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SIGNIFICANCE OF INDIA'S LEADERSHIP IN ASIAN NEUTRALISM

from a lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 4 November 1958 by
Doctor Phillips Talbot

When my family and I lived in Delhi some two years ago, we temporarily sublet a house in the new Diplomatic Enclave on a street called Kautilya Marg. Now, Kautilya was an Indian Machiavelli who more than two millennia ago gave his prince some very practical ideas of statecraft. It is intriguing that today's Indians should have given his name to a street built for the residences of foreign diplomats, in an era when India itself looks rather archly at power politics.

But Kautilya Marg is also on the route between the Prime Minister's house and Delhi's international airport. During our weeks of residence there I was fascinated at how many times my children would come rushing in from play to announce that "We've seen Mr. Nehru again." And sure enough they had, for the Prime Minister in his police-led motorcade was often busy welcoming or bidding farewell to some distinguished visitor.

In a fairly brief period Chou En-lai passed through several times, the Dalai Lama and the Pan-ch'en Lama were in and out of the capital repeatedly, Haile Selassie had come on a state visit, the Foreign Ministers of the Western "Big Three" had paused for talks, and leaders of several of the new states of Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia had come to meet Indian leaders. Few national capitals can have attracted more visitors — from the "Free World," from Communist countries and from the nonaligned nations — than Delhi in recent years. One of the facts of modern diplomacy is the degree to which India is noticed by other nations.

But Nehru has not spent all his time greeting visitors at home. A persistent, peripatetic traveler himself, sometimes called "the most travelled foreign minister in the world," not excluding

our own, he has not only seen the great capitals of the world but he has everywhere been received handsomely. It was the "red carpet" treatment for him when he visited the United States in 1949, the "red carpet" in the Soviet Union and in Communist China, and the "red carpet" in Japan when he went there not too long ago. If India has been discovering the rest of the world, India's leader has made a vivid impression wherever he has gone.

To Indians — articulate Indians, that is — the popularity of Delhi among distinguished foreign visitors and the demonstrative welcomes given Nehru on his tours abroad have had a tremendous symbolic importance. They see these demonstrations as evidence that India's foreign policy has been dramatically successful in what was after all the very first decade of the country's independence. More specifically, they see three very important fruits of their foreign policy:

1. They believe Indian policy has contributed to the preservation of peace. They are proud of the role which India has played in a wide range of world crises, from Korea and Vietnam to Suez.

2. They welcome the prestige that foreign policy seems to have given India. This is particularly important because India's domestic problems at the beginning, if you will recall them, were incredibly difficult. The price of independence in 1947 was the partitioning of the India that had a certain historical unity and had been molded into a political entity during the period of British control. The partition loosed massive passions that engulfed Hindus and Muslims of northern India and western Pakistan in murderous rioting, mob violence and the breakdown of both civil order and military control. For a time there was some question whether Delhi could be maintained as the capital of India. (On the Pakistan side, conditions were equally bad). Within a dozen weeks more than ten million persons were uprooted from their homes in India or Pakistan and forced to flee across the newly-erected international frontier. Some hundreds of thousands of victims died violently. The shock of all this to the Indian mind, steeped as it had been for generations in dreams of independence, was such as to make

freedom at first seem the road to disaster rather than to a promised land.

Very early, too, came awareness of the considerable difficulties India faced in organizing its resources to increase production and alleviate poverty in the face of rapid population growth. Food crises and monetary crises in the early years raised questions in the minds of many Indians about the capacity of free India to solve its people's most immediate problems.

There were other difficulties as well that contributed to the malaise of the early years of independence. But, almost from the beginning, India's posture in foreign affairs brought national satisfaction. The recognition given their new state, the consideration shown the views articulated by its Prime Minister — even by those who disagreed vigorously with his diagnoses and prescriptions — and the apparent success of many early foreign policy moves (except in the Kashmir case, to which we shall refer later), all these gave Indians reason for pride and for confidence that the country would move forward.

3. They believe their foreign policy has effectively served their national interests. By not becoming aligned with any power bloc, they hold they have had greater freedom of action and won more respect for their views than would otherwise have been true. Few of them put an allied point bluntly (and many would argue it is not only extraneous but libelous of India's intentions), but there are Indians who ask themselves how better to get the whole world trying to help you than to have a foreign policy that somehow strikes a responsive chord in the West and in what Americans call the East? And the fact is that India is the recipient of economic assistance and occasional political support from both the Western powers, including the United States, and the Communist-controlled powers. This is not necessarily bad; my point is that the existence of this condition heightens many Indians' confidence in their foreign policy.

It is easy in discussing "India's" foreign policy to leave the impression that this entity can be equated to our prevailing concept

to American foreign policy or British foreign policy. Because this may be misleading, I must define the term "India" as I use it in discussing foreign policy.

India's foreign policy is certainly not the expression of a consensus arising from serious consideration and debate among the 400 million citizens of the country. Nor is it, in fact, the outgrowth of views expressed widely among the, say, 65 million people who are supposed to be literate, or the eight million people who, according to one estimate, "read newspapers regularly," or the two million or so who have been through college. (These are all very rough figures, used only for illustrative purposes). These larger masses in the community have been important not as generators of policy but as responsive chords to the melodies created by the responsible leadership. Just as Mahatma Gandhi had extraordinary power to evoke mass support for the calculated positions he took during the nationalist struggle, so the design and conduct of Indian foreign policy since independence must be regarded mainly in terms of one individual and his immediate associates, however wide the popular support for the postures adopted.

Jawaharlal Nehru concerned himself with foreign affairs many years before he became Prime Minister of India. Back in 1939, when Nehru was between two of the terms in jail to which the government of the day periodically consigned him, I happened to be in the United Provinces (now the state of Uttar Pradesh), attending a meeting of the Provincial Committee of the Indian National Congress. This 'Congress' was and is a political body, of course, not a legislature. Some 20,000 people were present, as I recall. Some were from towns, but the bulk had come from their simple villages. Many looked as if they lived near the average income level for India: about \$50 per person per year. Probably few of them had ever been to a big city. Their knowledge of the outside world must have been woefully meager.

And yet Nehru addressed himself to these people — in a long, avuncular talk — not only on local or nationalist issues but on international struggles far distant from India. He spoke of the Spanish civil war, of Nazism and Fascism, of the World War then

just starting. Indians should be concerned with these problems, he said, because someday India would be involved. This was a point he pressed wherever he went.

Ever since his youth Nehru had perceived the Indian nationalist struggle in a world context. A product of Harrow and Cambridge, he knew Europe well. In 1927, ten years after the Bolshevik revolution, he visited the Soviet Union. From the end of the 1920's he became — and has remained — the architect of the resolutions on foreign affairs so often passed at the annual sessions of the Indian National Congress. Many of these resolutions showed Nehru's — and most Indian nationalists' — concern over the subjugation of one people by another. There were resolutions of sympathy to the Chinese people during the Japanese occupation, resolutions of good will to Arabs under European rule, resolutions saluting victims of Fascism and Nazism, and many others. However much or little it may have been realized at the time, Nehru was preparing the Indian people to assume a posture in international affairs when the country became independent. He was also preparing himself to be foreign minister. And he was functioning — as did Gandhi — in an interesting and complex philosophic climate that drew from ideas of toleration and nonviolence embedded in Hinduism, ideas of political liberalism expressed by the Western philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and a lively sense of the changes introduced into the world by modern technology and communications.

When I speak, then, of "India's" foreign policy in the dozen years since independence, I am really referring to the product of attitudes developed mainly by Jawaharlal Nehru — attitudes in which his immediate associates have been educated (by him and by their own similar experiences) and which, generally speaking, have become the elements of a national consensus achieved without very much collision or adjustment of conflicting views. Not that Nehru stands alone and could guide his country in any direction whim might dictate; he is the creature as well as in large part the creator of his environment, and his strength comes substantially

from the sensitivity with which he perceives and articulates national urges in India.

This emphasis on Nehru's transcendent role in India's foreign policy up to now does not imply that Indian postures are certain or even likely to change materially when he passes from the scene. Given roughly comparable conditions in world affairs, it would be a better guess, I believe, that the views and aspirations he personifies would continue to shape Indian policies. A succeeding Prime Minister might be more enmeshed in domestic affairs, less acutely sensitized to foreign affairs, and consequently less electric in his impact on international opinion and diplomacy, but his general posture might well be similar.

In examining India's foreign policy the first thing to notice, I believe, is that, like the foreign policies of most other countries, it has in fact been a combination of strategic self-interest and of a kind of ideology. Because the ideology underlying many of India's postures is relatively well perceived, let us look first at the ways in which India views its immediate national interest.

Where the direct protection of the nation is concerned, India no more than any other country shows itself neutral or unduly tolerant. As Nehru once said after he had been asked whose side he was on in world affairs, "I am on India's side." India has made it clear that its national interests will be defended first, foremost and last. The most dramatic example of this position is, of course, India's posture toward Pakistan. The partition which came in 1947 had the effect of turning sharp domestic tensions (mainly between Hindus, along with Sikhs and Muslims) into international friction. I need not recite the conflicts that have plagued Indo-Pakistan relations: the treatment of minorities in each country, evacuee property, trade and currency problems, and the allocations of river waters for canal irrigation, for example. It is enough to look at the Kashmir case.

For some years the basic dilemma in the Kashmir dispute has been that India wants it treated as a legal issue and Pakistan as a political issue. In the Indian view, Kashmir (that is, the State

of Jammu and Kashmir) is legally part of India because the Maharaja of the State signed an Instrument of Accession which, though executed when conditions in the State were stormy, followed agreed procedures. India's position on Kashmir has been intransigent (in the eyes of a foreign observer) in the sense that India has clung to the apparent legality of its position to the exclusion of procedures for a political solution proposed by the Security Council, a commission and various mediators of the United Nations. There is some basis for the Indian claim that its legal position is unassailable; my own impression is that India could probably sustain its case before the International Court of Justice, if the issue were to go to that body.

But it seems equally clear to me that if India were to accept a political resolution of its conflict with Pakistan over the final disposition of Kashmir, along the lines India has sometimes urged on disputants in other parts of the world, the result could be different. No one can predict with confidence, I believe, how a plebiscite would go in Kashmir; during visits to Kashmir at different times since 1947 I have sensed substantial swings of opinion among Kashmiris. But now, or at least last year, I would have felt safe in concluding that the majority of the people of the villages of Kashmir, as well as the townspeople, would not prefer to remain with India. I am not sure they would want to be attached to Pakistan either, if given a free choice; they would probably prefer the demand now widely discussed in the Valley for an autonomous Kashmir. Seeking out the preferences of the Kashmiri people is, however, not the immediate goal of Indian policy; it is, rather, to maintain the integrity of the areas that are considered legally part of the country, including Kashmir.

It is because India regards Pakistan as the one visible threat to its national interest (because of the possibility of conflict over Kashmir, canal waters, etc), that India has often reacted to other countries inversely to the level of their involvement with Pakistan. As Americans, we discovered how the agreement in 1954 to give military assistance to Pakistan critically strained our relations with India. Indeed, the fact that the United States has helped Pakistan

strengthen its military posture has in recent years been the principal irritant in Indian-American relations.

There are other issues touching the national interest on which India has taken a firm position. Take, for example, the Portuguese territory of Goa. To Indians it is a continuing shame that a foreign flag should fly over this small territory, which they consider part of their motherland. One Indian once told me that the Indian nationalists had not imagined that when they finally chased the British lion out of their country after two generations of effort, "a few fleas would remain." The tiny French enclaves did indeed go to India, after several years of negotiation. But the Portuguese Government has shown no similar inclination to give up the bits of territory it has in India. Rather, it has stood on a legal claim of sovereignty which it is prepared to test before the World Court. Unhappily for India, which has publicly renounced the idea of using force to "liberate" Goa, no means of denting Portugal's legalistic position have yet been found. I have the impression that when India urged its Western friends, Britain and the United States, to point out to Portugal the wisdom of withdrawing, they observed that they were nonaligned in this dispute between these two nations that were both their friends. How much this kind of response was appreciated in New Delhi, I can only guess; but the absorption of Goa is still plainly on India's list of unfinished business.

Another area in which India's policies have been dictated primarily by a sense of direct national interest is the northeast frontier region, where the borders of India and its protectorates march with those of Communist China. Since the Peking regime translated traditional Chinese suzerainty over Tibet into direct control, India has kept a particularly careful eye on the Northeast Frontier Areas of Assam (where Chinese maps still show the international frontier deep in what India regards as its territory), Sikkim and Bhutan (which Nehru has recently visited, Bhutan for the first time) and Nepal.

"Our interest in the internal conditions in Nepal has become still more acute and personal," Nehru told the Indian Parlia-

ment at the end of 1950, "because of the developments across our borders, to be frank, especially those in China and Tibet . . . Much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security."

I have mentioned these forthright positions not to challenge them, but to remind you that, like other governments, the New Delhi government is concerned first and centrally with the security of India — as it should be. Differences which a foreigner perceives between India's blunt positions on these issues and its postures in wider world affairs stem, it has seemed to me, from the fact that India rarely has regarded its own national interest to be clearly on one side or the other of the biggest conflict of our age, the cold war. Rather, India has approached many of these wider problems from an ideological point of view emerging from its pre-independence position.

For example, the Indian intelligentsia who found imperialism bad in their own country have continued to look at many world power issues as issues of colonialism — colonialism which by its nature is bad. We should remember, of course, that Indians normally understand colonialism in the terms in which they experienced: the domination or control of Asian and African peoples by Europeans, or, more simply, of colored peoples by whites. Colonialism and color-consciousness are closely linked. (Within Indian society, too, there is color-consciousness, as is testified by the matrimonial advertisements in newspapers that seek or offer prospective brides whose skin is the desired "wheat-colored," rather than darker. But in world affairs Indians' emotions are linked to the colored peoples rather than to the whites).

It is an important part of the Indian conviction that many of the colored peoples of the world, including the Indians, had magnificent civilizations in ancient times, in medieval times and right down to the industrial revolution, but then fell behind the rest of the world as they came under the domination of the newly advanced Western white nations. It would follow that the only way in which they can now catch up — a fond ambition — is to

break through the predominance of power and control that has been established by the white races.

Any Indian would recognize in the statement I have just made a gross oversimplification; but also, I believe, a kernel of truth that has powerfully affected attitudes. It is obvious that interracial clashes in the United States contribute to the stereotype of the white American trying to maintain his dominance at home — and abroad. What seems less obvious to many peoples is that by constantly describing the cold war as an East-West conflict, we are not only increasing the identification of the United States with these “white, Western” stereotypes, but we are actually helping the Soviet Union in its efforts to identify itself with the other side of the dichotomy, the “East,” or Asia. Considering these built-in images of the world, it is no accident that Indians have had a hard time equating the imposition of Communist regimes on Eastern European nations with their concepts of imperialism. Many of them call the troubles of the Slavs just another aspect of Europe’s long-continuing civil wars.

Besides strong feelings about colonialism and about race relations, a deep sense of Asianism helps shape Indian foreign policy attitudes. This is the idea that in our generation the renaissance of Asia is at hand, and that any step forward by an Asian people should be supported and applauded. This has been India’s attitude toward the struggles of Southeast Asian countries to get political freedom, and — at least until recently — it has seemed to be the main component of prevailing Indian attitudes toward China. Indians claim to know something about China. They point to the thousand years of cultural contact between India and China that made possible, among other things, the transfer of Buddhism into Eastern Asia. (But these contacts virtually dried up in the eleventh century, not to be resumed very actively until our day).

Many Indians interpreted the postwar revolution in China as a Chinese act of rejection of Western domination, a domination considered real even though indirect. The Chinese Communist movement was certainly the instrument of this rejection, these persons agree, but they judge the postwar changes as basically a Chinese

resurgence, and therefore part of the Asian renaissance. Recent developments — to which I have yet to refer — have caused quite a few Indians to modify their opinions, but these opinions have been important in the shaping of Indian policy attitudes to date.

Add to these views the belief widely found in India in what Nehru has called the “area of peace” idea, and you should have a clear idea of how many Indians look at the cold war. Nehru has stated repeatedly that neither capitalism (as he understands it — which I think may be a sort of 19th century textbook capitalism) nor Communism is suitable for India's conditions.

He recognizes that modern India has borrowed its major political institutions from the West, is culturally influenced by the West, and has its closest economic ties with the West, but he finds much that repels him in Western policies and institutions. On the other hand, he feels that the Soviets have something to offer India, for note the progress they have made in just forty years; perhaps India, too, by learning something from the Soviets, can be well up the ladder in another generation. But Nehru has only recently, in one of his rambling essays, predicted the eventual collapse of communism, on the ground that it does not sufficiently recognize the dignity of the human individual.

Feeling that there are virtues and also serious vices in both systems, and that both systems are backed by great power, Nehru and his associates have the view that India's danger is to get caught between the two systems. Prudence, they hold, dictates India's nonalignment with either bloc. They argue further that the chances of preventing war between the two blocs will grow as more areas of the world declare themselves to be uncommitted to either; that is, to be members of a third grouping, the “area of peace.” Because this seems the best path that India can follow in the quest for world peace — which Indians regard as essential if their country is to have a chance for political stability and economic development — many Indians argue it is a more important purpose than would be the effort to choose between the values of the West and those of the Soviet Union.

This posture has from time to time given India the opportunity, or responsibility, to help mediate cold-war disputes. It is interesting that this role corresponds in Indians' minds with that of the peacemaker in an Indian village who gains prestige because he has sufficient influence to mediate when other people quarrel, as they often do. Indians have regarded their contribution to the resolution of disputes in Korea and Vietnam, for example, as prestigious.

It is worth our looking, now, at how some of these Indian foreign policy concepts work to the advantage or disadvantage of the Soviet Union and of the United States. First, let me note that — from the Indian point of view — hardly any Soviet policy has so far cut athwart India's direct national interest, whereas American policies have repeatedly done so. When we say, for example, that we need the support of the Northern Tier countries and of Southeast Asia and of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization countries in order to prevent or repel Communist aggressions, many Indians are skeptical. They tend to look at these military alliances as evidence that the imperialist Westerner is finding new ways to return to control of parts of Asia. And the Soviets encourage this view, while pointing out that the Soviet Union and Communist China keep no military bases on the soil of West Asian nations.

More specifically, our Treaty alliances and the military assistance pact with Pakistan touched India at its most sensitive spot: the strengthening of its only visible rival. India has reacted vigorously. It has sought to maintain the military superiority over Pakistan that was determined at the partitioning of the old British Indian armed forces in 1947. As Pakistan has received jets from its American ally, India has bought more jets from other sources. Recently India has also, as you know, ordered an aircraft carrier from the British. And many Indians, saying they acknowledge that the United States did not intend to damage India's interests by giving military equipment to Pakistan, still blame the United States for their increased military outlays. In this, of course, they are encouraged by the Soviet Union, which has also sided up to India

with a more favorable stand (from India's point of view) on the Kashmir issue than the Western nations have heretofore adopted.

I have put the Indian view of American policies in Asia fairly strongly to suggest to you the emotions which get in the way of better understanding between the United States and India. Similarly, when colonial issues come before the Trusteeship Council or other organs of the United Nations the Indians are more likely to find the Soviets clearly on their side than the Americans. The Soviets had no African empire (Russian expansion had been westward, by land) ; they can afford to press for the precipitate liquidation of imperialism. We, however, committed to our European allies and, by now, recognizing the complexities of transfers of power, have stood on the general principle of self-determination but with what I would call realistic caution. We have often exercised a braking influence on the pace of change demanded by African nationalists, and this has often made Indians think the Americans are less sympathetic than the Soviets to the aspirations of colored peoples to be free.

I mention these points not on their merits, or in an attempt to analyze Indo-American relations. There are other facets of Indian-American relations we could examine — if that were our purpose today — to understand how it is that two countries with an almost uncanny capacity to irritate each other have, in spite of all, maintained quite effective relations since 1947. Indeed, I should say that Indian-American relations today are more understanding, and in many ways more fruitful, than they have been heretofore. But my purpose today is to point out why Indians have not automatically and vociferously chosen our side of the cold war, as we have often felt they should.

In thinking about why India should continue to be unaligned with either power bloc, let me come back to the special case of China. To all the Indians whose views I can remember having heard expressed, China means the mainland, Communist-controlled China. (The Formosan-based Government of the Kuomintang is considered discredited). I have said that in India there is a feeling China is important. Indians constantly argue that China's claims

to admission to the world community should be honored. China was the first country with which India signed the 'Five Principles' of peaceful coexistence. But, in my opinion, Indian opinion about China has of late become increasingly ambivalent.

It is not only the worry about Chinese penetration of Tibet and possible intentions toward the mountainous buffer areas between Tibet and India; the Indian Government has been bracing its defenses against pressures from that direction. Concern is also growing over the emerging stereotype of a China that by Communist methods is pushing ahead economically more rapidly than is democratic India. To the extent the Chinese succeed, some Indians fear that the image of a massive, vigorous Communist China will give aid and comfort to the Indian Communist Party and its friends. Since the 1957 elections, when the state of Kerala in southwest India elected a Communist-controlled legislature, more and more Indians — but perhaps still a very small part of the opinion-influencers — have come to feel that a powerful China will not necessarily be a friendly neighbor. Some Indians in public life now express these fears openly. As a generalization, however, the most that can be said is that there is more ambivalence toward China now than there was even a couple of years ago.

In a sense, the uncertain attitudes toward China reinforce those doubts about the Western powers and about Soviet Communism that have persuaded India that the policy of nonalignment is the most effective pattern of international relationships India could adopt. It is a pattern that Indians have also persuaded a number of other new nations in Asia and Africa to examine (and that it shares with Tito of Yugoslavia), and a pattern that has been found increasingly attractive by other countries. Even in 1947, just before India became independent, Nehru voiced this theme at the Asian Relations Conference. Addressing this meeting of unofficial personalities from all the countries of Asia (except Japan, which was then under Allied occupation, and including the Soviet Republics of Asia), he said: "The emergence of Asia in world affairs will be a powerful influence for world peace."

Eight years later India was one of the sponsors of the Bandung Conference, where African as well as Asian states were represented, and was still suggesting this course. At that time perhaps fourteen of the twenty-nine participants in the Bandung Conference could be described as nonaligned. Since then several of the other countries — Ceylon, for example — have shifted into the nonaligned category as contrasted to the viewpoint their spokesmen expressed at Bandung in support of positive identification with the nontotalitarian, democratic countries of the world. Surveying the postures adopted by the majority of the newer states of Africa as well as Asia, one has the impression that nonalignment — what in this country is often called neutralism, though that term is distasteful in India — is the prevailing posture of the emerging states.

You have asked me to comment today on the significance of India's leadership in Asian neutralism. The points we have been discussing suggest the active role India has been playing in this field. India was, after all, by far the most populous and fully developed of the countries which emerged from European colonial rule to political independence after World War II. This fact plus the extraordinarily dynamic leadership that has been given by Nehru, who symbolizes a great many of the aspirations of people in other Asian and African countries as well as in India, make it inevitable that India should take a leading role in this field despite constant protestations that it did not seek a position of leadership. Its spokesmen in the United Nations and elsewhere have often extended a big-brotherly hand to colonial peoples in Asia and Africa. And just as they have helped force the pace of political independence, they have encouraged new states to avoid entangling alliances.

Even though the role of India has been and remains extremely important, however, I sometimes think that Indians can overestimate their own influence on other countries in Southeast and Southwest Asia (and perhaps in Africa, but I don't know enough about conditions there to judge). I have the impression that many of these other countries also appreciate the idea of a noncommitted or unaligned "area of peace," that they are as concerned as India

is about postcolonial crises and new kinds of problems confronting them, and that they have been inspired by Ghandi and Nehru and are going the same road as India. Yet, they seem extremely anxious to make a visitor understand that far from being camp followers of India they would prefer to get credit for thinking for themselves and to speak for themselves.

Furthermore, there are increasing indications that the time is passing when India's voice does in fact speak for many others. Three years ago an Indian could say with conviction that Nehru and Krishna Menon were counseling Colonel Nasser. Today it would be a brave Indian who would suggest that Nasser is in any way dependent upon India's guidance. This may be reading a good deal into what seems to me to have been a subtle but significant change in the relationship between the leaders of India and Egypt. But, although the area of uncommitted nations remains, and may indeed be growing, India's earlier symbolic leadership of the area is being crowded now by the interests of other countries also coming to the forefront.

Now, how does all this concern the United States? I believe it suggests some of the realities which American policy can ignore only at its peril. One is that this concept of nonalignment is a fact — a fact which seems to fit local ideas of peace, of national interest, and of prestige. And it is a fact that is unlikely to evaporate just because other people in the world, including American policy-makers, do not believe it to be the most effective safeguard of peace.

We can observe, for example, how far the world has moved from the bipolarization of power that was almost complete just after World War II. In this year's session of the United Nations General Assembly, our country finds it no longer easy to rally a two-thirds vote on an agenda item that seems anti-Soviet to many Asian and African members. Considering the new nations likely to be admitted to the United Nations within the next five or six years, one can foresee a day in which the unaligned countries will have a real balance of power in the General Assembly. (This does not mean, of course, that issues between the Western Alliance

and the Communist camp will not continue to turn substantially on their respective power positions).

It should also be acknowledged, I believe, that the devotion to nonalignment does not mean that India and likeminded countries are Communist-inclined. There are domestic factors in India that seem to me to make the expansion of Communist influence in Indian states a distinct threat, but that is another subject. Sometimes, as we have seen, an unaligned position seems to support and get support from the Soviet Union more than the West. But India's posture of nonalignment in foreign affairs has, I believe, been developed in spite, rather than because, of the influence of Indian Communists on domestic politics. And nonalignment has at times irritated the Soviets (as in the Hungarian case) as much as at other times it has irritated Americans. The importance of nonalignment to Americans is the question it raises as to American strategic goals in relation to the nonaligned countries. It is easier, knowing where our allies stand, to shape our policies in relation to those countries. Does it follow, therefore, that the major object of our policy toward these uncommitted countries be to persuade them to join our alliances? Should our primary emphasis be on persuading, say, the people around Nehru to declare themselves in favor of the free countries that are trying to restrain the expansionist tendencies of Communist-controlled nations? Or is it more important in our long-run interests that the question of alignment or nonalignment be subordinated to problems of how these countries can achieve enough political stability and economic development to prevent internal collapse? Would that, in the end, be an even more effective strategy against the designs of the Communist powers?

I leave you with these questions and with my appreciation for your very close attention.

Thank you!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Doctor Phillips Talbot

Doctor Talbot, the Executive Director of the American Universities Field Staff, began Indian studies in 1938 under the auspices of the Institute of Current World Affairs. Since then he has spent about eight years in India and Pakistan on various assignments: as a student, as wartime United States Naval Liaison Officer in Bombay, as a *Chicago Daily News* correspondent, and as the American Universities Field Staff representative.

A graduate of the University of Illinois, he took later training at the London School of Oriental and African Studies, and holds a doctorate in International Relations granted by the University of Chicago. He has taught courses on India and Pakistan at the University of Chicago and at Columbia University.

Doctor Talbot has edited the Harris Institute volume titled *South Asia in the World Today* (written cooperatively with S. L. Poplai), *India and America*, which was published by the Council on Foreign Relations, and has also written many articles.