

1957

## The Future of Japan

David N. Rowe

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

---

### Recommended Citation

Rowe, David N. (1957) "The Future of Japan," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 10 : No. 7 , Article 2.  
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol10/iss7/2>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu](mailto:repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu).

## **SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE READER**

**The material contained herein is furnished to the individual addressee for his private information and education only. The frank remarks and personal opinions of many Naval War College guest lecturers are presented with the understanding that they will not be quoted; you are enjoined to respect their privacy. Under no circumstances will this material be republished or quoted publicly, as a whole or in part, without specific clearance in each instance with both the author and the Naval War College.**

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW** was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits of the resident students at the Naval War College. Distribution is in accordance with BUPERS Instruction 1552.5 of 23 June 1954. It must be kept in the possession of the subscriber, or other officers eligible for subscription, and should be destroyed by burning when no longer required.

**The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or of the Naval War College.**

# NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

**Issued Monthly  
U. S. Naval War College  
Newport, R. I.**

## THE FUTURE OF JAPAN

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
on 24 April 1957 by  
*Professor David N. Rowe*

My subject for today is *The Future of Japan*. Although many questions can be raised about it, it is hardly a controversial topic as are so many others.

Now let us survey very briefly and topically the basic situation of Japan after its surrender in 1945, because everything in the future takes off from there. Japan in 1945 was quite tremendously changed — a country which it was hard to recognize if looked at from the point of view of only a few years before that time.

What was the basic situation territorially? Japan was reduced back down to her limits of 1868; it is a very small territory, about the size of the State of California. The population in the interval between 1868 and 1945, however, had increased somewhere between two and a half to three times.

The defense of Japan, once so highly elaborated — and, incidentally, such a large drain upon the productivity and the resources of that extremely energetic country — naturally enough at the time of her surrender had been reduced down to almost zero, and, of course, during the early part of the occupation they were entirely eliminated.

The economy of Japan was wrecked. It was twice ruined, as we all know from history: once, it was ground pretty much to a halt by the submarine warfare, which cut off the supply of raw materials and fuels for the factories and foodstuffs to the people; the second time it was burned down in great quantity by the B-29 bombing raids, which, in many cases, were burning

down factories not in operation because they had run out of fuel and substance. The economy at the time of the surrender was incapable of supplying the normal civilian needs of the country. Rehabilitation under the occupation was the only way in which the people could be kept from actual starvation. Even as late as 1946 (after the occupation began), the total economic production of Japan was only 24% of the average from 1934 to 1936, typical prewar years.

The internal polity, the internal government and social organization of Japan, were completely a question mark for the future. Some general signposts only had been erected by the Allies in connection with the surrender, having to do with such generalities as democratization, the elimination of supernationalistic propaganda, the elimination of supermilitarism, and a few things of that kind. Of course the idea was to avoid burdening the surrender with too much detail, which would make the surrender even harder to secure than it might otherwise have been. No one knew at the time of the surrender just what kind of a future political system the Japanese were likely to have, although the aims and interests of the Japanese Government in this respect had been generally indicated.

In its international affairs, at the time of the surrender, all of Japan's allies and friends whom she had counted upon — the Germans, the Italians, and, at one time, even the Soviet Union — were all gone. They either had been destroyed or reduced previously or else they had turned on her, like the Russians did by the unilateral abrogation of the pact of mutual neutrality. Japan at her surrender, therefore, was a series of unanswered questions — nobody knew quite what would happen. The Japanese themselves in many cases were very apprehensive, looking for the worst in many places and with fear of what the occupation would do even to the civilians.

In light of this very, very dangerous, weak and open situation of 1945, the post-surrender recovery of Japan from 1945

to 1957 has been brilliantly successful. This has been the result of a combination of factors and influences, both Japanese and external. I will take up the topics which I mentioned before, item by item.

The territory, of course, has remained essentially the same. However, we are witnessing now the beginning of efforts at recovery of lost territory. These efforts have extended in recent months and years in exactly the same geographical directions away from the heart of Japan as were taken by the Japanese in the nineteenth century, at the time of their coming into international relationship, when they began their original course of expansion that ultimately led them to their defeat.

In the northeast, they have attempted to make arrangements with the Russians for the restitution of small islands off the northeast coast of one of the main islands (without any success at the present time). To the southwest, they are making an increasingly interesting attempt to recover at least their rights of government in relation to the Ryukyu Islands — and, chiefly, Okinawa. Of course the methods by which they are trying to regain control over these territories, which were once an integral part of their territory, are quite different from what they could be in the nineteenth century. Instead of using unilateral occupation, or military takeover and conquest, the Japanese are now having to proceed entirely by negotiation plus that new weapon in international affairs that has come into such great prominence between the two World Wars and since the Second World War, namely, the weapon of propaganda; the weapon of the cold war; the weapon of persuasion, of political argumentation, of the use of popular pressures, and things of that kind. We find the weapon of propaganda employed particularly at the present time in connection with Okinawa, the outcome of which is yet to be seen in the future.

As far as population since 1945 is concerned, I would be so bold as to say that the single greatest disaster in modern Japan

is the tremendous population expansion. It is in many ways puzzling as to exactly why this latest population expansion continues in the face of the influences of modernization such as urbanization and industrialization. In Western countries these influences have brought about a voluntary decrease at least in the rate of population increases.

I won't try to analyze the psychological influences and social influences in great detail here, but I would like to suggest that since the war Japan has been involved in a total psychology of insecurity. One of the most primitive responses to the total psychology of insecurity — as is indeed seen in the most advanced countries of the world in times of war — is the maintenance of a high rate of biological replacement. I do not say this as an expert on population matters, and demographers may want to argue with me. But, in the United States and all Western countries during the great wars the replacement of population by abnormally high birth rates, and the peculiar phenomenon of the increase in the total proportion of male births during the time of war, are mysteries which the social scientists and biologists have yet to solve. It seems to me that this kind of an influence is very clearly at work in post-surrender Japan in face of the other influences in the direction of the reduction of high biological reproduction.

As far as defense is concerned, defense was initially the total responsibility of the Occupying Powers after Japan's surrender. We all know the recent history involving the creation of small Japanese defense forces in the face of the constitutional provision having to do with the total abjuration of war and with the denial of any armed forces in the future. We must assert, of course, that this constitutional provision was not Japanese-oriented. It did not originate with the Japanese people. It originated with the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, and it was his suggestion that put that provision into the Japanese constitution.

This is just another illustration of the many instances in which the present of Japan (and probably the future of Japan) have been determined by a unilateral action taken from the outside. This was not always in complete harmony, shall we say, with what would have been done by the Japanese people if given free rein to determine things for themselves. This is not a matter of the ascription of moral responsibility: I think it is just a matter of stating the facts. In general, in looking at Japan's future, there is always a conflict which has to be assessed between what the Japanese are forced to do or think they are forced to do and what they want to do or believe at the time they would desire to do.

At the present time, the reluctance of the Japanese to rearm seems to me to be a product of a variety of causes. The constitutional provision does not inevitably stand in their way. Again, when the opportunity was given to revise it out of existence last summer, and a vote was taken on the matter, as you know, the Japanese refused to do so. They thus have taken a position which cannot be explained on the basis of a complete change in mentality. I do not think they have changed their whole attitude toward military things just in the course of a few years of defeat and occupation. No, I think that their refusal is based upon a variety of influences. This includes the development of some pacifism, particularly in intellectual circles in Japan but not deeply rooted among the people, and the development of a neutralistic attitude which has been the result of the current cold war difficulty. It is rooted in a conflict between the normal Japanese positive attitude toward things, desiring to determine their own fate, and the external influences of the cold war rivalry which put them in the middle of a very unhappy sort of situation. These influences are all fighting with a tendency which I think is typified in the reaction of the mass of the Japanese people, by and large, to the establishment of small defense forces — particularly land forces. You find, for example, that at all points the quota for enlistments in the defense forces is very, very heavily oversubscribed, so to



speaking. There is no problem of compulsion involved here, for the Japanese people are naturally inclined in that direction. I think it is a matter on their part of waiting to see how a number of things come out before they go into a national rearmament program based upon an alignment with one side or the other in the cold war. What I am saying at this point is: at the present time, the future international alignment of the Japanese is not yet fully determined (I am going to go into this in more detail a little bit later on).

Perhaps the most brilliant sector of the post-surrender development has been in the economic field, where the Japanese have made an excellent recovery. This recovery is based upon the fundamentals of Japan: the fundamentals of low labor costs; adequate-to-excellent technologies; willingness to work hard; and organization which ranges from adequate to excellent. All of these apply to the typical Japanese productive system; that is, the import of raw materials, the processing thereof in Japan, and the export of considerable portions of the finished product — if not the vast bulk thereof — to the outside in order to keep the cycle of the import-export process going.

Throughout the occupation period, the increase of production was steady. Not only did the Japanese produce more goods, but their per capita real income suddenly increased from 1945 on. That is a very large and very important statement, because only on that kind of a basis could there be the other thing that has happened, which is a rather high rate of capital accumulation over the need for subsistence. This has made possible the constant increase in plant facilities, and thus has made possible the constant increase in production.

The internal regime in Japan is now in full possession of the powers of self-government. The political system which the occupation attempted to set up has reverted back somewhat under independence towards more typically Japanese ways of getting

things done. Of course this is what would be expected: a reaction of a simple cyclical or pendulum nature. The reaction was bound to have set in. The full acceptance and the high degree of cooperation with the occupation could hardly be expected to last indefinitely into the future — politically speaking, if only because the Japanese people were bound to reassert themselves in their rights of self-government and sovereignty and because they were also bound to revert back somewhat into their own ways of doing things.

This is seen in relation to both the national and local governments, where increasing degrees of centralization of power have been developed as over against the dissemination and dispersion of power which the occupation attempted to institute. It is also seen in the position of the bureaucracy, which is returning rapidly — or, at least, steadily — back to its previous position of domination in the government of Japan — a position of an oligarchic and perhaps originally of a feudalistic nature, involving the notion that well-educated and well-trained men are what is important in government, not laws and constitutions.

All of these developments are natural and should not be looked upon with any particular degree of apprehension. Any progress made in the direction of representative government of our kind, or in the direction of more individualism in government, and so on, are trends of foreign importation and not something indigenous to Japan. Therefore, we could not expect continuous devotion to them on the part of the Japanese people. As a matter of fact the constitution itself, written (as it was) by the occupation and handed to the Japanese, was typically foreign in one rather interesting and entirely unique way. I think, if I am correct, that this is the only modern state in which the first version of the constitution was written in a foreign language and not in the native language of the country. Of course their constitution was written in English, and then had to be translated into Japanese.

But translation and interpretation are two different things. Actually, some of the very words and terms written into the constitution by the American officials of the Supreme Commanders' Headquarters were so foreign that they were almost untranslatable into Japanese. Of course it is a fantastic truth that in spite of this the Japanese, with their unique ability at adaptation of foreign imports of all kinds, took the constitution and essentially managed to domesticate it during the years of the occupation. It is not surprising that since then the constitution has remained intact but that the practices which are involved in and under it, or that part of the constitution which is practice and not law, tended to revert back to their former nature.

As I said, these developments are not alarming. But there are some other more alarming developments, at least from an American point of view — and, of course, I speak here strictly from an American point of view. There is the position of the Communist Party in Japan: this position in formal politics is small. They have no large constituency; they never get massive votes; they have never managed to seat many people in the legislative body. But if its position in formal politics is small, I would say that the position of the Communist Party in Japanese society is increasingly important.

Again, this is perhaps not so much because of the inherent appeal that Communist ideology has for the Japanese; in fact, the contrary is true. It is more to be attributed again to the general feeling of insecurity that the Japanese have as to how the current cold war is going to come out. What is going to be the winning side is the question, because, of course, on that winning side the Japanese *must* be the next time. They were not on that side last time but they were on it during the First World War, and the contrast is only too obvious. So the Communist Party in Japan has a certain blackmail value and a certain intimidation value in Japanese politics. It has not made tremendous inroads

yet, but I think it is slowly gaining. We will talk about that a bit more later on.

In international affairs in general, Japan has been restored fully to the Community of Nations. The Peace Treaty of 1951 has been generally acceded to, and, in addition, they have now made their peace and gotten into normal relations with the Soviet Union. Particularly significant is the long, tortuous, and difficult process of readjustment with the new States of South-east Asia, including the Philippines and Burma. In these countries, of course, the Japanese War and Occupation left a legacy of terrifying problems. When you see the economic significance of these areas to Japan's trade, the fact of a political settlement becomes of prime importance. From a security point of view in international affairs, however, in spite of her coming back into full membership in the International Community of Nations, Japan is today entirely a security dependency, and she is a security dependency of the United States. This is not a happy situation for the Japanese in some ways, but in other ways it is.

When we talk about the "economic rebirth of Japan" and the "tremendous progress in economic reconstruction," we must remember — as in the case of Western Germany since World War II — that the economic development and growth, the increase in production, the rise in real wages, the investment of surpluses — all of these are related strongly to the fact that these countries do not any longer have to invest such a large part of their total income in military apparatus, in military preparation, in military manpower, and so forth. All of that which used to be such a drain on their productivity and on their economy they have gained, for they do not have to pay that out any more. Of course this is the net gain — and a very important net gain it is — in the economic field from military and security dependency upon other countries. Dependency after the surrender was inevitable; it could not be avoided. Therefore, the Japanese have

turned to it and begun to reap the profits of it in the economic field.

So much for a sketch of the situation as it now exists — and it has to be an adequate and impartial sketch.

With these guiding lines, let us now turn to look at the problems of the future. We will again take up most of the main points that we have already taken up in sketching the picture of the present.

The population is still the single greatest internal problem of Japan in relation to the ratio between territory, population and economic development. As to the future, of course, this leads to the question of whether the Japanese will again resort to territorial expansion on the basis of its supposed relationship to population. Must Japan's increasing population lead to a new territorial expansion? In a single word, it not only must not but it should not. Japan's population concentration has been cited as very high, but, in fact, it is not much higher than the population concentration of many other countries in the world today. As far as food is concerned, it has to be taken not as a matter of square miles but as square units of arable land. That is perhaps an oversimplified way to look at it because other resources are involved. In this respect, the Japanese position is clearly not so bad.

The prewar position of England and Wales was 1,141 persons per square kilometer of arable land. Compared to this, prewar Japan had 1,163 persons per square kilometer of arable land. That is only a partial picture and does not take all of the material resources into account, but it certainly is significant. Added to this is the fact that all the previous prewar expansion of Japan was no cure for the Japanese population problem in terms of the ratio between people and area. In fact, the expansion of Japan was used as an argument to justify and support the high rates in population increase. Of course the Japanese military and political people wanted "to have their cake and eat it

at the same time." At the same time that they were insisting that their population made expansion necessary, they also insisted that the necessity of expansion meant they must have large drafts of new manpower coming along all of the time. Thus, they were caught in a closed circle.

The Japanese expanded into areas in eastern Asia which provided them with no possibility of population relief on a migration basis. I say "no possibility." Where did they go? First, to Korea; then to Manchuria, Formosa and China. Of course China's figure is a figure of about half the population density per square kilometer as that of Japan, or, prewar, 504 persons per square kilometer of arable land. But the fact was that the Japanese people could not and would not migrate into Manchuria or any other part of China in great numbers — where the population was relatively low. The reason for this was that they could not compete with the native populations in those areas. The Koreans and the Chinese could underlive, so to speak, even the hard-working and extremely frugal Japanese farmer who had a higher standard of living in his home country than the Koreans or the Chinese ever had in modern times, or can anticipate having even in the near future.

The result was that there was no population relief by migration. The places into which the Japanese wanted to migrate would not accept them: North America, Australia, and places of that kind. So Japanese expansion was a matter of getting territory for the purpose of getting command over raw material resources and markets; then, importing those resources, processing them in Japan, exporting the finished products into the markets, and proceeding to do it all over again. It was this which allowed the Japanese population to expand two and a half to three times between 1868 and 1938, from an absolute figure back in the middle of the nineteenth century which was relatively stable. So territorial expansion for the purpose of relieving population pressure was only a partial answer, and, today, is seemingly an impossible

answer to Japan's population picture. The solution of this problem must come from the institution of birth control; it must come from the institution of free trade back and forth in the buying of raw materials and the selling of finished products.

Naturally, this leads us to consider the economic problem of the future. The economic problem is a problem of economic production. First, consider raw materials availability. Are raw materials less available to Japan now than in 1941? The answer is this: They are more available now than they were in 1941, but they are not available on a basis of actual control of the territories and not on a basis of purchase for Japanese currency, as was the case with Korean, Manchurian, Chinese and Formosan raw materials in the past. However, adequate supplies of foodstuffs, coal, oil, cotton, iron, and other metals are available, and have been available to the Japanese by purchase since 1945.

Of course this again brings up this whole question of what the trend of the world is today. Is the present peace — unquiet and unstable as it is — going to continue, a situation under which the Japanese can rely upon the normal channels of world trade? Or, must the Japanese — as they always did before — plan upon the inevitability of war? Well, nobody can be too optimistic about this. One can pardon the Japanese and understand them thoroughly if they feel utterly insecure in the present situation.

Now as to the problem of access to markets. This is a much more difficult problem. With raw materials, it is a matter of having the currency with which to buy them. People want to sell. The United States today is selling Japan a very large proportion of her raw materials: for example, cotton, coal, and also foodstuffs. Access to markets is much more difficult. Even in this country there are increasing moves to block out Japanese imports. This is economic and political nonsense. It is often urged that in this respect the Japanese must "revive" (I use this word, but it is not an accurate word) their previous commercial relations with China. "Revival," of course, implies a preexistence of

something. Today, China is not a place where you can "revive" very much of anything that the past involved. It is a new and different place. You cannot just talk about "reviving old relationships" with a country that is as new and utterly different from what it used to be as is China today.

In China in the past, as far as Japan was concerned, the problem was one of political and military relations. That is still a problem today. But now, of course, the "shoe is on the other foot." The Chinese are the people who are on the aggressive side; the Chinese Communists are the ones who want to go outward. It is certainly not the Japanese who are aggressive from the point of view of territorial acquisition. The Chinese are trying to push themselves forward, to use a slang phrase, they are "on the make," as far as economy and development are concerned.

How can the Japanese fit into this very formidable problem? As a matter of fact, the pressure for more trade with Communist China is not going to pay the Japanese off in terms of solving their economic problems. Is trade with the Communist Bloc, involving Communist China, a panacea for Japan's economic ills? The answer to this must be "No," and it can be seen from a few facts.

Let us take here a complicated set of statistics. Take seventeen leading Japanese imports during 1951 and 1953; out of these seventeen imports select thirteen. Of these thirteen commodities, involving 72% of all Japanese imports in 1953, the total Communist Bloc exports to all countries in the world were less than Japan's requirements alone. The other four commodities were: coal, timber, soy beans, and oil seeds. For Japan, these came to \$215 million in 1953. Perhaps Japan can get about \$150 million worth of these from the Communist Bloc, but only that much because the Communist Bloc itself needs these things. This would amount only to a maximum of 10% of the total Japanese imports in a normal year like 1951 or 1953. So the Communist Bloc has very little to offer Japan. As far as raw materials are



concerned, this is going to decrease instead of increase because although the economic development of the Communist Bloc will demand the increasing production of these commodities, it will also mean increasing absorption of these commodities in the processing and sale inside the Communist Bloc itself.

By contrast, the Japanese exports to Taiwan (that is, Free China) in 1955 were \$58.4 million and her imports from Taiwan were \$76.3 million. This compared to a maximum of about \$150 million, which they can get in imports from the entire Communist Bloc. The figure for imports from Taiwan, the small island of Formosa alone, is \$76.3 million, or one-half of the total potentiality that the Communist Bloc affords.

Let us point out that trade with Taiwan can be conducted on a free basis. There are no economic penalties, and, above all, no powerful political or military liabilities attached to trade of this kind. All we have to do is to convince the Japanese that trade with the Free World — including Taiwan, for example, as a part of it as it now stands — can go on. It seems to me that one of the great reasons that lies back of the current Japanese drive for more trade with the Communist Bloc is a worry in respect to how much of the Free World is going to remain “free” in the next ten years, starting with Taiwan and going on down the line. This is important. Will Taiwan become a part of the Communist Bloc? If so, then the question of trade with China assumes an entirely different aspect and a different meaning. It is because we cannot convince the Japanese at the present moment of the utter stability of our intentions in respect to Taiwan and other parts of the Free World remaining out of the Communist Bloc that we must pardon the Japanese if they politely say to us: “It is all very nice of you to talk as though things are going to remain as they are. How can you prove this to us?” We will talk about that question a little bit later on.

Another great problem in Japan, from the economic point of view, and one which is generally lost sight of, is the problem of

economic modernization in Japan. "Well," you say, "we thought Japan was the most modern nation in the whole of Asia from an economic and technological point of view." That is true — but that is only a relative statement, is it not?

Let me point out to you by one illustration what I am talking about here. In Japan, on the average, it still takes twice as many man-hours of labor to manufacture a ton of pig iron as it does in the United Kingdom. So the labor cost per ton of pig iron in Japan is still higher today than it is in the United Kingdom — and this is a positive fact. Their so-called "cheap labor" is really not so cheap. Yet, the penalty of cheap labor is the failure or the refusal to utterly modernize the methods of production. The British themselves are far from being on a high standard from this point of view. In the British case, their nearest competitor, geographically, is West Germany.

In the case of West Germany, the people there — by one of those sardonic twists of fate — have an advantage in the fact that they lost the war. The advantage lies in the fact that the loss of the war was accompanied by such wholesale destruction of their basic plant facilities that to get back into production at all had to mean modernization of plants. When combined with the tremendous industry or willingness to work, and the refusal to bargain over wages and hours of labor, or the refusal (if I may be so bold to say so) to put in the socialized system under which the laboring man can get exactly what he wants at all times — the West Germans have got all the advantages over the British.

If this is so in regard to Britain, and Britain is at an advantage regarding Japan, the true nature of Japan's economic production problem must be quite evident to us. This is particularly important in view of the fact that Japan's two greatest competitors for markets for metallurgical products in Southeast Asia are precisely the United Kingdom and West Germany. This being the case, it dramatizes the situation which is general throughout the Japanese productive system.

Of course we are asking the Japanese for a great deal if we insist upon them raising their standards of living, of getting back into production, of increasing their production, of doing all of this by tremendous energy and, at the same time, having to buy all new plants with which to do it. We did not quite bomb them out of existence that much! They do not require that much plant replacement in order to produce! But this is their basic problem. Fundamentally, I think that there is a drag here which does not come from the matter of lack of funds and which does not come so much from a matter of not seeing the truth. It comes from a certain reluctance to put enough of the profits again back into the building of capital, back into savings, and thus into the modernization of productive methods. This is a very severe and difficult problem for modern Japan in the economic field.

I mentioned Taiwan a short time ago. As far as Japan is concerned, from the economic point of view, I wish to mention another very important area — and that is Korea. To this day, of course, the Republic of Korea and Japan have not gotten into any general adjustment of their over-all relationships. The future of the Korean-Japanese problem is very uncertain and very cloudy at the present time. We can only hope at this time that Korean-Japanese relations in the modern world will not fall into the kind of pattern which the relations between France and Germany fell into so early in Western Europe — the relations characterized by complete mutual distrust, by a feeling of superiority on both sides for different reasons, by a feeling of the inevitability of victory of one side over the other. These two countries are natural customers, one for the other. Yet, we find the Koreans refusing to allow the importance of Japanese machinery, even when paid for by the United Nations or by American relief, and we find the Japanese being just as obdurate in other matters on the other side. The early solution of Korean-Japanese relations is a “must” for any kind of stability in this part of the world. But how this solution is to be brought about, in view of the vast psychological gulf that separates these two countries and which seems to me

to "alienate" them ( I don't think that is too extreme a word) one from the other, is not an easy matter.

Now let us turn from the economic field to the internal political future of Japan. Of course the internal politics of Japan do have an external significance and importance. A great deal of attention is paid in the Western World to the political situation inside of Japan. We focus a lot of attention on the position of the emperor; we focus a lot of attention upon the possibility of a rise to power again of what we call "the militarists" in Japan; we focus a lot of attention upon the ideology and are interested in the revival of Shinto in Japan; we focus a lot of attention on the question of parliament and representative government, local government versus and vis-a-vis central administration, the position of the judiciary in the bureaucracy, and the matter of civil and personal rights. All of these things are things upon which we, as Americans, put a great deal of emphasis, and they have a high value in our focus of attention.

I would like to insist that the amount of attention which we focus on these things vis-a-vis Japan is largely unjustified because it involves the imposition upon the Japanese of a false standard of judgment. We cannot expect these people to come over all the way in our direction, particularly since it seems to me that from a political point of view the recent history of our relations with Japan has involved a rather crude approach, or, as it used to be jokingly said in the old days of the occupation: "We are going to give them democracy, if we have to shove it down their throats." Well, shoving democracy down people's throats is a contradiction in terms. I do not go as far as to say that we ever quite tried this. There is enough truth in it, though, to make us stop and think a bit about whether we ought to be so worried about these particular things as far as Japan's internal politics are concerned.

As far as internal Japanese government is concerned, I would like to point out at least two points that I think are far

more important for the future — both to us and to the Japanese people. The first point I will name under a general heading of “The Modernization of Operations.” Here, I would like to insist that what is needed is a strong emphasis (because modern Japan in the past has not been characterized by this), and a real development of, reliance upon the rule of law. Here, I am not talking about the rule of law as a political abstraction. We can find in Western political ideology a tremendous emphasis upon constitutionalism as an “ism.” I think that many of us do not seem to understand what the rule of law means. Here, the rule of law really means this: That one substitutes an impersonal, regularized, disciplined, formal approach to government procedures for a personal, irregular oligarchic — or, perhaps in Japan, bureaucratic — approach to government procedures.

The importance of all this was clearly seen during the last war. Again, maybe this is asking too much of the Japanese. We have always said that from a political point of view the Japanese were the most advanced nation in Eastern Asia. They did have a constitution early in their history and the constitution which they got was an expression of their basic values. Many people thought because the Japanese had a constitution that they had what we understand as “Constitutional government,” but you know there is a difference between “a constitution” and having “constitutional government.” If you don’t believe that, go to the library and dig out the constitution of the Soviet Union.

After all, all a constitution is is a description of something, isn’t it? It may be that it describes absolute despotism; it may describe an oligarchic government; or it can describe what we mean by “constitutional government,” which, by and large, is government under law, in which the people that govern are ruled by the law just as much as the people that are governed. That is the essential meaning of “constitutional government” to us.

But I am talking about a belief in this as an abstract value. I am talking about the kind of thing which, if you want

it documented, I refer you to one of the most valuable books on modern Japan that I can think of, a book, incidentally, written by a former naval officer, Professor Jerome B. Cohen, called *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction*. In this book, he analyzes the war economy of Japan on just this kind of a basis: How did they operate? He demonstrates that they did not do as well even with what they had by a long shot as they would have if they had had the rule of law in orderly procedures, regularized methods, and systematic regularity. The Japanese government has traditionally and typically been the rule of an oligarchy: a rule by men, rather than by laws. Well, of course, you pay your money and you take your choice. There are times when the rule of men is very convenient, when it is more flexible and more adjustable. But in the matter of personal government, its flexibility tends to fall down and to collapse when one gets into emergency situations.

For all of the "inefficiencies of constitutional government" that have been so widely cited by believers in Fascism, in Communism, and in all other dictatorships and totalitarianisms, the fact is that constitutional government is the only kind of government which can be truly called "modern" in the sense that it truly fits in with a system of production and system of distribution based upon science, with all that means in terms of regularity, of discipline, and of system. The efficiencies that are involved here are things which have been lost upon the Japanese, by and large. The Japanese adopted a facade structure of Western government in the nineteenth century, but they never got the real point of Western constitutionalism, which is the point that I have been trying to demonstrate, both as to its meaning and its practical significance.

Sometimes when we begin to wonder about the future of our own people and of our own country, and when we begin to long for the simple efficiencies of a regimentation produced by totalitarianism, let us consider that no such regimentation can

be reconciled with the demands of a scientific technology. We will find this to be just as true in the case of the Soviet Union in the long run as we have found it to be true of those other would-be dictators of the world, Hitler and Mussolini. Of course, Mussolini made the Italian trains run on time. But these are small efficiencies. The big efficiencies do not come from that kind of a single, concentrated, personal type of control.

I have already referred to the second great political problem inside Japan, and that is the prevention in Japan of the new totalitarian ideology of Communism being substituted for the old Japanese ideology. The problem here is that Communism, as it always does, tries to exploit those tendencies toward democratic tolerance, mutual give-and-take, multiparty systems, and all of those things that we Americans believe in so heartily and which we think everybody else ought to automatically want and desire from the fundamental nature of man himself. As far as these things existing in Japan is concerned, the fact is they were to a great extent put in there under the occupation — and the Communists have exploited these situations and these facts.

Of course it has often been asserted that the Japanese are temperamentally inhospitable to Communism in view of their traditional ideology, and I think this is true. But, again, the freeing of education in Japan from the restraints of a hidebound authoritarianism of the old type has, to a great extent, resulted in opening it to Communistic influences. If you do not believe this, look up the figures on the constituency and membership of the Japanese Teachers' Union, which is described in the most optimistic possible terms as "left wing controlled." That is the most optimistic way you can talk about it. Under the auspices of such Japanese teachers in the schools, the indoctrination of the Japanese youth goes on apace — not necessarily in terms of overt Communism, not in terms of overt Marxism, but in terms of all those things which can be reconciled with those values that I mentioned previously; not to the extent that these people want to

become Communists, but that they will tolerate Communism. Of course this really gets us over into controversial ground, does it not?

Is it our duty, as some extreme people tell us it is, to tolerate all points of view and tolerate Communism? Well, if we indoctrinate the Japanese sufficiently in their duty to be that tolerant, we have only ourselves to blame for what will happen. Of course these people are working slowly and gradually in building up this thing. I give them a fifteen- to twenty-year period. As things are now, by that time I think they will have enough people thoroughly indoctrinated in at least a minimum of toleration of Communism to present a very serious picture as far as Japan's future attitude is likely to be toward Communist aggression.

Of course this leads us over into the international relationships of present-day Japan. Here, I would like to raise a fundamental question: Why should anyone on our side worry about what side Japan is on? What are the Japanese assets? What does Japan mean? Is Japan an asset to be safeguarded? You know that it used to be said in the early days of the occupation that Japan would turn into a "strong bastion or bulwark of democracy against Communism." Well, this has yet to develop.

The military position of Japan is significant. It is an insular area, near to a large continental region, but it is highly concentrated in that insular area. The vulnerabilities of that area are well symbolized by the current tendency to remove from Japan the forward organizations of control of such groups as the Far Eastern Air Force, for instance, the headquarters of which, it has been announced in the newspapers, are to be removed back to the Hawaiian Islands. In case of a major war, Japan's position — like that of the British Isles — is rapidly developing in the direction of a liability. But as far as small wars are concerned we saw, as in the case of Korea, the extreme value of this forward position. So it is a highly mixed situation; it depends upon what



your prophecies are with regard to the shape of future wars as to the value which their position would have from that point of view.

As to military manpower, I would say, "Yes, the Japanese are a great asset." It would be very simple and easy in any plan of emergency to raise 2 million armed troops from the Japanese population without cutting down the efficiency of operations or the economy to any marked extent. They lack the necessary equipment and arms, but these materials could be supplied to them. They are thus an asset to whichever side they might be on.

From an economic point of view, their productivity is not as great an asset to our side, not only on account of the low order of productivity in comparison to that of the great economic units in the world today — and, also, as I said before, on account of the vulnerability and the lack of resources. But, again, in connection with small wars such as we have had it is important. We have to call the Korean War a small war, whether we like it or not, and these are very significant.

If this is the meaning to us, we also have to evaluate Japan from an entirely different point of view. We must look at Japan's significance to the other side. The importance, of course, is relative. If Japan's plant and productivity is relatively less significant to us, it is highly significant to the Chinese Communists, for example. The great assets of Japan, looking at the matter from the Communist point of view, are precisely two: one is their plant; the other is their know-how.

First, their plant is the only large industrial plant in all of East Asia. This is not saying it is of tremendous magnitude — for it is not of the first, second, or third magnitude — but it is the only modern large industrial plant in East Asia. Second, as to know-how: the Japanese have the only substantial body of highly-disciplined and organized technical skills available in East

Asia today. Taken together, these Japanese assets are the only possible source for the one thing which the Chinese Communist want more than anything else: a relatively rapid growth of their own economic power. This they can achieve (and their aim is very obvious) by establishing in reverse what the Japanese used to call the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." You all remember that the Japanese planned, as a result of their conquests during the period from 1937 on, to establish a great integrated economic area in Eastern Asia, with themselves providing these two things which I have mentioned and with the other people from these areas providing them with raw materials of all kinds (which they did not have control of at that time), with cheap manpower in great quantities, and, above all, with markets in which to sell their finished products — both consumer goods and their available supply of heavy capital machinery. Taken from a purely selfish Western point of view, the denial of Japan to the Communist Bloc is an imperative "must," to be listed right at the top level of the great foreign policy objectives of the United States.

If this is something from our point of view, what is the meaning of all of this to the Japanese? Well, the meaning of all of this to the Japanese is very much the same as the meaning of their position in the nineteenth century was to them then. At that time, remember, Japan was a weak country, living in those small islands with no real military power of any kind, but with tremendous initiative, energy, industry, a tremendous drive, and a great deal of will and desire for "self-improvement" (to use the best possible term we can apply to this). What they had to offer was what we call "alliance value." They said: "We will ally ourselves with whoever it is that will pay us off in the best possible national coin."

This alliance value was seen very clearly and exploited by other countries. The British were the ones who then succeeded in exploiting it most clearly. This was typified in the Anglo-

Japanese Alliance in the first part of the early years of the twentieth century. This led to the Russo-Japanese War, to Japanese self-improvement, and to the servicing of a great over-all British strategic aim in inhibiting the Russian expansion southward in Eastern Asia, which was one of their primary objectives in that region.

You see, this meant that the Japanese in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (and this lasted all throughout World War I) adopted a highly successful technique of allying themselves with the kind of military power (in the shape of sea power) that would pay them off the most, the quickest, and the best. Why was sea power the power with which they wanted to be allied? Simply because Japan's insular position meant that they could not go anywhere from Japan except through military power expressed on the surface of the water. The dominant sea powers were the Japanese allies up to World War I and through the intervening years. It was only in the 30's — when the Japanese became so overconfident in their own sea power on an autonomous, independent basis that they threw away their alliance and their alignment with the great sea powers of the world in favor of an alignment with Germany and Italy, and an attempt later to be at least mutually neutral with the Soviet Union — that they were faced with the disaster which finally overcame them during the years after Pearl Harbor.

The current problem of the Japanese is just as simple as that, but it does seem that at least two new factors have entered into it. First, the future of the Soviet Union as a sea power is something that nobody can evaluate at the present time. The Japanese certainly cannot make up their minds as to what Russian sea power will mean as time goes on in relation to the sea power of other countries. In the second place — which is far more important, something over which we have control, and therefore something which we must emphasize — the Japanese cannot judge as to whether the Americans have a fixed and certain strategy

from a combined political and military point of view. The current Japanese problem is this: "Can we depend upon the United States, who obviously seems to be our national ally and the only country that can get us anywhere from where we are?"

Well, you argue: "Of course you can! Don't you see that we fought in Korea, that we are fighting the cold war, that we are trying to throttle the Russians and keep Communism from spreading?"

The first question that the Japanese will ask you is this: "If that was so, maybe you started too late. What about China? You let that country go, and that is a big area that we face in Eastern Asia. If your intentions are only to hold marginal regions, allowing the great continental zones to pass over firmly and irrevocably into the hands of the Communists, we are a little more dubious about this."

I would characterize the current Japanese attitude (I may be wrong — I may be overestimating it) as an attitude of doubt, an attitude of "We are waiting to be convinced." That is their attitude as I see it. It is easy enough for *us* to be assured of our reliability. Oh, yes, we insist that we know exactly what we are doing! Well, other people have to be pardoned for not quite buying it all that easily.

As one Japanese said to me in Japan a few years ago, "The one thing that is dependable about American foreign policy is that you cannot depend upon it." I tried to argue with him for I didn't look at it quite in that way. But I am afraid I have to confess I never managed to change his basic mind on that subject.

What are the real issues in the Far East and elsewhere on which the Japanese, for better or for worse, will have to establish their estimate of the dependability of the United States as an ally in the future?

I will give you one issue which is a very, very dubious matter today, one which is much more dubious than the treaties

would make it out to be: the future of Free China, the future of Taiwan. What is our attitude going to be toward Communist China? Are we going to allow the Chinese Communists to take over Taiwan? Well, no, we want to have two Chinas. The Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists are not the only people who believe that two Chinas are impossible, and who reject it. You must remember that both the Communists and the Nationalists refused any such solution of the problem of China as two Chinas.

Almost all Asiatics with whom I have talked in the last couple of years (and I have been spending time out there) say: "You are 'trying to have your cake and eat it at the same time.'" Perhaps they don't use exactly those words, but that is what you come out with.

Are we going to surrender to Communist China on such points as the admission to the United Nations, recognition, cultural relations, and, finally, trade and economic development? Is all of this inconceivable? I don't think so — it is not inconceivable at all! It may all easily happen in the next few years, and the Japanese will look at that very hard!

Is Taiwan, their important market and source of foodstuffs, going to Communist China? If so, the whole attitude on trade with the Communist Bloc has to be dramatically revised, does it not? then our arguments about how the Japanese cannot basically profit from trade with the Communist Bloc will "go down the drain."

The second place to which the Japanese will look is our success or failure in South Viet Nam. In South Viet Nam, an excellent beginning has been made. How resolutely, how firmly and how consistently will we support South Viet Nam against the inevitable attacks that will come from all sides?

Another place at which the Japanese will look in order to evaluate American successes and failures is in the Philippines.

"Oh," you say, "that is a shocking idea! You mean there is any question about our relations with the Philippines?"

I say there are very grave questions regarding our future relations with the Philippines. The first of these questions has to do with nothing less than our mutual security arrangements — the situation of bases. This is all up in the air at the present time. The Japanese are going to look there. Are the Filipinos going to be insistent upon such a degree of nationalism as to be inconsistent with a real dependency upon the United States? Can the United States make dependency upon th U. S. attractive to the Phillipines by evading, by writing down and talking down the less attractive features?

The future of Indonesia is another case in point. Remember, the Americans are to a heavy extent responsible for the independence of the Indonesians from the Dutch. What will happen? Will this country go Communist? If so, how can the Americans be relied upon?

Then, finally, the security of the Republic of Korea, about which grave questions have arisen in the last few years, owing to the fact that the Communists — as usual — do not keep their bargains and that we do.

All of these things — as well as our direct relations with the Japanese over such questions as rearmament, Okinawa, trade, and a few other points of that kind — will be influential in regard to Japan. Thus, where Japan goes is, to a heavy extent, up to us.

I have gone well overtime, and I apologize for keeping you over in the formal presentation. But I am at your service as long as you want me for questions.

Thank you!

## **BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH**

### **Professor David N. Rowe**

Professor Rowe was born in Nanking, China, and he has travelled extensively in the Pacific area, China, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Siam, Cambodia, Malaya, Indonesia and India. He received his A.B. degree from Princeton University, his A.M. degree from the University of Southern California, and his Ph.D. degree from the University of Chicago.

He was a General Education Board Fellow in Humanities at Harvard University during 1935-1937 for the study of Chinese and Japanese languages, Chinese history and historiography. The following year, he was a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow at the College of Chinese Studies, Peking, China, for the study of Chinese languages and history.

From 1938 to 1943, Professor Rowe was a lecturer in Far Eastern Affairs at the School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, where he taught the Chinese language and Social and Political Institutions of Eastern Asia. During November 1941 to July 1942, he served as a Special Assistant to the Director of the Branch of Research and Analysis, Office of Strategic Services. He was sent to Chungking, China, by the Far Eastern Section, and while there he held an appointment as Special Assistant to the Ambassador, American Embassy, Chungking.

Professor Rowe was a Research Associate at the Institute of International Studies, Department of Foreign Area Studies, at Yale University during 1943-1951. From November 1943 to September 1945, he was a member of the War and Peace Studies Project, Council of Foreign Relations, New York. At various times during 1945 he was a lecturer for the Training Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Office of War Information, and United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Also, in 1945, he was a member of the International Secretariat, United Nations Conference on International Organization, at San Francisco.

During 1945 and 1946, he was Director of the Staff Officers School for Asiatic Studies at Yale University. The next two years he was Director of the Undergraduate and Graduate Studies, Division of Foreign Area Study, at Yale University, following which he was Director of Graduate Studies on East Asia there during 1949-1951. At various times since 1948 Professor Rowe has been Consultant to the United States Consultant General, Shanghai; the United States Air Force; Stanford Research Institute; The George Washington University, and to the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army. He has lectured at the National, Army, and Air War Colleges.

During 1954-1956, Professor Rowe was a Representative, The Asia Foundation, The Republic of China (Taiwan), a Visiting Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University, and Vice-Chairman of the Taiwan Committee, China Institute, in America. At present, Professor Rowe is Professor of Political Science at Yale University.