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POLITICAL FACTORS IN NATIONAL STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 8 June by
Dr. Henry M. Wriston

A detailed consideration of the topic assigned would require a review so extensive that time would run out before the discussion was well begun. It is necessary, therefore, to approach the topic in very broad terms and try to establish some kind of frame of reference for more thorough consideration elsewhere.

The text for this approach is found in a remark of Prince Bismark, the architect of the German Empire. He said, "War should be conducted in such a way as to make peace possible." It is obvious that this is what might be called a statesman's paraphrase of the soldier's — Clausewitz's — aphorism that "War is nothing but a continuation of political activities with other means intermingled. We say with other means intermingled in order to maintain at the same time that these political activities are not stopped by the war, are not changed into something totally different, but are substantially continuous whatever means are employed How could it be otherwise? Do political relations between different peoples and governments cease when the exchange of diplomatic notes is interrupted?" If political activity were suspended, military victory would be utterly futile. "For the political aims are the end; the war is the means, and the means can never be conceived without the end."

These sentiments have become deeply imbedded in the textbooks, but not so deeply in public consciousness. I can well remember — as though it were yesterday — my first day's study of international law. It turned about a phrase which is a terse paraphrase of both Bismark and Clausewitz: "The object of war is peace." So compact and dogmatic a dictum startled me.

These expressions are deceptively clear, consistent, and harmonious. They might well give the impression that the statesman and the military strategist see eye to eye in matters of grand strategy. Upon occasion, of course, they do; nevertheless, there is an innate tension between the political and the military points of view that must ever be borne in mind.

The military objective is not only to impair the enemy's will to resist, but to destroy it. From a military point of view "unconditional surrender" is the truly satisfactory outcome. When that occurs there is a feeling that it is possible to say "mission accomplished" with more assurance than with any other outcome.

The objective of the politician, however, must be much less absolute. If he were to make unconditional surrender a political goal, and really mean it, true peace would be virtually impossible of attainment. Carried to its logical extreme such complete defeat would put an end to all political action until too late. It would not only lead to the destruction of the capacity and the will to resist, it would create a political vacuum. Historical experience shows that, when a political vacuum or even an approximation of it occurs, peace is out of the question.

What ensues is a dictated, not negotiated, course of action. Usually it means an occupation and alien rule. That is either a transient situation or it degenerates into imperialism. The longer an occupation is continued, the more serious and the more lasting are the basic resentments which are built up; they are certain to poison subsequent relationships. For the hard fact is that *in the long run* every peace is a negotiated peace; it must ultimately be satisfactory to the defeated if it is to survive and be more than a truce.

No one has ever expressed this idea with more pith and force than Prime Minister David Lloyd George. He sent a memorandum to President Wilson on March 25, 1919, in which he said: "You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments

to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth-rate power; all the same in the end if she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the Peace of 1919, she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerers." His words were indeed prophetic, yet they were not only neglected at the time, they were forgotten and the lesson they taught ignored. Only so could the idea of the of the "pastoralization" of Germany — reducing it to an agricultural economy — gain such great momentum during the Second World War.

Our relationship with Japan over the last ten years offers a pertinent illustration of the need for a peace satisfactory to the defeated. The surrender on the deck of the *Misouri* was as complete, and in that sense as satisfying, as any such event could be. Our occupation also was complete, and, as compared with other occupations, it was both efficient and benevolent. Moreover, it was not confused and bedeviled by divided responsibilities, shared too deeply with allies; to all intents and purposes it was completely in our hands.

It was by our decision that the Emperor retained his throne; it was by our will that the Constitution for the new Japan prohibited rearmament. What was the consequence? We created a military vacuum. Such a state of affairs could no more be expected to continue off the coast of Asia than it could be a satisfactory situation in the very heart of Europe. Now we have to reverse some fundamental policies in order to cure that unhealthy, indeed impossible, situation. It is now necessary to woo our recent enemy in order to make an ally. It is now necessary to rearm a nation to which we but lately forbade that right.

When such basic decisions, taken soon after the surrender, must be reversed within a decade, the wisdom of the original determination is inevitably called into question. It is also a reminder that for many reasons the moment of victory is brief, and the settlements made in that moment are brittle unless they are

satisfactory not superficially, but fundamentally and in the long run, to the defeated nation. The reason can be summed up in a few words: politics is continuous, while war, even a world war, is episodic.

Yet basic decisions must be made at the moment of victory, and should be well thought out before its attainment. The notion of a delay in such decisions during a "cooling-off period" has been advanced from time to time. Experience, however, shows the folly of such a concept. The delay does not cool off passions; they continue to rise, and the last state of the matter is worse than the first. The key to wise action is to determine political objectives in advance, and cling to them during the period of intoxication that victory brings.

No one in our history grasped the realities of this whole matter more firmly than George Washington. He was one of those rare individuals who was able to think both in military and in political terms, each in its appropriate setting. As he prepared to retire from the Presidency, he opposed extending the tie once so essential to our independence but by which France subsequently sought to make us a satellite; he sent Chief Justice John Jay to negotiate an unpopular treaty with Britain in order to ease the acute post-revolutionary tension with that nation; he established a new and sweeping concept of neutrality in 1793.

Then he set down in exceedingly compact form the philosophy which had guided the course of his diplomatic strategy: "permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded, and . . . in place of them just and amicable feelings toward all should be cultivated. The Nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult

and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur

“So, likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement or justification.” It would be difficult to express so profound a conviction in fewer words.

The key to his thought was complete absence of sentimentalism. He knew that our quarrel had been with the government, not with the people of Britain, and that, on the other hand, the French people would not sacrifice their interests to ours. The national interest — a rational, not an emotional, concept — ought to determine the course of action which the United States should follow.

The statements of Bismark and Clausewitz were designed to be applicable to war. But we should observe that, in the current state of world tensions, they are as pertinent to “cold war” as to a period of armed strife. This constitutes a very significant enlargement of their valid scope.

By extension, therefore, we can assert that the object of a cold war is peace. No American wants war as a way of life. Deeply imbedded in our historical consciousness is the belief in peace as the only sane course. We have no noted political philosopher who has argued with any conviction that war is better than peace, or that it is a biological or even a psychological necessity. That concept was essentially Germanic and became part of the Nazi and Facist ideology. Ludendorff repudiated Clausewitz: “War,” said he, “is the highest expression of the racial will to

life, and *politics must be subservient to the conduct of war.*" Robert Ley, leader of the Nazi Labor Front, put it tersely, "War is the blessing of God," and Nietzsche was equally blunt: "War and courage have done more things than charity." Such philosophical conclusions about war never made any headway whatever in the United States; indeed, the American aims in both world wars specifically repudiated these doctrines as inconsistent with our tradition and our faith.

Surely the argument as to the primacy of political objectives apply to cold war — and with perhaps even more pertinency, for cold war constitutes in some respects a greater strain. War tends to solidify a nation, and fighting draws out the innate heroism in men; it summons them to great tasks and great sacrifices. It has its dark side, which, in our tradition, seems much more significant, but no one should overlook its heroic aspect. Poets and dramatists have elaborated that theme from the age of Homer almost to the present day. Cold war, however, is more likely to divide than unite a nation; it summons men to no like heroism; there is no challenge to sacrifice everything — even life itself — to a great cause. Instead, cold war is a grim test of endurance, of moral and mental stamina, with few of the dramatic episodes which make battles into national sagas.

Nonetheless the objects of a fighting and of a cold war are the same — the simultaneous attainment of peace and the national interest. To put the matter bluntly, hot war and cold war are simply phases of national policy. National policy is continuous, but in varying circumstances it changes relative emphases, employs various implements, and summons different resources to attain its purpose. The differences between all-out war, cold war, and peace are in the degree to which various instruments are employed. There is no basic difference in kind. Arms and armaments are vital elements in every circumstance; always political policy is dominant and diplomacy, direct and indirect, is continuous.

Arms, it must be emphasized, are by no means idle during even a cold war. That is evidenced by the recent air clash over the sea off Korea. There are the uninterrupted construction of bases, the fabrication of new weapons, the energetic development of war plans, the unending operational cruises and flights, the testing by repeated war games.

Before turning to the specific application of these principles to the current situation, one or two other pertinent observations must be made regarding them. One such comment is inevitable; Bismarck's dictum is to some extent a counsel of perfection. For the most part he put his own doctrine into practice; he fought limited wars for limited objectives, and stopped fighting when those objectives were attained. In the war for Schleswig-Holstein and in the Austrian war he took pains not to be carried away by victory or to overshoot his objectives.

Nevertheless, in one fatal instance he went beyond the bounds of his own dogma. In the Franco-Prussian War he paraded his troops through Paris and proclaimed the new German Empire in the Palace at Versailles; in that instance he added humiliation to defeat. He also took Alsace-Lorraine, and exacted reparations beyond reason. By these excesses, which transgressed his own doctrine, he kindled the flames of resentment, stirred a passion for revenge, and made irredentism inevitable. He laid the foundations for a later war that was to impair — or even destroy — his lifetime of labor.

Historical perspective upon war as an instrument of national policy shows the difficulty inherent in Bismarck's effort to use limited force for well-defined ends. The truth is that force, when purposefully employed as an instrument of policy, almost always overshoots its objectives and produces situations so different from those forecast that the original objectives are lost to sight. The heat of battle generates its own new issues and so confuses perspective that, when the war is over, the peace almost

never conforms to the original goals. The longer the war is carried on, the greater the energies mobilized, the more bitter feeling becomes, the more original purposes are obscured, or even destroyed.

This is the complete and final answer to the argument for so-called "preventive war." The thesis upon which that enterprise is based depends upon projections or extrapolations of current trends. Such predictions are notoriously unreliable; they are based, of necessity, upon sketchy and incomplete data, upon estimates of dubious accuracy regarding the enemy. Moreover, they neglect all the multitude of forces that may at any time reverse present drifts.

Even more decisive in demonstrating the folly of the self-contradictory preventive war is the fact that when war is entered upon force is exalted as opposed to reason; and peace based on force is transient by nature. Only reason can attain the cherished goal of peace. While reason needs the support of force, it can use it most effectively when it is force-in-readiness rather than force-in-action.

The truth is that proponents of preventive war have become fatigued with the cold war. They want to seize the sword and cut the Gordian knot; they have neither the patience nor the persistence to reduce it by careful examination of its structure and by continuous effort to solve its complexities. There is nothing in all human experience that warrants either of the presumptions upon which the proposal for preventive war is based. We cannot predict the future with enough accuracy to justify the idea that we must act now or lose the game. Nor do we have any historical assurance that victory would attain the desired objective; the shape of the physical, economic, and political world might be so altered as to be unrecognizable.

In this discussion of preventive war, I have deliberately left out of account all moral considerations. That is not because they would not be decisive by themselves; it is because they are

unnecessary to an exposition of the folly of the proposal. Even if a preventive war could be "successful" in the objective sense, it is beyond belief that on moral grounds alone American public sentiment would tolerate the suggestion that we should start a war or incite a prospective enemy to do so.

The second observation is that, hard as application of Bismarck's aphorism proved to be under the best circumstances, it is still more difficult when alliances are involved. Bismarck was able to manipulate events to suit himself, as in his famous condensation of the Ems Dispatch to bring about a desired war. He could neglect the interests of allies; indeed, he used his Austrian ally in the war for the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein to lay the foundation for the war with Austria itself. If, under the most favorable conditions, his dictum is so difficult to obey in all its implications, how much harder it becomes when there are complex alliances.

Whatever one may think of the tact or even the morals of Richard Olney's famous boast regarding our relations with Latin America, it could be understood. He said the "fiat" of the United States "is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? . . . It is not simply by reason of its higher character as a civilized state, not because wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers." In short, our position was then uncomplicated by any alliance; it was simplified by a long tradition based upon the Monroe Doctrine; it was fortified by the overwhelming power of the United States relative to that of the nations south of its border.

Alliances destroy all the simplicities which helped Bismarck attain the objective of a unified Germany and which long dominated the relationship of the United States with Latin America.

When there are allies, national policy must be modified to fit other national policies, which are superficially similar, but which nevertheless have fundamental historical and geopolitical differences. Sometimes alliances are called marriages of convenience. Like so many similes, that one conceals more than it reveals. An alliance is only a partial association and for limited purposes; its comparison with marriage is basically false and clouds our thinking.

When alliances become necessary — and I think few would challenge their present necessity — there is no possible room for a “flat”; Mr. Dulles could not paraphrase Olney about any spot in the world, even Formosa. Each act which implicates any of our allies must be shaped not only with our own national objective in mind; there must be equal attention to indirect and secondary effects upon the solidarity of the alliance.

We can observe this with great clarity when we think about Indo-China. The United States made contact with that area well over a century ago, but our interests were commercial and not colonial. It was in 1832 that we sent a roving diplomat — at six dollars a day — into the area. Little was known of the states in the region. Therefore, in his special passports the titles “appertaining to their majesties” were left blank, “those titles being unknown here.” But there was no such vagueness about his purpose. He was instructed to emphasize the superior virtues of the United States in dealing with countries of the East. “We never make conquests, or ask any nations to let us establish ourselves in their country as the English, the French, and the Dutch have done in the East Indies.”

In different language at different times that remained United States policy; it accounts for the reputation we long enjoyed of being anti-imperialists, and champions of freedom. Only as Communism under Russian and Chinese inspiration accelerated its processes of infiltration or subversion were we drawn into Indo-China as virtual receivers in bankruptcy of French colonialism in that region.

It is no secret that we have at no time been happy with French maneuvers there and it is no extravagance to say that they have at no time been happy with our intervention. This was revealed recently with extraordinary clarity in the statement of one of our high officials that alien domination of Vietnam is outdated, whether exercised from Washington or Paris or Cannes.

Yet, unsatisfactory as our relationship with the French has been in that whole area, it has been necessary for us in a hundred ways to adapt our action to French sensibilities. We have been obliged to consider the realities of the French relationship while striving to put an end to the anachronism of colonialism and give aid to the truncated nation in its effort to find means for governing itself. We regard it as highly important that it achieve such a degree of stability that the Communists will not have South Vietnam as a free gift in the plebiscite due to be held in the not distant future.

Meanwhile, we have to face the fact that our very interposition (despite its idealistic purposes of giving that people an opportunity to attain freedom and to organize their lives in accordance with plans which they draw for themselves) is nonetheless tainted by its association with the outmoded French imperialism. Consequently, what we gain by helping erect a barrier to Communism in that area is partially lost by the impairment of our traditional anti-imperialist position.

It does not help to denounce the blindness of some of the newer nations to the Communist menace. Their answer is that our thinking is obsessive, that we are egocentric and have Communism on the brain to such an extent that we do not see other problems which are pressing upon them more severely than Communist aggression. They are but lately released from colonialism. Their internal affairs are of prime importance — as ours were in 1793.

Most Americans now take the integrity of our national union so much for granted that they have forgotten with what

careful and persuasive argument Washington set forth its advantages, and sought to minimize the divisive forces which he could observe at work. They have forgotten, too, how he warned against "overgrown military establishments which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty" — particularly in new and weak countries.

All these considerations, once so familiar to our forefathers, are now vitally important in the young, uncommitted nations. Moreover, their economics are disorganized and must be not only reoriented but vastly strengthened. Their people live on the very margin of subsistence and will not be patient with political policies or military expenditures which delay or postpone improvement of their standard of living.

The recent Bandung Conference should have taught us what India's behavior had already suggested. Many peoples newly independent have a genuine passion for freedom, one which parallels our own and should give us spiritual kinship with them. Nehru, Sir John Kotelawala, and others have shown not only verbal hostility but vigorous resistance to domestic Communism. So far as committing themselves to one power bloc or the other, however, their policies today are a virtual paraphrase of another section of Washington's Farewell Address: "Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be *constantly* awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. But that jealousy, to be useful, must be impartial, else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defense against it."

When we find the neutralism of the uncommitted nations as irksome as the world rivals found our neutrality in 1793, we may soothe our irritation by reflecting upon our own early history. We must, indeed, not only come to recognize the fact of uncommitted nations, but to be less annoyed by their interest in neutrality.

In his Christmas message at the end of last year the President said: "The times are so critical and the difference between these world systems so vital and vast that grave doubt is cast upon the validity of the neutralistic argument. *Yet we shall continue faithfully to demonstrate our complete respect for the right of self-decision by these neutrals.*"

The very weight of our power in the world — the fact that we are one of the two remaining dominant nations — makes every act of ours a focus of world-wide attention. Thus, when we appear recreant to our oft-professed faith, when tension amounting to rupture between our professions and practices seems to be developing, the attention of those recently freed from colonialism is focused upon current manifestations rather than upon remembrance of our anti-imperialist tradition. The nations of Asia and Africa not long ago released from colonial status now chafe when we exhibit patience with remnants of imperialism. I do not know a more dramatic, or, in a sense, a more painful illustration of the limitations upon freedom which are occasioned by an alliance than the manner in which we have had to adapt our behavior in unwelcome ways in the East because of the necessity to keep firm an essential alliance in the West.

Let us take another familiar example which demonstrates the way in which national policy — and therefore national strategy — is modified by an essential alliance. It is no secret that Sir Winston Churchill's often-expressed desire for a four-power conference "at the summit" was not shared by President Eisenhower. That a meeting is to be held this summer is due only partially to Soviet moves which seem to betoken a more reasonable spirit. It is true that the Russians have met, in form at least, one of the indispensable prerequisites established as part of the policy of the United States — an act of good faith by the Soviets. The Austrian treaty can be so interpreted, whether accurately or not remains to be seen.

Nevertheless, it is highly doubtful that, if the decision had rested solely with the United States, the President would have desired or even agreed to the meeting at this time. The strict limitations he put upon the duration of the conference, his insistence that it is not to arrive at substantive decisions but only set out a series of topics, and suggest methods by which the foreign ministers can deal with them, offer clear enough evidence to support the inference that the meeting is not wholly welcome. It was the fact of alliance which proved far more decisive in inducing our attendance than faith in the sincerity of Russian gestures.

It was as plain as a pikestaff that the French government was in no position to resist the pressure of domestic public opinion clamoring for the meeting. It was equally plain that with a general election on its hands the British cabinet would have run a grave political risk if it had declined to take advantage of even the slenderest chance to negotiate, though the "situation of strength" was neither so clear nor so decisive as might have been desirable.

The United States, under these circumstances, conceded something to the allies and agreed to the meeting. On the other hand, American public opinion is in no mood to sanction any effort at definition action by the heads of states at a hurried conference. Rightly or wrongly, Yalta has become a kind of symbol; though the circumstances of a meeting now would, in any case, preclude the kind of bargaining that went on there, no conference which remotely resembled it, even in form, would be palatable. It would be politically dangerous to agree to any meeting at which final decisions were to be made "at the summit." Therefore, the allies conceded to the United States such points as the duration and nature of the agenda of the conference. This was a characteristic compromise growing out of an alliance.

The fact of alliance in a sense dominates what is done in relation to another Far Eastern situation. The United States at

Cairo, as well as before and afterward, made profound commitments to Chiang Kai-shek. Upon American insistence and contrary to the judgment of the British, China under Chiang was treated not only as a great power but as *the* great power in Asia; for that reason it was given a permanent seat on the United Nation's Security Council. Looked at in the cold light of history, it is now clear that we were insisting upon a myth, indeed no pretense in so large a matter was ever proved more wrong more rapidly. Because our allies yielded to us, the flexibility of our policy in dealing with the realities in the Far East has been impaired ever since. The problem of recognizing Red China would have been less difficult if it had not involved the inheritance of a permanent seat on the Security Council where that government obviously does not belong.

After the sweeping Communist success, the British recognized the government of Mao Tse-tung as the government of China. They did this in accordance with the classic American position which may be said to be Jeffersonian in origin — that *de facto* is also *de jure*. To the British it seemed obvious, as it seems obvious to most of the world, that Mao does have *de facto* control of China. They regard it as unrealistic to deny the legal claim of the Reds to what they hold in fact, particularly since the predecessor government obtained its power also by revolutionary means.

Moreover, it now seems apparent that when the British extended recognition they did not do so in conscious opposition to American policy. In the first place recognition to them is a formal matter, "an acknowledgement of fact not a mark of approbation." Secondly, for reasons which may perhaps never be known precisely or at least not until many more documents are available than have yet been published, it seems clear that the British believed not only that the United States had no objection to their act but was likely to act in concert very soon. I do not know whether the British understanding in this matter was correct or due to a misinterpretation. There can be no doubt that

the difference in action did have the consequence of irritating Anglo-American relations, particularly at the level of public opinion, though this was neither intended nor anticipated by the British.

However that may be, the United States did not recognize Mao and on the ground that in modern times we have added a second qualification to *de facto* control — namely, that the government must have both the capacity and the will to discharge its international obligations. It has been our contention that whatever the capacity of the Red government, it has not shown any readiness to discharge its international obligations. We feel that our position has subsequently been validated by the action of the United Nations in denouncing Red China as an aggressor and by Chinese failure to observe the terms of the truce of Panmunjom and its holding of prisoners who should have been returned.

This series of circumstances has led the United States and Britain into positions which can be denounced as illogical and unrealistic. If it were not so desperately serious a matter there would be an element of farce in our treatment of the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa as a great power with a permanent seat on the Security Council. Is it any wonder that Nehru seeks to usurp the position of spokesman for Asia from the two contending parties? The British on their part because of their alliance with us cannot accept the logic of their recognition of Mao's government as the *de jure* government of China. They cannot press the logic of their position, namely that Red China should have the permanent seat in the Security Council and represent the country in the various organs of the United Nations. Thus the fact of alliance leads both Western nations into inconsistencies.

The difficulties are heightened because at the Cairo Conference it was agreed that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." While under the treaty of peace Japan did not cede them to China, but only renounced

all right of title, the obvious logic of the British position is that Formosa and the Pescadores should go to the China it recognizes.

Logically there is no solution to this dilemma but, with the practical sense for which the British are famous, they have ceased to press the logic and seem ready to accept two Chinas, one on the mainland and one on Formosa. American policy in like manner has become more realistic; we no longer suggest unleashing the troops under Chiang to recover the continent. The unreality of that position without a deeper commitment to conflict than we are ready to make has become clear. As *The Economist* of London said some months ago: "The real Far Eastern policies of the State Department and of the Foreign Office have for a long time been quite close to each other."

Meanwhile, for a time after the abandonment of the Tachens, the only words that seemed to be known to journalists were Quemoy and Matsu; one might have supposed from the excited tone of the dispatches that they were *intrinsically* the key to war or peace. The Congressional resolution adopted with virtually unanimity left control of policy in that highly sensitive area in the hands of the President; and, for reasons which ought to be transparent, he did not define in advance precisely what he would do if they were attacked. Thus, the islands became symbolic of the different policies of the United States and Great Britain.

However, as a result conceivably of the Bandung Conference, of the interposition of Nehru, or of possible changes in Russian orientation, the fury of Red China's propaganda somewhat abated and the menacing gestures became less obvious — or the world got used to them. Again, the fact of alliance proved dominant over differences in policy. Britain and the United States seem to be tacitly collaborating in tacit progress toward a tacit cease-fire in the Formosa Strait! Mr. Dulles said *almost* that on June 7.

Britain and America hope that the Soviets and Red China will not act as one, but will again develop historic tensions. There are certainly enough points of friction, there are regions which both would like and regarding which both have certain claims. Moreover, Russia has had to turn Port Arthur and Dairen over to China though it would have liked to retain them. Chinese drains on Russian armament production carry potential difficulties, particularly as China may want more than Russia can afford to give, or may feel that it is being shortchanged if Russia should seem to charge more than the goods are worth.

The difference between the Western allies regarding their desire to reduce the solidarity of the Sino-Soviet alliance is in the tactical approach to the problem. The British seem to believe that China is too large ever to be a satellite in the sense in which Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania are held in thrall-dom. They seem to think that if we cooperate with the Reds in China it will give opportunity for the natural tensions between Russia and China and the clear contrariety of interests to develop. American action seeking the same ends has taken the line that dependence of Mao exclusively upon Russia will highlight to the Chinese Reds the disadvantages of so exclusive a relationship and will lead them to see the advantage of a less belligerent attitude toward the United States and a stricter regard for their international obligations.

In this matter, as in so many others, the fact of alliance has proved dominant and neither Britain nor the United States has pressed its view to a dogmatic degree. A practical working relationship, for the moment at least, underlies the difference in method which each would like to follow. Perhaps it may be said that the British are patient because they see that the United States does recognize some unpalatable realities, such as the partition of Korea and of Vietnam, and it may be that with the passage of time we will accept the possibility of two Chinas as a

practical matter, as Arthur Dean has suggested in his recent article in *Foreign Affairs*.

Japan is a vital factor in the Far East equation. As we reversed our policy toward Germany from the destruction of its industrial capacity and dropped the fantastic concept of an agricultural economy, so in Japan we have abandoned the policy of a military vacuum. But there was also an economic vacuum. The Asian co-prosperity sphere was destroyed by the war and Japan's economy became essentially upon the American occupation. Then with the peace treaty and the decline of our commitments and the trimming of American aid, the reality of the economic vacuum became more apparent.

Japan can no more live by itself than can Britain. Its loss of Formosa cut off important resources. Its markets in America are restricted; its markets in Oceania are restricted; its trade with Red China, though not forbidden by our occupation, has by no means regained normal size or consequence. Japan has not had opportunity to reestablish old relations or to create new relations of a commercial kind in Southeast Asia.

All this made it inevitable that the Hatoyama government should speak of normalizing relations with Red China, albeit cautiously avoiding stirring us up too much. It has also opened a way for the Soviets, in the name of bringing formal peace after a decade, to offer blandishments in an effort to withdraw Japan from our orbit. It is clear, however, that the strategic importance of Japan as an anchor for our chain of defense is so great that we will go to great lengths to hold it within the Western orientation.

There is one final political consideration which affects our whole strategic policy. The United States is the only nation which has actually dropped an atomic bomb in warfare. For some time we had a monopoly of that weapon and made it an obvious key to policy. The United States is the only nation which has tested a hydrogen bomb with such astonishingly lethal effect as to startle

the world. Both these facts raised serious questions in the minds of our allies as well as of neutrals whether we would regard those instruments as available for instantaneous use with all that such use might imply for the future of the world or whether they would be held in reserve as long as possible and employed only as a last resort.

It was this last question which caused the phrase "massive retaliation" employed by the Secretary of State on the 12th of January, 1954, to be drawn entirely out of its context and become in the minds of many a virtual summary of American military policy. It was regarded as an active threat that upon the least provocation we would resort to those implements. I do not think a study of the text of the Secretary's speech warrants that inference, but that such an inference was widely drawn does not seem open to question. Subsequent events, including discussions of implementing the President's proposal of an "atoms for peace" plan to the United Nations, helped offset the impression. Later developments and the rather favorable prognosis for the forthcoming Geneva conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy seem to have quieted some of the fears and put the whole matter in better perspective.

Moreover, the revelation of the unexpectedly rapid development of Russian air power and clear evidence of its possession of atomic and hydrogen weapons have led to that situation which the President once described, where relative superiority ceases to be decisive, or synonymous with victory. It might, instead, be synonymous with a world holocaust which would injure friends and neutrals and ourselves as well as the enemy.

When we review in our minds what has taken place, it is not necessary to assume that ultimate Russian objectives have changed or that any other dramatic event has altered the prospect of peace. It is necessary only to observe that the Western alliance has held firm, that it has been strengthened by the treaty with

Germany, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has grown stronger, that the enlargement of the Brussels pact has proved an acceptable, though not a perfect, substitute for the European Defense Community, that the period of active warfare is over in Korea and in Vietnam, and that the tensions have relaxed somewhat in the Formosa Strait.

We are, therefore, reminded again that the world does not have a choice simply between perfect peace at one end of the scale and total war at the other. As the President said, we can have a *modus vivendi*. It may not be satisfactory to anyone but it can be tolerable to everyone. The passage of time may tend to blunt the sharpness of some issues and allow for the resolution of dilemmas which would not yield to impulsive or rapid action. The prospects for peace in its ultimate meaning are not good in the near future; the dangers of war in its ultimate extreme have mitigated somewhat. Meanwhile, we must conduct the cold war in such a way as to make peace possible.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Dr. Henry M. Wriston

Dr. Henry M. Wriston received his B. A. degree from Wesleyan University, Connecticut, in 1911, and has since received three additional degrees from that university. He studied at Harvard University from 1911 to 1914, was an Austin teaching fellow for the last two years and was awarded a Ph. D. degree in 1922. He has received honorary degrees from Columbia University, Princeton University, Harvard University, Western Reserve University, New York University, University of Pennsylvania, and others.

Dr. Wriston has been well known nationally in educational work for many years. He was president of the Association of American Universities; trustee of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, and its chairman; vice president of the American Association for Adult Education; trustee of the World Peace Foundation, and of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and director and president of the Council on Foreign Relations.

From 1925 to 1937, Dr. Wriston was president of Lawrence College and from 1929 to 1937 he was director of the Institute of Paper Chemistry of Appleton, Wisconsin. Since 1937, he has been president of Brown University. In 1954, Dr. Wriston headed the Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel, which made a three-month study of the U. S. Foreign Service. Secretary John Foster Dulles approved the Wriston Report and ordered its recommendations to be put into effect.

He has written books on war, civil defense, and American foreign relations, including: *Prepare for Peace* (1941); *Challenge to Freedom* (1943); *Strategy of Peace* (1944). He is a frequent contributor of articles to journals and periodicals.