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THE USES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 13 October 1954 by
Professor H. Field Haviland, Jr.

Admiral McCormick, Gentlemen:

I want to begin by thanking the Naval War College for inviting me to be here today and to say that I am delighted to be able to make the visit. Of course I must admit that Newport, having such an exotic reputation — above and beyond what the Navy may have done to that reputation — is a great temptation to a person who is as curious as I am to come here under any circumstances.

Perhaps it is not quite as true today as it was at the turn of the century, when Mr. Dooley said: “Newport is the exhaust pipe of the country. Without it, we might blow up. It’s the hole in the top of the kettle.” Well, it may not be quite as exotic as it was then, but it certainly still has a romantic aura about it.

As a matter of fact, it has long been an interest of mine as to the way in which exotic locales, such as this, and the Navy have a way of finding their way into each other’s arms.

To come back to the challenge which I have been given this morning, we have the topic before us: *The Uses and Limitations of the United Nations*. The only reason that I dare embark upon quite as cosmic an issue as this is that my good friend, Bill Reitzel, had the temerity to speak to you previously on his topic, *The Cause of War*, in the same brief capsule of fifty minutes.

In thinking about this paper this morning, I mentally wrote four (4) papers (each of which would certainly have taken at

least fifty minutes) covering: (1) a history of the drafting of the U. N. Charter; (2) some background before the U. N.; (3) the historical evolution of the United Nations since its creation; and, (4), an evaluation of what the United Nations has actually done in terms of the United States national interest.

Then I proceeded (as you can see I had to do) mentally to tear up the first three and concentrate on the fourth, which I give you now. I did this not only because of the limitations of time but because I think it is more profitable to probe a particular aspect of the United Nations rather intensively. I also believe that the final evaluation in terms of the United States national interest is a sixty-four dollar question that goes to the very core of the subject with which we are concerned. I limit this discussion primarily to the security aspects of the United Nations not because I am not interested in the non-security aspects but there just is not time to do justice to the economic, social and dependent territory problems.

Because of these limitations, I am compelled to assume (as I am told that I can assume) that you are all quite familiar with the general pattern of the United Nations, its structure and its process. Yet, it may be worthwhile to spend just a minute or two on the salient features of the security organization.

Most of you probably recall that it was decided in drafting the U. N. Charter, following very much along the lines of the United States ideas on this question, that the organization was to have no binding authority except in the security area. In that field it was to be able to take a binding decision only through the Security Council and only in case the Security Council found an actual threat to the peace, such a decision to be subject to a veto by any one of the Council's five permanent members. The sanctions to be used would also be subject to previous agreements with individual states making national armed contingents available. Furthermore, such states were to be invited to participate in Council decisions regarding the employment of those states' forces.

I want to remind you that on all other matters the Security Council (containing eleven countries, including the five permanent ones) and the General Assembly (composed of all members of the United Nations) were empowered to do pretty much the same thing; that is, merely to adopt recommendations as distinguished from binding decisions. At the same time, it was provided that the Security Council would have primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; whereas the Assembly, the larger body, would be primarily charged with more long-range and less explosive problems.

Now let us turn to the central question before us this morning, as I posed it before: how effective has the United Nations been in performing its security tasks in terms of the United States national interest? Of course I think we have to recognize that to many Americans the "national interest" was excommunicated and summarily ostracized under the reign of "Woodrow the Just." The culprit has only recently been rediscovered and restored to polite society to be "lionized" in the salons of the *avant-garde*. But in actual practice, those of you who have been in the uncomfortable front line position of making U. S. policy probably were never aware that the national interest had been away. Yet, if you try to define the national interest in very specific terms, you soon recognize that it is a slippery concept to come to grips with. No two people see it in exactly the same way.

This calls to mind an incident which befell a very good friend of mine (whom some of you may know), Burt Marshall, who used to be with the State Department Policy Planning Staff. In one of his barn-storming junkets through the country he happened to be accosted in one group by what he has politely referred to as an "exigent lady" in the audience, who demanded to know what the pattern of the national interest of the United States would be for the next ten years.

He proceeded to enlighten her by saying, first of all, that his analytical equipment did not contain a crystal ball; and, se-

condly, that as far as he could see all he could predict with any certainty for the next ten years was trouble. I am afraid this did not satisfy the lady, and it probably did not do the stock of the State Department any good in that particular hamlet. But I think that we would agree that there was a rich vein of wisdom in what he said.

Every wise policy-maker, as you know, is extremely cautious about signing his name to any formulation of the national interest, particularly if he thinks that it is going to be published, because he knows that it may be a strait jacket which will confine him in the future. Yet, would any of us go to the other extreme and say that it was impossible to formulate the national interest? I do not think so. I think there is an observable, even measurable and fairly durable, consensus in this country which one can put down in some terms.

For our purposes, I suggest that it may be sufficient to say the following. Our basic national interest, as I shall use it today, seems to consist of at least three (3) major objectives:

1. The maintenance of international peace and security as the necessary, though I remind you not the sufficient, means of allowing this country and others to pursue what Aristotle called the "good life."
2. The development and protection of what we call the "democratic processes" as the best means, in the long run, to resolve the tensions and conflict which, as Bill Reitzel pointed out in his lecture, are always with us.
3. The improvement of the general living conditions among peoples of our country, as well as other countries, in ways which will reinforce the pursuit of our other two objectives of security and democracy.

If we can agree that this is the general pattern of our national interest, then we ought to be able to use this today as a kind of measuring stick to gauge the actual performance of the United Nations.

One more word of caution before we proceed. The problems we are dealing with here have in the past, as Bill suggested in his introduction, been subjected to such high voltages of emotionalism that many persons who seized hold of these problems show decided tendencies to disintegrate into clouds of optimism or vituperation. What I would like to do to guard against this danger today is to give the whole business a very strong dose of figures. I would like to do this in spite of the unkind things which may have been said about statistics and statisticians. I would like to lay before you some comparative figures which I think may be revealing.

I know that this may not be as titillating as a less restrained flight of the imagination. I have a friend who says that he always enjoyed flying as a means of transportation until someone told him that planes are heavier than air. I think that we might as well recognize at the outset that what we are dealing with here are very real problems, problems of real diplomacy — not problems of abstract ideas. They are earthy problems that we have to study in a down-to-earth fashion. And, perhaps when we are finished, we will have something substantial on which to base our conclusions.

Again, let me remind you that our purpose is to assess the U. N. — not in terms of an abstract millenium, not in terms of some global interest which the proverbial Man from Mars might espouse, but in terms of the national interest which I mentioned before.

It is also important to keep in mind the general climate of international relations, since the war, within which the U. N. has had to operate. Here, I mean specifically the unexpectedly rapid

deterioration of relations between East and West and also the equally unexpected acceleration of the liquidation of empires and colonial systems.

Against this background, let us proceed. What I should like to do is to take this in three phases: (1) I would like to look at the experience of the U. N. in terms of the types of national interest involved; (2) I would like to examine the degree of tension involved, or the degree of explosiveness; and (3) I would like to compare the relationships between U. N. and non-U. N. operations, although I cannot go into that very intensively.

Looking at the first phase of this question — gauging the performance of the United Nations in terms of the national interest involved — it is interesting to recall at the outset that it was not expected that the United Nations would be able to act very effectively when the interests of one or more great powers were involved; i. e., the permanent members of the Security Council. The fact that each of them had a veto over any action to be taken in the Security Council was only an organizational reflection of a deeper political fact that without agreement among the great powers there would not be a solid base upon which to build the collective security system. Related to this assumption was the general understanding that the new organization would not be burdened in the beginning with the problems involved in the post-war settlement but that the new organization would, as far as possible, be free to try its wings without the cruel and explosive problems connected with the post-war peace treaties.

Yet, what do we find? We find, in actual fact, that of twenty (20) major political questions which have been dealt with by the United Nations since 1945 no fewer than sixteen (16), or 80%, of those disputes have directly involved the interests of the great powers; that eleven (11) of those have arisen from differences between the Soviet Union and the other Western powers and that they were the most pernicious of all, concerning which the U. N.

was expected to have the least success. Yet, as you see, they comprised eleven (11) of the twenty (20) that I shall deal with, or slightly more than half. Furthermore, six (6) of these eleven (11) dealt with post-war settlement problems directly connected with the peace treaties.

I suggest that these figures help one to appreciate the tremendous burden which was placed upon the organization at the outset — a burden far more onerous than had ever been intended or expected by those who planned the U. N. Hence, I think, if we are going to be frank, no objective observer looking at this experience and seeing the infant being led among the lions could possibly have expected a very happy outcome. The fact that the child emerged from this experience at all may well be considered a kind of modern miracle (perhaps almost in the same class with Ezzard Charles sticking eight rounds with Rocky Marciano).

Let us now measure in some concrete fashion (although I admit it is only approximate) the performance of the United Nations on a number of counts in connection, first, with these eleven (11) disputes which involved East-West conflicts. If you run down a list of certain criteria — and I have chosen, more or less arbitrarily, eight (8) criteria by which to measure this performance — you get something like the following box score:

(1) The U. N. can be said to have made a significant contribution in the area of information. By that I mean the collecting, the analysis, and the dissemination of information with respect to these disputes in all of the eleven (11) cases involved. This proved particularly important in terms of mobilizing very wide support for the United Nations position with regard to the questions involving Greece, Korea, and the Italian colonies. It was most limited in connection with the questions regarding the Czechoslovakian coup, which was brought before the United Nations briefly, and the alleged violations of human rights in the three Balkan countries of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania.

(2) I think that the United Nations can be said to have facilitated negotiations aimed at a pacific settlement of these questions in seven (7) of the eleven (11) instances, or 60%. This proved particularly important in connection with those questions involving Korea, the Italian colonies and Berlin. It was far less successful in other cases, such as the Greek situation.

(3) The U. N. succeeded in adopting its own recommendations on the issues at stake in six (6) of these eleven (11) instances; i. e., slightly more than 50%.

(4) The recommendations that were adopted by the United Nations were substantially implemented in three (3) cases out of the eleven (11), or 50% of those cases in which the U. N. adopted recommendations. These were concerned with the Italian colonies, Korea and the first Iranian situation, when we were concerned about the Russian occupation of northern Iran.

(5) The United Nations assisted materially in achieving a cease-fire in one (1) instance out of the two (2) instances in which a cease-fire was an issue; in other words, in the two cases in which fighting was involved. The cease-fire, as you know, was effected in Korea. It was not effected through the United Nations in any formal way in Greece, although in fact we have had a cease-fire there.

(6) The United Nations promoted the employment of sanctions (which, as I reminded you at the beginning, was considered the most difficult function) in two (2) instances — not only military sanctions in Korea, which everyone knows about, but also economic sanctions in both Korea and Greece. One must admit immediately, however, that the embargo upon war supplies and other economic supplies in connection with the Greek situation were not enforced to the extent they were in connection with the Korean conflict.

(7) A settlement was finally achieved with the help of the U. N. in five (5) of the eleven (11) cases — in other words, ap-

proximately 45% of those cases: Iran, the Corfu Channel question, Berlin, the Italian colonies and Korea, with a virtual settlement in Greece. I do not pretend that the U. N. was the primary factor in each instance, but I say that these settlements were achieved with the help of the United Nations.

(8) Finally, if you look at the whole pattern of these issues that I have been presenting in terms of the general direction of U. S. policy, I think than an objective observer must say that in ten (10), or 90%, of those cases the general direction of U. N. policy more or less coincided with the direction of United States policy — a very high degree of correspondence. In fact, we largely dominated the decisions in connection with the Iranian case, the Greek case, Korea, Berlin, and we went along in most of the others.

On the basis of this analysis, I think that we can begin to see grounds for at least some preliminary conclusions. If anything is remarkable about this experience, I believe it is that the major powers found it advantageous to beat a well-traveled path to the door of the United Nations and that the structure — in spite of its weaknesses — proved to be relatively useful and durable.

If we ask the more difficult question of why — Why did the U. N. prove useful in some instances and not in others — the following answers suggest themselves. First of all, where was the U.N. most successful, looking again at the over-all picture? I think that you can say it was most successful on the whole in dealing with the Iranian situation, the Greek situation, Korea, the Italian colonies, the Corfu Channel (and, here, I include the International Court as part of the U. N. structure, which it is) and the Berlin case.

Among the major factors that I would cite as contributing to this success was, first of all, the fact that the United States was in a position and a mood to exert very strong pressures in these instances through the United Nations, as well as outside the Organization. As you recall, the United States assisted Greece and Berlin largely outside the U. N. framework. In the case of

South Korea, the aid was largely channeled under the auspices of the U. N. Organization.

A second factor that I think has to be recognized is that the Soviet Union in these particular cases was not in a position to block action. In no instance did it have absolute control over the territories involved.

A third factor is that the United Nations also served as a convenient instrument for mobilizing very widespread agreement with which the United States could associate itself. Notice that in every case that I have mentioned the United Kingdom, France, and various important middle powers, such as Canada and others, stood arm-in-arm with the United States. We also have to remind ourselves that this invariably involved some compromises on our part as well as theirs.

The United Nations also proved a convenient negotiating center when various circumstances (this has to be stressed here) created a situation which was ripe for negotiation. This is especially true, as you know, in the cases of Korea, Berlin and the Italian colonies.

Finally, the Soviet Union in at least one instance that I have mentioned, Iran, was still sensitive to non-Soviet pressures and responded very quickly.

On the other hand, one can see where the United Nations was not successful. I think that you can say it was relatively unsuccessful in connection with the alleged human rights violations in the three (3) satellite countries which I mentioned previously; it was relatively unsuccessful in connection with the complaints on bacterial warfare and atrocities in Korea; it was relatively unsuccessful in connection with the Czechoslovakian coup and Trieste.

Here, I would say that, in these cases, the United States (and other states) had no easy access to those particular areas

except for one, and that was Trieste. Hence, the Soviet Union was, for the most part, able to block U. N. action. Moreover, there tended to be greater differences on these issues within the U. N. membership, as you can see just by naming them: the question of the human rights violations in the satellite countries, for example, gave rise to great differences on political, religious and other grounds. For these and other reasons, therefore, none of these situations proved ripe for negotiation within the U. N.

Having concentrated thus far on only the eleven (11) great power disputes, those disputes which involved East-West conflicts, I want to look at the next largest group of disputes. Those are the questions arising out of the colonial problem, out of the conflicts between the colonial powers and their dependent peoples. Nine (9) of the twenty (20) questions in all have touched upon this issue. Two (2) of these have already been mentioned in connection with the post-war settlement questions — that is, Korea and the Italian colonies. So, for the moment, I would like to concentrate upon the other seven (7) colonial questions. Notice that, of these seven (7), five (5) directly involved the interests of the Soviet Union.

Now, again, let us measure the U. N. performance in terms of the eight (8) criteria that I suggested before.

First of all, on the information side, on the very important matter of getting the facts before the world public — not from the point of view of any single nation but from the point of view of a multilateral group, which is more trustworthy to the general populations of the world — the U. N. can be said to have proved useful in seven (7) situations out of seven (7), or 100%. It was most useful in that connection in the cases involving Indonesia and Palestine.

I think that you can also say that the United Nations facilitated negotiations in five (5) of the seven (7) cases, or 70%.

I would say that the U. N. was able to adopt significant recommendations regarding the issues in five (5) cases, or 70%. These were most fully developed, I wish to remind you, in connection with the Indonesian question — the struggle between the Netherlands and Indonesia — and the Palestine case, where the recommendations adopted by the United Nations were very influential. In three (3) of these five (5) cases, the recommendations were largely put into effect.

One can go on and say that the U. N. materially assisted in establishing a cease-fire in both of the situations that involved fighting; that is, in Indonesia and Palestine.

The U. N. promoted the use of sanctions in 50% of those two (2) cases; i. e., in connection with Palestine. There was an indirect threat (which I think can be considered a sanction) in connection with the Indonesian situation, but that was an economic threat which the United States exerted largely outside of the United Nations.

Finally, one can say that a settlement was effected in three (3) of the seven (7) cases, or 40%.

Again, the general direction of U. N. policy tended to coincide with the general direction of U. S. policy in six (6) of the seven (7) cases, or 85%.

Once more, I think one can begin to draw some tentative conclusions. In spite of the fact that the East-West conflict was not directly involved in most of these questions, the U. N. had approximately the same degree of success here as it had in the other eleven (11) cases which directly involved East-West post-war issues.

In general, I think one can say that the U. N. proved most effective in connection with three (3) cases: the Indonesian question, the Syria-Lebanon question (that was the matter of persuading the British and French to withdraw from Syria and Lebanon)

and the Palestine situation. Here, again, there is no doubt that, at the top of the list of reasons for this pattern, the fact has to be mentioned that the U. S. took a strong stand on these particular issues — supplemented, again, by pressure exerted outside the U. N. as well as inside.

Unlike the category that was mentioned above, however, in this case the Soviet Union was not a direct opponent. In actual fact, it espoused positions which tended to reinforce those of the United States. We are inclined to forget some of the cases in which, for reasons of national interest, the Soviet Union strengthened the position of the United States. But I have only to remind you of three cases: Indonesia, Syria-Lebanon and Palestine, in which the Soviet Union was on the same side as the United States — only more so.

Furthermore, considerable support for U. N. policies was mobilized among other member states. True, there were some conflicts among the Western democratic nations. Still, the United Kingdom stood substantially with the United States on Indonesia and Syria-Lebanon, and in Palestine — where it was most directly involved — the United Kingdom placed no insuperable obstacles in our way. France resisted on the Syria-Lebanon question, but not on the others. The Netherlands seriously resisted in connection with the liquidation of her own eastern empire, Indonesia. But neither in the case of France nor of Indonesia did we face opposition by a first-class power.

Finally, I think you have to recognize something which the colonial powers themselves had difficulty in recognizing: that the revolting indigenous forces in many cases had the strength to create at least a stalemate which tended to make the situation ripe for negotiation. This was particularly true in Indonesia.

On the other hand, what are the weaknesses? We can see that the United Nations was relatively unsuccessful in the following cases: (1) In the complaint of the treatment of Indians in South

Africa, which has been with us since the first session of the General Assembly; (2) in connection with the Morocco and Tunisia difficulties, which have been much in the papers recently; and (3) in connection with the two disputes involving England directly — the Anglo-Iranian and the Anglo-Egyptian disputes.

While there was no direct Soviet interference on these questions, neither was there strong U. S. support for any specific solution except, I think you might say, in the Anglo-Iranian question. There, our support was largely exerted outside the United States, rather than inside.

There was also intense resistance on the part of the states involved. You have only to take one of these cases, South Africa. "Intense resistance" is a euphemism for the position that South Africa has taken.

One can also point to the fact that on these questions there was less unity among the non-Soviet powers, naturally, because of the conflicts between the U. S. and certain other powers on colonial questions. The United States and the other powers had to weigh carefully the desirability of unity on colonial questions as compared with the question of unity on East-West questions. The increasing tendency has been for the United States to give way on some of the colonial questions in order to buy support on the East-West side.

Thus far, we have concentrated on eighteen (18) of the twenty (20) political disputes that I mentioned at the outset. Now I just want to say a word about the remaining two (2).

One of these is the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, on which the U. N. has lavished endless meetings and heroic patience with little to show for its pains except a cease-fire.

The other is the Spanish question, involving an effort by the wartime allies (the so-called "anti-fascist countries") to use the United Nations as a trumpet to blow down the walls of the

Franco regime. Unfortunately, or fortunately, however you look at it, the wind pressure generated has tended instead to prevent the walls from tottering and to keep the regime upright.

In spite of the fact that no major power opposed the U. N. position on either of these questions (and, hence, they would seem to be exactly the kind of disputes in which the U. N. could be most useful), the Organization's efforts on these questions to date have been among its least successful. Among the principal reasons for this state of affairs is the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom have not tried to force their views upon the parties involved — except very gingerly in the case of the India-Pakistan question, and that, as much outside as inside the United Nations.

Furthermore, opinion among the United Nations members, other than the great powers, has been extremely divided on these questions. Again, you have only to remind yourselves of these two facts: (1) of the India-Pakistan question, on which opinion has been extremely divided, and (2) of the Spanish question, on which the early unanimity has gradually degenerated.

Having analyzed the U. N. performance with primarily the interests at stake in mind, let us turn to the second phase of this analysis that I mentioned: an analysis according to the degree of tension involved, the degree of explosiveness, the degree of threat to the peace.

You will recall, again, that it was assumed that a threat to the peace would be the most difficult problem for the United Nations to deal with because it would require action by the Security Council, subject to the "veto." Let us see what has actually happened.

There have been five (5) cases of the twenty (20) that I have been talking about which involved open warfare: Greece, Indonesia, Palestine, Korea and Kashmir. What has been the performance? The Security Council has invoked Chapter VII in only

two (2) cases. Most people are aware of the Korean case, but this was true also of Palestine. Chapter VII is the chapter under which binding decisions were to be made and sanctions might be employed.

In all of these cases I think that the U. N. has proved a useful instrument for obtaining and analyzing information which bore on the situation. While you may not say that this was very important in the actual fighting, nevertheless it was a significant contribution in connection with Greece and in connection with Korea, as you recall, to get the facts accurately; to get the facts in a form that would be generally acceptable to the world; and to get them quickly. You may remember the ill-fated Lytton Commission which attempted to get the facts in connection with the Manchurian situation in 1931 — and which took approximately a year to return with the information.

Another point is that the United Nations called for non-military sanctions in two (2) of the five (5) cases, or in 40% of the cases. These were economic embargoes in connection with Korea and Greece.

The U. N. sponsored military sanctions in only one (1) case; that was Korea. But most people forget that it attempted to apply military sanctions in connection with Palestine — and failed.

A cease-fire was achieved, with U. N. assistance, in every single one of these five (5) situations.

Furthermore, U. N. observers (some of you have served in that capacity) have been utilized to help enforce certain agreements in every one of these cases, or in 100% of them.

Finally, a settlement was definitely achieved, with U. N. assistance, in one (1) case — Indonesia; partial settlements have been achieved in connection with Palestine, Korea and Kashmir; and a virtual settlement, a *de facto* settlement, has been achieved in Greece.

Again, you have to ask yourselves the question: What do these figures add up to? Perhaps the most interesting fact is that all of this activity, with respect to situations that were "hot," took place in spite of the fact that Chapter VII was virtually inoperative. The Charter provision with respect to armed forces has never been put into effect. Yet, you have all of this activity to which I have referred.

In exercising its various functions, the U. N. was naturally most successful in getting the facts — and, in connection with this, in furnishing observers as enforcement instruments. The U. N. was least successful in mobilizing economic and military support for its policies.

Now, I would like to go to the third aspect of this problem that I want to deal with: briefly, to say something about the connection between the U. N. and certain non-U. N. organizations. Although I know that it is going to be dealt with by another speaker, I think it would be a peculiar form of myopia not to say something about it in this connection.

One of the first questions which one is inclined to ask is: How important has the U. N. been as compared with these other arrangements, these special non-U. N. arrangements, regional and otherwise?

One measure of this is that, by my count, only eleven (11) contentious questions have been dealt with entirely outside the U. N., as compared with the twenty (20) which I have been talking about. Those eleven (11), to name them briefly, have involved the post-war settlements concerning Germany, Austria, Japan, Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Aside from these post-war settlements, there are the problems of Indo-China and two (2) Latin American bouts: Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua and Haiti vs. the Dominican Republic.

Of these, the peace treaty questions were dealt with by the Council of Foreign Ministers and other Allied groups: Indo-China,

just recently by an *ad hoc* conference; and the Latin American questions, by the Organization of American States. Notice that N.A.T.O. is nowhere mentioned here.

One should also point out that, of the twenty (20) disputes dealt with by the U. N., only four (4) were also considered by non-U. N. organizations as well as the U. N. Those were Korea, Berlin, the Italian colonies and Trieste. Of those four (4), only Berlin and Trieste were dealt with primarily outside the U. N.

There are two (2) other questions which were dealt with outside the U. N., but not by organizations: the Anglo-Iranian question and the Anglo-Egyptian question. They were dealt with by *ad hoc* negotiations, most of which were bilateral.

This means that of the total thirty-one (31) questions which I have mentioned so far, only fourteen (14), or slightly less than half, were dealt with chiefly outside the U. N.; and, of those, only ten (10), or approximately one-third, were handled by standing international organizations.

One can also ask: Were the disputes handled outside the U. N. more significant? Were they more important than those dealt with inside the U. N.?

Here, I have never discovered a set of scales that would balance this kind of thing. One can weigh on one side the major non-U. N. questions (I would select Germany, Austria, Japan and Indo-China) and on the other side, I think, an equally impressive array of issues under U. N. jurisdiction (Korea, Indonesia, Palestine, Kashmir, the Italian colonies and Greece).

One is also inclined to ask: Among those major questions, was the degree of success experienced in resolving the tensions involved any greater outside than inside the U. N.?

In what we may call the major non-U. N. cases there are virtual settlements regarding Indo-China and Japan, but no meeting

of minds yet among the major disputants in connection with Germany and Austria — although there has been progress.

Among the major U. N. questions, a final settlement has been reached on Indonesia and the Italian colonies; partial settlements on Korea, Palestine, Greece and Kashmir.

Hence, I think you can say honestly that the actions taken on these two categories — outside and inside the U. N. — have met with approximately equal success.

Now, I would like to sum up. Having combed this experience, what answer do we find to the question set forth at the outset — What are the principal strengths and weaknesses of the U. N. as an instrument of U. S. policy?

First, there is the matter of membership — particularly, its scope. The U. N. is, without question, the most universal of all international organizations and, therefore, includes the major countries which have been involved in the issues which I have been talking about. Whether they are Soviet or non-Soviet, anti-colonial as well as colonial, the more important powers tend to be in the United Nations — not all of them, but most of them. Thus, it is a ready forum for negotiation to the extent that conditions exist which are conducive to negotiation. N.A.T.O., on the other hand, would not have been a suitable forum for negotiation on either the twenty (20) disputes handled inside the U.N., or the eleven (11) disputes dealt with outside the U. N., since its membership does not include the principal countries involved in those questions.

On the other hand, you will have to admit that the organizations of more limited membership (such as N.A.T.O.) are for the most part (and this does not include all of them, such as the League of Arab States) based upon a higher degree of consensus and mutual confidence than the U. N. Therefore, I think they can be said to be better foundations for stronger defensive, economic

and political arrangements than can be expected under the United Nations.

Furthermore, if you look at the membership question, the U. N. membership is so extensive, so all-inclusive, that there are many states (such as Yemen and a few others that I could mention) which are so uninterested, so ill-equipped, and so ill-informed on these questions that they are apt to act rather irresponsibly on many of these issues.

Then, too, we finally have to remind ourselves on the membership point that there are twenty-one (21) states at the present time which have applied for admission to the U. N., and are still on the outside looking through the knothole because they have been blocked by one or more of the great powers in the Security Council.

Another question is the matter of the degree of authority which the U. N. can wield. It would seem to be a strength of the United Nations that it can virtually take any action that its more influential members want it to take. You have only to look at the Korean situation and the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, which recognizes the authority of the General Assembly to call for any kind of action (including military action) by a mere recommendation, to see how flexible the system is.

If you agree, as I think we must, that Communist expansionism is the principal threat to world peace, today, it is interesting to recall that eleven (11) of the twenty (20) political questions dealt with within the U. N. involved the struggle to hold back the Communist tide; that in seven (7) of those eleven (11) cases, or 60%, I think you can honestly say that the U. N. made a significant contribution to containing the Communist threat — particularly regarding Korea, Greece and Iran.

Yet, the U. N. policy process shows us certain undeniable weaknesses. First, there is the fact that the U. N. cannot issue binding decisions except under Chapter VII of the Charter. The

fact that the members are not legally bound by U. N. recommendations allows them to be quite irresponsible, to vote for resolutions which they have no real intention of enforcing, as happened to some extent in connection with Korea.

Finally, there are no strong and certain sanctions behind U. N. policies. The Organization still has to depend upon *ad hoc* appeals. Yet, I want to remind you again that this may be remarkably successful if given the right circumstances, as in connection with Korea.

There is still another aspect — and that is the decision-making process. Here, I mean particularly the voting process. You recall that the veto, as a problem of voting, was originally thought of not as a strength or as a weakness but as a necessity, a reflection (as I said before) of the basic political situation and the preponderant military might of the great powers.

Since that time, many observers have considered it an advantage that security questions might be taken to the General Assembly, in which decisions could be made by a mere two-thirds majority of those members present and voting. This raises the question of weighted voting because, as you know, there is no formal system of weighted voting in the Assembly. Russia has the same vote as Luxembourg or El Salvador. Yet, we have to recognize that there is a kind of informal, unofficial weighting by the very fact that the great powers necessarily influence the policies of the lesser powers. To cite only one example: We could certainly not have forestalled the Chinese Communist representation question unless there were informal weighting. Regardless of this fact, however, it is still a disadvantage not to have the real differences among nations reflected automatically and consistently in the decision-making process. The present informal system never works the same way twice, and I think it is seriously distorted by the rather unpredictable and inequitable action of the blocs of smaller powers, particularly of the Latin-American and Asian-Arab Blocs.

One last point I want to discuss deals with the frequent complaint that international organizations such as the U. N. are overly legalistic and moralistic efforts to banish power politics. The first reply to this complaint is that power is as essential to politics as energy is to the human body. To try to banish power from politics is to tell the body to stop living. To use another anatomical analogy, balance is as necessary to power politics as balance among the organs and glands of the body. If the white corpuscles begin getting out of hand, the reds do their damndest to restore the balance. If there is any iron law of politics, this is it, and it applies to every organization I know of, including the U. N.

All one can expect of an international organization such as the U. N. is that it may tend to maximize the non-violent means used in this balancing process and minimize the violent ones. In answer to those who complain that the time-honored techniques of diplomacy have been displaced by the bloodless, ascetic machinery of the U. N., one has only to trace a single decision, such as that which side-tracked the question of Chinese representation, to appreciate the fact that diplomacy is the lifeblood of the U. N. — only it is more intensive than ever before since it must juggle sixty different national interests at once.

In closing my remarks, if one can squeeze out all of this a few drops of wisdom perhaps they are these: I think that the United Nations cannot be hailed as our saviour or condemned as our nemesis in any wholesale fashion with respect to every question. I think it can more aptly be likened to a large ocean liner, and, like such a liner, it can accommodate more passengers and encompass a larger variety of activities than any smaller vessel. But it is not self-sufficient. It cannot, for example, defend itself from a strong attack, and, therefore, has to depend upon auxiliary vessels.

In the final analysis, the U. N. is only one of many ways to get from where you are to where you want to go. Its use in any

specific instance depends upon one's analysis of the special characteristics governing each situation. On this matter, I think I can do no better than to quote Abraham Lincoln, who wrote in 1865: "Important principles may and must be flexible."

Thank you!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

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Professor Haviland has been Associate Professor of the Department of Political Science at Haverford College since 1949. He holds A. B., M. A., and Ph. D. degrees at Harvard University.

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