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Lincoln P. Bloomfield

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## **THE U. N. AND THE U. S. NATIONAL INTEREST**

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 23 January 1958 by  
*Doctor Lincoln P. Bloomfield*

Gentlemen:

I propose this morning to use you as guinea pigs. Like yourselves, I have only recently stopped flying by the seat of the pants, so to speak, and, in a scholarly setting, have been attempting to sort things out in a reasonably ordered and orderly way. Like many of you, my efforts for some years have been in the realm of tactics rather than strategy. Even policy-planning, in days and years of crisis, tends to become tactical and day-to-day.

My new assignment is to take a fresh look at the relationship between the U. N. and the U. S. national interest over a time span that sees ahead to the next three to ten years. This differs from my previous responsibilities primarily in its longer range character. But there is another even more profound difference. For eight months now, I have been looking out over the Charles River rather than the Potomac, and the contrast is tremendous. You will understand me when I say that much of this past eight months has been a necessary period of "brainwashing" in reverse; or, if you will, a trip through the decompression chamber. In this process some of our better bureaucrats-turned-scholars have gotten a nasty case of the bends, and I am sure it happens the other way round, too. Apparently, to change the metaphor, there is a definite gestation period for research, and nature cannot be rushed, but even now some things are beginning to fall into perspective.

It is far too early to announce any final results, however, so what I am about to do here today will show how thin is the veneer of scholarly respectability I have been so far able to acquire.

What I propose to do is to share with you some of the perspectives that have begun to take form in a re-examination of the strategic uses of the U. N. for U. S. foreign policy in the years immediately ahead.

I would like to do this in three stages: *first*, I shall sketch out the strategic background setting as it seems to shape up in retrospect; *secondly*, I shall attempt to define certain overriding policy objectives of this country for the years directly ahead; *finally*, I shall try to match up some present or potential U. N. capabilities against these strategic imperatives.

The first part — the background or strategic setting — needs to be drawn in with some care. In this field, as in any other, how you frame questions often can determine the answers to those questions. Here, I wish to pay special attention to changes in the situation which have posed, and will pose, special new problems for the United States in this field. This selective background picture divides into five primary facts.

The first fact is the “cold war” in the U. N., and the changes that extraordinary battle has undergone. From the outset it became apparent that all nations were going to pursue their own policies and beliefs in the U. N. on issues which they felt affected their vital interests. American interests centered around the desire to see the world settle down, in order that we might take up where we left off in 1941. The Soviet Union’s interests were, from an international standpoint, essentially destructive and revolutionary. The conflict broke out in the U. N. at once.

For many people, especially Americans, the conversion from prewar isolationism to full commitment had taken place in the best revivalist tradition. It was enthusiastic, a trifle flamboyant, optimistic, deeply sincere, and overlaid with powerful moral and religious feelings.

The appearance of the global power struggle in the U. N. came as a profound shock to many. The result has, of course, been

a profound and world-wide disappointment in the capacity of the U. N. to achieve its supposed ends and a generalized downgrading of the very concept of multilateral collaboration on common problems. But we know now that some of those supposed ends were unrealistic in the extreme. There was no future for the expectation that the qualities of violence, power, and conflicting ideology could somehow be totally eliminated from the world scene. False illusion was, in this case, followed by equally hollow disillusionment. The U. N., by its very nature, has constituted a well-lit stage on which the Great Powers have acted out the drama of conflict which goes by the name of the "cold war."

I shall not go into detail, but within a very short time the two superpowers stood in hostile confrontation within the U. N. as well as outside. This fact alone tended to paralyze all the functions of the U. N. that depended on cooperation between these two. And if the U. N. could not force cooperation, neither could it punish lack of cooperation.

The U. N., in essence, consists of three things: a number of sovereign states; a written charter; and some machinery, whose use is purely optional. Now, these three elements can and do fuse into a higher order of purpose and action, but *only* when leadership is explicitly furnished to define and uphold a specific common interest. The U. N. *by itself* was, of course, incapable of any action to stop the Russians or punish the Russians when this meant an action which the U. S. and its allies were themselves unable or unwilling to take.

Even in this stalemate the principles of the Charter, and such machinery as the majority of nations was willing to use, were applied to the "cold war." U. N. action played a significant role in getting Russian troops out of Iran in 1946, in ending the communist guerrilla attack on Greece, and in throwing back the communist invasion of South Korea. In a more marginal sense, the U. N. was instrumental in terminating the Berlin Blockade

and in keeping the spotlight of world condemnation on the Soviets for their rape of Hungary in 1956. It was not much, but it was a faithful mirror of the degree of will and capacity of the Powers to take overt action in the growing deadlock.

The presence of the Soviets and the Americans under one roof posed a novel problem for Western diplomacy. It meant that during a period when the U. S. was struggling to organize a world-wide defensive coalition against the communist threat, it had to meet and negotiate with its allies in the presence of the enemy. The U. N. was the one place where we continuously met the Russians in the company of the entire Free World. Thus, each issue and each vote came to represent a separate test of Free World unity.

During the period 1946-1952, it was commonplace to achieve votes on important East-West issues with only the Soviet bloc in opposition. But, as time went on, Free World unity was put under an increasing strain by the growing split between what we might call North and South on issues arising primarily in the colonial field. Still, the alliance was held together, and at times it was even cemented by such Soviet actions as the Berlin Blockade, the Korean attack, and the generalized attitude of implacable hostility.

Since 1952, however, the visible nature of the communist threat has seemed to change, and the effect has posed acute new problems for the West. Starting with the 19th Party Congress in that year, even while Stalin was still alive, the decision was apparently taken to substitute for the military battlefield the arena of political and economic warfare. The tone and mode of Soviet diplomacy in and out of the U. N. began to change. From an embattled and hostile minority, the classic pose of Soviet Russia, the Soviets set about to create a new image that had three facets: a successful system of organization and production; a world-wide "anti-war" movement; and a source of verbal and tangible support

for countries striving to reduce their political, economic, and cultural dependence on the West. Whether this shift was purely a tactic to buy time until nuclear parity could be achieved is, for our purpose, unimportant.

The political effect was profound, and it came at a time when the bipolar political world itself was beginning to splinter. As the purely military component of power became the background rather than the substance of politics, forces within both the two coalitions began to assert their freedom of maneuver and to move toward positions independent of the two leader states. Britain, India, Yugoslavia, Poland, Egypt, perhaps China and Germany — these and others suddenly began to merge as foci of new leadership and of potentially independent directions. Clearly, the rest of the world was changing — and the U. N. was changing with it.

This leads to the second great fact in recent history. It has been given a number of names, but it is summed up by three of them: "Revolution of Rising Expectations"; "Neutralism"; and "Anticolonial Revolution Against the European West." All three forces were rapidly coming to full flower in the great arc stretching from North Africa across to Polynesia. This great rip tide of nationalism and of explosive economic and social demands flooded in even while Western military defenses were being hurriedly girded against the Soviet military threat. The result, both in and out of the U. N., has been that Western success in mobilizing the noncommunist world became increasingly dependent on the stand which Western nations adopted on issues of primary importance to the peoples of that third world — issues not of capitalism versus communism, or of European settlement, but colonialism, self-determination, economic development of underdeveloped territories, racial discrimination, and the like.

The U. N. Charter, in one way or another, calls for practically all of the things which this group of countries seek. We

may think of them as hopes rather than legally-binding commitments to action. But there are approximately 45 countries out of 82 in the U. N. today which, for one reason or another, see these as the crucial issues, and which put the U. S. to the test in regard to them with increasing frequency. Often the issue is purely symbolic, as in some of the debates with heavy racial overtones or in seemingly pious wishes for the ultimate independence of nonself-governing territories. But politically speaking, they can have the force of high explosives. And it is in the U. N., above any other place, that these issues take concrete shape in the form of resolutions and action programs in which Russian and American performance is constantly made the measure for a host of other attitudes.

My impression is that this country has done remarkably badly in this battle, given the many initial advantages possessed by our side. The reasons for this are several. Cheap promises of all-out support are vastly easier for the Russians to make than for us. For one thing, we have to consider our NATO relations on every single colonial issue that confronts us; for another, we take Assembly resolutions very seriously, even though they are not legally binding. Also, the legacy of resentment against White Europe is not something America itself can escape. But it must also be said that to some observers American diplomacy often has seemed inflexibly focused on the Soviet military threat, paralyzed by economy-mindedness, and incapable of getting off the defensive by offering new and appealing pathways of action to the rest of mankind.

The net effect of this development has been a general deterioration in this country's relations, both in and out of the U. N., with the underdeveloped, neutralist and anticolonial countries of Asia, Africa and, to an increasing extent, Latin America.

In this situation, the way we have restructured the U. N. itself has added to the American dilemma. It was the U. S. that

urged an ever greater role for the General Assembly (where each nation, however small, has an equal vote), in order to Offset the impotence of the Security Council. This was done largely, if implicitly, to enhance the capabilities of the U. N. for military collective action against the communist world. But those capabilities have, if anything, deteriorated inside as well as outside the U. N. The Assembly has, as a consequence, become the prime political forum for that third world which stands aside from the East-West confrontation and pursues its own goals of political independence, economic improvement, and racial dignity.

This, then, is the second paramount fact about the U. N. — the conflict between North and South, if you will, which cuts right across the East-West conflict and makes its own powerful demands on American diplomacy and initiative, while offering heaven-sent opportunities for the Soviets to sieze and hold the political initiative.

The third background fact is a function of the military situation. It is commonly believed that the anticipated military function of the U. N. lost its future when the Soviet Union and the U. S. failed to agree on a formula for contributing forces to the Security Council for enforcement action. Given the types of situations in which enforcement action would have actually been considered — Korea, Hungary, Suez — it is clear at once that the lack of a formula, like the use of the veto, merely reflected the overall political cleavage.

In 1950, the U. S. sponsored the "Uniting-For-Peace Resolution," under which the General Assembly can recommend the same sorts of emergency actions which the Security Council is supposed to be able to order. Advance commitments have been as scarce here as under Article 43.

I would like to suggest that there has been a rather fundamental defect in our thinking about the military uses of the U. N. The notion of collective security which looks for an abstract commitment to fight anyone, anywhere, anytime, on call of a majority,



is not a legitimate expectation, given the present lack of a true world community. Such collective security against the Soviet Union as has been achieved has been through regional and other special organizations where a community of purpose exists based on a community of specific interests.

The real life military situation between the Soviets and ourselves has, of course, been a growing stalemate in which the freedom of each side for military action has been steadily narrowed. The political *status quo* of the West is anathema to the Soviets, and the territorial *status quo* of world communism is unacceptable to us. Yet, as general war becomes an increasingly unattractive proposition for both sides, the *de facto* line between the two worlds has become relatively inviolate. When it is crossed, as in Korea, the entire world recognizes it as a profound violation of the peace, and counteraction becomes politically feasible. Even India and Egypt voted, initially, to oppose the communist aggression in Korea. In Hungary, on the other hand, world-wide counteraction was politically quite impossible even if the U. S. had been willing to lead it — which we were not.

The U. N. military potential has followed the trend of weapons development and military policy among the Great Powers. The U. S. has, on all the evidence, seemed to adopt a policy of renunciation of force in resolving political differences. Steps that could lead to general war are explicitly avoided. We have applied this to ourselves as a self-denying ordinance, as in the case of Communist China, the Berlin Blockade, the crossing of the Yalu, Indochina, and, most recently, Hungary. Needless to say, in the Hungarian situation the U. N. would have been able to do something militarily only if the U. S. itself had been willing to do something militarily. The decision at the highest level of American government was that we would not take the risk, whatever expectations we may have aroused in the past.

We have also applied this policy to our friends, as in the Suez crisis of 1956. American motives toward the Israeli-British-

French invasion of Egypt were uncommonly mixed. But the President was being entirely consistent in refusing to lend himself to a local military action that could lead directly to world war, however great the provocation that animated our allies. A significant result of the Suez fiasco is the realization that both the U. S. and, it might be added, the U. S. S. R. are actively exercising a veto over military action by third parties that might commit them to an expanding and potentially uncontrollable situation. This last fact has great significance for U. S. foreign policy, and for the ways it can — and should — use the U. N. in pursuit of national policy objectives.

This leads to fact number four in the background. It is often forgotten that, apart from the “cold war” and the anti-colonial revolution, all nations, like their individual citizens, have their traditional and continuing problems and differences, acting and reacting in the context of an ongoing and dynamic political life. One consequence of this continuation of life as usual, so to speak, is that disputes among nations over territories, boundaries, minorities, trade practices, and the host of other elements that traditionally make up the fabric of international relations have gone on and periodically reached the point where third-party intervention becomes necessary. Some cases in point are the Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir; the Palestine case in all of its ramifications, including the new issue of the status of international waterways; India versus South Africa, over Indian minority rights and racial discrimination; Greece versus the United Kingdom, over Cyprus; Indonesia versus the Netherlands, over West New Guinea. Each has the potential of “going critical.”

As Suez illustrated, a non-East-West dispute can very quickly pose life-and-death questions for the entire human family. The control rods of this particular pile, to continue the metaphor, are now held by an international brigade of U. N. troops. The chain reaction can start again out there, but the world is meanwhile buying time with the help of a variety of U. N. instrumentalities

for pacific settlement, including U. N. E. F., the U. N. Truce Supervision Organization, the Secretary-General, and Egypt's declarations to the U. N. about the uses of the Canal. If Kashmir should be the scene of renewed fighting, and if the Soviet Union backed India and we backed Pakistan, the chances of a direct Soviet-American confrontation would be that much greater, given the geography and the stakes.

The U. N. role in all these cases has been accentuated by the American disinclination to become involved in intrafamily disputes in the free world. Whenever possible, we have preferred to leave them to the U. N. It is among this range of issues, primarily involving noncommunist nations, that U. N. machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes has been brought into play. It is here, for example, that some few steps have been taken to submit disputes to legal adjudication, however feeble these steps may have been. And it is here that the opportunities for involvement in a general war perhaps become greatest as the chances of deliberate East-West hostilities diminish.

The fifth and final background fact is another consequence of the truism that life goes on, continuously presenting us with problems, inspirations, challenges, and opportunities in areas that have nothing to do with the "cold war," colonialism, or any of the revolutions and religious wars of our epoch. I refer to the whole realm of life where man as man confronts nature as nature. The U. N. and the specialized agencies have done good and important work in this realm, which only time forbids me from cataloguing here. As the "space age" comes upon us, it may well be that the most important thing the U. S. could do — both as a community of human beings and as a nation seeking to ensure its future security — would be to press vigorously for a U. N. regime for the control and utilization of outer space for peaceful purposes only. Because of time limits, I can only urge that this fifth fact be kept in perspective as we move on to complete our analysis.

I have taken great liberties with a highly complex situation in order to bring out, in this limited time, what seem to me the prime elements in the background picture. How do we relate this set of facts to the development of U. S. policies over the next few years? One prefatory word is necessary. Unquestionably the very existence of the U. N. and the profound impact it has had on world-wide opinion and action have given an extra dimension to the world of diplomacy. For the purposes of our inquiry here, however, I am going to disregard this dimension and, in effect, look at the U. N. as strictly two-dimensional. My approach is consciously based on the premises of U. S. foreign policy rather than the premises of the U. N. itself. In order that we can get as clear a picture as possible of the true relationship, we must ask what some of the overriding purposes of American foreign policy are today and what help the U. N. might be in achieving those purposes. This is, of course, another way of inquiring what the national interest is with respect to the U. N.

To keep our discussion relatively simple, I must bypass a great deal of reasoning and argumentation and spell out what I consider our most acute operational policy objectives. For purposes of this argument, I shall stick to those directly relevant to the paramount political and military crisis of our age. I shall take advantage of my command position here to suggest my own definitions, which are, of course, by no means all-inclusive. In doing so, I shall try to avoid generalities so far as possible, and shall try to limit objectives to those I believe to be realistic in a foreseeable time span. Prefacing all that follows is the overriding and obvious objective of *securing the kind of world in which we can cultivate our own society without fear of harm or disruption from the outside*. Everything else falls within this governing purpose.

These, then, are the objectives for the United States:

1. Reduce the generalized threat which Soviet communist power presents to the U. S. and Western society; this means —

- a. to reduce Soviet capabilities of inflicting intolerable physical damage upon us.
  - b. to moderate Soviet intentions.
  - c. to limit and, if possible, reduce the present international support for the Soviet Union.
2. Reduce the possibility of a general war developing by a chain of inadvertent circumstances.
  3. Find means of limiting warfare, if it does break out.
  4. Ensure, in the event of general war, that we rally maximum political support to our side, in order that we may fight with clear consciences and have the best chance of organizing the postwar world in an acceptable way.

With regard to 1-a, *Soviet military capabilities*, the U. N. has in fact no more to bring to bear than the U. S. and a few others are willing to provide: at the moment, it adds up to nothing; in the event of an all-out Soviet aggression, it probably would add up to everything. The question is not really meaningful because of the nature of the U. N., which, except in limited ways, possesses no tangible power or life outside that furnished by its most powerful members. The one concrete utility of the U. N. in limiting Soviet military capabilities in the foreseeable future lies in the variety of forums it can provide for negotiations on limitation and regulation of armaments. Specifically, the aim is to reduce the possibility of a surprise attack which might overwhelm a nation's retaliatory capabilities. This is the current focus of U. S. policy, and I believe it should be pursued relentlessly and without ever giving up hope.

Realistically, disarmament negotiation may be viewed, at root, as bilateral between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. But the

wide choice of negotiating means and devices should not be discounted. The provision of a neutral U. N. corridor was most helpful when Russia wanted to talk privately with us about liquidating the Berlin Blockade. On balance, the U. N. can affect Soviet capabilities only indirectly by furnishing a negotiating vehicle.

Objective 1-b, *affecting Soviet intentions*, is more complex. At its least complicated level — military intentions — Soviet policy since Korea seems to have consciously excluded overt military aggression in favor of the far more profitable and acceptable techniques of political and economic warfare. I have heard Secretary Dulles on several occasions say that if it were not for the U. N., we would be in World War III. I believe he had in mind, at least in part, the deterrent effect of the commitment taken by eighty-one (81) nations — including the Soviet Union — to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Perhaps the chief significance of this prohibition is the assurance that any warlike act will immediately be brought before eighty (80) other nations who have bound themselves by the same inhibition.

I would not compare that deterrent with the deterrent furnished by SAC. But we have seen too many examples of Soviet sensitivity to world public opinion to write it off as meaningless. It is not always remembered that the U. N. resolution condemning the U. S. S. R. in Hungary was supported by fifteen (15) Afro-Asian States, with none in opposition. The Soviets periodically stumble hard simply because of the difficulty of sustaining a soft line in the U. N. when the line outside hardens. Soviet troops are still in Hungary, but the Soviet reputation was gravely tarnished at a time when its efforts to woo the uncommitted nations were at a peak. On balance, the existence of the U. N. is probably a consideration; but it is hardly a prime factor in affecting Soviet calculations with respect to the profitability of military operations.

If, however, we think of intentions in the context of encouraging the evolution of Soviet society into something internationally more tolerable, there are additional dimensions that we may not have fully grasped. The U. N. certainly cannot significantly transform the nature of Soviet communism, but let me suggest a few ways in which it might create some favorable civilizing influences.

The U. N. is one of the few continuous contact points between East and West, and this fact may have special new significance in a changing situation. A generation of technicians and bureaucrats is moving into range of real power in Russia. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, for example, has served to expose many of them to an otherwise unavailable vision of the West. At some moment of possible choice in the future, it may have been indispensable to maintain bridges such as this. They furnish a way for the West to give continuous assurance that the Soviet Union can be readily accepted into a community of nations as a Great Power, although not as a Messianic and apocalyptic force. At the same time, U. N. membership can have the effect of sustaining and perhaps encouraging the independent identity of such satellites as Poland.

We should thus continue to create alternatives that may one day appear realistic and attractive to the Soviets. With or without the Russians, we should continue to work toward institutionalizing areas of common action. We have already done this in many nonpolitical fields such as health and technical assistance, which the Russians, for many reasons, ultimately came to join. In a different sense, this is true of disarmament. It may also be true with respect to peaceful uses of outer space. Evolution can stimulate evolution; but, conversely, the failure of the free world to grow and mature can be a signal for renewal of the most unacceptable kinds of developments in the Soviet world. I would not overrate the capacity of the U. N. to affect the nature of the Soviet system, but I would say that if Russian communism

is in a period of deep-rooted ferment the West should not neglect any external influences that may be constructive — and the U. N., properly viewed and employed, may be one such influence.

There is one final dimension that, for convenience, I place under the “intentions” heading, although it is not directly related. The U. N. is a demonstration and testing point for the unity of the free world. As that unity sharpens, Soviet estimates have traditionally seemed to become modified. Conversely, Western disunity encourages the Soviets to calculate their opportunities as more promising. The U. N. has sometimes become an embarrassment to us when it was used as a place for airing “dirty Western linen.” It is, by the same token, a place where the Russian can stimulate Western disunity. The simple answer is for us to pick up our marbles and walk off — but this, of course, is not only wholly undesirable but wholly unrealistic. The net effect, by any educated calculation, would be to leave approximately half the free world in a Russian-dominated U. N. — apart from its total unacceptability to the American people, who show consistent support for U. N. membership in poll after poll.

To live successfully in the kind of U. N. that has developed, the U. S. must do a number of new things. First, we must be prepared to go a great deal further than we have with our friends on issues which are of great political importance to them but of only slight importance to us. I have in mind essentially procedural issues, such as: elections, minor budget differences, composition of committees. These have been the source of perhaps more interallied friction than any substantive policy issues — apart from the Suez case — except, possibly, the issues of Chinese representation. On these procedural issues, we might better keep U. S. prestige disengaged and save it for the big ones.

We should also plan to exist gracefully in an occasional minority position on some issues where we genuinely differ, rather than insisting on having our own way, or going over the heads



of friendly delegates, or threatening retaliation — however subtly. In short, it means more perceptive and more truly democratic leadership on our part and far less pretended omniscience — based, so far as I can see, not on necessarily superior wisdom but, at least primarily, on greater material strength.

Objective 1-c is to reverse — or, at least, *to limit the trend of international political support for the Soviet Union*. This support is coming primarily from the underdeveloped, neutralist, anti-colonial countries and territories of the world. We spoke earlier of some of its causes; it is not at all clear that actions of ours can wholly reverse this tide until it has run its course. Nevertheless, it is here that the battle is being fought. I don't think we want to fall into the fallacy of the "belly communism theory," considering the number of well-fed intellectuals who tend to lead communist movements, but we want to find ways to divert local forces of discontent into constructive channels. To do this, we must furnish incentives for native leadership to harness the blind force of nationalism to tasks of building, rather than the paths of destruction and hate that are so often followed.

The prime factor here is economic. I would not want to predict our conclusions as to the proper amount of international economic assistance that should be channeled through the U. N., but — even apart from the vitally important question of financing — there are profound psychological factors involved. Here, as with interallied relations, the style and sensitivity of American diplomacy can be crucial. We cannot disregard such subtle factors as the way we handle the legacy of bruised feelings left by centuries of Western claims to racial superiority; or, the understanding with which we meet the ambition of Asians or Latin Americans to catch up, to become industrialized, to be less dependent on a peasant economy that promises only more of the same human misery and poverty.

The U. N. happens to be the one place where all of these tensions and claims and expectations come into focus in full view

of virtually all nations of the world. The uncommitted nations have found their place in the sun in the U. N., where the concept of legal equality of states offers them the self-respect and the dignity which they seek. Above all, it furnishes them with a parliamentary strength that is entirely disproportionate to the amount of real power they command in the world. Their new power is used primarily to bring before the rest of the world the ambitions and grievances about which they feel strongly.

The same opportunities to exploit this situation exist for us and for the Russians, but — taking all the evidence into consideration — the one which will ultimately succeed is the one which most successfully relates own interests to *their* interests, *their* aspirations, and *their* goals. What do they seek? Freedom from foreign domination; economic assistance — specifically, grants and low-interest loans for economic development and fair capital investment; protection of their exports from fluctuations in world prices; racial equality; freedom for remaining Western colonial possessions; international recognition of human rights — in short, equality with the rest of the world.

Some of these are things which we believe in, too; others are borderline; some are merely vague symbols. Most of these issues present us with exquisite political difficulties both at home and abroad. But if this analysis is correct, it suggests that we have not yet grasped the really crucial significance of the U. N. as an agency to reach these people on the issues of vital significance to them. In many cases, as with some of the colonial issues, it would be easier if we never had to stand up and be counted as between Europe and Asia or Africa. But, since we do, the logic of the situation demands that we find better ways than we now have to identify ourselves with these countries and their problems as those problems become issues in the U. N. setting.

The unity of the free world, which we discussed earlier in terms of our alliance systems, has a broader meaning here. In

the continuing political warfare with world communism, the ultimate test of American policy will be its ability to hold together the industrialized half and the underdeveloped half, and find new avenues to cooperation and unity. Where the U. N. provides the only agency acceptable to the latter half, it must be utilized to the utmost.

Objective 2 is to reduce the possibility of general war developing by a chain of inadvertent circumstances. It may well be that this should be the first of our priority objectives, practically speaking. If general war by design is not a lively possibility, barring a dramatic shift in the power equation, war by inadvertence becomes the chief object of concern for responsible statesmen.

Suez showed the practical operation of this country's determination to minimize risks of general war. That being so, the most profound significance of U. S. Suez policy has not really been faced up to, which is this: to the extent that we rule out remedies by force for the legitimate grievances of states, to that extent we shall be obliged to find other, nonviolent means for the solution of those problems. It is a simple problem in physics: as we hold the lid on, the temperature rises; and, as the temperature rises, the pressure increases. This fact has confounded all past human attempts to outlaw war; all of them failed to provide means for peaceful change so that the dynamics of international political life might be peacefully rather than violently expressed and contained.

It is here that the U. N. has possibly the most vital task in the future in terms of our national security. This country — and I mean its political and intellectual leaders — is going to have to attach a wholly new order of importance to the realm of peaceful settlement of disputes and means for peaceful change. These are now roughly in the same category as Mother's Day and the need for new schoolhouses: no one speaks against them, but our high command has so far by no means concentrated the

same intensive effort here as for our military preparations. Even when our very noses are rubbed in the problem, we, so far, have not seemed to be able to generate the common sense and the political muscle that is increasingly going to be needed on this front.

Let me illustrate. With all respect to the President and his Secretary of State, the classic example of American error was, in my judgment, furnished by the so-called "Eisenhower Doctrine for the Mid-East." It is not that a U. S. "Keep Out" sign in the area was not worth posting in front of the Red Army, but that this was our *only* real suggestion for remedying a whole set of local situations which were not primarily of the East-West variety, a forcible solution to which we had just foreclosed. The basic sources of violence — starting perhaps with something so specific as the Palestine refugee problem — have been once again passed over, and it can confidently be predicted that the next local explosion will be that much more potent. There is no question but that a crash effort is going to be needed to break through into new ground in the pacific settlement of dispute and peaceful change every bit as much as in the field of missiles — perhaps more so, because the missiles will be used only when diplomacy fails. If war is too important to be left to the generals, the specific multilateral techniques of peace are surely too important to be left to the legal theorists and the political scientists.

All logic, then, points to the need for greatly expanded efforts to eradicate the causes of international instability — and the political, the economic, and other causes as well. Here, the U. N. offers us a wealth of tested and thoughtfully conceived instrumentalities, and the future may well rest on the initiatives which the U. S. takes to move the stubborn political and territorial disputes of the world toward solution by diplomatic, conciliatory, legal, and other similar means. Wholly apart from the Soviet problem, the world is full of situations which, if left unchecked, could spell major trouble for us and for world peace as a whole.

Indeed, our motivation in working with great purpose and effort on the chronic causes of instability and friction should not be seen as arising only from the Soviet threat. Granted that in moments of pessimism it sometimes seems impossible for us to justify to ourselves any decent or sensible or humane international act on its own merits alone. But refer back for an instant to the general statement that preceded our catalogue of policy objectives. There is every justification for devoting more than the present lip service to the profound problems of international order, completely apart from the Soviet — U. S. context. The justification is that these problems threaten our ability to fulfill the internal promise of our own society. Our own role in the world must be more than that of a powerful negative force. Our own development as a people has become dependent on the development of other peoples in the direction of stability and satisfaction with the fairness of the existing order. If the threat of small wars mushrooming into big ones gives that continuing task added urgency, so much the better.

Perhaps the most disabling political factor in world peace today, apart from the “cold war,” is the colonial problem. Until it is finally liquidated, there will be friction and hatred. Afterwards, to be sure, there will be other problems — such as keeping new, weak nations afloat and in the camp of freedom — but if any one thing is true it is that the unsolicited presence of foreign rulers and military forces on the territory of a nation is guaranteed to bring trouble, whether in Cyprus, or Algeria, or, for that matter, Hungary, or even Okinawa. The U. N. provides the only agency through which the U. S. can continually keep pressure on its allies to move toward freeing their dependencies, while at the same time keeping pressure on the anticolonial forces to act in moderation; and, in general, ensuring that this vital process of evolution stays peaceful, moves at a proper pace, and stays out of the hands of those who would cynically exploit it. The role of “middleman” is at times excruciating, but it is unavoidable for us and indispensable for responsible solutions.

There is a great need for new formulas here that will satisfy these substantive requirements, while easing the burden on the U. S. — which, even more than its allies, must keep the overall world situation in focus. There are no “gimmicks” here, but there may be legitimate new modalities — perhaps like the new U. N. Commission on Africa — which we can use to improve the whole atmosphere of the colonial debate.

Objective 3 is to find means of limiting warfare, if it does break out. For our purposes here the general military issue has three parts: (1) the explicit avoidance of direct military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U. S. (which I have already spoken of); (2) the practical problem of keeping such a confrontation within tolerable bounds, if it happens; (3) the problem of keeping outbreaks within the noncommunist world from spreading into a general war.

Take, first, the case of East-West hostilities of a local variety. The scope of such hostilities would undoubtedly take its shape from the estimates which each side made of the intentions and capabilities of the other. Given the will to keep such hostilities limited, the U. N. can then offer the advantages it did when the U. S. unilaterally decided to resist the Russians in Korea.

These advantages are several. First, the U. N. furnishes one means of securing maximum world-wide political support. Such support is indispensable to prevent us from isolating ourselves from world opinion and from losing that sense of legitimacy and moral right without which we as a people could not, in my opinion, sustain a military effort. The second advantage is the exploitation of the commitment to assist the Organization in any action it takes in accordance with the Chapter. With the constitutional development of the U. N., this no longer has to mean “action” in the legal sense of Security Council enforcement. Even marginal offers of bases, transit rights, or even “a sharpshooter on a camel,” can pay heavy dividends in demonstrating the breadth of international disapproval of a Soviet act of limited aggression. The

technical difficulties of a unified type of command are great, but it has been demonstrated that they can be overcome.

The other situation, which seems the more likely one, deals with military hostilities not directly involving the U. S. or the U. S. S. R. I have already enumerated some of the likely candidates for this sort of local explosion in the future. I have also made reference to the U. N. Emergency Force, which, literally overnight, provided a means of separating the combatants in Egypt — making trained manpower available to supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal of troops — and now stands as a guarantor against any but the most reckless renewal of hostilities between Egypt and Israel. This was possible only because a conscious decision was made to exclude great power contingents from the force. In this way, the wound was cauterized and made relatively sterile. Great Power participation would, at best, have made the force inoperative, and, at worst, precipitated just the kind of direct confrontation on the ground which we wished to avoid.

There are many possible types of U. N. forces that might move into such trouble spots before or after hostilities. Their effective utility probably hinges on the exclusion of the Great Powers — limiting the conflict literally, as well as figuratively. Perhaps the most practical way to bypass the budgetary difficulties, which are great, would be to set up a training command — possibly renting a Swedish or Swiss training facility — and, with a small permanent cadre, rotate in and out selected units from the member countries, which would then be held in reserve at home. Perhaps the most important point is that we should stop judging the U. N. and its potential by a sterile and unrealistic image of collective security through a world police force, an image whose cost is world government which we ourselves seem to find wholly unacceptable. Realistically, the practical military contribution of the U. N. in this age doubtless lies in the kind of limited “brush-fire” prevention and clean-up squad which I am describing. Its

importance may be absolutely critical in preventing or pacifying another outburst like Suez.

The force I have in mind is not a fighting force, although it can defend itself against small-scale attack. It is a force in aid not of full-scale military action but of peaceful settlement procedures, either before or after fighting actually occurs. Perhaps it should be called the U. N. Corps for Observation and Patrol — UNCOP. We could spend the entire hour discussing it. It is enough to say, however, that it seems to offer a ready-made means for dealing with those situations which call for pacification procedures on the spot, but where U. S. or Russian involvement would spell nothing but greater trouble.

Our final objective deals with the uses of the U. N. in a general war situation. We are prone to believe that general war will mean the end of the U. N. This may be so — but if all our weapons are to be brought to bear, the U. N. umbrella could be a vitally important political weapon for legitimizing and maximizing a U. S. military response, just as it was in Korea. Certainly our war planning must not throw away this possibility, particularly if doing so would give the U. N. to Russia on a silver platter. There may be no postwar world to organize, but we must assume there will be. We must finally learn the lesson that war is a prelude to the politics of peace, not an end to all political problems. In this connection, I take a very dim view of proposals to expel the Russians and their satellites from the U. N. on the assumption that a total break is ultimately inevitable. Apart from all the other reasons for keeping contact, exposing Soviet policies to the light, and holding the U. N. together as a means of conducting the necessary business of nations, the U. N. could, at the very outset of a general war, provide a means for according legitimacy to non-communist representatives of the Soviet bloc and thus supply a vital political focus for the political aims of the war.

In conclusion, I repeat what I said at the outset. This analysis is fragmentary and incomplete, and, in the time available



to me, only some highlights could be touched upon. Perhaps the most that can be claimed for it lies in its suggestions for fruitful lines of action that seem worth exploring. But if it has any validity, it also strongly suggests that we may be prisoners of outmoded ways of thinking about and using the U. N.

Perhaps the Suez case of 1956 sums up much of what I have said about our peculiar misuse of the U. N. and of diplomacy itself. Throughout the period of intense and futile negotiations during the summer of 1956, we rigidly shunned any positive use of U. N. instrumentalities. Hard as it is to believe in the light of the subsequent disaster, our primary motive in avoiding such use throughout that period was to avoid any possible public discussion of the Panama Canal by association, as it were. Consequently, we relied exclusively on the so-called "London group." We thereby insisted on a forum that was unacceptable to Egypt. At the same time, we failed to avail ourselves of the wide range of U. N. possibilities, including appointment of a U. N. mediator; or a U. N. agent general to operate the Canal in the interim without prejudice; or a joint regime; or, at minimum, recognition that the Canal had international character. Reasonable proposals with heavy U. N. support could conceivably have altered Egypt's intransigence. When the British and French finally went to the U. N. in early October, it was, in retrospect, obviously to clear the way for unilateral action. Only when fighting broke out did we turn to the U. N. to stop it. And this was, of course, the one thing that the U. N. was able to do in any way — apart from its purely moral force and apart from outside, unilateral action, such as that taken in this case by the Russians and ourselves.

As I have shown, there may be extremely important ways of using the U. N. that are realistically supportive of our true concrete interests in the period now and immediately ahead. Some of the specific directions which I have pointed to must be set against the less useful shibboleths, stereotypes and symbols about

the U. N. that we still cling to — expressed in terms of universal collective security, the “misuse of the veto,” the need for rigid U. S. control over multilateral funds and programs, the popularity contest theory, and the persistent expectations about altruistic international behavior. The game is too important, and the stakes too big, to misuse any instrumentality that offers genuine opportunities to advance our national prospects and the prospects for a tolerable world around us.

## **BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH**

### **Doctor Lincoln P. Bloomfield**

Doctor Bloomfield received his B.S., M.P.A., and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard University in 1941, 1952 and 1956 respectively.

From 1942 to 1946, he served in the United States Navy, consecutively: in the U. S. S. RANGIER; as Officer in Charge of Navy V-12 Unit, University of Illinois; and in the Office of Strategic Services as Deputy Chief, Research and Intelligence Service, China Theater.

He was with the Department of State for the following year in these capacities: Assistant and, subsequently, Acting Executive Officer in the Office of Special Political Affairs; Staff Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs; a member of the Disarmament Staff; and Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs (responsible for policy planning on United Nation's problems).

Doctor Bloomfield is currently the Senior Staff Member at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Director of the United Nations Project.