supremacy and the leaders of this revolt found it convenient to adopt, and then further develop, the Nationalist ideology which was already current in Western Europe. In developing this ideology, the Asiatic leaders changed Nationalism from a political to a religious creed with all the fire, zeal, and fanaticism of a religious creed. In trying to estimate what an Asiatic country is likely to do, or intends to do, we must never forget that the country in question in all probability will not follow a logical or rational pattern in its course of action if such a pattern conflicts with some dogma derived from its Nationalist ideology. It is no use pointing out to an Iranian that

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he stands to lose rather than to gain by the nationalization of oil. He will insist upon nationalization even if he knows that he is likely to starve as the result.

There is another very curious feature about Nationalism which applies both to Europe and to Asia. For some reason or other most Nationalist movements begin as literary movements, then become political movements, and end up as military movements. Go back to the origins of most Nationalist movements and you will usually find a little group of long-haired men and short-haired women who get together to smoke cigarettes and to talk about poetry, about folklore, and about folk dances. This little group is interested in studying and popularizing ancient legends and traditions; not infrequently it is interested in reviving an ancient language which seems threatened with extinction. At first there is not a word or a thought of politics, but before long some one suggests that something practical ought to be accomplished, that the state should be forced to take a hand in the revival of the national language and the national traditions, and before long the literary movement is transformed into a political movement. If the political movement has difficulty accomplishing its purpose, before many years have elapsed some bright and eager young man, carried away by the strength of his convictions, reaches under his bed at night, gets out a gun, goes out and starts shooting. He is joined by a few enthusiastic comrades—and now we have a full-fledged military movement. By way of a summary, I might say that a Nationalist movement usually starts with poetry or *ballads*, then becomes concerned with politics or *ballots*, and ends up with free-for-all shooting or *bullets*.

All this may have some practical significance to you in the event that any of you gentlemen ever has to be concerned with the problems of military government. If, by chance, any of you

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becomes the military governor of an area, may I suggest that he keep a wary eye on the literary movements which spring up in this area. This movement may appear to be perfectly innocuous—but look out for trouble. Today, it may be concerned only with folk lore and folk dancing—but the shooting may start in a few months' time.

Another curious and important feature characteristic of Nationalism is the fact that so many of the Nationalist movements—both in Europe and Asia—have been led either by foreigners, or semi-foreigners, or else by what I call “deracinated persons.” First of all, let us deal with the case of foreigners and semi-foreigners. In studying the history of the rise of Nationalism it is amazing to note how many Nationalist movements were led by men who had no real connection with the nationality in question. A classical example of this situation was Greece. The most important figure in the Greek Nationalist movement was not a Greek but an Englishman with the very un-Greek name of George Gordon Byron. Lord Byron was, of course, primarily a poet; but, eventually, he got tired of writing poetry. He had a little woman trouble in England and had to get out of the country and after a brief stay in Italy he went over to Greece “to die that Greece may live.”

I am especially interested in the history of the Greek Nationalist movement for personal reasons. One of my collateral ancestors was one of the minor leaders of this movement. The man in question was an English country doctor, named John Scott, who did not speak a word of Greek and who had not the remotest connection with Greece, but he became enormously excited about the cause of Greek independence. He threw up his practice in England and went out to Greece to serve in Lord Bryon's army.

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As a soldier, in spite of his enthusiasm, he did not have a very successful career. A few months after his arrival in Greece he was captured by the Turks. The Turks were just about to shoot him when he managed to persuade them that they might find his medical service of value.

Dr. Scott's life was spared and, while remaining a prisoner of war, his services as a doctor came to be more and more esteemed by the Turkish army. In the end, he was called to serve as a physician in the harem of the Turkish Sultan. All this sounds very interesting, but if Dr. Scott told the truth in his diary, this period of his life turned out to be very dull. He was never allowed to see any of his female patients. The ladies of the harem would thrust an arm through a curtain so that he could feel their pulses, but this was the only portion of their anatomy he could feel or even look at. He was thus under a very severe handicap in trying to make a diagnosis. But Dr. Scott was either very lucky or very shrewd, because he was credited with several marvelous cures. In the end, he was freed and sent back to England, laden with presents. Subsequently, he came over to America, and his descendants are now scattered over the United States.

I have bored you with a little episode in my family history merely to show you that people can get mixed with Nationalist movements with which they have absolutely no personal connection. But history shows hundreds of other examples. Let us go from Greece to Ireland. I have always been interested in the career of Parnell, one of the outstanding leaders of the Irish Nationalist movement during the middle and latter part of the nineteenth century. Charles Stewart Parnell was a very great man, worthy of admiration. But it remains a fact that this

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leader of Irish Nationalism can scarcely be called a true Irishman. His father was English and his mother was an American. As far as I can make out, there was not a drop of Irish blood in his veins. Moreover, he was very untypical of Ireland and the Irish. We tend to think of the Irish as being fluent talkers, as liking a little alcoholic refreshment, and as staunch Catholics. In contrast with this, we find that Parnell was a rather poor speaker, was practically a teetotaler and was a staunch Protestant—but these facts did not prevent him from becoming an outstanding champion of the Irish cause.

Let us go from Ireland to Germany. One of the most powerful leaders of ultra-Nationalism in Germany, the man who can be regarded as Hitler's spiritual father, was an Englishman named Houston Stewart Chamberlain. Houston Stewart Chamberlain was a distant cousin of Neville Chamberlain, one time Prime Minister of England, and the brother of another remarkable man named Basil Hall Chamberlain. Basil Hall Chamberlain went out and settled in Japan, married a Japanese girl, devoted his life to the pursuit of Japanese studies and ended up as Professor of Japanese Language and Literature at the Imperial University of Tokyo. Houston Stewart Chamberlain also went abroad, but did not go so far. He went to Germany, married a German girl (the daughter of the well known musician, Richard Wagner), became a German subject and proceeded to write a whole series of books in German, all of which enjoyed an immense popularity in his adopted land. The most important and most influential of his works was his "*Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, or "*Foundation of the Nineteenth Century*," a monumental two-volume book which was published in the year 1900. Of very great importance is the fact that the ideas embodied in this book became the foundation stone of the whole

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Nazi ideology. In fact, we may say that Hitler's "*Mein Kampf*" is only an extended footnote or a sequel to Chamberlain's "*Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*." I hope that some of you gentlemen will take the trouble to read this book in order to see how a work dealing with abstract ideology can prove a potent factor in the development of a major political and military movement.

So far, I have dealt only with Europe. Let us now turn to Asia. By this time I hope that you are not surprised to find that the founder of the Indian Nationalist movement was not an Indian at all but an Englishman, named Allen Octavian Hume. Hume was a delightful and charming member of the Indian Civil Service who thought that the Hindus spent too much time in abstract speculation and were not taking sufficient interest in social, economic, and political issues. It was for this reason that, in 1883, he founded the Indian Nationalist Congress. At first he experienced great difficulty in getting any considerable number of Hindus to join, and I am told that in some cases he had to pay the initial membership dues of some persons in order to get them interested in the movement. After Hume's time the real leadership passed for a while into the hands of an Irishwoman, Mrs. Annie Besant. In the end the Hindus themselves took over and produced such outstanding leaders as Tilak, Gandhi, and Nehru, but we should never forget that the initial inspiration came from alien sources.

If the leaders of Nationalist movements are not foreigners, in many cases they are semi-foreigners. The classic example of such a case is Adolf Hitler. Hitler was undoubtedly the greatest or at least the most influential of all the German Nationalists, and yet, technically, he was not a German at all but an Austrian. To be sure, the Germans and the Austrians have many things in common, but there *is* a difference and you will remember that Hitler had

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considerable difficulty in becoming legally a German citizen so that he could hold office in the German republic. Perhaps the very fact that he had to struggle to become a German made him more fiery and fanatical in his devotion to German Nationalism than were many persons who were Germans by birth.

Another interesting example of a semi-foreigner as a Nationalist leader is the case of De Valera, the present Prime Minister of Ireland. There can be no question as to the ability and sincerity of Eamon de Valera, but to me it was somewhat amazing to find that this fiery leader of Irish Nationalism had a Spaniard for a father and that he himself was born in Brooklyn, New York. His only connection with Ireland was through his mother.

I should also like to remind you of the case of Rudyard Kipling, the great English poet and short story writer. Not only was Kipling a leader of English Nationalism, but he has also told us how he came to be linked with this cause. Kipling had an English father and mother, but he himself was born and reared in India. In spite of the fact that so much of his life was spent abroad we find in Kipling a much stronger devotion to England and all things English than is characteristic of the bulk of the people born and brought up in London, Liverpool, or Manchester. Kipling wrote a poem on this subject, one line of which reads:

“What do they know of England, who only England know?”

What he is really trying to say in the whole poem is that “I, who lived abroad so much, realize the glory and majesty of England much more than any native-born Englishman can be expected to do.”

To be personal for a moment, may I say that I find it very easy to understand Kipling's attitude because of my own peculiar

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background. I had an American father and an American mother and I was born in New York City. But, as I have already remarked, a large part of my boyhood was spent in the Philippines, Japan, and China. Later on, I was exposed to education in England, Germany, and France. When I came back to America, in my middle twenties, I had spent more than half of my life abroad. The net result of this peculiar upbringing is that I was (and still am) far more devoted to America and all things American than are most of the people who were born and brought up in Keokuk, Dubuque, or Peoria. I am consciously, not merely unconsciously, aware of what America means to me. I have lived so long abroad that I still get a thrill every time I see the old Stars and Stripes go floating by.

So far I have dealt with those leaders of Nationalist movements who were either foreigners or semi-foreigners. It is now time to discuss the case of what I term "deracinated persons." In some respects, such persons are the most important of all, certainly as regards Asiatic Nationalism. It is from a study of such persons that we can gain our best insight into certain trends which are especially characteristic of Nationalist movements in Asia, and from these trends we can build up an estimate of the probable intentions of the major Asiatic powers.

The term "deracinated person" is somewhat peculiar, and requires a little explanation. By a deracinated person I mean a person whose roots have been dug up from his native soil and then transplanted in alien soil. Better than a definition is to cite such outstanding examples as Gandhi and Nehru in India and Sun Yat Sen in China. I might also cite Sukarno, the outstanding leader of Indonesian Nationalism; Jinna, the creator of Pakistan, and most of the leaders of the Wafd or ultra-Nationalist party of Egypt.

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To get a clear understanding of what I mean let us make a brief examination of the background of a typical deracinated person. Because he is the best known, I shall start with Gandhi. Gandhi had an Indian father and mother, and he himself was born in India. But when he was in his teens he was shipped over to England, not merely to receive an English education but to be made into an English gentleman. In those days he did his best to act, to feel, and to think like an Englishman. In those days he did not insist upon wearing only a loin cloth, he was quite content to dress like a typical upper middle-class Englishman. He learned how to play the violin and how to dance in the European fashion. In those days he knew little and cared even less about the cultural heritage of India. Though he remained nominally a Hindu, he knew almost nothing about Hinduism. He had never even read the Vedas or the Upanishads. His first acquaintance with Hindu thought came through a perusal of Sir Edwin Arnold's "*Song Celestial*," a beautiful but not very accurate translation of the *Bhagavat Gita*. Gandhi succeeded in his ambition, and become a good Englishman. Then came the tragedy. The English gave him "the lemon squeeze," and continued to refer to him, condescendingly, as "a native." They refused to accept him as an equal or even as an Englishman at all.

Quite understandably, as time went on, Gandhi became more and more embittered, and in the end he became violently anti-British. The movement which he led and the political philosophy which he formulated played a major role in driving the British out of India. But what is of great interest and significance is the fact that Gandhi's political philosophy, about which there is so much talk, borrowed very little from traditional Hindu ideology. Traditional Hindu ideology was completely oblivious of the very idea of nationality and of national self-determination. Traditional

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Hindu ideology, being intimately associated with caste, was violently opposed to all notions of equality and democracy. Gandhi's two pet slogans were *Swaraj* and *Swadesh*, yet both terms were completely unknown in India before Gandhi's time. So alien was Gandhi-ism to traditional Hindu ideology that it is small wonder that Gandhi met his death at the hands of an orthodox Hindu.

If you take the trouble to read Gandhi's Autobiography, where he frankly traces the genesis of his ideas, you will find that nine-tenths of Gandhi's ideology is really derived from Western sources. There were three Western authors from whom he derived especial inspiration. One of these was John Ruskin, one of the founders of British Socialism; one was Leo Tolstoy, the noted Russian novelist; one was David Thoreau, the New England exponent of Naturalism. Incidentally, Gandhi's whole theory of passive resistance was derived from a passage in Thoreau's "*Walden or Life in the Woods*." In this connection, I should like to emphasize that I am not attacking Gandhi's philosophy. I am merely trying to emphasize that this philosophy was not indigenous to India, but was an import from abroad.

In many ways the career of Nehru was closely parallel to that of Gandhi. Like Gandhi, Nehru is a typical deracinated person. He, also, was born in India of Hindu parents; but he, too, was sent at an early age to be made into an English gentleman. Coming from a wealthier and more aristocratic background he was sent to Harrow, a fashionable English school, and then went on to Cambridge, a fashionable English university. He did well at both places, with the result that he speaks and writes perfect English. Moreover, his thought pattern is typically English and, in my opinion, he understands England and the English better than he understands India and the Hindus. He is frank to admit that he is unsympathetic to conventional Hindu ideas, and that his own

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beliefs are almost entirely derived from English and other Western sources. At the same time we must never forget that Nehru was, and still is, bitterly anti-British. Of even greater importance is the fact that Nehru was (and still is) definitely unsympathetic to the Americans, if only because he links the English and the Americans together.

Nehru is not pro-Communist; in fact, he has now definitely become anti-Communist. At one time he was inclined to be a little pro-Russian, largely because the Russians were also anti-British, but further association with the Russians has dispelled most of the friendly feeling which he once felt for them. But, in spite of this disillusionment, he still can not get over his suspicions of and antagonism to the English and to the Americans. This feeling is so inbred that it is ridiculous for us to think that we can make him pro-American overnight by a gift of \$200,000,000 worth of wheat. I do not believe that Nehru wishes to see the United States completely destroyed, but he would thoroughly enjoy the spectacle of our losing a good deal of prestige. If you will permit me to use a rather vulgar phrase, I would say that he would be delighted to see us soundly kicked in the rear end—and more especially if some Asiatic people, such as the Koreans or the Chinese, were to do the kicking.

Turning from India to China, permit me to draw a thumbnail sketch of the man whom the Chinese know as Sun Wen and whom we know as Sun Yat Sen. Dr. Sun is another outstanding example of a deracinated person. He was born in China (near Canton) of Chinese parents but most of his early years were spent in Hawaii, an American territory, and in Hong Kong, a British colony. His education was almost entirely Western. Years ago, when I was a young man and Dr. Sun was already an old man, I

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had an opportunity to have several talks with this distinguished man, and I can still remember how amazed I was to find how little he knew about ancient Chinese culture and ideology and how much he knew about Western culture and ideology. To him such ancient sages as Confucius, Mencius, and Lao Tse were little more than names, but he was thoroughly familiar with such men as Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson, Tom Paine, David Thoreau, John Ruskin, and George Bernard Shaw.

When I met Dr. Sun, I had just read his most noted book—the book which has become the Bible of New China. This work, the “*San Min Chu I*,” attempts to deal with the three basic principles of government, which are listed as being (1) Nationalism, (2) Democracy, and (3) *Min Sheng*, usually translated as Welfare State-ism. I remember asking Dr. Sun, “Where did you get this idea of the three principles? I have read my Confucius and Mencius, and I know that neither of these sages has anything to say about such things as Nationalism, Democracy, and Welfare State-ism.” Dr. Sun laughed, patted me on the back and said, “My boy, it should have been obvious to you, an American, that I got these three principles from Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, with its phrase ‘government of the people, by the people, and for the people.’ Government of the people means Nationalism, Government by the people means Democracy, and Government for the people implies the Welfare State.”

But the fact that Sun Yat Sen derived most of his ideas from the West did not prevent him from being bitterly anti-Western in general and anti-American in particular.

Did time permit, I should like to go into the biographical and cultural background of the other important leaders of Asiatic Nationalism. But, being pressed for time, I can only say that

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with rare exceptions all of these leaders follow a similar pattern. They were nearly all men who were educated in the West, who adopted Western ideology, and then became bitterly antagonistic to Westerners.

When we come to trying to estimate the intentions of the major Asiatic nations, most of which are now dominated by extreme Nationalists, we should bear these facts in mind: We can not afford to assume that in the event of World War III these Asiatic nations will automatically fall in on the American side. It is ridiculous to suppose that the mere doling out of money or favors will make them permanently friendly or sympathetic. At the same time I am not unduly pessimistic about the situation. While it remains true that if we are foolish in the handling of the Asiatic peoples we may well have most of them against us, it is also true that if we are shrewd and discreet in our diplomacy and in our use of the techniques of psychological warfare we can secure them as potential allies.

In this connection I am compelled to say that in my opinion during the last few years America, in dealing with the Asiatic nations, has been bungling and inefficient both as regards her diplomacy and her use of radio propaganda, with the result that in 1952 most Asiatics are far more anti-American than they were in 1945. This is not the time or the place to go into details regarding my views on what can and should be done to improve the situation, but there are one or two points which I would like to have you consider. In the first place it is no use telling the Asiatics how good, and sweet, and pure the Americans are. They don't and won't believe what we say on the subject. There is no use telling them how comfortable and prosperous we are under "the American way of life." It simply makes them envious. It is essential that we stress America's strength, both actual and po-

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tential, and also emphasize America's willingness to use this strength in case of need. The one place in Asia where America is most popular today is Japan—and that is largely because Japan had reason to be convinced of America's power and ability to use this power.

At the same time it is important that we bring home to the peoples of Asia the fact that they and the people of America, however much they may differ in other respects, have one basic ideal in common—namely, the love of freedom. We must point out to them again and again that the greatest threat to their freedom and to our freedom is Russian Imperialism, masking under the name of Communism. We must point out that because of this fact the peoples of Asia and America can and should regard themselves as *partners* in a common cause. It is essential to stress the idea of partnership, for psychological reasons. We must point out that America can not shoulder the sole responsibility of maintaining freedom throughout the world, but that she can and will help those nations (and more especially those nations in Asia) that are sincerely willing to help themselves.

In order to stress the idea of partnership, I think that it is essential that we plan to make greater use of Asiatic troops in any conflict which arises in Asia. In any case where we are forced to fight Asiatics it is essential to make extensive use of other Asiatics as allies. Because we neglected to build up the South Korean police into an effective fighting force, it was necessary to rely in large measure upon American troops when the Communists struck against South Korea. But the mere fact that the brunt of the battle against the Korean and Chinese Communists is borne by American troops makes many Asiatics regard us and our intentions with suspicion. For future operations we should try as far as possible to use Free Koreans to fight Communist Koreans, Free Chinese

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to fight Communist Chinese, Free Vietnam forces to fight Communist Vietminh forces. In the event of extensive warfare breaking out in Asia it may be highly advisable to make use of Japanese manpower and military potential, but in this case it would be well to stress the idea, in our radio propaganda, that we welcome the Japanese as *Asiatic* partners in the common struggle against Communist aggression.

Before closing my discussion I feel that it is necessary to point out one further characteristic of most Nationalist movements a characteristic which is likely to cause us some difficulty in the years which lie ahead. Most Nationalist movements, as they develop and become successful, tend to become Imperialistic. This statement may sound strange to some of you, as we tend to think of Nationalism as the direct opposite of Imperialism. However, a careful study of history shows that for the most part Nationalism is "baby Imperialism" and that Imperialism is "grown up Nationalism." This is true both for Europe and for Asia. In the middle of the nineteenth century Italian Nationalists were concerned only with achieving *Italia liberata*, an Italy free from all foreign control. But only a few years after Italian unity and independence had been secured, the force of Italian Nationalism led to the conquest of Libya, Ethiopia, and Albania. In like manner, during the middle of the nineteenth century, German Nationalists asserted that their only goal was a free and united Germany. This goal was duly achieved, but only a few decades later the German Nationalists were talking about *Lebensraum*, or elbow room, and thus were led to demand control over Hungary and the Ukraine.

In view of this situation, it is not surprising that the leaders of Asiatic Nationalism show marked Imperialistic tendencies. Sun Yat Sen spent half his life preaching against Imperialism, but

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he insisted that China retain control over Mongolia, Chinese Turk-
estan and Tibet—in all of which areas the Chinese constitute only
a small minority. In fact he insisted that the boundaries of the
Chinese Republic should be the same as those of the ancient T'ang
Empire, which would mean that China would have control over
half of Asia.

Nehru is another classical example of a man who is an ar-
dent Nationalist and also an ardent Imperialist. In the old days
he was content to demand a Free India. But once British India
becomes independent, what happens? He demands that Free In-
dia must be strengthened and enlarged. In this connection let us
remember what happened in Hyderabad and Kashmir. Hyderabad,
you will remember, was a large and important state in Central In-
dia which enjoyed almost complete autonomy even during the period
of British domination. It was controlled by a native monarch, the
so-called Nizam, and all the Cabinet Ministers were also natives
of Hyderabad. But it so happened that the Nizam and most of the
high officials were Mohammedans, while about 85% of the gen-
eral populace were Hindus. The Nizam wished Hyderabad to remain
an independent nation. But, using the preponderance of Hindus as
a pretext, Nehru ordered the Indian army to move in and Hyder-
bad was forcibly annexed to India.

Shortly afterward the case of Kashmir arose. Kashmir, an-
other large semi-autonomous state, was ruled over by a Maharaja
who happened to be a Hindu while over 85% of the population are
ardent Mohammedans. The Maharaja declared that Kashmir
should form a part of India, although it is clear that an over-
whelming majority of the Kashmiris opposed this move and wished
to form part of Pakistan. On the ground that the Maharaja's
wishes should be the determining factor, Nehru immediately sent
in Indian troops to occupy the country. Since then he has con-

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sistently refused to permit a plebescite to be held under neutral auspices, for the very good reason that he knows that such a plebescite would go overwhelmingly against him. Hyderabad and Kashmir together constitute a classic example of the old rule "Heads I win, tails you lose."

It is clear that Nehru and the other Indian Nationalists have even wider territorial ambitions. These Nationalists have openly declared that they will never be satisfied until the whole of Pakistan is incorporated within the boundaries of India, irrespective of how the inhabitants of Pakistan feel about the matter. Personally I have good reason to believe that Nehru has even more grandiose ideas. The Singhalese, or the inhabitants of Ceylon, are quite different from the inhabitants of India and are definitely anti-Hindu, but I am convinced that Nehru (for strategic reasons) is desirous of annexing Ceylon at the first favorable opportunity. One major reason why Nehru casts a covetous eye on Ceylon is that he wishes to secure control over the great naval base at Trincomalee, a fact which should be of some interest to students of naval strategy.

Another interesting and important example of the combination of Nationalism and Imperialism is the case of Egypt. At the very same time that the Egyptians are screaming, "We must be completely free—that means that all British troops must be evacuated from Egyptian soil," they are also screaming: "We demand control over the whole of the Sudan," without regard to the fact that the Egyptians and the Sudanese differ radically from one another in race, language, and traditions. At one and the same time the Egyptians want to get the English out of Egypt and the Egyptians into the Sudan.

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The combination of Nationalism and Imperialism in most Asiatic countries constitutes a problem with which the men who plan our Grand Strategy will have to cope. It is clearly to our advantage to aid the Nationalists of Asia struggle against Russian aggression, but we must study how far this aid will involve us in supporting Asiatic Imperialism.

DISCUSSION PERIOD

Q. What is your opinion of Chiang Kai-shek and his potential value as an ally?

A. We Americans are a peculiar people in that, more than most other peoples, we are apt to go to extremes. We go from extremes of optimism to extremes of pessimism and then back again. We go from the bull market of 1929 to the bear market of 1932. In 1940 most Americans believed that in the event of war between America and Japan, Japan would be easily and quickly defeated. Early in 1942 most Americans were converted to the belief that the Japanese were practically invincible. In like manner, most Americans swing from a belief that a man is an angel to a belief that he is a devil, and *vice versa*. There is also a very prevalent belief that we should do business only with angels.

Our attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek is a case in point. In the middle 1930's, as I traveled around the United States, I was amazed to find that in most quarters Chiang Kai-shek was regarded almost as a man without sin, as a glorious prophet of a new dispensation, almost as a new Messiah. I was sufficiently acquainted with Chiang's personality and background to know that all these ideas were absurd. In the period 1945-1950, I was equally amazed at the venomous dislike of Chiang and all his works which manifested itself among large sections of the American public.

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Among most Americans he was regarded during this period as the incarnation of everything evil; to have anything to do with him would be to lower our own moral standards. This concept was equally ridiculous. The Chiang of the mid-thirties and the Chiang of the mid-forties was the same man, with the same personal characteristics, and the same general policies. It was not Chiang, but American public opinion which had changed.

Chiang Kai-shek was, and is, a man with excellent intentions, but in many cases he was, and is, incapable of transforming these intentions into positive action. Sometimes this inability is due to controlling circumstances, sometimes to personal foibles. Chiang had, and has, a sincere and deep desire to improve the condition of his people. His patriotism is beyond question; he is ambitious and loves power, but he would never consciously betray his country in order to gain personal advantage. Like many other political leaders, Chiang is not an intellectual genius; quite clearly, in certain instances, he has made mistakes of judgement. But it would be hard to name a man who has not made equally grave mistakes. He is a man of strong likes and dislikes, and sometimes these likes and dislikes interfere with objective thinking. It is hard for him to forgive an enemy or to dismiss a friend. He is a strong Nationalist and sometimes his ultra-Nationalist bias led him, when he controlled most of China, to impose unnecessary and even harmful restrictions upon the activities of American missionaries and business men. Nevertheless, Chiang was, and is, much more moderate in his Nationalism than most other Asiatic leaders, and he is definitely friendly to the Western powers in general and to America in particular.

It is often stated that when the *Koumintang* controlled most of China, this government (headed by Chiang) was inefficient, wasteful and corrupt. There was a great deal of truth in those

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charges. But it is also true that the *Koumintang* government was not the only government which was and is inefficient, wasteful, and corrupt. There are many such governments in the world, and with several of them the United States finds it useful to maintain friendly relations and even to grant a considerable measure of active support. To cite only one example, I might point out the case of the government of the Philippines. It should also be pointed out that in China corruption did not start with Chiang, nor is it likely to end with Chiang. For centuries past all of the governments of China have been riddled with graft and corruption. In the old days, when China was ruled over by an Emperor, the administration was riddled with corruption. The administration of Yuan Shih-kai was notoriously corrupt. Because of this long tradition of dishonesty in government, we should not be surprised that many of the *Koumintang* officials were susceptible to bribery and "squeeze." It is also important to bear in mind that the new Communist regime, under Mao Tse-tung, is also honey-combed with corruption. As long as the Chinese Communists consisted of a small group of fanatics and ideologues struggling for power they were able to make a great to-do about their honesty in monetary matters, but now that they have secured control over most of China it is clear that they have also fallen heir to the old tradition of extortion and "squeeze." In fact the corruption rampant amongst most of the Communist officials, especially those in the lower echelon, is more devastating in its consequences than was the corruption of earlier regimes. In the old days every one was aware that a large part of the money paid as taxes made its way into the private pockets of the government officials, but this was not a matter of vital concern to the average Chinese farmer or merchant. Taxes were low and as long as the taxes were paid the government did not interfere with his private life. Under the Communists, on the other hand, a man's whole fortune and even

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his life is at the mercy of petty officials, and these officials are ruthless in their attempts to extort large sums of money from the general populace.

This state of affairs has had a considerable effect upon changing the attitude of the general populace towards Mao Tse-tung's regime. It is beyond doubt that in 1947 and 1948 the Chiang regime was unpopular in many parts of China. Its corruption and more especially its weakness and inefficiency, its inability to stop the Civil War and restore law and order, made millions of Chinese look forward to a change of government. Very few of these millions were Communists, but many were quite prepared to accept the government of Mao Tse-tung on the ground that this regime would bring about peace and stability. The ruthlessness and brutality of the Communist regime has brought about a great revulsion of feeling among the broad mass of the Chinese population. In many cases persons who gladly submitted to the establishment of Communist power are now bitter in their hatred of Mao's administration. By their own admission the Communists, during the past year, have felt it necessary to kill off over a million Chinese on the grounds of "counter-revolutionary activity." And in spite of this wholesale butchery many portions of China are still seething with discontent. It is true, of course, that all the persons who are anti-Mao are not necessarily pro-Chiang, but it is also true that the growth of the anti-Mao feeling has aided in the recrudescence of Chiang's prestige.

Another factor must be taken into consideration. The defeat of the Kuomintang armies in China proper and the transfer of Chiang's headquarters to Formosa has resulted in certain beneficial developments. Some of the worst elements in the old Kuomintang regime have been purged. Many of the weaker elements

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either fled or went over to the Communists. Broadly speaking, we may say that those who remained faithful to Chiang and went with him to Formosa were of somewhat better calibre than the others. The Nationalist army is still very far from being a first class army, but it is certainly much better than it was during the 1949 period and could, with outside assistance, be made into a reasonably effective fighting force.

Q. What is your long range forecast on Japan and its position in the Far East?

A. In the first place I should like to remind you of America's outstanding success in the job of occupying Japan. It is of interest to contrast the failure of American activities in China with the success of American activities in Japan during the period 1945-1950. In 1945 American prestige in China was very high and, in addition, America and Americans were very popular among the broad mass of the Chinese populace. By 1950 this popularity and this prestige had almost completely disappeared. In Japan, on the other hand, our prestige and our popularity remained high throughout the whole of this period. If you study military history you will find that it is an extremely difficult task to make any occupying power popular in the country which has been occupied. In the case of America's occupation of Japan, however, we have a case where the occupying power was tremendously popular with the broad mass of the people who were made subject to military control.

I can speak of American popularity in Japan from personal experience. During the period of occupation I had the good fortune on two different occasions to visit Japan and examine the situation with my own eyes. I had long talks with the Japanese Prime Minister and with various Cabinet Ministers. They all ex-

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pressed strong pro-American sentiments, but I took these statements with a grain of salt as all of them could be regarded as "American stooges." In addition to my official talks, however, SCAPE gave me permission to go around Japan on my own, and I made several field trips to small towns and villages. I was careful to go without any escort and without official interpreters (I still remembered a good deal of my Japanese). On these trips I had occasion to talk with many persons representing a cross-section of Japanese public opinion. Sometimes I talked to farmers; at other times with shopkeepers, or with barbers, policemen, or with Buddhist priests. The overwhelming majority of such persons were definite, and I believe sincere, in the expression of pro-American feelings.

Now, to be sure, the Japanese-American honeymoon is over. At the present time we Americans are not nearly as popular with the Japanese as we were two or three years ago. The signing of the Peace Treaty was the signal for the resurgence of certain Nationalist elements, some of which give occasional voice to mildly anti-American sentiments. Such a shift in public opinion is to be expected. At the same time I am convinced that the bulk of the Japanese populace is still definitely on our side and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future, if only because of the fact that most Japanese dislike and despise the Chinese and hate and fear the Russians. If we play our cards correctly, Japan will remain for some time to come a bulwark for the defense of the American position in the Far East.

There is only one serious danger. The Japanese will continue to remain in the American orbit as long as they believe that we do not intend to let them down. Quite obviously the Japanese do not wish to be pro-American and then find the American

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government declaring that it is not seriously concerned with future developments in the Far East in general and with Japan in particular.

Quite frankly, I am of the opinion that if large scale fighting breaks out in the Far East, it will be advisable and even necessary to call upon Japan for aid and to make use of Japanese troops. If we are forced to deal with millions of hostile Asiatics it will be of very great advantage to make use of serviceable Asiatic allies, and certainly the Japanese fall into this category. We Americans know from bitter experience that the Japanese make tough, hard fighting soldiers, and if we have the chance to raise twenty to twenty-five divisions of such men to aid us in a serious crisis, it would be foolish to throw away this opportunity.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Dr. William Montgomery McGovern

Dr. McGovern was born in New York City in 1897. He holds degrees from the Sorbonne, the University of Berlin and a PhD from Oxford.

Dr. McGovern's colorful career has carried him into many fields, including those of author, lecturer, university professor and explorer. He has been a member of the faculty at some of the outstanding universities of the world. He was a lecturer in the School of Oriental Studies of the University of London and a lecturer in History and Comparative Religion at the University of Wales.

In 1929, Dr. McGovern joined the faculty of Northwestern University as an associate professor of Political Science. He has continued there until the present time, with many leaves of absence for travel, visiting lecture courses, service in the U. S. Navy, and in June 1952, to fill the chair of Social Sciences at the Naval War College.

As a master of twelve languages and a specialist in Oriental studies, Dr. McGovern was of great service to the Navy and top Government leaders during World War II, at which time he served with the U. S. Navy as a Commander, connected with various Intelligence Committees, the Joint Strategic

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