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**INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICERS**

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戰時流血愈少
平時出汗愈多

“The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war.”

—An old Chinese Proverb

FOREWORD

The purpose of this Special Edition of INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS is to pass along some of the excellent lectures relating to Russia, the Soviets, and Communism to the officers of the naval service. The resident students of the Naval War College have found such lectures as these tend to stimulate a desire for additional knowledge of this great land mass with its two hundred million souls; moreover, they inspire further study of the factors which have enabled the Politburo to gain some control over eight hundred million humans.

I consider the naval officer of today must have a thorough understanding of the factors involved in the development of a national strategy which will effectively support our national interests. In war or in time of uneasy peace one should know his adversary. These lectures deal with an important aspect of the world situation which must be considered. It is hoped that they will serve to stimulate the interest of the reader in this subject. Enclosed herein is a brief bibliography which may be of benefit to the officer who desires to expand his knowledge.

The Naval War College is deeply indebted to the lecturers who have generously devoted the time and effort to edit their lectures, and who have cheerfully given permission to publish them here for the benefit of the officers throughout the service in all parts of the world.





RICHARD L. CONOLLY
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
President
U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

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RUSSIA

A Lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 7 September 1951 by
Prof. Hans Kohn

Gentlemen:

In trying to discuss briefly the background and understanding of Russia today, I shall first say a few words about the geographic situation of Russia and the changes which have occurred in it throughout the ages. We can divide Russian history in four epochs according to the capital in which Russia and Russian power was concentrated at that time. As you probably all know, what we call today Russia began in the Ninth Century about 1000 years ago with a settlement in what we call today Western Russia; that means a settlement of traders which went from the Baltic Sea through Novgorod and Kiev, down to the Black Sea. It was around this western river line that Russia originated.

At that time this Russia, from Novgorod to Kiev, was in close touch with Europe. At that time Russia was the eastern frontier of Europe and during that time there were two important events which determined Russian history: *First*, the acceptance of Christianity—not from Rome, as the Germanic peoples did, but in its Eastern Greek form from Constantinople, through influences which expanded north from the Black Sea up the Dnepr to Kiev. Russia was never a part of that European community formed by the influence of Roman law and classical civilization.

Professor Hans Kohn is a distinguished lecturer, author and historian. He was born in Czechoslovakia and lived in Russia during the period of the Bolshevik Revolution. He came to this country in 1931 and is now Professor of History at City College, New York.

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Secondly, these early Russians formed along these rivers a protective bastion of Europe, defending Europe against the Asiatic horsemen tribes who poured through the gate south of the Ural Mountains. The Slav settlements found the necessary cohesion only by calling in Scandinavian Vikings as rulers and organizers. The descendants of this house of Rurik ruled Russia for seven centuries.

In the Thirteenth Century the Russians succumbed to the last great wave of these Asiatic horsemen, the Mongols or Tatars under Genghis Khan. And other great leaders who spread into Europe were thrown back from Europe proper from Silesia in Germany or today in Poland, but conquered the whole of Russia. For about 300 years Russia was under Tatar domination; Kiev was destroyed; Western Russia broken, and from this moment on a new Russia grew up—no longer the Dnepr, no longer along the river which flows into the Black Sea with its gateway to the Mediterranean—but this time, as you know, around Moscow, a city founded about 800 years ago in primeval forests where then Finnish tribes lived. The Russian peasants, who from Kiev spread to the northeast to settle around Moscow, intermingled there with this Finnish and later Mongol or Tatar population. It was through the strength and ruthlessness of the Russian Princes of Moscow, from Rurik's family, that Moscow became the centre of the second Russia.

Now if you will look at the situation of Moscow, you will see that Moscow is no longer on a river which connects through the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and which leads up to the Baltic Sea, but it spreads along a river called Moskva which flows into the Oka; and the Oka flows near a city called today Gorki (but called Nizhni Novgorod until recently) into the Volga; and the Volga, as you know, into the Caspian Sea. That means that from Moscow

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no river, no road leads to Europe, even not to Byzantium or Constantinople; all the roads lead to Asia. And Moscow, in its whole character, in everything it has done in its social and intellectual life, was much more under Asiatic than under European influence. In fact we can say that this *second* Russia—the Russia of Moscow—was no longer the eastern border of Europe, but the western border of Asia; no longer the bulwark of Europe against horsemen from Asia, but a bulwark of Asia against European influences.

This *second* Russia—the Russia of Moscow—was replaced at the beginning of the Eighteenth Century, under Peter the Great in 1703, by a *third* Russia—a Russia of which Peter the Great was the founder and the greatest ruler—which he established in St. Petersburg, a city newly founded by him in marshland which never had been Russian. He had only recently conquered the land from Sweden. Determinedly, he built then a European city, but he built it by methods inherited from Moscow. It was the Moscow autocracy of Ivan the Terrible, though modernized by Western technology and administrative bureaucracy.

When Peter the Great came on the throne, Moscow and Russia were separated from Europe by three empires. One empire was the Swedish Empire, to which at that time Finland belonged. The Baltic Sea was then the Swedish Sea. The other empires were the Polish Empire and, south of it, the Turkish Empire. At that time what we call Southern Russia today (the approaches to the Black Sea) was part of the Turkish Empire.

These three empires—the Swedish Empire, the Polish Empire, the Turkish Empire—cut off Russia from Europe and even from the Black Sea; from the Mediterranean, from Constantinople, from Germany, from the whole of Europe. And from Peter the Great on, the effort of all Russian rulers has been to break down

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this barrier which separated Russia from Europe, and to expand at the expense of these three intermediary empires—the Swedish one, the Polish one, the Turkish one. You know that Peter the Great achieved the first part of this assignment. Peter the Great destroyed the Swedish Empire and with this destruction he annexed the Baltic Provinces to Russia.

Poland, as you know, was destroyed by one of his great successors, Catherine II, and from that moment on the whole effort of Russia was directed to destroying the Turkish Empire. Catherine II began by conquering Southern Russia.

And now when Peter the Great destroyed the Swedish Empire, he founded an entirely new centre wishing to change Russia fundamentally, turning her away from Asia and turning her resolutely towards the west. St. Petersburg was a port at the mouth of the Finnish Gulf, of the Baltic Sea, and here from St. Petersburg Russia did no longer look eastward but tried to look westward.

From Peter the Great on we may say that Russia tried to shift her frontier more and more westward and more and more southwestward—towards Berlin, towards Vienna, towards Constantinople. But now I wish to make one point which I think is very important to stress today. Though the Russian effort to move this frontier more and more westward had been steady, there have been very long intervals in which the frontier was not moved at all. And the most famous interval in that period was that from 1815-1914.

As you remember, in 1815 at the time of the Congress of Vienna which settled the European affairs after the Napoleonic Wars, Russia was the most powerful nation in Europe. You see

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there a strange parallel between 1815 and let's say 1945—a parallel which, however, like all parallels in history does not go too far. In any case at this time the then Russian Tsar, Alexander I, played a role somewhat similar to that of the Russians today. He owned the largest army in Europe (and it meant at that time in the world) and the Russian Army had defeated Napoleon in the same way as the Russian Army of our own time defeated Hitler. And we may say for the very same reason.

Again, I wish to recall to you that during the war we were told again and again that it was only thanks to Stalin's leadership, thanks to the industrialization of Russia by the Bolshevik regime, that Russia was able to defeat Hitler and to drive the Hitlerites back out of Russia. Now that may be or may not be the case, but one thing is certain: that the very same thing was accomplished by the Russians without Stalin and without the benefits of the Bolshevik regime in 1812-1813.

Don't forget that in 1812 the Russians did the very same thing which they did in 1942-1943; they were invaded by the army of Napoleon (at that time "la grande armee"), as large an army, as modern an army, as proud an army as Hitler's army was for its own time in 1941. Napoleon's army was as much disliked in Russia as Hitler's army was, and more so, we may say. If we ask ourselves, "Who was the greater general, the greater strategist—Napoleon or Hitler?"—undoubtedly most people would answer, "Napoleon was." And the Russian people, by their patriotism and stamina, with the help of the Russian space and Russian winter, without the benefit of Stalin or the benefit of Bolshevism, crippled the French Army as well as they crippled later the German Army.

In any case, in 1814-1815 the position of Russia was a position inspiring awe throughout Europe. And at that time there was

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general widespread fear that Russia would not be satisfied with her frontiers of 1815, but would try to push on towards the west. And now I think it is important to note that this did not happen. Russia's western frontier from 1815 was *not* expanded until 1945 and that later thing only on the ground of Hitler's war against the Russians. The Russians did not expand their western frontier for 130 years in spite of the fact that they made minor attempts to change it.

These minor attempts were made in four wars against Turkey. The effort was made to change the frontier in the southwestern direction and all this effort did not lead very far—and did not lead very far thanks to the resistance of Europe. Think of the Crimean War—The Crimean War was nothing else but the resistance of united Europe—Britain, France, Sardinia, and Austria against the attempt of the Russians to expand in the Balkans. The important thing to keep in mind is that for 150 years Russia did not expand in spite of minor efforts of trying to do it, and did not do it thanks (I would say) to the superior diplomacy and political strategy of the West—especially the British.

At that time the British had the leadership of what we might call “the resistance to Russian expansion”; something very similar to our situation today. And the British succeeded, at the expense of one war (the Crimean War); a very localized and minor war, as you know, to keep Russia in Europe within bounds. I wish to draw your attention to the most important event (which you all know, of course) when the British succeeded by superior diplomacy, exquisite polite firmness, and readiness for war, *without war*, to stop the Russians. And that was at the time of the great Balkan War, the Russian-Turkish War of 1877. You remember that in this war the Russians succeeded for the first time to break across the Balkan Mountains—after the famous long siege of Plevna and the

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famous Turkish defense of the Shipka Pass—to break through and to approach Constantinople proper, and to impose upon Turkey the Peace Treaty of San Stefano in February, 1878—a Peace Treaty which would have destroyed Turkey in Europe practically to a situation as it is today—Constantinople left, everything else to be greater Bulgaria, which the Russians then expected to be what we call today “a Russian satellite.”

Now as you know at that moment the (then) Prime Minister of Britain, Disraeli (the Earl of Beaconsfield) did something similar to what I think we are trying to do today in a certain way: by diplomatic strength and by readiness for a show of force, without having too much force in reality, to force the Russians into negotiations. You know that at that time Disraeli sent the British fleet into the Sea of Marmara and for the first time Indian troops were ordered to Europe to the Island of Malta. Disraeli made a show of force in spite of opposition in Britain itself by the Liberal Party under Gladstone. Most people were afraid that the British-Russian War was imminent. It was assumed that nothing could prevent it.

Then Disraeli, with the help of Bismarck, called the Berlin Congress in the summer of 1878. As a result of this Congress, *without war* Britain achieved a tremendous victory; the Peace of San Stefano was abandoned; Greater Bulgaria was *not* created; Turkey remained strong; and, as you know, Disraeli returned from there (from Berlin) with the Turkish Isle of Cyprus under British administration to England. That means Disraeli came back bringing as it was then said, “peace with honour.” It was really “peace with honour” because the clash between Britain and Russia (which was believed could not be averted at all) did not happen then, nor since.

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Since 1878 until today, Britain has not been at war with Russia. Disraeli achieved it by firmness and an intelligent diplomacy; I still believe diplomacy the most important weapon existing in the international field and to which military means should remain subordinate. He brought back real "peace with honour" and the Russian advance into the Balkans was stopped, until the Hitlerite military aggression gave Russia the opportunity which British diplomacy had successfully prevented.

To return to the main line of my subject, Peter the Great created a *third* Russia—a third Russia which was regarded as a part of Europe. Russia had not been a part of Europe between the Thirteenth and the Eighteenth Centuries. Neither the Renaissance nor the Reformation, neither the commercial nor the scientific revolution of the Seventeenth Century reached Russia. But Russia was not a part of Asia, either. It is important to emphasize this because today sometimes Russian propaganda wishes to point out Russia as an Asiatic people—especially, as you know, in Asia amongst the Indians and other Asiatic people the Russians try to pose as Asians. They are not Asians; they are not either Europeans. The Russians are something of their own kind, *sui generis*, something between Europe and Asia—not Europeans, certainly not Asiatics, either.

And now this period—this period of Russia's growing contact with Europe—which lasted from Peter the Great until 1918, came to an end when Lenin in 1918 shifted the capital back from St. Petersburg (now Leningrad) to Moscow, and today we are in the *fourth* chapter of Russian history. *First*, Russia of Kiev; *second*, Russia of Moscow; *third*, Russia of Saint Petersburg; and now, again, Russia of Moscow. And this Russia of Moscow, like the old Russia of Moscow, is directed against Europe.

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As I have heard, Dr. Burnham spoke here yesterday about "The Philosophy of Communism." As you know, the government of Lenin which transplanted Russia back from Petrograd to Moscow was a Communist government. And now you know very well that Communism had its origin *not* in Russia, but in Western Europe—in Brussels, in London, in the Rhineland, wherever you wish to say. It might appear as if the Marxisation of Russia would be an instrument of its Europeanization; it is not the case. I don't know the conclusion which Dr. Burnham arrived at yesterday, but I wish to point out that the Russians have an immense power to assimilate ideas and movements which come from outside and to Russianize them.

Now it happened that in Russia there is a Greek Orthodox Church which, as you know, came from Byzantium to Kiev. What happened is this: the Greek Orthodox Church in Russia is not today a Greek Orthodox Church, but a Russian Church. The character of the Russian people, its aspirations, assimilated, molded, transformed the Church. The very same thing happened with Marxism; though the texts remained more or less the same, the Hegelian tradition remained the same, the spirit was changed—Russified, completely transformed into something which is no longer Marxism but some kind of a new phase which is an amalgamation of certain Marxist elements with a Russian tradition which was born out of 500 to 900 years of history. Again, however, one thing is important: this Russia of Moscow is hostile to Europe and regards itself as it did in its previous period—as a bulwark of mankind against Europe.

And now I wish to point out that Marxist Communism in Russia today has become very largely a Russian faith. Marx wrote in the middle of the last century, and little of what he

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wrote can be truly applied to the middle of the 20th Century without serious distortion. One should perforce speak of Leninism or of Stalinism today rather than of Marxism proper in Russia.

It is very difficult to evaluate Stalin correctly because we know very little about what Stalin really thinks. And that knowing little about Stalin is one element of strength on his side. He doesn't speak very much; he speaks very rarely, different from either Hitler or Mussolini (his co-dictators) and by speaking very little (and if he speaks, saying very little, too) you really don't know the man so well. We knew Hitler very well. You had only to listen to his speeches and the whole man was revealed in the way in which he spoke, in the way of his style, in every turn of his speeches. Stalin is a man who does not speak, secluded in the Kremlin—secluded like the old Moscow Princes of the Sixteenth Century without any touch even with the Russian people.

Don't forget one thing—Hitler, Mussolini loved to show themselves to their people. Mussolini went around; Hitler made speeches, traveled, kissed little children, asked wives how their husbands were—the things which politicians are doing. He behaved, from time to time, like any Ward Leader in Tammany Hall does; he really took interest in the people, showed himself, showed a certain warmth, a certain contact. Hitler or Mussolini were still human, "rottenly human," if you like, but still human. Stalin has nothing of this common humanity; he is never being seen except on two or three great public occasions. Very distant. He never mingles. You never see him. He is unapproachable like the old Russian Princes who were High Priests—Oriental High Priests in the Kremlin between whom and the people there was nothing in common whatsoever. A kind of deity or daemon is Stalin, today.

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And therein he is very different from Lenin, too. I was in Russia in 1918-1919, when Lenin was in power, and you found nothing of that with Lenin. He was a normal human being, like Mussolini, mixing with the people, making speeches, going out. Stalin is a mystery, an oriental mystery, hidden behind the Kremlin walls; an icon, a picture for veneration—nothing more. That is not Marxism; it has nothing to do with Marx. It is an old Russian tradition before St. Petersburg, before Peter the Great; it is a return to the Old Moscow, a Tatar, Asian way of life—don't forget that.

And take one point more, and a very important point; namely, that what Stalin introduced and what did not exist with Lenin (in Communism) is the deification of the leader. The leader is no longer a human being, even not a human being like Mussolini, like Hitler, like Lenin. He is like a Byzantium emperor and an infallible High Priest, unapproachable yet ever-present; the fountain head of all justice, goodness, wisdom; omniscient in every field; a holy, but unattainable example for men. Today you cannot speak of Stalin in Russia as you could speak of Lenin. It is an entirely different approach, a return to the days of the greatest Moscow Prince.

If we wish to understand Stalin, I think we must think not only of Marx but of Ivan the Terrible, the great Prince of Moscow who ruled in the Sixteenth Century and who (as you know) was a man who created the strength of Moscow, the strength of Russia, but did it in *one* way—by eradicating, by wiping out all the remnants of liberty and individual rights in Russia, giving Russia a complete equality of all Russians who were equally nobody before the Tsar.

You must understand that there is in Russia since Ivan the Terrible an old tradition of "equality without liberty." That is

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something not understandable to the West, because we accepted liberty—diversified liberty—privileges and rights of individuals, castes and orders before we had equality. Today we or the British have still much more individual liberty than we have full equality. Because liberty and equality are *not* synonymous; on the contrary, they may be conflicting. In Russia the conflict was started not by Stalin, but by Ivan the Terrible in that way that there was complete equality in Russia without any liberty whatsoever. Free was one alone—the Tsar; all others, whether they were aristocrats or peasants, millionaires or beggars, were equally nobody without any rights before the Tsar and his arbitrary will. This lawless autocracy had been replaced since Catherine II and Alexander II by a growing liberty under law, thanks to the growing contacts with Europe and the heroic struggle of the enlightened class of Russians.

Now this autocracy of “equality without liberty” Stalin introduced again. Mind, if you look at the trials of famous Bolsheviks in 1935-36-37-38 and recently in Hungary and so on, that would have been impossible under Lenin because being a Bolshevik under Lenin gave a higher degree, gave you more rights—that doesn’t exist any more today. Today, everybody (the oldest Bolshevik and the oldest Capitalist) are equally without rights before Stalin. It is the old same form of equality without the slightest liberty or gradation for anybody. This oriental, primitive Moscow tyranny of Ivan the Terrible has been introduced in Russia and this, of course, was not there under Lenin. It is something that Stalin did—the old Moscow spirit. Yet, it should not be forgotten that not Stalin but Lenin was the first man to establish a totalitarian regime.

World War I was an immense tragedy because it destroyed the old Europe; an immense tragedy, also, because without World War I Lenin and the rise of Bolshevism would have been impossible

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and Russia might have developed into a free, civilized land. A step further—Hitler, Mussolini would have been impossible without World War I and without the example of Lenin. Lenin begot Mussolini; Mussolini begot Hitler; and Hitler begot Stalin.

I think that it is very important to understand that Stalin is not only the disciple of Lenin; he is, in my opinion, also a disciple of Hitler. When Hitler came to power in 1933, Stalin became fascinated by Hitler, by Hitler's theory and Hitler's way, and Stalin learned very much from Hitler. When Lenin came to power in Russia he was *not* a Russian Nationalist. The Lenin Revolution did not wish to make the Russians strong, or stronger. Lenin was a true Internationalist, one of the few who ever ruled a great country. You know that he transformed Russia (the Russian Empire) into a Soviet Union, into a union of equal peoples. His idea was not Russia leading the world, but the international proletariat; his idea was that from Russia the word of the Revolution would spread very quickly to Germany. And he was convinced that in 1918-1919 *Germany* would be leading the revolution, *not* Russia. He was a faithful Marxist though he, too, had been influenced by the anti-democratic, non-Western tactics of the Russian revolutionary movement—a movement of conspiracy, of secret methods, of ruthlessness.

He was a Marxist in that sense that he still believed that the leaders of the world revolution should be the most advanced proletariat and there was no doubt (with Lenin) that the Germans were the most advanced proletariat. Marx, Engels had been Germans, not Russians, and when Lenin was alive there was always the emphasis on Marx and Engels—of the Germans.

Under Stalin all that has changed. When Stalin took over from Hitler and what we can visualize in Russia, step-by-step, is one

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thing—it is Nationalism, Chauvinism, the return to the old traditions. And we may say that today Russia has got a fusion of a Communist theory and of the Russian Chauvinism—a Russian Nationalist Communism. This was not there under Lenin and it is misleading to regard Russia today as the Russia of Lenin. It is the Russia of Stalin, of the present Stalin; a very late development, which set in after 1933.

This has two consequences: *first*, it has aroused dormant traditions of the Russians. The Russians have regarded themselves since the Sixteenth Century as the guardians of the “true faith.” The Russians have had an idea since the Sixteenth Century that they were the chosen people—the people chosen by God to bring, through their faith to the whole of mankind, peace and justice—and to continue the mission of the Roman Empire. You remember that the Roman Empire was once (at least in its idea) a universal empire. And during the first two centuries of the imperial regime, from Augustus to Mark Aurelius, the Roman Empire really brought to mankind (in a way never seen before, never seen since) peace, prosperity, and justice. And mankind did not forget it. Until about 1500 all European people longed for a return of the Roman Empire, of this period of peace and justice, *pax et justitia*, for mankind.

And now, as you know, the center of the Roman Empire which originally was in Rome, Italy, was in the Fourth Century (in 333) transferred from Rome to Constantinople; in other words, a *second* Rome. And, mind, the old Rome had been a *pagan* Rome. Constantinople was a *Christian* Rome. It began as a Christian capital, the seat of the true Christian faith, of Orthodoxy. When Constantinople was overrun by the Turks in 1453, when the Roman Empire fell to the infidels, the question was, “Who will inherit the mission of the Roman Empire—where will be the new Rome?”

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It was at that time that the Russians (the only independent people of the Orthodox faith) began to believe that there in Moscow was the *third* Rome, the real Rome, the truly Christian Rome, the Rome destined to bring to mankind peace and justice. And the feeling of being the chosen people—chosen for a very great mission, the mission to spread the true gospel all over the earth—was since then deeply ingrained in the Russian tradition. Lenin had no use for this tradition; Stalin revived it. Stalin regards again Moscow as a *third* Rome, from which a true gospel of peace and justice (named the gospel of “Communism” now) would spread all over the earth.

Now there is a second consequence to which I wish again to draw your attention. It makes Russia's position in the plan of world conquest more difficult, not easier. As long as Lenin preached his Communism for the poor and disinherited everywhere, without any distinction whatever of any leading people, Communism could spread. Today, however, Communism means one thing more—it means the acceptance of *Russian* leadership. It means not only the acceptance of the Communist gospel, not only the promise of a Utopia of plenty, peace, and justice—it means something more. It means that all the peoples should look to *Moscow* as the *third* Rome, as a centre of the universe. This Russification of Communism weakens Communism and does not strengthen it. It weakens Communism for two reasons: *first*, that Russia is even today (and I'm deeply convinced of that) a backward country, backward industrially, backward in administration, backward in communications.

I understand that you had a lecture on “Russia's Economic Problems and Perspectives” this week. I am not an expert in Economics at all and I don't wish to go into the details (just because

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I don't know them), but I'm convinced that Russia is still a backward country, relatively spoken, compared to Germany or to Japan.

And here, gentlemen (because the Japanese Treaty is just being discussed in San Francisco) let me say one word about Japan. As you know, Stalin boasts (or rather Stalin's friends boast for him) here and everywhere that Stalin transformed Russia from a backward, agricultural, semi-oriental land into a progressive, advanced, industrialized country. True, to a certain extent, he did it, though it should not be forgotten that Russia was well on the way to modernization in 1914 and might have achieved greater results in liberty if its development had not been broken by Lenin. But, gentlemen, let me point out that the very same thing was done by the Japanese and, in my opinion, more successfully and without this immense amount of sacrifice and suffering of lawless autocracy which Stalin imposed upon the Russian people.

Don't forget that eighty years ago Japan (in 1870) was a backward, primitive, agrarian country, much more primitive than Russia; and that in 35 years (by 1904 or 1905) that Japan defeated Russia. Japan was a transformed country in communications, in industry, in administration—better transformed than Russia, without Bolshevism. If you will look at Japanese shipping or Japanese railroads in 1920 or 1930 and compare them with Russia (and Japan had no primary materials, while Russia had plenty of them), I believe that the miracles of Stalin are by far not as great as the Russian propagandists wish us to believe. On this one point, in my opinion, Stalin made a mistake which Lenin never did—to identify Communism with Russia. It is dangerous for Communism because Russia is still even today a backward country, compared *not* to the United States but compared to Germany or Japan.

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But there is a *second* reason. The second reason is that this amalgamation of Communism, this Russian Nationalism, this Russian Chauvinism must arouse the opposition of the non-Russian peoples. True, the opposition cannot show itself always—there is no doubt about it. But I am deeply convinced that in the Soviet Union today (and as you know very well the Great Russians form only a half of the population of the Soviet Union) the non-Great Russian peoples are violently opposed not so much to Communism, maybe, but to Moscow and Moscow's leadership. And among these peoples I wish to mention two, because they are of importance. *First*, the Ukrainians, about 40,000,000 people, who occupy the south of Russia between Moscow and the Black Sea. And the *second* people are the Mohammedan peoples of Central Asia, the Uzbeks, the Turkmen, the Kazakhs, the Kirgiz, the Tadzhiks.

We hear again and again of one thing: that the leading Communist officials and writers of these countries (of Uzbekistan or of Ukraina) again and again declare under Soviet Moscow pressure that they erred, that they committed a grievous error by stressing Ukrainian or Uzbek, Tadzhik or Georgian Nationalism. Mind, gentlemen, these people stressing that (who confess to their mistakes and errors) are not Capitalists, not Bourgeois—these are old Communists; and people so trusted by Stalin that they were made Presidents of their own Republics or Chairmen of their Writers' Unions and similar organizations. These old Communists, after thirty years of Communist rule, are Ukrainian Nationalists or Uzbek Nationalists, or Tatar Nationalists, or whatever they be. This resistance is due to the fact that Stalin, following Hitler, created a great Russian Chauvinism of the kind which is entirely similar to that which Hitler created in Germany.

The *second* consequence of this Stalinism is that it will be very difficult to establish harmony should the Soviets succeed to

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communize other countries because the Nationalists of these other countries will resist not Communism, but Moscow. This has happened, as you all know, in Yugoslavia. You remember, gentlemen, that only a few years ago (in 1946-1947) Tito was regarded as the Number 2 Man in international Communism, as "Stalin's white-haired boy." And you may remember that in 1946-1947 we were more hostile to Tito than to Stalin. You may remember that in 1946-1947 there were incidents with our airplanes flying over Yugoslavia, and being shot down. Americans had then stamped in their passports (in 1947-1948) that these passports were *not* valid for Yugoslavia—they were valid for Russia.

Now this very same Tito who was regarded as the Number 2 Communist is today not against Communism; he is still a convinced Communist, but against Moscow's leadership, against Russian Imperialism. The very same thing may develop sooner or later (maybe later) in China. It is unthinkable that in spite of Stalin's treating Mao with the utmost consideration to avoid this break—it is unthinkable that two great people, the Russians and the Chinese, each one today at the top of its Chauvinism, Imperialism, "chosen people" idea, can get along with China subordinating herself to Moscow.

I would like to point out in this connection that whether Stalinism is Communism or Russian Imperialism (I would say that Stalinism is both; it is Communism and it is Russian Imperialism, yet I think it would be very wise in our own propaganda, in our own activities, to separate these two aspects), I think it would be useless in China today to direct our propaganda against Communism. The Chinese masses, illiterate, poverty-stricken peasants, cannot understand the discussion about Hegel and Communism and about the principles given by Dr. Burnham—it is entirely beyond them. What they grasp is Russian Imperialism.

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And this is one point on which to base our propaganda; not in Europe—in Europe we are facing Communism, there is no doubt about that. In Asia we are facing Russian Imperialism and this emphasis is one of the weak spots in my opinion in the present Russian armor. Or to say differently, Communism was brought in by Lenin thirty-some years ago. What happened to Communism in Russia was that it was transformed, Russified by the continuation of Russian history. History—1000 years of tradition—is an immensely powerful element. And the Russian traditions, the Russian history has again done what it did with other movements coming from outside—it has Russified them.

What we are facing today is again in many ways old Russia; the Russia of the second or Moscow period, the period in Russia which was turning away from Europe and wished to spread its own gospel—the gospel of the “true faith.” Today it is Communism to be spread all over the world. But this Communist Russia receives its mentality (and also a fundamental weakness) from the Russian past; a past of autocracy, a past of poverty, a past of illiteracy, a past in which one thing was lacking which, in my opinion, makes the greatness of the West and that is the freedom of the spirit, initiative, looking for new ways. The lonely adventure of the mind which is possible in the West is impossible in an oriental despotism like the one now ruling again in Russia and trying from there to spread all over the earth, using Communism as its vehicle, as its universal gospel, and weakening it at the same time by its own emphasis on the Russian past—on the Russian tradition.